From: Eirik Nygaard Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2005 14:07:46 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Merge from vendor branch HEIMDAL: X-Git-Tag: v2.0.1~9111 X-Git-Url: https://gitweb.dragonflybsd.org/dragonfly.git/commitdiff_plain/f51e7baf0227138fa23a601d3e0f6958ec17ee69?hp=4b362de86f557cbc1ea95954bb14bbc98a97bd4b Merge from vendor branch HEIMDAL: Add heimdal-0.6.3 --- diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..159cf48a41 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,897 @@ +2004-09-13 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.6.3 + +2004-09-05 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (decode_enumerated): check that the tag + length isn't longer the the length + +2004-08-31 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): + kdc_reply can be set in case of failure too, clean on entry and + free the exit unconditionally to avoid memory leak + +2004-08-20 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/context.c: 1.93: (krb5_get_err_text): if neither of + com_right nor strerror finds the error-code, return Unknown error. + +2004-08-13 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: based on 1.162: (get_pa_etype_info): check for + dup enctypes from the client and filter them out. + +2004-06-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * admin/get.c: 1.23: (kt_get): catch errors from krb5_parse_name + +2004-06-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: man_MANS += krb5_set_password.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.3: 1.1-1.3: change password manpage + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: 1.49: implement + krb5_set_password_using_ccache 1.47: add tcp support to the set + protocol, should be cleaned up to enable sharing code with + krb5_sendto 1.46: (process_reply): log into result_string if + something goes bad, return 0 (even on failure), not the KPASSWD + protocol error code 1.45: krb5_princ_realm -> + krb5_principal_get_realm 1.44: (setpw_send_request): free + ap_req_data on failure 1.41: ooops, remove cut and paste error + 1.40: draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02 and rfc3244 share the + response packet sure more constants now that they exists 1.39: + implement rfc3244, partly from shadow@dementia.org + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: 1.211: some defines for rfc3244 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: 1.71: (gen_files): + asn1_ChangePasswdDataMS.x for RFC3244 + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: 1.30: add ChangePasswdDataMS, for RFC3244 + + * kuser/kinit.c: 1.114: move "setpag if (argc < 1)" to common path + +2004-05-06 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.6.2 + +2004-04-02 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/connect.c: case size_t to unsigned long for LP64 platforms + +2004-04-01 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.6.1 + +2004-03-30 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: 1.46: stop the client from renewing tickets + into the future From: Jeffrey Hutzelman + +2004-03-10 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: 1.43: (fcc_store_cred): NULL terminate + krb5_config_get_bool_default' arglist + +2004-03-09 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: 1.44: document + [libdefaults]fcc-mit-ticketflags=boolean 1.43: don't use path's in + first .Nm, it confuses some locate.updatedb, use FILES section to + describe where the file is instead. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_store_cred): default to use old format + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: 1.42: (fcc_store_cred): use + [libdefaults]fcc-mit-ticketflags=boolean to decide what format to + write the fcc in. Default to mit format (aka heimdal 0.7 format) + 1.41: (_krb5_xlock): handle that everything was ok, and don't put + an error in the error strings then + + * lib/krb5/store.c: 1.43: add _krb5_store_creds_heimdal_0_7 and + _krb5_store_creds_heimdal_pre_0_7 that store the creds in just + that format make krb5_store_creds default to mit format 1.42: + (krb5_ret_creds): Runtime detect the what is the higher bits of + the bitfield 1.41: (krb5_store_creds): add disabled code that + store the ticket flags in reverse order (bitswap32): new function + 1.40: (krb5_ret_creds): if the higher ticket flags are set, its a + mit cache, reverse the bits, bug pointed out by Sergio Gelato + + + delta modfied to not change the behavior of krb5_store_creds + +2004-03-07 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): fix assignment of usec2 + +2004-03-06 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: patch based on 1.17 and 1.18 but with + threading code pulled out; + + 1.18: (mcc_get_principal): also check for primary_principal == + NULL now that that isn't used as dead flag 1.17: don't overload + the primary_principal == NULL as dead since that doesn't always + work Based on patch from Jeffrey Hutzelman , but + tweek by me + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: 1.94: (decrypt_internal_special): do not not + modify the original data test case from Ronnie Sahlberg + + +2004-02-13 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: 1.22->1.23: (check_host): don't + check for EAI_NODATA, because its depricated in RFC3493 Pointed + out by Hajimu UMEMOTO on heimdal-discuss + + * lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c: 1.3->1.4: EAI_ADDRFAMILY and + EAI_NODATA is deprecated in RFC3493 + +2004-02-09 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c: 1.16: Fix len_unsigned for certain + negative integers, it got the length wrong, fix from Panasas, Inc. + + * lib/asn1/der_locl.h: 1.5: add _heim_len_unsigned, _heim_len_int + +2004-01-26 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/asn1/gen_length.c: 1.14: (length_type): TSequenceOf: add up + the size of all the elements, don't use just the size of the last + element. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: 1.40: (_krb5_xlock): catch EINVAL and assume + that it means that the filesystem doesn't support locking 1.39: + (_krb5_xlock): fix compile error in last commit 1.38: internally + export x{,un}lock and thus prefix them with _krb5_ + +2004-01-13 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kuser/kinit.c: 1.106: (renew_validate): if renewable_flag and + not time specifed, use "1 month" + 1.105: make -9 work again + +2004-01-09 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: 1.36: (add_addrs): don't increase + addr->len until in contains interesting data, use right iteration + counter when clearing the addresses 1.39: krb5_princ_realm -> + krb5_principal_get_realm 1.38: (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): use + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME if we want timestamp in forwarded + krb-cred 1.39: (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): If tickets are + address-less, forward address-less tickets. 1.40: + (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): try to handle errors better for + previous commit 1.41: (add_addrs): don't add same address multiple + times + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: 1.96->1.97: rename get_krbtgt to + _krb5_get_krbtgt and export it + +2003-12-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: part of 1.146->1.147: handle NULL client/server + names + +2003-12-03 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: 1.90->1.91: require cipher-text to be padded + to padsize 1.91->1.92: (decrypt_internal_derived): move up padsize + check to avoid memory leak + +2003-12-01 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kuser/kinit.c: 1.103->1.104: (main): return the return value + from simple_execvp + +2003-10-22 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/transited.c: 1.13->1.14: (krb5_domain_x500_encode): + always zero out encoding to make sure it have a defined value on + failure + + * lib/krb5/transited.c: 1.12->1.13: (krb5_domain_x500_encode): if + num_realms == 0, set encoding and return (avoids malloc(0)) check + return value from malloc + +2003-10-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/setup.texi: 1.35->1.36: spelling + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: 1.58->1.59: add flag to always check transited + policy + + * doc/setup.texi: 1.27->1.35: many changes + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: 1.95->1.96: get capath info from [capaths] + section + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: 1.50->1.51: (krb5_decrypt_ticket): try to + verify transited realms, unless the transited-policy-checked flag + is set + + * lib/krb5/transited.c: + 1.12: (krb5_domain_x500_decode): set *num_realms to zero not num_realms + 1.11: (krb5_domain_x500_decode): handle zero length tr data; + (krb5_check_transited): new function that does more useful stuff + + * kdc/kdc.8: 1.23->1.24: document enforce-transited-policy + + * kdc/config.c: 1.47->1.48: add flag to always check transited + policy + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: + 1.150: (fix_transited_encoding): also verify with policy, + unless asked not to + 1.151: always check transited policy if flag set either globally + (on principal part of patch not pulled up) + 1.152: (fix_transited_encoding): set transited type + 1.153: (fix_transited_encoding): always print cross-realm information + +2003-10-06 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: 1.48->1.49: + (krb5_config_parse_file_debug): punt if there is binding before a + section declaration. + Bug found by Arkadiusz Miskiewicz + + * kdc/kaserver.c: 1.21->1.23: + (do_getticket): if times data is shorter then 8 bytes, request is + malformed. + (do_authenticate): if request length is less then 8 bytes, its a + bad request and fail. Pointed out by Marco Foglia + +2003-09-22 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: 1.17->1.18: add missing " within + #if 0 From: stefan sokoll + +2003-09-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: + 1.47->1.48: (krb5_rd_req): allow caller to pass in a key + in the auth_context, they way processes that doesn't use the + keytab can still pass in the key of the service (matches behavior + of MIT Kerberos). + +2003-09-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: + 1.87->1.88: (usage2arcfour): simplify, only + include special cases From: Luke Howard + 1.86->1.87: (arcfour_checksum_p): return true when is arcfour, + not when its not pointed out by Luke Howard + 1.82->1.83: Do the arcfour checksum mapping for + krb5_create_checksum and krb5_verify_checksum, From: Luke Howard + + 1.81->1.82: (hmac): make it return an error + when out of memory, update callsites to either return error or use + krb5_abortx + (krb5_hmac): expose hmac + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: 1.26->1.27: (krb5_mk_req_internal): + when using arcfour-hmac-md5, use an unkeyed checksum + (rsa-md5), since Microsoft calculates the keyed checksum with + the subkey of the authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: + 1.93->1.94 (init_tgs_req): make generation of subkey + optional on configuration parameter + [realms]realm={tgs_require_subkey=bool} + defaults to off. The RFC1510 weakly defines the correct behavior, + so old DCE secd apparently required the subkey to be there, and MS + will use it when its there. But the request isn't encrypted in the + subkey, so you get to choose if you want to talk to a MS mdc or a + old DCE secd. + + partly 1.91->1.92: (init_tgs_req): in case of error, don't + free in the req_body addresses since they where pass in by caller + + lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: + 1.108->1.1.09: (krb5_get_in_tkt): for compatibility with with + the mit implemtation, don't free `creds' argument when done, its up + the the caller to do that, also allow a NULL ccache. + + * doc/ack.texi + 1.16->1.17: update Luke Howard email address + + * lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c: + 1.13->1.14: code rewrite from Luke Howard + 1.12->1.13: (LDAP_store): log what principal/dn failed + 1.11->1.12: use int2HDBFlags/HDBFlags2int + From: Alberto Patino , + Luke Howard + Pointed out by Andrew Bartlett of Samba + 1.10->1.11: (LDAP__connect): bind sasl "EXTERNAL" to ldap connection + (LDAP_store): remove superfluous argument to asprintf + From Alberto Patino + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: + 1.214->1.2015: add KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56 + +2003-09-12 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: fix prototypes Fredrik Ljungberg + + +2003-09-11 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h: 1.18->1.19: include for ULONG_MAX + noted by Wissler Magnus on heimdal-discuss + +2003-08-29 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/hdb/db3.c: 1.8->1.9: patch for working with DB4 on + heimdal-discuss From: Luke Howard 1.9->1.10: try + to include more db headers + +2003-08-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/connect.c: 1.92->1.93 (handle_tcp): handle recvfrom + returning 0 (connection closed) 1.91->1.92: (grow_descr): + increment the size after we succeed to allocate the space + +2003-08-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: 1.83->1.85: (unparse_name): len can't be + zero, so, don't check for that + (unparse_name): make sure there are space for a NUL, set *name to NULL + when there is a failure (so caller can't get hold of a freed + pointer) + +2003-05-08 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.6 + +2003-05-08 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kuser/klist.c: 1.68->1.69: print tokens even if there isn't v4 + support + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: 1.14->1.15: destroy tokens even if there isn't + v4 support + + * kuser/kinit.c: 1.90->1.91: print tokens even if there isn't v4 + support + +2003-05-06 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/name-45-test.c: need to use empty krb5.conf for some + tests + + * lib/asn1/check-gen.c: there is no \e escape sequence; replace + everything with hex-codes, and cast to unsigned char* to make some + compilers happy + +2003-05-06 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (make_pa_enc_timestamp): make sure first + argument to krb5_us_timeofday have correct type + +2003-05-05 Assar Westerlund + + * include/make_crypto.c (main): include aes.h if ENABLE_AES + +2003-05-05 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * NEWS: 1.108->1.110: fix text about gssapi compat + +2003-04-28 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/v4_dump.c: 1.4->1.5: (v4_prop_dump): limit strings length, + from openbsd + +2003-04-24 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/programming.texi: 1.2-1.3: s/managment/management/, from jmc + + +2003-04-22 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: 1.43->1.44: copy NUL too, from janj@wenf.org + via openbsd + +2003-04-17 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/asn1/der_copy.c (copy_general_string): use strdup + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: remove sprintf + * lib/asn1/gen.c: remove strcpy/sprintf + + * lib/krb5/name-45-test.c: use a more unique name then ratatosk so + that other (me) have such hosts in the local domain and the tests + fails, to take hokkigai.pdc.kth.se instead + + * lib/krb5/test_alname.c: add --version and --help + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3: add krb5_get_err_text + + * lib/krb5/transited.c: use strlcat/strlcpy, from openbsd + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (srv_find_realm): use strlcpy, from openbsd + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c (krb5_aname_to_localname): use + strlcpy, from openbsd + * kdc/hpropd.c: s/strcat/strlcat/, inspired from openbsd + * appl/kf/kfd.c: use strlcpy, from openbsd + +2003-04-16 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: fix for large file support in AIX, _LARGE_FILES + needs to be defined on the command line, since lex likes to + include stdio.h before we get to config.h + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/*.3: Change .Fd #include to .In header.h, + from Thomas Klausner + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: spelling, from Thomas Klausner + + +2003-04-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: fix some more memory leaks + +2003-04-11 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * appl/kf/kf.1: spelling, from jmc + +2003-04-08 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * admin/ktutil.8: typos, from jmc + +2003-04-06 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + * lib/krb5/krb5_data.3: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + * lib/krb5/krb5_address.3: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + * lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + * kuser/kinit.1: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + * kdc/kdc.8: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + +2003-04-01 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/test_alname.c: more krb5_aname_to_localname tests + + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c (krb5_aname_to_localname): when + converting too root, make sure user is ok according to + krb5_kuserok before allowing it. + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (noinst_PROGRAMS): += test_alname + + * lib/krb5/test_alname.c: add test for krb5_aname_to_localname + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_DES_AFS3_CMU_string_to_key): used p1 + instead of the "illegal" salt #~, same change as kth-krb did + 1999. Problems occur with crypt() that behaves like AT&T crypt + (openssl does this). Pointed out by Marcus Watts. + + * admin/change.c (kt_change): collect all principals we are going + to change, and pick the highest kvno and use that to guess what + kvno the resulting kvno is going to be. Now two ktutil change in a + row works. XXX fix the protocol to pass the kvno back. + +2003-03-31 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * appl/kf/kf.1: afs->AFS, from jmc + +2003-03-30 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/setup.texi: add description on how to turn on v4, 524 and + kaserver support + +2003-03-29 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c (appdefaults_entries): add afslog + and afs-use-524 + +2003-03-28 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): when the second enctype_to_string + failes, remember to free memory from the first enctype_to_string + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (usage2arcfour): map KRB5_KU_TICKET to 2, + from Harald Joerg + (enctype_arcfour_hmac_md5): disable checksum_hmac_md5_enc + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (hdb_unseal_keys_mkey): truncate key to the key + length when key is longer then expected length, its probably + longer since the encrypted data was padded, reported by Aidan + Cully + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_enctype_keysize): return key size of + encyption type, inspired by Aidan Cully + +2003-03-27 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_get_entry): avoid printing 0 + (wildcard kvno) after principal when the keytab entry isn't found, + reported by Chris Chiappa + +2003-03-26 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/misc.texi: update 2b example to match reality (from + mattiasa@e.kth.se) + + * doc/misc.texi: spelling and add `Configuring AFS clients' + subsection + +2003-03-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: add krb5_free_data_contents.3 + + * lib/krb5/data.c: add krb5_free_data_contents for compat with MIT + API + + * lib/krb5/krb5_data.3: add krb5_free_data_contents for compat + with MIT API + + * lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3: write more about how the ccache + argument should be inited when used + +2003-03-25 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): make sure + print_addr is defined for the given address type; make addrports + printable + + * kdc/string2key.c: print the used enctype for kerberos 5 keys + +2003-03-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/aes-test.c: add another arcfour test + +2003-03-22 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/aes-test.c: sneek in a test for arcfour-hmac-md5 + +2003-03-20 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3: update .Dd + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: sort in krb5_data functions + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS): += krb5_data.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_data.3: document krb5_data + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): if + prompter is NULL, don't try to ask for a password to + change. reported by Iain Moffat @ ufl.edu via Howard Chu + + +2003-03-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3: spelling, from + + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: . means new line + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: spelling, from + + + * lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.3: spelling, from + + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kuser/Makefile.am: INCLUDES: -I$(srcdir)/../lib/krb5 + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: add _krb5_krb_life_to_time + + * lib/krb5/krb5-v4compat.h: add _krb5_krb_life_to_time + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: 524 is independent of kerberos 4, so move out + #ifdef KRB4 from enable_v4_cross_realm since 524 needs it + + * kdc/config.c: 524 is independent of kerberos 4, so move out + enable_v4_cross_realm from #ifdef KRB4 since 524 needs it + +2003-03-17 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kdc.8: document --kerberos4-cross-realm + * kdc/kerberos4.c: pay attention to enable_v4_cross_realm + * kdc/kdc_locl.h (enable_v4_cross_realm): add + * kdc/524.c (encode_524_response): check the enable_v4_cross_realm + flag before giving out v4 tickets for foreign v5 principals + * kdc/config.c: add --enable-kerberos4-cross-realm option (default + to off) + +2003-03-17 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS) += krb5_aname_to_localname.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.3: manpage for + krb5_aname_to_localname + + * lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3: s/KRB5_USEROK/KRB5_KUSEROK/ + +2003-03-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS): add krb5_set_default_realm.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: add manpages from krb5_set_default_realm.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.3: Manpage for + krb5_free_host_realm, krb5_get_default_realm, + krb5_get_default_realms, krb5_get_host_realm, and + krb5_set_default_realm. + + * admin/ktutil.8: s/entype/enctype/, from Igor Sobrado + via NetBSD + + * lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3: add documention for krb5_kt_get_type + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_get_type): get prefix/type of keytab + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN): max length of prefix + + * lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3: document krb5_cc_get_ops, add more + types, add krb5_fcc_ops and krb5_mcc_ops + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_get_ops): new function, return ops for + a id + +2003-03-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/intro.texi: add reference to source code, binaries and the + manual + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: krb5.h isn't in krb5 directory in heimdal + +2003-03-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/kdc.8: better/difrent english + + * kdc/kdc.8: . -> .\n, copyright/license + + * kdc/kdc.8: changed configuration file -> restart kdc + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: add krb4 into the most error messages written + to the logfile + + * lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3: add missing name of argument + (krb5_context) to most functions + +2003-03-13 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/kuserok.c (krb5_kuserok): preserve old behviour of + function and return FALSE when there isn't a local account for + `luser'. + + * lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3: fix prototype, spelling and more text + describing the function + +2003-03-12 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_default): if krb5_cc_default_name + returned memory, don't return ENOMEM + +2003-03-11 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: add krb5_address stuff and sort + + * lib/krb5/krb5_address.3: fix krb5_addr2sockaddr description + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS): += krb5_address.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_address.3: document types krb5_address and + krb5_addresses and their helper functions + +2003-03-10 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS): += krb5_kuserok.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3: spelling, from cizzi@it.su.se + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS): += krb5_ccache.3 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3: spelling, from cizzi@it.su.se + + * lib/krb5/krb5.3: add more functions + + * lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3: document krb5_ccache and krb5_cc + functions + + * lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3: document krb5_kuserok + + * lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3: document + krb5_verify_opt_set_flags(opt, KRB5_VERIFY_LREALMS) behavior + + * lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3: document krb5_verify_opt* and + krb5_verify_user_opt + + * lib/krb5/*.[0-9]: add copyright/licenses on more manpages + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (main): handle that krb5_cc_default_name can + return NULL + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump minor + (TESTS): add test_cc + + * lib/krb5/test_cc.c: test some + krb5_cc_default_name/krb5_cc_set_default_name combinations + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): set + default_cc_name to NULL + (krb5_free_context): free default_cc_name if set + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_set_default_name): new function + (krb5_cc_default_name): use krb5_cc_set_default_name + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add default_cc_name + +2003-02-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * appl/kf/kf.1: s/securly/securely/ from NetBSD + +2003-02-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/connect.c: s/intialize/initialize, from + + +2003-02-17 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * configure.in: add AM_MAINTAINER_MODE + +2003-02-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * **/*.[0-9]: add copyright/licenses on all manpages + +2003-14-16 Jacques Vidrine + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (init_as_req): Send only a single + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP in the AS-REQ, using the first encryption + type specified by the KDC. + +2003-02-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * fix-export: some autoconf put their version number in + autom4te.cache, so remove autom4te*.cache + + * fix-export: make sure $1 is a directory + +2003-02-04 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.8: spelling, from jmc + + * kdc/kdc.8: spelling, from jmc + +2003-01-31 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * kdc/hpropd.8: s/databases/a database/ s/Not/not/ + + * kdc/hprop.8: add missing . + +2003-01-30 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: documentation for of boolean, etypes, + address, write out encryption type in sentences, s/Host/host + +2003-01-26 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/asn1/check-gen.c: add checks for Authenticator too + +2003-01-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/setup.texi: in the hprop example, use hprop and the first + component, not host + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): address-less + point-to-point might not have an address, just ignore + those. Reported by Harald Barth. + +2003-01-23 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c (check_section): when key isn't + found, don't print out all known keys + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c (syslogvals): mark up where severity + and facility start resp + (check_log): find_value() returns -1 when key isn't found + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (_krb5_aes_cts_encrypt): make key argument a + 'const void *' to avoid AES_KEY being exposed in krb5-private.h + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: add [kdc]use_2b + + * kdc/524.c (encode_524_response): its 2b not b2 + + * doc/misc.texi: quote @ where missing + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: add check-gen + + * lib/asn1/check-gen.c: add Principal check + + * lib/asn1/check-common.h: move generic asn1/der functions from + check-der.c to here + + * lib/asn1/check-common.c: move generic asn1/der functions from + check-der.c to here + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: move out the generic asn1/der functions to + a common file + +2003-01-22 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * doc/misc.texi: more text about afs, how to get get your KeyFile, + and how to start use 2b tokens + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: spelling, from Jason McIntyre + + +2003-01-21 Jacques Vidrine + + * kuser/kuser_locl.h: include crypto-headers.h for + des_read_pw_string prototype + +2003-01-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * admin/ktutil.8: document -v, --verbose + + * admin/get.c (kt_get): make getarg usage consistent with other + other parts of ktutil + + * admin/copy.c (kt_copy): remove adding verbose_flag to args + struct, since it will overrun the args array (from Sumit Bose) + +2003-01-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: write more about [realms] REALM = { kdc = + ... } + + * lib/krb5/aes-test.c: test vectors in aes-draft + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add aes-test.c + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: Add support for AES + (draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02), not enabled by default. + (HMAC_SHA1_DES3_checksum): rename to SP_HMAC_SHA1_checksum and modify + to support checksumtype that are have a shorter wireformat then + their output block size. + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (struct encryption_type): split the blocksize + into blocksize and padsize, padsize is the minimum padding + size. they are the same for now + (enctype_*): add padsize + (encrypt_internal): use padsize + (encrypt_internal_derived): use padsize + (wrapped_length): use padsize + (wrapped_length_dervied): use padsize + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: add extra `opaque' argument to string_to_key + function for each enctype in preparation enctypes that uses + `Encryption and Checksum Specifications for Kerberos 5' draft + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: add checksum and enctype for AES from + draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02.txt + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_keytype): add KEYTYPE_AES128, + KEYTYPE_AES256 + +2003-01-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * lib/hdb/common.c (_hdb_fetch): handle error code from + hdb_value2entry + + * kdc/Makefile.am: always include kerberos4.c and 524.c in + kdc_SOURCES to support 524 + + * kdc/524.c: always compile in support for 524 + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: move out krb/524 protos from under #ifdef KRB4 + + * kdc/config.c: always compile in support for 524 + + * kdc/connect.c: always compile in support for 524 + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: export encode_v4_ticket() and get_des_key() + even when we build without kerberos 4, 524 needs them + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c, lib/krb5/krb5-v4compat.h: Split out + Kerberos 4 help functions/structures so other parts of the source + tree can use it (like the KDC) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.1998 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.1998 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f26dba777e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.1998 @@ -0,0 +1,3201 @@ +Sat Dec 5 19:49:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c: remove ktype_is_etype + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c, lib/krb5/krb5.h, acconfig.h: NEW_DES3_CODE + + * configure.in: fix for AIX install; better tests for AIX dynamic + AFS libs; `--enable-new-des3-code' + +Tue Dec 1 14:44:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/afsutil/Makefile.am: link with extra libs for aix + + * kuser/Makefile.am: link with extra libs for aix + +Sun Nov 29 01:56:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (krb5_get_all_server_addrs): add. almost + the same as krb5_get_all_client_addrs except that it includes + loopback addresses + + * kdc/connect.c (init_socket): bind to a particular address + (init_sockets): get all local addresses and bind to them all + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (addr2sockaddr, print_addr): new + methods + (find_af, find_atype): new functions. use them. + + * configure.in: add hesiod + +Wed Nov 25 11:37:48 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_err.et: add some codes from kerberos-revisions-03 + +Mon Nov 23 12:53:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/log.c: rename delete -> remove + + * lib/kadm5/delete_s.c: rename delete -> remove + + * lib/hdb/common.c: rename delete -> remove + +Sun Nov 22 12:26:26 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: check for environ and `struct spwd' + +Sun Nov 22 11:42:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): set keytype to sess_ktype if + ktype_is_etype + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (krb5_keytype_to_etypes): zero terminate + etypes + (em): sort entries + +Sun Nov 22 06:54:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: more type correctness + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: re-structure code. remove limits on ASN1 + generated bits. + +Sun Nov 22 01:49:50 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): fix bogus indexing + +Sat Nov 21 21:39:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c (fail_verify_is_ok): new function + (krb5_verify_init_creds): if we cannot get a ticket for + host/`hostname` and fail_verify_is_ok just return. use + krb5_rd_req + +Sat Nov 21 23:12:27 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/free.c (krb5_xfree): new function + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_free_creds_contents): new function + + * lib/krb5/context.c: more type correctness + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: more type correctness + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): more type + correctness + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_length): fix test of len + (der_get_tag): more type correctness + + * kuser/klist.c (usage): void-ize + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_remove): some more type correctness. + +Sat Nov 21 16:49:20 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: try to list enctypes as keytypes + + * kuser/kinit.c: remove extra `--cache' option, add `--enctypes' + to set list of enctypes to use + + * kadmin/load.c: load strings as hex + + * kadmin/dump.c: dump hex as string is possible + + * admin/ktutil.c: use print_version() + + * configure.in, acconfig.h: test for hesiod + +Sun Nov 15 17:28:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: add some crypto debug code + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (_krb5_extract_ticket): don't use fixed + buffer when encoding ticket + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (re-)implement `krb5_auth_setenctype' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: allow mis-match of tgt session key, and service + session key + + * admin/ktutil.c: keytype -> enctype + +Fri Nov 13 05:35:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_TGS_NAME, KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE): added + +Sat Nov 7 19:56:31 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (add_cred): add termination NULL pointer + +Mon Nov 2 01:15:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: ENOMEM -> ERANGE + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c: cleanup and adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c: get enctype from auth_context keyblock + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: cleanup and adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c: use new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/context.c: rename etype functions to enctype ditto + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: use new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: remove enctype and cksumtype from + auth_context + +Mon Nov 2 01:15:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_udp, handle_tcp): correct type of `n' + +Tue Sep 15 18:41:38 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: fix printing of unrecognized keytypes + +Tue Sep 15 17:02:33 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c: add KEYTYPE_USE_AFS3_SALT to keytype if + using AFS3 salt + +Tue Aug 25 23:30:52 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): care about + `use_admin_kdc' + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (get_kdc_address): use + krb5_get_krb_admin_hst + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krb_admin_hst): new function + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add `use_admin_kdc' + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_get_use_admin_kdc, + krb5_set_use_admin_kdc): new functions + +Tue Aug 18 22:24:12 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: remove all calls to abort(); check return + value from _key_schedule; + (RSA_MD[45]_DES_verify): zero tmp and res; + (RSA_MD5_DES3_{verify,checksum}): implement + +Mon Aug 17 20:18:46 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (swap32): conditionalize + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_internal): new function + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): if the hostname + returned from gethostby*() isn't a FQDN, try with the original + hostname + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (make_pa_tgs_req): use krb5_mk_req_internal + and correct key usage + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (verify_checksum): make static + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_list): use krb5_enctype_to_string + +Sun Aug 16 20:57:56 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/cpw.c (do_cpw_entry): use asprintf for the prompt + + * kadmin/ank.c (ank): print principal name in prompt + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (hmac): always allocate space for checksum. + never trust c.checksum.length + (_get_derived_key): try to return the derived key + +Sun Aug 16 19:48:42 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (hmac): fix some peculiarities and bugs + (get_checksum_key): assume usage is `formatted' + (create_checksum,verify_checksum): moved the guts of the krb5_* + functions here, both take `formatted' key-usages + (encrypt_internal_derived): fix various bogosities + (derive_key): drop key_type parameter (already given by the + encryption_type) + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_flags): handle case where client is NULL + + * kdc/connect.c (process_request): return zero after processing + kerberos 4 request + +Sun Aug 16 18:38:15 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: merge x-*.[ch] into one file + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: remove residual from krb5_ccache_data + +Fri Aug 14 16:28:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/x-crypto.c (derive_key): move DES3 specific code to + separate function (will eventually end up someplace else) + + * lib/krb5/x-crypto.c (krb5_string_to_key_derived): allocate key + + * configure.in, acconfig.h: test for four valued krb_put_int + +Thu Aug 13 23:46:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0t + +Thu Aug 13 22:40:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding): remove trailing + whitespace + +Wed Aug 12 20:15:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/x-checksum.c (krb5_verify_checksum): pass checksum type + to krb5_create_checksum + + * lib/krb5/x-key.c: implement DES3_string_to_key_derived; fix a + few typos + +Wed Aug 5 12:39:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0s + +Thu Jul 30 23:12:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c (krb5_mk_error): realloc until you die + +Thu Jul 23 19:49:03 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: proto for `get_des_key' + + * configure.in: test for four valued el_init + + * kuser/klist.c: keytype -> enctype + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (change): use new `krb5_string_to_key*' + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop, ka_convert): convert to a set of keys + + * kdc/kaserver.c: use `get_des_key' + + * kdc/524.c: use new crypto api + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: use new crypto api + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: always treat keytypes as enctypes; use new + crypto api + + * kdc/kstash.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * kdc/string2key.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * admin/srvconvert.c: add keys for all possible enctypes + + * admin/ktutil.c: keytype -> enctype + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c: get enctype from auth_context + keyblock + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: remove hdb_*_keytype2key + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: add keys for des-cbc-crc, des-cbc-md4, + des-cbc-md5, and des3-cbc-sha1 + + * lib/krb5/heim_err.et: error message for unsupported salt + + * lib/krb5/codec.c: short-circuit these functions, since they are + not needed any more + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: cleanup and adapt to new crypto api + +Mon Jul 13 23:00:59 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): don't advance + hostent->h_addr_list, use a copy instead + +Mon Jul 13 15:00:31 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding, parse_section): make sure + everything is ok before adding to linked list + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: skip ws before checking for comment + +Wed Jul 8 10:45:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: hmac-sha1-des3 = 12 + +Tue Jun 30 18:08:05 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): do not close the + unopened file + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c: realloc correctly + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): init j + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_init_context): print error if parsing + of config file produced an error. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_list, krb5_config_parse_file): + ignore more spaces + + * lib/krb5/codec.c (krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart, + krb5_encode_ETYPE_INFO): initialize `ret' + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): realloc + correctly + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): initialize `ret' + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (get_cred_cache): try to do the right thing + with default_client + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): initialize `ticket_life' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): initialize `ret' + (tgs_rep2): initialize `krbtgt' + + * kdc/connect.c (do_request): check for errors from `sendto' + + * kdc/524.c (do_524): initialize `ret' + + * kadmin/util.c (foreach_principal): don't clobber `ret' + + * kadmin/del.c (del_entry): don't apply on zeroth argument + + * kadmin/cpw.c (do_cpw_entry): initialize `ret' + +Sat Jun 13 04:14:01 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0r + +Sun Jun 7 04:13:14 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: fall-back definition of + IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4 + + * configure.in: only set CFLAGS if it wasn't set look for + dn_expand and res_search + +Mon Jun 1 21:28:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: remove duplicate seteuid + +Sat May 30 00:19:51 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: import _krb_time_to_life, to avoid + runtime dependencies on libkrb with some shared library + implementations + +Fri May 29 00:09:02 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit_options.c: Default options for kinit. + + * kuser/kauth_options.c: Default options for kauth. + + * kuser/kinit.c: Implement lots a new options. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_tgs_flags): make sure kdc-req-body->rtime + is not NULL; set endtime to min of new starttime + old_life, and + requested endtime + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (get_init_creds_common): if the + forwardable or proxiable flags are set in options, set the + kdc-flags to the value specified, and not always to one + +Thu May 28 21:28:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Optionally compare client address to addresses + in ticket. + + * kdc/connect.c: Pass client address to as_rep() and tgs_rep(). + + * kdc/config.c: Add check_ticket_addresses, and + allow_null_ticket_addresses variables. + +Tue May 26 14:03:42 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: possibly make DES keys version 4 salted + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c: check config file for kadmin/use_v4_salt + before zapping version 4 salts + +Sun May 24 05:22:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0q + + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c: new file + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c (repl_mutual): no output token + + * lib/gssapi/display_name.c (gss_display_name): zero terminate + output. + +Sat May 23 19:11:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/display_status.c: new file + + * Makefile.am: send -I to aclocal + + * configure.in: remove duplicate setenv + +Sat May 23 04:55:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/util.c (foreach_principal): Check for expression before + wading through the whole database. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Pass NULL password to + kadm5_*_init_with_password. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c: Implement init_with_{skey,creds}*. Make use + of `password' parameter to init_with_password. + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c: implement init_with_{skey,creds}* + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Better arguments for + kadm5_init_with_password. + +Sat May 16 07:10:36 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hprop.c: conditionalize ka-server reading support on + KASERVER_DB + + * configure.in: new option `--enable-kaserver-db' + +Fri May 15 19:39:18 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Better error if local tgt couldn't be + found. + +Tue May 12 21:11:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0p + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): only set + encryption type in auth_context if it's compatible with the type + of the session key + +Mon May 11 21:11:14 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: add support for ka-server databases + + * appl/ftp/ftpd: link with -lcrypt, if needed + +Fri May 1 07:29:52 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: don't test for winsock.h + +Sat Apr 18 21:43:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0o + +Sat Apr 18 00:31:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: Save hostname. + +Sun Apr 5 11:29:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: Use same enctype as in ticket. + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): Check for null key. + +Fri Apr 3 03:54:54 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Fix DES3 string-to-key. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Get default keytab name from context. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Get `default_keytab_name' value. + + * kadmin/util.c (foreach_principal): Print error message if + `kadm5_get_principals' fails. + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: Use `kadmind_loop'. + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Replace several other functions with + `kadmind_loop'. + +Sat Mar 28 09:49:18 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (fkt_add_entry): use an explicit seek instead + of O_APPEND + + * configure.in: generate ftp Makefiles + + * kuser/klist.c (print_cred_verbose): print IPv4-address in a + portable way. + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): return 0 if successful + +Tue Mar 24 00:40:33 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: MIT compatible changes: add and use sizes to + keytab entries, and change default keytab to `/etc/krb5.keytab'. + +Mon Mar 23 23:43:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/gssapi/wrap.c: Use `gss_krb5_getsomekey'. + + * lib/gssapi/unwrap.c: Implement and use `gss_krb5_getsomekey'. + Fix bug in checking of pad. + + * lib/gssapi/{un,}wrap.c: Add support for just integrity + protecting data. + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c: Use + `gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum'. + + * lib/gssapi/8003.c: Implement `gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum'. + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c: Zero cred, and store session key + properly in auth-context. + +Sun Mar 22 00:47:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/delete_s.c: Check immutable bit. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Pass client name to kadm5_init. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c: Get creds for client name passed in. + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): Check for `changepw.kerberos'. + +Sat Mar 21 22:57:13 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c: Verify that error_code is in the range + [0,127]. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Move checking of principal flags to new + function `check_flags'. + +Sat Mar 21 14:38:51 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): handle an empty salt + + * configure.in: define SunOS if running solaris + +Sat Mar 21 00:26:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Unifdef test for same principal when + changing password. + + * kadmin/util.c: If kadm5_get_principals failes, we might still be + able to perform the requested opreration (for instance someone if + trying to change his own password). + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c: Try to get ticket via initial request, if + not possible via tgt. + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Check for principals changing their own + passwords. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): check for interesting flags on + involved principals. + + * kadmin/util.c: Fix order of flags. + +Thu Mar 19 16:54:10 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Return sane error code if krb_rd_req fails. + +Wed Mar 18 17:11:47 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h: rename HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 to HAVE_IPV6 + +Wed Mar 18 09:58:18 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c (krb5_keytab_key_proc): don't + free keyseed; use correct keytab + +Tue Mar 10 09:56:16 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * acinclude.m4 (AC_KRB_IPV6): rewrote to avoid false positives + +Mon Mar 16 23:58:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0n + +Fri Mar 6 00:41:30 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/gssapi/{accept_sec_context,release_cred}.c: Use + krb5_kt_close/krb5_kt_resolve. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): Use resolver + to lookup hosts, so CNAMEs can be ignored. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc, send_and_recv_http): + Add support for using proxy. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Initialize `http_proxy' from + `libdefaults/http_proxy'. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add `http_proxy' to context. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Recognize `http/' and `udp/' as protocol + specifications. + +Wed Mar 4 01:47:29 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: Implement `add' and `remove' functions. Make + `--keytab' a global option. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Implement remove with files. Add memory + operations. + +Tue Mar 3 20:09:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Use function pointers. + + * admin: Remove kdb_edit. + +Sun Mar 1 03:28:42 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/dump_log.c: print operation names + +Sun Mar 1 03:04:12 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: add X-tests, and {bin,...}dir appl/{kx,kauth} + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c,mk_priv.c,rd_safe.c,mk_safe.c,mk_rep.c: + remove arbitrary limit + + * kdc/hprop-common.c: use krb5_{read,write}_message + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c (send_diffs): more careful use + krb5_{write,read}_message + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c (get_creds): get credentials for + `iprop/master' directly. + (main): use `krb5_read_message' + +Sun Mar 1 02:05:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Cleanup commands list, and add help strings. + + * kadmin/get.c: Add long, short, and terse (equivalent to `list') + output formats. Short is the default. + + * kadmin/util.c: Add `include_time' flag to timeval2str. + + * kadmin/init.c: Max-life and max-renew can, infact, be zero. + + * kadmin/{cpw,del,ext,get}.c: Use `foreach_principal'. + + * kadmin/util.c: Add function `foreach_principal', that loops over + all principals matching an expression. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add usage string to `privileges'. + + * lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c: Also try to match aganist the + expression appended with `@default-realm'. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Add `krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short', that + excludes the realm if it's the same as the default realm. + +Fri Feb 27 05:02:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: more WFLAGS and WFLAGS_NOUNUSED added missing + headers and functions error -> com_err + + (krb5_get_init_creds_keytab): use krb5_keytab_key_proc + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c: make `krb5_keytab_key_proc' + global + + * lib/kadm5/marshall.c (ret_principal_ent): set `n_tl_data' + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: use `struct ndbm_db' everywhere. + +Fri Feb 27 04:49:24 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): bump static limit to 10240. + This should be fixed the correct way. + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c (check_acl:) truncate buf correctly + (send_diffs): compare versions correctly + (main): reorder handling of events + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (kadm5_log_previous): avoid bad type conversion + +Thu Feb 26 02:22:35 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_{slave,master}.c: new files + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (kadm5_log_get_version): take an `fd' as + argument + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): `et_list' should be `struct + et_list *' + + * aux/make-proto.pl: Should work with perl4 + +Mon Feb 16 17:20:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: Remove (it gets included via + {asn1,krb5}_err.h). + +Thu Feb 12 03:28:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (_krb5_extract_ticket): if time difference + is larger than max_skew, return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (get_version): globalize + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h: include + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: add PA_KEY_INFO and PA_KEY_INFO_ENTRY + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): remove gcc-ism of + initializing local struct in declaration. + +Sat Jan 31 17:28:58 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/524.c: Use krb5_decode_EncTicketPart. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check at runtime whether to use enctypes + instead of keytypes. If so use the same value to encrypt ticket, + and kdc-rep as well as `keytype' for session key. Fix some obvious + bugs with the handling of additional tickets. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Use krb5_decode_EncTicketPart, and + krb5_decode_Authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c: Use krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart. + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: Use krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart. + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: Make sure enc_part.etype is an encryption + type, and not a key type. Use krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Use krb5_decode_PA_KEY_INFO. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Use krb5_decode_Enc{AS,TGS}RepPart. + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: Use krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Use krb5_decode_Enc{AS,TGS}RepPart. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: Use krb5_encode_Authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/codec.c: Enctype conversion stuff. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Ignore KRB5_CONFIG if *not* running + setuid. Get configuration for libdefaults ktype_is_etype, and + default_etypes. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add krb5_string_to_etype, rename + krb5_convert_etype to krb5_decode_keytype, and add + krb5_decode_keyblock. + +Fri Jan 23 00:32:09 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{get_in_tkt,rd_req}.c: Use krb5_convert_etype. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add krb5_convert_etype function - converts + from protocol keytypes (that really are enctypes) to internal + representation. + +Thu Jan 22 21:24:36 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Add PA-KEY-INFO structure to hold information + on keys in the database; and also a new `pa-key-info' padata-type. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: If pre-authentication fails, return a list of + keytypes, salttypes, and salts. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Add better support for + pre-authentication, by looking at hints from the KDC. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Add better support for specifying what + pre-authentication to use. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Merge entries for KEYTYPE_DES and + KEYTYPE_DES_AFS3. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add pre-authentication structures. + + * kdc/connect.c: Don't fail if realloc(X, 0) returns NULL. + +Wed Jan 21 06:20:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c (kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx): initialize + `log_context.socket_name' and `log_context.socket_fd' + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (kadm5_log_flush): send a unix domain datagram + to inform the possible running ipropd of an update. + +Wed Jan 21 01:34:09 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Return error-packet to caller. + + * lib/krb5/free.c (krb5_free_kdc_rep): Free krb5_kdc_rep->error. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Add some support for using enctypes instead of + keytypes. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Fixes to send authorization-data to the + KDC. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: Only generate local subkey if there is + none. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add krb5_authdata type. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Add + krb5_auth_con_set{,localsub,remotesub}key. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Return some error if prompter + functions return failure. + +Wed Jan 21 01:16:13 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: detect bad password. use krb5_err. + + * kadmin/util.c (edit_entry): remove unused variables + +Tue Jan 20 22:58:31 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: rename `-s' to `-S' to be MIT-compatible. + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h: add kadm5_log_context and + kadm5_log*-functions + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c (kadm5_s_create_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c (kadm5_s_rename_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c (kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx): initialize + log_context + + * lib/kadm5/delete_s.c (kadm5_s_delete_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/modify_s.c (kadm5_s_modify_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c (kadm5_s_randkey_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c (kadm5_s_chpass_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: add log.c, dump_log and replay_log + + * lib/kadm5/replay_log.c: new file + + * lib/kadm5/dump_log.c: new file + + * lib/kadm5/log.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c (get_str): initialize pad space to zero + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (krb5_config_vget_next): handle c == NULL + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: rewritten to use the kadm5 API + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am: link with kadm5srv + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep): initialize `i' + + * kadmin/kadmind.c (main): use kadm5_server_{send,recv}_sp + + * include/Makefile.am: added admin.h + +Sun Jan 18 01:41:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/gen_copy.c: Don't return ENOMEM if allocating 0 bytes. + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_store_cred): restore linked list if + copy_creds fails. + +Tue Jan 6 04:17:56 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: add kadm5_server_{send,recv}{,_sp} + + * lib/kadm5/marshall.c: add kadm5_{store,ret}_principal_ent_mask. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx): use + krb5_getportbyname + + * kadmin/kadmind.c (main): htons correctly. + moved kadm5_server_{recv,send} + + * kadmin/kadmin.c (main): only set admin_server if explicitly + given + +Mon Jan 5 23:34:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: Implement locking of database. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Process AuthorizationData. + +Sat Jan 3 22:07:07 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/string2key.c: Use AFS string-to-key from libkrb5. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Handle pa-afs3-salt case. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add value for AFS salts. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Add support for AFS string-to-key. + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c: Use correct salt. + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c: Always enable client. Only set max-life + and max-renew if != 0. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Add context to all krb5_config_*get_*. + +Thu Dec 25 17:03:25 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/ank.c (ank): don't zero password if --random-key was + given. + +Tue Dec 23 01:56:45 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0m + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c (attr_to_flags): try to set `client' + + * kadmin/util.c (edit_time): only set mask if != 0 + (edit_attributes): only set mask if != 0 + + * kadmin/init.c (init): create `default' + +Sun Dec 21 09:44:05 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/util.c (str2deltat, str2attr, get_deltat): return value + as pointer and have return value indicate success. + + (get_response): check NULL from fgets + + (edit_time, edit_attributes): new functions for reading values and + offering list of answers on '?' + + (edit_entry): use edit_time and edit_attributes + + * kadmin/ank.c (add_new_key): test the return value of + `krb5_parse_name' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_check_authenticator): RFC1510 doesn't say + that the checksum has to be keyed, even though later drafts do. + Accept unkeyed checksums to be compatible with MIT. + + * kadmin/kadmin_locl.h: add some prototypes. + + * kadmin/util.c (edit_entry): return a value + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c (main): return a exit code. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): use krb5_keytype_to_enctypes + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (krb5_keytype_to_enctypes): new function. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): use + krb5_{free,copy}_keyblock instead of the _contents versions + +Fri Dec 12 14:20:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{mk,rd}_priv.c: fix check for local/remote subkey + +Mon Dec 8 08:48:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c: don't look at KRB5_CONFIG if running setuid + +Sat Dec 6 10:09:40 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c (krb5_free_keyblock): check for NULL + keyblock + +Sat Dec 6 08:26:10 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0l + +Thu Dec 4 03:38:12 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Add TCP client support. + + * lib/krb5/store.c: Add k_{put,get}_int. + + * kadmin/ank.c: Set initial kvno to 1. + + * kdc/connect.c: Send version 5 TCP-reply as length+data. + +Sat Nov 29 07:10:11 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req): fixed obvious bug + + * kdc/kaserver.c (create_reply_ticket): use a random nonce in the + reply packet. + + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): less reallocing. + + * **/*.c: changed `struct fd_set' to `fd_set' + +Sat Nov 29 05:12:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: More guessing. + +Thu Nov 20 02:55:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Use principal from ticket if no server is + given. + +Tue Nov 18 02:58:02 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: Use krb5_err*(). + +Sun Nov 16 11:57:43 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add local `init', `load', `dump', and `merge' + commands. + +Sun Nov 16 02:52:20 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_ext): figure out the correct + `enctype' + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use `(*auth_context)->enctype' + if set. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: handle the case of a specific keytype + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): enctype as a + parameter instead of guessing it. + + * lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c (krb5_build_ap_req): new parameter + `enctype' + + * appl/test/common.c (common_setup): don't use `optarg' + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents): new function + (krb5_kt_get_entry): retrieve the latest version if kvno == 0 + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: define KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): check for + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE + + * lib/gssapi/8003.c (gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum): remove + unused variable + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_copy_creds_contents): only free the + contents if we fail. + +Sun Nov 16 00:32:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: Get password expiration time from config + file. + + * lib/asn1/{der_get,gen_decode}.c: Allow passing NULL size. + +Wed Nov 12 02:35:57 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): + restructured and fixed. + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_h_addr2addr): new function. + +Wed Nov 12 01:36:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fall back to hostname's addresses if other + methods fail. + +Tue Nov 11 22:22:12 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add `-l' flag to use local database. + + * lib/kadm5/acl.c: Use KADM5_PRIV_ALL. + + * lib/kadm5: Use function pointer trampoline for easier dual use + (without radiation-hardening capability). + +Tue Nov 11 05:15:22 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (krb5_etype_valid): new function + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_copy_creds_contents): zero target + + * lib/krb5/context.c (valid_etype): remove + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: remove dead code + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (send_request): free memory on error. + + * lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c (krb5_build_ap_req): check return value + from malloc. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): free memory on + failure correctly. + (krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd): return error correctly. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_{keytab,skey}.c: new files + +Tue Nov 11 02:53:19 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Implement auth_con_setuserkey. + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c: Use krb5_auth_con_getkey. + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c: Rename krb5_free_keyblock to + krb5_free_keyblock_contents, and reimplement krb5_free_keyblock. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Use auth_context->keyblock if + ap_options.use_session_key. + +Tue Nov 11 02:35:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/net_{read,write}.c: change `int fd' to `void *p_fd'. + fix callers. + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: include and + + * include/Makefile.am: add xdbm.h + +Tue Nov 11 01:58:22 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Implement krb5_get_cred_from_kdc. + +Mon Nov 10 22:41:53 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/ticket.c: Implement copy_ticket. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Make `options' parameter MIT-compatible. + + * lib/krb5/data.c: Implement free_data and copy_data. + +Sun Nov 9 02:17:27 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5: Implement kadm5_get_privs, and kadm5_get_principals. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add get_privileges function. + + * lib/kadm5: Rename KADM5_ACL_* -> KADM5_PRIV_* to conform with + specification. + + * kdc/connect.c: Exit if no sockets could be bound. + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: Check return value from krb5_net_read(). + + * lib/kadm5,kadmin: Fix memory leaks. + +Fri Nov 7 02:45:26 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: Get some default values from `default' + principal. + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c: Add optional default entry to get some + values from. + +Thu Nov 6 00:20:41 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Remove generated destroy_*_error_table + prototype + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: Crude admin server. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Update to use remote protocol. + + * kadmin/get.c: Fix principal formatting. + + * lib/kadm5: Add client support. + + * lib/kadm5/error.c: Error code mapping. + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Kadmind support function. + + * lib/kadm5/marshall.c: Kadm5 marshalling. + + * lib/kadm5/acl.c: Simple acl system. + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h: Add client stuff. + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c: Initialize acl. + + * lib/kadm5/*: Return values. + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: Correct kvno. + +Wed Nov 5 22:06:50 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: Fix parsing of log destinations. + +Mon Nov 3 20:33:55 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Reduce number of reallocs in unparse_name. + +Sat Nov 1 01:40:53 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin: Simple kadmin utility. + + * admin/ktutil.c: Print keytype. + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c: Set correct n_key_data. + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c: Add kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx. Use + master key. + + * lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c: Check for allocated context. + + * lib/kadm5/{create,chpass}_s.c: Use _kadm5_set_keys(). + +Sat Nov 1 00:21:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: test for readv, writev + +Wed Oct 29 23:41:26 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): handle the case of an illegal error + code + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (encode_reply): return success + +Wed Oct 29 18:01:59 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (find_etype) Return correct index of selected + etype. + +Wed Oct 29 04:07:06 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0k + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_init_context): support `KRB5_CONFIG' + environment variable + + * *: use the roken_get*-macros from roken.h for the benefit of + Crays. + + * configure.in: add --{enable,disable}-otp. check for compatible + prototypes for gethostbyname, gethostbyaddr, getservbyname, and + openlog (they have strange prototypes on Crays) + + * acinclude.m4: new macro `AC_PROTO_COMPAT' + +Tue Oct 28 00:11:22 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Log bad requests. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Move stuff that's in common between as_rep and + tgs_rep to separate functions. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fix user-to-user authentication. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Some restructuring of krb5_get_credentials: + - add a kdc-options argument to krb5_get_credentials, and rename + it to krb5_get_credentials_with_flags + - honour the KRB5_GC_CACHED, and KRB5_GC_USER_USER options + - add some more user-to-user glue + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Move parts of krb5_verify_ap_req into a new + function, krb5_decrypt_ticket, so it is easier to decrypt and + check a ticket without having an ap-req. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add KRB5_GC_CACHED, and KRB5_GC_USER_USER + flags. + + * lib/krb5/crc.c (crc_init_table): Check if table is already + inited. + +Sun Oct 26 04:51:02 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_length, fix_dce): Special-case + indefinite encoding. + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_units): Check for empty + member-list. + +Sat Oct 25 07:24:57 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Allow specifying table-base. + +Tue Oct 21 20:21:40 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check version number of krbtgt. + +Mon Oct 20 01:14:53 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c (krb5_prompter_posix): implement the + case of unhidden prompts. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c (string_to_key_internal): return error + instead of aborting. always free memory + + * admin/ktutil.c: add `help' command + + * admin/kdb_edit.c: implement new commands: add_random_key(ark), + change_password(cpw), change_random_key(crk) + +Thu Oct 16 05:16:36 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: change all the keys in the database + + * kdc: removed all unsealing, now done by the hdb layer + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: new functions `hdb_create', `hdb_set_master_key' + and `hdb_clear_master_key' + + * admin/misc.c: removed + +Wed Oct 15 22:47:31 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/klist.c: print year as YYYY iff verbose + +Wed Oct 15 20:02:13 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: print etype from ticket + +Mon Oct 13 17:18:57 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0j + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Get the subkey from mk_req so it can be + used to decrypt the reply from DCE secds. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Add {get,set}enctype. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Fix for DCE secd. + + * lib/krb5/store.c: Store keytype twice, as MIT does. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Use etype from reply. + +Fri Oct 10 00:39:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: check for leading '/' in http request + +Tue Sep 30 21:50:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0i + +Mon Sep 29 15:58:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req): redone because we don't know + the kvno or keytype before receiving the AP-REQ + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): figure out what cksumtype to + use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): figure out what + cksumtype to use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): figure out what etype to use + from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_get_entry): check the keytype + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): figure out + what etype to use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c (krb5_generate_seq_number): + handle other key types than DES + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (key_type): add `best_cksumtype' + (krb5_keytype_to_cksumtype): new function + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): figure out + what etype to use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): set `cksumtype' + and `enctype' to 0 + + * admin/extkeytab.c (ext_keytab): extract all keys + + * appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c: INET6_ADDRSTRLEN kludge + + * configure.in: check for . check for -linet6 + +Tue Sep 23 03:00:53 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: fix checksumtype for des3-cbc-sha1 + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: fix check for keyed and collision-proof + checksum + + * lib/krb5/context.c (valid_etype): remove hard-coded constants + (default_etypes): include DES3 + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: fix check for keyed and collision-proof + checksum + + * admin/util.c (init_des_key, set_password): DES3 keys also + + * lib/krb/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): no data returned means + no contact? + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: fix typo in `ipv6_anyaddr' + +Mon Sep 22 11:44:27 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Somewhat fix the etype usage. The list sent by + the client is used to select wich key to encrypt the kdc rep with + (in case of as-req), and with the server info to select the + session key type. The server key the ticket is encrypted is based + purely on the keys in the database. + + * kdc/string2key.c: Add keytype support. Default to version 5 + keys. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Fix a lot of etype/keytype misuse. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add des3-cbc-md5, and des3-cbc-sha1. Add + many *_to_* functions. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Add des3 string-to-key. Add ktype argument + to krb5_string_to_key(). + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: Some cleanup, and added: + - rsa-md5-des3 + - hmac-sha1-des3 + - keyed and collision proof flags to each checksum method + - checksum<->string functions. + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c: Use krb5_generate_random_keyblock. + +Sun Sep 21 15:19:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c: use new addr_families functions + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use new addr_families functions. Now works + over IPv6 + + * kuser/klist.c: use correct symbols for address families + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6 + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: use new addr_families functions. Now works + over IPv6 + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: new file + + * acconfig.h: AC_SOCKADDR_IN6 -> AC_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6. Updated + uses. + + * acinclude.m4: new macro `AC_KRB_IPV6'. Use it. + +Sat Sep 13 23:04:23 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: Don't encrypt twice. Complain on non-convertable + principals. + +Sat Sep 13 00:59:36 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0h + + * appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c: AF_INET6 support + + * admin/misc.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/context.c: new configuration variable `max_retries' + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: fixes and better #ifdef's + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: implement krb5_config_get_int + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c, send_to_kdc.c, sock_principal.c: + AF_INET6 support + + * kuser/klist.c: support for printing IPv6-addresses + + * kdc/connect.c: support AF_INET6 + + * configure.in: test for gethostbyname2 and struct sockaddr_in6 + +Thu Sep 11 07:25:28 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Use `METHOD-DATA' instead of `SEQUENCE OF + PA-DATA' + +Wed Sep 10 21:20:17 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fixes for cross-realm, including (but not + limited to): + - allow client to be non-existant (should probably check for + "local realm") + - if server isn't found and it is a request for a krbtgt, try to + find a realm on the way to the requested realm + - update the transited encoding iff + client-realm != server-realm != tgt-realm + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Several fixes for cross-realm. + +Tue Sep 9 15:59:20 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/string2key.c: Fix password handling. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: krb5_key_to_string + +Tue Sep 9 07:46:05 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: rewrote. Now should be able to handle + aliases and IPv6 addresses + + * kuser/klist.c: try printing IPv6 addresses + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: increase the arbitrary limit from 1024 to 8192 + + * configure.in: check for + +Mon Sep 8 02:57:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * doc: fixes + + * admin/util.c (init_des_key): increase kvno + (set_password): return -1 if `des_read_pw_string' failed + + * admin/mod.c (doit2): check the return value from `set_password' + + * admin/ank.c (doit): don't add a new entry if `set_password' + failed + +Mon Sep 8 02:20:16 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c: fix ap_req_nofail semantics + + * lib/krb5/transited.c: something that might resemble + domain-x500-compress + +Mon Sep 8 01:24:42 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (main): check number of arguments + + * appl/popper/pop_init.c (pop_init): check number of arguments + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kdc/string2key.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (main): use sigaction without SA_RESTART to + break out of select when a signal arrives + + * kdc/main.c (main): use sigaction without SA_RESTART to break out + of select when a signal arrives + + * kdc/kstash.c: default to HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key" + + * kdc/config.c (configure): add `--version'. Check the number of + arguments. Handle the case of there being no specification of port + numbers. + + * admin/util.c: seal and unseal key at appropriate places + + * admin/kdb_edit.c (main): parse arguments, config file and read + master key iff there's one. + + * admin/extkeytab.c (ext_keytab): unseal key while extracting + +Sun Sep 7 20:41:01 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/roken.h: include + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (set_salt_padata): new function + + * appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c: Rename some variables that + conflict with cpp symbols on HP-UX 10.20 + + * change all calls of `gethostbyaddr' to cast argument 1 to `const + char *' + + * acconfig.h: only use SGTTY on nextstep + +Sun Sep 7 14:33:50 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check invalid flag. + +Fri Sep 5 14:19:38 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: Use get_init_creds/verify_init_creds. + + * lib/kafs: Move functions common to krb/krb5 modules to new file, + and make things more modular. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: rename STRING -> krb5_config_string, and LIST + -> krb5_config_list + +Thu Sep 4 23:39:43 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fix loopback test. + +Thu Sep 4 04:45:49 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/roken.h: fallback definition of `O_ACCMODE' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): be more careful when + checking for a v4 reply + +Wed Sep 3 18:20:14 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: Add `--decrypt' and `--encrypt' flags. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: new {seal,unseal}_keys functions + + * kdc/{hprop,hpropd}.c: Add support to dump database to stdout. + + * kdc/hprop.c: Don't use same master key as version 4. + + * admin/util.c: Don't dump core if no `default' is found. + +Wed Sep 3 16:01:07 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Allow run time port specification. + + * kdc/config.c: Add flags for http support, and port + specifications. + +Tue Sep 2 02:00:03 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * include/bits.c: Don't generate ifndef's in bits.h. Instead, use + them when building the program. This makes it possible to include + bits.h without having defined all HAVE_INT17_T symbols. + + * configure.in: test for sigaction + + * doc: updated documentation. + +Tue Sep 2 00:20:31 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0g + +Mon Sep 1 17:42:14 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/data.c: don't return ENOMEM if len == 0 + +Sun Aug 31 17:15:49 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: Include salt type in salt. + + * kdc/hprop.h: Change port to 754. + + * kdc/hpropd.c: Verify who tries to transmit a database. + + * appl/popper: Use getarg and krb5_log. + + * lib/krb5/get_port.c: Add context parameter. Now takes port in + host byte order. + +Sat Aug 30 18:48:19 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Add timeout to select, and log about expired tcp + connections. + + * kdc/config.c: Add `database' option. + + * kdc/hpropd.c: Log about duplicate entries. + + * lib/hdb/{db,ndbm}.c: Use common routines. + + * lib/hdb/common.c: Implement more generic fetch/store/delete + functions. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: Add `replace' parameter to store. + + * kdc/connect.c: Set filedecriptor to -1 on allocated decriptor + entries. + +Fri Aug 29 03:13:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: extract_ticket -> _krb5_extract_ticket + + * aux/make-proto.pl: fix __P for stone age mode + +Fri Aug 29 02:45:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/45/mk_req.c: implementation of krb_mk_req that uses 524 + protocol + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: make change_password and + get_init_creds_common static + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Merge stuff from removed headerfiles. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: fcc_ops -> krb5_fcc_ops + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: mcc_ops -> krb5_mcc_ops + +Fri Aug 29 01:45:25 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Remove all prototypes. + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: Use `struct credentials' instead of + `CREDENTIALS'. + +Fri Aug 29 00:08:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c: new file. generates 2int and int2 functions + and units for bit strings. + + * admin/util.c: flags2int, int2flags, and flag_units are now + generated by asn1_compile + + * lib/roken/parse_units.c: generalised `parse_units' and + `unparse_units' and added new functions `parse_flags' and + `unparse_flags' that use these + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: moved krb5_data* functions to krb5.h + + * admin/util.c: Use {un,}parse_flags for printing and parsing + hdbflags. + +Thu Aug 28 03:26:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: restructured + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): leak less memory + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_free_entry): zero keys + (hdb_check_db_format): leak less memory + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_seq): check for valid hdb_entries implement + NDBM__get, NDBM__put + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_seq): check for valid hdb_entries + +Thu Aug 28 02:06:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Don't use sendto on connected sockets. + +Thu Aug 28 01:13:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.1, klist.1, kdestroy.1: new man pages + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.1, kpasswdd.8: new man pages + + * kdc/kstash.8, hprop.8, hpropd.8: new man pages + + * admin/ktutil.8, admin/kdb_edit.8: new man pages + + * admin/mod.c: new file + + * admin/life.c: renamed gettime and puttime to getlife and putlife + and moved them to life.c + + * admin/util.c: add print_flags, parse_flags, init_entry, + set_created_by, set_modified_by, edit_entry, set_password. Use + them. + + * admin/get.c: use print_flags + + * admin: removed unused stuff. use krb5_{warn,err}* + + * admin/ank.c: re-organized and abstracted. + + * admin/gettime.c: removed + +Thu Aug 28 00:37:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{get_cred,get_in_tkt}.c: Check for v4 reply. + + * lib/roken/base64.c: Add base64 functions. + + * kdc/connect.c lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Add http support. + +Wed Aug 27 00:29:20 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * include/Makefile.am: Don't make links to built files. + + * admin/kdb_edit.c: Add command to set the database path. + + * lib/hdb: Include version number in database. + +Tue Aug 26 20:14:54 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil: Merged v4 srvtab conversion. + +Mon Aug 25 23:02:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/roken.h: add F_OK + + * lib/gssapi/acquire_creds.c: fix typo + + * configure.in: call AC_TYPE_MODE_T + + * acinclude.m4: Add AC_TYPE_MODE_T + +Sun Aug 24 16:46:53 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0f + +Sun Aug 24 08:06:54 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/popper/pop_pass.c: log poppers + + * kdc/kaserver.c: some more checks + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: removed `-p' + + * kuser/kinit.c: removed `-p' + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): If + KDC_ERR_PREUATH_REQUIRED, add preauthentication and try again. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): don't print out + krb-error text + + * lib/gssapi/import_name.c (input_name): more names types. + + * admin/load.c (parse_keys): handle the case of an empty salt + + * kdc/kaserver.c: fix up memory deallocation + + * kdc/kaserver.c: quick hack at talking kaserver protocol + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Make `db-fetch4' global + + * configure.in: add --enable-kaserver + + * kdc/rx.h, kdc/kerberos4.h: new header files + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: fix krb5_build_principal_ext & c:o + +Sun Aug 24 03:52:44 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{get_in_tkt,mk_safe,mk_priv}.c: Fix some Cray specific + type conflicts. + + * lib/krb5/{get_cred,get_in_tkt}.c: Mask nonce to 32 bits. + + * lib/des/{md4,md5,sha}.c: Now works on Crays. + +Sat Aug 23 18:15:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c: If no cells or files specified, get + tokens for all local cells. Better test for files. + +Thu Aug 21 23:33:38 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/v1.c: new file with v1 compatibility functions. + +Thu Aug 21 20:36:13 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c: Don't check ticket file for afs ticket. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Check database when converting v4 principals. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Include kvno in Ticket. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add kvno parameter to encrypt_EncryptedData. + + * kuser/klist.c: Print version number of ticket, include more + flags. + +Wed Aug 20 21:26:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c (get_cred): Check cached afs tickets for + expiration. + +Wed Aug 20 17:40:31 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c (krb5_recvauth): Send a KRB-ERROR iff + there's an error. + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): correct the protocol + documentation and process KRB-ERROR's + +Tue Aug 19 20:41:30 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Fix memory leak in v4 protocol handler. + +Mon Aug 18 05:15:09 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c: Added + `gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity' + +Sun Aug 17 01:40:20 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): don't + always pass server == NULL to krb5_rd_req. + + * lib/gssapi: new files: canonicalize_name.c export_name.c + context_time.c compare_name.c release_cred.c acquire_cred.c + inquire_cred.c, from Luke Howard + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Add netinfo support from Luke Howard + + + * lib/editline/sysunix.c: sgtty-support from Luke Howard + + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: krb5_sname_to_principal fix from Luke + Howard + +Sat Aug 16 00:44:47 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0e + +Sat Aug 16 00:23:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c: Use new libkafs. + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c: Get AFS tokens via 524 protocol. + + * lib/krb5/warn.c: Fix format string for *x type. + +Fri Aug 15 22:15:01 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/get.c (get_entry): print more information about the entry + + * lib/des/Makefile.am: build destest, mdtest, des, rpw, speed + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: new functions `krb5_config_get_time' and + `krb5_config_vget_time'. Use them. + +Fri Aug 15 00:09:37 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: Keytab manipulation program. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Return sane values from resolve and + start_seq_get. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fix for old clients passing 0 for `no endtime'. + + * lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c: Kerberos 4 get_ad_tkt using + krb524_convert_creds_kdc. + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: Implementation of + krb524_convert_creds_kdc. + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Make kdc-req-body.till OPTIONAL + + * kdc/524.c: A somewhat working 524-protocol module. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Add version 4 ticket encoding and encryption + functions. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Fix kdc_timeout. + + * lib/hdb/{ndbm,db}.c: Free name in close. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_check_autenticator): Return error code + +Thu Aug 14 21:29:03 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_make_reply): Fix endtime in reply. + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: Fix reallocation bug. + +Tue Aug 12 01:29:46 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c, appl/popper/pop_init.c: Use + `krb5_sock_to_principal'. Send server parameter to + krb5_rd_req/krb5_recvauth. Set addresses in auth_context. + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c: Set addresses in auth_context if there + aren't any + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: New function + `krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd' + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: new function + `krb5_sock_to_principal' + + * lib/krb5/time.c: new file with `krb5_timeofday' and + `krb5_us_timeofday'. Use these functions. + + * kuser/klist.c: print KDC offset iff verbose + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: implement KDC time offset and use it if + [libdefaults]kdc_timesync is set. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: Implement version 4 of the ccache format. + +Mon Aug 11 05:34:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c (krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part): free all memory + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_unparse_name): allocate memory + properly + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: Use `krb5_change_password' + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (init_cred): set realm of server + correctly. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: support changing of password when it + has expired + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: new file + + * kuser/klist.c: use getarg + + * admin/init.c (init): add `kadmin/changepw' + +Mon Aug 11 04:30:47 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Make get_credentials handle cross-realm. + +Mon Aug 11 00:03:24 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: implement support for #-comments + +Sat Aug 9 02:21:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop*.c: Add database propagation programs. + + * kdc/connect.c: Max request size. + +Sat Aug 9 00:47:28 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/otp: resurrected from krb4 + + * appl/push: new program for fetching mail with POP. + + * appl/popper/popper.h: new include files. new fields in `POP' + + * appl/popper/pop_pass.c: Implement both v4 and v5. + + * appl/popper/pop_init.c: Implement both v4 and v5. + + * appl/popper/pop_debug.c: use getarg. Talk both v4 and v5 + + * appl/popper: Popper from krb4. + + * configure.in: check for inline and generate + files in appl/popper, appl/push, and lib/otp + +Fri Aug 8 05:51:02 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: clean-up and try to free memory even when + there're errors + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: adapt to new `extract_ticket' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: reorganize. check everything and try to + return memory even if there are errors. + + * kuser/kverify.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): implement + different nametypes. Also free memory. + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c: more functionality + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): free the checksum + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (extract_ticket): don't copy over the + principals in creds. Should also compare them with that received + from the KDC + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_gen_new): copy the newly allocated + krb5_ccache + (krb5_cc_destroy): call krb5_cc_close + (krb5_cc_retrieve_cred): delete the unused creds + +Fri Aug 8 02:30:40 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: Allow better control of destinations of logging + (like passing explicit destinations, and log-functions). + +Fri Aug 8 01:20:39 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: new file + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use krb5_log* + +Fri Aug 8 00:37:47 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Implement krb5_get_init_creds_keytab. + +Fri Aug 8 00:37:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Use `krb5_get_default_principal'. + Print password expire information. + + * kdc/config.c: new variable `kdc_warn_pwexpire' + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: converted to getarg and get_init_creds + +Thu Aug 7 22:17:09 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: new file + + * admin/gettime.c: new function puttime. Use it. + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c: Added krb5_free_keyblock and + krb5_copy_keyblock + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: more functionality + + * lib/krb5/creds.c: Added krb5_free_creds_contents and + krb5_copy_creds. Changed callers. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: new functions krb5_config_get and + krb5_config_vget + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: cleanup added mcache + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: include last-req's of type 6 and 7, if + applicable + +Wed Aug 6 20:38:23 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: New parameter `log-level'. Default to `SYSLOG'. + +Tue Aug 5 22:53:54 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c, init_creds_pw.c, init_creds.c, + prompter_posix.c: the beginning of an implementation of the cygnus + initial-ticket API. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c: make `krb5_password_key_proc' global + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): new function that is + almost krb5_get_in_tkt but doesn't write the creds to the ccache. + Small fixes in krb5_get_in_tkt + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (krb5_get_all_client_addrs): don't include + loopback. + +Mon Aug 4 20:20:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc: Make context global. + +Fri Aug 1 17:23:56 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0d + + * lib/roken/flock.c: new file + + * kuser/kinit.c: check for and print expiry information in the + `kdc_rep' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Set `ret_as_reply' if != NULL + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check the valid times on client and server. + Check the password expiration. + Check the require_preauth flag. + Send an lr_type == 6 with pw_end. + Set key.expiration to min(valid_end, pw_end) + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: new flags `require_preauth' and `change_pw' + + * admin/util.c, admin/load.c: handle the new flags. + +Fri Aug 1 16:56:12 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb: Add some simple locking. + +Sun Jul 27 04:44:31 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: Add some general logging functions. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Add version 4 protocol handler. The requrement + for this to work is that all involved principals has a des key in + the database, and that the client has a version 4 (un-)salted + key. Furthermore krb5_425_conv_principal has to do it's job, as + present it's not very clever. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Quick patch to make 425_conv work + somewhat. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: Add keytype->key and next key functions. + +Fri Jul 25 17:32:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): don't free + `cksum'. It's allocated and freed by the caller + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_kdc_cred): Don't free `addresses'. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): make sure we also have an defined + `client' to return as part of the KRB-ERROR + +Thu Jul 24 08:13:59 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Unseal keys from database before use. + + * kdc/misc.c: New functions set_master_key, unseal_key and + free_key. + + * lib/roken/getarg.c: Handle `-f arg' correctly. + +Thu Jul 24 01:54:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: implement `-l' aka `--lifetime' + + * lib/roken/parse_units.c, parse_time.c: new files + + * admin/gettime.c (gettime): use `parse_time' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): Use `METHOD-DATA' when sending + KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, not PA-DATA. + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: fix freeing bug use sequence numbers set + addresses in auth_context bind one socket per interface. + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: use sequence numbers + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_verify_ap_req): do abs when verifying + the timestamps + + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c (krb5_rd_priv): Fetch the correct session key + from auth_context + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): Fetch the correct session key + from auth_context + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c (krb5_mk_error): return an error number and + not a comerr'd number. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_tkt): interpret the error + number in KRB-ERROR correctly. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_kdc_cred): interpret the error + number in KRB-ERROR correctly. + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Add `METHOD-DATA' + + * removed some memory leaks. + +Wed Jul 23 07:53:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0c + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c, get_for_creds.c: new files + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: try default realm as last chance + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: updated to hdb changes + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c: Implement forwarding + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet: removed totally unused files + + * admin/ank.c: fix prompts and generation of random keys + +Wed Jul 23 04:02:32 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/dump.c: Include salt in dump. + + * admin: Mostly updated for new db-format. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Update to use new db format. Better checking of + flags and such. More logging. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: Use generated encode and decode functions. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: Get hdb_entry from ASN.1 generated code. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Get addresses from krbtgt if there are none + in the reply. + +Sun Jul 20 16:22:30 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: break if des_read_pw_string() != 0 + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: send a reply + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: restructured code. better report on + krb-error break if des_read_pw_string() != 0 + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check `require_enc_timestamp' malloc space for + starttime and renew_till + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_is): Send a + keyblock to krb5_verify_chekcsum + +Sun Jul 20 06:35:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0b + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: Avoid using non-standard struct names. + +Sat Jul 19 19:26:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_get_entry): check return from + `krb5_kt_start_seq_get'. From + +Sat Jul 19 04:07:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Update with more pa-data types from + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt + + * admin/load.c: Update to match current db-format. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): Try all valid pa-datas before giving + up. Send back an empty pa-data if the client has the v4 flag set. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Pass both version5 and version4 salted + pa-data. DTRT if there is any pa-data in the reply. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: XOR with some sane value. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: Add `version 4 salted key' flag. + + * kuser/kinit.c: Ask for password before calling get_in_tkt. This + makes it possible to call key_proc more than once. + + * kdc/string2key.c: Add flags to output version 5 (DES only), + version 4, and AFS string-to-key of a password. + + * lib/asn1/gen_copy.c: copy_* functions now returns an int (0 or + ENOMEM). + +Fri Jul 18 02:54:58 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): do the + name2name thing + + * kdc/misc.c: check result of hdb_open + + * admin/kdb_edit: updated to new sl + + * lib/sl: sl_func now returns an int. != 0 means to exit. + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd: A crude (but somewhat working) implementation + of `draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-00.txt' + +Fri Jul 18 00:55:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/krenew.c: Crude ticket renewing program. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Rewritten flags parsing, it now might work to + get forwarded and renewed tickets. + + * kuser/kinit.c: Add `-r' flag. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Move most of contents of get_creds to new + function get_kdc_cred, that always contacts the kdc and doesn't + save in the cache. This is a hack. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Pass starttime and renew_till in request + (a bit kludgy). + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: Make an auth_context if none passed in. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Get timeout from context. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Add kdc_timeout to context struct. + +Thu Jul 17 20:35:45 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: Print start time of ticket if available. + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: Return error if no realm was found. + +Thu Jul 17 20:28:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd: non-working kpasswd added + +Thu Jul 17 00:21:22 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0a + + * kdc/main.c: Add -p flag to disable pa-enc-timestamp requirement. + +Wed Jul 16 03:37:41 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): Free ticket and ap_req. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_free): Free remote + subkey. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_free_principal): Check for NULL. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Check for NULL return from + gethostbyname. + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c: Try to get realm of local host if + no default realm is available. + + * Remove non ASN.1 principal code. + +Wed Jul 16 03:17:30 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Split tgs_rep in smaller functions. Add better + error handing. Do some logging. + + * kdc/log.c: Some simple logging facilities. + + * kdc/misc.c (db_fetch): Take a krb5_principal. + + * kdc/connect.c: Pass address of request to as_rep and + tgs_rep. Send KRB-ERROR. + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c: Add more fields. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Print normal error code if no e_text is + available. + +Wed Jul 16 03:07:50 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: implement `krb5_init_etype'. + Change encryption type of pa_enc_timestamp to DES-CBC-MD5 + + * lib/krb5/context.c: recognize all encryption types actually + implemented + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): Change default + encryption type to `DES_CBC_MD5' + + * lib/krb5/read_message.c, write_message.c: new files + +Tue Jul 15 17:14:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1: replaced asn1_locl.h by `der_locl.h' and `gen_locl.h'. + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: generate a prototype for the + `destroy_foo_error_table' function. + +Mon Jul 14 12:24:40 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krbhst): Get all kdc's and try also + with `kerberos.REALM' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c, lib/krb5/rd_priv.c, lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: use + `max_skew' + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_verify_ap_req): record authenticator + subkey + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): always + generate a subkey. + + * lib/krb5/address.c: implement `krb5_address_order' + + * lib/gssapi/import_name.c: Implement `gss_import_name' + + * lib/gssapi/external.c: Use new OID + + * lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c: New functions + `gssapi_krb5_encap_length' and `gssapi_krb5_make_header'. Changed + callers. + + * lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c: New function + `gssaspi_krb5_verify_header'. Changed callers. + + * lib/asn1/gen*.c: Give tags to generated structs. + Use `err' and `asprintf' + + * appl/test/gss_common.c: new file + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c: removed all krb5 calls + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c: Add support for genering and + verifying checksums. Also start using session subkeys. + +Mon Jul 14 12:08:25 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock): Split up. + +Sun Jul 13 03:07:44 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c, mk_safe.c: made bug-compatible with MIT + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: new functions `DES_encrypt_null_ivec' and + `DES_encrypt_key_ivec' + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: implement rsa-md4-des and rsa-md5-des + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep): support keyed checksums + + * lib/krb5/creds.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: better freeing + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_free_context): more freeing + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: New function `krb5_config_file_free' + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Generate a `destroy_' function. + + * kuser/kinit.c, klist.c: Don't leak memory. + +Sun Jul 13 02:46:27 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Check filedescriptor in select. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Remove most of the most common memory leaks. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Free allocated data. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_free): Free a lot of + fields. + +Sun Jul 13 00:32:16 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet: Conditionalize the krb4-support. + + * configure.in: Test for krb4 + +Sat Jul 12 17:14:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: check if the pre-auth was decrypted properly. + set the `pre_authent' flag + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c, lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: generate a random nonce. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Made `generate_random_block' global. + + * appl/test: Added gssapi_client and gssapi_server. + + * lib/krb5/data.c: Add `krb5_data_zero' + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: try `mk_safe' and `mk_priv' + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: try `rd_safe' and `rd_priv' + +Sat Jul 12 16:45:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fix for systems that has sa_len, but + returns zero length from SIOCGIFCONF. + +Sat Jul 12 16:38:34 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/test: new programs + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: add address compare + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: allow no checksum + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_ret_string): 0-terminate string + + * lib/krb5/address.c: fix `krb5_address_compare' + +Sat Jul 12 15:03:16 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fix ip4 address extraction. + + * kuser/klist.c: Add verbose flag, and split main into smaller + pieces. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: Save ticket flags. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (extract_ticket): Extract addresses and + flags. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add ticket_flags to krb5_creds. + +Sat Jul 12 13:12:48 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: Call `AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S' + + * acinclude.m4: Add `AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S' from krb4 + +Sat Jul 12 00:57:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Use union of krb5_flags and KDCOptions to + pass options. + +Fri Jul 11 15:04:22 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet: telnet & telnetd seems to be working. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Added krb5_config_v?get_list Fixed + krb5_config_vget_next + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c: update to current API + +Thu Jul 10 14:54:39 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_status): call + `krb5_kuserok' + + * appl/telnet: Added. + +Thu Jul 10 05:09:25 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Remove usage of sub, gsub, and + functions for compatibility with awk. + + * include/bits.c: Must use signed char. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Move krb5_get_err_text, and krb5_init_ets + here. + + * lib/error/error.c: Replace krb5_get_err_text with new function + com_right. + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Avoid using static variables. + + * lib/error/error.c: Don't use krb5_locl.h + + * lib/error/error.h: Move definitions of error_table and + error_list from krb5.h. + + * lib/error: Moved from lib/krb5. + +Wed Jul 9 07:42:04 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Temporary hack to avoid des_rand_data. + +Wed Jul 9 06:58:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/{rd,mk}_{*}.c: more checking for addresses and stuff + according to pseudocode from 1510 + +Wed Jul 9 06:06:06 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: Add hdb_etype2key. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check authenticator. Use more general etype + functions. + +Wed Jul 9 03:51:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Made all `s_address' OPTIONAL according to + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-00.txt + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_parse_name): default to local realm + if none given + + * kuser/kinit.c: New option `-p' and prompt + +Wed Jul 9 02:30:06 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c: Keyblock generation functions. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Use functions from checksum.c. + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: Move checksum functions here. Add + krb5_cksumsize function. + +Wed Jul 9 01:15:38 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: implemented + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Redid part. New functions: + krb5_config_v?get_next + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: new program + + * kuser/kinit.c: new flag `-f' + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Made HostAddresses = SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + + * acinclude.m4: Added AC_KRB_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: krb5_addresses == HostAddresses. Changed all + users. + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: figure out all local addresses, possibly + even IPv6! + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: table-driven checksum + +Mon Jul 7 21:13:28 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Make krb5_decrypt use the same struct as + krb5_encrypt. + +Mon Jul 7 11:15:51 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/vsyslog.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: add des-cbc-md4. + adjust krb5_encrypt and krb5_decrypt to reality + +Mon Jul 7 02:46:31 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Implement as a vector of function pointers. + + * lib/krb5/{decrypt,encrypt}.c: Implement des-cbc-crc, and + des-cbc-md5 in separate functions. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add more checksum and encryption types. + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: Add etype to krb5_decrypt. + +Sun Jul 6 23:02:59 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/[gs]et_default_realm.c, kuserok.c: new files + + * lib/krb5/config_file.[ch]: new c-based configuration reading + stuff + +Wed Jul 2 23:12:56 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: Set WFLAGS if using gcc + +Wed Jul 2 17:47:03 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (der_put_int): Return size correctly. + + * admin/ank.c: Be compatible with the asn1 principal format. + +Wed Jul 1 23:52:20 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1: Now all decode_* and encode_* functions now take a + final size_t* argument, that they return the size in. Return + values are zero for success, and anything else (such as some + ASN1_* constant) for error. + +Mon Jun 30 06:08:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_add_entry): change open mode to + O_WRONLY | O_APPEND + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: removed stale prototype for + `extract_ticket' and corrected call. + + * lib/asn1/gen_length.c (length_type): Make the length functions + for SequenceOf non-destructive + + * admin/ank.c (doit): Fix reading of `y/n'. + +Mon Jun 16 05:41:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/wrap.c, unwrap.c: do encrypt and add sequence number + + * lib/gssapi/get_mic.c, verify_mic.c: Add sequence number. + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): Set + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE. Verify 8003 checksum. + + * lib/gssapi/8003.c: New file. + + * lib/krb/krb5.h: Define a `krb_authenticator' as an ASN.1 + Authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: New functions + `krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber' and `krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber' + +Tue Jun 10 00:35:54 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5: Preapre for use of some asn1-types. + + * lib/asn1/*.c (copy_*): Constness. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Include asn1.h; krb5_data is now an + octet_string. + + * lib/asn1/der*,gen.c: krb5_data -> octet_string, char * -> + general_string + + * lib/asn1/libasn1.h: Moved stuff from asn1_locl.h that doesn't + have anything to do with asn1_compile. + + * lib/asn1/asn1_locl.h: Remove der.h. Add some prototypes. + +Sun Jun 8 03:51:55 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fix PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + * kdc/connect.c(process_request): Set `new' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Do PA-ENC-TS-ENC the correct way. + + * lib: Added editline,sl,roken. + +Mon Jun 2 00:37:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: Move file cache from cache.c. + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: Allow more than one cache type. + +Sun Jun 1 23:45:33 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/extkeytab.c: Merged with kdb_edit. + +Sun Jun 1 23:23:08 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kdc.c: more support for ENC-TS-ENC + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: redone to enable pre-authentication + +Sun Jun 1 22:45:11 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/db.c: Merge fetch and store. + + * admin: Merge to one program. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Fill in keytype and length. + +Sun Jun 1 16:31:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c, lib/krb5/rd_priv.c, lib/krb5/mk_rep.c, + lib/krb5/mk_priv.c, lib/krb5/build_auth.c: Some support for + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (get_in_tkt): be prepared to parse an + KRB_ERROR. Some support for PA_ENC_TS_ENC. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: implemented seq_number functions + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c, generate_seq_number.c: new files + + * lib/gssapi/gssapi.h: avoid including + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: SUFFIXES as a variable to make automake + happy + + * kdc/kdc.c: preliminary PREAUTH_ENC_TIMESTAMP + + * configure.in: adapted to automake 1.1p + +Mon May 26 22:26:21 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Add contexts to many functions. + +Thu May 15 20:25:37 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: First stab at a verify user. + + * lib/auth/sia/sia5.c: SIA module for Kerberos 5. + +Mon Apr 14 00:09:03 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi: Enough of a gssapi-over-krb5 implementation to be + able to (mostly) run gss-client and gss-server. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: implemented krb5_kt_add_entry, + krb5_kt_store_principal, krb5_kt_store_keyblock + + * lib/des/md5.[ch], sha.[ch]: new files + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (generalizedtime2time): use `timegm' + + * lib/asn1/timegm.c: new file + + * admin/extkeytab.c: new program + + * admin/admin_locl.h: new file + + * admin/Makefile.am: Added extkeytab + + * configure.in: moved config to include + removed timezone garbage + added lib/gssapi and admin + + * Makefile.am: Added admin + +Mon Mar 17 11:34:05 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc.c: Use new copying functions, and free some data. + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: Try to not always rebuild generated files. + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: Add fix_dce(). + + * lib/asn1/der_{get,length,put}.c: Fix include files. + + * lib/asn1/der_free.c: Remove unused functions. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Split into gen_encode, gen_decode, gen_free, + gen_length, and gen_copy. + +Sun Mar 16 18:13:52 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c: implemented functionality + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c: Use `krb5_decrypt' + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_get_name): return default if `id' == + NULL + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_free_principal): added `context' + argument. Changed all callers. + + (krb5_sname_to_principal): new function + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_free_authenticator): add `context' + argument. Changed all callers + + * lib/krb5/{net_write.c,net_read.c,recvauth.c}: new files + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Fix encoding and decoding of BitStrings + +Fri Mar 14 11:29:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: look for *dbm? + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Fix filename in generated files. Check fopens. + Put trailing newline in asn1_files. + +Fri Mar 14 05:06:44 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Fix some memory leaks. + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: Properly free hostlist. + + * lib/krb5/decrypt.c: CRCs are 32 bits. + +Fri Mar 14 04:39:15 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Generate one file for each type. + +Fri Mar 14 04:13:47 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Generate `length_FOO' functions + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c: new file + + * kuser/klist.c: renamed stime -> printable_time to avoid conflict + on HP/UX + +Fri Mar 14 03:37:23 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: Return NOENTRY if fetch fails. Don't free + datums. Don't add .db to filename. + +Fri Mar 14 02:49:51 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/dump.c: Database dump program. + + * kdc/ank.c: Trivial database editing program. + + * kdc/{kdc.c, load.c}: Use libhdb. + + * lib/hdb: New database routine library. + + * lib/krb5/error/Makefile.am: Add hdb_err. + +Wed Mar 12 17:41:14 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc.c: Rewritten AS, and somewhat more working TGS support. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Generate free functions. + + * Some specific free functions. + +Wed Mar 12 12:30:13 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_mk_req_ext.c: new file + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: optimize the case with a simple type + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_credentials): Use + `mk_req_extended' and remove old code. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (decrypt_tkt): First try with an + EncASRepPart, then with an EncTGSRepPart. + +Wed Mar 12 08:26:04 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: New resizable memory storage. + + * lib/krb5/{store.c, store_fd.c, store_mem.c}: Split of store.c + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add free entry to krb5_storage. + + * lib/krb5/decrypt.c: Make keyblock const. + +Tue Mar 11 20:22:17 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add EncTicketPart to krb5_ticket. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Return whole asn.1 ticket in + krb5_ticket->tkt. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: TGS -> AS + + * kuser/kfoo.c: Print error string rather than number. + + * kdc/kdc.c: Some kind of non-working TGS support. + +Mon Mar 10 01:43:22 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: reduced generated code by 1/5 + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: (der_put_length_and_tag): new function + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_match_tag_and_length): new function + + * lib/asn1/der.h: added prototypes + +Mon Mar 10 01:15:43 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Include . Add prototype for + krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Add function krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock that + takes a precomputed keyblock. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Use krb5_mk_req rather than inlined code. + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c: Calculate checksum of in_data. + +Sun Mar 9 21:17:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/error/compile_et.awk: Add a declaration of struct + error_list, and multiple inclusion block to header files. + +Sun Mar 9 21:01:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: do some checks on times + + * lib/krb/{mk_priv.c, rd_priv.c, sendauth.c, decrypt.c, + address.c}: new files + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: more code + + * configure.in: try to figure out timezone + +Sat Mar 8 11:41:07 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/error/error.c: Try strerror if error code wasn't found. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Remove realm parameter from + krb5_get_salt. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Initialize error table. + + * kdc: The beginnings of a kdc. + +Sat Mar 8 08:16:28 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c (krb5_verify_checksum): New function + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: use krb5_create_checksum + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/store.c: no more arithmetic with void* + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: now seems to work again + +Sat Mar 8 06:58:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: Add asn1_glue.c and error/*.c to libkrb5. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Moved some functions to asn1_glue.c. + + * lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c: Moved some asn1-stuff here. + + * lib/krb5/{cache,keytab}.c: Use new storage functions. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Protypes for new storage functions. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Make krb5_{ret,store}_* functions able to write + data to more than file descriptors. + +Sat Mar 8 01:01:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: New file. + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: More -I + + * configure.in: Test for big endian, random, rand, setitimer + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: perhaps even decodes bitstrings + +Thu Mar 6 19:05:29 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/config_file.y: Better return values on error. + +Sat Feb 8 15:59:56 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/parse.y: ifdef HAVE_STRDUP + + * lib/asn1/lex.l: ifdef strdup + brange-dead version of list of special characters to make stupid + lex accept it. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: A DER integer should really be a `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: A DER integer should really be a `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c: A DER integer should really be a `unsigned' + + * lib/krb5/error/Makefile.am: It seems "$(SHELL) ./compile_et" is + needed. + + * lib/krb/mk_rep.c, lib/krb/rd_req.c, lib/krb/store.c, + lib/krb/store.h: new files. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: now even with some functionality. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: changed paramater from void * to Foo * + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_octet_string): Fixed bug with empty + string. + +Sun Jan 19 06:17:39 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_credentials): Check for creds in + cc before getting new ones. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_free_keyblock): Fix prototype. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): It seems the + CRC should be stored LSW first. (?) + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Implement `krb5_auth_con_getkey' and + `krb5_free_keyblock' + + * lib/**/Makefile.am: Rename foo libfoo.a + + * include/Makefile.in: Use test instead of [ + -e does not work with /bin/sh on psoriasis + + * configure.in: Search for awk + create lib/krb/error/compile_et + +Tue Jan 14 03:46:26 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: replaced mit-crc.c by crc.c + +Wed Dec 18 00:53:55 1996 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: Guess principal. + + * lib/krb5/error/compile_et.awk: Don't include krb5.h. Fix some + warnings. + + * lib/krb5/error/asn1_err.et: Add ASN.1 error messages. + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c: Get client from cache. + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: Add better error checking some useful return + values. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Fix krb5_auth_context. + + * lib/asn1/der.h: Make krb5_data compatible with krb5.h + +Tue Dec 17 01:32:36 1996 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/error: Add primitive error library. + +Mon Dec 16 16:30:20 1996 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: Get correct address type from cache. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Change int16 to int to be compatible with asn1. + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.1999 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.1999 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e022b96824 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.1999 @@ -0,0 +1,2194 @@ +1999-12-30 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (krb4): use `-ldes' in tests + +1999-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/print.c (event2string): handle events without principal. + From Luke Howard + +1999-12-25 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2j + +Tue Dec 21 18:03:17 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (asn1_files): add $(EXEEXT) for cygwin and + related systems + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (asn1_files): add $(EXEEXT) for cygwin and + related systems + + * include/Makefile.am (krb5-types.h): add $(EXEEXT) for cygwin and + related systems + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2i + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 6:3:1 + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_via_proxy): free data + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_via_proxy): new function use + getaddrinfo instead of gethostbyname{,2} + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: use getaddrinfo instead of + getnodebyname{,2} + +1999-12-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2h + +1999-12-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2g + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:2:1 + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): handle + ai_canonname not being set + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): handle + ai_canonname not being set + + * appl/test/uu_server.c: print messages to stderr + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: print messages to stderr + * appl/test/nt_gss_server.c: print messages to stderr + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c: print messages to stderr + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c (proto): remove shadowing `context' + * appl/test/common.c (client_doit): add forgotten ntohs + +1999-12-13 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (VERISON): bump to 0.2g-pre + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): be more + robust and handle extra dot at the beginning of default_domain + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2f + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:1:1 + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (get_kdc_address): use + `krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst' + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst): add + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: add support for _kerberos.domain + (according to draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-01.txt) + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2e + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): use the correct + address + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:0:1 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:4:0 + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: move AC_KRB_IPv6 to make sure it's performed + before AC_BROKEN + (el_init): use new feature of AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS + + * appl/test/uu_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/test_locl.h (client_doit): add prototype + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/nt_gss_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/common.c (client_doit): move identical code here and + start using getaddrinfo + + * appl/kf/kf.c (doit): rewrite to use getaddrinfo + * kdc/hprop.c: re-write to use getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): use + getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: re-write to use getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_parse_address): use getaddrinfo + +1999-12-03 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (BROKEN): check for freeaddrinfo, getaddrinfo, + getnameinfo, gai_strerror + (socklen_t): check for + +1999-12-02 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: ARCFOUR_set_key -> RC4_set_key + +1999-11-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (ARCFOUR_string_to_key): change order of bytes + within unicode characters. this should probably be done in some + arbitrarly complex way to do it properly and you would have to + know what character encoding was used for the password and salt + string. + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv4_uninteresting): ignore 0.0.0.0 + (INADDR_ANY) + (ipv6_uninteresting): remove unused macro + +1999-11-22 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: rc4->arcfour + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: rc4->arcfour + +1999-11-17 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: add + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_keytype): add KEYTYPE_RC4 + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: some code for doing RC4/MD5/HMAC which might + not be totally different from some small company up in the + north-west corner of the US + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): change code to + actually increment buf_size + +1999-11-14 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add `scan_interfaces' + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (krb5_get_all_client_addrs): make interaces + scanning optional + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): set + `scan_interfaces' + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add add_et_list.c + * lib/krb5/add_et_list.c (krb5_add_et_list): new function + +1999-11-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c (krb5_get_default_realm, + krb5_get_default_realms): set realms if they were unset + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): don't + initialize default realms here. it's done lazily instead. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_TC_*): make constants unsigned + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_2int, generate_units): make sure + bit constants are unsigned + * lib/asn1/gen.c (define_type): make length in sequences be + unsigned. + + * configure.in: remove duplicate test for setsockopt test for + struct tm.tm_isdst + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): generate + preauthentication information if we get back ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): remove + preauthentication generation code. it's now in krb5_get_in_cred + + * configure.in (AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF): add strptime check for struct + tm.tm_gmtoff and timezone + +1999-11-11 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/main.c: make this work with multi-db + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: make this work with multi-db + + * kdc/config.c: make this work with multi-db + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/misc.c: update for multi-database code + + * kdc/main.c: update for multi-database code + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: update + + * kdc/config.c: allow us to have more than one database + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2d + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 to be safe + (krb5_context_data has changed and some code do (might) access + fields directly) + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add `etypes_des' + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): use + krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default): new + function + + * lib/krb5/context.c (set_etypes): new function + (init_context_from_config_file): set both `etypes' and `etypes_des' + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (VERSION): bump to 0.2d-pre + +1999-10-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_parse_name): check memory allocations + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2c + + * lib/krb5/dump_config.c (print_tree): check for empty tree + + * lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c (tests): update the test cases + with empty principals so that they actually use an empty realm and + not the default. use the correct etype for 3DES + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 4:1:0 + + * kdc/config.c (configure): more careful with the port string + +1999-10-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2b + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:0 + (krb524_convert_creds_kdc and potentially some other functions + have changed prototypes) + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:1 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:3:0 + + * configure.in (LIB_roken): add dbopen. getcap in roken + references dbopen and with shared libraries we need to add this + dependency. + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c (main): support speicifying the + configuration file to test on the command line + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding): handle line with no + whitespace before = + (krb5_config_parse_file_debug): set lineno earlier so that we don't + use it unitialized + + * configure.in (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump to 0.2b-pre opt*: need + more include files for these tests + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c (krb5_set_default_realm): use + krb5_config_get_strings, which means that your configuration file + should look like: + + [libdefaults] + default_realm = realm1 realm2 realm3 + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c (config_binding_to_list): fix + copy-o. From Michal Vocu + + * kdc/config.c (configure): add a missing strdup. From Michal + Vocu + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2a + + * configure.in: only test for db.h with using berkeley_db. remember + to link with LIB_tgetent when checking for el_init. add xnlock + + * appl/Makefile.am: add xnlock + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (find_etype): support null keys + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (get_des_key): support null keys + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_get_wrapped_length): more correct + calculation + +1999-10-16 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): pass ccache to krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-10-12 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_enctype_to_keytype): remove warning + +1999-10-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use krb5_free_host_realm + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_ccache_data): make `ops' const + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_string_to_salttype): new function + + * **/*.[ch]: const-ize + +1999-10-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): const-ify + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: clean-up and comment-up + + * lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c (krb5_copy_host_realm): copy all the + strings + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c (krb5_verify_user_lrealm): free the + correct realm part + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): things work much better when ret is + initialized + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): look at the + type of the session key + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys): spell + correctly + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): fix spelling of + krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): get new + credentials from the KDC if the existing one doesn't have a DES + session key. + + * lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c (get_ad_tkt): update to new + krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-10-03 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: make krb5_akf_ops const + + * lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c: make krb5_mkt_ops const + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: make krb5_fkt_ops const + +1999-10-01 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: rewritten to allow error messages + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (bin_PROGRAMS): add verify_krb5_conf + (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add config_file_netinfo.c + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: new program for verifying that + krb5.conf is corret + + * lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c: moved netinfo code here from + config_file.c + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): kludge default_realm + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: add test cases for Generalized time and + make sure we return the correct value + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: simplify by using der_put_length_and_tag + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c (krb5_verify_user_lrealm): ariant of + krb5_verify_user that tries in all the local realms + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c: add support for having several + default realms + + * lib/krb5/kuserok.c (krb5_kuserok): use `krb5_get_default_realms' + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c (krb5_get_default_realms): add + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): change `default_realm' to + `default_realms' + + * lib/krb5/context.c: change from `default_realm' to + `default_realms' + + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c (krb5_aname_to_localname): use + krb5_get_default_realms + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add copy_host_realm.c + + * lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c: new file + +1999-09-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (encode_generalized_time): encode length + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c: new function `krb5_recvauth_match_version' + that allows more intelligent matching of the application version + +1999-09-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: add err.h + + * kdc/config.c (configure): use parse_bytes + + * appl/test/nt_gss_common.c: use the correct header file + +1999-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: add a `--cache' flag + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): only get default value for `get_v4_tgt' if + it's explicitly set in krb5.conf + +1999-09-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c (tag_names); add another univeral tag + + * lib/asn1/der.h: update universal tags + +1999-09-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c (loop): print length of octet string + +1999-09-21 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_get): add `--help' + +1999-09-21 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/Makefile.am: add kdecode_ticket + + * kuser/kdecode_ticket.c: new debug program + + * appl/test/nt_gss_server.c: new program to test against `Sample * + SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + + * appl/test/Makefile.am: add nt_gss_client and nt_gss_server + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (decode_general_string): remember to advance + ret over the length-len + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: add asn1_print + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: new program for printing DER-structures + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: make functions more consistent + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c: make functions more consistent + +1999-09-20 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: be more informative in pa-data error messages + +1999-09-16 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: test for strlcpy, strlcat + +1999-09-14 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): return + KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR when interrupted + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c (krb5_password_key_proc): check return + value from des_read_pw_string + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): don't print any error if reading the + password was interrupted + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): don't print any error if reading the + password was interrupted + + * kdc/string2key.c (main): check the return value from fgets + + * kdc/kstash.c (main): check return value from des_read_pw_string + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_add): check the return-value from fgets and + overwrite the password for paranoid reasons + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (get_cell_and_realm): only remove the + newline if it's there + +1999-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (main): remove bogus error with `--print'. remove + sysloging of number of principals transferred + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_convert): set flags correctly for krbtgt/CELL + principals + (main): get rid of bogus opening of hdb database when propagating + ka-server database + +1999-09-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h (O_BINARY): add fallback definition + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add keytab types + + * configure.in: revert back awk test, not worked around in + roken.awk + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: remove O_BINARY + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: some support for AFS KeyFile's. From + Love + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: remove O_BINARY + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: move the list of keytab types to the context + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: remove O_BINARY + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): register all + standard cache and keytab types + (krb5_free_context): free `kt_types' + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_resolve): move the registration of the + standard types of credential caches to context + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add keytab_keyfile.c + +1999-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: add comments and clean-up + + * admin/ktutil.c: add `ktutil copy' + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_kt_cursor): add a `data' field + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add keytab_krb4.c + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: add krb4 and correct some if's + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): move common code + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_fkt_ops, krb5_mkt_ops): new variables + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: move out file and memory functions + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add keytab_file.c, + keytab_memory.c + + * lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: new file + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: move out password quality functions + +1999-09-07 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_SOURCES): add keytab.c. From + Love + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): check + return value from `krb5_sendto_kdc' + +1999-09-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_and_recv): rename to recv_loop and + remove the sending of data. add a parameter `limit'. let callers + send the date themselves (and preferably with net_write on tcp + sockets) + (send_and_recv_tcp): read first the length field and then only that + many bytes + +1999-09-05 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): try to print warning `TCP data of + strange type' less often + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_and_recv): handle EINTR properly. + return on EOF. always free data. check return value from + realloc. + (send_and_recv_tcp, send_and_recv_http): check advertised length + against actual length + +1999-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for sgi capabilities + +1999-08-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: krb5_get_all_server_addrs shouldn't return + extra addresses + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use HDB keytabs; change some error messages; + add --realm flag + + * lib/krb5/address.c (krb5_append_addresses): remove duplicates + +1999-08-26 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/keytab.c: HDB keytab backend + +1999-08-25 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c + (krb5_kt_{start_seq_get,next_entry,end_seq_get}): check for NULL + pointer + +1999-08-24 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: add `--keytab' flag + +1999-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4): use `s6_addr' + instead of the non-standard `s6_addr32'. From Yoshinobu Inoue + by way of the KAME repository + +1999-08-18 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (--enable-new-des3-code): remove check for `struct + addrinfo' + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (etypes): remove NEW_DES3_CODE, enable + des3-cbc-sha1 and keep old-des3-cbc-sha1 for backwards + compatability + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_enctype): des3-cbc-sha1 (with key + derivation) just got assigned etype 16 by . keep the + old etype at 7. + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): only look at errno if + krb5_net_read actually returns -1 + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c (krb5_recvauth): only look at errno if + krb5_net_read actually returns -1 + + * appl/kf/kf.c (proto): don't trust errno if krb5_net_read hasn't + returned -1 + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c (proto): only trust errno if + krb5_net_read actually returns -1 + + * appl/kf/kfd.c (proto): be more careful with the return value + from krb5_net_read + +1999-08-13 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (get_addrs_int): try the different ways + sequentially instead of just one. this helps if your heimdal was + built with v6-support but your kernel doesn't have it, for + example. + +1999-08-12 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c: add inetd flag. default means try to figure out + if stdin is a socket or not. + + * Makefile.am (ACLOCAL): just use `cf', this variable is only used + when the current directory is $(top_srcdir) anyways and having + $(top_srcdir) there breaks if it's a relative path + +1999-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for setproctitle + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): remember to call + freehostent + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: call freehostent + + * appl/kf/kf.c (doit): call freehostent + + * appl/kf/kf.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: simplify by using krb5_err instead of + errx + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: simplify by using krb5_err instead of + errx + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1m + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): some more KRB4-conditionalizing + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: type correctness + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_fwd_tgs_creds): set forwarded in + flags. From Miroslav Ruda + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): add config file support for forwardable + and krb4 support. From Miroslav Ruda + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): add an empty X500-compress string as + transited. + (fix_transited_encoding): check length. + From Miroslav Ruda + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): check the realm so that we don't dump + principals in some other realm. From Miroslav Ruda + + (main): rename sa_len -> sin_len, sa_lan is a define on some + platforms. + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: add regpag support. From Miroslav Ruda + + + * appl/kf/kf.c: add `-G' and forwardable option in krb5.conf. + From Miroslav Ruda + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_list): don't run past end of line + + * appl/test/gss_common.h: new prototypes + + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c: use gss_err instead of abort + + * appl/test/gss_common.c (gss_verr, gss_err): add + +1999-08-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (n_fold_test_LDADD): need to set this + otherwise it doesn't build with shared libraries + + * kdc/hpropd.c: v6-ify + + * kdc/hprop.c: v6-ify + +1999-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use krb5_expand_hostname + +1999-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm_int): new + function that takes a FQDN + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add exapnd_hostname.c + + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c: new file + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1l + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:2:0 + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 3:1:0 + + * configure.in: more inet_pton to roken + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use + getipnodebyname + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1k + +1999-07-26 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version number (changed function + signatures) + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version number (changes to some + function signatures) + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 3:0:2 + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version to 2:1:0 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:1:0 + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1j + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: rokenize inet_ntop + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + + * lib/krb5/store.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + (krb5_ret_stringz): check return value from realloc + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c: some type correctness + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c: some type correctness + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_storage): change return values of + functions from size_t to ssize_t + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1i + + * configure.in (AC_PROG_AWK): disable. mawk seems to mishandle \# + in lib/roken/roken.awk + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): try to use SA_LEN to + step over addresses if there's no `sa_lan' field + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c (krb5_sock_to_principal): simplify by + using `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): simplify by using + `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): simplify by using + `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd): + simplify by using `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (*): simplify by using `struct + sockaddr_storage' + + * kdc/connect.c (*): simplify by using `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * configure.in (sa_family_t): just test for existence + (sockaddr_storage): also specify include file + + * configure.in (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump version to 0.1i + (sa_family_t): test for + (struct sockaddr_storage): test for + + * kdc/hprop.c (propagate_database): typo, NULL should be + auth_context + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: conditionalize on HAVE_IPV6 instead of + AF_INET6 + + * appl/kf/kf.c (main): use warnx + + * appl/kf/kf.c (proto): remove shadowing context + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): try to handle the + case of getting back an `sockaddr_in6' address when sizeof(struct + sockaddr_in6) > sizeof(struct sockaddr) and we have no sa_len to + tell us how large the address is. This obviously doesn't work + with unknown protocol types. + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1h + +1999-07-23 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: clean-up and more paranoia + + * etc/services.append: add kf + + * appl/kf/kf.c: rename tk_file to ccache for consistency. clean-up + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c (main): print the correct data + + * appl/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): add kf + + * appl/kf: new program. From Miroslav Ruda + + * kdc/hprop.c: declare some variables unconditionally to simplify + things + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: initialize kadm5 connection for every change + (otherwise the modifier in the database doesn't get set) + + * kdc/hpropd.c: clean-up and re-organize + + * kdc/hprop.c: clean-up and re-organize + + * configure.in (SunOS): define to xy for SunOS x.y + +1999-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (AC_BROKEN): test for copyhostent, freehostent, + getipnodebyaddr, getipnodebyname + +1999-07-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: more test cases for integers + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c (length_int): handle the case of the + largest negative integer by not calling abs + +1999-07-14 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c (generic_test): check malloc return value + properly + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add string_to_key_test + + * lib/krb5/prog_setup.c (krb5_program_setup): always initialize + the context + + * lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c (main): return a relevant return value + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: do SRV lookups for admin server as well. + some clean-up. + +1999-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: handle not building X programs + +1999-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv6_parse_addr): remove duplicate + variable + (ipv6_sockaddr2port): fix typo + + * etc/services.append: beginning of a file with services + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_resolve): fall-back to files if + there's no prefix. also clean-up a little bit. + + * kdc/hprop.c (--kaspecials): new flag for handling special KA + server entries. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + +1999-07-05 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): make sure we have data before + starting to look for HTTP + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): always do getpeername, we can't + trust recvfrom to return anything sensible + +1999-07-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (add_padat): encrypt pre-auth data with + all enctypes + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (change): fetch the salt-type from the entry + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): better error messages + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (unparse_name): error check malloc properly + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_init_etype): error check malloc + properly + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (*): do some malloc return-value checks + properly + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_process_master_key): simplify by using + krb5_data_alloc + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_process_master_key): check return value from + malloc + + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c (decode_type): fix generation of decoding + information for TSequenceOf. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): check return value from + malloc + +1999-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/der_copy.c (copy_octet_string): don't fail if length == + 0 and malloc returns NULL + +1999-06-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv6_parse_addr): implement + +1999-06-24 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c (krb5_rd_cred): compare the sender's address + as an addrport one + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT, KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT): + add + (krb5_auth_context): add local and remote port + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): get the + local and remote address and add them to the krb-cred packet + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: save the local and remove ports in the + auth_context + + * lib/krb5/address.c (krb5_make_addrport): create an address of + type KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT from (addr, port) + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_sockaddr2port): new function for + grabbing the port number out of the sockaddr + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/srvcreate.c (srvcreate): always take the DES-CBC-MD5 key. + increase possible verbosity. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_list): handle blank lines at + another place + + * kdc/connect.c (add_port_string): don't return a value + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (get_cred_cache): you cannot reuse the cred + cache if the principals are different. close and NULL the old one + so that we create a new one. + + * configure.in: move around cgywin et al + (LIB_kdb): set at the end of krb4-block + (krb4): test for krb_enable_debug and krb_disable_debug + +1999-06-16 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (main): try to destroy v4 ticket even if the + destruction of the v5 one fails + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (DES3_postproc): new version that does the + right thing + (*): don't put and recover length in 3DES encoding + other small fixes + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: rewrite to use + get_default_username + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add n-fold-test + + * kdc/connect.c: add fallbacks for all lookups by service name + (handle_tcp): break-up and clean-up + +1999-06-09 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv6_uninteresting): don't consider + the loopback address as uninteresting + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: new magic flag to get loopback address if + there are no other addresses. + (krb5_get_all_client_addrs): use that flag + +1999-06-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (HMAC_SHA1_DES3_checksum): don't include the + length + (checksum_sha1, checksum_hmac_sha1_des3): blocksize should be 64 + (encrypt_internal_derived): don't include the length and don't + decrease by the checksum size twice + (_get_derived_key): the constant should be 5 bytes + +1999-06-02 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use KRB_CHECK_X + + * configure.in: check for netinet/ip.h + +1999-05-31 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (setup_passwd_quality_check): conditionalize + on RTLD_NOW + +1999-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/test/uu_server.c: removed unused stuff + + * appl/test/uu_client.c: removed unused stuff + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kgetcred.c (main): correct error message + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (verify_checksum): call (*ct->checksum) + directly, avoiding redundant lookups and memory leaks + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd): free + local and remote addresses + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c (get_logname): also try + $USERNAME + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (asn1_files): add $(EXEEXT) + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (USE_RESOLVER): try to define only if we + have a libresolv (currently by checking for res_search) + +1999-05-18 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): remove %-escapes in request + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1g + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_remove): -t should be -e + + * configure.in (CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP): use + + * kdc/hpropd.c: support for dumping to krb4. From Miroslav Ruda + + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_add): new option `--no-salt'. From Miroslav + Ruda + + * configure.in: add cygwin and DOS tests replace sendmsg, recvmsg, + and innetgr with roken versions + + * kuser/kgetcred.c: new program + +Tue May 11 14:09:33 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: fix paste-o + +1999-05-10 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: don't use uname + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h (KRB_PUT_INT): if we don't have KRB4 use four + arguments :-) + + * appl/test/uu_server.c (setsockopt): cast to get rid of a warning + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c (setsockopt): cast to get rid of a + warning + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c (proto): call krb5_sendauth with ccache + == NULL + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c (setsockopt): cast to get rid of a + warning + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): handle ccache == NULL by + setting the default ccache. + + * configure.in (getsockopt, setsockopt): test for + (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump version to 0.1g + + * appl/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): add kx + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c (main): handle the case of no master key + +1999-05-09 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1f + + * kuser/kinit.c: add --noaddresses + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (init_as_req): interpret `addrs' being an + empty sit of list as to not ask for any addresses. + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h (_GNU_SOURCE): define this to enable (used) + extensions on glibc-based systems such as linux + +1999-05-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_from_kdc_flags): allocate and free + `*out_creds' properly + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): just verify that the + keytypes/enctypes are compatible, not that they are the same + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (cache): const-correctness + +1999-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_set_master_key): initialise master key + version + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: add support for upgrading database + versions + + * kdc/misc.c: add flags to fetch + + * kdc/kstash.c: unlink keyfile on failure, chmod to 400 + + * kdc/hpropd.c: add --print option + + * kdc/hprop.c: pass flags to hdb_foreach + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: add some flags + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: remove extra LDFLAGS, update version to 2; + build prototype headers + + * lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h: update prototypes + + * lib/hdb/print.c: move printable version of entry from kadmin + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: change hdb_{seal,unseal}_* to check if the key is + sealed or not; add flags to hdb_foreach + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: add flags to NDBM_seq, NDBM_firstkey, and + NDBM_nextkey + + * lib/hdb/db.c: add flags to DB_seq, DB_firstkey, and DB_nextkey + + * lib/hdb/common.c: add flags to _hdb_{fetch,store} + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: add master_key_version to struct hdb, update + prototypes + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: make mkvno optional, update version to 2 + + * configure.in: --enable-netinfo + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: HAVE_NETINFO_NI_H -> HAVE_NETINFO + + * config.sub: fix for crays + + * config.guess: new version from automake 1.4 + + * config.sub: new version from automake 1.4 + +Wed Apr 28 00:21:17 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1e + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_get_next): get the current cursor + correctly + + * acconfig.h: correct definition of KRB_PUT_INT for old krb4 code. + From Ake Sandgren + +1999-04-27 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: fix arguments to decrypt_ticket + +1999-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_internal): try to handle old + DCE secd's that are not able to handle MD5 checksums by defaulting + to MD4 if the keytype was DES-CBC-CRC + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use auth_context->keytype + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_auth_context_data): add `keytype' and + `cksumtype' + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (make_pa_tgs_req): remove old kludge for + secd + (init_tgs_req): add all supported enctypes for the keytype in + `in_creds->session.keytype' if it's set + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (F_PSEUDO): new flag for non-protocol + encryption types + (do_checksum): new function + (verify_checksum): take the checksum to use from the checksum message + and not from the crypto struct + (etypes): add F_PSEUDO flags + (krb5_keytype_to_enctypes): new function + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): initalize keytype + and cksumtype + (krb5_auth_setcksumtype, krb5_auth_getcksumtype): implement + (krb5_auth_setkeytype, krb5_auth_getkeytype): implement + (krb5_auth_setenctype): comment out, it's rather bogus anyway + +Sun Apr 25 16:55:50 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: fix for stupid aix warnings + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (erase_file): don't malloc + +Sat Apr 24 18:35:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/config.c: pass context to krb5_config_file_free + + * kuser/kinit.c: add `--fcache-version' to set cache version to + create + + * kuser/klist.c: print cache version if verbose + + * lib/krb5/transited.c (krb5_domain_x500_decode): don't abort + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): init + fcache_version; add krb5_{get,set}_fcache_version + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: add support for reading (and writing?) old + version keytabs + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: add krb5_cc_get_version + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: add support for reading and writing old + version cache files + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c (krb5_storage_from_mem): zero flags + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (krb5_storage_emem): zero flags + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (krb5_storage_from_fd): zero flags + + * lib/krb5/store.c: add flags to change how various fields are + stored, used for old cache version support + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add support for reading and writing old version + cache files, and keytabs + +Wed Apr 21 00:09:26 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: fix test for readline.h remember to link with + $LIB_tgetent when trying linking with readline + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (get_init_creds_common): if start_time + is given, request a postdated ticket. + + * lib/krb5/data.c (krb5_data_free): free data as long as it's not + NULL + +Tue Apr 20 20:18:14 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am (kpasswdd_LDADD): add LIB_dlopen + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID): add + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_decrypt_ticket): add `flags` and + KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID for ignoring that the ticket is + invalid + +Tue Apr 20 12:42:08 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: don't try to load library by default; get + library and function name from krb5.conf + + * kpasswd/sample_passwd_check.c: sample password checking + functions + +Mon Apr 19 22:22:19 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_storage_to_data, krb5_ret_data): use + krb5_data_alloc and be careful with checking allocation and sizes. + + * kuser/klist.c (--tokens): conditionalize on KRB4 + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): set all flags + (main): fix cut-n-paste error when setting start-time + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_tgs_flags): starttime of a validate + ticket should be > than current time + (*): send flags to krb5_verify_ap_req and krb5_decrypt_ticket + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): use the client realm instead of + the local realm when renewing tickets. + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_fwd_tgs_creds): compat function + (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): correct freeing of out_creds + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): hopefully fix up freeing of + memory + + * configure.in: do all the krb4 tests with "$krb4" != "no" + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c (krb5_free_keyblock_contents): don't zero + keyvalue if it's NULL. noticed by Ake Sandgren + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (add_padata): loop over all enctypes + instead of just taking the first one. fix all callers. From + "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h (enable_kaserver): declaration + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_convert): print the failing principal. AFS 3.4a + creates krbtgt.REALMOFCELL as NOTGS+NOSEAL, work around. From + "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + * kdc/hpropd.c (open_socket): stupid cast to get rid of a warning + + * kdc/connect.c (add_standard_ports, process_request): look at + enable_kaserver. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + + * kdc/config.c: new flag --kaserver and config file option + enable-kaserver. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + +Mon Apr 19 12:32:04 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for dlopen, and dlfcn.h + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: add support for dlopen:ing password quality + check library + + * configure.in: add appl/su + +Sun Apr 18 15:46:53 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: add krb5_cc_get_type that returns type of a + cache + +Fri Apr 16 17:58:51 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: LIB_kdb: -L should be before -lkdb + test for prototype of strsep + +Thu Apr 15 11:34:38 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: update version + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): use + ALLOC_SEQ + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: add some support for reading and writing old + cache formats; + (fcc_store_cred): use krb5_store_creds; (fcc_read_cred): use + krb5_ret_creds + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c (krb5_storage_from_mem): check malloc, + initialize host_byteorder + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (krb5_storage_from_fd): initialize + host_byteorder + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (krb5_storage_emem): initialize + host_byteorder + + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_storage_set_host_byteorder): add; + (krb5_store_int32,krb5_ret_int32,krb5_store_int16,krb5_ret_int16): + check host_byteorder flag; (krb5_store_creds): add; + (krb5_ret_creds): add + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_storage): add `host_byteorder' flag for + storage of numbers + + * lib/krb5/heim_err.et: add `host not found' error + + * kdc/connect.c: don't use data after clearing decriptor + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/warn.c: add __attribute__; add *abort functions + + * configure.in: check for __attribute__ + + * kdc/connect.c: log bogus requests + +Tue Apr 13 18:38:05 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c (kadm5_s_create_principal): create v4 salts + for all DES keys + +1999-04-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): re-structure a little bit + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): some more error checking + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c (krb5_generate_subkey): check return + value from malloc + +Sun Apr 11 03:47:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: update to reality + + * lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3: update to reality + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: handle more than one realm for a host + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): use krb5_program_setup and + print_version + + * kdc/string2key.c (main): use krb5_program_setup and + print_version + +Sun Apr 11 02:35:58 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_524_conv_principal): make it actually + work, and check built-in list of host-type first-components + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: lookup SRV-records to find a kdc for a realm + + * lib/krb5/context.c: add srv_* flags to context + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: add default v4_name_convert entries + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add srv_* flags to context + +Sat Apr 10 22:52:28 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: complain about un-recognised commands + + * admin/ktutil.c: complain about un-recognised commands + +Sat Apr 10 15:41:49 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/load.c (doit): fix error message + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (encrypt_internal): free checksum if lengths + fail to match. + (krb5_get_wrapped_length): new function + + * configure.in: security/pam_modules.h: check for + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): kludge + around `ret_as_reply' semantics by only freeing it when ret == 0 + +Fri Apr 9 20:24:04 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/klist.c (print_cred_verbose): handle the case of a bad + enctype + + * configure.in: test for more header files + (LIB_roken): set + +Thu Apr 8 15:01:59 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: fixes for building w/o krb4 + + * ltmain.sh: update to libtool 1.2d + + * ltconfig: update to libtool 1.2d + +Wed Apr 7 23:37:26 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c: fix some error messages to be more understandable. + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_dump): remove unused variables + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: remove unused variables + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c: remove unused variables + + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c: remove unused variables + +Wed Apr 7 14:05:15 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_get_err_text): long -> krb5_error_code + + * kuser/klist.c: make it compile w/o krb4 + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: make it compile w/o krb4 + + * admin/ktutil.c: fix {srv,key}2{srv,key}tab confusion; add help + strings + +Mon Apr 5 16:13:46 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: test for MIPS ABI; new test_package + +Thu Apr 1 11:00:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * include/Makefile.am: clean krb5-private.h + + * Release 0.1d + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (doit): pass context to + krb5_get_all_client_addrs + + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): pass context to + krb5_get_all_server_addrs + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (init_as_req): pass context to + krb5_get_all_client_addrs + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_kdc_la): pass context to + krb5_get_all_client_addrs + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (get_addrs_int): add extra host addresses + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add support for adding an extra set of + addresses + + * lib/krb5/context.c: add support for adding an extra set of + addresses + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: add krb5_parse_address + + * lib/krb5/address.c: krb5_append_addresses + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding): don't zap everything + after first whitespace + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): don't allocate out + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): don't + allocate out_creds + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_kdc, get_cred_kdc_la): make + out_creds pointer; + (krb5_get_kdc_cred): allocate out_creds; (get_cred_from_kdc_flags): + free more memory + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (encrypt_internal): free checksum + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): free reply, + and ticket + + * kuser/Makefile.am: remove kfoo + + * lib/Makefile.am: add auth + + * lib/kadm5/iprop.h: getarg.h + + * lib/kadm5/replay_log.c: use getarg + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c: use getarg + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c: use getarg + + * lib/kadm5/dump_log.c: use getarg + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use getarg + + * Makefile.am.common: make a more working check-local target + + * lib/asn1/main.c: use getargs + +Mon Mar 29 20:19:57 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c (print_cred_verbose): use krb5_print_address + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): handle unknown + address types; (ipv6_print_addr): print in 16-bit groups (as it + should) + + * lib/krb5/crc.c: crc_{init_table,update} -> + _krb5_crc_{init_table,update} + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + crc_{init_table,update} -> _krb5_crc_{init_table,update} + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + + * lib/krb5/store.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: include krb5-private.h + + * kdc/connect.c (addr_to_string): use krb5_print_address + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): int -> size_t + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: add support for printing ipv6 + addresses, either with inet_ntop, or ugly for-loop + + * kdc/524.c: check that the ticket came from a valid address; use + the address of the connection as the address to put in the v4 + ticket (if this address is AF_INET) + + * kdc/connect.c: pass addr to do_524 + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: prototype for do_524 + +Sat Mar 27 17:48:31 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for OSF C2; bind/bitypes.h, getudbnam, + setlim; check for auth modules; siad.h, getpwnam_r; + lib/auth/Makefile, lib/auth/sia/Makefile + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: n_fold -> _krb5_n_fold + + * lib/krb5/n-fold.c: n_fold -> _krb5_n_fold + +Thu Mar 25 04:35:21 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): free salt when zapping + it + + * lib/kadm5/free.c (kadm5_free_principal_ent): free `key_data' + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_destroy): clear master key + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_destroy): clear master key + (DB_open): check malloc + + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): free addresses + + * kadmin/kadmin.c (main): make code more consistent. always free + configuration information. + + * kadmin/init.c (create_random_entry): free the entry + +Wed Mar 24 04:02:03 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): + re-organize the code to always free `kdc_reply' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): be more careful about + freeing memory + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_destroy): don't call fcc_close + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_crypto_destroy): free `crypto' + + * lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h: try db_185.h first in case db.h is a DB 2.0 + header + + * configure.in (db_185.h): check for + + * admin/srvcreate.c: new file. contributed by Daniel Kouril + + + * admin/ktutil.c: srvcreate: new command + + * kuser/klist.c: add support for printing AFS tokens + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: add support for destroying v4 tickets and AFS + tokens. based on code by Love + + * kuser/Makefile.am (kdestroy_LDADD, klist_LDADD): more libraries + + * configure.in: sys/ioccom.h: test for + + * kuser/klist.c (main): don't print `no ticket file' with --test. + From: Love + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (doit): more braces to make gcc happy + + * kdc/connect.c (init_socket): get rid of a stupid warning + + * include/bits.c (my_strupr): cast away some stupid warnings + +Tue Mar 23 14:34:44 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): no infinite + loops, please + +Tue Mar 23 00:00:45 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am (install_build_headers): recover from make + rewriting the names of the headers kludge to help solaris make + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: kludge to help solaris make + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: kludge to help solaris make + + * configure.in (LIB_kdb): make sure there's a -L option in here by + adding $(LIB_krb4) + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_2int, generate_int2): int -> + unsigned + + * configure.in (SunOS): set to a number KRB4, KRB5 conditionals: + remove the `dnl' to work around an automake flaw + +Sun Mar 21 15:08:49 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c: char* -> krb5_realm + +Sun Mar 21 14:08:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * include/bits.c: + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: create krb5-private.h + +Sat Mar 20 00:08:59 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (gethostname): remove duplicate + +Fri Mar 19 14:48:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: add version-info + + * lib/gssapi/Makefile.am: add version-info + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: use $(x:y=z) make syntax; move check-der + to check_PROGRAMS + + * lib/Makefile.am: add 45 + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: split in client and server libraries + (breaks shared libraries otherwise) + +Thu Mar 18 11:33:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * include/kadm5/Makefile.am: clean a lot of header files (since + automake lacks a clean-hook) + + * include/Makefile.am: clean a lot of header files (since automake + lacks a clean-hook) + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: fix build-installation of headers + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * include/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * doc/whatis.texi: define sub for html + + * configure.in: LIB_kdb, have_err_h, have_fnmatch_h, have_glob_h + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: der.h + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: admin.h -> kadm5/admin.h + + * kdc/Makefile.am: remove junk + + * kadmin/Makefile.am: sl.a -> sl.la + + * appl/afsutil/Makefile.am: remove EXTRA_bin_PROGRAMS + + * admin/Makefile.am: sl.a -> sl.la + + * configure.in: condition KRB5; AC_CHECK_XAU + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * include/kadm5/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common; don't + install headers from here + + * include/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common; don't install + headers from here + + * doc/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/gssapi/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/45/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kuser/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kdc/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kadmin/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * appl/test/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * appl/afsutil/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * appl/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * admin/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Wed Mar 17 03:04:38 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_store_stringz): braces fix + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): braces fix + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): braces fix + + * kdc/connect.c (loop): braces fix + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: cast to unsigned char to make is* happy + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_addlog_dest): more braces to make gcc happy + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_verify_checksum): rename C -> cksum to + be consistent + + * kadmin/util.c (timeval2str): more braces to make gcc happy + + * kadmin/load.c: cast in is* to get rid of stupid warning + + * kadmin/dump.c (append_hex): cast in isalnum to get rid of stupid + warning + + * kdc/kaserver.c: malloc checks and fixes + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): include leading + dot (if any) when looking up realms. + +Fri Mar 12 13:57:56 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: add dns support + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c: use krb5_free_host_realm + + * lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c: check for NULL realmlist + + * lib/krb5/context.c: don't print warning if there is no krb5.conf + +Wed Mar 10 19:29:46 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use AC_WFLAGS + +Mon Mar 8 11:49:43 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.1c + + * kuser/klist.c: use print_version + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: use print_version + + * kdc/hpropd.c: use print_version + + * kdc/hprop.c: use print_version + + * kdc/config.c: use print_version + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: use print_version + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: use print_version + + * appl/test/common.c: use print_version + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c: use print_version + +Mon Mar 1 10:49:14 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: SOCKADDR_HAS_SA_LEN -> + HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + + * configure.in, acconfig.h, cf/*: update to automake 1.4/autoconf 2.13 + +Sun Feb 28 18:19:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: make `BIT STRING's unsigned + + * lib/asn1/{symbol.h,gen.c}: add TUInteger type + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c (krb5_verify_user): pass prompter to + krb5_get_init_creds_password + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_gen_new): implement + +Sat Feb 27 22:41:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/install.texi: krb4 is now automatically detected + + * doc/misc.texi: update procedure to set supported encryption + types + + * doc/setup.texi: change some silly wordings + +Sat Feb 27 22:17:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (fkt_remove_entry): make this work + + * admin/ktutil.c: add minimally working `get' command + +Sat Feb 27 19:44:49 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: more typos + + * include/Makefile.am: remove EXTRA_DATA (as of autoconf + 2.13/automake 1.4) + + * appl/Makefile.am: OTP_dir + +Fri Feb 26 17:37:00 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/setup.texi: add kadmin section + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: fix printf warnings + +Thu Feb 25 11:16:49 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: -O does not belong in WFLAGS + +Thu Feb 25 11:05:57 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: fix der_put_int + +Tue Feb 23 20:35:12 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use AC_BROKEN_GLOB + +Mon Feb 22 15:12:44 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for glob + +Mon Feb 22 11:32:42 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.1b + +Sat Feb 20 15:48:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: convert DES3 keys to des3-cbc-sha1, and + des3-cbc-md5 + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (DES3_string_to_key): make this actually do + what the draft said it should + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: little program for database conversion + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_open): try to open database w/o .db extension + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_open): add test for database format + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_open): add test for database format + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_2int): don't depend on flags being + unsigned + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: change `hdb_set_master_key' to take an + EncryptionKey, and add a new function `hdb_set_master_keyfile' to + do what `hdb_set_master_key' used to do + + * kdc/kstash.c: add `--convert-file' option to change keytype of + existing master key file + +Fri Feb 19 07:04:14 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1a + +Sat Feb 13 17:12:53 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): sizeof(buf) -> buf_size, buf + is now a `u_char *' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_init_etype): etypes are now `int' + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): constize + orig_host + + (krb5_salttype_to_string): new function (RSA_MD5_DES_verify, + RSA_MD5_DES3_verify): initialize ret + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c (init_auth): remove unnecessary + gssapi_krb5_init. ask for KEYTYPE_DES credentials + + * kadmin/get.c (print_entry_long): print the keytypes and salts + available for the principal + + * configure.in (WFLAGS): add `-O' to catch unitialized variables + and such + (gethostname, mkstemp, getusershell, inet_aton): more tests + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: update prototypes + + * configure.in: homogenize broken detection with krb4 + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_context): remove unused + `error' + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (check-der): add + + * lib/asn1/gen.c (define_type): map ASN1 Integer to `int' instead + of `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c (length_unsigned): new function + (length_int): handle signed integers + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (der_put_unsigned): new function + (der_put_int): handle signed integers + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_unsigned): new function + (der_get_int): handle signed integers + + * lib/asn1/der.h: all integer functions take `int' instead of + `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/lex.l (filename): unused. remove. + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: new test program for der encoding and + decoding. + +Mon Feb 1 04:09:06 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): only call + gethostbyname2 with AF_INET6 if we actually have IPv6. From + "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (get_kdc_address): dito + +Sun Jan 31 06:26:36 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (parse_prots): always bind to AF_INET, there are + v6-implementations without support for `mapped V4 addresses'. + From Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino + +Sat Jan 30 22:38:27 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0u + +Sat Jan 30 13:43:02 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: explicit rules for *.et files + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (get_kadm_ticket): only remove creds if + krb5_get_credentials was succesful. + (get_new_cache): return better error codes and return earlier. + (get_cred_cache): only delete default_client if it's different + from client + (kadm5_c_init_with_context): return a more descriptive error. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_flags): handle NULL client or server + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): return the error in + `ret_error' iff != NULL + + * lib/krb5/rd_error.c (krb5_free_error, krb5_free_error_contents): + new functions + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): more + type-correctness + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_error): typedef to KRB_ERROR + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: KRB5_TGS_NAME: use + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: KRB5_TGS_NAME: use + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): update to changes + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c (kadm5_s_rename_principal): call remove + instead of rename, but shouldn't this just call rename? + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): always return an + error if the principal wasn't found. + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_seq): unseal key + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_seq): unseal key + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: added explicit rules for asn1_err.[ch] + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): add krbtgt/THISREALM@OTHERREALM when + finding cross-realm tgts in the v4 database + + * kadmin/mod.c (mod_entry): check the number of arguments. check + that kadm5_get_principal worked. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (fkt_remove_entry): remove KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND if + we weren't able to remove it. + + * admin/ktutil.c: less drive-by-deleting. From Love + + + * kdc/connect.c (parse_ports): copy the string before mishandling + it with strtok_r + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): print the principal with mismatching + kvnos + + * kadmin/kadmind.c (main): convert `debug_port' to network byte + order + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: allow specification of port number. + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h (kadm5_client_context): add + `kadmind_port'. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): move up + initalize_kadm5_error_table_r. + allow specification of port number. + + From Love + + * kuser/klist.c: add option -t | --test + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2000 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2000 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1cb687f55 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2000 @@ -0,0 +1,1320 @@ +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/test_get_addrs.c (main): handle krb5_init_context + failure consistently + * lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c (main): handle krb5_init_context + failure consistently + * lib/krb5/prog_setup.c (krb5_program_setup): handle + krb5_init_context failure consistently + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/kverify.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/klist.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/kinit.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/kgetcred.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/kdestroy.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/kdecode_ticket.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kuser/generate-requests.c (generate_requests): handle + krb5_init_context failure consistently + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c (generate_requests): handle + krb5_init_context failure consistently + * kdc/main.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + * appl/test/uu_client.c (proto): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * appl/kf/kf.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * admin/ktutil.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + + * admin/get.c (kt_get): more error checking + +2000-12-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c (loop): check for length longer than data. + inspired by lha@stacken.kth.se + +2000-12-16 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.8: reflect recent changes + + * admin/copy.c: don't copy an entry that already exists in the + keytab, and warn if the keyblock differs + +2000-12-15 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/Makefile.am: merge srvconvert and srvcreate with copy + + * admin/copy.c: merge srvconvert and srvcreate with copy + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: always build keytab_krb4.c + + * lib/krb5/context.c: always register the krb4 keytab functions + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: declare krb4_ftk_ops + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: We don't really need to include krb.h + here, since we only use the principal size macros, so define these + here. Theoretically someone could have a krb4 system where these + values are != 40, but this is unlikely, and + krb5_524_conv_principal also assume they are 40. + +2000-12-13 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: s/krb5_donot_reply/krb5_donot_replay/ + + * lib/krb5/replay.c: fix query-replace-o from MD5 API change, and + the struct is called krb5_donot_replay + +2000-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconvert): do not use data after free:ing + it + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.3d + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 14:0:0 + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): update to 6:3:0 + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LIBADD): add library + dependencies + +2000-12-10 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: implement krb5_auth_con_{get,set}rcache + +2000-12-08 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_enctype): add ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE_IVEC as + a new pseudo-type + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (DES_AFS3_CMU_string_to_key): always treat + cell names as lower case + (krb5_encrypt_ivec, krb5_decrypt_ivec): new functions that allow an + explicit ivec to be specified. fix all sub-functions. + (DES3_CBC_encrypt_ivec): new function that takes an explicit ivec + +2000-12-06 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: actually build replay cache code + + * lib/krb5/replay.c: implement krb5_get_server_rcache + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: de-pointerise auth_context parameter to + krb5_mk_rep + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c: de-pointerise auth_context parameter to + krb5_mk_rep + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: auth_context should not be a pointer + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: implement krb5_auth_con_genaddrs, and + make setaddrs_from_fd use that + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add some more KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_* flags + +2000-12-05 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add kerberos.8 manpage + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: check for NULL remove_cred function + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: pretend that empty files are non-existant + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): use getifaddrs, from + Jason Thorpe + +2000-12-01 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: remove configure-time generation of krb5-config + * tools/Makefile.am: add generation of krb5-config at make-time + instead of configure-time + + * tools/krb5-config.in: add --prefix and --exec-prefix + +2000-11-30 Assar Westerlund + + * tools/Makefile.am: add krb5-config.1 + * tools/krb5-config.in: add kadm-client and kadm5-server as + libraries + +2000-11-29 Assar Westerlund + + * tools/krb5-config.in: add --prefix, --exec-prefix and gssapi + +2000-11-29 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: add roken/Makefile here, since it can't live in + rk_ROKEN + +2000-11-16 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: use the libtool -rpath, do not rely on ld + understanding -rpath + + * configure.in: fix the -Wl stuff for krb4 linking add some + gratuitous extra options when linking with an existing libdes + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_next_enctype2key): const-ize a little bit + * lib/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): try to only build des when needed + * kuser/klist.c: print key versions numbers of v4 tickets in + verbose mode + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): adapt to new krb5_verify_ap_req2 + * appl/test/gss_common.c (read_token): remove unused variable + + * configure.in (krb4): add -Wl + (MD4Init et al): look for these in more libraries + (getmsg): only run test if we have the function + (AC_OUTPUT): create tools/krb5-config + + * tools/krb5-config.in: new script for storing flags to use + * Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): add tools + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (make_pa_tgs_req): update to new + krb5_mk_req_internal + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_internal): allow different + usages for the encryption. change callers + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (decrypt_authenticator): add an encryption + `usage'. also try the old + (and wrong) usage of KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH for backwards compatibility + (krb5_verify_ap_req2): new function for specifying the usage different + from the default (KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH) + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): add a `usage' + parameter to permit the generation of authenticators with + different crypto usage + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req_exact): new function that takes a + krb5_principal + (krb5_mk_req): use krb5_mk_req_exact + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_close): free data + (mcc_destroy): don't free data + +2000-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: handle both ndbm.h and gdbm/ndbm.h + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: handle both ndbm.h and gdbm/ndbm.h + +2000-11-12 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hpropd.8: remove extra .Xc + +2000-10-27 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: fix v4 fallback lifetime calculation + +2000-10-10 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/524.c: fix log messge + +2000-10-08 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): check for fd's being + too large to select on + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (add_new_tcp): check for the socket fd being + too large to select on + * kdc/connect.c (add_new_tcp): check for the socket fd being too + large to selct on + * kdc/connect.c (loop): check that the socket fd is not too large + to select on + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (recv_loop): check `fd' for being too + large to be able to select on + + * kdc/kaserver.c (do_authenticate): check for time skew + +2000-10-01 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/524.c (set_address): allocate memory for storing addresses + in if the original request had an empty set of addresses + * kdc/524.c (set_address): fix bad return of pointer to automatic + data + + * config.sub: update to version 2000-09-11 (aka 1.181) from + subversions.gnu.org + + * config.guess: update to version 2000-09-05 (aka 1.156) from + subversions.gnu.org plus some minor tweaks + +2000-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.3c + +2000-09-19 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to + 13:1:0 + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 6:2:0 + +2000-09-17 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_decrypt_ticket): plug some memory leak + (krb5_rd_req): try not to return an allocated auth_context on error + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_vlog_msg): fix const-ness + +2000-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/524.c: re-organize + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): try to avoid leaking auth_context + * kdc/kerberos4.c (valid_princ): check return value of functions + (encode_v4_ticket): add some const + * kdc/misc.c (db_fetch): check malloc + (free_ent): new function + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_vlog_msg): log just the format string it we + fail to allocate the actual string to log, should at least provide + some hint as to where things went wrong + +2000-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/log.c: use DEFAULT_LOG_DEST + + * kdc/config.c: use _PATH_KDC_CONF + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: add macro constants for kdc.conf, and kdc.log + +2000-09-09 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (_key_schedule): re-use an existing schedule + +2000-09-06 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: fix dpagaix test + +2000-09-05 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: with_dce -> enable_dce. noticed by Ake Sandgren + + +2000-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kstash.8: update manual page + + * kdc/kstash.c: fix typo, and remove unused option + + * lib/krb5/kerberos.7: short kerberos intro page + +2000-08-27 Assar Westerlund + + * include/bits.c: add __attribute__ for gcc's pleasure + * lib/hdb/keytab.c: re-write to delay the opening of the database + till it's known which principal is being sought, thereby allowing + the usage of multiple databases, however they need to be specified + in /etc/krb5.conf since all the programs using this keytab do not + read kdc.conf + + * appl/test/test_locl.h (keytab): add + * appl/test/common.c: add --keytab + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: remove trailing commas + (KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ): renamed from KRB5_KU_USAGE_MIC + +2000-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_via_proxy): handle `http://' at the + beginning of the proxy specification. use getaddrinfo correctly + (krb5_sendto): always return a return code + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_KU_USAGE_MIC): rename to KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_free): handle + auth_context == NULL + +2000-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (find_type): make sure of always setting + `ret_etype' correctly. clean-up structure some + +2000-08-23 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: implement resolve + +2000-08-18 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kdecode_ticket.c: check return value from krb5_crypto_init + * kdc/kerberos5.c, kdc/524.c: check return value from krb5_crypto_init + * lib/krb5/*.c: check return value from krb5_crypto_init + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.3b + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 13:0:0 + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: set version to 6:1:0 + + * configure.in: do getmsg testing the same way as in krb4 + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (krb5_config_parse_file_debug): make sure + of closing the file on error + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (encrypt_internal_derived): free the checksum + after use + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): initialize args to make third, + purify et al happy + +2000-08-13 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: re-write search for keys code. loop over all + supported enctypes in order, looping over all keys of each type, + and picking the one with the v5 default salt preferably + +2000-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/test/gss_common.c (enet_read): add and use + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (heimdal_version, heimdal_long_version): make + const + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_internal): add comment on + checksum type selection + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_init_context): do not leak memory on + failure + (default_etypes): prefer arcfour-hmac-md5 to des-cbc-md5 + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: add fnmatch.h + +2000-08-09 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: call AC_PROG_CC and AC_PROG_CPP to make sure later + checks that should require them don't fail + * acconfig.h: add HAVE_UINT17_T + +2000-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/mit_dump.c: handle all sorts of weird MIT salt types + +2000-08-08 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/setup.texi: port 212 -> 2121 + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: krb5_principal_match + +2000-08-04 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c: add comment on *why* DCE sometimes used BER + encoding + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am: link with pidfile library + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: write a pid file + + * kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h: util.h + + * kdc/Makefile.am: link with pidfile library + + * kdc/main.c: write a pid file + + * kdc/headers.h: util.h + +2000-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): always put + hostnames in lower case + (default_v4_name_convert): add imap + +2000-08-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crc.c (_krb5_crc_update): const-ize (finally) + +2000-07-31 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for uint*_t + * include/bits.c: define uint*_t + +2000-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_tgs_flags): set endtime correctly when + renewing, From Derrick J Brashear + +2000-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.3a + +2000-07-27 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hprop.c (dump_database): write an empty message to signal + end of dump + +2000-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): try to be more + careful when not to resend + + * lib/hdb/db3.c: always create a cursor with db3. From Derrick J + Brashear + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:0:0 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 3:0:1 + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 12:0:1 + + * lib/krb5/krb5_config.3: manpage + + * lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.3: manpage + + * lib/krb5/appdefault.c: implementation of the krb5_appdefault set + of functions + +2000-07-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (change_password): reset forwardable + and proxiable. copy preauthentication list correctly from + supplied options + + * kdc/hpropd.c (main): check that the ticket was for `hprop/' for + paranoid reasons + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c (krb5_sock_to_principal): look in + aliases for the real name + +2000-07-22 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/setup.texi: say something about starting kadmind from the + command line + +2000-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use kadm5_s_chpass_principal_cond instead of + mis-doing it here + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): make timeout 1 + + 2^{0,1,...}. also keep track if we got an old packet back and + then just wait without sending a new packet + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: use a datagram socket and remove the + sequence numbers + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): clarify an + expression, avoiding a warning + +2000-07-22 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: make -a and -n aliases for -v + + * lib/krb5/write_message.c: ws + + * kdc/hprop-common.c: nuke extra definitions of + krb5_read_priv_message et.al + + * lib/krb5/read_message.c (krb5_read_message): return error if EOF + +2000-07-20 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: print usage consistently + * kdc/hprop.h (HPROP_KEYTAB): use HDB for the keytab + * kdc/hpropd.c: add --keytab + * kdc/hpropd.c: don't care what principal we recvauth as + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: be more careful of not returning creds at + all when an error is returned + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_gen_new): do mkstemp correctly + +2000-07-19 Johan Danielsson + + * fix-export: use autoreconf + + * configure.in: remove stuff that belong in roken, and remove some + obsolete constructs + +2000-07-18 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: fix some typos + + * appl/Makefile.am: dceutil*s* + + * missing: update to missing from automake 1.4a + +2000-07-17 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: try to get xlc flags from ibmcxx.cfg use + conditional for X use readline cf macro + + * configure.in: subst AIX compiler flags + +2000-07-15 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: pass sixth parameter to test-package; use some + newer autoconf constructs + + * ltmain.sh: update to libtool 1.3c + + * ltconfig: update to libtool 1.3c + + * configure.in: update this to newer auto*/libtool + + * appl/Makefile.am: use conditional for dce + + * lib/Makefile.am: use conditional for dce + +2000-07-11 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/write_message.c: krb5_write_{priv,save}_message + * lib/krb5/read_message.c: krb5_read_{priv,save}_message + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: try port kerberos/88 if no response on + krb524/4444 + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: use krb5_sendto + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: add more generic krb5_sendto that send + to a port at arbitrary list of hosts + +2000-07-10 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/misc.texi: language; say something about kadmin del_enctype + +2000-07-10 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/kf/Makefile.am: actually install + +2000-07-08 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump to 0.3a-pre + (AC_ROKEN): roken is now at 10 + + * lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c: add a arcfour-hmac-md5 test case + * kdc/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): add ../lib/krb5 + * configure.in: update for standalone roken + * lib/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): make roken conditional + * kdc/hprop.c: update to new hdb_seal_keys_mkey + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (_hdb_unseal_keys_int, _hdb_seal_keys_int): + rename and export them + + * kdc/headers.h: add krb5_locl.h (since we just use some stuff + from there) + +2000-07-08 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.1: update for -f and add some more text for -v + + * kuser/klist.c: use rtbl to format cred listing, add -f and -s + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: fix type in des3-cbc-none + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c: add key usage + + * kdc/kstash.c: remove writing of old keyfile, and treat + --convert-file as just reading and writing the keyfile without + asking for a new key + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (read_master_encryptionkey): handle old keytype + based files, and convert the key to cfb64 + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (hdb_read_master_key): set mkey to NULL before + doing anything else + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: use krb5_eai_to_heim_errno + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: use krb5_eai_to_heim_errno + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: use krb5_eai_to_heim_errno + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: use krb5_eai_to_heim_errno + + * lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c: convert getaddrinfo error codes to + something that can be passed to get_err_text + +2000-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_next_enctype2key): make sure of skipping + `*key' + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (get_des_key): rewrite some, be more careful + +2000-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): be careful as to now overflowing when + calculating the end of lifetime of a ticket. + + * lib/krb5/context.c (default_etypes): add ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 + + * lib/hdb/db3.c: only use a cursor when needed, from Derrick J + Brashear + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: introduce the `special' encryption methods + that are not like all other encryption methods and implement + arcfour-hmac-md5 + +2000-07-05 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/mit_dump.c: set initial master key version number to 0 + instead of 1; if we lated bump the mkvno we don't risk using the + wrong key to decrypt + + * kdc/hprop.c: only get master key if we're actually going to use + it; enable reading of MIT krb5 dump files + + * kdc/mit_dump.c: read MIT krb5 dump files + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (read_master_mit): fix this + + * kdc/kstash.c: make this work with the new mkey code + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: add mkey.c, and bump version number + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: rewrite master key handling + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c: rewrite master key handling + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: add some more pseudo crypto types + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: change some funny etypes to use negative + numbers, and add some more + +2000-07-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (get_krbhst): only try SRV lookup if there are + none in the configuration file + +2000-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (akf_add_entry): remove unused + variable + + * kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c: new test program + * kpasswd/Makefile.am: add kpasswd-generator + + * include/Makefile.am (CLEANFILES): add rc4.h + + * kuser/generate-requests.c: new test program + * kuser/Makefile.am (noinst_PROGRAMS): add generate-requests + +2000-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: add --enable-dce and related stuff + * appl/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): add $(APPL_dce) + +2000-06-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (get_des_key): fix thinkos/typos + +2000-06-29 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/purge.c: use parse_time to parse age + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_vlog_msg): use krb5_format_time + + * admin/list.c: add printing of timestamp and key data; some + cleanup + + * lib/krb5/time.c (krb5_format_time): new function to format time + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): init + date_fmt, also do some cleanup + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add date_fmt to context + +2000-06-28 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/{kerberos4,kaserver,524}.c (get_des_key): change to return + v4 or afs keys if possible + +2000-06-25 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_convert): allow using null salt, and treat 0 + pw_expire as never (from Derrick Brashear) + +2000-06-24 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c (add_standard_ports): only listen to port 750 if + serving v4 requests + +2000-06-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/lex.l: fix includes, and lex stuff + * lib/asn1/lex.h (error_message): update prototype + (yylex): add + * lib/asn1/gen_length.c (length_type): fail on malloc error + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c (decode_type): fail on malloc error + +2000-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: be more compatible with MIT code. + From Daniel Kouril + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: be more compatible with MIT code. From + Daniel Kouril + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): do not set salttype if it's + vanilla pw-salt, that keeps win2k happy. also do the malloc check + correctly. From Daniel Kouril + +2000-06-21 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: add hdb keytabs + +2000-06-20 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: back out rev. 1.64 + +2000-06-19 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: pa_* -> KRB5_PADATA_* + + * kdc/hpropd.c: add realm override flag + + * kdc/v4_dump.c: code for reading krb4 dump files + + * kdc/hprop.c: generalize source database handing, add support for + non-standard local realms (from by Daniel Kouril + and Miroslav Ruda ), and + support for using different ports (requested by the Czechs, but + implemented differently) + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: pa_* -> KRB5_PADATA_* + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: pa_* -> KRB5_PADATA_* + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: use some definitions from asn1.h + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: use new import syntax + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: use distinguished value integers + + * lib/asn1/gen_length.c: support for distinguished value integers + + * lib/asn1/gen_encode.c: support for distinguished value integers + + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c: support for distinguished value integers + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: support for distinguished value integers + + * lib/asn1/lex.l: add support for more standards like import + statements + + * lib/asn1/parse.y: add support for more standards like import + statements, and distinguished value integers + +2000-06-11 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (add_addrs): ignore addresses of + unknown type + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (add_addrs): zero memory before + starting to copy memory + +2000-06-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/test_get_addrs.c: test program for get_addrs + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): remember to add in + the size of ifr->ifr_name when using SA_LEN. noticed by Ken + Raeburn + +2000-06-07 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: add db3 detection stuff do not use streamsptys on + HP-UX 11 + * lib/hdb/hdb.h (HDB): add dbc for db3 + * kdc/connect.c (add_standard_ports): also listen on krb524 aka + 4444 + * etc/services.append (krb524): add + * lib/hdb/db3.c: add berkeley db3 interface. contributed by + Derrick J Brashear + * lib/hdb/hdb.h (struct HDB): add + +2000-06-07 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/524.c: if 524 is not enabled, just generate error reply and + exit + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: if v4 is not enabled, just generate error reply + and exit + + * kdc/connect.c: only listen to port 4444 if 524 is enabled + + * kdc/config.c: add options to enable/disable v4 and 524 requests + +2000-06-06 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/524.c: handle non-existant server principals (from Daniel + Kouril) + +2000-06-03 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/ktutil.c: print name when failing to open keytab + + * kuser/kinit.c: try also to fallback to v4 when no KDC is found + +2000-05-28 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/klist.c: continue even we have no v5 ccache. make showing + your krb4 tickets the default (if build with krb4 support) + * kuser/kinit.c: add a fallback that tries to get a v4 ticket if + built with krb4 support and we got back a version error from the + KDC + +2000-05-23 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: make this actually work + +2000-05-19 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (emem_store): make it write-compatible + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (fd_store): make it write-compatible + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c (mem_store): make it write-compatible + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_storage): make store write-compatible + +2000-05-18 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: add stdio.h in dbopen test + +2000-05-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2t + +2000-05-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 11:1:0 + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: fix second lseek + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_524_conv_principal): fix typo + +2000-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2s + +2000-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 11:0:0 + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 4:2:1 + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (libasn1_la_LDFLAGS): bump to 2:0:0 + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_524_conv_principal): comment-ize, and + simplify string copying + +2000-05-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (scrub_file): new function + (erase_file): re-write, use scrub_file + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_DEFAULT_CCFILE_ROOT): add + + * configure.in (dbopen): add header files + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_key_usage): add some more + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (erase_file): try to detect symlink games. + also call revoke. + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): remember to close + the socket on error + + * kdc/main.c (main): also call sigterm on SIGTERM + +2000-05-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (krb5_config_vget_string_default, + krb5_config_get_string_default): add + +2000-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_initialize): just forget about + over-writing the old cred cache. it's too much of a hazzle trying + to do this safely. + +2000-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_get_wrapped_length): rewrite into + different parts for the derived and non-derived cases + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_get_wrapped_length): the padding should + be done after having added confounder and checksum + +2000-04-09 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): apperently solaris + can return EINVAL when the buffer is too small. cope. + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (gen_files): add asn1_UNSIGNED.x + * lib/asn1/gen_locl.h (filename): add prototype + (init_generate): const-ize + * lib/asn1/gen.c (filename): new function clean-up a little bit. + * lib/asn1/parse.y: be more tolerant in ranges + * lib/asn1/lex.l: count lines correctly. + (error_message): print filename in messages + +2000-04-08 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c (krb5_rd_safe): increment sequence number + after comparing + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c (krb5_rd_priv): increment sequence number + after comparing + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): make `tmp_seq' unsigned + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): make `tmp_seq' unsigned + * lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c (krb5_generate_seq_number): make + `seqno' be unsigned + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): increment local sequence + number after the fact and only increment it if we were successful + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): increment local sequence + number after the fact and only increment it if we were successful + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_auth_context_data): make sequence number + unsigned + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): + `in_tkt_service' can be NULL + +2000-04-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/parse.y: regonize INTEGER (0..UNIT_MAX). + (DOTDOT): add + * lib/asn1/lex.l (DOTDOT): add + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1 (UNSIGNED): add. use UNSIGNED for all sequence + numbers. + * lib/asn1/gen_length.c (length_type): add TUInteger + * lib/asn1/gen_free.c (free_type): add TUInteger + * lib/asn1/gen_encode.c (encode_type, generate_type_encode): add + TUInteger + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c (decode_type, generate_type_decode): add + TUInteger + * lib/asn1/gen_copy.c (copy_type): add TUInteger + * lib/asn1/gen.c (define_asn1): add TUInteger + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (encode_unsigned): add + * lib/asn1/der_length.c (length_unsigned): add + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (decode_unsigned): add + * lib/asn1/der.h (decode_unsigned, encode_unsigned, + length_unsigned): add prototypes + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: update pre-authentication types + * lib/krb5/krb5_err.et: add some error codes from pkinit + +2000-04-05 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: add support for hdb methods (aka back-ends). + include ldap. + * lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c: tweak the ifdef to OPENLDAP + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: add hdb-ldap.c and openldap + * kdc/Makefile.am, kpasswd/Makefile.am, kadmin/Makefile.am: add + * configure.in: bump version to 0.2s-pre add options and testing + for (open)ldap + +2000-04-04 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (krb4): fix the krb_mk_req test + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (krb4): add test for const arguments to krb_mk_req + * lib/45/mk_req.c (krb_mk_req): conditionalize const-ness of + arguments + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2r + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 10:0:0 + * lib/45/mk_req.c (krb_mk_req): const-ize the arguments + +2000-03-30 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): add some + comments. add fall-back on adding the realm name in lower case. + +2000-03-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c: remember to repoint all descr->sa to _ss after + realloc as this might have moved the memory around. problem + discovered and diagnosed by Brandon S. Allbery + +2000-03-27 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: recognize solaris 2.8 + * config.guess, config.sub: update to current version from + :pserver:anoncvs@subversions.gnu.org:/home/cvs + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (print_expire): do not assume anything + about the size of time_t, i.e. make it 64-bit happy + +2000-03-13 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/klist.c: add support for display v4 tickets + +2000-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kaserver.c (do_authenticate, do_getticket): call check_flags + * kdc/kerberos4.c (do_version4): call check_flags. + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_flags): make global + +2000-03-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): evil + hack to avoid recursion + +2000-03-04 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: add `krb4_get_tickets' per realm. add --anonymous + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_get_init_creds_opt): add `anonymous' and + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (get_init_creds_common): set + request_anonymous flag appropriatly + * lib/krb5/init_creds.c (krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous): + add + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (_krb5_extract_ticket): new parameter to + determine whetever to ignore client name of not. always copy + client name from kdc. fix callers. + + * kdc: add support for anonymous tickets + + * kdc/string2key.8: add man-page for string2key + +2000-03-03 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): get expiration date from `valid_end' + and not `pw_end' + + * kdc/kadb.h (ka_entry): fix name pw_end -> valid_end. add some + more fields + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): set the `valid_end' from the v4 + expiration date instead of the `pw_expire' + (ka_convert): set `valid_end' from ka expiration data and `pw_expire' + from pw_change + pw_expire + (main): add a default database for ka dumping + +2000-02-28 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): change + rfc2052 default to no. 2782 says that underscore should be used. + +2000-02-24 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_initialize, fcc_store_cred): verify that + stores and close succeed + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_store_creds): check to see that the + stores are succesful. + +2000-02-23 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2q + +2000-02-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 9:2:0 + + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname_realms): copy + the correct hostname + + * kdc/connect.c (add_new_tcp): use the correct entries in the + descriptor table + * kdc/connect.c: initialize `descr' uniformly and correctly + +2000-02-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2p + +2000-02-19 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 9:1:0 + + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): make sure + that realms is filled in even when getaddrinfo fails or does not + return any canonical name + + * kdc/connect.c (descr): add sockaddr and string representation + (*): re-write to use the above mentioned + +2000-02-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_parse_address): use + krb5_sockaddr2address to copy the result from getaddrinfo. + +2000-02-14 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2o + +2000-02-13 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 9:0:0 + + * kdc/kaserver.c (do_authenticate): return the kvno of the server + and not the client. Thanks to Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH + and Chaskiel M Grundman + for debugging. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (do_version4): if an tgs-req is received with an + old kvno, return an error reply and write a message in the log. + +2000-02-12 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c (proto): with `--fork', create a child + and send over/receive creds with export/import_sec_context + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c (proto): with `--fork', create a child + and send over/receive creds with export/import_sec_context + * appl/test/common.c: add `--fork' / `-f' (only used by gssapi) + +2000-02-11 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: remove keyfile add explicit_addresses + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): pay attention to + explicit_addresses some more comments. better error messages. + * kdc/config.c: add some comments. + remove --key-file. + add --addresses. + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_set_extra_addresses): const-ize and use + proper abstraction + +2000-02-07 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: use roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2n + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 8:0:0 + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_default_name): use strlcpy + (krb5_kt_add_entry): set timestamp + +2000-02-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add macros for accessing krb5_realm + * lib/krb5/time.c (krb5_timeofday): use `krb5_timestamp' instead + of `int32_t' + + * lib/krb5/replay.c (checksum_authenticator): update to new API + for md5 + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: remove des.h, it's not needed and applications + should not have to make sure to find it. + +2000-02-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (get_key_from_keytab): rename parameter to + `out_key' to avoid conflicting with label. reported by Sean Doran + + +2000-02-02 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c: remember to lower-case host names. + bug reported by + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (do_version4): look at check_ticket_addresses + and emulate that by setting krb_ignore_ip_address (not a great + interface but it doesn't seem like the time to go around fixing + libkrb stuff now) + +2000-02-01 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: change --noaddresses into --no-addresses + +2000-01-28 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): make sure the ticket is not + forwardable and not proxiable + +2000-01-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for + md4,md5,sha. some changes to libdes calls to make them more + portable. + +2000-01-21 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c (krb5_verify_init_creds): make sure to + clean up the correct creds. + +2000-01-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (append_component): change parameter to + `const char *'. check malloc + * lib/krb5/principal.c (append_component, va_ext_princ, va_princ): + const-ize + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): make `service' and `hostname' + const + * lib/krb5/principal.c (replace_chars): also add space here + * lib/krb5/principal.c: (quotable_chars): add space + +2000-01-12 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (do_version4): check if preauth was required and + bail-out if so since there's no way that could be done in v4. + Return NULL_KEY as an error to the client (which is non-obvious, + but what can you do?) + +2000-01-09 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use + krb5_expand_hostname_realms + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_km_req): use krb5_expand_hostname_realms + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname_realms): new + variant of krb5_expand_hostname that tries until it expands into + something that's digestable by krb5_get_host_realm, returning also + the result from that function. + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2m + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: replace AC_C_BIGENDIAN with KRB_C_BIGENDIAN + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 7:1:0 + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use + krb5_expand_hostname + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): handle + ai_canonname being set in any of the addresses returnedby + getaddrinfo. glibc apparently returns the reverse lookup of every + address in ai_canonname. + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2l + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 7:0:0 + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): remove `hp' + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: set version to 4:1:1 + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): use `krb5_get_default_realms' + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (add_padata): change types to make + everything work out + (krb5_get_in_cred): remove const to make types match + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (ARCFOUR_string_to_key): correct signature + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): handle not + getting back a canonname + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2k + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): advance colon so that + we actually parse the port number. based on a patch from Leif + Johansson + +2000-01-02 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/purge.c: remove all non-current and old entries from a + keytab + + * admin: break up ktutil.c into files + + * admin/ktutil.c (list): support --verbose (also listning time + stamps) + (kt_add, kt_get): set timestamp in newly created entries + (kt_change): add `change' command + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): set timestamp in newly created + entries + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (akf_next_entry): set timetsamp, + always go the a predicatble position on error + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents): copy timestamp + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c (fkt_add_entry): store timestamp + (fkt_next_entry_int): return timestamp + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_keytab_entry): add timestamp diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2001 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2001 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b048488f8d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2001 @@ -0,0 +1,1122 @@ +2001-12-20 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: use our own des string-to-key function, since + the one from openssl sometimes generates wrong output + +2001-12-05 Jacques Vidrine + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c: fix a bug in which kstash would crash if + there were no /etc/krb5.conf + +2001-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3: sort references (from Thomas + Klausner) + + * lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.3: add section to reference + (from Thomas Klausner) + + * lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.3: sort references (from Thomas + Klausner) + + * lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3: white space fixes (from Thomas Klausner) + + * lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.3: remove extra white space (from + Thomas Klausner) + + * lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3: add section to reference + (from Thomas Klausner) + +2001-10-29 Jacques Vidrine + + * admin/get.c: fix a bug in which a reference to a data + structure on the stack was being kept after the containing + function's lifetime, resulting in a segfault during `ktutil + get'. + +2001-10-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: make all high-level encrypting and decrypting + functions check the return value of the underlying function and + handle errors more consistently. noted by Sam Hartman + + +2001-10-21 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (enctype_arcfour_hmac_md5): actually use a + non-keyed checksum when it should be non-keyed + +2001-09-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.1: add the kauth alias + * kuser/kinit.c: allow specification of afslog in krb5.conf, noted + by jhutz@cs.cmu.edu + +2001-09-27 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: remove the need for libasn1.h, also make + generated files include all files from IMPORTed modules + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_KPASSWD_*): set correct values + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: improve error message printing + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_passwd_result_to_string): add change + to use sequence numbers connect the udp socket so that we can + figure out the local address + +2001-09-25 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1: implement OBJECT IDENTIFIER and ENUMERATED + +2001-09-20 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): try using + lower case realm as domain, but only when given a verification + function + +2001-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (der_put_length): do not even try writing + anything when len == 0 + +2001-09-18 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hpropd.c: add realm override option + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c (krb5_set_default_realm): make + realm parameter const + + * kdc/hprop.c: more free's + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_keytab): free key + proc data + + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname_realms): free + addrinfo + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (hdb_set_master_keyfile): clear error string when + not returning error + +2001-09-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/appdefault.c (krb5_appdefault_{boolean,string,time): + make realm const + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: use des functions to avoid generating + warnings with openssl's prototypes + +2001-09-05 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for termcap.h + + * lib/asn1/lex.l: add another undef ECHO to keep AIX lex happy + +2001-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): handle snprintf + returning < 0. noticed by hin@stacken.kth.se + +2001-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.4e + +2001-09-02 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/Makefile.am: install kauth as a symlink to kinit + + * kuser/kinit.c: get v4_tickets by default + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: fix for broken automake + +2001-08-31 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c: some pretty much untested changes from Luke + Howard + + * kuser/kinit.1: remove references to kauth + + * kuser/Makefile.am: kauth is no more + + * kuser/kinit.c: use appdefaults for everything. defaults are now + as in kauth. + + * lib/krb5/appdefault.c: also check libdefaults, and realms/realm + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_free_context): free more stuff + +2001-08-30 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: do some checks of the values in the + file + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: remove srv_try_txt, fix spelling + + * lib/krb5/context.c: don't init srv_try_txt, since it isn't used + anymore + +2001-08-29 Jacques Vidrine + + * configure.in: Check for already-installed com_err. + +2001-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): set versoin to 18:2:1 + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/Makefile.am: remove CHECK_LOCAL - non bin programs require + no special treatment now + + * kuser/generate-requests.c: parse arguments in a useful way + * kuser/kverify.c: add --help/--verify + +2001-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: bump prereq to 2.52 remove unused test_LIB_KRB4 + + * configure.in: re-write the handling of crypto libraries. try to + use the one of openssl's libcrypto or krb4's libdes that has all + the required functionality (md4, md5, sha1, des, rc4). if there + is no such library, the included lib/des is built. + + * kdc/headers.h: include libutil.h if it exists + * kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h: include libutil.h if it exists + * kdc/kerberos4.c (get_des_key): check for null keys even if + is_server + +2001-08-21 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: print some size_t correctly + * configure.in: remove extra space after -L check for libutil.h + +2001-08-17 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: fix prototype for get_des_key + + * kdc/kaserver.c: fix call to get_des_key + + * kdc/524.c: fix call to get_des_key + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (get_des_key): if getting a key for a server, + return any des-key not just keys that can be string-to-keyed by + the client + +2001-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.4d + +2001-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: check for openpty + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): update to 7:4:0 + +2001-08-08 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: just add -L (if required) from krb4 when testing + for libdes/libcrypto + +2001-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (man_MANS): add some missing man pages + * fix-export: fix the sed expression for finding the man pages + +2001-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c (main): implement --version and + --help + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): update version to + 18:1:1 + +2001-07-27 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): check + parsing of addresses + +2001-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c (krb5_sock_to_principal): rename + sa_len -> salen to avoid the macro that's defined on irix. noted + by "Jacques A. Vidrine" + +2001-07-24 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: add support for type + KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_address_order): complain about + unsuppored address types + +2001-07-23 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/get.c: don't open connection to server until we loop over + the principals, at that time we know the realm of the (first) + principal and we can default to that admin server + + * admin: add a rename command + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hprop.c (usage): clarify a tiny bit + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.4c + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to + 18:0:1 + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_fwd_tgt_creds): make it behave + the same way as the MIT function + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): update to 7:3:0 + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c (krb5_sock_to_principal): use + getnameinfo + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (srv_find_realm): handle port numbers + consistenly in local byte order + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c (krb5_get_default_realm): set an + error string + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): invert condition correctly. get + v4 tickets if we succeed renewing + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_principal_get_type): add + (default_v4_name_convert): add "smtp" + +2001-07-13 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: remove make-print-version from LIBOBJS, it's no + longer in lib/roken but always built in lib/vers + +2001-07-12 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c: more set_error_string + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LIBADD): add required library + dependencies + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (libasn1_la_LIBADD): add required library + dependencies + +2001-07-11 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: remove v4 master key handling; remove old v4-db and + ka-db flags; add defaults for v4_realm and afs_cell + +2001-07-09 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c (krb5_sock_to_principal): copy hname + before calling krb5_sname_to_principal. from "Jacques A. Vidrine" + + +2001-07-08 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c: use krb5_copy_addresses instead of + copy_HostAddresses + +2001-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (LIB_des_a, LIB_des_so): add these so that they can + be used by lib/auth/sia + + * kuser/kinit.c: re-do some of the v4 fallbacks: look at + get-tokens flag do not print extra errors do not try to do 524 if + we got tickets from a v4 server + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/replay.c (krb5_get_server_rcache): cast argument to + printf + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): call free_addresses + on ignore_addresses correctly + * lib/krb5/init_creds.c + (krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags): change to take a + const realm + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): if the + instance is the first component of the local hostname, the + converted host should be the long hostname. from + + +2001-07-02 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: address.c is no more; add a couple of + manpages + + * lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.3: new manpage + + * lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3: new manpage + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (init_as_req): treat no addresses as + wildcard + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_kdc_la): treat no addresses as + wildcard + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: don't include client addresses that match + ignore_addresses + + * lib/krb5/context.c: initialise ignore_addresses + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: add new `arange' fake address type, + that matches more than one address; this required some internal + changes to many functions, so all of address.c got moved here + (wasn't much left there) + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add list of ignored addresses to context + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.4b + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 17:0:0 + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 7:2:0 + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.4a + +2001-07-02 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: make this compile without krb4 support + + * lib/krb5/write_message.c: remove priv parameter from + write_safe_message; don't know why it was there in the first place + + * doc/install.texi: remove kaserver switches, it's always compiled + in now + + * kdc/hprop.c: always include kadb support + + * kdc/kaserver.c: always include kaserver support + +2001-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (doit): make failing to bind a socket a + non-fatal error, and abort if no sockets were bound + +2001-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: remember the real port number when falling + back from kpasswd -> kadmin, and krb524 -> kdc + +2001-06-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): if + no_addresses is set, do not add any local addresses to KRB_CRED + + * kuser/kinit.c: remove extra clearing of password and some + redundant code + +2001-06-29 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: move ticket conversion code to separate function, + and call that from a couple of places, like when renewing a + ticket; also add a flag for just converting a ticket + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: set renew-life to some sane value + + * kdc/524.c: don't send more data than required + +2001-06-24 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (krb5_storage_from_fd): check malloc returns + + * lib/krb5/keytab_any.c (any_resolve); improving parsing of ANY: + (any_start_seq_get): remove a double free + (any_next_entry): iterate over all (sub) keytabs and avoid leave data + around to be freed again + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: add a define for des_new_random_key when using + openssl's libcrypto + + * configure.in: move v6 tests down + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): remove srv_try_rfc2052 + + * update to libtool 1.4 and autoconf 2.50 + +2001-06-22 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: use krb5_add_et_list + +2001-06-21 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: add generation number + * lib/hdb/common.c: add generation number code + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: add generation number + * lib/hdb/print.c: use krb5_storage to make it more dynamic + +2001-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: update to changed names used by + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags + * lib/krb5/init_creds.c + (krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags): make the appdefault + keywords have the same names + + * configure.in: only add -L and -R to the krb4 libdir if we are + actually using it + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (fallback_get_hosts): do not copy trailing + dot of hostname add some comments + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: use getaddrinfo instead of dns_lookup when + testing for kerberos.REALM. this allows reusing that information + when actually contacting the server and thus avoids one DNS lookup + +2001-06-20 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: include k524_err.h + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): don't test + for keytype, the server will do this for us if it has anything to + complain about + + * lib/krb5/context.c: add protocol compatible krb524 error codes + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add protocol compatible krb524 error codes + + * lib/krb5/k524_err.et: add protocol compatible krb524 error codes + + * lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.3: manpage + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: add functions `krb5_principal_get_realm' + and `krb5_principal_get_comp_string' that returns parts of a + principal; this is a replacement for the internal + `krb5_princ_realm' and `krb5_princ_component' macros that everyone + seem to use + +2001-06-19 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): dereference result from krb5_princ_realm. + from Thomas Nystrom + +2001-06-18 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req_exact): free creds when done + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_string_to_key_derived): fix memory leak + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (config_get_hosts): free hostlist + * kuser/kinit.c: free principal + +2001-06-18 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto): remove an extra + freeaddrinfo + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache): + remove some unused variables + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (admin_get_next): spell kerberos correctly + * kdc/kerberos5.c: update to new krb5_auth_con* names + * kdc/hpropd.c: update to new krb5_auth_con* names + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req): use krb5_auth_con* functions + and remove some comments + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c (krb5_rd_safe): pick the keys in the right + order: remote - local - session + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c (krb5_rd_rep): save the remote sub key in the + auth_context + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c (krb5_rd_priv): pick keys in the correct + order: remote - local - session + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): pick keys in the right order, + local - remote - session + +2001-06-18 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: use starttime instead of authtime, + from Chris Chiappa + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: make krb524_convert_creds_kdc match + the MIT function by the same name; add + krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache that does what the old version did + + * admin/list.c (do_list): make sure list of keys is NULL + terminated; similar to patch sent by Chris Chiappa + +2001-06-18 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_remove_cred): use + krb5_free_creds_contents + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: name function krb5_auth_con more + consistenly + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum): use + renamed krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): update to + use krb5_krbhst API + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): update to use + krb5_krbhst API + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: update to use krb5_krbhst API + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo): add set def_port + in krb5_krbhst_info + (krb5_krbhst_free): free everything + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_VERIFY_NO_ADDRESSES): add + (krb5_krbhst_info): add def_port (default port for this service) + + * lib/krb5/krbhst-test.c: make it more verbose and useful + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: remove some more memory leaks do not try any + dns operations if there is local configuration admin: fallback to + kerberos.REALM 524: fallback to kdcs kpasswd: fallback to admin + add some comments + + * configure.in: remove initstate and setstate, they should be in + cf/roken-frag.m4 + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (noinst_PROGRAMS): add krbhst-test + * lib/krb5/krbhst-test.c: new program for testing krbhst + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (common_init): remove memory leak + (main): move test program into krbhst-test + +2001-06-17 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.3: manpage + + * lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.3: manpage + +2001-06-16 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add opaque krb5_krbhst_handle type + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: change void* to krb5_krbhst_handle + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: types for new krbhst api + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: implement a new api that looks up one host at + a time, instead of making a list of hosts + +2001-06-09 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: test for initstate and setstate + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: remove rfc2052 support + +2001-06-08 Johan Danielsson + + * fix some manpages for broken mdoc.old grog test + +2001-05-28 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: add [appdefaults] + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: remove configuration reading that is + now done in krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags + * lib/krb5/init_creds.c + (krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags): add reading of + libdefaults versions of these and add no_addresses + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): clear error string + when preauth was required and we retry + +2001-05-25 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): call + krb5_get_krb524hst + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krb524hst): add and restructure the + support functions + +2001-05-22 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): alloc and free csec and cusec + properly + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.3f + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 16:0:0 + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version to 7:1:0 + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: add SRVTAB as an alias for krb4 + * lib/krb5/codec.c: remove dead code + +2001-05-17 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/config.c: actually check the ticket addresses + +2001-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_error.c (krb5_error_from_rd_error): use correct + parenthesis + + * lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c (krb5_eai_to_heim_errno): add + `errno' (called system_error) to allow callers to make sure they + pass the current and relevant value. update callers + +2001-05-14 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: krb5_verify_user_opt + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: verify_opt + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: pass context to krb5_domain_x500_decode + +2001-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: adapt to new address functions + * kdc/kerberos5.c: adapt to changing address functions use LR_TYPE + * kdc/connect.c: adapt to changing address functions + * kdc/config.c: new krb5_config_parse_file + * kdc/524.c: new krb5_sockaddr2address + * lib/krb5/*: add some krb5_{set,clear}_error_string + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1 (LR_TYPE): add + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (gen_files): add asn1_LR_TYPE.x + +2001-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tsg_rep): fix typo in variable name + + * kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c (nop_prompter): update prototype + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: update to new prompter, use prompter + types and send two prompts at once when changning password + * lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c (krb5_prompter_posix): add name + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_prompt): add type + (krb5_prompter_fct): add anem + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_next_cred): transpose last two + paramaters to krb5_cc_next_cred (as MIT does, and not as they + document). From "Jacques A. Vidrine" + +2001-05-11 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: store-test + + * lib/krb5/store-test.c: simple bit storage test + + * lib/krb5/store.c: add more byteorder storage flags + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add more byteorder storage flags + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: don't use NULL where we mean 0 + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: put referral test code in separate function, + and test for KRB5_NT_SRV_INST + +2001-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/list.c (do_list): do not close the keytab if opening it + failed + * admin/list.c (do_list): always print complete names. print + everything to stdout. + * admin/list.c: print both v5 and v4 list by default + * admin/remove.c (kt_remove): reorganize some. open the keytab + (defaulting to the modify one). + * admin/purge.c (kt_purge): reorganize some. open the keytab + (defaulting to the modify one). correct usage strings + * admin/list.c (kt_list): reorganize some. open the keytab + * admin/get.c (kt_get): reorganize some. open the keytab + (defaulting to the modify one) + * admin/copy.c (kt_copy): default to modify key name. re-organise + * admin/change.c (kt_change): reorganize some. open the keytab + (defaulting to the modify one) + * admin/add.c (kt_add): reorganize some. open the keytab + (defaulting to the modify one) + * admin/ktutil.c (main): do not open the keytab, let every + sub-function handle it + + * kdc/config.c (configure): call free_getarg_strings + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): set error strings for + a few more errors + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm_int): make + `use_dns' parameter boolean + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add default_keytab_modify + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): set + default_keytab_modify + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h (KEYTAB_DEFAULT): change to + ANY:FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab,krb4:/etc/srvtab + (KEYTAB_DEFAULT_MODIFY): add + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_default_modify_name): add + (krb5_kt_resolve): set error string for failed keytab type + +2001-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (encryption_type): make field names more + consistent + (create_checksum): separate usage and type + (krb5_create_checksum): add a separate type parameter + (encrypt_internal): only free once on mismatched checksum length + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc2): try to tell what + realm we didn't manage to reach any KDC for in the error string + + * lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c (krb5_generate_seq_number): free + the entire subkey. from + +2001-05-07 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (akf_start_seq_get): return + KT_NOTFOUND if the file is empty + +2001-05-07 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: call krb5_set_error_string when open fails + fatally + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: call krb5_set_error_string when open + fails fatally + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): print error_string in context in + preference to error string derived from error code + * kuser/kinit.c (main): try to print the error string + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): set some sensible + error strings for errors + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add error_string and + error_buf + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add error_string.c + * lib/krb5/error_string.c: new file + +2001-05-02 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/time.c: krb5_string_to_deltat + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: one less data copy + + * lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c: conversion function for h_errno's + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: change this slightly + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: make checksum_types into an array of pointers + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: make sure we always use a des-cbc-crc + ticket + +2001-04-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): return a reference to a krbtgt for + the right realm if we fail to find a non-krbtgt service in the + database and the second component does a succesful non-dns lookup + to get the real realm (which has to be different from the + originally-supplied realm). this should help windows 2000 clients + that always start their lookups in `their' realm and do not have + any idea of how to map hostnames into realms + * kdc/kerberos5.c (is_krbtgt): rename to get_krbtgt_realm + +2001-04-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm_int): add extra + parameter to request use of dns or not + +2001-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/get.c (kt_get): allow specification of encryption types + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c (krb5_verify_init_creds): do not try to + close an unopened ccache, noted by + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_any_ops): add declaration + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): register + krb5_any_ops + + * lib/krb5/keytab_any.c: new file, implementing union of keytabs + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add keytab_any.c + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (get_init_creds_common): handle options + == NULL. noted by + +2001-04-19 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: set ret_creds to NULL before doing anything + else, from Jacques Vidrine + +2001-04-18 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/libasn1.h: asn1.h -> krb5_asn1.h + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: add asn1_ENCTYPE.x + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: adapt to asn1 changes + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: move enctypes here + + * lib/asn1/libasn1.h: rename asn1.h to krb5_asn1.h to avoid + conflicts + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: rename asn1.h to krb5_asn1.h to avoid + conflicts + + * lib/asn1/lex.l: use strtol to parse constants + +2001-04-06 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: add simple support for running commands + +2001-03-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c: change order of includes to allow it to work + with more versions of openldap + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): try to set sec and usec in error + replies + (*): update callers of krb5_km_error + (check_tgs_flags): handle renews requesting non-renewable tickets + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c (krb5_mk_error): allow specifying both ctime + and cusec + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_checksum, krb5_keyusage): add + compatibility names + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (create_checksum): change so that `type == 0' + means pick from the `crypto' (context) and otherwise use that + type. this is not a large change in practice and allows callers + to specify the exact checksum algorithm to use + +2001-03-13 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_kdc): add support for falling back + to KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH when KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH gives `bad + integrity'. this helps for talking to old (pre 0.3d) KDCs + +2001-03-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_derive_key): new function, used by + derived-key-test.c + * lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c: add new test vectors posted by + Ken Raeburn in to + ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov + * lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c: more test vectors from same source + * lib/krb5/derived-key-test.c: more tests from same source + +2001-03-06 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h: include roken_rename.h when appropriate + +2001-03-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_enctype): remove trailing comma + +2001-03-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_enctype): add ENCTYPE_* aliases for + compatibility with MIT krb5 + +2001-03-02 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): only request a renewable ticket when + explicitly requested. it still gets a renewable one if the renew + life is specified + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): treat -1 as flags not being set + +2001-02-28 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_init_ets): use krb5_add_et_list + +2001-02-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: implement krb5_get_cred_from_kdc_opt + +2001-02-25 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: do not use -R when testing for des functions + +2001-02-14 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: test for lber.h when trying to link against + openldap to handle openldap v1, from Sumit Bose + + +2001-02-19 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/libasn1.h: add string.h (for memset) + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): add printf attributes + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto): loop over all address + returned by getaddrinfo before trying the next kdc. from + thorpej@netbsd.org + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: fix default_realm in example + + * kdc/connect.c: fix a few kdc_log format types + + * configure.in: try to handle libdes/libcrypto ont requiring -L + +2001-02-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c (generate_type_decode): zero the data at + the beginning of the generated function, and add a label `fail' + that the code jumps to in case of errors that frees all allocated + data + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: aix dce: fix misquotes, from Ake Sandgren + + + * configure.in (dpagaix_LDFLAGS): try to add export file + +2001-02-05 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3: new man page, contributed by + + + * kdc/kaserver.c: update to new db_fetch4 + +2001-02-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.3e + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_get_masterkey): check kdb_verify_master_key + properly + (kdb_prop): decrypt key properly + * kdc/hprop.c: handle building with KRB4 always try to decrypt v4 + data with the master key leave it up to the v5 how to encrypt with + that master key + + * kdc/kstash.c: include file name in error messages + * kdc/hprop.c: fix a typo and check some more return values + * lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c (LDAP__lookup_princ): call ldap_search_s + correctly. From Jacques Vidrine + * kdc/misc.c (db_fetch): HDB_ERR_NOENTRY makes more sense than + ENOENT + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to + 15:0:0 + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 7:0:0 + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (libasn1_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:0:2 + * kdc/misc.c (db_fetch): return an error code. change callers to + look at this and try to print it in log messages + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (decrypt_internal_derived): check that there's + enough data + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hprop.c (realm_buf): move it so it becomes properly + conditional on KRB4 + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c (hdb_unseal_keys_mkey, hdb_seal_keys_mkey, + hdb_unseal_keys, hdb_seal_keys): check that we have the correct + master key and that we manage to decrypt the key properly, + returning an error code. fix all callers to check return value. + + * tools/krb5-config.in: use @LIB_des_appl@ + * tools/Makefile.am (krb5-config): add LIB_des_appl + * configure.in (LIB_des): set correctly + (LIB_des_appl): add for the use by krb5-config.in + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (fd_fetch, fd_store): use net_{read,write} + to make sure of not dropping data when doing it over a socket. + (this might break when used with ordinary files on win32) + + * lib/hdb/hdb_err.et (NO_MKEY): add + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): be paranoid and check + krb5_enctype_to_string for failure, noted by + + * lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.3, lib/krb5/krb5_context.3, + lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.3: add new man pages, contributed by + + + * use the openssl api for md4/md5/sha and handle openssl/*.h + + * kdc/kaserver.c (do_getticket): check length of ticket. noted by + + +2001-01-28 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: send -R instead of -rpath to libtool to set + runtime library paths + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: remove all dependencies on libkrb + +2001-01-27 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rcp: add port of bsd rcp changed to use existing rsh, + contributed by Richard Nyberg + +2001-01-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_port.c: don't warn if the port name can't be found, + nobody cares anyway + +2001-01-26 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: make it possible to convert a v4 dump file without + having any v4 libraries; the kdb backend still require them + + * kdc/v4_dump.c: include shadow definition of kdb Principal, so we + don't have to depend on any v4 libraries + + * kdc/hprop.h: include shadow definition of kdb Principal, so we + don't have to depend on any v4 libraries + + * lib/hdb/print.c: reduce number of memory allocations + + * lib/hdb/mkey.c: add support for reading krb4 /.k files + +2001-01-19 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: document admin_server and kpasswd_server + for realms document capath better + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst): preferably look + at kpasswd_server before admin_server + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_from_kdc_flags): look in + [libdefaults]capath for better hint of realm to send request to. + this allows the client to specify `realm routing information' in + case it cannot be done at the server (which is preferred) + + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c (krb5_rd_priv): handle no sequence number as + zero when we were expecting a sequence number. MIT krb5 cannot + generate a sequence number of zero, instead generating no sequence + number + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c (krb5_rd_safe): dito + +2001-01-11 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: add --port option + +2001-01-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/appdefault.c (krb5_appdefault_string): fix condition + just before returning + +2001-01-09 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/kf/kfd.c (proto): use krb5_rd_cred2 instead of krb5_rd_cred + +2001-01-05 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: call a time `time', and not `seconds' + + * lib/krb5/init_creds.c: not much point in setting the anonymous + flag here + + * lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.3: document appdefault_time + +2001-01-04 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: use + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags + + * kuser/kinit.c: use krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags + + * lib/krb5/init_creds.c: new function + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags to set options from + krb5.conf + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: make this match the MIT function + + * lib/krb5/appdefault.c (krb5_appdefault_string): handle NULL + def_val + (krb5_appdefault_time): new function + +2001-01-03 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (main): handle EOF when reading from stdin diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2002 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2002 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37fda2e494 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ChangeLog.2002 @@ -0,0 +1,726 @@ +2002-12-19 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: free allocated storage; reported by Howard + Chu + +2002-12-08 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: remove old encrypt_v4_ticket prototype + +2002-12-02 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (doit): initialise sa_size to size of + sockaddr_storage + + * kdc/connect.c (init_socket): initialise sa_size to size of + sockaddr_storage + +2002-11-15 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: remove trailing comma in enum + +2002-11-07 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/524.c: implement crude b2 style (non-)conversion for use + with afs + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: move encrypt_v4_ticket to 524.c, since that's + where it's used + +2002-10-21 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: more strcspn + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (emem_store): limit how much we allocate + (from Olaf Kirch) + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: don't allow trailing backslashes in + components + + * kdc/connect.c: check that %-quotes are followed by two hex + digits + + * lib/krb5/keytab_any.c: properly close the open keytabs (from + Larry Greenfield) + + * kdc/kaserver.c: make sure life is positive (from John Godehn) + +2002-10-17 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c (display_tokens): allow tokens up to size of + buffer (from Magnus Holmberg) + +2002-09-29 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (process_reply): fix reply length check + calculation (reported by various people) + +2002-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c (fkt_remove_entry): check return value + from start_seq_get (from Wynn Wilkes) + +2002-09-19 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_set_config_files): return ENXIO instead + of ENOENT when "unconfigured" + +2002-09-16 Jacques Vidrine + + * lib/krb5/kuserok.c, lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c: use strcspn + to convert the newline to NUL in fgets results. + +2002-09-13 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.1: remove unneeded Ns + + * lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.3: remove extra "application" + + * fix-export: remove autom4ate.cache + +2002-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * include/make_crypto.c: don't use function macros if possible + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: get limits.h for UINT_MAX + + * include/Makefile.am: use make_crypto to create crypto-headers.h + + * include/make_crypto.c: crypto header generation tool + + * configure.in: move crypto test to just after testing for krb4, + and move roken tests to after both, this speeds up various failure + cases with krb4 + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: don't use NULL when we mean 0 + + * configure.in: we don't set package_libdir anymore, so no point + in testing for it + + * tools/Makefile.am: subst INCLUDE_des + + * tools/krb5-config.in: add INCLUDE_des to cflags + + * configure.in: use AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR + + * fix-export: remove some unneeded stuff + + * kuser/kinit.c (do_524init): free principals + +2002-09-09 Jacques Vidrine + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info, fix_transited_encoding), + kdc/kaserver.c (krb5_ret_xdr_data), + lib/krb5/transited.c (krb5_domain_x500_decode): Validate some + counts: Check that they are non-negative, and that they are small + enough to avoid integer overflow when used in memory allocation + calculations. Potential problem areas pointed out by + Sebastian Krahmer . + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (akf_add_entry): Use O_EXCL when + creating a new keyfile. + +2002-09-09 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: don't try to build pam module + +2002-09-05 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/kf/kf.c: fix warning string + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_vlog_msg): delay message formating till we + know we need it + +2002-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (encode_reply): correct error logging + +2002-09-04 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c: close ccache if we opened it + + * appl/kf/kf.c: handle new protocol + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: use krb5_err instead of sysloging directly, + handle the new protocol, and bail out if an old client tries to + connect + + * appl/kf/kf_locl.h: we need a protocol version string + + * lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c: use ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: use ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE + + * kdc/hprop.c: set AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY + + * lib/hdb/common.c: use ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: add convenience macro that allocates a buffer + and encoded into that + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): use + in_creds->session.keytype literally instead of trying to convert + to a list of enctypes (it should already be an enctype) + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): init ret + +2002-09-03 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: remove ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE_IVEC + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: remove ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE_IVEC + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: get rid of DES3_CBC_encrypt_ivec, just use + zero ivec in DES3_CBC_encrypt if passed ivec is NULL + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: back out 1.144, since it will re-create + krb5-protos.h at build-time, which requires perl, which is bad + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): don't + blindly use the local subkey + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: add function krb5_crypto_getblocksize that + extracts the required blocksize from a crypto context + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: just get the length of the encoded + authenticator instead of trying to grow a buffer + +2002-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: add --disable-mmap option, and tests for + sys/mman.h and mmap + +2002-09-03 Jacques Vidrine + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: verify lengths in response + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (decode_integer, decode_unsigned): check for + truncated integers + +2002-09-02 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: generate a local subkey if + AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY is set + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: we don't have enough information about + whether to generate a local subkey here, so don't try to + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: new function + krb5_auth_con_generatelocalsubkey + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: only set kdc_sec_offset if looking at an + initial ticket + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): simplify + initialisation of srv_lookup + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (send_request): set AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY + +2002-08-30 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/name-45-test.c: also test krb5_524_conv_principal + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (TESTS): add name-45-test + * lib/krb5/name-45-test.c: add testcases for + krb5_425_conv_principal + +2002-08-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/parse-name-test.c: also test unparse_short functions + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: use com_err/error_message API + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add parse-name-test + * lib/krb5/parse-name-test.c: add a program for testing parsing + and unparsing principal names + +2002-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/config.c: add missing ifdef DAEMON + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use rk_SUNOS + + * kdc/config.c: add detach options + + * kdc/main.c: maybe detach from console? + + * kdc/kdc.8: markup changes + + * configure.in: AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW -> rk_TEST_PACKAGE + + * configure.in: use rk_TELNET, rename some other macros, and don't + add -ldes to krb4 link command + + * kuser/kinit.1: whitespace fix (from NetBSD) + + * include/bits.c: we may need unistd.h for ssize_t + +2002-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): lookup AAAA + rrs before A ones when using the resolver to verify a mapping, + also use getaddrinfo when resolver is not available + + * lib/hdb/keytab.c (find_db): const-correctness in parameters to + krb5_config_get_next + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: include in the generated files (for + memset) + +2002-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/test_get_addrs.c, lib/krb5/krbhst-test.c: make it use + getarg so that it can handle --help and --version (and thus make + check can pass) + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: make this build again + +2002-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_int): handle len == 0. based on a + patch from Love + +2002-08-22 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: we seem to call KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP + KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED, so define the former to the latter + + * kdc/kdc.8: add blurb about adding and removing addresses; update + kdc.conf section to match reality + + * configure.in: KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN seems to always have existed, so + don't define it + +2002-08-21 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: print OIDs too, based on a patch from + Love + +2002-08-21 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c (do_v4_fallback): don't use krb_get_pw_in_tkt2 + since it might not exist, and we don't actually care about the key + +2002-08-20 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: correct documentation for + verify_ap_req_nofail + + * lib/krb5/log.c: rename syslog_data to avoid name conflicts (from + Mattias Amnefelt) + + * kuser/klist.c (display_tokens): increase token buffer size, and + add more checks of the kernel data (from Love) + +2002-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * fix-export: use make to parse Makefile.am instead of perl + + * configure.in: use argument-less AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE, now that it + groks AC_INIT with package name etc. + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: include + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: include com_right.h + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: socklen_t -> krb5_socklen_t + + * include/bits.c: define krb5_socklen_t type; this should really + go someplace else, but this was easy + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: don't bail out if parsing of a file + fails, just warn about it + + * kdc/log.c (kdc_openlog): no need for a config_file parameter + + * kdc/config.c: just treat kdc.conf like any other config file + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_get_default_config_files): ignore + duplicate files + +2002-08-16 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: turn strings into pointers, so we can assign to + them + + * lib/krb5/constants.c: turn strings into pointers, so we can + assign to them + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (get_addrs_int): initialise res if + SCAN_INTERFACES is not set + + * lib/krb5/context.c: fix various borked stuff in previous commits + +2002-08-16 Jacques Vidrine + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (kpasswd_get_next): if we fall back to using + the `admin_server' entry for kpasswd, override the `proto' result + to be UDP. + +2002-08-15 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: check return value of + krb5_sockaddr2address + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: check return value of + krb5_sockaddr2address + + * lib/krb5/context.c: get the default keytab from KRB5_KTNAME + +2002-08-14 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: allow parsing of more than one file + + * lib/krb5/context.c: allow changing config files with the + function krb5_set_config_files, there are also related functions + krb5_get_default_config_files and krb5_free_config_files; these + should work similar to their MIT counterparts + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: allow the use of more than one config + file by using the new function krb5_config_parse_file_multi + +2002-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * use sysconfdir instead of /etc + + * configure.in: require autoconf 2.53; rename dpagaix_LDFLAGS etc + to appease automake; force sysconfdir and localstatedir to /etc + and /var/heimdal for now + + * kdc/connect.c (addr_to_string): check return value of + sockaddr2address + +2002-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: if the remote address isn't an addrport, + don't try comparing to one; this should make old clients work with + new servers + + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c: remove unused variable + +2002-07-31 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/{kerberos5,524}.c: ENOENT -> HDB_ERR_NOENTRY (from Derrick + Brashear) + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: actually lower case the lower case + instance name (spotted by Derrick Brashear) + +2002-07-24 Johan Danielsson + + * fix-export: if DATEDVERSION is set, change the version to + current date + + * configure.in: don't use AC_PROG_RANLIB, and use magic foo to set + LTLIBOBJS + +2002-07-04 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: add some cache-control-foo to the http responses + (from Gombas Gabor) + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): don't copy size + if ret_len == NULL + +2002-06-28 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c (display_tokens): don't bail out before we get + EDOM (signaling the end of the tokens), the kernel can also return + ENOTCONN, meaning that the index does not exist anymore (for + example if the token has expired) + +2002-06-06 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: make sure we return an error if there are + no changepw hosts found; from Wynn Wilkes + +2002-05-29 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_register): break out of loop when the + same type is found; spotted by Wynn Wilkes + +2002-05-28 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: check size of entry before trying to + read 32-bit kvno; also fix typo in previous + +2002-05-24 Johan Danielsson + + * include/Makefile.am: only add to INCLUDES + + * lib/45/mk_req.c: fix for storage change + + * lib/hdb/print.c: fix for storage change + +2002-05-15 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: don't free encrypted padata until we're really + done with it + +2002-05-07 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: when decrypting pa-data, try all keys matching + enctype + + * kuser/kinit.1: document -a + + * kuser/kinit.c: add command line switch for extra addresses + +2002-04-30 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: remove some duplicate tests + + * configure.in: use AC_HELP_STRING + +2002-04-29 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (usage2arcfour): don't abort if the usage is + unknown + +2002-04-25 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use rk_DESTDIRS + +2002-04-22 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3: make it clear that _lrealm modifies + the principal + +2002-04-19 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c: fix typo in error string + +2002-04-18 Johan Danielsson + + * acconfig.h: remove some stuff that is defined elsewhere + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: include + + * lib/krb5/acl.c: rename acl_string parameter + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: remove __P from protos, and put parameter + names in comments + + * kuser/klist.c: better align some headers + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: storage tweaks + + * kdc/kaserver.c: storage tweaks + + * kdc/524.c: storage tweaks + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: storage tweaks + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: storage tweaks + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: storage tweaks; also try to handle zero + sized keytab files + + * lib/krb5/keytab_any.c: use KRB5_KT_END instead of KRB5_CC_END + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: storage tweaks + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c: make the krb5_storage opaque, and add + function wrappers for store/fetch/seek, and also make the eof-code + configurable + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c: make the krb5_storage opaque, and add + function wrappers for store/fetch/seek, and also make the eof-code + configurable + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: make the krb5_storage opaque, and add + function wrappers for store/fetch/seek, and also make the eof-code + configurable + + * lib/krb5/store.c: make the krb5_storage opaque, and add function + wrappers for store/fetch/seek, and also make the eof-code + configurable + + * lib/krb5/store-int.h: make the krb5_storage opaque, and add + function wrappers for store/fetch/seek, and also make the eof-code + configurable + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: make the krb5_storage opaque, and add function + wrappers for store/fetch/seek, and also make the eof-code + configurable + + * include/bits.c: include to get socklen_t + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): sort ETYPE-INFOs by + requested KDC-REQ etypes + + * kdc/hpropd.c: constify + + * kdc/hprop.c: constify + + * kdc/string2key.c: constify + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: make port_str const + + * kdc/config.c: constify + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: constify + + * kdc/kstash.c: constify + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: remove unnecessary cast + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c: constify + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_parse_name): const qualify + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_get_name): constify return type + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_free_context): don't try to free the + ccache prefix + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_register): don't make a copy of the + prefix + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: constify some struct members + + * lib/krb5/log.c: constify + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): const + qualify + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_init_etype): constify + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: constify some + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: constify + + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c (krb5_aname_to_localname): + constify local variable + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv4_sockaddr2port): constify + +2002-04-17 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: add some log checking + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_addlog_dest): reorganise syslog parsing + +2002-04-16 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_crypto_init): check that the key size + matches the expected length + +2002-03-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: rename send parameter to send_data + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c: rename ctime parameter to client_time + +2002-03-22 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (find_etype): unsigned -> krb5_enctype (from + Reinoud Zandijk) + +2002-03-18 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: add the GSS-API checksum type here + +2002-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to + 18:3:1 + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 7:5:0 + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (libasn1_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 6:0:0 + +2002-03-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: handle addresses with port numbers + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c, lib/krb5/keytab.c: + store the kvno % 256 as the byte and the complete 32 bit kvno after + the end of the current keytab entry + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: + handle LR_PW_EXPTIME and LR_ACCT_EXPTIME in the same way + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): + handle ports giving for the remote address + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: + get a ticket with no addresses if no-addresses is set + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: + rename functions DES_* to krb5_* to avoid colliding with modern + openssl + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: + make all functions taking 'struct sockaddr' actually take a socklen_t + instead of int and that acts as an in-out parameter (indicating the + maximum length of the sockaddr to be written) + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: + make the kvno's in the krb4 universe by the real one % 256, since they + cannot only be 8 bit, and the v5 ones are actually 32 bits + +2002-02-15 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (akf_add_entry): don't create the file + before we need to write to it + (from Åke Sandgren) + +2002-02-14 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: rk_RETSIGTYPE and rk_BROKEN_REALLOC are called via + rk_ROKEN (from Gombas Gabor); find inttypes by CHECK_TYPES + directly + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: actually use the correct key (from Daniel + Kouril) + +2002-02-12 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_get_err_text): protect against NULL + context + +2002-02-11 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: no need to use the "modify" keytab anymore + + * lib/krb5/keytab_any.c: implement add and remove + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: implement add and remove + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (emem_free): clear memory before freeing + (this should perhaps be selectable with a flag) + +2002-02-04 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/config.c (get_dbinfo): if there are database specifications + in the config file, don't automatically try to use the default + values (from Gombas Gabor) + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_closelog): don't pass pointer to pointer + (from Gombas Gabor) + +2002-01-30 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/list.c: get the default keytab from krb5.conf, and list + all parts of an ANY type keytab + + * lib/krb5/context.c: default default_keytab_modify to NULL + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_default_modify_name): if no modify + name is specified take it from the first component of the default + keytab name + +2002-01-29 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: compare keytab types case insensitively + +2002-01-07 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (create_checksum): make usage `unsigned' (it's + not really a krb5_key_usage). From Ben Harris + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: use krb5_enctype consistently. From Ben + Harris + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: use krb5_enctype consistently. From Ben + Harris + * kdc/kerberos5.c: use krb5_enctype consistently. From Ben Harris + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/NEWS b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/NEWS new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..262038b26e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/NEWS @@ -0,0 +1,625 @@ +Changes in release 0.6.3 + + * fix vulnerabilities in ftpd + + * support for linux AFS /proc "syscalls" + + * support for RFC3244 (Windows 2000 Kerberos Change/Set Password) in + kpasswdd + + * fix possible KDC denial of service + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.6.2 + + * Fix possible buffer overrun in v4 kadmin (which now defaults to off) + +Changes in release 0.6.1 + + * Fixed ARCFOUR suppport + + * Cross realm vulnerability + + * kdc: fix denial of service attack + + * kdc: stop clients from renewing tickets into the future + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.6 + +* The DES3 GSS-API mechanism has been changed to inter-operate with + other GSSAPI implementations. See man page for gssapi(3) how to turn + on generation of correct MIC messages. Next major release of heimdal + will generate correct MIC by default. + +* More complete GSS-API support + +* Better AFS support: kdc (524) supports 2b; 524 in kdc and AFS + support in applications no longer requires Kerberos 4 libs + +* Kerberos 4 support in kdc defaults to turned off (includes ka and 524) + +* other bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.5.2 + + * kdc: add option for disabling v4 cross-realm (defaults to off) + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.5.1 + + * kadmind: fix remote exploit + + * kadmind: add option to disable kerberos 4 + + * kdc: make sure kaserver token life is positive + + * telnet: use the session key if there is no subkey + + * fix EPSV parsing in ftp + + * other bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.5 + + * add --detach option to kdc + + * allow setting forward and forwardable option in telnet from + .telnetrc, with override from command line + + * accept addresses with or without ports in krb5_rd_cred + + * make it work with modern openssl + + * use our own string2key function even with openssl (that handles weak + keys incorrectly) + + * more system-specific requirements in login + + * do not use getlogin() to determine root in su + + * telnet: abort if telnetd does not support encryption + + * update autoconf to 2.53 + + * update config.guess, config.sub + + * other bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.4e + + * improve libcrypto and database autoconf tests + + * do not care about salting of server principals when serving v4 requests + + * some improvements to gssapi library + + * test for existing compile_et/libcom_err + + * portability fixes + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.4d + + * fix some problems when using libcrypto from openssl + + * handle /dev/ptmx `unix98' ptys on Linux + + * add some forgotten man pages + + * rsh: clean-up and add man page + + * fix -A and -a in builtin-ls in tpd + + * fix building problem on Irix + + * make `ktutil get' more efficient + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.4c + + * fix buffer overrun in telnetd + + * repair some of the v4 fallback code in kinit + + * add more shared library dependencies + + * simplify and fix hprop handling of v4 databases + + * fix some building problems (osf's sia and osfc2 login) + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.4b + + * update the shared library version numbers correctly + +Changes in release 0.4a + + * corrected key used for checksum in mk_safe, unfortunately this + makes it backwards incompatible + + * update to autoconf 2.50, libtool 1.4 + + * re-write dns/config lookups (krb5_krbhst API) + + * make order of using subkeys consistent + + * add man page links + + * add more man pages + + * remove rfc2052 support, now only rfc2782 is supported + + * always build with kaserver protocol support in the KDC (assuming + KRB4 is enabled) and support for reading kaserver databases in + hprop + +Changes in release 0.3f + + * change default keytab to ANY:FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab,krb4:/etc/srvtab, + the new keytab type that tries both of these in order (SRVTAB is + also an alias for krb4:) + + * improve error reporting and error handling (error messages should + be more detailed and more useful) + + * improve building with openssl + + * add kadmin -K, rcp -F + + * fix two incorrect weak DES keys + + * fix building of kaserver compat in KDC + + * the API is closer to what MIT krb5 is using + + * more compatible with windows 2000 + + * removed some memory leaks + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.3e + + * rcp program included + + * fix buffer overrun in ftpd + + * handle omitted sequence numbers as zeroes to handle MIT krb5 that + cannot generate zero sequence numbers + + * handle v4 /.k files better + + * configure/portability fixes + + * fixes in parsing of options to kadmin (sub-)commands + + * handle errors in kadmin load better + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.3d + + * add krb5-config + + * fix a bug in 3des gss-api mechanism, making it compatible with the + specification and the MIT implementation + + * make telnetd only allow a specific list of environment variables to + stop it from setting `sensitive' variables + + * try to use an existing libdes + + * lib/krb5, kdc: use correct usage type for ap-req messages. This + should improve compatability with MIT krb5 when using 3DES + encryption types + + * kdc: fix memory allocation problem + + * update config.guess and config.sub + + * lib/roken: more stuff implemented + + * bug fixes and portability enhancements + +Changes in release 0.3c + + * lib/krb5: memory caches now support the resolve operation + + * appl/login: set PATH to some sane default + + * kadmind: handle several realms + + * bug fixes (including memory leaks) + +Changes in release 0.3b + + * kdc: prefer default-salted keys on v5 requests + + * kdc: lowercase hostnames in v4 mode + + * hprop: handle more types of MIT salts + + * lib/krb5: fix memory leak + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.3a: + + * implement arcfour-hmac-md5 to interoperate with W2K + + * modularise the handling of the master key, and allow for other + encryption types. This makes it easier to import a database from + some other source without having to re-encrypt all keys. + + * allow for better control over which encryption types are created + + * make kinit fallback to v4 if given a v4 KDC + + * make klist work better with v4 and v5, and add some more MIT + compatibility options + + * make the kdc listen on the krb524 (4444) port for compatibility + with MIT krb5 clients + + * implement more DCE/DFS support, enabled with --enable-dce, see + lib/kdfs and appl/dceutils + + * make the sequence numbers work correctly + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2t: + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2s: + + * add OpenLDAP support in hdb + + * login will get v4 tickets when it receives forwarded tickets + + * xnlock supports both v5 and v4 + + * repair source routing for telnet + + * fix building problems with krb4 (krb_mk_req) + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2r: + + * fix realloc memory corruption bug in kdc + + * `add --key' and `cpw --key' in kadmin + + * klist supports listing v4 tickets + + * update config.guess and config.sub + + * make v4 -> v5 principal name conversion more robust + + * support for anonymous tickets + + * new man-pages + + * telnetd: do not negotiate KERBEROS5 authentication if there's no keytab. + + * use and set expiration and not password expiration when dumping + to/from ka server databases / krb4 databases + + * make the code happier with 64-bit time_t + + * follow RFC2782 and by default do not look for non-underscore SRV names + +Changes in release 0.2q: + + * bug fix in tcp-handling in kdc + + * bug fix in expand_hostname + +Changes in release 0.2p: + + * bug fix in `kadmin load/merge' + + * bug fix in krb5_parse_address + +Changes in release 0.2o: + + * gss_{import,export}_sec_context added to libgssapi + + * new option --addresses to kdc (for listening on an explicit set of + addresses) + + * bug fixes in the krb4 and kaserver emulation part of the kdc + + * other bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2n: + + * more robust parsing of dump files in kadmin + * changed default timestamp format for log messages to extended ISO + 8601 format (Y-M-DTH:M:S) + * changed md4/md5/sha1 APIes to be de-facto `standard' + * always make hostname into lower-case before creating principal + * small bits of more MIT-compatability + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2m: + + * handle glibc's getaddrinfo() that returns several ai_canonname + + * new endian test + + * man pages fixes + +Changes in release 0.2l: + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2k: + + * better IPv6 test + + * make struct sockaddr_storage in roken work better on alphas + + * some missing [hn]to[hn]s fixed. + + * allow users to change their own passwords with kadmin (with initial + tickets) + + * fix stupid bug in parsing KDC specification + + * add `ktutil change' and `ktutil purge' + +Changes in release 0.2j: + + * builds on Irix + + * ftpd works in passive mode + + * should build on cygwin + + * work around broken IPv6-code on OpenBSD 2.6, also add configure + option --disable-ipv6 + +Changes in release 0.2i: + + * use getaddrinfo in the missing places. + + * fix SRV lookup for admin server + + * use get{addr,name}info everywhere. and implement it in terms of + getipnodeby{name,addr} (which uses gethostbyname{,2} and + gethostbyaddr) + +Changes in release 0.2h: + + * fix typo in kx (now compiles) + +Changes in release 0.2g: + + * lots of bug fixes: + * push works + * repair appl/test programs + * sockaddr_storage works on solaris (alignment issues) + * works better with non-roken getaddrinfo + * rsh works + * some non standard C constructs removed + +Changes in release 0.2f: + + * support SRV records for kpasswd + * look for both _kerberos and krb5-realm when doing host -> realm mapping + +Changes in release 0.2e: + + * changed copyright notices to remove `advertising'-clause. + * get{addr,name}info added to roken and used in the other code + (this makes things work much better with hosts with both v4 and v6 + addresses, among other things) + * do pre-auth for both password and key-based get_in_tkt + * support for having several databases + * new command `del_enctype' in kadmin + * strptime (and new strftime) add to roken + * more paranoia about finding libdb + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2d: + + * new configuration option [libdefaults]default_etypes_des + * internal ls in ftpd builds without KRB4 + * kx/rsh/push/pop_debug tries v5 and v4 consistenly + * build bug fixes + * other bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2c: + + * bug fixes (see ChangeLog's for details) + +Changes in release 0.2b: + + * bug fixes + * actually bump shared library versions + +Changes in release 0.2a: + + * a new program verify_krb5_conf for checking your /etc/krb5.conf + * add 3DES keys when changing password + * support null keys in database + * support multiple local realms + * implement a keytab backend for AFS KeyFile's + * implement a keytab backend for v4 srvtabs + * implement `ktutil copy' + * support password quality control in v4 kadmind + * improvements in v4 compat kadmind + * handle the case of having the correct cred in the ccache but with + the wrong encryption type better + * v6-ify the remaining programs. + * internal ls in ftpd + * rename strcpy_truncate/strcat_truncate to strlcpy/strlcat + * add `ank --random-password' and `cpw --random-password' in kadmin + * some programs and documentation for trying to talk to a W2K KDC + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1m: + + * support for getting default from krb5.conf for kinit/kf/rsh/telnet. + From Miroslav Ruda + * v6-ify hprop and hpropd + * support numeric addresses in krb5_mk_req + * shadow support in login and su. From Miroslav Ruda + * make rsh/rshd IPv6-aware + * make the gssapi sample applications better at reporting errors + * lots of bug fixes + * handle systems with v6-aware libc and non-v6 kernels (like Linux + with glibc 2.1) better + * hide failure of ERPT in ftp + * lots of bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1l: + + * make ftp and ftpd IPv6-aware + * add inet_pton to roken + * more IPv6-awareness + * make mini_inetd v6 aware + +Changes in release 0.1k: + + * bump shared libraries versions + * add roken version of inet_ntop + * merge more changes to rshd + +Changes in release 0.1j: + + * restore back to the `old' 3DES code. This was supposed to be done + in 0.1h and 0.1i but I did a CVS screw-up. + * make telnetd handle v6 connections + +Changes in release 0.1i: + + * start using `struct sockaddr_storage' which simplifies the code + (with a fallback definition if it's not defined) + * bug fixes (including in hprop and kf) + * don't use mawk which seems to mishandle roken.awk + * get_addrs should be able to handle v6 addresses on Linux (with the + required patch to the Linux kernel -- ask within) + * rshd builds with shadow passwords + +Changes in release 0.1h: + + * kf: new program for forwarding credentials + * portability fixes + * make forwarding credentials work with MIT code + * better conversion of ka database + * add etc/services.append + * correct `modified by' from kpasswdd + * lots of bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1g: + + * kgetcred: new program for explicitly obtaining tickets + * configure fixes + * krb5-aware kx + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1f; + + * experimental support for v4 kadmin protokoll in kadmind + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1e: + + * try to handle old DCE and MIT kdcs + * support for older versions of credential cache files and keytabs + * postdated tickets work + * support for password quality checks in kpasswdd + * new flag --enable-kaserver for kdc + * renew fixes + * prototype su program + * updated (some) manpages + * support for KDC resource records + * should build with --without-krb4 + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1d: + + * Support building with DB2 (uses 1.85-compat API) + * Support krb5-realm.DOMAIN in DNS + * new `ktutil srvcreate' + * v4/kafs support in klist/kdestroy + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1c: + + * fix ASN.1 encoding of signed integers + * somewhat working `ktutil get' + * some documentation updates + * update to Autoconf 2.13 and Automake 1.4 + * the usual bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1b: + + * some old -> new crypto conversion utils + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1a: + + * new crypto code + * more bug fixes + * make sure we ask for DES keys in gssapi + * support signed ints in ASN1 + * IPv6-bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0u: + + * lots of bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0t: + + * more robust parsing of krb5.conf + * include net{read,write} in lib/roken + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0s: + + * kludges for parsing options to rsh + * more robust parsing of krb5.conf + * removed some arbitrary limits + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0r: + + * default options for some programs + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0q: + + * support for building shared libraries with libtool + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0p: + + * keytab moved to /etc/krb5.keytab + * avoid false detection of IPv6 on Linux + * Lots of more functionality in the gssapi-library + * hprop can now read ka-server databases + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0o: + + * FTP with GSSAPI support. + * Bug fixes. + +Changes in release 0.0n: + + * Incremental database propagation. + * Somewhat improved kadmin ui; the stuff in admin is now removed. + * Some support for using enctypes instead of keytypes. + * Lots of other improvement and bug fixes, see ChangeLog for details. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f27b67f912 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +$Id: README,v 1.1 2000/07/27 02:33:54 assar Exp $ + +Heimdal is a Kerberos 5 implementation. + +Please see the manual in doc, by default installed in +/usr/heimdal/info/heimdal.info for information on how to install. +There are also briefer man pages for most of the commands. + +Bug reports and bugs are appreciated, see more under Bug reports in +the manual on how we prefer them. + +For more information see the web-page at + or the mailing lists: + +heimdal-announce@sics.se low-volume announcement +heimdal-discuss@sics.se high-volume discussion + +send a mail to heimdal-announce-request@sics.se and +heimdal-discuss-request@sics.se respectively to subscribe. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DELETED b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DELETED new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56ecb231ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DELETED @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +Makefile.am +Makefile.am.common +Makefile.in +configure +configure.in diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DRAGONFLY b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DRAGONFLY new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f58f9bcc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DRAGONFLY @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# $DragonFly: src/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/README.DRAGONFLY,v 1.1.1.1 2005/01/16 14:07:40 eirikn Exp $ + +Heimdal as used by DragonFly + +DO NOT CREATE OR EDIT ANY FILES IN THIS DIRECTORY HIERARCHY! THIS +HIERARCHY REPRESENTS AN EXACT COPY, MINUS UNNEEDED FILES, OF THE ORIGINAL +ARCHIVE. All modifications are made in the DragonFly build wrapper, in +/usr/src/kerberos5, by creating overrides or performing surgery on the +distribution into local files. The only additional files added to this +directory are README.DRAGONFLY and README.DELETED. + +Original source is availale from: +ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/heimdal/src/ +MD5 (/home/eirikn/src/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3.tar.gz) = 2265fd2d4573dd3a8da45ce62519e48b + +Removed files are listed in README.DELETED diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eeb43158e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +-*- indented-text -*- + +$Id: TODO,v 1.67 2003/03/20 20:00:53 lha Exp $ + +* configure + +handle readline hiding in readline/readline.h + +* appl + +** appl/popper + +Implement RFC1731 and 1734, pop over GSS-API + +* doc + +* kdc + +* kadmin + +make it happy with reading and parsing kdc.conf + +is in need of a major cleanup + +* kpasswdd + +figure out what's the deal with do_sequence and the MIT client + +* lib + +** lib/asn1 + +prepend a prefix on all generated symbols + +** lib/auth + +** lib/auth/sia + +PAM + +** lib/com_err + +write a man-page + +** lib/des + +make everything work with openssl and make prototypes compatible + +** lib/gssapi + +anonymous credentials not implemented + +add rc4 + +** lib/hdb + +** lib/kadm5 + +add policies? + +fix to use rpc? + +** lib/krb5 + +the replay cache is, in its current state, not very useful + +OTP? + +make checksum/encryption type configuration more realm-specific. make +some simple way of handling the w2k situtation + +crypto: allow scatter/gather creation of checksums + +verify_user: handle non-secure verification failing because of +host->realm mapping + +config_file: do it in case-sensitive and/or insensitive + +** lib/roken diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO-1.0 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO-1.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e514da726 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO-1.0 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +$Id: TODO-1.0,v 1.3 2001/09/27 16:27:30 assar Exp $ + +- sort out hprop:ing +- figure out hostname case sensitive issues +- verify_user: handle non-secure verification failing because of + host->realm mapping +- gssapi rc4 mechanism +- PAM? +- kadmin: make it happy with reading and parsing kdc.conf +- handle readline hiding in readline/readline.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO-shadow b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO-shadow new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..313438d1af --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/TODO-shadow @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-krb5_fwd_tgt_creds() is still broken +-the 4 to 5 principal thing +-gss_acquire_cred still doesn't allow an alternate keytab +-and the db lib versus headers thing + +/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr/shadow/ka2heim.txt diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/aclocal.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/aclocal.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e2ce60528 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/aclocal.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,6649 @@ +# generated automatically by aclocal 1.8.3 -*- Autoconf -*- + +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# libtool.m4 - Configure libtool for the host system. -*-Autoconf-*- + +# serial 47 AC_PROG_LIBTOOL + + +# AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE(MACRO-NAME, IF-PROVIDED, IF-NOT-PROVIDED) +# ----------------------------------------------------------- +# If this macro is not defined by Autoconf, define it here. +m4_ifdef([AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE], + [], + [m4_define([AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE], + [m4_ifdef([AC_PROVIDE_$1], + [$2], [$3])])]) + + +# AC_PROG_LIBTOOL +# --------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_PROG_LIBTOOL], +[AC_REQUIRE([_AC_PROG_LIBTOOL])dnl +dnl If AC_PROG_CXX has already been expanded, run AC_LIBTOOL_CXX +dnl immediately, otherwise, hook it in at the end of AC_PROG_CXX. + AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_PROG_CXX], + [AC_LIBTOOL_CXX], + [define([AC_PROG_CXX], defn([AC_PROG_CXX])[AC_LIBTOOL_CXX + ])]) +dnl And a similar setup for Fortran 77 support + AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_PROG_F77], + [AC_LIBTOOL_F77], + [define([AC_PROG_F77], defn([AC_PROG_F77])[AC_LIBTOOL_F77 +])]) + +dnl Quote A][M_PROG_GCJ so that aclocal doesn't bring it in needlessly. +dnl If either AC_PROG_GCJ or A][M_PROG_GCJ have already been expanded, run +dnl AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ immediately, otherwise, hook it in at the end of both. + AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_PROG_GCJ], + [AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ], + [AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([A][M_PROG_GCJ], + [AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ], + [AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([LT_AC_PROG_GCJ], + [AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ], + [ifdef([AC_PROG_GCJ], + [define([AC_PROG_GCJ], defn([AC_PROG_GCJ])[AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ])]) + ifdef([A][M_PROG_GCJ], + [define([A][M_PROG_GCJ], defn([A][M_PROG_GCJ])[AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ])]) + ifdef([LT_AC_PROG_GCJ], + [define([LT_AC_PROG_GCJ], + defn([LT_AC_PROG_GCJ])[AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ])])])]) +])])# AC_PROG_LIBTOOL + + +# _AC_PROG_LIBTOOL +# ---------------- +AC_DEFUN([_AC_PROG_LIBTOOL], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl +AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_CXX])dnl +AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_F77])dnl +AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ])dnl + +# This can be used to rebuild libtool when needed +LIBTOOL_DEPS="$ac_aux_dir/ltmain.sh" + +# Always use our own libtool. +LIBTOOL='$(SHELL) $(top_builddir)/libtool' +AC_SUBST(LIBTOOL)dnl + +# Prevent multiple expansion +define([AC_PROG_LIBTOOL], []) +])# _AC_PROG_LIBTOOL + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP +# ---------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP], +[AC_PREREQ(2.50)dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_ENABLE_SHARED])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_ENABLE_STATIC])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_HOST])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_BUILD])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_LD])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_LD_RELOAD_FLAG])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_NM])dnl + +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_LN_S])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_DEPLIBS_CHECK_METHOD])dnl +# Autoconf 2.13's AC_OBJEXT and AC_EXEEXT macros only works for C compilers! +AC_REQUIRE([AC_OBJEXT])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_EXEEXT])dnl +dnl + +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_MAX_CMD_LEN +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_GLOBAL_SYMBOL_PIPE +AC_LIBTOOL_OBJDIR + +AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER])dnl +_LT_AC_PROG_ECHO_BACKSLASH + +case $host_os in +aix3*) + # AIX sometimes has problems with the GCC collect2 program. 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It backslashifies +# metacharacters that are still active within double-quoted strings. +Xsed='sed -e s/^X//' +[sed_quote_subst='s/\([\\"\\`$\\\\]\)/\\\1/g'] + +# Same as above, but do not quote variable references. +[double_quote_subst='s/\([\\"\\`\\\\]\)/\\\1/g'] + +# Sed substitution to delay expansion of an escaped shell variable in a +# double_quote_subst'ed string. +delay_variable_subst='s/\\\\\\\\\\\$/\\\\\\$/g' + +# Sed substitution to avoid accidental globbing in evaled expressions +no_glob_subst='s/\*/\\\*/g' + +# Constants: +rm="rm -f" + +# Global variables: +default_ofile=libtool +can_build_shared=yes + +# All known linkers require a `.a' archive for static linking (except M$VC, +# which needs '.lib'). +libext=a +ltmain="$ac_aux_dir/ltmain.sh" +ofile="$default_ofile" +with_gnu_ld="$lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld" + +AC_CHECK_TOOL(AR, ar, false) +AC_CHECK_TOOL(RANLIB, ranlib, :) +AC_CHECK_TOOL(STRIP, strip, :) + +old_CC="$CC" +old_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + +# Set sane defaults for various variables +test -z "$AR" && AR=ar +test -z "$AR_FLAGS" && AR_FLAGS=cru +test -z "$AS" && AS=as +test -z "$CC" && CC=cc +test -z "$LTCC" && LTCC=$CC +test -z "$DLLTOOL" && DLLTOOL=dlltool +test -z "$LD" && LD=ld +test -z "$LN_S" && LN_S="ln -s" +test -z "$MAGIC_CMD" && MAGIC_CMD=file +test -z "$NM" && NM=nm +test -z "$SED" && SED=sed +test -z "$OBJDUMP" && OBJDUMP=objdump +test -z "$RANLIB" && RANLIB=: +test -z "$STRIP" && STRIP=: +test -z "$ac_objext" && ac_objext=o + +# Determine commands to create old-style static archives. +old_archive_cmds='$AR $AR_FLAGS $oldlib$oldobjs$old_deplibs' +old_postinstall_cmds='chmod 644 $oldlib' +old_postuninstall_cmds= + +if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + case $host_os in + openbsd*) + old_postinstall_cmds="\$RANLIB -t \$oldlib~$old_postinstall_cmds" + ;; + *) + old_postinstall_cmds="\$RANLIB \$oldlib~$old_postinstall_cmds" + ;; + esac + old_archive_cmds="$old_archive_cmds~\$RANLIB \$oldlib" +fi + +# Only perform the check for file, if the check method requires it +case $deplibs_check_method in +file_magic*) + if test "$file_magic_cmd" = '$MAGIC_CMD'; then + AC_PATH_MAGIC + fi + ;; +esac + +AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN], enable_dlopen=yes, enable_dlopen=no) +AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL], +enable_win32_dll=yes, enable_win32_dll=no) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE([libtool-lock], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-libtool-lock], + [avoid locking (might break parallel builds)])]) +test "x$enable_libtool_lock" != xno && enable_libtool_lock=yes + +AC_ARG_WITH([pic], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--with-pic], + [try to use only PIC/non-PIC objects @<:@default=use both@:>@])], + [pic_mode="$withval"], + [pic_mode=default]) +test -z "$pic_mode" && pic_mode=default + +# Use C for the default configuration in the libtool script +tagname= +AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_C_CONFIG +_LT_AC_TAGCONFIG +])# AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP + + +# _LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER +# ------------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC])dnl + +# If no C compiler was specified, use CC. +LTCC=${LTCC-"$CC"} + +# Allow CC to be a program name with arguments. +compiler=$CC +])# _LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER + + +# _LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX +# ---------------------- +# Links a minimal program and checks the executable +# for the system default hardcoded library path. In most cases, +# this is /usr/lib:/lib, but when the MPI compilers are used +# the location of the communication and MPI libs are included too. +# If we don't find anything, use the default library path according +# to the aix ld manual. +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX], +[AC_LINK_IFELSE(AC_LANG_PROGRAM,[ +aix_libpath=`dump -H conftest$ac_exeext 2>/dev/null | $SED -n -e '/Import File Strings/,/^$/ { /^0/ { s/^0 *\(.*\)$/\1/; p; } +}'` +# Check for a 64-bit object if we didn't find anything. +if test -z "$aix_libpath"; then aix_libpath=`dump -HX64 conftest$ac_exeext 2>/dev/null | $SED -n -e '/Import File Strings/,/^$/ { /^0/ { s/^0 *\(.*\)$/\1/; p; } +}'`; fi],[]) +if test -z "$aix_libpath"; then aix_libpath="/usr/lib:/lib"; fi +])# _LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX + + +# _LT_AC_SHELL_INIT(ARG) +# ---------------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_SHELL_INIT], +[ifdef([AC_DIVERSION_NOTICE], + [AC_DIVERT_PUSH(AC_DIVERSION_NOTICE)], + [AC_DIVERT_PUSH(NOTICE)]) +$1 +AC_DIVERT_POP +])# _LT_AC_SHELL_INIT + + +# _LT_AC_PROG_ECHO_BACKSLASH +# -------------------------- +# Add some code to the start of the generated configure script which +# will find an echo command which doesn't interpret backslashes. +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_PROG_ECHO_BACKSLASH], +[_LT_AC_SHELL_INIT([ +# Check that we are running under the correct shell. +SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} + +case X$ECHO in +X*--fallback-echo) + # Remove one level of quotation (which was required for Make). + ECHO=`echo "$ECHO" | sed 's,\\\\\[$]\\[$]0,'[$]0','` + ;; +esac + +echo=${ECHO-echo} +if test "X[$]1" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift +elif test "X[$]1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # Avoid inline document here, it may be left over + : +elif test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' ; then + # Yippee, $echo works! + : +else + # Restart under the correct shell. + exec $SHELL "[$]0" --no-reexec ${1+"[$]@"} +fi + +if test "X[$]1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # used as fallback echo + shift + cat </dev/null && + echo_test_string="`eval $cmd`" && + (test "X$echo_test_string" = "X$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null + then + break + fi + done +fi + +if test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + : +else + # The Solaris, AIX, and Digital Unix default echo programs unquote + # backslashes. This makes it impossible to quote backslashes using + # echo "$something" | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g' + # + # So, first we look for a working echo in the user's PATH. + + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR + for dir in $PATH /usr/ucb; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + if (test -f $dir/echo || test -f $dir/echo$ac_exeext) && + test "X`($dir/echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($dir/echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + echo="$dir/echo" + break + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + + if test "X$echo" = Xecho; then + # We didn't find a better echo, so look for alternatives. + if test "X`(print -r '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`(print -r "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + # This shell has a builtin print -r that does the trick. + echo='print -r' + elif (test -f /bin/ksh || test -f /bin/ksh$ac_exeext) && + test "X$CONFIG_SHELL" != X/bin/ksh; then + # If we have ksh, try running configure again with it. + ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} + export ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL + CONFIG_SHELL=/bin/ksh + export CONFIG_SHELL + exec $CONFIG_SHELL "[$]0" --no-reexec ${1+"[$]@"} + else + # Try using printf. + echo='printf %s\n' + if test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + # Cool, printf works + : + elif echo_testing_string=`($ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL "[$]0" --fallback-echo '\t') 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL "[$]0" --fallback-echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + CONFIG_SHELL=$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL + export CONFIG_SHELL + SHELL="$CONFIG_SHELL" + export SHELL + echo="$CONFIG_SHELL [$]0 --fallback-echo" + elif echo_testing_string=`($CONFIG_SHELL "[$]0" --fallback-echo '\t') 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($CONFIG_SHELL "[$]0" --fallback-echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + echo="$CONFIG_SHELL [$]0 --fallback-echo" + else + # maybe with a smaller string... + prev=: + + for cmd in 'echo test' 'sed 2q "[$]0"' 'sed 10q "[$]0"' 'sed 20q "[$]0"' 'sed 50q "[$]0"'; do + if (test "X$echo_test_string" = "X`eval $cmd`") 2>/dev/null + then + break + fi + prev="$cmd" + done + + if test "$prev" != 'sed 50q "[$]0"'; then + echo_test_string=`eval $prev` + export echo_test_string + exec ${ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL-${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}} "[$]0" ${1+"[$]@"} + else + # Oops. We lost completely, so just stick with echo. + echo=echo + fi + fi + fi + fi +fi +fi + +# Copy echo and quote the copy suitably for passing to libtool from +# the Makefile, instead of quoting the original, which is used later. +ECHO=$echo +if test "X$ECHO" = "X$CONFIG_SHELL [$]0 --fallback-echo"; then + ECHO="$CONFIG_SHELL \\\$\[$]0 --fallback-echo" +fi + +AC_SUBST(ECHO) +])])# _LT_AC_PROG_ECHO_BACKSLASH + + +# _LT_AC_LOCK +# ----------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_LOCK], +[AC_ARG_ENABLE([libtool-lock], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-libtool-lock], + [avoid locking (might break parallel builds)])]) +test "x$enable_libtool_lock" != xno && enable_libtool_lock=yes + +# Some flags need to be propagated to the compiler or linker for good +# libtool support. +case $host in +ia64-*-hpux*) + # Find out which ABI we are using. + echo 'int i;' > conftest.$ac_ext + if AC_TRY_EVAL(ac_compile); then + case `/usr/bin/file conftest.$ac_objext` in + *ELF-32*) + HPUX_IA64_MODE="32" + ;; + *ELF-64*) + HPUX_IA64_MODE="64" + ;; + esac + fi + rm -rf conftest* + ;; +*-*-irix6*) + # Find out which ABI we are using. + echo '[#]line __oline__ "configure"' > conftest.$ac_ext + if AC_TRY_EVAL(ac_compile); then + if test "$lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld" = yes; then + case `/usr/bin/file conftest.$ac_objext` in + *32-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -melf32bsmip" + ;; + *N32*) + LD="${LD-ld} -melf32bmipn32" + ;; + *64-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -melf64bmip" + ;; + esac + else + case `/usr/bin/file conftest.$ac_objext` in + *32-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -32" + ;; + *N32*) + LD="${LD-ld} -n32" + ;; + *64-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -64" + ;; + esac + fi + fi + rm -rf conftest* + ;; + +x86_64-*linux*|ppc*-*linux*|powerpc*-*linux*|s390*-*linux*|sparc*-*linux*) + # Find out which ABI we are using. + echo 'int i;' > conftest.$ac_ext + if AC_TRY_EVAL(ac_compile); then + case "`/usr/bin/file conftest.o`" in + *32-bit*) + case $host in + x86_64-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf_i386" + ;; + ppc64-*linux*|powerpc64-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf32ppclinux" + ;; + s390x-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf_s390" + ;; + sparc64-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf32_sparc" + ;; + esac + ;; + *64-bit*) + case $host in + x86_64-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf_x86_64" + ;; + ppc*-*linux*|powerpc*-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf64ppc" + ;; + s390*-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf64_s390" + ;; + sparc*-*linux*) + LD="${LD-ld} -m elf64_sparc" + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + fi + rm -rf conftest* + ;; + +*-*-sco3.2v5*) + # On SCO OpenServer 5, we need -belf to get full-featured binaries. + SAVE_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" + AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether the C compiler needs -belf], lt_cv_cc_needs_belf, + [AC_LANG_PUSH(C) + AC_TRY_LINK([],[],[lt_cv_cc_needs_belf=yes],[lt_cv_cc_needs_belf=no]) + AC_LANG_POP]) + if test x"$lt_cv_cc_needs_belf" != x"yes"; then + # this is probably gcc 2.8.0, egcs 1.0 or newer; no need for -belf + CFLAGS="$SAVE_CFLAGS" + fi + ;; +AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL], +[*-*-cygwin* | *-*-mingw* | *-*-pw32*) + AC_CHECK_TOOL(DLLTOOL, dlltool, false) + AC_CHECK_TOOL(AS, as, false) + AC_CHECK_TOOL(OBJDUMP, objdump, false) + ;; + ]) +esac + +need_locks="$enable_libtool_lock" + +])# _LT_AC_LOCK + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_COMPILER_OPTION(MESSAGE, VARIABLE-NAME, FLAGS, +# [OUTPUT-FILE], [ACTION-SUCCESS], [ACTION-FAILURE]) +# ---------------------------------------------------------------- +# Check whether the given compiler option works +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_COMPILER_OPTION], +[AC_REQUIRE([LT_AC_PROG_SED]) +AC_CACHE_CHECK([$1], [$2], + [$2=no + ifelse([$4], , [ac_outfile=conftest.$ac_objext], [ac_outfile=$4]) + printf "$lt_simple_compile_test_code" > conftest.$ac_ext + lt_compiler_flag="$3" + # Insert the option either (1) after the last *FLAGS variable, or + # (2) before a word containing "conftest.", or (3) at the end. + # Note that $ac_compile itself does not contain backslashes and begins + # with a dollar sign (not a hyphen), so the echo should work correctly. + # The option is referenced via a variable to avoid confusing sed. + lt_compile=`echo "$ac_compile" | $SED \ + -e 's:.*FLAGS}? :&$lt_compiler_flag :; t' \ + -e 's: [[^ ]]*conftest\.: $lt_compiler_flag&:; t' \ + -e 's:$: $lt_compiler_flag:'` + (eval echo "\"\$as_me:__oline__: $lt_compile\"" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD) + (eval "$lt_compile" 2>conftest.err) + ac_status=$? + cat conftest.err >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + echo "$as_me:__oline__: \$? = $ac_status" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + if (exit $ac_status) && test -s "$ac_outfile"; then + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test ! -s conftest.err; then + $2=yes + fi + fi + $rm conftest* +]) + +if test x"[$]$2" = xyes; then + ifelse([$5], , :, [$5]) +else + ifelse([$6], , :, [$6]) +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_COMPILER_OPTION + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_LINKER_OPTION(MESSAGE, VARIABLE-NAME, FLAGS, +# [ACTION-SUCCESS], [ACTION-FAILURE]) +# ------------------------------------------------------------ +# Check whether the given compiler option works +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_LINKER_OPTION], +[AC_CACHE_CHECK([$1], [$2], + [$2=no + save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $3" + printf "$lt_simple_link_test_code" > conftest.$ac_ext + if (eval $ac_link 2>conftest.err) && test -s conftest$ac_exeext; then + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test -s conftest.err; then + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + else + $2=yes + fi + fi + $rm conftest* + LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS" +]) + +if test x"[$]$2" = xyes; then + ifelse([$4], , :, [$4]) +else + ifelse([$5], , :, [$5]) +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_LINKER_OPTION + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_MAX_CMD_LEN +# -------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_MAX_CMD_LEN], +[# find the maximum length of command line arguments +AC_MSG_CHECKING([the maximum length of command line arguments]) +AC_CACHE_VAL([lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len], [dnl + i=0 + testring="ABCD" + + case $build_os in + msdosdjgpp*) + # On DJGPP, this test can blow up pretty badly due to problems in libc + # (any single argument exceeding 2000 bytes causes a buffer overrun + # during glob expansion). Even if it were fixed, the result of this + # check would be larger than it should be. + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=12288; # 12K is about right + ;; + + gnu*) + # Under GNU Hurd, this test is not required because there is + # no limit to the length of command line arguments. + # Libtool will interpret -1 as no limit whatsoever + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=-1; + ;; + + cygwin* | mingw*) + # On Win9x/ME, this test blows up -- it succeeds, but takes + # about 5 minutes as the teststring grows exponentially. + # Worse, since 9x/ME are not pre-emptively multitasking, + # you end up with a "frozen" computer, even though with patience + # the test eventually succeeds (with a max line length of 256k). + # Instead, let's just punt: use the minimum linelength reported by + # all of the supported platforms: 8192 (on NT/2K/XP). + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=8192; + ;; + + amigaos*) + # On AmigaOS with pdksh, this test takes hours, literally. + # So we just punt and use a minimum line length of 8192. + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=8192; + ;; + + *) + # If test is not a shell built-in, we'll probably end up computing a + # maximum length that is only half of the actual maximum length, but + # we can't tell. + while (test "X"`$CONFIG_SHELL [$]0 --fallback-echo "X$testring" 2>/dev/null` \ + = "XX$testring") >/dev/null 2>&1 && + new_result=`expr "X$testring" : ".*" 2>&1` && + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=$new_result && + test $i != 17 # 1/2 MB should be enough + do + i=`expr $i + 1` + testring=$testring$testring + done + testring= + # Add a significant safety factor because C++ compilers can tack on massive + # amounts of additional arguments before passing them to the linker. + # It appears as though 1/2 is a usable value. + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=`expr $lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len \/ 2` + ;; + esac +]) +if test -n $lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT(none) +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_MAX_CMD_LEN + + +# _LT_AC_CHECK_DLFCN +# -------------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_CHECK_DLFCN], +[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(dlfcn.h)dnl +])# _LT_AC_CHECK_DLFCN + + +# _LT_AC_TRY_DLOPEN_SELF (ACTION-IF-TRUE, ACTION-IF-TRUE-W-USCORE, +# ACTION-IF-FALSE, ACTION-IF-CROSS-COMPILING) +# ------------------------------------------------------------------ +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_TRY_DLOPEN_SELF], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_CHECK_DLFCN])dnl +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + [$4] +else + lt_dlunknown=0; lt_dlno_uscore=1; lt_dlneed_uscore=2 + lt_status=$lt_dlunknown + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef RTLD_GLOBAL +# define LT_DLGLOBAL RTLD_GLOBAL +#else +# ifdef DL_GLOBAL +# define LT_DLGLOBAL DL_GLOBAL +# else +# define LT_DLGLOBAL 0 +# endif +#endif + +/* We may have to define LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW in the command line if we + find out it does not work in some platform. */ +#ifndef LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW +# ifdef RTLD_LAZY +# define LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW RTLD_LAZY +# else +# ifdef DL_LAZY +# define LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW DL_LAZY +# else +# ifdef RTLD_NOW +# define LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW RTLD_NOW +# else +# ifdef DL_NOW +# define LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW DL_NOW +# else +# define LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW 0 +# endif +# endif +# endif +# endif +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" void exit (int); +#endif + +void fnord() { int i=42;} +int main () +{ + void *self = dlopen (0, LT_DLGLOBAL|LT_DLLAZY_OR_NOW); + int status = $lt_dlunknown; + + if (self) + { + if (dlsym (self,"fnord")) status = $lt_dlno_uscore; + else if (dlsym( self,"_fnord")) status = $lt_dlneed_uscore; + /* dlclose (self); */ + } + + exit (status); +}] +EOF + if AC_TRY_EVAL(ac_link) && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} 2>/dev/null; then + (./conftest; exit; ) 2>/dev/null + lt_status=$? + case x$lt_status in + x$lt_dlno_uscore) $1 ;; + x$lt_dlneed_uscore) $2 ;; + x$lt_unknown|x*) $3 ;; + esac + else : + # compilation failed + $3 + fi +fi +rm -fr conftest* +])# _LT_AC_TRY_DLOPEN_SELF + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN_SELF +# ------------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN_SELF], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_CHECK_DLFCN])dnl +if test "x$enable_dlopen" != xyes; then + enable_dlopen=unknown + enable_dlopen_self=unknown + enable_dlopen_self_static=unknown +else + lt_cv_dlopen=no + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + + case $host_os in + beos*) + lt_cv_dlopen="load_add_on" + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + lt_cv_dlopen_self=yes + ;; + + mingw* | pw32*) + lt_cv_dlopen="LoadLibrary" + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + ;; + + cygwin*) + lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + ;; + + darwin*) + # if libdl is installed we need to link against it + AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], + [lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-ldl"],[ + lt_cv_dlopen="dyld" + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + lt_cv_dlopen_self=yes + ]) + ;; + + *) + AC_CHECK_FUNC([shl_load], + [lt_cv_dlopen="shl_load"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([dld], [shl_load], + [lt_cv_dlopen="shl_load" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-dld"], + [AC_CHECK_FUNC([dlopen], + [lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], + [lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-ldl"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([svld], [dlopen], + [lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-lsvld"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([dld], [dld_link], + [lt_cv_dlopen="dld_link" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-dld"]) + ]) + ]) + ]) + ]) + ]) + ;; + esac + + if test "x$lt_cv_dlopen" != xno; then + enable_dlopen=yes + else + enable_dlopen=no + fi + + case $lt_cv_dlopen in + dlopen) + save_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" + test "x$ac_cv_header_dlfcn_h" = xyes && CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DHAVE_DLFCN_H" + + save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + eval LDFLAGS=\"\$LDFLAGS $export_dynamic_flag_spec\" + + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$lt_cv_dlopen_libs $LIBS" + + AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether a program can dlopen itself], + lt_cv_dlopen_self, [dnl + _LT_AC_TRY_DLOPEN_SELF( + lt_cv_dlopen_self=yes, lt_cv_dlopen_self=yes, + lt_cv_dlopen_self=no, lt_cv_dlopen_self=cross) + ]) + + if test "x$lt_cv_dlopen_self" = xyes; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $link_static_flag" + AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether a statically linked program can dlopen itself], + lt_cv_dlopen_self_static, [dnl + _LT_AC_TRY_DLOPEN_SELF( + lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=yes, lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=yes, + lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=no, lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=cross) + ]) + fi + + CPPFLAGS="$save_CPPFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS" + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + ;; + esac + + case $lt_cv_dlopen_self in + yes|no) enable_dlopen_self=$lt_cv_dlopen_self ;; + *) enable_dlopen_self=unknown ;; + esac + + case $lt_cv_dlopen_self_static in + yes|no) enable_dlopen_self_static=$lt_cv_dlopen_self_static ;; + *) enable_dlopen_self_static=unknown ;; + esac +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN_SELF + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_CC_C_O([TAGNAME]) +# --------------------------------- +# Check to see if options -c and -o are simultaneously supported by compiler +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_CC_C_O], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER])dnl +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $compiler supports -c -o file.$ac_objext], + [_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_cv_prog_compiler_c_o, $1)], + [_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_cv_prog_compiler_c_o, $1)=no + $rm -r conftest 2>/dev/null + mkdir conftest + cd conftest + mkdir out + printf "$lt_simple_compile_test_code" > conftest.$ac_ext + + lt_compiler_flag="-o out/conftest2.$ac_objext" + # Insert the option either (1) after the last *FLAGS variable, or + # (2) before a word containing "conftest.", or (3) at the end. + # Note that $ac_compile itself does not contain backslashes and begins + # with a dollar sign (not a hyphen), so the echo should work correctly. + lt_compile=`echo "$ac_compile" | $SED \ + -e 's:.*FLAGS}? :&$lt_compiler_flag :; t' \ + -e 's: [[^ ]]*conftest\.: $lt_compiler_flag&:; t' \ + -e 's:$: $lt_compiler_flag:'` + (eval echo "\"\$as_me:__oline__: $lt_compile\"" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD) + (eval "$lt_compile" 2>out/conftest.err) + ac_status=$? + cat out/conftest.err >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + echo "$as_me:__oline__: \$? = $ac_status" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + if (exit $ac_status) && test -s out/conftest2.$ac_objext + then + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test ! -s out/conftest.err; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_cv_prog_compiler_c_o, $1)=yes + fi + fi + chmod u+w . + $rm conftest* + # SGI C++ compiler will create directory out/ii_files/ for + # template instantiation + test -d out/ii_files && $rm out/ii_files/* && rmdir out/ii_files + $rm out/* && rmdir out + cd .. + rmdir conftest + $rm conftest* +]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_CC_C_O + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_HARD_LINK_LOCKS([TAGNAME]) +# ----------------------------------------- +# Check to see if we can do hard links to lock some files if needed +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_HARD_LINK_LOCKS], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_LOCK])dnl + +hard_links="nottested" +if test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_cv_prog_compiler_c_o, $1)" = no && test "$need_locks" != no; then + # do not overwrite the value of need_locks provided by the user + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we can lock with hard links]) + hard_links=yes + $rm conftest* + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>/dev/null && hard_links=no + touch conftest.a + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>&5 || hard_links=no + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>/dev/null && hard_links=no + AC_MSG_RESULT([$hard_links]) + if test "$hard_links" = no; then + AC_MSG_WARN([`$CC' does not support `-c -o', so `make -j' may be unsafe]) + need_locks=warn + fi +else + need_locks=no +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_HARD_LINK_LOCKS + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_OBJDIR +# ----------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_OBJDIR], +[AC_CACHE_CHECK([for objdir], [lt_cv_objdir], +[rm -f .libs 2>/dev/null +mkdir .libs 2>/dev/null +if test -d .libs; then + lt_cv_objdir=.libs +else + # MS-DOS does not allow filenames that begin with a dot. + lt_cv_objdir=_libs +fi +rmdir .libs 2>/dev/null]) +objdir=$lt_cv_objdir +])# AC_LIBTOOL_OBJDIR + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_HARDCODE_LIBPATH([TAGNAME]) +# ---------------------------------------------- +# Check hardcoding attributes. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_HARDCODE_LIBPATH], +[AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to hardcode library paths into programs]) +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1)= +if test -n "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)" || \ + test -n "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(runpath_var $1)" || \ + test "X$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1)"="Xyes" ; then + + # We can hardcode non-existant directories. + if test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)" != no && + # If the only mechanism to avoid hardcoding is shlibpath_var, we + # have to relink, otherwise we might link with an installed library + # when we should be linking with a yet-to-be-installed one + ## test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)" != no && + test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)" != no; then + # Linking always hardcodes the temporary library directory. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1)=relink + else + # We can link without hardcoding, and we can hardcode nonexisting dirs. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1)=immediate + fi +else + # We cannot hardcode anything, or else we can only hardcode existing + # directories. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1)=unsupported +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT([$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1)]) + +if test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1)" = relink; then + # Fast installation is not supported + enable_fast_install=no +elif test "$shlibpath_overrides_runpath" = yes || + test "$enable_shared" = no; then + # Fast installation is not necessary + enable_fast_install=needless +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_HARDCODE_LIBPATH + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_LIB_STRIP +# ------------------------ +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_LIB_STRIP], +[striplib= +old_striplib= +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether stripping libraries is possible]) +if test -n "$STRIP" && $STRIP -V 2>&1 | grep "GNU strip" >/dev/null; then + test -z "$old_striplib" && old_striplib="$STRIP --strip-debug" + test -z "$striplib" && striplib="$STRIP --strip-unneeded" + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) +else +# FIXME - insert some real tests, host_os isn't really good enough + case $host_os in + darwin*) + if test -n "$STRIP" ; then + striplib="$STRIP -x" + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) +fi + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ;; + esac +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_LIB_STRIP + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_DYNAMIC_LINKER +# ----------------------------- +# PORTME Fill in your ld.so characteristics +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_DYNAMIC_LINKER], +[AC_MSG_CHECKING([dynamic linker characteristics]) +library_names_spec= +libname_spec='lib$name' +soname_spec= +shrext=".so" +postinstall_cmds= +postuninstall_cmds= +finish_cmds= +finish_eval= +shlibpath_var= +shlibpath_overrides_runpath=unknown +version_type=none +dynamic_linker="$host_os ld.so" +sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib" +if test "$GCC" = yes; then + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`$CC -print-search-dirs | grep "^libraries:" | $SED -e "s/^libraries://" -e "s,=/,/,g"` + if echo "$sys_lib_search_path_spec" | grep ';' >/dev/null ; then + # if the path contains ";" then we assume it to be the separator + # otherwise default to the standard path separator (i.e. ":") - it is + # assumed that no part of a normal pathname contains ";" but that should + # okay in the real world where ";" in dirpaths is itself problematic. + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`echo "$sys_lib_search_path_spec" | $SED -e 's/;/ /g'` + else + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`echo "$sys_lib_search_path_spec" | $SED -e "s/$PATH_SEPARATOR/ /g"` + fi +else + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib" +fi +need_lib_prefix=unknown +hardcode_into_libs=no + +# when you set need_version to no, make sure it does not cause -set_version +# flags to be left without arguments +need_version=unknown + +case $host_os in +aix3*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix $libname.a' + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + + # AIX 3 has no versioning support, so we append a major version to the name. + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + ;; + +aix4* | aix5*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + hardcode_into_libs=yes + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # AIX 5 supports IA64 + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix $libname${shared_ext}' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + else + # With GCC up to 2.95.x, collect2 would create an import file + # for dependence libraries. The import file would start with + # the line `#! .'. This would cause the generated library to + # depend on `.', always an invalid library. This was fixed in + # development snapshots of GCC prior to 3.0. + case $host_os in + aix4 | aix4.[[01]] | aix4.[[01]].*) + if { echo '#if __GNUC__ > 2 || (__GNUC__ == 2 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 97)' + echo ' yes ' + echo '#endif'; } | ${CC} -E - | grep yes > /dev/null; then + : + else + can_build_shared=no + fi + ;; + esac + # AIX (on Power*) has no versioning support, so currently we can not hardcode correct + # soname into executable. Probably we can add versioning support to + # collect2, so additional links can be useful in future. + if test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = yes; then + # If using run time linking (on AIX 4.2 or later) use lib.so + # instead of lib.a to let people know that these are not + # typical AIX shared libraries. + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + else + # We preserve .a as extension for shared libraries through AIX4.2 + # and later when we are not doing run time linking. + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.a $libname.a' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + fi + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + fi + ;; + +amigaos*) + library_names_spec='$libname.ixlibrary $libname.a' + # Create ${libname}_ixlibrary.a entries in /sys/libs. + finish_eval='for lib in `ls $libdir/*.ixlibrary 2>/dev/null`; do libname=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e '\''s%^.*/\([[^/]]*\)\.ixlibrary$%\1%'\''`; test $rm /sys/libs/${libname}_ixlibrary.a; $show "cd /sys/libs && $LN_S $lib ${libname}_ixlibrary.a"; cd /sys/libs && $LN_S $lib ${libname}_ixlibrary.a || exit 1; done' + ;; + +beos*) + library_names_spec='${libname}${shared_ext}' + dynamic_linker="$host_os ld.so" + shlibpath_var=LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +bsdi4*) + version_type=linux + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/shlib /usr/lib /usr/X11/lib /usr/contrib/lib /lib /usr/local/lib" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/shlib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib" + # the default ld.so.conf also contains /usr/contrib/lib and + # /usr/X11R6/lib (/usr/X11 is a link to /usr/X11R6), but let us allow + # libtool to hard-code these into programs + ;; + +cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + version_type=windows + shrext=".dll" + need_version=no + need_lib_prefix=no + + case $GCC,$host_os in + yes,cygwin* | yes,mingw* | yes,pw32*) + library_names_spec='$libname.dll.a' + # DLL is installed to $(libdir)/../bin by postinstall_cmds + postinstall_cmds='base_file=`basename \${file}`~ + dlpath=`$SHELL 2>&1 -c '\''. $dir/'\''\${base_file}'\''i;echo \$dlname'\''`~ + dldir=$destdir/`dirname \$dlpath`~ + test -d \$dldir || mkdir -p \$dldir~ + $install_prog $dir/$dlname \$dldir/$dlname' + postuninstall_cmds='dldll=`$SHELL 2>&1 -c '\''. $file; echo \$dlname'\''`~ + dlpath=$dir/\$dldll~ + $rm \$dlpath' + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + + case $host_os in + cygwin*) + # Cygwin DLLs use 'cyg' prefix rather than 'lib' + soname_spec='`echo ${libname} | sed -e 's/^lib/cyg/'``echo ${release} | $SED -e 's/[[.]]/-/g'`${versuffix}${shared_ext}' + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib /lib/w32api /lib /usr/local/lib" + ;; + mingw*) + # MinGW DLLs use traditional 'lib' prefix + soname_spec='${libname}`echo ${release} | $SED -e 's/[[.]]/-/g'`${versuffix}${shared_ext}' + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`$CC -print-search-dirs | grep "^libraries:" | $SED -e "s/^libraries://" -e "s,=/,/,g"` + if echo "$sys_lib_search_path_spec" | [grep ';[c-zC-Z]:/' >/dev/null]; then + # It is most probably a Windows format PATH printed by + # mingw gcc, but we are running on Cygwin. Gcc prints its search + # path with ; separators, and with drive letters. We can handle the + # drive letters (cygwin fileutils understands them), so leave them, + # especially as we might pass files found there to a mingw objdump, + # which wouldn't understand a cygwinified path. Ahh. + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`echo "$sys_lib_search_path_spec" | $SED -e 's/;/ /g'` + else + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`echo "$sys_lib_search_path_spec" | $SED -e "s/$PATH_SEPARATOR/ /g"` + fi + ;; + pw32*) + # pw32 DLLs use 'pw' prefix rather than 'lib' + library_names_spec='`echo ${libname} | sed -e 's/^lib/pw/'``echo ${release} | $SED -e 's/[.]/-/g'`${versuffix}${shared_ext}' + ;; + esac + ;; + + *) + library_names_spec='${libname}`echo ${release} | $SED -e 's/[[.]]/-/g'`${versuffix}${shared_ext} $libname.lib' + ;; + esac + dynamic_linker='Win32 ld.exe' + # FIXME: first we should search . and the directory the executable is in + shlibpath_var=PATH + ;; + +darwin* | rhapsody*) + dynamic_linker="$host_os dyld" + version_type=darwin + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${versuffix}$shared_ext ${libname}${release}${major}$shared_ext ${libname}$shared_ext' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${major}$shared_ext' + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + shlibpath_var=DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH + shrext='$(test .$module = .yes && echo .so || echo .dylib)' + # Apple's gcc prints 'gcc -print-search-dirs' doesn't operate the same. + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`$CC -print-search-dirs | tr "\n" "$PATH_SEPARATOR" | sed -e 's/libraries:/@libraries:/' | tr "@" "\n" | grep "^libraries:" | sed -e "s/^libraries://" -e "s,=/,/,g" -e "s,$PATH_SEPARATOR, ,g" -e "s,.*,& /lib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib,g"` + else + sys_lib_search_path_spec='/lib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib' + fi + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec='/usr/local/lib /lib /usr/lib' + ;; + +dgux*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname$shared_ext' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +freebsd1*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; + +kfreebsd*-gnu) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major ${libname}${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + hardcode_into_libs=yes + dynamic_linker='GNU ld.so' + ;; + +freebsd*) + objformat=`test -x /usr/bin/objformat && /usr/bin/objformat || echo aout` + version_type=freebsd-$objformat + case $version_type in + freebsd-elf*) + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext} $libname${shared_ext}' + need_version=no + need_lib_prefix=no + ;; + freebsd-*) + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix $libname${shared_ext}$versuffix' + need_version=yes + ;; + esac + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + case $host_os in + freebsd2*) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + ;; + freebsd3.[01]* | freebsdelf3.[01]*) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + *) # from 3.2 on + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + esac + ;; + +gnu*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}${major} ${libname}${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + +hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + # Give a soname corresponding to the major version so that dld.sl refuses to + # link against other versions. + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + case "$host_cpu" in + ia64*) + shrext='.so' + hardcode_into_libs=yes + dynamic_linker="$host_os dld.so" + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes # Unless +noenvvar is specified. + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + if test "X$HPUX_IA64_MODE" = X32; then + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib/hpux32 /usr/local/lib/hpux32 /usr/local/lib" + else + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib/hpux64 /usr/local/lib/hpux64" + fi + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec=$sys_lib_search_path_spec + ;; + hppa*64*) + shrext='.sl' + hardcode_into_libs=yes + dynamic_linker="$host_os dld.sl" + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH # How should we handle SHLIB_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes # Unless +noenvvar is specified. + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib/pa20_64 /usr/ccs/lib/pa20_64" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec=$sys_lib_search_path_spec + ;; + *) + shrext='.sl' + dynamic_linker="$host_os dld.sl" + shlibpath_var=SHLIB_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no # +s is required to enable SHLIB_PATH + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + ;; + esac + # HP-UX runs *really* slowly unless shared libraries are mode 555. + postinstall_cmds='chmod 555 $lib' + ;; + +irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux*) + case $host_os in + nonstopux*) version_type=nonstopux ;; + *) + if test "$lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld" = yes; then + version_type=linux + else + version_type=irix + fi ;; + esac + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major ${libname}${release}${shared_ext} $libname${shared_ext}' + case $host_os in + irix5* | nonstopux*) + libsuff= shlibsuff= + ;; + *) + case $LD in # libtool.m4 will add one of these switches to LD + *-32|*"-32 "|*-melf32bsmip|*"-melf32bsmip ") + libsuff= shlibsuff= libmagic=32-bit;; + *-n32|*"-n32 "|*-melf32bmipn32|*"-melf32bmipn32 ") + libsuff=32 shlibsuff=N32 libmagic=N32;; + *-64|*"-64 "|*-melf64bmip|*"-melf64bmip ") + libsuff=64 shlibsuff=64 libmagic=64-bit;; + *) libsuff= shlibsuff= libmagic=never-match;; + esac + ;; + esac + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY${shlibsuff}_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib${libsuff} /lib${libsuff} /usr/local/lib${libsuff}" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/usr/lib${libsuff} /lib${libsuff}" + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + +# No shared lib support for Linux oldld, aout, or coff. +linux*oldld* | linux*aout* | linux*coff*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; + +# This must be Linux ELF. +linux*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -n $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + # This implies no fast_install, which is unacceptable. + # Some rework will be needed to allow for fast_install + # before this can be enabled. + hardcode_into_libs=yes + + # Append ld.so.conf contents to the search path + if test -f /etc/ld.so.conf; then + ld_extra=`$SED -e 's/[:,\t]/ /g;s/=[^=]*$//;s/=[^= ]* / /g' /etc/ld.so.conf` + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib $ld_extra" + fi + + # We used to test for /lib/ld.so.1 and disable shared libraries on + # powerpc, because MkLinux only supported shared libraries with the + # GNU dynamic linker. Since this was broken with cross compilers, + # most powerpc-linux boxes support dynamic linking these days and + # people can always --disable-shared, the test was removed, and we + # assume the GNU/Linux dynamic linker is in use. + dynamic_linker='GNU/Linux ld.so' + ;; + +knetbsd*-gnu) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major ${libname}${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + hardcode_into_libs=yes + dynamic_linker='GNU ld.so' + ;; + +netbsd*) + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + if echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null; then + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${shared_ext}$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -m $libdir' + dynamic_linker='NetBSD (a.out) ld.so' + else + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major ${libname}${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + dynamic_linker='NetBSD ld.elf_so' + fi + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + +newsos6) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + ;; + +nto-qnx*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + ;; + +openbsd*) + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=yes + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${shared_ext}$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -m $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + if test -z "`echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__`" || test "$host_os-$host_cpu" = "openbsd2.8-powerpc"; then + case $host_os in + openbsd2.[[89]] | openbsd2.[[89]].*) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + ;; + *) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + ;; + esac + else + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + fi + ;; + +os2*) + libname_spec='$name' + shrext=".dll" + need_lib_prefix=no + library_names_spec='$libname${shared_ext} $libname.a' + dynamic_linker='OS/2 ld.exe' + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + ;; + +osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + version_type=osf + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/shlib /usr/ccs/lib /usr/lib/cmplrs/cc /usr/lib /usr/local/lib /var/shlib" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="$sys_lib_search_path_spec" + ;; + +sco3.2v5*) + version_type=osf + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +solaris*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + hardcode_into_libs=yes + # ldd complains unless libraries are executable + postinstall_cmds='chmod +x $lib' + ;; + +sunos4*) + version_type=sunos + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${shared_ext}$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/usr/etc" ldconfig $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + need_lib_prefix=no + fi + need_version=yes + ;; + +sysv4 | sysv4.2uw2* | sysv4.3* | sysv5*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + case $host_vendor in + sni) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + need_lib_prefix=no + export_dynamic_flag_spec='${wl}-Blargedynsym' + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + ;; + siemens) + need_lib_prefix=no + ;; + motorola) + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + sys_lib_search_path_spec='/lib /usr/lib /usr/ccs/lib' + ;; + esac + ;; + +sysv4*MP*) + if test -d /usr/nec ;then + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='$libname${shared_ext}.$versuffix $libname${shared_ext}.$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='$libname${shared_ext}.$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + fi + ;; + +uts4*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$versuffix ${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major $libname${shared_ext}' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${shared_ext}$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; +esac +AC_MSG_RESULT([$dynamic_linker]) +test "$dynamic_linker" = no && can_build_shared=no +])# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_DYNAMIC_LINKER + + +# _LT_AC_TAGCONFIG +# ---------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_TAGCONFIG], +[AC_ARG_WITH([tags], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--with-tags@<:@=TAGS@:>@], + [include additional configurations @<:@automatic@:>@])], + [tagnames="$withval"]) + +if test -f "$ltmain" && test -n "$tagnames"; then + if test ! -f "${ofile}"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([output file `$ofile' does not exist]) + fi + + if test -z "$LTCC"; then + eval "`$SHELL ${ofile} --config | grep '^LTCC='`" + if test -z "$LTCC"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([output file `$ofile' does not look like a libtool script]) + else + AC_MSG_WARN([using `LTCC=$LTCC', extracted from `$ofile']) + fi + fi + + # Extract list of available tagged configurations in $ofile. + # Note that this assumes the entire list is on one line. + available_tags=`grep "^available_tags=" "${ofile}" | $SED -e 's/available_tags=\(.*$\)/\1/' -e 's/\"//g'` + + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}$PATH_SEPARATOR," + for tagname in $tagnames; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + # Check whether tagname contains only valid characters + case `$echo "X$tagname" | $Xsed -e 's:[[-_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890,/]]::g'` in + "") ;; + *) AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid tag name: $tagname]) + ;; + esac + + if grep "^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname$" < "${ofile}" > /dev/null + then + AC_MSG_ERROR([tag name \"$tagname\" already exists]) + fi + + # Update the list of available tags. + if test -n "$tagname"; then + echo appending configuration tag \"$tagname\" to $ofile + + case $tagname in + CXX) + if test -n "$CXX" && test "X$CXX" != "Xno"; then + AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_CXX_CONFIG + else + tagname="" + fi + ;; + + F77) + if test -n "$F77" && test "X$F77" != "Xno"; then + AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_F77_CONFIG + else + tagname="" + fi + ;; + + GCJ) + if test -n "$GCJ" && test "X$GCJ" != "Xno"; then + AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_GCJ_CONFIG + else + tagname="" + fi + ;; + + RC) + AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_RC_CONFIG + ;; + + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([Unsupported tag name: $tagname]) + ;; + esac + + # Append the new tag name to the list of available tags. + if test -n "$tagname" ; then + available_tags="$available_tags $tagname" + fi + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + + # Now substitute the updated list of available tags. + if eval "sed -e 's/^available_tags=.*\$/available_tags=\"$available_tags\"/' \"$ofile\" > \"${ofile}T\""; then + mv "${ofile}T" "$ofile" + chmod +x "$ofile" + else + rm -f "${ofile}T" + AC_MSG_ERROR([unable to update list of available tagged configurations.]) + fi +fi +])# _LT_AC_TAGCONFIG + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN +# ----------------- +# enable checks for dlopen support +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN], + [AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL +# -------------------- +# declare package support for building win32 dll's +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL], +[AC_BEFORE([$0], [AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL + + +# AC_ENABLE_SHARED([DEFAULT]) +# --------------------------- +# implement the --enable-shared flag +# DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to `yes'. +AC_DEFUN([AC_ENABLE_SHARED], +[define([AC_ENABLE_SHARED_DEFAULT], ifelse($1, no, no, yes))dnl +AC_ARG_ENABLE([shared], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-shared@<:@=PKGS@:>@], + [build shared libraries @<:@default=]AC_ENABLE_SHARED_DEFAULT[@:>@])], + [p=${PACKAGE-default} + case $enableval in + yes) enable_shared=yes ;; + no) enable_shared=no ;; + *) + enable_shared=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}$PATH_SEPARATOR," + for pkg in $enableval; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_shared=yes + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + ;; + esac], + [enable_shared=]AC_ENABLE_SHARED_DEFAULT) +])# AC_ENABLE_SHARED + + +# AC_DISABLE_SHARED +# ----------------- +#- set the default shared flag to --disable-shared +AC_DEFUN([AC_DISABLE_SHARED], +[AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl +AC_ENABLE_SHARED(no) +])# AC_DISABLE_SHARED + + +# AC_ENABLE_STATIC([DEFAULT]) +# --------------------------- +# implement the --enable-static flag +# DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to `yes'. +AC_DEFUN([AC_ENABLE_STATIC], +[define([AC_ENABLE_STATIC_DEFAULT], ifelse($1, no, no, yes))dnl +AC_ARG_ENABLE([static], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-static@<:@=PKGS@:>@], + [build static libraries @<:@default=]AC_ENABLE_STATIC_DEFAULT[@:>@])], + [p=${PACKAGE-default} + case $enableval in + yes) enable_static=yes ;; + no) enable_static=no ;; + *) + enable_static=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}$PATH_SEPARATOR," + for pkg in $enableval; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_static=yes + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + ;; + esac], + [enable_static=]AC_ENABLE_STATIC_DEFAULT) +])# AC_ENABLE_STATIC + + +# AC_DISABLE_STATIC +# ----------------- +# set the default static flag to --disable-static +AC_DEFUN([AC_DISABLE_STATIC], +[AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl +AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no) +])# AC_DISABLE_STATIC + + +# AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL([DEFAULT]) +# --------------------------------- +# implement the --enable-fast-install flag +# DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to `yes'. +AC_DEFUN([AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL], +[define([AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL_DEFAULT], ifelse($1, no, no, yes))dnl +AC_ARG_ENABLE([fast-install], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-fast-install@<:@=PKGS@:>@], + [optimize for fast installation @<:@default=]AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL_DEFAULT[@:>@])], + [p=${PACKAGE-default} + case $enableval in + yes) enable_fast_install=yes ;; + no) enable_fast_install=no ;; + *) + enable_fast_install=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}$PATH_SEPARATOR," + for pkg in $enableval; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_fast_install=yes + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + ;; + esac], + [enable_fast_install=]AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL_DEFAULT) +])# AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL + + +# AC_DISABLE_FAST_INSTALL +# ----------------------- +# set the default to --disable-fast-install +AC_DEFUN([AC_DISABLE_FAST_INSTALL], +[AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl +AC_ENABLE_FAST_INSTALL(no) +])# AC_DISABLE_FAST_INSTALL + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_PICMODE([MODE]) +# -------------------------- +# implement the --with-pic flag +# MODE is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to `both'. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_PICMODE], +[AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl +pic_mode=ifelse($#,1,$1,default) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_PICMODE + + +# AC_PROG_EGREP +# ------------- +# This is predefined starting with Autoconf 2.54, so this conditional +# definition can be removed once we require Autoconf 2.54 or later. +m4_ifndef([AC_PROG_EGREP], [AC_DEFUN([AC_PROG_EGREP], +[AC_CACHE_CHECK([for egrep], [ac_cv_prog_egrep], + [if echo a | (grep -E '(a|b)') >/dev/null 2>&1 + then ac_cv_prog_egrep='grep -E' + else ac_cv_prog_egrep='egrep' + fi]) + EGREP=$ac_cv_prog_egrep + AC_SUBST([EGREP]) +])]) + + +# AC_PATH_TOOL_PREFIX +# ------------------- +# find a file program which can recognise shared library +AC_DEFUN([AC_PATH_TOOL_PREFIX], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_EGREP])dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(lt_cv_path_MAGIC_CMD, +[case $MAGIC_CMD in +[[\\/*] | ?:[\\/]*]) + lt_cv_path_MAGIC_CMD="$MAGIC_CMD" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; +*) + lt_save_MAGIC_CMD="$MAGIC_CMD" + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +dnl $ac_dummy forces splitting on constant user-supplied paths. +dnl POSIX.2 word splitting is done only on the output of word expansions, +dnl not every word. This closes a longstanding sh security hole. + ac_dummy="ifelse([$2], , $PATH, [$2])" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$1; then + lt_cv_path_MAGIC_CMD="$ac_dir/$1" + if test -n "$file_magic_test_file"; then + case $deplibs_check_method in + "file_magic "*) + file_magic_regex="`expr \"$deplibs_check_method\" : \"file_magic \(.*\)\"`" + MAGIC_CMD="$lt_cv_path_MAGIC_CMD" + if eval $file_magic_cmd \$file_magic_test_file 2> /dev/null | + $EGREP "$file_magic_regex" > /dev/null; then + : + else + cat <&2 + +*** Warning: the command libtool uses to detect shared libraries, +*** $file_magic_cmd, produces output that libtool cannot recognize. +*** The result is that libtool may fail to recognize shared libraries +*** as such. This will affect the creation of libtool libraries that +*** depend on shared libraries, but programs linked with such libtool +*** libraries will work regardless of this problem. Nevertheless, you +*** may want to report the problem to your system manager and/or to +*** bug-libtool@gnu.org + +EOF + fi ;; + esac + fi + break + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + MAGIC_CMD="$lt_save_MAGIC_CMD" + ;; +esac]) +MAGIC_CMD="$lt_cv_path_MAGIC_CMD" +if test -n "$MAGIC_CMD"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($MAGIC_CMD) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) +fi +])# AC_PATH_TOOL_PREFIX + + +# AC_PATH_MAGIC +# ------------- +# find a file program which can recognise a shared library +AC_DEFUN([AC_PATH_MAGIC], +[AC_PATH_TOOL_PREFIX(${ac_tool_prefix}file, /usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH) +if test -z "$lt_cv_path_MAGIC_CMD"; then + if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + AC_PATH_TOOL_PREFIX(file, /usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH) + else + MAGIC_CMD=: + fi +fi +])# AC_PATH_MAGIC + + +# AC_PROG_LD +# ---------- +# find the pathname to the GNU or non-GNU linker +AC_DEFUN([AC_PROG_LD], +[AC_ARG_WITH([gnu-ld], + [AC_HELP_STRING([--with-gnu-ld], + [assume the C compiler uses GNU ld @<:@default=no@:>@])], + [test "$withval" = no || with_gnu_ld=yes], + [with_gnu_ld=no]) +AC_REQUIRE([LT_AC_PROG_SED])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_HOST])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_BUILD])dnl +ac_prog=ld +if test "$GCC" = yes; then + # Check if gcc -print-prog-name=ld gives a path. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ld used by $CC]) + case $host in + *-*-mingw*) + # gcc leaves a trailing carriage return which upsets mingw + ac_prog=`($CC -print-prog-name=ld) 2>&5 | tr -d '\015'` ;; + *) + ac_prog=`($CC -print-prog-name=ld) 2>&5` ;; + esac + case $ac_prog in + # Accept absolute paths. + [[\\/]]* | ?:[[\\/]]*) + re_direlt='/[[^/]][[^/]]*/\.\./' + # Canonicalize the pathname of ld + ac_prog=`echo $ac_prog| $SED 's%\\\\%/%g'` + while echo $ac_prog | grep "$re_direlt" > /dev/null 2>&1; do + ac_prog=`echo $ac_prog| $SED "s%$re_direlt%/%"` + done + test -z "$LD" && LD="$ac_prog" + ;; + "") + # If it fails, then pretend we aren't using GCC. + ac_prog=ld + ;; + *) + # If it is relative, then search for the first ld in PATH. + with_gnu_ld=unknown + ;; + esac +elif test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GNU ld]) +else + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for non-GNU ld]) +fi +AC_CACHE_VAL(lt_cv_path_LD, +[if test -z "$LD"; then + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR + for ac_dir in $PATH; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f "$ac_dir/$ac_prog" || test -f "$ac_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exeext"; then + lt_cv_path_LD="$ac_dir/$ac_prog" + # Check to see if the program is GNU ld. I'd rather use --version, + # but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. + # Break only if it was the GNU/non-GNU ld that we prefer. + case `"$lt_cv_path_LD" -v 2>&1 &1 /dev/null; then + case $host_cpu in + i*86 ) + # Not sure whether the presence of OpenBSD here was a mistake. + # Let's accept both of them until this is cleared up. + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic (FreeBSD|OpenBSD)/i[[3-9]]86 (compact )?demand paged shared library' + lt_cv_file_magic_cmd=/usr/bin/file + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=`echo /usr/lib/libc.so.*` + ;; + esac + else + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + fi + ;; + +gnu*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + +hpux10.20* | hpux11*) + lt_cv_file_magic_cmd=/usr/bin/file + case "$host_cpu" in + ia64*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic (s[[0-9]][[0-9]][[0-9]]|ELF-[[0-9]][[0-9]]) shared object file - IA64' + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=/usr/lib/hpux32/libc.so + ;; + hppa*64*) + [lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic (s[0-9][0-9][0-9]|ELF-[0-9][0-9]) shared object file - PA-RISC [0-9].[0-9]'] + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=/usr/lib/pa20_64/libc.sl + ;; + *) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic (s[[0-9]][[0-9]][[0-9]]|PA-RISC[[0-9]].[[0-9]]) shared library' + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=/usr/lib/libc.sl + ;; + esac + ;; + +irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux*) + case $LD in + *-32|*"-32 ") libmagic=32-bit;; + *-n32|*"-n32 ") libmagic=N32;; + *-64|*"-64 ") libmagic=64-bit;; + *) libmagic=never-match;; + esac + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + +# This must be Linux ELF. +linux*) + case $host_cpu in + alpha*|hppa*|i*86|ia64*|m68*|mips*|powerpc*|sparc*|s390*|sh*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all ;; + *) + # glibc up to 2.1.1 does not perform some relocations on ARM + # this will be overridden with pass_all, but let us keep it just in case + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic ELF [[0-9]][[0-9]]*-bit [[LM]]SB (shared object|dynamic lib )' ;; + esac + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=`echo /lib/libc.so* /lib/libc-*.so` + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + +netbsd*) + if echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__ > /dev/null; then + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='match_pattern /lib[[^/]]+(\.so\.[[0-9]]+\.[[0-9]]+|_pic\.a)$' + else + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='match_pattern /lib[[^/]]+(\.so|_pic\.a)$' + fi + ;; + +newos6*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic ELF [[0-9]][[0-9]]*-bit [[ML]]SB (executable|dynamic lib)' + lt_cv_file_magic_cmd=/usr/bin/file + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=/usr/lib/libnls.so + ;; + +nto-qnx*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=unknown + ;; + +openbsd*) + lt_cv_file_magic_cmd=/usr/bin/file + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=`echo /usr/lib/libc.so.*` + if test -z "`echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__`" || test "$host_os-$host_cpu" = "openbsd2.8-powerpc"; then + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic ELF [[0-9]][[0-9]]*-bit [[LM]]SB shared object' + else + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic OpenBSD.* shared library' + fi + ;; + +osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + +sco3.2v5*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + +solaris*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + +sysv4 | sysv4.2uw2* | sysv4.3* | sysv5*) + case $host_vendor in + motorola) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic ELF [[0-9]][[0-9]]*-bit [[ML]]SB (shared object|dynamic lib) M[[0-9]][[0-9]]* Version [[0-9]]' + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=`echo /usr/lib/libc.so*` + ;; + ncr) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + sequent) + lt_cv_file_magic_cmd='/bin/file' + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method='file_magic ELF [[0-9]][[0-9]]*-bit [[LM]]SB (shared object|dynamic lib )' + ;; + sni) + lt_cv_file_magic_cmd='/bin/file' + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method="file_magic ELF [[0-9]][[0-9]]*-bit [[LM]]SB dynamic lib" + lt_cv_file_magic_test_file=/lib/libc.so + ;; + siemens) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; + esac + ;; + +sysv5OpenUNIX8* | sysv5UnixWare7* | sysv5uw[[78]]* | unixware7* | sysv4*uw2*) + lt_cv_deplibs_check_method=pass_all + ;; +esac +]) +file_magic_cmd=$lt_cv_file_magic_cmd +deplibs_check_method=$lt_cv_deplibs_check_method +test -z "$deplibs_check_method" && deplibs_check_method=unknown +])# AC_DEPLIBS_CHECK_METHOD + + +# AC_PROG_NM +# ---------- +# find the pathname to a BSD-compatible name lister +AC_DEFUN([AC_PROG_NM], +[AC_CACHE_CHECK([for BSD-compatible nm], lt_cv_path_NM, +[if test -n "$NM"; then + # Let the user override the test. + lt_cv_path_NM="$NM" +else + lt_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR + for ac_dir in $PATH /usr/ccs/bin /usr/ucb /bin; do + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + tmp_nm="$ac_dir/${ac_tool_prefix}nm" + if test -f "$tmp_nm" || test -f "$tmp_nm$ac_exeext" ; then + # Check to see if the nm accepts a BSD-compat flag. + # Adding the `sed 1q' prevents false positives on HP-UX, which says: + # nm: unknown option "B" ignored + # Tru64's nm complains that /dev/null is an invalid object file + case `"$tmp_nm" -B /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'` in + */dev/null* | *'Invalid file or object type'*) + lt_cv_path_NM="$tmp_nm -B" + break + ;; + *) + case `"$tmp_nm" -p /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'` in + */dev/null*) + lt_cv_path_NM="$tmp_nm -p" + break + ;; + *) + lt_cv_path_NM=${lt_cv_path_NM="$tmp_nm"} # keep the first match, but + continue # so that we can try to find one that supports BSD flags + ;; + esac + esac + fi + done + IFS="$lt_save_ifs" + test -z "$lt_cv_path_NM" && lt_cv_path_NM=nm +fi]) +NM="$lt_cv_path_NM" +])# AC_PROG_NM + + +# AC_CHECK_LIBM +# ------------- +# check for math library +AC_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_LIBM], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_HOST])dnl +LIBM= +case $host in +*-*-beos* | *-*-cygwin* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-darwin*) + # These system don't have libm, or don't need it + ;; +*-ncr-sysv4.3*) + AC_CHECK_LIB(mw, _mwvalidcheckl, LIBM="-lmw") + AC_CHECK_LIB(m, cos, LIBM="$LIBM -lm") + ;; +*) + AC_CHECK_LIB(m, cos, LIBM="-lm") + ;; +esac +])# AC_CHECK_LIBM + + +# AC_LIBLTDL_CONVENIENCE([DIRECTORY]) +# ----------------------------------- +# sets LIBLTDL to the link flags for the libltdl convenience library and +# LTDLINCL to the include flags for the libltdl header and adds +# --enable-ltdl-convenience to the configure arguments. Note that LIBLTDL +# and LTDLINCL are not AC_SUBSTed, nor is AC_CONFIG_SUBDIRS called. If +# DIRECTORY is not provided, it is assumed to be `libltdl'. LIBLTDL will +# be prefixed with '${top_builddir}/' and LTDLINCL will be prefixed with +# '${top_srcdir}/' (note the single quotes!). If your package is not +# flat and you're not using automake, define top_builddir and +# top_srcdir appropriately in the Makefiles. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBLTDL_CONVENIENCE], +[AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl + case $enable_ltdl_convenience in + no) AC_MSG_ERROR([this package needs a convenience libltdl]) ;; + "") enable_ltdl_convenience=yes + ac_configure_args="$ac_configure_args --enable-ltdl-convenience" ;; + esac + LIBLTDL='${top_builddir}/'ifelse($#,1,[$1],['libltdl'])/libltdlc.la + LTDLINCL='-I${top_srcdir}/'ifelse($#,1,[$1],['libltdl']) + # For backwards non-gettext consistent compatibility... + INCLTDL="$LTDLINCL" +])# AC_LIBLTDL_CONVENIENCE + + +# AC_LIBLTDL_INSTALLABLE([DIRECTORY]) +# ----------------------------------- +# sets LIBLTDL to the link flags for the libltdl installable library and +# LTDLINCL to the include flags for the libltdl header and adds +# --enable-ltdl-install to the configure arguments. Note that LIBLTDL +# and LTDLINCL are not AC_SUBSTed, nor is AC_CONFIG_SUBDIRS called. If +# DIRECTORY is not provided and an installed libltdl is not found, it is +# assumed to be `libltdl'. LIBLTDL will be prefixed with '${top_builddir}/' +# and LTDLINCL will be prefixed with '${top_srcdir}/' (note the single +# quotes!). If your package is not flat and you're not using automake, +# define top_builddir and top_srcdir appropriately in the Makefiles. +# In the future, this macro may have to be called after AC_PROG_LIBTOOL. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBLTDL_INSTALLABLE], +[AC_BEFORE([$0],[AC_LIBTOOL_SETUP])dnl + AC_CHECK_LIB(ltdl, lt_dlinit, + [test x"$enable_ltdl_install" != xyes && enable_ltdl_install=no], + [if test x"$enable_ltdl_install" = xno; then + AC_MSG_WARN([libltdl not installed, but installation disabled]) + else + enable_ltdl_install=yes + fi + ]) + if test x"$enable_ltdl_install" = x"yes"; then + ac_configure_args="$ac_configure_args --enable-ltdl-install" + LIBLTDL='${top_builddir}/'ifelse($#,1,[$1],['libltdl'])/libltdl.la + LTDLINCL='-I${top_srcdir}/'ifelse($#,1,[$1],['libltdl']) + else + ac_configure_args="$ac_configure_args --enable-ltdl-install=no" + LIBLTDL="-lltdl" + LTDLINCL= + fi + # For backwards non-gettext consistent compatibility... + INCLTDL="$LTDLINCL" +])# AC_LIBLTDL_INSTALLABLE + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_CXX +# -------------- +# enable support for C++ libraries +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_CXX], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_LANG_CXX]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_CXX + + +# _LT_AC_LANG_CXX +# --------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_LANG_CXX], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CXX]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CXXCPP]) +_LT_AC_SHELL_INIT([tagnames=${tagnames+${tagnames},}CXX]) +])# _LT_AC_LANG_CXX + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_F77 +# -------------- +# enable support for Fortran 77 libraries +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_F77], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_LANG_F77]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_F77 + + +# _LT_AC_LANG_F77 +# --------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_LANG_F77], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_F77]) +_LT_AC_SHELL_INIT([tagnames=${tagnames+${tagnames},}F77]) +])# _LT_AC_LANG_F77 + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ +# -------------- +# enable support for GCJ libraries +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_LANG_GCJ]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_GCJ + + +# _LT_AC_LANG_GCJ +# --------------- +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_LANG_GCJ], +[AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([AC_PROG_GCJ],[], + [AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([A][M_PROG_GCJ],[], + [AC_PROVIDE_IFELSE([LT_AC_PROG_GCJ],[], + [ifdef([AC_PROG_GCJ],[AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_GCJ])], + [ifdef([A][M_PROG_GCJ],[AC_REQUIRE([A][M_PROG_GCJ])], + [AC_REQUIRE([A][C_PROG_GCJ_OR_A][M_PROG_GCJ])])])])])]) +_LT_AC_SHELL_INIT([tagnames=${tagnames+${tagnames},}GCJ]) +])# _LT_AC_LANG_GCJ + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_RC +# -------------- +# enable support for Windows resource files +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_RC], +[AC_REQUIRE([LT_AC_PROG_RC]) +_LT_AC_SHELL_INIT([tagnames=${tagnames+${tagnames},}RC]) +])# AC_LIBTOOL_RC + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_C_CONFIG +# ------------------------ +# Ensure that the configuration vars for the C compiler are +# suitably defined. Those variables are subsequently used by +# AC_LIBTOOL_CONFIG to write the compiler configuration to `libtool'. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_C_CONFIG], [_LT_AC_LANG_C_CONFIG]) +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_LANG_C_CONFIG], +[lt_save_CC="$CC" +AC_LANG_PUSH(C) + +# Source file extension for C test sources. +ac_ext=c + +# Object file extension for compiled C test sources. +objext=o +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(objext, $1)=$objext + +# Code to be used in simple compile tests +lt_simple_compile_test_code="int some_variable = 0;\n" + +# Code to be used in simple link tests +lt_simple_link_test_code='int main(){return(0);}\n' + +_LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER + +# +# Check for any special shared library compilation flags. +# +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_cc_shlib, $1)= +if test "$GCC" = no; then + case $host_os in + sco3.2v5*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_cc_shlib, $1)='-belf' + ;; + esac +fi +if test -n "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_cc_shlib, $1)"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([`$CC' requires `$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_cc_shlib, $1)' to build shared libraries]) + if echo "$old_CC $old_CFLAGS " | grep "[[ ]]$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_cc_shlib, $1)[[ ]]" >/dev/null; then : + else + AC_MSG_WARN([add `$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_cc_shlib, $1)' to the CC or CFLAGS env variable and reconfigure]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_cv_prog_cc_can_build_shared, $1)=no + fi +fi + + +# +# Check to make sure the static flag actually works. +# +AC_LIBTOOL_LINKER_OPTION([if $compiler static flag $_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1) works], + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static_works, $1), + $_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1), + [], + [_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)=]) + + +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_NO_RTTI($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_PIC($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_CC_C_O($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_HARD_LINK_LOCKS($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_SHLIBS($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_DYNAMIC_LINKER($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_HARDCODE_LIBPATH($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_LIB_STRIP +AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN_SELF($1) + +# Report which librarie types wil actually be built +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libtool supports shared libraries]) +AC_MSG_RESULT([$can_build_shared]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build shared libraries]) +test "$can_build_shared" = "no" && enable_shared=no + +# On AIX, shared libraries and static libraries use the same namespace, and +# are all built from PIC. +case "$host_os" in +aix3*) + test "$enable_shared" = yes && enable_static=no + if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + archive_cmds="$archive_cmds~\$RANLIB \$lib" + postinstall_cmds='$RANLIB $lib' + fi + ;; + +aix4*) + if test "$host_cpu" != ia64 && test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = no ; then + test "$enable_shared" = yes && enable_static=no + fi + ;; + darwin* | rhapsody*) + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no + case "$host_os" in + rhapsody* | darwin1.[[012]]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-undefined suppress' + ;; + *) # Darwin 1.3 on + if test -z ${MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET} ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-flat_namespace -undefined suppress' + else + case ${MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET} in + 10.[[012]]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-flat_namespace -undefined suppress' + ;; + 10.*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-undefined dynamic_lookup' + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + esac + output_verbose_link_cmd='echo' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -dynamiclib $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_cmds, $1)='$CC $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib -bundle $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags' + # Don't fix this by using the ld -exported_symbols_list flag, it doesn't exist in older darwin ld's + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC -dynamiclib $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib -bundle $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)='-all_load $convenience' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; +esac +AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_shared]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build static libraries]) +# Make sure either enable_shared or enable_static is yes. +test "$enable_shared" = yes || enable_static=yes +AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_static]) + +AC_LIBTOOL_CONFIG($1) + +AC_LANG_POP +CC="$lt_save_CC" +])# AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_C_CONFIG + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_CXX_CONFIG +# -------------------------- +# Ensure that the configuration vars for the C compiler are +# suitably defined. Those variables are subsequently used by +# AC_LIBTOOL_CONFIG to write the compiler configuration to `libtool'. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_CXX_CONFIG], [_LT_AC_LANG_CXX_CONFIG(CXX)]) +AC_DEFUN([_LT_AC_LANG_CXX_CONFIG], +[AC_LANG_PUSH(C++) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CXX]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CXXCPP]) + +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=no +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=no +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1)=no +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_cmds, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_expsym_cmds, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=unknown +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)=$old_archive_cmds +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(enable_shared_with_static_runtimes, $1)=no + +# Dependencies to place before and after the object being linked: +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(predep_objects, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(postdep_objects, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(predeps, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(postdeps, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(compiler_lib_search_path, $1)= + +# Source file extension for C++ test sources. +ac_ext=cc + +# Object file extension for compiled C++ test sources. +objext=o +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(objext, $1)=$objext + +# Code to be used in simple compile tests +lt_simple_compile_test_code="int some_variable = 0;\n" + +# Code to be used in simple link tests +lt_simple_link_test_code='int main(int, char *[]) { return(0); }\n' + +# ltmain only uses $CC for tagged configurations so make sure $CC is set. +_LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER + +# Allow CC to be a program name with arguments. +lt_save_CC=$CC +lt_save_LD=$LD +lt_save_GCC=$GCC +GCC=$GXX +lt_save_with_gnu_ld=$with_gnu_ld +lt_save_path_LD=$lt_cv_path_LD +if test -n "${lt_cv_prog_gnu_ldcxx+set}"; then + lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld=$lt_cv_prog_gnu_ldcxx +else + unset lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld +fi +if test -n "${lt_cv_path_LDCXX+set}"; then + lt_cv_path_LD=$lt_cv_path_LDCXX +else + unset lt_cv_path_LD +fi +test -z "${LDCXX+set}" || LD=$LDCXX +CC=${CXX-"c++"} +compiler=$CC +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(compiler, $1)=$CC +cc_basename=`$echo X"$compiler" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + +# We don't want -fno-exception wen compiling C++ code, so set the +# no_builtin_flag separately +if test "$GXX" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1)=' -fno-builtin' +else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1)= +fi + +if test "$GXX" = yes; then + # Set up default GNU C++ configuration + + AC_PROG_LD + + # Check if GNU C++ uses GNU ld as the underlying linker, since the + # archiving commands below assume that GNU ld is being used. + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols -o $lib' + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--export-dynamic' + + # If archive_cmds runs LD, not CC, wlarc should be empty + # XXX I think wlarc can be eliminated in ltcf-cxx, but I need to + # investigate it a little bit more. (MM) + wlarc='${wl}' + + # ancient GNU ld didn't support --whole-archive et. al. + if eval "`$CC -print-prog-name=ld` --help 2>&1" | \ + grep 'no-whole-archive' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)="$wlarc"'--whole-archive$convenience '"$wlarc"'--no-whole-archive' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)= + fi + else + with_gnu_ld=no + wlarc= + + # A generic and very simple default shared library creation + # command for GNU C++ for the case where it uses the native + # linker, instead of GNU ld. If possible, this setting should + # overridden to take advantage of the native linker features on + # the platform it is being used on. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags -o $lib' + fi + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + output_verbose_link_cmd='$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep "\-L"' + +else + GXX=no + with_gnu_ld=no + wlarc= +fi + +# PORTME: fill in a description of your system's C++ link characteristics +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the $compiler linker ($LD) supports shared libraries]) +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=yes +case $host_os in + aix3*) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + aix4* | aix5*) + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # On IA64, the linker does run time linking by default, so we don't + # have to do anything special. + aix_use_runtimelinking=no + exp_sym_flag='-Bexport' + no_entry_flag="" + else + aix_use_runtimelinking=no + + # Test if we are trying to use run time linking or normal + # AIX style linking. If -brtl is somewhere in LDFLAGS, we + # need to do runtime linking. + case $host_os in aix4.[[23]]|aix4.[[23]].*|aix5*) + for ld_flag in $LDFLAGS; do + case $ld_flag in + *-brtl*) + aix_use_runtimelinking=yes + break + ;; + esac + done + esac + + exp_sym_flag='-bexport' + no_entry_flag='-bnoentry' + fi + + # When large executables or shared objects are built, AIX ld can + # have problems creating the table of contents. If linking a library + # or program results in "error TOC overflow" add -mminimal-toc to + # CXXFLAGS/CFLAGS for g++/gcc. In the cases where that is not + # enough to fix the problem, add -Wl,-bbigtoc to LDFLAGS. + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=':' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + + if test "$GXX" = yes; then + case $host_os in aix4.[012]|aix4.[012].*) + # We only want to do this on AIX 4.2 and lower, the check + # below for broken collect2 doesn't work under 4.3+ + collect2name=`${CC} -print-prog-name=collect2` + if test -f "$collect2name" && \ + strings "$collect2name" | grep resolve_lib_name >/dev/null + then + # We have reworked collect2 + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + else + # We have old collect2 + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=unsupported + # It fails to find uninstalled libraries when the uninstalled + # path is not listed in the libpath. Setting hardcode_minus_L + # to unsupported forces relinking + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)= + fi + esac + shared_flag='-shared' + else + # not using gcc + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # VisualAge C++, Version 5.5 for AIX 5L for IA-64, Beta 3 Release + # chokes on -Wl,-G. The following line is correct: + shared_flag='-G' + else + if test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = yes; then + shared_flag='${wl}-G' + else + shared_flag='${wl}-bM:SRE' + fi + fi + fi + + # It seems that -bexpall does not export symbols beginning with + # underscore (_), so it is better to generate a list of symbols to export. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=yes + if test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = yes; then + # Warning - without using the other runtime loading flags (-brtl), + # -berok will link without error, but may produce a broken library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-berok' + # Determine the default libpath from the value encoded in an empty executable. + _LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-blibpath:$libdir:'"$aix_libpath" + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="\$CC"' -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags `if test "x${allow_undefined_flag}" != "x"; then echo "${wl}${allow_undefined_flag}"; else :; fi` '"\${wl}$no_entry_flag \${wl}$exp_sym_flag:\$export_symbols $shared_flag" + else + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-R $libdir:/usr/lib:/lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)="-z nodefs" + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="\$CC $shared_flag"' -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}${allow_undefined_flag} '"\${wl}$no_entry_flag \${wl}$exp_sym_flag:\$export_symbols" + else + # Determine the default libpath from the value encoded in an empty executable. + _LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-blibpath:$libdir:'"$aix_libpath" + # Warning - without using the other run time loading flags, + # -berok will link without error, but may produce a broken library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-bernotok' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-berok' + # -bexpall does not export symbols beginning with underscore (_) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=yes + # Exported symbols can be pulled into shared objects from archives + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)=' ' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=yes + # This is similar to how AIX traditionally builds it's shared libraries. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="\$CC $shared_flag"' -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-bE:$export_symbols ${wl}-bnoentry${allow_undefined_flag}~$AR $AR_FLAGS $output_objdir/$libname$release.a $output_objdir/$soname' + fi + fi + ;; + chorus*) + case $cc_basename in + *) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + esac + ;; + + cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + # _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1) is actually meaningless, + # as there is no search path for DLLs. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(enable_shared_with_static_runtimes, $1)=yes + + if $LD --help 2>&1 | grep 'auto-import' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags -o $output_objdir/$soname ${wl}--image-base=0x10000000 ${wl}--out-implib,$lib' + # If the export-symbols file already is a .def file (1st line + # is EXPORTS), use it as is; otherwise, prepend... + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='if test "x`$SED 1q $export_symbols`" = xEXPORTS; then + cp $export_symbols $output_objdir/$soname.def; + else + echo EXPORTS > $output_objdir/$soname.def; + cat $export_symbols >> $output_objdir/$soname.def; + fi~ + $CC -shared -nostdlib $output_objdir/$soname.def $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags -o $output_objdir/$soname ${wl}--image-base=0x10000000 ${wl}--out-implib,$lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + + darwin* | rhapsody*) + if test "$GXX" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no + case "$host_os" in + rhapsody* | darwin1.[[012]]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-undefined suppress' + ;; + *) # Darwin 1.3 on + if test -z ${MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET} ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-flat_namespace -undefined suppress' + else + case ${MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET} in + 10.[[012]]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-flat_namespace -undefined suppress' + ;; + 10.*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-undefined dynamic_lookup' + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + esac + lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod=no + output_verbose_link_cmd='echo' + if $CC -dumpspecs 2>&1 | grep 'single_module' >/dev/null ; then + lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod=yes + fi + if test "X$lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod" = Xyes ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -dynamiclib -single_module $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -r ${wl}-bind_at_load -keep_private_externs -nostdlib -o ${lib}-master.o $libobjs~$CC -dynamiclib $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib ${lib}-master.o $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_cmds, $1)='$CC ${wl}-bind_at_load $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib -bundle $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags' + + # Don't fix this by using the ld -exported_symbols_list flag, it doesn't exist in older darwin ld's + if test "X$lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod" = Xyes ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC -dynamiclib -single_module $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC -r ${wl}-bind_at_load -keep_private_externs -nostdlib -o ${lib}-master.o $libobjs~$CC -dynamiclib $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib ${lib}-master.o $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib -bundle $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)='-all_load $convenience' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + + dgux*) + case $cc_basename in + ec++) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + ghcx) + # Green Hills C++ Compiler + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + *) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + esac + ;; + freebsd[12]*) + # C++ shared libraries reported to be fairly broken before switch to ELF + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + freebsd-elf*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no + ;; + freebsd* | kfreebsd*-gnu) + # FreeBSD 3 and later use GNU C++ and GNU ld with standard ELF + # conventions + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=yes + ;; + gnu*) + ;; + hpux9*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-E' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes # Not in the search PATH, + # but as the default + # location of the library. + + case $cc_basename in + CC) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + aCC) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$rm $output_objdir/$soname~$CC -b ${wl}+b ${wl}$install_libdir -o $output_objdir/$soname $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags~test $output_objdir/$soname = $lib || mv $output_objdir/$soname $lib' + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + # + # There doesn't appear to be a way to prevent this compiler from + # explicitly linking system object files so we need to strip them + # from the output so that they don't get included in the library + # dependencies. + output_verbose_link_cmd='templist=`($CC -b $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1) | egrep "\-L"`; list=""; for z in $templist; do case $z in conftest.$objext) list="$list $z";; *.$objext);; *) list="$list $z";;esac; done; echo $list' + ;; + *) + if test "$GXX" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$rm $output_objdir/$soname~$CC -shared -nostdlib -fPIC ${wl}+b ${wl}$install_libdir -o $output_objdir/$soname $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags~test $output_objdir/$soname = $lib || mv $output_objdir/$soname $lib' + else + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + esac + ;; + hpux10*|hpux11*) + if test $with_gnu_ld = no; then + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld, $1)='+b $libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + ;; + ia64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-E' + ;; + esac + fi + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + ia64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes # Not in the search PATH, + # but as the default + # location of the library. + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes # Not in the search PATH, + # but as the default + # location of the library. + ;; + esac + + case $cc_basename in + CC) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + aCC) + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -b +h $soname -o $lib $linker_flags $libobjs $deplibs' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -b ${wl}+h ${wl}$soname ${wl}+b ${wl}$install_libdir -o $lib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags' + ;; + esac + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + # + # There doesn't appear to be a way to prevent this compiler from + # explicitly linking system object files so we need to strip them + # from the output so that they don't get included in the library + # dependencies. + output_verbose_link_cmd='templist=`($CC -b $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1) | grep "\-L"`; list=""; for z in $templist; do case $z in conftest.$objext) list="$list $z";; *.$objext);; *) list="$list $z";;esac; done; echo $list' + ;; + *) + if test "$GXX" = yes; then + if test $with_gnu_ld = no; then + case "$host_cpu" in + ia64*|hppa*64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -b +h $soname -o $lib $linker_flags $libobjs $deplibs' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib -fPIC ${wl}+h ${wl}$soname ${wl}+b ${wl}$install_libdir -o $lib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags' + ;; + esac + fi + else + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + esac + ;; + irix5* | irix6*) + case $cc_basename in + CC) + # SGI C++ + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -all -multigot $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags -soname $soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo -set_version $verstring` -update_registry ${objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + + # Archives containing C++ object files must be created using + # "CC -ar", where "CC" is the IRIX C++ compiler. This is + # necessary to make sure instantiated templates are included + # in the archive. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -ar -WR,-u -o $oldlib $oldobjs' + ;; + *) + if test "$GXX" = yes; then + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = no; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` ${wl}-update_registry ${wl}${objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` -o $lib' + fi + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + ;; + esac + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + ;; + linux*) + case $cc_basename in + KCC) + # Kuck and Associates, Inc. (KAI) C++ Compiler + + # KCC will only create a shared library if the output file + # ends with ".so" (or ".sl" for HP-UX), so rename the library + # to its proper name (with version) after linking. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='tempext=`echo $shared_ext | $SED -e '\''s/\([[^()0-9A-Za-z{}]]\)/\\\\\1/g'\''`; templib=`echo $lib | $SED -e "s/\${tempext}\..*/.so/"`; $CC $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags --soname $soname -o \$templib; mv \$templib $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='tempext=`echo $shared_ext | $SED -e '\''s/\([[^()0-9A-Za-z{}]]\)/\\\\\1/g'\''`; templib=`echo $lib | $SED -e "s/\${tempext}\..*/.so/"`; $CC $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags --soname $soname -o \$templib ${wl}-retain-symbols-file,$export_symbols; mv \$templib $lib' + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + # + # There doesn't appear to be a way to prevent this compiler from + # explicitly linking system object files so we need to strip them + # from the output so that they don't get included in the library + # dependencies. + output_verbose_link_cmd='templist=`$CC $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext -o libconftest$shared_ext 2>&1 | grep "ld"`; rm -f libconftest$shared_ext; list=""; for z in $templist; do case $z in conftest.$objext) list="$list $z";; *.$objext);; *) list="$list $z";;esac; done; echo $list' + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--rpath,$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--export-dynamic' + + # Archives containing C++ object files must be created using + # "CC -Bstatic", where "CC" is the KAI C++ compiler. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -Bstatic -o $oldlib $oldobjs' + ;; + icpc) + # Intel C++ + with_gnu_ld=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath,$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--export-dynamic' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--whole-archive$convenience ${wl}--no-whole-archive' + ;; + cxx) + # Compaq C++ + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols' + + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-rpath $libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + # + # There doesn't appear to be a way to prevent this compiler from + # explicitly linking system object files so we need to strip them + # from the output so that they don't get included in the library + # dependencies. + output_verbose_link_cmd='templist=`$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep "ld"`; templist=`echo $templist | $SED "s/\(^.*ld.*\)\( .*ld .*$\)/\1/"`; list=""; for z in $templist; do case $z in conftest.$objext) list="$list $z";; *.$objext);; *) list="$list $z";;esac; done; echo $list' + ;; + esac + ;; + lynxos*) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + m88k*) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + mvs*) + case $cc_basename in + cxx) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + *) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + esac + ;; + netbsd*) + if echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $linker_flags' + wlarc= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-R$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + fi + # Workaround some broken pre-1.5 toolchains + output_verbose_link_cmd='$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep conftest.$objext | $SED -e "s:-lgcc -lc -lgcc::"' + ;; + osf3*) + case $cc_basename in + KCC) + # Kuck and Associates, Inc. (KAI) C++ Compiler + + # KCC will only create a shared library if the output file + # ends with ".so" (or ".sl" for HP-UX), so rename the library + # to its proper name (with version) after linking. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='tempext=`echo $shared_ext | $SED -e '\''s/\([[^()0-9A-Za-z{}]]\)/\\\\\1/g'\''`; templib=`echo $lib | $SED -e "s/\${tempext}\..*/.so/"`; $CC $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags --soname $soname -o \$templib; mv \$templib $lib' + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath,$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + + # Archives containing C++ object files must be created using + # "CC -Bstatic", where "CC" is the KAI C++ compiler. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -Bstatic -o $oldlib $oldobjs' + + ;; + RCC) + # Rational C++ 2.4.1 + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + cxx) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-expect_unresolved ${wl}\*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared${allow_undefined_flag} $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version $verstring` -update_registry ${objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + # + # There doesn't appear to be a way to prevent this compiler from + # explicitly linking system object files so we need to strip them + # from the output so that they don't get included in the library + # dependencies. + output_verbose_link_cmd='templist=`$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep "ld" | grep -v "ld:"`; templist=`echo $templist | $SED "s/\(^.*ld.*\)\( .*ld.*$\)/\1/"`; list=""; for z in $templist; do case $z in conftest.$objext) list="$list $z";; *.$objext);; *) list="$list $z";;esac; done; echo $list' + ;; + *) + if test "$GXX" = yes && test "$with_gnu_ld" = no; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-expect_unresolved ${wl}\*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib ${allow_undefined_flag} $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` ${wl}-update_registry ${wl}${objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + output_verbose_link_cmd='$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep "\-L"' + + else + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + esac + ;; + osf4* | osf5*) + case $cc_basename in + KCC) + # Kuck and Associates, Inc. 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list=""; for z in $templist; do case $z in conftest.$objext) list="$list $z";; *.$objext);; *) list="$list $z";;esac; done; echo $list' + ;; + *) + if test "$GXX" = yes && test "$with_gnu_ld" = no; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-expect_unresolved ${wl}\*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib ${allow_undefined_flag} $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-msym ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` ${wl}-update_registry ${wl}${objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + output_verbose_link_cmd='$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep "\-L"' + + else + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; 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This is + # necessary to make sure instantiated templates are included + # in the archive. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -xar -o $oldlib $oldobjs' + ;; + gcx) + # Green Hills C++ Compiler + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-h $wl$soname -o $lib' + + # The C++ compiler must be used to create the archive. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)='$CC $LDFLAGS -archive -o $oldlib $oldobjs' + ;; + *) + # GNU C++ compiler with Solaris linker + if test "$GXX" = yes && test "$with_gnu_ld" = no; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-z ${wl}defs' + if $CC --version | grep -v '^2\.7' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -nostdlib $LDFLAGS $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-h $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$echo "{ global:" > $lib.exp~cat $export_symbols | $SED -e "s/\(.*\)/\1;/" >> $lib.exp~$echo "local: *; };" >> $lib.exp~ + $CC -shared -nostdlib ${wl}-M $wl$lib.exp -o $lib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags~$rm $lib.exp' + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + output_verbose_link_cmd="$CC -shared $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep \"\-L\"" + else + # g++ 2.7 appears to require `-G' NOT `-shared' on this + # platform. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -G -nostdlib $LDFLAGS $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags ${wl}-h $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$echo "{ global:" > $lib.exp~cat $export_symbols | $SED -e "s/\(.*\)/\1;/" >> $lib.exp~$echo "local: *; };" >> $lib.exp~ + $CC -G -nostdlib ${wl}-M $wl$lib.exp -o $lib $predep_objects $libobjs $deplibs $postdep_objects $compiler_flags~$rm $lib.exp' + + # Commands to make compiler produce verbose output that lists + # what "hidden" libraries, object files and flags are used when + # linking a shared library. + output_verbose_link_cmd="$CC -G $CFLAGS -v conftest.$objext 2>&1 | grep \"\-L\"" + fi + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-R $wl$libdir' + fi + ;; + esac + ;; + sysv5OpenUNIX8* | sysv5UnixWare7* | sysv5uw[[78]]* | unixware7*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no + ;; + tandem*) + case $cc_basename in + NCC) + # NonStop-UX NCC 3.20 + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + *) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + esac + ;; + vxworks*) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + *) + # FIXME: insert proper C++ library support + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; +esac +AC_MSG_RESULT([$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)]) +test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)" = no && can_build_shared=no + +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(GCC, $1)="$GXX" +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(LD, $1)="$LD" + +AC_LIBTOOL_POSTDEP_PREDEP($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_PIC($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_CC_C_O($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_HARD_LINK_LOCKS($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_SHLIBS($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_DYNAMIC_LINKER($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_HARDCODE_LIBPATH($1) +AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_LIB_STRIP +AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN_SELF($1) + +AC_LIBTOOL_CONFIG($1) + +AC_LANG_POP +CC=$lt_save_CC +LDCXX=$LD +LD=$lt_save_LD +GCC=$lt_save_GCC +with_gnu_ldcxx=$with_gnu_ld +with_gnu_ld=$lt_save_with_gnu_ld +lt_cv_path_LDCXX=$lt_cv_path_LD +lt_cv_path_LD=$lt_save_path_LD +lt_cv_prog_gnu_ldcxx=$lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld +lt_cv_prog_gnu_ld=$lt_save_with_gnu_ld +])# AC_LIBTOOL_LANG_CXX_CONFIG + +# AC_LIBTOOL_POSTDEP_PREDEP([TAGNAME]) +# ------------------------ +# Figure out "hidden" library dependencies from verbose +# compiler output when linking a shared library. +# Parse the compiler output and extract the necessary +# objects, libraries and library flags. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_POSTDEP_PREDEP],[ +dnl we can't use the lt_simple_compile_test_code here, +dnl because it contains code intended for an executable, +dnl not a library. It's possible we should let each +dnl tag define a new lt_????_link_test_code variable, +dnl but it's only used here... +ifelse([$1],[],[cat > conftest.$ac_ext < conftest.$ac_ext < conftest.$ac_ext < conftest.$ac_ext <> "$cfgfile" +ifelse([$1], [], +[#! $SHELL + +# `$echo "$cfgfile" | sed 's%^.*/%%'` - Provide generalized library-building support services. +# Generated automatically by $PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION$TIMESTAMP) +# NOTE: Changes made to this file will be lost: look at ltmain.sh. +# +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# This file is part of GNU Libtool: +# Originally by Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# A sed program that does not truncate output. +SED=$lt_SED + +# Sed that helps us avoid accidentally triggering echo(1) options like -n. +Xsed="$SED -e s/^X//" + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test "X\${CDPATH+set}" = Xset; then CDPATH=:; export CDPATH; fi + +# The names of the tagged configurations supported by this script. +available_tags= + +# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL CONFIG], +[# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname]) + +# Libtool was configured on host `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`: + +# Shell to use when invoking shell scripts. +SHELL=$lt_SHELL + +# Whether or not to build shared libraries. +build_libtool_libs=$enable_shared + +# Whether or not to build static libraries. +build_old_libs=$enable_static + +# Whether or not to add -lc for building shared libraries. +build_libtool_need_lc=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1) + +# Whether or not to disallow shared libs when runtime libs are static +allow_libtool_libs_with_static_runtimes=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(enable_shared_with_static_runtimes, $1) + +# Whether or not to optimize for fast installation. +fast_install=$enable_fast_install + +# The host system. +host_alias=$host_alias +host=$host + +# An echo program that does not interpret backslashes. +echo=$lt_echo + +# The archiver. +AR=$lt_AR +AR_FLAGS=$lt_AR_FLAGS + +# A C compiler. +LTCC=$lt_LTCC + +# A language-specific compiler. +CC=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(compiler, $1) + +# Is the compiler the GNU C compiler? +with_gcc=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(GCC, $1) + +# An ERE matcher. +EGREP=$lt_EGREP + +# The linker used to build libraries. +LD=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(LD, $1) + +# Whether we need hard or soft links. +LN_S=$lt_LN_S + +# A BSD-compatible nm program. +NM=$lt_NM + +# A symbol stripping program +STRIP=$lt_STRIP + +# Used to examine libraries when file_magic_cmd begins "file" +MAGIC_CMD=$MAGIC_CMD + +# Used on cygwin: DLL creation program. +DLLTOOL="$DLLTOOL" + +# Used on cygwin: object dumper. +OBJDUMP="$OBJDUMP" + +# Used on cygwin: assembler. +AS="$AS" + +# The name of the directory that contains temporary libtool files. +objdir=$objdir + +# How to create reloadable object files. +reload_flag=$lt_reload_flag +reload_cmds=$lt_reload_cmds + +# How to pass a linker flag through the compiler. +wl=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1) + +# Object file suffix (normally "o"). +objext="$ac_objext" + +# Old archive suffix (normally "a"). +libext="$libext" + +# Shared library suffix (normally ".so"). +shrext='$shrext' + +# Executable file suffix (normally ""). +exeext="$exeext" + +# Additional compiler flags for building library objects. +pic_flag=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1) +pic_mode=$pic_mode + +# What is the maximum length of a command? +max_cmd_len=$lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len + +# Does compiler simultaneously support -c and -o options? +compiler_c_o=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_cv_prog_compiler_c_o, $1) + +# Must we lock files when doing compilation ? +need_locks=$lt_need_locks + +# Do we need the lib prefix for modules? +need_lib_prefix=$need_lib_prefix + +# Do we need a version for libraries? +need_version=$need_version + +# Whether dlopen is supported. +dlopen_support=$enable_dlopen + +# Whether dlopen of programs is supported. +dlopen_self=$enable_dlopen_self + +# Whether dlopen of statically linked programs is supported. +dlopen_self_static=$enable_dlopen_self_static + +# Compiler flag to prevent dynamic linking. +link_static_flag=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1) + +# Compiler flag to turn off builtin functions. +no_builtin_flag=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1) + +# Compiler flag to allow reflexive dlopens. +export_dynamic_flag_spec=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1) + +# Compiler flag to generate shared objects directly from archives. +whole_archive_flag_spec=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1) + +# Compiler flag to generate thread-safe objects. +thread_safe_flag_spec=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(thread_safe_flag_spec, $1) + +# Library versioning type. +version_type=$version_type + +# Format of library name prefix. +libname_spec=$lt_libname_spec + +# List of archive names. First name is the real one, the rest are links. +# The last name is the one that the linker finds with -lNAME. +library_names_spec=$lt_library_names_spec + +# The coded name of the library, if different from the real name. +soname_spec=$lt_soname_spec + +# Commands used to build and install an old-style archive. +RANLIB=$lt_RANLIB +old_archive_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1) +old_postinstall_cmds=$lt_old_postinstall_cmds +old_postuninstall_cmds=$lt_old_postuninstall_cmds + +# Create an old-style archive from a shared archive. +old_archive_from_new_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_from_new_cmds, $1) + +# Create a temporary old-style archive to link instead of a shared archive. +old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds, $1) + +# Commands used to build and install a shared archive. +archive_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1) +archive_expsym_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1) +postinstall_cmds=$lt_postinstall_cmds +postuninstall_cmds=$lt_postuninstall_cmds + +# Commands used to build a loadable module (assumed same as above if empty) +module_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_cmds, $1) +module_expsym_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_expsym_cmds, $1) + +# Commands to strip libraries. +old_striplib=$lt_old_striplib +striplib=$lt_striplib + +# Dependencies to place before the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +predep_objects=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(predep_objects, $1) + +# Dependencies to place after the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +postdep_objects=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(postdep_objects, $1) + +# Dependencies to place before the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +predeps=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(predeps, $1) + +# Dependencies to place after the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +postdeps=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(postdeps, $1) + +# The library search path used internally by the compiler when linking +# a shared library. +compiler_lib_search_path=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(compiler_lib_search_path, $1) + +# Method to check whether dependent libraries are shared objects. +deplibs_check_method=$lt_deplibs_check_method + +# Command to use when deplibs_check_method == file_magic. +file_magic_cmd=$lt_file_magic_cmd + +# Flag that allows shared libraries with undefined symbols to be built. +allow_undefined_flag=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1) + +# Flag that forces no undefined symbols. +no_undefined_flag=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1) + +# Commands used to finish a libtool library installation in a directory. +finish_cmds=$lt_finish_cmds + +# Same as above, but a single script fragment to be evaled but not shown. +finish_eval=$lt_finish_eval + +# Take the output of nm and produce a listing of raw symbols and C names. +global_symbol_pipe=$lt_lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe + +# Transform the output of nm in a proper C declaration +global_symbol_to_cdecl=$lt_lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_cdecl + +# Transform the output of nm in a C name address pair +global_symbol_to_c_name_address=$lt_lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_c_name_address + +# This is the shared library runtime path variable. +runpath_var=$runpath_var + +# This is the shared library path variable. +shlibpath_var=$shlibpath_var + +# Is shlibpath searched before the hard-coded library search path? +shlibpath_overrides_runpath=$shlibpath_overrides_runpath + +# How to hardcode a shared library path into an executable. +hardcode_action=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_action, $1) + +# Whether we should hardcode library paths into libraries. +hardcode_into_libs=$hardcode_into_libs + +# Flag to hardcode \$libdir into a binary during linking. +# This must work even if \$libdir does not exist. +hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1) + +# If ld is used when linking, flag to hardcode \$libdir into +# a binary during linking. This must work even if \$libdir does +# not exist. +hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld, $1) + +# Whether we need a single -rpath flag with a separated argument. +hardcode_libdir_separator=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1) + +# Set to yes if using DIR/libNAME${shared_ext} during linking hardcodes DIR into the +# resulting binary. +hardcode_direct=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1) + +# Set to yes if using the -LDIR flag during linking hardcodes DIR into the +# resulting binary. +hardcode_minus_L=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1) + +# Set to yes if using SHLIBPATH_VAR=DIR during linking hardcodes DIR into +# the resulting binary. +hardcode_shlibpath_var=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1) + +# Set to yes if building a shared library automatically hardcodes DIR into the library +# and all subsequent libraries and executables linked against it. +hardcode_automatic=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1) + +# Variables whose values should be saved in libtool wrapper scripts and +# restored at relink time. +variables_saved_for_relink="$variables_saved_for_relink" + +# Whether libtool must link a program against all its dependency libraries. +link_all_deplibs=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1) + +# Compile-time system search path for libraries +sys_lib_search_path_spec=$lt_sys_lib_search_path_spec + +# Run-time system search path for libraries +sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec=$lt_sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec + +# Fix the shell variable \$srcfile for the compiler. +fix_srcfile_path="$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(fix_srcfile_path, $1)" + +# Set to yes if exported symbols are required. +always_export_symbols=$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1) + +# The commands to list exported symbols. +export_symbols_cmds=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1) + +# The commands to extract the exported symbol list from a shared archive. +extract_expsyms_cmds=$lt_extract_expsyms_cmds + +# Symbols that should not be listed in the preloaded symbols. +exclude_expsyms=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(exclude_expsyms, $1) + +# Symbols that must always be exported. +include_expsyms=$lt_[]_LT_AC_TAGVAR(include_expsyms, $1) + +ifelse([$1],[], +[# ### END LIBTOOL CONFIG], +[# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname]) + +__EOF__ + +ifelse([$1],[], [ + case $host_os in + aix3*) + cat <<\EOF >> "$cfgfile" + +# AIX sometimes has problems with the GCC collect2 program. For some +# reason, if we set the COLLECT_NAMES environment variable, the problems +# vanish in a puff of smoke. +if test "X${COLLECT_NAMES+set}" != Xset; then + COLLECT_NAMES= + export COLLECT_NAMES +fi +EOF + ;; + esac + + # We use sed instead of cat because bash on DJGPP gets confused if + # if finds mixed CR/LF and LF-only lines. Since sed operates in + # text mode, it properly converts lines to CR/LF. This bash problem + # is reportedly fixed, but why not run on old versions too? + sed '$q' "$ltmain" >> "$cfgfile" || (rm -f "$cfgfile"; exit 1) + + mv -f "$cfgfile" "$ofile" || \ + (rm -f "$ofile" && cp "$cfgfile" "$ofile" && rm -f "$cfgfile") + chmod +x "$ofile" +]) +else + # If there is no Makefile yet, we rely on a make rule to execute + # `config.status --recheck' to rerun these tests and create the + # libtool script then. + ltmain_in=`echo $ltmain | sed -e 's/\.sh$/.in/'` + if test -f "$ltmain_in"; then + test -f Makefile && make "$ltmain" + fi +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_CONFIG + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_NO_RTTI([TAGNAME]) +# ------------------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_NO_RTTI], +[AC_REQUIRE([_LT_AC_SYS_COMPILER])dnl + +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1)= + +if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1)=' -fno-builtin' + + AC_LIBTOOL_COMPILER_OPTION([if $compiler supports -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions], + lt_cv_prog_compiler_rtti_exceptions, + [-fno-rtti -fno-exceptions], [], + [_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1)="$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1) -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions"]) +fi +])# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_NO_RTTI + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_GLOBAL_SYMBOL_PIPE +# --------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_GLOBAL_SYMBOL_PIPE], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_HOST]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_NM]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_OBJEXT]) +# Check for command to grab the raw symbol name followed by C symbol from nm. +AC_MSG_CHECKING([command to parse $NM output from $compiler object]) +AC_CACHE_VAL([lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe], +[ +# These are sane defaults that work on at least a few old systems. +# [They come from Ultrix. What could be older than Ultrix?!! ;)] + +# Character class describing NM global symbol codes. +symcode='[[BCDEGRST]]' + +# Regexp to match symbols that can be accessed directly from C. +sympat='\([[_A-Za-z]][[_A-Za-z0-9]]*\)' + +# Transform the above into a raw symbol and a C symbol. +symxfrm='\1 \2\3 \3' + +# Transform an extracted symbol line into a proper C declaration +lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_cdecl="sed -n -e 's/^. .* \(.*\)$/extern int \1;/p'" + +# Transform an extracted symbol line into symbol name and symbol address +lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_c_name_address="sed -n -e 's/^: \([[^ ]]*\) $/ {\\\"\1\\\", (lt_ptr) 0},/p' -e 's/^$symcode \([[^ ]]*\) \([[^ ]]*\)$/ {\"\2\", (lt_ptr) \&\2},/p'" + +# Define system-specific variables. +case $host_os in +aix*) + symcode='[[BCDT]]' + ;; +cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + symcode='[[ABCDGISTW]]' + ;; +hpux*) # Its linker distinguishes data from code symbols + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + symcode='[[ABCDEGRST]]' + fi + lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_cdecl="sed -n -e 's/^T .* \(.*\)$/extern int \1();/p' -e 's/^$symcode* .* \(.*\)$/extern char \1;/p'" + lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_c_name_address="sed -n -e 's/^: \([[^ ]]*\) $/ {\\\"\1\\\", (lt_ptr) 0},/p' -e 's/^$symcode* \([[^ ]]*\) \([[^ ]]*\)$/ {\"\2\", (lt_ptr) \&\2},/p'" + ;; +irix* | nonstopux*) + symcode='[[BCDEGRST]]' + ;; +osf*) + symcode='[[BCDEGQRST]]' + ;; +solaris* | sysv5*) + symcode='[[BDRT]]' + ;; +sysv4) + symcode='[[DFNSTU]]' + ;; +esac + +# Handle CRLF in mingw tool chain +opt_cr= +case $build_os in +mingw*) + opt_cr=`echo 'x\{0,1\}' | tr x '\015'` # option cr in regexp + ;; +esac + +# If we're using GNU nm, then use its standard symbol codes. +case `$NM -V 2>&1` in +*GNU* | *'with BFD'*) + symcode='[[ABCDGIRSTW]]' ;; +esac + +# Try without a prefix undercore, then with it. +for ac_symprfx in "" "_"; do + + # Write the raw and C identifiers. + lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe="sed -n -e 's/^.*[[ ]]\($symcode$symcode*\)[[ ]][[ ]]*\($ac_symprfx\)$sympat$opt_cr$/$symxfrm/p'" + + # Check to see that the pipe works correctly. + pipe_works=no + + rm -f conftest* + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < $nlist) && test -s "$nlist"; then + # Try sorting and uniquifying the output. + if sort "$nlist" | uniq > "$nlist"T; then + mv -f "$nlist"T "$nlist" + else + rm -f "$nlist"T + fi + + # Make sure that we snagged all the symbols we need. + if grep ' nm_test_var$' "$nlist" >/dev/null; then + if grep ' nm_test_func$' "$nlist" >/dev/null; then + cat < conftest.$ac_ext +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +EOF + # Now generate the symbol file. + eval "$lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_cdecl"' < "$nlist" | grep -v main >> conftest.$ac_ext' + + cat <> conftest.$ac_ext +#if defined (__STDC__) && __STDC__ +# define lt_ptr_t void * +#else +# define lt_ptr_t char * +# define const +#endif + +/* The mapping between symbol names and symbols. */ +const struct { + const char *name; + lt_ptr_t address; +} +lt_preloaded_symbols[[]] = +{ +EOF + $SED "s/^$symcode$symcode* \(.*\) \(.*\)$/ {\"\2\", (lt_ptr_t) \&\2},/" < "$nlist" | grep -v main >> conftest.$ac_ext + cat <<\EOF >> conftest.$ac_ext + {0, (lt_ptr_t) 0} +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif +EOF + # Now try linking the two files. + mv conftest.$ac_objext conftstm.$ac_objext + lt_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + lt_save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + LIBS="conftstm.$ac_objext" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_no_builtin_flag, $1)" + if AC_TRY_EVAL(ac_link) && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + pipe_works=yes + fi + LIBS="$lt_save_LIBS" + CFLAGS="$lt_save_CFLAGS" + else + echo "cannot find nm_test_func in $nlist" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + fi + else + echo "cannot find nm_test_var in $nlist" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + fi + else + echo "cannot run $lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + fi + else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + fi + rm -f conftest* conftst* + + # Do not use the global_symbol_pipe unless it works. + if test "$pipe_works" = yes; then + break + else + lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe= + fi +done +]) +if test -z "$lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe"; then + lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_cdecl= +fi +if test -z "$lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_pipe$lt_cv_sys_global_symbol_to_cdecl"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(failed) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT(ok) +fi +]) # AC_LIBTOOL_SYS_GLOBAL_SYMBOL_PIPE + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_PIC([TAGNAME]) +# --------------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_COMPILER_PIC], +[_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)= +_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)= + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $compiler option to produce PIC]) + ifelse([$1],[CXX],[ + # C++ specific cases for pic, static, wl, etc. + if test "$GXX" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-static' + + case $host_os in + aix*) + # All AIX code is PIC. + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # AIX 5 now supports IA64 processor + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + fi + ;; + amigaos*) + # FIXME: we need at least 68020 code to build shared libraries, but + # adding the `-m68020' flag to GCC prevents building anything better, + # like `-m68040'. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-m68020 -resident32 -malways-restore-a4' + ;; + beos* | cygwin* | irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux* | osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + # PIC is the default for these OSes. + ;; + mingw* | os2* | pw32*) + # This hack is so that the source file can tell whether it is being + # built for inclusion in a dll (and should export symbols for example). + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-DDLL_EXPORT' + ;; + darwin* | rhapsody*) + # PIC is the default on this platform + # Common symbols not allowed in MH_DYLIB files + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fno-common' + ;; + *djgpp*) + # DJGPP does not support shared libraries at all + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)= + ;; + sysv4*MP*) + if test -d /usr/nec; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)=-Kconform_pic + fi + ;; + hpux*) + # PIC is the default for IA64 HP-UX and 64-bit HP-UX, but + # not for PA HP-UX. + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fPIC' + ;; + esac + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fPIC' + ;; + esac + else + case $host_os in + aix4* | aix5*) + # All AIX code is PIC. + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # AIX 5 now supports IA64 processor + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-bnso -bI:/lib/syscalls.exp' + fi + ;; + chorus*) + case $cc_basename in + cxch68) + # Green Hills C++ Compiler + # _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)="--no_auto_instantiation -u __main -u __premain -u _abort -r $COOL_DIR/lib/libOrb.a $MVME_DIR/lib/CC/libC.a $MVME_DIR/lib/classix/libcx.s.a" + ;; + esac + ;; + dgux*) + case $cc_basename in + ec++) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + ;; + ghcx) + # Green Hills C++ Compiler + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-pic' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + freebsd* | kfreebsd*-gnu) + # FreeBSD uses GNU C++ + ;; + hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + case $cc_basename in + CC) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)="${ac_cv_prog_cc_wl}-a ${ac_cv_prog_cc_wl}archive" + if test "$host_cpu" != ia64; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='+Z' + fi + ;; + aCC) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)="${ac_cv_prog_cc_wl}-a ${ac_cv_prog_cc_wl}archive" + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + # +Z the default + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='+Z' + ;; + esac + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux*) + case $cc_basename in + CC) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-non_shared' + # CC pic flag -KPIC is the default. + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + linux*) + case $cc_basename in + KCC) + # KAI C++ Compiler + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='--backend -Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fPIC' + ;; + icpc) + # Intel C++ + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-static' + ;; + cxx) + # Compaq C++ + # Make sure the PIC flag is empty. It appears that all Alpha + # Linux and Compaq Tru64 Unix objects are PIC. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-non_shared' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + lynxos*) + ;; + m88k*) + ;; + mvs*) + case $cc_basename in + cxx) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-W c,exportall' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + netbsd*) + ;; + osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + case $cc_basename in + KCC) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='--backend -Wl,' + ;; + RCC) + # Rational C++ 2.4.1 + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-pic' + ;; + cxx) + # Digital/Compaq C++ + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + # Make sure the PIC flag is empty. It appears that all Alpha + # Linux and Compaq Tru64 Unix objects are PIC. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-non_shared' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + psos*) + ;; + sco*) + case $cc_basename in + CC) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fPIC' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + solaris*) + case $cc_basename in + CC) + # Sun C++ 4.2, 5.x and Centerline C++ + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Qoption ld ' + ;; + gcx) + # Green Hills C++ Compiler + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-PIC' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + sunos4*) + case $cc_basename in + CC) + # Sun C++ 4.x + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-pic' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + ;; + lcc) + # Lucid + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-pic' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + tandem*) + case $cc_basename in + NCC) + # NonStop-UX NCC 3.20 + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + ;; + *) + ;; + esac + ;; + unixware*) + ;; + vxworks*) + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_can_build_shared, $1)=no + ;; + esac + fi +], +[ + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-static' + + case $host_os in + aix*) + # All AIX code is PIC. + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # AIX 5 now supports IA64 processor + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + fi + ;; + + amigaos*) + # FIXME: we need at least 68020 code to build shared libraries, but + # adding the `-m68020' flag to GCC prevents building anything better, + # like `-m68040'. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-m68020 -resident32 -malways-restore-a4' + ;; + + beos* | cygwin* | irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux* | osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + # PIC is the default for these OSes. + ;; + + mingw* | pw32* | os2*) + # This hack is so that the source file can tell whether it is being + # built for inclusion in a dll (and should export symbols for example). + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-DDLL_EXPORT' + ;; + + darwin* | rhapsody*) + # PIC is the default on this platform + # Common symbols not allowed in MH_DYLIB files + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fno-common' + ;; + + msdosdjgpp*) + # Just because we use GCC doesn't mean we suddenly get shared libraries + # on systems that don't support them. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_can_build_shared, $1)=no + enable_shared=no + ;; + + sysv4*MP*) + if test -d /usr/nec; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)=-Kconform_pic + fi + ;; + + hpux*) + # PIC is the default for IA64 HP-UX and 64-bit HP-UX, but + # not for PA HP-UX. + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + # +Z the default + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fPIC' + ;; + esac + ;; + + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-fPIC' + ;; + esac + else + # PORTME Check for flag to pass linker flags through the system compiler. + case $host_os in + aix*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # AIX 5 now supports IA64 processor + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-bnso -bI:/lib/syscalls.exp' + fi + ;; + + mingw* | pw32* | os2*) + # This hack is so that the source file can tell whether it is being + # built for inclusion in a dll (and should export symbols for example). + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-DDLL_EXPORT' + ;; + + hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + # PIC is the default for IA64 HP-UX and 64-bit HP-UX, but + # not for PA HP-UX. + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + # +Z the default + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='+Z' + ;; + esac + # Is there a better lt_prog_compiler_static that works with the bundled CC? + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='${wl}-a ${wl}archive' + ;; + + irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + # PIC (with -KPIC) is the default. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-non_shared' + ;; + + newsos6) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + ;; + + linux*) + case $CC in + icc* | ecc*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-static' + ;; + ccc*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + # All Alpha code is PIC. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-non_shared' + ;; + esac + ;; + + osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + # All OSF/1 code is PIC. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-non_shared' + ;; + + sco3.2v5*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-Kpic' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-dn' + ;; + + solaris*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + ;; + + sunos4*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Qoption ld ' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-PIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + ;; + + sysv4 | sysv4.2uw2* | sysv4.3* | sysv5*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_wl, $1)='-Wl,' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-KPIC' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + ;; + + sysv4*MP*) + if test -d /usr/nec ;then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-Kconform_pic' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + fi + ;; + + uts4*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)='-pic' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_static, $1)='-Bstatic' + ;; + + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_can_build_shared, $1)=no + ;; + esac + fi +]) +AC_MSG_RESULT([$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)]) + +# +# Check to make sure the PIC flag actually works. +# +if test -n "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)"; then + AC_LIBTOOL_COMPILER_OPTION([if $compiler PIC flag $_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1) works], + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic_works, $1), + [$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)ifelse([$1],[],[ -DPIC],[ifelse([$1],[CXX],[ -DPIC],[])])], [], + [case $_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1) in + "" | " "*) ;; + *) _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)=" $_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)" ;; + esac], + [_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_can_build_shared, $1)=no]) +fi +case "$host_os" in + # For platforms which do not support PIC, -DPIC is meaningless: + *djgpp*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)= + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)="$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(lt_prog_compiler_pic, $1)ifelse([$1],[],[ -DPIC],[ifelse([$1],[CXX],[ -DPIC],[])])" + ;; +esac +]) + + +# AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_SHLIBS([TAGNAME]) +# ------------------------------------ +# See if the linker supports building shared libraries. +AC_DEFUN([AC_LIBTOOL_PROG_LD_SHLIBS], +[AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the $compiler linker ($LD) supports shared libraries]) +ifelse([$1],[CXX],[ + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM $libobjs $convenience | $global_symbol_pipe | $SED '\''s/.* //'\'' | sort | uniq > $export_symbols' + case $host_os in + aix4* | aix5*) + # If we're using GNU nm, then we don't want the "-C" option. + # -C means demangle to AIX nm, but means don't demangle with GNU nm + if $NM -V 2>&1 | grep 'GNU' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM -Bpg $libobjs $convenience | awk '\''{ if (((\[$]2 == "T") || (\[$]2 == "D") || (\[$]2 == "B")) && ([substr](\[$]3,1,1) != ".")) { print \[$]3 } }'\'' | sort -u > $export_symbols' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM -BCpg $libobjs $convenience | awk '\''{ if (((\[$]2 == "T") || (\[$]2 == "D") || (\[$]2 == "B")) && ([substr](\[$]3,1,1) != ".")) { print \[$]3 } }'\'' | sort -u > $export_symbols' + fi + ;; + pw32*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)="$ltdll_cmds" + ;; + cygwin* | mingw*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM $libobjs $convenience | $global_symbol_pipe | $SED -e '\''/^[[BCDGS]] /s/.* \([[^ ]]*\)/\1 DATA/'\'' | $SED -e '\''/^[[AITW]] /s/.* //'\'' | sort | uniq > $export_symbols' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM $libobjs $convenience | $global_symbol_pipe | $SED '\''s/.* //'\'' | sort | uniq > $export_symbols' + ;; + esac +],[ + runpath_var= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(enable_shared_with_static_runtimes, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_From_new_cmds, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(thread_safe_flag_spec, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=unknown + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_cmds, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_expsym_cmds, $1)= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM $libobjs $convenience | $global_symbol_pipe | $SED '\''s/.* //'\'' | sort | uniq > $export_symbols' + # include_expsyms should be a list of space-separated symbols to be *always* + # included in the symbol list + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(include_expsyms, $1)= + # exclude_expsyms can be an extended regexp of symbols to exclude + # it will be wrapped by ` (' and `)$', so one must not match beginning or + # end of line. Example: `a|bc|.*d.*' will exclude the symbols `a' and `bc', + # as well as any symbol that contains `d'. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(exclude_expsyms, $1)="_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_" + # Although _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is a valid symbol C name, most a.out + # platforms (ab)use it in PIC code, but their linkers get confused if + # the symbol is explicitly referenced. Since portable code cannot + # rely on this symbol name, it's probably fine to never include it in + # preloaded symbol tables. + extract_expsyms_cmds= + + case $host_os in + cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + # FIXME: the MSVC++ port hasn't been tested in a loooong time + # When not using gcc, we currently assume that we are using + # Microsoft Visual C++. + if test "$GCC" != yes; then + with_gnu_ld=no + fi + ;; + openbsd*) + with_gnu_ld=no + ;; + esac + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=yes + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + # If archive_cmds runs LD, not CC, wlarc should be empty + wlarc='${wl}' + + # See if GNU ld supports shared libraries. + case $host_os in + aix3* | aix4* | aix5*) + # On AIX/PPC, the GNU linker is very broken + if test "$host_cpu" != ia64; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + cat <&2 + +*** Warning: the GNU linker, at least up to release 2.9.1, is reported +*** to be unable to reliably create shared libraries on AIX. +*** Therefore, libtool is disabling shared libraries support. If you +*** really care for shared libraries, you may want to modify your PATH +*** so that a non-GNU linker is found, and then restart. + +EOF + fi + ;; + + amigaos*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$rm $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define NAME $libname" > $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define LIBRARY_ID 1" >> $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define VERSION $major" >> $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define REVISION $revision" >> $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$AR $AR_FLAGS $lib $libobjs~$RANLIB $lib~(cd $output_objdir && a2ixlibrary -32)' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + + # Samuel A. Falvo II reports + # that the semantics of dynamic libraries on AmigaOS, at least up + # to version 4, is to share data among multiple programs linked + # with the same dynamic library. Since this doesn't match the + # behavior of shared libraries on other platforms, we can't use + # them. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + + beos*) + if $LD --help 2>&1 | grep ': supported targets:.* elf' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=unsupported + # Joseph Beckenbach says some releases of gcc + # support --undefined. This deserves some investigation. FIXME + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -nostart $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + + cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + # _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1) is actually meaningless, + # as there is no search path for DLLs. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(enable_shared_with_static_runtimes, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM $libobjs $convenience | $global_symbol_pipe | $SED -e '\''/^[[BCDGS]] /s/.* \([[^ ]]*\)/\1 DATA/'\'' | $SED -e '\''/^[[AITW]] /s/.* //'\'' | sort | uniq > $export_symbols' + + if $LD --help 2>&1 | grep 'auto-import' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags -o $output_objdir/$soname ${wl}--image-base=0x10000000 ${wl}--out-implib,$lib' + # If the export-symbols file already is a .def file (1st line + # is EXPORTS), use it as is; otherwise, prepend... + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='if test "x`$SED 1q $export_symbols`" = xEXPORTS; then + cp $export_symbols $output_objdir/$soname.def; + else + echo EXPORTS > $output_objdir/$soname.def; + cat $export_symbols >> $output_objdir/$soname.def; + fi~ + $CC -shared $output_objdir/$soname.def $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags -o $output_objdir/$soname ${wl}--image-base=0x10000000 ${wl}--out-implib,$lib' + else + ld_shlibs=no + fi + ;; + + netbsd*) + if echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -Bshareable $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags -o $lib' + wlarc= + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols -o $lib' + fi + ;; + + solaris* | sysv5*) + if $LD -v 2>&1 | grep 'BFD 2\.8' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + cat <&2 + +*** Warning: The releases 2.8.* of the GNU linker cannot reliably +*** create shared libraries on Solaris systems. Therefore, libtool +*** is disabling shared libraries support. We urge you to upgrade GNU +*** binutils to release 2.9.1 or newer. Another option is to modify +*** your PATH or compiler configuration so that the native linker is +*** used, and then restart. + +EOF + elif $LD --help 2>&1 | grep ': supported targets:.* elf' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + + sunos4*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -assert pure-text -Bshareable -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + wlarc= + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + linux*) + if $LD --help 2>&1 | egrep ': supported targets:.* elf' > /dev/null; then + tmp_archive_cmds='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)="$tmp_archive_cmds" + supports_anon_versioning=no + case `$LD -v 2>/dev/null` in + *\ [01].* | *\ 2.[[0-9]].* | *\ 2.10.*) ;; # catch versions < 2.11 + *\ 2.11.93.0.2\ *) supports_anon_versioning=yes ;; # RH7.3 ... + *\ 2.11.92.0.12\ *) supports_anon_versioning=yes ;; # Mandrake 8.2 ... + *\ 2.11.*) ;; # other 2.11 versions + *) supports_anon_versioning=yes ;; + esac + if test $supports_anon_versioning = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$echo "{ global:" > $output_objdir/$libname.ver~ +cat $export_symbols | sed -e "s/\(.*\)/\1;/" >> $output_objdir/$libname.ver~ +$echo "local: *; };" >> $output_objdir/$libname.ver~ + $CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-version-script ${wl}$output_objdir/$libname.ver -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="$tmp_archive_cmds" + fi + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + + *) + if $LD --help 2>&1 | grep ': supported targets:.* elf' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + esac + + if test "$_LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)" = yes; then + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}--export-dynamic' + # ancient GNU ld didn't support --whole-archive et. al. + if $LD --help 2>&1 | grep 'no-whole-archive' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)="$wlarc"'--whole-archive$convenience '"$wlarc"'--no-whole-archive' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)= + fi + fi + else + # PORTME fill in a description of your system's linker (not GNU ld) + case $host_os in + aix3*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$LD -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags -bE:$export_symbols -T512 -H512 -bM:SRE~$AR $AR_FLAGS $lib $output_objdir/$soname' + # Note: this linker hardcodes the directories in LIBPATH if there + # are no directories specified by -L. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + if test "$GCC" = yes && test -z "$link_static_flag"; then + # Neither direct hardcoding nor static linking is supported with a + # broken collect2. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=unsupported + fi + ;; + + aix4* | aix5*) + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # On IA64, the linker does run time linking by default, so we don't + # have to do anything special. + aix_use_runtimelinking=no + exp_sym_flag='-Bexport' + no_entry_flag="" + else + # If we're using GNU nm, then we don't want the "-C" option. + # -C means demangle to AIX nm, but means don't demangle with GNU nm + if $NM -V 2>&1 | grep 'GNU' > /dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM -Bpg $libobjs $convenience | awk '\''{ if (((\[$]2 == "T") || (\[$]2 == "D") || (\[$]2 == "B")) && ([substr](\[$]3,1,1) != ".")) { print \[$]3 } }'\'' | sort -u > $export_symbols' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_symbols_cmds, $1)='$NM -BCpg $libobjs $convenience | awk '\''{ if (((\[$]2 == "T") || (\[$]2 == "D") || (\[$]2 == "B")) && ([substr](\[$]3,1,1) != ".")) { print \[$]3 } }'\'' | sort -u > $export_symbols' + fi + aix_use_runtimelinking=no + + # Test if we are trying to use run time linking or normal + # AIX style linking. If -brtl is somewhere in LDFLAGS, we + # need to do runtime linking. + case $host_os in aix4.[[23]]|aix4.[[23]].*|aix5*) + for ld_flag in $LDFLAGS; do + if (test $ld_flag = "-brtl" || test $ld_flag = "-Wl,-brtl"); then + aix_use_runtimelinking=yes + break + fi + done + esac + + exp_sym_flag='-bexport' + no_entry_flag='-bnoentry' + fi + + # When large executables or shared objects are built, AIX ld can + # have problems creating the table of contents. If linking a library + # or program results in "error TOC overflow" add -mminimal-toc to + # CXXFLAGS/CFLAGS for g++/gcc. In the cases where that is not + # enough to fix the problem, add -Wl,-bbigtoc to LDFLAGS. + + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=':' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + case $host_os in aix4.[012]|aix4.[012].*) + # We only want to do this on AIX 4.2 and lower, the check + # below for broken collect2 doesn't work under 4.3+ + collect2name=`${CC} -print-prog-name=collect2` + if test -f "$collect2name" && \ + strings "$collect2name" | grep resolve_lib_name >/dev/null + then + # We have reworked collect2 + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + else + # We have old collect2 + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=unsupported + # It fails to find uninstalled libraries when the uninstalled + # path is not listed in the libpath. Setting hardcode_minus_L + # to unsupported forces relinking + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)= + fi + esac + shared_flag='-shared' + else + # not using gcc + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # VisualAge C++, Version 5.5 for AIX 5L for IA-64, Beta 3 Release + # chokes on -Wl,-G. The following line is correct: + shared_flag='-G' + else + if test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = yes; then + shared_flag='${wl}-G' + else + shared_flag='${wl}-bM:SRE' + fi + fi + fi + + # It seems that -bexpall does not export symbols beginning with + # underscore (_), so it is better to generate a list of symbols to export. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=yes + if test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = yes; then + # Warning - without using the other runtime loading flags (-brtl), + # -berok will link without error, but may produce a broken library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-berok' + # Determine the default libpath from the value encoded in an empty executable. + _LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-blibpath:$libdir:'"$aix_libpath" + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="\$CC"' -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags `if test "x${allow_undefined_flag}" != "x"; then echo "${wl}${allow_undefined_flag}"; else :; fi` '"\${wl}$no_entry_flag \${wl}$exp_sym_flag:\$export_symbols $shared_flag" + else + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-R $libdir:/usr/lib:/lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)="-z nodefs" + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="\$CC $shared_flag"' -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}${allow_undefined_flag} '"\${wl}$no_entry_flag \${wl}$exp_sym_flag:\$export_symbols" + else + # Determine the default libpath from the value encoded in an empty executable. + _LT_AC_SYS_LIBPATH_AIX + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-blibpath:$libdir:'"$aix_libpath" + # Warning - without using the other run time loading flags, + # -berok will link without error, but may produce a broken library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-bernotok' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-berok' + # -bexpall does not export symbols beginning with underscore (_) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(always_export_symbols, $1)=yes + # Exported symbols can be pulled into shared objects from archives + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)=' ' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=yes + # This is similar to how AIX traditionally builds it's shared libraries. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)="\$CC $shared_flag"' -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-bE:$export_symbols ${wl}-bnoentry${allow_undefined_flag}~$AR $AR_FLAGS $output_objdir/$libname$release.a $output_objdir/$soname' + fi + fi + ;; + + amigaos*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$rm $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define NAME $libname" > $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define LIBRARY_ID 1" >> $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define VERSION $major" >> $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define REVISION $revision" >> $output_objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$AR $AR_FLAGS $lib $libobjs~$RANLIB $lib~(cd $output_objdir && a2ixlibrary -32)' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + # see comment about different semantics on the GNU ld section + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + + bsdi4*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)=-rdynamic + ;; + + cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + # When not using gcc, we currently assume that we are using + # Microsoft Visual C++. + # hardcode_libdir_flag_spec is actually meaningless, as there is + # no search path for DLLs. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)=' ' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=unsupported + # Tell ltmain to make .lib files, not .a files. + libext=lib + # Tell ltmain to make .dll files, not .so files. + shrext=".dll" + # FIXME: Setting linknames here is a bad hack. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -o $lib $libobjs $compiler_flags `echo "$deplibs" | $SED -e '\''s/ -lc$//'\''` -link -dll~linknames=' + # The linker will automatically build a .lib file if we build a DLL. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_From_new_cmds, $1)='true' + # FIXME: Should let the user specify the lib program. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_cmds, $1)='lib /OUT:$oldlib$oldobjs$old_deplibs' + fix_srcfile_path='`cygpath -w "$srcfile"`' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(enable_shared_with_static_runtimes, $1)=yes + ;; + + darwin* | rhapsody*) + if test "$GXX" = yes ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds_need_lc, $1)=no + case "$host_os" in + rhapsody* | darwin1.[[012]]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-undefined suppress' + ;; + *) # Darwin 1.3 on + if test -z ${MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET} ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-flat_namespace -undefined suppress' + else + case ${MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET} in + 10.[[012]]) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-flat_namespace -undefined suppress' + ;; + 10.*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)='-undefined dynamic_lookup' + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + esac + lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod=no + output_verbose_link_cmd='echo' + if $CC -dumpspecs 2>&1 | grep 'single_module' >/dev/null ; then + lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod=yes + fi + if test "X$lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod" = Xyes ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -dynamiclib -single_module $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -r ${wl}-bind_at_load -keep_private_externs -nostdlib -o ${lib}-master.o $libobjs~$CC -dynamiclib $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib ${lib}-master.o $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_cmds, $1)='$CC ${wl}-bind_at_load $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib -bundle $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags' + # Don't fix this by using the ld -exported_symbols_list flag, it doesn't exist in older darwin ld's + if test "X$lt_int_apple_cc_single_mod" = Xyes ; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC -dynamiclib -single_module $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC -r ${wl}-bind_at_load -keep_private_externs -nostdlib -o ${lib}-master.o $libobjs~$CC -dynamiclib $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib ${lib}-master.o $deplibs $compiler_flags -install_name $rpath/$soname $verstring~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(module_expsym_cmds, $1)='sed -e "s,#.*,," -e "s,^[ ]*,," -e "s,^\(..*\),_&," < $export_symbols > $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym~$CC $allow_undefined_flag -o $lib -bundle $libobjs $deplibs$compiler_flags~nmedit -s $output_objdir/${libname}-symbols.expsym ${lib}' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_automatic, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)='-all_load $convenience' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + fi + ;; + + dgux*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + freebsd1*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=no + ;; + + # FreeBSD 2.2.[012] allows us to include c++rt0.o to get C++ constructor + # support. Future versions do this automatically, but an explicit c++rt0.o + # does not break anything, and helps significantly (at the cost of a little + # extra space). + freebsd2.2*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags /usr/lib/c++rt0.o' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-R$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + # Unfortunately, older versions of FreeBSD 2 do not have this feature. + freebsd2*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + # FreeBSD 3 and greater uses gcc -shared to do shared libraries. + freebsd* | kfreebsd*-gnu) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-R$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + hpux9*) + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$rm $output_objdir/$soname~$CC -shared -fPIC ${wl}+b ${wl}$install_libdir -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags~test $output_objdir/$soname = $lib || mv $output_objdir/$soname $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$rm $output_objdir/$soname~$LD -b +b $install_libdir -o $output_objdir/$soname $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags~test $output_objdir/$soname = $lib || mv $output_objdir/$soname $lib' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + + # hardcode_minus_L: Not really in the search PATH, + # but as the default location of the library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-E' + ;; + + hpux10* | hpux11*) + if test "$GCC" = yes -a "$with_gnu_ld" = no; then + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared ${wl}+h ${wl}$soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared -fPIC ${wl}+h ${wl}$soname ${wl}+b ${wl}$install_libdir -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + ;; + esac + else + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*|ia64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -b +h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -b +h $soname +b $install_libdir -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + ;; + esac + fi + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = no; then + case "$host_cpu" in + hppa*64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld, $1)='+b $libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + ia64*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + + # hardcode_minus_L: Not really in the search PATH, + # but as the default location of the library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-E' + + # hardcode_minus_L: Not really in the search PATH, + # but as the default location of the library. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + + irix5* | irix6* | nonstopux*) + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` ${wl}-update_registry ${wl}${output_objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -shared $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags -soname $soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo -set_version $verstring` -update_registry ${output_objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld, $1)='-rpath $libdir' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + ;; + + netbsd*) + if echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' # a.out + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -shared -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' # ELF + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-R$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + newsos6) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + openbsd*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + if test -z "`echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__`" || test "$host_os-$host_cpu" = "openbsd2.8-powerpc"; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $pic_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath,$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-E' + else + case $host_os in + openbsd[[01]].* | openbsd2.[[0-7]] | openbsd2.[[0-7]].*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-R$libdir' + ;; + *) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared $pic_flag -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath,$libdir' + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + + os2*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=unsupported + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$echo "LIBRARY $libname INITINSTANCE" > $output_objdir/$libname.def~$echo "DESCRIPTION \"$libname\"" >> $output_objdir/$libname.def~$echo DATA >> $output_objdir/$libname.def~$echo " SINGLE NONSHARED" >> $output_objdir/$libname.def~$echo EXPORTS >> $output_objdir/$libname.def~emxexp $libobjs >> $output_objdir/$libname.def~$CC -Zdll -Zcrtdll -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags $output_objdir/$libname.def' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(old_archive_From_new_cmds, $1)='emximp -o $output_objdir/$libname.a $output_objdir/$libname.def' + ;; + + osf3*) + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-expect_unresolved ${wl}\*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared${allow_undefined_flag} $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` ${wl}-update_registry ${wl}${output_objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' -expect_unresolved \*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -shared${allow_undefined_flag} $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags -soname $soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo -set_version $verstring` -update_registry ${output_objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + ;; + + osf4* | osf5*) # as osf3* with the addition of -msym flag + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' ${wl}-expect_unresolved ${wl}\*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared${allow_undefined_flag} $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags ${wl}-msym ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring` ${wl}-update_registry ${wl}${output_objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(allow_undefined_flag, $1)=' -expect_unresolved \*' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -shared${allow_undefined_flag} $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags -msym -soname $soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo -set_version $verstring` -update_registry ${output_objdir}/so_locations -o $lib' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='for i in `cat $export_symbols`; do printf "%s %s\\n" -exported_symbol "\$i" >> $lib.exp; done; echo "-hidden">> $lib.exp~ + $LD -shared${allow_undefined_flag} -input $lib.exp $linker_flags $libobjs $deplibs -soname $soname `test -n "$verstring" && echo -set_version $verstring` -update_registry ${objdir}/so_locations -o $lib~$rm $lib.exp' + + # Both c and cxx compiler support -rpath directly + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-rpath $libdir' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_separator, $1)=: + ;; + + sco3.2v5*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='${wl}-Bexport' + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + hardcode_runpath_var=yes + ;; + + solaris*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)=' -z text' + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared ${wl}-h ${wl}$soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$echo "{ global:" > $lib.exp~cat $export_symbols | $SED -e "s/\(.*\)/\1;/" >> $lib.exp~$echo "local: *; };" >> $lib.exp~ + $CC -shared ${wl}-M ${wl}$lib.exp ${wl}-h ${wl}$soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags~$rm $lib.exp' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G${allow_undefined_flag} -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$echo "{ global:" > $lib.exp~cat $export_symbols | $SED -e "s/\(.*\)/\1;/" >> $lib.exp~$echo "local: *; };" >> $lib.exp~ + $LD -G${allow_undefined_flag} -M $lib.exp -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags~$rm $lib.exp' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-R$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + case $host_os in + solaris2.[[0-5]] | solaris2.[[0-5]].*) ;; + *) # Supported since Solaris 2.6 (maybe 2.5.1?) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(whole_archive_flag_spec, $1)='-z allextract$convenience -z defaultextract' ;; + esac + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(link_all_deplibs, $1)=yes + ;; + + sunos4*) + if test "x$host_vendor" = xsequent; then + # Use $CC to link under sequent, because it throws in some extra .o + # files that make .init and .fini sections work. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -G ${wl}-h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -assert pure-text -Bstatic -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + fi + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_libdir_flag_spec, $1)='-L$libdir' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + sysv4) + case $host_vendor in + sni) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes # is this really true??? + ;; + siemens) + ## LD is ld it makes a PLAMLIB + ## CC just makes a GrossModule. + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(reload_cmds, $1)='$CC -r -o $output$reload_objs' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no + ;; + motorola) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=no #Motorola manual says yes, but my tests say they lie + ;; + esac + runpath_var='LD_RUN_PATH' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + sysv4.3*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(export_dynamic_flag_spec, $1)='-Bexport' + ;; + + sysv4*MP*) + if test -d /usr/nec; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + hardcode_runpath_var=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(ld_shlibs, $1)=yes + fi + ;; + + sysv4.2uw2*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_direct, $1)=yes + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_minus_L, $1)=no + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + hardcode_runpath_var=yes + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + ;; + + sysv5OpenUNIX8* | sysv5UnixWare7* | sysv5uw[[78]]* | unixware7*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)='${wl}-z ${wl}text' + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -shared ${wl}-h ${wl}$soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + else + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$CC -G ${wl}-h ${wl}$soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $compiler_flags' + fi + runpath_var='LD_RUN_PATH' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(hardcode_shlibpath_var, $1)=no + ;; + + sysv5*) + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(no_undefined_flag, $1)=' -z text' + # $CC -shared without GNU ld will not create a library from C++ + # object files and a static libstdc++, better avoid it by now + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1)='$LD -G${allow_undefined_flag} -h $soname -o $lib $libobjs $deplibs $linker_flags' + _LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_expsym_cmds, $1)='$echo "{ global:" > $lib.exp~cat $export_symbols | $SED -e "s/\(.*\)/\1;/" >> $lib.exp~$echo "local: *; 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then + case $_LT_AC_TAGVAR(archive_cmds, $1) in + *'~'*) + # FIXME: we may have to deal with multi-command sequences. + ;; + '$CC '*) + # Test whether the compiler implicitly links with -lc since on some + # systems, -lgcc has to come before -lc. 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See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. + +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA + +# AM_AUTOMAKE_VERSION(VERSION) +# ---------------------------- +# Automake X.Y traces this macro to ensure aclocal.m4 has been +# generated from the m4 files accompanying Automake X.Y. +AC_DEFUN([AM_AUTOMAKE_VERSION], [am__api_version="1.8"]) + +# AM_SET_CURRENT_AUTOMAKE_VERSION +# ------------------------------- +# Call AM_AUTOMAKE_VERSION so it can be traced. +# This function is AC_REQUIREd by AC_INIT_AUTOMAKE. +AC_DEFUN([AM_SET_CURRENT_AUTOMAKE_VERSION], + [AM_AUTOMAKE_VERSION([1.8.3])]) + +# AM_AUX_DIR_EXPAND + +# Copyright (C) 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 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See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. + +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA +# 02111-1307, USA. + +# serial 6 + +# AM_CONDITIONAL(NAME, SHELL-CONDITION) +# ------------------------------------- +# Define a conditional. +AC_DEFUN([AM_CONDITIONAL], +[AC_PREREQ(2.52)dnl + ifelse([$1], [TRUE], [AC_FATAL([$0: invalid condition: $1])], + [$1], [FALSE], [AC_FATAL([$0: invalid condition: $1])])dnl +AC_SUBST([$1_TRUE]) +AC_SUBST([$1_FALSE]) +if $2; then + $1_TRUE= + $1_FALSE='#' +else + $1_TRUE='#' + $1_FALSE= +fi +AC_CONFIG_COMMANDS_PRE( +[if test -z "${$1_TRUE}" && test -z "${$1_FALSE}"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([conditional "$1" was never defined. +Usually this means the macro was only invoked conditionally.]) +fi])]) + +# Like AC_CONFIG_HEADER, but automatically create stamp file. -*- Autoconf -*- + +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 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See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. + +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA +# 02111-1307, USA. + +# One issue with vendor `install' (even GNU) is that you can't +# specify the program used to strip binaries. This is especially +# annoying in cross-compiling environments, where the build's strip +# is unlikely to handle the host's binaries. +# Fortunately install-sh will honor a STRIPPROG variable, so we +# always use install-sh in `make install-strip', and initialize +# STRIPPROG with the value of the STRIP variable (set by the user). +AC_DEFUN([AM_PROG_INSTALL_STRIP], +[AC_REQUIRE([AM_PROG_INSTALL_SH])dnl +# Installed binaries are usually stripped using `strip' when the user +# run `make install-strip'. However `strip' might not be the right +# tool to use in cross-compilation environments, therefore Automake +# will honor the `STRIP' environment variable to overrule this program. +dnl Don't test for $cross_compiling = yes, because it might be `maybe'. +if test "$cross_compiling" != no; then + AC_CHECK_TOOL([STRIP], [strip], :) +fi +INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM="\${SHELL} \$(install_sh) -c -s" +AC_SUBST([INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM])]) + +m4_include([cf/aix.m4]) +m4_include([cf/auth-modules.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken-glob.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken-realloc.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken-snprintf.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken.m4]) +m4_include([cf/broken2.m4]) +m4_include([cf/c-attribute.m4]) +m4_include([cf/capabilities.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-compile-et.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-declaration.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-man.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-type-extra.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-var.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-x.m4]) +m4_include([cf/check-xau.m4]) +m4_include([cf/crypto.m4]) +m4_include([cf/db.m4]) +m4_include([cf/destdirs.m4]) +m4_include([cf/dlopen.m4]) +m4_include([cf/find-func-no-libs.m4]) +m4_include([cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4]) +m4_include([cf/find-func.m4]) +m4_include([cf/find-if-not-broken.m4]) +m4_include([cf/have-struct-field.m4]) +m4_include([cf/have-type.m4]) +m4_include([cf/irix.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-bigendian.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-ipv6.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-readline.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4]) +m4_include([cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4]) +m4_include([cf/mips-abi.m4]) +m4_include([cf/misc.m4]) +m4_include([cf/need-proto.m4]) +m4_include([cf/osfc2.m4]) +m4_include([cf/otp.m4]) +m4_include([cf/proto-compat.m4]) +m4_include([cf/retsigtype.m4]) +m4_include([cf/roken-frag.m4]) +m4_include([cf/sunos.m4]) +m4_include([cf/telnet.m4]) +m4_include([cf/test-package.m4]) +m4_include([cf/wflags.m4]) +m4_include([cf/with-all.m4]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..81aa47f1f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.35 2001/08/28 08:31:19 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_des) + +man_MANS = ktutil.8 + +sbin_PROGRAMS = ktutil + +ktutil_SOURCES = \ + add.c \ + change.c \ + copy.c \ + get.c \ + ktutil.c \ + list.c \ + purge.c \ + remove.c \ + rename.c + +LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la \ + $(LIB_readline) \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..024a9a7188 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,831 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.35 2001/08/28 08:31:19 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(ktutil_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +sbin_PROGRAMS = ktutil$(EXEEXT) +subdir = admin +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + 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a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/add.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/add.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6003800c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/add.c @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add.c,v 1.5 2002/09/10 19:26:52 joda Exp $"); + +int +kt_add(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + char buf[128]; + char *principal_string = NULL; + int kvno = -1; + char *enctype_string = NULL; + krb5_enctype enctype; + char *password_string = NULL; + int salt_flag = 1; + int random_flag = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "principal of key", "principal"}, + { "kvno", 'V', arg_integer, NULL, "key version of key" }, + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, NULL, "encryption type of key" }, + { "password", 'w', arg_string, NULL, "password for key"}, + { "salt", 's', arg_negative_flag, NULL, "no salt" }, + { "random", 'r', arg_flag, NULL, "generate random key" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + args[i++].value = &principal_string; + args[i++].value = &kvno; + args[i++].value = &enctype_string; + args[i++].value = &password_string; + args[i++].value = &salt_flag; + args[i++].value = &random_flag; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil add", ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil add", ""); + return 1; + } + if((keytab = ktutil_open_keytab()) == NULL) + return 1; + + memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry)); + if(principal_string == NULL) { + printf("Principal: "); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + principal_string = buf; + } + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string, &entry.principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", principal_string); + goto out; + } + if(enctype_string == NULL) { + printf("Encryption type: "); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + goto out; + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + enctype_string = buf; + } + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, enctype_string, &enctype); + if(ret) { + int t; + if(sscanf(enctype_string, "%d", &t) == 1) + enctype = t; + else { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", enctype_string); + goto out; + } + } + if(kvno == -1) { + printf("Key version: "); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + goto out; + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + kvno = atoi(buf); + } + if(password_string == NULL && random_flag == 0) { + if(des_read_pw_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "Password: ", 1)) + goto out; + password_string = buf; + } + if(password_string) { + if (!salt_flag) { + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_data pw; + + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + pw.data = (void*)password_string; + pw.length = strlen(password_string); + krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context, enctype, pw, salt, + &entry.keyblock); + } else { + krb5_string_to_key(context, enctype, password_string, + entry.principal, &entry.keyblock); + } + memset (password_string, 0, strlen(password_string)); + } else { + krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, enctype, &entry.keyblock); + } + entry.vno = kvno; + entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "add"); + out: + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/change.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/change.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f790da3436 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/change.c @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: change.c,v 1.5 2003/04/01 15:04:49 lha Exp $"); + +static void +change_entry (krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_principal principal, krb5_kvno kvno, + const char *realm, const char *admin_server, int server_port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + kadm5_config_params conf; + void *kadm_handle; + char *client_name; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int num_keys; + int i; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, principal, &client_name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + return; + } + + memset (&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + + if(realm) + conf.realm = (char *)realm; + else + conf.realm = *krb5_princ_realm (context, principal); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + + if (admin_server) { + conf.admin_server = (char *)admin_server; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER; + } + + if (server_port) { + conf.kadmind_port = htons(server_port); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT; + } + + ret = kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx (context, + client_name, + keytab_string, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + free (client_name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx"); + return; + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal (kadm_handle, principal, &keys, &num_keys); + kadm5_destroy (kadm_handle); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_randkey_principal"); + return; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_keys; ++i) { + krb5_keytab_entry new_entry; + + new_entry.principal = principal; + new_entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + new_entry.vno = kvno + 1; + new_entry.keyblock = keys[i]; + + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry (context, keytab, &new_entry); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &keys[i]); + } +} + +/* + * loop over all the entries in the keytab (or those given) and change + * their keys, writing the new keys + */ + +struct change_set { + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_kvno kvno; +}; + +int +kt_change (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + char *realm = NULL; + char *admin_server = NULL; + int server_port = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + int optind = 0; + int i, j, max; + struct change_set *changeset; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, NULL, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { "admin-server", 'a', arg_string, NULL, + "server to contact", "host" + }, + { "server-port", 's', arg_integer, NULL, + "port to contact", "port number" + }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + + args[0].value = &realm; + args[1].value = &admin_server; + args[2].value = &server_port; + args[3].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind) + || help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + "ktutil change", "principal..."); + return 1; + } + + if((keytab = ktutil_open_keytab()) == NULL) + return 1; + + j = 0; + max = 0; + changeset = NULL; + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get %s", keytab_string); + goto out; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + int add = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < j; ++i) { + if (krb5_principal_compare (context, changeset[i].principal, + entry.principal)) { + if (changeset[i].kvno < entry.vno) + changeset[i].kvno = entry.vno; + break; + } + } + if (i < j) + continue; + + if (optind == argc) { + add = 1; + } else { + for (i = optind; i < argc; ++i) { + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, argv[i], &princ); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", argv[i]); + continue; + } + if (krb5_principal_compare (context, princ, entry.principal)) + add = 1; + + krb5_free_principal (context, princ); + } + } + + if (add) { + if (j >= max) { + void *tmp; + + max = max(max * 2, 1); + tmp = realloc (changeset, max * sizeof(*changeset)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + krb5_warnx (context, "realloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + break; + } + changeset = tmp; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, entry.principal, + &changeset[j].principal); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_copy_principal"); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + break; + } + changeset[j].kvno = entry.vno; + ++j; + } + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + } + + if (ret == KRB5_KT_END) { + for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { + if (verbose_flag) { + char *client_name; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, changeset[i].principal, + &client_name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + } else { + printf("Changing %s kvno %d\n", + client_name, changeset[i].kvno); + free(client_name); + } + } + change_entry (context, keytab, + changeset[i].principal, changeset[i].kvno, + realm, admin_server, server_port); + } + } + for (i = 0; i < j; i++) + krb5_free_principal (context, changeset[i].principal); + free (changeset); + + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + out: + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/copy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18b9d6e0b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: copy.c,v 1.9 2003/01/16 18:59:03 lha Exp $"); + + +static krb5_boolean +compare_keyblock(const krb5_keyblock *a, const krb5_keyblock *b) +{ + if(a->keytype != b->keytype || + a->keyvalue.length != b->keyvalue.length || + memcmp(a->keyvalue.data, b->keyvalue.data, a->keyvalue.length) != 0) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +static int +kt_copy_int (const char *from, const char *to) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab src_keytab, dst_keytab; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry, dummy; + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, from, &src_keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "resolving src keytab `%s'", from); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, to, &dst_keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_kt_close (context, src_keytab); + krb5_warn (context, ret, "resolving dst keytab `%s'", to); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get (context, src_keytab, &cursor); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get %s", keytab_string); + goto out; + } + + if (verbose_flag) + fprintf(stderr, "copying %s to %s\n", from, to); + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, src_keytab, + &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + char *name_str; + char *etype_str; + krb5_unparse_name (context, entry.principal, &name_str); + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, entry.keyblock.keytype, &etype_str); + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry(context, dst_keytab, + entry.principal, + entry.vno, + entry.keyblock.keytype, + &dummy); + if(ret == 0) { + /* this entry is already in the new keytab, so no need to + copy it; if the keyblocks are not the same, something + is weird, so complain about that */ + if(!compare_keyblock(&entry.keyblock, &dummy.keyblock)) { + krb5_warnx(context, "entry with different keyvalue " + "already exists for %s, keytype %s, kvno %d", + name_str, etype_str, entry.vno); + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &dummy); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + free(name_str); + free(etype_str); + continue; + } else if(ret != KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_get_entry(%s)", name_str); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + free(name_str); + free(etype_str); + break; + } + if (verbose_flag) + fprintf (stderr, "copying %s, keytype %s, kvno %d\n", name_str, + etype_str, entry.vno); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry (context, dst_keytab, &entry); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry(%s)", name_str); + free(name_str); + free(etype_str); + break; + } + free(name_str); + free(etype_str); + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get (context, src_keytab, &cursor); + + out: + krb5_kt_close (context, src_keytab); + krb5_kt_close (context, dst_keytab); + return 0; +} + +int +kt_copy (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int help_flag = 0; + int optind = 0; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL} + }; + + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int i = 0; + + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil copy", + "keytab-src keytab-dest"); + return 1; + } + if (help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil copy", + "keytab-src keytab-dest"); + return 1; + } + + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + + if (argc != 2) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil copy", + "keytab-src keytab-dest"); + return 1; + } + + return kt_copy_int(argv[0], argv[1]); +} + +#ifndef KEYFILE +#define KEYFILE SYSCONFDIR "/srvtab" +#endif + +/* copy to from v4 srvtab, just short for copy */ +static int +conv(int srvconv, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int help_flag = 0; + char *srvtab = KEYFILE; + int optind = 0; + char kt4[1024], kt5[1024]; + + char *name; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "srvtab", 's', arg_string, NULL}, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL} + }; + + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int i = 0; + + args[i++].value = &srvtab; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(srvconv) + name = "ktutil srvconvert"; + else + name = "ktutil srvcreate"; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, name, ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, name, ""); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, name, ""); + return 1; + } + + snprintf(kt4, sizeof(kt4), "krb4:%s", srvtab); + + if(srvconv) { + if(keytab_string != NULL) + return kt_copy_int(kt4, keytab_string); + else { + krb5_kt_default_modify_name(context, kt5, sizeof(kt5)); + return kt_copy_int(kt4, kt5); + } + } else { + if(keytab_string != NULL) + return kt_copy_int(keytab_string, kt4); + + krb5_kt_default_name(context, kt5, sizeof(kt5)); + return kt_copy_int(kt5, kt4); + } +} + +int +srvconv(int argc, char **argv) +{ + return conv(1, argc, argv); +} + +int +srvcreate(int argc, char **argv) +{ + return conv(0, argc, argv); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/get.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/get.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e827738bb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/get.c @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get.c,v 1.22.2.1 2004/06/21 10:55:46 lha Exp $"); + +static void* +open_kadmin_connection(char *principal, + const char *realm, + char *admin_server, + int server_port) +{ + static kadm5_config_params conf; + krb5_error_code ret; + void *kadm_handle; + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + + if(realm) { + conf.realm = (char*)realm; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + } + + if (admin_server) { + conf.admin_server = admin_server; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER; + } + + if (server_port) { + conf.kadmind_port = htons(server_port); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT; + } + + /* should get realm from each principal, instead of doing + everything with the same (local) realm */ + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + principal, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password"); + return NULL; + } + return kadm_handle; +} + +int +kt_get(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_keytab keytab; + void *kadm_handle = NULL; + char *principal = NULL; + char *realm = NULL; + char *admin_server = NULL; + int server_port = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + int optind = 0; + struct getarg_strings etype_strs = {0, NULL}; + krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL; + size_t netypes = 0; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, NULL, + "admin principal", "principal" + }, + { "enctypes", 'e', arg_strings, NULL, + "encryption types to use", "enctypes" }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, NULL, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { "admin-server", 'a', arg_string, NULL, + "server to contact", "host" + }, + { "server-port", 's', arg_integer, NULL, + "port to contact", "port number" + }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int i = 0, j; + + args[i++].value = &principal; + args[i++].value = &etype_strs; + args[i++].value = &realm; + args[i++].value = &admin_server; + args[i++].value = &server_port; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind) + || help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + "ktutil get", "principal..."); + return 1; + } + if(optind == argc) { + krb5_warnx(context, "no principals specified"); + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + "ktutil get", "principal..."); + return 1; + } + + if((keytab = ktutil_open_keytab()) == NULL) + return 1; + + if(realm) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm); + + if (etype_strs.num_strings) { + int i; + + etypes = malloc (etype_strs.num_strings * sizeof(*etypes)); + if (etypes == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "malloc failed"); + goto out; + } + netypes = etype_strs.num_strings; + for(i = 0; i < netypes; i++) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, + etype_strs.strings[i], + &etypes[i]); + if(ret) { + krb5_warnx(context, "unrecognized enctype: %s", + etype_strs.strings[i]); + goto out; + } + } + } + + + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + krb5_principal princ_ent; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + int mask = 0; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int n_keys; + int created = 0; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[i], &princ_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "can't parse principal %s", argv[i]); + continue; + } + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + princ.principal = princ_ent; + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + princ.attributes |= KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + princ.princ_expire_time = 0; + mask |= KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME; + + if(kadm_handle == NULL) { + const char *r; + if(realm != NULL) + r = realm; + else + r = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, princ_ent); + kadm_handle = open_kadmin_connection(principal, + r, + admin_server, + server_port); + if(kadm_handle == NULL) { + break; + } + } + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask, "x"); + if(ret == 0) + created++; + else if(ret != KADM5_DUP) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_create_principal(%s)", argv[i]); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + continue; + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &keys, &n_keys); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_randkey_principal(%s)", argv[i]); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + continue; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_get_principal(%s)", argv[i]); + for (j = 0; j < n_keys; j++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[j]); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + continue; + } + princ.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + mask = KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + if(created) { + princ.kvno = 1; + mask |= KADM5_KVNO; + } + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_modify_principal(%s)", argv[i]); + for (j = 0; j < n_keys; j++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[j]); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + continue; + } + for(j = 0; j < n_keys; j++) { + int do_add = TRUE; + + if (netypes) { + int i; + + do_add = FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < netypes; ++i) + if (keys[j].keytype == etypes[i]) { + do_add = TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (do_add) { + entry.principal = princ_ent; + entry.vno = princ.kvno; + entry.keyblock = keys[j]; + entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + } + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[j]); + } + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + } + out: + free_getarg_strings(&etype_strs); + free(etypes); + if (kadm_handle) + kadm5_destroy(kadm_handle); + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + return ret != 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f75a953e5d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.8 @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: ktutil.8,v 1.19 2003/04/08 20:55:10 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd December 16, 2000 +.Dt KTUTIL 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm ktutil +.Nd manage Kerberos keytabs +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl k Ar keytab \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl h | Fl -help +.Ar command +.Op Ar args +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a program for managing keytabs. +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl v , +.Fl -verbose +.Xc +Verbose output. +.El +.Pp +.Ar command +can be one of the following: +.Bl -tag -width srvconvert +.It add Xo +.Op Fl p Ar principal +.Op Fl -principal= Ns Ar principal +.Op Fl V Ar kvno +.Op Fl -kvno= Ns Ar kvno +.Op Fl e Ar enctype +.Op Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Op Fl w Ar password +.Op Fl -password= Ns Ar password +.Op Fl r +.Op Fl -random +.Op Fl s +.Op Fl -no-salt +.Xc +Adds a key to the keytab. Options that are not specified will be +prompted for. This requires that you know the password of the +principal to add; if what you really want is to add a new principal to +the keytab, you should consider the +.Ar get +command, which talks to the kadmin server. +.It change Xo +.Op Fl r Ar realm +.Op Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Op Fl -a Ar host +.Op Fl -admin-server= Ns Ar host +.Op Fl -s Ar port +.Op Fl -server-port= Ns Ar port +.Xc +Update one or several keys to new versions. By default, use the admin +server for the realm of a keytab entry. Otherwise it will use the +values specified by the options. +.Pp +If no principals are given, all the ones in the keytab are updated. +.It copy Xo +.Ar keytab-src +.Ar keytab-dest +.Xc +Copies all the entries from +.Ar keytab-src +to +.Ar keytab-dest . +.It get Xo +.Op Fl p Ar admin principal +.Op Fl -principal= Ns Ar admin principal +.Op Fl e Ar enctype +.Op Fl -enctypes= Ns Ar enctype +.Op Fl r Ar realm +.Op Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Op Fl a Ar admin server +.Op Fl -admin-server= Ns Ar admin server +.Op Fl s Ar server port +.Op Fl -server-port= Ns Ar server port +.Ar principal ... +.Xc +For each +.Ar principal , +generate a new key for it (creating it if it doesn't already exist), +and put that key in the keytab. +.Pp +If no +.Ar realm +is specified, the realm to operate on is taken from the first +principal. +.It list Xo +.Op Fl -keys +.Op Fl -timestamp +.Xc +List the keys stored in the keytab. +.It remove Xo +.Op Fl p Ar principal +.Op Fl -principal= Ns Ar principal +.Op Fl V kvno +.Op Fl -kvno= Ns Ar kvno +.Op Fl e enctype +.Op Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Xc +Removes the specified key or keys. Not specifying a +.Ar kvno +removes keys with any version number. Not specifying an +.Ar enctype +removes keys of any type. +.It rename Xo +.Ar from-principal +.Ar to-principal +.Xc +Renames all entries in the keytab that match the +.Ar from-principal +to +.Ar to-principal . +.It purge Xo +.Op Fl -age= Ns Ar age +.Xc +Removes all old entries (for which there is a newer version) that are +older than +.Ar age +(default one week). +.It srvconvert +.It srv2keytab Xo +.Op Fl s Ar srvtab +.Op Fl -srvtab= Ns Ar srvtab +.Xc +Converts the version 4 srvtab in +.Ar srvtab +to a version 5 keytab and stores it in +.Ar keytab . +Identical to: +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +.Li ktutil copy +.Li krb4: Ns Ar srvtab +.Ar keytab +.Ed +.It srvcreate +.It key2srvtab Xo +.Op Fl s Ar srvtab +.Op Fl -srvtab= Ns Ar srvtab +.Xc +Converts the version 5 keytab in +.Ar keytab +to a version 4 srvtab and stores it in +.Ar srvtab . +Identical to: +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +.Li ktutil copy +.Ar keytab +.Li krb4: Ns Ar srvtab +.Ed +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kadmin 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ac9b4bd77 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: ktutil.c,v 1.36 2002/02/11 14:14:11 joda Exp $"); + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +int verbose_flag; +char *keytab_string; +static char keytab_buf[256]; + +static int help(int argc, char **argv); + +static SL_cmd cmds[] = { + { "add", kt_add, "add", + "adds key to keytab" }, + { "change", kt_change, "change [principal...]", + "get new key for principals (all)" }, + { "copy", kt_copy, "copy src dst", + "copy one keytab to another" }, + { "get", kt_get, "get [principal...]", + "create key in database and add to keytab" }, + { "list", kt_list, "list", + "shows contents of a keytab" }, + { "purge", kt_purge, "purge", + "remove old and superceeded entries" }, + { "remove", kt_remove, "remove", + "remove key from keytab" }, + { "rename", kt_rename, "rename from to", + "rename entry" }, + { "srvconvert", srvconv, "srvconvert [flags]", + "convert v4 srvtab to keytab" }, + { "srv2keytab" }, + { "srvcreate", srvcreate, "srvcreate [flags]", + "convert keytab to v4 srvtab" }, + { "key2srvtab" }, + { "help", help, "help", "" }, + { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } +}; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { + "version", + 0, + arg_flag, + &version_flag, + NULL, + NULL + }, + { + "help", + 'h', + arg_flag, + &help_flag, + NULL, + NULL + }, + { + "keytab", + 'k', + arg_string, + &keytab_string, + "keytab", + "keytab to operate on" + }, + { + "verbose", + 'v', + arg_flag, + &verbose_flag, + "verbose", + "run verbosely" + } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +krb5_context context; + +krb5_keytab +ktutil_open_keytab(void) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab keytab; + if (keytab_string == NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_default_name (context, keytab_buf, sizeof(keytab_buf)); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_default_name"); + return NULL; + } + keytab_string = keytab_buf; + } + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_string, &keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "resolving keytab %s", keytab_string); + return NULL; + } + if (verbose_flag) + fprintf (stderr, "Using keytab %s\n", keytab_string); + + return keytab; +} + +static int +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sl_help(cmds, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +static void +usage(int status) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "command"); + exit(status); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + setprogname(argv[0]); + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + if(argc == 0) + usage(1); + ret = sl_command(cmds, argc, argv); + if(ret == -1) + krb5_warnx (context, "unrecognized command: %s", argv[0]); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d7d12e7fb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ + +KTUTIL(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KTUTIL(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkttuuttiill - manage Kerberos keytabs + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkttuuttiill [--kk _k_e_y_t_a_b | ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b] [--vv | ----vveerrbboossee] [----vveerrssiioonn] [--hh | + ----hheellpp] _c_o_m_m_a_n_d [_a_r_g_s] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkttuuttiill is a program for managing keytabs. Supported options: + + --vv, ----vveerrbboossee + Verbose output. + + _c_o_m_m_a_n_d can be one of the following: + + add [--pp _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [----pprriinncciippaall==_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [--VV _k_v_n_o] [----kkvvnnoo==_k_v_n_o] [--ee + _e_n_c_t_y_p_e] [----eennccttyyppee==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e] [--ww _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d] + [----ppaasssswwoorrdd==_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d] [--rr] [----rraannddoomm] [--ss] [----nnoo--ssaalltt] + Adds a key to the keytab. Options that are not specified will + be prompted for. This requires that you know the password of + the principal to add; if what you really want is to add a new + principal to the keytab, you should consider the _g_e_t command, + which talks to the kadmin server. + + change [--rr _r_e_a_l_m] [----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m] [----aa _h_o_s_t] [----aaddmmiinn--sseerrvveerr==_h_o_s_t] [----ss + _p_o_r_t] [----sseerrvveerr--ppoorrtt==_p_o_r_t] + Update one or several keys to new versions. By default, use + the admin server for the realm of a keytab entry. Otherwise + it will use the values specified by the options. + + If no principals are given, all the ones in the keytab are + updated. + + copy _k_e_y_t_a_b_-_s_r_c _k_e_y_t_a_b_-_d_e_s_t + Copies all the entries from _k_e_y_t_a_b_-_s_r_c to _k_e_y_t_a_b_-_d_e_s_t. + + get [--pp _a_d_m_i_n _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [----pprriinncciippaall==_a_d_m_i_n _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [--ee _e_n_c_t_y_p_e] + [----eennccttyyppeess==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e] [--rr _r_e_a_l_m] [----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m] [--aa _a_d_m_i_n + _s_e_r_v_e_r] [----aaddmmiinn--sseerrvveerr==_a_d_m_i_n _s_e_r_v_e_r] [--ss _s_e_r_v_e_r _p_o_r_t] + [----sseerrvveerr--ppoorrtt==_s_e_r_v_e_r _p_o_r_t] _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _._._. + For each _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, generate a new key for it (creating it if + it doesn't already exist), and put that key in the keytab. + + If no _r_e_a_l_m is specified, the realm to operate on is taken + from the first principal. + + list [----kkeeyyss] [----ttiimmeessttaammpp] + List the keys stored in the keytab. + + remove [--pp _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [----pprriinncciippaall==_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [--VV --kkvvnnoo] [----kkvvnnoo==_k_v_n_o] + [--ee --eennccttyyppee] [----eennccttyyppee==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e] + Removes the specified key or keys. Not specifying a _k_v_n_o re- + moves keys with any version number. Not specifying an _e_n_c_t_y_p_e + removes keys of any type. + + rename _f_r_o_m_-_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _t_o_-_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l + Renames all entries in the keytab that match the _f_r_o_m_- + _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l to _t_o_-_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l. + + purge [----aaggee==_a_g_e] + Removes all old entries (for which there is a newer version) + + that are older than _a_g_e (default one week). + + srvconvert + + srv2keytab [--ss _s_r_v_t_a_b] [----ssrrvvttaabb==_s_r_v_t_a_b] + Converts the version 4 srvtab in _s_r_v_t_a_b to a version 5 keytab + and stores it in _k_e_y_t_a_b. Identical to: + + ktutil copy krb4:_s_r_v_t_a_b _k_e_y_t_a_b + + srvcreate + + key2srvtab [--ss _s_r_v_t_a_b] [----ssrrvvttaabb==_s_r_v_t_a_b] + Converts the version 5 keytab in _k_e_y_t_a_b to a version 4 srvtab + and stores it in _s_r_v_t_a_b. Identical to: + + ktutil copy _k_e_y_t_a_b krb4:_s_r_v_t_a_b + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kadmin(8) + + HEIMDAL December 16, 2000 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da60f426ba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/ktutil_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: ktutil_locl.h,v 1.18 2002/09/10 20:03:45 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __KTUTIL_LOCL_H__ +#define __KTUTIL_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "crypto-headers.h" +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +extern krb5_context context; + +extern int verbose_flag; +extern char *keytab_string; + +krb5_keytab ktutil_open_keytab(void); + +int kt_add (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_change (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_copy (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_get (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_list(int argc, char **argv); +int kt_purge(int argc, char **argv); +int kt_remove(int argc, char **argv); +int kt_rename(int argc, char **argv); +int srvconv(int argc, char **argv); +int srvcreate(int argc, char **argv); + +#endif /* __KTUTIL_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/list.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/list.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4c11c2f13f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/list.c @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: list.c,v 1.10 2002/01/30 10:12:21 joda Exp $"); + +static int help_flag; +static int list_keys; +static int list_timestamp; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "keys", 0, arg_flag, &list_keys, "show key value" }, + { "timestamp", 0, arg_flag, &list_timestamp, "show timestamp" }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +struct key_info { + char *version; + char *etype; + char *principal; + char *timestamp; + char *key; + struct key_info *next; +}; + +static int +do_list(const char *keytab_string) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + struct key_info *ki, **kie = &ki, *kp; + + int max_version = sizeof("Vno") - 1; + int max_etype = sizeof("Type") - 1; + int max_principal = sizeof("Principal") - 1; + int max_timestamp = sizeof("Date") - 1; + int max_key = sizeof("Key") - 1; + + /* XXX specialcase the ANY type */ + if(strncasecmp(keytab_string, "ANY:", 4) == 0) { + int flag = 0; + char buf[1024]; + keytab_string += 4; + while (strsep_copy((const char**)&keytab_string, ",", + buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1) { + if(flag) + printf("\n"); + do_list(buf); + flag = 1; + } + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_string, &keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "resolving keytab %s", keytab_string); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get %s", keytab_string); + goto out; + } + + printf ("%s:\n\n", keytab_string); + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0){ +#define CHECK_MAX(F) if(max_##F < strlen(kp->F)) max_##F = strlen(kp->F) + + kp = malloc(sizeof(*kp)); + if (kp == NULL) { + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "malloc failed"); + goto out; + } + + asprintf(&kp->version, "%d", entry.vno); + CHECK_MAX(version); + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, + entry.keyblock.keytype, &kp->etype); + if (ret != 0) + asprintf(&kp->etype, "unknown (%d)", entry.keyblock.keytype); + CHECK_MAX(etype); + krb5_unparse_name(context, entry.principal, &kp->principal); + CHECK_MAX(principal); + if (list_timestamp) { + char tstamp[256]; + + krb5_format_time(context, entry.timestamp, + tstamp, sizeof(tstamp), FALSE); + + kp->timestamp = strdup(tstamp); + CHECK_MAX(timestamp); + } + if(list_keys) { + int i; + kp->key = malloc(2 * entry.keyblock.keyvalue.length + 1); + for(i = 0; i < entry.keyblock.keyvalue.length; i++) + snprintf(kp->key + 2 * i, 3, "%02x", + ((unsigned char*)entry.keyblock.keyvalue.data)[i]); + CHECK_MAX(key); + } + *kie = kp; + kie = &kp->next; + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + *kie = NULL; /* termiate list */ + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + + printf("%-*s %-*s %-*s", max_version, "Vno", + max_etype, "Type", + max_principal, "Principal"); + if(list_timestamp) + printf(" %-*s", max_timestamp, "Date"); + if(list_keys) + printf(" %s", "Key"); + printf("\n"); + + for(kp = ki; kp; ) { + printf("%*s %-*s %-*s", max_version, kp->version, + max_etype, kp->etype, + max_principal, kp->principal); + if(list_timestamp) + printf(" %-*s", max_timestamp, kp->timestamp); + if(list_keys) + printf(" %s", kp->key); + printf("\n"); + + /* free entries */ + free(kp->version); + free(kp->etype); + free(kp->principal); + if(list_timestamp) + free(kp->timestamp); + if(list_keys) { + memset(kp->key, 0, strlen(kp->key)); + free(kp->key); + } + ki = kp; + kp = kp->next; + free(ki); + } +out: + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + return 0; +} + +int +kt_list(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int optind = 0; + char kt[1024]; + + if(verbose_flag) + list_timestamp = 1; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil list", ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil list", ""); + return 0; + } + + if (keytab_string == NULL) { + if((ret = krb5_kt_default_name(context, kt, sizeof(kt))) != 0) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "getting default keytab name"); + return 0; + } + keytab_string = kt; + } + do_list(keytab_string); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/purge.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/purge.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aaca00a6c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/purge.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: purge.c,v 1.6 2001/07/23 09:46:41 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * keep track of the highest version for every principal. + */ + +struct e { + krb5_principal principal; + int max_vno; + struct e *next; +}; + +static struct e * +get_entry (krb5_principal princ, struct e *head) +{ + struct e *e; + + for (e = head; e != NULL; e = e->next) + if (krb5_principal_compare (context, princ, e->principal)) + return e; + return NULL; +} + +static void +add_entry (krb5_principal princ, int vno, struct e **head) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct e *e; + + e = get_entry (princ, *head); + if (e != NULL) { + e->max_vno = max (e->max_vno, vno); + return; + } + e = malloc (sizeof (*e)); + if (e == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, princ, &e->principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_copy_principal"); + e->max_vno = vno; + e->next = *head; + *head = e; +} + +static void +delete_list (struct e *head) +{ + while (head != NULL) { + struct e *next = head->next; + krb5_free_principal (context, head->principal); + free (head); + head = next; + } +} + +/* + * Remove all entries that have newer versions and that are older + * than `age' + */ + +int +kt_purge(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + int help_flag = 0; + char *age_str = "1 week"; + int age; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "age", 0, arg_string, NULL, "age to retire" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + struct e *head = NULL; + time_t judgement_day; + + args[i++].value = &age_str; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil purge", ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil purge", ""); + return 1; + } + + age = parse_time(age_str, "s"); + if(age < 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "unparasable time `%s'", age_str); + return 1; + } + + if((keytab = ktutil_open_keytab()) == NULL) + return 1; + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get %s", keytab_string); + goto out; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + add_entry (entry.principal, entry.vno, &head); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + + judgement_day = time (NULL); + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get, %s", keytab_string); + goto out; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + struct e *e = get_entry (entry.principal, head); + + if (e == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "ignoring extra entry"); + continue; + } + + if (entry.vno < e->max_vno + && judgement_day - entry.timestamp > age) { + if (verbose_flag) { + char *name_str; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, entry.principal, &name_str); + printf ("removing %s vno %d\n", name_str, entry.vno); + free (name_str); + } + ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry (context, keytab, &entry); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "remove"); + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + + delete_list (head); + + out: + krb5_kt_close (context, keytab); + return ret != 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/remove.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/remove.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45f8119202 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/remove.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: remove.c,v 1.3 2001/07/23 09:46:41 joda Exp $"); + +int +kt_remove(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_keytab keytab; + char *principal_string = NULL; + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + int kvno = 0; + char *keytype_string = NULL; + krb5_enctype enctype = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "principal to remove" }, + { "kvno", 'V', arg_integer, NULL, "key version to remove" }, + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, NULL, "enctype to remove" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + args[i++].value = &principal_string; + args[i++].value = &kvno; + args[i++].value = &keytype_string; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil remove", ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil remove", ""); + return 0; + } + if(principal_string) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string, &principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", principal_string); + return 1; + } + } + if(keytype_string) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, keytype_string, &enctype); + if(ret) { + int t; + if(sscanf(keytype_string, "%d", &t) == 1) + enctype = t; + else { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", keytype_string); + if(principal) + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + return 1; + } + } + } + if (!principal && !enctype && !kvno) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "You must give at least one of " + "principal, enctype or kvno."); + return 1; + } + + if((keytab = ktutil_open_keytab()) == NULL) + return 1; + + entry.principal = principal; + entry.keyblock.keytype = enctype; + entry.vno = kvno; + ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "remove"); + if(principal) + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/rename.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/rename.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dcfb35244f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/admin/rename.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename.c,v 1.1 2001/07/23 10:17:32 joda Exp $"); + +int +kt_rename(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_principal from_princ, to_princ; + int help_flag = 0; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil rename", "from to"); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil rename", "from to"); + return 0; + } + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + if(argc != 2) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil rename", "from to"); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &from_princ); + if(ret != 0) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", argv[0]); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[1], &to_princ); + if(ret != 0) { + krb5_free_principal(context, from_princ); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", argv[1]); + return 0; + } + + if((keytab = ktutil_open_keytab()) == NULL) { + krb5_free_principal(context, from_princ); + krb5_free_principal(context, to_princ); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret) { + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + krb5_free_principal(context, from_princ); + krb5_free_principal(context, to_princ); + return 1; + } + while(1) { + ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor); + if(ret != 0) { + if(ret != KRB5_CC_END && ret != KRB5_KT_END) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "getting entry from keytab"); + break; + } + if(krb5_principal_compare(context, entry.principal, from_princ)) { + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + entry.principal = to_princ; + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + if(ret) { + entry.principal = NULL; + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "adding entry"); + break; + } + entry.principal = from_princ; + ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + if(ret) { + entry.principal = NULL; + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "removing entry"); + break; + } + entry.principal = NULL; + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + + krb5_free_principal(context, from_princ); + krb5_free_principal(context, to_princ); + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e867521aaf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.24 2001/01/27 18:34:39 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +if OTP +dir_otp = otp +endif +if DCE +dir_dce = dceutils +endif +SUBDIRS = \ + afsutil \ + ftp \ + login \ + $(dir_otp) \ + popper \ + push \ + rsh \ + rcp \ + su \ + xnlock \ + telnet \ + test \ + kx \ + kf \ + $(dir_dce) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6846105a74 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,795 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.24 2001/01/27 18:34:39 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +subdir = appl +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken2.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/c-attribute.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/capabilities.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-compile-et.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-declaration.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 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Åstrand + + * afslog.c: 1.21->1.22: (log_func): drop the error number + +2003-04-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * afslog.c: set kafs log function if verbose is turned on + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): use LIB_kafs + + * afslog.1: --no-v4, --no-v5 + + * Makefile.am: always build afsutils now + + * afslog.c: make build without KRB4 + +2002-11-26 Johan Danielsson + + * afslog.c: remove plural form in help string + + * Makefile.am: add afslog manpage + + * afslog.1: manpage + + * afslog.c: try more files when trying to expand a cell name + + * afslog.c: create a list of cells to get tokens for, before + actually doing anything, and try to get tokens via krb4 if krb5 + fails, and give it a chance to work with krb4-only; also some bug + fixes, partially from Tomas Olsson. + +2002-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * pagsh.c: make it handle --version/--help + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * afslog.c (main): call free_getarg_strings + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * afslog.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + +2000-12-25 Assar Westerlund + + * afslog.c: clarify usage strings + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * pagsh.c (main): use mkstemp to generate temporary file names. + From Miroslav Ruda + +1999-07-04 Assar Westerlund + + * afslog.c (expand_cell_name): terminate on #. From Miroslav Ruda + + +1999-06-27 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (bin_PROGRAMS): only include pagsh if KRB4 + +1999-06-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add pagsh + + * pagsh.c: new file. contributed by Miroslav Ruda + +Sat Mar 27 12:49:43 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * afslog.c: cleanup option parsing diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e6c4eb2b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 2003/03/18 13:13:06 lha Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = afslog pagsh + +afslog_SOURCES = afslog.c + +pagsh_SOURCES = pagsh.c + +man_MANS = afslog.1 + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git 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Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: afslog.1,v 1.3 2003/03/18 04:29:34 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd November 26, 2002 +.Dt AFSLOG 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm afslog +.Nd +obtain AFS tokens +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl c Ar cell \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -cell= Ns Ar cell +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl p Ar path \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -file= Ns Ar path +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl k Ar realm \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -no-v4 +.Op Fl -no-v5 +.Op Fl u | Fl -unlog +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl h | Fl -help +.Op Ar cell | path ... +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +obtains AFS tokens for a number of cells. What cells to get tokens for +can either be specified as an explicit list, as file paths to get +tokens for, or be left unspecified, in which case +.Nm +will use whatever magic +.Xr krb_afslog 3 +decides upon. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar cell, +.Fl -cell= Ns Ar cell +.Xc +This specified one or more cell names to get tokens for. +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar path , +.Fl -file= Ns Ar path +.Xc +This specified one or more file paths for which tokens should be +obtained. +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar realm , +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +This is the Kerberos realm the AFS servers live in, this should +normally not be specified. +.It Fl -no-v4 +This makes +.Nm +not try using Kerberos 4. +.It Fl -no-v5 +This makes +.Nm +not try using Kerberos 5. +.It Xo +.Fl u , +.Fl -unlog +.Xc +Destroy tokens instead of obtaining new. If this is specified, all +other options are ignored (except for +.Fl -help +and +.Fl -version ) . +.It Xo +.Fl v , +.Fl -verbose +.Xc +Adds more verbosity for what is actually going on. +.El +Instead of using +.Fl c +and +.Fl p , +you may also pass a list of cells and file paths after any other +options. These arguments are considered files if they are either +the strings +.Do . Dc +or +.Dq .. +or they contain a slash, or if there exists a file by that name. +.Sh EXAMPLES +Assuming that there is no file called +.Dq openafs.org +in the current directory, and that +.Pa /afs/openafs.org +points to that cell, the follwing should be identical: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ afslog -c openafs.org +$ afslog openafs.org +$ afslog /afs/openafs.org/some/file +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb_afslog 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/afslog.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/afslog.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0d85a1ea09 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/afslog.c @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: afslog.c,v 1.21.2.2 2003/08/25 11:43:51 lha Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +#if 0 +static int create_user; +#endif +static getarg_strings cells; +static char *realm; +static getarg_strings files; +static int unlog_flag; +static int verbose; +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_krb4 = 1; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +static int use_krb5 = 1; +#endif + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "cell", 'c', arg_strings, &cells, "cells to get tokens for", "cell" }, + { "file", 'p', arg_strings, &files, "files to get tokens for", "path" }, + { "realm", 'k', arg_string, &realm, "realm for afs cell", "realm" }, + { "unlog", 'u', arg_flag, &unlog_flag, "remove tokens" }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "v4", 0, arg_negative_flag, &use_krb4, "use Kerberos 4" }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { "v5", 0, arg_negative_flag, &use_krb5, "use Kerberos 5" }, +#endif +#if 0 + { "create-user", 0, arg_flag, &create_user, "create user if not found" }, +#endif + { "verbose",'v', arg_flag, &verbose }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +#ifdef KRB5 +krb5_context context; +krb5_ccache id; +#endif + +static const char * +expand_one_file(FILE *f, const char *cell) +{ + static char buf[1024]; + char *p; + + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + if(buf[0] == '>') { + for(p = buf; *p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p) && *p != '#'; p++) + ; + *p = '\0'; + if(strncmp(buf + 1, cell, strlen(cell)) == 0) + return buf + 1; + } + buf[0] = '\0'; + } + return NULL; +} + +static const char * +expand_cell_name(const char *cell) +{ + FILE *f; + const char *c; + const char **fn, *files[] = { _PATH_CELLSERVDB, + _PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB, + _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_CELLSERVDB, + _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_CELLSERVDB, + NULL }; + for(fn = files; *fn; fn++) { + f = fopen(*fn, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + continue; + c = expand_one_file(f, cell); + fclose(f); + if(c) + return c; + } + return cell; +} + +#if 0 +static int +createuser (char *cell) +{ + char cellbuf[64]; + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char cmd[1024]; + + if (cell == NULL) { + FILE *f; + int len; + + f = fopen (_PATH_THISCELL, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + err (1, "open(%s)", _PATH_THISCELL); + if (fgets (cellbuf, sizeof(cellbuf), f) == NULL) + err (1, "read cellname from %s", _PATH_THISCELL); + len = strlen(cellbuf); + if (cellbuf[len-1] == '\n') + cellbuf[len-1] = '\0'; + cell = cellbuf; + } + + if(krb_get_default_principal(name, instance, realm)) + errx (1, "Could not even figure out who you are"); + + snprintf (cmd, sizeof(cmd), + "pts createuser %s%s%s@%s -cell %s", + name, *instance ? "." : "", instance, strlwr(realm), + cell); + DEBUG("Executing %s", cmd); + return system(cmd); +} +#endif + +static void +usage(int ecode) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "[cell|path]..."); + exit(ecode); +} + +struct cell_list { + char *cell; + struct cell_list *next; +} *cell_list; + +static int +afslog_cell(const char *cell, int expand) +{ + struct cell_list *p, **q; + const char *c = cell; + if(expand){ + c = expand_cell_name(cell); + if(c == NULL){ + warnx("No cell matching \"%s\" found.", cell); + return -1; + } + if(verbose && strcmp(c, cell) != 0) + warnx("Cell \"%s\" expanded to \"%s\"", cell, c); + } + /* add to list of cells to get tokens for, and also remove + duplicates; the actual afslog takes place later */ + for(p = cell_list, q = &cell_list; p; q = &p->next, p = p->next) + if(strcmp(p->cell, c) == 0) + return 0; + p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if(p == NULL) + return -1; + p->cell = strdup(c); + if(p->cell == NULL) { + free(p); + return -1; + } + p->next = NULL; + *q = p; + return 0; +} + +static int +afslog_file(const char *path) +{ + char cell[64]; + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(path, cell, sizeof(cell))){ + warnx("No cell found for file \"%s\".", path); + return -1; + } + if(verbose) + warnx("File \"%s\" lives in cell \"%s\"", path, cell); + return afslog_cell(cell, 0); +} + +static int +do_afslog(const char *cell) +{ + int k5ret, k4ret; + + k5ret = k4ret = 0; + +#ifdef KRB5 + if(context != NULL && id != NULL && use_krb5) { + k5ret = krb5_afslog(context, id, cell, NULL); + if(k5ret == 0) + return 0; + } +#endif +#if KRB4 + if (use_krb4) { + k4ret = krb_afslog(cell, NULL); + if(k4ret == 0) + return 0; + } +#endif + if (cell == NULL) + cell = ""; +#ifdef KRB5 + if (k5ret) + warnx("krb5_afslog(%s): %s", cell, krb5_get_err_text(context, k5ret)); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (k4ret) + warnx("krb_afslog(%s): %s", cell, krb_get_err_text(k4ret)); +#endif + if (k5ret || k4ret) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +static void +log_func(void *ctx, const char *str) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", str); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int i; + int num; + int ret = 0; + int failed = 0; + struct cell_list *p; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(!k_hasafs()) + errx(1, "AFS does not seem to be present on this machine"); + + if(unlog_flag){ + k_unlog(); + exit(0); + } +#ifdef KRB5 + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + context = NULL; + else + if(krb5_cc_default(context, &id) != 0) + id = NULL; +#endif + + if (verbose) + kafs_set_verbose(log_func, NULL); + + num = 0; + for(i = 0; i < files.num_strings; i++){ + afslog_file(files.strings[i]); + num++; + } + free_getarg_strings (&files); + for(i = 0; i < cells.num_strings; i++){ + afslog_cell(cells.strings[i], 1); + num++; + } + free_getarg_strings (&cells); + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + num++; + if(strcmp(argv[i], ".") == 0 || + strcmp(argv[i], "..") == 0 || + strchr(argv[i], '/') || + access(argv[i], F_OK) == 0) + afslog_file(argv[i]); + else + afslog_cell(argv[i], 1); + } + if(num == 0) { + if(do_afslog(NULL)) + failed++; + } else + for(p = cell_list; p; p = p->next) { + if(verbose) + warnx("Getting tokens for cell \"%s\"", p->cell); + if(do_afslog(p->cell)) + failed++; + } + + return failed; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/afslog.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/afslog.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d662b4eadf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/afslog.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ + +AFSLOG(1) UNIX Reference Manual AFSLOG(1) + +NNAAMMEE + aaffsslloogg - obtain AFS tokens + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + aaffsslloogg [--cc _c_e_l_l | ----cceellll==_c_e_l_l] [--pp _p_a_t_h | ----ffiillee==_p_a_t_h] [--kk _r_e_a_l_m | + ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m] [----nnoo--vv44] [----nnoo--vv55] [--uu | ----uunnlloogg] [--vv | ----vveerrbboossee] + [----vveerrssiioonn] [--hh | ----hheellpp] [_c_e_l_l | _p_a_t_h _._._.] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + aaffsslloogg obtains AFS tokens for a number of cells. What cells to get tokens + for can either be specified as an explicit list, as file paths to get to- + kens for, or be left unspecified, in which case aaffsslloogg will use whatever + magic krb_afslog(3) decides upon. + + Supported options: + + --cc _c_e_l_l_, ----cceellll==_c_e_l_l + This specified one or more cell names to get tokens for. + + --pp _p_a_t_h, ----ffiillee==_p_a_t_h + This specified one or more file paths for which tokens should be + obtained. + + --kk _r_e_a_l_m, ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m + This is the Kerberos realm the AFS servers live in, this should + normally not be specified. + + ----nnoo--vv44 + This makes aaffsslloogg not try using Kerberos 4. + + ----nnoo--vv55 + This makes aaffsslloogg not try using Kerberos 5. + + --uu, ----uunnlloogg + Destroy tokens instead of obtaining new. If this is specified, + all other options are ignored (except for ----hheellpp and ----vveerrssiioonn). + + --vv, ----vveerrbboossee + Adds more verbosity for what is actually going on. + Instead of using --cc and --pp, you may also pass a list of cells and file + paths after any other options. These arguments are considered files if + they are either the strings ``.'' or ``..'' or they contain a slash, or + if there exists a file by that name. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + Assuming that there is no file called ``openafs.org'' in the current di- + rectory, and that _/_a_f_s_/_o_p_e_n_a_f_s_._o_r_g points to that cell, the follwing + should be identical: + + $ afslog -c openafs.org + $ afslog openafs.org + $ afslog /afs/openafs.org/some/file + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb_afslog(3) + + HEIMDAL November 26, 2002 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d61dba2fa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: pagsh.c,v 1.6 2002/08/23 17:54:20 assar Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int c_flag; + +struct getargs getargs[] = { + { NULL, 'c', arg_flag, &c_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(getargs) / sizeof(getargs[0]); + +static void +usage(int ecode) +{ + arg_printusage(getargs, num_args, NULL, "command [args...]"); + exit(ecode); +} + +/* + * Run command with a new ticket file / credentials cache / token + */ + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int f; + char tf[1024]; + char *p; + + char *path; + char **args; + int i; + int optind = 0; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(getargs, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + +#ifdef KRB5 + snprintf (tf, sizeof(tf), "%sXXXXXX", KRB5_DEFAULT_CCROOT); + f = mkstemp (tf + 5); + close (f); + unlink (tf + 5); + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME", tf, 1); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 + snprintf (tf, sizeof(tf), "%s_XXXXXX", TKT_ROOT); + f = mkstemp (tf); + close (f); + unlink (tf); + esetenv("KRBTKFILE", tf, 1); +#endif + + i = 0; + + args = (char **) malloc((argc + 10)*sizeof(char *)); + if (args == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory allocating %lu bytes", + (unsigned long)((argc + 10)*sizeof(char *))); + + if(*argv == NULL) { + path = getenv("SHELL"); + if(path == NULL){ + struct passwd *pw = k_getpwuid(geteuid()); + path = strdup(pw->pw_shell); + } + } else { + path = strdup(*argv++); + } + if (path == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory copying path"); + + p=strrchr(path, '/'); + if(p) + args[i] = strdup(p+1); + else + args[i] = strdup(path); + + if (args[i++] == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory copying arguments"); + + while(*argv) + args[i++] = *argv++; + + args[i++] = NULL; + + if(k_hasafs()) + k_setpag(); + + unsetenv("PAGPID"); + execvp(path, args); + if (errno == ENOENT) { + char **sh_args = malloc ((i + 2) * sizeof(char *)); + int j; + + if (sh_args == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory copying sh arguments"); + for (j = 1; j < i; ++j) + sh_args[j + 2] = args[j]; + sh_args[0] = "sh"; + sh_args[1] = "-c"; + sh_args[2] = path; + execv ("/bin/sh", sh_args); + } + err (1, "execvp"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8925c86ec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +2002-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: rename dpagaix_LDFLAGS etc to appease automake + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (dpagaix): make sure of using $(EXEEXT) just to + please automake (this is aix-only code) + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (dpagaix): needs to be linked with ld, add an + explicit command for it. from Ake Sandgren + +2000-10-02 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: link with roken on everything except irix, where + apperently it fails. reported by Ake Sandgren + +2000-07-17 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: set compiler flags + +2000-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * imported stuff from Ake Sandgren + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf795204b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.8 2002/08/12 15:03:43 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + + +DFSPROGS = k5dcecon +if AIX +AIX_DFSPROGS = dpagaix +endif + +libexec_PROGRAMS = $(DFSPROGS) $(AIX_DFSPROGS) + +dpagaix_CFLAGS = $(dpagaix_cflags) +dpagaix_LDFLAGS = $(dpagaix_ldflags) +dpagaix_LDADD = $(dpagaix_ldadd) + +dpagaix$(EXEEXT): $(dpagaix_OBJECTS) + ld -edpagaix -o dpagaix$(EXEEXT) $(dpagaix_OBJECTS) $(srcdir)/dfspag.exp + +LIB_dce = -ldce + +k5dcecon_SOURCES = k5dcecon.c k5dce.h + +dpagaix_SOURCES = dpagaix.c + +if IRIX +LDADD = $(LIB_dce) +else +LDADD = $(LIB_roken) $(LIB_dce) +endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95ed827f26 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,783 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.8 2002/08/12 15:03:43 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(dpagaix_SOURCES) $(k5dcecon_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog +libexec_PROGRAMS = $(am__EXEEXT_1) $(am__EXEEXT_2) +subdir = appl/dceutils +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + 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+install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +dpagaix$(EXEEXT): $(dpagaix_OBJECTS) + ld -edpagaix -o dpagaix$(EXEEXT) $(dpagaix_OBJECTS) $(srcdir)/dfspag.exp +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/README.dcedfs b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/README.dcedfs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..80a06fec9a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/README.dcedfs @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +This is a set of patches and files to get a DFS ticket from a k5 ticket. +This code comes from Doug Engert, Argonne Nat. Lab (See dce/README.original +for more info) + +The files in dce are; +testpag: for testing if this is at all possible. +k5dfspag: included in libkrb5 +k5dcecon: Creates (or searches for) the actual DFSPAG ticketfile. +dpagaix: An AIX syscall stub. +README.original: Original README file from Doug Engert + + +Certain applications (rshd/telnetd) have been patched to call the +functions in k5dfspag when the situation is right. They are ifdef +with DCE. The patches are also originally from Doug but they +where against MIT krb5 code and have been merged into heimdal by me. +I will try to fix ftpd soon... + +There is also an ifdefs for DCE && AIX that can be used to make AIX +use DCE for getting group/passwd entries. This is needed if one is running +with a bare bones passwd/group file and AUTHSTATE set to DCE (This will be +more or less clear to people doing this...) I have forced this on for now. + +k5dfspag.c is in lib/krb5 +k5dfspag.c is dependent on DCE only. +It is also POSIX systems only. There are defines for the location of +k5dcecon and dpagaix that needs a correct configure setting. + +k5dcecon needs no special things for the compile except whatever is needed +on the target system to compile dce programs. +(On aix the dce compile flags are: -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_AIX32_THREADS=1 -D_AIX41 -D_AES_SOURCE or one can use xlc_r4 if it is version 3.6.4 or later) + +k5dcecon wants the following libs (on aix 4.3): +-ldce (and setenv from somewhere) + +dpagaix is only needed on AIX (see k5dfspag.c). +dpagaix needs dfspag.exp and is linked with +ld -edpagaix -o dpagaix dpagaix.o dfspag.exp + + +Hope to get this into heimdal soon :-) although I know that you will have to +change some things to get it cleanly into configure. Since I don't know the +structure of the code (heimdal), nor enough of configure, good enough I +just won't try it myself. + +One more thing, to get this to work one has to put fcache_version = x in +krb5.conf where x = whatever the DCE implementation understands, (usually +1 or 2). +Thanks for adding that... + + +Åke Sandgren (ake@hpc2n.umu.se) +HPC2N +Umeå University +Sweden + +PS +I have now added patches for configure.in and some Makefile.am's to get this +all cleanly (I hope) into heimdal. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/README.original b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/README.original new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..088702307a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/README.original @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +KERBEROS and DCE INTEROPERABILITY ROUTINES + +WHAT'S NEW + +When k5dcecon was examining the ticket caches looking to +update one with a newer TGT, it might update the wrong +one for the correct user. This problem was reported by PNNL, +and is now fixed. + +Any Kerberized application can now use a forwarded TGT to establish a +DCE context, or can use a previously established DCE context. This is +both a functional improvement and a performance improvement. + +BACKGROUND + +The MIT Kerberos 5 Release 1.x and DCE 1.1 can interoperate in a +number of ways. This is possible because: + + o DCE used Kerberos 5 internally. Based on the MIT code as of beta 4 + or so, with additional changes. + + o The DCE security server can act as a K5 KDC, as defined in RFC 1510 + and responds on port 88. + + o On the clients, DCE and Kerberos use the same format for the ticket + cache, and then can share it. The KRB5CCNAME environment variable points + at the cache. + + o On the clients, DCE and Kerberos use the same format for the srvtab + file. DCE refers to is a /krb5/v5srvtab and Kerberos as + /etc/krb5.keytab. They can be symlinked. + + o MIT has added many options to the krb5.conf configuration file + which allows newer features of Release 1.0 to be turned off to match + the earlier version of Kerberos upon which DCE is based. + + o DCE will accept a externally obtained Kerberos TGT in place of a + password when establishing a DCE context. + +There are some areas where they differ, including the following: + + o Administration of the database and the keytab files is done by the + DCE routines, rather the the Kerberos kadmin. + + o User password changes must be done using the DCE commands. Kpasswd + does not work. (But there are mods to Kerberos to use the v5passwd + with DCE. + + o DCE goes beyond authentication only, and provides authorization via + the PAC, and the dce-ptgt tickets stored in the cache. Thus a + Kerberos KDC can not act as a DCE security server. + + o A DCE cell and Kerberos realm can cross-realm authenticate, but + there can be no intermediate realms. (There are other problems + in this area as well. But directly connected realms/cells do work.) + + o You can't link a module with the DCE library and the Kerberos + library. They have conflicting routines, static data and structures. + +One of the main features of DCE is the Distributed File System +DFS. Access to DFS requires authentication and authorization, and when +one uses a Kerberized network utility such as telnet, a forwarded +Kerberos ticket can be used to establish the DCE context to allow +access to DFS. + + +NEW TO THIS RELEASE + +This release introduces sharing of a DCE context, and PAG, and allows +any Kerberized application to establish or share the context. This is +made possible by using an undocumented feature of DCE which is on at +least the Transarc and IBM releases of DCE 1.1. + +I am in the process of trying to get this contributed to the general +DCE 1.2.2 release as a patch, so it could be included in other vendors +products. HP has expressed interest in doing this, as well as the +OpenGroup if the modification is contributed. You can help by +requesting Transarc and/or IBM to submit this modification to the +OpenGroup and ask your vendor to adopt this modification. + +The feature is a modification to the setpag() system call which will +allow an authorized process to set the PAG to a specific value, and +thus allow unrelated processes to share the same PAG. + +This then allows the Kerberized daemons such as kshd, to exec a DCE +module which established the DCE context. Kshd then sets the +KRB5CCNAME environment variable and then issues the setpag() to use +this context. This solves the linking problem. This is done via the +k5dfspag.c routine. + +The k5dfspag.c code is compiled with the lib/krb5/os routines and +included in the libkrb5. A daemon calls krb5_dfs_pag after the +krb5_kuserok has determined that the Kerberos principal and local +userid pair are acceptable. This should be done early so as to give +the daemon access to the home directory which may be located on DFS. +If the .k5login file is used by krb5_kuserok it will need to be +accessed by the daemon and will need special ACL handling. + +The krb5_dfs_pag routine will exec the k5dcecon module to do all the +real work. Upon return, if a PAG is obtained, krb5_dfs_pag with set +the PAG for the current process to the returned PAG value. It will +also set the KRB5CCNAME environment as well. Under DCE the PAG value +is the nnnnnnn part of the name of the cache: +FILE:/opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds/dcecred_nnnnnnnn. + +The k5dcecon routine will attempt to use TGT which may have been +forwarded, to convert it to a DCE context. If there is no TGT, an +attempt will be made to join an existing PAG for the local userid, and +Kerberos principal. If there are existing PAGs, and a forwarded TGT, +k5dcecon will check the lifetime of the forwarded TGT, and if it is +less than the lifetime of the PAG, it will just join the PAG. If it +is greater, it will refresh the PAG using the forwarded TGT. +This approach has the advantage of not requiring many new tickets from +having to be obtained, and allows one to refresh a DCE context, or use +an already established context. + +If the system also has AFS, the AFS krb5_afs_pag should be called +after the krb5_dfs_pag, since cache pointed at via the KRB5CCNAME may +have changed, such as if a DFS PAG has been joined. The AFS code does +not have the capability to join an existing AFS PAG, but can use the +same cache which might already had a +afsx/@ service ticket. + + +WHAT'S IN THIS RELEASE + +The k5prelogin, k5dcelogin, k5afslogin (with ak5log) were designed to +be slipped in between telnetd or klogind and login.krb5. They would +use a forwarded Kerberos ticket to establish a DCE context. They are +the older programs which are included here. They work on all DCE +platforms, and don't take advantage of the undocumented setpag +feature. (A version of k5dcelogin is being included with DCE 1.2.2) + +K5dcecon is the new program which can be used to create, update or +join a DCE context. k5dcecon returns KRB5CCNAME string which contains +the PAG. + +k5dfspag.c is to be built in the MIT Kerberos 5 release 1.0 patchlevel +1 and added to the libkrb5. It will exec k5dcecon and upon return set +the KRB5CCNAME and PAG. Mods to Kerberized klogind, rshd, telnetd, +ftpd are available to use the k5dfspag. + +Testpag.c is a test programs to see if the PAG can be set. + +The cpwkey.c routine can be used to change a key in the DCE registry, +by adding the key directly, or by setting the salt/pepper and password +or by providing the key and the pepper. This could be useful when +coping keys from a K4 or AFS database to DCE. It can also be used when +setting a DCE to K5 cross-cell key. This program is a test program +For mass inserts, it should be rewritten to read from stdin. + +K5dcelogin can also be called directly, much like dce_login. +I use the following commands in effect do the same thing as dce_login +and get a forwardable ticket, DCE context and an AFS token: + + #!/bin/csh + # simulate a dce_login using krb5 kinit and k5dcelogin + # + setenv KRB5CCNAME FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_p$$ + /krb5/bin/kinit -f + exec /krb5/sbin/k5dcelogin /krb5/sbin/k5afslogin /bin/csh + #exec /krb5/sbin/k5dcelogin /bin/csh + +This could be useful in a mixed cell where "AS_REQ" messages are +handled by a K5 KDC, but DCE RPCs are handled by the DCE security +server. + +TESTING THE SETPAG + +The krb5_dfs_pag routine relies on an undocumented feature which is +in the AIX and Transarc Solaris ports of DCE and has been recently +added to the SGI version. To test if this feature is present +on some other DFS implementation use the testpag routine. + +The testpag routine attempts to set a PAG value to one you supply. It +uses the afs_syscall with the afs_setpag, and passes the supplied +PAG value as the next parameter. On an unmodifed system, this +will be ignored, and a new will be set. You should also check that +if run as a user, you cannot join a PAG owned by another user. +When run as root, any PAG should be usable. + +On a machine with DFS running, do a dce_login to get a DCE context and +PAG. ECHO the KRB5CCNAME and look at the nnnnnnnn at the end. It +should look like an 8 char hex value, which may be 41ffxxxx on some +systems. + +Su to root and unsetenv KRB5CCNAME. Do a testpag -n nnnnnnnn where +nnnnnnnn is the PAG obtained for the above name. + +It should look like this example on an AIX 4.1.4 system: + + pembroke# ./testpag -n 63dc9997 + calling k5dcepag newpag=63dc9997 + PAG returned = 63dc9997 + +You will be running under a new shell with the PAG and KRB5CCNAME set. +If the PAG returned is the same as the newpag, then it worked. You can +further verify this by doing a DCE klist, cd to DFS and a DCE klist +again. The klist should show some tickets for DFS servers. + +If the PAG returned is not the same, and repeated attempts show a +returned PAG decremented by 1 from the previous returned PAG, then +this system does not have the modification For example: + + # ./testpag -n 41fffff9 + calling k5dcepag newpag=41fffff9 + PAG returned = 41fffff8 + # ./testpag -n 41fffff9 + calling k5dcepag newpag=41fffff9 + PAG returned = 41fffff7 + +In this case the syscall is ignoring the newpag parameter. + +Running it with -n 0 should get the next PAG value with or without +this modification. + +If the DFS kernel extensions are not installed, you would get +something like this: + + caliban.ctd.anl.gov% ./testpag -n 012345678 + calling k5dcepag newpag=012345678 + Setpag failed with a system error + PAG returned = ffffffff + Not a good pag value + +If you DFS implementation does not have this modification, you could +attempt to install it yourself. But this requires source and requires +modifications to the kernel extensions. At the end of this note is an +untested sample using the DCE 1.2.2 source code. You can also contact +your system vendor and ask for this modification. + +UNICOS has a similar function setppag(newpag) which can be used to set +the PAG of the parent. Contact me if you are interested. + +HOW TO INSTALL + +Examine the k5dfspag.c file to make sure the DFS syscalls are correct +for your platform. See the /opt/dcelocal/share/include/dcedfs/syscall.h +on Solaris for example. + +You should build the testpag routine and make sure it works before +adding all the other mods. If it fails you can still use the klogind +and telnetd with the k5prelogin and k5dcelogin code. + +If you intend to install with a prefix other than /krb5, change: +DPAGAIX and K5DCECON in k5dfspag.c; the three references in +k5prelogin.c; and the DESTDIR in the Makefile. + +Get k5101.cdiff.xxxxxx.tar file and install the mods for ANL_DFS_PAG +and ANL_DCE to the MIT Kerberos 5 source. These mods turn on some DCE +related changes and the calls to krb5_dfs_pag. + +Symlink or copy the k5dfspag.c to the src/lib/krb5/os directory. + +Add the -DANL_DFS_PAG and -DANL_DCE flags to the configuration. + +Configure and Build the Kerberos v5. + +Modify the k5dce Makefile for your system. + +Build the k5dcecon and related programs. + +Install both the MIT Kerberos v5 and the k5dcecon and dpagaix if AIX. + +The makefile can also build k5dcelogin and k5prelogin. The install +can install k5dcelogin, k5prelogin and update the links for login.krb5 +-> k5prelogin and moving login.krb5 to login.k5. If you will be using +the k5dcecon/k5dfspag with the Kerberos mods, you don't need +k5prelogin, or the links changed, and may not need k5dcelogin. + +Note that Transarc has obfuscated the entries to the lib, and +the 1.0.3a is different from the 1.1. You may need to build two +versions of the k5dcelogin and/or k5dcecon one for each. + +AIX ONLY + +The dpagaix routine is needed for AIX because of the way they do the +syscalls. + +The following fix.aix.libdce.mk is not needed if dce 2.1.0.21 +has been installed. This PTF exposed the needed entrypoints. + +The fix.aix.libdce.mk is a Makefile for AIX 4.x to add the required +external entry points to the libdce.a. These are needed by k5dcecon +and k5dcelogin. A bug report was submitted to IBM on this, and it was +rejected. But since DCE 1.2.2 will have a k5dcelogin, this should not +be needed with 1.2.2 + +Copy /usr/lib/libdce.a to /usr/libdce.a.orig before starting. Copy the +makefile to its own directory. It will create a new libdce.a which you +need to copy back to /usr/lib/libdce.a You will need to reboot the +machine. See the /usr/lpp/dce/examples/inst/README.AIX for a similar +procedure. IBM was not responsive in a request to have these added. + +UNTESTED KERNEL EXTENSION FOR SETPAG + +*** src/file/osi/,osi_pag.c Wed Oct 2 13:03:05 1996 +--- src/file/osi/osi_pag.c Mon Jul 28 13:53:13 1997 +*************** +*** 293,298 **** +--- 293,302 ---- + int code; + + osi_MakePreemptionRight(); ++ /* allow sharing of a PAG by non child processes DEE- 6/6/97 */ ++ if (unused && osi_GetUID(osi_getucred()) == 0) { ++ newpag = unused; ++ } else { + osi_mutex_enter(&osi_pagLock); + now = osi_Time(); + soonest = osi_firstPagTime + +*************** +*** 309,314 **** +--- 313,319 ---- + } + osi_mutex_exit(&osi_pagLock); + newpag = osi_genpag(); ++ } + osi_pcred_lock(p); + credp = crcopy(osi_getucred()); + code = osi_SetPagInCred(credp, newpag); + +Created 07/08/96 +Modified 09/30/96 +Modified 11/19/96 +Modified 12/19/96 +Modified 06/20/97 +Modified 07/28/97 +Modified 02/18/98 + + Douglas E. Engert + Argonne National Laboratory + 9700 South Cass Avenue + Argonne, Illinois 60439 + (630) 252-5444 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/dfspag.exp b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/dfspag.exp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed39788d5e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/dfspag.exp @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +#!/unix +* kernel extentions used to get the pag +kafs_syscall syscall diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/dpagaix.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/dpagaix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cbc23cb880 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/dpagaix.c @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * dpagaix.c + * On AIX we need to get the kernel extentions + * with the DFS kafs_syscall in it. + * We might be running on a system + * where DFS is not active. + * So we use this dummy routine which + * might not load to do the dirty work + * + * DCE does this with the /usr/lib/drivers/dfsloadobj + * + */ + + int dpagaix(parm1, parm2, parm3, parm4, parm5, parm6) + int parm1; + int parm2; + int parm3; + int parm4; + int parm5; + int parm6; + { + return(kafs_syscall(parm1, parm2, parm3, parm4, parm5, parm6)); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/k5dce.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/k5dce.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..424ebdc0da --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/k5dce.h @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* dummy K5 routines which are needed to get this to + * compile without having access ti the DCE versions + * of the header files. + * Thiis is very crude, and OSF needs to expose the K5 + * API. + */ + +#ifdef sun +/* Transarc obfascates these routines */ +#ifdef DCE_1_1 + +#define krb5_init_ets _dce_PkjKqOaklP +#define krb5_copy_creds _dce_LuFxPiITzD +#define krb5_unparse_name _dce_LWHtAuNgRV +#define krb5_get_default_realm _dce_vDruhprWGh +#define krb5_build_principal _dce_qwAalSzTtF +#define krb5_build_principal_ext _dce_vhafIQlejW +#define krb5_build_principal_va _dce_alsqToMmuJ +#define krb5_cc_default _dce_KZRshhTXhE +#define krb5_cc_default_name _dce_bzJVAjHXVQ +#define sec_login_krb5_add_cred _dce_ePDtOJTZvU + +#else /* DCE 1.0.3a */ + +#define krb5_init_ets _dce_BmLRpOVsBo +#define krb5_copy_creds _dce_VGwSEBNwaf +#define krb5_unparse_name _dce_PgAOkJoMXA +#define krb5_get_default_realm _dce_plVOzStKyK +#define krb5_build_principal _dce_uAKSsluIFy +#define krb5_build_principal_ext _dce_tRMpPiRada +#define krb5_build_principal_va _dce_SxnLejZemH +#define krb5_cc_default _dce_SeKosWFnsv +#define krb5_cc_default_name _dce_qJeaphJWVc +#define sec_login_krb5_add_cred _dce_uHwRasumsN + +#endif +#endif + +/* Define the bare minimum k5 structures which are needed + * by this program. Since the krb5 includes are not supplied + * with DCE, these were based on the MIT Kerberos 5 beta 3 + * which should match the DCE as of 1.0.3 at least. + * The tricky one is the krb5_creds, since one is allocated + * by this program, and it needs access to the client principal + * in it. + * Note that there are no function prototypes, so there is no + * compile time checking. + * DEE 07/11/95 + */ +#define NPROTOTYPE(x) () +typedef int krb5_int32; /* assuming all DCE systems are 32 bit */ +typedef short krb5short; /* assuming short is 16 bit */ +typedef krb5_int32 krb5_error_code; +typedef unsigned char krb5_octet; +typedef krb5_octet krb5_boolean; +typedef krb5short krb5_keytype; /* in k5.2 it's a short */ +typedef krb5_int32 krb5_flags; +typedef krb5_int32 krb5_timestamp; + +typedef char * krb5_pointer; /* pointer to unexposed data */ + +typedef struct _krb5_ccache { + struct _krb5_cc_ops *ops; + krb5_pointer data; +} *krb5_ccache; + +typedef struct _krb5_cc_ops { + char *prefix; + char *(*get_name) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache)); + krb5_error_code (*resolve) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache *, char *)); + krb5_error_code (*gen_new) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache *)); + krb5_error_code (*init) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_principal)); + krb5_error_code (*destroy) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache)); + krb5_error_code (*close) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache)); + krb5_error_code (*store) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_creds *)); + krb5_error_code (*retrieve) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_flags, + krb5_creds *, krb5_creds *)); + krb5_error_code (*get_princ) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, + krb5_principal *)); + krb5_error_code (*get_first) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, + krb5_cc_cursor *)); + krb5_error_code (*get_next) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *, + krb5_creds *)); + krb5_error_code (*end_get) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *)); + krb5_error_code (*remove_cred) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_flags, + krb5_creds *)); + krb5_error_code (*set_flags) NPROTOTYPE((krb5_ccache, krb5_flags)); +} krb5_cc_ops; + +typedef struct _krb5_keyblock { + krb5_keytype keytype; + int length; + krb5_octet *contents; +} krb5_keyblock; + +typedef struct _krb5_ticket_times { + krb5_timestamp authtime; + krb5_timestamp starttime; + krb5_timestamp endtime; + krb5_timestamp renew_till; +} krb5_ticket_times; + +typedef krb5_pointer krb5_cc_cursor; + +typedef struct _krb5_data { + int length; + char *data; +} krb5_data; + +typedef struct _krb5_authdata { + int ad_type; + int length; + krb5_octet *contents; +} krb5_authdata; + +typedef struct _krb5_creds { + krb5_pointer client; + krb5_pointer server; + krb5_keyblock keyblock; + krb5_ticket_times times; + krb5_boolean is_skey; + krb5_flags ticket_flags; + krb5_pointer **addresses; + krb5_data ticket; + krb5_data second_ticket; + krb5_pointer **authdata; +} krb5_creds; + +typedef krb5_pointer krb5_principal; + +#define KRB5_CC_END 336760974 +#define KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE 0x00000001 + +/* Ticket flags */ +/* flags are 32 bits; each host is responsible to put the 4 bytes + representing these bits into net order before transmission */ +/* #define TKT_FLG_RESERVED 0x80000000 */ +#define TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE 0x40000000 +#define TKT_FLG_FORWARDED 0x20000000 +#define TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE 0x10000000 +#define TKT_FLG_PROXY 0x08000000 +#define TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE 0x04000000 +#define TKT_FLG_POSTDATED 0x02000000 +#define TKT_FLG_INVALID 0x01000000 +#define TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE 0x00800000 +#define TKT_FLG_INITIAL 0x00400000 +#define TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH 0x00200000 +#define TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH 0x00100000 +#ifdef PK_INIT +#define TKT_FLG_PUBKEY_PREAUTH 0x00080000 +#define TKT_FLG_DIGSIGN_PREAUTH 0x00040000 +#define TKT_FLG_PRIVKEY_PREAUTH 0x00020000 +#endif + + +#define krb5_cc_get_principal(cache, principal) (*(cache)->ops->get_princ)(cache, principal) +#define krb5_cc_set_flags(cache, flags) (*(cache)->ops->set_flags)(cache, flags) +#define krb5_cc_get_name(cache) (*(cache)->ops->get_name)(cache) +#define krb5_cc_start_seq_get(cache, cursor) (*(cache)->ops->get_first)(cache, cursor) +#define krb5_cc_next_cred(cache, cursor, creds) (*(cache)->ops->get_next)(cache, cursor, creds) +#define krb5_cc_destroy(cache) (*(cache)->ops->destroy)(cache) +#define krb5_cc_end_seq_get(cache, cursor) (*(cache)->ops->end_get)(cache, cursor) + +/* end of k5 dummy typedefs */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/k5dcecon.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/k5dcecon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..99310bb34c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/k5dcecon.c @@ -0,0 +1,791 @@ +/* + * (c) Copyright 1995 HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY + * + * To anyone who acknowledges that this file is provided + * "AS IS" without any express or implied warranty: + * permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this + * file for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, + * provided that the above copyright notice and this + * notice appears in all copies, and that the name of + * Hewlett-Packard Company not be used in advertising or + * publicity pertaining to distribution of the software + * without specific, written prior permission. Hewlett- + * Packard Company makes no representations about the + * suitability of this software for any purpose. + * + */ +/* + * k5dcecon - Program to convert a K5 TGT to a DCE context, + * for use with DFS and its PAG. + * + * The program is designed to be called as a sub process, + * and return via stdout the name of the cache which implies + * the PAG which should be used. This program itself does not + * use the cache or PAG itself, so the PAG in the kernel for + * this program may not be set. + * + * The calling program can then use the name of the cache + * to set the KRB5CCNAME and PAG for its self and its children. + * + * If no ticket was passed, an attemplt to join an existing + * PAG will be made. + * + * If a forwarded K5 TGT is passed in, either a new DCE + * context will be created, or an existing one will be updated. + * If the same ticket was already used to create an existing + * context, it will be joined instead. + * + * Parts of this program are based on k5dceauth,c which was + * given to me by HP and by the k5dcelogin.c which I developed. + * A slightly different version of k5dcelogin.c, was added to + * DCE 1.2.2 + * + * D. E. Engert 6/17/97 ANL + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include "k5dce.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* #define DEBUG */ +#if defined(DEBUG) +#define DEEDEBUG(A) fprintf(stderr,A); fflush(stderr) +#define DEEDEBUG2(A,B) fprintf(stderr,A,B); fflush(stderr) +#else +#define DEEDEBUG(A) +#define DEEDEBUG2(A,B) +#endif + +#ifdef __hpux +#define seteuid(A) setresuid(-1,A,-1); +#endif + + +int k5dcecreate (uid_t, char *, char*, krb5_creds **); +int k5dcecon (uid_t, char *, char *); +int k5dcegettgt (krb5_ccache *, char *, char *, krb5_creds **); +int k5dcematch (uid_t, char *, char *, off_t *, krb5_creds **); +int k5dcesession (uid_t, char *, krb5_creds **, int *,krb5_flags); + + +char *progname = "k5dcecon"; +static time_t now; + +#ifdef notdef +#ifdef _AIX +/*---------------------------------------------*/ + /* AIX with DCE 1.1 does not have the com_err in the libdce.a + * do a half hearted job of substituting for it. + */ +void com_err(char *p1, int code, ...) +{ + int lst; + dce_error_string_t err_string; + dce_error_inq_text(code, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr,"Error %d in %s: %s\n", code, p1, err_string ); +} + +/*---------------------------------------------*/ +void krb5_init_ets() +{ + +} +#endif +#endif + + +/*------------------------------------------------*/ +/* find a cache to use for our new pag */ +/* Since there is no simple way to determine which + * caches are associated with a pag, we will have + * do look around and see what makes most sense on + * different systems. + * on a Solaris system, and in the DCE source, + * the pags always start with a 41. + * this is not true on the IBM, where there does not + * appear to be any pattern. + * + * But since we are always certifing our creds when + * they are received, we can us that fact, and look + * at the first word of the associated data file + * to see that it has a "5". If not don't use. + */ + +int k5dcesession(luid, pname, tgt, ppag, tflags) + uid_t luid; + char *pname; + krb5_creds **tgt; + int *ppag; + krb5_flags tflags; +{ + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *direntp; + off_t size; + krb5_timestamp endtime; + int better = 0; + krb5_creds *xtgt; + + char prev_name[17] = ""; + krb5_timestamp prev_endtime; + off_t prev_size; + u_long prev_pag = 0; + + char ccname[64] = "FILE:/opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds/"; + + error_status_t st; + sec_login_handle_t lcontext = 0; + dce_error_string_t err_string; + int lst; + + DEEDEBUG2("k5dcesession looking for flags %8.8x\n",tflags); + + dirp = opendir("/opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds/"); + if (dirp == NULL) { + return 1; + } + + while ( (direntp = readdir( dirp )) != NULL ) { + +/* + * (but root has the ffffffff which we are not interested in) + */ + if (!strncmp(direntp->d_name,"dcecred_",8) + && (strlen(direntp->d_name) == 16)) { + + /* looks like a cache name, lets do the stat, etc */ + + strcpy(ccname+38,direntp->d_name); + if (!k5dcematch(luid, pname, ccname, &size, &xtgt)) { + + /* its one of our caches, see if it is better + * i.e. the endtime is farther, and if the endtimes + * are the same, take the larger, as he who has the + * most tickets wins. + * it must also had the same set of flags at least + * i.e. if the forwarded TGT is forwardable, this one must + * be as well. + */ + + DEEDEBUG2("Cache:%s",direntp->d_name); + DEEDEBUG2(" size:%d",size); + DEEDEBUG2(" flags:%8.8x",xtgt->ticket_flags); + DEEDEBUG2(" %s",ctime((time_t *)&xtgt->times.endtime)); + + if ((xtgt->ticket_flags & tflags) == tflags ) { + if (prev_name[0]) { + if (xtgt->times.endtime > prev_endtime) { + better = 1; + } else if ((xtgt->times.endtime = prev_endtime) + && (size > prev_size)){ + better = 1; + } + } else { /* the first */ + if (xtgt->times.endtime >= now) { + better = 1; + } + } + if (better) { + strcpy(prev_name, direntp->d_name); + prev_endtime = xtgt->times.endtime; + prev_size = size; + sscanf(prev_name+8,"%8X",&prev_pag); + *tgt = xtgt; + better = 0; + } + } + } + } + } + (void)closedir( dirp ); + + if (!prev_name[0]) + return 1; /* failed to find one */ + + DEEDEBUG2("Best: %s\n",prev_name); + + if (ppag) + *ppag = prev_pag; + + strcpy(ccname+38,prev_name); + setenv("KRB5CCNAME",ccname,1); + + return(0); +} + + +/*----------------------------------------------*/ +/* see if this cache is for this this principal */ + +int k5dcematch(luid, pname, ccname, sizep, tgt) + uid_t luid; + char *pname; + char *ccname; + off_t *sizep; /* size of the file */ + krb5_creds **tgt; +{ + + krb5_ccache cache; + struct stat stbuf; + char ccdata[256]; + int fd; + int status; + + /* DEEDEBUG2("k5dcematch called: cache=%s\n",ccname+38); */ + + if (!strncmp(ccname,"FILE:",5)) { + + strcpy(ccdata,ccname+5); + strcat(ccdata,".data"); + + /* DEEDEBUG2("Checking the .data file for %s\n",ccdata); */ + + if (stat(ccdata, &stbuf)) + return(1); + + if (stbuf.st_uid != luid) + return(1); + + if ((fd = open(ccdata,O_RDONLY)) == -1) + return(1); + + if ((read(fd,&status,4)) != 4) { + close(fd); + return(1); + } + + /* DEEDEBUG2(".data file status = %d\n", status); */ + + if (status != 5) + return(1); + + if (stat(ccname+5, &stbuf)) + return(1); + + if (stbuf.st_uid != luid) + return(1); + + *sizep = stbuf.st_size; + } + + return(k5dcegettgt(&cache, ccname, pname, tgt)); +} + + +/*----------------------------------------*/ +/* k5dcegettgt - get the tgt from a cache */ + +int k5dcegettgt(pcache, ccname, pname, tgt) + krb5_ccache *pcache; + char *ccname; + char *pname; + krb5_creds **tgt; + +{ + krb5_ccache cache; + krb5_cc_cursor cur; + krb5_creds creds; + int code; + int found = 1; + krb5_principal princ; + char *kusername; + krb5_flags flags; + char *sname, *realm, *tgtname = NULL; + + /* Since DCE does not expose much of the Kerberos interface, + * we will have to use what we can. This means setting the + * KRB5CCNAME for each file we want to test + * We will also not worry about freeing extra cache structures + * as this this routine is also not exposed, and this should not + * effect this module. + * We should also free the creds contents, but that is not exposed + * either. + */ + + setenv("KRB5CCNAME",ccname,1); + cache = NULL; + *tgt = NULL; + + if (code = krb5_cc_default(pcache)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while getting ccache"); + goto return2; + } + + DEEDEBUG("Got cache\n"); + flags = 0; + if (code = krb5_cc_set_flags(*pcache, flags)) { + com_err(progname, code,"While setting flags"); + goto return2; + } + DEEDEBUG("Set flags\n"); + if (code = krb5_cc_get_principal(*pcache, &princ)) { + com_err(progname, code, "While getting princ"); + goto return1; + } + DEEDEBUG("Got principal\n"); + if (code = krb5_unparse_name(princ, &kusername)) { + com_err(progname, code, "While unparsing principal"); + goto return1; + } + + DEEDEBUG2("Unparsed to \"%s\"\n", kusername); + DEEDEBUG2("pname is \"%s\"\n", pname); + if (strcmp(kusername, pname)) { + DEEDEBUG("Principals not equal\n"); + goto return1; + } + DEEDEBUG("Principals equal\n"); + + realm = strchr(pname,'@'); + realm++; + + if ((tgtname = malloc(9 + 2 * strlen(realm))) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr,"Malloc failed for tgtname\n"); + goto return1; + } + + strcpy(tgtname,"krbtgt/"); + strcat(tgtname,realm); + strcat(tgtname,"@"); + strcat(tgtname,realm); + + DEEDEBUG2("Getting tgt %s\n", tgtname); + if (code = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(*pcache, &cur)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while starting to retrieve tickets"); + goto return1; + } + + while (!(code = krb5_cc_next_cred(*pcache, &cur, &creds))) { + krb5_creds *cred = &creds; + + if (code = krb5_unparse_name(cred->server, &sname)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while unparsing server name"); + continue; + } + + if (strncmp(sname, tgtname, strlen(tgtname)) == 0) { + DEEDEBUG("FOUND\n"); + if (code = krb5_copy_creds(&creds, tgt)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while copying TGT"); + goto return1; + } + found = 0; + break; + } + /* we should do a krb5_free_cred_contents(creds); */ + } + + if (code = krb5_cc_end_seq_get(*pcache, &cur)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while finishing retrieval"); + goto return2; + } + +return1: + flags = KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE; + krb5_cc_set_flags(*pcache, flags); /* force a close */ + +return2: + if (tgtname) + free(tgtname); + + return(found); +} + + +/*------------------------------------------*/ +/* Convert a forwarded TGT to a DCE context */ +int k5dcecon(luid, luser, pname) + uid_t luid; + char *luser; + char *pname; +{ + + krb5_creds *ftgt = NULL; + krb5_creds *tgt = NULL; + unsigned32 dfspag; + boolean32 reset_passwd = 0; + int lst; + dce_error_string_t err_string; + char *shell_prog; + krb5_ccache fcache; + char *ccname; + char *kusername; + char *urealm; + char *cp; + int pag; + int code; + krb5_timestamp endtime; + + + /* If there is no cache to be converted, we should not be here */ + + if ((ccname = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) == NULL) { + DEEDEBUG("No KRB5CCNAME\n"); + return(1); + } + + if (k5dcegettgt(&fcache, ccname, pname, &ftgt)) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: Did not find TGT\n", progname); + return(1); + } + + + DEEDEBUG2("flags=%x\n",ftgt->ticket_flags); + if (!(ftgt->ticket_flags & TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)){ + fprintf(stderr,"Ticket not forwardable\n"); + return(0); /* but OK to continue */ + } + + setenv("KRB5CCNAME","",1); + +#define TKT_ACCEPTABLE (TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE | TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE \ + | TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE | TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE | TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH \ + | TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH) + + if (!k5dcesession(luid, pname, &tgt, &pag, + (ftgt->ticket_flags & TKT_ACCEPTABLE))) { + if (ftgt->times.endtime > tgt->times.endtime) { + DEEDEBUG("Updating existing cache\n"); + return(k5dceupdate(&ftgt, pag)); + } else { + DEEDEBUG("Using existing cache\n"); + return(0); /* use the original one */ + } + } + /* see if the tgts match up */ + + if ((code = k5dcecreate(luid, luser, pname, &ftgt))) { + return (code); + } + + /* + * Destroy the Kerberos5 cred cache file. + * but dont care aout the return code. + */ + + DEEDEBUG("Destroying the old cache\n"); + if ((code = krb5_cc_destroy(fcache))) { + com_err(progname, code, "while destroying Kerberos5 ccache"); + } + return (0); +} + + +/*--------------------------------------------------*/ +/* k5dceupdate - update the cache with a new TGT */ +/* Assumed that the KRB5CCNAME has been set */ + +int k5dceupdate(krbtgt, pag) + krb5_creds **krbtgt; + int pag; +{ + + krb5_ccache ccache; + int code; + + if (code = krb5_cc_default(&ccache)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while opening cache for update"); + return(2); + } + + if (code = ccache->ops->init(ccache,(*krbtgt)->client)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while reinitilizing cache"); + return(3); + } + + /* krb5_cc_store_cred */ + if (code = ccache->ops->store(ccache, *krbtgt)) { + com_err(progname, code, "while updating cache"); + return(2); + } + + sec_login_pag_new_tgt(pag, (*krbtgt)->times.endtime); + return(0); +} +/*--------------------------------------------------*/ +/* k5dcecreate - create a new DCE context */ + +int k5dcecreate(luid, luser, pname, krbtgt) + uid_t luid; + char *luser; + char *pname; + krb5_creds **krbtgt; +{ + + char *cp; + char *urealm; + char *username; + char *defrealm; + uid_t uid; + + error_status_t st; + sec_login_handle_t lcontext = 0; + sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = 0; + boolean32 reset_passwd = 0; + int lst; + dce_error_string_t err_string; + + setenv("KRB5CCNAME","",1); /* make sure it not misused */ + + uid = getuid(); + DEEDEBUG2("uid=%d\n",uid); + + /* if run as root, change to user, so as to have the + * cache created for the local user even if cross-cell + * If run as a user, let standard file protection work. + */ + + if (uid == 0) { + seteuid(luid); + } + + cp = strchr(pname,'@'); + *cp = '\0'; + urealm = ++cp; + + DEEDEBUG2("basename=%s\n",cp); + DEEDEBUG2("realm=%s\n",urealm); + + /* now build the username as a single string or a /.../cell/user + * if this is a cross cell + */ + + if ((username = malloc(7+strlen(pname)+strlen(urealm))) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr,"Malloc failed for username\n"); + goto abort; + } + if (krb5_get_default_realm(&defrealm)) { + DEEDEBUG("krb5_get_default_realm failed\n"); + goto abort; + } + + + if (!strcmp(urealm,defrealm)) { + strcpy(username,pname); + } else { + strcpy(username,"/.../"); + strcat(username,urealm); + strcat(username,"/"); + strcat(username,pname); + } + + /* + * Setup a DCE login context + */ + + if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned_char_p_t)username, + (sec_login_external_tgt|sec_login_proxy_cred), + &lcontext, &st)) { + /* + * Add our TGT. + */ + DEEDEBUG("Adding our new TGT\n"); + sec_login_krb5_add_cred(lcontext, *krbtgt, &st); + if (st) { + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, + "Error while adding credentials for %s because %s\n", + username, err_string); + goto abort; + } + DEEDEBUG("validating and certifying\n"); + /* + * Now "validate" and certify the identity, + * usually we would pass a password here, but... + * sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident + * sec_login_validate_identity + */ + + if (sec_login_validate_identity(lcontext, 0, &reset_passwd, + &auth_src, &st)) { + DEEDEBUG2("validate_identity st=%d\n",st); + if (st) { + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, "Validation error for %s because %s\n", + username, err_string); + goto abort; + } + if (!sec_login_certify_identity(lcontext,&st)) { + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, + "Credentials not certified because %s\n",err_string); + } + if (reset_passwd) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Password must be changed for %s\n", username); + } + if (auth_src == sec_login_auth_src_local) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Credentials obtained from local registry for %s\n", + username); + } + if (auth_src == sec_login_auth_src_overridden) { + fprintf(stderr, "Validated %s from local override entry, no network credentials obtained\n", username); + goto abort; + + } + /* + * Actually create the cred files. + */ + DEEDEBUG("Ceating new cred files.\n"); + sec_login_set_context(lcontext, &st); + if (st) { + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, + "Unable to set context for %s because %s\n", + username, err_string); + goto abort; + } + + /* + * Now free up the local context and leave the + * network context with its pag + */ +#if 0 + sec_login_release_context(&lcontext, &st); + if (st) { + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, + "Unable to release context for %s because %s\n", + username, err_string); + goto abort; + } +#endif + } + else { + DEEDEBUG2("validate failed %d\n",st); + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, + "Unable to validate %s because %s\n", username, + err_string); + goto abort; + } + } + else { + dce_error_inq_text(st, err_string, &lst); + fprintf(stderr, + "Unable to setup login entry for %s because %s\n", + username, err_string); + goto abort; + } + + done: + /* if we were root, get back to root */ + + DEEDEBUG2("sec_login_inq_pag %8.8x\n", + sec_login_inq_pag(lcontext, &st)); + + if (uid == 0) { + seteuid(0); + } + + DEEDEBUG("completed\n"); + return(0); + + abort: + if (uid == 0) { + seteuid(0); + } + + DEEDEBUG("Aborting\n"); + return(2); +} + + + +/*-------------------------------------------------*/ +main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + int status; + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + int rv; + + char *lusername = NULL; + char *pname = NULL; + int fflag = 0; + struct passwd *pw; + uid_t luid; + uid_t myuid; + char *ccname; + krb5_creds *tgt = NULL; + +#ifdef DEBUG + close(2); + open("/tmp/k5dce.debug",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600); +#endif + + if (myuid = getuid()) { + DEEDEBUG2("UID = %d\n",myuid); + exit(33); /* must be root to run this, get out now */ + } + + while ((rv = getopt(argc,argv,"l:p:fs")) != -1) { + DEEDEBUG2("Arg = %c\n", rv); + switch(rv) { + case 'l': /* user name */ + lusername = optarg; + DEEDEBUG2("Optarg = %s\n", optarg); + break; + case 'p': /* principal name */ + pname = optarg; + DEEDEBUG2("Optarg = %s\n", optarg); + break; + case 'f': /* convert a forwarded TGT to a context */ + fflag++; + break; + case 's': /* old test parameter, ignore it */ + break; + } + } + + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); + krb5_init_ets(); + time(&now); /* set time to check expired tickets */ + + /* if lusername == NULL, Then user is passed as the USER= variable */ + + if (!lusername) { + lusername = getenv("USER"); + if (!lusername) { + fprintf(stderr, "USER not in environment\n"); + return(3); + } + } + + if ((pw = getpwnam(lusername)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Who are you?\n"); + return(44); + } + + luid = pw->pw_uid; + + if (fflag) { + status = k5dcecon(luid, lusername, pname); + } else { + status = k5dcesession(luid, pname, &tgt, NULL, 0); + } + + if (!status) { + printf("%s",getenv("KRB5CCNAME")); /* return via stdout to caller */ + DEEDEBUG2("KRB5CCNAME=%s\n",getenv("KRB5CCNAME")); + } + + DEEDEBUG2("Returning status %d\n",status); + return (status); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/testpag.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/testpag.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4613fba5e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/dceutils/testpag.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* Test the k5dcepag routine by setting a pag, and + * and execing a shell under this pag. + * + * This allows you to join a PAG which was created + * earlier by some other means. + * for example k5dcecon + * + * Must be run as root for testing only. + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define POSIX_SETJMP +#define POSIX_SIGNALS + +#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS +typedef struct sigaction handler; +#define handler_init(H,F) (sigemptyset(&(H).sa_mask), \ + (H).sa_flags=0, \ + (H).sa_handler=(F)) +#define handler_swap(S,NEW,OLD) sigaction(S, &NEW, &OLD) +#define handler_set(S,OLD) sigaction(S, &OLD, NULL) +#else +typedef sigtype (*handler)(); +#define handler_init(H,F) ((H) = (F)) +#define handler_swap(S,NEW,OLD) ((OLD) = signal ((S), (NEW))) + +#define handler_set(S,OLD) (signal ((S), (OLD))) +#endif + +typedef void sigtype; + +/* + * We could include the dcedfs/syscall.h which should have these + * numbers, but it has extra baggage. So for + * simplicity sake now, we define these here. + */ + + +#define AFSCALL_SETPAG 2 +#define AFSCALL_GETPAG 11 + +#if defined(sun) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 72 + +#elif defined(hpux) +/* assume HPUX 10 + or is it 50 */ +#define AFS_SYSCALL 326 + +#elif defined(_AIX) +#define DPAGAIX "dpagaix" +/* #define DPAGAIX "/krb5/sbin/dpagaix" */ + +#elif defined(sgi) || defined(_sgi) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 206+1000 + +#else +#define AFS_SYSCALL (Unknown_DFS_AFS_SYSCALL) +#endif + +static sigjmp_buf setpag_buf; + +static sigtype mysig() +{ + siglongjmp(setpag_buf, 1); +} + + +int krb5_dfs_newpag(new_pag) + int new_pag; +{ + handler sa1, osa1; + handler sa2, osa2; + int pag = -1; + + handler_init (sa1, mysig); + handler_init (sa2, mysig); + handler_swap (SIGSYS, sa1, osa1); + handler_swap (SIGSEGV, sa2, osa2); + + if (sigsetjmp(setpag_buf, 1) == 0) { +#if defined(_AIX) + int (*dpagaix)(int, int, int, int, int, int); + + if (dpagaix = load(DPAGAIX, 0, 0)) + pag = (*dpagaix)(AFSCALL_SETPAG, new_pag, 0, 0, 0, 0); +#else + pag = syscall(AFS_SYSCALL,AFSCALL_SETPAG, new_pag, 0, 0, 0, 0); +#endif + handler_set (SIGSYS, osa1); + handler_set (SIGSEGV, osa2); + return(pag); + } + + fprintf(stderr,"Setpag failed with a system error\n"); + /* syscall failed! return 0 */ + handler_set (SIGSYS, osa1); + handler_set (SIGSEGV, osa2); + return(-1); +} + +main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + int rv; + int rc; + unsigned int pag; + unsigned int newpag = 0; + char ccname[256]; + int nflag = 0; + + while((rv = getopt(argc,argv,"n:")) != -1) { + switch(rv) { + case 'n': + nflag++; + sscanf(optarg,"%8x",&newpag); + break; + default: + printf("Usage: k5dcepagt -n pag \n"); + exit(1); + } + } + + if (nflag) { + fprintf (stderr,"calling k5dcepag newpag=%8.8x\n",newpag); + pag = krb5_dfs_newpag(newpag); + + fprintf (stderr,"PAG returned = %8.8x\n",pag); + if ((pag != 0) && (pag != -1)) { + sprintf (ccname, + "FILE:/opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds/dcecred_%8.8x", + pag); + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME",ccname,1); + execl("/bin/csh","csh",0); + } + else { + fprintf(stderr," Not a good pag value\n"); + } + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74ed7429d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,795 @@ +2004-08-20 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftp/ftp.c: 1.77: send ABOR protect with security layer if its there + + * ftpd/{ftpd_locl.h, extern.h, ftpcmd.y, ftpd.8, ftpd.c}: + Remove all traces of setjmp/longjmp. + Handle those command that is needed in oobhandler, + those are ABOR, STAT, ENC, CONF, MIC. + add options to turn off insecure OOB handling and document the option + + Changes inspired by openbsd and netbsd changes but quite diffrent is + most places since the code no longer look and is structured the same + way. + + extern.h: 1.25 + ftpcmd.y: 1.65 + ftpd.8: 1.22 + ftpd.c: 1.170 + ftpd_locl.h: 1.14 + +2004-06-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: 1.64: make cbuf 64k to handle lager tickets From: + MAAAAA MOOOR 1.63: strncasecmp returns + integer so don't compare with NULL + +2004-03-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: 1.169: (main): setpag if there is krb4 OR krb5 + support + +2003-08-20 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ftpd.8: 1.20->1.21: document --gss-bindings + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: 1.166->1.168: wrap gssapi stuff with KRB5, + (args): add gss-bindings + + * ftp/main.c: 1.33->1.35: wrap gssapi stuff with KRB5, + (args): add gss-bindings + (main): set ftp_do_gss_bindings to 1 to make client use them + + * ftp/security.h: 1.9->1.10: add ftp_do_gss_bindings + + * ftp/gssapi.c: 1.24->1.25: Optionally support gss bindings, + client does it by default, server not. This is to make it work + for clients behind NAT. + + * ftp/ftp.1: 1.12->1.15: gssapi bindings + madoc fixes + +2003-08-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftp/gssapi.c: 1.23->1.24: (gss_adat): fix name allocation bug + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: make sure argument to is* functions are unsigned + +2003-04-06 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ftpd.8: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + +2003-03-23 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/pathnames.h (_PATH_FTPUSERS): conditionalize + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (krb5_verify): always do krb5_afslog, remove setpag + (its done in main) + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c: drop setpag + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (main): set afs PAG + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c: always try krb5_afslog, and while here do a + setpag too + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: always include kafs + +2003-03-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_adat): now that gss_export_name exports a + principal, bandaid with gss_display_name, and check that oid is + GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME, also free memory + +2003-02-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): print out the name we authenticated too + +2003-02-25 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ftpd/ls.c: use readlink with bufsize - 1, From NetBSD + + * ftp/ftp.1: s/utilizes/uses/ from NetBSD + + * ftpd/ftpd.8: s/utilize/use/ from NetBSD + +2003-02-10 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (accept_with_timeout): use socklen_t + +2002-10-29 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/main.c: reinstate -n flag (from Torbjörn Granlund) + +2002-10-16 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/ftp.c: fix parsing of epsv ports (from Love) + +2002-09-05 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/security.c (sec_vfprintf): free encoded data + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_decode): release buffer + + * ftp/ftp.c (active_mode): no need to allocate buffer for EPRT + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/ftp.c (command): clean up va_{start,end}ing (from NetBSD) + +2002-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/main.c: start using getarg + +2002-08-22 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ls.c: uxp/v lacks _S_IFMT, but has S_IFMT + +2002-08-20 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c: remove unused variable + +2002-04-24 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/ftp.c: fix buffer overrun when receiving long replies + +2002-04-02 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/popen.c: make sure gl_pathc != 0 before referencing + gl_pathv + +2002-03-15 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_adat): if accept_sec_context fails, syslog a + reason and give a temporary error message + +2002-02-28 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: if builtin_ls failes, return error + + * ftpd/ls.c (builtin_ls): return status; also don't print fatal + error messages to the output stream, instead use syslog + +2001-09-14 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ls.c: make sure we don't include . in recursive listings + +2001-09-13 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dataconn): don't wait forever on accept + +2001-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_adat): leak less memory and check return value + from asprintf + +2001-08-28 Jacques Vidrine + + * ftpd/ftpd.c, ftpd/ftpd.8: On systems with IP_PORTRANGE, have + ftpd use `high-numbered' ports by default. Add a -U option + to get the old behavior. + +2001-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c: try using "host" if there's no "ftp" principal + +2001-08-26 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ls.c: implement -R + +2001-08-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c: make -a and -A do the same as in ls(1) + +2001-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: add some (unsigned char) casts to is* + * ftp/cmds.c: add some (unsigned char) casts to is* + * ftpd/gss_userok.c (gss_userok): make argument to printf type + correct + +2001-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/cmds.c (setpeer): __NetBSD__ is also a unix-like OS + +2001-06-19 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/popen.c, ftpd/ftpd.c: try to handle GLOB_MAXPATH (FreeBSD) + +2001-04-19 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (do_store): call closefunc before claiming that + everything went ok, if the close fails the file might not have + been stored properly + +2001-03-26 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c, ftpd/popen.c: always use GLOB_LIMIT + * ftpd/popen.c (ftpd_popen): use GLOB_LIMIT if defined + * ftpd/ftpd.c (send_file_list): use GLOB_LIMIT if defined + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/cmds.c (setpeer): handle both service names and port numbers + for the second optional argument. also make parsing more robust + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c (sec_end): only clean app_data if there is any + (*): do realloc consistently + +2001-02-05 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/popen.c (ftpd_popen): avoid overwriting the bounds of argv + and gargv + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c: use gss_krb5_copy_ccache + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: move up LIB_otp so we do not end up picking + one from /usr/athena + +2001-01-25 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ls.c: fix bug in previous; make it easier to build test + version + +2001-01-19 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ls.c (lstat_file): handle case where file lives in `/' + +2001-01-18 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (pasv): close already open passive port + +2000-12-14 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ls.c: reverse time and size sort order (pointed out by + tege) + +2000-12-11 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: make it possible to set list of good filename + characters from command line + +2000-12-10 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: some spec-violating mirror software assumes that + you can do things like `LIST -CF'; don't pass `--' to ls so this + actually works + + * ftpd/ls.c: implement -1CFx flags + +2000-12-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c (gss_userok): handle getpwnam failing + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): be more explicit in error message + +2000-11-29 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.8: close list + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/main.c: add `-l' for no line-editing + * ftp/globals.c (readline): add + * ftp/ftp_var.h (lineedit): add variable indicated if we should + use readline + +2000-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/security.c (sec_read): fix bug in previous (from Jacques A. + Vidrine ) + +2000-11-05 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: only allow pasv if logged in + +2000-10-23 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: change bad filename message slightly + + * common/buffer.c: HAVE_ST_BLKSIZE -> HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE + +2000-10-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (*): check that fds are not too large to select on + * ftp/main.c (cmdscanner): print a newline upon EOF + +2000-09-19 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.h: add some attributes to prototypes of sec* + * ftp/extern.h (command): add attributes + +2000-08-31 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: change redundant password message to something + people can understand + +2000-07-27 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c (gss_userok): only do AFS iff KRB4 + * ftpd/ftpd.c (krb5_verify): only do AFS stuff if KRB4 + +2000-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: do not call setproctitle with a variable as the + format string + +2000-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: krb5.h before kafs.h + * ftpd/ftpd.c (krb5_verify): static-ize + * ftpd/ftpd.c (krb5_verify): conditionalize on KRB5 + +2000-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd: support for authenticating passwords with krb5, by Daniel + Kouril + +2000-06-06 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: change unix test to be negative + +2000-05-18 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): should use `debug'. From Onno van der + Linden . + +2000-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (login): re-structure code so that we prompt for + password for ftp/anonymous + +2000-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (login): initialize tmp before calling fgets + +2000-04-02 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c: rename all st_mtime variables to avoid conflict with + #define. + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: rename all st_mtime variables to avoid conflict + with #define. + * ftp/cmds.c: rename all st_mtime variables to avoid conflict with + #define. + +2000-03-26 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c, ftpd/ftpcmd.y, ftp/cmds.c: make sure to always call + time, ctime, and gmtime with `time_t's. there were some types + (like in lastlog) that we believed to always be time_t. this has + proven wrong on Solaris 8 in 64-bit mode, where they are stored as + 32-bit quantities but time_t has gone up to 64 bits + +2000-03-09 Johan Danielsson + + * call list_file for broken usages of nlst too + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: call list_file for broken usages of nlst too + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c (sec_read): more paranoia with return value from + sec_get_data + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (hookup): handle ai_canonname being set in any of the + addresses returnedby getaddrinfo. glibc apparently returns the + reverse lookup of every address in ai_canonname. + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): dito + +1999-12-21 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: don't use sa_len as a parameter, it's defined on + Irix + +1999-12-21 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dataconn): make sure from points to actual data + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): handle ai_canonname not being + set + * ftp/ftp.c (hookup): handle ai_canonname not being set + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_auth): the nat-IP address might not be realm + bounded. + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dolog): update prototype + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dolog): use getnameinfo_verified + * ftpd/ftpd.c: replace inaddr2str by getnameinfo + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): re-write to use getaddrinfo + * ftp/ftp.c (hookup): re-write to use getaddrinfo + +1999-11-30 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (getdatasock): make sure to keep the port-number of + the outgoing connections. It has to be `ftp-data' or some people + might get upset. + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): set correct variable when `-l' so that + logging actually works + +1999-11-29 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c (sec_login): check return value from realloc + (sec_end): set app_data to NULL + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_auth): obtain the `local' address when doing + NAT. also turn on passive mode. From + +1999-11-20 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (make_fileinfo): cast to allow for non-const + prototypes of readlink + +1999-11-12 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): use arg_counter for `l' + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (S_ISSOCK, S_ISLNK): fallback definitions for systems + that don't have them (such as ultrix) + +1999-10-29 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (make_fileinfo): cast uid's and gid's to unsigned in + printf, we don't know what types they might be. + (lstat_file): conditionalize the kafs part on KRB4 + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: is needed for kafs.h + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (lstat_file): don't set st_mode, it should already be + correct + + * ftpd/ls.c: don't use warnx to print errors + + * ftpd/ls.c (builtin_ls): fix typo, 'd' shouldn't imply 'f' + + * ftpd/ls.c (lstat_file): new function for avoiding stating AFS + mount points. From Love + (list_files): use `lstat_file' + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: some const-poisoning + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): add `-B' as an alias for `--builtin-ls' to + allow for stupid inetds that only support two arguments. From + Love + +1999-10-26 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y (help): it's unnecessary to interpret help strings + as printf commands + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (show_issue): don't interpret contents of + /etc/issue* as printf commands. From Brian A May + + +1999-10-21 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/kauth.c (kauth): complain if protection level isn't + `private' + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_decode): syslog failure reason + + * ftp/kauth.c (kauth): set private level earlier + + * ftp/security.c: get_command_prot; (sec_prot): partially match + `command' and `data' + +1999-10-18 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: change `-l' flag to use arg_collect (this makes + `-ll' work again) + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (list_file): pass filename to ls + +1999-10-04 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: FEAT + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c: fall-back definitions for constans and casts for + printfs + +1999-10-03 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (main): make this use getarg; add `list_file' + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y (LIST): call list_file + + * ftpd/ls.c: add simple built-in ls + + * ftp/security.c: add `sec_vfprintf2' and `sec_fprintf2' that + prints to the data stream + + * ftp/kauth.c (kauth): make sure we're using private protection + level + + * ftp/security.c (set_command_prot): set command protection level + + * ftp/security.c: make it possible to set the command protection + level with `prot' + +1999-09-30 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: add prototype for fclose to make sunos happy + +1999-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (do_login): show issue-file + (send_data): change handling of zero-byte files + +1999-08-18 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/cmds.c (getit): be more suspicious when parsing the result + of MDTM. Do the comparison of timestamps correctly. + +1999-08-13 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (send_data): avoid calling mmap with `len == 0'. + Some mmap:s rather dislike that (Solaris) and some munmap (Linux) + get grumpy later. + + * ftp/ftp.c (copy_stream): avoid calling mmap with `len == 0'. + Some mmap:s rather dislike that (Solaris) and some munmap (Linux) + get grumpy later. + +1999-08-03 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (active_mode): hide failure of EPRT by setting verbose + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): initialize application_data in bindings + +1999-08-02 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: save file names when doing commands that might + get aborted (and longjmp:ed out of) to avoid overwriting them also + remove extra closing brace + +1999-08-01 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: change `site find' to `site locate' (to match + what it does, and other implementations) keep find as an alias + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * common/socket.c: moved to roken + + * common/socket.c: new file with generic socket functions + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: make it more AF-neutral and v6-capable + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: add EPRT and EPSV + + * ftpd/extern.h: update prototypes and variables + + * ftp/krb4.c: update to new types of addresses + + * ftp/gssapi.c: add support for both AF_INET and AF_INET6 + addresses + + * ftp/ftp.c: make it more AF-neutral and v6-capable + + * ftp/extern.h (hookup): change prototype + + * common/common.h: add prototypes for functions in socket.c + + * common/Makefile.am (libcommon_a_SOURCES): add socket.c + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): check return value from + `gss_import_name' and print error messages if it fails + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_auth): type correctness + +1999-06-02 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/ftp.c (sendrequest): lmode != rmode + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/extern.h (sendrequest): update prototype + + * ftp/cmds.c: update calls to sendrequest and recvrequest to send + "b" when appropriate + + * ftp/ftp.c (sendrequest): add argument for mode to open file in. + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: rename getline -> ftpd_getline + + * ftp/main.c (makeargv): fill in unused slots with NULL + +Thu Apr 8 15:06:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER (moved to + config.h) + +Wed Apr 7 16:15:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): call gss_display_status to get a sane + error message; return AUTH_{CONTINUE,ERROR}, where appropriate + + * ftp/krb4.c: return AUTH_{CONTINUE,ERROR}, where appropriate + + * ftp/security.c (sec_login): if mechanism returns AUTH_CONTINUE, + just continue with the next mechanism, this fixes the case of + having GSSAPI fail because of non-existant of expired tickets + + * ftp/security.h: add AUTH_{OK,CONTINUE,ERROR} + +Thu Apr 1 16:59:04 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: don't run check-local + + * ftp/Makefile.am: don't run check-local + +Mon Mar 22 22:15:18 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (pass): fall-back for KRB_VERIFY_SECURE + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (pass): 1 -> KRB_VERIFY_SECURE + +Thu Mar 18 12:07:09 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: clean ftpcmd.c + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: remove krb5.h (breaks in ftpcmd.y) + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: move include of krb5.h here + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * ftp/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * common/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Tue Mar 16 22:28:37 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: add krb5.h to get heimdal_version + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: krb_verify_user_multiple -> krb_verify_user + +Thu Mar 11 14:54:59 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/Makefile.in: WFLAGS + + * ftp/ruserpass.c: add some if-braces + +Wed Mar 10 20:02:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: remove ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH + +Mon Mar 8 21:29:24 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: re-add version in greeting message + +Mon Mar 1 10:49:38 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/logwtmp.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + +Mon Feb 22 19:20:51 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * common/Makefile.in: remove glob + +Sat Feb 13 17:19:35 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (match): remove #ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH. We have a + fnmatch implementation in roken and therefore always have it. + + * ftp/ftp.c (copy_stream): initialize `werr' + +Wed Jan 13 23:52:57 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: moved all check_login and check_login_no_guest to + the end of the rules to ensure we don't generate several + (independent) error messages. once again, having a yacc-grammar + for FTP with embedded actions doesn't strike me as the most + optimal way of doing it. + +Tue Dec 1 14:44:29 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: link with extra libs for aix + +Sun Nov 22 10:28:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (retrying): support on-the-fly decompression + + * ftpd/Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): new function + (ruserpass): use it + + * common/Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sat Nov 21 23:13:03 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c: some more type correctness. + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_adat): more braces to shut up warnings + +Wed Nov 18 21:47:55 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/main.c (main): new option `-p' for enable passive mode. + +Mon Nov 2 01:57:49 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (getreply): remove extra `break' + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): fixo typo(copyo?) + + * ftp/security.c (sec_login): fix loop and return value + +Tue Sep 1 16:56:42 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/cmds.c (quote1): fix % quoting bug + +Fri Aug 14 17:10:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/krb4.c: krb_put_int -> KRB_PUT_INT + +Tue Jun 30 18:07:15 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c (auth): free `app_data' + (sec_end): only destroy if it was initialized + +Tue Jun 9 21:01:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/krb4.c: pass client address to krb_rd_req + +Sat May 16 00:02:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: link with DBLIB + +Tue May 12 14:15:32 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c: Save client name for userok(). + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c: Userok for gssapi. + +Fri May 1 07:15:01 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c: unifdef -DHAVE_H_ERRNO + +Fri Mar 27 00:46:07 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Make compile w/o krb4. + +Thu Mar 26 03:49:12 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/*, ftpd/*: Changes for new framework. + + * ftp/gssapi.c: GSS-API backend for the new security framework. + + * ftp/krb4.c: Updated for new framework. + + * ftp/security.{c,h}: New unified security framework. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8831a308d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:14 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = common ftp ftpd diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1b7c39ef2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,776 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 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Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include +#include +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: buffer.c,v 1.4 2000/10/23 04:49:25 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Allocate a buffer enough to handle st->st_blksize, if + * there is such a field, otherwise BUFSIZ. + */ + +void * +alloc_buffer (void *oldbuf, size_t *sz, struct stat *st) +{ + size_t new_sz; + + new_sz = BUFSIZ; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE + if (st) + new_sz = max(BUFSIZ, st->st_blksize); +#endif + if(new_sz > *sz) { + if (oldbuf) + free (oldbuf); + oldbuf = malloc (new_sz); + if (oldbuf == NULL) { + warn ("malloc"); + *sz = 0; + return NULL; + } + *sz = new_sz; + } + return oldbuf; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/common/common.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/common/common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5949b25d7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/common/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: common.h,v 1.12 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef __COMMON_H__ +#define __COMMON_H__ + +#include "base64.h" + +void set_buffer_size(int, int); + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +void *alloc_buffer (void *oldbuf, size_t *sz, struct stat *st); + +#endif /* __COMMON_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..460cc6fbf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: sockbuf.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $"); + +void +set_buffer_size(int fd, int read) +{ +#if defined(SO_RCVBUF) && defined(SO_SNDBUF) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + size_t size = 4194304; + while(size >= 131072 && + setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, read ? SO_RCVBUF : SO_SNDBUF, + (void *)&size, sizeof(size)) < 0) + size /= 2; +#endif +} + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9f4927dd96 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 2001/08/28 08:31:21 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/../common $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) + +bin_PROGRAMS = ftp + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +if KRB4 +krb4_sources = krb4.c kauth.c +endif +if KRB5 +krb5_sources = gssapi.c +endif + +ftp_SOURCES = \ + cmds.c \ + cmdtab.c \ + extern.h \ + ftp.c \ + ftp_locl.h \ + ftp_var.h \ + main.c \ + pathnames.h \ + ruserpass.c \ + domacro.c \ + globals.c \ + security.c \ + security.h \ + $(krb4_sources) \ + $(krb5_sources) + +EXTRA_ftp_SOURCES = krb4.c kauth.c gssapi.c + +man_MANS = ftp.1 + +LDADD = \ + ../common/libcommon.a \ + $(LIB_gssapi) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_readline) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da8fef7377 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,849 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 2001/08/28 08:31:21 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(ftp_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_ftp_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +bin_PROGRAMS = ftp$(EXEEXT) +subdir = appl/ftp/ftp +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken2.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/c-attribute.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/capabilities.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-compile-et.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-declaration.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-man.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-type-extra.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-var.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-x.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-xau.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/crypto.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/db.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/destdirs.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/dlopen.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 \ + 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a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a7928eb830 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c @@ -0,0 +1,2127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * FTP User Program -- Command Routines. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: cmds.c,v 1.44 2001/08/05 06:39:14 assar Exp $"); + +typedef void (*sighand)(int); + +jmp_buf jabort; +char *mname; +char *home = "/"; + +/* + * `Another' gets another argument, and stores the new argc and argv. + * It reverts to the top level (via main.c's intr()) on EOF/error. + * + * Returns false if no new arguments have been added. + */ +int +another(int *pargc, char ***pargv, char *prompt) +{ + int len = strlen(line), ret; + + if (len >= sizeof(line) - 3) { + printf("sorry, arguments too long\n"); + intr(0); + } + printf("(%s) ", prompt); + line[len++] = ' '; + if (fgets(&line[len], sizeof(line) - len, stdin) == NULL) + intr(0); + len += strlen(&line[len]); + if (len > 0 && line[len - 1] == '\n') + line[len - 1] = '\0'; + makeargv(); + ret = margc > *pargc; + *pargc = margc; + *pargv = margv; + return (ret); +} + +/* + * Connect to peer server and + * auto-login, if possible. + */ +void +setpeer(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *host; + u_short port; + struct servent *sp; + + if (connected) { + printf("Already connected to %s, use close first.\n", + hostname); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (argc < 2) + another(&argc, &argv, "to"); + if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) { + printf("usage: %s host-name [port]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + sp = getservbyname("ftp", "tcp"); + if (sp == NULL) + errx(1, "You bastard. You removed ftp/tcp from services"); + port = sp->s_port; + if (argc > 2) { + sp = getservbyname(argv[2], "tcp"); + if (sp != NULL) { + port = sp->s_port; + } else { + char *ep; + + port = strtol(argv[2], &ep, 0); + if (argv[2] == ep) { + printf("%s: bad port number-- %s\n", + argv[1], argv[2]); + printf ("usage: %s host-name [port]\n", + argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + port = htons(port); + } + } + host = hookup(argv[1], port); + if (host) { + int overbose; + + connected = 1; + /* + * Set up defaults for FTP. + */ + strlcpy(typename, "ascii", sizeof(typename)); + type = TYPE_A; + curtype = TYPE_A; + strlcpy(formname, "non-print", sizeof(formname)); + form = FORM_N; + strlcpy(modename, "stream", sizeof(modename)); + mode = MODE_S; + strlcpy(structname, "file", sizeof(structname)); + stru = STRU_F; + strlcpy(bytename, "8", sizeof(bytename)); + bytesize = 8; + if (autologin) + login(argv[1]); + +#if (defined(unix) || defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || defined(_AIX) || defined(_CRAY) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && NBBY == 8 +/* + * this ifdef is to keep someone form "porting" this to an incompatible + * system and not checking this out. This way they have to think about it. + */ + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + if (command("SYST") == COMPLETE && overbose) { + char *cp, c; + cp = strchr(reply_string+4, ' '); + if (cp == NULL) + cp = strchr(reply_string+4, '\r'); + if (cp) { + if (cp[-1] == '.') + cp--; + c = *cp; + *cp = '\0'; + } + + printf("Remote system type is %s.\n", + reply_string+4); + if (cp) + *cp = c; + } + if (!strncmp(reply_string, "215 UNIX Type: L8", 17)) { + if (proxy) + unix_proxy = 1; + else + unix_server = 1; + /* + * Set type to 0 (not specified by user), + * meaning binary by default, but don't bother + * telling server. We can use binary + * for text files unless changed by the user. + */ + type = 0; + strlcpy(typename, "binary", sizeof(typename)); + if (overbose) + printf("Using %s mode to transfer files.\n", + typename); + } else { + if (proxy) + unix_proxy = 0; + else + unix_server = 0; + if (overbose && + !strncmp(reply_string, "215 TOPS20", 10)) + printf( +"Remember to set tenex mode when transfering binary files from this machine.\n"); + } + verbose = overbose; +#endif /* unix */ + } +} + +struct types { + char *t_name; + char *t_mode; + int t_type; + char *t_arg; +} types[] = { + { "ascii", "A", TYPE_A, 0 }, + { "binary", "I", TYPE_I, 0 }, + { "image", "I", TYPE_I, 0 }, + { "ebcdic", "E", TYPE_E, 0 }, + { "tenex", "L", TYPE_L, bytename }, + { NULL } +}; + +/* + * Set transfer type. + */ +void +settype(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct types *p; + int comret; + + if (argc > 2) { + char *sep; + + printf("usage: %s [", argv[0]); + sep = " "; + for (p = types; p->t_name; p++) { + printf("%s%s", sep, p->t_name); + sep = " | "; + } + printf(" ]\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (argc < 2) { + printf("Using %s mode to transfer files.\n", typename); + code = 0; + return; + } + for (p = types; p->t_name; p++) + if (strcmp(argv[1], p->t_name) == 0) + break; + if (p->t_name == 0) { + printf("%s: unknown mode\n", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if ((p->t_arg != NULL) && (*(p->t_arg) != '\0')) + comret = command ("TYPE %s %s", p->t_mode, p->t_arg); + else + comret = command("TYPE %s", p->t_mode); + if (comret == COMPLETE) { + strlcpy(typename, p->t_name, sizeof(typename)); + curtype = type = p->t_type; + } +} + +/* + * Internal form of settype; changes current type in use with server + * without changing our notion of the type for data transfers. + * Used to change to and from ascii for listings. + */ +void +changetype(int newtype, int show) +{ + struct types *p; + int comret, oldverbose = verbose; + + if (newtype == 0) + newtype = TYPE_I; + if (newtype == curtype) + return; + if (debug == 0 && show == 0) + verbose = 0; + for (p = types; p->t_name; p++) + if (newtype == p->t_type) + break; + if (p->t_name == 0) { + printf("ftp: internal error: unknown type %d\n", newtype); + return; + } + if (newtype == TYPE_L && bytename[0] != '\0') + comret = command("TYPE %s %s", p->t_mode, bytename); + else + comret = command("TYPE %s", p->t_mode); + if (comret == COMPLETE) + curtype = newtype; + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +char *stype[] = { + "type", + "", + 0 +}; + +/* + * Set binary transfer type. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +setbinary(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + stype[1] = "binary"; + settype(2, stype); +} + +/* + * Set ascii transfer type. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +setascii(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + stype[1] = "ascii"; + settype(2, stype); +} + +/* + * Set tenex transfer type. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +settenex(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + stype[1] = "tenex"; + settype(2, stype); +} + +/* + * Set file transfer mode. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +setftmode(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + printf("We only support %s mode, sorry.\n", modename); + code = -1; +} + +/* + * Set file transfer format. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +setform(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + printf("We only support %s format, sorry.\n", formname); + code = -1; +} + +/* + * Set file transfer structure. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +setstruct(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + printf("We only support %s structure, sorry.\n", structname); + code = -1; +} + +/* + * Send a single file. + */ +void +put(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cmd; + int loc = 0; + char *oldargv1, *oldargv2; + + if (argc == 2) { + argc++; + argv[2] = argv[1]; + loc++; + } + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-file")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-file")) { +usage: + printf("usage: %s local-file remote-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + oldargv1 = argv[1]; + oldargv2 = argv[2]; + if (!globulize(&argv[1])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + /* + * If "globulize" modifies argv[1], and argv[2] is a copy of + * the old argv[1], make it a copy of the new argv[1]. + */ + if (argv[1] != oldargv1 && argv[2] == oldargv1) { + argv[2] = argv[1]; + } + cmd = (argv[0][0] == 'a') ? "APPE" : ((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR"); + if (loc && ntflag) { + argv[2] = dotrans(argv[2]); + } + if (loc && mapflag) { + argv[2] = domap(argv[2]); + } + sendrequest(cmd, argv[1], argv[2], + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + argv[1] != oldargv1 || argv[2] != oldargv2); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +mabort(int signo) +{ + int ointer; + + printf("\n"); + fflush(stdout); + if (mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with", mname)) { + interactive = ointer; + longjmp(jabort,0); + } + interactive = ointer; + } + mflag = 0; + longjmp(jabort,0); +} + +/* + * Send multiple files. + */ +void +mput(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + RETSIGTYPE (*oldintr)(int); + int ointer; + char *tp; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-files")) { + printf("usage: %s local-files\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + if (proxy) { + char *cp, *tp2, tmpbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + while ((cp = remglob(argv,0)) != NULL) { + if (*cp == 0) { + mflag = 0; + continue; + } + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], cp)) { + tp = cp; + if (mcase) { + while (*tp && !islower((unsigned char)*tp)) { + tp++; + } + if (!*tp) { + tp = cp; + tp2 = tmpbuf; + while ((*tp2 = *tp) != '\0') { + if (isupper((unsigned char)*tp2)) { + *tp2 = 'a' + *tp2 - 'A'; + } + tp++; + tp2++; + } + } + tp = tmpbuf; + } + if (ntflag) { + tp = dotrans(tp); + } + if (mapflag) { + tp = domap(tp); + } + sendrequest((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR", + cp, tp, + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + cp != tp || !interactive); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mput")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; + return; + } + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + char **cpp; + glob_t gl; + int flags; + + if (!doglob) { + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], argv[i])) { + tp = (ntflag) ? dotrans(argv[i]) : argv[i]; + tp = (mapflag) ? domap(tp) : tp; + sendrequest((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR", + argv[i], + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + tp, tp != argv[i] || !interactive); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mput")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + continue; + } + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + if (glob(argv[i], flags, NULL, &gl) || gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + warnx("%s: not found", argv[i]); + globfree(&gl); + continue; + } + for (cpp = gl.gl_pathv; cpp && *cpp != NULL; cpp++) { + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], *cpp)) { + tp = (ntflag) ? dotrans(*cpp) : *cpp; + tp = (mapflag) ? domap(tp) : tp; + sendrequest((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR", + *cpp, tp, + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + *cpp != tp || !interactive); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mput")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + globfree(&gl); + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +void +reget(int argc, char **argv) +{ + getit(argc, argv, 1, curtype == TYPE_I ? "r+wb" : "r+w"); +} + +void +get(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *mode; + + if (restart_point) { + if (curtype == TYPE_I) + mode = "r+wb"; + else + mode = "r+w"; + } else { + if (curtype == TYPE_I) + mode = "wb"; + else + mode = "w"; + } + + getit(argc, argv, 0, mode); +} + +/* + * Receive one file. + */ +int +getit(int argc, char **argv, int restartit, char *mode) +{ + int loc = 0; + int local_given = 1; + char *oldargv1, *oldargv2; + + if (argc == 2) { + argc++; + local_given = 0; + argv[2] = argv[1]; + loc++; + } + if ((argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-file")) || + (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-file"))) { + printf("usage: %s remote-file [ local-file ]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return (0); + } + oldargv1 = argv[1]; + oldargv2 = argv[2]; + if (!globulize(&argv[2])) { + code = -1; + return (0); + } + if (loc && mcase) { + char *tp = argv[1], *tp2, tmpbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + while (*tp && !islower((unsigned char)*tp)) { + tp++; + } + if (!*tp) { + tp = argv[2]; + tp2 = tmpbuf; + while ((*tp2 = *tp) != '\0') { + if (isupper((unsigned char)*tp2)) { + *tp2 = 'a' + *tp2 - 'A'; + } + tp++; + tp2++; + } + argv[2] = tmpbuf; + } + } + if (loc && ntflag) + argv[2] = dotrans(argv[2]); + if (loc && mapflag) + argv[2] = domap(argv[2]); + if (restartit) { + struct stat stbuf; + int ret; + + ret = stat(argv[2], &stbuf); + if (restartit == 1) { + if (ret < 0) { + warn("local: %s", argv[2]); + return (0); + } + restart_point = stbuf.st_size; + } else if (ret == 0) { + int overbose; + int cmdret; + int yy, mo, day, hour, min, sec; + struct tm *tm; + time_t mtime = stbuf.st_mtime; + + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + cmdret = command("MDTM %s", argv[1]); + verbose = overbose; + if (cmdret != COMPLETE) { + printf("%s\n", reply_string); + return (0); + } + if (sscanf(reply_string, + "%*s %04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", + &yy, &mo, &day, &hour, &min, &sec) + != 6) { + printf ("bad MDTM result\n"); + return (0); + } + + tm = gmtime(&mtime); + tm->tm_mon++; + tm->tm_year += 1900; + + if ((tm->tm_year > yy) || + (tm->tm_year == yy && + tm->tm_mon > mo) || + (tm->tm_mon == mo && + tm->tm_mday > day) || + (tm->tm_mday == day && + tm->tm_hour > hour) || + (tm->tm_hour == hour && + tm->tm_min > min) || + (tm->tm_min == min && + tm->tm_sec > sec)) + return (1); + } + } + + recvrequest("RETR", argv[2], argv[1], mode, + argv[1] != oldargv1 || argv[2] != oldargv2, local_given); + restart_point = 0; + return (0); +} + +static int +suspicious_filename(const char *fn) +{ + return strstr(fn, "../") != NULL || *fn == '/'; +} + +/* + * Get multiple files. + */ +void +mget(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int ch, ointer; + char *cp, *tp, *tp2, tmpbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-files")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-files\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + while ((cp = remglob(argv,proxy)) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '\0') { + mflag = 0; + continue; + } + if (mflag && suspicious_filename(cp)) + printf("*** Suspicious filename: %s\n", cp); + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], cp)) { + tp = cp; + if (mcase) { + for (tp2 = tmpbuf; (ch = *tp++);) + *tp2++ = tolower(ch); + *tp2 = '\0'; + tp = tmpbuf; + } + if (ntflag) { + tp = dotrans(tp); + } + if (mapflag) { + tp = domap(tp); + } + recvrequest("RETR", tp, cp, + curtype == TYPE_I ? "wb" : "w", + tp != cp || !interactive, 0); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mget")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + signal(SIGINT,oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +char * +remglob(char **argv, int doswitch) +{ + char temp[16]; + static char buf[MaxPathLen]; + static FILE *ftemp = NULL; + static char **args; + int oldverbose, oldhash; + char *cp, *mode; + + if (!mflag) { + if (!doglob) { + args = NULL; + } + else { + if (ftemp) { + fclose(ftemp); + ftemp = NULL; + } + } + return (NULL); + } + if (!doglob) { + if (args == NULL) + args = argv; + if ((cp = *++args) == NULL) + args = NULL; + return (cp); + } + if (ftemp == NULL) { + int fd; + strlcpy(temp, _PATH_TMP_XXX, sizeof(temp)); + fd = mkstemp(temp); + if(fd < 0){ + warn("unable to create temporary file %s", temp); + return NULL; + } + close(fd); + oldverbose = verbose, verbose = 0; + oldhash = hash, hash = 0; + if (doswitch) { + pswitch(!proxy); + } + for (mode = "w"; *++argv != NULL; mode = "a") + recvrequest ("NLST", temp, *argv, mode, 0, 0); + if (doswitch) { + pswitch(!proxy); + } + verbose = oldverbose; hash = oldhash; + ftemp = fopen(temp, "r"); + unlink(temp); + if (ftemp == NULL) { + printf("can't find list of remote files, oops\n"); + return (NULL); + } + } + while(fgets(buf, sizeof (buf), ftemp)) { + if ((cp = strchr(buf, '\n')) != NULL) + *cp = '\0'; + if(!interactive && suspicious_filename(buf)){ + printf("Ignoring remote globbed file `%s'\n", buf); + continue; + } + return buf; + } + fclose(ftemp); + ftemp = NULL; + return (NULL); +} + +char * +onoff(int bool) +{ + + return (bool ? "on" : "off"); +} + +/* + * Show status. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +status(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + + if (connected) + printf("Connected to %s.\n", hostname); + else + printf("Not connected.\n"); + if (!proxy) { + pswitch(1); + if (connected) { + printf("Connected for proxy commands to %s.\n", hostname); + } + else { + printf("No proxy connection.\n"); + } + pswitch(0); + } + sec_status(); + printf("Mode: %s; Type: %s; Form: %s; Structure: %s\n", + modename, typename, formname, structname); + printf("Verbose: %s; Bell: %s; Prompting: %s; Globbing: %s\n", + onoff(verbose), onoff(bell), onoff(interactive), + onoff(doglob)); + printf("Store unique: %s; Receive unique: %s\n", onoff(sunique), + onoff(runique)); + printf("Case: %s; CR stripping: %s\n",onoff(mcase),onoff(crflag)); + if (ntflag) { + printf("Ntrans: (in) %s (out) %s\n", ntin,ntout); + } + else { + printf("Ntrans: off\n"); + } + if (mapflag) { + printf("Nmap: (in) %s (out) %s\n", mapin, mapout); + } + else { + printf("Nmap: off\n"); + } + printf("Hash mark printing: %s; Use of PORT cmds: %s\n", + onoff(hash), onoff(sendport)); + if (macnum > 0) { + printf("Macros:\n"); + for (i=0; i 1) { + val = atoi(argv[1]); + if (val < 0) { + printf("%s: bad debugging value.\n", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + } else + val = !debug; + debug = val; + if (debug) + options |= SO_DEBUG; + else + options &= ~SO_DEBUG; + printf("Debugging %s (debug=%d).\n", onoff(debug), debug); + code = debug > 0; +} + +/* + * Set current working directory + * on remote machine. + */ +void +cd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-directory")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-directory\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("CWD %s", argv[1]) == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("CWD command not recognized, trying XCWD\n"); + command("XCWD %s", argv[1]); + } +} + +/* + * Set current working directory + * on local machine. + */ +void +lcd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (argc < 2) + argc++, argv[1] = home; + if (argc != 2) { + printf("usage: %s local-directory\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (!globulize(&argv[1])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) { + warn("local: %s", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (getcwd(buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL) + printf("Local directory now %s\n", buf); + else + warnx("getwd: %s", buf); + code = 0; +} + +/* + * Delete a single file. + */ +void +delete(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-file")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + command("DELE %s", argv[1]); +} + +/* + * Delete multiple files. + */ +void +mdelete(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int ointer; + char *cp; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-files")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-files\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + while ((cp = remglob(argv,0)) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '\0') { + mflag = 0; + continue; + } + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], cp)) { + command("DELE %s", cp); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with", "mdelete")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +/* + * Rename a remote file. + */ +void +renamefile(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "from-name")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "to-name")) { +usage: + printf("%s from-name to-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("RNFR %s", argv[1]) == CONTINUE) + command("RNTO %s", argv[2]); +} + +/* + * Get a directory listing + * of remote files. + */ +void +ls(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cmd; + + if (argc < 2) + argc++, argv[1] = NULL; + if (argc < 3) + argc++, argv[2] = "-"; + if (argc > 3) { + printf("usage: %s remote-directory local-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + cmd = argv[0][0] == 'n' ? "NLST" : "LIST"; + if (strcmp(argv[2], "-") && !globulize(&argv[2])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + if (strcmp(argv[2], "-") && *argv[2] != '|') + if (!globulize(&argv[2]) || !confirm("output to local-file:", + argv[2])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + recvrequest(cmd, argv[2], argv[1], "w", 0, 1); +} + +/* + * Get a directory listing + * of multiple remote files. + */ +void +mls(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int ointer, i; + char *cmd, mode[1], *dest; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-files")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-file")) { +usage: + printf("usage: %s remote-files local-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + dest = argv[argc - 1]; + argv[argc - 1] = NULL; + if (strcmp(dest, "-") && *dest != '|') + if (!globulize(&dest) || + !confirm("output to local-file:", dest)) { + code = -1; + return; + } + cmd = argv[0][1] == 'l' ? "NLST" : "LIST"; + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + for (i = 1; mflag && i < argc-1; ++i) { + *mode = (i == 1) ? 'w' : 'a'; + recvrequest(cmd, dest, argv[i], mode, 0, 1); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with", argv[0])) { + mflag ++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +/* + * Do a shell escape + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +shell(int argc, char **argv) +{ + pid_t pid; + RETSIGTYPE (*old1)(int), (*old2)(int); + char shellnam[40], *shell, *namep; + int status; + + old1 = signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + old2 = signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + for (pid = 3; pid < 20; pid++) + close(pid); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); + shell = getenv("SHELL"); + if (shell == NULL) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + namep = strrchr(shell,'/'); + if (namep == NULL) + namep = shell; + snprintf (shellnam, sizeof(shellnam), + "-%s", ++namep); + if (strcmp(namep, "sh") != 0) + shellnam[0] = '+'; + if (debug) { + printf ("%s\n", shell); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (argc > 1) { + execl(shell,shellnam,"-c",altarg,(char *)0); + } + else { + execl(shell,shellnam,(char *)0); + } + warn("%s", shell); + code = -1; + exit(1); + } + if (pid > 0) + while (waitpid(-1, &status, 0) != pid) + ; + signal(SIGINT, old1); + signal(SIGQUIT, old2); + if (pid == -1) { + warn("%s", "Try again later"); + code = -1; + } + else { + code = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Send new user information (re-login) + */ +void +user(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char acct[80]; + int n, aflag = 0; + char tmp[256]; + + if (argc < 2) + another(&argc, &argv, "username"); + if (argc < 2 || argc > 4) { + printf("usage: %s username [password] [account]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + n = command("USER %s", argv[1]); + if (n == CONTINUE) { + if (argc < 3 ) { + des_read_pw_string (tmp, + sizeof(tmp), + "Password: ", 0); + argv[2] = tmp; + argc++; + } + n = command("PASS %s", argv[2]); + } + if (n == CONTINUE) { + if (argc < 4) { + printf("Account: "); fflush(stdout); + fgets(acct, sizeof(acct) - 1, stdin); + acct[strlen(acct) - 1] = '\0'; + argv[3] = acct; argc++; + } + n = command("ACCT %s", argv[3]); + aflag++; + } + if (n != COMPLETE) { + fprintf(stdout, "Login failed.\n"); + return; + } + if (!aflag && argc == 4) { + command("ACCT %s", argv[3]); + } +} + +/* + * Print working directory. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +pwd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + /* + * If we aren't verbose, this doesn't do anything! + */ + verbose = 1; + if (command("PWD") == ERROR && code == 500) { + printf("PWD command not recognized, trying XPWD\n"); + command("XPWD"); + } + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +/* + * Make a directory. + */ +void +makedir(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "directory-name")) { + printf("usage: %s directory-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("MKD %s", argv[1]) == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("MKD command not recognized, trying XMKD\n"); + command("XMKD %s", argv[1]); + } +} + +/* + * Remove a directory. + */ +void +removedir(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "directory-name")) { + printf("usage: %s directory-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("RMD %s", argv[1]) == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("RMD command not recognized, trying XRMD\n"); + command("XRMD %s", argv[1]); + } +} + +/* + * Send a line, verbatim, to the remote machine. + */ +void +quote(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "command line to send")) { + printf("usage: %s line-to-send\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + quote1("", argc, argv); +} + +/* + * Send a SITE command to the remote machine. The line + * is sent verbatim to the remote machine, except that the + * word "SITE" is added at the front. + */ +void +site(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "arguments to SITE command")) { + printf("usage: %s line-to-send\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + quote1("SITE ", argc, argv); +} + +/* + * Turn argv[1..argc) into a space-separated string, then prepend initial text. + * Send the result as a one-line command and get response. + */ +void +quote1(char *initial, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; /* must be >= sizeof(line) */ + + strlcpy(buf, initial, sizeof(buf)); + for(i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + if(i > 1) + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, argv[i], sizeof(buf)); + } + if (command("%s", buf) == PRELIM) { + while (getreply(0) == PRELIM) + continue; + } +} + +void +do_chmod(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "mode")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "file-name")) { +usage: + printf("usage: %s mode file-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + command("SITE CHMOD %s %s", argv[1], argv[2]); +} + +void +do_umask(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + verbose = 1; + command(argc == 1 ? "SITE UMASK" : "SITE UMASK %s", argv[1]); + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +void +ftp_idle(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + verbose = 1; + command(argc == 1 ? "SITE IDLE" : "SITE IDLE %s", argv[1]); + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +/* + * Ask the other side for help. + */ +void +rmthelp(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + verbose = 1; + command(argc == 1 ? "HELP" : "HELP %s", argv[1]); + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +/* + * Terminate session and exit. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +quit(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (connected) + disconnect(0, 0); + pswitch(1); + if (connected) { + disconnect(0, 0); + } + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Terminate session, but don't exit. + */ +void +disconnect(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (!connected) + return; + command("QUIT"); + if (cout) { + fclose(cout); + } + cout = NULL; + connected = 0; + sec_end(); + data = -1; + if (!proxy) { + macnum = 0; + } +} + +int +confirm(char *cmd, char *file) +{ + char line[BUFSIZ]; + + if (!interactive) + return (1); + printf("%s %s? ", cmd, file); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(line, sizeof line, stdin) == NULL) + return (0); + return (*line == 'y' || *line == 'Y'); +} + +void +fatal(char *msg) +{ + + errx(1, "%s", msg); +} + +/* + * Glob a local file name specification with + * the expectation of a single return value. + * Can't control multiple values being expanded + * from the expression, we return only the first. + */ +int +globulize(char **cpp) +{ + glob_t gl; + int flags; + + if (!doglob) + return (1); + + flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + if (glob(*cpp, flags, NULL, &gl) || + gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + warnx("%s: not found", *cpp); + globfree(&gl); + return (0); + } + *cpp = strdup(gl.gl_pathv[0]); /* XXX - wasted memory */ + globfree(&gl); + return (1); +} + +void +account(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char acct[50]; + + if (argc > 1) { + ++argv; + --argc; + strlcpy (acct, *argv, sizeof(acct)); + while (argc > 1) { + --argc; + ++argv; + strlcat(acct, *argv, sizeof(acct)); + } + } + else { + des_read_pw_string(acct, sizeof(acct), "Account:", 0); + } + command("ACCT %s", acct); +} + +jmp_buf abortprox; + +static RETSIGTYPE +proxabort(int sig) +{ + + if (!proxy) { + pswitch(1); + } + if (connected) { + proxflag = 1; + } + else { + proxflag = 0; + } + pswitch(0); + longjmp(abortprox,1); +} + +void +doproxy(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct cmd *c; + RETSIGTYPE (*oldintr)(int); + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "command")) { + printf("usage: %s command\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + c = getcmd(argv[1]); + if (c == (struct cmd *) -1) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\n"); + fflush(stdout); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\n"); + fflush(stdout); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (!c->c_proxy) { + printf("?Invalid proxy command\n"); + fflush(stdout); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (setjmp(abortprox)) { + code = -1; + return; + } + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, proxabort); + pswitch(1); + if (c->c_conn && !connected) { + printf("Not connected\n"); + fflush(stdout); + pswitch(0); + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + (*c->c_handler)(argc-1, argv+1); + if (connected) { + proxflag = 1; + } + else { + proxflag = 0; + } + pswitch(0); + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); +} + +void +setcase(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + mcase = !mcase; + printf("Case mapping %s.\n", onoff(mcase)); + code = mcase; +} + +void +setcr(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + crflag = !crflag; + printf("Carriage Return stripping %s.\n", onoff(crflag)); + code = crflag; +} + +void +setntrans(int argc, char **argv) +{ + if (argc == 1) { + ntflag = 0; + printf("Ntrans off.\n"); + code = ntflag; + return; + } + ntflag++; + code = ntflag; + strlcpy (ntin, argv[1], 17); + if (argc == 2) { + ntout[0] = '\0'; + return; + } + strlcpy (ntout, argv[2], 17); +} + +char * +dotrans(char *name) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + char *cp1, *cp2 = new; + int i, ostop, found; + + for (ostop = 0; *(ntout + ostop) && ostop < 16; ostop++) + continue; + for (cp1 = name; *cp1; cp1++) { + found = 0; + for (i = 0; *(ntin + i) && i < 16; i++) { + if (*cp1 == *(ntin + i)) { + found++; + if (i < ostop) { + *cp2++ = *(ntout + i); + } + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + *cp2++ = *cp1; + } + } + *cp2 = '\0'; + return (new); +} + +void +setnmap(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cp; + + if (argc == 1) { + mapflag = 0; + printf("Nmap off.\n"); + code = mapflag; + return; + } + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "mapout")) { + printf("Usage: %s [mapin mapout]\n",argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mapflag = 1; + code = 1; + cp = strchr(altarg, ' '); + if (proxy) { + while(*++cp == ' ') + continue; + altarg = cp; + cp = strchr(altarg, ' '); + } + *cp = '\0'; + strlcpy(mapin, altarg, MaxPathLen); + while (*++cp == ' ') + continue; + strlcpy(mapout, cp, MaxPathLen); +} + +char * +domap(char *name) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + char *cp1 = name, *cp2 = mapin; + char *tp[9], *te[9]; + int i, toks[9], toknum = 0, match = 1; + + for (i=0; i < 9; ++i) { + toks[i] = 0; + } + while (match && *cp1 && *cp2) { + switch (*cp2) { + case '\\': + if (*++cp2 != *cp1) { + match = 0; + } + break; + case '$': + if (*(cp2+1) >= '1' && (*cp2+1) <= '9') { + if (*cp1 != *(++cp2+1)) { + toks[toknum = *cp2 - '1']++; + tp[toknum] = cp1; + while (*++cp1 && *(cp2+1) + != *cp1); + te[toknum] = cp1; + } + cp2++; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + if (*cp2 != *cp1) { + match = 0; + } + break; + } + if (match && *cp1) { + cp1++; + } + if (match && *cp2) { + cp2++; + } + } + if (!match && *cp1) /* last token mismatch */ + { + toks[toknum] = 0; + } + cp1 = new; + *cp1 = '\0'; + cp2 = mapout; + while (*cp2) { + match = 0; + switch (*cp2) { + case '\\': + if (*(cp2 + 1)) { + *cp1++ = *++cp2; + } + break; + case '[': +LOOP: + if (*++cp2 == '$' && isdigit((unsigned char)*(cp2+1))) { + if (*++cp2 == '0') { + char *cp3 = name; + + while (*cp3) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + match = 1; + } + else if (toks[toknum = *cp2 - '1']) { + char *cp3 = tp[toknum]; + + while (cp3 != te[toknum]) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + match = 1; + } + } + else { + while (*cp2 && *cp2 != ',' && + *cp2 != ']') { + if (*cp2 == '\\') { + cp2++; + } + else if (*cp2 == '$' && + isdigit((unsigned char)*(cp2+1))) { + if (*++cp2 == '0') { + char *cp3 = name; + + while (*cp3) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + else if (toks[toknum = + *cp2 - '1']) { + char *cp3=tp[toknum]; + + while (cp3 != + te[toknum]) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + } + else if (*cp2) { + *cp1++ = *cp2++; + } + } + if (!*cp2) { + printf("nmap: unbalanced brackets\n"); + return (name); + } + match = 1; + cp2--; + } + if (match) { + while (*++cp2 && *cp2 != ']') { + if (*cp2 == '\\' && *(cp2 + 1)) { + cp2++; + } + } + if (!*cp2) { + printf("nmap: unbalanced brackets\n"); + return (name); + } + break; + } + switch (*++cp2) { + case ',': + goto LOOP; + case ']': + break; + default: + cp2--; + goto LOOP; + } + break; + case '$': + if (isdigit((unsigned char)*(cp2 + 1))) { + if (*++cp2 == '0') { + char *cp3 = name; + + while (*cp3) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + else if (toks[toknum = *cp2 - '1']) { + char *cp3 = tp[toknum]; + + while (cp3 != te[toknum]) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + break; + } + /* intentional drop through */ + default: + *cp1++ = *cp2; + break; + } + cp2++; + } + *cp1 = '\0'; + if (!*new) { + return (name); + } + return (new); +} + +void +setpassive(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + passivemode = !passivemode; + printf("Passive mode %s.\n", onoff(passivemode)); + code = passivemode; +} + +void +setsunique(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + sunique = !sunique; + printf("Store unique %s.\n", onoff(sunique)); + code = sunique; +} + +void +setrunique(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + runique = !runique; + printf("Receive unique %s.\n", onoff(runique)); + code = runique; +} + +/* change directory to perent directory */ +void +cdup(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (command("CDUP") == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("CDUP command not recognized, trying XCUP\n"); + command("XCUP"); + } +} + +/* restart transfer at specific point */ +void +restart(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc != 2) + printf("restart: offset not specified\n"); + else { + restart_point = atol(argv[1]); + printf("restarting at %ld. %s\n", (long)restart_point, + "execute get, put or append to initiate transfer"); + } +} + +/* show remote system type */ +void +syst(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + command("SYST"); +} + +void +macdef(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *tmp; + int c; + + if (macnum == 16) { + printf("Limit of 16 macros have already been defined\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "macro name")) { + printf("Usage: %s macro_name\n",argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (interactive) { + printf("Enter macro line by line, terminating it with a null line\n"); + } + strlcpy(macros[macnum].mac_name, + argv[1], + sizeof(macros[macnum].mac_name)); + if (macnum == 0) { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macbuf; + } + else { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macros[macnum - 1].mac_end + 1; + } + tmp = macros[macnum].mac_start; + while (tmp != macbuf+4096) { + if ((c = getchar()) == EOF) { + printf("macdef:end of file encountered\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + if ((*tmp = c) == '\n') { + if (tmp == macros[macnum].mac_start) { + macros[macnum++].mac_end = tmp; + code = 0; + return; + } + if (*(tmp-1) == '\0') { + macros[macnum++].mac_end = tmp - 1; + code = 0; + return; + } + *tmp = '\0'; + } + tmp++; + } + while (1) { + while ((c = getchar()) != '\n' && c != EOF) + /* LOOP */; + if (c == EOF || getchar() == '\n') { + printf("Macro not defined - 4k buffer exceeded\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + } +} + +/* + * get size of file on remote machine + */ +void +sizecmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "filename")) { + printf("usage: %s filename\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + command("SIZE %s", argv[1]); +} + +/* + * get last modification time of file on remote machine + */ +void +modtime(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int overbose; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "filename")) { + printf("usage: %s filename\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + if (command("MDTM %s", argv[1]) == COMPLETE) { + int yy, mo, day, hour, min, sec; + sscanf(reply_string, "%*s %04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", &yy, &mo, + &day, &hour, &min, &sec); + /* might want to print this in local time */ + printf("%s\t%02d/%02d/%04d %02d:%02d:%02d GMT\n", argv[1], + mo, day, yy, hour, min, sec); + } else + printf("%s\n", reply_string); + verbose = overbose; +} + +/* + * show status on reomte machine + */ +void +rmtstatus(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + command(argc > 1 ? "STAT %s" : "STAT" , argv[1]); +} + +/* + * get file if modtime is more recent than current file + */ +void +newer(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (getit(argc, argv, -1, curtype == TYPE_I ? "wb" : "w")) + printf("Local file \"%s\" is newer than remote file \"%s\"\n", + argv[2], argv[1]); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5dc96efa36 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" + +/* + * User FTP -- Command Tables. + */ + +char accounthelp[] = "send account command to remote server"; +char appendhelp[] = "append to a file"; +char asciihelp[] = "set ascii transfer type"; +char beephelp[] = "beep when command completed"; +char binaryhelp[] = "set binary transfer type"; +char casehelp[] = "toggle mget upper/lower case id mapping"; +char cdhelp[] = "change remote working directory"; +char cduphelp[] = "change remote working directory to parent directory"; +char chmodhelp[] = "change file permissions of remote file"; +char connecthelp[] = "connect to remote tftp"; +char crhelp[] = "toggle carriage return stripping on ascii gets"; +char deletehelp[] = "delete remote file"; +char debughelp[] = "toggle/set debugging mode"; +char dirhelp[] = "list contents of remote directory"; +char disconhelp[] = "terminate ftp session"; +char domachelp[] = "execute macro"; +char formhelp[] = "set file transfer format"; +char globhelp[] = "toggle metacharacter expansion of local file names"; +char hashhelp[] = "toggle printing `#' for each buffer transferred"; +char helphelp[] = "print local help information"; +char idlehelp[] = "get (set) idle timer on remote side"; +char lcdhelp[] = "change local working directory"; +char lshelp[] = "list contents of remote directory"; +char macdefhelp[] = "define a macro"; +char mdeletehelp[] = "delete multiple files"; +char mdirhelp[] = "list contents of multiple remote directories"; +char mgethelp[] = "get multiple files"; +char mkdirhelp[] = "make directory on the remote machine"; +char mlshelp[] = "list contents of multiple remote directories"; +char modtimehelp[] = "show last modification time of remote file"; +char modehelp[] = "set file transfer mode"; +char mputhelp[] = "send multiple files"; +char newerhelp[] = "get file if remote file is newer than local file "; +char nlisthelp[] = "nlist contents of remote directory"; +char nmaphelp[] = "set templates for default file name mapping"; +char ntranshelp[] = "set translation table for default file name mapping"; +char porthelp[] = "toggle use of PORT cmd for each data connection"; +char prompthelp[] = "force interactive prompting on multiple commands"; +char proxyhelp[] = "issue command on alternate connection"; +char pwdhelp[] = "print working directory on remote machine"; +char quithelp[] = "terminate ftp session and exit"; +char quotehelp[] = "send arbitrary ftp command"; +char receivehelp[] = "receive file"; +char regethelp[] = "get file restarting at end of local file"; +char remotehelp[] = "get help from remote server"; +char renamehelp[] = "rename file"; +char restarthelp[]= "restart file transfer at bytecount"; +char rmdirhelp[] = "remove directory on the remote machine"; +char rmtstatushelp[]="show status of remote machine"; +char runiquehelp[] = "toggle store unique for local files"; +char resethelp[] = "clear queued command replies"; +char sendhelp[] = "send one file"; +char passivehelp[] = "enter passive transfer mode"; +char sitehelp[] = "send site specific command to remote server\n\t\tTry \"rhelp site\" or \"site help\" for more information"; +char shellhelp[] = "escape to the shell"; +char sizecmdhelp[] = "show size of remote file"; +char statushelp[] = "show current status"; +char structhelp[] = "set file transfer structure"; +char suniquehelp[] = "toggle store unique on remote machine"; +char systemhelp[] = "show remote system type"; +char tenexhelp[] = "set tenex file transfer type"; +char tracehelp[] = "toggle packet tracing"; +char typehelp[] = "set file transfer type"; +char umaskhelp[] = "get (set) umask on remote side"; +char userhelp[] = "send new user information"; +char verbosehelp[] = "toggle verbose mode"; + +char prothelp[] = "set protection level"; +#ifdef KRB4 +char kauthhelp[] = "get remote tokens"; +char klisthelp[] = "show remote tickets"; +char kdestroyhelp[] = "destroy remote tickets"; +char krbtkfilehelp[] = "set filename of remote tickets"; +char afsloghelp[] = "obtain remote AFS tokens"; +#endif + +struct cmd cmdtab[] = { + { "!", shellhelp, 0, 0, 0, shell }, + { "$", domachelp, 1, 0, 0, domacro }, + { "account", accounthelp, 0, 1, 1, account}, + { "append", appendhelp, 1, 1, 1, put }, + { "ascii", asciihelp, 0, 1, 1, setascii }, + { "bell", beephelp, 0, 0, 0, setbell }, + { "binary", binaryhelp, 0, 1, 1, setbinary }, + { "bye", quithelp, 0, 0, 0, quit }, + { "case", casehelp, 0, 0, 1, setcase }, + { "cd", cdhelp, 0, 1, 1, cd }, + { "cdup", cduphelp, 0, 1, 1, cdup }, + { "chmod", chmodhelp, 0, 1, 1, do_chmod }, + { "close", disconhelp, 0, 1, 1, disconnect }, + { "cr", crhelp, 0, 0, 0, setcr }, + { "delete", deletehelp, 0, 1, 1, delete }, + { "debug", debughelp, 0, 0, 0, setdebug }, + { "dir", dirhelp, 1, 1, 1, ls }, + { "disconnect", disconhelp, 0, 1, 1, disconnect }, + { "form", formhelp, 0, 1, 1, setform }, + { "get", receivehelp, 1, 1, 1, get }, + { "glob", globhelp, 0, 0, 0, setglob }, + { "hash", hashhelp, 0, 0, 0, sethash }, + { "help", helphelp, 0, 0, 1, help }, + { "idle", idlehelp, 0, 1, 1, ftp_idle }, + { "image", binaryhelp, 0, 1, 1, setbinary }, + { "lcd", lcdhelp, 0, 0, 0, lcd }, + { "ls", lshelp, 1, 1, 1, ls }, + { "macdef", macdefhelp, 0, 0, 0, macdef }, + { "mdelete", mdeletehelp, 1, 1, 1, mdelete }, + { "mdir", mdirhelp, 1, 1, 1, mls }, + { "mget", mgethelp, 1, 1, 1, mget }, + { "mkdir", mkdirhelp, 0, 1, 1, makedir }, + { "mls", mlshelp, 1, 1, 1, mls }, + { "mode", modehelp, 0, 1, 1, setftmode }, + { "modtime", modtimehelp, 0, 1, 1, modtime }, + { "mput", mputhelp, 1, 1, 1, mput }, + { "newer", newerhelp, 1, 1, 1, newer }, + { "nmap", nmaphelp, 0, 0, 1, setnmap }, + { "nlist", nlisthelp, 1, 1, 1, ls }, + { "ntrans", ntranshelp, 0, 0, 1, setntrans }, + { "open", connecthelp, 0, 0, 1, setpeer }, + { "passive", passivehelp, 0, 0, 0, setpassive }, + { "prompt", prompthelp, 0, 0, 0, setprompt }, + { "proxy", proxyhelp, 0, 0, 1, doproxy }, + { "sendport", porthelp, 0, 0, 0, setport }, + { "put", sendhelp, 1, 1, 1, put }, + { "pwd", pwdhelp, 0, 1, 1, pwd }, + { "quit", quithelp, 0, 0, 0, quit }, + { "quote", quotehelp, 1, 1, 1, quote }, + { "recv", receivehelp, 1, 1, 1, get }, + { "reget", regethelp, 1, 1, 1, reget }, + { "rstatus", rmtstatushelp, 0, 1, 1, rmtstatus }, + { "rhelp", remotehelp, 0, 1, 1, rmthelp }, + { "rename", renamehelp, 0, 1, 1, renamefile }, + { "reset", resethelp, 0, 1, 1, reset }, + { "restart", restarthelp, 1, 1, 1, restart }, + { "rmdir", rmdirhelp, 0, 1, 1, removedir }, + { "runique", runiquehelp, 0, 0, 1, setrunique }, + { "send", sendhelp, 1, 1, 1, put }, + { "site", sitehelp, 0, 1, 1, site }, + { "size", sizecmdhelp, 1, 1, 1, sizecmd }, + { "status", statushelp, 0, 0, 1, status }, + { "struct", structhelp, 0, 1, 1, setstruct }, + { "system", systemhelp, 0, 1, 1, syst }, + { "sunique", suniquehelp, 0, 0, 1, setsunique }, + { "tenex", tenexhelp, 0, 1, 1, settenex }, + { "trace", tracehelp, 0, 0, 0, settrace }, + { "type", typehelp, 0, 1, 1, settype }, + { "user", userhelp, 0, 1, 1, user }, + { "umask", umaskhelp, 0, 1, 1, do_umask }, + { "verbose", verbosehelp, 0, 0, 0, setverbose }, + { "?", helphelp, 0, 0, 1, help }, + + { "prot", prothelp, 0, 1, 0, sec_prot }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "kauth", kauthhelp, 0, 1, 0, kauth }, + { "klist", klisthelp, 0, 1, 0, klist }, + { "kdestroy", kdestroyhelp, 0, 1, 0, kdestroy }, + { "krbtkfile", krbtkfilehelp, 0, 1, 0, krbtkfile }, + { "afslog", afsloghelp, 0, 1, 0, afslog }, +#endif + + { 0 }, +}; + +int NCMDS = (sizeof (cmdtab) / sizeof (cmdtab[0])) - 1; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d91660d014 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: domacro.c,v 1.7 1999/09/16 20:37:29 assar Exp $"); + +void +domacro(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j, count = 2, loopflg = 0; + char *cp1, *cp2, line2[200]; + struct cmd *c; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "macro name")) { + printf("Usage: %s macro_name.\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + for (i = 0; i < macnum; ++i) { + if (!strncmp(argv[1], macros[i].mac_name, 9)) { + break; + } + } + if (i == macnum) { + printf("'%s' macro not found.\n", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + strlcpy(line2, line, sizeof(line2)); +TOP: + cp1 = macros[i].mac_start; + while (cp1 != macros[i].mac_end) { + while (isspace(*cp1)) { + cp1++; + } + cp2 = line; + while (*cp1 != '\0') { + switch(*cp1) { + case '\\': + *cp2++ = *++cp1; + break; + case '$': + if (isdigit(*(cp1+1))) { + j = 0; + while (isdigit(*++cp1)) { + j = 10*j + *cp1 - '0'; + } + cp1--; + if (argc - 2 >= j) { + strcpy(cp2, argv[j+1]); + cp2 += strlen(argv[j+1]); + } + break; + } + if (*(cp1+1) == 'i') { + loopflg = 1; + cp1++; + if (count < argc) { + strcpy(cp2, argv[count]); + cp2 += strlen(argv[count]); + } + break; + } + /* intentional drop through */ + default: + *cp2++ = *cp1; + break; + } + if (*cp1 != '\0') { + cp1++; + } + } + *cp2 = '\0'; + makeargv(); + c = getcmd(margv[0]); + if (c == (struct cmd *)-1) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\n"); + code = -1; + } + else if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\n"); + code = -1; + } + else if (c->c_conn && !connected) { + printf("Not connected.\n"); + code = -1; + } + else { + if (verbose) { + printf("%s\n",line); + } + (*c->c_handler)(margc, margv); + if (bell && c->c_bell) { + putchar('\007'); + } + strcpy(line, line2); + makeargv(); + argc = margc; + argv = margv; + } + if (cp1 != macros[i].mac_end) { + cp1++; + } + } + if (loopflg && ++count < argc) { + goto TOP; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..337bed674d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1994 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)extern.h 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/9/94 + */ + +/* $Id: extern.h,v 1.19 2000/09/19 13:15:12 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif + +void abort_remote (FILE *); +void abortpt (int); +void abortrecv (int); +void account (int, char **); +int another (int *, char ***, char *); +void blkfree (char **); +void cd (int, char **); +void cdup (int, char **); +void changetype (int, int); +void cmdabort (int); +void cmdscanner (int); +int command (char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1,2))); +int confirm (char *, char *); +FILE *dataconn (const char *); +void delete (int, char **); +void disconnect (int, char **); +void do_chmod (int, char **); +void do_umask (int, char **); +void domacro (int, char **); +char *domap (char *); +void doproxy (int, char **); +char *dotrans (char *); +int empty (fd_set *, int); +void fatal (char *); +void get (int, char **); +struct cmd *getcmd (char *); +int getit (int, char **, int, char *); +int getreply (int); +int globulize (char **); +char *gunique (char *); +void help (int, char **); +char *hookup (const char *, int); +void ftp_idle (int, char **); +int initconn (void); +void intr (int); +void lcd (int, char **); +int login (char *); +RETSIGTYPE lostpeer (int); +void ls (int, char **); +void macdef (int, char **); +void makeargv (void); +void makedir (int, char **); +void mdelete (int, char **); +void mget (int, char **); +void mls (int, char **); +void modtime (int, char **); +void mput (int, char **); +char *onoff (int); +void newer (int, char **); +void proxtrans (char *, char *, char *); +void psabort (int); +void pswitch (int); +void ptransfer (char *, long, struct timeval *, struct timeval *); +void put (int, char **); +void pwd (int, char **); +void quit (int, char **); +void quote (int, char **); +void quote1 (char *, int, char **); +void recvrequest (char *, char *, char *, char *, int, int); +void reget (int, char **); +char *remglob (char **, int); +void removedir (int, char **); +void renamefile (int, char **); +void reset (int, char **); +void restart (int, char **); +void rmthelp (int, char **); +void rmtstatus (int, char **); +int ruserpass (char *, char **, char **, char **); +void sendrequest (char *, char *, char *, char *, int); +void setascii (int, char **); +void setbell (int, char **); +void setbinary (int, char **); +void setcase (int, char **); +void setcr (int, char **); +void setdebug (int, char **); +void setform (int, char **); +void setftmode (int, char **); +void setglob (int, char **); +void sethash (int, char **); +void setnmap (int, char **); +void setntrans (int, char **); +void setpassive (int, char **); +void setpeer (int, char **); +void setport (int, char **); +void setprompt (int, char **); +void setrunique (int, char **); +void setstruct (int, char **); +void setsunique (int, char **); +void settenex (int, char **); +void settrace (int, char **); +void settype (int, char **); +void setverbose (int, char **); +void shell (int, char **); +void site (int, char **); +void sizecmd (int, char **); +char *slurpstring (void); +void status (int, char **); +void syst (int, char **); +void tvsub (struct timeval *, struct timeval *, struct timeval *); +void user (int, char **); + +extern jmp_buf abortprox; +extern int abrtflag; +extern struct cmd cmdtab[]; +extern FILE *cout; +extern int data; +extern char *home; +extern jmp_buf jabort; +extern int proxy; +extern char reply_string[]; +extern off_t restart_point; +extern int NCMDS; + +extern char username[32]; +extern char myhostname[]; +extern char *mydomain; + +void afslog (int, char **); +void kauth (int, char **); +void kdestroy (int, char **); +void klist (int, char **); +void krbtkfile (int, char **); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..282aab82bf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,1201 @@ +.\" $NetBSD: ftp.1,v 1.11 1995/09/08 01:06:24 tls Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1990, 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)ftp.1 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/9/94 +.\" +.Dd April 27, 1996 +.Dt FTP 1 +.Os BSD 4.2 +.Sh NAME +.Nm ftp +.Nd +.Tn ARPANET +file transfer program +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ftp +.Op Fl t +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl i +.Op Fl n +.Op Fl g +.Op Fl p +.Op Fl l +.Op Fl -no-gss-bindings +.Op Ar host +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm Ftp +is the user interface to the +.Tn ARPANET +standard File Transfer Protocol. +The program allows a user to transfer files to and from a +remote network site. +.Pp +Modifications has been made so that it almost follows the ftpsec +Internet draft. +.Pp +Options may be specified at the command line, or to the +command interpreter. +.Bl -tag -width flag +.It Fl t +Enables packet tracing. +.It Fl v +Verbose option forces +.Nm ftp +to show all responses from the remote server, as well +as report on data transfer statistics. +.It Fl n +Restrains +.Nm ftp +from attempting \*(Lqauto-login\*(Rq upon initial connection. +If auto-login is enabled, +.Nm ftp +will check the +.Pa .netrc +(see below) file in the user's home directory for an entry describing +an account on the remote machine. +If no entry exists, +.Nm ftp +will prompt for the remote machine login name (default is the user +identity on the local machine), and, if necessary, prompt for a password +and an account with which to login. +.It Fl i +Turns off interactive prompting during +multiple file transfers. +.It Fl p +Turn on passive mode. +.It Fl d +Enables debugging. +.It Fl g +Disables file name globbing. +.It Fl -no-gss-bindings +use GSS-API bindings when talking to peer (ie make sure IP addresses match). +.It Fl l +Disables command line editing. +.El +.Pp +The client host with which +.Nm ftp +is to communicate may be specified on the command line. +If this is done, +.Nm ftp +will immediately attempt to establish a connection to an +.Tn FTP +server on that host; otherwise, +.Nm ftp +will enter its command interpreter and await instructions +from the user. +When +.Nm ftp +is awaiting commands from the user the prompt +.Ql ftp\*[Gt] +is provided to the user. +The following commands are recognized +by +.Nm ftp : +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ic \&! Op Ar command Op Ar args +Invoke an interactive shell on the local machine. +If there are arguments, the first is taken to be a command to execute +directly, with the rest of the arguments as its arguments. +.It Ic \&$ Ar macro-name Op Ar args +Execute the macro +.Ar macro-name +that was defined with the +.Ic macdef +command. +Arguments are passed to the macro unglobbed. +.It Ic account Op Ar passwd +Supply a supplemental password required by a remote system for access +to resources once a login has been successfully completed. +If no argument is included, the user will be prompted for an account +password in a non-echoing input mode. +.It Ic append Ar local-file Op Ar remote-file +Append a local file to a file on the remote machine. +If +.Ar remote-file +is left unspecified, the local file name is used in naming the +remote file after being altered by any +.Ic ntrans +or +.Ic nmap +setting. +File transfer uses the current settings for +.Ic type , +.Ic format , +.Ic mode , +and +.Ic structure . +.It Ic ascii +Set the file transfer +.Ic type +to network +.Tn ASCII . +This is the default type. +.It Ic bell +Arrange that a bell be sounded after each file transfer +command is completed. +.It Ic binary +Set the file transfer +.Ic type +to support binary image transfer. +.It Ic bye +Terminate the +.Tn FTP +session with the remote server +and exit +.Nm ftp . +An end of file will also terminate the session and exit. +.It Ic case +Toggle remote computer file name case mapping during +.Ic mget +commands. +When +.Ic case +is on (default is off), remote computer file names with all letters in +upper case are written in the local directory with the letters mapped +to lower case. +.It Ic \&cd Ar remote-directory +Change the working directory on the remote machine +to +.Ar remote-directory . +.It Ic cdup +Change the remote machine working directory to the parent of the +current remote machine working directory. +.It Ic chmod Ar mode file-name +Change the permission modes of the file +.Ar file-name +on the remote +sytem to +.Ar mode . +.It Ic close +Terminate the +.Tn FTP +session with the remote server, and +return to the command interpreter. +Any defined macros are erased. +.It Ic \&cr +Toggle carriage return stripping during +ascii type file retrieval. +Records are denoted by a carriage return/linefeed sequence +during ascii type file transfer. +When +.Ic \&cr +is on (the default), carriage returns are stripped from this +sequence to conform with the +.Ux +single linefeed record +delimiter. +Records on +.Pf non\- Ns Ux +remote systems may contain single linefeeds; +when an ascii type transfer is made, these linefeeds may be +distinguished from a record delimiter only when +.Ic \&cr +is off. +.It Ic delete Ar remote-file +Delete the file +.Ar remote-file +on the remote machine. +.It Ic debug Op Ar debug-value +Toggle debugging mode. +If an optional +.Ar debug-value +is specified it is used to set the debugging level. +When debugging is on, +.Nm ftp +prints each command sent to the remote machine, preceded +by the string +.Ql \-\-\*[Gt] +.It Xo +.Ic dir +.Op Ar remote-directory +.Op Ar local-file +.Xc +Print a listing of the directory contents in the +directory, +.Ar remote-directory , +and, optionally, placing the output in +.Ar local-file . +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic dir +output. +If no directory is specified, the current working +directory on the remote machine is used. +If no local +file is specified, or +.Ar local-file +is +.Fl , +output comes to the terminal. +.It Ic disconnect +A synonym for +.Ar close . +.It Ic form Ar format +Set the file transfer +.Ic form +to +.Ar format . +The default format is \*(Lqfile\*(Rq. +.It Ic get Ar remote-file Op Ar local-file +Retrieve the +.Ar remote-file +and store it on the local machine. +If the local +file name is not specified, it is given the same +name it has on the remote machine, subject to +alteration by the current +.Ic case , +.Ic ntrans , +and +.Ic nmap +settings. +The current settings for +.Ic type , +.Ic form , +.Ic mode , +and +.Ic structure +are used while transferring the file. +.It Ic glob +Toggle filename expansion for +.Ic mdelete , +.Ic mget +and +.Ic mput . +If globbing is turned off with +.Ic glob , +the file name arguments +are taken literally and not expanded. +Globbing for +.Ic mput +is done as in +.Xr csh 1 . +For +.Ic mdelete +and +.Ic mget , +each remote file name is expanded +separately on the remote machine and the lists are not merged. +Expansion of a directory name is likely to be +different from expansion of the name of an ordinary file: +the exact result depends on the foreign operating system and ftp server, +and can be previewed by doing +.Ql mls remote-files \- . +As a security measure, remotely globbed files that starts with +.Sq / +or contains +.Sq ../ , +will not be automatically received. If you have interactive prompting +turned off, these filenames will be ignored. Note: +.Ic mget +and +.Ic mput +are not meant to transfer +entire directory subtrees of files. +That can be done by +transferring a +.Xr tar 1 +archive of the subtree (in binary mode). +.It Ic hash +Toggle hash-sign (``#'') printing for each data block +transferred. +The size of a data block is 1024 bytes. +.It Ic help Op Ar command +Print an informative message about the meaning of +.Ar command . +If no argument is given, +.Nm ftp +prints a list of the known commands. +.It Ic idle Op Ar seconds +Set the inactivity timer on the remote server to +.Ar seconds +seconds. +If +.Ar seconds +is omitted, the current inactivity timer is printed. +.It Ic lcd Op Ar directory +Change the working directory on the local machine. +If +no +.Ar directory +is specified, the user's home directory is used. +.It Xo +.Ic \&ls +.Op Ar remote-directory +.Op Ar local-file +.Xc +Print a listing of the contents of a +directory on the remote machine. +The listing includes any system-dependent information that the server +chooses to include; for example, most +.Ux +systems will produce +output from the command +.Ql ls \-l . +(See also +.Ic nlist . ) +If +.Ar remote-directory +is left unspecified, the current working directory is used. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic \&ls +output. +If no local file is specified, or if +.Ar local-file +is +.Sq Fl , +the output is sent to the terminal. +.It Ic macdef Ar macro-name +Define a macro. +Subsequent lines are stored as the macro +.Ar macro-name ; +a null line (consecutive newline characters +in a file or +carriage returns from the terminal) terminates macro input mode. +There is a limit of 16 macros and 4096 total characters in all +defined macros. +Macros remain defined until a +.Ic close +command is executed. +The macro processor interprets `$' and `\e' as special characters. +A `$' followed by a number (or numbers) is replaced by the +corresponding argument on the macro invocation command line. +A `$' followed by an `i' signals that macro processor that the +executing macro is to be looped. +On the first pass `$i' is +replaced by the first argument on the macro invocation command line, +on the second pass it is replaced by the second argument, and so on. +A `\e' followed by any character is replaced by that character. +Use the `\e' to prevent special treatment of the `$'. +.It Ic mdelete Op Ar remote-files +Delete the +.Ar remote-files +on the remote machine. +.It Ic mdir Ar remote-files local-file +Like +.Ic dir , +except multiple remote files may be specified. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic mdir +output. +.It Ic mget Ar remote-files +Expand the +.Ar remote-files +on the remote machine +and do a +.Ic get +for each file name thus produced. +See +.Ic glob +for details on the filename expansion. +Resulting file names will then be processed according to +.Ic case , +.Ic ntrans , +and +.Ic nmap +settings. +Files are transferred into the local working directory, +which can be changed with +.Ql lcd directory ; +new local directories can be created with +.Ql "\&! mkdir directory" . +.It Ic mkdir Ar directory-name +Make a directory on the remote machine. +.It Ic mls Ar remote-files local-file +Like +.Ic nlist , +except multiple remote files may be specified, +and the +.Ar local-file +must be specified. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic mls +output. +.It Ic mode Op Ar mode-name +Set the file transfer +.Ic mode +to +.Ar mode-name . +The default mode is \*(Lqstream\*(Rq mode. +.It Ic modtime Ar file-name +Show the last modification time of the file on the remote machine. +.It Ic mput Ar local-files +Expand wild cards in the list of local files given as arguments +and do a +.Ic put +for each file in the resulting list. +See +.Ic glob +for details of filename expansion. +Resulting file names will then be processed according to +.Ic ntrans +and +.Ic nmap +settings. +.It Ic newer Ar file-name +Get the file only if the modification time of the remote file is more +recent that the file on the current system. +If the file does not +exist on the current system, the remote file is considered +.Ic newer . +Otherwise, this command is identical to +.Ar get . +.It Xo +.Ic nlist +.Op Ar remote-directory +.Op Ar local-file +.Xc +Print a list of the files in a +directory on the remote machine. +If +.Ar remote-directory +is left unspecified, the current working directory is used. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic nlist +output. +If no local file is specified, or if +.Ar local-file +is +.Fl , +the output is sent to the terminal. +.It Ic nmap Op Ar inpattern outpattern +Set or unset the filename mapping mechanism. +If no arguments are specified, the filename mapping mechanism is unset. +If arguments are specified, remote filenames are mapped during +.Ic mput +commands and +.Ic put +commands issued without a specified remote target filename. +If arguments are specified, local filenames are mapped during +.Ic mget +commands and +.Ic get +commands issued without a specified local target filename. +This command is useful when connecting to a +.No non\- Ns Ux +remote computer +with different file naming conventions or practices. +The mapping follows the pattern set by +.Ar inpattern +and +.Ar outpattern . +.Op Ar Inpattern +is a template for incoming filenames (which may have already been +processed according to the +.Ic ntrans +and +.Ic case +settings). +Variable templating is accomplished by including the +sequences `$1', `$2', ..., `$9' in +.Ar inpattern . +Use `\\' to prevent this special treatment of the `$' character. +All other characters are treated literally, and are used to determine the +.Ic nmap +.Op Ar inpattern +variable values. +For example, given +.Ar inpattern +$1.$2 and the remote file name "mydata.data", $1 would have the value +"mydata", and $2 would have the value "data". +The +.Ar outpattern +determines the resulting mapped filename. +The sequences `$1', `$2', ...., `$9' are replaced by any value resulting +from the +.Ar inpattern +template. +The sequence `$0' is replace by the original filename. +Additionally, the sequence +.Ql Op Ar seq1 , Ar seq2 +is replaced by +.Op Ar seq1 +if +.Ar seq1 +is not a null string; otherwise it is replaced by +.Ar seq2 . +For example, the command +.Pp +.Bd -literal -offset indent -compact +nmap $1.$2.$3 [$1,$2].[$2,file] +.Ed +.Pp +would yield +the output filename "myfile.data" for input filenames "myfile.data" and +"myfile.data.old", "myfile.file" for the input filename "myfile", and +"myfile.myfile" for the input filename ".myfile". +Spaces may be included in +.Ar outpattern , +as in the example: `nmap $1 sed "s/ *$//" \*[Gt] $1' . +Use the `\e' character to prevent special treatment +of the `$','[','[', and `,' characters. +.It Ic ntrans Op Ar inchars Op Ar outchars +Set or unset the filename character translation mechanism. +If no arguments are specified, the filename character +translation mechanism is unset. +If arguments are specified, characters in +remote filenames are translated during +.Ic mput +commands and +.Ic put +commands issued without a specified remote target filename. +If arguments are specified, characters in +local filenames are translated during +.Ic mget +commands and +.Ic get +commands issued without a specified local target filename. +This command is useful when connecting to a +.No non\- Ns Ux +remote computer +with different file naming conventions or practices. +Characters in a filename matching a character in +.Ar inchars +are replaced with the corresponding character in +.Ar outchars . +If the character's position in +.Ar inchars +is longer than the length of +.Ar outchars , +the character is deleted from the file name. +.It Ic open Ar host Op Ar port +Establish a connection to the specified +.Ar host +.Tn FTP +server. +An optional port number may be supplied, +in which case, +.Nm ftp +will attempt to contact an +.Tn FTP +server at that port. +If the +.Ic auto-login +option is on (default), +.Nm ftp +will also attempt to automatically log the user in to +the +.Tn FTP +server (see below). +.It Ic passive +Toggle passive mode. If passive mode is turned on +(default is off), the ftp client will +send a +.Dv PASV +command for all data connections instead of the usual +.Dv PORT +command. The +.Dv PASV +command requests that the remote server open a port for the data connection +and return the address of that port. The remote server listens on that +port and the client connects to it. When using the more traditional +.Dv PORT +command, the client listens on a port and sends that address to the remote +server, who connects back to it. Passive mode is useful when using +.Nm ftp +through a gateway router or host that controls the directionality of +traffic. +(Note that though ftp servers are required to support the +.Dv PASV +command by RFC 1123, some do not.) +.It Ic prompt +Toggle interactive prompting. +Interactive prompting +occurs during multiple file transfers to allow the +user to selectively retrieve or store files. +If prompting is turned off (default is on), any +.Ic mget +or +.Ic mput +will transfer all files, and any +.Ic mdelete +will delete all files. +.It Ic proxy Ar ftp-command +Execute an ftp command on a secondary control connection. +This command allows simultaneous connection to two remote ftp +servers for transferring files between the two servers. +The first +.Ic proxy +command should be an +.Ic open , +to establish the secondary control connection. +Enter the command "proxy ?" to see other ftp commands executable on the +secondary connection. +The following commands behave differently when prefaced by +.Ic proxy : +.Ic open +will not define new macros during the auto-login process, +.Ic close +will not erase existing macro definitions, +.Ic get +and +.Ic mget +transfer files from the host on the primary control connection +to the host on the secondary control connection, and +.Ic put , +.Ic mput , +and +.Ic append +transfer files from the host on the secondary control connection +to the host on the primary control connection. +Third party file transfers depend upon support of the ftp protocol +.Dv PASV +command by the server on the secondary control connection. +.It Ic put Ar local-file Op Ar remote-file +Store a local file on the remote machine. +If +.Ar remote-file +is left unspecified, the local file name is used +after processing according to any +.Ic ntrans +or +.Ic nmap +settings +in naming the remote file. +File transfer uses the +current settings for +.Ic type , +.Ic format , +.Ic mode , +and +.Ic structure . +.It Ic pwd +Print the name of the current working directory on the remote +machine. +.It Ic quit +A synonym for +.Ic bye . +.It Ic quote Ar arg1 arg2 ... +The arguments specified are sent, verbatim, to the remote +.Tn FTP +server. +.It Ic recv Ar remote-file Op Ar local-file +A synonym for get. +.It Ic reget Ar remote-file Op Ar local-file +Reget acts like get, except that if +.Ar local-file +exists and is +smaller than +.Ar remote-file , +.Ar local-file +is presumed to be +a partially transferred copy of +.Ar remote-file +and the transfer +is continued from the apparent point of failure. +This command +is useful when transferring very large files over networks that +are prone to dropping connections. +.It Ic remotehelp Op Ar command-name +Request help from the remote +.Tn FTP +server. +If a +.Ar command-name +is specified it is supplied to the server as well. +.It Ic remotestatus Op Ar file-name +With no arguments, show status of remote machine. +If +.Ar file-name +is specified, show status of +.Ar file-name +on remote machine. +.It Xo +.Ic rename +.Op Ar from +.Op Ar to +.Xc +Rename the file +.Ar from +on the remote machine, to the file +.Ar to . +.It Ic reset +Clear reply queue. +This command re-synchronizes command/reply sequencing with the remote +ftp server. +Resynchronization may be necessary following a violation of the ftp protocol +by the remote server. +.It Ic restart Ar marker +Restart the immediately following +.Ic get +or +.Ic put +at the +indicated +.Ar marker . +On +.Ux +systems, marker is usually a byte +offset into the file. +.It Ic rmdir Ar directory-name +Delete a directory on the remote machine. +.It Ic runique +Toggle storing of files on the local system with unique filenames. +If a file already exists with a name equal to the target +local filename for a +.Ic get +or +.Ic mget +command, a ".1" is appended to the name. +If the resulting name matches another existing file, +a ".2" is appended to the original name. +If this process continues up to ".99", an error +message is printed, and the transfer does not take place. +The generated unique filename will be reported. +Note that +.Ic runique +will not affect local files generated from a shell command +(see below). +The default value is off. +.It Ic send Ar local-file Op Ar remote-file +A synonym for put. +.It Ic sendport +Toggle the use of +.Dv PORT +commands. +By default, +.Nm ftp +will attempt to use a +.Dv PORT +command when establishing +a connection for each data transfer. +The use of +.Dv PORT +commands can prevent delays +when performing multiple file transfers. +If the +.Dv PORT +command fails, +.Nm ftp +will use the default data port. +When the use of +.Dv PORT +commands is disabled, no attempt will be made to use +.Dv PORT +commands for each data transfer. +This is useful +for certain +.Tn FTP +implementations which do ignore +.Dv PORT +commands but, incorrectly, indicate they've been accepted. +.It Ic site Ar arg1 arg2 ... +The arguments specified are sent, verbatim, to the remote +.Tn FTP +server as a +.Dv SITE +command. +.It Ic size Ar file-name +Return size of +.Ar file-name +on remote machine. +.It Ic status +Show the current status of +.Nm ftp . +.It Ic struct Op Ar struct-name +Set the file transfer +.Ar structure +to +.Ar struct-name . +By default \*(Lqstream\*(Rq structure is used. +.It Ic sunique +Toggle storing of files on remote machine under unique file names. +Remote ftp server must support ftp protocol +.Dv STOU +command for +successful completion. +The remote server will report unique name. +Default value is off. +.It Ic system +Show the type of operating system running on the remote machine. +.It Ic tenex +Set the file transfer type to that needed to +talk to +.Tn TENEX +machines. +.It Ic trace +Toggle packet tracing. +.It Ic type Op Ar type-name +Set the file transfer +.Ic type +to +.Ar type-name . +If no type is specified, the current type +is printed. +The default type is network +.Tn ASCII . +.It Ic umask Op Ar newmask +Set the default umask on the remote server to +.Ar newmask . +If +.Ar newmask +is omitted, the current umask is printed. +.It Xo +.Ic user Ar user-name +.Op Ar password +.Op Ar account +.Xc +Identify yourself to the remote +.Tn FTP +server. +If the +.Ar password +is not specified and the server requires it, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user for it (after disabling local echo). +If an +.Ar account +field is not specified, and the +.Tn FTP +server +requires it, the user will be prompted for it. +If an +.Ar account +field is specified, an account command will +be relayed to the remote server after the login sequence +is completed if the remote server did not require it +for logging in. +Unless +.Nm ftp +is invoked with \*(Lqauto-login\*(Rq disabled, this +process is done automatically on initial connection to +the +.Tn FTP +server. +.It Ic verbose +Toggle verbose mode. +In verbose mode, all responses from +the +.Tn FTP +server are displayed to the user. +In addition, +if verbose is on, when a file transfer completes, statistics +regarding the efficiency of the transfer are reported. +By default, +verbose is on. +.It Ic \&? Op Ar command +A synonym for help. +.El +.Pp +The following command can be used with ftpsec-aware servers. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Xo +.Ic prot +.Ar clear | +.Ar safe | +.Ar confidential | +.Ar private +.Xc +Set the data protection level to the requested level. +.El +.Pp +The following command can be used with ftp servers that has +implemented the KAUTH site command. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ic kauth Op Ar principal +Obtain remote tickets. +.El +.Pp +Command arguments which have embedded spaces may be quoted with +quote `"' marks. +.Sh ABORTING A FILE TRANSFER +To abort a file transfer, use the terminal interrupt key +(usually Ctrl-C). +Sending transfers will be immediately halted. +Receiving transfers will be halted by sending a ftp protocol +.Dv ABOR +command to the remote server, and discarding any further data received. +The speed at which this is accomplished depends upon the remote +server's support for +.Dv ABOR +processing. +If the remote server does not support the +.Dv ABOR +command, an +.Ql ftp\*[Gt] +prompt will not appear until the remote server has completed +sending the requested file. +.Pp +The terminal interrupt key sequence will be ignored when +.Nm ftp +has completed any local processing and is awaiting a reply +from the remote server. +A long delay in this mode may result from the ABOR processing described +above, or from unexpected behavior by the remote server, including +violations of the ftp protocol. +If the delay results from unexpected remote server behavior, the local +.Nm ftp +program must be killed by hand. +.Sh FILE NAMING CONVENTIONS +Files specified as arguments to +.Nm ftp +commands are processed according to the following rules. +.Bl -enum +.It +If the file name +.Sq Fl +is specified, the +.Ar stdin +(for reading) or +.Ar stdout +(for writing) is used. +.It +If the first character of the file name is +.Sq \&| , +the +remainder of the argument is interpreted as a shell command. +.Nm Ftp +then forks a shell, using +.Xr popen 3 +with the argument supplied, and reads (writes) from the stdout +(stdin). +If the shell command includes spaces, the argument +must be quoted; e.g. +\*(Lq" ls -lt"\*(Rq. +A particularly +useful example of this mechanism is: \*(Lqdir more\*(Rq. +.It +Failing the above checks, if ``globbing'' is enabled, +local file names are expanded +according to the rules used in the +.Xr csh 1 ; +c.f. the +.Ic glob +command. +If the +.Nm ftp +command expects a single local file (.e.g. +.Ic put ) , +only the first filename generated by the "globbing" operation is used. +.It +For +.Ic mget +commands and +.Ic get +commands with unspecified local file names, the local filename is +the remote filename, which may be altered by a +.Ic case , +.Ic ntrans , +or +.Ic nmap +setting. +The resulting filename may then be altered if +.Ic runique +is on. +.It +For +.Ic mput +commands and +.Ic put +commands with unspecified remote file names, the remote filename is +the local filename, which may be altered by a +.Ic ntrans +or +.Ic nmap +setting. +The resulting filename may then be altered by the remote server if +.Ic sunique +is on. +.El +.Sh FILE TRANSFER PARAMETERS +The FTP specification specifies many parameters which may +affect a file transfer. +The +.Ic type +may be one of \*(Lqascii\*(Rq, \*(Lqimage\*(Rq (binary), +\*(Lqebcdic\*(Rq, and \*(Lqlocal byte size\*(Rq (for +.Tn PDP Ns -10's +and +.Tn PDP Ns -20's +mostly). +.Nm Ftp +supports the ascii and image types of file transfer, +plus local byte size 8 for +.Ic tenex +mode transfers. +.Pp +.Nm Ftp +supports only the default values for the remaining +file transfer parameters: +.Ic mode , +.Ic form , +and +.Ic struct . +.Sh THE .netrc FILE +The +.Pa .netrc +file contains login and initialization information +used by the auto-login process. +It resides in the user's home directory. +The following tokens are recognized; they may be separated by spaces, +tabs, or new-lines: +.Bl -tag -width password +.It Ic machine Ar name +Identify a remote machine +.Ar name . +The auto-login process searches the +.Pa .netrc +file for a +.Ic machine +token that matches the remote machine specified on the +.Nm ftp +command line or as an +.Ic open +command argument. +Once a match is made, the subsequent +.Pa .netrc +tokens are processed, +stopping when the end of file is reached or another +.Ic machine +or a +.Ic default +token is encountered. +.It Ic default +This is the same as +.Ic machine +.Ar name +except that +.Ic default +matches any name. +There can be only one +.Ic default +token, and it must be after all +.Ic machine +tokens. +This is normally used as: +.Pp +.Dl default login anonymous password user@site +.Pp +thereby giving the user +.Ar automatic +anonymous ftp login to +machines not specified in +.Pa .netrc . +This can be overridden +by using the +.Fl n +flag to disable auto-login. +.It Ic login Ar name +Identify a user on the remote machine. +If this token is present, the auto-login process will initiate +a login using the specified +.Ar name . +.It Ic password Ar string +Supply a password. +If this token is present, the auto-login process will supply the +specified string if the remote server requires a password as part +of the login process. +Note that if this token is present in the +.Pa .netrc +file for any user other +than +.Ar anonymous , +.Nm ftp +will abort the auto-login process if the +.Pa .netrc +is readable by +anyone besides the user. +.It Ic account Ar string +Supply an additional account password. +If this token is present, the auto-login process will supply the +specified string if the remote server requires an additional +account password, or the auto-login process will initiate an +.Dv ACCT +command if it does not. +.It Ic macdef Ar name +Define a macro. +This token functions like the +.Nm ftp +.Ic macdef +command functions. +A macro is defined with the specified name; its contents begin with the +next +.Pa .netrc +line and continue until a null line (consecutive new-line +characters) is encountered. +If a macro named +.Ic init +is defined, it is automatically executed as the last step in the +auto-login process. +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Nm Ftp +uses the following environment variables. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ev HOME +For default location of a +.Pa .netrc +file, if one exists. +.It Ev SHELL +For default shell. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftpd 8 +.Rs +.%T RFC2228 +.Re +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm ftp +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . +.Sh BUGS +Correct execution of many commands depends upon proper behavior +by the remote server. +.Pp +An error in the treatment of carriage returns +in the +.Bx 4.2 +ascii-mode transfer code +has been corrected. +This correction may result in incorrect transfers of binary files +to and from +.Bx 4.2 +servers using the ascii type. +Avoid this problem by using the binary image type. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6cb90e819 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c @@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID ("$Id: ftp.c,v 1.75.2.1 2004/08/20 14:59:06 lha Exp $"); + +struct sockaddr_storage hisctladdr_ss; +struct sockaddr *hisctladdr = (struct sockaddr *)&hisctladdr_ss; +struct sockaddr_storage data_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *data_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&data_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr_storage myctladdr_ss; +struct sockaddr *myctladdr = (struct sockaddr *)&myctladdr_ss; +int data = -1; +int abrtflag = 0; +jmp_buf ptabort; +int ptabflg; +int ptflag = 0; +off_t restart_point = 0; + + +FILE *cin, *cout; + +typedef void (*sighand) (int); + +char * +hookup (const char *host, int port) +{ + static char hostnamebuf[MaxHostNameLen]; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + socklen_t len; + int s; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (host, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + warnx ("%s: %s", host, gai_strerror(error)); + code = -1; + return NULL; + } + strlcpy (hostnamebuf, host, sizeof(hostnamebuf)); + hostname = hostnamebuf; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) + strlcpy (hostnamebuf, a->ai_canonname, sizeof(hostnamebuf)); + + memcpy (hisctladdr, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen); + + error = connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen); + if (error < 0) { + char addrstr[256]; + + if (getnameinfo (a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen, + addrstr, sizeof(addrstr), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + strlcpy (addrstr, "unknown address", sizeof(addrstr)); + + warn ("connect %s", addrstr); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (error < 0) { + warnx ("failed to contact %s", host); + code = -1; + return NULL; + } + + len = sizeof(myctladdr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, myctladdr, &len) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname"); + code = -1; + close (s); + return NULL; + } +#ifdef IPTOS_LOWDELAY + socket_set_tos (s, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); +#endif + cin = fdopen (s, "r"); + cout = fdopen (s, "w"); + if (cin == NULL || cout == NULL) { + warnx ("fdopen failed."); + if (cin) + fclose (cin); + if (cout) + fclose (cout); + code = -1; + goto bad; + } + if (verbose) + printf ("Connected to %s.\n", hostname); + if (getreply (0) > 2) { /* read startup message from server */ + if (cin) + fclose (cin); + if (cout) + fclose (cout); + code = -1; + goto bad; + } +#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int on = 1; + + if (setsockopt (s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, (char *) &on, sizeof (on)) + < 0 && debug) { + warn ("setsockopt"); + } + } +#endif /* SO_OOBINLINE */ + + return (hostname); +bad: + close (s); + return NULL; +} + +int +login (char *host) +{ + char tmp[80]; + char defaultpass[128]; + char *user, *pass, *acct; + int n, aflag = 0; + + char *myname = NULL; + struct passwd *pw = k_getpwuid(getuid()); + + if (pw != NULL) + myname = pw->pw_name; + + user = pass = acct = 0; + + if(sec_login(host)) + printf("\n*** Using plaintext user and password ***\n\n"); + else{ + printf("Authentication successful.\n\n"); + } + + if (ruserpass (host, &user, &pass, &acct) < 0) { + code = -1; + return (0); + } + while (user == NULL) { + if (myname) + printf ("Name (%s:%s): ", host, myname); + else + printf ("Name (%s): ", host); + *tmp = '\0'; + if (fgets (tmp, sizeof (tmp) - 1, stdin) != NULL) + tmp[strlen (tmp) - 1] = '\0'; + if (*tmp == '\0') + user = myname; + else + user = tmp; + } + strlcpy(username, user, sizeof(username)); + n = command("USER %s", user); + if (n == COMPLETE) + n = command("PASS dummy"); /* DK: Compatibility with gssftp daemon */ + else if(n == CONTINUE) { + if (pass == NULL) { + char prompt[128]; + if(myname && + (!strcmp(user, "ftp") || !strcmp(user, "anonymous"))) { + snprintf(defaultpass, sizeof(defaultpass), + "%s@%s", myname, mydomain); + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Password (%s): ", defaultpass); + } else if (sec_complete) { + pass = myname; + } else { + *defaultpass = '\0'; + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Password: "); + } + if (pass == NULL) { + pass = defaultpass; + des_read_pw_string (tmp, sizeof (tmp), prompt, 0); + if (tmp[0]) + pass = tmp; + } + } + n = command ("PASS %s", pass); + } + if (n == CONTINUE) { + aflag++; + acct = tmp; + des_read_pw_string (acct, 128, "Account:", 0); + n = command ("ACCT %s", acct); + } + if (n != COMPLETE) { + warnx ("Login failed."); + return (0); + } + if (!aflag && acct != NULL) + command ("ACCT %s", acct); + if (proxy) + return (1); + for (n = 0; n < macnum; ++n) { + if (!strcmp("init", macros[n].mac_name)) { + strlcpy (line, "$init", sizeof (line)); + makeargv(); + domacro(margc, margv); + break; + } + } + sec_set_protection_level (); + return (1); +} + +void +cmdabort (int sig) +{ + + printf ("\n"); + fflush (stdout); + abrtflag++; + if (ptflag) + longjmp (ptabort, 1); +} + +int +command (char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list ap; + int r; + sighand oldintr; + + abrtflag = 0; + if (cout == NULL) { + warn ("No control connection for command"); + code = -1; + return (0); + } + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, cmdabort); + if(debug){ + printf("---> "); + if (strncmp("PASS ", fmt, 5) == 0) + printf("PASS XXXX"); + else { + va_start(ap, fmt); + vfprintf(stdout, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + } + } + va_start(ap, fmt); + sec_vfprintf(cout, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(debug){ + printf("\n"); + fflush(stdout); + } + fprintf (cout, "\r\n"); + fflush (cout); + cpend = 1; + r = getreply (!strcmp (fmt, "QUIT")); + if (abrtflag && oldintr != SIG_IGN) + (*oldintr) (SIGINT); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return (r); +} + +char reply_string[BUFSIZ]; /* last line of previous reply */ + +int +getreply (int expecteof) +{ + char *p; + char *lead_string; + int c; + struct sigaction sa, osa; + char buf[8192]; + int reply_code; + int long_warn = 0; + + sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = cmdabort; + sigaction (SIGINT, &sa, &osa); + + p = buf; + + reply_code = 0; + while (1) { + c = getc (cin); + switch (c) { + case EOF: + if (expecteof) { + sigaction (SIGINT, &osa, NULL); + code = 221; + return 0; + } + lostpeer (0); + if (verbose) { + printf ("421 Service not available, " + "remote server has closed connection\n"); + fflush (stdout); + } + code = 421; + return (4); + case IAC: + c = getc (cin); + if (c == WILL || c == WONT) + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, DONT, getc (cin)); + if (c == DO || c == DONT) + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, WONT, getc (cin)); + continue; + case '\n': + *p++ = '\0'; + if(isdigit(buf[0])){ + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + if(code == 631){ + code = 0; + sec_read_msg(buf, prot_safe); + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + lead_string = "S:"; + } else if(code == 632){ + code = 0; + sec_read_msg(buf, prot_private); + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + lead_string = "P:"; + }else if(code == 633){ + code = 0; + sec_read_msg(buf, prot_confidential); + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + lead_string = "C:"; + }else if(sec_complete) + lead_string = "!!"; + else + lead_string = ""; + if(code != 0 && reply_code == 0) + reply_code = code; + if (verbose > 0 || (verbose > -1 && code > 499)) + fprintf (stdout, "%s%s\n", lead_string, buf); + if (code == reply_code && buf[3] == ' ') { + strlcpy (reply_string, buf, sizeof(reply_string)); + if (code >= 200) + cpend = 0; + sigaction (SIGINT, &osa, NULL); + if (code == 421) + lostpeer (0); +#if 1 + if (abrtflag && + osa.sa_handler != cmdabort && + osa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN) + osa.sa_handler (SIGINT); +#endif + if (code == 227 || code == 229) { + char *p; + + p = strchr (reply_string, '('); + if (p) { + p++; + strlcpy(pasv, p, sizeof(pasv)); + p = strrchr(pasv, ')'); + if (p) + *p = '\0'; + } + } + return code / 100; + } + }else{ + if(verbose > 0 || (verbose > -1 && code > 499)){ + if(sec_complete) + fprintf(stdout, "!!"); + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", buf); + } + } + p = buf; + long_warn = 0; + continue; + default: + if(p < buf + sizeof(buf) - 1) + *p++ = c; + else if(long_warn == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: incredibly long line received\n"); + long_warn = 1; + } + } + } + +} + + +#if 0 +int +getreply (int expecteof) +{ + int c, n; + int dig; + int originalcode = 0, continuation = 0; + sighand oldintr; + int pflag = 0; + char *cp, *pt = pasv; + + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, cmdabort); + for (;;) { + dig = n = code = 0; + cp = reply_string; + while ((c = getc (cin)) != '\n') { + if (c == IAC) { /* handle telnet commands */ + switch (c = getc (cin)) { + case WILL: + case WONT: + c = getc (cin); + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, DONT, c); + fflush (cout); + break; + case DO: + case DONT: + c = getc (cin); + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, WONT, c); + fflush (cout); + break; + default: + break; + } + continue; + } + dig++; + if (c == EOF) { + if (expecteof) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = 221; + return (0); + } + lostpeer (0); + if (verbose) { + printf ("421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection\n"); + fflush (stdout); + } + code = 421; + return (4); + } + if (c != '\r' && (verbose > 0 || + (verbose > -1 && n == '5' && dig > 4))) { + if (proxflag && + (dig == 1 || dig == 5 && verbose == 0)) + printf ("%s:", hostname); + putchar (c); + } + if (dig < 4 && isdigit (c)) + code = code * 10 + (c - '0'); + if (!pflag && code == 227) + pflag = 1; + if (dig > 4 && pflag == 1 && isdigit (c)) + pflag = 2; + if (pflag == 2) { + if (c != '\r' && c != ')') + *pt++ = c; + else { + *pt = '\0'; + pflag = 3; + } + } + if (dig == 4 && c == '-') { + if (continuation) + code = 0; + continuation++; + } + if (n == 0) + n = c; + if (cp < &reply_string[sizeof (reply_string) - 1]) + *cp++ = c; + } + if (verbose > 0 || verbose > -1 && n == '5') { + putchar (c); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (continuation && code != originalcode) { + if (originalcode == 0) + originalcode = code; + continue; + } + *cp = '\0'; + if(sec_complete){ + if(code == 631) + sec_read_msg(reply_string, prot_safe); + else if(code == 632) + sec_read_msg(reply_string, prot_private); + else if(code == 633) + sec_read_msg(reply_string, prot_confidential); + n = code / 100 + '0'; + } + if (n != '1') + cpend = 0; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (code == 421 || originalcode == 421) + lostpeer (0); + if (abrtflag && oldintr != cmdabort && oldintr != SIG_IGN) + (*oldintr) (SIGINT); + return (n - '0'); + } +} + +#endif + +int +empty (fd_set * mask, int sec) +{ + struct timeval t; + + t.tv_sec = sec; + t.tv_usec = 0; + return (select (FD_SETSIZE, mask, NULL, NULL, &t)); +} + +jmp_buf sendabort; + +static RETSIGTYPE +abortsend (int sig) +{ + + mflag = 0; + abrtflag = 0; + printf ("\nsend aborted\nwaiting for remote to finish abort\n"); + fflush (stdout); + longjmp (sendabort, 1); +} + +#define HASHBYTES 1024 + +static int +copy_stream (FILE * from, FILE * to) +{ + static size_t bufsize; + static char *buf; + int n; + int bytes = 0; + int werr = 0; + int hashbytes = HASHBYTES; + struct stat st; + +#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && !defined(NO_MMAP) + void *chunk; + +#ifndef MAP_FAILED +#define MAP_FAILED (-1) +#endif + + if (fstat (fileno (from), &st) == 0 && S_ISREG (st.st_mode)) { + /* + * mmap zero bytes has potential of loosing, don't do it. + */ + if (st.st_size == 0) + return 0; + chunk = mmap (0, st.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fileno (from), 0); + if (chunk != (void *) MAP_FAILED) { + int res; + + res = sec_write (fileno (to), chunk, st.st_size); + if (munmap (chunk, st.st_size) < 0) + warn ("munmap"); + sec_fflush (to); + return res; + } + } +#endif + + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat (fileno (from), &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) + return -1; + + while ((n = read (fileno (from), buf, bufsize)) > 0) { + werr = sec_write (fileno (to), buf, n); + if (werr < 0) + break; + bytes += werr; + while (hash && bytes > hashbytes) { + putchar ('#'); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + } + sec_fflush (to); + if (n < 0) + warn ("local"); + + if (werr < 0) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netout"); + bytes = -1; + } + return bytes; +} + +void +sendrequest (char *cmd, char *local, char *remote, char *lmode, int printnames) +{ + struct stat st; + struct timeval start, stop; + int c, d; + FILE *fin, *dout = 0; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + RETSIGTYPE (*oldintr)(int), (*oldintp)(int); + long bytes = 0, hashbytes = HASHBYTES; + char *rmode = "w"; + + if (verbose && printnames) { + if (local && strcmp (local, "-") != 0) + printf ("local: %s ", local); + if (remote) + printf ("remote: %s\n", remote); + } + if (proxy) { + proxtrans (cmd, local, remote); + return; + } + if (curtype != type) + changetype (type, 0); + closefunc = NULL; + oldintr = NULL; + oldintp = NULL; + + if (setjmp (sendabort)) { + while (cpend) { + getreply (0); + } + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (oldintr) + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + code = -1; + return; + } + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, abortsend); + if (strcmp (local, "-") == 0) + fin = stdin; + else if (*local == '|') { + oldintp = signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + fin = popen (local + 1, lmode); + if (fin == NULL) { + warn ("%s", local + 1); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + code = -1; + return; + } + closefunc = pclose; + } else { + fin = fopen (local, lmode); + if (fin == NULL) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + closefunc = fclose; + if (fstat (fileno (fin), &st) < 0 || + (st.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) { + fprintf (stdout, "%s: not a plain file.\n", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + fclose (fin); + code = -1; + return; + } + } + if (initconn ()) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + code = -1; + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + if (setjmp (sendabort)) + goto abort; + + if (restart_point && + (strcmp (cmd, "STOR") == 0 || strcmp (cmd, "APPE") == 0)) { + int rc; + + switch (curtype) { + case TYPE_A: + rc = fseek (fin, (long) restart_point, SEEK_SET); + break; + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + rc = lseek (fileno (fin), restart_point, SEEK_SET); + break; + } + if (rc < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + restart_point = 0; + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + if (command ("REST %ld", (long) restart_point) + != CONTINUE) { + restart_point = 0; + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + restart_point = 0; + rmode = "r+w"; + } + if (remote) { + if (command ("%s %s", cmd, remote) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + } else if (command ("%s", cmd) != PRELIM) { + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal(SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc)(fin); + return; + } + dout = dataconn(rmode); + if (dout == NULL) + goto abort; + set_buffer_size (fileno (dout), 0); + gettimeofday (&start, (struct timezone *) 0); + oldintp = signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + switch (curtype) { + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + errno = d = c = 0; + bytes = copy_stream (fin, dout); + break; + + case TYPE_A: + while ((c = getc (fin)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') { + while (hash && (bytes >= hashbytes)) { + putchar ('#'); + fflush (stdout); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + if (ferror (dout)) + break; + sec_putc ('\r', dout); + bytes++; + } + sec_putc (c, dout); + bytes++; + } + sec_fflush (dout); + if (hash) { + if (bytes < hashbytes) + putchar ('#'); + putchar ('\n'); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (ferror (fin)) + warn ("local: %s", local); + if (ferror (dout)) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netout"); + bytes = -1; + } + break; + } + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + fclose (dout); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + getreply (0); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (bytes > 0) + ptransfer ("sent", bytes, &start, &stop); + return; +abort: + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (!cpend) { + code = -1; + return; + } + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (dout) + fclose (dout); + getreply (0); + code = -1; + if (closefunc != NULL && fin != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + if (bytes > 0) + ptransfer ("sent", bytes, &start, &stop); +} + +jmp_buf recvabort; + +void +abortrecv (int sig) +{ + + mflag = 0; + abrtflag = 0; + printf ("\nreceive aborted\nwaiting for remote to finish abort\n"); + fflush (stdout); + longjmp (recvabort, 1); +} + +void +recvrequest (char *cmd, char *local, char *remote, + char *lmode, int printnames, int local_given) +{ + FILE *fout, *din = 0; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + sighand oldintr, oldintp; + int c, d, is_retr, tcrflag, bare_lfs = 0; + static size_t bufsize; + static char *buf; + long bytes = 0, hashbytes = HASHBYTES; + struct timeval start, stop; + struct stat st; + + is_retr = strcmp (cmd, "RETR") == 0; + if (is_retr && verbose && printnames) { + if (local && strcmp (local, "-") != 0) + printf ("local: %s ", local); + if (remote) + printf ("remote: %s\n", remote); + } + if (proxy && is_retr) { + proxtrans (cmd, local, remote); + return; + } + closefunc = NULL; + oldintr = NULL; + oldintp = NULL; + tcrflag = !crflag && is_retr; + if (setjmp (recvabort)) { + while (cpend) { + getreply (0); + } + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (oldintr) + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, abortrecv); + if (!local_given || (strcmp (local, "-") && *local != '|')) { + if (access (local, 2) < 0) { + char *dir = strrchr (local, '/'); + + if (errno != ENOENT && errno != EACCES) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (dir != NULL) + *dir = 0; + d = access (dir ? local : ".", 2); + if (dir != NULL) + *dir = '/'; + if (d < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (!runique && errno == EACCES && + chmod (local, 0600) < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (runique && errno == EACCES && + (local = gunique (local)) == NULL) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + } else if (runique && (local = gunique (local)) == NULL) { + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + } + if (!is_retr) { + if (curtype != TYPE_A) + changetype (TYPE_A, 0); + } else if (curtype != type) + changetype (type, 0); + if (initconn ()) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (setjmp (recvabort)) + goto abort; + if (is_retr && restart_point && + command ("REST %ld", (long) restart_point) != CONTINUE) + return; + if (remote) { + if (command ("%s %s", cmd, remote) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + } else { + if (command ("%s", cmd) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + } + din = dataconn ("r"); + if (din == NULL) + goto abort; + set_buffer_size (fileno (din), 1); + if (local_given && strcmp (local, "-") == 0) + fout = stdout; + else if (local_given && *local == '|') { + oldintp = signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + fout = popen (local + 1, "w"); + if (fout == NULL) { + warn ("%s", local + 1); + goto abort; + } + closefunc = pclose; + } else { + fout = fopen (local, lmode); + if (fout == NULL) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + goto abort; + } + closefunc = fclose; + } + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat (fileno (fout), &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) + goto abort; + + gettimeofday (&start, (struct timezone *) 0); + switch (curtype) { + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + if (restart_point && + lseek (fileno (fout), restart_point, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + return; + } + errno = d = 0; + while ((c = sec_read (fileno (din), buf, bufsize)) > 0) { + if ((d = write (fileno (fout), buf, c)) != c) + break; + bytes += c; + if (hash) { + while (bytes >= hashbytes) { + putchar ('#'); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + fflush (stdout); + } + } + if (hash && bytes > 0) { + if (bytes < HASHBYTES) + putchar ('#'); + putchar ('\n'); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (c < 0) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netin"); + bytes = -1; + } + if (d < c) { + if (d < 0) + warn ("local: %s", local); + else + warnx ("%s: short write", local); + } + break; + + case TYPE_A: + if (restart_point) { + int i, n, ch; + + if (fseek (fout, 0L, SEEK_SET) < 0) + goto done; + n = restart_point; + for (i = 0; i++ < n;) { + if ((ch = sec_getc (fout)) == EOF) + goto done; + if (ch == '\n') + i++; + } + if (fseek (fout, 0L, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + done: + warn ("local: %s", local); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + return; + } + } + while ((c = sec_getc(din)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') + bare_lfs++; + while (c == '\r') { + while (hash && (bytes >= hashbytes)) { + putchar ('#'); + fflush (stdout); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + bytes++; + if ((c = sec_getc (din)) != '\n' || tcrflag) { + if (ferror (fout)) + goto break2; + putc ('\r', fout); + if (c == '\0') { + bytes++; + goto contin2; + } + if (c == EOF) + goto contin2; + } + } + putc (c, fout); + bytes++; + contin2:; + } +break2: + if (bare_lfs) { + printf ("WARNING! %d bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode\n", + bare_lfs); + printf ("File may not have transferred correctly.\n"); + } + if (hash) { + if (bytes < hashbytes) + putchar ('#'); + putchar ('\n'); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (ferror (din)) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netin"); + bytes = -1; + } + if (ferror (fout)) + warn ("local: %s", local); + break; + } + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + fclose (din); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + getreply (0); + if (bytes > 0 && is_retr) + ptransfer ("received", bytes, &start, &stop); + return; +abort: + + /* abort using RFC959 recommended IP,SYNC sequence */ + + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintr); + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + if (!cpend) { + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + abort_remote(din); + code = -1; + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (closefunc != NULL && fout != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + if (din) + fclose (din); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + if (bytes > 0) + ptransfer ("received", bytes, &start, &stop); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); +} + +static int +parse_epsv (const char *str) +{ + char sep; + char *end; + int port; + + if (*str == '\0') + return -1; + sep = *str++; + if (sep != *str++) + return -1; + if (sep != *str++) + return -1; + port = strtol (str, &end, 0); + if (str == end) + return -1; + if (end[0] != sep || end[1] != '\0') + return -1; + return htons(port); +} + +static int +parse_pasv (struct sockaddr_in *sin, const char *str) +{ + int a0, a1, a2, a3, p0, p1; + + /* + * What we've got at this point is a string of comma separated + * one-byte unsigned integer values. The first four are the an IP + * address. The fifth is the MSB of the port number, the sixth is the + * LSB. From that we'll prepare a sockaddr_in. + */ + + if (sscanf (str, "%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d", + &a0, &a1, &a2, &a3, &p0, &p1) != 6) { + printf ("Passive mode address scan failure. " + "Shouldn't happen!\n"); + return -1; + } + if (a0 < 0 || a0 > 255 || + a1 < 0 || a1 > 255 || + a2 < 0 || a2 > 255 || + a3 < 0 || a3 > 255 || + p0 < 0 || p0 > 255 || + p1 < 0 || p1 > 255) { + printf ("Can't parse passive mode string.\n"); + return -1; + } + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl ((a0 << 24) | (a1 << 16) | + (a2 << 8) | a3); + sin->sin_port = htons ((p0 << 8) | p1); + return 0; +} + +static int +passive_mode (void) +{ + int port; + + data = socket (myctladdr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (data < 0) { + warn ("socket"); + return (1); + } + if (options & SO_DEBUG) + socket_set_debug (data); + if (command ("EPSV") != COMPLETE) { + if (command ("PASV") != COMPLETE) { + printf ("Passive mode refused.\n"); + goto bad; + } + } + + /* + * Parse the reply to EPSV or PASV + */ + + port = parse_epsv (pasv); + if (port > 0) { + data_addr->sa_family = myctladdr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (data_addr, + socket_get_address (hisctladdr), + port); + } else { + if (parse_pasv ((struct sockaddr_in *)data_addr, pasv) < 0) + goto bad; + } + + if (connect (data, data_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (data_addr)) < 0) { + warn ("connect"); + goto bad; + } +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (data, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (0); +bad: + close (data); + data = -1; + sendport = 1; + return (1); +} + + +static int +active_mode (void) +{ + int tmpno = 0; + socklen_t len; + int result; + +noport: + data_addr->sa_family = myctladdr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (data_addr, socket_get_address (myctladdr), + sendport ? 0 : socket_get_port (myctladdr)); + + if (data != -1) + close (data); + data = socket (data_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (data < 0) { + warn ("socket"); + if (tmpno) + sendport = 1; + return (1); + } + if (!sendport) + socket_set_reuseaddr (data, 1); + if (bind (data, data_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (data_addr)) < 0) { + warn ("bind"); + goto bad; + } + if (options & SO_DEBUG) + socket_set_debug (data); + len = sizeof (data_addr_ss); + if (getsockname (data, data_addr, &len) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname"); + goto bad; + } + if (listen (data, 1) < 0) + warn ("listen"); + if (sendport) { + char addr_str[256]; + int inet_af; + int overbose; + + if (inet_ntop (data_addr->sa_family, socket_get_address (data_addr), + addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)) == NULL) + errx (1, "inet_ntop failed"); + switch (data_addr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : + inet_af = 1; + break; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + inet_af = 2; + break; +#endif + default : + errx (1, "bad address family %d", data_addr->sa_family); + } + + + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + + result = command ("EPRT |%d|%s|%d|", + inet_af, addr_str, + ntohs(socket_get_port (data_addr))); + verbose = overbose; + + if (result == ERROR) { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)data_addr; + + unsigned int a = ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr); + unsigned int p = ntohs(sin->sin_port); + + if (data_addr->sa_family != AF_INET) { + warnx ("remote server doesn't support EPRT"); + goto bad; + } + + result = command("PORT %d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d", + (a >> 24) & 0xff, + (a >> 16) & 0xff, + (a >> 8) & 0xff, + a & 0xff, + (p >> 8) & 0xff, + p & 0xff); + if (result == ERROR && sendport == -1) { + sendport = 0; + tmpno = 1; + goto noport; + } + return (result != COMPLETE); + } + return result != COMPLETE; + } + if (tmpno) + sendport = 1; + + +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (data, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (0); +bad: + close (data); + data = -1; + if (tmpno) + sendport = 1; + return (1); +} + +/* + * Need to start a listen on the data channel before we send the command, + * otherwise the server's connect may fail. + */ +int +initconn (void) +{ + if (passivemode) + return passive_mode (); + else + return active_mode (); +} + +FILE * +dataconn (const char *lmode) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from_ss; + struct sockaddr *from = (struct sockaddr *)&from_ss; + socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from_ss); + int s; + + if (passivemode) + return (fdopen (data, lmode)); + + s = accept (data, from, &fromlen); + if (s < 0) { + warn ("accept"); + close (data), data = -1; + return (NULL); + } + close (data); + data = s; +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (s, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (fdopen (data, lmode)); +} + +void +ptransfer (char *direction, long int bytes, + struct timeval * t0, struct timeval * t1) +{ + struct timeval td; + float s; + float bs; + int prec; + char *unit; + + if (verbose) { + td.tv_sec = t1->tv_sec - t0->tv_sec; + td.tv_usec = t1->tv_usec - t0->tv_usec; + if (td.tv_usec < 0) { + td.tv_sec--; + td.tv_usec += 1000000; + } + s = td.tv_sec + (td.tv_usec / 1000000.); + bs = bytes / (s ? s : 1); + if (bs >= 1048576) { + bs /= 1048576; + unit = "M"; + prec = 2; + } else if (bs >= 1024) { + bs /= 1024; + unit = "k"; + prec = 1; + } else { + unit = ""; + prec = 0; + } + + printf ("%ld bytes %s in %.3g seconds (%.*f %sbyte/s)\n", + bytes, direction, s, prec, bs, unit); + } +} + +void +psabort (int sig) +{ + + abrtflag++; +} + +void +pswitch (int flag) +{ + sighand oldintr; + static struct comvars { + int connect; + char name[MaxHostNameLen]; + struct sockaddr_storage mctl; + struct sockaddr_storage hctl; + FILE *in; + FILE *out; + int tpe; + int curtpe; + int cpnd; + int sunqe; + int runqe; + int mcse; + int ntflg; + char nti[17]; + char nto[17]; + int mapflg; + char mi[MaxPathLen]; + char mo[MaxPathLen]; + } proxstruct, tmpstruct; + struct comvars *ip, *op; + + abrtflag = 0; + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, psabort); + if (flag) { + if (proxy) + return; + ip = &tmpstruct; + op = &proxstruct; + proxy++; + } else { + if (!proxy) + return; + ip = &proxstruct; + op = &tmpstruct; + proxy = 0; + } + ip->connect = connected; + connected = op->connect; + if (hostname) { + strlcpy (ip->name, hostname, sizeof (ip->name)); + } else + ip->name[0] = 0; + hostname = op->name; + ip->hctl = hisctladdr_ss; + hisctladdr_ss = op->hctl; + ip->mctl = myctladdr_ss; + myctladdr_ss = op->mctl; + ip->in = cin; + cin = op->in; + ip->out = cout; + cout = op->out; + ip->tpe = type; + type = op->tpe; + ip->curtpe = curtype; + curtype = op->curtpe; + ip->cpnd = cpend; + cpend = op->cpnd; + ip->sunqe = sunique; + sunique = op->sunqe; + ip->runqe = runique; + runique = op->runqe; + ip->mcse = mcase; + mcase = op->mcse; + ip->ntflg = ntflag; + ntflag = op->ntflg; + strlcpy (ip->nti, ntin, sizeof (ip->nti)); + strlcpy (ntin, op->nti, 17); + strlcpy (ip->nto, ntout, sizeof (ip->nto)); + strlcpy (ntout, op->nto, 17); + ip->mapflg = mapflag; + mapflag = op->mapflg; + strlcpy (ip->mi, mapin, MaxPathLen); + strlcpy (mapin, op->mi, MaxPathLen); + strlcpy (ip->mo, mapout, MaxPathLen); + strlcpy (mapout, op->mo, MaxPathLen); + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + if (abrtflag) { + abrtflag = 0; + (*oldintr) (SIGINT); + } +} + +void +abortpt (int sig) +{ + + printf ("\n"); + fflush (stdout); + ptabflg++; + mflag = 0; + abrtflag = 0; + longjmp (ptabort, 1); +} + +void +proxtrans (char *cmd, char *local, char *remote) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int secndflag = 0, prox_type, nfnd; + char *cmd2; + fd_set mask; + + if (strcmp (cmd, "RETR")) + cmd2 = "RETR"; + else + cmd2 = runique ? "STOU" : "STOR"; + if ((prox_type = type) == 0) { + if (unix_server && unix_proxy) + prox_type = TYPE_I; + else + prox_type = TYPE_A; + } + if (curtype != prox_type) + changetype (prox_type, 1); + if (command ("PASV") != COMPLETE) { + printf ("proxy server does not support third party transfers.\n"); + return; + } + pswitch (0); + if (!connected) { + printf ("No primary connection\n"); + pswitch (1); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (curtype != prox_type) + changetype (prox_type, 1); + if (command ("PORT %s", pasv) != COMPLETE) { + pswitch (1); + return; + } + if (setjmp (ptabort)) + goto abort; + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, abortpt); + if (command ("%s %s", cmd, remote) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + pswitch (1); + return; + } + sleep (2); + pswitch (1); + secndflag++; + if (command ("%s %s", cmd2, local) != PRELIM) + goto abort; + ptflag++; + getreply (0); + pswitch (0); + getreply (0); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + pswitch (1); + ptflag = 0; + printf ("local: %s remote: %s\n", local, remote); + return; +abort: + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + ptflag = 0; + if (strcmp (cmd, "RETR") && !proxy) + pswitch (1); + else if (!strcmp (cmd, "RETR") && proxy) + pswitch (0); + if (!cpend && !secndflag) { /* only here if cmd = "STOR" (proxy=1) */ + if (command ("%s %s", cmd2, local) != PRELIM) { + pswitch (0); + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + } + pswitch (1); + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + pswitch (!proxy); + if (!cpend && !secndflag) { /* only if cmd = "RETR" (proxy=1) */ + if (command ("%s %s", cmd2, local) != PRELIM) { + pswitch (0); + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + pswitch (1); + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + } + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + pswitch (!proxy); + if (cpend) { + FD_ZERO (&mask); + if (fileno(cin) >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET (fileno (cin), &mask); + if ((nfnd = empty (&mask, 10)) <= 0) { + if (nfnd < 0) { + warn ("abort"); + } + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + lostpeer (0); + } + getreply (0); + getreply (0); + } + if (proxy) + pswitch (0); + pswitch (1); + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); +} + +void +reset (int argc, char **argv) +{ + fd_set mask; + int nfnd = 1; + + FD_ZERO (&mask); + while (nfnd > 0) { + if (fileno (cin) >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET (fileno (cin), &mask); + if ((nfnd = empty (&mask, 0)) < 0) { + warn ("reset"); + code = -1; + lostpeer(0); + } else if (nfnd) { + getreply(0); + } + } +} + +char * +gunique (char *local) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + char *cp = strrchr (local, '/'); + int d, count = 0; + char ext = '1'; + + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + d = access (cp ? local : ".", 2); + if (cp) + *cp = '/'; + if (d < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + return NULL; + } + strlcpy (new, local, sizeof(new)); + cp = new + strlen(new); + *cp++ = '.'; + while (!d) { + if (++count == 100) { + printf ("runique: can't find unique file name.\n"); + return NULL; + } + *cp++ = ext; + *cp = '\0'; + if (ext == '9') + ext = '0'; + else + ext++; + if ((d = access (new, 0)) < 0) + break; + if (ext != '0') + cp--; + else if (*(cp - 2) == '.') + *(cp - 1) = '1'; + else { + *(cp - 2) = *(cp - 2) + 1; + cp--; + } + } + return (new); +} + +void +abort_remote (FILE * din) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int nfnd; + fd_set mask; + + /* + * send IAC in urgent mode instead of DM because 4.3BSD places oob mark + * after urgent byte rather than before as is protocol now + */ + snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%c%c%c", IAC, IP, IAC); + if (send (fileno (cout), buf, 3, MSG_OOB) != 3) + warn ("abort"); + fprintf (cout, "%c", DM); + sec_fprintf(cout, "ABOR"); + sec_fflush (cout); + fprintf (cout, "\r\n"); + fflush(cout); + FD_ZERO (&mask); + if (fileno (cin) >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET (fileno (cin), &mask); + if (din) { + if (fileno (din) >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET (fileno (din), &mask); + } + if ((nfnd = empty (&mask, 10)) <= 0) { + if (nfnd < 0) { + warn ("abort"); + } + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + lostpeer (0); + } + if (din && FD_ISSET (fileno (din), &mask)) { + while (read (fileno (din), buf, BUFSIZ) > 0) + /* LOOP */ ; + } + if (getreply (0) == ERROR && code == 552) { + /* 552 needed for nic style abort */ + getreply (0); + } + getreply (0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7aff3dd686 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,652 @@ + +FTP(1) UNIX Reference Manual FTP(1) + +NNAAMMEE + ffttpp - ARPANET file transfer program + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + ffttpp [--tt] [--vv] [--dd] [--ii] [--nn] [--gg] [--pp] [--ll] [----nnoo--ggssss--bbiinnddiinnggss] [_h_o_s_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + FFttpp is the user interface to the ARPANET standard File Transfer Protocol. + The program allows a user to transfer files to and from a remote network + site. + + Modifications has been made so that it almost follows the ftpsec Internet + draft. + + Options may be specified at the command line, or to the command inter- + preter. + + --tt Enables packet tracing. + + --vv Verbose option forces ffttpp to show all responses from the remote + server, as well as report on data transfer statistics. + + --nn Restrains ffttpp from attempting ``auto-login'' upon initial connec- + tion. If auto-login is enabled, ffttpp will check the _._n_e_t_r_c (see be- + low) file in the user's home directory for an entry describing an + account on the remote machine. If no entry exists, ffttpp will prompt + for the remote machine login name (default is the user identity on + the local machine), and, if necessary, prompt for a password and an + account with which to login. + + --ii Turns off interactive prompting during multiple file transfers. + + --pp Turn on passive mode. + + --dd Enables debugging. + + --gg Disables file name globbing. + + ----nnoo--ggssss--bbiinnddiinnggss + use GSS-API bindings when talking to peer (ie make sure IP address- + es match). + + --ll Disables command line editing. + + The client host with which ffttpp is to communicate may be specified on the + command line. If this is done, ffttpp will immediately attempt to establish + a connection to an FTP server on that host; otherwise, ffttpp will enter its + command interpreter and await instructions from the user. When ffttpp is + awaiting commands from the user the prompt `ftp>' is provided to the us- + er. The following commands are recognized by ffttpp: + + !! [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d [_a_r_g_s]] + Invoke an interactive shell on the local machine. If there + are arguments, the first is taken to be a command to execute + directly, with the rest of the arguments as its arguments. + + $$ _m_a_c_r_o_-_n_a_m_e [_a_r_g_s] + Execute the macro _m_a_c_r_o_-_n_a_m_e that was defined with the mmaaccddeeff + command. Arguments are passed to the macro unglobbed. + + aaccccoouunntt [_p_a_s_s_w_d] + Supply a supplemental password required by a remote system + for access to resources once a login has been successfully + completed. If no argument is included, the user will be + prompted for an account password in a non-echoing input mode. + + aappppeenndd _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e] + Append a local file to a file on the remote machine. If + _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e is left unspecified, the local file name is used + in naming the remote file after being altered by any nnttrraannss + or nnmmaapp setting. File transfer uses the current settings for + ttyyppee, ffoorrmmaatt, mmooddee, and ssttrruuccttuurree. + + aasscciiii Set the file transfer ttyyppee to network ASCII. This is the de- + fault type. + + bbeellll Arrange that a bell be sounded after each file transfer com- + mand is completed. + + bbiinnaarryy Set the file transfer ttyyppee to support binary image transfer. + + bbyyee Terminate the FTP session with the remote server and exit + ffttpp. An end of file will also terminate the session and exit. + + ccaassee Toggle remote computer file name case mapping during mmggeett + commands. When ccaassee is on (default is off), remote computer + file names with all letters in upper case are written in the + local directory with the letters mapped to lower case. + + ccdd _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y + Change the working directory on the remote machine to _r_e_m_o_t_e_- + _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y. + + ccdduupp Change the remote machine working directory to the parent of + the current remote machine working directory. + + cchhmmoodd _m_o_d_e _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e + Change the permission modes of the file _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e on the re- + mote sytem to _m_o_d_e. + + cclloossee Terminate the FTP session with the remote server, and return + to the command interpreter. Any defined macros are erased. + + ccrr Toggle carriage return stripping during ascii type file re- + trieval. Records are denoted by a carriage return/linefeed + sequence during ascii type file transfer. When ccrr is on (the + default), carriage returns are stripped from this sequence to + conform with the UNIX single linefeed record delimiter. + Records on non-UNIX remote systems may contain single line- + feeds; when an ascii type transfer is made, these linefeeds + may be distinguished from a record delimiter only when ccrr is + off. + + ddeelleettee _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e + Delete the file _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e on the remote machine. + + ddeebbuugg [_d_e_b_u_g_-_v_a_l_u_e] + Toggle debugging mode. If an optional _d_e_b_u_g_-_v_a_l_u_e is speci- + fied it is used to set the debugging level. When debugging + is on, ffttpp prints each command sent to the remote machine, + preceded by the string `-->' + + ddiirr [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y] [_l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e] + Print a listing of the directory contents in the directory, + _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y, and, optionally, placing the output in + _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e. If interactive prompting is on, ffttpp will prompt + the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the tar- + get local file for receiving ddiirr output. If no directory is + specified, the current working directory on the remote ma- + chine is used. If no local file is specified, or _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e + is --, output comes to the terminal. + + ddiissccoonnnneecctt A synonym for _c_l_o_s_e. + + ffoorrmm _f_o_r_m_a_t + Set the file transfer ffoorrmm to _f_o_r_m_a_t. The default format is + ``file''. + + ggeett _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e [_l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e] + Retrieve the _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e and store it on the local machine. + If the local file name is not specified, it is given the same + name it has on the remote machine, subject to alteration by + the current ccaassee, nnttrraannss, and nnmmaapp settings. The current + settings for ttyyppee, ffoorrmm, mmooddee, and ssttrruuccttuurree are used while + transferring the file. + + gglloobb Toggle filename expansion for mmddeelleettee, mmggeett and mmppuutt. If + globbing is turned off with gglloobb, the file name arguments are + taken literally and not expanded. Globbing for mmppuutt is done + as in csh(1). For mmddeelleettee and mmggeett, each remote file name is + expanded separately on the remote machine and the lists are + not merged. Expansion of a directory name is likely to be + different from expansion of the name of an ordinary file: the + exact result depends on the foreign operating system and ftp + server, and can be previewed by doing `mls remote-files -'. + As a security measure, remotely globbed files that starts + with `/' or contains `../', will not be automatically re- + ceived. If you have interactive prompting turned off, these + filenames will be ignored. Note: mmggeett and mmppuutt are not meant + to transfer entire directory subtrees of files. That can be + done by transferring a tar(1) archive of the subtree (in bi- + nary mode). + + hhaasshh Toggle hash-sign (``#'') printing for each data block trans- + ferred. The size of a data block is 1024 bytes. + + hheellpp [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d] + Print an informative message about the meaning of _c_o_m_m_a_n_d. If + no argument is given, ffttpp prints a list of the known com- + mands. + + iiddllee [_s_e_c_o_n_d_s] + Set the inactivity timer on the remote server to _s_e_c_o_n_d_s sec- + onds. If _s_e_c_o_n_d_s is omitted, the current inactivity timer is + printed. + + llccdd [_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y] + Change the working directory on the local machine. If no + _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y is specified, the user's home directory is used. + + llss [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y] [_l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e] + Print a listing of the contents of a directory on the remote + machine. The listing includes any system-dependent informa- + tion that the server chooses to include; for example, most + UNIX systems will produce output from the command `ls -l'. + (See also nnlliisstt.) If _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y is left unspecified, + the current working directory is used. If interactive + prompting is on, ffttpp will prompt the user to verify that the + last argument is indeed the target local file for receiving + llss output. If no local file is specified, or if _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e + is `--', the output is sent to the terminal. + + mmaaccddeeff _m_a_c_r_o_-_n_a_m_e + Define a macro. Subsequent lines are stored as the macro + _m_a_c_r_o_-_n_a_m_e; a null line (consecutive newline characters in a + file or carriage returns from the terminal) terminates macro + input mode. There is a limit of 16 macros and 4096 total + characters in all defined macros. Macros remain defined un- + til a cclloossee command is executed. The macro processor inter- + prets `$' and `\' as special characters. A `$' followed by a + number (or numbers) is replaced by the corresponding argument + on the macro invocation command line. A `$' followed by an + `i' signals that macro processor that the executing macro is + to be looped. On the first pass `$i' is replaced by the + first argument on the macro invocation command line, on the + second pass it is replaced by the second argument, and so on. + A `\' followed by any character is replaced by that charac- + ter. Use the `\' to prevent special treatment of the `$'. + + mmddeelleettee [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e_s] + Delete the _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e_s on the remote machine. + + mmddiirr _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e_s _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e + Like ddiirr, except multiple remote files may be specified. If + interactive prompting is on, ffttpp will prompt the user to ver- + ify that the last argument is indeed the target local file + for receiving mmddiirr output. + + mmggeett _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e_s + Expand the _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e_s on the remote machine and do a ggeett + for each file name thus produced. See gglloobb for details on + the filename expansion. Resulting file names will then be + processed according to ccaassee, nnttrraannss, and nnmmaapp settings. + Files are transferred into the local working directory, which + can be changed with `lcd directory'; new local directories + can be created with `! mkdir directory'. + + mmkkddiirr _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y_-_n_a_m_e + Make a directory on the remote machine. + + mmllss _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e_s _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e + Like nnlliisstt, except multiple remote files may be specified, + and the _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e must be specified. If interactive prompt- + ing is on, ffttpp will prompt the user to verify that the last + argument is indeed the target local file for receiving mmllss + output. + + mmooddee [_m_o_d_e_-_n_a_m_e] + Set the file transfer mmooddee to _m_o_d_e_-_n_a_m_e. The default mode is + ``stream'' mode. + + mmooddttiimmee _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e + Show the last modification time of the file on the remote ma- + chine. + + mmppuutt _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e_s + Expand wild cards in the list of local files given as argu- + ments and do a ppuutt for each file in the resulting list. See + gglloobb for details of filename expansion. Resulting file names + will then be processed according to nnttrraannss and nnmmaapp settings. + + nneewweerr _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e + Get the file only if the modification time of the remote file + is more recent that the file on the current system. If the + file does not exist on the current system, the remote file is + considered nneewweerr. Otherwise, this command is identical to + _g_e_t. + + nnlliisstt [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y] [_l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e] + Print a list of the files in a directory on the remote ma- + chine. If _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y is left unspecified, the current + working directory is used. If interactive prompting is on, + ffttpp will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is + indeed the target local file for receiving nnlliisstt output. If + no local file is specified, or if _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e is --, the output + is sent to the terminal. + + nnmmaapp [_i_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n _o_u_t_p_a_t_t_e_r_n] + Set or unset the filename mapping mechanism. If no arguments + are specified, the filename mapping mechanism is unset. If + arguments are specified, remote filenames are mapped during + mmppuutt commands and ppuutt commands issued without a specified re- + mote target filename. If arguments are specified, local + filenames are mapped during mmggeett commands and ggeett commands + issued without a specified local target filename. This com- + mand is useful when connecting to a non-UNIX remote computer + with different file naming conventions or practices. The + mapping follows the pattern set by _i_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n and _o_u_t_p_a_t_t_e_r_n. + [_I_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n] is a template for incoming filenames (which may + have already been processed according to the nnttrraannss and ccaassee + settings). Variable templating is accomplished by including + the sequences `$1', `$2', ..., `$9' in _i_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n. Use `\' to + prevent this special treatment of the `$' character. All + other characters are treated literally, and are used to de- + termine the nnmmaapp [_i_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n] variable values. For example, + given _i_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n $1.$2 and the remote file name "mydata.data", + $1 would have the value "mydata", and $2 would have the value + "data". The _o_u_t_p_a_t_t_e_r_n determines the resulting mapped file- + name. The sequences `$1', `$2', ...., `$9' are replaced by + any value resulting from the _i_n_p_a_t_t_e_r_n template. The se- + quence `$0' is replace by the original filename. Additional- + ly, the sequence `[_s_e_q_1, _s_e_q_2]' is replaced by [_s_e_q_1] if _s_e_q_1 + is not a null string; otherwise it is replaced by _s_e_q_2. For + example, the command + + nmap $1.$2.$3 [$1,$2].[$2,file] + + would yield the output filename "myfile.data" for input file- + names "myfile.data" and "myfile.data.old", "myfile.file" for + the input filename "myfile", and "myfile.myfile" for the in- + put filename ".myfile". Spaces may be included in + _o_u_t_p_a_t_t_e_r_n, as in the example: `nmap $1 sed "s/ *$//" > $1' + . Use the `\' character to prevent special treatment of the + `$','[','[', and `,' characters. + + nnttrraannss [_i_n_c_h_a_r_s [_o_u_t_c_h_a_r_s]] + Set or unset the filename character translation mechanism. + If no arguments are specified, the filename character trans- + lation mechanism is unset. If arguments are specified, char- + acters in remote filenames are translated during mmppuutt com- + mands and ppuutt commands issued without a specified remote tar- + get filename. If arguments are specified, characters in lo- + cal filenames are translated during mmggeett commands and ggeett + commands issued without a specified local target filename. + This command is useful when connecting to a non-UNIX remote + computer with different file naming conventions or practices. + Characters in a filename matching a character in _i_n_c_h_a_r_s are + replaced with the corresponding character in _o_u_t_c_h_a_r_s. If the + character's position in _i_n_c_h_a_r_s is longer than the length of + _o_u_t_c_h_a_r_s, the character is deleted from the file name. + + ooppeenn _h_o_s_t [_p_o_r_t] + Establish a connection to the specified _h_o_s_t FTP server. An + optional port number may be supplied, in which case, ffttpp will + attempt to contact an FTP server at that port. If the aauuttoo-- + llooggiinn option is on (default), ffttpp will also attempt to auto- + + matically log the user in to the FTP server (see below). + + ppaassssiivvee Toggle passive mode. If passive mode is turned on (default + is off), the ftp client will send a PASV command for all data + connections instead of the usual PORT command. The PASV com- + mand requests that the remote server open a port for the data + connection and return the address of that port. The remote + server listens on that port and the client connects to it. + When using the more traditional PORT command, the client lis- + tens on a port and sends that address to the remote server, + who connects back to it. Passive mode is useful when using + ffttpp through a gateway router or host that controls the direc- + tionality of traffic. (Note that though ftp servers are re- + quired to support the PASV command by RFC 1123, some do not.) + + pprroommpptt Toggle interactive prompting. Interactive prompting occurs + during multiple file transfers to allow the user to selec- + tively retrieve or store files. If prompting is turned off + (default is on), any mmggeett or mmppuutt will transfer all files, + and any mmddeelleettee will delete all files. + + pprrooxxyy _f_t_p_-_c_o_m_m_a_n_d + Execute an ftp command on a secondary control connection. + This command allows simultaneous connection to two remote ftp + servers for transferring files between the two servers. The + first pprrooxxyy command should be an ooppeenn, to establish the sec- + ondary control connection. Enter the command "proxy ?" to + see other ftp commands executable on the secondary connec- + tion. The following commands behave differently when pref- + aced by pprrooxxyy: ooppeenn will not define new macros during the au- + to-login process, cclloossee will not erase existing macro defini- + tions, ggeett and mmggeett transfer files from the host on the pri- + mary control connection to the host on the secondary control + connection, and ppuutt, mmppuutt, and aappppeenndd transfer files from the + host on the secondary control connection to the host on the + primary control connection. Third party file transfers de- + pend upon support of the ftp protocol PASV command by the + server on the secondary control connection. + + ppuutt _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e] + Store a local file on the remote machine. If _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e is + left unspecified, the local file name is used after process- + ing according to any nnttrraannss or nnmmaapp settings in naming the + remote file. File transfer uses the current settings for + ttyyppee, ffoorrmmaatt, mmooddee, and ssttrruuccttuurree. + + ppwwdd Print the name of the current working directory on the remote + machine. + + qquuiitt A synonym for bbyyee. + + qquuoottee _a_r_g_1 _a_r_g_2 _._._. + The arguments specified are sent, verbatim, to the remote FTP + server. + + rreeccvv _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e [_l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e] + A synonym for get. + + rreeggeett _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e [_l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e] + Reget acts like get, except that if _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e exists and is + smaller than _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e, _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e is presumed to be a par- + tially transferred copy of _r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e and the transfer is + continued from the apparent point of failure. This command + is useful when transferring very large files over networks + + that are prone to dropping connections. + + rreemmootteehheellpp [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d_-_n_a_m_e] + Request help from the remote FTP server. If a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d_-_n_a_m_e + is specified it is supplied to the server as well. + + rreemmootteessttaattuuss [_f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e] + With no arguments, show status of remote machine. If _f_i_l_e_- + _n_a_m_e is specified, show status of _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e on remote ma- + chine. + + rreennaammee [_f_r_o_m] [_t_o] + Rename the file _f_r_o_m on the remote machine, to the file _t_o. + + rreesseett Clear reply queue. This command re-synchronizes command/re- + ply sequencing with the remote ftp server. Resynchronization + may be necessary following a violation of the ftp protocol by + the remote server. + + rreessttaarrtt _m_a_r_k_e_r + Restart the immediately following ggeett or ppuutt at the indicated + _m_a_r_k_e_r. On UNIX systems, marker is usually a byte offset into + the file. + + rrmmddiirr _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y_-_n_a_m_e + Delete a directory on the remote machine. + + rruunniiqquuee Toggle storing of files on the local system with unique file- + names. If a file already exists with a name equal to the + target local filename for a ggeett or mmggeett command, a ".1" is + appended to the name. If the resulting name matches another + existing file, a ".2" is appended to the original name. If + this process continues up to ".99", an error message is + printed, and the transfer does not take place. The generated + unique filename will be reported. Note that rruunniiqquuee will not + affect local files generated from a shell command (see be- + low). The default value is off. + + sseenndd _l_o_c_a_l_-_f_i_l_e [_r_e_m_o_t_e_-_f_i_l_e] + A synonym for put. + + sseennddppoorrtt Toggle the use of PORT commands. By default, ffttpp will at- + tempt to use a PORT command when establishing a connection + for each data transfer. The use of PORT commands can prevent + delays when performing multiple file transfers. If the PORT + command fails, ffttpp will use the default data port. When the + use of PORT commands is disabled, no attempt will be made to + use PORT commands for each data transfer. This is useful for + certain FTP implementations which do ignore PORT commands + but, incorrectly, indicate they've been accepted. + + ssiittee _a_r_g_1 _a_r_g_2 _._._. + The arguments specified are sent, verbatim, to the remote FTP + server as a SITE command. + + ssiizzee _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e + Return size of _f_i_l_e_-_n_a_m_e on remote machine. + + ssttaattuuss Show the current status of ffttpp. + + ssttrruucctt [_s_t_r_u_c_t_-_n_a_m_e] + Set the file transfer _s_t_r_u_c_t_u_r_e to _s_t_r_u_c_t_-_n_a_m_e. By default + ``stream'' structure is used. + + ssuunniiqquuee Toggle storing of files on remote machine under unique file + names. Remote ftp server must support ftp protocol STOU com- + mand for successful completion. The remote server will re- + port unique name. Default value is off. + + ssyysstteemm Show the type of operating system running on the remote ma- + chine. + + tteenneexx Set the file transfer type to that needed to talk to TENEX + machines. + + ttrraaccee Toggle packet tracing. + + ttyyppee [_t_y_p_e_-_n_a_m_e] + Set the file transfer ttyyppee to _t_y_p_e_-_n_a_m_e. If no type is speci- + fied, the current type is printed. The default type is net- + work ASCII. + + uummaasskk [_n_e_w_m_a_s_k] + Set the default umask on the remote server to _n_e_w_m_a_s_k. If + _n_e_w_m_a_s_k is omitted, the current umask is printed. + + uusseerr _u_s_e_r_-_n_a_m_e [_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d] [_a_c_c_o_u_n_t] + Identify yourself to the remote FTP server. If the _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d + is not specified and the server requires it, ffttpp will prompt + the user for it (after disabling local echo). If an _a_c_c_o_u_n_t + field is not specified, and the FTP server requires it, the + user will be prompted for it. If an _a_c_c_o_u_n_t field is speci- + fied, an account command will be relayed to the remote server + after the login sequence is completed if the remote server + did not require it for logging in. Unless ffttpp is invoked + with ``auto-login'' disabled, this process is done automati- + cally on initial connection to the FTP server. + + vveerrbboossee Toggle verbose mode. In verbose mode, all responses from the + FTP server are displayed to the user. In addition, if ver- + bose is on, when a file transfer completes, statistics re- + garding the efficiency of the transfer are reported. By de- + fault, verbose is on. + + ?? [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d] + A synonym for help. + + The following command can be used with ftpsec-aware servers. + + pprroott _c_l_e_a_r | _s_a_f_e | _c_o_n_f_i_d_e_n_t_i_a_l | _p_r_i_v_a_t_e + Set the data protection level to the requested level. + + The following command can be used with ftp servers that has implemented + the KAUTH site command. + + kkaauutthh [_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] + Obtain remote tickets. + + Command arguments which have embedded spaces may be quoted with quote `"' + marks. + +AABBOORRTTIINNGG AA FFIILLEE TTRRAANNSSFFEERR + To abort a file transfer, use the terminal interrupt key (usually Ctrl- + C). Sending transfers will be immediately halted. Receiving transfers + will be halted by sending a ftp protocol ABOR command to the remote serv- + er, and discarding any further data received. The speed at which this is + accomplished depends upon the remote server's support for ABOR process- + ing. If the remote server does not support the ABOR command, an `ftp>' + prompt will not appear until the remote server has completed sending the + requested file. + + + The terminal interrupt key sequence will be ignored when ffttpp has complet- + ed any local processing and is awaiting a reply from the remote server. + A long delay in this mode may result from the ABOR processing described + above, or from unexpected behavior by the remote server, including viola- + tions of the ftp protocol. If the delay results from unexpected remote + server behavior, the local ffttpp program must be killed by hand. + +FFIILLEE NNAAMMIINNGG CCOONNVVEENNTTIIOONNSS + Files specified as arguments to ffttpp commands are processed according to + the following rules. + + 1. If the file name `--' is specified, the _s_t_d_i_n (for reading) or _s_t_d_o_u_t + (for writing) is used. + + 2. If the first character of the file name is `|', the remainder of the + argument is interpreted as a shell command. FFttpp then forks a shell, + using popen(3) with the argument supplied, and reads (writes) from + the stdout (stdin). If the shell command includes spaces, the argu- + ment must be quoted; e.g. ``" ls -lt"''. A particularly useful ex- + ample of this mechanism is: ``dir more''. + + 3. Failing the above checks, if ``globbing'' is enabled, local file + names are expanded according to the rules used in the csh(1); c.f. + the gglloobb command. If the ffttpp command expects a single local file + (.e.g. ppuutt), only the first filename generated by the "globbing" + operation is used. + + 4. For mmggeett commands and ggeett commands with unspecified local file + names, the local filename is the remote filename, which may be al- + tered by a ccaassee, nnttrraannss, or nnmmaapp setting. The resulting filename + may then be altered if rruunniiqquuee is on. + + 5. For mmppuutt commands and ppuutt commands with unspecified remote file + names, the remote filename is the local filename, which may be al- + tered by a nnttrraannss or nnmmaapp setting. The resulting filename may then + be altered by the remote server if ssuunniiqquuee is on. + +FFIILLEE TTRRAANNSSFFEERR PPAARRAAMMEETTEERRSS + The FTP specification specifies many parameters which may affect a file + transfer. The ttyyppee may be one of ``ascii'', ``image'' (binary), + ``ebcdic'', and ``local byte size'' (for PDP-10's and PDP-20's mostly). + FFttpp supports the ascii and image types of file transfer, plus local byte + size 8 for tteenneexx mode transfers. + + FFttpp supports only the default values for the remaining file transfer pa- + rameters: mmooddee, ffoorrmm, and ssttrruucctt. + +TTHHEE ..nneettrrcc FFIILLEE + The _._n_e_t_r_c file contains login and initialization information used by the + auto-login process. It resides in the user's home directory. The fol- + lowing tokens are recognized; they may be separated by spaces, tabs, or + new-lines: + + mmaacchhiinnee _n_a_m_e + Identify a remote machine _n_a_m_e. The auto-login process searches + the _._n_e_t_r_c file for a mmaacchhiinnee token that matches the remote ma- + chine specified on the ffttpp command line or as an ooppeenn command + argument. Once a match is made, the subsequent _._n_e_t_r_c tokens + are processed, stopping when the end of file is reached or an- + other mmaacchhiinnee or a ddeeffaauulltt token is encountered. + + ddeeffaauulltt This is the same as mmaacchhiinnee _n_a_m_e except that ddeeffaauulltt matches + any name. There can be only one ddeeffaauulltt token, and it must be + after all mmaacchhiinnee tokens. This is normally used as: + + + default login anonymous password user@site + + thereby giving the user _a_u_t_o_m_a_t_i_c anonymous ftp login to ma- + chines not specified in _._n_e_t_r_c. This can be overridden by using + the --nn flag to disable auto-login. + + llooggiinn _n_a_m_e + Identify a user on the remote machine. If this token is pre- + sent, the auto-login process will initiate a login using the + specified _n_a_m_e. + + ppaasssswwoorrdd _s_t_r_i_n_g + Supply a password. If this token is present, the auto-login + process will supply the specified string if the remote server + requires a password as part of the login process. Note that if + this token is present in the _._n_e_t_r_c file for any user other + than _a_n_o_n_y_m_o_u_s, ffttpp will abort the auto-login process if the + _._n_e_t_r_c is readable by anyone besides the user. + + aaccccoouunntt _s_t_r_i_n_g + Supply an additional account password. If this token is pre- + sent, the auto-login process will supply the specified string + if the remote server requires an additional account password, + or the auto-login process will initiate an ACCT command if it + does not. + + mmaaccddeeff _n_a_m_e + Define a macro. This token functions like the ffttpp mmaaccddeeff com- + mand functions. A macro is defined with the specified name; + its contents begin with the next _._n_e_t_r_c line and continue until + a null line (consecutive new-line characters) is encountered. + If a macro named iinniitt is defined, it is automatically executed + as the last step in the auto-login process. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + FFttpp uses the following environment variables. + + HOME For default location of a _._n_e_t_r_c file, if one exists. + + SHELL For default shell. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + ftpd(8) + + _R_F_C_2_2_2_8. + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + The ffttpp command appeared in 4.2BSD. + +BBUUGGSS + Correct execution of many commands depends upon proper behavior by the + remote server. + + An error in the treatment of carriage returns in the 4.2BSD ascii-mode + transfer code has been corrected. This correction may result in incor- + rect transfers of binary files to and from 4.2BSD servers using the ascii + type. Avoid this problem by using the binary image type. + +4.2 Berkeley Distribution April 27, 1996 10 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4749da0901 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: ftp_locl.h,v 1.37 2002/09/10 20:03:46 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __FTP_LOCL_H__ +#define __FTP_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_FTP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +extern int LIBPREFIX(fclose) (FILE *); + +/* This doesn't belong here. */ +struct tm *localtime(const time_t *); +struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *); + +#endif + +#include "ftp_var.h" +#include "extern.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "pathnames.h" + +#include "roken.h" +#include "security.h" + +/* des_read_pw_string */ +#include "crypto-headers.h" + +#if defined(__sun__) && !defined(__svr4) +int fclose(FILE*); +int pclose(FILE*); +#endif + +#endif /* __FTP_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3dbe6b44a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)ftp_var.h 8.4 (Berkeley) 10/9/94 + */ + +/* + * FTP global variables. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include + +/* + * Options and other state info. + */ +extern int trace; /* trace packets exchanged */ +extern int hash; /* print # for each buffer transferred */ +extern int sendport; /* use PORT cmd for each data connection */ +extern int verbose; /* print messages coming back from server */ +extern int connected; /* connected to server */ +extern int fromatty; /* input is from a terminal */ +extern int interactive; /* interactively prompt on m* cmds */ +extern int lineedit; /* use line-editing */ +extern int debug; /* debugging level */ +extern int bell; /* ring bell on cmd completion */ +extern int doglob; /* glob local file names */ +extern int autologin; /* establish user account on connection */ +extern int proxy; /* proxy server connection active */ +extern int proxflag; /* proxy connection exists */ +extern int sunique; /* store files on server with unique name */ +extern int runique; /* store local files with unique name */ +extern int mcase; /* map upper to lower case for mget names */ +extern int ntflag; /* use ntin ntout tables for name translation */ +extern int mapflag; /* use mapin mapout templates on file names */ +extern int code; /* return/reply code for ftp command */ +extern int crflag; /* if 1, strip car. rets. on ascii gets */ +extern char pasv[64]; /* passive port for proxy data connection */ +extern int passivemode; /* passive mode enabled */ +extern char *altarg; /* argv[1] with no shell-like preprocessing */ +extern char ntin[17]; /* input translation table */ +extern char ntout[17]; /* output translation table */ +extern char mapin[MaxPathLen]; /* input map template */ +extern char mapout[MaxPathLen]; /* output map template */ +extern char typename[32]; /* name of file transfer type */ +extern int type; /* requested file transfer type */ +extern int curtype; /* current file transfer type */ +extern char structname[32]; /* name of file transfer structure */ +extern int stru; /* file transfer structure */ +extern char formname[32]; /* name of file transfer format */ +extern int form; /* file transfer format */ +extern char modename[32]; /* name of file transfer mode */ +extern int mode; /* file transfer mode */ +extern char bytename[32]; /* local byte size in ascii */ +extern int bytesize; /* local byte size in binary */ + +extern char *hostname; /* name of host connected to */ +extern int unix_server; /* server is unix, can use binary for ascii */ +extern int unix_proxy; /* proxy is unix, can use binary for ascii */ + +extern jmp_buf toplevel; /* non-local goto stuff for cmd scanner */ + +extern char line[200]; /* input line buffer */ +extern char *stringbase; /* current scan point in line buffer */ +extern char argbuf[200]; /* argument storage buffer */ +extern char *argbase; /* current storage point in arg buffer */ +extern int margc; /* count of arguments on input line */ +extern char **margv; /* args parsed from input line */ +extern int margvlen; /* how large margv is currently */ +extern int cpend; /* flag: if != 0, then pending server reply */ +extern int mflag; /* flag: if != 0, then active multi command */ + +extern int options; /* used during socket creation */ +extern int use_kerberos; /* use Kerberos authentication */ + +/* + * Format of command table. + */ +struct cmd { + char *c_name; /* name of command */ + char *c_help; /* help string */ + char c_bell; /* give bell when command completes */ + char c_conn; /* must be connected to use command */ + char c_proxy; /* proxy server may execute */ + void (*c_handler) (int, char **); /* function to call */ +}; + +struct macel { + char mac_name[9]; /* macro name */ + char *mac_start; /* start of macro in macbuf */ + char *mac_end; /* end of macro in macbuf */ +}; + +extern int macnum; /* number of defined macros */ +extern struct macel macros[16]; +extern char macbuf[4096]; + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a0e1c93de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: globals.c,v 1.8 2000/11/15 22:56:08 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Options and other state info. + */ +int trace; /* trace packets exchanged */ +int hash; /* print # for each buffer transferred */ +int sendport; /* use PORT cmd for each data connection */ +int verbose; /* print messages coming back from server */ +int connected; /* connected to server */ +int fromatty; /* input is from a terminal */ +int interactive; /* interactively prompt on m* cmds */ +int lineedit; /* use line-editing */ +int debug; /* debugging level */ +int bell; /* ring bell on cmd completion */ +int doglob; /* glob local file names */ +int autologin; /* establish user account on connection */ +int proxy; /* proxy server connection active */ +int proxflag; /* proxy connection exists */ +int sunique; /* store files on server with unique name */ +int runique; /* store local files with unique name */ +int mcase; /* map upper to lower case for mget names */ +int ntflag; /* use ntin ntout tables for name translation */ +int mapflag; /* use mapin mapout templates on file names */ +int code; /* return/reply code for ftp command */ +int crflag; /* if 1, strip car. rets. on ascii gets */ +char pasv[64]; /* passive port for proxy data connection */ +int passivemode; /* passive mode enabled */ +char *altarg; /* argv[1] with no shell-like preprocessing */ +char ntin[17]; /* input translation table */ +char ntout[17]; /* output translation table */ +char mapin[MaxPathLen]; /* input map template */ +char mapout[MaxPathLen]; /* output map template */ +char typename[32]; /* name of file transfer type */ +int type; /* requested file transfer type */ +int curtype; /* current file transfer type */ +char structname[32]; /* name of file transfer structure */ +int stru; /* file transfer structure */ +char formname[32]; /* name of file transfer format */ +int form; /* file transfer format */ +char modename[32]; /* name of file transfer mode */ +int mode; /* file transfer mode */ +char bytename[32]; /* local byte size in ascii */ +int bytesize; /* local byte size in binary */ + +char *hostname; /* name of host connected to */ +int unix_server; /* server is unix, can use binary for ascii */ +int unix_proxy; /* proxy is unix, can use binary for ascii */ + +jmp_buf toplevel; /* non-local goto stuff for cmd scanner */ + +char line[200]; /* input line buffer */ +char *stringbase; /* current scan point in line buffer */ +char argbuf[200]; /* argument storage buffer */ +char *argbase; /* current storage point in arg buffer */ +int margc; /* count of arguments on input line */ +char **margv; /* args parsed from input line */ +int margvlen; /* how large margv is currently */ +int cpend; /* flag: if != 0, then pending server reply */ +int mflag; /* flag: if != 0, then active multi command */ + +int options; /* used during socket creation */ +int use_kerberos; /* use Kerberos authentication */ + +/* + * Format of command table. + */ + +int macnum; /* number of defined macros */ +struct macel macros[16]; +char macbuf[4096]; + +char username[32]; + +/* these are set in ruserpass */ +char myhostname[MaxHostNameLen]; +char *mydomain; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..65742e84d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c @@ -0,0 +1,517 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#else +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#endif +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: gssapi.c,v 1.22.2.2 2003/08/20 16:41:24 lha Exp $"); + +int ftp_do_gss_bindings = 0; + +struct gss_data { + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl; + char *client_name; + gss_cred_id_t delegated_cred_handle; +}; + +static int +gss_init(void *app_data) +{ + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + d->context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + d->delegated_cred_handle = NULL; +#if defined(FTP_SERVER) + return 0; +#else + /* XXX Check the gss mechanism; with gss_indicate_mechs() ? */ +#ifdef KRB5 + return !use_kerberos; +#else + return 0 +#endif /* KRB5 */ +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ +} + +static int +gss_check_prot(void *app_data, int level) +{ + if(level == prot_confidential) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +static int +gss_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len, int level) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc input, output; + gss_qop_t qop_state; + int conf_state; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + size_t ret_len; + + input.length = len; + input.value = buf; + maj_stat = gss_unwrap (&min_stat, + d->context_hdl, + &input, + &output, + &conf_state, + &qop_state); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + return -1; + memmove(buf, output.value, output.length); + ret_len = output.length; + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output); + return ret_len; +} + +static int +gss_overhead(void *app_data, int level, int len) +{ + return 100; /* dunno? */ +} + + +static int +gss_encode(void *app_data, void *from, int length, int level, void **to) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc input, output; + int conf_state; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + + input.length = length; + input.value = from; + maj_stat = gss_wrap (&min_stat, + d->context_hdl, + level == prot_private, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + &input, + &conf_state, + &output); + *to = output.value; + return output.length; +} + +static void +sockaddr_to_gss_address (const struct sockaddr *sa, + OM_uint32 *addr_type, + gss_buffer_desc *gss_addr) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + gss_addr->length = 16; + gss_addr->value = &sin6->sin6_addr; + *addr_type = GSS_C_AF_INET6; + break; + } +#endif + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + gss_addr->length = 4; + gss_addr->value = &sin->sin_addr; + *addr_type = GSS_C_AF_INET; + break; + } + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + + } +} + +/* end common stuff */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +static int +gss_adat(void *app_data, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + char *p = NULL; + gss_buffer_desc input_token, output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t client_name; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + gss_channel_bindings_t bindings; + + if (ftp_do_gss_bindings) { + bindings = malloc(sizeof(*bindings)); + if (bindings == NULL) + errx(1, "out of memory"); + + sockaddr_to_gss_address (his_addr, + &bindings->initiator_addrtype, + &bindings->initiator_address); + sockaddr_to_gss_address (ctrl_addr, + &bindings->acceptor_addrtype, + &bindings->acceptor_address); + + bindings->application_data.length = 0; + bindings->application_data.value = NULL; + } else + bindings = GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS; + + input_token.value = buf; + input_token.length = len; + + d->delegated_cred_handle = malloc(sizeof(*d->delegated_cred_handle)); + if (d->delegated_cred_handle == NULL) { + reply(500, "Out of memory"); + goto out; + } + + memset ((char*)d->delegated_cred_handle, 0, + sizeof(*d->delegated_cred_handle)); + + maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context (&min_stat, + &d->context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &input_token, + bindings, + &client_name, + NULL, + &output_token, + NULL, + NULL, + &d->delegated_cred_handle); + + if (bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) + free(bindings); + + if(output_token.length) { + if(base64_encode(output_token.value, output_token.length, &p) < 0) { + reply(535, "Out of memory base64-encoding."); + return -1; + } + } + if(maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE){ + char *name; + gss_buffer_desc export_name; + gss_OID oid; + + maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, client_name, + &export_name, &oid); + if(maj_stat != 0) { + reply(500, "Error displaying name"); + goto out; + } + /* XXX kerberos */ + if(oid != GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME) { + reply(500, "OID not kerberos principal name"); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &export_name); + goto out; + } + name = malloc(export_name.length + 1); + if(name == NULL) { + reply(500, "Out of memory"); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &export_name); + goto out; + } + memcpy(name, export_name.value, export_name.length); + name[export_name.length] = '\0'; + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &export_name); + d->client_name = name; + if(p) + reply(235, "ADAT=%s", p); + else + reply(235, "ADAT Complete"); + sec_complete = 1; + + } else if(maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + if(p) + reply(335, "ADAT=%s", p); + else + reply(335, "OK, need more data"); + } else { + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + gss_display_status(&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + syslog(LOG_ERR, "gss_accept_sec_context: %s", + (char*)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status_string); + reply(431, "Security resource unavailable"); + } + out: + free(p); + return 0; +} + +int gss_userok(void*, char*); + +struct sec_server_mech gss_server_mech = { + "GSSAPI", + sizeof(struct gss_data), + gss_init, /* init */ + NULL, /* end */ + gss_check_prot, + gss_overhead, + gss_encode, + gss_decode, + /* */ + NULL, + gss_adat, + NULL, /* pbsz */ + NULL, /* ccc */ + gss_userok +}; + +#else /* FTP_SERVER */ + +extern struct sockaddr *hisctladdr, *myctladdr; + +static int +import_name(const char *kname, const char *host, gss_name_t *target_name) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc name; + + name.length = asprintf((char**)&name.value, "%s@%s", kname, host); + if (name.value == NULL) { + printf("Out of memory\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + + maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, + &name, + GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + target_name); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + + gss_display_status(&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + printf("Error importing name %s: %s\n", + (char *)name.value, + (char *)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status_string); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + free(name.value); + return 0; +} + +static int +gss_auth(void *app_data, char *host) +{ + + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t target_name; + gss_buffer_desc input, output_token; + int context_established = 0; + char *p; + int n; + gss_channel_bindings_t bindings; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + + const char *knames[] = { "ftp", "host", NULL }, **kname = knames; + + + if(import_name(*kname++, host, &target_name)) + return AUTH_ERROR; + + input.length = 0; + input.value = NULL; + + if (ftp_do_gss_bindings) { + bindings = malloc(sizeof(*bindings)); + if (bindings == NULL) + errx(1, "out of memory"); + + sockaddr_to_gss_address (myctladdr, + &bindings->initiator_addrtype, + &bindings->initiator_address); + sockaddr_to_gss_address (hisctladdr, + &bindings->acceptor_addrtype, + &bindings->acceptor_address); + + bindings->application_data.length = 0; + bindings->application_data.value = NULL; + } else + bindings = GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS; + + while(!context_established) { + maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &d->context_hdl, + target_name, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + | GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, + 0, + bindings, + &input, + NULL, + &output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + + if(min_stat == KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN && *kname != NULL) { + if(import_name(*kname++, host, &target_name)) { + if (bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) + free(bindings); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + continue; + } + + if (bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) + free(bindings); + + gss_display_status(&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + printf("Error initializing security context: %s\n", + (char*)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status_string); + return AUTH_CONTINUE; + } + + if (input.value) { + free(input.value); + input.value = NULL; + input.length = 0; + } + if (output_token.length != 0) { + base64_encode(output_token.value, output_token.length, &p); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token); + n = command("ADAT %s", p); + free(p); + } + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (d->context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &d->context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + p = strstr(reply_string, "ADAT="); + if(p == NULL){ + printf("Error: expected ADAT in reply. got: %s\n", + reply_string); + if (bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) + free(bindings); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } else { + p+=5; + input.value = malloc(strlen(p)); + input.length = base64_decode(p, input.value); + } + } else { + if(code != 235) { + printf("Unrecognized response code: %d\n", code); + if (bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) + free(bindings); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + context_established = 1; + } + } + + if (bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) + free(bindings); + if (input.value) + free(input.value); + + { + gss_name_t targ_name; + + maj_stat = gss_inquire_context(&min_stat, + d->context_hdl, + NULL, + &targ_name, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat) == 0) { + gss_buffer_desc name; + maj_stat = gss_display_name (&min_stat, + targ_name, + &name, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat) == 0) { + printf("Authenticated to <%s>\n", (char *)name.value); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &name); + } + gss_release_name(&min_stat, &targ_name); + } else + printf("Failed to get gss name of peer.\n"); + } + + + return AUTH_OK; +} + +struct sec_client_mech gss_client_mech = { + "GSSAPI", + sizeof(struct gss_data), + gss_init, + gss_auth, + NULL, /* end */ + gss_check_prot, + gss_overhead, + gss_encode, + gss_decode, +}; + +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..613593a712 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#include +RCSID("$Id: kauth.c,v 1.20 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $"); + +void +kauth(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + char buf[1024]; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + KTEXT_ST tkt, tktcopy; + char *name; + char *p; + int overbose; + char passwd[100]; + int tmp; + + int save; + + if(argc > 2){ + printf("usage: %s [principal]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if(argc == 2) + name = argv[1]; + else + name = username; + + overbose = verbose; + verbose = 0; + + save = set_command_prot(prot_private); + ret = command("SITE KAUTH %s", name); + if(ret != CONTINUE){ + verbose = overbose; + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + verbose = overbose; + p = strstr(reply_string, "T="); + if(!p){ + printf("Bad reply from server.\n"); + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + p += 2; + tmp = base64_decode(p, &tkt.dat); + if(tmp < 0){ + printf("Failed to decode base64 in reply.\n"); + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + tkt.length = tmp; + tktcopy.length = tkt.length; + + p = strstr(reply_string, "P="); + if(!p){ + printf("Bad reply from server.\n"); + verbose = overbose; + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + name = p + 2; + for(; *p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\r' && *p != '\n'; p++); + *p = 0; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Password for %s:", name); + if (des_read_pw_string (passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, buf, 0)) + *passwd = '\0'; + des_string_to_key (passwd, &key); + + des_key_sched(&key, schedule); + + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)tkt.dat, (des_cblock*)tktcopy.dat, + tkt.length, + schedule, &key, DES_DECRYPT); + if (strcmp ((char*)tktcopy.dat + 8, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET) != 0) { + afs_string_to_key (passwd, krb_realmofhost(hostname), &key); + des_key_sched (&key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)tkt.dat, (des_cblock*)tktcopy.dat, + tkt.length, + schedule, &key, DES_DECRYPT); + } + memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset(schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + if(base64_encode(tktcopy.dat, tktcopy.length, &p) < 0) { + printf("Out of memory base64-encoding.\n"); + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + memset (tktcopy.dat, 0, tktcopy.length); + ret = command("SITE KAUTH %s %s", name, p); + free(p); + set_command_prot(save); + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + code = -1; + return; + } + code = 0; +} + +void +klist(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if(argc != 1){ + printf("usage: %s\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + + ret = command("SITE KLIST"); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} + +void +kdestroy(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if (argc != 1) { + printf("usage: %s\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + ret = command("SITE KDESTROY"); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} + +void +krbtkfile(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if(argc != 2) { + printf("usage: %s tktfile\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + ret = command("SITE KRBTKFILE %s", argv[1]); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} + +void +afslog(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if(argc > 2) { + printf("usage: %s [cell]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if(argc == 2) + ret = command("SITE AFSLOG %s", argv[1]); + else + ret = command("SITE AFSLOG"); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d057ed7135 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#else +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#endif +#include + +RCSID("$Id: krb4.c,v 1.38 2000/06/21 02:46:09 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#define LOCAL_ADDR ctrl_addr +#define REMOTE_ADDR his_addr +#else +#define LOCAL_ADDR myctladdr +#define REMOTE_ADDR hisctladdr +#endif + +extern struct sockaddr *LOCAL_ADDR, *REMOTE_ADDR; + +struct krb4_data { + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; +}; + +static int +krb4_check_prot(void *app_data, int level) +{ + if(level == prot_confidential) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +static int +krb4_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len, int level) +{ + MSG_DAT m; + int e; + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + + if(level == prot_safe) + e = krb_rd_safe(buf, len, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, &m); + else + e = krb_rd_priv(buf, len, d->schedule, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, &m); + if(e){ + syslog(LOG_ERR, "krb4_decode: %s", krb_get_err_text(e)); + return -1; + } + memmove(buf, m.app_data, m.app_length); + return m.app_length; +} + +static int +krb4_overhead(void *app_data, int level, int len) +{ + return 31; +} + +static int +krb4_encode(void *app_data, void *from, int length, int level, void **to) +{ + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + *to = malloc(length + 31); + if(level == prot_safe) + return krb_mk_safe(from, *to, length, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR); + else if(level == prot_private) + return krb_mk_priv(from, *to, length, d->schedule, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR); + else + return -1; +} + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +static int +krb4_adat(void *app_data, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + KTEXT_ST tkt; + AUTH_DAT auth_dat; + char *p; + int kerror; + u_int32_t cs; + char msg[35]; /* size of encrypted block */ + int tmp_len; + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + char inst[INST_SZ]; + struct sockaddr_in *his_addr_sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)his_addr; + + memcpy(tkt.dat, buf, len); + tkt.length = len; + + k_getsockinst(0, inst, sizeof(inst)); + kerror = krb_rd_req(&tkt, "ftp", inst, + his_addr_sin->sin_addr.s_addr, &auth_dat, ""); + if(kerror == RD_AP_UNDEC){ + k_getsockinst(0, inst, sizeof(inst)); + kerror = krb_rd_req(&tkt, "rcmd", inst, + his_addr_sin->sin_addr.s_addr, &auth_dat, ""); + } + + if(kerror){ + reply(535, "Error reading request: %s.", krb_get_err_text(kerror)); + return -1; + } + + memcpy(d->key, auth_dat.session, sizeof(d->key)); + des_set_key(&d->key, d->schedule); + + strlcpy(d->name, auth_dat.pname, sizeof(d->name)); + strlcpy(d->instance, auth_dat.pinst, sizeof(d->instance)); + strlcpy(d->realm, auth_dat.prealm, sizeof(d->instance)); + + cs = auth_dat.checksum + 1; + { + unsigned char tmp[4]; + KRB_PUT_INT(cs, tmp, 4, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp_len = krb_mk_safe(tmp, msg, 4, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR); + } + if(tmp_len < 0){ + reply(535, "Error creating reply: %s.", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + len = tmp_len; + if(base64_encode(msg, len, &p) < 0) { + reply(535, "Out of memory base64-encoding."); + return -1; + } + reply(235, "ADAT=%s", p); + sec_complete = 1; + free(p); + return 0; +} + +static int +krb4_userok(void *app_data, char *user) +{ + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + return krb_kuserok(d->name, d->instance, d->realm, user); +} + +struct sec_server_mech krb4_server_mech = { + "KERBEROS_V4", + sizeof(struct krb4_data), + NULL, /* init */ + NULL, /* end */ + krb4_check_prot, + krb4_overhead, + krb4_encode, + krb4_decode, + /* */ + NULL, + krb4_adat, + NULL, /* pbsz */ + NULL, /* ccc */ + krb4_userok +}; + +#else /* FTP_SERVER */ + +static int +krb4_init(void *app_data) +{ + return !use_kerberos; +} + +static int +mk_auth(struct krb4_data *d, KTEXT adat, + char *service, char *host, int checksum) +{ + int ret; + CREDENTIALS cred; + char sname[SNAME_SZ], inst[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ]; + + strlcpy(sname, service, sizeof(sname)); + strlcpy(inst, krb_get_phost(host), sizeof(inst)); + strlcpy(realm, krb_realmofhost(host), sizeof(realm)); + ret = krb_mk_req(adat, sname, inst, realm, checksum); + if(ret) + return ret; + strlcpy(sname, service, sizeof(sname)); + strlcpy(inst, krb_get_phost(host), sizeof(inst)); + strlcpy(realm, krb_realmofhost(host), sizeof(realm)); + ret = krb_get_cred(sname, inst, realm, &cred); + memmove(&d->key, &cred.session, sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_key_sched(&d->key, d->schedule); + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + return ret; +} + +static int +krb4_auth(void *app_data, char *host) +{ + int ret; + char *p; + int len; + KTEXT_ST adat; + MSG_DAT msg_data; + int checksum; + u_int32_t cs; + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + struct sockaddr_in *localaddr = (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR; + struct sockaddr_in *remoteaddr = (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR; + + checksum = getpid(); + ret = mk_auth(d, &adat, "ftp", host, checksum); + if(ret == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) + ret = mk_auth(d, &adat, "rcmd", host, checksum); + if(ret){ + printf("%s\n", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return AUTH_CONTINUE; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_KRB_GET_OUR_IP_FOR_REALM + if (krb_get_config_bool("nat_in_use")) { + struct in_addr natAddr; + + if (krb_get_our_ip_for_realm(krb_realmofhost(host), + &natAddr) != KSUCCESS + && krb_get_our_ip_for_realm(NULL, &natAddr) != KSUCCESS) + printf("Can't get address for realm %s\n", + krb_realmofhost(host)); + else { + if (natAddr.s_addr != localaddr->sin_addr.s_addr) { + printf("Using NAT IP address (%s) for kerberos 4\n", + inet_ntoa(natAddr)); + localaddr->sin_addr = natAddr; + + /* + * This not the best place to do this, but it + * is here we know that (probably) NAT is in + * use! + */ + + passivemode = 1; + printf("Setting: Passive mode on.\n"); + } + } + } +#endif + + printf("Local address is %s\n", inet_ntoa(localaddr->sin_addr)); + printf("Remote address is %s\n", inet_ntoa(remoteaddr->sin_addr)); + + if(base64_encode(adat.dat, adat.length, &p) < 0) { + printf("Out of memory base64-encoding.\n"); + return AUTH_CONTINUE; + } + ret = command("ADAT %s", p); + free(p); + + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + printf("Server didn't accept auth data.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + + p = strstr(reply_string, "ADAT="); + if(!p){ + printf("Remote host didn't send adat reply.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + p += 5; + len = base64_decode(p, adat.dat); + if(len < 0){ + printf("Failed to decode base64 from server.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + adat.length = len; + ret = krb_rd_safe(adat.dat, adat.length, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)hisctladdr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)myctladdr, &msg_data); + if(ret){ + printf("Error reading reply from server: %s.\n", + krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + krb_get_int(msg_data.app_data, &cs, 4, 0); + if(cs - checksum != 1){ + printf("Bad checksum returned from server.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + return AUTH_OK; +} + +struct sec_client_mech krb4_client_mech = { + "KERBEROS_V4", + sizeof(struct krb4_data), + krb4_init, /* init */ + krb4_auth, + NULL, /* end */ + krb4_check_prot, + krb4_overhead, + krb4_encode, + krb4_decode +}; + +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..071f60127d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * FTP User Program -- Command Interface. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.33.2.1 2003/08/20 16:43:14 lha Exp $"); + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int debug_flag; + +struct getargs getargs[] = { + { NULL, 'd', arg_flag, &debug_flag, + "debug", NULL }, + { NULL, 'g', arg_negative_flag, &doglob, + "disables globbing", NULL}, + { NULL, 'i', arg_negative_flag, &interactive, + "Turn off interactive prompting", NULL}, + { NULL, 'l', arg_negative_flag, &lineedit, + "Turn off line editing", NULL}, + { NULL, 'n', arg_negative_flag, &autologin, + "Turn off auto-login", NULL}, + { NULL, 'p', arg_flag, &passivemode, + "passive mode", NULL}, + { NULL, 't', arg_counter, &trace, + "Packet tracing", NULL}, +#ifdef KRB5 + { "gss-bindings", 0, arg_negative_flag, &ftp_do_gss_bindings, + "Use GSS-API bindings", NULL}, +#endif + { NULL, 'v', arg_counter, &verbose, + "verbosity", NULL}, + { NULL, 'K', arg_negative_flag, &use_kerberos, + "Disable kerberos authentication", NULL}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(getargs) / sizeof(getargs[0]); + +static void +usage(int ecode) +{ + arg_printusage(getargs, num_args, NULL, "[host [port]]"); + exit(ecode); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int top; + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + char homedir[MaxPathLen]; + struct servent *sp; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + sp = getservbyname("ftp", "tcp"); + if (sp == 0) + errx(1, "ftp/tcp: unknown service"); + doglob = 1; + interactive = 1; + autologin = 1; + lineedit = 1; + passivemode = 0; /* passive mode not active */ + use_kerberos = 1; +#ifdef KRB5 + ftp_do_gss_bindings = 1; +#endif + + if(getarg(getargs, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if (debug_flag) { + options |= SO_DEBUG; + debug++; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + fromatty = isatty(fileno(stdin)); + if (fromatty) + verbose++; + cpend = 0; /* no pending replies */ + proxy = 0; /* proxy not active */ + crflag = 1; /* strip c.r. on ascii gets */ + sendport = -1; /* not using ports */ + /* + * Set up the home directory in case we're globbing. + */ + pw = k_getpwuid(getuid()); + if (pw != NULL) { + strlcpy(homedir, pw->pw_dir, sizeof(homedir)); + home = homedir; + } + if (argc > 0) { + char *xargv[5]; + + if (setjmp(toplevel)) + exit(0); + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGPIPE, lostpeer); + xargv[0] = (char*)getprogname(); + xargv[1] = argv[0]; + xargv[2] = argv[1]; + xargv[3] = argv[2]; + xargv[4] = NULL; + setpeer(argc+1, xargv); + } + if(setjmp(toplevel) == 0) + top = 1; + else + top = 0; + if (top) { + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGPIPE, lostpeer); + } + for (;;) { + cmdscanner(top); + top = 1; + } +} + +void +intr(int sig) +{ + + longjmp(toplevel, 1); +} + +#ifndef SHUT_RDWR +#define SHUT_RDWR 2 +#endif + +RETSIGTYPE +lostpeer(int sig) +{ + + if (connected) { + if (cout != NULL) { + shutdown(fileno(cout), SHUT_RDWR); + fclose(cout); + cout = NULL; + } + if (data >= 0) { + shutdown(data, SHUT_RDWR); + close(data); + data = -1; + } + connected = 0; + } + pswitch(1); + if (connected) { + if (cout != NULL) { + shutdown(fileno(cout), SHUT_RDWR); + fclose(cout); + cout = NULL; + } + connected = 0; + } + proxflag = 0; + pswitch(0); + sec_end(); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +/* +char * +tail(filename) + char *filename; +{ + char *s; + + while (*filename) { + s = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if (s == NULL) + break; + if (s[1]) + return (s + 1); + *s = '\0'; + } + return (filename); +} +*/ + +static char * +simple_readline(char *prompt) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + printf ("%s", prompt); + fflush (stdout); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + return strdup(buf); +} + +#ifndef HAVE_READLINE + +static char * +readline(char *prompt) +{ + return simple_readline (prompt); +} + +static void +add_history(char *p) +{ +} + +#else + +/* These should not really be here */ + +char *readline(char *); +void add_history(char *); + +#endif + +/* + * Command parser. + */ +void +cmdscanner(int top) +{ + struct cmd *c; + int l; + + if (!top) + putchar('\n'); + for (;;) { + if (fromatty) { + char *p; + if (lineedit) + p = readline("ftp> "); + else + p = simple_readline("ftp> "); + if(p == NULL) { + printf("\n"); + quit(0, 0); + } + strlcpy(line, p, sizeof(line)); + if (lineedit) + add_history(p); + free(p); + } else{ + if (fgets(line, sizeof line, stdin) == NULL) + quit(0, 0); + } + /* XXX will break on long lines */ + l = strlen(line); + if (l == 0) + break; + if (line[--l] == '\n') { + if (l == 0) + break; + line[l] = '\0'; + } else if (l == sizeof(line) - 2) { + printf("sorry, input line too long\n"); + while ((l = getchar()) != '\n' && l != EOF) + /* void */; + break; + } /* else it was a line without a newline */ + makeargv(); + if (margc == 0) { + continue; + } + c = getcmd(margv[0]); + if (c == (struct cmd *)-1) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\n"); + continue; + } + if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\n"); + continue; + } + if (c->c_conn && !connected) { + printf("Not connected.\n"); + continue; + } + (*c->c_handler)(margc, margv); + if (bell && c->c_bell) + putchar('\007'); + if (c->c_handler != help) + break; + } + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGPIPE, lostpeer); +} + +struct cmd * +getcmd(char *name) +{ + char *p, *q; + struct cmd *c, *found; + int nmatches, longest; + + longest = 0; + nmatches = 0; + found = 0; + for (c = cmdtab; (p = c->c_name); c++) { + for (q = name; *q == *p++; q++) + if (*q == 0) /* exact match? */ + return (c); + if (!*q) { /* the name was a prefix */ + if (q - name > longest) { + longest = q - name; + nmatches = 1; + found = c; + } else if (q - name == longest) + nmatches++; + } + } + if (nmatches > 1) + return ((struct cmd *)-1); + return (found); +} + +/* + * Slice a string up into argc/argv. + */ + +int slrflag; + +void +makeargv(void) +{ + char **argp; + + argp = margv; + stringbase = line; /* scan from first of buffer */ + argbase = argbuf; /* store from first of buffer */ + slrflag = 0; + for (margc = 0; ; margc++) { + /* Expand array if necessary */ + if (margc == margvlen) { + int i; + + margv = (margvlen == 0) + ? (char **)malloc(20 * sizeof(char *)) + : (char **)realloc(margv, + (margvlen + 20)*sizeof(char *)); + if (margv == NULL) + errx(1, "cannot realloc argv array"); + for(i = margvlen; i < margvlen + 20; ++i) + margv[i] = NULL; + margvlen += 20; + argp = margv + margc; + } + + if ((*argp++ = slurpstring()) == NULL) + break; + } + +} + +/* + * Parse string into argbuf; + * implemented with FSM to + * handle quoting and strings + */ +char * +slurpstring(void) +{ + int got_one = 0; + char *sb = stringbase; + char *ap = argbase; + char *tmp = argbase; /* will return this if token found */ + + if (*sb == '!' || *sb == '$') { /* recognize ! as a token for shell */ + switch (slrflag) { /* and $ as token for macro invoke */ + case 0: + slrflag++; + stringbase++; + return ((*sb == '!') ? "!" : "$"); + /* NOTREACHED */ + case 1: + slrflag++; + altarg = stringbase; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + +S0: + switch (*sb) { + + case '\0': + goto OUT; + + case ' ': + case '\t': + sb++; goto S0; + + default: + switch (slrflag) { + case 0: + slrflag++; + break; + case 1: + slrflag++; + altarg = sb; + break; + default: + break; + } + goto S1; + } + +S1: + switch (*sb) { + + case ' ': + case '\t': + case '\0': + goto OUT; /* end of token */ + + case '\\': + sb++; goto S2; /* slurp next character */ + + case '"': + sb++; goto S3; /* slurp quoted string */ + + default: + *ap++ = *sb++; /* add character to token */ + got_one = 1; + goto S1; + } + +S2: + switch (*sb) { + + case '\0': + goto OUT; + + default: + *ap++ = *sb++; + got_one = 1; + goto S1; + } + +S3: + switch (*sb) { + + case '\0': + goto OUT; + + case '"': + sb++; goto S1; + + default: + *ap++ = *sb++; + got_one = 1; + goto S3; + } + +OUT: + if (got_one) + *ap++ = '\0'; + argbase = ap; /* update storage pointer */ + stringbase = sb; /* update scan pointer */ + if (got_one) { + return (tmp); + } + switch (slrflag) { + case 0: + slrflag++; + break; + case 1: + slrflag++; + altarg = (char *) 0; + break; + default: + break; + } + return NULL; +} + +#define HELPINDENT ((int) sizeof ("directory")) + +/* + * Help command. + * Call each command handler with argc == 0 and argv[0] == name. + */ +void +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct cmd *c; + + if (argc == 1) { + int i, j, w, k; + int columns, width = 0, lines; + + printf("Commands may be abbreviated. Commands are:\n\n"); + for (c = cmdtab; c < &cmdtab[NCMDS]; c++) { + int len = strlen(c->c_name); + + if (len > width) + width = len; + } + width = (width + 8) &~ 7; + columns = 80 / width; + if (columns == 0) + columns = 1; + lines = (NCMDS + columns - 1) / columns; + for (i = 0; i < lines; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < columns; j++) { + c = cmdtab + j * lines + i; + if (c->c_name && (!proxy || c->c_proxy)) { + printf("%s", c->c_name); + } + else if (c->c_name) { + for (k=0; k < strlen(c->c_name); k++) { + putchar(' '); + } + } + if (c + lines >= &cmdtab[NCMDS]) { + printf("\n"); + break; + } + w = strlen(c->c_name); + while (w < width) { + w = (w + 8) &~ 7; + putchar('\t'); + } + } + } + return; + } + while (--argc > 0) { + char *arg; + arg = *++argv; + c = getcmd(arg); + if (c == (struct cmd *)-1) + printf("?Ambiguous help command %s\n", arg); + else if (c == (struct cmd *)0) + printf("?Invalid help command %s\n", arg); + else + printf("%-*s\t%s\n", HELPINDENT, + c->c_name, c->c_help); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f7c1fb391d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)pathnames.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93 + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#define _PATH_TMP_XXX "/tmp/ftpXXXXXX" + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b22f6997ee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: ruserpass.c,v 1.19 2000/01/08 07:45:11 assar Exp $"); + +static int token (void); +static FILE *cfile; + +#define DEFAULT 1 +#define LOGIN 2 +#define PASSWD 3 +#define ACCOUNT 4 +#define MACDEF 5 +#define PROT 6 +#define ID 10 +#define MACH 11 + +static char tokval[100]; + +static struct toktab { + char *tokstr; + int tval; +} toktab[]= { + { "default", DEFAULT }, + { "login", LOGIN }, + { "password", PASSWD }, + { "passwd", PASSWD }, + { "account", ACCOUNT }, + { "machine", MACH }, + { "macdef", MACDEF }, + { "prot", PROT }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +/* + * Write a copy of the hostname into `hostname, sz' and return a guess + * as to the `domain' of that hostname. + */ + +static char * +guess_domain (char *hostname, size_t sz) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char *dot; + + if (gethostname (hostname, sz) < 0) { + strlcpy (hostname, "", sz); + return ""; + } + dot = strchr (hostname, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) + return dot + 1; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return hostname; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + strlcpy (hostname, ai->ai_canonname, sz); + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + dot = strchr (hostname, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) + return dot + 1; + else + return hostname; +} + +int +ruserpass(char *host, char **aname, char **apass, char **aacct) +{ + char *hdir, buf[BUFSIZ], *tmp; + int t, i, c, usedefault = 0; + struct stat stb; + + mydomain = guess_domain (myhostname, MaxHostNameLen); + + hdir = getenv("HOME"); + if (hdir == NULL) + hdir = "."; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.netrc", hdir); + cfile = fopen(buf, "r"); + if (cfile == NULL) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + warn("%s", buf); + return (0); + } + +next: + while ((t = token())) switch(t) { + + case DEFAULT: + usedefault = 1; + /* FALL THROUGH */ + + case MACH: + if (!usedefault) { + if (token() != ID) + continue; + /* + * Allow match either for user's input host name + * or official hostname. Also allow match of + * incompletely-specified host in local domain. + */ + if (strcasecmp(host, tokval) == 0) + goto match; + if (strcasecmp(hostname, tokval) == 0) + goto match; + if ((tmp = strchr(hostname, '.')) != NULL && + tmp++ && + strcasecmp(tmp, mydomain) == 0 && + strncasecmp(hostname, tokval, tmp-hostname) == 0 && + tokval[tmp - hostname] == '\0') + goto match; + if ((tmp = strchr(host, '.')) != NULL && + tmp++ && + strcasecmp(tmp, mydomain) == 0 && + strncasecmp(host, tokval, tmp - host) == 0 && + tokval[tmp - host] == '\0') + goto match; + continue; + } + match: + while ((t = token()) && t != MACH && t != DEFAULT) switch(t) { + + case LOGIN: + if (token()) { + if (*aname == 0) { + *aname = strdup(tokval); + } else { + if (strcmp(*aname, tokval)) + goto next; + } + } + break; + case PASSWD: + if ((*aname == NULL || strcmp(*aname, "anonymous")) && + fstat(fileno(cfile), &stb) >= 0 && + (stb.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + warnx("Error: .netrc file is readable by others."); + warnx("Remove password or make file unreadable by others."); + goto bad; + } + if (token() && *apass == 0) { + *apass = strdup(tokval); + } + break; + case ACCOUNT: + if (fstat(fileno(cfile), &stb) >= 0 + && (stb.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + warnx("Error: .netrc file is readable by others."); + warnx("Remove account or make file unreadable by others."); + goto bad; + } + if (token() && *aacct == 0) { + *aacct = strdup(tokval); + } + break; + case MACDEF: + if (proxy) { + fclose(cfile); + return (0); + } + while ((c=getc(cfile)) != EOF && + (c == ' ' || c == '\t')); + if (c == EOF || c == '\n') { + printf("Missing macdef name argument.\n"); + goto bad; + } + if (macnum == 16) { + printf("Limit of 16 macros have already been defined\n"); + goto bad; + } + tmp = macros[macnum].mac_name; + *tmp++ = c; + for (i=0; i < 8 && (c=getc(cfile)) != EOF && + !isspace(c); ++i) { + *tmp++ = c; + } + if (c == EOF) { + printf("Macro definition missing null line terminator.\n"); + goto bad; + } + *tmp = '\0'; + if (c != '\n') { + while ((c=getc(cfile)) != EOF && c != '\n'); + } + if (c == EOF) { + printf("Macro definition missing null line terminator.\n"); + goto bad; + } + if (macnum == 0) { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macbuf; + } + else { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macros[macnum-1].mac_end + 1; + } + tmp = macros[macnum].mac_start; + while (tmp != macbuf + 4096) { + if ((c=getc(cfile)) == EOF) { + printf("Macro definition missing null line terminator.\n"); + goto bad; + } + *tmp = c; + if (*tmp == '\n') { + if (*(tmp-1) == '\0') { + macros[macnum++].mac_end = tmp - 1; + break; + } + *tmp = '\0'; + } + tmp++; + } + if (tmp == macbuf + 4096) { + printf("4K macro buffer exceeded\n"); + goto bad; + } + break; + case PROT: + token(); + if(sec_request_prot(tokval) < 0) + warnx("Unknown protection level \"%s\"", tokval); + break; + default: + warnx("Unknown .netrc keyword %s", tokval); + break; + } + goto done; + } +done: + fclose(cfile); + return (0); +bad: + fclose(cfile); + return (-1); +} + +static int +token(void) +{ + char *cp; + int c; + struct toktab *t; + + if (feof(cfile) || ferror(cfile)) + return (0); + while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF && + (c == '\n' || c == '\t' || c == ' ' || c == ',')) + continue; + if (c == EOF) + return (0); + cp = tokval; + if (c == '"') { + while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF && c != '"') { + if (c == '\\') + c = getc(cfile); + *cp++ = c; + } + } else { + *cp++ = c; + while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF + && c != '\n' && c != '\t' && c != ' ' && c != ',') { + if (c == '\\') + c = getc(cfile); + *cp++ = c; + } + } + *cp = 0; + if (tokval[0] == 0) + return (0); + for (t = toktab; t->tokstr; t++) + if (!strcmp(t->tokstr, tokval)) + return (t->tval); + return (ID); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db67775dbd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c @@ -0,0 +1,805 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#else +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: security.c,v 1.19 2002/09/04 22:01:28 joda Exp $"); + +static enum protection_level command_prot; +static enum protection_level data_prot; +static size_t buffer_size; + +struct buffer { + void *data; + size_t size; + size_t index; + int eof_flag; +}; + +static struct buffer in_buffer, out_buffer; +int sec_complete; + +static struct { + enum protection_level level; + const char *name; +} level_names[] = { + { prot_clear, "clear" }, + { prot_safe, "safe" }, + { prot_confidential, "confidential" }, + { prot_private, "private" } +}; + +static const char * +level_to_name(enum protection_level level) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(level_names) / sizeof(level_names[0]); i++) + if(level_names[i].level == level) + return level_names[i].name; + return "unknown"; +} + +#ifndef FTP_SERVER /* not used in server */ +static enum protection_level +name_to_level(const char *name) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(level_names) / sizeof(level_names[0]); i++) + if(!strncasecmp(level_names[i].name, name, strlen(name))) + return level_names[i].level; + return (enum protection_level)-1; +} +#endif + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +static struct sec_server_mech *mechs[] = { +#ifdef KRB5 + &gss_server_mech, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + &krb4_server_mech, +#endif + NULL +}; + +static struct sec_server_mech *mech; + +#else + +static struct sec_client_mech *mechs[] = { +#ifdef KRB5 + &gss_client_mech, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + &krb4_client_mech, +#endif + NULL +}; + +static struct sec_client_mech *mech; + +#endif + +static void *app_data; + +int +sec_getc(FILE *F) +{ + if(sec_complete && data_prot) { + char c; + if(sec_read(fileno(F), &c, 1) <= 0) + return EOF; + return c; + } else + return getc(F); +} + +static int +block_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int b; + while(len) { + b = read(fd, p, len); + if (b == 0) + return 0; + else if (b < 0) + return -1; + len -= b; + p += b; + } + return p - (unsigned char*)buf; +} + +static int +block_write(int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int b; + while(len) { + b = write(fd, p, len); + if(b < 0) + return -1; + len -= b; + p += b; + } + return p - (unsigned char*)buf; +} + +static int +sec_get_data(int fd, struct buffer *buf, int level) +{ + int len; + int b; + void *tmp; + + b = block_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len)); + if (b == 0) + return 0; + else if (b < 0) + return -1; + len = ntohl(len); + tmp = realloc(buf->data, len); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; + buf->data = tmp; + b = block_read(fd, buf->data, len); + if (b == 0) + return 0; + else if (b < 0) + return -1; + buf->size = (*mech->decode)(app_data, buf->data, len, data_prot); + buf->index = 0; + return 0; +} + +static size_t +buffer_read(struct buffer *buf, void *data, size_t len) +{ + len = min(len, buf->size - buf->index); + memcpy(data, (char*)buf->data + buf->index, len); + buf->index += len; + return len; +} + +static size_t +buffer_write(struct buffer *buf, void *data, size_t len) +{ + if(buf->index + len > buf->size) { + void *tmp; + if(buf->data == NULL) + tmp = malloc(1024); + else + tmp = realloc(buf->data, buf->index + len); + if(tmp == NULL) + return -1; + buf->data = tmp; + buf->size = buf->index + len; + } + memcpy((char*)buf->data + buf->index, data, len); + buf->index += len; + return len; +} + +int +sec_read(int fd, void *data, int length) +{ + size_t len; + int rx = 0; + + if(sec_complete == 0 || data_prot == 0) + return read(fd, data, length); + + if(in_buffer.eof_flag){ + in_buffer.eof_flag = 0; + return 0; + } + + len = buffer_read(&in_buffer, data, length); + length -= len; + rx += len; + data = (char*)data + len; + + while(length){ + int ret; + + ret = sec_get_data(fd, &in_buffer, data_prot); + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + if(ret == 0 && in_buffer.size == 0) { + if(rx) + in_buffer.eof_flag = 1; + return rx; + } + len = buffer_read(&in_buffer, data, length); + length -= len; + rx += len; + data = (char*)data + len; + } + return rx; +} + +static int +sec_send(int fd, char *from, int length) +{ + int bytes; + void *buf; + bytes = (*mech->encode)(app_data, from, length, data_prot, &buf); + bytes = htonl(bytes); + block_write(fd, &bytes, sizeof(bytes)); + block_write(fd, buf, ntohl(bytes)); + free(buf); + return length; +} + +int +sec_fflush(FILE *F) +{ + if(data_prot != prot_clear) { + if(out_buffer.index > 0){ + sec_write(fileno(F), out_buffer.data, out_buffer.index); + out_buffer.index = 0; + } + sec_send(fileno(F), NULL, 0); + } + fflush(F); + return 0; +} + +int +sec_write(int fd, char *data, int length) +{ + int len = buffer_size; + int tx = 0; + + if(data_prot == prot_clear) + return write(fd, data, length); + + len -= (*mech->overhead)(app_data, data_prot, len); + while(length){ + if(length < len) + len = length; + sec_send(fd, data, len); + length -= len; + data += len; + tx += len; + } + return tx; +} + +int +sec_vfprintf2(FILE *f, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *buf; + int ret; + if(data_prot == prot_clear) + return vfprintf(f, fmt, ap); + else { + vasprintf(&buf, fmt, ap); + ret = buffer_write(&out_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + free(buf); + return ret; + } +} + +int +sec_fprintf2(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = sec_vfprintf2(f, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +sec_putc(int c, FILE *F) +{ + char ch = c; + if(data_prot == prot_clear) + return putc(c, F); + + buffer_write(&out_buffer, &ch, 1); + if(c == '\n' || out_buffer.index >= 1024 /* XXX */) { + sec_write(fileno(F), out_buffer.data, out_buffer.index); + out_buffer.index = 0; + } + return c; +} + +int +sec_read_msg(char *s, int level) +{ + int len; + char *buf; + int code; + + buf = malloc(strlen(s)); + len = base64_decode(s + 4, buf); /* XXX */ + + len = (*mech->decode)(app_data, buf, len, level); + if(len < 0) + return -1; + + buf[len] = '\0'; + + if(buf[3] == '-') + code = 0; + else + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + if(buf[len-1] == '\n') + buf[len-1] = '\0'; + strcpy(s, buf); + free(buf); + return code; +} + +int +sec_vfprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *buf; + void *enc; + int len; + if(!sec_complete) + return vfprintf(f, fmt, ap); + + vasprintf(&buf, fmt, ap); + len = (*mech->encode)(app_data, buf, strlen(buf), command_prot, &enc); + free(buf); + if(len < 0) { + printf("Failed to encode command.\n"); + return -1; + } + if(base64_encode(enc, len, &buf) < 0){ + free(enc); + printf("Out of memory base64-encoding.\n"); + return -1; + } + free(enc); +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + if(command_prot == prot_safe) + fprintf(f, "631 %s\r\n", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_private) + fprintf(f, "632 %s\r\n", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_confidential) + fprintf(f, "633 %s\r\n", buf); +#else + if(command_prot == prot_safe) + fprintf(f, "MIC %s", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_private) + fprintf(f, "ENC %s", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_confidential) + fprintf(f, "CONF %s", buf); +#endif + free(buf); + return 0; +} + +int +sec_fprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = sec_vfprintf(f, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +/* end common stuff */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +void +auth(char *auth_name) +{ + int i; + void *tmp; + + for(i = 0; (mech = mechs[i]) != NULL; i++){ + if(!strcasecmp(auth_name, mech->name)){ + tmp = realloc(app_data, mech->size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + reply(431, "Unable to accept %s at this time", mech->name); + return; + } + app_data = tmp; + + if(mech->init && (*mech->init)(app_data) != 0) { + reply(431, "Unable to accept %s at this time", mech->name); + return; + } + if(mech->auth) { + (*mech->auth)(app_data); + return; + } + if(mech->adat) + reply(334, "Send authorization data."); + else + reply(234, "Authorization complete."); + return; + } + } + free (app_data); + app_data = NULL; + reply(504, "%s is unknown to me", auth_name); +} + +void +adat(char *auth_data) +{ + if(mech && !sec_complete) { + void *buf = malloc(strlen(auth_data)); + size_t len; + len = base64_decode(auth_data, buf); + (*mech->adat)(app_data, buf, len); + free(buf); + } else + reply(503, "You must %sissue an AUTH first.", mech ? "re-" : ""); +} + +void pbsz(int size) +{ + size_t new = size; + if(!sec_complete) + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); + if(mech->pbsz) + new = (*mech->pbsz)(app_data, size); + if(buffer_size != new){ + buffer_size = size; + } + if(new != size) + reply(200, "PBSZ=%lu", (unsigned long)new); + else + reply(200, "OK"); +} + +void +prot(char *pl) +{ + int p = -1; + + if(buffer_size == 0){ + reply(503, "No protection buffer size negotiated."); + return; + } + + if(!strcasecmp(pl, "C")) + p = prot_clear; + else if(!strcasecmp(pl, "S")) + p = prot_safe; + else if(!strcasecmp(pl, "E")) + p = prot_confidential; + else if(!strcasecmp(pl, "P")) + p = prot_private; + else { + reply(504, "Unrecognized protection level."); + return; + } + + if(sec_complete){ + if((*mech->check_prot)(app_data, p)){ + reply(536, "%s does not support %s protection.", + mech->name, level_to_name(p)); + }else{ + data_prot = (enum protection_level)p; + reply(200, "Data protection is %s.", level_to_name(p)); + } + }else{ + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); + } +} + +void ccc(void) +{ + if(sec_complete){ + if(mech->ccc && (*mech->ccc)(app_data) == 0) + command_prot = data_prot = prot_clear; + else + reply(534, "You must be joking."); + }else + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); +} + +void mec(char *msg, enum protection_level level) +{ + void *buf; + size_t len; + if(!sec_complete) { + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); + return; + } + buf = malloc(strlen(msg) + 2); /* XXX go figure out where that 2 + comes from :-) */ + len = base64_decode(msg, buf); + command_prot = level; + if(len == (size_t)-1) { + reply(501, "Failed to base64-decode command"); + return; + } + len = (*mech->decode)(app_data, buf, len, level); + if(len == (size_t)-1) { + reply(535, "Failed to decode command"); + return; + } + ((char*)buf)[len] = '\0'; + if(strstr((char*)buf, "\r\n") == NULL) + strcat((char*)buf, "\r\n"); + new_ftp_command(buf); +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +int +sec_userok(char *user) +{ + if(sec_complete) + return (*mech->userok)(app_data, user); + return 0; +} + +char *ftp_command; + +void +new_ftp_command(char *command) +{ + ftp_command = command; +} + +void +delete_ftp_command(void) +{ + free(ftp_command); + ftp_command = NULL; +} + +int +secure_command(void) +{ + return ftp_command != NULL; +} + +enum protection_level +get_command_prot(void) +{ + return command_prot; +} + +#else /* FTP_SERVER */ + +void +sec_status(void) +{ + if(sec_complete){ + printf("Using %s for authentication.\n", mech->name); + printf("Using %s command channel.\n", level_to_name(command_prot)); + printf("Using %s data channel.\n", level_to_name(data_prot)); + if(buffer_size > 0) + printf("Protection buffer size: %lu.\n", + (unsigned long)buffer_size); + }else{ + printf("Not using any security mechanism.\n"); + } +} + +static int +sec_prot_internal(int level) +{ + int ret; + char *p; + unsigned int s = 1048576; + + int old_verbose = verbose; + verbose = 0; + + if(!sec_complete){ + printf("No security data exchange has taken place.\n"); + return -1; + } + + if(level){ + ret = command("PBSZ %u", s); + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + printf("Failed to set protection buffer size.\n"); + return -1; + } + buffer_size = s; + p = strstr(reply_string, "PBSZ="); + if(p) + sscanf(p, "PBSZ=%u", &s); + if(s < buffer_size) + buffer_size = s; + } + verbose = old_verbose; + ret = command("PROT %c", level["CSEP"]); /* XXX :-) */ + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + printf("Failed to set protection level.\n"); + return -1; + } + + data_prot = (enum protection_level)level; + return 0; +} + +enum protection_level +set_command_prot(enum protection_level level) +{ + enum protection_level old = command_prot; + command_prot = level; + return old; +} + +void +sec_prot(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int level = -1; + + if(argc < 2 || argc > 3) + goto usage; + if(!sec_complete) { + printf("No security data exchange has taken place.\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + level = name_to_level(argv[argc - 1]); + + if(level == -1) + goto usage; + + if((*mech->check_prot)(app_data, level)) { + printf("%s does not implement %s protection.\n", + mech->name, level_to_name(level)); + code = -1; + return; + } + + if(argc == 2 || strncasecmp(argv[1], "data", strlen(argv[1])) == 0) { + if(sec_prot_internal(level) < 0){ + code = -1; + return; + } + } else if(strncasecmp(argv[1], "command", strlen(argv[1])) == 0) + set_command_prot(level); + else + goto usage; + code = 0; + return; + usage: + printf("usage: %s [command|data] [clear|safe|confidential|private]\n", + argv[0]); + code = -1; +} + +static enum protection_level request_data_prot; + +void +sec_set_protection_level(void) +{ + if(sec_complete && data_prot != request_data_prot) + sec_prot_internal(request_data_prot); +} + + +int +sec_request_prot(char *level) +{ + int l = name_to_level(level); + if(l == -1) + return -1; + request_data_prot = (enum protection_level)l; + return 0; +} + +int +sec_login(char *host) +{ + int ret; + struct sec_client_mech **m; + int old_verbose = verbose; + + verbose = -1; /* shut up all messages this will produce (they + are usually not very user friendly) */ + + for(m = mechs; *m && (*m)->name; m++) { + void *tmp; + + tmp = realloc(app_data, (*m)->size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + warnx ("realloc %u failed", (*m)->size); + return -1; + } + app_data = tmp; + + if((*m)->init && (*(*m)->init)(app_data) != 0) { + printf("Skipping %s...\n", (*m)->name); + continue; + } + printf("Trying %s...\n", (*m)->name); + ret = command("AUTH %s", (*m)->name); + if(ret != CONTINUE){ + if(code == 504){ + printf("%s is not supported by the server.\n", (*m)->name); + }else if(code == 534){ + printf("%s rejected as security mechanism.\n", (*m)->name); + }else if(ret == ERROR) { + printf("The server doesn't support the FTP " + "security extensions.\n"); + verbose = old_verbose; + return -1; + } + continue; + } + + ret = (*(*m)->auth)(app_data, host); + + if(ret == AUTH_CONTINUE) + continue; + else if(ret != AUTH_OK){ + /* mechanism is supposed to output error string */ + verbose = old_verbose; + return -1; + } + mech = *m; + sec_complete = 1; + command_prot = prot_safe; + break; + } + + verbose = old_verbose; + return *m == NULL; +} + +void +sec_end(void) +{ + if (mech != NULL) { + if(mech->end) + (*mech->end)(app_data); + if (app_data != NULL) { + memset(app_data, 0, mech->size); + free(app_data); + app_data = NULL; + } + } + sec_complete = 0; + data_prot = (enum protection_level)0; +} + +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e14ebd953 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: security.h,v 1.9.12.1 2003/08/20 16:41:53 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __security_h__ +#define __security_h__ + +enum protection_level { + prot_clear, + prot_safe, + prot_confidential, + prot_private +}; + +struct sec_client_mech { + char *name; + size_t size; + int (*init)(void *); + int (*auth)(void *, char*); + void (*end)(void *); + int (*check_prot)(void *, int); + int (*overhead)(void *, int, int); + int (*encode)(void *, void*, int, int, void**); + int (*decode)(void *, void*, int, int); +}; + +struct sec_server_mech { + char *name; + size_t size; + int (*init)(void *); + void (*end)(void *); + int (*check_prot)(void *, int); + int (*overhead)(void *, int, int); + int (*encode)(void *, void*, int, int, void**); + int (*decode)(void *, void*, int, int); + + int (*auth)(void *); + int (*adat)(void *, void*, size_t); + size_t (*pbsz)(void *, size_t); + int (*ccc)(void*); + int (*userok)(void*, char*); +}; + +#define AUTH_OK 0 +#define AUTH_CONTINUE 1 +#define AUTH_ERROR 2 + +extern int ftp_do_gss_bindings; +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +extern struct sec_server_mech krb4_server_mech, gss_server_mech; +#else +extern struct sec_client_mech krb4_client_mech, gss_client_mech; +#endif + +extern int sec_complete; + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +extern char *ftp_command; +void new_ftp_command(char*); +void delete_ftp_command(void); +#endif + +/* ---- */ + + +int sec_fflush (FILE *); +int sec_fprintf (FILE *, const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,3))); +int sec_getc (FILE *); +int sec_putc (int, FILE *); +int sec_read (int, void *, int); +int sec_read_msg (char *, int); +int sec_vfprintf (FILE *, const char *, va_list) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,0))); +int sec_fprintf2(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,3))); +int sec_vfprintf2(FILE *, const char *, va_list) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,0))); +int sec_write (int, char *, int); + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +void adat (char *); +void auth (char *); +void ccc (void); +void mec (char *, enum protection_level); +void pbsz (int); +void prot (char *); +void delete_ftp_command (void); +void new_ftp_command (char *); +int sec_userok (char *); +int secure_command (void); +enum protection_level get_command_prot(void); +#else +void sec_end (void); +int sec_login (char *); +void sec_prot (int, char **); +int sec_request_prot (char *); +void sec_set_protection_level (void); +void sec_status (void); + +enum protection_level set_command_prot(enum protection_level); + +#endif + +#endif /* __security_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20f8b57cfb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.26 2001/09/06 12:18:34 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/../common $(INCLUDE_krb4) -DFTP_SERVER + +libexec_PROGRAMS = ftpd + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +if KRB4 +krb4_sources = krb4.c kauth.c +endif +if KRB5 +krb5_sources = gssapi.c gss_userok.c +endif + +ftpd_SOURCES = \ + extern.h \ + ftpcmd.y \ + ftpd.c \ + ftpd_locl.h \ + logwtmp.c \ + ls.c \ + pathnames.h \ + popen.c \ + security.c \ + $(krb4_sources) \ + $(krb5_sources) + +EXTRA_ftpd_SOURCES = krb4.c kauth.c gssapi.c gss_userok.c + +$(ftpd_OBJECTS): security.h + +security.c: + @test -f security.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/security.c . +security.h: + @test -f security.h || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/security.h . +krb4.c: + @test -f krb4.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/krb4.c . +gssapi.c: + @test -f gssapi.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/gssapi.c . + +CLEANFILES = security.c security.h krb4.c gssapi.c ftpcmd.c + +man_MANS = ftpd.8 ftpusers.5 + +LDADD = ../common/libcommon.a \ + $(LIB_otp) \ + $(LIB_gssapi) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6d8f62276 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,932 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.26 2001/09/06 12:18:34 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(ftpd_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_ftpd_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = 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versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..751d04cea5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)extern.h 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/4/94 + */ + +#ifndef _EXTERN_H_ +#define _EXTERN_H_ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef NBBY +#define NBBY CHAR_BIT +#endif + +void abor(void); +void blkfree(char **); +char **copyblk(char **); +void cwd(char *); +void do_delete(char *); +void dologout(int); +void eprt(char *); +void epsv(char *); +void fatal(char *); +int filename_check(char *); +int ftpd_pclose(FILE *); +FILE *ftpd_popen(char *, char *, int, int); +char *ftpd_getline(char *, int); +void ftpd_logwtmp(char *, char *, char *); +void lreply(int, const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); +void makedir(char *); +void nack(char *); +void nreply(const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); +void pass(char *); +void pasv(void); +void perror_reply(int, const char *); +void pwd(void); +void removedir(char *); +void renamecmd(char *, char *); +char *renamefrom(char *); +void reply(int, const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); +void retrieve(const char *, char *); +void send_file_list(char *); +void setproctitle(const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); +void statcmd(void); +void statfilecmd(char *); +void do_store(char *, char *, int); +void upper(char *); +void user(char *); +void yyerror(char *); + +void list_file(char*); + +void kauth(char *, char*); +void klist(void); +void cond_kdestroy(void); +void kdestroy(void); +void krbtkfile(const char *tkfile); +void afslog(const char *cell); +void afsunlog(void); + +int find(char *); + +int builtin_ls(FILE*, const char*); + +int do_login(int code, char *passwd); +int klogin(char *name, char *password); + +const char *ftp_rooted(const char *path); + +extern struct sockaddr *ctrl_addr, *his_addr; +extern char hostname[]; + +extern struct sockaddr *data_dest; +extern int logged_in; +extern struct passwd *pw; +extern int guest; +extern int logging; +extern int type; +extern off_t file_size; +extern off_t byte_count; + +extern int form; +extern int debug; +extern int ftpd_timeout; +extern int maxtimeout; +extern int pdata; +extern char hostname[], remotehost[]; +extern char proctitle[]; +extern int usedefault; +extern char tmpline[]; + +#endif /* _EXTERN_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9c5fa4c37d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y @@ -0,0 +1,1461 @@ +/* $NetBSD: ftpcmd.y,v 1.6 1995/06/03 22:46:45 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1988, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)ftpcmd.y 8.3 (Berkeley) 4/6/94 + */ + +/* + * Grammar for FTP commands. + * See RFC 959. + */ + +%{ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: ftpcmd.y,v 1.61.10.2 2004/08/20 15:15:46 lha Exp $"); + +off_t restart_point; + +static int hasyyerrored; + + +static int cmd_type; +static int cmd_form; +static int cmd_bytesz; +char cbuf[64*1024]; +char *fromname; + +struct tab { + char *name; + short token; + short state; + short implemented; /* 1 if command is implemented */ + char *help; +}; + +extern struct tab cmdtab[]; +extern struct tab sitetab[]; + +static char *copy (char *); +static void help (struct tab *, char *); +static struct tab * + lookup (struct tab *, char *); +static void sizecmd (char *); +static RETSIGTYPE toolong (int); +static int yylex (void); + +/* This is for bison */ + +#if !defined(alloca) && !defined(HAVE_ALLOCA) +#define alloca(x) malloc(x) +#endif + +%} + +%union { + int i; + char *s; +} + +%token + A B C E F I + L N P R S T + + SP CRLF COMMA + + USER PASS ACCT REIN QUIT PORT + PASV TYPE STRU MODE RETR STOR + APPE MLFL MAIL MSND MSOM MSAM + MRSQ MRCP ALLO REST RNFR RNTO + ABOR DELE CWD LIST NLST SITE + sTAT HELP NOOP MKD RMD PWD + CDUP STOU SMNT SYST SIZE MDTM + EPRT EPSV + + UMASK IDLE CHMOD + + AUTH ADAT PROT PBSZ CCC MIC + CONF ENC + + KAUTH KLIST KDESTROY KRBTKFILE AFSLOG + LOCATE URL + + FEAT OPTS + + LEXERR + +%token STRING +%token NUMBER + +%type check_login check_login_no_guest check_secure octal_number byte_size +%type struct_code mode_code type_code form_code +%type pathstring pathname password username + +%start cmd_list + +%% + +cmd_list + : /* empty */ + | cmd_list cmd + { + fromname = (char *) 0; + restart_point = (off_t) 0; + } + | cmd_list rcmd + ; + +cmd + : USER SP username CRLF + { + user($3); + free($3); + } + | PASS SP password CRLF + { + pass($3); + memset ($3, 0, strlen($3)); + free($3); + } + | PORT SP host_port CRLF + { + usedefault = 0; + if (pdata >= 0) { + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + } + reply(200, "PORT command successful."); + } + | EPRT SP STRING CRLF + { + eprt ($3); + free ($3); + } + | PASV CRLF check_login + { + if($3) + pasv (); + } + | EPSV CRLF check_login + { + if($3) + epsv (NULL); + } + | EPSV SP STRING CRLF check_login + { + if($5) + epsv ($3); + free ($3); + } + | TYPE SP type_code CRLF + { + switch (cmd_type) { + + case TYPE_A: + if (cmd_form == FORM_N) { + reply(200, "Type set to A."); + type = cmd_type; + form = cmd_form; + } else + reply(504, "Form must be N."); + break; + + case TYPE_E: + reply(504, "Type E not implemented."); + break; + + case TYPE_I: + reply(200, "Type set to I."); + type = cmd_type; + break; + + case TYPE_L: +#if NBBY == 8 + if (cmd_bytesz == 8) { + reply(200, + "Type set to L (byte size 8)."); + type = cmd_type; + } else + reply(504, "Byte size must be 8."); +#else /* NBBY == 8 */ + UNIMPLEMENTED for NBBY != 8 +#endif /* NBBY == 8 */ + } + } + | STRU SP struct_code CRLF + { + switch ($3) { + + case STRU_F: + reply(200, "STRU F ok."); + break; + + default: + reply(504, "Unimplemented STRU type."); + } + } + | MODE SP mode_code CRLF + { + switch ($3) { + + case MODE_S: + reply(200, "MODE S ok."); + break; + + default: + reply(502, "Unimplemented MODE type."); + } + } + | ALLO SP NUMBER CRLF + { + reply(202, "ALLO command ignored."); + } + | ALLO SP NUMBER SP R SP NUMBER CRLF + { + reply(202, "ALLO command ignored."); + } + | RETR SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + retrieve(0, name); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | STOR SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + do_store(name, "w", 0); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | APPE SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + do_store(name, "a", 0); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | NLST CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + send_file_list("."); + } + | NLST SP STRING CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + send_file_list(name); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | LIST CRLF check_login + { + if($3) + list_file("."); + } + | LIST SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if($5) + list_file($3); + free($3); + } + | sTAT SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + statfilecmd($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | sTAT CRLF + { + statcmd(); + } + | DELE SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + do_delete($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | RNTO SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if($5){ + if (fromname) { + renamecmd(fromname, $3); + free(fromname); + fromname = (char *) 0; + } else { + reply(503, "Bad sequence of commands."); + } + } + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | ABOR CRLF + { + reply(225, "ABOR command successful."); + } + | CWD CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + cwd(pw->pw_dir); + } + | CWD SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + cwd($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | HELP CRLF + { + help(cmdtab, (char *) 0); + } + | HELP SP STRING CRLF + { + char *cp = $3; + + if (strncasecmp(cp, "SITE", 4) == 0) { + cp = $3 + 4; + if (*cp == ' ') + cp++; + if (*cp) + help(sitetab, cp); + else + help(sitetab, (char *) 0); + } else + help(cmdtab, $3); + } + | NOOP CRLF + { + reply(200, "NOOP command successful."); + } + | MKD SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + makedir($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | RMD SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + removedir($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | PWD CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + pwd(); + } + | CDUP CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + cwd(".."); + } + | FEAT CRLF + { + lreply(211, "Supported features:"); + lreply(0, " MDTM"); + lreply(0, " REST STREAM"); + lreply(0, " SIZE"); + reply(211, "End"); + } + | OPTS SP STRING CRLF + { + free ($3); + reply(501, "Bad options"); + } + + | SITE SP HELP CRLF + { + help(sitetab, (char *) 0); + } + | SITE SP HELP SP STRING CRLF + { + help(sitetab, $5); + } + | SITE SP UMASK CRLF check_login + { + if ($5) { + int oldmask = umask(0); + umask(oldmask); + reply(200, "Current UMASK is %03o", oldmask); + } + } + | SITE SP UMASK SP octal_number CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($7) { + if (($5 == -1) || ($5 > 0777)) { + reply(501, "Bad UMASK value"); + } else { + int oldmask = umask($5); + reply(200, + "UMASK set to %03o (was %03o)", + $5, oldmask); + } + } + } + | SITE SP CHMOD SP octal_number SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($9 && $7 != NULL) { + if ($5 > 0777) + reply(501, + "CHMOD: Mode value must be between 0 and 0777"); + else if (chmod($7, $5) < 0) + perror_reply(550, $7); + else + reply(200, "CHMOD command successful."); + } + if ($7 != NULL) + free($7); + } + | SITE SP IDLE CRLF + { + reply(200, + "Current IDLE time limit is %d seconds; max %d", + ftpd_timeout, maxtimeout); + } + | SITE SP IDLE SP NUMBER CRLF + { + if ($5 < 30 || $5 > maxtimeout) { + reply(501, + "Maximum IDLE time must be between 30 and %d seconds", + maxtimeout); + } else { + ftpd_timeout = $5; + alarm((unsigned) ftpd_timeout); + reply(200, + "Maximum IDLE time set to %d seconds", + ftpd_timeout); + } + } + + | SITE SP KAUTH SP STRING CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + char *p; + + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else{ + if($7 && $5 != NULL){ + p = strpbrk($5, " \t"); + if(p){ + *p++ = 0; + kauth($5, p + strspn(p, " \t")); + }else + kauth($5, NULL); + } + } + if($5 != NULL) + free($5); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP KLIST CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if($5) + klist(); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP KDESTROY CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if($5) + kdestroy(); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP KRBTKFILE SP STRING CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else if($7 && $5) + krbtkfile($5); + if($5) + free($5); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP AFSLOG CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else if($5) + afslog(NULL); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP AFSLOG SP STRING CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else if($7) + afslog($5); + if($5) + free($5); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP LOCATE SP STRING CRLF check_login + { + if($7 && $5 != NULL) + find($5); + if($5 != NULL) + free($5); + } + | SITE SP URL CRLF + { + reply(200, "http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/"); + } + | STOU SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + do_store($3, "w", 1); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | SYST CRLF + { +#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__EMX__) && !defined(__OS2__) && !defined(__CYGWIN32__) + reply(215, "UNIX Type: L%d", NBBY); +#else + reply(215, "UNKNOWN Type: L%d", NBBY); +#endif + } + + /* + * SIZE is not in RFC959, but Postel has blessed it and + * it will be in the updated RFC. + * + * Return size of file in a format suitable for + * using with RESTART (we just count bytes). + */ + | SIZE SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + sizecmd($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + + /* + * MDTM is not in RFC959, but Postel has blessed it and + * it will be in the updated RFC. + * + * Return modification time of file as an ISO 3307 + * style time. E.g. YYYYMMDDHHMMSS or YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.xxx + * where xxx is the fractional second (of any precision, + * not necessarily 3 digits) + */ + | MDTM SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) { + struct stat stbuf; + if (stat($3, &stbuf) < 0) + reply(550, "%s: %s", + $3, strerror(errno)); + else if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) { + reply(550, + "%s: not a plain file.", $3); + } else { + struct tm *t; + time_t mtime = stbuf.st_mtime; + + t = gmtime(&mtime); + reply(213, + "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", + t->tm_year + 1900, + t->tm_mon + 1, + t->tm_mday, + t->tm_hour, + t->tm_min, + t->tm_sec); + } + } + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | QUIT CRLF + { + reply(221, "Goodbye."); + dologout(0); + } + | error CRLF + { + yyerrok; + } + ; +rcmd + : RNFR SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + restart_point = (off_t) 0; + if ($5 && $3) { + fromname = renamefrom($3); + if (fromname == (char *) 0 && $3) { + free($3); + } + } + } + | REST SP byte_size CRLF + { + fromname = (char *) 0; + restart_point = $3; /* XXX $3 is only "int" */ + reply(350, "Restarting at %ld. %s", + (long)restart_point, + "Send STORE or RETRIEVE to initiate transfer."); + } + | AUTH SP STRING CRLF + { + auth($3); + free($3); + } + | ADAT SP STRING CRLF + { + adat($3); + free($3); + } + | PBSZ SP NUMBER CRLF + { + pbsz($3); + } + | PROT SP STRING CRLF + { + prot($3); + } + | CCC CRLF + { + ccc(); + } + | MIC SP STRING CRLF + { + mec($3, prot_safe); + free($3); + } + | CONF SP STRING CRLF + { + mec($3, prot_confidential); + free($3); + } + | ENC SP STRING CRLF + { + mec($3, prot_private); + free($3); + } + ; + +username + : STRING + ; + +password + : /* empty */ + { + $$ = (char *)calloc(1, sizeof(char)); + } + | STRING + ; + +byte_size + : NUMBER + ; + +host_port + : NUMBER COMMA NUMBER COMMA NUMBER COMMA NUMBER COMMA + NUMBER COMMA NUMBER + { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)data_dest; + + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = htons($9 * 256 + $11); + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = + htonl(($1 << 24) | ($3 << 16) | ($5 << 8) | $7); + } + ; + +form_code + : N + { + $$ = FORM_N; + } + | T + { + $$ = FORM_T; + } + | C + { + $$ = FORM_C; + } + ; + +type_code + : A + { + cmd_type = TYPE_A; + cmd_form = FORM_N; + } + | A SP form_code + { + cmd_type = TYPE_A; + cmd_form = $3; + } + | E + { + cmd_type = TYPE_E; + cmd_form = FORM_N; + } + | E SP form_code + { + cmd_type = TYPE_E; + cmd_form = $3; + } + | I + { + cmd_type = TYPE_I; + } + | L + { + cmd_type = TYPE_L; + cmd_bytesz = NBBY; + } + | L SP byte_size + { + cmd_type = TYPE_L; + cmd_bytesz = $3; + } + /* this is for a bug in the BBN ftp */ + | L byte_size + { + cmd_type = TYPE_L; + cmd_bytesz = $2; + } + ; + +struct_code + : F + { + $$ = STRU_F; + } + | R + { + $$ = STRU_R; + } + | P + { + $$ = STRU_P; + } + ; + +mode_code + : S + { + $$ = MODE_S; + } + | B + { + $$ = MODE_B; + } + | C + { + $$ = MODE_C; + } + ; + +pathname + : pathstring + { + /* + * Problem: this production is used for all pathname + * processing, but only gives a 550 error reply. + * This is a valid reply in some cases but not in others. + */ + if (logged_in && $1 && *$1 == '~') { + glob_t gl; + int flags = + GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + if (glob($1, flags, NULL, &gl) || + gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + reply(550, "not found"); + $$ = NULL; + } else { + $$ = strdup(gl.gl_pathv[0]); + } + globfree(&gl); + free($1); + } else + $$ = $1; + } + ; + +pathstring + : STRING + ; + +octal_number + : NUMBER + { + int ret, dec, multby, digit; + + /* + * Convert a number that was read as decimal number + * to what it would be if it had been read as octal. + */ + dec = $1; + multby = 1; + ret = 0; + while (dec) { + digit = dec%10; + if (digit > 7) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + ret += digit * multby; + multby *= 8; + dec /= 10; + } + $$ = ret; + } + ; + + +check_login_no_guest : check_login + { + $$ = $1 && !guest; + if($1 && !$$) + reply(550, "Permission denied"); + } + ; + +check_login : check_secure + { + if($1) { + if(($$ = logged_in) == 0) + reply(530, "Please login with USER and PASS."); + } else + $$ = 0; + } + ; + +check_secure : /* empty */ + { + $$ = 1; + if(sec_complete && !secure_command()) { + $$ = 0; + reply(533, "Command protection level denied " + "for paranoid reasons."); + } + } + ; + +%% + +#define CMD 0 /* beginning of command */ +#define ARGS 1 /* expect miscellaneous arguments */ +#define STR1 2 /* expect SP followed by STRING */ +#define STR2 3 /* expect STRING */ +#define OSTR 4 /* optional SP then STRING */ +#define ZSTR1 5 /* SP then optional STRING */ +#define ZSTR2 6 /* optional STRING after SP */ +#define SITECMD 7 /* SITE command */ +#define NSTR 8 /* Number followed by a string */ + +struct tab cmdtab[] = { /* In order defined in RFC 765 */ + { "USER", USER, STR1, 1, " username" }, + { "PASS", PASS, ZSTR1, 1, " password" }, + { "ACCT", ACCT, STR1, 0, "(specify account)" }, + { "SMNT", SMNT, ARGS, 0, "(structure mount)" }, + { "REIN", REIN, ARGS, 0, "(reinitialize server state)" }, + { "QUIT", QUIT, ARGS, 1, "(terminate service)", }, + { "PORT", PORT, ARGS, 1, " b0, b1, b2, b3, b4" }, + { "EPRT", EPRT, STR1, 1, " string" }, + { "PASV", PASV, ARGS, 1, "(set server in passive mode)" }, + { "EPSV", EPSV, OSTR, 1, "[ foo]" }, + { "TYPE", TYPE, ARGS, 1, " [ A | E | I | L ]" }, + { "STRU", STRU, ARGS, 1, "(specify file structure)" }, + { "MODE", MODE, ARGS, 1, "(specify transfer mode)" }, + { "RETR", RETR, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "STOR", STOR, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "APPE", APPE, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "MLFL", MLFL, OSTR, 0, "(mail file)" }, + { "MAIL", MAIL, OSTR, 0, "(mail to user)" }, + { "MSND", MSND, OSTR, 0, "(mail send to terminal)" }, + { "MSOM", MSOM, OSTR, 0, "(mail send to terminal or mailbox)" }, + { "MSAM", MSAM, OSTR, 0, "(mail send to terminal and mailbox)" }, + { "MRSQ", MRSQ, OSTR, 0, "(mail recipient scheme question)" }, + { "MRCP", MRCP, STR1, 0, "(mail recipient)" }, + { "ALLO", ALLO, ARGS, 1, "allocate storage (vacuously)" }, + { "REST", REST, ARGS, 1, " offset (restart command)" }, + { "RNFR", RNFR, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "RNTO", RNTO, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "ABOR", ABOR, ARGS, 1, "(abort operation)" }, + { "DELE", DELE, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "CWD", CWD, OSTR, 1, "[ directory-name ]" }, + { "XCWD", CWD, OSTR, 1, "[ directory-name ]" }, + { "LIST", LIST, OSTR, 1, "[ path-name ]" }, + { "NLST", NLST, OSTR, 1, "[ path-name ]" }, + { "SITE", SITE, SITECMD, 1, "site-cmd [ arguments ]" }, + { "SYST", SYST, ARGS, 1, "(get type of operating system)" }, + { "STAT", sTAT, OSTR, 1, "[ path-name ]" }, + { "HELP", HELP, OSTR, 1, "[ ]" }, + { "NOOP", NOOP, ARGS, 1, "" }, + { "MKD", MKD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "XMKD", MKD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "RMD", RMD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "XRMD", RMD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "PWD", PWD, ARGS, 1, "(return current directory)" }, + { "XPWD", PWD, ARGS, 1, "(return current directory)" }, + { "CDUP", CDUP, ARGS, 1, "(change to parent directory)" }, + { "XCUP", CDUP, ARGS, 1, "(change to parent directory)" }, + { "STOU", STOU, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "SIZE", SIZE, OSTR, 1, " path-name" }, + { "MDTM", MDTM, OSTR, 1, " path-name" }, + + /* extensions from RFC2228 */ + { "AUTH", AUTH, STR1, 1, " auth-type" }, + { "ADAT", ADAT, STR1, 1, " auth-data" }, + { "PBSZ", PBSZ, ARGS, 1, " buffer-size" }, + { "PROT", PROT, STR1, 1, " prot-level" }, + { "CCC", CCC, ARGS, 1, "" }, + { "MIC", MIC, STR1, 1, " integrity command" }, + { "CONF", CONF, STR1, 1, " confidentiality command" }, + { "ENC", ENC, STR1, 1, " privacy command" }, + + /* RFC2389 */ + { "FEAT", FEAT, ARGS, 1, "" }, + { "OPTS", OPTS, ARGS, 1, " command [ options]" }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +struct tab sitetab[] = { + { "UMASK", UMASK, ARGS, 1, "[ umask ]" }, + { "IDLE", IDLE, ARGS, 1, "[ maximum-idle-time ]" }, + { "CHMOD", CHMOD, NSTR, 1, " mode file-name" }, + { "HELP", HELP, OSTR, 1, "[ ]" }, + + { "KAUTH", KAUTH, STR1, 1, " principal [ ticket ]" }, + { "KLIST", KLIST, ARGS, 1, "(show ticket file)" }, + { "KDESTROY", KDESTROY, ARGS, 1, "(destroy tickets)" }, + { "KRBTKFILE", KRBTKFILE, STR1, 1, " ticket-file" }, + { "AFSLOG", AFSLOG, OSTR, 1, "[ cell]" }, + + { "LOCATE", LOCATE, STR1, 1, " globexpr" }, + { "FIND", LOCATE, STR1, 1, " globexpr" }, + + { "URL", URL, ARGS, 1, "?" }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +static struct tab * +lookup(struct tab *p, char *cmd) +{ + + for (; p->name != NULL; p++) + if (strcmp(cmd, p->name) == 0) + return (p); + return (0); +} + +/* + * ftpd_getline - a hacked up version of fgets to ignore TELNET escape codes. + */ +char * +ftpd_getline(char *s, int n) +{ + int c; + char *cs; + + cs = s; + + /* might still be data within the security MIC/CONF/ENC */ + if(ftp_command){ + strlcpy(s, ftp_command, n); + if (debug) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "command: %s", s); + return s; + } + while ((c = getc(stdin)) != EOF) { + c &= 0377; + if (c == IAC) { + if ((c = getc(stdin)) != EOF) { + c &= 0377; + switch (c) { + case WILL: + case WONT: + c = getc(stdin); + printf("%c%c%c", IAC, DONT, 0377&c); + fflush(stdout); + continue; + case DO: + case DONT: + c = getc(stdin); + printf("%c%c%c", IAC, WONT, 0377&c); + fflush(stdout); + continue; + case IAC: + break; + default: + continue; /* ignore command */ + } + } + } + *cs++ = c; + if (--n <= 0 || c == '\n') + break; + } + if (c == EOF && cs == s) + return (NULL); + *cs++ = '\0'; + if (debug) { + if (!guest && strncasecmp("pass ", s, 5) == 0) { + /* Don't syslog passwords */ + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "command: %.5s ???", s); + } else { + char *cp; + int len; + + /* Don't syslog trailing CR-LF */ + len = strlen(s); + cp = s + len - 1; + while (cp >= s && (*cp == '\n' || *cp == '\r')) { + --cp; + --len; + } + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "command: %.*s", len, s); + } + } +#ifdef XXX + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", s); +#endif + return (s); +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +toolong(int signo) +{ + + reply(421, + "Timeout (%d seconds): closing control connection.", + ftpd_timeout); + if (logging) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "User %s timed out after %d seconds", + (pw ? pw -> pw_name : "unknown"), ftpd_timeout); + dologout(1); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +static int +yylex(void) +{ + static int cpos, state; + char *cp, *cp2; + struct tab *p; + int n; + char c; + + for (;;) { + switch (state) { + + case CMD: + hasyyerrored = 0; + + signal(SIGALRM, toolong); + alarm((unsigned) ftpd_timeout); + if (ftpd_getline(cbuf, sizeof(cbuf)-1) == NULL) { + reply(221, "You could at least say goodbye."); + dologout(0); + } + alarm(0); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + if (strncasecmp(cbuf, "PASS", 4) != 0) + setproctitle("%s: %s", proctitle, cbuf); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + if ((cp = strchr(cbuf, '\r'))) { + *cp++ = '\n'; + *cp = '\0'; + } + if ((cp = strpbrk(cbuf, " \n"))) + cpos = cp - cbuf; + if (cpos == 0) + cpos = 4; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + strupr(cbuf); + p = lookup(cmdtab, cbuf); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + if (p != 0) { + if (p->implemented == 0) { + nack(p->name); + hasyyerrored = 1; + break; + } + state = p->state; + yylval.s = p->name; + return (p->token); + } + break; + + case SITECMD: + if (cbuf[cpos] == ' ') { + cpos++; + return (SP); + } + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + if ((cp2 = strpbrk(cp, " \n"))) + cpos = cp2 - cbuf; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + strupr(cp); + p = lookup(sitetab, cp); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + if (p != 0) { + if (p->implemented == 0) { + state = CMD; + nack(p->name); + hasyyerrored = 1; + break; + } + state = p->state; + yylval.s = p->name; + return (p->token); + } + state = CMD; + break; + + case OSTR: + if (cbuf[cpos] == '\n') { + state = CMD; + return (CRLF); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case STR1: + case ZSTR1: + dostr1: + if (cbuf[cpos] == ' ') { + cpos++; + if(state == OSTR) + state = STR2; + else + state++; + return (SP); + } + break; + + case ZSTR2: + if (cbuf[cpos] == '\n') { + state = CMD; + return (CRLF); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case STR2: + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + n = strlen(cp); + cpos += n - 1; + /* + * Make sure the string is nonempty and \n terminated. + */ + if (n > 1 && cbuf[cpos] == '\n') { + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + yylval.s = copy(cp); + cbuf[cpos] = '\n'; + state = ARGS; + return (STRING); + } + break; + + case NSTR: + if (cbuf[cpos] == ' ') { + cpos++; + return (SP); + } + if (isdigit((unsigned char)cbuf[cpos])) { + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + while (isdigit((unsigned char)cbuf[++cpos])) + ; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + yylval.i = atoi(cp); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + state = STR1; + return (NUMBER); + } + state = STR1; + goto dostr1; + + case ARGS: + if (isdigit((unsigned char)cbuf[cpos])) { + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + while (isdigit((unsigned char)cbuf[++cpos])) + ; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + yylval.i = atoi(cp); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + return (NUMBER); + } + switch (cbuf[cpos++]) { + + case '\n': + state = CMD; + return (CRLF); + + case ' ': + return (SP); + + case ',': + return (COMMA); + + case 'A': + case 'a': + return (A); + + case 'B': + case 'b': + return (B); + + case 'C': + case 'c': + return (C); + + case 'E': + case 'e': + return (E); + + case 'F': + case 'f': + return (F); + + case 'I': + case 'i': + return (I); + + case 'L': + case 'l': + return (L); + + case 'N': + case 'n': + return (N); + + case 'P': + case 'p': + return (P); + + case 'R': + case 'r': + return (R); + + case 'S': + case 's': + return (S); + + case 'T': + case 't': + return (T); + + } + break; + + default: + fatal("Unknown state in scanner."); + } + yyerror(NULL); + state = CMD; + return (0); + } +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +void +yyerror(char *s) +{ + char *cp; + + if (hasyyerrored) + return; + + if ((cp = strchr(cbuf,'\n'))) + *cp = '\0'; + reply(500, "'%s': command not understood.", cbuf); + hasyyerrored = 1; +} + +static char * +copy(char *s) +{ + char *p; + + p = strdup(s); + if (p == NULL) + fatal("Ran out of memory."); + return p; +} + +static void +help(struct tab *ctab, char *s) +{ + struct tab *c; + int width, NCMDS; + char *type; + char buf[1024]; + + if (ctab == sitetab) + type = "SITE "; + else + type = ""; + width = 0, NCMDS = 0; + for (c = ctab; c->name != NULL; c++) { + int len = strlen(c->name); + + if (len > width) + width = len; + NCMDS++; + } + width = (width + 8) &~ 7; + if (s == 0) { + int i, j, w; + int columns, lines; + + lreply(214, "The following %scommands are recognized %s.", + type, "(* =>'s unimplemented)"); + columns = 76 / width; + if (columns == 0) + columns = 1; + lines = (NCMDS + columns - 1) / columns; + for (i = 0; i < lines; i++) { + strlcpy (buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + for (j = 0; j < columns; j++) { + c = ctab + j * lines + i; + snprintf (buf + strlen(buf), + sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + "%s%c", + c->name, + c->implemented ? ' ' : '*'); + if (c + lines >= &ctab[NCMDS]) + break; + w = strlen(c->name) + 1; + while (w < width) { + strlcat (buf, + " ", + sizeof(buf)); + w++; + } + } + lreply(214, "%s", buf); + } + reply(214, "Direct comments to kth-krb-bugs@pdc.kth.se"); + return; + } + strupr(s); + c = lookup(ctab, s); + if (c == (struct tab *)0) { + reply(502, "Unknown command %s.", s); + return; + } + if (c->implemented) + reply(214, "Syntax: %s%s %s", type, c->name, c->help); + else + reply(214, "%s%-*s\t%s; unimplemented.", type, width, + c->name, c->help); +} + +static void +sizecmd(char *filename) +{ + switch (type) { + case TYPE_L: + case TYPE_I: { + struct stat stbuf; + if (stat(filename, &stbuf) < 0 || !S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) + reply(550, "%s: not a plain file.", filename); + else + reply(213, "%lu", (unsigned long)stbuf.st_size); + break; + } + case TYPE_A: { + FILE *fin; + int c; + size_t count; + struct stat stbuf; + fin = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (fin == NULL) { + perror_reply(550, filename); + return; + } + if (fstat(fileno(fin), &stbuf) < 0 || !S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) { + reply(550, "%s: not a plain file.", filename); + fclose(fin); + return; + } + + count = 0; + while((c=getc(fin)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') /* will get expanded to \r\n */ + count++; + count++; + } + fclose(fin); + + reply(213, "%lu", (unsigned long)count); + break; + } + default: + reply(504, "SIZE not implemented for Type %c.", "?AEIL"[type]); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b630641923 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +.\" $NetBSD: ftpd.8,v 1.7 1995/04/11 02:44:53 cgd Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)ftpd.8 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/19/94 +.\" +.Dd July 19, 2003 +.Dt FTPD 8 +.Os BSD 4.2 +.Sh NAME +.Nm ftpd +.Nd Internet File Transfer Protocol server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl a Ar authmode +.Op Fl dilvU +.Op Fl g Ar umask +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl T Ar maxtimeout +.Op Fl t Ar timeout +.Op Fl -gss-bindings +.Op Fl I | Fl -no-insecure-oob +.Op Fl u Ar default umask +.Op Fl B | Fl -builtin-ls +.Op Fl -good-chars= Ns Ar string +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm Ftpd +is the +Internet File Transfer Protocol +server process. The server uses the +.Tn TCP +protocol +and listens at the port specified in the +.Dq ftp +service specification; see +.Xr services 5 . +.Pp +Available options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl a +Select the level of authentication required. Kerberised login can not +be turned off. The default is to only allow kerberised login. Other +possibilities can be turned on by giving a string of comma separated +flags as argument to +.Fl a . +Recognised flags are: +.Bl -tag -width plain +.It Ar plain +Allow logging in with plaintext password. The password can be a(n) OTP +or an ordinary password. +.It Ar otp +Same as +.Ar plain , +but only OTP is allowed. +.It Ar ftp +Allow anonymous login. +.El +.Pp +The following combination modes exists for backwards compatibility: +.Bl -tag -width plain +.It Ar none +Same as +.Ar plain,ftp . +.It Ar safe +Same as +.Ar ftp . +.It Ar user +Ignored. +.El +.It Fl d +Debugging information is written to the syslog using LOG_FTP. +.It Fl g +Anonymous users will get a umask of +.Ar umask . +.It Fl -gss-bindings +require the peer to use GSS-API bindings (ie make sure IP addresses match). +.It Fl i +Open a socket and wait for a connection. This is mainly used for +debugging when ftpd isn't started by inetd. +.It Fl l +Each successful and failed +.Xr ftp 1 +session is logged using syslog with a facility of LOG_FTP. +If this option is specified twice, the retrieve (get), store (put), append, +delete, make directory, remove directory and rename operations and +their filename arguments are also logged. +.It Fl p +Use +.Ar port +(a service name or number) instead of the default +.Ar ftp/tcp . +.It Fl T +A client may also request a different timeout period; +the maximum period allowed may be set to +.Ar timeout +seconds with the +.Fl T +option. +The default limit is 2 hours. +.It Fl t +The inactivity timeout period is set to +.Ar timeout +seconds (the default is 15 minutes). +.It Fl u +Set the initial umask to something else than the default 027. +.It Fl U +In previous versions of +.Nm ftpd , +when a passive mode client requested a data connection to the server, the +server would use data ports in the range 1024..4999. Now, by default, +if the system supports the IP_PORTRANGE socket option, the server will +use data ports in the range 49152..65535. Specifying this option will +revert to the old behavior. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +.It Xo +.Fl B , +.Fl -builtin-ls +.Xc +use built-in ls to list files +.It Xo +.Fl -good-chars= Ns Ar string +.Xc +allowed anonymous upload filename chars +.It Xo +.Fl I +.Fl -no-insecure-oob +.Xc +don't allow insecure out of band. +Heimdal ftp client before 0.7 doesn't support secure oob, so turning +on this options makes them no longer work. +.El +.Pp +The file +.Pa /etc/nologin +can be used to disable ftp access. +If the file exists, +.Nm +displays it and exits. +If the file +.Pa /etc/ftpwelcome +exists, +.Nm +prints it before issuing the +.Dq ready +message. +If the file +.Pa /etc/motd +exists, +.Nm +prints it after a successful login. +.Pp +The ftp server currently supports the following ftp requests. +The case of the requests is ignored. +.Bl -column "Request" -offset indent +.It Request Ta "Description" +.It ABOR Ta "abort previous command" +.It ACCT Ta "specify account (ignored)" +.It ALLO Ta "allocate storage (vacuously)" +.It APPE Ta "append to a file" +.It CDUP Ta "change to parent of current working directory" +.It CWD Ta "change working directory" +.It DELE Ta "delete a file" +.It HELP Ta "give help information" +.It LIST Ta "give list files in a directory" Pq Dq Li "ls -lgA" +.It MKD Ta "make a directory" +.It MDTM Ta "show last modification time of file" +.It MODE Ta "specify data transfer" Em mode +.It NLST Ta "give name list of files in directory" +.It NOOP Ta "do nothing" +.It PASS Ta "specify password" +.It PASV Ta "prepare for server-to-server transfer" +.It PORT Ta "specify data connection port" +.It PWD Ta "print the current working directory" +.It QUIT Ta "terminate session" +.It REST Ta "restart incomplete transfer" +.It RETR Ta "retrieve a file" +.It RMD Ta "remove a directory" +.It RNFR Ta "specify rename-from file name" +.It RNTO Ta "specify rename-to file name" +.It SITE Ta "non-standard commands (see next section)" +.It SIZE Ta "return size of file" +.It STAT Ta "return status of server" +.It STOR Ta "store a file" +.It STOU Ta "store a file with a unique name" +.It STRU Ta "specify data transfer" Em structure +.It SYST Ta "show operating system type of server system" +.It TYPE Ta "specify data transfer" Em type +.It USER Ta "specify user name" +.It XCUP Ta "change to parent of current working directory (deprecated)" +.It XCWD Ta "change working directory (deprecated)" +.It XMKD Ta "make a directory (deprecated)" +.It XPWD Ta "print the current working directory (deprecated)" +.It XRMD Ta "remove a directory (deprecated)" +.El +.Pp +The following commands are specified by RFC2228. +.Bl -column Request -offset indent +.It AUTH Ta "authentication/security mechanism" +.It ADAT Ta "authentication/security data" +.It PROT Ta "data channel protection level" +.It PBSZ Ta "protection buffer size" +.It MIC Ta "integrity protected command" +.It CONF Ta "confidentiality protected command" +.It ENC Ta "privacy protected command" +.It CCC Ta "clear command channel" +.El +.Pp +The following non-standard or +.Tn UNIX +specific commands are supported +by the +SITE request. +.Pp +.Bl -column Request -offset indent +.It UMASK Ta change umask, (e.g. +.Ic "SITE UMASK 002" ) +.It IDLE Ta set idle-timer, (e.g. +.Ic "SITE IDLE 60" ) +.It CHMOD Ta change mode of a file (e.g. +.Ic "SITE CHMOD 755 filename" ) +.It FIND Ta quickly find a specific file with GNU +.Xr locate 1 . +.It HELP Ta give help information. +.El +.Pp +The following Kerberos related site commands are understood. +.Bl -column Request -offset indent +.It KAUTH Ta obtain remote tickets. +.It KLIST Ta show remote tickets +.El +.Pp +The remaining ftp requests specified in Internet RFC 959 +are +recognized, but not implemented. +MDTM and SIZE are not specified in RFC 959, but will appear in the +next updated FTP RFC. +.Pp +The ftp server will abort an active file transfer only when the +ABOR +command is preceded by a Telnet "Interrupt Process" (IP) +signal and a Telnet "Synch" signal in the command Telnet stream, +as described in Internet RFC 959. +If a +STAT +command is received during a data transfer, preceded by a Telnet IP +and Synch, transfer status will be returned. +.Pp +.Nm Ftpd +interprets file names according to the +.Dq globbing +conventions used by +.Xr csh 1 . +This allows users to use the metacharacters +.Dq Li \&*?[]{}~ . +.Pp +.Nm Ftpd +authenticates users according to these rules. +.Pp +.Bl -enum -offset indent +.It +If Kerberos authentication is used, the user must pass valid tickets +and the principal must be allowed to login as the remote user. +.It +The login name must be in the password data base, and not have a null +password (if Kerberos is used the password field is not checked). In +this case a password must be provided by the client before any file +operations may be performed. If the user has an OTP key, the response +from a successful USER command will include an OTP challenge. The +client may choose to respond with a PASS command giving either a +standard password or an OTP one-time password. The server will +automatically determine which type of password it has been given and +attempt to authenticate accordingly. See +.Xr otp 1 +for more information on OTP authentication. +.It +The login name must not appear in the file +.Pa /etc/ftpusers . +.It +The user must have a standard shell returned by +.Xr getusershell 3 . +.It +If the user name appears in the file +.Pa /etc/ftpchroot +the session's root will be changed to the user's login directory by +.Xr chroot 2 +as for an +.Dq anonymous +or +.Dq ftp +account (see next item). However, the user must still supply a password. +This feature is intended as a compromise between a fully anonymous account +and a fully privileged account. The account should also be set up as for an +anonymous account. +.It +If the user name is +.Dq anonymous +or +.Dq ftp , +an +anonymous ftp account must be present in the password +file (user +.Dq ftp ) . +In this case the user is allowed +to log in by specifying any password (by convention an email address for +the user should be used as the password). +.El +.Pp +In the last case, +.Nm ftpd +takes special measures to restrict the client's access privileges. +The server performs a +.Xr chroot 2 +to the home directory of the +.Dq ftp +user. +In order that system security is not breached, it is recommended +that the +.Dq ftp +subtree be constructed with care, consider following these guidelines +for anonymous ftp. +.Pp +In general all files should be owned by +.Dq root , +and have non-write permissions (644 or 755 depending on the kind of +file). No files should be owned or writable by +.Dq ftp +(possibly with exception for the +.Pa ~ftp/incoming , +as specified below). +.Bl -tag -width "~ftp/pub" -offset indent +.It Pa ~ftp +The +.Dq ftp +homedirectory should be owned by root. +.It Pa ~ftp/bin +The directory for external programs (such as +.Xr ls 1 ) . +These programs must either be statically linked, or you must setup an +environment for dynamic linking when running chrooted. +These programs will be used if present: +.Bl -tag -width "locate" -offset indent +.It ls +Used when listing files. +.It compress +When retrieving a filename that ends in +.Pa .Z , +and that file isn't present, +.Nm +will try to find the filename without +.Pa .Z +and compress it on the fly. +.It gzip +Same as compress, just with files ending in +.Pa .gz . +.It gtar +Enables retrieval of whole directories as files ending in +.Pa .tar . +Can also be combined with compression. You must use GNU Tar (or some +other that supports the +.Fl z +and +.Fl Z +flags). +.It locate +Will enable ``fast find'' with the +.Ic SITE FIND +command. You must also create a +.Pa locatedb +file in +.Pa ~ftp/etc . +.El +.It Pa ~ftp/etc +If you put copies of the +.Xr passwd 5 +and +.Xr group 5 +files here, ls will be able to produce owner names rather than +numbers. Remember to remove any passwords from these files. +.Pp +The file +.Pa motd , +if present, will be printed after a successful login. +.It Pa ~ftp/dev +Put a copy of +.Xr /dev/null 7 +here. +.It Pa ~ftp/pub +Traditional place to put whatever you want to make public. +.El +.Pp +If you want guests to be able to upload files, create a +.Pa ~ftp/incoming +directory owned by +.Dq root , +and group +.Dq ftp +with mode 730 (make sure +.Dq ftp +is member of group +.Dq ftp ) . +The following restrictions apply to anonymous users: +.Bl -bullet +.It +Directories created will have mode 700. +.It +Uploaded files will be created with an umask of 777, if not changed +with the +.Fl g +option. +.It +These command are not accessible: +.Ic DELE , RMD , RNTO , RNFR , +.Ic SITE UMASK , +and +.Ic SITE CHMOD . +.It +Filenames must start with an alpha-numeric character, and consist of +alpha-numeric characters or any of the following: +.Li \&+ +(plus), +.Li \&- +(minus), +.Li \&= +(equal), +.Li \&_ +(underscore), +.Li \&. +(period), and +.Li \&, +(comma). +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width /etc/ftpwelcome -compact +.It Pa /etc/ftpusers +Access list for users. +.It Pa /etc/ftpchroot +List of normal users who should be chroot'd. +.It Pa /etc/ftpwelcome +Welcome notice. +.It Pa /etc/motd +Welcome notice after login. +.It Pa /etc/nologin +Displayed and access refused. +.It Pa ~/.klogin +Login access for Kerberos. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftp 1 , +.Xr otp 1 , +.Xr getusershell 3 , +.Xr ftpusers 5 , +.Xr syslogd 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +.Bl -tag -compact -width "RFC 1938" +.It Cm RFC 959 +FTP PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION +.It Cm RFC 1938 +OTP Specification +.It Cm RFC 2228 +FTP Security Extensions. +.El +.Sh BUGS +The server must run as the super-user +to create sockets with privileged port numbers. It maintains +an effective user id of the logged in user, reverting to +the super-user only when binding addresses to sockets. The +possible security holes have been extensively +scrutinized, but are possibly incomplete. +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88bb4a1bb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c @@ -0,0 +1,2374 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#define FTP_NAMES +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#include "getarg.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ftpd.c,v 1.166.2.3 2004/08/20 15:16:37 lha Exp $"); + +static char version[] = "Version 6.00"; + +extern off_t restart_point; +extern char cbuf[]; + +struct sockaddr_storage ctrl_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *ctrl_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&ctrl_addr_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage data_source_ss; +struct sockaddr *data_source = (struct sockaddr *)&data_source_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage data_dest_ss; +struct sockaddr *data_dest = (struct sockaddr *)&data_dest_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage his_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *his_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&his_addr_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage pasv_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *pasv_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&pasv_addr_ss; + +int data; +int logged_in; +struct passwd *pw; +int debug = 0; +int ftpd_timeout = 900; /* timeout after 15 minutes of inactivity */ +int maxtimeout = 7200;/* don't allow idle time to be set beyond 2 hours */ +int restricted_data_ports = 1; +int logging; +int guest; +int dochroot; +int type; +int form; +int stru; /* avoid C keyword */ +int mode; +int usedefault = 1; /* for data transfers */ +int pdata = -1; /* for passive mode */ +int allow_insecure_oob = 1; +static int transflag; +static int urgflag; +off_t file_size; +off_t byte_count; +#if !defined(CMASK) || CMASK == 0 +#undef CMASK +#define CMASK 027 +#endif +int defumask = CMASK; /* default umask value */ +int guest_umask = 0777; /* Paranoia for anonymous users */ +char tmpline[10240]; +char hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; +char remotehost[MaxHostNameLen]; +static char ttyline[20]; + +#define AUTH_PLAIN (1 << 0) /* allow sending passwords */ +#define AUTH_OTP (1 << 1) /* passwords are one-time */ +#define AUTH_FTP (1 << 2) /* allow anonymous login */ + +static int auth_level = 0; /* Only allow kerberos login by default */ + +/* + * Timeout intervals for retrying connections + * to hosts that don't accept PORT cmds. This + * is a kludge, but given the problems with TCP... + */ +#define SWAITMAX 90 /* wait at most 90 seconds */ +#define SWAITINT 5 /* interval between retries */ + +int swaitmax = SWAITMAX; +int swaitint = SWAITINT; + +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE +char proctitle[BUFSIZ]; /* initial part of title */ +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + +#define LOGCMD(cmd, file) \ + if (logging > 1) \ + syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s %s%s", cmd, \ + *(file) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file); +#define LOGCMD2(cmd, file1, file2) \ + if (logging > 1) \ + syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s %s%s %s%s", cmd, \ + *(file1) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file1, \ + *(file2) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file2); +#define LOGBYTES(cmd, file, cnt) \ + if (logging > 1) { \ + if (cnt == (off_t)-1) \ + syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s %s%s", cmd, \ + *(file) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file); \ + else \ + syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s %s%s = %ld bytes", \ + cmd, (*(file) == '/') ? "" : curdir(), file, (long)cnt); \ + } + +static void ack (char *); +static void myoob (int); +static int handleoobcmd(void); +static int checkuser (char *, char *); +static int checkaccess (char *); +static FILE *dataconn (const char *, off_t, const char *); +static void dolog (struct sockaddr *sa, int len); +static void end_login (void); +static FILE *getdatasock (const char *); +static char *gunique (char *); +static RETSIGTYPE lostconn (int); +static int receive_data (FILE *, FILE *); +static void send_data (FILE *, FILE *); +static struct passwd * sgetpwnam (char *); + +static char * +curdir(void) +{ + static char path[MaxPathLen+1]; /* path + '/' + '\0' */ + + if (getcwd(path, sizeof(path)-1) == NULL) + return (""); + if (path[1] != '\0') /* special case for root dir. */ + strlcat(path, "/", sizeof(path)); + /* For guest account, skip / since it's chrooted */ + return (guest ? path+1 : path); +} + +#ifndef LINE_MAX +#define LINE_MAX 1024 +#endif + +static int +parse_auth_level(char *str) +{ + char *p; + int ret = 0; + char *foo = NULL; + + for(p = strtok_r(str, ",", &foo); + p; + p = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &foo)) { + if(strcmp(p, "user") == 0) + ; +#ifdef OTP + else if(strcmp(p, "otp") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_PLAIN|AUTH_OTP; +#endif + else if(strcmp(p, "ftp") == 0 || + strcmp(p, "safe") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_FTP; + else if(strcmp(p, "plain") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_PLAIN; + else if(strcmp(p, "none") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_PLAIN|AUTH_FTP; + else + warnx("bad value for -a: `%s'", p); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Print usage and die. + */ + +static int interactive_flag; +static char *guest_umask_string; +static char *port_string; +static char *umask_string; +static char *auth_string; + +int use_builtin_ls = -1; + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; + +static const char *good_chars = "+-=_,."; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, 'a', arg_string, &auth_string, "required authentication" }, + { NULL, 'i', arg_flag, &interactive_flag, "don't assume stdin is a socket" }, + { NULL, 'p', arg_string, &port_string, "what port to listen to" }, + { NULL, 'g', arg_string, &guest_umask_string, "umask for guest logins" }, + { NULL, 'l', arg_counter, &logging, "log more stuff", "" }, + { NULL, 't', arg_integer, &ftpd_timeout, "initial timeout" }, + { NULL, 'T', arg_integer, &maxtimeout, "max timeout" }, + { NULL, 'u', arg_string, &umask_string, "umask for user logins" }, + { NULL, 'U', arg_negative_flag, &restricted_data_ports, "don't use high data ports" }, + { NULL, 'd', arg_flag, &debug, "enable debugging" }, + { NULL, 'v', arg_flag, &debug, "enable debugging" }, + { "builtin-ls", 'B', arg_flag, &use_builtin_ls, "use built-in ls to list files" }, + { "good-chars", 0, arg_string, &good_chars, "allowed anonymous upload filename chars" }, + { "insecure-oob", 'I', arg_negative_flag, &allow_insecure_oob, "don't allow insecure OOB ABOR/STAT" }, +#ifdef KRB5 + { "gss-bindings", 0, arg_flag, &ftp_do_gss_bindings, "Require GSS-API bindings", NULL}, +#endif + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage (int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (code); +} + +/* output contents of a file */ +static int +show_file(const char *file, int code) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[128]; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return -1; + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)){ + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + lreply(code, "%s", buf); + } + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + socklen_t his_addr_len, ctrl_addr_len; + int on = 1; + int port; + struct servent *sp; + + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + /* detach from any tickets and tokens */ + { +#ifdef KRB4 + char tkfile[1024]; + snprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile), + "/tmp/ftp_%u", (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile); +#endif + } +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if(k_hasafs()) + k_setpag(); +#endif + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(auth_string) + auth_level = parse_auth_level(auth_string); + { + char *p; + long val = 0; + + if(guest_umask_string) { + val = strtol(guest_umask_string, &p, 8); + if (*p != '\0' || val < 0) + warnx("bad value for -g"); + else + guest_umask = val; + } + if(umask_string) { + val = strtol(umask_string, &p, 8); + if (*p != '\0' || val < 0) + warnx("bad value for -u"); + else + defumask = val; + } + } + sp = getservbyname("ftp", "tcp"); + if(sp) + port = sp->s_port; + else + port = htons(21); + if(port_string) { + sp = getservbyname(port_string, "tcp"); + if(sp) + port = sp->s_port; + else + if(isdigit((unsigned char)port_string[0])) + port = htons(atoi(port_string)); + else + warnx("bad value for -p"); + } + + if (maxtimeout < ftpd_timeout) + maxtimeout = ftpd_timeout; + +#if 0 + if (ftpd_timeout > maxtimeout) + ftpd_timeout = maxtimeout; +#endif + + if(interactive_flag) + mini_inetd (port); + + /* + * LOG_NDELAY sets up the logging connection immediately, + * necessary for anonymous ftp's that chroot and can't do it later. + */ + openlog("ftpd", LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY, LOG_FTP); + his_addr_len = sizeof(his_addr_ss); + if (getpeername(STDIN_FILENO, his_addr, &his_addr_len) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "getpeername (%s): %m",argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + ctrl_addr_len = sizeof(ctrl_addr_ss); + if (getsockname(STDIN_FILENO, ctrl_addr, &ctrl_addr_len) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "getsockname (%s): %m",argv[0]); + exit(1); + } +#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int tos = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; + + if (setsockopt(STDIN_FILENO, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, + (void *)&tos, sizeof(int)) < 0) + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (IP_TOS): %m"); + } +#endif + data_source->sa_family = ctrl_addr->sa_family; + socket_set_port (data_source, + htons(ntohs(socket_get_port(ctrl_addr)) - 1)); + + /* set this here so it can be put in wtmp */ + snprintf(ttyline, sizeof(ttyline), "ftp%u", (unsigned)getpid()); + + + /* freopen(_PATH_DEVNULL, "w", stderr); */ + signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); +#ifdef SIGURG + if (signal(SIGURG, myoob) == SIG_ERR) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "signal: %m"); +#endif + + /* Try to handle urgent data inline */ +#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (setsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, (void *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsockopt: %m"); +#endif + +#ifdef F_SETOWN + if (fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETOWN, getpid()) == -1) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "fcntl F_SETOWN: %m"); +#endif + dolog(his_addr, his_addr_len); + /* + * Set up default state + */ + data = -1; + type = TYPE_A; + form = FORM_N; + stru = STRU_F; + mode = MODE_S; + tmpline[0] = '\0'; + + /* If logins are disabled, print out the message. */ + if(show_file(_PATH_NOLOGIN, 530) == 0) { + reply(530, "System not available."); + exit(0); + } + show_file(_PATH_FTPWELCOME, 220); + /* reply(220,) must follow */ + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + + reply(220, "%s FTP server (%s" +#ifdef KRB5 + "+%s" +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + "+%s" +#endif + ") ready.", hostname, version +#ifdef KRB5 + ,heimdal_version +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + ,krb4_version +#endif + ); + + for (;;) + yyparse(); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +lostconn(int signo) +{ + + if (debug) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "lost connection"); + dologout(-1); +} + +/* + * Helper function for sgetpwnam(). + */ +static char * +sgetsave(char *s) +{ + char *new = strdup(s); + + if (new == NULL) { + perror_reply(421, "Local resource failure: malloc"); + dologout(1); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + return new; +} + +/* + * Save the result of a getpwnam. Used for USER command, since + * the data returned must not be clobbered by any other command + * (e.g., globbing). + */ +static struct passwd * +sgetpwnam(char *name) +{ + static struct passwd save; + struct passwd *p; + + if ((p = k_getpwnam(name)) == NULL) + return (p); + if (save.pw_name) { + free(save.pw_name); + free(save.pw_passwd); + free(save.pw_gecos); + free(save.pw_dir); + free(save.pw_shell); + } + save = *p; + save.pw_name = sgetsave(p->pw_name); + save.pw_passwd = sgetsave(p->pw_passwd); + save.pw_gecos = sgetsave(p->pw_gecos); + save.pw_dir = sgetsave(p->pw_dir); + save.pw_shell = sgetsave(p->pw_shell); + return (&save); +} + +static int login_attempts; /* number of failed login attempts */ +static int askpasswd; /* had user command, ask for passwd */ +static char curname[10]; /* current USER name */ +#ifdef OTP +OtpContext otp_ctx; +#endif + +/* + * USER command. + * Sets global passwd pointer pw if named account exists and is acceptable; + * sets askpasswd if a PASS command is expected. If logged in previously, + * need to reset state. If name is "ftp" or "anonymous", the name is not in + * _PATH_FTPUSERS, and ftp account exists, set guest and pw, then just return. + * If account doesn't exist, ask for passwd anyway. Otherwise, check user + * requesting login privileges. Disallow anyone who does not have a standard + * shell as returned by getusershell(). Disallow anyone mentioned in the file + * _PATH_FTPUSERS to allow people such as root and uucp to be avoided. + */ +void +user(char *name) +{ + char *cp, *shell; + + if(auth_level == 0 && !sec_complete){ + reply(530, "No login allowed without authorization."); + return; + } + + if (logged_in) { + if (guest) { + reply(530, "Can't change user from guest login."); + return; + } else if (dochroot) { + reply(530, "Can't change user from chroot user."); + return; + } + end_login(); + } + + guest = 0; + if (strcmp(name, "ftp") == 0 || strcmp(name, "anonymous") == 0) { + if ((auth_level & AUTH_FTP) == 0 || + checkaccess("ftp") || + checkaccess("anonymous")) + reply(530, "User %s access denied.", name); + else if ((pw = sgetpwnam("ftp")) != NULL) { + guest = 1; + defumask = guest_umask; /* paranoia for incoming */ + askpasswd = 1; + reply(331, "Guest login ok, type your name as password."); + } else + reply(530, "User %s unknown.", name); + if (!askpasswd && logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "ANONYMOUS FTP LOGIN REFUSED FROM %s(%s)", + remotehost, data_addr); + } + return; + } + if((auth_level & AUTH_PLAIN) == 0 && !sec_complete){ + reply(530, "Only authorized and anonymous login allowed."); + return; + } + if ((pw = sgetpwnam(name))) { + if ((shell = pw->pw_shell) == NULL || *shell == 0) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + while ((cp = getusershell()) != NULL) + if (strcmp(cp, shell) == 0) + break; + endusershell(); + + if (cp == NULL || checkaccess(name)) { + reply(530, "User %s access denied.", name); + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, + sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, + "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "FTP LOGIN REFUSED FROM %s(%s), %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + name); + } + pw = (struct passwd *) NULL; + return; + } + } + if (logging) + strlcpy(curname, name, sizeof(curname)); + if(sec_complete) { + if(sec_userok(name) == 0) + do_login(232, name); + else + reply(530, "User %s access denied.", name); + } else { + char ss[256]; + +#ifdef OTP + if (otp_challenge(&otp_ctx, name, ss, sizeof(ss)) == 0) { + reply(331, "Password %s for %s required.", + ss, name); + askpasswd = 1; + } else +#endif + if ((auth_level & AUTH_OTP) == 0) { + reply(331, "Password required for %s.", name); + askpasswd = 1; + } else { + char *s; + +#ifdef OTP + if ((s = otp_error (&otp_ctx)) != NULL) + lreply(530, "OTP: %s", s); +#endif + reply(530, + "Only authorized, anonymous" +#ifdef OTP + " and OTP " +#endif + "login allowed."); + } + + } + /* + * Delay before reading passwd after first failed + * attempt to slow down passwd-guessing programs. + */ + if (login_attempts) + sleep(login_attempts); +} + +/* + * Check if a user is in the file "fname" + */ +static int +checkuser(char *fname, char *name) +{ + FILE *fd; + int found = 0; + char *p, line[BUFSIZ]; + + if ((fd = fopen(fname, "r")) != NULL) { + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fd) != NULL) + if ((p = strchr(line, '\n')) != NULL) { + *p = '\0'; + if (line[0] == '#') + continue; + if (strcmp(line, name) == 0) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + fclose(fd); + } + return (found); +} + + +/* + * Determine whether a user has access, based on information in + * _PATH_FTPUSERS. The users are listed one per line, with `allow' + * or `deny' after the username. If anything other than `allow', or + * just nothing, is given after the username, `deny' is assumed. + * + * If the user is not found in the file, but the pseudo-user `*' is, + * the permission is taken from that line. + * + * This preserves the old semantics where if a user was listed in the + * file he was denied, otherwise he was allowed. + * + * Return 1 if the user is denied, or 0 if he is allowed. */ + +static int +match(const char *pattern, const char *string) +{ + return fnmatch(pattern, string, FNM_NOESCAPE); +} + +static int +checkaccess(char *name) +{ +#define ALLOWED 0 +#define NOT_ALLOWED 1 + FILE *fd; + int allowed = ALLOWED; + char *user, *perm, line[BUFSIZ]; + char *foo; + + fd = fopen(_PATH_FTPUSERS, "r"); + + if(fd == NULL) + return allowed; + + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fd) != NULL) { + foo = NULL; + user = strtok_r(line, " \t\n", &foo); + if (user == NULL || user[0] == '#') + continue; + perm = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n", &foo); + if (match(user, name) == 0){ + if(perm && strcmp(perm, "allow") == 0) + allowed = ALLOWED; + else + allowed = NOT_ALLOWED; + break; + } + } + fclose(fd); + return allowed; +} +#undef ALLOWED +#undef NOT_ALLOWED + + +int do_login(int code, char *passwd) +{ + login_attempts = 0; /* this time successful */ + if (setegid((gid_t)pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't set gid."); + return -1; + } + initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid); + + /* open wtmp before chroot */ + ftpd_logwtmp(ttyline, pw->pw_name, remotehost); + logged_in = 1; + + dochroot = checkuser(_PATH_FTPCHROOT, pw->pw_name); + if (guest) { + /* + * We MUST do a chdir() after the chroot. Otherwise + * the old current directory will be accessible as "." + * outside the new root! + */ + if (chroot(pw->pw_dir) < 0 || chdir("/") < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't set guest privileges."); + return -1; + } + } else if (dochroot) { + if (chroot(pw->pw_dir) < 0 || chdir("/") < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't change root."); + return -1; + } + } else if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { + if (chdir("/") < 0) { + reply(530, "User %s: can't change directory to %s.", + pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); + return -1; + } else + lreply(code, "No directory! Logging in with home=/"); + } + if (seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid) < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't set uid."); + return -1; + } + + if(use_builtin_ls == -1) { + struct stat st; + /* if /bin/ls exist and is a regular file, use it, otherwise + use built-in ls */ + if(stat("/bin/ls", &st) == 0 && + S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) + use_builtin_ls = 0; + else + use_builtin_ls = 1; + } + + /* + * Display a login message, if it exists. + * N.B. reply(code,) must follow the message. + */ + show_file(_PATH_FTPLOGINMESG, code); + if(show_file(_PATH_ISSUE_NET, code) != 0) + show_file(_PATH_ISSUE, code); + if (guest) { + reply(code, "Guest login ok, access restrictions apply."); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + snprintf (proctitle, sizeof(proctitle), + "%s: anonymous/%s", + remotehost, + passwd); + setproctitle("%s", proctitle); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "ANONYMOUS FTP LOGIN FROM %s(%s), %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + passwd); + } + } else { + reply(code, "User %s logged in.", pw->pw_name); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + snprintf(proctitle, sizeof(proctitle), "%s: %s", remotehost, pw->pw_name); + setproctitle("%s", proctitle); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "FTP LOGIN FROM %s(%s) as %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + pw->pw_name); + } + } + umask(defumask); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Terminate login as previous user, if any, resetting state; + * used when USER command is given or login fails. + */ +static void +end_login(void) +{ + + seteuid((uid_t)0); + if (logged_in) + ftpd_logwtmp(ttyline, "", ""); + pw = NULL; + logged_in = 0; + guest = 0; + dochroot = 0; +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +krb5_verify(struct passwd *pwd, char *passwd) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache id; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, pwd->pw_name, &princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &id); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_verify_user(context, + princ, + id, + passwd, + 1, + NULL); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + if (k_hasafs()) { + krb5_afslog_uid_home(context, id,NULL, NULL,pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + } + krb5_cc_destroy(context, id); + krb5_free_context (context); + if(ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +void +pass(char *passwd) +{ + int rval; + + /* some clients insists on sending a password */ + if (logged_in && askpasswd == 0){ + reply(230, "Password not necessary"); + return; + } + + if (logged_in || askpasswd == 0) { + reply(503, "Login with USER first."); + return; + } + askpasswd = 0; + rval = 1; + if (!guest) { /* "ftp" is only account allowed no password */ + if (pw == NULL) + rval = 1; /* failure below */ +#ifdef OTP + else if (otp_verify_user (&otp_ctx, passwd) == 0) { + rval = 0; + } +#endif + else if((auth_level & AUTH_OTP) == 0) { +#ifdef KRB5 + rval = krb5_verify(pw, passwd); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (rval) { + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + if((rval = krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1)) == KSUCCESS) + rval = krb_verify_user(pw->pw_name, + "", realm, + passwd, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL); + if (rval == KSUCCESS ) { + chown (tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + if(k_hasafs()) + krb_afslog(0, 0); + } + } +#endif + if (rval) + rval = unix_verify_user(pw->pw_name, passwd); + } else { + char *s; + +#ifdef OTP + if ((s = otp_error(&otp_ctx)) != NULL) + lreply(530, "OTP: %s", s); +#endif + } + memset (passwd, 0, strlen(passwd)); + + /* + * If rval == 1, the user failed the authentication + * check above. If rval == 0, either Kerberos or + * local authentication succeeded. + */ + if (rval) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + reply(530, "Login incorrect."); + if (logging) + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "FTP LOGIN FAILED FROM %s(%s), %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + curname); + pw = NULL; + if (login_attempts++ >= 5) { + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "repeated login failures from %s(%s)", + remotehost, + data_addr); + exit(0); + } + return; + } + } + if(!do_login(230, passwd)) + return; + + /* Forget all about it... */ + end_login(); +} + +void +retrieve(const char *cmd, char *name) +{ + FILE *fin = NULL, *dout; + struct stat st; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + char line[BUFSIZ]; + + + if (cmd == 0) { + fin = fopen(name, "r"); + closefunc = fclose; + st.st_size = 0; + if(fin == NULL){ + int save_errno = errno; + struct cmds { + const char *ext; + const char *cmd; + const char *rev_cmd; + } cmds[] = { + {".tar", "/bin/gtar cPf - %s", NULL}, + {".tar.gz", "/bin/gtar zcPf - %s", NULL}, + {".tar.Z", "/bin/gtar ZcPf - %s", NULL}, + {".gz", "/bin/gzip -c -- %s", "/bin/gzip -c -d -- %s"}, + {".Z", "/bin/compress -c -- %s", "/bin/uncompress -c -- %s"}, + {NULL, NULL} + }; + struct cmds *p; + for(p = cmds; p->ext; p++){ + char *tail = name + strlen(name) - strlen(p->ext); + char c = *tail; + + if(strcmp(tail, p->ext) == 0 && + (*tail = 0) == 0 && + access(name, R_OK) == 0){ + snprintf (line, sizeof(line), p->cmd, name); + *tail = c; + break; + } + *tail = c; + if (p->rev_cmd != NULL) { + char *ext; + + asprintf(&ext, "%s%s", name, p->ext); + if (ext != NULL) { + if (access(ext, R_OK) == 0) { + snprintf (line, sizeof(line), + p->rev_cmd, ext); + free(ext); + break; + } + free(ext); + } + } + + } + if(p->ext){ + fin = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 0, 0); + closefunc = ftpd_pclose; + st.st_size = -1; + cmd = line; + } else + errno = save_errno; + } + } else { + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), cmd, name); + name = line; + fin = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 1, 0); + closefunc = ftpd_pclose; + st.st_size = -1; + } + if (fin == NULL) { + if (errno != 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + if (cmd == 0) { + LOGCMD("get", name); + } + } + return; + } + byte_count = -1; + if (cmd == 0){ + if(fstat(fileno(fin), &st) < 0 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + reply(550, "%s: not a plain file.", name); + goto done; + } + } + if (restart_point) { + if (type == TYPE_A) { + off_t i, n; + int c; + + n = restart_point; + i = 0; + while (i++ < n) { + if ((c=getc(fin)) == EOF) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + if (c == '\n') + i++; + } + } else if (lseek(fileno(fin), restart_point, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + } + dout = dataconn(name, st.st_size, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + goto done; + set_buffer_size(fileno(dout), 0); + send_data(fin, dout); + fclose(dout); + data = -1; + pdata = -1; +done: + if (cmd == 0) + LOGBYTES("get", name, byte_count); + (*closefunc)(fin); +} + +/* filename sanity check */ + +int +filename_check(char *filename) +{ + unsigned char *p; + + p = (unsigned char *)strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(p) + filename = p + 1; + + p = filename; + + if(isalnum(*p)){ + p++; + while(*p && (isalnum(*p) || strchr(good_chars, *p))) + p++; + if(*p == '\0') + return 0; + } + lreply(553, "\"%s\" is not an acceptable filename.", filename); + lreply(553, "The filename must start with an alphanumeric " + "character and must only"); + reply(553, "consist of alphanumeric characters or any of the following: %s", + good_chars); + return 1; +} + +void +do_store(char *name, char *mode, int unique) +{ + FILE *fout, *din; + struct stat st; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + + if(guest && filename_check(name)) + return; + if (unique && stat(name, &st) == 0 && + (name = gunique(name)) == NULL) { + LOGCMD(*mode == 'w' ? "put" : "append", name); + return; + } + + if (restart_point) + mode = "r+"; + fout = fopen(name, mode); + closefunc = fclose; + if (fout == NULL) { + perror_reply(553, name); + LOGCMD(*mode == 'w' ? "put" : "append", name); + return; + } + byte_count = -1; + if (restart_point) { + if (type == TYPE_A) { + off_t i, n; + int c; + + n = restart_point; + i = 0; + while (i++ < n) { + if ((c=getc(fout)) == EOF) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + if (c == '\n') + i++; + } + /* + * We must do this seek to "current" position + * because we are changing from reading to + * writing. + */ + if (fseek(fout, 0L, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + } else if (lseek(fileno(fout), restart_point, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + } + din = dataconn(name, (off_t)-1, "r"); + if (din == NULL) + goto done; + set_buffer_size(fileno(din), 1); + if (receive_data(din, fout) == 0) { + if((*closefunc)(fout) < 0) + perror_reply(552, name); + else { + if (unique) + reply(226, "Transfer complete (unique file name:%s).", + name); + else + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + } + } else + (*closefunc)(fout); + fclose(din); + data = -1; + pdata = -1; +done: + LOGBYTES(*mode == 'w' ? "put" : "append", name, byte_count); +} + +static FILE * +getdatasock(const char *mode) +{ + int s, t, tries; + + if (data >= 0) + return (fdopen(data, mode)); + seteuid(0); + s = socket(ctrl_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) + goto bad; + socket_set_reuseaddr (s, 1); + /* anchor socket to avoid multi-homing problems */ + socket_set_address_and_port (data_source, + socket_get_address (ctrl_addr), + socket_get_port (data_source)); + + for (tries = 1; ; tries++) { + if (bind(s, data_source, + socket_sockaddr_size (data_source)) >= 0) + break; + if (errno != EADDRINUSE || tries > 10) + goto bad; + sleep(tries); + } + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (s, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (fdopen(s, mode)); +bad: + /* Return the real value of errno (close may change it) */ + t = errno; + seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + close(s); + errno = t; + return (NULL); +} + +static int +accept_with_timeout(int socket, + struct sockaddr *address, + socklen_t *address_len, + struct timeval *timeout) +{ + int ret; + fd_set rfd; + FD_ZERO(&rfd); + FD_SET(socket, &rfd); + ret = select(socket + 1, &rfd, NULL, NULL, timeout); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + if(ret == 0) { + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + return -1; + } + return accept(socket, address, address_len); +} + +static FILE * +dataconn(const char *name, off_t size, const char *mode) +{ + char sizebuf[32]; + FILE *file; + int retry = 0; + + file_size = size; + byte_count = 0; + if (size >= 0) + snprintf(sizebuf, sizeof(sizebuf), " (%ld bytes)", (long)size); + else + *sizebuf = '\0'; + if (pdata >= 0) { + struct sockaddr_storage from_ss; + struct sockaddr *from = (struct sockaddr *)&from_ss; + struct timeval timeout; + int s; + socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from_ss); + + timeout.tv_sec = 15; + timeout.tv_usec = 0; + s = accept_with_timeout(pdata, from, &fromlen, &timeout); + if (s < 0) { + reply(425, "Can't open data connection."); + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + return (NULL); + } + close(pdata); + pdata = s; +#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int tos = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; + + setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, (void *)&tos, + sizeof(tos)); + } +#endif + reply(150, "Opening %s mode data connection for '%s'%s.", + type == TYPE_A ? "ASCII" : "BINARY", name, sizebuf); + return (fdopen(pdata, mode)); + } + if (data >= 0) { + reply(125, "Using existing data connection for '%s'%s.", + name, sizebuf); + usedefault = 1; + return (fdopen(data, mode)); + } + if (usedefault) + data_dest = his_addr; + usedefault = 1; + file = getdatasock(mode); + if (file == NULL) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (data_source->sa_family, + socket_get_address(data_source), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + reply(425, "Can't create data socket (%s,%d): %s.", + data_addr, + socket_get_port (data_source), + strerror(errno)); + return (NULL); + } + data = fileno(file); + while (connect(data, data_dest, + socket_sockaddr_size(data_dest)) < 0) { + if (errno == EADDRINUSE && retry < swaitmax) { + sleep(swaitint); + retry += swaitint; + continue; + } + perror_reply(425, "Can't build data connection"); + fclose(file); + data = -1; + return (NULL); + } + reply(150, "Opening %s mode data connection for '%s'%s.", + type == TYPE_A ? "ASCII" : "BINARY", name, sizebuf); + return (file); +} + +/* + * Tranfer the contents of "instr" to "outstr" peer using the appropriate + * encapsulation of the data subject * to Mode, Structure, and Type. + * + * NB: Form isn't handled. + */ +static void +send_data(FILE *instr, FILE *outstr) +{ + int c, cnt, filefd, netfd; + static char *buf; + static size_t bufsize; + + transflag = 1; + switch (type) { + + case TYPE_A: + while ((c = getc(instr)) != EOF) { + if (urgflag && handleoobcmd()) + return; + byte_count++; + if(c == '\n') + sec_putc('\r', outstr); + sec_putc(c, outstr); + } + sec_fflush(outstr); + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + if (ferror(instr)) + goto file_err; + if (ferror(outstr)) + goto data_err; + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + return; + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: +#if 0 /* XXX handle urg flag */ +#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && !defined(NO_MMAP) +#ifndef MAP_FAILED +#define MAP_FAILED (-1) +#endif + { + struct stat st; + char *chunk; + int in = fileno(instr); + if(fstat(in, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) + && st.st_size > 0) { + /* + * mmap zero bytes has potential of loosing, don't do it. + */ + chunk = mmap(0, st.st_size, PROT_READ, + MAP_SHARED, in, 0); + if((void *)chunk != (void *)MAP_FAILED) { + cnt = st.st_size - restart_point; + sec_write(fileno(outstr), chunk + restart_point, cnt); + if (munmap(chunk, st.st_size) < 0) + warn ("munmap"); + sec_fflush(outstr); + byte_count = cnt; + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + } + } + } +#endif +#endif + if(transflag) { + struct stat st; + + netfd = fileno(outstr); + filefd = fileno(instr); + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat(filefd, &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) { + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + perror_reply(451, "Local resource failure: malloc"); + return; + } + while ((cnt = read(filefd, buf, bufsize)) > 0 && + sec_write(netfd, buf, cnt) == cnt) { + byte_count += cnt; + if (urgflag && handleoobcmd()) + return; + } + sec_fflush(outstr); /* to end an encrypted stream */ + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + if (cnt != 0) { + if (cnt < 0) + goto file_err; + goto data_err; + } + } + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + return; + default: + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + reply(550, "Unimplemented TYPE %d in send_data", type); + return; + } + +data_err: + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + perror_reply(426, "Data connection"); + return; + +file_err: + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + perror_reply(551, "Error on input file"); +} + +/* + * Transfer data from peer to "outstr" using the appropriate encapulation of + * the data subject to Mode, Structure, and Type. + * + * N.B.: Form isn't handled. + */ +static int +receive_data(FILE *instr, FILE *outstr) +{ + int cnt, bare_lfs = 0; + static char *buf; + static size_t bufsize; + struct stat st; + + transflag = 1; + + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat(fileno(outstr), &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) { + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + perror_reply(451, "Local resource failure: malloc"); + return -1; + } + + switch (type) { + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + while ((cnt = sec_read(fileno(instr), buf, bufsize)) > 0) { + if (write(fileno(outstr), buf, cnt) != cnt) + goto file_err; + byte_count += cnt; + if (urgflag && handleoobcmd()) + return (-1); + } + if (cnt < 0) + goto data_err; + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + return (0); + + case TYPE_E: + reply(553, "TYPE E not implemented."); + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + return (-1); + + case TYPE_A: + { + char *p, *q; + int cr_flag = 0; + while ((cnt = sec_read(fileno(instr), + buf + cr_flag, + bufsize - cr_flag)) > 0){ + if (urgflag && handleoobcmd()) + return (-1); + byte_count += cnt; + cnt += cr_flag; + cr_flag = 0; + for(p = buf, q = buf; p < buf + cnt;) { + if(*p == '\n') + bare_lfs++; + if(*p == '\r') { + if(p == buf + cnt - 1){ + cr_flag = 1; + p++; + continue; + }else if(p[1] == '\n'){ + *q++ = '\n'; + p += 2; + continue; + } + } + *q++ = *p++; + } + fwrite(buf, q - buf, 1, outstr); + if(cr_flag) + buf[0] = '\r'; + } + if(cr_flag) + putc('\r', outstr); + fflush(outstr); + if (ferror(instr)) + goto data_err; + if (ferror(outstr)) + goto file_err; + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + if (bare_lfs) { + lreply(226, "WARNING! %d bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode\r\n" + " File may not have transferred correctly.\r\n", + bare_lfs); + } + return (0); + } + default: + reply(550, "Unimplemented TYPE %d in receive_data", type); + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + return (-1); + } + +data_err: + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + perror_reply(426, "Data Connection"); + return (-1); + +file_err: + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + perror_reply(452, "Error writing file"); + return (-1); +} + +void +statfilecmd(char *filename) +{ + FILE *fin; + int c; + char line[LINE_MAX]; + + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "/bin/ls -la -- %s", filename); + fin = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 1, 0); + lreply(211, "status of %s:", filename); + while ((c = getc(fin)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') { + if (ferror(stdout)){ + perror_reply(421, "control connection"); + ftpd_pclose(fin); + dologout(1); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + if (ferror(fin)) { + perror_reply(551, filename); + ftpd_pclose(fin); + return; + } + putc('\r', stdout); + } + putc(c, stdout); + } + ftpd_pclose(fin); + reply(211, "End of Status"); +} + +void +statcmd(void) +{ +#if 0 + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + u_char *a, *p; + + lreply(211, "%s FTP server (%s) status:", hostname, version); + printf(" %s\r\n", version); + printf(" Connected to %s", remotehost); + if (!isdigit(remotehost[0])) + printf(" (%s)", inet_ntoa(his_addr.sin_addr)); + printf("\r\n"); + if (logged_in) { + if (guest) + printf(" Logged in anonymously\r\n"); + else + printf(" Logged in as %s\r\n", pw->pw_name); + } else if (askpasswd) + printf(" Waiting for password\r\n"); + else + printf(" Waiting for user name\r\n"); + printf(" TYPE: %s", typenames[type]); + if (type == TYPE_A || type == TYPE_E) + printf(", FORM: %s", formnames[form]); + if (type == TYPE_L) +#if NBBY == 8 + printf(" %d", NBBY); +#else + printf(" %d", bytesize); /* need definition! */ +#endif + printf("; STRUcture: %s; transfer MODE: %s\r\n", + strunames[stru], modenames[mode]); + if (data != -1) + printf(" Data connection open\r\n"); + else if (pdata != -1) { + printf(" in Passive mode"); + sin = &pasv_addr; + goto printaddr; + } else if (usedefault == 0) { + printf(" PORT"); + sin = &data_dest; +printaddr: + a = (u_char *) &sin->sin_addr; + p = (u_char *) &sin->sin_port; +#define UC(b) (((int) b) & 0xff) + printf(" (%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d)\r\n", UC(a[0]), + UC(a[1]), UC(a[2]), UC(a[3]), UC(p[0]), UC(p[1])); +#undef UC + } else + printf(" No data connection\r\n"); +#endif + reply(211, "End of status"); +} + +void +fatal(char *s) +{ + + reply(451, "Error in server: %s\n", s); + reply(221, "Closing connection due to server error."); + dologout(0); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static void +int_reply(int, char *, const char *, va_list) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))) +#endif +; + +static void +int_reply(int n, char *c, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char buf[10240]; + char *p; + p=buf; + if(n){ + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf), "%d%s", n, c); + p+=strlen(p); + } + vsnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - strlen(p), fmt, ap); + p+=strlen(p); + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - strlen(p), "\r\n"); + p+=strlen(p); + sec_fprintf(stdout, "%s", buf); + fflush(stdout); + if (debug) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "<--- %s- ", buf); +} + +void +reply(int n, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + int_reply(n, " ", fmt, ap); + delete_ftp_command(); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +lreply(int n, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + int_reply(n, "-", fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +nreply(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + int_reply(0, NULL, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +static void +ack(char *s) +{ + + reply(250, "%s command successful.", s); +} + +void +nack(char *s) +{ + + reply(502, "%s command not implemented.", s); +} + +void +do_delete(char *name) +{ + struct stat st; + + LOGCMD("delete", name); + if (stat(name, &st) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return; + } + if ((st.st_mode&S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) { + if (rmdir(name) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return; + } + goto done; + } + if (unlink(name) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return; + } +done: + ack("DELE"); +} + +void +cwd(char *path) +{ + + if (chdir(path) < 0) + perror_reply(550, path); + else + ack("CWD"); +} + +void +makedir(char *name) +{ + + LOGCMD("mkdir", name); + if(guest && filename_check(name)) + return; + if (mkdir(name, 0777) < 0) + perror_reply(550, name); + else{ + if(guest) + chmod(name, 0700); /* guest has umask 777 */ + reply(257, "MKD command successful."); + } +} + +void +removedir(char *name) +{ + + LOGCMD("rmdir", name); + if (rmdir(name) < 0) + perror_reply(550, name); + else + ack("RMD"); +} + +void +pwd(void) +{ + char path[MaxPathLen]; + char *ret; + + /* SunOS has a broken getcwd that does popen(pwd) (!!!), this + * failes miserably when running chroot + */ + ret = getcwd(path, sizeof(path)); + if (ret == NULL) + reply(550, "%s.", strerror(errno)); + else + reply(257, "\"%s\" is current directory.", path); +} + +char * +renamefrom(char *name) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (stat(name, &st) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return NULL; + } + reply(350, "File exists, ready for destination name"); + return (name); +} + +void +renamecmd(char *from, char *to) +{ + + LOGCMD2("rename", from, to); + if(guest && filename_check(to)) + return; + if (rename(from, to) < 0) + perror_reply(550, "rename"); + else + ack("RNTO"); +} + +static void +dolog(struct sockaddr *sa, int len) +{ + getnameinfo_verified (sa, len, remotehost, sizeof(remotehost), + NULL, 0, 0); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + snprintf(proctitle, sizeof(proctitle), "%s: connected", remotehost); + setproctitle("%s", proctitle); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "connection from %s(%s)", + remotehost, + data_addr); + } +} + +/* + * Record logout in wtmp file + * and exit with supplied status. + */ +void +dologout(int status) +{ + transflag = 0; + urgflag = 0; + if (logged_in) { + seteuid((uid_t)0); + ftpd_logwtmp(ttyline, "", ""); +#ifdef KRB4 + cond_kdestroy(); +#endif + } + /* beware of flushing buffers after a SIGPIPE */ +#ifdef XXX + exit(status); +#else + _exit(status); +#endif +} + +void abor(void) +{ + if (!transflag) + return; + reply(426, "Transfer aborted. Data connection closed."); + reply(226, "Abort successful"); + transflag = 0; +} + +static void +myoob(int signo) +{ + urgflag = 1; +} + +static char * +mec_space(char *p) +{ + while(isspace(*(unsigned char *)p)) + p++; + return p; +} + +static int +handleoobcmd(void) +{ + char *cp; + + /* only process if transfer occurring */ + if (!transflag) + return 0; + + urgflag = 0; + + cp = tmpline; + if (ftpd_getline(cp, sizeof(tmpline)) == NULL) { + reply(221, "You could at least say goodbye."); + dologout(0); + } + + if (strncasecmp("MIC", cp, 3) == 0) { + mec(mec_space(cp + 3), prot_safe); + } else if (strncasecmp("CONF", cp, 4) == 0) { + mec(mec_space(cp + 4), prot_confidential); + } else if (strncasecmp("ENC", cp, 3) == 0) { + mec(mec_space(cp + 3), prot_private); + } else if (!allow_insecure_oob) { + reply(533, "Command protection level denied " + "for paranoid reasons."); + goto out; + } + + if (secure_command()) + cp = ftp_command; + + if (strcasecmp(cp, "ABOR\r\n") == 0) { + abor(); + } else if (strcasecmp(cp, "STAT\r\n") == 0) { + if (file_size != (off_t) -1) + reply(213, "Status: %ld of %ld bytes transferred", + (long)byte_count, + (long)file_size); + else + reply(213, "Status: %ld bytes transferred", + (long)byte_count); + } +out: + return (transflag == 0); +} + +/* + * Note: a response of 425 is not mentioned as a possible response to + * the PASV command in RFC959. However, it has been blessed as + * a legitimate response by Jon Postel in a telephone conversation + * with Rick Adams on 25 Jan 89. + */ +void +pasv(void) +{ + socklen_t len; + char *p, *a; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + + if (ctrl_addr->sa_family != AF_INET) { + reply(425, + "You cannot do PASV with something that's not IPv4"); + return; + } + + if(pdata != -1) + close(pdata); + + pdata = socket(ctrl_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (pdata < 0) { + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; + } + pasv_addr->sa_family = ctrl_addr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (pasv_addr, + socket_get_address (ctrl_addr), + 0); + socket_set_portrange(pdata, restricted_data_ports, + pasv_addr->sa_family); + seteuid(0); + if (bind(pdata, pasv_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (pasv_addr)) < 0) { + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + goto pasv_error; + } + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + len = sizeof(pasv_addr_ss); + if (getsockname(pdata, pasv_addr, &len) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + if (listen(pdata, 1) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)pasv_addr; + a = (char *) &sin->sin_addr; + p = (char *) &sin->sin_port; + +#define UC(b) (((int) b) & 0xff) + + reply(227, "Entering Passive Mode (%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d)", UC(a[0]), + UC(a[1]), UC(a[2]), UC(a[3]), UC(p[0]), UC(p[1])); + return; + +pasv_error: + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; +} + +void +epsv(char *proto) +{ + socklen_t len; + + pdata = socket(ctrl_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (pdata < 0) { + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; + } + pasv_addr->sa_family = ctrl_addr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (pasv_addr, + socket_get_address (ctrl_addr), + 0); + socket_set_portrange(pdata, restricted_data_ports, + pasv_addr->sa_family); + seteuid(0); + if (bind(pdata, pasv_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (pasv_addr)) < 0) { + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + goto pasv_error; + } + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + len = sizeof(pasv_addr_ss); + if (getsockname(pdata, pasv_addr, &len) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + if (listen(pdata, 1) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + + reply(229, "Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||%d|)", + ntohs(socket_get_port (pasv_addr))); + return; + +pasv_error: + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; +} + +void +eprt(char *str) +{ + char *end; + char sep; + int af; + int ret; + int port; + + usedefault = 0; + if (pdata >= 0) { + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + } + + sep = *str++; + if (sep == '\0') { + reply(500, "Bad syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + af = strtol (str, &end, 0); + if (af == 0 || *end != sep) { + reply(500, "Bad syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + str = end + 1; + switch (af) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case 2 : + data_dest->sa_family = AF_INET6; + break; +#endif + case 1 : + data_dest->sa_family = AF_INET; + break; + default : + reply(522, "Network protocol %d not supported, use (1" +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + ",2" +#endif + ")", af); + return; + } + end = strchr (str, sep); + if (end == NULL) { + reply(500, "Bad syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + *end = '\0'; + ret = inet_pton (data_dest->sa_family, str, + socket_get_address (data_dest)); + + if (ret != 1) { + reply(500, "Bad address syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + str = end + 1; + port = strtol (str, &end, 0); + if (port == 0 || *end != sep) { + reply(500, "Bad port syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + socket_set_port (data_dest, htons(port)); + reply(200, "EPRT command successful."); +} + +/* + * Generate unique name for file with basename "local". + * The file named "local" is already known to exist. + * Generates failure reply on error. + */ +static char * +gunique(char *local) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + struct stat st; + int count; + char *cp; + + cp = strrchr(local, '/'); + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + if (stat(cp ? local : ".", &st) < 0) { + perror_reply(553, cp ? local : "."); + return NULL; + } + if (cp) + *cp = '/'; + for (count = 1; count < 100; count++) { + snprintf (new, sizeof(new), "%s.%d", local, count); + if (stat(new, &st) < 0) + return (new); + } + reply(452, "Unique file name cannot be created."); + return (NULL); +} + +/* + * Format and send reply containing system error number. + */ +void +perror_reply(int code, const char *string) +{ + reply(code, "%s: %s.", string, strerror(errno)); +} + +static char *onefile[] = { + "", + 0 +}; + +void +list_file(char *file) +{ + if(use_builtin_ls) { + FILE *dout; + dout = dataconn(file, -1, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + return; + set_buffer_size(fileno(dout), 0); + if(builtin_ls(dout, file) == 0) + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + else + reply(451, "Requested action aborted. Local error in processing."); + fclose(dout); + data = -1; + pdata = -1; + } else { +#ifdef HAVE_LS_A + const char *cmd = "/bin/ls -lA %s"; +#else + const char *cmd = "/bin/ls -la %s"; +#endif + retrieve(cmd, file); + } +} + +void +send_file_list(char *whichf) +{ + struct stat st; + DIR *dirp = NULL; + struct dirent *dir; + FILE *dout = NULL; + char **dirlist, *dirname; + int simple = 0; + int freeglob = 0; + glob_t gl; + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (strpbrk(whichf, "~{[*?") != NULL) { + int flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE| +#ifdef GLOB_MAXPATH + GLOB_MAXPATH +#else + GLOB_LIMIT +#endif + ; + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + freeglob = 1; + if (glob(whichf, flags, 0, &gl)) { + reply(550, "not found"); + goto out; + } else if (gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + errno = ENOENT; + perror_reply(550, whichf); + goto out; + } + dirlist = gl.gl_pathv; + } else { + onefile[0] = whichf; + dirlist = onefile; + simple = 1; + } + + while ((dirname = *dirlist++)) { + + if (urgflag && handleoobcmd()) + goto out; + + if (stat(dirname, &st) < 0) { + /* + * If user typed "ls -l", etc, and the client + * used NLST, do what the user meant. + */ + if (dirname[0] == '-' && *dirlist == NULL && + transflag == 0) { + list_file(dirname); + goto out; + } + perror_reply(550, whichf); + goto out; + } + + if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + if (dout == NULL) { + dout = dataconn("file list", (off_t)-1, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + goto out; + transflag = 1; + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s\n", dirname, + type == TYPE_A ? "\r" : ""); + sec_write(fileno(dout), buf, strlen(buf)); + byte_count += strlen(dirname) + 1; + continue; + } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + continue; + + if ((dirp = opendir(dirname)) == NULL) + continue; + + while ((dir = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + char nbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (urgflag && handleoobcmd()) + goto out; + + if (!strcmp(dir->d_name, ".")) + continue; + if (!strcmp(dir->d_name, "..")) + continue; + + snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s/%s", dirname, dir->d_name); + + /* + * We have to do a stat to insure it's + * not a directory or special file. + */ + if (simple || (stat(nbuf, &st) == 0 && + S_ISREG(st.st_mode))) { + if (dout == NULL) { + dout = dataconn("file list", (off_t)-1, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + goto out; + transflag = 1; + } + if(strncmp(nbuf, "./", 2) == 0) + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s\n", nbuf +2, + type == TYPE_A ? "\r" : ""); + else + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s\n", nbuf, + type == TYPE_A ? "\r" : ""); + sec_write(fileno(dout), buf, strlen(buf)); + byte_count += strlen(nbuf) + 1; + } + } + closedir(dirp); + } + if (dout == NULL) + reply(550, "No files found."); + else if (ferror(dout) != 0) + perror_reply(550, "Data connection"); + else + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + +out: + transflag = 0; + if (dout != NULL){ + sec_write(fileno(dout), buf, 0); /* XXX flush */ + + fclose(dout); + } + data = -1; + pdata = -1; + if (freeglob) { + freeglob = 0; + globfree(&gl); + } +} + + +int +find(char *pattern) +{ + char line[1024]; + FILE *f; + + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), + "/bin/locate -d %s -- %s", + ftp_rooted("/etc/locatedb"), + pattern); + f = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 1, 1); + if(f == NULL){ + perror_reply(550, "/bin/locate"); + return 1; + } + lreply(200, "Output from find."); + while(fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)){ + if(line[strlen(line)-1] == '\n') + line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; + nreply("%s", line); + } + reply(200, "Done"); + ftpd_pclose(f); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f005dd3efd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ + +FTPD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual FTPD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + ffttppdd - Internet File Transfer Protocol server + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + ffttppdd [--aa _a_u_t_h_m_o_d_e] [--ddiillvvUU] [--gg _u_m_a_s_k] [--pp _p_o_r_t] [--TT _m_a_x_t_i_m_e_o_u_t] [--tt + _t_i_m_e_o_u_t] [----ggssss--bbiinnddiinnggss] [--II | ----nnoo--iinnsseeccuurree--oooobb] [--uu _d_e_f_a_u_l_t _u_m_a_s_k] [--BB + | ----bbuuiillttiinn--llss] [----ggoooodd--cchhaarrss==_s_t_r_i_n_g] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + FFttppdd is the Internet File Transfer Protocol server process. The server + uses the TCP protocol and listens at the port specified in the ``ftp'' + service specification; see services(5). + + Available options: + + --aa Select the level of authentication required. Kerberised login + can not be turned off. The default is to only allow kerberised + login. Other possibilities can be turned on by giving a string + of comma separated flags as argument to --aa. Recognised flags are: + + _p_l_a_i_n Allow logging in with plaintext password. The password can + be a(n) OTP or an ordinary password. + + _o_t_p Same as _p_l_a_i_n, but only OTP is allowed. + + _f_t_p Allow anonymous login. + + The following combination modes exists for backwards compatibili- + ty: + + _n_o_n_e Same as _p_l_a_i_n_,_f_t_p. + + _s_a_f_e Same as _f_t_p. + + _u_s_e_r Ignored. + + --dd Debugging information is written to the syslog using LOG_FTP. + + --gg Anonymous users will get a umask of _u_m_a_s_k. + + ----ggssss--bbiinnddiinnggss + require the peer to use GSS-API bindings (ie make sure IP ad- + dresses match). + + --ii Open a socket and wait for a connection. This is mainly used for + debugging when ftpd isn't started by inetd. + + --ll Each successful and failed ftp(1) session is logged using syslog + with a facility of LOG_FTP. If this option is specified twice, + the retrieve (get), store (put), append, delete, make directory, + remove directory and rename operations and their filename argu- + ments are also logged. + + --pp Use _p_o_r_t (a service name or number) instead of the default + _f_t_p_/_t_c_p. + + --TT A client may also request a different timeout period; the maximum + period allowed may be set to _t_i_m_e_o_u_t seconds with the --TT option. + The default limit is 2 hours. + + --tt The inactivity timeout period is set to _t_i_m_e_o_u_t seconds (the de- + + fault is 15 minutes). + + --uu Set the initial umask to something else than the default 027. + + --UU In previous versions of ffttppdd, when a passive mode client request- + ed a data connection to the server, the server would use data + ports in the range 1024..4999. Now, by default, if the system + supports the IP_PORTRANGE socket option, the server will use data + ports in the range 49152..65535. Specifying this option will re- + vert to the old behavior. + + --vv Verbose mode. + + --BB, ----bbuuiillttiinn--llss + use built-in ls to list files + + ----ggoooodd--cchhaarrss==_s_t_r_i_n_g + allowed anonymous upload filename chars + + --II ----nnoo--iinnsseeccuurree--oooobb + don't allow insecure out of band. Heimdal ftp client before 0.7 + doesn't support secure oob, so turning on this options makes them + no longer work. + + The file _/_e_t_c_/_n_o_l_o_g_i_n can be used to disable ftp access. If the file ex- + ists, ffttppdd displays it and exits. If the file _/_e_t_c_/_f_t_p_w_e_l_c_o_m_e exists, + ffttppdd prints it before issuing the ``ready'' message. If the file + _/_e_t_c_/_m_o_t_d exists, ffttppdd prints it after a successful login. + + The ftp server currently supports the following ftp requests. The case + of the requests is ignored. + + Request Description + ABOR abort previous command + ACCT specify account (ignored) + ALLO allocate storage (vacuously) + APPE append to a file + CDUP change to parent of current working directory + CWD change working directory + DELE delete a file + HELP give help information + LIST give list files in a directory (``ls -lgA'') + MKD make a directory + MDTM show last modification time of file + MODE specify data transfer _m_o_d_e + NLST give name list of files in directory + NOOP do nothing + PASS specify password + PASV prepare for server-to-server transfer + PORT specify data connection port + PWD print the current working directory + QUIT terminate session + REST restart incomplete transfer + RETR retrieve a file + RMD remove a directory + RNFR specify rename-from file name + RNTO specify rename-to file name + SITE non-standard commands (see next section) + SIZE return size of file + STAT return status of server + STOR store a file + STOU store a file with a unique name + STRU specify data transfer _s_t_r_u_c_t_u_r_e + SYST show operating system type of server system + + + TYPE specify data transfer _t_y_p_e + USER specify user name + XCUP change to parent of current working directory + (deprecated) + XCWD change working directory (deprecated) + XMKD make a directory (deprecated) + XPWD print the current working directory (deprecated) + XRMD remove a directory (deprecated) + + The following commands are specified by RFC2228. + + AUTH authentication/security mechanism + ADAT authentication/security data + PROT data channel protection level + PBSZ protection buffer size + MIC integrity protected command + CONF confidentiality protected command + ENC privacy protected command + CCC clear command channel + + The following non-standard or UNIX specific commands are supported by the + SITE request. + + UMASK change umask, (e.g. SSIITTEE UUMMAASSKK 000022) + IDLE set idle-timer, (e.g. SSIITTEE IIDDLLEE 6600) + CHMOD change mode of a file (e.g. SSIITTEE CCHHMMOODD 775555 ffiilleennaammee) + FIND quickly find a specific file with GNU locate(1). + HELP give help information. + + The following Kerberos related site commands are understood. + + KAUTH obtain remote tickets. + KLIST show remote tickets + + The remaining ftp requests specified in Internet RFC 959 are recognized, + but not implemented. MDTM and SIZE are not specified in RFC 959, but + will appear in the next updated FTP RFC. + + The ftp server will abort an active file transfer only when the ABOR com- + mand is preceded by a Telnet "Interrupt Process" (IP) signal and a Telnet + "Synch" signal in the command Telnet stream, as described in Internet RFC + 959. If a STAT command is received during a data transfer, preceded by a + Telnet IP and Synch, transfer status will be returned. + + FFttppdd interprets file names according to the ``globbing'' conventions used + by csh(1). This allows users to use the metacharacters ``*?[]{}~''. + + FFttppdd authenticates users according to these rules. + + 1. If Kerberos authentication is used, the user must pass valid + tickets and the principal must be allowed to login as the re- + mote user. + + 2. The login name must be in the password data base, and not have + a null password (if Kerberos is used the password field is not + checked). In this case a password must be provided by the + client before any file operations may be performed. If the + user has an OTP key, the response from a successful USER com- + mand will include an OTP challenge. The client may choose to + respond with a PASS command giving either a standard password + or an OTP one-time password. The server will automatically de- + termine which type of password it has been given and attempt + to authenticate accordingly. See otp(1) for more information + on OTP authentication. + + + 3. The login name must not appear in the file _/_e_t_c_/_f_t_p_u_s_e_r_s. + + 4. The user must have a standard shell returned by + getusershell(3). + + 5. If the user name appears in the file _/_e_t_c_/_f_t_p_c_h_r_o_o_t the ses- + sion's root will be changed to the user's login directory by + chroot(2) as for an ``anonymous'' or ``ftp'' account (see next + item). However, the user must still supply a password. This + feature is intended as a compromise between a fully anonymous + account and a fully privileged account. The account should + also be set up as for an anonymous account. + + 6. If the user name is ``anonymous'' or ``ftp'', an anonymous ftp + account must be present in the password file (user ``ftp''). + In this case the user is allowed to log in by specifying any + password (by convention an email address for the user should + be used as the password). + + In the last case, ffttppdd takes special measures to restrict the client's + access privileges. The server performs a chroot(2) to the home directory + of the ``ftp'' user. In order that system security is not breached, it + is recommended that the ``ftp'' subtree be constructed with care, consid- + er following these guidelines for anonymous ftp. + + In general all files should be owned by ``root'', and have non-write per- + missions (644 or 755 depending on the kind of file). No files should be + owned or writable by ``ftp'' (possibly with exception for the + _~_f_t_p_/_i_n_c_o_m_i_n_g, as specified below). + + _~_f_t_p The ``ftp'' homedirectory should be owned by root. + + _~_f_t_p_/_b_i_n The directory for external programs (such as ls(1)). + These programs must either be statically linked, or you + must setup an environment for dynamic linking when run- + ning chrooted. These programs will be used if present: + + ls Used when listing files. + + compress + When retrieving a filename that ends in _._Z, + and that file isn't present, ffttppdd will try + to find the filename without _._Z and com- + press it on the fly. + + gzip Same as compress, just with files ending in + _._g_z. + + gtar Enables retrieval of whole directories as + files ending in _._t_a_r. Can also be combined + with compression. You must use GNU Tar (or + some other that supports the --zz and --ZZ + flags). + + locate Will enable ``fast find'' with the SSIITTEE + FFIINNDD command. You must also create a + _l_o_c_a_t_e_d_b file in _~_f_t_p_/_e_t_c. + + _~_f_t_p_/_e_t_c If you put copies of the passwd(5) and group(5) files + here, ls will be able to produce owner names rather than + numbers. Remember to remove any passwords from these + files. + + The file _m_o_t_d, if present, will be printed after a suc- + + + cessful login. + + _~_f_t_p_/_d_e_v Put a copy of /dev/null(7) here. + + _~_f_t_p_/_p_u_b Traditional place to put whatever you want to make pub- + lic. + + If you want guests to be able to upload files, create a _~_f_t_p_/_i_n_c_o_m_i_n_g di- + rectory owned by ``root'', and group ``ftp'' with mode 730 (make sure + ``ftp'' is member of group ``ftp''). The following restrictions apply to + anonymous users: + + ++oo Directories created will have mode 700. + + ++oo Uploaded files will be created with an umask of 777, if not changed + with the --gg option. + + ++oo These command are not accessible: DDEELLEE, RRMMDD, RRNNTTOO, RRNNFFRR, SSIITTEE UUMMAASSKK, + and SSIITTEE CCHHMMOODD. + + ++oo Filenames must start with an alpha-numeric character, and consist of + alpha-numeric characters or any of the following: + (plus), - (mi- + nus), = (equal), _ (underscore), . (period), and , (comma). + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/ftpusers Access list for users. + /etc/ftpchroot List of normal users who should be chroot'd. + /etc/ftpwelcome Welcome notice. + /etc/motd Welcome notice after login. + /etc/nologin Displayed and access refused. + ~/.klogin Login access for Kerberos. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + ftp(1), otp(1), getusershell(3), ftpusers(5), syslogd(8) + +SSTTAANNDDAARRDDSS + RRFFCC 995599 FTP PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION + RRFFCC 11993388 OTP Specification + RRFFCC 22222288 FTP Security Extensions. + +BBUUGGSS + The server must run as the super-user to create sockets with privileged + port numbers. It maintains an effective user id of the logged in user, + reverting to the super-user only when binding addresses to sockets. The + possible security holes have been extensively scrutinized, but are possi- + bly incomplete. + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + The ffttppdd command appeared in 4.2BSD. + +4.2 Berkeley Distribution July 19, 2003 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb172ac85a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: ftpd_locl.h,v 1.13.2.1 2004/08/20 15:17:07 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ftpd_locl_h__ +#define __ftpd_locl_h__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +/* + * FTP server. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCCOM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_BSD_BSD_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include "roken.h" + +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "extern.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "security.h" + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef OTP +#include +#endif + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +extern int LIBPREFIX(fclose) (FILE *); +#endif + +/* SunOS doesn't have any declaration of fclose */ + +int fclose(FILE *stream); + +int yyparse(); + +#ifndef LOG_FTP +#define LOG_FTP LOG_DAEMON +#endif + +#endif /* __ftpd_locl_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce59df820e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +.\" $Id: ftpusers.5,v 1.5 2002/08/20 17:07:04 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 7, 1997 +.Dt FTPUSERS 5 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Sh NAME +.Pa /etc/ftpusers +.Nd FTP access list file +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Pa /etc/ftpusers +contains a list of users that should be allowed or denied FTP +access. Each line contains a user, optionally followed by +.Dq allow +(anything but +.Dq allow +is ignored). The semi-user +.Dq * +matches any user. Users that has an explicit +.Dq allow , +or that does not match any line, are allowed access. Anyone else is +denied access. +.Pp +Note that this is compatible with the old format, where this file +contained a list of users that should be denied access. +.Sh EXAMPLES +This will deny anyone but +.Dq foo +and +.Dq bar +to use FTP: +.Bd -literal +foo allow +bar allow +* +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftpd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.cat5 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.cat5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2ee3d3c3a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.cat5 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ + +FTPUSERS(5) UNIX Programmer's Manual FTPUSERS(5) + +NNAAMMEE + _/_e_t_c_/_f_t_p_u_s_e_r_s - FTP access list file + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + _/_e_t_c_/_f_t_p_u_s_e_r_s contains a list of users that should be allowed or denied + FTP access. Each line contains a user, optionally followed by ``allow'' + (anything but ``allow'' is ignored). The semi-user ``*'' matches any us- + er. Users that has an explicit ``allow'', or that does not match any + line, are allowed access. Anyone else is denied access. + + Note that this is compatible with the old format, where this file con- + tained a list of users that should be denied access. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + This will deny anyone but ``foo'' and ``bar'' to use FTP: + + foo allow + bar allow + * + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + ftpd(8) + + KTH-KRB May 7, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11a2e75d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: gss_userok.c,v 1.10 2003/03/18 13:56:35 lha Exp $"); + +/* XXX a bit too much of krb5 dependency here... + What is the correct way to do this? + */ + +extern krb5_context gssapi_krb5_context; + +/* XXX sync with gssapi.c */ +struct gss_data { + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl; + char *client_name; + gss_cred_id_t delegated_cred_handle; +}; + +int gss_userok(void*, char*); /* to keep gcc happy */ + +int +gss_userok(void *app_data, char *username) +{ + struct gss_data *data = app_data; + if(gssapi_krb5_context) { + krb5_principal client; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(gssapi_krb5_context, data->client_name, &client); + if(ret) + return 1; + ret = krb5_kuserok(gssapi_krb5_context, client, username); + if (!ret) { + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, client); + return 1; + } + + ret = 0; + + /* more of krb-depend stuff :-( */ + /* gss_add_cred() ? */ + if (data->delegated_cred_handle && + data->delegated_cred_handle->ccache ) { + + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + char* ticketfile; + struct passwd *pw; + OM_uint32 minor_status; + + pw = getpwnam(username); + + if (pw == NULL) { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + asprintf (&ticketfile, "%s%u", KRB5_DEFAULT_CCROOT, + (unsigned)pw->pw_uid); + + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_krb5_context, ticketfile, &ccache); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&minor_status, + data->delegated_cred_handle, + ccache); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + chown (ticketfile+5, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + + if (k_hasafs()) { + krb5_afslog(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache, 0, 0); + } + esetenv ("KRB5CCNAME", ticketfile, 1); + +fail: + if (ccache) + krb5_cc_close(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache); + krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, + data->delegated_cred_handle->ccache); + data->delegated_cred_handle->ccache = NULL; + free(ticketfile); + } + + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, client); + return ret; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dad4de5401 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kauth.c,v 1.25 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); + +static KTEXT_ST cip; +static unsigned int lifetime; +static time_t local_time; + +static krb_principal pr; + +static int do_destroy_tickets = 1; + +static int +save_tkt(const char *user, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + const void *arg, + key_proc_t key_proc, + KTEXT *cipp) +{ + local_time = time(0); + memmove(&cip, *cipp, sizeof(cip)); + return -1; +} + +static int +store_ticket(KTEXT cip) +{ + char *ptr; + des_cblock session; + krb_principal sp; + unsigned char kvno; + KTEXT_ST tkt; + int left = cip->length; + int len; + int kerror; + + ptr = (char *) cip->dat; + + /* extract session key */ + memmove(session, ptr, 8); + ptr += 8; + left -= 8; + + len = strnlen(ptr, left); + if (len == left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract server's name */ + strlcpy(sp.name, ptr, sizeof(sp.name)); + ptr += len + 1; + left -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(ptr, left); + if (len == left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract server's instance */ + strlcpy(sp.instance, ptr, sizeof(sp.instance)); + ptr += len + 1; + left -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(ptr, left); + if (len == left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract server's realm */ + strlcpy(sp.realm, ptr, sizeof(sp.realm)); + ptr += len + 1; + left -= len + 1; + + if(left < 3) + return INTK_BADPW; + /* extract ticket lifetime, server key version, ticket length */ + /* be sure to avoid sign extension on lifetime! */ + lifetime = (unsigned char) ptr[0]; + kvno = (unsigned char) ptr[1]; + tkt.length = (unsigned char) ptr[2]; + ptr += 3; + left -= 3; + + if (tkt.length > left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract ticket itself */ + memmove(tkt.dat, ptr, tkt.length); + ptr += tkt.length; + left -= tkt.length; + + /* Here is where the time should be verified against the KDC. + * Unfortunately everything is sent in host byte order (receiver + * makes wrong) , and at this stage there is no way for us to know + * which byteorder the KDC has. So we simply ignore the time, + * there are no security risks with this, the only thing that can + * happen is that we might receive a replayed ticket, which could + * at most be useless. + */ + +#if 0 + /* check KDC time stamp */ + { + time_t kdc_time; + + memmove(&kdc_time, ptr, sizeof(kdc_time)); + if (swap_bytes) swap_u_long(kdc_time); + + ptr += 4; + + if (abs((int)(local_time - kdc_time)) > CLOCK_SKEW) { + return(RD_AP_TIME); /* XXX should probably be better + code */ + } + } +#endif + + /* initialize ticket cache */ + + if (tf_create(TKT_FILE) != KSUCCESS) + return(INTK_ERR); + + if (tf_put_pname(pr.name) != KSUCCESS || + tf_put_pinst(pr.instance) != KSUCCESS) { + tf_close(); + return(INTK_ERR); + } + + + kerror = tf_save_cred(sp.name, sp.instance, sp.realm, session, + lifetime, kvno, &tkt, local_time); + tf_close(); + + return(kerror); +} + +void +kauth(char *principal, char *ticket) +{ + char *p; + int ret; + + if(get_command_prot() != prot_private) { + reply(500, "Request denied (bad protection level)"); + return; + } + ret = krb_parse_name(principal, &pr); + if(ret){ + reply(500, "Bad principal: %s.", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return; + } + if(pr.realm[0] == 0) + krb_get_lrealm(pr.realm, 1); + + if(ticket){ + cip.length = base64_decode(ticket, &cip.dat); + if(cip.length == -1){ + reply(500, "Failed to decode data."); + return; + } + ret = store_ticket(&cip); + if(ret){ + reply(500, "Kerberos error: %s.", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + memset(&cip, 0, sizeof(cip)); + return; + } + do_destroy_tickets = 1; + + if(k_hasafs()) + krb_afslog(0, 0); + reply(200, "Tickets will be destroyed on exit."); + return; + } + + ret = krb_get_in_tkt (pr.name, + pr.instance, + pr.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, + pr.realm, + DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, + NULL, save_tkt, NULL); + if(ret != INTK_BADPW){ + reply(500, "Kerberos error: %s.", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return; + } + if(base64_encode(cip.dat, cip.length, &p) < 0) { + reply(500, "Out of memory while base64-encoding."); + return; + } + reply(300, "P=%s T=%s", krb_unparse_name(&pr), p); + free(p); + memset(&cip, 0, sizeof(cip)); +} + + +static char * +short_date(int32_t dp) +{ + char *cp; + time_t t = (time_t)dp; + + if (t == (time_t)(-1L)) return "*** Never *** "; + cp = ctime(&t) + 4; + cp[15] = '\0'; + return (cp); +} + +void +klist(void) +{ + int err; + + char *file = tkt_string(); + + krb_principal pr; + + char buf1[128], buf2[128]; + int header = 1; + CREDENTIALS c; + + + + err = tf_init(file, R_TKT_FIL); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + tf_close(); + + /* + * We must find the realm of the ticket file here before calling + * tf_init because since the realm of the ticket file is not + * really stored in the principal section of the file, the + * routine we use must itself call tf_init and tf_close. + */ + err = krb_get_tf_realm(file, pr.realm); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + + err = tf_init(file, R_TKT_FIL); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + + err = tf_get_pname(pr.name); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + err = tf_get_pinst(pr.instance); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + + /* + * You may think that this is the obvious place to get the + * realm of the ticket file, but it can't be done here as the + * routine to do this must open the ticket file. This is why + * it was done before tf_init. + */ + + lreply(200, "Ticket file: %s", tkt_string()); + + lreply(200, "Principal: %s", krb_unparse_name(&pr)); + while ((err = tf_get_cred(&c)) == KSUCCESS) { + if (header) { + lreply(200, "%-15s %-15s %s", + " Issued", " Expires", " Principal (kvno)"); + header = 0; + } + strlcpy(buf1, short_date(c.issue_date), sizeof(buf1)); + c.issue_date = krb_life_to_time(c.issue_date, c.lifetime); + if (time(0) < (unsigned long) c.issue_date) + strlcpy(buf2, short_date(c.issue_date), sizeof(buf2)); + else + strlcpy(buf2, ">>> Expired <<< ", sizeof(buf2)); + lreply(200, "%s %s %s (%d)", buf1, buf2, + krb_unparse_name_long(c.service, c.instance, c.realm), c.kvno); + } + if (header && err == EOF) { + lreply(200, "No tickets in file."); + } + reply(200, " "); +} + +/* + * Only destroy if we created the tickets + */ + +void +cond_kdestroy(void) +{ + if (do_destroy_tickets) + dest_tkt(); + afsunlog(); +} + +void +kdestroy(void) +{ + dest_tkt(); + afsunlog(); + reply(200, "Tickets destroyed"); +} + +void +krbtkfile(const char *tkfile) +{ + do_destroy_tickets = 0; + krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile); + reply(200, "Using ticket file %s", tkfile); +} + +void +afslog(const char *cell) +{ + if(k_hasafs()) { + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + reply(200, "afslog done"); + } else { + reply(200, "no AFS present"); + } +} + +void +afsunlog(void) +{ + if(k_hasafs()) + k_unlog(); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..51139a817e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: logwtmp.c,v 1.15 2000/09/19 13:17:05 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "extern.h" + +#ifndef WTMP_FILE +#ifdef _PATH_WTMP +#define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP +#else +#define WTMP_FILE "/var/adm/wtmp" +#endif +#endif + +void +ftpd_logwtmp(char *line, char *name, char *host) +{ + static int init = 0; + static int fd; +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + static int fdx; +#endif + struct utmp ut; +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + struct utmpx utx; +#endif + + memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(struct utmp)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE + if(name[0]) + ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + else + ut.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +#endif + strncpy(ut.ut_line, line, sizeof(ut.ut_line)); + strncpy(ut.ut_name, name, sizeof(ut.ut_name)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID + ut.ut_pid = getpid(); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + strncpy(ut.ut_host, host, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); +#endif + ut.ut_time = time(NULL); + +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + strncpy(utx.ut_line, line, sizeof(utx.ut_line)); + strncpy(utx.ut_user, name, sizeof(utx.ut_user)); + strncpy(utx.ut_host, host, sizeof(utx.ut_host)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN + utx.ut_syslen = strlen(host) + 1; + if (utx.ut_syslen > sizeof(utx.ut_host)) + utx.ut_syslen = sizeof(utx.ut_host); +#endif + { + struct timeval tv; + + gettimeofday (&tv, 0); + utx.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; + utx.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec; + } + + if(name[0]) + utx.ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + else + utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +#endif + + if(!init){ + fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0); +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + fdx = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0); +#endif + init = 1; + } + if(fd >= 0) { + write(fd, &ut, sizeof(struct utmp)); /* XXX */ +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + write(fdx, &utx, sizeof(struct utmpx)); +#endif + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8ec4ad12c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c @@ -0,0 +1,854 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifndef TEST +#include "ftpd_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ls.c,v 1.26 2003/02/25 10:51:30 lha Exp $"); + +#else +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define sec_fprintf2 fprintf +#define sec_fflush fflush +static void list_files(FILE *out, const char **files, int n_files, int flags); +static int parse_flags(const char *options); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i = 1; + int flags; + if(argc > 1 && argv[1][0] == '-') { + flags = parse_flags(argv[1]); + i = 2; + } else + flags = parse_flags(NULL); + + list_files(stdout, (const char **)argv + i, argc - i, flags); + return 0; +} +#endif + +struct fileinfo { + struct stat st; + int inode; + int bsize; + char mode[11]; + int n_link; + char *user; + char *group; + char *size; + char *major; + char *minor; + char *date; + char *filename; + char *link; +}; + +static void +free_fileinfo(struct fileinfo *f) +{ + free(f->user); + free(f->group); + free(f->size); + free(f->major); + free(f->minor); + free(f->date); + free(f->filename); + free(f->link); +} + +#define LS_DIRS (1 << 0) +#define LS_IGNORE_DOT (1 << 1) +#define LS_SORT_MODE (3 << 2) +#define SORT_MODE(f) ((f) & LS_SORT_MODE) +#define LS_SORT_NAME (1 << 2) +#define LS_SORT_MTIME (2 << 2) +#define LS_SORT_SIZE (3 << 2) +#define LS_SORT_REVERSE (1 << 4) + +#define LS_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define LS_INODE (1 << 6) +#define LS_TYPE (1 << 7) +#define LS_DISP_MODE (3 << 8) +#define DISP_MODE(f) ((f) & LS_DISP_MODE) +#define LS_DISP_LONG (1 << 8) +#define LS_DISP_COLUMN (2 << 8) +#define LS_DISP_CROSS (3 << 8) +#define LS_SHOW_ALL (1 << 10) +#define LS_RECURSIVE (1 << 11) +#define LS_EXTRA_BLANK (1 << 12) +#define LS_SHOW_DIRNAME (1 << 13) +#define LS_DIR_FLAG (1 << 14) /* these files come via list_dir */ + +#ifndef S_ISTXT +#define S_ISTXT S_ISVTX +#endif + +#if !defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(S_IFMT) +#define _S_IFMT S_IFMT +#endif + +#ifndef S_ISSOCK +#define S_ISSOCK(mode) (((mode) & _S_IFMT) == S_IFSOCK) +#endif + +#ifndef S_ISLNK +#define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & _S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) +#endif + +static size_t +block_convert(size_t blocks) +{ +#ifdef S_BLKSIZE + return blocks * S_BLKSIZE / 1024; +#else + return blocks * 512 / 1024; +#endif +} + +static void +make_fileinfo(FILE *out, const char *filename, struct fileinfo *file, int flags) +{ + char buf[128]; + int file_type = 0; + struct stat *st = &file->st; + + file->inode = st->st_ino; + file->bsize = block_convert(st->st_blocks); + + if(S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) { + file->mode[0] = 'd'; + file_type = '/'; + } + else if(S_ISCHR(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'c'; + else if(S_ISBLK(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'b'; + else if(S_ISREG(st->st_mode)) { + file->mode[0] = '-'; + if(st->st_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) + file_type = '*'; + } + else if(S_ISFIFO(st->st_mode)) { + file->mode[0] = 'p'; + file_type = '|'; + } + else if(S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) { + file->mode[0] = 'l'; + file_type = '@'; + } + else if(S_ISSOCK(st->st_mode)) { + file->mode[0] = 's'; + file_type = '='; + } +#ifdef S_ISWHT + else if(S_ISWHT(st->st_mode)) { + file->mode[0] = 'w'; + file_type = '%'; + } +#endif + else + file->mode[0] = '?'; + { + char *x[] = { "---", "--x", "-w-", "-wx", + "r--", "r-x", "rw-", "rwx" }; + strcpy(file->mode + 1, x[(st->st_mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6]); + strcpy(file->mode + 4, x[(st->st_mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3]); + strcpy(file->mode + 7, x[(st->st_mode & S_IRWXO) >> 0]); + if((st->st_mode & S_ISUID)) { + if((st->st_mode & S_IXUSR)) + file->mode[3] = 's'; + else + file->mode[3] = 'S'; + } + if((st->st_mode & S_ISGID)) { + if((st->st_mode & S_IXGRP)) + file->mode[6] = 's'; + else + file->mode[6] = 'S'; + } + if((st->st_mode & S_ISTXT)) { + if((st->st_mode & S_IXOTH)) + file->mode[9] = 't'; + else + file->mode[9] = 'T'; + } + } + file->n_link = st->st_nlink; + { + struct passwd *pwd; + pwd = getpwuid(st->st_uid); + if(pwd == NULL) + asprintf(&file->user, "%u", (unsigned)st->st_uid); + else + file->user = strdup(pwd->pw_name); + } + { + struct group *grp; + grp = getgrgid(st->st_gid); + if(grp == NULL) + asprintf(&file->group, "%u", (unsigned)st->st_gid); + else + file->group = strdup(grp->gr_name); + } + + if(S_ISCHR(st->st_mode) || S_ISBLK(st->st_mode)) { +#if defined(major) && defined(minor) + asprintf(&file->major, "%u", (unsigned)major(st->st_rdev)); + asprintf(&file->minor, "%u", (unsigned)minor(st->st_rdev)); +#else + /* Don't want to use the DDI/DKI crap. */ + asprintf(&file->major, "%u", (unsigned)st->st_rdev); + asprintf(&file->minor, "%u", 0); +#endif + } else + asprintf(&file->size, "%lu", (unsigned long)st->st_size); + + { + time_t t = time(NULL); + time_t mtime = st->st_mtime; + struct tm *tm = localtime(&mtime); + if((t - mtime > 6*30*24*60*60) || + (mtime - t > 6*30*24*60*60)) + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%b %e %Y", tm); + else + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%b %e %H:%M", tm); + file->date = strdup(buf); + } + { + const char *p = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = filename; + if((flags & LS_TYPE) && file_type != 0) + asprintf(&file->filename, "%s%c", p, file_type); + else + file->filename = strdup(p); + } + if(S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) { + int n; + n = readlink((char *)filename, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); + if(n >= 0) { + buf[n] = '\0'; + file->link = strdup(buf); + } else + sec_fprintf2(out, "readlink(%s): %s", filename, strerror(errno)); + } +} + +static void +print_file(FILE *out, + int flags, + struct fileinfo *f, + int max_inode, + int max_bsize, + int max_n_link, + int max_user, + int max_group, + int max_size, + int max_major, + int max_minor, + int max_date) +{ + if(f->filename == NULL) + return; + + if(flags & LS_INODE) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*d", max_inode, f->inode); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + } + if(flags & LS_SIZE) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*d", max_bsize, f->bsize); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + } + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s", f->mode); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*d", max_n_link, f->n_link); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%-*s", max_user, f->user); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%-*s", max_group, f->group); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + if(f->major != NULL && f->minor != NULL) + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*s, %*s", max_major, f->major, max_minor, f->minor); + else + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*s", max_size, f->size); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*s", max_date, f->date); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s", f->filename); + if(f->link) + sec_fprintf2(out, " -> %s", f->link); + sec_fprintf2(out, "\r\n"); +} + +static int +compare_filename(struct fileinfo *a, struct fileinfo *b) +{ + if(a->filename == NULL) + return 1; + if(b->filename == NULL) + return -1; + return strcmp(a->filename, b->filename); +} + +static int +compare_mtime(struct fileinfo *a, struct fileinfo *b) +{ + if(a->filename == NULL) + return 1; + if(b->filename == NULL) + return -1; + return b->st.st_mtime - a->st.st_mtime; +} + +static int +compare_size(struct fileinfo *a, struct fileinfo *b) +{ + if(a->filename == NULL) + return 1; + if(b->filename == NULL) + return -1; + return b->st.st_size - a->st.st_size; +} + +static int list_dir(FILE*, const char*, int); + +static int +log10(int num) +{ + int i = 1; + while(num > 10) { + i++; + num /= 10; + } + return i; +} + +/* + * Operate as lstat but fake up entries for AFS mount points so we don't + * have to fetch them. + */ + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int do_the_afs_dance = 1; +#endif + +static int +lstat_file (const char *file, struct stat *sb) +{ +#ifdef KRB4 + if (do_the_afs_dance && + k_hasafs() + && strcmp(file, ".") + && strcmp(file, "..") + && strcmp(file, "/")) + { + struct ViceIoctl a_params; + char *dir, *last; + char *path_bkp; + static ino_t ino_counter = 0, ino_last = 0; + int ret; + const int maxsize = 2048; + + path_bkp = strdup (file); + if (path_bkp == NULL) + return -1; + + a_params.out = malloc (maxsize); + if (a_params.out == NULL) { + free (path_bkp); + return -1; + } + + /* If path contains more than the filename alone - split it */ + + last = strrchr (path_bkp, '/'); + if (last != NULL) { + if(last[1] == '\0') + /* if path ended in /, replace with `.' */ + a_params.in = "."; + else + a_params.in = last + 1; + while(last > path_bkp && *--last == '/'); + if(*last != '/' || last != path_bkp) { + *++last = '\0'; + dir = path_bkp; + } else + /* we got to the start, so this must be the root dir */ + dir = "/"; + } else { + /* file is relative to cdir */ + dir = "."; + a_params.in = path_bkp; + } + + a_params.in_size = strlen (a_params.in) + 1; + a_params.out_size = maxsize; + + ret = k_pioctl (dir, VIOC_AFS_STAT_MT_PT, &a_params, 0); + free (a_params.out); + if (ret < 0) { + free (path_bkp); + + if (errno != EINVAL) + return ret; + else + /* if we get EINVAL this is probably not a mountpoint */ + return lstat (file, sb); + } + + /* + * wow this was a mountpoint, lets cook the struct stat + * use . as a prototype + */ + + ret = lstat (dir, sb); + free (path_bkp); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ino_last == sb->st_ino) + ino_counter++; + else { + ino_last = sb->st_ino; + ino_counter = 0; + } + sb->st_ino += ino_counter; + sb->st_nlink = 3; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + return lstat (file, sb); +} + +#define IS_DOT_DOTDOT(X) ((X)[0] == '.' && ((X)[1] == '\0' || \ + ((X)[1] == '.' && (X)[2] == '\0'))) + +static int +list_files(FILE *out, const char **files, int n_files, int flags) +{ + struct fileinfo *fi; + int i; + int *dirs = NULL; + size_t total_blocks = 0; + int n_print = 0; + int ret = 0; + + if(n_files == 0) + return 0; + + if(n_files > 1) + flags |= LS_SHOW_DIRNAME; + + fi = calloc(n_files, sizeof(*fi)); + if (fi == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "out of memory"); + return -1; + } + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(lstat_file(files[i], &fi[i].st) < 0) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s: %s\r\n", files[i], strerror(errno)); + fi[i].filename = NULL; + } else { + int include_in_list = 1; + total_blocks += block_convert(fi[i].st.st_blocks); + if(S_ISDIR(fi[i].st.st_mode)) { + if(dirs == NULL) + dirs = calloc(n_files, sizeof(*dirs)); + if(dirs == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", files[i]); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + dirs[i] = 1; + if((flags & LS_DIRS) == 0) + include_in_list = 0; + } + if(include_in_list) { + make_fileinfo(out, files[i], &fi[i], flags); + n_print++; + } + } + } + switch(SORT_MODE(flags)) { + case LS_SORT_NAME: + qsort(fi, n_files, sizeof(*fi), + (int (*)(const void*, const void*))compare_filename); + break; + case LS_SORT_MTIME: + qsort(fi, n_files, sizeof(*fi), + (int (*)(const void*, const void*))compare_mtime); + break; + case LS_SORT_SIZE: + qsort(fi, n_files, sizeof(*fi), + (int (*)(const void*, const void*))compare_size); + break; + } + if(DISP_MODE(flags) == LS_DISP_LONG) { + int max_inode = 0; + int max_bsize = 0; + int max_n_link = 0; + int max_user = 0; + int max_group = 0; + int max_size = 0; + int max_major = 0; + int max_minor = 0; + int max_date = 0; + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(fi[i].filename == NULL) + continue; + if(fi[i].inode > max_inode) + max_inode = fi[i].inode; + if(fi[i].bsize > max_bsize) + max_bsize = fi[i].bsize; + if(fi[i].n_link > max_n_link) + max_n_link = fi[i].n_link; + if(strlen(fi[i].user) > max_user) + max_user = strlen(fi[i].user); + if(strlen(fi[i].group) > max_group) + max_group = strlen(fi[i].group); + if(fi[i].major != NULL && strlen(fi[i].major) > max_major) + max_major = strlen(fi[i].major); + if(fi[i].minor != NULL && strlen(fi[i].minor) > max_minor) + max_minor = strlen(fi[i].minor); + if(fi[i].size != NULL && strlen(fi[i].size) > max_size) + max_size = strlen(fi[i].size); + if(strlen(fi[i].date) > max_date) + max_date = strlen(fi[i].date); + } + if(max_size < max_major + max_minor + 2) + max_size = max_major + max_minor + 2; + else if(max_size - max_minor - 2 > max_major) + max_major = max_size - max_minor - 2; + max_inode = log10(max_inode); + max_bsize = log10(max_bsize); + max_n_link = log10(max_n_link); + + if(n_print > 0) + sec_fprintf2(out, "total %lu\r\n", (unsigned long)total_blocks); + if(flags & LS_SORT_REVERSE) + for(i = n_files - 1; i >= 0; i--) + print_file(out, + flags, + &fi[i], + max_inode, + max_bsize, + max_n_link, + max_user, + max_group, + max_size, + max_major, + max_minor, + max_date); + else + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) + print_file(out, + flags, + &fi[i], + max_inode, + max_bsize, + max_n_link, + max_user, + max_group, + max_size, + max_major, + max_minor, + max_date); + } else if(DISP_MODE(flags) == LS_DISP_COLUMN || + DISP_MODE(flags) == LS_DISP_CROSS) { + int max_len = 0; + int size_len = 0; + int num_files = n_files; + int columns; + int j; + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(fi[i].filename == NULL) { + num_files--; + continue; + } + if(strlen(fi[i].filename) > max_len) + max_len = strlen(fi[i].filename); + if(log10(fi[i].bsize) > size_len) + size_len = log10(fi[i].bsize); + } + if(num_files == 0) + goto next; + if(flags & LS_SIZE) { + columns = 80 / (size_len + 1 + max_len + 1); + max_len = 80 / columns - size_len - 1; + } else { + columns = 80 / (max_len + 1); /* get space between columns */ + max_len = 80 / columns; + } + if(flags & LS_SIZE) + sec_fprintf2(out, "total %lu\r\n", + (unsigned long)total_blocks); + if(DISP_MODE(flags) == LS_DISP_CROSS) { + for(i = 0, j = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(fi[i].filename == NULL) + continue; + if(flags & LS_SIZE) + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*u %-*s", size_len, fi[i].bsize, + max_len, fi[i].filename); + else + sec_fprintf2(out, "%-*s", max_len, fi[i].filename); + j++; + if(j == columns) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "\r\n"); + j = 0; + } + } + if(j > 0) + sec_fprintf2(out, "\r\n"); + } else { + int skip = (num_files + columns - 1) / columns; + j = 0; + for(i = 0; i < skip; i++) { + for(j = i; j < n_files;) { + while(j < n_files && fi[j].filename == NULL) + j++; + if(flags & LS_SIZE) + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*u %-*s", size_len, fi[j].bsize, + max_len, fi[j].filename); + else + sec_fprintf2(out, "%-*s", max_len, fi[j].filename); + j += skip; + } + sec_fprintf2(out, "\r\n"); + } + } + } else { + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(fi[i].filename == NULL) + continue; + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s\r\n", fi[i].filename); + } + } + next: + if(((flags & LS_DIRS) == 0 || (flags & LS_RECURSIVE)) && dirs != NULL) { + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(dirs[i]) { + const char *p = strrchr(files[i], '/'); + if(p == NULL) + p = files[i]; + else + p++; + if(!(flags & LS_DIR_FLAG) || !IS_DOT_DOTDOT(p)) { + if((flags & LS_SHOW_DIRNAME)) { + if ((flags & LS_EXTRA_BLANK)) + sec_fprintf2(out, "\r\n"); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s:\r\n", files[i]); + } + list_dir(out, files[i], flags | LS_DIRS | LS_EXTRA_BLANK); + } + } + } + } + out: + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) + free_fileinfo(&fi[i]); + free(fi); + if(dirs != NULL) + free(dirs); + return ret; +} + +static void +free_files (char **files, int n) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + free (files[i]); + free (files); +} + +static int +hide_file(const char *filename, int flags) +{ + if(filename[0] != '.') + return 0; + if((flags & LS_IGNORE_DOT)) + return 1; + if(filename[1] == '\0' || (filename[1] == '.' && filename[2] == '\0')) { + if((flags & LS_SHOW_ALL)) + return 0; + else + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +list_dir(FILE *out, const char *directory, int flags) +{ + DIR *d = opendir(directory); + struct dirent *ent; + char **files = NULL; + int n_files = 0; + + if(d == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", directory); + return -1; + } + while((ent = readdir(d)) != NULL) { + void *tmp; + + if(hide_file(ent->d_name, flags)) + continue; + tmp = realloc(files, (n_files + 1) * sizeof(*files)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: out of memory", directory); + free_files (files, n_files); + closedir (d); + return -1; + } + files = tmp; + asprintf(&files[n_files], "%s/%s", directory, ent->d_name); + if (files[n_files] == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: out of memory", directory); + free_files (files, n_files); + closedir (d); + return -1; + } + ++n_files; + } + closedir(d); + return list_files(out, (const char**)files, n_files, flags | LS_DIR_FLAG); +} + +static int +parse_flags(const char *options) +{ +#ifdef TEST + int flags = LS_SORT_NAME | LS_IGNORE_DOT | LS_DISP_COLUMN; +#else + int flags = LS_SORT_NAME | LS_IGNORE_DOT | LS_DISP_LONG; +#endif + + const char *p; + if(options == NULL || *options != '-') + return flags; + for(p = options + 1; *p; p++) { + switch(*p) { + case '1': + flags = (flags & ~LS_DISP_MODE); + break; + case 'a': + flags |= LS_SHOW_ALL; + /*FALLTHROUGH*/ + case 'A': + flags &= ~LS_IGNORE_DOT; + break; + case 'C': + flags = (flags & ~LS_DISP_MODE) | LS_DISP_COLUMN; + break; + case 'd': + flags |= LS_DIRS; + break; + case 'f': + flags = (flags & ~LS_SORT_MODE); + break; + case 'F': + flags |= LS_TYPE; + break; + case 'i': + flags |= LS_INODE; + break; + case 'l': + flags = (flags & ~LS_DISP_MODE) | LS_DISP_LONG; + break; + case 'r': + flags |= LS_SORT_REVERSE; + break; + case 'R': + flags |= LS_RECURSIVE; + break; + case 's': + flags |= LS_SIZE; + break; + case 'S': + flags = (flags & ~LS_SORT_MODE) | LS_SORT_SIZE; + break; + case 't': + flags = (flags & ~LS_SORT_MODE) | LS_SORT_MTIME; + break; + case 'x': + flags = (flags & ~LS_DISP_MODE) | LS_DISP_CROSS; + break; + /* these are a bunch of unimplemented flags from BSD ls */ + case 'k': /* display sizes in kB */ + case 'c': /* last change time */ + case 'L': /* list symlink target */ + case 'm': /* stream output */ + case 'o': /* BSD file flags */ + case 'p': /* display / after directories */ + case 'q': /* print non-graphic characters */ + case 'u': /* use last access time */ + case 'T': /* display complete time */ + case 'W': /* include whiteouts */ + break; + } + } + return flags; +} + +int +builtin_ls(FILE *out, const char *file) +{ + int flags; + int ret; + + if(*file == '-') { + flags = parse_flags(file); + file = "."; + } else + flags = parse_flags(""); + + ret = list_files(out, &file, 1, flags); + sec_fflush(out); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e4f5b441ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)pathnames.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL +#define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_FTPUSERS +#define _PATH_FTPUSERS SYSCONFDIR "/ftpusers" +#endif + +#define _PATH_FTPCHROOT SYSCONFDIR "/ftpchroot" +#define _PATH_FTPWELCOME SYSCONFDIR "/ftpwelcome" +#define _PATH_FTPLOGINMESG SYSCONFDIR "/motd" + +#define _PATH_ISSUE SYSCONFDIR "/issue" +#define _PATH_ISSUE_NET SYSCONFDIR "/issue.net" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..708cae1b7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software written by Ken Arnold and + * published in UNIX Review, Vol. 6, No. 8. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: popen.c,v 1.26 2002/04/02 11:57:39 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "extern.h" + + +/* + * Special version of popen which avoids call to shell. This ensures + * no one may create a pipe to a hidden program as a side effect of a + * list or dir command. + */ +static int *pids; +static int fds; + +extern int dochroot; + +/* return path prepended with ~ftp if that file exists, otherwise + * return path unchanged + */ + +const char * +ftp_rooted(const char *path) +{ + static char home[MaxPathLen] = ""; + static char newpath[MaxPathLen]; + struct passwd *pwd; + + if(!home[0]) + if((pwd = k_getpwnam("ftp"))) + strlcpy(home, pwd->pw_dir, sizeof(home)); + snprintf(newpath, sizeof(newpath), "%s/%s", home, path); + if(access(newpath, X_OK)) + strlcpy(newpath, path, sizeof(newpath)); + return newpath; +} + + +#define MAXARGS 100 +#define MAXGLOBS 1000 + +FILE * +ftpd_popen(char *program, char *type, int do_stderr, int no_glob) +{ + char *cp; + FILE *iop; + int argc, gargc, pdes[2], pid; + char **pop, *argv[MAXARGS], *gargv[MAXGLOBS]; + char *foo; + + if (strcmp(type, "r") && strcmp(type, "w")) + return (NULL); + + if (!pids) { + + /* This function is ugly and should be rewritten, in + * modern unices there is no such thing as a maximum + * filedescriptor. + */ + + fds = getdtablesize(); + pids = (int*)calloc(fds, sizeof(int)); + if(!pids) + return NULL; + } + if (pipe(pdes) < 0) + return (NULL); + + /* break up string into pieces */ + foo = NULL; + for (argc = 0, cp = program; argc < MAXARGS - 1; cp = NULL) { + if (!(argv[argc++] = strtok_r(cp, " \t\n", &foo))) + break; + } + argv[MAXARGS - 1] = NULL; + + gargv[0] = (char*)ftp_rooted(argv[0]); + /* glob each piece */ + for (gargc = argc = 1; argv[argc] && gargc < MAXGLOBS - 1; argc++) { + glob_t gl; + int flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE + | +#ifdef GLOB_MAXPATH + GLOB_MAXPATH +#else + GLOB_LIMIT +#endif + ; + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + if (no_glob || + glob(argv[argc], flags, NULL, &gl) || + gl.gl_pathc == 0) + gargv[gargc++] = strdup(argv[argc]); + else + for (pop = gl.gl_pathv; + *pop && gargc < MAXGLOBS - 1; + pop++) + gargv[gargc++] = strdup(*pop); + globfree(&gl); + } + gargv[gargc] = NULL; + + iop = NULL; + switch(pid = fork()) { + case -1: /* error */ + close(pdes[0]); + close(pdes[1]); + goto pfree; + /* NOTREACHED */ + case 0: /* child */ + if (*type == 'r') { + if (pdes[1] != STDOUT_FILENO) { + dup2(pdes[1], STDOUT_FILENO); + close(pdes[1]); + } + if(do_stderr) + dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO); + close(pdes[0]); + } else { + if (pdes[0] != STDIN_FILENO) { + dup2(pdes[0], STDIN_FILENO); + close(pdes[0]); + } + close(pdes[1]); + } + execv(gargv[0], gargv); + gargv[0] = argv[0]; + execv(gargv[0], gargv); + _exit(1); + } + /* parent; assume fdopen can't fail... */ + if (*type == 'r') { + iop = fdopen(pdes[0], type); + close(pdes[1]); + } else { + iop = fdopen(pdes[1], type); + close(pdes[0]); + } + pids[fileno(iop)] = pid; + +pfree: + for (argc = 1; gargv[argc] != NULL; argc++) + free(gargv[argc]); + + + return (iop); +} + +int +ftpd_pclose(FILE *iop) +{ + int fdes, status; + pid_t pid; + sigset_t sigset, osigset; + + /* + * pclose returns -1 if stream is not associated with a + * `popened' command, or, if already `pclosed'. + */ + if (pids == 0 || pids[fdes = fileno(iop)] == 0) + return (-1); + fclose(iop); + sigemptyset(&sigset); + sigaddset(&sigset, SIGINT); + sigaddset(&sigset, SIGQUIT); + sigaddset(&sigset, SIGHUP); + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, &osigset); + while ((pid = waitpid(pids[fdes], &status, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL); + pids[fdes] = 0; + if (pid < 0) + return (pid); + if (WIFEXITED(status)) + return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return (1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c145e07c94 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 2000/11/15 22:51:08 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +bin_PROGRAMS = kf + +libexec_PROGRAMS = kfd + 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+.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2426063af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.1 @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kf.1,v 1.6 2003/04/11 12:43:57 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 2, 2000 +.Dt KF 1 +.Os Heimdal +.Sh NAME +.Nm kf +.Nd securely forward tickets +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo +.Fl p Ar port | +.Fl -port Ns = Ns Ar port +.Oc +.Oo +.Fl l Ar login | +.Fl -login Ns = Ns Ar login +.Oc +.Oo +.Fl c Ar ccache | +.Fl -ccache Ns = Ns Ar ccache +.Oc +.Op Fl F | -forwardable +.Op Fl G | -no-forwardable +.Op Fl h | -help +.Op Fl -version +.Ar host ... +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program forwards tickets to a remote host through an authenticated +and encrypted stream. +Options supported are: +.Bl -tag -width indent +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port , +.Fl -port Ns = Ns Ar port +.Xc +port to connect to +.It Xo +.Fl l Ar login , +.Fl -login Ns = Ns Ar login +.Xc +remote login name +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar ccache , +.Fl -ccache Ns = Ns Ar ccache +.Xc +remote cred cache +.It Fl F , -forwardable +forward forwardable credentials +.It Fl G , -no-forwardable +do not forward forwardable credentials +.It Fl h , -help +.It Fl -version +.El +.Pp +.Nm +is useful when you do not want to enter your password on a remote host +but want to have your tickets one for example AFS. +.Pp +In order for +.Nm +to work you will need to acquire your initial ticket with forwardable +flag, i.e. +.Nm kinit Fl -forwardable . +.Pp +.Nm telnet +is able to forward tickets by itself. +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr telnet 1 , +.Xr kfd 8 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..190101ba04 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.c @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kf_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kf.c,v 1.17 2002/09/05 15:00:03 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +const char *service = KF_SERVICE; +const char *remote_name = NULL; +int forwardable = 0; +const char *ccache_name = NULL; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to connect to", "port" }, + { "login", 'l',arg_string, &remote_name,"remote login name","login"}, + { "ccache", 'c',arg_string, &ccache_name, "remote cred cache","ccache"}, + { "forwardable",'F',arg_flag,&forwardable, + "Forward forwardable credentials", NULL }, + { "forwardable",'G',arg_negative_flag,&forwardable, + "Don't forward forwardable credentials", NULL }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "hosts"); + exit(code); +} + +static int +client_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int port = 0; + int status; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + status = krb5_init_context (context); + if (status) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", status); + + forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool (*context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "forwardable", + NULL); + + if (getarg (args, num_args, *argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1, args, num_args); + + if(help_flag) + usage (0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, KF_PORT_NAME, "tcp", KF_PORT_NUM); + + if(*argc - optind < 1) + usage(1, args, num_args); + *argc = optind; + + return port; +} + +/* + * forward creds to `hostname'/`service' over `sock' + * return 0 iff OK + */ + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service, + char *message, size_t len) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data data_send; + + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_principal principal; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + KF_VERSION_1, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) { + krb5_warn(context, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + return 1; + } + + if (ccache_name == NULL) + ccache_name = ""; + + data_send.data = (void *)remote_name; + data_send.length = strlen(remote_name) + 1; + status = krb5_write_priv_message(context, auth_context, &sock, &data_send); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_write_message"); + return 1; + } + data_send.data = (void *)ccache_name; + data_send.length = strlen(ccache_name)+1; + status = krb5_write_priv_message(context, auth_context, &sock, &data_send); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_write_message"); + return 1; + } + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + status = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_cc_default"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + return 1; + } + + creds.client = principal; + + status = krb5_make_principal (context, + &creds.server, + principal->realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + principal->realm, + NULL); + + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_make_principal"); + return 1; + } + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.forwarded = 1; + flags.b.forwardable = forwardable; + + status = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags.i, + hostname, + &creds, + &data); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_get_forwarded_creds"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_write_priv_message(context, auth_context, &sock, &data); + + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + return 1; + } + + krb5_data_free (&data); + + status = krb5_read_priv_message(context, auth_context, &sock, &data); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + return 1; + } + if(data.length >= len) { + krb5_warnx (context, "returned string is too long, truncating"); + memcpy(message, data.data, len); + message[len - 1] = '\0'; + } else { + memcpy(message, data.data, data.length); + message[data.length] = '\0'; + } + krb5_data_free (&data); + + return(strcmp(message, "ok")); +} + +static int +doit (const char *hostname, int port, const char *service, + char *message, size_t len) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + errx (1, "getaddrinfo(%s): %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return proto (s, hostname, service, message, len); + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int argcc,port,i; + int ret=0; + + argcc = argc; + port = client_setup(&context, &argcc, argv); + + if (remote_name == NULL) { + remote_name = get_default_username (); + if (remote_name == NULL) + errx (1, "who are you?"); + } + + for (i = argcc;i < argc; i++) { + char message[128]; + ret = doit (argv[i], port, service, message, sizeof(message)); + if(ret == 0) + warnx ("%s: ok", argv[i]); + else + warnx ("%s: failed: %s", argv[i], message); + } + return(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..35ebcf4407 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ + +KF(1) UNIX Reference Manual KF(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkff - securely forward tickets + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkff [--pp _p_o_r_t | ----ppoorrtt=_p_o_r_t] [--ll _l_o_g_i_n | ----llooggiinn=_l_o_g_i_n] [--cc _c_c_a_c_h_e | + ----ccccaacchhee=_c_c_a_c_h_e] [--FF | ----ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee] [--GG | ----nnoo--ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee] [--hh | + ----hheellpp] [----vveerrssiioonn] _h_o_s_t _._._. + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkff program forwards tickets to a remote host through an authenticated + and encrypted stream. Options supported are: + + --pp _p_o_r_t, ----ppoorrtt=_p_o_r_t + port to connect to + + --ll _l_o_g_i_n, ----llooggiinn=_l_o_g_i_n + remote login name + + --cc _c_c_a_c_h_e, ----ccccaacchhee=_c_c_a_c_h_e + remote cred cache + + --FF, ----ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee + forward forwardable credentials + + --GG, ----nnoo--ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee + do not forward forwardable credentials + + --hh, ----hheellpp + + ----vveerrssiioonn + + kkff is useful when you do not want to enter your password on a remote host + but want to have your tickets one for example AFS. + + In order for kkff to work you will need to acquire your initial ticket with + forwardable flag, i.e. kkiinniitt ----ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee. + + tteellnneett is able to forward tickets by itself. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kinit(1), telnet(1), kfd(8) + + Heimdal July 2, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a6a28f935 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kf_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kf_locl.h,v 1.3 2002/09/04 20:29:04 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define KF_SERVICE "host" + +#define KF_PORT_NAME "kf" +#define KF_PORT_NUM 2110 +#define KF_VERSION_1 "KFWDV0.1" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94d26cc7cf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kfd.8,v 1.4 2003/02/16 21:10:05 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 2, 2000 +.Dt KFD 8 +.Os Heimdal +.Sh NAME +.Nm kfd +.Nd receive forwarded tickets +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo +.Fl p Ar port | +.Fl -port Ns = Ns Ar port +.Oc +.Op Fl i | -inetd +.Oo +.Fl R Ar regpag | +.Fl -regpag Ns = Ns Ar regpag +.Oc +.Op Fl h | -help +.Op Fl -version +.Sh DESCRIPTION +This is the daemon for +.Xr kf 1 . +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width indent +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port , +.Fl -port Ns = Ns Ar port +.Xc +port to listen to +.It Fl i , -inetd +not started from inetd +.It Xo +.Fl R Ar regpag , +.Fl -regpag= Ns Ar regpag +.Xc +path to regpag binary +.El +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.Sh EXAMPLES +Put the following in +.Pa /etc/inetd.conf : +.Bd -literal +kf stream tcp nowait root /usr/heimdal/libexec/kfd kfd +.Ed +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kf 1 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c358b540b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.c @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kf_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kfd.c,v 1.11 2003/04/16 15:40:24 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; +char krb5_tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +char *service = KF_SERVICE; +int do_inetd = 0; +static char *regpag_str=NULL; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "inetd",'i',arg_flag, &do_inetd, + "Not started from inetd", NULL }, + { "regpag",'R',arg_string,®pag_str,"path to regpag binary","regpag"}, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +static int +server_setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = 0; + int local_argc; + + local_argc = krb5_program_setup(context, argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + (*usage)(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str){ + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, KF_PORT_NAME, "tcp", KF_PORT_NUM); + + if(argv[local_argc] != NULL) + usage(1, args, num_args); + + return port; +} + +static int protocol_version; + +static krb5_boolean +kfd_match_version(const void *arg, const char *version) +{ + if(strcmp(version, KF_VERSION_1) == 0) { + protocol_version = 1; + return TRUE; + } else if (strlen(version) == 4 && + version[0] == '0' && + version[1] == '.' && + (version[2] == '4' || version[2] == '3') && + islower(version[3])) { + protocol_version = 0; + return TRUE; + } + return FALSE; +} + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *name; + char ret_string[10]; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data remotename; + krb5_data tk_file; + krb5_ccache ccache; + char ccname[MAXPATHLEN]; + struct passwd *pwd; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + + if(gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "gethostname"); + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + status = krb5_recvauth_match_version (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + kfd_match_version, + NULL, + server, + 0, + NULL, + &ticket); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_recvauth"); + + status = krb5_unparse_name (context, + ticket->client, + &name); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + if(protocol_version == 0) { + data.data = "old clnt"; /* XXX old clients only had room for + 10 bytes of message, and also + didn't show it to the user */ + data.length = strlen(data.data) + 1; + krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &data); + sleep(2); /* XXX give client time to finish */ + krb5_errx(context, 1, "old client; exiting"); + } + + status=krb5_read_priv_message (context, auth_context, + &sock, &remotename); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + status=krb5_read_priv_message (context, auth_context, + &sock, &tk_file); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + + if(((char*)remotename.data)[remotename.length-1] != '\0') + krb5_errx(context, 1, "unterminated received"); + if(((char*)tk_file.data)[tk_file.length-1] != '\0') + krb5_errx(context, 1, "unterminated received"); + + status = krb5_read_priv_message(context, auth_context, &sock, &data); + + if (status) { + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + goto out; + } + + pwd = getpwnam ((char *)(remotename.data)); + if (pwd == NULL) { + status=1; + krb5_warnx(context, "getpwnam: %s failed",(char *)(remotename.data)); + goto out; + } + + if(!krb5_kuserok (context, + ticket->client, + (char *)(remotename.data))) { + status=1; + krb5_warnx(context, "krb5_kuserok: permission denied"); + goto out; + } + + if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "setgid"); + goto out; + } + if (setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "setuid"); + goto out; + } + + if (tk_file.length != 1) + snprintf (ccname, sizeof(ccname), "%s", (char *)(tk_file.data)); + else + snprintf (ccname, sizeof(ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u",pwd->pw_uid); + + status = krb5_cc_resolve (context, ccname, &ccache); + if (status) { + krb5_warn(context, status, "krb5_cc_resolve"); + goto out; + } + status = krb5_cc_initialize (context, ccache, ticket->client); + if (status) { + krb5_warn(context, status, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + goto out; + } + status = krb5_rd_cred2 (context, auth_context, ccache, &data); + krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + if (status) { + krb5_warn(context, status, "krb5_rd_cred"); + goto out; + + } + strlcpy(krb5_tkfile,ccname,sizeof(krb5_tkfile)); + krb5_warnx(context, "%s forwarded ticket to %s,%s", + name, + (char *)(remotename.data),ccname); + out: + if (status) { + strlcpy(ret_string, "no", sizeof(ret_string)); + krb5_warnx(context, "failed"); + } else { + strlcpy(ret_string, "ok", sizeof(ret_string)); + } + + krb5_data_free (&tk_file); + krb5_data_free (&remotename); + krb5_data_free (&data); + free(name); + + data.data = ret_string; + data.length = strlen(ret_string) + 1; + return krb5_write_priv_message(context, auth_context, &sock, &data); +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + if (do_inetd) + mini_inetd(port); + return proto (STDIN_FILENO, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port; + int ret; + krb5_log_facility *fac; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + roken_openlog (argv[0], LOG_ODELAY | LOG_PID,LOG_AUTH); + port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + ret = krb5_openlog(context, "kfd", &fac); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_openlog"); + ret = krb5_set_warn_dest(context, fac); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_set_warn_dest"); + + ret = doit (port, service); + closelog(); + if (ret == 0 && regpag_str != NULL) + ret = execl(regpag_str, "regpag", "-t", krb5_tkfile, "-r", NULL); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..396ffdc8fc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kf/kfd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ + +KFD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KFD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkffdd - receive forwarded tickets + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkffdd [--pp _p_o_r_t | ----ppoorrtt=_p_o_r_t] [--ii | ----iinneettdd] [--RR _r_e_g_p_a_g | ----rreeggppaagg=_r_e_g_p_a_g] + [--hh | ----hheellpp] [----vveerrssiioonn] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + This is the daemon for kf(1). Supported options: + + --pp _p_o_r_t, ----ppoorrtt=_p_o_r_t + port to listen to + + --ii, ----iinneettdd + not started from inetd + + --RR _r_e_g_p_a_g, ----rreeggppaagg==_r_e_g_p_a_g + path to regpag binary + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + Put the following in _/_e_t_c_/_i_n_e_t_d_._c_o_n_f: + + kf stream tcp nowait root /usr/heimdal/libexec/kfd kfd + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kf(1) + + Heimdal July 2, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c2214a6c7f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,408 @@ +2004-03-16 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * krb5.c: 1.12: (krb5_destroy): free allocated memory, not + something else + +2004-02-18 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * krb4.c: 1.12: remove dup on + +2004-01-08 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * krb5.c: 1.10->1.11: clean up krb5 support, log to syslog instead + of stdout + (very confusing for the other end tcp connection), patch originally + from joda + +2003-05-15 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kxd.c: 1.71->1.74: + (recv_conn): pass pointer to sockaddr, not pointer to pointer + (recv_conn): if getnameinfo failes, send error to client (and syslog) + (recv_conn): get sizeof of the sockaddr_storage, not the sockaddr + pointer + +2003-04-16 Johan Danielsson + + * kx.c (doit_{passive,active}): use kc->thataddr directly + + * kx.h: don't directly use sockaddr_storage, since we can't always + know what it looks like + +2003-04-11 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * rxterm.1: spelling, from jmc + * rxtelnet.1: spelling, from jmc + * kxd.8: spelling, from jmc + * kx.1: spelling, from jmc + +2003-02-25 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * krb4.c: remove \n from warnx, from NetBSD + +2002-12-11 Johan Danielsson + + * kx.c (connect_host): pass size of thisaddr_ss to getsockname + +2002-10-15 Johan Danielsson + + * some ipv6 support (from Love) + +2002-09-09 Johan Danielsson + + * krb5.c (krb5_authenticate): use subkey + +2002-08-22 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c: remove only reference to strndup + +2002-05-07 Johan Danielsson + + * krb5.c: use krb5_warn where appropriate + +2002-03-18 Johan Danielsson + + * rxtelnet.in, rxterm.in: add forward (-f) option + +2001-09-17 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.h: add a kludge to make it build on aix (that defines NOERROR + in both sys/stream.h and arpa/nameser.h and considers that a fatal + error) + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (connect_local_xsocket): handle a tcp socket as last + resort + + * rxterm.in: add -K (send arguments to kx) + * rxtelnet.in: add -K (send arguments to kx) + +2001-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * rxterm.in: add -b for pointing to the rsh program. from + + * rxtelnet.in: add -b for pointing to the telnet program. from + + +2001-01-17 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c: don't write to string constants + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * krb5.c (krb5_make_context): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + +2000-10-08 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (doit_passive): check that fds are not too large to select + on + * kx.c (doit_active): check that fds are not too large to select + on + * krb5.c (krb5_copy_encrypted): check that fds are not too large + to select on + * krb4.c (krb4_copy_encrypted): check that fds are not too large + to select on + +2000-07-17 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: use conditional for X + +2000-06-10 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: use INSTALL_SCRIPT for installing rxterm, rxtelnet, + tenletxr + +2000-04-19 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c: try hostname uncanonified if getaddrinfo() fails + +2000-02-06 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.h: remove old prorotypes + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (match_local_auth): handle ai_canonname being set in + any of the addresses returnedby getaddrinfo. glibc apparently + returns the reverse lookup of every address in ai_canonname. + +1999-12-28 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (main): call krb5_getportbyname with the default in + host-byte-order + +1999-12-17 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (match_local_auth): remove extra brace. spotted by + Jakob Schlyter + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (match_local_auth): handle ai_canonname not being set + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * krb4.c (krb4_authenticate): the NAT address might not be the one + for the relevant realm, try anyway. + * kxd.c (recv_conn): type correctness + * kx.c (connect_host): typo + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (INADDR_LOOPBACK): remove. now in roken. + + * kxd.c (recv_conn): use getnameinfo_verified + * kxd.c (recv_conn): replace inaddr2str with getnameinfo + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c (connect_host): use getaddrinfo + * common.c (find_auth_cookie, match_local_auth): re-write to use + getaddrinfo + +1999-11-27 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (recv_conn): better errors when getting unrecognized data + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * krb4.c (krb4_authenticate): obtain the `local' address when + doing NAT. also turn on passive mode. From + +1999-11-18 Assar Westerlund + + * krb5.c (krb5_destroy): free the correct part of the context + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c (main): redo the v4/v5 selection for consistency. -4 -> + try only v4 -5 -> try only v5 none, -45 -> try v5, v4 + +1999-10-10 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (CLEANFILES): add generated files so that they get + cleaned away + +1999-09-29 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (match_local_auth): only look for FamilyLocal (and + FamilyWild) cookies. This will not work when we start talking tcp + to the local X-server but `connect_local_xsocket' and the rest of + the code doesn't handle it anyway and the old code could (and did) + pick up the wrong cookie sometimes. If we have to match + FamilyInternet cookies, the search order has to be changed anyway + +1999-09-02 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (childhandler): watch for child `wait_on_pid' to die. + (recv_conn): set `wait_on_pid' instead of looping on waitpid here + also. This should solve the problem of kxd looping which was + caused by the signal handler getting invoked before this waitpid + and reaping the child leaving this poor loop without any child + +1999-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (recv_conn): give better error message + (doit_active): don't die if fork gives EAGAIN + +1999-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * kxd.c (recv_conn): call setjob on crays; + (doit_passive): if fork fails with EAGAIN, don't shutdown, just close + the connection re-implement `-t' flag + +1999-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: handle not building X programs + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c: conditionalize krb_enable_debug + +1999-06-20 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (main): hopefully do inetd confusion right + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * krb4.c (krb4_authenticate): get rid of a warning + + * kx.h: const-pollution + + * kx.c: use get_default_username and resulting const pollution + + * context.c (context_set): const pollution + +1999-05-22 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (recv_conn): fix syslog messages + (main): fix inetd_flag thinko + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c (main): don't byte-swap the argument to krb5_getportbyname + + * kx.c (main): try to use $USERNAME + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES*): update sources list + + * kx.c (main): forgot to conditionalize some KRB5 code + + * kxd.c (main): use getarg + (*): handle v4 and/or v5 + + * kx.h: update + + * kx.c (main): use getarg. + (*): handle v4 and/or v5 + + * common.c (do_enccopy, copy_encrypted): remove use + net_{read,write} instead of krb_net_{read,write} + (krb_get_int, krb_put_int): include fallback of these for when we + compile without krb4 + + * Makefile.am (*_SOURCES): remove encdata, add krb[45].c, + context.c + (LDADD): add krb5 + + * krb4.c, krb5.c, context.c: new files + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (doit_passive): handle error code from + create_and_write_cookie + + * kx.c (doit_active): handle error code from + create_and_write_cookie + + * common.c (create_and_write_cookie): try to return better (and + correct) errors. Based on a patch from Love + + * common.c (try_pie): more braces + (match_local_auth): new function + (find_auth_cookie): new function + (replace_cookie): don't just take the first auth cookie. based on + patch from Ake Sandgren + +Wed Apr 7 23:39:23 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (get_xsockets): init local variable to get rid of a gcc + warning + +Thu Apr 1 21:11:36 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: fix for writeauth.o + +Fri Mar 19 15:12:31 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kx.c: add gcc-braces + +Thu Mar 18 11:18:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Thu Mar 11 14:58:32 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * writeauth.c: protoize + + * common.c: fix some warnings + +Wed Mar 10 19:33:39 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kxd.c: openlog -> roken_openlog + +Wed Feb 3 22:01:55 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * rxtelnet.in: print out what telnet program we are running. From + + + * tenletxr.in: add --version, [-h | --help], -v + + * rxterm.in: add --version, [-h | --help], -v + + * rxtelnet.in: add --version, [-h | --help], -v + + * Makefile.in (rxterm, rxtelnet, telnetxr): substitute VERSION and + PACKAGE + + * rxtelnet.in: update usage string + +Fri Jan 22 23:51:05 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (verify_and_remove_cookies): give back a meaningful + error message if we're using the wrong cookie + +Fri Dec 18 17:42:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (replace_cookie): try to handle the case of not finding + any cookies + +Sun Nov 22 10:31:53 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Wed Nov 18 20:25:37 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * rxtelnet.in: new argument -n for not starting any terminal + emulator + + * kx.c (doit_passive): parse $DISPLAY correctly + +Fri Oct 2 06:34:51 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c (doit_active): check DISPLAY to figure out what local + socket to connect to. From Åke Sandgren + +Thu Oct 1 23:02:29 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kx.h: case MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES with Solaris + +Tue Sep 29 02:22:44 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c: fix from Ake Sandgren + +Mon Sep 28 18:04:03 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c (try_pipe): return -1 if I_PUSH fails with ENOSYS + +Sat Sep 26 17:34:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c: create sockets before setuid to handle Solaris' strange + permissions on /tmp/.X11-{unix,pipe} + + * common.c (chown_xsockets): new function + + * kx.h (chown_xsockets): new prototype + +Sun Aug 16 18:34:30 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (doit_passive): conditionalize stream pipe code + + * implement support for Solaris's named-pipe X transport + +Thu May 28 17:20:39 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c: fix for (compiler?) bug in solaris 2.4 bind + + * kx.c: get_xsockets returns int, not unsigned + +Wed May 27 04:20:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kxd.c (doit): better error reporting + +Tue May 26 17:41:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kx.c: use krb_enable_debug + +Mon May 25 05:22:18 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): remove encdata.c + +Fri May 1 07:16:36 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kx.c: unifdef -DHAVE_H_ERRNO + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec3f2498e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.12 2000/11/15 22:51:08 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(X_CFLAGS) + +WFLAGS += $(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT) + +if HAVE_X + +bin_PROGRAMS = kx +bin_SCRIPTS = rxterm rxtelnet tenletxr +libexec_PROGRAMS = kxd + +else + +bin_PROGRAMS = +bin_SCRIPTS = +libexec_PROGRAMS = + +endif + +CLEANFILES = rxterm rxtelnet tenletxr + +if NEED_WRITEAUTH +XauWriteAuth_c = writeauth.c +endif + +kx_SOURCES = \ + kx.c \ + kx.h \ + common.c \ + context.c \ + krb4.c \ + krb5.c \ + $(XauWriteAuth_c) + +EXTRA_kx_SOURCES = writeauth.c + +kxd_SOURCES = \ + kxd.c \ + kx.h \ + common.c \ + context.c \ + krb4.c \ + krb5.c \ + $(XauWriteAuth_c) + +EXTRA_kxd_SOURCES = writeauth.c + +EXTRA_DIST = rxterm.in rxtelnet.in tenletxr.in + +man_MANS = kx.1 rxtelnet.1 rxterm.1 tenletxr.1 kxd.8 + +rxterm: rxterm.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/rxterm.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +rxtelnet: rxtelnet.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/rxtelnet.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +tenletxr: tenletxr.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/tenletxr.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +LDADD = \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(X_LIBS) $(LIB_XauReadAuth) $(X_PRE_LIBS) $(X_EXTRA_LIBS) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08ff9819d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,982 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.12 2000/11/15 22:51:08 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + +SOURCES = $(kx_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_kx_SOURCES) $(kxd_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_kxd_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ 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install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +rxterm: rxterm.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/rxterm.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +rxtelnet: rxtelnet.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/rxtelnet.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +tenletxr: tenletxr.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/tenletxr.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..557f99d10a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,817 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kx.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.68 2003/04/16 16:45:39 joda Exp $"); + +char x_socket[MaxPathLen]; + +u_int32_t display_num; +char display[MaxPathLen]; +int display_size = sizeof(display); +char xauthfile[MaxPathLen]; +int xauthfile_size = sizeof(xauthfile); +u_char cookie[16]; +size_t cookie_len = sizeof(cookie); + +#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH +#define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X" +#endif + +#ifndef X_PIPE_PATH +#define X_PIPE_PATH "/tmp/.X11-pipe/X" +#endif + +/* + * Allocate a unix domain socket in `s' for display `dpy' and with + * filename `pattern' + * + * 0 if all is OK + * -1 if bind failed badly + * 1 if dpy is already used */ + +static int +try_socket (struct x_socket *s, int dpy, const char *pattern) +{ + struct sockaddr_un addr; + int fd; + + fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + err (1, "socket AF_UNIX"); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + snprintf (addr.sun_path, sizeof(addr.sun_path), pattern, dpy); + if(bind(fd, + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + sizeof(addr)) < 0) { + close (fd); + if (errno == EADDRINUSE || + errno == EACCES /* Cray return EACCESS */ +#ifdef ENOTUNIQ + || errno == ENOTUNIQ /* bug in Solaris 2.4 */ +#endif + ) + return 1; + else + return -1; + } + s->fd = fd; + s->pathname = strdup (addr.sun_path); + if (s->pathname == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + s->flags = UNIX_SOCKET; + return 0; +} + +#ifdef MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES +/* + * Allocate a stream (masqueraded as a named pipe) + * + * 0 if all is OK + * -1 if bind failed badly + * 1 if dpy is already used + */ + +static int +try_pipe (struct x_socket *s, int dpy, const char *pattern) +{ + char path[MAXPATHLEN]; + int ret; + int fd; + int pipefd[2]; + + snprintf (path, sizeof(path), pattern, dpy); + fd = open (path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == EEXIST) + return 1; + else + return -1; + } + + close (fd); + + ret = pipe (pipefd); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "pipe"); + + ret = ioctl (pipefd[1], I_PUSH, "connld"); + if (ret < 0) { + if(errno == ENOSYS) + return -1; + err (1, "ioctl I_PUSH"); + } + + ret = fattach (pipefd[1], path); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "fattach %s", path); + + s->fd = pipefd[0]; + close (pipefd[1]); + s->pathname = strdup (path); + if (s->pathname == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + s->flags = STREAM_PIPE; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES */ + +/* + * Try to create a TCP socket in `s' corresponding to display `dpy'. + * + * 0 if all is OK + * -1 if bind failed badly + * 1 if dpy is already used + */ + +static int +try_tcp (struct x_socket *s, int dpy) +{ + struct sockaddr_in tcpaddr; + struct in_addr local; + int one = 1; + int fd; + + memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local)); + local.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + + fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + err (1, "socket AF_INET"); +#if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + setsockopt (fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); +#endif + memset (&tcpaddr, 0, sizeof(tcpaddr)); + tcpaddr.sin_family = AF_INET; + tcpaddr.sin_addr = local; + tcpaddr.sin_port = htons(6000 + dpy); + if (bind (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&tcpaddr, + sizeof(tcpaddr)) < 0) { + close (fd); + if (errno == EADDRINUSE) + return 1; + else + return -1; + } + s->fd = fd; + s->pathname = NULL; + s->flags = TCP; + return 0; +} + +/* + * The potential places to create unix sockets. + */ + +static char *x_sockets[] = { +X_UNIX_PATH "%u", +"/var/X/.X11-unix/X" "%u", +"/usr/spool/sockets/X11/" "%u", +NULL +}; + +/* + * Dito for stream pipes. + */ + +#ifdef MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES +static char *x_pipes[] = { +X_PIPE_PATH "%u", +"/var/X/.X11-pipe/X" "%u", +NULL +}; +#endif + +/* + * Create the directory corresponding to dirname of `path' or fail. + */ + +static void +try_mkdir (const char *path) +{ + char *dir; + char *p; + int oldmask; + + if((dir = strdup (path)) == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + p = strrchr (dir, '/'); + if (p) + *p = '\0'; + + oldmask = umask(0); + mkdir (dir, 01777); + umask (oldmask); + free (dir); +} + +/* + * Allocate a display, returning the number of sockets in `number' and + * all the corresponding sockets in `sockets'. If `tcp_socket' is + * true, also allcoaet a TCP socket. + * + * The return value is the display allocated or -1 if an error occurred. + */ + +int +get_xsockets (int *number, struct x_socket **sockets, int tcp_socket) +{ + int dpy; + struct x_socket *s; + int n; + int i; + + s = malloc (sizeof(*s) * 5); + if (s == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + + try_mkdir (X_UNIX_PATH); + try_mkdir (X_PIPE_PATH); + + for(dpy = 4; dpy < 256; ++dpy) { + char **path; + int tmp = 0; + + n = 0; + for (path = x_sockets; *path; ++path) { + tmp = try_socket (&s[n], dpy, *path); + if (tmp == -1) { + if (errno != ENOTDIR && errno != ENOENT) + return -1; + } else if (tmp == 1) { + while(--n >= 0) { + close (s[n].fd); + free (s[n].pathname); + } + break; + } else if (tmp == 0) + ++n; + } + if (tmp == 1) + continue; + +#ifdef MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES + for (path = x_pipes; *path; ++path) { + tmp = try_pipe (&s[n], dpy, *path); + if (tmp == -1) { + if (errno != ENOTDIR && errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOSYS) + return -1; + } else if (tmp == 1) { + while (--n >= 0) { + close (s[n].fd); + free (s[n].pathname); + } + break; + } else if (tmp == 0) + ++n; + } + + if (tmp == 1) + continue; +#endif + + if (tcp_socket) { + tmp = try_tcp (&s[n], dpy); + if (tmp == -1) + return -1; + else if (tmp == 1) { + while (--n >= 0) { + close (s[n].fd); + free (s[n].pathname); + } + break; + } else if (tmp == 0) + ++n; + } + break; + } + if (dpy == 256) + errx (1, "no free x-servers"); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if (s[i].flags & LISTENP + && listen (s[i].fd, SOMAXCONN) < 0) + err (1, "listen %s", s[i].pathname ? s[i].pathname : "tcp"); + *number = n; + *sockets = s; + return dpy; +} + +/* + * Change owner on the `n' sockets in `sockets' to `uid', `gid'. + * Return 0 is succesful or -1 if an error occurred. + */ + +int +chown_xsockets (int n, struct x_socket *sockets, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if (sockets[i].pathname != NULL) + if (chown (sockets[i].pathname, uid, gid) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Connect to local display `dnr' with local transport or TCP. + * Return a file descriptor. + */ + +int +connect_local_xsocket (unsigned dnr) +{ + int fd; + char **path; + + for (path = x_sockets; *path; ++path) { + struct sockaddr_un addr; + + fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + break; + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + snprintf (addr.sun_path, sizeof(addr.sun_path), *path, dnr); + if (connect (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) + return fd; + close(fd); + } + { + struct sockaddr_in addr; + + fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + err (1, "socket AF_INET"); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + addr.sin_port = htons(6000 + dnr); + if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) + return fd; + close(fd); + } + err (1, "connecting to local display %u", dnr); +} + +/* + * Create a cookie file with a random cookie for the localhost. The + * file name will be stored in `xauthfile' (but not larger than + * `xauthfile_size'), and the cookie returned in `cookie', `cookie_sz'. + * Return 0 if succesful, or errno. + */ + +int +create_and_write_cookie (char *xauthfile, + size_t xauthfile_size, + u_char *cookie, + size_t cookie_sz) +{ + Xauth auth; + char tmp[64]; + int fd; + FILE *f; + char hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; + int saved_errno; + + gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + + auth.family = FamilyLocal; + auth.address = hostname; + auth.address_length = strlen(auth.address); + snprintf (tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", display_num); + auth.number_length = strlen(tmp); + auth.number = tmp; + auth.name = COOKIE_TYPE; + auth.name_length = strlen(auth.name); + auth.data_length = cookie_sz; + auth.data = (char*)cookie; +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_generate_random_block (cookie, cookie_sz); +#else + krb_generate_random_block (cookie, cookie_sz); +#endif + + strlcpy(xauthfile, "/tmp/AXXXXXX", xauthfile_size); + fd = mkstemp(xauthfile); + if(fd < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + syslog(LOG_ERR, "create_and_write_cookie: mkstemp: %m"); + return saved_errno; + } + f = fdopen(fd, "r+"); + if(f == NULL){ + saved_errno = errno; + close(fd); + return errno; + } + if(XauWriteAuth(f, &auth) == 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + fclose(f); + return saved_errno; + } + + /* + * I would like to write a cookie for localhost:n here, but some + * stupid code in libX11 will not look for cookies of that type, + * so we are forced to use FamilyWild instead. + */ + + auth.family = FamilyWild; + auth.address_length = 0; + + if (XauWriteAuth(f, &auth) == 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + fclose (f); + return saved_errno; + } + + if(fclose(f)) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify and remove cookies. Read and parse a X-connection from + * `fd'. Check the cookie used is the same as in `cookie'. Remove the + * cookie and copy the rest of it to `sock'. + * Expect cookies iff cookiesp. + * Return 0 iff ok. + * + * The protocol is as follows: + * + * C->S: [Bl] 1 + * unused 1 + * protocol major version 2 + * protocol minor version 2 + * length of auth protocol name(n) 2 + * length of auth protocol data 2 + * unused 2 + * authorization protocol name n + * pad pad(n) + * authorization protocol data d + * pad pad(d) + * + * S->C: Failed + * 0 1 + * length of reason 1 + * protocol major version 2 + * protocol minor version 2 + * length in 4 bytes unit of + * additional data (n+p)/4 2 + * reason n + * unused p = pad(n) + */ + +int +verify_and_remove_cookies (int fd, int sock, int cookiesp) +{ + u_char beg[12]; + int bigendianp; + unsigned n, d, npad, dpad; + char *protocol_name, *protocol_data; + u_char zeros[6] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + u_char refused[20] = {0, 10, + 0, 0, /* protocol major version */ + 0, 0, /* protocol minor version */ + 0, 0, /* length of additional data / 4 */ + 'b', 'a', 'd', ' ', 'c', 'o', 'o', 'k', 'i', 'e', + 0, 0}; + + if (net_read (fd, beg, sizeof(beg)) != sizeof(beg)) + return 1; + if (net_write (sock, beg, 6) != 6) + return 1; + bigendianp = beg[0] == 'B'; + if (bigendianp) { + n = (beg[6] << 8) | beg[7]; + d = (beg[8] << 8) | beg[9]; + } else { + n = (beg[7] << 8) | beg[6]; + d = (beg[9] << 8) | beg[8]; + } + npad = (4 - (n % 4)) % 4; + dpad = (4 - (d % 4)) % 4; + protocol_name = malloc(n + npad); + if (n + npad != 0 && protocol_name == NULL) + return 1; + protocol_data = malloc(d + dpad); + if (d + dpad != 0 && protocol_data == NULL) { + free (protocol_name); + return 1; + } + if (net_read (fd, protocol_name, n + npad) != n + npad) + goto fail; + if (net_read (fd, protocol_data, d + dpad) != d + dpad) + goto fail; + if (cookiesp) { + if (strncmp (protocol_name, COOKIE_TYPE, strlen(COOKIE_TYPE)) != 0) + goto refused; + if (d != cookie_len || + memcmp (protocol_data, cookie, cookie_len) != 0) + goto refused; + } + free (protocol_name); + free (protocol_data); + if (net_write (sock, zeros, 6) != 6) + return 1; + return 0; +refused: + refused[2] = beg[2]; + refused[3] = beg[3]; + refused[4] = beg[4]; + refused[5] = beg[5]; + if (bigendianp) + refused[7] = 3; + else + refused[6] = 3; + + net_write (fd, refused, sizeof(refused)); +fail: + free (protocol_name); + free (protocol_data); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Return 0 iff `cookie' is compatible with the cookie for the + * localhost with name given in `ai' (or `hostname') and display + * number in `disp_nr'. + */ + +static int +match_local_auth (Xauth* auth, + struct addrinfo *ai, const char *hostname, int disp_nr) +{ + int auth_disp; + char *tmp_disp; + struct addrinfo *a; + + tmp_disp = malloc(auth->number_length + 1); + if (tmp_disp == NULL) + return -1; + memcpy(tmp_disp, auth->number, auth->number_length); + tmp_disp[auth->number_length] = '\0'; + auth_disp = atoi(tmp_disp); + free (tmp_disp); + if (auth_disp != disp_nr) + return 1; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if ((auth->family == FamilyLocal + || auth->family == FamilyWild) + && a->ai_canonname != NULL + && strncmp (auth->address, + a->ai_canonname, + auth->address_length) == 0) + return 0; + } + if (hostname != NULL + && (auth->family == FamilyLocal + || auth->family == FamilyWild) + && strncmp (auth->address, hostname, auth->address_length) == 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Find `our' cookie from the cookie file `f' and return it or NULL. + */ + +static Xauth* +find_auth_cookie (FILE *f) +{ + Xauth *ret = NULL; + char local_hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; + char *display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + char d[MaxHostNameLen + 4]; + char *colon; + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct addrinfo hints; + int disp; + int error; + + if(display == NULL) + display = ":0"; + strlcpy(d, display, sizeof(d)); + display = d; + colon = strchr (display, ':'); + if (colon == NULL) + disp = 0; + else { + *colon = '\0'; + disp = atoi (colon + 1); + } + if (strcmp (display, "") == 0 + || strncmp (display, "unix", 4) == 0 + || strncmp (display, "localhost", 9) == 0) { + gethostname (local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)); + display = local_hostname; + } + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + error = getaddrinfo (display, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + ai = NULL; + + for (; (ret = XauReadAuth (f)) != NULL; XauDisposeAuth(ret)) { + if (match_local_auth (ret, ai, display, disp) == 0) { + if (ai != NULL) + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return ret; + } + } + if (ai != NULL) + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Get rid of the cookie that we were sent and get the correct one + * from our own cookie file instead. + */ + +int +replace_cookie(int xserver, int fd, char *filename, int cookiesp) /* XXX */ +{ + u_char beg[12]; + int bigendianp; + unsigned n, d, npad, dpad; + FILE *f; + u_char zeros[6] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + + if (net_read (fd, beg, sizeof(beg)) != sizeof(beg)) + return 1; + if (net_write (xserver, beg, 6) != 6) + return 1; + bigendianp = beg[0] == 'B'; + if (bigendianp) { + n = (beg[6] << 8) | beg[7]; + d = (beg[8] << 8) | beg[9]; + } else { + n = (beg[7] << 8) | beg[6]; + d = (beg[9] << 8) | beg[8]; + } + if (n != 0 || d != 0) + return 1; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f != NULL) { + Xauth *auth = find_auth_cookie (f); + u_char len[6] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + + fclose (f); + + if (auth != NULL) { + n = auth->name_length; + d = auth->data_length; + } else { + n = 0; + d = 0; + } + if (bigendianp) { + len[0] = n >> 8; + len[1] = n & 0xFF; + len[2] = d >> 8; + len[3] = d & 0xFF; + } else { + len[0] = n & 0xFF; + len[1] = n >> 8; + len[2] = d & 0xFF; + len[3] = d >> 8; + } + if (net_write (xserver, len, 6) != 6) { + XauDisposeAuth(auth); + return 1; + } + if(n != 0 && net_write (xserver, auth->name, n) != n) { + XauDisposeAuth(auth); + return 1; + } + npad = (4 - (n % 4)) % 4; + if (npad && net_write (xserver, zeros, npad) != npad) { + XauDisposeAuth(auth); + return 1; + } + if (d != 0 && net_write (xserver, auth->data, d) != d) { + XauDisposeAuth(auth); + return 1; + } + XauDisposeAuth(auth); + dpad = (4 - (d % 4)) % 4; + if (dpad && net_write (xserver, zeros, dpad) != dpad) + return 1; + } else { + if(net_write(xserver, zeros, 6) != 6) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Some simple controls on the address and corresponding socket + */ + +int +suspicious_address (int sock, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + char data[40]; + socklen_t len = sizeof(data); + + switch (addr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + return ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr.s_addr != + htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK) +#if defined(IP_OPTIONS) && defined(HAVE_GETSOCKOPT) + || getsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, data, &len) < 0 + || len != 0 +#endif + ; + break; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6: + /* XXX check route headers */ + return !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&((struct sockaddr_in6*)addr)->sin6_addr); +#endif + default: + return 1; + } +} + +/* + * This really sucks, but these functions are used and if we're not + * linking against libkrb they don't exist. Using the heimdal storage + * functions will not work either cause we do not always link with + * libkrb5 either. + */ + +#ifndef KRB4 + +int +krb_get_int(void *f, u_int32_t *to, int size, int lsb) +{ + int i; + unsigned char *from = (unsigned char *)f; + + *to = 0; + if(lsb){ + for(i = size-1; i >= 0; i--) + *to = (*to << 8) | from[i]; + }else{ + for(i = 0; i < size; i++) + *to = (*to << 8) | from[i]; + } + return size; +} + +int +krb_put_int(u_int32_t from, void *to, size_t rem, int size) +{ + int i; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)to; + + if (rem < size) + return -1; + + for(i = size - 1; i >= 0; i--){ + p[i] = from & 0xff; + from >>= 8; + } + return size; +} + +#endif /* !KRB4 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..28e7254f7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/context.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kx.h" + +RCSID("$Id: context.c,v 1.5 2003/04/16 16:45:41 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Set the common part of the context `kc' + */ + +void +context_set (kx_context *kc, const char *host, const char *user, int port, + int debug_flag, int keepalive_flag, int tcp_flag) +{ + kc->thisaddr = (struct sockaddr*)&kc->__ss_this; + kc->thataddr = (struct sockaddr*)&kc->__ss_that; + kc->host = host; + kc->user = user; + kc->port = port; + kc->debug_flag = debug_flag; + kc->keepalive_flag = keepalive_flag; + kc->tcp_flag = tcp_flag; +} + +/* + * dispatch functions + */ + +void +context_destroy (kx_context *kc) +{ + (*kc->destroy)(kc); +} + +int +context_authenticate (kx_context *kc, int s) +{ + return (*kc->authenticate)(kc, s); +} + +int +context_userok (kx_context *kc, char *user) +{ + return (*kc->userok)(kc, user); +} + +ssize_t +kx_read (kx_context *kc, int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return (*kc->read)(kc, fd, buf, len); +} + +ssize_t +kx_write (kx_context *kc, int fd, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return (*kc->write)(kc, fd, buf, len); +} + +int +copy_encrypted (kx_context *kc, int fd1, int fd2) +{ + return (*kc->copy_encrypted)(kc, fd1, fd2); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/krb4.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/krb4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd70a447d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/krb4.c @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kx.h" + +RCSID("$Id: krb4.c,v 1.11.2.1 2004/02/18 19:22:30 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +struct krb4_kx_context { + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + AUTH_DAT auth; +}; + +typedef struct krb4_kx_context krb4_kx_context; + +/* + * Destroy the krb4 context in `c'. + */ + +static void +krb4_destroy (kx_context *c) +{ + memset (c->data, 0, sizeof(krb4_kx_context)); + free (c->data); +} + +/* + * Read the authentication information from `s' and return 0 if + * succesful, else -1. + */ + +static int +krb4_authenticate (kx_context *kc, int s) +{ + CREDENTIALS cred; + KTEXT_ST text; + MSG_DAT msg; + int status; + krb4_kx_context *c = (krb4_kx_context *)kc->data; + const char *host = kc->host; + + if (kc->thisaddr->sa_family != AF_INET) { + warnx ("%s: used Kerberos v4 authentiocation on non-IP4 address", host); + return -1; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_KRB_GET_OUR_IP_FOR_REALM + if (krb_get_config_bool("nat_in_use")) { + struct in_addr natAddr; + + if (krb_get_our_ip_for_realm(krb_realmofhost(kc->host), + &natAddr) == KSUCCESS + || krb_get_our_ip_for_realm (NULL, &natAddr) == KSUCCESS) + ((struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thisaddr)->sin_addr = natAddr; + } +#endif + + status = krb_sendauth (KOPT_DO_MUTUAL, s, &text, "rcmd", + (char *)host, krb_realmofhost (host), + getpid(), &msg, &cred, c->schedule, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thisaddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thataddr, KX_VERSION); + if (status != KSUCCESS) { + warnx ("%s: %s", host, krb_get_err_text(status)); + return -1; + } + memcpy (c->key, cred.session, sizeof(des_cblock)); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Read a krb4 priv packet from `fd' into `buf' (of size `len'). + * Return the number of bytes read or 0 on EOF or -1 on error. + */ + +static ssize_t +krb4_read (kx_context *kc, + int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char tmp[4]; + ssize_t ret; + size_t l; + int status; + krb4_kx_context *c = (krb4_kx_context *)kc->data; + MSG_DAT msg; + + ret = krb_net_read (fd, tmp, 4); + if (ret == 0) + return ret; + if (ret != 4) + return -1; + l = (tmp[0] << 24) | (tmp[1] << 16) | (tmp[2] << 8) | tmp[3]; + if (l > len) + return -1; + if (krb_net_read (fd, buf, l) != l) + return -1; + status = krb_rd_priv (buf, l, c->schedule, &c->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thataddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thisaddr, &msg); + if (status != RD_AP_OK) { + warnx ("krb4_read: %s", krb_get_err_text(status)); + return -1; + } + memmove (buf, msg.app_data, msg.app_length); + return msg.app_length; +} + +/* + * Write a krb4 priv packet on `fd' with the data in `buf, len'. + * Return len or -1 on error + */ + +static ssize_t +krb4_write(kx_context *kc, + int fd, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + void *outbuf; + krb4_kx_context *c = (krb4_kx_context *)kc->data; + int outlen; + unsigned char tmp[4]; + + outbuf = malloc (len + 30); + if (outbuf == NULL) + return -1; + outlen = krb_mk_priv ((void *)buf, outbuf, len, c->schedule, &c->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thisaddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thataddr); + if (outlen < 0) { + free (outbuf); + return -1; + } + tmp[0] = (outlen >> 24) & 0xFF; + tmp[1] = (outlen >> 16) & 0xFF; + tmp[2] = (outlen >> 8) & 0xFF; + tmp[3] = (outlen >> 0) & 0xFF; + + if (krb_net_write (fd, tmp, 4) != 4 || + krb_net_write (fd, outbuf, outlen) != outlen) { + free (outbuf); + return -1; + } + free (outbuf); + return len; +} + +/* + * Copy data from `fd1' to `fd2', {en,de}crypting with cfb64 + * with `mode' and state stored in `iv', `schedule', and `num'. + * Return -1 if error, 0 if eof, else 1 + */ + +static int +do_enccopy (int fd1, int fd2, int mode, des_cblock *iv, + des_key_schedule schedule, int *num) +{ + int ret; + u_char buf[BUFSIZ]; + + ret = read (fd1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + if (ret < 0) { + warn ("read"); + return ret; + } +#ifndef NOENCRYPTION + des_cfb64_encrypt (buf, buf, ret, schedule, iv, + num, mode); +#endif + ret = krb_net_write (fd2, buf, ret); + if (ret < 0) { + warn ("write"); + return ret; + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Copy data between fd1 and fd2, encrypting one way and decrypting + * the other. + */ + +static int +krb4_copy_encrypted (kx_context *kc, + int fd1, int fd2) +{ + krb4_kx_context *c = (krb4_kx_context *)kc->data; + des_cblock iv1, iv2; + int num1 = 0, num2 = 0; + + memcpy (iv1, c->key, sizeof(iv1)); + memcpy (iv2, c->key, sizeof(iv2)); + for (;;) { + fd_set fdset; + int ret; + + if (fd1 >= FD_SETSIZE || fd2 >= FD_SETSIZE) { + warnx ("fd too large"); + return 1; + } + + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(fd1, &fdset); + FD_SET(fd2, &fdset); + + ret = select (max(fd1, fd2)+1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) { + warn ("select"); + return 1; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd1, &fdset)) { + ret = do_enccopy (fd1, fd2, DES_ENCRYPT, &iv1, c->schedule, &num1); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd2, &fdset)) { + ret = do_enccopy (fd2, fd1, DES_DECRYPT, &iv2, c->schedule, &num2); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + } + } +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the user authenticated on `kc' is allowed to login as + * `user'. + */ + +static int +krb4_userok (kx_context *kc, char *user) +{ + krb4_kx_context *c = (krb4_kx_context *)kc->data; + char *tmp; + + tmp = krb_unparse_name_long (c->auth.pname, + c->auth.pinst, + c->auth.prealm); + kc->user = strdup (tmp); + if (kc->user == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + + + return kuserok (&c->auth, user); +} + +/* + * Create an instance of an krb4 context. + */ + +void +krb4_make_context (kx_context *kc) +{ + kc->authenticate = krb4_authenticate; + kc->userok = krb4_userok; + kc->read = krb4_read; + kc->write = krb4_write; + kc->copy_encrypted = krb4_copy_encrypted; + kc->destroy = krb4_destroy; + kc->user = NULL; + kc->data = malloc(sizeof(krb4_kx_context)); + + if (kc->data == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); +} + +/* + * Receive authentication information on `sock' (first four bytes + * in `buf'). + */ + +int +recv_v4_auth (kx_context *kc, int sock, u_char *buf) +{ + int status; + KTEXT_ST ticket; + char instance[INST_SZ + 1]; + char version[KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN + 1]; + krb4_kx_context *c; + AUTH_DAT auth; + des_key_schedule schedule; + + if (kc->thisaddr->sa_family != AF_INET) + return -1; + + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, 4) != 0) + return -1; + if (net_read (sock, buf + 4, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) != + KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "read: %m"); + exit (1); + } + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "unrecognized auth protocol: %.8s", buf); + exit (1); + } + + k_getsockinst (sock, instance, sizeof(instance)); + status = krb_recvauth (KOPT_IGNORE_PROTOCOL | KOPT_DO_MUTUAL, + sock, + &ticket, + "rcmd", + instance, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thataddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)kc->thisaddr, + &auth, + "", + schedule, + version); + if (status != KSUCCESS) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "krb_recvauth: %s", krb_get_err_text(status)); + exit (1); + } + if (strncmp (version, KX_VERSION, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) { + /* Try to be nice to old kx's */ + if (strncmp (version, KX_OLD_VERSION, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) == 0) { + char *old_errmsg = "\001Old version of kx. Please upgrade."; + char user[64]; + + syslog (LOG_ERR, "Old version client (%s)", version); + + krb_net_read (sock, user, sizeof(user)); + krb_net_write (sock, old_errmsg, strlen(old_errmsg) + 1); + exit (1); + } else { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "bad version: %s", version); + exit (1); + } + } + + krb4_make_context (kc); + c = (krb4_kx_context *)kc->data; + + c->auth = auth; + memcpy (c->key, &auth.session, sizeof(des_cblock)); + memcpy (c->schedule, schedule, sizeof(schedule)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/krb5.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/krb5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d3309dbf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/krb5.c @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kx.h" + +RCSID("$Id: krb5.c,v 1.10.6.2 2004/03/16 11:33:48 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB5 + +struct krb5_kx_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_keyblock *keyblock; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_log_facility *log; + +}; + +typedef struct krb5_kx_context krb5_kx_context; + +#define K5DATA(kc) ((krb5_kx_context*)kc->data) +#define CONTEXT(kc) (K5DATA(kc)->context) + +/* + * Destroy the krb5 context in `c'. + */ + +static void +krb5_destroy (kx_context *kc) +{ + if (K5DATA(kc)->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->keyblock); + if (K5DATA(kc)->crypto) + krb5_crypto_destroy (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->crypto); + if (K5DATA(kc)->client) + krb5_free_principal (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->client); + if (CONTEXT(kc)) + krb5_free_context (CONTEXT(kc)); + memset (kc->data, 0, sizeof(krb5_kx_context)); + free (kc->data); +} + +/* + * Read the authentication information from `s' and return 0 if + * succesful, else -1. + */ + +static int +krb5_authenticate (kx_context *kc, int s) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal server; + const char *host = kc->host; + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (CONTEXT(kc), + host, "host", KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal: %s", host); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_sendauth (CONTEXT(kc), + &auth_context, + &s, + KX_VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (ret) { + if(ret != KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE) + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), ret, "krb5_sendauth: %s", host); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey (CONTEXT(kc), auth_context, + &K5DATA(kc)->keyblock); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), ret, "krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s", host); + krb5_auth_con_free (CONTEXT(kc), auth_context); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_crypto_init (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->keyblock, + 0, &K5DATA(kc)->crypto); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), ret, "krb5_crypto_init"); + krb5_auth_con_free (CONTEXT(kc), auth_context); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Read an encapsulated krb5 packet from `fd' into `buf' (of size + * `len'). Return the number of bytes read or 0 on EOF or -1 on + * error. + */ + +static ssize_t +krb5_read (kx_context *kc, + int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t data_len, outer_len; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char tmp[4]; + krb5_data data; + int l; + + l = krb5_net_read (CONTEXT(kc), &fd, tmp, 4); + if (l == 0) + return l; + if (l != 4) + return -1; + data_len = (tmp[0] << 24) | (tmp[1] << 16) | (tmp[2] << 8) | tmp[3]; + outer_len = krb5_get_wrapped_length (CONTEXT(kc), + K5DATA(kc)->crypto, data_len); + if (outer_len > len) + return -1; + if (krb5_net_read (CONTEXT(kc), &fd, buf, outer_len) != outer_len) + return -1; + + ret = krb5_decrypt (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->crypto, + KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED, + buf, outer_len, &data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), ret, "krb5_decrypt"); + return -1; + } + if (data_len > data.length) { + krb5_data_free (&data); + return -1; + } + memmove (buf, data.data, data_len); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return data_len; +} + +/* + * Write an encapsulated krb5 packet on `fd' with the data in `buf, + * len'. Return len or -1 on error. + */ + +static ssize_t +krb5_write(kx_context *kc, + int fd, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + krb5_data data; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char tmp[4]; + size_t outlen; + + ret = krb5_encrypt (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->crypto, + KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED, + (void *)buf, len, &data); + if (ret){ + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), ret, "krb5_write"); + return -1; + } + + outlen = data.length; + tmp[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xFF; + tmp[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xFF; + tmp[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + tmp[3] = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + + if (krb5_net_write (CONTEXT(kc), &fd, tmp, 4) != 4 || + krb5_net_write (CONTEXT(kc), &fd, data.data, outlen) != outlen) { + krb5_data_free (&data); + return -1; + } + krb5_data_free (&data); + return len; +} + +/* + * Copy from the unix socket `from_fd' encrypting to `to_fd'. + * Return 0, -1 or len. + */ + +static int +copy_out (kx_context *kc, int from_fd, int to_fd) +{ + char buf[32768]; + ssize_t len; + + len = read (from_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (len < 0) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), errno, "read"); + return len; + } + return krb5_write (kc, to_fd, buf, len); +} + +/* + * Copy from the socket `from_fd' decrypting to `to_fd'. + * Return 0, -1 or len. + */ + +static int +copy_in (kx_context *kc, int from_fd, int to_fd) +{ + char buf[33000]; /* XXX */ + + ssize_t len; + + len = krb5_read (kc, from_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (len < 0) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), errno, "krb5_read"); + return len; + } + + return krb5_net_write (CONTEXT(kc), &to_fd, buf, len); +} + +/* + * Copy data between `fd1' and `fd2', encrypting in one direction and + * decrypting in the other. + */ + +static int +krb5_copy_encrypted (kx_context *kc, int fd1, int fd2) +{ + for (;;) { + fd_set fdset; + int ret; + + if (fd1 >= FD_SETSIZE || fd2 >= FD_SETSIZE) { + krb5_warnx (CONTEXT(kc), "fd too large"); + return 1; + } + + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(fd1, &fdset); + FD_SET(fd2, &fdset); + + ret = select (max(fd1, fd2)+1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) { + krb5_warn (CONTEXT(kc), errno, "select"); + return 1; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd1, &fdset)) { + ret = copy_out (kc, fd1, fd2); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd2, &fdset)) { + ret = copy_in (kc, fd2, fd1); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + } + } +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the user authenticated on `kc' is allowed to login as + * `user'. + */ + +static int +krb5_userok (kx_context *kc, char *user) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *tmp; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->client, &tmp); + if (ret) + krb5_err (CONTEXT(kc), 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + kc->user = tmp; + + return !krb5_kuserok (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->client, user); +} + +/* + * Create an instance of an krb5 context. + */ + +void +krb5_make_context (kx_context *kc) +{ + krb5_kx_context *c; + krb5_error_code ret; + + kc->authenticate = krb5_authenticate; + kc->userok = krb5_userok; + kc->read = krb5_read; + kc->write = krb5_write; + kc->copy_encrypted = krb5_copy_encrypted; + kc->destroy = krb5_destroy; + kc->user = NULL; + kc->data = malloc(sizeof(krb5_kx_context)); + + if (kc->data == NULL) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "failed to malloc %u bytes", sizeof(krb5_kx_context)); + exit(1); + } + memset (kc->data, 0, sizeof(krb5_kx_context)); + c = (krb5_kx_context *)kc->data; + ret = krb5_init_context (&c->context); + if (ret) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "failed initialise krb5 context"); + exit(1); + } +} + +/* + * Receive authentication information on `sock' (first four bytes + * in `buf'). + */ + +int +recv_v5_auth (kx_context *kc, int sock, u_char *buf) +{ + u_int32_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + + if (memcmp (buf, "\x00\x00\x00\x13", 4) != 0) + return 1; + len = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | (buf[3]); + if (net_read(sock, buf, len) != len) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "read: %m"); + exit (1); + } + if (len != sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + || memcmp (buf, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) != 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "bad sendauth version: %.8s", buf); + exit (1); + } + + krb5_make_context (kc); + krb5_openlog(CONTEXT(kc), "kxd", &K5DATA(kc)->log); + krb5_set_warn_dest(CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->log); + + ret = krb5_sock_to_principal (CONTEXT(kc), sock, "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (ret) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "krb5_sock_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (CONTEXT(kc), ret)); + exit (1); + } + + ret = krb5_recvauth (CONTEXT(kc), + &auth_context, + &sock, + KX_VERSION, + server, + KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + NULL, + &ticket); + krb5_free_principal (CONTEXT(kc), server); + if (ret) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "krb5_sock_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (CONTEXT(kc), ret)); + exit (1); + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey (CONTEXT(kc), auth_context, &K5DATA(kc)->keyblock); + if (ret) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (CONTEXT(kc), ret)); + exit (1); + } + + ret = krb5_crypto_init (CONTEXT(kc), K5DATA(kc)->keyblock, 0, &K5DATA(kc)->crypto); + if (ret) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "krb5_crypto_init: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (CONTEXT(kc), ret)); + exit (1); + } + + K5DATA(kc)->client = ticket->client; + ticket->client = NULL; + krb5_free_ticket (CONTEXT(kc), ticket); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9e488fae81 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.1 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1996 - 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kx.1,v 1.9 2003/04/11 12:44:57 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 27, 1996 +.Dt KX 1 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm kx +.Nd +securely forward X conections +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Ar kx +.Op Fl l Ar username +.Op Fl k +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl t +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl P +.Ar host +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program forwards an X connection from a remote client to a local screen +through an authenticated and encrypted stream. Options supported by +.Nm kx : +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl l +Log in on the remote the host as user +.Ar username . +.It Fl k +Do not enable keep-alives on the TCP connections. +.It Fl d +Do not fork. This is mainly useful for debugging. +.It Fl t +Listen not only on a UNIX-domain socket but on a TCP socket as well. +.It Fl p +Use the port +.Ar port . +.It Fl P +Force passive mode. +.El +.Pp +This program is used by +.Nm rxtelnet +and +.Nm rxterm +and you should not need to run it directly. +.Pp +It connects to a +.Nm kxd +on the host +.Ar host +and then will relay the traffic from the remote X clients to the local +server. When started, it prints the display and Xauthority-file to be +used on host +.Ar host +and then goes to the background, waiting for connections from the +remote +.Nm kxd . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr rxtelnet 1 , +.Xr rxterm 1 , +.Xr kxd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27a69b5533 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.c @@ -0,0 +1,765 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kx.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kx.c,v 1.72 2003/04/16 17:33:02 joda Exp $"); + +static int nchild; +static int donep; + +/* + * Signal handler that justs waits for the children when they die. + */ + +static RETSIGTYPE +childhandler (int sig) +{ + pid_t pid; + int status; + + do { + pid = waitpid (-1, &status, WNOHANG|WUNTRACED); + if (pid > 0 && (WIFEXITED(status) || WIFSIGNALED(status))) + if (--nchild == 0 && donep) + exit (0); + } while(pid > 0); + signal (SIGCHLD, childhandler); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +/* + * Handler for SIGUSR1. + * This signal means that we should wait until there are no children + * left and then exit. + */ + +static RETSIGTYPE +usr1handler (int sig) +{ + donep = 1; + + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +/* + * Almost the same as for SIGUSR1, except we should exit immediately + * if there are no active children. + */ + +static RETSIGTYPE +usr2handler (int sig) +{ + donep = 1; + if (nchild == 0) + exit (0); + + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +/* + * Establish authenticated connection. Return socket or -1. + */ + +static int +connect_host (kx_context *kc) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + socklen_t addrlen; + int s; + struct sockaddr_storage thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr_ss; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(kc->port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (kc->host, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + warnx ("%s: %s", kc->host, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", kc->host); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (a == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return -1; + } + + addrlen = sizeof(thisaddr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0 || + addrlen != a->ai_addrlen) + err(1, "getsockname(%s)", kc->host); + memcpy (&kc->__ss_this, thisaddr, sizeof(kc->__ss_this)); + kc->thisaddr_len = addrlen; + memcpy (&kc->__ss_that, a->ai_addr, sizeof(kc->__ss_that)); + kc->thataddr_len = a->ai_addrlen; + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if ((*kc->authenticate)(kc, s)) + return -1; + return s; +} + +/* + * Get rid of the cookie that we were sent and get the correct one + * from our own cookie file instead and then just copy data in both + * directions. + */ + +static int +passive_session (int xserver, int fd, kx_context *kc) +{ + if (replace_cookie (xserver, fd, XauFileName(), 1)) + return 1; + else + return copy_encrypted (kc, xserver, fd); +} + +static int +active_session (int xserver, int fd, kx_context *kc) +{ + if (verify_and_remove_cookies (xserver, fd, 1)) + return 1; + else + return copy_encrypted (kc, xserver, fd); +} + +/* + * fork (unless debugp) and print the output that will be used by the + * script to capture the display, xauth cookie and pid. + */ + +static void +status_output (int debugp) +{ + if(debugp) + printf ("%u\t%s\t%s\n", (unsigned)getpid(), display, xauthfile); + else { + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + err(1, "fork"); + } else if (pid > 0) { + printf ("%u\t%s\t%s\n", (unsigned)pid, display, xauthfile); + exit (0); + } else { + fclose(stdout); + } + } +} + +/* + * Obtain an authenticated connection on `kc'. Send a kx message + * saying we are `kc->user' and want to use passive mode. Wait for + * answer on that connection and fork of a child for every new + * connection we have to make. + */ + +static int +doit_passive (kx_context *kc) +{ + int otherside; + u_char msg[1024], *p; + int len; + u_int32_t tmp; + const char *host = kc->host; + + otherside = connect_host (kc); + + if (otherside < 0) + return 1; +#if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (kc->keepalive_flag) { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (otherside, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + + p = msg; + *p++ = INIT; + len = strlen(kc->user); + p += KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, sizeof(msg) - 1, 4); + memcpy(p, kc->user, len); + p += len; + *p++ = PASSIVE | (kc->keepalive_flag ? KEEP_ALIVE : 0); + if (kx_write (kc, otherside, msg, p - msg) != p - msg) + err (1, "write to %s", host); + len = kx_read (kc, otherside, msg, sizeof(msg)); + if (len <= 0) + errx (1, + "error reading initial message from %s: " + "this probably means it's using an old version.", + host); + p = (u_char *)msg; + if (*p == ERROR) { + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp, 4, 0); + errx (1, "%s: %.*s", host, (int)tmp, p); + } else if (*p != ACK) { + errx (1, "%s: strange msg %d", host, *p); + } else + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp, 4, 0); + memcpy(display, p, tmp); + display[tmp] = '\0'; + p += tmp; + + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp, 4, 0); + memcpy(xauthfile, p, tmp); + xauthfile[tmp] = '\0'; + p += tmp; + + status_output (kc->debug_flag); + for (;;) { + pid_t child; + + len = kx_read (kc, otherside, msg, sizeof(msg)); + if (len < 0) + err (1, "read from %s", host); + else if (len == 0) + return 0; + + p = (u_char *)msg; + if (*p == ERROR) { + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp, 4, 0); + errx (1, "%s: %.*s", host, (int)tmp, p); + } else if(*p != NEW_CONN) { + errx (1, "%s: strange msg %d", host, *p); + } else { + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp, 4, 0); + } + + ++nchild; + child = fork (); + if (child < 0) { + warn("fork"); + continue; + } else if (child == 0) { + int fd; + int xserver; + + close (otherside); + + socket_set_port(kc->thataddr, htons(tmp)); + + fd = socket (kc->thataddr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + err(1, "socket"); +#if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif +#if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (kc->keepalive_flag) { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + + if (connect (fd, kc->thataddr, kc->thataddr_len) < 0) + err(1, "connect(%s)", host); + { + int d = 0; + char *s; + + s = getenv ("DISPLAY"); + if (s != NULL) { + s = strchr (s, ':'); + if (s != NULL) + d = atoi (s + 1); + } + + xserver = connect_local_xsocket (d); + if (xserver < 0) + return 1; + } + return passive_session (xserver, fd, kc); + } else { + } + } +} + +/* + * Allocate a local pseudo-xserver and wait for connections + */ + +static int +doit_active (kx_context *kc) +{ + int otherside; + int nsockets; + struct x_socket *sockets; + u_char msg[1024], *p; + int len = strlen(kc->user); + int tmp, tmp2; + char *s; + int i; + size_t rem; + u_int32_t other_port; + int error; + const char *host = kc->host; + + otherside = connect_host (kc); + if (otherside < 0) + return 1; +#if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (kc->keepalive_flag) { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (otherside, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + p = msg; + rem = sizeof(msg); + *p++ = INIT; + --rem; + len = strlen(kc->user); + tmp = KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, rem, 4); + if (tmp < 0) + return 1; + p += tmp; + rem -= tmp; + memcpy(p, kc->user, len); + p += len; + rem -= len; + *p++ = (kc->keepalive_flag ? KEEP_ALIVE : 0); + --rem; + + s = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (s == NULL || (s = strchr(s, ':')) == NULL) + s = ":0"; + len = strlen (s); + tmp = KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, rem, 4); + if (tmp < 0) + return 1; + rem -= tmp; + p += tmp; + memcpy (p, s, len); + p += len; + rem -= len; + + s = getenv("XAUTHORITY"); + if (s == NULL) + s = ""; + len = strlen (s); + tmp = KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, rem, 4); + if (tmp < 0) + return 1; + p += len; + rem -= len; + memcpy (p, s, len); + p += len; + rem -= len; + + if (kx_write (kc, otherside, msg, p - msg) != p - msg) + err (1, "write to %s", host); + + len = kx_read (kc, otherside, msg, sizeof(msg)); + if (len < 0) + err (1, "read from %s", host); + p = (u_char *)msg; + if (*p == ERROR) { + u_int32_t u32; + + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &u32, 4, 0); + errx (1, "%s: %.*s", host, (int)u32, p); + } else if (*p != ACK) { + errx (1, "%s: strange msg %d", host, *p); + } else + p++; + + tmp2 = get_xsockets (&nsockets, &sockets, kc->tcp_flag); + if (tmp2 < 0) + return 1; + display_num = tmp2; + if (kc->tcp_flag) + snprintf (display, display_size, "localhost:%u", display_num); + else + snprintf (display, display_size, ":%u", display_num); + error = create_and_write_cookie (xauthfile, xauthfile_size, + cookie, cookie_len); + if (error) { + warnx ("failed creating cookie file: %s", strerror(error)); + return 1; + } + status_output (kc->debug_flag); + for (;;) { + fd_set fdset; + pid_t child; + int fd, thisfd = -1; + socklen_t zero = 0; + + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) { + if (sockets[i].fd >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, &fdset); + } + if (select(FD_SETSIZE, &fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) + continue; + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) + if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, &fdset)) { + thisfd = sockets[i].fd; + break; + } + fd = accept (thisfd, NULL, &zero); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + err(1, "accept"); + } + + p = msg; + *p++ = NEW_CONN; + if (kx_write (kc, otherside, msg, p - msg) != p - msg) + err (1, "write to %s", host); + len = kx_read (kc, otherside, msg, sizeof(msg)); + if (len < 0) + err (1, "read from %s", host); + p = (u_char *)msg; + if (*p == ERROR) { + u_int32_t val; + + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &val, 4, 0); + errx (1, "%s: %.*s", host, (int)val, p); + } else if (*p != NEW_CONN) { + errx (1, "%s: strange msg %d", host, *p); + } else { + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &other_port, 4, 0); + } + + ++nchild; + child = fork (); + if (child < 0) { + warn("fork"); + continue; + } else if (child == 0) { + int s; + + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) + close (sockets[i].fd); + + close (otherside); + + socket_set_port(kc->thataddr, htons(tmp)); + + s = socket (kc->thataddr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) + err(1, "socket"); +#if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif +#if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (kc->keepalive_flag) { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + + if (connect (s, kc->thataddr, kc->thataddr_len) < 0) + err(1, "connect"); + + return active_session (fd, s, kc); + } else { + close (fd); + } + } +} + +/* + * Should we interpret `disp' as this being a passive call? + */ + +static int +check_for_passive (const char *disp) +{ + char local_hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; + + gethostname (local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)); + + return disp != NULL && + (*disp == ':' + || strncmp(disp, "unix", 4) == 0 + || strncmp(disp, "localhost", 9) == 0 + || strncmp(disp, local_hostname, strlen(local_hostname)) == 0); +} + +/* + * Set up signal handlers and then call the functions. + */ + +static int +doit (kx_context *kc, int passive_flag) +{ + signal (SIGCHLD, childhandler); + signal (SIGUSR1, usr1handler); + signal (SIGUSR2, usr2handler); + if (passive_flag) + return doit_passive (kc); + else + return doit_active (kc); +} + +#ifdef KRB4 + +/* + * Start a v4-authenticatated kx connection. + */ + +static int +doit_v4 (const char *host, int port, const char *user, + int passive_flag, int debug_flag, int keepalive_flag, int tcp_flag) +{ + int ret; + kx_context context; + + krb4_make_context (&context); + context_set (&context, + host, user, port, debug_flag, keepalive_flag, tcp_flag); + + ret = doit (&context, passive_flag); + context_destroy (&context); + return ret; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 + +/* + * Start a v5-authenticatated kx connection. + */ + +static int +doit_v5 (const char *host, int port, const char *user, + int passive_flag, int debug_flag, int keepalive_flag, int tcp_flag) +{ + int ret; + kx_context context; + + krb5_make_context (&context); + context_set (&context, + host, user, port, debug_flag, keepalive_flag, tcp_flag); + + ret = doit (&context, passive_flag); + context_destroy (&context); + return ret; +} +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +/* + * Variables set from the arguments + */ + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_v4 = -1; +#ifdef HAVE_KRB_ENABLE_DEBUG +static int krb_debug_flag = 0; +#endif /* HAVE_KRB_ENABLE_DEBUG */ +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#ifdef KRB5 +static int use_v5 = -1; +#endif +static char *port_str = NULL; +static const char *user = NULL; +static int tcp_flag = 0; +static int passive_flag = 0; +static int keepalive_flag = 1; +static int debug_flag = 0; +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "krb4", '4', arg_flag, &use_v4, "Use Kerberos V4", + NULL }, +#ifdef HAVE_KRB_ENABLE_DEBUG + { "krb4-debug", 'D', arg_flag, &krb_debug_flag, + "enable krb4 debugging" }, +#endif /* HAVE_KRB_ENABLE_DEBUG */ +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#ifdef KRB5 + { "krb5", '5', arg_flag, &use_v5, "Use Kerberos V5", + NULL }, +#endif + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "number-of-service" }, + { "user", 'l', arg_string, &user, "Run as this user", + NULL }, + { "tcp", 't', arg_flag, &tcp_flag, + "Use a TCP connection for X11" }, + { "passive", 'P', arg_flag, &passive_flag, + "Force a passive connection" }, + { "keepalive", 'k', arg_negative_flag, &keepalive_flag, + "disable keep-alives" }, + { "debug", 'd', arg_flag, &debug_flag, + "Enable debug information" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, "Print version", + NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, + NULL } +}; + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "host"); + exit (ret); +} + +/* + * kx - forward an x-connection over a kerberos-encrypted channel. + */ + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = 0; + int optind = 0; + int ret = 1; + char *host = NULL; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (optind != argc - 1) + usage (1); + + host = argv[optind]; + + if (port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (user == NULL) { + user = get_default_username (); + if (user == NULL) + errx (1, "who are you?"); + } + + if (!passive_flag) + passive_flag = check_for_passive (getenv("DISPLAY")); + +#if defined(HAVE_KERNEL_ENABLE_DEBUG) + if (krb_debug_flag) + krb_enable_debug (); +#endif + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5) + if(use_v4 == -1 && use_v5 == 1) + use_v4 = 0; + if(use_v5 == -1 && use_v4 == 1) + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret && use_v5) { + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname(NULL, "kx", "tcp", KX_PORT); + ret = doit_v5 (host, port, user, + passive_flag, debug_flag, keepalive_flag, tcp_flag); + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && use_v4) { + if (port == 0) + port = k_getportbyname("kx", "tcp", htons(KX_PORT)); + ret = doit_v4 (host, port, user, + passive_flag, debug_flag, keepalive_flag, tcp_flag); + } +#endif + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7d2c343ef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ + +KX(1) UNIX Reference Manual KX(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkxx - securely forward X conections + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_x [--ll _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e] [--kk] [--dd] [--tt] [--pp _p_o_r_t] [--PP] _h_o_s_t + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkxx program forwards an X connection from a remote client to a local + screen through an authenticated and encrypted stream. Options supported + by kkxx: + + --ll Log in on the remote the host as user _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e. + + --kk Do not enable keep-alives on the TCP connections. + + --dd Do not fork. This is mainly useful for debugging. + + --tt Listen not only on a UNIX-domain socket but on a TCP socket as + well. + + --pp Use the port _p_o_r_t. + + --PP Force passive mode. + + This program is used by rrxxtteellnneett and rrxxtteerrmm and you should not need to + run it directly. + + It connects to a kkxxdd on the host _h_o_s_t and then will relay the traffic + from the remote X clients to the local server. When started, it prints + the display and Xauthority-file to be used on host _h_o_s_t and then goes to + the background, waiting for connections from the remote kkxxdd. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + rxtelnet(1), rxterm(1), kxd(8) + + KTH-KRB September 27, 1996 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc66272335 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kx.h @@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kx.h,v 1.41 2003/04/16 16:45:43 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H +#include +#endif + +/* defined by aix's sys/stream.h and again by arpa/nameser.h */ + +#undef NOERROR + +/* as far as we know, this is only used with later versions of Slowlaris */ +#if SunOS >= 50 && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H) && defined(HAVE_FATTACH) && defined(I_PUSH) +#define MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES +#endif + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +/* This doesn't belong here. */ +struct tm *localtime(const time_t *); +struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +struct x_socket { + char *pathname; + int fd; + enum { + LISTENP = 0x80, + TCP = LISTENP | 1, + UNIX_SOCKET = LISTENP | 2, + STREAM_PIPE = 3 + } flags; +}; + +extern char x_socket[]; +extern u_int32_t display_num; +extern char display[]; +extern int display_size; +extern char xauthfile[]; +extern int xauthfile_size; +extern u_char cookie[]; +extern size_t cookie_len; + +int get_xsockets (int *number, struct x_socket **sockets, int tcpp); +int chown_xsockets (int n, struct x_socket *sockets, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); + +int connect_local_xsocket (unsigned dnr); +int create_and_write_cookie (char *xauthfile, + size_t size, + u_char *cookie, + size_t sz); +int verify_and_remove_cookies (int fd, int sock, int cookiesp); +int replace_cookie(int xserver, int fd, char *filename, int cookiesp); + +int suspicious_address (int sock, struct sockaddr *addr); + +#define KX_PORT 2111 + +#define KX_OLD_VERSION "KXSERV.1" +#define KX_VERSION "KXSERV.2" + +#define COOKIE_TYPE "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" + +enum { INIT = 0, ACK = 1, NEW_CONN = 2, ERROR = 3 }; + +enum kx_flags { PASSIVE = 1, KEEP_ALIVE = 2 }; + +typedef enum kx_flags kx_flags; + +struct kx_context { + int (*authenticate)(struct kx_context *kc, int s); + int (*userok)(struct kx_context *kc, char *user); + ssize_t (*read)(struct kx_context *kc, + int fd, void *buf, size_t len); + ssize_t (*write)(struct kx_context *kc, + int fd, const void *buf, size_t len); + int (*copy_encrypted)(struct kx_context *kc, + int fd1, int fd2); + void (*destroy)(struct kx_context *kc); + const char *host; + const char *user; + int port; + int debug_flag; + int keepalive_flag; + int tcp_flag; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss_this; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss_that; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr; + struct sockaddr *thataddr; + socklen_t thisaddr_len, thataddr_len; + void *data; +}; + +typedef struct kx_context kx_context; + +void +context_set (kx_context *kc, const char *host, const char *user, int port, + int debug_flag, int keepalive_flag, int tcp_flag); + +void +context_destroy (kx_context *kc); + +int +context_authenticate (kx_context *kc, int s); + +int +context_userok (kx_context *kc, char *user); + +ssize_t +kx_read (kx_context *kc, int fd, void *buf, size_t len); + +ssize_t +kx_write (kx_context *kc, int fd, const void *buf, size_t len); + +int +copy_encrypted (kx_context *kc, int fd1, int fd2); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +void +krb4_make_context (kx_context *c); + +int +recv_v4_auth (kx_context *kc, int sock, u_char *buf); + +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 + +void +krb5_make_context (kx_context *c); + +int +recv_v5_auth (kx_context *kc, int sock, u_char *buf); + +#endif + +void +fatal (kx_context *kc, int fd, char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))) +#endif +; + +#ifndef KRB4 + +int +krb_get_int(void *f, u_int32_t *to, int size, int lsb); + +int +krb_put_int(u_int32_t from, void *to, size_t rem, int size); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ba136e754 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1996 - 1997, 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kxd.8,v 1.7 2003/04/11 12:46:57 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 27, 1996 +.Dt KXD 8 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm kxd +.Nd +securely forward X conections +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Ar kxd +.Op Fl t +.Op Fl i +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Sh DESCRIPTION +This is the daemon for +.Nm kx . +.Pp +Options supported by +.Nm kxd : +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl t +TCP. Normally +.Nm kxd +will only listen for X connections on a UNIX socket, but some machines +(for example, Cray) have X libraries that are not able to use UNIX +sockets and thus you need to use TCP to talk to the pseudo-xserver +created by +.Nm kxd . +This option decreases the security significantly and should only be +used when it is necessary and you have considered the consequences of +doing so. +.It Fl i +Interactive. Do not expect to be started by +.Nm inetd , +but allocate and listen to the socket yourself. Handy for testing +and debugging. +.It Fl p +Port. Listen on the port +.Ar port . +Only usable with +.Fl i . +.El +.Sh EXAMPLES +Put the following in +.Pa /etc/inetd.conf : +.Bd -literal +kx stream tcp nowait root /usr/athena/libexec/kxd kxd +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kx 1 , +.Xr rxtelnet 1 , +.Xr rxterm 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b05cd6030 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.c @@ -0,0 +1,766 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kx.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kxd.c,v 1.71.2.2 2003/05/15 15:11:35 lha Exp $"); + +static pid_t wait_on_pid = -1; +static int done = 0; + +/* + * Signal handler that justs waits for the children when they die. + */ + +static RETSIGTYPE +childhandler (int sig) +{ + pid_t pid; + int status; + + do { + pid = waitpid (-1, &status, WNOHANG|WUNTRACED); + if (pid > 0 && pid == wait_on_pid) + done = 1; + } while(pid > 0); + signal (SIGCHLD, childhandler); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +/* + * Print the error message `format' and `...' on fd and die. + */ + +void +fatal (kx_context *kc, int fd, char *format, ...) +{ + u_char msg[1024]; + u_char *p; + va_list args; + int len; + + va_start(args, format); + p = msg; + *p++ = ERROR; + vsnprintf ((char *)p + 4, sizeof(msg) - 5, format, args); + syslog (LOG_ERR, "%s", (char *)p + 4); + len = strlen ((char *)p + 4); + p += KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, 4, 4); + p += len; + kx_write (kc, fd, msg, p - msg); + va_end(args); + exit (1); +} + +/* + * Remove all sockets and cookie files. + */ + +static void +cleanup(int nsockets, struct x_socket *sockets) +{ + int i; + + if(xauthfile[0]) + unlink(xauthfile); + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) { + if (sockets[i].pathname != NULL) { + unlink (sockets[i].pathname); + free (sockets[i].pathname); + } + } +} + +/* + * Prepare to receive a connection on `sock'. + */ + +static int +recv_conn (int sock, kx_context *kc, + int *dispnr, int *nsockets, struct x_socket **sockets, + int tcp_flag) +{ + u_char msg[1024], *p; + char user[256]; + socklen_t addrlen; + struct passwd *passwd; + char remotehost[MaxHostNameLen]; + char remoteaddr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; + int ret = 1; + int flags; + int len; + u_int32_t tmp32; + + addrlen = sizeof(kc->__ss_this); + kc->thisaddr = (struct sockaddr*)&kc->__ss_this; + if (getsockname (sock, kc->thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "getsockname: %m"); + exit (1); + } + kc->thisaddr_len = addrlen; + addrlen = sizeof(kc->__ss_that); + kc->thataddr = (struct sockaddr*)&kc->__ss_that; + if (getpeername (sock, kc->thataddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "getpeername: %m"); + exit (1); + } + kc->thataddr_len = addrlen; + + getnameinfo_verified (kc->thataddr, + kc->thataddr_len, + remotehost, sizeof(remotehost), + NULL, 0, 0); + + if (net_read (sock, msg, 4) != 4) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "read: %m"); + exit (1); + } + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret && recv_v5_auth (kc, sock, msg) == 0) + ret = 0; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && recv_v4_auth (kc, sock, msg) == 0) + ret = 0; +#endif + if (ret) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "unrecognized auth protocol: %x %x %x %x", + msg[0], msg[1], msg[2], msg[3]); + exit (1); + } + + len = kx_read (kc, sock, msg, sizeof(msg)); + if (len < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "kx_read failed"); + exit (1); + } + p = (u_char *)msg; + if (*p != INIT) + fatal(kc, sock, "Bad message"); + p++; + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp32, 4, 0); + len = min(sizeof(user), tmp32); + memcpy (user, p, len); + p += tmp32; + user[len] = '\0'; + + passwd = k_getpwnam (user); + if (passwd == NULL) + fatal (kc, sock, "cannot find uid for %s", user); + + if (context_userok (kc, user) != 0) + fatal (kc, sock, "%s not allowed to login as %s", + kc->user, user); + + flags = *p++; + + if (flags & PASSIVE) { + pid_t pid; + int tmp; + + tmp = get_xsockets (nsockets, sockets, tcp_flag); + if (tmp < 0) { + fatal (kc, sock, "Cannot create X socket(s): %s", + strerror(errno)); + } + *dispnr = tmp; + + if (chown_xsockets (*nsockets, *sockets, + passwd->pw_uid, passwd->pw_gid)) { + cleanup (*nsockets, *sockets); + fatal (kc, sock, "Cannot chown sockets: %s", + strerror(errno)); + } + + pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + cleanup (*nsockets, *sockets); + fatal (kc, sock, "fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + } else if (pid != 0) { + wait_on_pid = pid; + while (!done) + pause (); + cleanup (*nsockets, *sockets); + exit (0); + } + } + + if (setgid (passwd->pw_gid) || + initgroups(passwd->pw_name, passwd->pw_gid) || +#ifdef HAVE_GETUDBNAM /* XXX this happens on crays */ + setjob(passwd->pw_uid, 0) == -1 || +#endif + setuid(passwd->pw_uid)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setting uid/groups: %m"); + fatal (kc, sock, "cannot set uid"); + } + + ret = getnameinfo(kc->thataddr, kc->thataddr_len, + remoteaddr, sizeof(remoteaddr), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); + if (ret != 0) + fatal (kc, sock, "getnameinfo failed: %s", gai_strerror(ret)); + + syslog (LOG_INFO, "from %s(%s): %s -> %s", + remotehost, remoteaddr, + kc->user, user); + umask(077); + if (!(flags & PASSIVE)) { + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp32, 4, 0); + len = min(tmp32, display_size); + memcpy (display, p, len); + display[len] = '\0'; + p += tmp32; + p += krb_get_int (p, &tmp32, 4, 0); + len = min(tmp32, xauthfile_size); + memcpy (xauthfile, p, len); + xauthfile[len] = '\0'; + p += tmp32; + } +#if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (flags & KEEP_ALIVE) { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + return flags; +} + +/* + * + */ + +static int +passive_session (kx_context *kc, int fd, int sock, int cookiesp) +{ + if (verify_and_remove_cookies (fd, sock, cookiesp)) + return 1; + else + return copy_encrypted (kc, fd, sock); +} + +/* + * + */ + +static int +active_session (kx_context *kc, int fd, int sock, int cookiesp) +{ + fd = connect_local_xsocket(0); + + if (replace_cookie (fd, sock, xauthfile, cookiesp)) + return 1; + else + return copy_encrypted (kc, fd, sock); +} + +/* + * Handle a new connection. + */ + +static int +doit_conn (kx_context *kc, + int fd, int meta_sock, int flags, int cookiesp) +{ + int sock, sock2, port; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss_addr; + struct sockaddr *addr = (struct sockaddr*)&__ss_addr; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss_thisaddr; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr = (struct sockaddr*)&__ss_thisaddr; + socklen_t addrlen; + u_char msg[1024], *p; + + sock = socket (kc->thisaddr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "socket: %m"); + return 1; + } +#if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int one = 1; + setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *)&one, sizeof(one)); + } +#endif +#if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (flags & KEEP_ALIVE) { + int one = 1; + + setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + memset (&__ss_addr, 0, sizeof(__ss_addr)); + addr->sa_family = kc->thisaddr->sa_family; + if (kc->thisaddr_len > sizeof(__ss_addr)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in af"); + return 1; + } + if (bind (sock, addr, kc->thisaddr_len) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "bind: %m"); + return 1; + } + addrlen = sizeof(__ss_addr); + if (getsockname (sock, addr, &addrlen) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "getsockname: %m"); + return 1; + } + if (listen (sock, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "listen: %m"); + return 1; + } + port = socket_get_port(addr); + + p = msg; + *p++ = NEW_CONN; + p += KRB_PUT_INT (ntohs(port), p, 4, 4); + + if (kx_write (kc, meta_sock, msg, p - msg) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "write: %m"); + return 1; + } + + addrlen = sizeof(__ss_thisaddr); + sock2 = accept (sock, thisaddr, &addrlen); + if (sock2 < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "accept: %m"); + return 1; + } + close (sock); + close (meta_sock); + + if (flags & PASSIVE) + return passive_session (kc, fd, sock2, cookiesp); + else + return active_session (kc, fd, sock2, cookiesp); +} + +/* + * Is the current user the owner of the console? + */ + +static void +check_user_console (kx_context *kc, int fd) +{ + struct stat sb; + + if (stat ("/dev/console", &sb) < 0) + fatal (kc, fd, "Cannot stat /dev/console: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (getuid() != sb.st_uid) + fatal (kc, fd, "Permission denied"); +} + +/* close down the new connection with a reasonable error message */ +static void +close_connection(int fd, const char *message) +{ + char buf[264]; /* max message */ + char *p; + int lsb = 0; + size_t mlen; + + mlen = strlen(message); + if(mlen > 255) + mlen = 255; + + /* read first part of connection packet, to get byte order */ + if(read(fd, buf, 6) != 6) { + close(fd); + return; + } + if(buf[0] == 0x6c) + lsb++; + p = buf; + *p++ = 0; /* failed */ + *p++ = mlen; /* length of message */ + p += 4; /* skip protocol version */ + p += 2; /* skip additional length */ + memcpy(p, message, mlen); /* copy message */ + p += mlen; + while((p - buf) % 4) /* pad to multiple of 4 bytes */ + *p++ = 0; + + /* now fill in length of additional data */ + if(lsb) { + buf[6] = (p - buf - 8) / 4; + buf[7] = 0; + }else{ + buf[6] = 0; + buf[7] = (p - buf - 8) / 4; + } + write(fd, buf, p - buf); + close(fd); +} + + +/* + * Handle a passive session on `sock' + */ + +static int +doit_passive (kx_context *kc, + int sock, + int flags, + int dispnr, + int nsockets, + struct x_socket *sockets, + int tcp_flag) +{ + int tmp; + int len; + size_t rem; + u_char msg[1024], *p; + int error; + + display_num = dispnr; + if (tcp_flag) + snprintf (display, display_size, "localhost:%u", display_num); + else + snprintf (display, display_size, ":%u", display_num); + error = create_and_write_cookie (xauthfile, xauthfile_size, + cookie, cookie_len); + if (error) { + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + fatal (kc, sock, "Cookie-creation failed: %s", strerror(error)); + return 1; + } + + p = msg; + rem = sizeof(msg); + *p++ = ACK; + --rem; + + len = strlen (display); + tmp = KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, rem, 4); + if (tmp < 0 || rem < len + 4) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "doit: buffer too small"); + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + return 1; + } + p += tmp; + rem -= tmp; + + memcpy (p, display, len); + p += len; + rem -= len; + + len = strlen (xauthfile); + tmp = KRB_PUT_INT (len, p, rem, 4); + if (tmp < 0 || rem < len + 4) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "doit: buffer too small"); + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + return 1; + } + p += tmp; + rem -= tmp; + + memcpy (p, xauthfile, len); + p += len; + rem -= len; + + if(kx_write (kc, sock, msg, p - msg) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "write: %m"); + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + return 1; + } + for (;;) { + pid_t child; + int fd = -1; + fd_set fds; + int i; + int ret; + int cookiesp = TRUE; + + FD_ZERO(&fds); + if (sock >= FD_SETSIZE) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "fd too large"); + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + return 1; + } + + FD_SET(sock, &fds); + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) { + if (sockets[i].fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "fd too large"); + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + return 1; + } + FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, &fds); + } + ret = select(FD_SETSIZE, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if(ret <= 0) + continue; + if(FD_ISSET(sock, &fds)){ + /* there are no processes left on the remote side + */ + cleanup(nsockets, sockets); + exit(0); + } else if(ret) { + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) { + if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, &fds)) { + if (sockets[i].flags == TCP) { + struct sockaddr_storage __ss_peer; + struct sockaddr *peer = (struct sockaddr*)&__ss_peer; + socklen_t len = sizeof(__ss_peer); + + fd = accept (sockets[i].fd, + peer, + &len); + if (fd < 0 && errno != EINTR) + syslog (LOG_ERR, "accept: %m"); + + /* XXX */ + if (fd >= 0 && suspicious_address (fd, peer)) { + close (fd); + fd = -1; + errno = EINTR; + } + } else if(sockets[i].flags == UNIX_SOCKET) { + socklen_t zero = 0; + + fd = accept (sockets[i].fd, NULL, &zero); + + if (fd < 0 && errno != EINTR) + syslog (LOG_ERR, "accept: %m"); +#ifdef MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES + } else if(sockets[i].flags == STREAM_PIPE) { + /* + * this code tries to handle the + * send fd-over-pipe stuff for + * solaris + */ + + struct strrecvfd strrecvfd; + + ret = ioctl (sockets[i].fd, + I_RECVFD, &strrecvfd); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "ioctl I_RECVFD: %m"); + } + + /* XXX */ + if (ret == 0) { + if (strrecvfd.uid != getuid()) { + close (strrecvfd.fd); + fd = -1; + errno = EINTR; + } else { + fd = strrecvfd.fd; + cookiesp = FALSE; + } + } +#endif /* MAY_HAVE_X11_PIPES */ + } else + abort (); + break; + } + } + } + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + return 1; + } + + child = fork (); + if (child < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "fork: %m"); + if(errno != EAGAIN) + return 1; + close_connection(fd, strerror(errno)); + } else if (child == 0) { + for (i = 0; i < nsockets; ++i) + close (sockets[i].fd); + return doit_conn (kc, fd, sock, flags, cookiesp); + } else { + close (fd); + } + } +} + +/* + * Handle an active session on `sock' + */ + +static int +doit_active (kx_context *kc, + int sock, + int flags, + int tcp_flag) +{ + u_char msg[1024], *p; + + check_user_console (kc, sock); + + p = msg; + *p++ = ACK; + + if(kx_write (kc, sock, msg, p - msg) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "write: %m"); + return 1; + } + for (;;) { + pid_t child; + int len; + + len = kx_read (kc, sock, msg, sizeof(msg)); + if (len < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "read: %m"); + return 1; + } + p = (u_char *)msg; + if (*p != NEW_CONN) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "bad_message: %d", *p); + return 1; + } + + child = fork (); + if (child < 0) { + syslog (LOG_ERR, "fork: %m"); + if (errno != EAGAIN) + return 1; + } else if (child == 0) { + return doit_conn (kc, sock, sock, flags, 1); + } else { + } + } +} + +/* + * Receive a connection on `sock' and process it. + */ + +static int +doit(int sock, int tcp_flag) +{ + int ret; + kx_context context; + int dispnr; + int nsockets; + struct x_socket *sockets; + int flags; + + flags = recv_conn (sock, &context, &dispnr, &nsockets, &sockets, tcp_flag); + + if (flags & PASSIVE) + ret = doit_passive (&context, sock, flags, dispnr, + nsockets, sockets, tcp_flag); + else + ret = doit_active (&context, sock, flags, tcp_flag); + context_destroy (&context); + return ret; +} + +static char *port_str = NULL; +static int inetd_flag = 1; +static int tcp_flag = 0; +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "inetd", 'i', arg_negative_flag, &inetd_flag, + "Not started from inetd" }, + { "tcp", 't', arg_flag, &tcp_flag, "Use TCP" }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "port" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "host"); + exit (ret); +} + +/* + * kxd - receive a forwarded X conncection + */ + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + roken_openlog ("kxd", LOG_ODELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if(port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } else { +#if defined(KRB5) + port = krb5_getportbyname(NULL, "kx", "tcp", KX_PORT); +#elif defined(KRB4) + port = k_getportbyname ("kx", "tcp", htons(KX_PORT)); +#else +#error define KRB4 or KRB5 +#endif + } + + if (!inetd_flag) + mini_inetd (port); + + signal (SIGCHLD, childhandler); + return doit(STDIN_FILENO, tcp_flag); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e452b72c9e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/kxd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ + +KXD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KXD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkxxdd - securely forward X conections + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_x_d [--tt] [--ii] [--pp _p_o_r_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + This is the daemon for kkxx. + + Options supported by kkxxdd: + + --tt TCP. Normally kkxxdd will only listen for X connections on a UNIX + socket, but some machines (for example, Cray) have X libraries + that are not able to use UNIX sockets and thus you need to use + TCP to talk to the pseudo-xserver created by kkxxdd. This option de- + creases the security significantly and should only be used when + it is necessary and you have considered the consequences of doing + so. + + --ii Interactive. Do not expect to be started by iinneettdd, but allocate + and listen to the socket yourself. Handy for testing and debug- + ging. + + --pp Port. Listen on the port _p_o_r_t. Only usable with --ii. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + Put the following in _/_e_t_c_/_i_n_e_t_d_._c_o_n_f: + + kx stream tcp nowait root /usr/athena/libexec/kxd kxd + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kx(1), rxtelnet(1), rxterm(1) + + KTH-KRB September 27, 1996 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55f2561f9e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.1 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1996 - 1998, 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: rxtelnet.1,v 1.12 2003/04/11 12:48:46 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 27, 1996 +.Dt RXTELNET 1 +.Os KTH_KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm rxtelnet +.Nd +start a telnet and forward X-connections. +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm rxtelnet +.Op Fl l Ar username +.Op Fl k +.Op Fl t Ar telnet_args +.Op Fl x Ar xterm_args +.Op Fl K Ar kx_args +.Op Fl w Ar term_emulator +.Op Fl b Ar telnet_program +.Op Fl n +.Op Fl v +.Ar host +.Op Ar port +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program starts an +.Nm xterm +window with a telnet to host +.Ar host . +From this window you will also be able to run X clients that will be +able to connect securely to your X server. If +.Ar port +is given, that port will be used instead of the default. +.Pp +The supported options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl l +Log in on the remote host as user +.Ar username . +.It Fl k +Disables keep-alives. +.It Fl t +Send +.Ar telnet_args +as arguments to +.Nm telnet . +.It Fl x +Send +.Ar xterm_args +as arguments to +.Nm xterm . +.It Fl X +Send +.Ar kx_args +as arguments to +.Nm kx . +.It Fl w +Use +.Ar term_emulator +instead of xterm. +.It Fl b +Use +.Ar telnet_program +instead of telnet. +.It Fl n +Do not start any terminal emulator. +.It Fl v +Be verbose. +.El +.Sh EXAMPLE +To login from host +.Va foo +(where your display is) +to host +.Va bar , +you might do the following. +.Bl -enum +.It +On foo: +.Nm +.Va bar +.It +You will get a new window with a +.Nm telnet +to +.Va bar . +In this window you will be able to start X clients. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kx 1 , +.Xr rxterm 1 , +.Xr telnet 1 , +.Xr tenletxr 1 , +.Xr kxd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f95ab3fd9f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ + +RXTELNET(1) UNIX Reference Manual RXTELNET(1) + +NNAAMMEE + rrxxtteellnneett - start a telnet and forward X-connections. + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + rrxxtteellnneett [--ll _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e] [--kk] [--tt _t_e_l_n_e_t___a_r_g_s] [--xx _x_t_e_r_m___a_r_g_s] [--KK _k_x___a_r_g_s] + [--ww _t_e_r_m___e_m_u_l_a_t_o_r] [--bb _t_e_l_n_e_t___p_r_o_g_r_a_m] [--nn] [--vv] _h_o_s_t [_p_o_r_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The rrxxtteellnneett program starts an xxtteerrmm window with a telnet to host _h_o_s_t. + From this window you will also be able to run X clients that will be able + to connect securely to your X server. If _p_o_r_t is given, that port will be + used instead of the default. + + The supported options are: + + --ll Log in on the remote host as user _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e. + + --kk Disables keep-alives. + + --tt Send _t_e_l_n_e_t___a_r_g_s as arguments to tteellnneett. + + --xx Send _x_t_e_r_m___a_r_g_s as arguments to xxtteerrmm. + + --XX Send _k_x___a_r_g_s as arguments to kkxx. + + --ww Use _t_e_r_m___e_m_u_l_a_t_o_r instead of xterm. + + --bb Use _t_e_l_n_e_t___p_r_o_g_r_a_m instead of telnet. + + --nn Do not start any terminal emulator. + + --vv Be verbose. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + To login from host _f_o_o (where your display is) to host _b_a_r, you might do + the following. + + 1. On foo: rrxxtteellnneett _b_a_r + + 2. You will get a new window with a tteellnneett to _b_a_r. In this window you + will be able to start X clients. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kx(1), rxterm(1), telnet(1), tenletxr(1), kxd(8) + + KTH_KRB September 27, 1996 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b4497c74b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxtelnet.in @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: rxtelnet.in,v 1.29 2002/03/18 17:37:34 joda Exp $ +# +usage="Usage: $0 [-l username] [-k] [-f] [-t args_to_telnet] [-x args_to_xterm] [-K args_to_kx] [-w term_emulator] [-b telnet_binary] [-n] [-v] [-h | --help] [--version] host [port]" +binary=telnet +term= +kx_args=-P +while true +do + case $1 in + -l) telnet_args="${telnet_args} -l $2 "; kx_args="${kx_args} -l $2"; title="${2}@"; shift 2;; + -t) telnet_args="${telnet_args} $2 "; shift 2;; + -x) xterm_args="${xterm_args} $2 "; shift 2;; + -f) telnet_args="${telnet_args} -f"; shift;; + -k) kx_args="${kx_args} -k"; shift;; + -K) kx_args="${kx_args} $2 "; shift 2;; + -n) term=none; shift;; + -w) term=$2; shift 2;; + -b) binary=$2; shift 2;; + --version) echo "$0: %PACKAGE% %VERSION%"; exit 0;; + -h) echo $usage; exit 0;; + --help) echo $usage; exit 0;; + -v) set -x; verb=1; shift;; + -*) echo "$0: Bad option $1"; echo $usage; exit 1;; + *) break;; + esac +done +if test $# -lt 1; then + echo $usage + exit 1 +fi +host=$1 +port=$2 +title="${title}${host}" +bindir=%bindir% +pdc_trams=`dirname $0` +PATH=$pdc_trams:$bindir:$PATH +export PATH +set -- `kx $kx_args $host` +if test $# -ne 3; then + exit 1 +fi +screen=`echo $DISPLAY | sed -ne 's/[^:]*:[0-9]*\(\.[0-9]*\)/\1/p'` +pid=$1 +disp=${2}${screen} +auth=$3 +oldifs=$IFS +IFS=: +set -- $PATH +IFS=$oldifs +if test -z "$term"; then + for j in xterm dtterm aixterm dxterm hpterm; do + for i in $*; do + test -n "$i" || i="." + if test -x $i/$j; then + term=$j; break 2 + fi + done + done +fi +test "$verb" && echo "Telnet command used is `type $binary`." +if test -n "$term" -a "$term" != "none"; then + ($term -title $title -n $title $xterm_args -e env DISPLAY=$disp XAUTHORITY=$auth $binary -D $telnet_args $host $port; kill -USR2 $pid) & +else + env DISPLAY=$disp XAUTHORITY=$auth $binary -D $telnet_args $host $port + kill -USR2 $pid +fi diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68b6f3625b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.1 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1996 - 1997, 2001 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: rxterm.1,v 1.10 2003/04/11 12:50:03 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 11, 2003 +.Dt RXTERM 1 +.Os KTH_KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm rxterm +.Nd +start a secure remote xterm +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm rxterm +.Op Fl l Ar username +.Op Fl k +.Op Fl r Ar rsh_args +.Op Fl x Ar xterm_args +.Op Fl K Ar kx_args +.Op Fl w Ar term_emulator +.Op Fl b Ar rsh_program +.Ar host +.Op Ar port +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program starts an +.Nm xterm +window on host +.Ar host . +From this window you will also be able to run X clients that will be +able to connect securely to your X server. If +.Ar port +is given, that port will be used instead of the default. +.Pp +The supported options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl l +Log in on the remote host as user +.Ar username . +.It Fl k +Disable keep-alives. +.It Fl r +Send +.Ar rsh_args +as arguments to +.Nm rsh . +.It Fl x +Send +.Ar xterm_args +as arguments to +.Nm xterm . +.It Fl X +Send +.Ar kx_args +as arguments to +.Nm kx . +.It Fl w +Use +.Ar term_emulator +instead of xterm. +.It Fl b +Use +.Ar rsh_program +instead of rsh. +.It Fl v +Be verbose. +.El +.Sh EXAMPLE +To login from host +.Va foo +(where your display is) +to host +.Va bar , +you might do the following. +.Bl -enum +.It +On foo: +.Nm +.Va bar +.It +You will get a new window running an +.Nm xterm +on host +.Va bar . +In this window you will be able to start X clients. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kx 1 , +.Xr rsh 1 , +.Xr rxtelnet 1 , +.Xr tenletxr 1 , +.Xr kxd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41750c38c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ + +RXTERM(1) UNIX Reference Manual RXTERM(1) + +NNAAMMEE + rrxxtteerrmm - start a secure remote xterm + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + rrxxtteerrmm [--ll _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e] [--kk] [--rr _r_s_h___a_r_g_s] [--xx _x_t_e_r_m___a_r_g_s] [--KK _k_x___a_r_g_s] [--ww + _t_e_r_m___e_m_u_l_a_t_o_r] [--bb _r_s_h___p_r_o_g_r_a_m] _h_o_s_t [_p_o_r_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The rrxxtteerrmm program starts an xxtteerrmm window on host _h_o_s_t. From this window + you will also be able to run X clients that will be able to connect se- + curely to your X server. If _p_o_r_t is given, that port will be used instead + of the default. + + The supported options are: + + --ll Log in on the remote host as user _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e. + + --kk Disable keep-alives. + + --rr Send _r_s_h___a_r_g_s as arguments to rrsshh. + + --xx Send _x_t_e_r_m___a_r_g_s as arguments to xxtteerrmm. + + --XX Send _k_x___a_r_g_s as arguments to kkxx. + + --ww Use _t_e_r_m___e_m_u_l_a_t_o_r instead of xterm. + + --bb Use _r_s_h___p_r_o_g_r_a_m instead of rsh. + + --vv Be verbose. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + To login from host _f_o_o (where your display is) to host _b_a_r, you might do + the following. + + 1. On foo: rrxxtteerrmm _b_a_r + + 2. You will get a new window running an xxtteerrmm on host _b_a_r. In this win- + dow you will be able to start X clients. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kx(1), rsh(1), rxtelnet(1), tenletxr(1), kxd(8) + + KTH_KRB April 11, 2003 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9291d21dfa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/rxterm.in @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: rxterm.in,v 1.23 2002/03/18 17:37:34 joda Exp $ +# +usage="Usage: $0 [-l username] [-k] [-f] [-r rsh_args] [-x xterm_args] [-K kx_args] [-w term_emulator] [-b rsh_binary][-v] [-h | --help] [--version] host" +binary=rsh +term=xterm +while true +do + case $1 in + -l) rsh_args="${rsh_args} -l $2 "; kx_args="${kx_args} -l $2"; title="${2}@"; shift 2;; + -r) rsh_args="${rsh_args} $2 "; shift 2;; + -x) xterm_args="${xterm_args} $2 "; shift 2;; + -f) rsh_args="${rsh_args} -f"; shift;; + -k) kx_args="${kx_args} -k"; shift;; + -K) kx_args="${kx_args} $2 "; shift 2;; + -w) term=$2; shift 2;; + -b) binary=$2; shift 2;; + --version) echo "$0: %PACKAGE% %VERSION%"; exit 0;; + -h) echo $usage; exit 0;; + --help) echo $usage; exit 0;; + -v) set -x; shift;; + -*) echo "$0: Bad option $1"; echo $usage; exit 1;; + *) break;; + esac +done +if test $# -lt 1; then + echo "Usage: $0 host [arguments to $term]" + exit 1 +fi +host=$1 +title="${title}${host}" +bindir=%bindir% +pdc_trams=`dirname $0` +PATH=$pdc_trams:$bindir:$PATH +export PATH +set -- `kx $kx_args $host` +if test $# -ne 3; then + exit 1 +fi +screen=`echo $DISPLAY | sed -ne 's/[^:]*:[0-9]*\(\.[0-9]*\)/\1/p'` +pid=$1 +disp=${2}${screen} +auth=$3 +kill -USR1 $pid +$binary -n $rsh_args $host "/bin/sh -c 'DISPLAY=$disp XAUTHORITY=$auth $term -T $title -n $title $xterm_args /dev/null 2>/dev/null &'" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a48510c8d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.1 @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: tenletxr.1,v 1.5 2003/02/16 21:10:16 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 31, 1997 +.Dt TENLETXR 1 +.Os KTH_KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm tenletxr +.Nd +forward X-connections backwards. +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm tenletxr +.Op Fl l Ar username +.Op Fl k +.Ar host +.Op Ar port +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program +enables forwarding of X-connections from this machine to host +.Ar host . +If +.Ar port +is given, that port will be used instead of the default. +.Pp +The supported options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl l +Log in on the remote host as user +.Ar username +.It Fl k +Disables keep-alives. +.El +.Sh EXAMPLE +To login from host +.Va foo +to host +.Va bar +(where your display is), +you might do the following. +.Bl -enum +.It +On foo: +.Nm +.Va bar +.It +You will get a new shell where you will be able to start X clients +that will show their windows on +.Va bar . +.El +.Sh BUGS +It currently checks if you have permission to run it by checking if +you own +.Pa /dev/console +on the remote host. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kx 1 , +.Xr rxtelnet 1 , +.Xr rxterm 1 , +.Xr telnet 1 , +.Xr kxd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..99bcf7e240 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ + +TENLETXR(1) UNIX Reference Manual TENLETXR(1) + +NNAAMMEE + tteennlleettxxrr - forward X-connections backwards. + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + tteennlleettxxrr [--ll _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e] [--kk] _h_o_s_t [_p_o_r_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The tteennlleettxxrr program enables forwarding of X-connections from this ma- + chine to host _h_o_s_t. If _p_o_r_t is given, that port will be used instead of + the default. + + The supported options are: + + --ll Log in on the remote host as user _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e + + --kk Disables keep-alives. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + To login from host _f_o_o to host _b_a_r (where your display is), you might do + the following. + + 1. On foo: tteennlleettxxrr _b_a_r + + 2. You will get a new shell where you will be able to start X clients + that will show their windows on _b_a_r. + +BBUUGGSS + It currently checks if you have permission to run it by checking if you + own _/_d_e_v_/_c_o_n_s_o_l_e on the remote host. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kx(1), rxtelnet(1), rxterm(1), telnet(1), kxd(8) + + KTH_KRB March 31, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c05dc9d4c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/tenletxr.in @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: tenletxr.in,v 1.3 1999/02/04 09:29:59 assar Exp $ +# +usage="Usage: $0 [-l username] [-k] [-v] [-h | --help] [--version] host [port]" +while true +do + case $1 in + -l) kx_args="${kx_args} -l $2"; shift 2;; + -k) kx_args="${kx_args} -k"; shift;; + --version) echo "$0: %PACKAGE% %VERSION%"; exit 0;; + -h) echo $usage; exit 0;; + --help) echo $usage; exit 0;; + -v) set -x; shift;; + -*) echo "$0: Bad option $1"; echo $usage; exit 1;; + *) break;; + esac +done +if test $# -lt 1; then + echo $usage + exit 1 +fi +host=$1 +port=$2 +bindir=%bindir% +pdc_trams=`dirname $0` +PATH=$pdc_trams:$bindir:$PATH +export PATH +set -- `kx $kx_args $host` +if test $# -ne 3; then + exit 1 +fi +screen=`echo $DISPLAY | sed -ne 's/[^:]*:[0-9]*\(\.[0-9]*\)/\1/p'` +pid=$1 +disp=${2}${screen} +auth=$3 +env DISPLAY=$disp XAUTHORITY=$auth $SHELL +kill -USR2 $pid diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/writeauth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/writeauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11dc72dfec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/kx/writeauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* $XConsortium: AuWrite.c,v 1.6 94/04/17 20:15:45 gildea Exp $ */ + +/* + +Copyright (c) 1988 X Consortium + +Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal +in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights +to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell +copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN +CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + +Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not be +used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other dealings +in this Software without prior written authorization from the X Consortium. + +*/ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: writeauth.c,v 1.4 1999/05/12 17:59:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +static int +write_short (unsigned short s, FILE *file) +{ + unsigned char file_short[2]; + + file_short[0] = (s & (unsigned)0xff00) >> 8; + file_short[1] = s & 0xff; + if (fwrite (file_short, sizeof (file_short), 1, file) != 1) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int +write_counted_string (unsigned short count, char *string, FILE *file) +{ + if (write_short (count, file) == 0) + return 0; + if (fwrite (string, (int) sizeof (char), (int) count, file) != count) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +int +XauWriteAuth (FILE *auth_file, Xauth *auth) +{ + if (write_short (auth->family, auth_file) == 0) + return 0; + if (write_counted_string (auth->address_length, auth->address, auth_file) == 0) + return 0; + if (write_counted_string (auth->number_length, auth->number, auth_file) == 0) + return 0; + if (write_counted_string (auth->name_length, auth->name, auth_file) == 0) + return 0; + if (write_counted_string (auth->data_length, auth->data, auth_file) == 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3da323743a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +2004-09-08 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: pull up 1.62->1.63: use krb5_appdefault_boolean instead + of krb5_config_get_bool + +2003-03-24 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: install man pages + + * login.1: manpage for login + + * login.c: allow "welcome" as well as "motd" in login.conf + + * login.access.5: login.access manual page + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * login.c: also need pag_set + * login.c: if there is kerberos 5, call krb5_afslog\* + +2002-08-23 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: if motd is set in login.conf, output its contents + before starting the shell + +2002-02-27 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: reset signals to default, needed on solaris 8 + +2002-02-19 Johan Danielsson + + * login_locl.h: include netgroup.h and rpcsvc/ypclnt.h + + * login.c: make this build without krb5 + +2001-09-22 Assar Westerlund + + * login_locl.h: kludge: use absolute path to find prot.h so we do + not get confused by athena's prot.h + +2001-09-17 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): add setpcred + +2001-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: move osf2c magic earlier. from Mark Davies + + +2001-06-19 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_to4): dereference result from krb5_princ_realm. + noted by Thomas Nystrom + +2001-06-04 Assar Westerlund + + * update copyright messages on Wietse Venema's code. + +2001-05-31 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_to4): look for [realms]krb4_get_tickets to + decide whether to get kerberos 4 tickets + +2001-02-08 Assar Westerlund + + * utmp_login.c, utmpx_login.c: try to write a useful string as + host in utmp, using the same algoritm as telnetd + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: remove some krb5_free_context that might happen at + unappropriate times + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): set the group on the tty. + (r_flag): comment out + * login.c (krb5_to4): always return a value + +2000-10-15 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_to4): check another return code + +2000-08-22 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c (do_login): set PATH to something sane; + (start_logout_process): avoid getting signals sent to the parent + + * login_locl.h: _PATH_DEFPATH + +2000-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (login_timeout): add back + +2000-06-28 Johan Danielsson + + * env.c: new file for environment related functions + + * login.c: move environment stuff to separate file, allow + specifying list of environment files via login.conf + +2000-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): add otp + * login.c: add reading of /etc/environment. From Ake Sandgren + + add otp support. From Daniel Kouril + +2000-06-09 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): work-around for setuid and capabilities bug + fixed in Linux 2.2.16 + +2000-04-09 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: allow conversion of v5 -> v4 tickets when logging in + with forwarded tickets + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * conf.c: remove case for not having cgetent, since it's in roken + +1999-11-05 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): conditionalize shadow stuff on getspnam + +1999-10-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (login_DEPENDENCIES): remove, it's not entirely + correct and was causing problems with non-GNU make + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (start_logout_proceess): don't examine `prog' before + setting it. + +1999-10-27 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): chown and chmod the tty. some clean-up. + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_start_session): correct the ccache to + krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_verify): use krb5_verify_user_lrealm + +1999-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: SGI capability mumbo-jumbo + +1999-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c (start_logout_process): call setproctitle + + * login_locl.h: declare struct spwd + + * login.c: add support for starting extra processes at login and + logout; always preserve TERM and TZ + + * conf.c: add configuration file support + +1999-08-07 Assar Westerlund + + * shadow.c (check_shadow): check for a NULL sp + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): move down login incorrect to disallow account + guessing + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * utmpx_login.c (utmpx_login): fix for Solaris. From Miroslav + Ruda + + * login_locl.h: add and some prototypes + + * login.c: fixes with v4 and shadow support. From Miroslav Ruda + + + * shadow.c: new file with functions for handling shadow passwords + + * Makefile.am: add shadow + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): generate a better tty name + +1999-05-25 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c (do_login): set $SHELL + +1999-05-18 Assar Westerlund + + * add login-access + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: copy the v5 ccache to a file after having done setuid + +1999-05-09 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_verify): check seteuid for errors + +Mon Apr 19 22:30:55 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: conditionalize the kafs calls on KRB4 + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): add kafs + + * login.c: add support for getting afs tokens with v4 and v5 + +Sun Apr 18 14:12:28 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: check _PATH_NOLOGIN + + * login_locl.h: _PATH_NOLOGIN + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): use print_version + +Thu Apr 8 15:03:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER et.al. (moved to + config.h) + + * login_locl.h: include udb.h, sys/resource.h, and sys/category.h + +Sat Mar 27 17:58:37 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: osfc2.c + + * login.c: magic for OSF C2, and Crays + + * login_locl.h: do_osfc2_magic proto + + * osfc2.c: bsd_locl -> login_locl + + * osfc2.c: OSF C2 magic + +Tue Mar 23 14:17:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login_locl.h: _PATH_UTMP + +Sun Mar 21 15:02:31 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: `-h' is host, not help + +Sat Mar 20 00:11:13 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * login_locl.h: krb.h: add + + * login.c: static-size + (krb4_verify): add + +Thu Mar 18 11:36:10 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Thu Mar 11 17:53:36 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * utmpx_login.c: add some consts + + * utmp_login.c: add some consts + + * login.c: staticize + + * login_locl.h: add prototypes, and defaults for + _PATH_* + +Mon Mar 1 10:49:14 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * utmpx_login.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + + * utmp_login.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..860ce70e52 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.21 2003/03/24 16:15:48 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +man_MANS = login.1 login.access.5 + +bin_PROGRAMS = login + +login_SOURCES = \ + conf.c \ + env.c \ + login.c \ + login_access.c \ + login_locl.h \ + login_protos.h \ + osfc2.c \ + read_string.c \ + shadow.c \ + stty_default.c \ + tty.c \ + utmp_login.c \ + utmpx_login.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_otp) \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_security) \ + $(DBLIB) + +$(srcdir)/login_protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o login_protos.h -q -P comment $(login_SOURCES) || rm -f login_protos.h + +$(login_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/login_protos.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72648ab609 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,889 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.21 2003/03/24 16:15:48 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(login_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog +bin_PROGRAMS = login$(EXEEXT) +subdir = appl/login 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$(srcdir)/login_protos.h +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/conf.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/conf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85cfc0099d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/conf.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: conf.c,v 1.3 2000/05/29 16:52:24 assar Exp $"); + +static char *confbuf; + +static int +login_conf_init(void) +{ + char *files[] = { _PATH_LOGIN_CONF, NULL }; + return cgetent(&confbuf, files, "default"); +} + +char * +login_conf_get_string(const char *str) +{ + char *value; + if(login_conf_init() != 0) + return NULL; + if(cgetstr(confbuf, (char *)str, &value) < 0) + return NULL; + return value; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/env.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/env.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..57f68b1c9a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/env.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: env.c,v 1.1 2000/06/28 12:27:38 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * the environment we will send to execle and the shell. + */ + +char **env; +int num_env; + +void +extend_env(char *str) +{ + env = realloc(env, (num_env + 1) * sizeof(*env)); + if(env == NULL) + errx(1, "Out of memory!"); + env[num_env++] = str; +} + +void +add_env(const char *var, const char *value) +{ + int i; + char *str; + asprintf(&str, "%s=%s", var, value); + if(str == NULL) + errx(1, "Out of memory!"); + for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) + if(strncmp(env[i], var, strlen(var)) == 0 && + env[i][strlen(var)] == '='){ + free(env[i]); + env[i] = str; + return; + } + + extend_env(str); +} + +void +copy_env(void) +{ + char **p; + for(p = environ; *p; p++) + extend_env(*p); +} + +int +login_read_env(const char *file) +{ + char **newenv; + char *p; + int i, j; + + newenv = NULL; + i = read_environment(file, &newenv); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + p = strchr(newenv[j], '='); + *p++ = 0; + add_env(newenv[j], p); + *--p = '='; + free(newenv[j]); + } + free(newenv); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b0c9a6ce74 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.1 @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +.\" $Id: login.1,v 1.1 2003/03/24 16:15:12 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 24, 2003 +.Dt LOGIN 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm login +.Nd +authenticate a user and start new session +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl fp +.Op Fl a Ar level +.Op Fl h Ar hostname +.Ar [username] +.Sh DESCRIPTION +This manual page documents the +.Nm login +program distributed with the Heimdal Kerberos 5 implementation, it may +differ in important ways from your system version. +.Pp +The +.Nm login +programs logs users into the system. It is intended to be run by +system daemons like +.Xr getty 8 +or +.Xr telnetd 8 . +If you are already logged in, but want to change to another user, you +should use +.Xr su 1 . +.Pp +A username can be given on the command line, else one will be prompted +for. +.Pp +A password is required to login, unless the +.Fl f +option is given (indicating that the calling program has already done +proper authentication). With +.Fl f +the user will be logged in without further questions. +.Pp +For password authentication Kerberos 5, Kerberos 4 (if compiled in), +OTP (if compiled in) and local +.No ( Pa /etc/passwd ) +passwords are supported. OTP will be used if the the user is +registered to use it, and +.Nm login +is given the option +.Fl a Li otp . +When using OTP, a challenge is shown to the user. +.Pp +Further options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl a Ar string +Which authentication mode to use, the only supported value is +currently +.Dq otp . +.It Fl f +Indicates that the user is already authenticated. This happens, for +instance, when login is started by telnetd, and the user has proved +authentic via Kerberos. +.It Fl h Ar hostname +Indicates which host the user is logging in from. This is passed from +telnetd, and is entered into the login database. +.It Fl p +This tells +.Nm login +to preserve all environment variables. If not given, only the +.Dv TERM +and +.Dv TZ +variables are preserved. It could be a security risk to pass random +variables to +.Nm login +or the user shell, so the calling daemon should make sure it only +passes +.Dq safe +variables. +.El +.Pp +The process of logging user in proceeds as follows. +.Pp +First a check is made that logins are allowed at all. This usually +means checking +.Pa /etc/nologin . +If it exists, and the user trying to login is not root, the contents +is printed, and then login exits. +.Pp +Then various system parameters are set up, like changing the owner of +the tty to the user, setting up signals, setting the group list, and +user and group id. Also various machine specific tasks are performed. +.Pp +Next +.Nm login +changes to the users home directory, or if that fails, to +.Pa / . +The environment is setup, by adding some required variables (such as +.Dv PATH ) , +and also authentication related ones (such as +.Dv KRB5CCNAME ) . +If an environment file exists +.No ( Pa /etc/environment ) , +variables are set according to +it. +.Pp +If one or more login message files are configured, their contents is +printed to the terminal. +.Pp +If a login time command is configured, it is executed. A logout time +command can also be configured, which makes +.Nm login +fork, and wait for the user shell to exit, and then run the command. +This can be used to clean up user credentials. +.Pp +Finally, the user's shell is executed. If the user logging in is root, +and root's login shell does not exist, a default shell (usually +.Pa /bin/sh ) +is also tried before giving up. +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +These environment variables are set by login (not including ones set by +.Pa /etc/environment ) : +.Pp +.Bl -tag -compact -width USERXXLOGNAME +.It Dv PATH +the default system path +.It Dv HOME +the user's home directory (or possibly +.Pa / ) +.It Dv USER , Dv LOGNAME +both set to the username +.It Dv SHELL +the user's shell +.It Dv TERM , Dv TZ +set to whatever is passed to +.Nm login +.It Dv KRB5CCNAME +if the password is verified via Kerberos 5, this will point to the +credentials cache file +.It Dv KRBTKFILE +if the password is verified via Kerberos 4, this will point to the +ticket file +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -compact -width Ds +.It Pa /etc/environment +Contains a set of environment variables that should be set in addition +to the ones above. It should contain sh-style assignments like +.Dq VARIABLE=value . +Note that they are not parsed the way a shell would. No variable +expansion is performed, and all strings are literal, and quotation +marks should not be used. Everything after a hash mark is considered a +comment. The following are all different (the last will set the +variable +.Dv BAR , +not +.Dv FOO ) . +.Bd -literal -offset indent +FOO=this is a string +FOO="this is a string" +BAR= FOO='this is a string' +.Ed +.It Pa /etc/login.access +See +.Xr login.access 5 . +.It Pa /etc/login.conf +This is a termcap style configuration file, that contains various +settings used by +.Nm login . +Currently only the +.Dq default +capability record is used. The possible capability strings include: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -compact -width Ds +.It Li environment +This is a comma separated list of environment files that are read in +the order specified. If this is missing the default +.Pa /etc/environment +is used. +.It Li login_program +This program will be executed just before the user's shell is started. +It will be called without arguments. +.It Li logout_program +This program will be executed just after the user's shell has +terminated. It will be called without arguments. This program will be +the parent process of the spawned shell. +.It Li motd +A comma separated list of text files that will be printed to the +user's terminal before starting the shell. The string +.Li welcome +works similarly, but points to a single file. +.El +.It Pa /etc/nologin +If it exists, login is denied to all but root. The contents of this +file is printed before login exits. +.El +.Pp +Other +.Nm login +programs typically print all sorts of information by default, such as +last time you logged in, if you have mail, and system message files. +This version of +.Nm login +does not, so there is no reason for +.Pa .hushlogin +files or similar. We feel that these tasks are best left to the user's +shell, but the +.Li login_program +facility allows for a shell independent solution, if that is desired. +.Sh EXAMPLES +A +.Pa login.conf +file could look like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +default:\\ + :motd=/etc/motd,/etc/motd.local: +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr su 1 , +.Xr login.access 5 , +.Xr getty 8 , +.Xr telnetd 8 +.Sh AUTHORS +This login program was written for the Heimdal Kerberos 5 +implementation. The login.access code was written by Wietse Venema. +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.access.5 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.access.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be8828c94f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.access.5 @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +.\" $Id: login.access.5,v 1.1 2003/03/24 15:49:30 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 21, 2003 +.Dt LOGIN.ACCESS 5 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm login.access +.Nd +login access control table +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm login.access +file specifies on which ttys or from which hosts certain users are +allowed to login. +.Pp +At login, the +.Pa /etc/login.access +file is checked for the first entry that matches a specific user/host +or user/tty combination. That entry can either allow or deny login +access to that user. +.Pp +Each entry have three fields separated by colon: +.Bl -bullet +.It +The first field indicates the permission given if the entry matches. +It can be either +.Dq + +(allow access) +or +.Dq - +(deny access) . +.It +The second field is a comma separated list of users or groups for +which the current entry applies. NIS netgroups can used (if +configured) if preceeded by @. The magic string ALL matches all users. +A group will match if the user is a member of that group, or it is the +user's primary group. +.It +The third field is a list of ttys, or network names. A network name +can be either a hostname, a domain (indicated by a starting period), +or a netgroup. As with the user list, ALL matches anything. LOCAL +matches a string not containing a period. +.El +.Pp +If the string EXCEPT is found in either the user or from list, the +rest of the list are exceptions to the list before EXCEPT. +.Sh BUGS +If there's a user and a group with the same name, there is no way to +make the group match if the user also matches. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr login 1 +.Sh AUTHORS +The +.Fn login_access +function was written by +Wietse Venema. This manual page was written for Heimdal. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.access.cat5 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.access.cat5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d53505c5b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.access.cat5 @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ + +LOGIN.ACCESS(5) UNIX Programmer's Manual LOGIN.ACCESS(5) + +NNAAMMEE + llooggiinn..aacccceessss - login access control table + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The llooggiinn..aacccceessss file specifies on which ttys or from which hosts certain + users are allowed to login. + + At login, the _/_e_t_c_/_l_o_g_i_n_._a_c_c_e_s_s file is checked for the first entry that + matches a specific user/host or user/tty combination. That entry can ei- + ther allow or deny login access to that user. + + Each entry have three fields separated by colon: + + ++oo The first field indicates the permission given if the entry matches. + It can be either ``+'' (allow access) or ``-'' (deny access) . + + ++oo The second field is a comma separated list of users or groups for + which the current entry applies. NIS netgroups can used (if config- + ured) if preceeded by @. The magic string ALL matches all users. A + group will match if the user is a member of that group, or it is the + user's primary group. + + ++oo The third field is a list of ttys, or network names. A network name + can be either a hostname, a domain (indicated by a starting period), + or a netgroup. As with the user list, ALL matches anything. LOCAL + matches a string not containing a period. + + If the string EXCEPT is found in either the user or from list, the rest + of the list are exceptions to the list before EXCEPT. + +BBUUGGSS + If there's a user and a group with the same name, there is no way to make + the group match if the user also matches. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + login(1) + +AAUUTTHHOORRSS + The llooggiinn__aacccceessss() function was written by Wietse Venema. This manual + page was written for Heimdal. + + HEIMDAL March 21, 2003 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1531eecbfa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.c @@ -0,0 +1,858 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_CAPABILITY_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: login.c,v 1.59.2.1 2004/09/08 09:15:39 joda Exp $"); + +static int login_timeout = 60; + +static int +start_login_process(void) +{ + char *prog, *argv0; + prog = login_conf_get_string("login_program"); + if(prog == NULL) + return 0; + argv0 = strrchr(prog, '/'); + + if(argv0) + argv0++; + else + argv0 = prog; + + return simple_execle(prog, argv0, NULL, env); +} + +static int +start_logout_process(void) +{ + char *prog, *argv0; + pid_t pid; + + prog = login_conf_get_string("logout_program"); + if(prog == NULL) + return 0; + argv0 = strrchr(prog, '/'); + + if(argv0) + argv0++; + else + argv0 = prog; + + pid = fork(); + if(pid == 0) { + /* avoid getting signals sent to the shell */ + setpgid(0, getpid()); + return 0; + } + if(pid == -1) + err(1, "fork"); + /* wait for the real login process to exit */ +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + setproctitle("waitpid %d", pid); +#endif + while(1) { + int status; + int ret; + ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if(ret > 0) { + if(WIFEXITED(status) || WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + execle(prog, argv0, NULL, env); + err(1, "exec %s", prog); + } + } else if(ret < 0) + err(1, "waitpid"); + } +} + +static void +exec_shell(const char *shell, int fallback) +{ + char *sh; + const char *p; + + extend_env(NULL); + if(start_login_process() < 0) + warn("login process"); + start_logout_process(); + + p = strrchr(shell, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = shell; + asprintf(&sh, "-%s", p); + execle(shell, sh, NULL, env); + if(fallback){ + warnx("Can't exec %s, trying %s", + shell, _PATH_BSHELL); + execle(_PATH_BSHELL, "-sh", NULL, env); + err(1, "%s", _PATH_BSHELL); + } + err(1, "%s", shell); +} + +static enum { NONE = 0, AUTH_KRB4 = 1, AUTH_KRB5 = 2, AUTH_OTP = 3 } auth; + +#ifdef OTP +static OtpContext otp_ctx; + +static int +otp_verify(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + return (otp_verify_user (&otp_ctx, password)); +} +#endif /* OTP */ + + +static int pag_set = 0; + +#ifdef KRB5 +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_ccache id, id2; + +static int +krb5_verify(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, pwd->pw_name, &princ); + if(ret) + return 1; + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &id); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return 1; + } + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(context, + princ, + id, + password, + 1, + NULL); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static krb5_error_code +krb5_to4 (krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ; + + int get_v4_tgt; + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, id, &princ); + if(ret == 0) { + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, "login", + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, princ), + "krb4_get_tickets", FALSE, &get_v4_tgt); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + } else { + krb5_realm realm = NULL; + krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, "login", + realm, + "krb4_get_tickets", FALSE, &get_v4_tgt); + free(realm); + } + + if (get_v4_tgt) { + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + char krb4tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, id, &princ); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, + princ->realm, + "krbtgt", + princ->realm, + NULL); + krb5_free_principal (context, princ); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, id, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(context, id, &cred, &c); + if(ret == 0) { + snprintf(krb4tkfile,sizeof(krb4tkfile),"%s%d",TKT_ROOT, + getuid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(krb4tkfile); + tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + } + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + } + krb5_free_principal(context, mcred.server); + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +static int +krb5_start_session (const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char residual[64]; + + /* copy credentials to file cache */ + snprintf(residual, sizeof(residual), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u", + (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid); + krb5_cc_resolve(context, residual, &id2); + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache(context, id, id2); + if (ret == 0) + add_env("KRB5CCNAME", residual); + else { + krb5_cc_destroy (context, id2); + return ret; + } +#ifdef KRB4 + krb5_to4 (id2); +#endif + krb5_cc_close(context, id2); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, id); + return 0; +} + +static void +krb5_finish (void) +{ + krb5_free_context(context); +} + +static void +krb5_get_afs_tokens (const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + char cell[64]; + char *pw_dir; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if (!k_hasafs ()) + return; + + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id2); + + if (ret == 0) { + pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir; + + if (!pag_set) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set = 1; + } + + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id2, + cell, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id2, NULL, NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_cc_close (context, id2); + } +} + +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef KRB4 + +static int +krb4_verify(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + char lrealm[REALM_SZ]; + int ret; + char ticket_file[MaxPathLen]; + + ret = krb_get_lrealm (lrealm, 1); + if (ret) + return 1; + + snprintf (ticket_file, sizeof(ticket_file), + "%s%u_%u", + TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid, (unsigned)getpid()); + + krb_set_tkt_string (ticket_file); + + ret = krb_verify_user (pwd->pw_name, "", lrealm, (char *)password, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL, NULL); + if (ret) + return 1; + + if (chown (ticket_file, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { + dest_tkt(); + return 1; + } + + add_env ("KRBTKFILE", ticket_file); + return 0; +} + +static void +krb4_get_afs_tokens (const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + char cell[64]; + char *pw_dir; + + if (!k_hasafs ()) + return; + + pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir; + + if (!pag_set) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set = 1; + } + + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog_uid_home (cell, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + + krb_afslog_uid_home (NULL, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +static int f_flag; +static int p_flag; +#if 0 +static int r_flag; +#endif +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +static char *remote_host; +static char *auth_level = NULL; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, 'a', arg_string, &auth_level, "authentication mode" }, +#if 0 + { NULL, 'd' }, +#endif + { NULL, 'f', arg_flag, &f_flag, "pre-authenticated" }, + { NULL, 'h', arg_string, &remote_host, "remote host", "hostname" }, + { NULL, 'p', arg_flag, &p_flag, "don't purge environment" }, +#if 0 + { NULL, 'r', arg_flag, &r_flag, "rlogin protocol" }, +#endif + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag,&help_flag, } +}; + +int nargs = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +update_utmp(const char *username, const char *hostname, + char *tty, char *ttyn) +{ + /* + * Update the utmp files, both BSD and SYSV style. + */ + if (utmpx_login(tty, username, hostname) != 0 && !f_flag) { + printf("No utmpx entry. You must exec \"login\" from the " + "lowest level shell.\n"); + exit(1); + } + utmp_login(ttyn, username, hostname); +} + +static void +checknologin(void) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[1024]; + + f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return; + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stdout); + fclose(f); + exit(0); +} + +/* print contents of a file */ +static void +show_file(const char *file) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + if((f = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) + return; + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stdout); + fclose(f); +} + +/* + * Actually log in the user. `pwd' contains all the relevant + * information about the user. `ttyn' is the complete name of the tty + * and `tty' the short name. + */ + +static void +do_login(const struct passwd *pwd, char *tty, char *ttyn) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + struct spwd *sp; +#endif + int rootlogin = (pwd->pw_uid == 0); + gid_t tty_gid; + struct group *gr; + const char *home_dir; + int i; + + if(!rootlogin) + checknologin(); + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + sp = getspnam(pwd->pw_name); +#endif + + update_utmp(pwd->pw_name, remote_host ? remote_host : "", + tty, ttyn); + + gr = getgrnam ("tty"); + if (gr != NULL) + tty_gid = gr->gr_gid; + else + tty_gid = pwd->pw_gid; + + if (chown (ttyn, pwd->pw_uid, tty_gid) < 0) { + warn("chown %s", ttyn); + if (rootlogin == 0) + exit (1); + } + + if (chmod (ttyn, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP) < 0) { + warn("chmod %s", ttyn); + if (rootlogin == 0) + exit (1); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOGIN + if(setlogin(pwd->pw_name)){ + warn("setlogin(%s)", pwd->pw_name); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED + if (setpcred (pwd->pw_name, NULL) == -1) + warn("setpcred(%s)", pwd->pw_name); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ +#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS + if(initgroups(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid)){ + warn("initgroups(%s, %u)", pwd->pw_name, (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } +#endif + if(do_osfc2_magic(pwd->pw_uid)) + exit(1); + if(setgid(pwd->pw_gid)){ + warn("setgid(%u)", (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } + if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) || (pwd->pw_uid != 0 && setuid(0) == 0)) { + warn("setuid(%u)", (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } + + /* make sure signals are set to default actions, apparently some + OS:es like to ignore SIGINT, which is not very convenient */ + + for (i = 1; i < NSIG; ++i) + signal(i, SIG_DFL); + + /* all kinds of different magic */ + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + check_shadow(pwd, sp); +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_GETUDBNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETLIM) + { + struct udb *udb; + long t; + const long maxcpu = 46116860184; /* some random constant */ + udb = getudbnam(pwd->pw_name); + if(udb == UDB_NULL) + errx(1, "Failed to get UDB entry."); + t = udb->ue_pcpulim[UDBRC_INTER]; + if(t == 0 || t > maxcpu) + t = CPUUNLIM; + else + t *= 100 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC; + + if(limit(C_PROC, 0, L_CPU, t) < 0) + warn("limit C_PROC"); + + t = udb->ue_jcpulim[UDBRC_INTER]; + if(t == 0 || t > maxcpu) + t = CPUUNLIM; + else + t *= 100 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC; + + if(limit(C_JOBPROCS, 0, L_CPU, t) < 0) + warn("limit C_JOBPROCS"); + + nice(udb->ue_nice[UDBRC_INTER]); + } +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SGI_GETCAPABILITYBYNAME) && defined(HAVE_CAP_SET_PROC) + /* XXX SGI capability hack IRIX 6.x (x >= 0?) has something + called capabilities, that allow you to give away + permissions (such as chown) to specific processes. From 6.5 + this is default on, and the default capability set seems to + not always be the empty set. The problem is that the + runtime linker refuses to do just about anything if the + process has *any* capabilities set, so we have to remove + them here (unless otherwise instructed by /etc/capability). + In IRIX < 6.5, these functions was called sgi_cap_setproc, + etc, but we ignore this fact (it works anyway). */ + { + struct user_cap *ucap = sgi_getcapabilitybyname(pwd->pw_name); + cap_t cap; + if(ucap == NULL) + cap = cap_from_text("all="); + else + cap = cap_from_text(ucap->ca_default); + if(cap == NULL) + err(1, "cap_from_text"); + if(cap_set_proc(cap) < 0) + err(1, "cap_set_proc"); + cap_free(cap); + free(ucap); + } +#endif + home_dir = pwd->pw_dir; + if (chdir(home_dir) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "No home directory \"%s\"!\n", pwd->pw_dir); + if (chdir("/")) + exit(0); + home_dir = "/"; + fprintf(stderr, "Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"); + } +#ifdef KRB5 + if (auth == AUTH_KRB5) { + krb5_start_session (pwd); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + else if (auth == 0) { + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id; + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &id); + if (ret == 0) { + krb5_to4 (id); + krb5_cc_close (context, id); + } + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + krb5_get_afs_tokens (pwd); + + krb5_finish (); +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef KRB4 + krb4_get_afs_tokens (pwd); +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + add_env("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH); + + { + const char *str = login_conf_get_string("environment"); + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if(str == NULL) { + login_read_env(_PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT); + } else { + while(strsep_copy(&str, ",", buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1) { + if(buf[0] == '\0') + continue; + login_read_env(buf); + } + } + } + { + const char *str = login_conf_get_string("motd"); + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if(str != NULL) { + while(strsep_copy(&str, ",", buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1) { + if(buf[0] == '\0') + continue; + show_file(buf); + } + } else { + str = login_conf_get_string("welcome"); + if(str != NULL) + show_file(str); + } + } + add_env("HOME", home_dir); + add_env("USER", pwd->pw_name); + add_env("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name); + add_env("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell); + exec_shell(pwd->pw_shell, rootlogin); +} + +static int +check_password(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + if(pwd->pw_passwd == NULL) + return 1; + if(pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '\0'){ +#ifdef ALLOW_NULL_PASSWORD + return password[0] != '\0'; +#else + return 1; +#endif + } + if(strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) == 0) + return 0; +#ifdef KRB5 + if(krb5_verify(pwd, password) == 0) { + auth = AUTH_KRB5; + return 0; + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (krb4_verify (pwd, password) == 0) { + auth = AUTH_KRB4; + return 0; + } +#endif +#ifdef OTP + if (otp_verify (pwd, password) == 0) { + auth = AUTH_OTP; + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +static void +usage(int status) +{ + arg_printusage(args, nargs, NULL, "[username]"); + exit(status); +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +sig_handler(int sig) +{ + if (sig == SIGALRM) + fprintf(stderr, "Login timed out after %d seconds\n", + login_timeout); + else + fprintf(stderr, "Login received signal, exiting\n"); + exit(0); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int max_tries = 5; + int try; + + char username[32]; + int optind = 0; + + int ask = 1; + struct sigaction sa; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + +#ifdef KRB5 + { + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + } +#endif + + openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTH); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if (version_flag) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (geteuid() != 0) + errx(1, "only root may use login, use su"); + + /* Default tty settings. */ + stty_default(); + + if(p_flag) + copy_env(); + else { + /* this set of variables is always preserved by BSD login */ + if(getenv("TERM")) + add_env("TERM", getenv("TERM")); + if(getenv("TZ")) + add_env("TZ", getenv("TZ")); + } + + if(*argv){ + if(strchr(*argv, '=') == NULL && strcmp(*argv, "-") != 0){ + strlcpy (username, *argv, sizeof(username)); + ask = 0; + } + } + +#if defined(DCE) && defined(AIX) + esetenv("AUTHSTATE", "DCE", 1); +#endif + + /* XXX should we care about environment on the command line? */ + + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sa.sa_handler = sig_handler; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, NULL); + alarm(login_timeout); + + for(try = 0; try < max_tries; try++){ + struct passwd *pwd; + char password[128]; + int ret; + char ttname[32]; + char *tty, *ttyn; + char prompt[128]; +#ifdef OTP + char otp_str[256]; +#endif + + if(ask){ + f_flag = 0; +#if 0 + r_flag = 0; +#endif + ret = read_string("login: ", username, sizeof(username), 1); + if(ret == -3) + exit(0); + if(ret == -2) + sig_handler(0); /* exit */ + } + pwd = k_getpwnam(username); +#ifdef ALLOW_NULL_PASSWORD + if (pwd != NULL && (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '\0')) { + strcpy(password,""); + } + else +#endif + + { +#ifdef OTP + if(auth_level && strcmp(auth_level, "otp") == 0 && + otp_challenge(&otp_ctx, username, + otp_str, sizeof(otp_str)) == 0) + snprintf (prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's %s Password: ", + username, otp_str); + else +#endif + strncpy(prompt, "Password: ", sizeof(prompt)); + + if (f_flag == 0) { + ret = read_string(prompt, password, sizeof(password), 0); + if (ret == -3) { + ask = 1; + continue; + } + if (ret == -2) + sig_handler(0); + } + } + + if(pwd == NULL){ + fprintf(stderr, "Login incorrect.\n"); + ask = 1; + continue; + } + + if(f_flag == 0 && check_password(pwd, password)){ + fprintf(stderr, "Login incorrect.\n"); + ask = 1; + continue; + } + ttyn = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO); + if(ttyn == NULL){ + snprintf(ttname, sizeof(ttname), "%s??", _PATH_TTY); + ttyn = ttname; + } + if (strncmp (ttyn, _PATH_DEV, strlen(_PATH_DEV)) == 0) + tty = ttyn + strlen(_PATH_DEV); + else + tty = ttyn; + + if (login_access (pwd, remote_host ? remote_host : tty) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Permission denied\n"); + if (remote_host) + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s LOGIN REFUSED FROM %s", + pwd->pw_name, remote_host); + else + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s LOGIN REFUSED ON %s", + pwd->pw_name, tty); + exit (1); + } + alarm(0); + do_login(pwd, tty, ttyn); + } + exit(1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21ca2a53d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ + +LOGIN(1) UNIX Reference Manual LOGIN(1) + +NNAAMMEE + llooggiinn - authenticate a user and start new session + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + llooggiinn [--ffpp] [--aa _l_e_v_e_l] [--hh _h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e] _[_u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e_] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + This manual page documents the llooggiinn program distributed with the Heim- + dal Kerberos 5 implementation, it may differ in important ways from your + system version. + + The llooggiinn programs logs users into the system. It is intended to be run + by system daemons like getty(8) or telnetd(8). If you are already logged + in, but want to change to another user, you should use su(1). + + A username can be given on the command line, else one will be prompted + for. + + A password is required to login, unless the --ff option is given (indicat- + ing that the calling program has already done proper authentication). + With --ff the user will be logged in without further questions. + + For password authentication Kerberos 5, Kerberos 4 (if compiled in), OTP + (if compiled in) and local (_/_e_t_c_/_p_a_s_s_w_d) passwords are supported. OTP + will be used if the the user is registered to use it, and llooggiinn is given + the option --aa otp. When using OTP, a challenge is shown to the user. + + Further options are: + + --aa _s_t_r_i_n_g + Which authentication mode to use, the only supported value is + currently ``otp''. + + --ff Indicates that the user is already authenticated. This happens, + for instance, when login is started by telnetd, and the user has + proved authentic via Kerberos. + + --hh _h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e + Indicates which host the user is logging in from. This is passed + from telnetd, and is entered into the login database. + + --pp This tells llooggiinn to preserve all environment variables. If not + given, only the TERM and TZ variables are preserved. It could be + a security risk to pass random variables to llooggiinn or the user + shell, so the calling daemon should make sure it only passes + ``safe'' variables. + + The process of logging user in proceeds as follows. + + First a check is made that logins are allowed at all. This usually means + checking _/_e_t_c_/_n_o_l_o_g_i_n. If it exists, and the user trying to login is not + root, the contents is printed, and then login exits. + + Then various system parameters are set up, like changing the owner of the + tty to the user, setting up signals, setting the group list, and user and + group id. Also various machine specific tasks are performed. + + Next llooggiinn changes to the users home directory, or if that fails, to _/. + The environment is setup, by adding some required variables (such as + PATH), and also authentication related ones (such as KRB5CCNAME). If an + environment file exists (_/_e_t_c_/_e_n_v_i_r_o_n_m_e_n_t), variables are set according + to it. + + If one or more login message files are configured, their contents is + printed to the terminal. + + If a login time command is configured, it is executed. A logout time com- + mand can also be configured, which makes llooggiinn fork, and wait for the us- + er shell to exit, and then run the command. This can be used to clean up + user credentials. + + Finally, the user's shell is executed. If the user logging in is root, + and root's login shell does not exist, a default shell (usually _/_b_i_n_/_s_h) + is also tried before giving up. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + These environment variables are set by login (not including ones set by + _/_e_t_c_/_e_n_v_i_r_o_n_m_e_n_t): + + PATH the default system path + HOME the user's home directory (or possibly _/) + USER, LOGNAME both set to the username + SHELL the user's shell + TERM, TZ set to whatever is passed to llooggiinn + KRB5CCNAME if the password is verified via Kerberos 5, this will + point to the credentials cache file + KRBTKFILE if the password is verified via Kerberos 4, this will + point to the ticket file + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/environment + Contains a set of environment variables that should be set in ad- + dition to the ones above. It should contain sh-style assignments + like ``VARIABLE=value''. Note that they are not parsed the way a + shell would. No variable expansion is performed, and all strings + are literal, and quotation marks should not be used. Everything + after a hash mark is considered a comment. The following are all + different (the last will set the variable BAR, not FOO). + + FOO=this is a string + FOO="this is a string" + BAR= FOO='this is a string' + /etc/login.access + See login.access(5). + /etc/login.conf + This is a termcap style configuration file, that contains various + settings used by llooggiinn. Currently only the ``default'' capability + record is used. The possible capability strings include: + + environment + This is a comma separated list of environment files that + are read in the order specified. If this is missing the + default _/_e_t_c_/_e_n_v_i_r_o_n_m_e_n_t is used. + login_program + This program will be executed just before the user's + shell is started. It will be called without arguments. + logout_program + This program will be executed just after the user's shell + has terminated. It will be called without arguments. This + program will be the parent process of the spawned shell. + motd A comma separated list of text files that will be printed + to the user's terminal before starting the shell. The + string welcome works similarly, but points to a single + file. + /etc/nologin + If it exists, login is denied to all but root. The contents of + this file is printed before login exits. + + + Other llooggiinn programs typically print all sorts of information by default, + such as last time you logged in, if you have mail, and system message + files. This version of llooggiinn does not, so there is no reason for + _._h_u_s_h_l_o_g_i_n files or similar. We feel that these tasks are best left to + the user's shell, but the login_program facility allows for a shell inde- + pendent solution, if that is desired. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + A _l_o_g_i_n_._c_o_n_f file could look like: + + default:\ + :motd=/etc/motd,/etc/motd.local: + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + su(1), login.access(5), getty(8), telnetd(8) + +AAUUTTHHOORRSS + This login program was written for the Heimdal Kerberos 5 implementation. + The login.access code was written by Wietse Venema. + + HEIMDAL March 24, 2003 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_access.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_access.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d6275fdfb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_access.c @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/************************************************************************ +* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved. Some individual +* files may be covered by other copyrights. +* +* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at +* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991, +* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +* modification, are permitted provided that this entire copyright notice +* is duplicated in all such copies. +* +* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied +* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of +* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose. +************************************************************************/ + /* + * This module implements a simple but effective form of login access + * control based on login names and on host (or domain) names, internet + * addresses (or network numbers), or on terminal line names in case of + * non-networked logins. Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). + * + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: login_access.c,v 1.2 2001/06/04 14:09:45 assar Exp $"); + + /* Delimiters for fields and for lists of users, ttys or hosts. */ + +static char fs[] = ":"; /* field separator */ +static char sep[] = ", \t"; /* list-element separator */ + + /* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */ + +#define YES 1 +#define NO 0 + + /* + * A structure to bundle up all login-related information to keep the + * functional interfaces as generic as possible. + */ +struct login_info { + struct passwd *user; + char *from; +}; + +static int list_match(char *list, struct login_info *item, + int (*match_fn)(char *, struct login_info *)); +static int user_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item); +static int from_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item); +static int string_match(char *tok, char *string); + +/* login_access - match username/group and host/tty with access control file */ + +int login_access(struct passwd *user, char *from) +{ + struct login_info item; + FILE *fp; + char line[BUFSIZ]; + char *perm; /* becomes permission field */ + char *users; /* becomes list of login names */ + char *froms; /* becomes list of terminals or hosts */ + int match = NO; + int end; + int lineno = 0; /* for diagnostics */ + char *foo; + + /* + * Bundle up the arguments to avoid unnecessary clumsiness lateron. + */ + item.user = user; + item.from = from; + + /* + * Process the table one line at a time and stop at the first match. + * Blank lines and lines that begin with a '#' character are ignored. + * Non-comment lines are broken at the ':' character. All fields are + * mandatory. The first field should be a "+" or "-" character. A + * non-existing table means no access control. + */ + + if ((fp = fopen(_PATH_LOGACCESS, "r")) != 0) { + while (!match && fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) { + lineno++; + if (line[end = strlen(line) - 1] != '\n') { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: line %d: missing newline or line too long", + _PATH_LOGACCESS, lineno); + continue; + } + if (line[0] == '#') + continue; /* comment line */ + while (end > 0 && isspace((unsigned char)line[end - 1])) + end--; + line[end] = 0; /* strip trailing whitespace */ + if (line[0] == 0) /* skip blank lines */ + continue; + foo = NULL; + if (!(perm = strtok_r(line, fs, &foo)) + || !(users = strtok_r(NULL, fs, &foo)) + || !(froms = strtok_r(NULL, fs, &foo)) + || strtok_r(NULL, fs, &foo)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: line %d: bad field count", + _PATH_LOGACCESS, + lineno); + continue; + } + if (perm[0] != '+' && perm[0] != '-') { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: line %d: bad first field", + _PATH_LOGACCESS, + lineno); + continue; + } + match = (list_match(froms, &item, from_match) + && list_match(users, &item, user_match)); + } + fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot open %s: %m", _PATH_LOGACCESS); + } + return (match == 0 || (line[0] == '+')); +} + +/* list_match - match an item against a list of tokens with exceptions */ + +static int +list_match(char *list, + struct login_info *item, + int (*match_fn)(char *, struct login_info *)) +{ + char *tok; + int match = NO; + char *foo = NULL; + + /* + * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches + * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find + * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether + * the match is affected by any exceptions. + */ + + for (tok = strtok_r(list, sep, &foo); + tok != NULL; + tok = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &foo)) { + if (strcasecmp(tok, "EXCEPT") == 0) /* EXCEPT: give up */ + break; + if ((match = (*match_fn) (tok, item)) != 0) /* YES */ + break; + } + /* Process exceptions to matches. */ + + if (match != NO) { + while ((tok = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &foo)) && strcasecmp(tok, "EXCEPT")) + /* VOID */ ; + if (tok == 0 || list_match(NULL, item, match_fn) == NO) + return (match); + } + return (NO); +} + +/* myhostname - figure out local machine name */ + +static char *myhostname(void) +{ + static char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1] = ""; + + if (name[0] == 0) { + gethostname(name, sizeof(name)); + name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = 0; + } + return (name); +} + +/* netgroup_match - match group against machine or user */ + +static int netgroup_match(char *group, char *machine, char *user) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN + static char *mydomain = 0; + + if (mydomain == 0) + yp_get_default_domain(&mydomain); + return (innetgr(group, machine, user, mydomain)); +#else + syslog(LOG_ERR, "NIS netgroup support not configured"); + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* user_match - match a username against one token */ + +static int user_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item) +{ + char *string = item->user->pw_name; + struct login_info fake_item; + struct group *group; + int i; + char *at; + + /* + * If a token has the magic value "ALL" the match always succeeds. + * Otherwise, return YES if the token fully matches the username, if the + * token is a group that contains the username, or if the token is the + * name of the user's primary group. + */ + + if ((at = strchr(tok + 1, '@')) != 0) { /* split user@host pattern */ + *at = 0; + fake_item.from = myhostname(); + return (user_match(tok, item) && from_match(at + 1, &fake_item)); + } else if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup */ + return (netgroup_match(tok + 1, (char *) 0, string)); + } else if (string_match(tok, string)) { /* ALL or exact match */ + return (YES); + } else if ((group = getgrnam(tok)) != 0) { /* try group membership */ + if (item->user->pw_gid == group->gr_gid) + return (YES); + for (i = 0; group->gr_mem[i]; i++) + if (strcasecmp(string, group->gr_mem[i]) == 0) + return (YES); + } + return (NO); +} + +/* from_match - match a host or tty against a list of tokens */ + +static int from_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item) +{ + char *string = item->from; + int tok_len; + int str_len; + + /* + * If a token has the magic value "ALL" the match always succeeds. Return + * YES if the token fully matches the string. If the token is a domain + * name, return YES if it matches the last fields of the string. If the + * token has the magic value "LOCAL", return YES if the string does not + * contain a "." character. If the token is a network number, return YES + * if it matches the head of the string. + */ + + if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup */ + return (netgroup_match(tok + 1, string, (char *) 0)); + } else if (string_match(tok, string)) { /* ALL or exact match */ + return (YES); + } else if (tok[0] == '.') { /* domain: match last fields */ + if ((str_len = strlen(string)) > (tok_len = strlen(tok)) + && strcasecmp(tok, string + str_len - tok_len) == 0) + return (YES); + } else if (strcasecmp(tok, "LOCAL") == 0) { /* local: no dots */ + if (strchr(string, '.') == 0) + return (YES); + } else if (tok[(tok_len = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.' /* network */ + && strncmp(tok, string, tok_len) == 0) { + return (YES); + } + return (NO); +} + +/* string_match - match a string against one token */ + +static int string_match(char *tok, char *string) +{ + + /* + * If the token has the magic value "ALL" the match always succeeds. + * Otherwise, return YES if the token fully matches the string. + */ + + if (strcasecmp(tok, "ALL") == 0) { /* all: always matches */ + return (YES); + } else if (strcasecmp(tok, string) == 0) { /* try exact match */ + return (YES); + } + return (NO); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc1d92021e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: login_locl.h,v 1.24 2002/08/12 15:09:15 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __LOGIN_LOCL_H__ +#define __LOGIN_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CATEGORY_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef OTP +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_OSFC2 +#define getargs OSFgetargs +#include "/usr/include/prot.h" +#undef getargs +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_TTY +#define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_DEV +#define _PATH_DEV "/dev/" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_WTMP +#ifdef WTMP_FILE +#define _PATH_WTMP WTMP_FILE +#else +#define _PATH_WTMP "/var/adm/wtmp" +#endif +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_UTMP +#ifdef UTMP_FILE +#define _PATH_UTMP UTMP_FILE +#else +#define _PATH_UTMP "/var/adm/utmp" +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_LOGACCESS +#define _PATH_LOGACCESS SYSCONFDIR "/login.access" +#endif /* _PATH_LOGACCESS */ + +#ifndef _PATH_LOGIN_CONF +#define _PATH_LOGIN_CONF SYSCONFDIR "/login.conf" +#endif /* _PATH_LOGIN_CONF */ + +#ifndef _PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT +#define _PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT SYSCONFDIR "/environment" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEFPATH +#define _PATH_DEFPATH "/usr/bin:/bin" +#endif + +struct spwd; + +extern char **env; +extern int num_env; + +#include "login_protos.h" + +#endif /* __LOGIN_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_protos.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..48b8101c23 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/login_protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __login_protos_h__ +#define __login_protos_h__ + +#include + +void +add_env ( + const char */*var*/, + const char */*value*/); + +void +check_shadow ( + const struct passwd */*pw*/, + const struct spwd */*sp*/); + +char * +clean_ttyname (char */*tty*/); + +void +copy_env (void); + +int +do_osfc2_magic (uid_t /*uid*/); + +void +extend_env (char */*str*/); + +int +login_access ( + struct passwd */*user*/, + char */*from*/); + +char * +login_conf_get_string (const char */*str*/); + +int +login_read_env (const char */*file*/); + +char * +make_id (char */*tty*/); + +void +prepare_utmp ( + struct utmp */*utmp*/, + char */*tty*/, + const char */*username*/, + const char */*hostname*/); + +int +read_string ( + const char */*prompt*/, + char */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/, + int /*echo*/); + +void +shrink_hostname ( + const char */*hostname*/, + char */*dst*/, + size_t /*dst_sz*/); + +void +stty_default (void); + +void +utmp_login ( + char */*tty*/, + const char */*username*/, + const char */*hostname*/); + +int +utmpx_login ( + char */*line*/, + const char */*user*/, + const char */*host*/); + +#endif /* __login_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/osfc2.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/osfc2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..056484c413 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/osfc2.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: osfc2.c,v 1.4 2001/02/20 01:44:46 assar Exp $"); + +int +do_osfc2_magic(uid_t uid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OSFC2 + struct es_passwd *epw; + char *argv[2]; + + /* fake */ + argv[0] = (char*)getprogname(); + argv[1] = NULL; + set_auth_parameters(1, argv); + + epw = getespwuid(uid); + if(epw == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_AUTHPRIV|LOG_NOTICE, + "getespwuid failed for %d", uid); + printf("Sorry.\n"); + return 1; + } + /* We don't check for auto-retired, foo-retired, + bar-retired, or any other kind of retired accounts + here; neither do we check for time-locked accounts, or + any other kind of serious C2 mumbo-jumbo. We do, + however, call setluid, since failing to do so is not + very good (take my word for it). */ + + if(!epw->uflg->fg_uid) { + syslog(LOG_AUTHPRIV|LOG_NOTICE, + "attempted login by %s (has no uid)", epw->ufld->fd_name); + printf("Sorry.\n"); + return 1; + } + setluid(epw->ufld->fd_uid); + if(getluid() != epw->ufld->fd_uid) { + syslog(LOG_AUTHPRIV|LOG_NOTICE, + "failed to set LUID for %s (%d)", + epw->ufld->fd_name, epw->ufld->fd_uid); + printf("Sorry.\n"); + return 1; + } +#endif /* HAVE_OSFC2 */ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/read_string.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/read_string.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3cee14368 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/read_string.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: read_string.c,v 1.4 2000/06/21 02:09:36 assar Exp $"); + +static sig_atomic_t intr_flag; + +static void +intr(int sig) +{ + intr_flag++; +} + +int +read_string(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t len, int echo) +{ + struct sigaction sigs[47]; + struct sigaction sa; + FILE *tty; + int ret = 0; + int of = 0; + int i; + int c; + char *p; + + struct termios t_new, t_old; + + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sa.sa_handler = intr; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(sigs) / sizeof(sigs[0]); i++) + if (i != SIGALRM) sigaction(i, &sa, &sigs[i]); + + if((tty = fopen("/dev/tty", "r")) == NULL) + tty = stdin; + + fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt); + fflush(stderr); + + if(echo == 0){ + tcgetattr(fileno(tty), &t_old); + memcpy(&t_new, &t_old, sizeof(t_new)); + t_new.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; + tcsetattr(fileno(tty), TCSANOW, &t_new); + } + intr_flag = 0; + p = buf; + while(intr_flag == 0){ + c = getc(tty); + if(c == EOF){ + if(!ferror(tty)) + ret = 1; + break; + } + if(c == '\n') + break; + if(of == 0) + *p++ = c; + of = (p == buf + len); + } + if(of) + p--; + *p = 0; + + if(echo == 0){ + printf("\n"); + tcsetattr(fileno(tty), TCSANOW, &t_old); + } + + if(tty != stdin) + fclose(tty); + + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(sigs) / sizeof(sigs[0]); i++) + if (i != SIGALRM) sigaction(i, &sigs[i], NULL); + + if(ret) + return -3; + if(intr_flag) + return -2; + if(of) + return -1; + return 0; +} + + +#if 0 +int main() +{ + char s[128]; + int ret; + ret = read_string("foo: ", s, sizeof(s), 0); + printf("%d ->%s<-\n", ret, s); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/shadow.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/shadow.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0923831c34 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/shadow.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: shadow.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H + +#ifndef _PATH_CHPASS +#define _PATH_CHPASS "/usr/bin/passwd" +#endif + +static int +change_passwd(const struct passwd *who) +{ + int status; + pid_t pid; + + switch (pid = fork()) { + case -1: + printf("fork /bin/passwd"); + exit(1); + case 0: + execlp(_PATH_CHPASS, "passwd", who->pw_name, (char *) 0); + exit(1); + default: + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + return (status); + } +} + +void +check_shadow(const struct passwd *pw, const struct spwd *sp) +{ + long today; + + today = time(0)/(24L * 60 * 60); + + if (sp == NULL) + return; + + if (sp->sp_expire > 0) { + if (today >= sp->sp_expire) { + printf("Your account has expired.\n"); + sleep(1); + exit(0); + } else if (sp->sp_expire - today < 14) { + printf("Your account will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_expire - today)); + } + } + + if (sp->sp_max > 0) { + if (today >= (sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max)) { + printf("Your password has expired. Choose a new one.\n"); + change_passwd(pw); + } else if (sp->sp_warn > 0 + && (today > (sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - sp->sp_warn))) { + printf("Your password will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - today)); + } + } +} +#endif /* HAVE_SHADOW_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/stty_default.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/stty_default.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e38566295 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/stty_default.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: stty_default.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +#include + +/* HP-UX 9.0 termios doesn't define these */ +#ifndef FLUSHO +#define FLUSHO 0 +#endif + +#ifndef XTABS +#define XTABS 0 +#endif + +#ifndef OXTABS +#define OXTABS XTABS +#endif + +/* Ultrix... */ +#ifndef ECHOPRT +#define ECHOPRT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef ECHOCTL +#define ECHOCTL 0 +#endif + +#ifndef ECHOKE +#define ECHOKE 0 +#endif + +#ifndef IMAXBEL +#define IMAXBEL 0 +#endif + +#define Ctl(x) ((x) ^ 0100) + +void +stty_default(void) +{ + struct termios termios; + + /* + * Finalize the terminal settings. Some systems default to 8 bits, + * others to 7, so we should leave that alone. + */ + tcgetattr(0, &termios); + + termios.c_iflag |= (BRKINT|IGNPAR|ICRNL|IXON|IMAXBEL); + termios.c_iflag &= ~IXANY; + + termios.c_lflag |= (ISIG|IEXTEN|ICANON|ECHO|ECHOE|ECHOK|ECHOCTL|ECHOKE); + termios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHOPRT|TOSTOP|FLUSHO); + + termios.c_oflag |= (OPOST|ONLCR); + termios.c_oflag &= ~OXTABS; + + termios.c_cc[VINTR] = Ctl('C'); + termios.c_cc[VERASE] = Ctl('H'); + termios.c_cc[VKILL] = Ctl('U'); + termios.c_cc[VEOF] = Ctl('D'); + + termios.c_cc[VSUSP] = Ctl('Z'); + + tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &termios); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/tty.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/tty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ffea7249f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/tty.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: tty.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Clean the tty name. Return a pointer to the cleaned version. + */ + +char * +clean_ttyname (char *tty) +{ + char *res = tty; + + if (strncmp (res, _PATH_DEV, strlen(_PATH_DEV)) == 0) + res += strlen(_PATH_DEV); + if (strncmp (res, "pty/", 4) == 0) + res += 4; + if (strncmp (res, "ptym/", 5) == 0) + res += 5; + return res; +} + +/* + * Generate a name usable as an `ut_id', typically without `tty'. + */ + +char * +make_id (char *tty) +{ + char *res = tty; + + if (strncmp (res, "pts/", 4) == 0) + res += 4; + if (strncmp (res, "tty", 3) == 0) + res += 3; + return res; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/utmp_login.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/utmp_login.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0be6cdb19f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/utmp_login.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: utmp_login.c,v 1.18 2001/02/08 16:08:26 assar Exp $"); + +/* try to put something useful from hostname into dst, dst_sz: + * full name, first component or address */ + +void +shrink_hostname (const char *hostname, + char *dst, size_t dst_sz) +{ + char local_hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; + char *ld, *hd; + int ret; + struct addrinfo *ai; + + if (strlen(hostname) < dst_sz) { + strlcpy (dst, hostname, dst_sz); + return; + } + gethostname (local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)); + hd = strchr (hostname, '.'); + ld = strchr (local_hostname, '.'); + if (hd != NULL && ld != NULL && strcmp(hd, ld) == 0 + && hd - hostname < dst_sz) { + strlcpy (dst, hostname, dst_sz); + dst[hd - hostname] = '\0'; + return; + } + + ret = getaddrinfo (hostname, NULL, NULL, &ai); + if (ret) { + strncpy (dst, hostname, dst_sz); + return; + } + ret = getnameinfo (ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + dst, dst_sz, + NULL, 0, + NI_NUMERICHOST); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (ret) { + strncpy (dst, hostname, dst_sz); + return; + } +} + +void +prepare_utmp (struct utmp *utmp, char *tty, + const char *username, const char *hostname) +{ + char *ttyx = clean_ttyname (tty); + + memset(utmp, 0, sizeof(*utmp)); + utmp->ut_time = time(NULL); + strncpy(utmp->ut_line, ttyx, sizeof(utmp->ut_line)); + strncpy(utmp->ut_name, username, sizeof(utmp->ut_name)); + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER + strncpy(utmp->ut_user, username, sizeof(utmp->ut_user)); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR + if (hostname[0]) { + struct hostent *he; + if ((he = gethostbyname(hostname))) + memcpy(&utmp->ut_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], + sizeof(utmp->ut_addr)); + } +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + shrink_hostname (hostname, utmp->ut_host, sizeof(utmp->ut_host)); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE + utmp->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID + utmp->ut_pid = getpid(); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + strncpy(utmp->ut_id, make_id(ttyx), sizeof(utmp->ut_id)); +# endif +} + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +void utmp_login(char *tty, const char *username, const char *hostname) +{ + return; +} +#else + +/* update utmp and wtmp - the BSD way */ + +void utmp_login(char *tty, const char *username, const char *hostname) +{ + struct utmp utmp; + int fd; + + prepare_utmp (&utmp, tty, username, hostname); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETUTENT + utmpname(_PATH_UTMP); + setutent(); + pututline(&utmp); + endutent(); +#else + +#ifdef HAVE_TTYSLOT + { + int ttyno; + ttyno = ttyslot(); + if (ttyno > 0 && (fd = open(_PATH_UTMP, O_WRONLY, 0)) >= 0) { + lseek(fd, (long)(ttyno * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET); + write(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(fd); + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_TTYSLOT */ +#endif /* HAVE_SETUTENT */ + + if ((fd = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) >= 0) { + write(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(fd); + } +} +#endif /* !HAVE_UTMPX_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/utmpx_login.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/utmpx_login.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6e5fcf1c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/login/utmpx_login.c @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/************************************************************************ +* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved. Some individual +* files may be covered by other copyrights. +* +* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at +* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991, +* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +* modification, are permitted provided that this entire copyright notice +* is duplicated in all such copies. +* +* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied +* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of +* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose. +************************************************************************/ +/* Author: Wietse Venema */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: utmpx_login.c,v 1.26 2001/06/04 14:10:19 assar Exp $"); + +/* utmpx_login - update utmp and wtmp after login */ + +#ifndef HAVE_UTMPX_H +int utmpx_login(char *line, const char *user, const char *host) { return 0; } +#else + +static void +utmpx_update(struct utmpx *ut, char *line, const char *user, const char *host) +{ + struct timeval tmp; + char *clean_tty = clean_ttyname(line); + + strncpy(ut->ut_line, clean_tty, sizeof(ut->ut_line)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_ID + strncpy(ut->ut_id, make_id(clean_tty), sizeof(ut->ut_id)); +#endif + strncpy(ut->ut_user, user, sizeof(ut->ut_user)); + shrink_hostname (host, ut->ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN + ut->ut_syslen = strlen(host) + 1; + if (ut->ut_syslen > sizeof(ut->ut_host)) + ut->ut_syslen = sizeof(ut->ut_host); +#endif + ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + gettimeofday (&tmp, 0); + ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = tmp.tv_sec; + ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = tmp.tv_usec; + pututxline(ut); +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, ut); +#elif defined(WTMP_FILE) + { + struct utmp utmp; + int fd; + + prepare_utmp (&utmp, line, user, host); + if ((fd = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) >= 0) { + write(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(fd); + } + } +#endif +} + +int +utmpx_login(char *line, const char *user, const char *host) +{ + struct utmpx *ut, save_ut; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); + int ret = (-1); + + /* + * SYSV4 ttymon and login use tty port names with the "/dev/" prefix + * stripped off. Rlogind and telnetd, on the other hand, make utmpx + * entries with device names like /dev/pts/nnn. We therefore cannot use + * getutxline(). Return nonzero if no utmp entry was found with our own + * process ID for a login or user process. + */ + + while ((ut = getutxent())) { + /* Try to find a reusable entry */ + if (ut->ut_pid == mypid + && ( ut->ut_type == INIT_PROCESS + || ut->ut_type == LOGIN_PROCESS + || ut->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)) { + save_ut = *ut; + utmpx_update(&save_ut, line, user, host); + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + if (ret == -1) { + /* Grow utmpx file by one record. */ + struct utmpx newut; + memset(&newut, 0, sizeof(newut)); + newut.ut_pid = mypid; + utmpx_update(&newut, line, user, host); + ret = 0; + } + endutxent(); + return (ret); +} +#endif /* HAVE_UTMPX_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..760c9c4cc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +2003-02-25 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * otp.c: remove \n from errx, from NetBSD + +2000-11-29 Johan Danielsson + + * otpprint.1: sort parameters and close a list + + * otp.1: sort parameters and close a list + +1999-09-14 Assar Westerlund + + * otp.c (verify_user_otp): check return value from + des_read_pw_string + +Thu Apr 1 16:51:07 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * otpprint.c: use getarg + + * otp.c: use getarg + +Thu Mar 18 12:08:58 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Thu Mar 4 19:45:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: DESTDIR + +Sat Feb 27 19:44:25 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add + +Sun Nov 22 10:32:50 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * otpprint.c: more braces + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sun Dec 21 09:31:30 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * otp.c (renew): don't set the OTP if the reading of the string + fails. + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16e1c0c4e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.11 2001/08/28 08:31:21 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_des) + +bin_PROGRAMS = otp otpprint +bin_SUIDS = otp +otp_SOURCES = otp.c otp_locl.h +otpprint_SOURCES = otpprint.c otp_locl.h + +man_MANS = otp.1 otpprint.1 + +LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/otp/libotp.la diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff739bbebc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,816 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.11 2001/08/28 08:31:21 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(otp_SOURCES) $(otpprint_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : 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install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7abdaf1ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1996, 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: otp.1,v 1.3 2003/02/16 21:10:08 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd November 17, 1996 +.Dt OTP 1 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm otp +.Nd +manages one-time passwords +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm otp +.Op Fl dhlor +.Op Fl f Ar algorithm +.Op Fl u Ar user +.Ar sequence-number +.Ar seed +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program initializes and updates your current series of one-time +passwords (OTPs). +.Pp +Use this to set a new series of one-time passwords. Only perform this +on the console or over an encrypted link as you will have to supply +your pass-phrase. The other two parameters are +.Ar sequence-number +and +.Ar seed . +.Pp +Options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl d +To delete a one-time password. +.It Fl f +Choose a different +.Ar algorithm +from the default md5. Pick any of: md4, md5, and sha. +.It Fl h +For getting a help message. +.It Fl l +List the current table of one-time passwords. +.It Fl o +To open (unlock) the otp-entry for a user. +.It Fl r +To renew a one-time password series. This operation can be performed +over an potentially eavesdropped link because you do not supply the +pass-phrase. First you need to supply the current one-time password +and then the new one corresponding to the supplied +.Ar sequence-number +and +.Ar seed . +.It Fl u +To choose a different +.Ar user +to set one-time passwords for. This only works when running +.Nm +as root. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr otpprint 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed5772c636 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.c @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "otp_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: otp.c,v 1.34 2003/02/25 10:55:17 lha Exp $"); + +static int listp; +static int deletep; +static int openp; +static int renewp; +static char* alg_string; +static char *user; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "list", 'l', arg_flag, &listp, "list OTP status" }, + { "delete", 'd', arg_flag, &deletep, "delete OTP" }, + { "open", 'o', arg_flag, &openp, "open a locked OTP" }, + { "renew", 'r', arg_flag, &renewp, "securely renew OTP" }, + { "hash", 'f', arg_string, &alg_string, + "hash algorithm (md4, md5, or sha)", "algorithm"}, + { "user", 'u', arg_string, &user, + "user other than current user (root only)", "user" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "[num seed]"); + exit(code); +} + +/* + * Renew the OTP for a user. + * The pass-phrase is not required (RFC 1938/8.0) + */ + +static int +renew (int argc, char **argv, OtpAlgorithm *alg, char *user) +{ + OtpContext newctx, *ctx; + char prompt[128]; + char pw[64]; + void *dbm; + int ret; + + newctx.alg = alg; + newctx.user = user; + newctx.n = atoi (argv[0]); + strlcpy (newctx.seed, argv[1], sizeof(newctx.seed)); + strlwr(newctx.seed); + snprintf (prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "[ otp-%s %u %s ]", + newctx.alg->name, + newctx.n, + newctx.seed); + if (des_read_pw_string (pw, sizeof(pw), prompt, 0) == 0 && + otp_parse (newctx.key, pw, alg) == 0) { + ctx = &newctx; + ret = 0; + } else + return 1; + + dbm = otp_db_open (); + if (dbm == NULL) { + warnx ("otp_db_open failed"); + return 1; + } + otp_put (dbm, ctx); + otp_db_close (dbm); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the user could enter the next OTP. + * I would rather have returned !=0 but it's shell-like here around. + */ + +static int +verify_user_otp(char *username) +{ + OtpContext ctx; + char passwd[OTP_MAX_PASSPHRASE + 1]; + char prompt[128], ss[256]; + + if (otp_challenge (&ctx, username, ss, sizeof(ss)) != 0) { + warnx("no otp challenge found for %s", username); + return 1; + } + + snprintf (prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's %s Password: ", username, ss); + if(des_read_pw_string(passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, prompt, 0)) + return 1; + return otp_verify_user (&ctx, passwd); +} + +/* + * Set the OTP for a user + */ + +static int +set (int argc, char **argv, OtpAlgorithm *alg, char *user) +{ + void *db; + OtpContext ctx; + char pw[OTP_MAX_PASSPHRASE + 1]; + int ret; + int i; + + ctx.alg = alg; + ctx.user = strdup (user); + if (ctx.user == NULL) + err (1, "out of memory"); + + ctx.n = atoi (argv[0]); + strlcpy (ctx.seed, argv[1], sizeof(ctx.seed)); + strlwr(ctx.seed); + do { + if (des_read_pw_string (pw, sizeof(pw), "Pass-phrase: ", 1)) + return 1; + if (strlen (pw) < OTP_MIN_PASSPHRASE) + printf ("Too short pass-phrase. Use at least %d characters\n", + OTP_MIN_PASSPHRASE); + } while(strlen(pw) < OTP_MIN_PASSPHRASE); + ctx.alg->init (ctx.key, pw, ctx.seed); + for (i = 0; i < ctx.n; ++i) + ctx.alg->next (ctx.key); + db = otp_db_open (); + if(db == NULL) { + free (ctx.user); + err (1, "otp_db_open failed"); + } + ret = otp_put (db, &ctx); + otp_db_close (db); + free (ctx.user); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Delete otp of user from the database + */ + +static int +delete_otp (int argc, char **argv, char *user) +{ + void *db; + OtpContext ctx; + int ret; + + db = otp_db_open (); + if(db == NULL) + errx (1, "otp_db_open failed"); + + ctx.user = user; + ret = otp_delete(db, &ctx); + otp_db_close (db); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Tell whether the user has an otp + */ + +static int +has_an_otp(char *user) +{ + void *db; + OtpContext ctx; + int ret; + + db = otp_db_open (); + if(db == NULL) { + warnx ("otp_db_open failed"); + return 0; /* if no db no otp! */ + } + + ctx.user = user; + ret = otp_simple_get(db, &ctx); + + otp_db_close (db); + return !ret; +} + +/* + * Get and print out the otp entry for some user + */ + +static void +print_otp_entry_for_name (void *db, char *user) +{ + OtpContext ctx; + + ctx.user = user; + if (!otp_simple_get(db, &ctx)) { + fprintf(stdout, + "%s\totp-%s %d %s", + ctx.user, ctx.alg->name, ctx.n, ctx.seed); + if (ctx.lock_time) + fprintf(stdout, + "\tlocked since %s", + ctime(&ctx.lock_time)); + else + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } +} + +static int +open_otp (int argc, char **argv, char *user) +{ + void *db; + OtpContext ctx; + int ret; + + db = otp_db_open (); + if (db == NULL) + errx (1, "otp_db_open failed"); + + ctx.user = user; + ret = otp_simple_get (db, &ctx); + if (ret == 0) + ret = otp_put (db, &ctx); + otp_db_close (db); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Print otp entries for one or all users + */ + +static int +list_otps (int argc, char **argv, char *user) +{ + void *db; + struct passwd *pw; + + db = otp_db_open (); + if(db == NULL) + errx (1, "otp_db_open failed"); + + if (user) + print_otp_entry_for_name(db, user); + else + /* scans all users... so as to get a deterministic order */ + while ((pw = getpwent())) + print_otp_entry_for_name(db, pw->pw_name); + + otp_db_close (db); + return 0; +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int defaultp = 0; + int uid = getuid(); + OtpAlgorithm *alg = otp_find_alg (OTP_ALG_DEFAULT); + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(deletep && uid != 0) + errx (1, "Only root can delete OTPs"); + if(alg_string) { + alg = otp_find_alg (alg_string); + if (alg == NULL) + errx (1, "Unknown algorithm: %s", alg_string); + } + if (user && uid != 0) + errx (1, "Only root can use `-u'"); + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (!(listp || deletep || renewp || openp)) + defaultp = 1; + + if ( listp + deletep + renewp + defaultp + openp != 1) + usage(1); /* one of -d or -l or -r or none */ + + if(deletep || openp || listp) { + if(argc != 0) + errx(1, "delete, open, and list requires no arguments"); + } else { + if(argc != 2) + errx(1, "setup, and renew requires `num', and `seed'"); + } + if (listp) + return list_otps (argc, argv, user); + + if (user == NULL) { + struct passwd *pwd; + + pwd = k_getpwuid(uid); + if (pwd == NULL) + err (1, "You don't exist"); + user = pwd->pw_name; + } + + /* + * users other that root must provide the next OTP to update the sequence. + * it avoids someone to use a pending session to change an OTP sequence. + * see RFC 1938/8.0. + */ + if (uid != 0 && (defaultp || renewp)) { + if (!has_an_otp(user)) { + errx (1, "Only root can set an initial OTP"); + } else { /* Check the next OTP (RFC 1938/8.0: SHOULD) */ + if (verify_user_otp(user) != 0) { + errx (1, "User authentification failed"); + } + } + } + + if (deletep) + return delete_otp (argc, argv, user); + else if (renewp) + return renew (argc, argv, alg, user); + else if (openp) + return open_otp (argc, argv, user); + else + return set (argc, argv, alg, user); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..588bcc2f6c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ + +OTP(1) UNIX Reference Manual OTP(1) + +NNAAMMEE + oottpp - manages one-time passwords + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + oottpp [--ddhhlloorr] [--ff _a_l_g_o_r_i_t_h_m] [--uu _u_s_e_r] _s_e_q_u_e_n_c_e_-_n_u_m_b_e_r _s_e_e_d + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The oottpp program initializes and updates your current series of one-time + passwords (OTPs). + + Use this to set a new series of one-time passwords. Only perform this on + the console or over an encrypted link as you will have to supply your + pass-phrase. The other two parameters are _s_e_q_u_e_n_c_e_-_n_u_m_b_e_r and _s_e_e_d. + + Options are: + + --dd To delete a one-time password. + + --ff Choose a different _a_l_g_o_r_i_t_h_m from the default md5. Pick any of: + md4, md5, and sha. + + --hh For getting a help message. + + --ll List the current table of one-time passwords. + + --oo To open (unlock) the otp-entry for a user. + + --rr To renew a one-time password series. This operation can be per- + formed over an potentially eavesdropped link because you do not + supply the pass-phrase. First you need to supply the current + one-time password and then the new one corresponding to the sup- + plied _s_e_q_u_e_n_c_e_-_n_u_m_b_e_r and _s_e_e_d. + + --uu To choose a different _u_s_e_r to set one-time passwords for. This + only works when running oottpp as root. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + otpprint(1) + + KTH-KRB November 17, 1996 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..65f9370bad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otp_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: otp_locl.h,v 1.10 2002/09/10 20:03:46 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include "crypto-headers.h" /* for des_read_pw_string */ +#include diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e66bb356f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.1 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1996, 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: otpprint.1,v 1.5 2003/02/16 21:10:09 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd November 17, 1996 +.Dt OTP 1 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Sh NAME +.Nm otpprint +.Nd +print lists of one-time passwords +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm otp +.Op Fl n Ar count +.Op Fl e +.Op Fl h +.Op Fl f Ar algorithm +.Ar sequence-number +.Ar seed +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program prints lists of OTPs. +.Pp +Use this to print out a series of one-time passwords. You will have +to supply the +.Ar sequence number +and the +.Ar seed +as arguments and then the program will prompt you for your pass-phrase. +.Pp +There are several different print formats. The default is to print +each password with six short english words. +.Pp +Options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl e +Print the passwords in ``extended'' format. In this format a prefix +that says ``hex:'' or ``word:'' is included. +.It Fl f +To choose a different +.Ar algorithm +from the default md5. Pick any of: md4, md5, and sha. +.It Fl h +Print the passwords in hex. +.It Fl n +Print +.Ar count +one-time passwords, starting at +.Ar sequence-number +and going backwards. The default is 10. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr otp 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1d0a84a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "otp_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: otpprint.c,v 1.14 2001/02/20 01:44:46 assar Exp $"); + +static int extendedp; +static int count = 10; +static int hexp; +static char* alg_string; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "extended", 'e', arg_flag, &extendedp, "print keys in extended format" }, + { "count", 'n', arg_integer, &count, "number of keys to print" }, + { "hexadecimal", 'h', arg_flag, &hexp, "output in hexadecimal" }, + { "hash", 'f', arg_string, &alg_string, + "hash algorithm (md4, md5, or sha)", "algorithm"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "num seed"); + exit(code); +} + +static int +print (int argc, + char **argv, + int count, + OtpAlgorithm *alg, + void (*print_fn)(OtpKey, char *, size_t)) +{ + char pw[64]; + OtpKey key; + int n; + int i; + char *seed; + + if (argc != 2) + usage (1); + n = atoi(argv[0]); + seed = argv[1]; + if (des_read_pw_string (pw, sizeof(pw), "Pass-phrase: ", 0)) + return 1; + alg->init (key, pw, seed); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + char s[64]; + + alg->next (key); + if (i >= n - count) { + (*print_fn)(key, s, sizeof(s)); + printf ("%d: %s\n", i + 1, s); + } + } + return 0; +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + void (*fn)(OtpKey, char *, size_t); + OtpAlgorithm *alg = otp_find_alg (OTP_ALG_DEFAULT); + + setprogname (argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(alg_string) { + alg = otp_find_alg (alg_string); + if (alg == NULL) + errx(1, "Unknown algorithm: %s", alg_string); + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (hexp) { + if (extendedp) + fn = otp_print_hex_extended; + else + fn = otp_print_hex; + } else { + if (extendedp) + fn = otp_print_stddict_extended; + else + fn = otp_print_stddict; + } + + return print (argc, argv, count, alg, fn); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c4d2444fa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/otp/otpprint.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ + +OTP(1) UNIX Reference Manual OTP(1) + +NNAAMMEE + oottpppprriinntt - print lists of one-time passwords + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + oottpp [--nn _c_o_u_n_t] [--ee] [--hh] [--ff _a_l_g_o_r_i_t_h_m] _s_e_q_u_e_n_c_e_-_n_u_m_b_e_r _s_e_e_d + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The oottpppprriinntt program prints lists of OTPs. + + Use this to print out a series of one-time passwords. You will have to + supply the _s_e_q_u_e_n_c_e _n_u_m_b_e_r and the _s_e_e_d as arguments and then the program + will prompt you for your pass-phrase. + + There are several different print formats. The default is to print each + password with six short english words. + + Options are: + + --ee Print the passwords in ``extended'' format. In this format a + prefix that says ``hex:'' or ``word:'' is included. + + --ff To choose a different _a_l_g_o_r_i_t_h_m from the default md5. Pick any + of: md4, md5, and sha. + + --hh Print the passwords in hex. + + --nn Print _c_o_u_n_t one-time passwords, starting at _s_e_q_u_e_n_c_e_-_n_u_m_b_e_r and + going backwards. The default is 10. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + otp(1) + + KTH-KRB November 17, 1996 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..33d7b2cade --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +2003-10-13 Love + + * pop_init.c: 1.58->1.59: (pop_init): change call to + authentication function, from a ?: construct (which toubles some + versions of gcc) to if; from Björn Grönvall + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * popper.8: spelling, from jmc + +2002-07-04 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_dropcopy.c: use RESP-CODES + + * pop_get_command.c: implement CAPA + + * popper.c: don't print our version in the greeting string + + * popper.h: add a flags parameter to the pop context + +2002-05-02 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_debug.c: revert some accidentally commited code in previous + +2002-02-07 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_debug.c: only claim krb5 support if really present + +2001-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * maildir.c: replace MAXDROPLEN with MAXPATHLEN + + * popper.h: replace MAXDROPLEN with MAXPATHLEN + +2001-08-13 Johan Danielsson + + * popper.8: rewritten man page + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_init.c (pop_init): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * pop_debug.c (doit_v5): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + +2000-06-10 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_init.c (krb4_authenticate): do not exit on failure, just + return + (krb5_authenticate): log errors from krb5_recvauth + +2000-04-12 Assar Westerlund + + * *.c: replace all erroneous calls to pop_log with POP_FAILURE + with POP_PRIORITY. reported by Janne Johansson ' + +2000-01-27 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_debug.c (main): figure out port number + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_init.c (pop_init): use getnameinfo_verified + + * pop_debug.c (get_socket): use getaddrinfo + +1999-12-03 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_init.c: optionally trace connected addresses to a file + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_debug.c (main): redo the v4/v5 selection for consistency. + -4 -> try only v4 -5 -> try only v5 none, -45 -> try v5, v4 + +1999-10-16 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_init.c (krb5_authenticate): don't use the principal + associated with the socket for authentication, instead let + krb5_rd_req pick the correct one from the ticket; just check that + it actually was a pop-ticket + +1999-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_init.c (pop_init): don't freehostent if ch == NULL + + * pop_dele.c: implement XDELE to delete a range of messages + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_init.c: v6-ify + + * pop_debug.c: v6-ify + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_debug.c (doit_v5): call krb5_sendauth with ccache == NULL + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_debug.c (main): use print_version + +Thu Apr 8 15:07:11 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_pass.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER (moved to + config.h) + +Thu Mar 18 12:55:42 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_pass.c: define KRB_VERIFY_SECURE if not defined + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Wed Mar 17 23:36:21 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_pass.c (krb4_verify_password): use KRB_VERIFY_SECURE instead + of 1 + +Tue Mar 16 22:28:52 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_pass.c: krb_verify_user_multiple -> krb_verify_user + +Sat Mar 13 22:17:29 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_parse.c (pop_parse): cast when calling is* to get rid of a + warning + +Mon Mar 8 11:50:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_init.c: use print_version + +Fri Mar 5 15:14:29 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_send.c: fix handling of messages w/o body + +Sun Nov 22 10:33:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_pass.c (pop_pass): try to always log + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Fri Jul 10 01:14:25 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_init.c: s/net_read/pop_net_read/ + +Tue Jun 2 17:33:54 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_send.c: add missing newlines + +Sun May 24 20:59:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * maildir.c (make_path): fix reversed args + +Sat May 16 00:02:18 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: link with DBLIB + +Sun Apr 26 11:47:58 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_pass.c (pop_pass): check return value from changeuser + + * pop_dropcopy.c (changeuser): check that `setuid' and `setgid' + succeeded. + + * popper.h: changeuser now returns int + +Thu Apr 23 00:54:38 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Add support for maildir spoolfiles. + + * popper.h (MsgInfoList): replace `del_flag' and `retr_flag' with + single `flags' + + * pop_dropcopy.c: Fix mismatched parenthesis. + +Sat Apr 4 15:13:56 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_dropcopy.c (pop_dropcopy): first do mkstemp and then fdopen. + Originally from + + * popper.h: include + +Sat Feb 7 10:07:39 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_pass.c(krb4_verify_password: Don't use REALM_SZ + 1, just + REALM_SZ + +Mon Dec 29 16:37:26 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_updt.c (pop_updt): lseek before ftruncating the file. From + + +Sat Nov 22 13:46:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * pop_pass.c: Destroy tickets after verification. + +Sun Nov 9 09:11:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_dropinfo.c: be careful with mails without msg-id, subject, + or from + +Wed Oct 29 02:09:24 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * pop_pass.c: conditionalize OTP-support + + * pop_init.c: conditionalize OTP-support + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3311dadf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.14 2001/08/04 03:08:02 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +noinst_PROGRAMS = pop_debug + +libexec_PROGRAMS = popper + +popper_SOURCES = \ + pop_dele.c pop_dropcopy.c pop_dropinfo.c \ + pop_get_command.c pop_init.c \ + pop_last.c pop_list.c pop_log.c \ + pop_msg.c pop_parse.c pop_pass.c pop_quit.c \ + pop_rset.c pop_send.c pop_stat.c pop_updt.c \ + pop_user.c pop_uidl.c pop_xover.c popper.c \ + maildir.c popper.h version.h + +EXTRA_DIST = pop3.rfc1081 pop3e.rfc1082 \ + popper.README.release README-FIRST README-KRB4 + +LDADD = \ + $(LIB_otp) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +man_MANS = popper.8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..299eb066f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,854 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.14 2001/08/04 03:08:02 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = pop_debug.c $(popper_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = README $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog +noinst_PROGRAMS = pop_debug$(EXEEXT) +libexec_PROGRAMS = popper$(EXEEXT) +subdir = appl/popper +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken2.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/c-attribute.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/capabilities.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-compile-et.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-declaration.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-man.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 \ 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$$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0735fdd56c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +@(#)@(#)README 2.6 2.6 4/2/91 + + +The Post Office Protocol Server: Installation Guide + + + +Introduction + +The Post Office Protocol server runs on a variety of Unix[1] computers +to manage electronic mail for Macintosh and MS-DOS computers. The +server was developed at the University of California at Berkeley and +conforms fully to the specifications in RFC 1081[2] and RFC 1082[3]. +The Berkeley server also has extensions to send electronic mail on +behalf of a client. + +This guide explains how to install the POP server on your Unix +computer. It assumes that you are not only familiar with Unix but also +capable of performing Unix system administration. + + +How to Obtain the Server + +The POP server is available via anonymous ftp from ftp.CC.Berkeley.EDU +(128.32.136.9, 128.32.206.12). It is in two files in the pub directory: +a compressed tar file popper-version.tar.Z and a Macintosh StuffIt archive +in BinHex format called MacPOP.sit.hqx. + + +Contents of the Distribution + +The distribution contains the following: + ++ All of the C source necessary to create the server program. + ++ A visual representation of how the POP system works. + ++ Reprints of RFC 1081 and RFC 1082. + ++ A HyperCard stack POP client implementation using MacTCP. + ++ A man page for the popper daemon. + ++ This guide. + + +Compatibility + +The Berkeley POP server has been successfully tested on the following +Unix operating systems: + ++ Berkeley Systems Distribution 4.3 + ++ Sun Microsystems Operating System versions 3.5 and 4.0 + ++ Ultrix version 2.3 + +The following POP clients operate correctly with the Berkeley POP server: + ++ The Berkeley HyperMail HyperCard stack for the Apple Macintosh + (distributed with the server). + ++ The Stanford University Macintosh Internet Protocol MacMH program. + ++ The Stanford University Personal Computer Internet Protocol MH + program. + ++ The mh version 6.0 programs for Unix. + + +Support + +The Berkeley POP server is not officially supported and is without any +warranty, explicit or implied. However, we are interested in your +experiences using the server. Bugs, comments and suggestions should be +sent electronically to netinfo@garnet.Berkeley.EDU. + + +Operational Characteristics + +The POP Transaction Cycle + +The Berkeley POP server is a single program (called popper) that is +launched by inetd when it gets a service request on the POP TCP port. +(The official port number specified in RFC 1081 for POP version 3 is +port 110. However, some POP3 clients attempt to contact the server at +port 109, the POP version 2 port. Unless you are running both POP2 and +POP3 servers, you can simply define both ports for use by the POP3 +server. This is explained in the installation instructions later on.) +The popper program initializes and verifies that the peer IP address is +registered in the local domain, logging a warning message when a +connection is made to a client whose IP address does not have a +canonical name. For systems using BSD 4.3 bind, it also checks to see +if a cannonical name lookup for the client returns the same peer IP +address, logging a warning message if it does not. The the server +enters the authorization state, during which the client must correctly +identify itself by providing a valid Unix userid and password on the +server's host machine. No other exchanges are allowed during this +state (other than a request to quit.) If authentication fails, a +warning message is logged and the session ends. Once the user is +identified, popper changes its user and group ids to match that of the +user and enters the transaction state. The server makes a temporary +copy of the user's maildrop (ordinarily in /usr/spool/mail) which is +used for all subsequent transactions. These include the bulk of POP +commands to retrieve mail, delete mail, undelete mail, and so forth. A +Berkeley extension also allows the user to submit a mail parcel to the +server who mails it using the sendmail program (this extension is +supported in the HyperMail client distributed with the server). When +the client quits, the server enters the final update state during which +the network connection is terminated and the user's maildrop is updated +with the (possibly) modified temporary maildrop. + + +Logging + +The POP server uses syslog to keep a record of its activities. On +systems with BSD 4.3 syslogging, the server logs (by default) to the +"local0" facility at priority "notice" for all messages except +debugging which is logged at priority "debug". The default log file is +/usr/spool/mqueue/POPlog. These can be changed, if desired. On +systems with 4.2 syslogging all messages are logged to the local log +file, usually /usr/spool/mqueue/syslog. + +Problems + +If the filesystem which holds the /usr/spool/mail fills up users will +experience difficulties. The filesystem must have enough space to hold +(approximately) two copies of the largest mail box. Popper (v1.81 and +above) is designed to be robust in the face of this problem, but you may +end up with a situation where some of the user's mail is in + + /usr/spool/mail/.userid.pop + +and some of the mail is in + + /usr/spool/mail/userid + +If this happens the System Administrator should clear enough disk space +so that the filesystem has at least as much free disk as both mailboxes +hold and probably a little more. Then the user should initiate a POP +session, and do nothing but quit. If the POP session ends without an +error the user can then use POP or another mail program to clean up his/her +mailbox. + +Alternatively, the System Administrator can combine the two files (but +popper will do this for you if there is enough disk space). + + +Debugging + +The popper program will log debugging information when the -d parameter +is specified after its invocation in the inetd.conf file. Care should +be exercised in using this option since it generates considerable +output in the syslog file. Alternatively, the "-t " option +will place debugging information into file "" using fprintf +instead of syslog. (To enable debugging, you must edit the Makefile +to add -DDEBUG to the compiler options.) + +For SunOS version 3.5, the popper program is launched by inetd from +/etc/servers. This file does not allow you to specify command line +arguments. Therefore, if you want to enable debugging, you can specify +a shell script in /etc/servers to be launched instead of popper and in +this script call popper with the desired arguments. + + +Installation + +1. Examine this file for the latest information, warnings, etc. + +2. Check the Makefile for conformity with your system. + +3. Issue the make command in the directory containing the popper + source. + +4. Issue the make install command in the directory containing the + popper source to copy the program to /usr/etc. + +5. Enable syslogging: + + + For systems with 4.3 syslogging: + + Add the following line to the /etc/syslog.conf file: + + local0.notice;local0.debug /usr/spool/mqueue/POPlog + + Create the empty file /usr/spool/mqueue/POPlog. + + Kill and restart the syslogd daemon. + + + For systems with 4.2 syslogging: + + Be sure that you are logging messages of priority 7 and higher. + For example: + + 7/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog + 9/dev/null + +6. Update /etc/services: + + Add the following line to the /etc/services file: + + pop 110/tcp + + Note: This is the official port number for version 3 of the + Post Office Protocol as defined in RFC 1081. However, some + POP3 clients use port 109, the port number for the previous + version (2) of POP. Therefore you may also want to add the + following line to the /etc/services file: + + pop2 109/tcp + + For Sun systems running yp, also do the following: + + + Change to the /var/yp directory. + + + Issue the make services command. + +7. Update the inetd daemon configuration. Include the second line ONLY if you + are running the server at both ports. + + + On BSD 4.3 and SunOS 4.0 systems, add the following line to the + /etc/inetd.conf file: + + pop stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/popper popper + pop2 stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/popper popper + + + On Ultrix systems, add the following line to the + /etc/inetd.conf file: + + pop stream tcp nowait /usr/etc/popper popper + pop2 stream tcp nowait /usr/etc/popper popper + + + On SunOS 3.5 systems, add the following line to the + /etc/servers file: + + pop tcp /usr/etc/popper + pop2 tcp /usr/etc/popper + + Kill and restart the inetd daemon. + +You can confirm that the POP server is running on Unix by telneting to +port 110 (or 109 if you set it up that way). For example: + +%telnet myhost 110 +Trying... +Connected to myhost.berkeley.edu. +Escape character is '^]'. ++OK UCB Pop server (version 1.6) at myhost starting. +quit +Connection closed by foreign host. + + +Release Notes + +1.83 Make sure that everything we do as root is non-destructive. + +1.82 Make the /usr/spool/mail/.userid.pop file owned by the user rather + than owned by root. + +1.81 There were two versions of 1.7 floating around, 1.7b4 and 1.7b5. + The difference is that 1.7b5 attempted to save disk space on + /usr/spool/mail by deleting the users permanent maildrop after + making the temporary copy. Unfortunately, if compiled with + -DDEBUG, this version could easily wipe out a users' mail file. + This is now fixed. + + This version also fixes a security hole for systems that have + /usr/spool/mail writeable by all users. + + With this version we go to all new SCCS IDs for all files. This + is unfortunate, and we hope it is not too much of a problem. + + Thanks to Steve Dorner of UIUC for pointing out the major problem. + +1.7 Extensive re-write of the maildrop processing code contributed by + Viktor Dukhovni that greatly reduces the + possibility that the maildrop can be corrupted as the result of + simultaneous access by two or more processes. + + Added "pop_dropcopy" module to create a temporary maildrop from + the existing, standard maildrop as root before the setuid and + setgid for the user is done. This allows the temporary maildrop + to be created in a mail spool area that is not world read-writable. + + This version does *not* send the sendmail "From " delimiter line + in response to a TOP or RETR command. + + Encased all debugging code in #ifdef DEBUG constructs. This code can + be included by specifying the DEGUG compiler flag. Note: You still + need to use the -d or -t option to obtain debugging output. + +1.6 Corrects a bug that causes the server to crash on SunOS + 4.0 systems. + + Uses varargs and vsprintf (if available) in pop_log and + pop_msg. This is enabled by the "HAVE_VSPRINTF" + compiler flag. + + For systems with BSD 4.3 bind, performs a cannonical + name lookup and searches the returned address(es) for + the client's address, logging a warning message if it + is not located. This is enabled by the "BIND43" + comiler flag. + + Removed all the includes from popper.h and distributed + them throughout the porgrams files, as needed. + + Reformatted the source to convert tabs to spaces and + shorten lines for display on 80-column terminals. + +1.5 Creates the temporary maildrop with mode "600" and + immediately unlinks it. + + Uses client's IP address in lieu of a canonical name if + the latter cannot be obtained. + + Added "-t " option. The presence of this + option causes debugging output to be placed in the file + "file-name" using fprintf instead of the system log + file using syslog. + + Corrected maildrop parsing problem. + +1.4 Copies user's mail into a temporary maildrop on which + all subsequent activity is performed. + + Added "pop_log" function and replaced "syslog" calls + throughout the code with it. + +1.3 Corrected updating of Status: header line. + + Added strncasecmp for systems that do not have one. + Used strncasecmp in all appropriate places. This is + enabled by the STRNCASECMP compiler flag. + +1.2 Support for version 4.2 syslogging added. This is + enabled by the SYSLOG42 compiler flag. + +1.1 Several bugs fixed. + +1.0 Original version. + + +Limitations + ++ The POP server copies the user's entire maildrop to /tmp and + then operates on that copy. If the maildrop is particularly + large, or inadequate space is available in /tmp, then the + server will refuse to continue and terminate the connection. + ++ Simultaneous modification of a single maildrop can result in + confusing results. For example, manipulating messages in a + maildrop using the Unix /usr/ucb/mail command while a copy of + it is being processed by the POP server can cause the changes + made by one program to be lost when the other terminates. This + problem is being worked on and will be fixed in a later + release. + + +Credits + +The POP server was written by Edward Moy and Austin Shelton with +contributions from Robert Campbell (U.C. Berkeley) and Viktor Dukhovni +(Princeton University). Edward Moy wrote the HyperMail stack and drew +the POP operation diagram. This installation guide was written by +Austin Shelton. + + +Footnotes + +[1] Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California. + All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. Unix is + a registered trademark of AT&T corporation. HyperCard and + Macintosh are registered trademarks of Apple Corporation. + +[2] M. Rose, Post Office Protocol - Version 3. RFC 1081, NIC, + November 1988. + +[3] M. Rose, Post Office Protocol - Version 3 Extended Service + Offerings. RFC 1082, NIC, November 1988. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README-FIRST b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README-FIRST new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d78fb644b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README-FIRST @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This kerberized popper was based on popper-1.831beta +which was later announced as "offical" and not beta. + +This program is able to talk both the pop3 and the kpop3 protocol. + +Please note that the server principal is pop.hostname and not +rcmd.hostname. I.e an additional entry is needed in your mailhub's +/etc/srvtab. Use ksrvutil to add the extra prinicpal. + +The server is usually started from inetd and there is already an entry +for that in inetd.conf.changes. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README-KRB4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README-KRB4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f029cf97c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/README-KRB4 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Define KERBEROS if you want support for Kerberos V4 style +authentification, then you will be able to start a kerberise pop with +the `-k' flag. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/maildir.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/maildir.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4953d4bd4e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/maildir.c @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include +RCSID("$Id: maildir.c,v 1.6 2001/09/10 11:56:53 joda Exp $"); + +static void +make_path(POP *p, MsgInfoList *mp, int new, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + snprintf(buf, len, "%s/%s%s%s", p->drop_name, + new ? "new" : "cur", mp ? "/" : "", mp ? mp->name : ""); +} + +static int +scan_file(POP *p, MsgInfoList *mp) +{ + char path[MAXPATHLEN]; + FILE *f; + char buf[1024]; + int eoh = 0; + + make_path(p, mp, mp->flags & NEW_FLAG, path, sizeof(path)); + f = fopen(path, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, + "Failed to open message file `%s': %s", + path, strerror(errno)); +#endif + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "Failed to open message file `%s'", path); + } + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + mp->lines++; + mp->length += strlen(buf); + if(eoh) + continue; + if(strcmp(buf, "\n") == 0) + eoh = 1; + parse_header(mp, buf); + } + fclose(f); + return add_missing_headers(p, mp); +} + +static int +scan_dir(POP *p, int new) +{ + char tmp[MAXPATHLEN]; + DIR *dir; + struct dirent *dent; + MsgInfoList *mp = p->mlp; + int n_mp = p->msg_count; + int e; + + make_path(p, NULL, new, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + mkdir(tmp, 0700); + dir = opendir(tmp); + while((dent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { + if(strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(dent->d_name, "..") == 0) + continue; + mp = realloc(mp, (n_mp + 1) * sizeof(*mp)); + if(mp == NULL) { + p->msg_count = 0; + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "Can't build message list for '%s': Out of memory", + p->user); + } + memset(mp + n_mp, 0, sizeof(*mp)); + mp[n_mp].name = strdup(dent->d_name); + if(mp[n_mp].name == NULL) { + p->msg_count = 0; + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "Can't build message list for '%s': Out of memory", + p->user); + } + mp[n_mp].number = n_mp + 1; + mp[n_mp].flags = 0; + if(new) + mp[n_mp].flags |= NEW_FLAG; + e = scan_file(p, &mp[n_mp]); + if(e != POP_SUCCESS) + return e; + p->drop_size += mp[n_mp].length; + n_mp++; + } + closedir(dir); + p->mlp = mp; + p->msg_count = n_mp; + return POP_SUCCESS; +} + +int +pop_maildir_info(POP *p) +{ + int e; + + p->temp_drop[0] = '\0'; + p->mlp = NULL; + p->msg_count = 0; + + e = scan_dir(p, 0); + if(e != POP_SUCCESS) return e; + + e = scan_dir(p, 1); + if(e != POP_SUCCESS) return e; + return POP_SUCCESS; +} + +int +pop_maildir_update(POP *p) +{ + int i; + char tmp1[MAXPATHLEN], tmp2[MAXPATHLEN]; + for(i = 0; i < p->msg_count; i++) { + make_path(p, &p->mlp[i], p->mlp[i].flags & NEW_FLAG, + tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); + if(p->mlp[i].flags & DEL_FLAG) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Removing `%s'", tmp1); +#endif + if(unlink(tmp1) < 0) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Failed to remove `%s': %s", + tmp1, strerror(errno)); +#endif + /* return failure? */ + } + } else if((p->mlp[i].flags & NEW_FLAG) && + (p->mlp[i].flags & RETR_FLAG)) { + make_path(p, &p->mlp[i], 0, tmp2, sizeof(tmp2)); +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Linking `%s' to `%s'", tmp1, tmp2); +#endif + if(link(tmp1, tmp2) == 0) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Removing `%s'", tmp1); +#endif + if(unlink(tmp1) < 0) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Failed to remove `%s'", tmp1); +#endif + /* return failure? */ + } + } else { + if(errno == EXDEV) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Trying to rename `%s' to `%s'", + tmp1, tmp2); +#endif + if(rename(tmp1, tmp2) < 0) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "Failed to rename `%s' to `%s'", + tmp1, tmp2); +#endif + } + } + } + } + } + return(pop_quit(p)); +} + +int +pop_maildir_open(POP *p, MsgInfoList *mp) +{ + char tmp[MAXPATHLEN]; + make_path(p, mp, mp->flags & NEW_FLAG, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + if(p->drop) + fclose(p->drop); + p->drop = fopen(tmp, "r"); + if(p->drop == NULL) + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "Failed to open message file"); + return POP_SUCCESS; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop3.rfc1081 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop3.rfc1081 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08ea6dd143 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop3.rfc1081 @@ -0,0 +1,898 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Rose +Request for Comments: 1081 TWG + November 1988 + + Post Office Protocol - Version 3 + + +Status of this Memo + + This memo suggests a simple method for workstations to dynamically + access mail from a mailbox server. This RFC specifies a proposed + protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and + suggestions for improvements. Distribution of this memo is + unlimited. + + This memo is based on RFC 918 (since revised as RFC 937). Although + similar in form to the original Post Office Protocol (POP) proposed + for the Internet community, the protocol discussed in this memo is + similar in spirit to the ideas investigated by the MZnet project at + the University of California, Irvine. + + Further, substantial work was done on examining POP in a PC-based + environment. This work, which resulted in additional functionality + in this protocol, was performed by the ACIS Networking Systems Group + at Stanford University. The author gratefully acknowledges their + interest. + +Introduction + + On certain types of smaller nodes in the Internet it is often + impractical to maintain a message transport system (MTS). For + example, a workstation may not have sufficient resources (cycles, + disk space) in order to permit a SMTP server and associated local + mail delivery system to be kept resident and continuously running. + Similarly, it may be expensive (or impossible) to keep a personal + computer interconnected to an IP-style network for long amounts of + time (the node is lacking the resource known as "connectivity"). + + Despite this, it is often very useful to be able to manage mail on + these smaller nodes, and they often support a user agent (UA) to aid + the tasks of mail handling. To solve this problem, a node which can + support an MTS entity offers a maildrop service to these less endowed + nodes. The Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3) is intended to + permit a workstation to dynamically access a maildrop on a server + host in a useful fashion. Usually, this means that the POP3 is used + to allow a workstation to retrieve mail that the server is holding + for it. + + + + +Rose [Page 1] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + For the remainder of this memo, the term "client host" refers to a + host making use of the POP3 service, while the term "server host" + refers to a host which offers the POP3 service. + +A Short Digression + + This memo does not specify how a client host enters mail into the + transport system, although a method consistent with the philosophy of + this memo is presented here: + + When the user agent on a client host wishes to enter a message + into the transport system, it establishes an SMTP connection to + its relay host (this relay host could be, but need not be, the + POP3 server host for the client host). + + If this method is followed, then the client host appears to the MTS + as a user agent, and should NOT be regarded as a "trusted" MTS entity + in any sense whatsoever. This concept, along with the role of the + POP3 as a part of a split-UA model is discussed later in this memo. + + Initially, the server host starts the POP3 service by listening on + TCP port 110. When a client host wishes to make use of the service, + it establishes a TCP connection with the server host. When the + connection is established, the POP3 server sends a greeting. The + client and POP3 server then exchange commands and responses + (respectively) until the connection is closed or aborted. + + Commands in the POP3 consist of a keyword possibly followed by an + argument. All commands are terminated by a CRLF pair. + + Responses in the POP3 consist of a success indicator and a keyword + possibly followed by additional information. All responses are + terminated by a CRLF pair. There are currently two success + indicators: positive ("+OK") and negative ("-ERR"). + + Responses to certain commands are multi-line. In these cases, which + are clearly indicated below, after sending the first line of the + response and a CRLF, any additional lines are sent, each terminated + by a CRLF pair. When all lines of the response have been sent, a + final line is sent, consisting of a termination octet (decimal code + 046, ".") and a CRLF pair. If any line of the multi-line response + begins with the termination octet, the line is "byte-stuffed" by + pre-pending the termination octet to that line of the response. + Hence a multi-line response is terminated with the five octets + "CRLF.CRLF". When examining a multi-line response, the client checks + to see if the line begins with the termination octet. If so and if + octets other than CRLF follow, the the first octet of the line (the + termination octet) is stripped away. If so and if CRLF immediately + + + +Rose [Page 2] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + follows the termination character, then the response from the POP + server is ended and the line containing ".CRLF" is not considered + part of the multi-line response. + + A POP3 session progresses through a number of states during its + lifetime. Once the TCP connection has been opened and the POP3 + server has sent the greeting, the session enters the AUTHORIZATION + state. In this state, the client must identify itself to the POP3 + server. Once the client has successfully done this, the server + acquires resources associated with the client's maildrop, and the + session enters the TRANSACTION state. In this state, the client + requests actions on the part of the POP3 server. When the client has + finished its transactions, the session enters the UPDATE state. In + this state, the POP3 server releases any resources acquired during + the TRANSACTION state and says goodbye. The TCP connection is then + closed. + +The AUTHORIZATION State + + Once the TCP connection has been opened by a POP3 client, the POP3 + server issues a one line greeting. This can be any string terminated + by CRLF. An example might be: + + S. +OK dewey POP3 server ready (Comments to: PostMaster@UDEL.EDU) + + Note that this greeting is a POP3 reply. The POP3 server should + always give a positive response as the greeting. + + The POP3 session is now in the AUTHORIZATION state. The client must + now issue the USER command. If the POP3 server responds with a + positive success indicator ("+OK"), then the client may issue either + the PASS command to complete the authorization, or the QUIT command + to terminate the POP3 session. If the POP3 server responds with a + negative success indicator ("-ERR") to the USER command, then the + client may either issue a new USER command or may issue the QUIT + command. + + When the client issues the PASS command, the POP3 server uses the + argument pair from the USER and PASS commands to determine if the + client should be given access to the appropriate maildrop. If so, + the POP3 server then acquires an exclusive-access lock on the + maildrop. If the lock is successfully acquired, the POP3 server + parses the maildrop into individual messages (read note below), + determines the last message (if any) present in the maildrop that was + referenced by the RETR command, and responds with a positive success + indicator. The POP3 session now enters the TRANSACTION state. If + the lock can not be acquired or the client should is denied access to + the appropriate maildrop or the maildrop can't be parsed for some + + + +Rose [Page 3] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + reason, the POP3 server responds with a negative success indicator. + (If a lock was acquired but the POP3 server intends to respond with a + negative success indicator, the POP3 server must release the lock + prior to rejecting the command.) At this point, the client may + either issue a new USER command and start again, or the client may + issue the QUIT command. + + NOTE: Minimal implementations of the POP3 need only be + able to break a maildrop into its component messages; + they need NOT be able to parse individual messages. + More advanced implementations may wish to have this + capability, for reasons discussed later. + + After the POP3 server has parsed the maildrop into individual + messages, it assigns a message-id to each message, and notes the size + of the message in octets. The first message in the maildrop is + assigned a message-id of "1", the second is assigned "2", and so on, + so that the n'th message in a maildrop is assigned a message-id of + "n". In POP3 commands and responses, all message-id's and message + sizes are expressed in base-10 (i.e., decimal). + + It sets the "highest number accessed" to be that of the last message + referenced by the RETR command. + + Here are summaries for the three POP3 commands discussed thus far: + + USER name + Arguments: a server specific user-id (required) + Restrictions: may only be given in the AUTHORIZATION + state after the POP3 greeting or after an + unsuccessful USER or PASS command + Possible Responses: + +OK name is welcome here + -ERR never heard of name + Examples: + C: USER mrose + S: +OK mrose is a real hoopy frood + ... + C: USER frated + S: -ERR sorry, frated doesn't get his mail here + + PASS string + Arguments: a server/user-id specific password (required) + Restrictions: may only be given in the AUTHORIZATION + state after a successful USER command + Possible Responses: + +OK maildrop locked and ready + -ERR invalid password + + + +Rose [Page 4] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + -ERR unable to lock maildrop + Examples: + C: USER mrose + S: +OK mrose is a real hoopy frood + C: PASS secret + S: +OK mrose's maildrop has 2 messages + (320 octets) + ... + C: USER mrose + S: +OK mrose is a real hoopy frood + C: PASS secret + S: -ERR unable to lock mrose's maildrop, file + already locked + + QUIT + Arguments: none + Restrictions: none + Possible Responses: + +OK + Examples: + C: QUIT + S: +OK dewey POP3 server signing off + + +The TRANSACTION State + + Once the client has successfully identified itself to the POP3 server + and the POP3 server has locked and burst the appropriate maildrop, + the POP3 session is now in the TRANSACTION state. The client may now + issue any of the following POP3 commands repeatedly. After each + command, the POP3 server issues a response. Eventually, the client + issues the QUIT command and the POP3 session enters the UPDATE state. + + Here are the POP3 commands valid in the TRANSACTION state: + + STAT + Arguments: none + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + The POP3 server issues a positive response with a line + containing information for the maildrop. This line is + called a "drop listing" for that maildrop. + + In order to simplify parsing, all POP3 servers are + required to use a certain format for drop listings. + The first octets present must indicate the number of + messages in the maildrop. Following this is the size + + + +Rose [Page 5] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + of the maildrop in octets. This memo makes no + requirement on what follows the maildrop size. + Minimal implementations should just end that line of + the response with a CRLF pair. More advanced + implementations may include other information. + + NOTE: This memo STRONGLY discourages + implementations from supplying additional + information in the drop listing. Other, + optional, facilities are discussed later on + which permit the client to parse the messages + in the maildrop. + + Note that messages marked as deleted are not counted in + either total. + + Possible Responses: + +OK nn mm + Examples: + C: STAT + S: +OK 2 320 + + LIST [msg] + Arguments: a message-id (optionally) If a message-id is + given, it may NOT refer to a message marked as + deleted. + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + If an argument was given and the POP3 server issues a + positive response with a line containing information + for that message. This line is called a "scan listing" + for that message. + + If no argument was given and the POP3 server issues a + positive response, then the response given is + multi-line. After the initial +OK, for each message + in the maildrop, the POP3 server responds with a line + containing information for that message. This line + is called a "scan listing" for that message. + + In order to simplify parsing, all POP3 servers are + required to use a certain format for scan listings. + The first octets present must be the message-id of + the message. Following the message-id is the size of + the message in octets. This memo makes no requirement + on what follows the message size in the scan listing. + Minimal implementations should just end that line of + + + +Rose [Page 6] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + the response with a CRLF pair. More advanced + implementations may include other information, as + parsed from the message. + + NOTE: This memo STRONGLY discourages + implementations from supplying additional + information in the scan listing. Other, optional, + facilities are discussed later on which permit + the client to parse the messages in the maildrop. + + Note that messages marked as deleted are not listed. + + Possible Responses: + +OK scan listing follows + -ERR no such message + Examples: + C: LIST + S: +OK 2 messages (320 octets) + S: 1 120 + S: 2 200 + S: . + ... + C: LIST 2 + S: +OK 2 200 + ... + C: LIST 3 + S: -ERR no such message, only 2 messages in + maildrop + + RETR msg + Arguments: a message-id (required) This message-id may + NOT refer to a message marked as deleted. + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + If the POP3 server issues a positive response, then the + response given is multi-line. After the initial +OK, + the POP3 server sends the message corresponding to the + given message-id, being careful to byte-stuff the + termination character (as with all multi-line + responses). + + If the number associated with this message is higher + than the "highest number accessed" in the maildrop, the + POP3 server updates the "highest number accessed" to + the number associated with this message. + + + + + +Rose [Page 7] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + Possible Responses: + +OK message follows + -ERR no such message + Examples: + C: RETR 1 + S: +OK 120 octets + S: + S: . + + DELE msg + Arguments: a message-id (required) This message-id + may NOT refer to a message marked as deleted. + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + The POP3 server marks the message as deleted. Any + future reference to the message-id associated with the + message in a POP3 command generates an error. The POP3 + server does not actually delete the message until the + POP3 session enters the UPDATE state. + + If the number associated with this message is higher + than the "highest number accessed" in the maildrop, + the POP3 server updates the "highest number accessed" + to the number associated with this message. + + Possible Responses: + +OK message deleted + -ERR no such message + Examples: + C: DELE 1 + S: +OK message 1 deleted + ... + C: DELE 2 + S: -ERR message 2 already deleted + + NOOP + Arguments: none + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + The POP3 server does nothing, it merely replies with a + positive response. + + Possible Responses: + +OK + + + + + +Rose [Page 8] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + Examples: + C: NOOP + S: +OK + + LAST + Arguments: none + Restrictions: may only be issued in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + The POP3 server issues a positive response with a line + containing the highest message number which accessed. + Zero is returned in case no message in the maildrop has + been accessed during previous transactions. A client + may thereafter infer that messages, if any, numbered + greater than the response to the LAST command are + messages not yet accessed by the client. + + Possible Response: + +OK nn + + Examples: + C: STAT + S: +OK 4 320 + C: LAST + S: +OK 1 + C: RETR 3 + S: +OK 120 octets + S: + S: . + C: LAST + S: +OK 3 + C: DELE 2 + S: +OK message 2 deleted + C: LAST + S: +OK 3 + C: RSET + S: +OK + C: LAST + S: +OK 1 + + RSET + Arguments: none + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION + state. + Discussion: + + If any messages have been marked as deleted by the POP3 + + + +Rose [Page 9] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + server, they are unmarked. The POP3 server then + replies with a positive response. In addition, the + "highest number accessed" is also reset to the value + determined at the beginning of the POP3 session. + + Possible Responses: + +OK + Examples: + C: RSET + S: +OK maildrop has 2 messages (320 octets) + + + +The UPDATE State + + When the client issues the QUIT command from the TRANSACTION state, + the POP3 session enters the UPDATE state. (Note that if the client + issues the QUIT command from the AUTHORIZATION state, the POP3 + session terminates but does NOT enter the UPDATE state.) + + QUIT + Arguments: none + Restrictions: none + Discussion: + + The POP3 server removes all messages marked as deleted + from the maildrop. It then releases the + exclusive-access lock on the maildrop and replies as + to the success of + these operations. The TCP connection is then closed. + + Possible Responses: + +OK + Examples: + C: QUIT + S: +OK dewey POP3 server signing off (maildrop + empty) + ... + C: QUIT + S: +OK dewey POP3 server signing off (2 messages + left) + ... + + +Optional POP3 Commands + + The POP3 commands discussed above must be supported by all minimal + implementations of POP3 servers. + + + +Rose [Page 10] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + The optional POP3 commands described below permit a POP3 client + greater freedom in message handling, while preserving a simple POP3 + server implementation. + + NOTE: This memo STRONGLY encourages implementations to + support these commands in lieu of developing augmented + drop and scan listings. In short, the philosophy of + this memo is to put intelligence in the part of the + POP3 client and not the POP3 server. + + TOP msg n + Arguments: a message-id (required) and a number. This + message-id may NOT refer to a message marked as + deleted. + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + If the POP3 server issues a positive response, then + the response given is multi-line. After the initial + +OK, the POP3 server sends the headers of the message, + the blank line separating the headers from the body, + and then the number of lines indicated message's body, + being careful to byte-stuff the termination character + (as with all multi-line responses). + + Note that if the number of lines requested by the POP3 + client is greater than than the number of lines in the + body, then the POP3 server sends the entire message. + + Possible Responses: + +OK top of message follows + -ERR no such message + Examples: + C: TOP 10 + S: +OK + S: + S: . + ... + C: TOP 100 + S: -ERR no such message + + RPOP user + Arguments: a client specific user-id (required) + Restrictions: may only be given in the AUTHORIZATION + state after a successful USER command; in addition, + may only be given if the client used a reserved + + + +Rose [Page 11] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + (privileged) TCP port to connect to the server. + Discussion: + + The RPOP command may be used instead of the PASS + command to authenticate access to the maildrop. In + order for this command to be successful, the POP3 + client must use a reserved TCP port (port < 1024) to + connect tothe server. The POP3 server uses the + argument pair from the USER and RPOP commands to + determine if the client should be given access to + the appropriate maildrop. Unlike the PASS command + however, the POP3 server considers if the remote user + specified by the RPOP command who resides on the POP3 + client host is allowed to access the maildrop for the + user specified by the USER command (e.g., on Berkeley + UNIX, the .rhosts mechanism is used). With the + exception of this differing in authentication, this + command is identical to the PASS command. + + Note that the use of this feature has allowed much wider + penetration into numerous hosts on local networks (and + sometimes remote networks) by those who gain illegal + access to computers by guessing passwords or otherwise + breaking into the system. + + Possible Responses: + +OK maildrop locked and ready + -ERR permission denied + Examples: + C: USER mrose + S: +OK mrose is a real hoopy frood + C: RPOP mrose + S: +OK mrose's maildrop has 2 messages (320 + octets) + + Minimal POP3 Commands: + USER name valid in the AUTHORIZATION state + PASS string + QUIT + + STAT valid in the TRANSACTION state + LIST [msg] + RETR msg + DELE msg + NOOP + LAST + RSET + + + + +Rose [Page 12] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + QUIT valid in the UPDATE state + + Optional POP3 Commands: + RPOP user valid in the AUTHORIZATION state + + TOP msg n valid in the TRANSACTION state + + POP3 Replies: + +OK + -ERR + + Note that with the exception of the STAT command, the reply given + by the POP3 server to any command is significant only to "+OK" + and "-ERR". Any text occurring after this reply may be ignored + by the client. + +Example POP3 Session + + S: + ... + C: + S: +OK dewey POP3 server ready (Comments to: PostMaster@UDEL.EDU) + C: USER mrose + S: +OK mrose is a real hoopy frood + C: PASS secret + S: +OK mrose's maildrop has 2 messages (320 octets) + C: STAT + S: +OK 2 320 + C: LIST + S: +OK 2 messages (320 octets) + S: 1 120 + S: 2 200 + S: . + C: RETR 1 + S: +OK 120 octets + S: + S: . + C: DELE 1 + S: +OK message 1 deleted + C: RETR 2 + S: +OK 200 octets + S: + S: . + C: DELE 2 + S: +OK message 2 deleted + C: QUIT + + + + + +Rose [Page 13] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + S: +OK dewey POP3 server signing off (maildrop empty) + C: + S: + +Message Format + + All messages transmitted during a POP3 session are assumed to conform + to the standard for the format of Internet text messages [RFC822]. + + It is important to note that the byte count for a message on the + server host may differ from the octet count assigned to that message + due to local conventions for designating end-of-line. Usually, + during the AUTHORIZATION state of the POP3 session, the POP3 client + can calculate the size of each message in octets when it parses the + maildrop into messages. For example, if the POP3 server host + internally represents end-of-line as a single character, then the + POP3 server simply counts each occurrence of this character in a + message as two octets. Note that lines in the message which start + with the termination octet need not be counted twice, since the POP3 + client will remove all byte-stuffed termination characters when it + receives a multi-line response. + +The POP and the Split-UA model + + The underlying paradigm in which the POP3 functions is that of a + split-UA model. The POP3 client host, being a remote PC based + workstation, acts solely as a client to the message transport system. + It does not provide delivery/authentication services to others. + Hence, it is acting as a UA, on behalf of the person using the + workstation. Furthermore, the workstation uses SMTP to enter mail + into the MTS. + + In this sense, we have two UA functions which interface to the + message transport system: Posting (SMTP) and Retrieval (POP3). The + entity which supports this type of environment is called a split-UA + (since the user agent is split between two hosts which must + interoperate to provide these functions). + + ASIDE: Others might term this a remote-UA instead. + There are arguments supporting the use of both terms. + + This memo has explicitly referenced TCP as the underlying transport + agent for the POP3. This need not be the case. In the MZnet split- + UA, for example, personal micro-computer systems are used which do + not have IP-style networking capability. To connect to the POP3 + server host, a PC establishes a terminal connection using some simple + protocol (PhoneNet). A program on the PC drives the connection, + first establishing a login session as a normal user. The login shell + + + +Rose [Page 14] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + for this pseudo-user is a program which drives the other half of the + terminal protocol and communicates with one of two servers. Although + MZnet can support several PCs, a single pseudo-user login is present + on the server host. The user-id and password for this pseudo-user + login is known to all members of MZnet. Hence, the first action of + the login shell, after starting the terminal protocol, is to demand a + USER/PASS authorization pair from the PC. This second level of + authorization is used to ascertain who is interacting with the MTS. + Although the server host is deemed to support a "trusted" MTS entity, + PCs in MZnet are not. Naturally, the USER/PASS authorization pair + for a PC is known only to the owner of the PC (in theory, at least). + + After successfully verifying the identity of the client, a modified + SMTP server is started, and the PC posts mail with the server host. + After the QUIT command is given to the SMTP server and it terminates, + a modified POP3 server is started, and the PC retrieves mail from the + server host. After the QUIT command is given to the POP3 server and + it terminates, the login shell for the pseudo-user terminates the + terminal protocol and logs the job out. The PC then closes the + terminal connection to the server host. + + The SMTP server used by MZnet is modified in the sense that it knows + that it's talking to a user agent and not a "trusted" entity in the + message transport system. Hence, it does performs the validation + activities normally performed by an entity in the MTS when it accepts + a message from a UA. + + The POP3 server used by MZnet is modified in the sense that it does + not require a USER/PASS combination before entering the TRANSACTION + state. The reason for this (of course) is that the PC has already + identified itself during the second-level authorization step + described above. + + NOTE: Truth in advertising laws require that the author + of this memo state that MZnet has not actually been + fully implemented. The concepts presented and proven + by the project led to the notion of the MZnet + split-slot model. This notion has inspired the + split-UA concept described in this memo, led to the + author's interest in the POP, and heavily influenced + the the description of the POP3 herein. + + In fact, some UAs present in the Internet already support the notion + of posting directly to an SMTP server and retrieving mail directly + from a POP server, even if the POP server and client resided on the + same host! + + ASIDE: this discussion raises an issue which this memo + + + +Rose [Page 15] + +RFC 1081 POP3 November 1988 + + + purposedly avoids: how does SMTP know that it's talking + to a "trusted" MTS entity? + +References + + [MZnet] Stefferud, E., J. Sweet, and T. Domae, "MZnet: Mail + Service for Personal Micro-Computer Systems", + Proceedings, IFIP 6.5 International Conference on + Computer Message Systems, Nottingham, U.K., May 1984. + + [RFC821] Postel, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", + USC/Information Sciences Institute, August 1982. + + [RFC822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the Format of ARPA-Internet + Text Messages", University of Delaware, August 1982. + + [RFC937] Butler, M., J. Postel, D. Chase, J. Goldberger, and J. + Reynolds, "Post Office Protocol - Version 2", RFC 937, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, February 1985. + + [RFC1010] Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC + 1010, USC/Information Sciences Institute, May 1987. + +Author's Address: + + + Marshall Rose + The Wollongong Group + 1129 San Antonio Rd. + Palo Alto, California 94303 + + Phone: (415) 962-7100 + + Email: MRose@TWG.COM + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Rose [Page 16] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop3e.rfc1082 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop3e.rfc1082 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac49448b5e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop3e.rfc1082 @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Rose +Request for Comments: 1082 TWG + November 1988 + + + + Post Office Protocol - Version 3 + Extended Service Offerings + +Status of This Memo + + This memo suggests a simple method for workstations to dynamically + access mail from a discussion group server, as an extension to an + earlier memo which dealt with dynamically accessing mail from a + mailbox server using the Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3). + This RFC specifies a proposed protocol for the Internet community, + and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. All of the + extensions described in this memo to the POP3 are OPTIONAL. + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Introduction and Motivation + + It is assumed that the reader is familiar with RFC 1081 that + discusses the Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3) [RFC1081]. + This memo describes extensions to the POP3 which enhance the service + it offers to clients. This additional service permits a client host + to access discussion group mail, which is often kept in a separate + spool area, using the general POP3 facilities. + + The next section describes the evolution of discussion groups and the + technologies currently used to implement them. To summarize: + + o An exploder is used to map from a single address to + a list of addresses which subscribe to the list, and redirects + any subsequent error reports associated with the delivery of + each message. This has two primary advantages: + - Subscribers need know only a single address + - Responsible parties get the error reports and not + the subscribers + + + + + + + + + + + + +Rose [Page 1] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + o Typically, each subscription address is not a person's private + maildrop, but a system-wide maildrop, which can be accessed + by more than one user. This has several advantages: + - Only a single copy of each message need traverse the + net for a given site (which may contain several local + hosts). This conserves bandwidth and cycles. + - Only a single copy of each message need reside on each + subscribing host. This conserves disk space. + - The private maildrop for each user is not cluttered + with discussion group mail. + + Despite this optimization of resources, further economy can be + achieved at sites with more than one host. Typically, sites with + more than one host either: + + 1. Replicate discussion group mail on each host. This + results in literally gigabytes of disk space committed to + unnecessarily store redundant information. + + 2. Keep discussion group mail on one host and give all users a + login on that host (in addition to any other logins they may + have). This is usually a gross inconvenience for users who + work on other hosts, or a burden to users who are forced to + work on that host. + + As discussed in [RFC1081], the problem of giving workstations dynamic + access to mail from a mailbox server has been explored in great + detail (originally there was [RFC918], this prompted the author to + write [RFC1081], independently of this [RFC918] was upgraded to + [RFC937]). A natural solution to the problem outlined above is to + keep discussion group mail on a mailbox server at each site and + permit different hosts at that site to employ the POP3 to access + discussion group mail. If implemented properly, this avoids the + problems of both strategies outlined above. + + ASIDE: It might be noted that a good distributed filesystem + could also solve this problem. Sadly, "good" + distributed filesystems, which do not suffer + unacceptable response time for interactive use, are + few and far between these days! + + Given this motivation, now let's consider discussion groups, both in + general and from the point of view of a user agent. Following this, + extensions to the POP3 defined in [RFC1081] are presented. Finally, + some additional policy details are discussed along with some initial + experiences. + + + + + +Rose [Page 2] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + +What's in a Discussion Group + + Since mailers and user agents first crawled out of the primordial + ARPAnet, the value of discussion groups have been appreciated, + (though their implementation has not always been well-understood). + + Described simply, a discussion group is composed of a number of + subscribers with a common interest. These subscribers post mail to a + single address, known as a distribution address. From this + distribution address, a copy of the message is sent to each + subscriber. Each group has a moderator, which is the person that + administrates the group. The moderator can usually be reached at a + special address, known as a request address. Usually, the + responsibilities of the moderator are quite simple, since the mail + system handles the distribution to subscribers automatically. In + some cases, the interest group, instead of being distributed directly + to its subscribers, is put into a digest format by the moderator and + then sent to the subscribers. Although this requires more work on + the part of the moderator, such groups tend to be better organized. + + Unfortunately, there are a few problems with the scheme outlined + above. First, if two users on the same host subscribe to the same + interest group, two copies of the message get delivered. This is + wasteful of both processor and disk resources. + + Second, some of these groups carry a lot of traffic. Although + subscription to an group does indicate interest on the part of a + subscriber, it is usually not interesting to get 50 messages or so + delivered to the user's private maildrop each day, interspersed with + personal mail, that is likely to be of a much more important and + timely nature. + + Third, if a subscriber on the distribution list for a group becomes + "bad" somehow, the originator of the message and not the moderator of + the group is notified. It is not uncommon for a large list to have + 10 or so bogus addresses present. This results in the originator + being flooded with "error messages" from mailers across the Internet + stating that a given address on the list was bad. Needless to say, + the originator usually could not care less if the bogus addresses got + a copy of the message or not. The originator is merely interested in + posting a message to the group at large. Furthermore, the moderator + of the group does care if there are bogus addresses on the list, but + ironically does not receive notification. + + There are various approaches which can be used to solve some or all + of these problems. Usually these involve placing an exploder agent + at the distribution source of the discussion group, which expands the + name of the group into the list of subscription addresses for the + + + +Rose [Page 3] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + group. In the process, the exploder will also change the address + that receives error notifications to be the request address or other + responsible party. + + A complementary approach, used in order to cut down on resource + utilization of all kinds, replaces all the subscribers at a single + host (or group of hosts under a single administration) with a single + address at that host. This address maps to a file on the host, + usually in a spool area, which all users can access. (Advanced + implementations can also implement private discussion groups this + way, in which a single copy of each message is kept, but is + accessible to only a select number of users on the host.) + + The two approaches can be combined to avoid all of the problems + described above. + + Finally, a third approach can be taken, which can be used to aid user + agents processing mail for the discussion group: In order to speed + querying of the maildrop which contains the local host's copy of the + discussion group, two other items are usually associated with the + discussion group, on a local basis. These are the maxima and the + last-date. Each time a message is received for the group on the + local host, the maxima is increased by at least one. Furthermore, + when a new maxima is generated, the current date is determined. This + is called the last date. As the message is entered into the local + maildrop, it is given the current maxima and last-date. This permits + the user agent to quickly determine if new messages are present in + the maildrop. + + NOTE: The maxima may be characterized as a monotonically + increasing quanity. Although sucessive values of the + maxima need not be consecutive, any maxima assigned + is always greater than any previously assigned value. + +Definition of Terms + + To formalize these notions somewhat, consider the following 7 + parameters which describe a given discussion group from the + perspective of the user agent (the syntax given is from [RFC822]): + + + + + + + + + + + + +Rose [Page 4] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + NAME Meaning: the name of the discussion group + Syntax: TOKEN (ALPHA *[ ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" ]) + (case-insensitive recognition) + Example: unix-wizards + + ALIASES Meaning: alternates names for the group, which + are locally meaningful; these are + typically used to shorten user typein + Syntax: TOKEN (case-insensitive recognition) + Example: uwiz + + ADDRESS Meaning: the primary source of the group + Syntax: 822 address + Example: Unix-Wizards@BRL.MIL + + REQUEST Meaning: the primary moderator of the group + Syntax: 822 address + Example: Unix-Wizards-Request@BRL.MIL + + FLAGS Meaning: locally meaningful flags associated + with the discussion group; this memo + leaves interpretation of this + parameter to each POP3 implementation + Syntax: octal number + Example: 01 + + MAXIMA Meaning: the magic cookie associated with the + last message locally received for the + group; it is the property of the magic + cookie that it's value NEVER + decreases, and increases by at least + one each time a message is locally + received + Syntax: decimal number + Example: 1004 + + LASTDATE Meaning: the date that the last message was + locally received + Syntax: 822 date + Example: Thu, 19 Dec 85 10:26:48 -0800 + + Note that the last two values are locally determined for the maildrop + associated with the discussion group and with each message in that + maildrop. Note however that the last message in the maildrop have a + different MAXIMA and LASTDATE than the discussion group. This often + occurs when the maildrop has been archived. + + + + + +Rose [Page 5] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + Finally, some local systems provide mechanisms for automatically + archiving discussion group mail. In some cases, a two-level archive + scheme is used: current mail is kept in the standard maildrop, + recent mail is kept in an archive maildrop, and older mail is kept + off-line. With this scheme, in addition to having a "standard" + maildrop for each discussion group, an "archive" maildrop may also be + available. This permits a user agent to examine the most recent + archive using the same mechanisms as those used on the current mail. + +The XTND Command + + The following commands are valid only in the TRANSACTION state of the + POP3. This implies that the POP3 server has already opened the + user's maildrop (which may be empty). This maildrop is called the + "default maildrop". The phrase "closes the current maildrop" has two + meanings, depending on whether the current maildrop is the default + maildrop or is a maildrop associated with a discussion group. + + In the former context, when the current maildrop is closed any + messages marked as deleted are removed from the maildrop currently in + use. The exclusive-access lock on the maildrop is then released + along with any implementation-specific resources (e.g., file- + descriptors). + + In the latter context, a maildrop associated with a discussion group + is considered to be read-only to the POP3 client. In this case, the + phrase "closes the current maildrop" merely means that any + implementation-specific resources are released. (Hence, the POP3 + command DELE is a no-op.) + + All the new facilities are introduced via a single POP3 command, + XTND. All positive reponses to the XTND command are multi-line. + + The most common multi-line response to the commands contains a + "discussion group listing" which presents the name of the discussion + group along with it's maxima. In order to simplify parsing all POP3 + servers are required to use a certain format for discussion group + listings: + + NAME SP MAXIMA + + This memo makes no requirement on what follows the maxima in the + listing. Minimal implementations should just end that line of the + response with a CRLF pair. More advanced implementations may include + other information, as parsed from the message. + + NOTE: This memo STRONGLY discourages implementations from + supplying additional information in the listing. + + + +Rose [Page 6] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + XTND BBOARDS [name] + Arguments: the name of a discussion group (optionally) + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + If an argument was given, the POP3 server closes the current + maildrop. The POP3 server then validates the argument as the name of + a discussion group. If this is successful, it opens the maildrop + associated with the group, and returns a multi-line response + containing the discussion group listing. If the discussion group + named is not valid, or the associated archive maildrop is not + readable by the user, then an error response is returned. + + If no argument was given, the POP3 server issues a multi-line + response. After the initial +OK, for each discussion group known, + the POP3 server responds with a line containing the listing for that + discussion group. Note that only world-readable discussion groups + are included in the multi-line response. + + In order to aid user agents, this memo requires an extension to the + scan listing when an "XTND BBOARDS" command has been given. + Normally, a scan listing, as generated by the LIST, takes the form: + + MSGNO SIZE + + where MSGNO is the number of the message being listed and SIZE is the + size of the message in octets. When reading a maildrop accessed via + "XTND BBOARDS", the scan listing takes the form + + MSGNO SIZE MAXIMA + + where MAXIMA is the maxima that was assigned to the message when it + was placed in the BBoard. + + Possible Responses: + +OK XTND + -ERR no such bboard + Examples: + C: XTND BBOARDS + S: +OK XTND + S: system 10 + S: mh-users 100 + S: . + C: XTND BBOARDS system + S: + OK XTND + S: system 10 + S: . + + + + +Rose [Page 7] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + XTND ARCHIVE name + Arguments: the name of a discussion group (required) + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + The POP3 server closes the current maildrop. The POP3 server then + validates the argument as the name of a discussion group. If this is + successful, it opens the archive maildrop associated with the group, + and returns a multi-line response containing the discussion group + listing. If the discussion group named is not valid, or the + associated archive maildrop is not readable by the user, then an + error response is returned. + + In addition, the scan listing generated by the LIST command is + augmented (as described above). + + Possible Responses: + +OK XTND + -ERR no such bboard Examples: + C: XTND ARCHIVE system + S: + OK XTND + S: system 3 + S: . + + XTND X-BBOARDS name + Arguments: the name of a discussion group (required) + Restrictions: may only be given in the TRANSACTION state. + Discussion: + + The POP3 server validates the argument as the name of a + discussion group. If this is unsuccessful, then an error + response is returned. Otherwise a multi-line response is + returned. The first 14 lines of this response (after the + initial +OK) are defined in this memo. Minimal implementations + need not include other information (and may omit certain + information, outputing a bare CRLF pair). More advanced + implementations may include other information. + + Line Information (refer to "Definition of Terms") + ---- ----------- + 1 NAME + 2 ALIASES, separated by SP + 3 system-specific: maildrop + 4 system-specific: archive maildrop + 5 system-specific: information + 6 system-specific: maildrop map + 7 system-specific: encrypted password + 8 system-specific: local leaders, separated by SP + + + +Rose [Page 8] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + 9 ADDRESS + 10 REQUEST + 11 system-specific: incoming feed + 12 system-specific: outgoing feeds + 13 FLAGS SP MAXIMA + 14 LASTDATE + + Most of this information is entirely too specific to the UCI Version + of the Rand MH Message Handling System [MRose85]. Nevertheless, + lines 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, and 14 are of general interest, regardless of + the implementation. + + Possible Responses: + +OK XTND + -ERR no such bboard + Examples: + C: XTND X-BBOARDS system + S: + OK XTND + S: system + S: local general + S: /usr/bboards/system.mbox + S: /usr/bboards/archive/system.mbox + S: /usr/bboards/.system.cnt + S: /usr/bboards/.system.map + S: * + S: mother + S: system@nrtc.northrop.com + S: system-request@nrtc.northrop.com + S: + S: dist-system@nrtc-gremlin.northrop.com + S: 01 10 + S: Thu, 19 Dec 85 00:08:49 -0800 + S: . + +Policy Notes + + Depending on the particular entity administrating the POP3 service + host, two additional policies might be implemented: + + 1. Private Discussion Groups + + In the general case, discussion groups are world-readable, any user, + once logged in (via a terminal, terminal server, or POP3, etc.), is + able to read the maildrop for each discussion group known to the POP3 + service host. Nevertheless, it is desirable, usually for privacy + reasons, to implement private discussion groups as well. + + Support of this is consistent with the extensions outlined in this + + + +Rose [Page 9] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + memo. Once the AUTHORIZATION state has successfully concluded, the + POP3 server grants the user access to exactly those discussion groups + the POP3 service host permits the authenticated user to access. As a + "security" feature, discussion groups associated with unreadable + maildrops should not be listed in a positive response to the XTND + BBOARDS command. + + 2. Anonymous POP3 Users + + In order to minimize the authentication problem, a policy permitting + "anonymous" access to the world-readable maildrops for discussion + groups on the POP3 server may be implemented. + + Support of this is consistent with the extensions outlined in this + memo. The POP3 server can be modified to accept a USER command for a + well-known pseudonym (i.e., "anonymous") which is valid with any PASS + command. As a "security" feature, it is advisable to limit this kind + of access to only hosts at the local site, or to hosts named in an + access list. + +Experiences and Conclusions + + All of the facilities described in this memo and in [RFC1081] have + been implemented in MH #6.1. Initial experiences have been, on the + whole, very positive. + + After the first implementation, some performance tuning was required. + This consisted primarily of caching the datastructures which describe + discussion groups in the POP3 server. A second optimization + pertained to the client: the program most commonly used to read + BBoards in MH was modified to retrieve messages only when needed. + Two schemes are used: + + o If only the headers (and the first few lines of the body) of + the message are required (e.g., for a scan listing), then only + these are retrieved. The resulting output is then cached, on + a per-message basis. + + o If the entire message is required, then it is retrieved intact, + and cached locally. + + With these optimizations, response time is quite adequate when the + POP3 server and client are connected via a high-speed local area + network. In fact, the author uses this mechanism to access certain + private discussion groups over the Internet. In this case, response + is still good. When a 9.6Kbps modem is inserted in the path, + response went from good to almost tolerable (fortunately the author + only reads a few discussion groups in this fashion). + + + +Rose [Page 10] + +RFC 1082 POP3 Extended Service November 1988 + + + To conclude: the POP3 is a good thing, not only for personal mail but + for discussion group mail as well. + + +References + + [RFC1081] Rose, M., "Post Office Protocol - Verison 3 (POP3)", RFC + 1081, TWG, November 1988. + + [MRose85] Rose, M., and J. Romine, "The Rand MH Message Handling + System: User's Manual", University of California, Irvine, + November 1985. + + [RFC822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the Format of ARPA-Internet + Text Messages", RFC 822, University of Delaware, August + 1982. + + [RFC918] Reynolds, J., "Post Office Protocol", RFC 918, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1984. + + [RFC937] Butler, M., J. Postel, D. Chase, J. Goldberger, and J. + Reynolds, "Post Office Protocol - Version 2", RFC 937, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, February 1985. + +Author's Address: + + + Marshall Rose + The Wollongong Group + 1129 San Antonio Rd. + Palo Alto, California 94303 + + Phone: (415) 962-7100 + + Email: MRose@TWG.COM + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Rose [Page 11] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_auth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..525beaa381 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the Kungliga Tekniska + * Högskolan and its contributors. + * + * 4. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_auth.c,v 1.2 2000/04/12 15:37:45 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +enum { + NO_PROT = 1, + INT_PROT = 2, + PRIV_PROT = 4 +}; + +static int +auth_krb4(POP *p) +{ + int ret; + des_cblock key; + u_int32_t nonce, nonce_reply; + u_int32_t max_client_packet; + int protocols = NO_PROT | INT_PROT | PRIV_PROT; + char data[8]; + int len; + char *s; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + KTEXT_ST authent; + des_key_schedule schedule; + struct passwd *pw; + + /* S -> C: 32 bit nonce in MSB base64 */ + + des_new_random_key(&key); + nonce = (key[0] | (key[1] << 8) | (key[2] << 16) | (key[3] << 24) + | key[4] | (key[5] << 8) | (key[6] << 16) | (key[7] << 24)); + krb_put_int(nonce, data, 4, 8); + len = base64_encode(data, 4, &s); + + pop_msg(p, POP_CONTINUE, "%s", s); + free(s); + + /* C -> S: ticket and authenticator */ + + ret = sch_readline(p->input, &s); + if (ret <= 0 || strcmp (s, "*") == 0) + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, + "authentication aborted by client"); + len = strlen(s); + if (len > sizeof(authent.dat)) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "data packet too long"); + } + + authent.length = base64_decode(s, authent.dat); + + k_getsockinst (0, instance, sizeof(instance)); + ret = krb_rd_req(&authent, "pop", instance, + p->in_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, + &p->kdata, NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "rd_req: %s", + krb_get_err_text(ret)); + } + if (p->kdata.checksum != nonce) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "data stream modified"); + } + + /* S -> C: nonce + 1 | bit | max segment */ + + krb_put_int(nonce + 1, data, 4, 7); + data[4] = protocols; + krb_put_int(1024, data + 5, 3, 3); /* XXX */ + des_key_sched(&p->kdata.session, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)data, + (des_cblock*)data, 8, + schedule, + &p->kdata.session, + DES_ENCRYPT); + len = base64_encode(data, 8, &s); + pop_msg(p, POP_CONTINUE, "%s", s); + + free(s); + + /* C -> S: nonce | bit | max segment | username */ + + ret = sch_readline(p->input, &s); + if (ret <= 0 || strcmp (s, "*") == 0) + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, + "authentication aborted"); + len = strlen(s); + if (len > sizeof(authent.dat)) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "data packet too long"); + } + + authent.length = base64_decode(s, authent.dat); + + if (authent.length % 8 != 0) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "reply is not a multiple of 8 bytes"); + } + + des_key_sched(&p->kdata.session, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)authent.dat, + (des_cblock*)authent.dat, + authent.length, + schedule, + &p->kdata.session, + DES_DECRYPT); + + krb_get_int(authent.dat, &nonce_reply, 4, 0); + if (nonce_reply != nonce) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "data stream modified"); + } + protocols &= authent.dat[4]; + krb_get_int(authent.dat + 5, &max_client_packet, 3, 0); + if(authent.dat[authent.length - 1] != '\0') { + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "bad format of username"); + } + strncpy (p->user, authent.dat + 8, sizeof(p->user)); + pw = k_getpwnam(p->user); + if (pw == NULL) { + return (pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Password supplied for \"%s\" is incorrect.", + p->user)); + } + + if (kuserok(&p->kdata, p->user)) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, + "%s: (%s.%s@%s) tried to retrieve mail for %s.", + p->client, p->kdata.pname, p->kdata.pinst, + p->kdata.prealm, p->user); + return(pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Popping not authorized")); + } + pop_log(p, POP_INFO, "%s: %s.%s@%s -> %s", + p->ipaddr, + p->kdata.pname, p->kdata.pinst, p->kdata.prealm, + p->user); + ret = pop_login(p, pw); + if (protocols & PRIV_PROT) + ; + else if (protocols & INT_PROT) + ; + else + ; + + return ret; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +auth_gssapi(POP *p) +{ + +} +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +/* + * auth: RFC1734 + */ + +static struct { + const char *name; + int (*func)(POP *); +} methods[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + {"KERBEROS_V4", auth_krb4}, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + {"GSSAPI", auth_gssapi}, +#endif + {NULL, NULL} +}; + +int +pop_auth (POP *p) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; methods[i].name != NULL; ++i) + if (strcasecmp(p->pop_parm[1], methods[i].name) == 0) + return (*methods[i].func)(p); + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, + "Authentication method %s unknown", p->pop_parm[1]); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_debug.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_debug.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a29e4d29a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_debug.c @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* Tiny program to help debug popper */ + +#include "popper.h" +RCSID("$Id: pop_debug.c,v 1.23 2002/05/02 16:27:16 joda Exp $"); + +static void +loop(int s) +{ + char cmd[1024]; + char buf[1024]; + fd_set fds; + while(1){ + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(0, &fds); + FD_SET(s, &fds); + if(select(s+1, &fds, 0, 0, 0) < 0) + err(1, "select"); + if(FD_ISSET(0, &fds)){ + fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), stdin); + cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] = '\0'; + strlcat (cmd, "\r\n", sizeof(cmd)); + write(s, cmd, strlen(cmd)); + } + if(FD_ISSET(s, &fds)){ + int n = read(s, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if(n == 0) + exit(0); + fwrite(buf, n, 1, stdout); + } + } +} + +static int +get_socket (const char *hostname, int port) +{ + int ret; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", ntohs(port)); + ret = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (ret) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo %s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror (ret)); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return s; + } + err (1, "failed to connect to %s", hostname); +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +doit_v4 (char *host, int port) +{ + KTEXT_ST ticket; + MSG_DAT msg_data; + CREDENTIALS cred; + des_key_schedule sched; + int ret; + int s = get_socket (host, port); + + ret = krb_sendauth(0, + s, + &ticket, + "pop", + host, + krb_realmofhost(host), + getpid(), + &msg_data, + &cred, + sched, + NULL, + NULL, + "KPOPV0.1"); + if(ret) { + warnx("krb_sendauth: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + loop(s); + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +doit_v5 (char *host, int port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_principal server; + int s = get_socket (host, port); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + host, + "pop", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_sname_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + ret = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &s, + "KPOPV1.0", + NULL, + server, + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_sendauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + loop (s); + return 0; +} +#endif + + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_v4 = -1; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +static int use_v5 = -1; +#endif +static char *port_str; +static int do_version; +static int do_help; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "krb4", '4', arg_flag, &use_v4, "Use Kerberos V4", + NULL }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { "krb5", '5', arg_flag, &use_v5, "Use Kerberos V5", + NULL }, +#endif + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "number-or-service" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version, "Print version", + NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help, NULL, + NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "hostname"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = 0; + int ret = 1; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (argc < 1) + usage (1); + + if (port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + if (port == 0) { +#ifdef KRB5 + port = krb5_getportbyname (NULL, "kpop", "tcp", 1109); +#elif defined(KRB4) + port = k_getportbyname ("kpop", "tcp", 1109); +#else +#error must define KRB4 or KRB5 +#endif + } + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5) + if(use_v4 == -1 && use_v5 == 1) + use_v4 = 0; + if(use_v5 == -1 && use_v4 == 1) + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret && use_v5) { + ret = doit_v5 (argv[0], port); + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && use_v4) { + ret = doit_v4 (argv[0], port); + } +#endif + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dele.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dele.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1c2952a21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dele.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_dele.c,v 1.10 1999/08/12 11:35:26 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * dele: Delete a message from the POP maildrop + */ +int +pop_dele (POP *p) +{ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message info list */ + int msg_num; + + /* Convert the message number parameter to an integer */ + msg_num = atoi(p->pop_parm[1]); + + /* Is requested message out of range? */ + if ((msg_num < 1) || (msg_num > p->msg_count)) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"Message %d does not exist.",msg_num)); + + /* Get a pointer to the message in the message list */ + mp = &(p->mlp[msg_num-1]); + + /* Is the message already flagged for deletion? */ + if (mp->flags & DEL_FLAG) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"Message %d has already been deleted.", + msg_num)); + + /* Flag the message for deletion */ + mp->flags |= DEL_FLAG; + +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, + "Deleting message %u at offset %ld of length %ld\n", + mp->number, mp->offset, mp->length); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Update the messages_deleted and bytes_deleted counters */ + p->msgs_deleted++; + p->bytes_deleted += mp->length; + + /* Update the last-message-accessed number if it is lower than + the deleted message */ + if (p->last_msg < msg_num) p->last_msg = msg_num; + + return (pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS,"Message %d has been deleted.",msg_num)); +} + +#ifdef XDELE +/* delete a range of messages */ +int +pop_xdele(POP *p) +{ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message info list */ + + int msg_min, msg_max; + int i; + + + msg_min = atoi(p->pop_parm[1]); + if(p->parm_count == 1) + msg_max = msg_min; + else + msg_max = atoi(p->pop_parm[2]); + + if (msg_min < 1) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"Message %d does not exist.",msg_min)); + if(msg_max > p->msg_count) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"Message %d does not exist.",msg_max)); + for(i = msg_min; i <= msg_max; i++) { + + /* Get a pointer to the message in the message list */ + mp = &(p->mlp[i - 1]); + + /* Is the message already flagged for deletion? */ + if (mp->flags & DEL_FLAG) + continue; /* no point in returning error */ + /* Flag the message for deletion */ + mp->flags |= DEL_FLAG; + +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, + "Deleting message %u at offset %ld of length %ld\n", + mp->number, mp->offset, mp->length); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Update the messages_deleted and bytes_deleted counters */ + p->msgs_deleted++; + p->bytes_deleted += mp->length; + } + + /* Update the last-message-accessed number if it is lower than + the deleted message */ + if (p->last_msg < msg_max) p->last_msg = msg_max; + + return (pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS,"Messages %d-%d has been deleted.", + msg_min, msg_max)); + +} +#endif /* XDELE */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dropcopy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dropcopy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..99ea49d085 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dropcopy.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_dropcopy.c,v 1.26 2002/07/04 14:10:11 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Run as the user in `pwd' + */ + +int +changeuser(POP *p, struct passwd *pwd) +{ + if(setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { + pop_log (p, POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to change to gid %u: %s", + (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "Unable to change gid"); + } + if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0) { + pop_log (p, POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to change to uid %u: %s", + (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "Unable to change uid"); + } +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG,"uid = %u, gid = %u", + (unsigned)getuid(), + (unsigned)getgid()); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + return POP_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * dropcopy: Make a temporary copy of the user's mail drop and + * save a stream pointer for it. + */ + +int +pop_dropcopy(POP *p, struct passwd *pwp) +{ + int mfd; /* File descriptor for + the user's maildrop */ + int dfd; /* File descriptor for + the SERVER maildrop */ + FILE *tf; /* The temp file */ + char template[POP_TMPSIZE]; /* Temp name holder */ + char buffer[BUFSIZ]; /* Read buffer */ + long offset; /* Old/New boundary */ + int nchar; /* Bytes written/read */ + int tf_fd; /* fd for temp file */ + int ret; + + /* Create a temporary maildrop into which to copy the updated maildrop */ + snprintf(p->temp_drop, sizeof(p->temp_drop), POP_DROP,p->user); + +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Creating temporary maildrop '%s'", + p->temp_drop); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Here we work to make sure the user doesn't cause us to remove or + * write over existing files by limiting how much work we do while + * running as root. + */ + + strlcpy(template, POP_TMPDROP, sizeof(template)); + if ((tf_fd = mkstemp(template)) < 0 || + (tf = fdopen(tf_fd, "w+")) == NULL) { + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to create temporary temporary maildrop '%s': %s",template, + strerror(errno)); + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "System error, can't create temporary file."); + } + + /* Now give this file to the user */ + chown(template, pwp->pw_uid, pwp->pw_gid); + chmod(template, 0600); + + /* Now link this file to the temporary maildrop. If this fails it + * is probably because the temporary maildrop already exists. If so, + * this is ok. We can just go on our way, because by the time we try + * to write into the file we will be running as the user. + */ + link(template,p->temp_drop); + fclose(tf); + unlink(template); + + ret = changeuser(p, pwp); + if (ret != POP_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + /* Open for append, this solves the crash recovery problem */ + if ((dfd = open(p->temp_drop,O_RDWR|O_APPEND|O_CREAT,0600)) == -1){ + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to open temporary maildrop '%s': %s",p->temp_drop, + strerror(errno)); + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "System error, can't open temporary file, do you own it?"); + } + + /* Lock the temporary maildrop */ + if ( flock (dfd, (LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB)) == -1 ) + switch(errno) { + case EWOULDBLOCK: + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "%sMaildrop lock busy! Is another session active?", + (p->flags & POP_FLAG_CAPA) ? "[IN-USE] " : ""); + /* NOTREACHED */ + default: + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,"flock: '%s': %s", p->temp_drop, + strerror(errno)); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + + /* May have grown or shrunk between open and lock! */ + offset = lseek(dfd,0, SEEK_END); + + /* Open the user's maildrop, If this fails, no harm in assuming empty */ + if ((mfd = open(p->drop_name,O_RDWR)) > 0) { + + /* Lock the maildrop */ + if (flock (mfd, LOCK_EX) == -1) { + close(mfd) ; + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, "flock: '%s': %s", p->temp_drop, + strerror(errno)); + } + + /* Copy the actual mail drop into the temporary mail drop */ + while ( (nchar=read(mfd,buffer,BUFSIZ)) > 0 ) + if ( nchar != write(dfd,buffer,nchar) ) { + nchar = -1 ; + break ; + } + + if ( nchar != 0 ) { + /* Error adding new mail. Truncate to original size, + and leave the maildrop as is. The user will not + see the new mail until the error goes away. + Should let them process the current backlog, in case + the error is a quota problem requiring deletions! */ + ftruncate(dfd,(int)offset) ; + } else { + /* Mail transferred! Zero the mail drop NOW, that we + do not have to do gymnastics to figure out what's new + and what is old later */ + ftruncate(mfd,0) ; + } + + /* Close the actual mail drop */ + close (mfd); + } + + /* Acquire a stream pointer for the temporary maildrop */ + if ( (p->drop = fdopen(dfd,"a+")) == NULL ) { + close(dfd) ; + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,"Cannot assign stream for %s", + p->temp_drop); + } + + rewind (p->drop); + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dropinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dropinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71922d2cb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_dropinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_dropinfo.c,v 1.24 1999/09/16 20:38:49 assar Exp $"); + +#if defined(UIDL) || defined(XOVER) + +/* + * Copy the string found after after : into a malloced buffer. Stop + * copying at end of string or end of line. End of line delimiter is + * not part of the resulting copy. + */ +static +char * +find_value_after_colon(char *p) +{ + char *t, *tmp; + + for (; *p != 0 && *p != ':'; p++) /* Find : */ + ; + + if (*p == 0) + goto error; + + p++; /* Skip over : */ + + for(; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++) /* Remove white space */ + ; + + for (t = p; *t != 0 && *t != '\n' && *t != '\r'; t++) /* Find end of str */ + ; + + tmp = t = malloc(t - p + 1); + if (tmp == 0) + goto error; + + for (; *p != 0 && *p != '\n' && *p != '\r'; p++, t++) /* Copy characters */ + *t = *p; + *t = 0; /* Terminate string */ + return tmp; + +error: + return "ErrorUIDL"; +} +#endif + +void +parse_header(MsgInfoList *mp, char *buffer) +{ +#if defined(UIDL) || defined(XOVER) + if (strncasecmp("Message-Id:",buffer, 11) == 0) { + if (mp->msg_id == NULL) + mp->msg_id = find_value_after_colon(buffer); + } +#ifdef UIDL + else if (strncasecmp(buffer, "X-UIDL:", 7) == 0) { + /* Courtesy to Qualcomm, there really is no such + thing as X-UIDL */ + mp->msg_id = find_value_after_colon(buffer); + } +#endif +#endif +#ifdef XOVER + else if (strncasecmp("Subject:", buffer, 8) == 0) { + if(mp->subject == NULL){ + char *p; + mp->subject = find_value_after_colon(buffer); + for(p = mp->subject; *p; p++) + if(*p == '\t') *p = ' '; + } + } + else if (strncasecmp("From:", buffer, 5) == 0) { + if(mp->from == NULL){ + char *p; + mp->from = find_value_after_colon(buffer); + for(p = mp->from; *p; p++) + if(*p == '\t') *p = ' '; + } + } + else if (strncasecmp("Date:", buffer, 5) == 0) { + if(mp->date == NULL){ + char *p; + mp->date = find_value_after_colon(buffer); + for(p = mp->date; *p; p++) + if(*p == '\t') *p = ' '; + } + } +#endif +} + +int +add_missing_headers(POP *p, MsgInfoList *mp) +{ +#if defined(UIDL) || defined(XOVER) + if (mp->msg_id == NULL) { + asprintf(&mp->msg_id, "no-message-id-%d", mp->number); + if(mp->msg_id == NULL) { + fclose (p->drop); + p->msg_count = 0; + return pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Can't build message list for '%s': Out of memory", + p->user); + } + } +#endif +#ifdef XOVER + if (mp->subject == NULL) + mp->subject = ""; + if (mp->from == NULL) + mp->from = ""; + if (mp->date == NULL) + mp->date = ""; +#endif + return POP_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * dropinfo: Extract information about the POP maildrop and store + * it for use by the other POP routines. + */ + +int +pop_dropinfo(POP *p) +{ + char buffer[BUFSIZ]; /* Read buffer */ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message + info list */ + int msg_num; /* Current message + counter */ + int nchar; /* Bytes written/read */ + int blank_line = 1; /* previous line was blank */ + int in_header = 0; /* if we are in a header block */ + + /* Initialize maildrop status variables in the POP parameter block */ + p->msg_count = 0; + p->msgs_deleted = 0; + p->last_msg = 0; + p->bytes_deleted = 0; + p->drop_size = 0; + + /* Allocate memory for message information structures */ + p->msg_count = ALLOC_MSGS; + p->mlp = (MsgInfoList *)calloc((unsigned)p->msg_count,sizeof(MsgInfoList)); + if (p->mlp == NULL){ + fclose (p->drop); + p->msg_count = 0; + return pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Can't build message list for '%s': Out of memory", p->user); + } + + rewind (p->drop); + + /* Scan the file, loading the message information list with + information about each message */ + + for (msg_num = p->drop_size = 0, mp = p->mlp - 1; + fgets(buffer,MAXMSGLINELEN,p->drop);) { + + nchar = strlen(buffer); + + if (blank_line && strncmp(buffer,"From ",5) == 0) { + in_header = 1; + if (++msg_num > p->msg_count) { + p->mlp=(MsgInfoList *) realloc(p->mlp, + (p->msg_count+=ALLOC_MSGS)*sizeof(MsgInfoList)); + if (p->mlp == NULL){ + fclose (p->drop); + p->msg_count = 0; + return pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Can't build message list for '%s': Out of memory", + p->user); + } + mp = p->mlp + msg_num - 2; + } + ++mp; + mp->number = msg_num; + mp->length = 0; + mp->lines = 0; + mp->offset = ftell(p->drop) - nchar; + mp->flags = 0; +#if defined(UIDL) || defined(XOVER) + mp->msg_id = 0; +#endif +#ifdef XOVER + mp->subject = 0; + mp->from = 0; + mp->date = 0; +#endif +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, + "Msg %d at offset %ld being added to list", + mp->number, mp->offset); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + } else if(in_header) + parse_header(mp, buffer); + blank_line = (strncmp(buffer, "\n", nchar) == 0); + if(blank_line) { + int e; + in_header = 0; + e = add_missing_headers(p, mp); + if(e != POP_SUCCESS) + return e; + } + mp->length += nchar; + p->drop_size += nchar; + mp->lines++; + } + p->msg_count = msg_num; + +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug && msg_num > 0) { + int i; + for (i = 0, mp = p->mlp; i < p->msg_count; i++, mp++) +#ifdef UIDL + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG, + "Msg %d at offset %ld is %ld octets long and has %u lines and id %s.", + mp->number,mp->offset,mp->length,mp->lines, mp->msg_id); +#else + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG, + "Msg %d at offset %d is %d octets long and has %u lines.", + mp->number,mp->offset,mp->length,mp->lines); +#endif + } +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_get_command.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_get_command.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f10c3fe53c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_get_command.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_get_command.c,v 1.16 2002/07/04 14:09:47 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * get_command: Extract the command from an input line form a POP client + */ + +int pop_capa (POP *p); +static state_table states[] = { + {auth1, "user", 1, 1, pop_user, {auth1, auth2}}, + {auth2, "pass", 1, 99, pop_pass, {auth1, trans}}, +#ifdef RPOP + {auth2, "rpop", 1, 1, pop_rpop, {auth1, trans}}, +#endif /* RPOP */ + {auth1, "quit", 0, 0, pop_quit, {halt, halt}}, + {auth2, "quit", 0, 0, pop_quit, {halt, halt}}, +#ifdef CAPA + {auth1, "capa", 0, 0, pop_capa, {auth1, auth1}}, + {auth2, "capa", 0, 0, pop_capa, {auth2, auth2}}, + {trans, "capa", 0, 0, pop_capa, {trans, trans}}, +#endif + {trans, "stat", 0, 0, pop_stat, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "list", 0, 1, pop_list, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "retr", 1, 1, pop_send, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "dele", 1, 1, pop_dele, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "noop", 0, 0, NULL, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "rset", 0, 0, pop_rset, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "top", 2, 2, pop_send, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "last", 0, 0, pop_last, {trans, trans}}, + {trans, "quit", 0, 0, pop_updt, {halt, halt}}, + {trans, "help", 0, 0, pop_help, {trans, trans}}, +#ifdef UIDL + {trans, "uidl", 0, 1, pop_uidl, {trans, trans}}, +#endif +#ifdef XOVER + {trans, "xover", 0, 0, pop_xover, {trans, trans}}, +#endif +#ifdef XDELE + {trans, "xdele", 1, 2, pop_xdele, {trans, trans}}, +#endif + {(state) 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, {halt, halt}}, +}; + +int +pop_capa (POP *p) +{ + /* Search for the POP command in the command/state table */ + pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS, "Capability list follows"); + fprintf(p->output, "USER\r\n"); + fprintf(p->output, "TOP\r\n"); + fprintf(p->output, "PIPELINING\r\n"); + fprintf(p->output, "EXPIRE NEVER\r\n"); + fprintf(p->output, "RESP-CODES\r\n"); +#ifdef UIDL + fprintf(p->output, "UIDL\r\n"); +#endif +#ifdef XOVER + fprintf(p->output, "XOVER\r\n"); +#endif +#ifdef XDELE + fprintf(p->output, "XDELE\r\n"); +#endif + if(p->CurrentState == trans) + fprintf(p->output, "IMPLEMENTATION %s-%s\r\n", PACKAGE, VERSION); + fprintf(p->output,".\r\n"); + fflush(p->output); + + p->flags |= POP_FLAG_CAPA; + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} + +state_table * +pop_get_command(POP *p, char *mp) +{ + state_table * s; + char buf[MAXMSGLINELEN]; + + /* Save a copy of the original client line */ +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) strlcpy (buf, mp, sizeof(buf)); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Parse the message into the parameter array */ + if ((p->parm_count = pop_parse(p,mp)) < 0) return(NULL); + + /* Do not log cleartext passwords */ +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug){ + if(strcmp(p->pop_command,"pass") == 0) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Received: \"%s xxxxxxxxx\"",p->pop_command); + else { + /* Remove trailing */ + buf[strlen(buf)-2] = '\0'; + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Received: \"%s\"",buf); + } + } +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Search for the POP command in the command/state table */ + for (s = states; s->command; s++) { + + /* Is this a valid command for the current operating state? */ + if (strcmp(s->command,p->pop_command) == 0 + && s->ValidCurrentState == p->CurrentState) { + + /* Were too few parameters passed to the command? */ + if (p->parm_count < s->min_parms) { + pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Too few arguments for the %s command.", + p->pop_command); + return NULL; + } + + /* Were too many parameters passed to the command? */ + if (p->parm_count > s->max_parms) { + pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Too many arguments for the %s command.", + p->pop_command); + return NULL; + } + + /* Return a pointer to the entry for this command in + the command/state table */ + return (s); + } + } + /* The client command was not located in the command/state table */ + pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Unknown command: \"%s\".",p->pop_command); + return NULL; +} + +int +pop_help (POP *p) +{ + state_table *s; + + pop_msg(p, POP_SUCCESS, "help"); + + for (s = states; s->command; s++) { + fprintf (p->output, "%s\r\n", s->command); + } + fprintf (p->output, ".\r\n"); + fflush (p->output); + return POP_SUCCESS; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_init.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4f780c7aad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,401 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_init.c,v 1.58.12.1 2003/10/13 12:01:35 lha Exp $"); + + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + +static int +pop_net_read(POP *p, int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ +#ifdef KRB5 + return krb5_net_read(p->context, &fd, buf, len); +#elif defined(KRB4) + return krb_net_read(fd, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif + +static char *addr_log; + +static void +pop_write_addr(POP *p, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + char ts[32]; + char as[128]; + time_t t; + FILE *f; + if(addr_log == NULL) + return; + t = time(NULL); + strftime(ts, sizeof(ts), "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", localtime(&t)); + if(inet_ntop (addr->sa_family, socket_get_address(addr), + as, sizeof(as)) == NULL) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "failed to print address"); + return; + } + + f = fopen(addr_log, "a"); + if(f == NULL) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "failed to open address log (%s)", addr_log); + return; + } + fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", as, ts); + fclose(f); +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +krb4_authenticate (POP *p, int s, u_char *buf, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + Key_schedule schedule; + KTEXT_ST ticket; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char version[9]; + int auth; + + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, 4) != 0) + return -1; + if (pop_net_read (p, s, buf + 4, + KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) != KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) + return -1; + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) + return -1; + + k_getsockinst (0, instance, sizeof(instance)); + auth = krb_recvauth(KOPT_IGNORE_PROTOCOL, + s, + &ticket, + "pop", + instance, + (struct sockaddr_in *)addr, + (struct sockaddr_in *) NULL, + &p->kdata, + "", + schedule, + version); + + if (auth != KSUCCESS) { + pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "Kerberos authentication failure: %s", + krb_get_err_text(auth)); + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "%s: (%s.%s@%s) %s", p->client, + p->kdata.pname, p->kdata.pinst, p->kdata.prealm, + krb_get_err_text(auth)); + return -1; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, "%s.%s@%s (%s): ok", p->kdata.pname, + p->kdata.pinst, p->kdata.prealm, p->ipaddr); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +krb5_authenticate (POP *p, int s, u_char *buf, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + u_int32_t len; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *server; + + if (memcmp (buf, "\x00\x00\x00\x13", 4) != 0) + return -1; + len = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | (buf[3]); + + if (krb5_net_read(p->context, &s, buf, len) != len) + return -1; + if (len != sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + || memcmp (buf, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) != 0) + return -1; + + ret = krb5_recvauth (p->context, + &auth_context, + &s, + "KPOPV1.0", + NULL, /* let rd_req figure out what server to use */ + KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + NULL, + &ticket); + if (ret) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "krb5_recvauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(p->context, ret)); + return -1; + } + + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(p->context, ticket->server, &server); + if(ret) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "krb5_unparse_name: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(p->context, ret)); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + /* does this make sense? */ + if(strncmp(server, "pop/", 4) != 0) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, + "Got ticket for service `%s'", server); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } else if(p->debug) + pop_log(p, POP_DEBUG, + "Accepted ticket for service `%s'", server); + free(server); + out: + krb5_auth_con_free (p->context, auth_context); + krb5_copy_principal (p->context, ticket->client, &p->principal); + krb5_free_ticket (p->context, ticket); + + return ret; +} +#endif + +static int +krb_authenticate(POP *p, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + u_char buf[BUFSIZ]; + + if (pop_net_read (p, 0, buf, 4) != 4) { + pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "Reading four bytes: %s", + strerror(errno)); + exit (1); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if (krb4_authenticate (p, 0, buf, addr) == 0){ + pop_write_addr(p, addr); + p->version = 4; + return POP_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + if (krb5_authenticate (p, 0, buf, addr) == 0){ + pop_write_addr(p, addr); + p->version = 5; + return POP_SUCCESS; + } +#endif + exit (1); + +#endif /* defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) */ + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} + +static int +plain_authenticate (POP *p, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} + +static int kerberos_flag; +static char *auth_str; +static int debug_flag; +static int interactive_flag; +static char *port_str; +static char *trace_file; +static int timeout; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + { "kerberos", 'k', arg_flag, &kerberos_flag, "use kerberos" }, +#endif + { "auth-mode", 'a', arg_string, &auth_str, "required authentication" }, + { "debug", 'd', arg_flag, &debug_flag }, + { "interactive", 'i', arg_flag, &interactive_flag, "create new socket" }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "trace-file", 't', arg_string, &trace_file, "trace all command to file", "file" }, + { "timeout", 'T', arg_integer, &timeout, "timeout", "seconds" }, + { "address-log", 0, arg_string, &addr_log, "enable address log", "file" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +/* + * init: Start a Post Office Protocol session + */ + +static int +pop_getportbyname(POP *p, const char *service, + const char *proto, short def) +{ +#ifdef KRB5 + return krb5_getportbyname(p->context, service, proto, def); +#elif defined(KRB4) + return k_getportbyname(service, proto, htons(def)); +#else + return htons(default); +#endif +} + +int +pop_init(POP *p,int argcount,char **argmessage) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage cs_ss; + struct sockaddr *cs = (struct sockaddr *)&cs_ss; + socklen_t len; + char * trace_file_name = "/tmp/popper-trace"; + int portnum = 0; + int optind = 0; + int error; + + /* Initialize the POP parameter block */ + memset (p, 0, sizeof(POP)); + + setprogname(argmessage[0]); + + /* Save my name in a global variable */ + p->myname = (char*)getprogname(); + + /* Get the name of our host */ + gethostname(p->myhost,MaxHostNameLen); + +#ifdef KRB5 + { + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&p->context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + krb5_openlog(p->context, p->myname, &p->logf); + krb5_set_warn_dest(p->context, p->logf); + } +#else + /* Open the log file */ + roken_openlog(p->myname,POP_LOGOPTS,POP_FACILITY); +#endif + + p->auth_level = AUTH_NONE; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argcount, argmessage, &optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(1); + } + if(help_flag){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(0); + } + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argcount -= optind; + argmessage += optind; + + if (argcount != 0) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(1); + } + + if(auth_str){ + if (strcmp (auth_str, "none") == 0) + p->auth_level = AUTH_NONE; + else if(strcmp(auth_str, "otp") == 0) + p->auth_level = AUTH_OTP; + else + warnx ("bad value for -a: %s", optarg); + } + /* Debugging requested */ + p->debug = debug_flag; + + if(port_str) + portnum = htons(atoi(port_str)); + if(trace_file){ + p->debug++; + if ((p->trace = fopen(trace_file, "a+")) == NULL) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to open trace file \"%s\", err = %d", + optarg,errno); + exit (1); + } + trace_file_name = trace_file; + } + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + p->kerberosp = kerberos_flag; +#endif + + if(timeout) + pop_timeout = timeout; + + /* Fake inetd */ + if (interactive_flag) { + if (portnum == 0) + portnum = p->kerberosp ? + pop_getportbyname(p, "kpop", "tcp", 1109) : + pop_getportbyname(p, "pop", "tcp", 110); + mini_inetd (portnum); + } + + /* Get the address and socket of the client to whom I am speaking */ + len = sizeof(cs_ss); + if (getpeername(STDIN_FILENO, cs, &len) < 0) { + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to obtain socket and address of client, err = %d",errno); + exit (1); + } + + /* Save the dotted decimal form of the client's IP address + in the POP parameter block */ + inet_ntop (cs->sa_family, socket_get_address (cs), + p->ipaddr, sizeof(p->ipaddr)); + + /* Save the client's port */ + p->ipport = ntohs(socket_get_port (cs)); + + /* Get the canonical name of the host to whom I am speaking */ + error = getnameinfo_verified (cs, len, p->client, sizeof(p->client), + NULL, 0, 0); + if (error) { + pop_log (p, POP_PRIORITY, + "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + strlcpy (p->client, p->ipaddr, sizeof(p->client)); + } + + /* Create input file stream for TCP/IP communication */ + if ((p->input = fdopen(STDIN_FILENO,"r")) == NULL){ + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to open communication stream for input, err = %d",errno); + exit (1); + } + + /* Create output file stream for TCP/IP communication */ + if ((p->output = fdopen(STDOUT_FILENO,"w")) == NULL){ + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "Unable to open communication stream for output, err = %d",errno); + exit (1); + } + + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "(v%s) Servicing request from \"%s\" at %s\n", + VERSION,p->client,p->ipaddr); + +#ifdef DEBUG + if (p->trace) + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY, + "Tracing session and debugging information in file \"%s\"", + trace_file_name); + else if (p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY,"Debugging turned on"); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + + if(p->kerberosp) + return krb_authenticate(p, cs); + else + return plain_authenticate(p, cs); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_last.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_last.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36fdd0d25a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_last.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_last.c,v 1.6 1996/10/28 16:25:28 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * last: Display the last message touched in a POP session + */ + +int +pop_last (POP *p) +{ + return (pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS,"%u is the last message seen.",p->last_msg)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_list.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_list.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa7666a631 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_list.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_list.c,v 1.10 1998/04/23 17:37:47 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * list: List the contents of a POP maildrop + */ + +int +pop_list (POP *p) +{ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message info list */ + int i; + int msg_num; + + /* Was a message number provided? */ + if (p->parm_count > 0) { + msg_num = atoi(p->pop_parm[1]); + + /* Is requested message out of range? */ + if ((msg_num < 1) || (msg_num > p->msg_count)) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Message %d does not exist.",msg_num)); + + /* Get a pointer to the message in the message list */ + mp = &p->mlp[msg_num-1]; + + /* Is the message already flagged for deletion? */ + if (mp->flags & DEL_FLAG) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Message %d has been deleted.",msg_num)); + + /* Display message information */ + return (pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS,"%d %ld",msg_num,mp->length)); + } + + /* Display the entire list of messages */ + pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS, + "%d messages (%ld octets)", + p->msg_count-p->msgs_deleted, + p->drop_size-p->bytes_deleted); + + /* Loop through the message information list. Skip deleted messages */ + for (i = p->msg_count, mp = p->mlp; i > 0; i--, mp++) { + if (!(mp->flags & DEL_FLAG)) + fprintf(p->output,"%u %lu\r\n",mp->number,mp->length); + } + + /* "." signals the end of a multi-line transmission */ + fprintf(p->output,".\r\n"); + fflush(p->output); + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..deb9841d87 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_log.c,v 1.13 1997/10/14 21:59:07 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * log: Make a log entry + */ + +int +pop_log(POP *p, int stat, char *format, ...) +{ + char msgbuf[MAXLINELEN]; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, format); + vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), format, ap); + + if (p->debug && p->trace) { + fprintf(p->trace,"%s\n",msgbuf); + fflush(p->trace); + } else { +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_log(p->context, p->logf, stat, "%s", msgbuf); +#else + syslog (stat,"%s",msgbuf); +#endif + } + va_end(ap); + + return(stat); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_msg.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_msg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12887a49fa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_msg.c,v 1.16 1999/09/16 20:38:50 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * msg: Send a formatted line to the POP client + */ + +int +pop_msg(POP *p, int stat, char *format, ...) +{ + char *mp; + char message[MAXLINELEN]; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, format); + + /* Point to the message buffer */ + mp = message; + + /* Format the POP status code at the beginning of the message */ + snprintf (mp, sizeof(message), "%s ", + (stat == POP_SUCCESS) ? POP_OK : POP_ERR); + + /* Point past the POP status indicator in the message message */ + mp += strlen(mp); + + /* Append the message (formatted, if necessary) */ + if (format) + vsnprintf (mp, sizeof(message) - strlen(message), + format, ap); + + /* Log the message if debugging is turned on */ +#ifdef DEBUG + if (p->debug && stat == POP_SUCCESS) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"%s",message); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Log the message if a failure occurred */ + if (stat != POP_SUCCESS) + pop_log(p,POP_PRIORITY,"%s",message); + + /* Append the */ + strlcat(message, "\r\n", sizeof(message)); + + /* Send the message to the client */ + fputs(message, p->output); + fflush(p->output); + + va_end(ap); + return(stat); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_parse.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_parse.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37aef369a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_parse.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_parse.c,v 1.9 1999/03/13 21:17:27 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * parse: Parse a raw input line from a POP client + * into null-delimited tokens + */ + +int +pop_parse(POP *p, char *buf) +{ + char * mp; + int i; + + /* Loop through the POP command array */ + for (mp = buf, i = 0; ; i++) { + + /* Skip leading spaces and tabs in the message */ + while (isspace((unsigned char)*mp))mp++; + + /* Are we at the end of the message? */ + if (*mp == 0) break; + + /* Have we already obtained the maximum allowable parameters? */ + if (i >= MAXPARMCOUNT) { + pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,"Too many arguments supplied."); + return(-1); + } + + /* Point to the start of the token */ + p->pop_parm[i] = mp; + + /* Search for the first space character (end of the token) */ + while (!isspace((unsigned char)*mp) && *mp) mp++; + + /* Delimit the token with a null */ + if (*mp) *mp++ = 0; + } + + /* Were any parameters passed at all? */ + if (i == 0) return (-1); + + /* Convert the first token (POP command) to lower case */ + strlwr(p->pop_command); + + /* Return the number of tokens extracted minus the command itself */ + return (i-1); + +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_pass.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_pass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cebd78083c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_pass.c @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_pass.c,v 1.41 2000/04/12 15:37:46 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +krb4_verify_password (POP *p) +{ + int status; + char lrealm[REALM_SZ]; + char tkt[MaxPathLen]; + + status = krb_get_lrealm(lrealm,1); + if (status == KFAILURE) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "%s: (%s.%s@%s) %s", p->client, + p->kdata.pname, p->kdata.pinst, p->kdata.prealm, + krb_get_err_text(status)); + return 1; + } + snprintf(tkt, sizeof(tkt), "%s_popper.%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_set_tkt_string (tkt); + + status = krb_verify_user(p->user, "", lrealm, + p->pop_parm[1], KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, "pop"); + dest_tkt(); /* no point in keeping the tickets */ + return status; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +krb5_verify_password (POP *p) +{ + krb5_preauthtype pre_auth_types[] = {KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP}; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt get_options; + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt verify_options; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal client, server; + krb5_creds creds; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&get_options); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list (&get_options, + pre_auth_types, + 1); + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init (&verify_options); + + ret = krb5_parse_name (p->context, p->user, &client); + if (ret) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, "krb5_parse_name: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (p->context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (p->context, + &creds, + client, + p->pop_parm[1], + NULL, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, + &get_options); + if (ret) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, + "krb5_get_init_creds_password: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (p->context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (p->context, + p->myhost, + "pop", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, + "krb5_get_init_creds_password: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (p->context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds (p->context, + &creds, + server, + NULL, + NULL, + &verify_options); + krb5_free_principal (p->context, client); + krb5_free_principal (p->context, server); + krb5_free_creds_contents (p->context, &creds); + return ret; +} +#endif +/* + * pass: Obtain the user password from a POP client + */ + +int +pop_pass (POP *p) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + int i; + struct stat st; + + /* Make one string of all these parameters */ + + for (i = 1; i < p->parm_count; ++i) + p->pop_parm[i][strlen(p->pop_parm[i])] = ' '; + + /* Look for the user in the password file */ + if ((pw = k_getpwnam(p->user)) == NULL) + return (pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Password supplied for \"%s\" is incorrect.", + p->user)); + + if (p->kerberosp) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (p->version == 4) { + if(kuserok (&p->kdata, p->user)) { + pop_log(p, POP_PRIORITY, + "%s: (%s.%s@%s) tried to retrieve mail for %s.", + p->client, p->kdata.pname, p->kdata.pinst, + p->kdata.prealm, p->user); + return(pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, + "Popping not authorized")); + } + pop_log(p, POP_INFO, "%s: %s.%s@%s -> %s", + p->ipaddr, + p->kdata.pname, p->kdata.pinst, p->kdata.prealm, + p->user); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#ifdef KRB5 + if (p->version == 5) { + char *name; + + if (!krb5_kuserok (p->context, p->principal, p->user)) { + pop_log (p, POP_PRIORITY, + "krb5 permission denied"); + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, + "Popping not authorized"); + } + if(krb5_unparse_name (p->context, p->principal, &name) == 0) { + pop_log(p, POP_INFO, "%s: %s -> %s", + p->ipaddr, name, p->user); + free (name); + } + } else { + pop_log (p, POP_PRIORITY, "kerberos authentication failed"); + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "kerberos authentication failed"); + } +#endif + { } + } else { + /* We don't accept connections from users with null passwords */ + if (pw->pw_passwd == NULL) + return (pop_msg(p, + POP_FAILURE, + "Password supplied for \"%s\" is incorrect.", + p->user)); + +#ifdef OTP + if (otp_verify_user (&p->otp_ctx, p->pop_parm[1]) == 0) + /* pass OK */; + else +#endif + /* Compare the supplied password with the password file entry */ + if (p->auth_level != AUTH_NONE) + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, + "Password supplied for \"%s\" is incorrect.", + p->user); + else if (!strcmp(crypt(p->pop_parm[1], pw->pw_passwd), pw->pw_passwd)) + /* pass OK */; + else { + int ret = -1; +#ifdef KRB4 + ret = krb4_verify_password (p); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + if(ret) + ret = krb5_verify_password (p); +#endif + if(ret) + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, + "Password incorrect"); + } + } + pop_log(p, POP_INFO, "login from %s as %s", + p->ipaddr, p->user); + + /* Build the name of the user's maildrop */ + snprintf(p->drop_name, sizeof(p->drop_name), "%s/%s", POP_MAILDIR, p->user); + + if(stat(p->drop_name, &st) < 0 || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)){ + /* Make a temporary copy of the user's maildrop */ + /* and set the group and user id */ + if (pop_dropcopy(p, pw) != POP_SUCCESS) return (POP_FAILURE); + + /* Get information about the maildrop */ + if (pop_dropinfo(p) != POP_SUCCESS) return(POP_FAILURE); + } else { + if(changeuser(p, pw) != POP_SUCCESS) return POP_FAILURE; + if(pop_maildir_info(p) != POP_SUCCESS) return POP_FAILURE; + } + /* Initialize the last-message-accessed number */ + p->last_msg = 0; + + /* Authorization completed successfully */ + return (pop_msg (p, POP_SUCCESS, + "%s has %d message(s) (%ld octets).", + p->user, p->msg_count, p->drop_size)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_quit.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_quit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..429b1815dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_quit.c @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_quit.c,v 1.7 1996/11/19 22:48:30 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * quit: Terminate a POP session + */ + +int +pop_quit (POP *p) +{ + /* Release the message information list */ + if (p->mlp) free (p->mlp); + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_rset.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_rset.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6888ebfbad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_rset.c @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_rset.c,v 1.9 1998/04/23 17:38:08 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * rset: Unflag all messages flagged for deletion in a POP maildrop + */ + +int +pop_rset (POP *p) +{ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to the message info list */ + int i; + + /* Unmark all the messages */ + for (i = p->msg_count, mp = p->mlp; i > 0; i--, mp++) + mp->flags &= ~DEL_FLAG; + + /* Reset the messages-deleted and bytes-deleted counters */ + p->msgs_deleted = 0; + p->bytes_deleted = 0; + + /* Reset the last-message-access flag */ + p->last_msg = 0; + + return (pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS,"Maildrop has %u messages (%ld octets)", + p->msg_count, p->drop_size)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_send.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_send.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..166b990a14 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_send.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_send.c,v 1.25 1999/03/05 14:14:28 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * sendline: Send a line of a multi-line response to a client. + */ +static int +pop_sendline(POP *p, char *buffer) +{ + char * bp; + + /* Byte stuff lines that begin with the termination octet */ + if (*buffer == POP_TERMINATE) + fputc(POP_TERMINATE,p->output); + + /* Look for a in the buffer */ + if ((bp = strchr(buffer, '\n'))) + *bp = 0; + + /* Send the line to the client */ + fputs(buffer,p->output); + +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Sending line \"%s\"",buffer); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Put a if a newline was removed from the buffer */ + if (bp) + fputs ("\r\n",p->output); + return bp != NULL; +} + +/* + * send: Send the header and a specified number of lines + * from a mail message to a POP client. + */ + +int +pop_send(POP *p) +{ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message info list */ + int msg_num; + int msg_lines; + char buffer[MAXMSGLINELEN]; +#ifdef RETURN_PATH_HANDLING + char * return_path_adr; + char * return_path_end; + int return_path_sent; + int return_path_linlen; +#endif + int sent_nl = 0; + + /* Convert the first parameter into an integer */ + msg_num = atoi(p->pop_parm[1]); + + /* Is requested message out of range? */ + if ((msg_num < 1) || (msg_num > p->msg_count)) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"Message %d does not exist.",msg_num)); + + /* Get a pointer to the message in the message list */ + mp = &p->mlp[msg_num-1]; + + /* Is the message flagged for deletion? */ + if (mp->flags & DEL_FLAG) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Message %d has been deleted.",msg_num)); + + /* If this is a TOP command, get the number of lines to send */ + if (strcmp(p->pop_command, "top") == 0) { + /* Convert the second parameter into an integer */ + msg_lines = atoi(p->pop_parm[2]); + } + else { + /* Assume that a RETR (retrieve) command was issued */ + msg_lines = -1; + /* Flag the message as retreived */ + mp->flags |= RETR_FLAG; + } + + /* Display the number of bytes in the message */ + pop_msg(p, POP_SUCCESS, "%ld octets", mp->length); + + if(IS_MAILDIR(p)) { + int e = pop_maildir_open(p, mp); + if(e != POP_SUCCESS) + return e; + } + + /* Position to the start of the message */ + fseek(p->drop, mp->offset, 0); + + return_path_sent = 0; + + if(!IS_MAILDIR(p)) { + /* Skip the first line (the sendmail "From" line) */ + fgets (buffer,MAXMSGLINELEN,p->drop); + +#ifdef RETURN_PATH_HANDLING + if (strncmp(buffer,"From ",5) == 0) { + return_path_linlen = strlen(buffer); + for (return_path_adr = buffer+5; + (*return_path_adr == ' ' || *return_path_adr == '\t') && + return_path_adr < buffer + return_path_linlen; + return_path_adr++) + ; + if (return_path_adr < buffer + return_path_linlen) { + if ((return_path_end = strchr(return_path_adr, ' ')) != NULL) + *return_path_end = '\0'; + if (strlen(return_path_adr) != 0 && *return_path_adr != '\n') { + static char tmpbuf[MAXMSGLINELEN + 20]; + if (snprintf (tmpbuf, + sizeof(tmpbuf), + "Return-Path: %s\n", + return_path_adr) < MAXMSGLINELEN) { + pop_sendline (p,tmpbuf); + if (hangup) + return pop_msg (p, POP_FAILURE, + "SIGHUP or SIGPIPE flagged"); + return_path_sent++; + } + } + } + } +#endif + } + + /* Send the header of the message followed by a blank line */ + while (fgets(buffer,MAXMSGLINELEN,p->drop)) { +#ifdef RETURN_PATH_HANDLING + /* Don't send existing Return-Path-header if already sent own */ + if (!return_path_sent || strncasecmp(buffer, "Return-Path:", 12) != 0) +#endif + sent_nl = pop_sendline (p,buffer); + /* A single newline (blank line) signals the + end of the header. sendline() converts this to a NULL, + so that's what we look for. */ + if (*buffer == 0) break; + if (hangup) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"SIGHUP or SIGPIPE flagged")); + } + /* Send the message body */ + { + int blank_line = 1; + while (fgets(buffer, MAXMSGLINELEN-1, p->drop)) { + /* Look for the start of the next message */ + if (!IS_MAILDIR(p) && blank_line && strncmp(buffer,"From ",5) == 0) + break; + blank_line = (strncmp(buffer, "\n", 1) == 0); + /* Decrement the lines sent (for a TOP command) */ + if (msg_lines >= 0 && msg_lines-- == 0) break; + sent_nl = pop_sendline(p,buffer); + if (hangup) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE,"SIGHUP or SIGPIPE flagged")); + } + /* add missing newline at end */ + if(!sent_nl) + fputs("\r\n", p->output); + /* some pop-clients want a blank line at the end of the + message, we always add one here, but what the heck -- in + outer (white) space, no one can hear you scream */ + if(IS_MAILDIR(p)) + fputs("\r\n", p->output); + } + /* "." signals the end of a multi-line transmission */ + fputs(".\r\n",p->output); + fflush(p->output); + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_stat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_stat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ab2800b0f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_stat.c @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_stat.c,v 1.7 1997/05/11 11:04:35 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * stat: Display the status of a POP maildrop to its client + */ + +int +pop_stat (POP *p) +{ +#ifdef DEBUG + if (p->debug) pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"%d message(s) (%ld octets).", + p->msg_count-p->msgs_deleted, + p->drop_size-p->bytes_deleted); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + return (pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS, + "%d %ld", + p->msg_count-p->msgs_deleted, + p->drop_size-p->bytes_deleted)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_uidl.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_uidl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42dc12deba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_uidl.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_uidl.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:33 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef UIDL +/* + * uidl: Uidl the contents of a POP maildrop + */ + +int +pop_uidl (POP *p) +{ + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message info list */ + int i; + int msg_num; + + /* Was a message number provided? */ + if (p->parm_count > 0) { + msg_num = atoi(p->pop_parm[1]); + + /* Is requested message out of range? */ + if ((msg_num < 1) || (msg_num > p->msg_count)) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Message %d does not exist.",msg_num)); + + /* Get a pointer to the message in the message list */ + mp = &p->mlp[msg_num-1]; + + /* Is the message already flagged for deletion? */ + if (mp->flags & DEL_FLAG) + return (pop_msg (p,POP_FAILURE, + "Message %d has been deleted.",msg_num)); + + /* Display message information */ + return (pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS,"%u %s",msg_num,mp->msg_id)); + } + + /* Display the entire list of messages */ + pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS, + "%d messages (%ld octets)", + p->msg_count-p->msgs_deleted, + p->drop_size-p->bytes_deleted); + + /* Loop through the message information list. Skip deleted messages */ + for (i = p->msg_count, mp = p->mlp; i > 0; i--, mp++) { + if (!(mp->flags & DEL_FLAG)) + fprintf(p->output,"%u %s\r\n",mp->number,mp->msg_id); + } + + /* "." signals the end of a multi-line transmission */ + fprintf(p->output,".\r\n"); + fflush(p->output); + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +} +#endif /* UIDL */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_updt.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_updt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..013013257d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_updt.c @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_updt.c,v 1.19 1998/04/23 18:36:51 joda Exp $"); + +static char standard_error[] = + "Error error updating primary drop. Mailbox unchanged"; + +/* + * updt: Apply changes to a user's POP maildrop + */ + +int +pop_updt (POP *p) +{ + FILE * md; /* Stream pointer for + the user's maildrop */ + int mfd; /* File descriptor for + above */ + char buffer[BUFSIZ]; /* Read buffer */ + + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message + info list */ + int msg_num; /* Current message + counter */ + int status_written; /* Status header field + written */ + int nchar; /* Bytes read/written */ + + long offset; /* New mail offset */ + + int blank_line; + +#ifdef DEBUG + if (p->debug) { + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Performing maildrop update..."); + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Checking to see if all messages were deleted"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + if(IS_MAILDIR(p)) + return pop_maildir_update(p); + + if (p->msgs_deleted == p->msg_count) { + /* Truncate before close, to avoid race condition, DO NOT UNLINK! + Another process may have opened, and not yet tried to lock */ + ftruncate ((int)fileno(p->drop),0); + fclose(p->drop) ; + return (POP_SUCCESS); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + if (p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Opening mail drop \"%s\"",p->drop_name); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* Open the user's real maildrop */ + if ((mfd = open(p->drop_name,O_RDWR|O_CREAT,0600)) == -1 || + (md = fdopen(mfd,"r+")) == NULL) { + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,standard_error); + } + + /* Lock the user's real mail drop */ + if ( flock(mfd, LOCK_EX) == -1 ) { + fclose(md) ; + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE, "flock: '%s': %s", p->temp_drop, + strerror(errno)); + } + + /* Go to the right places */ + offset = lseek((int)fileno(p->drop),0,SEEK_END) ; + + /* Append any messages that may have arrived during the session + to the temporary maildrop */ + while ((nchar=read(mfd,buffer,BUFSIZ)) > 0) + if ( nchar != write((int)fileno(p->drop),buffer,nchar) ) { + nchar = -1; + break ; + } + if ( nchar != 0 ) { + fclose(md) ; + ftruncate((int)fileno(p->drop),(int)offset) ; + fclose(p->drop) ; + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,standard_error); + } + + rewind(md); + lseek(mfd,0,SEEK_SET); + ftruncate(mfd,0) ; + + /* Synch stdio and the kernel for the POP drop */ + rewind(p->drop); + lseek((int)fileno(p->drop),0,SEEK_SET); + + /* Transfer messages not flagged for deletion from the temporary + maildrop to the new maildrop */ +#ifdef DEBUG + if (p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Creating new maildrop \"%s\" from \"%s\"", + p->drop_name,p->temp_drop); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + for (msg_num = 0; msg_num < p->msg_count; ++msg_num) { + + int doing_body; + + /* Get a pointer to the message information list */ + mp = &p->mlp[msg_num]; + + if (mp->flags & DEL_FLAG) { +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG, + "Message %d flagged for deletion.",mp->number); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + continue; + } + + fseek(p->drop,mp->offset,0); + +#ifdef DEBUG + if(p->debug) + pop_log(p,POP_DEBUG,"Copying message %d.",mp->number); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + blank_line = 1; + for(status_written = doing_body = 0 ; + fgets(buffer,MAXMSGLINELEN,p->drop);) { + + if (doing_body == 0) { /* Header */ + + /* Update the message status */ + if (strncasecmp(buffer,"Status:",7) == 0) { + if (mp->flags & RETR_FLAG) + fputs("Status: RO\n",md); + else + fputs(buffer, md); + status_written++; + continue; + } + /* A blank line signals the end of the header. */ + if (*buffer == '\n') { + doing_body = 1; + if (status_written == 0) { + if (mp->flags & RETR_FLAG) + fputs("Status: RO\n\n",md); + else + fputs("Status: U\n\n",md); + } + else fputs ("\n", md); + continue; + } + /* Save another header line */ + fputs (buffer, md); + } + else { /* Body */ + if (blank_line && strncmp(buffer,"From ",5) == 0) break; + fputs (buffer, md); + blank_line = (*buffer == '\n'); + } + } + } + + /* flush and check for errors now! The new mail will writen + without stdio, since we need not separate messages */ + + fflush(md) ; + if (ferror(md)) { + ftruncate(mfd,0) ; + fclose(md) ; + fclose(p->drop) ; + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,standard_error); + } + + /* Go to start of new mail if any */ + lseek((int)fileno(p->drop),offset,SEEK_SET); + + while((nchar=read((int)fileno(p->drop),buffer,BUFSIZ)) > 0) + if ( nchar != write(mfd,buffer,nchar) ) { + nchar = -1; + break ; + } + if ( nchar != 0 ) { + ftruncate(mfd,0) ; + fclose(md) ; + fclose(p->drop) ; + return pop_msg(p,POP_FAILURE,standard_error); + } + + /* Close the maildrop and empty temporary maildrop */ + fclose(md); + ftruncate((int)fileno(p->drop),0); + fclose(p->drop); + + return(pop_quit(p)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_user.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_user.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be771e690c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_user.c,v 1.15 1999/09/16 20:38:50 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * user: Prompt for the user name at the start of a POP session + */ + +int +pop_user (POP *p) +{ + char ss[256]; + + strlcpy(p->user, p->pop_parm[1], sizeof(p->user)); + +#ifdef OTP + if (otp_challenge (&p->otp_ctx, p->user, ss, sizeof(ss)) == 0) { + return pop_msg(p, POP_SUCCESS, "Password %s required for %s.", + ss, p->user); + } else +#endif + if (p->auth_level != AUTH_NONE) { + char *s = NULL; +#ifdef OTP + s = otp_error(&p->otp_ctx); +#endif + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "Permission denied%s%s", + s ? ":" : "", s ? s : ""); + } else + return pop_msg(p, POP_SUCCESS, "Password required for %s.", p->user); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_xover.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_xover.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94936f9839 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/pop_xover.c @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +#include +RCSID("$Id: pop_xover.c,v 1.4 1998/04/23 17:39:31 joda Exp $"); + +int +pop_xover (POP *p) +{ +#ifdef XOVER + MsgInfoList * mp; /* Pointer to message info list */ + int i; + + pop_msg(p,POP_SUCCESS, + "%d messages (%ld octets)", + p->msg_count-p->msgs_deleted, + p->drop_size-p->bytes_deleted); + + /* Loop through the message information list. Skip deleted messages */ + for (i = p->msg_count, mp = p->mlp; i > 0; i--, mp++) { + if (!(mp->flags & DEL_FLAG)) + fprintf(p->output,"%u\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%lu\t%u\r\n", + mp->number, + mp->subject, + mp->from, + mp->date, + mp->msg_id, + mp->length, + mp->lines); + } + + /* "." signals the end of a multi-line transmission */ + fprintf(p->output,".\r\n"); + fflush(p->output); + + return(POP_SUCCESS); +#else + return pop_msg(p, POP_FAILURE, "Command not implemented."); +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2e04825601 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: popper.8,v 1.10 2003/04/16 20:49:54 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 16, 2003 +.Dt POPPER 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm popper +.Nd +POP3 server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl k +.Op Fl a Ar none Ns \*(Ba Ns otp +.Op Fl t Ar file +.Op Fl T Ar seconds +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl i +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl -address-log= Ns Pa file +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +serves mail via the Post Office Protocol. Supported options include: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl a Ar none Ns \*(Ba Ns otp , +.Fl -auth-mode= Ns Ar none Ns \*(Ba Ns otp +.Xc +tells +.Nm +what authentication modes are acceptable, passing +.Ar otp +disables clear text passwords. Otp doesn't disable Kerberos +authentication, only cleartext passwords. +.It Xo +.Fl -address-log= Ns Pa file +.Xc +logs the addresses of all clients to the specified file +.It Xo +.Fl d , +.Fl -debug +.Xc +enables more verbose log messages +.It Xo +.Fl i , +.Fl -interactive +.Xc +when not started by inetd, this flag tells +.Nm +that it has to create a socket by itself +.It Xo +.Fl k , +.Fl -kerberos +.Xc +tells +.Nm +to use the Kerberos for authentication. +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port , +.Fl -port= Ns Ar port +.Xc +port to listen to, in combination with +.Fl i +.It Xo +.Fl t Ar file , +.Fl -trace-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +trace all commands to file +.It Xo +.Fl T Ar seconds , +.Fl -timeout= Ns Ar seconds +.Xc +set timeout to something other than the default of 120 seconds +.El +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr push 8 , +.Xr movemail 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +RFC1939 (Post Office Protocol - Version 3) +.\" RFC2449 (POP3 Extension Mechanism) +.\".Sh HISTORY +.Sh AUTHORS +The server was initially developed at the University of California, +Berkeley. +.Pp +Many changes have been made as part of the KTH Kerberos distributions. +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.README.release b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.README.release new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c0b313ecd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.README.release @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +Release Notes: + +popper-1.831beta is no longer beta 30 July 91 + Removed popper-1.7.tar.Z + +popper-1.831beta.tar.Z 03 April 91 + Changed mkstemp to mktemp for Ultrix. Sigh. + +popper-1.83beta.tar.Z 02 April 91 + + This version makes certain that while running as root we do nothing + at all destructive. + +popper-1.82beta.tar.Z 27 March 91 + + This version fixes problems on Encore MultiMax and some Sun releases + which wouldn't allow a user to ftruncate() a file from an open + file descripter unless the user owns the file. Now the user + owns the /usr/spool/mail/.userid.pop file. Thanks to Ben Levy + of FTP Software and Henry Holtzman of Apple. + +popper-1.81beta.tar.Z 20 March 91 + + This version of popper is supposed to fix three problems reported + with various versions of popper (all called 1.7 or 1.7something). + + 1) Dropped network connections meant lost mail files. Some 1.7 + versions also risked corrupting mail files. + + 2) Some versions of 1.7 created temporary drop files with world + read and write permissions. + + 3) Some versions of 1.7 were not careful about opening the temporary + drop file. + +popper-1.7.tar.Z 09 September 90 (updated 20 March 91) + + This version will exhibit the first problem listed above if it is + compiled with -DDEBUG and run without the "-d" (debug) flag. + + If it is compiled without -DDEBUG it will exhibit only the second + and third bug listed above. + +Cliff Frost poptest@nettlesome.berkeley.edu +UC Berkeley diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6aee29441c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + */ + +#include +RCSID("$Id: popper.c,v 1.16 2002/07/04 14:09:25 joda Exp $"); + +int hangup = FALSE ; + +static RETSIGTYPE +catchSIGHUP(int sig) +{ + hangup = TRUE ; + + /* This should not be a problem on BSD systems */ + signal(SIGHUP, catchSIGHUP); + signal(SIGPIPE, catchSIGHUP); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +int pop_timeout = POP_TIMEOUT; + +jmp_buf env; + +static RETSIGTYPE +ring(int sig) +{ + longjmp(env,1); +} + +/* + * fgets, but with a timeout + */ +static char * +tgets(char *str, int size, FILE *fp, int timeout) +{ + signal(SIGALRM, ring); + alarm(timeout); + if (setjmp(env)) + str = NULL; + else + str = fgets(str,size,fp); + alarm(0); + signal(SIGALRM,SIG_DFL); + return(str); +} + +/* + * popper: Handle a Post Office Protocol version 3 session + */ +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + POP p; + state_table * s; + char message[MAXLINELEN]; + + signal(SIGHUP, catchSIGHUP); + signal(SIGPIPE, catchSIGHUP); + + /* Start things rolling */ + pop_init(&p,argc,argv); + + /* Tell the user that we are listenting */ + pop_msg(&p,POP_SUCCESS, "POP3 server ready"); + + /* State loop. The POP server is always in a particular state in + which a specific suite of commands can be executed. The following + loop reads a line from the client, gets the command, and processes + it in the current context (if allowed) or rejects it. This continues + until the client quits or an error occurs. */ + + for (p.CurrentState=auth1;p.CurrentState!=halt&&p.CurrentState!=error;) { + if (hangup) { + pop_msg(&p, POP_FAILURE, "POP hangup: %s", p.myhost); + if (p.CurrentState > auth2 && !pop_updt(&p)) + pop_msg(&p, POP_FAILURE, + "POP mailbox update failed: %s", p.myhost); + p.CurrentState = error; + } else if (tgets(message, MAXLINELEN, p.input, pop_timeout) == NULL) { + pop_msg(&p, POP_FAILURE, "POP timeout: %s", p.myhost); + if (p.CurrentState > auth2 && !pop_updt(&p)) + pop_msg(&p,POP_FAILURE, + "POP mailbox update failed: %s", p.myhost); + p.CurrentState = error; + } + else { + /* Search for the command in the command/state table */ + if ((s = pop_get_command(&p,message)) == NULL) continue; + + /* Call the function associated with this command in + the current state */ + if (s->function) p.CurrentState = s->result[(*s->function)(&p)]; + + /* Otherwise assume NOOP and send an OK message to the client */ + else { + p.CurrentState = s->success_state; + pop_msg(&p,POP_SUCCESS,NULL); + } + } + } + + /* Say goodbye to the client */ + pop_msg(&p,POP_SUCCESS,"Pop server at %s signing off.",p.myhost); + + /* Log the end of activity */ + pop_log(&p,POP_PRIORITY, + "(v%s) Ending request from \"%s\" at %s\n",VERSION,p.client,p.ipaddr); + + /* Stop logging */ + closelog(); + + return(0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2f3ebfc1d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ + +POPPER(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual POPPER(8) + +NNAAMMEE + ppooppppeerr - POP3 server + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + ppooppppeerr [--kk] [--aa _n_o_n_e|otp] [--tt _f_i_l_e] [--TT _s_e_c_o_n_d_s] [--dd] [--ii] [--pp _p_o_r_t] + [----aaddddrreessss--lloogg==_f_i_l_e] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + ppooppppeerr serves mail via the Post Office Protocol. Supported options in- + clude: + + --aa _n_o_n_e|otp, ----aauutthh--mmooddee==_n_o_n_e|otp + tells ppooppppeerr what authentication modes are acceptable, passing + _o_t_p disables clear text passwords. Otp doesn't disable Kerberos + authentication, only cleartext passwords. + + ----aaddddrreessss--lloogg==_f_i_l_e + logs the addresses of all clients to the specified file + + --dd, ----ddeebbuugg + enables more verbose log messages + + --ii, ----iinntteerraaccttiivvee + when not started by inetd, this flag tells ppooppppeerr that it has to + create a socket by itself + + --kk, ----kkeerrbbeerrooss + tells ppooppppeerr to use the Kerberos for authentication. + + --pp _p_o_r_t, ----ppoorrtt==_p_o_r_t + port to listen to, in combination with --ii + + --tt _f_i_l_e, ----ttrraaccee--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + trace all commands to file + + --TT _s_e_c_o_n_d_s, ----ttiimmeeoouutt==_s_e_c_o_n_d_s + set timeout to something other than the default of 120 seconds + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + push(8), movemail(8) + +SSTTAANNDDAARRDDSS + RFC1939 (Post Office Protocol - Version 3) + +AAUUTTHHOORRSS + The server was initially developed at the University of California, + Berkeley. + + Many changes have been made as part of the KTH Kerberos distributions. + + HEIMDAL April 16, 2003 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7eac257c75 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/popper.h @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + * + * static char copyright[] = "Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California.\nAll rights reserved.\n"; + * static char SccsId[] = "@(#)@(#)popper.h 2.2 2.2 4/2/91"; + * + */ + +/* $Id: popper.h,v 1.51 2002/07/04 13:56:12 joda Exp $ */ + +/* + * Header file for the POP programs + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#define UIDL +#define XOVER +#define XDELE +#define DEBUG +#define RETURN_PATH_HANDLING +#endif + +/* Common include files */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#ifdef _AIX +struct sockaddr_dl; /* AIX fun */ +struct ether_addr; +#endif +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include "version.h" + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif + +#define MAXUSERNAMELEN 65 +#define MAXLINELEN 1024 +#define MAXMSGLINELEN 1024 +#define MAXCMDLEN 4 +#define MAXPARMCOUNT 10 +#define MAXPARMLEN 10 +#define ALLOC_MSGS 20 +#define MAIL_COMMAND "/usr/lib/sendmail" + +#define POP_FACILITY LOG_LOCAL0 +#define POP_PRIORITY LOG_NOTICE +#define POP_DEBUG LOG_DEBUG +#define POP_INFO LOG_INFO +#define POP_LOGOPTS 0 + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef OTP +#include +#endif + +#if defined(KRB4_MAILDIR) +#define POP_MAILDIR KRB4_MAILDIR +#elif defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) +#define POP_MAILDIR _PATH_MAILDIR +#elif defined(MAILDIR) +#define POP_MAILDIR MAILDIR +#else +#define POP_MAILDIR "/usr/spool/mail" +#endif + +#define POP_DROP POP_MAILDIR "/.%s.pop" + /* POP_TMPSIZE needs to be big enough to hold the string + * defined by POP_TMPDROP. POP_DROP and POP_TMPDROP + * must be in the same filesystem. + */ +#define POP_TMPDROP POP_MAILDIR "/tmpXXXXXX" +#define POP_TMPSIZE 256 +#define POP_TMPXMIT "/tmp/xmitXXXXXX" +#define POP_OK "+OK" +#define POP_ERR "-ERR" +#define POP_SUCCESS 1 +#define POP_FAILURE 0 +#define POP_TERMINATE '.' +#define POP_TIMEOUT 120 /* timeout connection after this many secs */ + +extern int pop_timeout; + +extern int hangup; + +#define AUTH_NONE 0 +#define AUTH_OTP 1 + +#define pop_command pop_parm[0] /* POP command is first token */ +#define pop_subcommand pop_parm[1] /* POP XTND subcommand is the + second token */ + +typedef enum { /* POP processing states */ + auth1, /* Authorization: waiting for + USER command */ + auth2, /* Authorization: waiting for + PASS command */ + trans, /* Transaction */ + update, /* Update: session ended, + process maildrop changes */ + halt, /* (Halt): stop processing + and exit */ + error /* (Error): something really + bad happened */ +} state; + + +#define DEL_FLAG 1 +#define RETR_FLAG 2 +#define NEW_FLAG 4 + +typedef struct { /* Message information */ + int number; /* Message number relative to + the beginning of list */ + long length; /* Length of message in + bytes */ + int lines; /* Number of (null-terminated) lines in the message */ + long offset; /* Offset from beginning of + file */ + unsigned flags; + +#if defined(UIDL) || defined(XOVER) + char *msg_id; /* The POP UIDL uniqueifier */ +#endif +#ifdef XOVER + char *subject; + char *from; + char *date; +#endif + char *name; +} MsgInfoList; + +#define IS_MAILDIR(P) ((P)->temp_drop[0] == '\0') + +typedef struct { /* POP parameter block */ + int debug; /* Debugging requested */ + char * myname; /* The name of this POP + daemon program */ + char myhost[MaxHostNameLen]; /* The name of our host + computer */ + char client[MaxHostNameLen]; /* Canonical name of client + computer */ + char ipaddr[MaxHostNameLen]; /* Dotted-notation format of + client IP address */ + unsigned short ipport; /* Client port for privileged + operations */ + char user[MAXUSERNAMELEN]; /* Name of the POP user */ + state CurrentState; /* The current POP operational state */ + MsgInfoList * mlp; /* Message information list */ + int msg_count; /* Number of messages in + the maildrop */ + int msgs_deleted; /* Number of messages flagged + for deletion */ + int last_msg; /* Last message touched by + the user */ + long bytes_deleted; /* Number of maildrop bytes + flagged for deletion */ + char drop_name[MAXPATHLEN]; /* The name of the user's + maildrop */ + char temp_drop[MAXPATHLEN]; /* The name of the user's + temporary maildrop */ + long drop_size; /* Size of the maildrop in + bytes */ + FILE * drop; /* (Temporary) mail drop */ + FILE * input; /* Input TCP/IP communication + stream */ + FILE * output; /* Output TCP/IP communication stream */ + FILE * trace; /* Debugging trace file */ + char * pop_parm[MAXPARMCOUNT]; /* Parse POP parameter list */ + int parm_count; /* Number of parameters in + parsed list */ + int kerberosp; /* Using KPOP? */ +#ifdef KRB4 + AUTH_DAT kdata; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal principal; /* principal auth as */ + krb5_log_facility* logf; +#endif + int version; /* 4 or 5? */ + int auth_level; /* Dont allow cleartext */ +#ifdef OTP + OtpContext otp_ctx; /* OTP context */ +#endif + unsigned int flags; +#define POP_FLAG_CAPA 1 +} POP; + +typedef struct { /* State information for + each POP command */ + state ValidCurrentState; /* The operating state of + the command */ + char * command; /* The POP command */ + int min_parms; /* Minimum number of parms + for the command */ + int max_parms; /* Maximum number of parms + for the command */ + int (*function) (); /* The function that process + the command */ + state result[2]; /* The resulting state after + command processing */ +#define success_state result[0] /* State when a command + succeeds */ +} state_table; + +typedef struct { /* Table of extensions */ + char * subcommand; /* The POP XTND subcommand */ + int min_parms; /* Minimum number of parms for + the subcommand */ + int max_parms; /* Maximum number of parms for + the subcommand */ + int (*function) (); /* The function that processes + the subcommand */ +} xtnd_table; + +int pop_dele(POP *p); +int pop_dropcopy(POP *p, struct passwd *pwp); +int pop_dropinfo(POP *p); +int pop_init(POP *p,int argcount,char **argmessage); +int pop_last(POP *p); +int pop_list(POP *p); +int pop_parse(POP *p, char *buf); +int pop_pass(POP *p); +int pop_quit(POP *p); +int pop_rset(POP *p); +int pop_send(POP *p); +int pop_stat(POP *p); +int pop_updt(POP *p); +int pop_user(POP *p); +#ifdef UIDL +int pop_uidl(POP *p); +#endif +#ifdef XOVER +int pop_xover(POP *p); +#endif +#ifdef XDELE +int pop_xdele(POP *p); +#endif +int pop_help(POP *p); +state_table *pop_get_command(POP *p, char *mp); +void pop_lower(char *buf); + +int pop_log(POP *p, int stat, char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))) +#endif +; + +int pop_msg(POP *p, int stat, char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))) +#endif +; + +int pop_maildir_info (POP*); +int pop_maildir_open (POP*, MsgInfoList*); +int pop_maildir_update (POP*); + +int changeuser(POP*, struct passwd*); +void parse_header(MsgInfoList*, char*); +int add_missing_headers(POP*, MsgInfoList*); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/version.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/version.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b5d135cf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/popper/version.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement + * specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. + * + * static char copyright[] = "Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California.\nAll rights reserved.\n"; + * static char SccsId[] = "@(#)@(#)version.h 2.6 2.6 4/3/91"; + * + */ + +/* $Id: version.h,v 1.5 1997/08/08 22:50:13 assar Exp $ */ + +/* + * Current version of this POP implementation + */ + +#if 0 +#define VERSION krb4_version +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e158181043 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +2004-06-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * push.c: 1.48: alloc memory to handle very long lines + +2003-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c: fixed one incorrect fprintf to stderr + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * push.c: add names of pop states, add some more debugging and use + fprintf(stderr) for all dbg stmts. + +2001-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (doit): check return values from snprintf being negative + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + +2000-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c: support several headers, from use + estrdup, emalloc, erealloc + +2000-11-29 Johan Danielsson + + * pfrom.1: work around bug in grog that makes it think it needs + mdoc.old + + * push.8: work around bug in grog that makes it think it needs + mdoc.old + +2000-11-27 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: add space to usage + +2000-10-08 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (doit): check that fds are not too large to select on + +2000-03-04 Assar Westerlund + + * add man-page for pfrom + +1999-12-28 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): call k_getportbyname with port number in + network-byte-order + +1999-12-14 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_connect): remove bogus local block variable + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_connect): use `getaddrinfo' + * push.c: add --count (print number of messages and bytes at + beginning) + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c: make `-v' a arg_counter + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): redo the v4/v5 selection for consistency. -4 -> + try only v4 -5 -> try only v5 none, -45 -> try v5, v4 + +1999-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (doit): remember to step over the error message when we + discover that XDELE is not supported + +1999-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: use XDELE + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_connect): v6-ify + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c: get_default_username and the resulting const propagation + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (parse_pobox): try $USERNAME + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_v5): remove unused and non-working code + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_v5): call krb5_sendauth with ccache == NULL + +Wed Apr 7 23:40:00 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: fix names of hesiod variables + +Wed Mar 24 04:37:04 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (pfrom): fix typo + + * push.c (get_pobox): try to handle old and new hesiod APIs + +Mon Mar 22 22:19:40 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: hesoid -> hesiod + +Sun Mar 21 18:02:10 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bindir -> libexecdir + +Sat Mar 20 00:12:26 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: LDADD: add missing backslash + +Thu Mar 18 15:28:35 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: clean pfrom + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Mon Mar 15 18:26:16 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: strncasecmp headers + +Mon Feb 15 22:22:09 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (pfrom): use libexecdir + + * Makefile.am: build and install pfrom + + * push.c (do_connect): init `s' + (pop_state): spell-check enums + +Tue Nov 24 23:20:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: build and install pfrom + + * pfrom.in: bindir -> libexecdir + +Sun Nov 22 15:33:52 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: eliminate some warnings + +Sun Nov 22 10:34:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Thu Nov 19 01:17:33 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * push_locl.h: add + + * Makefile.am, Makefile.in: link and include hesiod + + * push.c (get_pobox): new function. add hesiod support. + +1998-11-07 Assar Westerlund + + * push.8: updated + + * push.c: --from implementation from + +Fri Jul 10 01:14:45 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (net_{read,write}): remove + +Wed Jun 24 14:41:41 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: allow `po:user@host' mailbox syntax + +Tue Jun 2 17:35:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: quote '^From ' properly + +Mon May 25 05:22:47 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): PROGS -> PROGRAMS + +Sun Apr 26 11:42:13 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): better default for v4 and v5 + + * push.c (main): init context correctly + + * push.c: should work with krb4 + + * push_locl.h: krb4 compat + + * Makefile.in: new file + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5999ec1a52 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.17 2000/11/15 22:51:09 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_hesiod) + +bin_SCRIPTS = pfrom + +libexec_PROGRAMS = push + +push_SOURCES = push.c push_locl.h + +pfrom: pfrom.in + sed -e "s!%libexecdir%!$(libexecdir)!" $(srcdir)/pfrom.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +man_MANS = push.8 pfrom.1 + +CLEANFILES = pfrom + +EXTRA_DIST = pfrom.in $(man_MANS) + +LDADD = $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_hesiod) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4dc3b92a89 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,894 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.17 2000/11/15 22:51:09 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + +SOURCES = $(push_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = 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$(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +pfrom: pfrom.in + sed -e "s!%libexecdir%!$(libexecdir)!" $(srcdir)/pfrom.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d7983c240 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.1 @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: pfrom.1,v 1.5 2003/02/16 21:10:11 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 4, 2000 +.Dt PFROM 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm pfrom +.Nd "fetch a list of the current mail via POP" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -krb4 +.Op Fl 5 | Fl -krb5 +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl c | -count +.Op Fl -header +.Oo Fl p Ar port-spec \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -port= Ns Ar port-spec +.Xc +.Oc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a script that does push --from. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr push 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4035710bc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ + +PFROM(1) UNIX Reference Manual PFROM(1) + +NNAAMMEE + ppffrroomm - fetch a list of the current mail via POP + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + ppffrroomm [--44 | ----kkrrbb44] [--55 | ----kkrrbb55] [--vv | ----vveerrbboossee] [--cc | ----ccoouunntt] + [----hheeaaddeerr] [--pp _p_o_r_t_-_s_p_e_c | ----ppoorrtt==_p_o_r_t_-_s_p_e_c] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + ppffrroomm is a script that does push --from. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + push(8) + + HEIMDAL March 4, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6adf4f0f79 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/pfrom.in @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: pfrom.in,v 1.2 1998/11/24 13:25:47 assar Exp $ +libexecdir=%libexecdir% +PATH=$libexecdir:$PATH +export PATH +push --from $* diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14561a9f9b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.8 @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +.\" $Id: push.8,v 1.13 2002/08/20 17:07:07 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 31, 1998 +.Dt PUSH 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm push +.Nd fetch mail via POP +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -krb4 +.Op Fl 5 | Fl -krb5 +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl f | Fl -fork +.Op Fl l | -leave +.Op Fl -from +.Op Fl c | -count +.Op Fl -headers Ns = Ns Ar headers +.Oo Fl p Ar port-spec \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -port Ns = Ns Ar port-spec +.Xc +.Oc +.Ar po-box +.Pa filename +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +retrieves mail from the post office box +.Ar po-box , +and stores the mail in mbox format in +.Pa filename . +The +.Ar po-box +can have any of the following formats: +.Bl -hang -compact -offset indent +.It Ql hostname:username +.It Ql po:hostname:username +.It Ql username@hostname +.It Ql po:username@hostname +.It Ql hostname +.It Ql po:username +.El +.Pp +If no username is specified, +.Nm +assumes that it's the same as on the local machine; +.Ar hostname +defaults to the value of the +.Ev MAILHOST +environment variable. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -krb4 +.Xc +use Kerberos 4 (if compiled with support for Kerberos 4) +.It Xo +.Fl 5 , +.Fl -krb5 +.Xc +use Kerberos 5 (if compiled with support for Kerberos 5) +.It Xo +.Fl f , +.Fl -fork +.Xc +fork before starting to delete messages +.It Xo +.Fl l , +.Fl -leave +.Xc +don't delete fetched mail +.It Xo +.Fl -from +.Xc +behave like from. +.It Xo +.Fl c , +.Fl -count +.Xc +first print how many messages and bytes there are. +.It Xo +.Fl -headers Ns = Ns Ar headers +.Xc +a list of comma-separated headers that should get printed. +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port-spec , +.Fl -port Ns = Ns Ar port-spec +.Xc +use this port instead of the default +.Ql kpop +or +.Ql 1109 . +.El +.Pp +The default is to first try Kerberos 5 authentication and then, if +that fails, Kerberos 4. +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev MAILHOST +points to the post office, if no other hostname is specified. +.El +.\".Sh FILES +.Sh EXAMPLES +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ push cornfield:roosta ~/.emacs-mail-crash-box +.Ed +.Pp +tries to fetch mail for the user +.Ar roosta +from the post office at +.Dq cornfield , +and stores the mail in +.Pa ~/.emacs-mail-crash-box +(you are using Gnus, aren't you?) +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ push --from -5 havregryn +.Ed +.Pp +tries to fetch +.Sy From: +lines for current user at post office +.Dq havregryn +using Kerberos 5. +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr from 1 , +.Xr pfrom 1 , +.Xr movemail 8 , +.Xr popper 8 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +was written while waiting for +.Nm movemail +to finish getting the mail. +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2e6f8b89a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.c @@ -0,0 +1,842 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "push_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: push.c,v 1.47.2.1 2004/06/21 10:54:46 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_v4 = -1; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int use_v5 = -1; +static krb5_context context; +#endif + +static char *port_str; +static int verbose_level; +static int do_fork; +static int do_leave; +static int do_version; +static int do_help; +static int do_from; +static int do_count; +static char *header_str; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "krb4", '4', arg_flag, &use_v4, "Use Kerberos V4", + NULL }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { "krb5", '5', arg_flag, &use_v5, "Use Kerberos V5", + NULL }, +#endif + { "verbose",'v', arg_counter, &verbose_level, "Verbose", + NULL }, + { "fork", 'f', arg_flag, &do_fork, "Fork deleting proc", + NULL }, + { "leave", 'l', arg_flag, &do_leave, "Leave mail on server", + NULL }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "number-or-service" }, + { "from", 0, arg_flag, &do_from, "Behave like from", + NULL }, + { "headers", 0, arg_string, &header_str, "Headers to print", NULL }, + { "count", 'c', arg_flag, &do_count, "Print number of messages", NULL}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version, "Print version", + NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help, NULL, + NULL } + +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "[[{po:username[@hostname] | hostname[:username]}] ...] " + "filename"); + exit (ret); +} + +static int +do_connect (const char *hostname, int port, int nodelay) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + int s = -1; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo(%s): %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (a == NULL) { + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + return -1; + } + + if(setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, + (void *)&nodelay, sizeof(nodelay)) < 0) + err (1, "setsockopt TCP_NODELAY"); + return s; +} + +typedef enum { INIT = 0, GREET, USER, PASS, STAT, RETR, TOP, + DELE, XDELE, QUIT} pop_state; + +static char *pop_state_string[] = { + "INIT", "GREET", "USER", "PASS", "STAT", "RETR", "TOP", + "DELE", "XDELE", "QUIT" +}; + +#define PUSH_BUFSIZ 65536 + +#define STEP 16 + +struct write_state { + struct iovec *iovecs; + size_t niovecs, maxiovecs, allociovecs; + int fd; +}; + +static void +write_state_init (struct write_state *w, int fd) +{ +#ifdef UIO_MAXIOV + w->maxiovecs = UIO_MAXIOV; +#else + w->maxiovecs = 16; +#endif + w->allociovecs = min(STEP, w->maxiovecs); + w->niovecs = 0; + w->iovecs = emalloc(w->allociovecs * sizeof(*w->iovecs)); + w->fd = fd; +} + +static void +write_state_add (struct write_state *w, void *v, size_t len) +{ + if(w->niovecs == w->allociovecs) { + if(w->niovecs == w->maxiovecs) { + if(writev (w->fd, w->iovecs, w->niovecs) < 0) + err(1, "writev"); + w->niovecs = 0; + } else { + w->allociovecs = min(w->allociovecs + STEP, w->maxiovecs); + w->iovecs = erealloc (w->iovecs, + w->allociovecs * sizeof(*w->iovecs)); + } + } + w->iovecs[w->niovecs].iov_base = v; + w->iovecs[w->niovecs].iov_len = len; + ++w->niovecs; +} + +static void +write_state_flush (struct write_state *w) +{ + if (w->niovecs) { + if (writev (w->fd, w->iovecs, w->niovecs) < 0) + err (1, "writev"); + w->niovecs = 0; + } +} + +static void +write_state_destroy (struct write_state *w) +{ + free (w->iovecs); +} + +static int +doit(int s, + const char *host, + const char *user, + const char *outfilename, + const char *header_str, + int leavep, + int verbose, + int forkp) +{ + int ret; + char out_buf[PUSH_BUFSIZ]; + int out_len = 0; + char *in_buf; + size_t in_buf_size; + size_t in_len = 0; + char *in_ptr; + pop_state state = INIT; + unsigned count, bytes; + unsigned asked_for = 0, retrieved = 0, asked_deleted = 0, deleted = 0; + unsigned sent_xdele = 0; + int out_fd; + char from_line[128]; + size_t from_line_length; + time_t now; + struct write_state write_state; + int numheaders = 1; + char **headers = NULL; + int i; + char *tmp = NULL; + + in_buf = emalloc(PUSH_BUFSIZ + 1); + in_ptr = in_buf; + in_buf_size = PUSH_BUFSIZ; + + if (do_from) { + char *tmp2; + + tmp2 = tmp = estrdup(header_str); + + out_fd = -1; + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "%s@%s\n", user, host); + while (*tmp != '\0') { + tmp = strchr(tmp, ','); + if (tmp == NULL) + break; + tmp++; + numheaders++; + } + + headers = emalloc(sizeof(char *) * (numheaders + 1)); + for (i = 0; i < numheaders; i++) { + headers[i] = strtok_r(tmp2, ",", &tmp2); + } + headers[numheaders] = NULL; + } else { + out_fd = open(outfilename, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, 0666); + if (out_fd < 0) + err (1, "open %s", outfilename); + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "%s@%s -> %s\n", user, host, outfilename); + } + + now = time(NULL); + from_line_length = snprintf (from_line, sizeof(from_line), + "From %s %s", "push", ctime(&now)); + + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "USER %s\r\nPASS hej\r\nSTAT\r\n", + user); + if (out_len < 0) + errx (1, "snprintf failed"); + if (net_write (s, out_buf, out_len) != out_len) + err (1, "write"); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "%s", out_buf); + + if (!do_from) + write_state_init (&write_state, out_fd); + + while(state != QUIT) { + fd_set readset, writeset; + + FD_ZERO(&readset); + FD_ZERO(&writeset); + if (s >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(s,&readset); + + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "state: %s count: %d asked_for: %d " + "retrieved: %d asked_deleted: %d\n", + pop_state_string[state], + count, asked_for, retrieved, asked_deleted); + + if (((state == STAT || state == RETR || state == TOP) + && asked_for < count) + || (state == XDELE && !sent_xdele) + || (state == DELE && asked_deleted < count)) + FD_SET(s,&writeset); + ret = select (s + 1, &readset, &writeset, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + else + err (1, "select"); + } + + if (FD_ISSET(s, &readset)) { + char *beg, *p; + size_t rem; + int blank_line = 0; + + if(in_len >= in_buf_size) { + char *tmp = erealloc(in_buf, in_buf_size + PUSH_BUFSIZ + 1); + in_ptr = tmp + (in_ptr - in_buf); + in_buf = tmp; + in_buf_size += PUSH_BUFSIZ; + } + + ret = read (s, in_ptr, in_buf_size - in_len); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) + errx (1, "EOF during read"); + + in_len += ret; + in_ptr += ret; + *in_ptr = '\0'; + + beg = in_buf; + rem = in_len; + while(rem > 1 + && (p = strstr(beg, "\r\n")) != NULL) { + if (state == TOP) { + char *copy = beg; + + for (i = 0; i < numheaders; i++) { + size_t len; + + len = min(p - copy + 1, strlen(headers[i])); + if (strncasecmp(copy, headers[i], len) == 0) { + fprintf (stdout, "%.*s\n", (int)(p - copy), copy); + } + } + if (beg[0] == '.' && beg[1] == '\r' && beg[2] == '\n') { + if (numheaders > 1) + fprintf (stdout, "\n"); + state = STAT; + if (++retrieved == count) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "QUIT\r\n"); + } + } + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else if (state == RETR) { + char *copy = beg; + if (beg[0] == '.') { + if (beg[1] == '\r' && beg[2] == '\n') { + if(!blank_line) + write_state_add(&write_state, "\n", 1); + state = STAT; + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + if (++retrieved == count) { + write_state_flush (&write_state); + if (fsync (out_fd) < 0) + err (1, "fsync"); + close(out_fd); + if (leavep) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "QUIT\r\n"); + } else { + if (forkp) { + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + warn ("fork"); + else if(pid != 0) { + if(verbose) + fprintf (stderr, + "(exiting)"); + return 0; + } + } + + state = XDELE; + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "deleting... "); + } + } + continue; + } else + ++copy; + } + *p = '\n'; + if(blank_line && + strncmp(copy, "From ", min(p - copy + 1, 5)) == 0) + write_state_add(&write_state, ">", 1); + write_state_add(&write_state, copy, p - copy + 1); + blank_line = (*copy == '\n'); + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else if (rem >= 3 && strncmp (beg, "+OK", 3) == 0) { + if (state == STAT) { + if (!do_from) + write_state_add(&write_state, + from_line, from_line_length); + blank_line = 0; + if (do_from) + state = TOP; + else + state = RETR; + } else if (state == XDELE) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "QUIT\r\n"); + break; + } else if (state == DELE) { + if (++deleted == count) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "QUIT\r\n"); + break; + } + } else if (++state == STAT) { + if(sscanf (beg + 4, "%u %u", &count, &bytes) != 2) + errx(1, "Bad STAT-line: %.*s", (int)(p - beg), beg); + if (verbose) { + fprintf (stderr, "%u message(s) (%u bytes). " + "fetching... ", + count, bytes); + if (do_from) + fprintf (stderr, "\n"); + } else if (do_count) { + fprintf (stderr, "%u message(s) (%u bytes).\n", + count, bytes); + } + if (count == 0) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "QUIT\r\n"); + break; + } + } + + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else { + if(state == XDELE) { + state = DELE; + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else + errx (1, "Bad response: %.*s", (int)(p - beg), beg); + } + } + if (!do_from) + write_state_flush (&write_state); + + memmove (in_buf, beg, rem); + in_len = rem; + in_ptr = in_buf + rem; + } + if (FD_ISSET(s, &writeset)) { + if ((state == STAT && !do_from) || state == RETR) + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "RETR %u\r\n", ++asked_for); + else if ((state == STAT && do_from) || state == TOP) + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "TOP %u 0\r\n", ++asked_for); + else if(state == XDELE) { + out_len = snprintf(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "XDELE %u %u\r\n", 1, count); + sent_xdele++; + } + else if(state == DELE) + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "DELE %u\r\n", ++asked_deleted); + if (out_len < 0) + errx (1, "snprintf failed"); + if (net_write (s, out_buf, out_len) != out_len) + err (1, "write"); + if (verbose > 1) + fprintf (stderr, "%s", out_buf); + } + } + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "Done\n"); + if (do_from) { + free (tmp); + free (headers); + } else { + write_state_destroy (&write_state); + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +do_v5 (const char *host, + int port, + const char *user, + const char *filename, + const char *header_str, + int leavep, + int verbose, + int forkp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_principal server; + int s; + + s = do_connect (host, port, 1); + if (s < 0) + return 1; + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + host, + "pop", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_sname_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &s, + "KPOPV1.0", + NULL, + server, + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_sendauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + return doit (s, host, user, filename, header_str, leavep, verbose, forkp); +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +do_v4 (const char *host, + int port, + const char *user, + const char *filename, + const char *header_str, + int leavep, + int verbose, + int forkp) +{ + KTEXT_ST ticket; + MSG_DAT msg_data; + CREDENTIALS cred; + des_key_schedule sched; + int s; + int ret; + + s = do_connect (host, port, 1); + if (s < 0) + return 1; + ret = krb_sendauth(0, + s, + &ticket, + "pop", + (char *)host, + krb_realmofhost(host), + getpid(), + &msg_data, + &cred, + sched, + NULL, + NULL, + "KPOPV0.1"); + if(ret) { + warnx("krb_sendauth: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + return doit (s, host, user, filename, header_str, leavep, verbose, forkp); +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef HESIOD + +#ifdef HESIOD_INTERFACES + +static char * +hesiod_get_pobox (const char **user) +{ + void *context; + struct hesiod_postoffice *hpo; + char *ret = NULL; + + if(hesiod_init (&context) != 0) + err (1, "hesiod_init"); + + hpo = hesiod_getmailhost (context, *user); + if (hpo == NULL) { + warn ("hesiod_getmailhost %s", *user); + } else { + if (strcasecmp(hpo->hesiod_po_type, "pop") != 0) + errx (1, "Unsupported po type %s", hpo->hesiod_po_type); + + ret = estrdup(hpo->hesiod_po_host); + *user = estrdup(hpo->hesiod_po_name); + hesiod_free_postoffice (context, hpo); + } + hesiod_end (context); + return ret; +} + +#else /* !HESIOD_INTERFACES */ + +static char * +hesiod_get_pobox (const char **user) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + struct hes_postoffice *hpo; + + hpo = hes_getmailhost (*user); + if (hpo == NULL) { + warn ("hes_getmailhost %s", *user); + } else { + if (strcasecmp(hpo->po_type, "pop") != 0) + errx (1, "Unsupported po type %s", hpo->po_type); + + ret = estrdup(hpo->po_host); + *user = estrdup(hpo->po_name); + } + return ret; +} + +#endif /* HESIOD_INTERFACES */ + +#endif /* HESIOD */ + +static char * +get_pobox (const char **user) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + +#ifdef HESIOD + ret = hesiod_get_pobox (user); +#endif + + if (ret == NULL) + ret = getenv("MAILHOST"); + if (ret == NULL) + errx (1, "MAILHOST not set"); + return ret; +} + +static void +parse_pobox (char *a0, const char **host, const char **user) +{ + const char *h, *u; + char *p; + int po = 0; + + if (a0 == NULL) { + + *user = getenv ("USERNAME"); + if (*user == NULL) { + struct passwd *pwd = getpwuid (getuid ()); + + if (pwd == NULL) + errx (1, "Who are you?"); + *user = estrdup (pwd->pw_name); + } + *host = get_pobox (user); + return; + } + + /* if the specification starts with po:, remember this information */ + if(strncmp(a0, "po:", 3) == 0) { + a0 += 3; + po++; + } + /* if there is an `@', the hostname is after it, otherwise at the + beginning of the string */ + p = strchr(a0, '@'); + if(p != NULL) { + *p++ = '\0'; + h = p; + } else { + h = a0; + } + /* if there is a `:', the username comes before it, otherwise at + the beginning of the string */ + p = strchr(a0, ':'); + if(p != NULL) { + *p++ = '\0'; + u = p; + } else { + u = a0; + } + if(h == u) { + /* some inconsistent compatibility with various mailers */ + if(po) { + h = get_pobox (&u); + } else { + u = get_default_username (); + if (u == NULL) + errx (1, "Who are you?"); + } + } + *host = h; + *user = u; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = 0; + int optind = 0; + int ret = 1; + const char *host, *user, *filename = NULL; + char *pobox = NULL; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + +#ifdef KRB5 + { + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + } +#endif + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5) + if(use_v4 == -1 && use_v5 == 1) + use_v4 = 0; + if(use_v5 == -1 && use_v4 == 1) + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + + if (do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version(NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (do_from && header_str == NULL) + header_str = "From:"; + else if (header_str != NULL) + do_from = 1; + + if (do_from) { + if (argc == 0) + pobox = NULL; + else if (argc == 1) + pobox = argv[0]; + else + usage (1); + } else { + if (argc == 1) { + filename = argv[0]; + pobox = NULL; + } else if (argc == 2) { + filename = argv[1]; + pobox = argv[0]; + } else + usage (1); + } + + if (port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + if (port == 0) { +#ifdef KRB5 + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kpop", "tcp", 1109); +#elif defined(KRB4) + port = k_getportbyname ("kpop", "tcp", htons(1109)); +#else +#error must define KRB4 or KRB5 +#endif + } + + parse_pobox (pobox, &host, &user); + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret && use_v5) { + ret = do_v5 (host, port, user, filename, header_str, + do_leave, verbose_level, do_fork); + } +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && use_v4) { + ret = do_v4 (host, port, user, filename, header_str, + do_leave, verbose_level, do_fork); + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd92e2ad3b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ + +PUSH(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual PUSH(8) + +NNAAMMEE + ppuusshh - fetch mail via POP + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + ppuusshh [--44 | ----kkrrbb44] [--55 | ----kkrrbb55] [--vv | ----vveerrbboossee] [--ff | ----ffoorrkk] [--ll | + ----lleeaavvee] [----ffrroomm] [--cc | ----ccoouunntt] [----hheeaaddeerrss=_h_e_a_d_e_r_s] [--pp _p_o_r_t_-_s_p_e_c | + ----ppoorrtt=_p_o_r_t_-_s_p_e_c] _p_o_-_b_o_x _f_i_l_e_n_a_m_e + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + ppuusshh retrieves mail from the post office box _p_o_-_b_o_x, and stores the mail + in mbox format in _f_i_l_e_n_a_m_e. The _p_o_-_b_o_x can have any of the following for- + mats: + `hostname:username' + `po:hostname:username' + `username@hostname' + `po:username@hostname' + `hostname' + `po:username' + + If no username is specified, ppuusshh assumes that it's the same as on the + local machine; _h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e defaults to the value of the MAILHOST environment + variable. + + Supported options: + + --44, ----kkrrbb44 + use Kerberos 4 (if compiled with support for Kerberos 4) + + --55, ----kkrrbb55 + use Kerberos 5 (if compiled with support for Kerberos 5) + + --ff, ----ffoorrkk + fork before starting to delete messages + + --ll, ----lleeaavvee + don't delete fetched mail + + ----ffrroomm behave like from. + + --cc, ----ccoouunntt + first print how many messages and bytes there are. + + ----hheeaaddeerrss=_h_e_a_d_e_r_s + a list of comma-separated headers that should get printed. + + --pp _p_o_r_t_-_s_p_e_c, ----ppoorrtt=_p_o_r_t_-_s_p_e_c + use this port instead of the default `kpop' or `1109'. + + The default is to first try Kerberos 5 authentication and then, if that + fails, Kerberos 4. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + MAILHOST + points to the post office, if no other hostname is specified. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + $ push cornfield:roosta ~/.emacs-mail-crash-box + + tries to fetch mail for the user _r_o_o_s_t_a from the post office at + ``cornfield'', and stores the mail in _~_/_._e_m_a_c_s_-_m_a_i_l_-_c_r_a_s_h_-_b_o_x (you are + using Gnus, aren't you?) + + $ push --from -5 havregryn + + tries to fetch FFrroomm:: lines for current user at post office ``havregryn'' + using Kerberos 5. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + from(1), pfrom(1), movemail(8), popper(8) + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + ppuusshh was written while waiting for mmoovveemmaaiill to finish getting the mail. + + HEIMDAL May 31, 1998 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e5ca784c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/push/push_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: push_locl.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:33 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HESIOD +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c830d63ed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +2003-04-16 Johan Danielsson + + * rcp.1: add a HISTORY section + + * rcp.1: brief manpage + + * rcp.c: add a -4 option + +2001-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * rcp.c: more va_* fixing; from Thomas Klausner + +2001-09-08 Assar Westerlund + + * rcp.c (run_err): always match va_start and va_end + +2001-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (allocbuf): do not leak memory on failure and zero + re-used memory, from Markus Friedl + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * rcp.c (main): add missing setprogname + +2001-06-14 Assar Westerlund + + * rcp.c: add some const replace a few malloc/snprintf with + asprintf + * rcp.c (sizestr): remove and use snprintf to do this correctly + instead + +2001-04-21 Johan Danielsson + + * rcp.c: convert to use getarg + + * rcp.c: do a better job of supporting files larger than 2GB + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * rcp.c: add -F for forwarding ticket, from Ake Sandgren + + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (roundup): add fallback definition + + * rcp.c: remove non-STDC code + * rcp_locl.h: add sys/types.h and sys/wait.h + + * rcp.c: no calls to err with NULL + +2001-01-28 Assar Westerlund + + * rcp_locl.h: add + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): remove unused libraries + +2001-01-27 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c: replace vfork by fork + + * rcp.c: add RCSID S_ISTXT -> S_ISVTX printf sizes of files with + %lu instead of %q (which is not portable) + + * util.c: add RCSID do not use sig_t + * rcp.c: remove __P, use st_mtime et al from struct stat + * extern.h: remove __P + + * initial import of port of bsd rcp changed to use existing rsh, + contributed by Richard Nyberg + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ecf7a63b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 2001/01/28 22:50:35 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = rcp + +rcp_SOURCES = rcp.c util.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c5a0c439f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,755 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 2001/01/28 22:50:35 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(rcp_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = 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$(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/extern.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/extern.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a41ce6eae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/extern.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)extern.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 5/31/93 + * $FreeBSD: src/bin/rcp/extern.h,v 1.5 1999/08/27 23:14:57 peter Exp $ + */ + +typedef struct { + int cnt; + char *buf; +} BUF; + +extern int iamremote; + +BUF *allocbuf (BUF *, int, int); +char *colon (char *); +void lostconn (int); +void nospace (void); +int okname (char *); +void run_err (const char *, ...); +int susystem (char *, int); +void verifydir (char *); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ce9527a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +.\" $Id: rcp.1,v 1.2 2003/04/16 12:20:43 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 16, 2003 +.Dt RCP 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm rcp +.Nd +copy file to and from remote machines +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm rcp +.Op Fl 45FKpxz +.Op Fl P Ar port +.Ar file1 file2 +.Nm rcp +.Op Fl 45FKprxz +.Op Fl P Ar port +.Ar file... directory +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm rcp +copies files between machines. Each file argument is either a remote file name of the form +.Dq rname@rhost:path +or a local file (containing no colon or with a slash before the first +colon). +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl 5 , +.Fl K , +.Fl F , +.Fl x , +.Fl z +.Xc +These options are passed on to +.Xr rsh 1 . +.It Fl P Ar port +This will pass the option +.Fl p Ar port +to +.Xr rsh 1 . +.It Fl p +Preserve file permissions. +.It Fl r +Copy source directories recursively. +.El +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Nm rcp +is implemented as a protocol on top of +.Xr rsh 1 , +and thus requires a working rsh. If you intend to use Kerberos +authentication, rsh needs to be Kerberos aware, else you may see more +or less strange errors, such as "login incorrect", or "lost +connection". +.\".Sh SEE ALSO +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm rcp +utility first appeared in 4.2BSD. This version is derived from +4.3BSD-Reno. +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c54409a343 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,789 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rcp_locl.h" +#include + +#define RSH_PROGRAM "rsh" + +struct passwd *pwd; +uid_t userid; +int errs, remin, remout; +int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; +int doencrypt, noencrypt; +int usebroken, usekrb4, usekrb5, forwardtkt; +char *port; + +#define CMDNEEDS 64 +char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ + +int response (void); +void rsource (char *, struct stat *); +void sink (int, char *[]); +void source (int, char *[]); +void tolocal (int, char *[]); +void toremote (char *, int, char *[]); + +int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout); + +static int fflag, tflag; + +static int version_flag, help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, '4', arg_flag, &usekrb4, "use Kerberos 4 authentication" }, + { NULL, '5', arg_flag, &usekrb5, "use Kerberos 5 authentication" }, + { NULL, 'F', arg_flag, &forwardtkt, "forward credentials" }, + { NULL, 'K', arg_flag, &usebroken, "use BSD authentication" }, + { NULL, 'P', arg_string, &port, "non-default port", "port" }, + { NULL, 'p', arg_flag, &pflag, "preserve file permissions" }, + { NULL, 'r', arg_flag, &iamrecursive, "recursive mode" }, + { NULL, 'x', arg_flag, &doencrypt, "use encryption" }, + { NULL, 'z', arg_flag, &noencrypt, "don't encrypt" }, + { NULL, 'd', arg_flag, &targetshouldbedirectory }, + { NULL, 'f', arg_flag, &fflag }, + { NULL, 't', arg_flag, &tflag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "file1 file2|file... directory"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *targ; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if (version_flag) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + iamremote = (fflag || tflag); + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) + errx(1, "unknown user %d", (int)userid); + + remin = STDIN_FILENO; /* XXX */ + remout = STDOUT_FILENO; + + if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ + response(); + setuid(userid); + source(argc, argv); + exit(errs); + } + + if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ + setuid(userid); + sink(argc, argv); + exit(errs); + } + + if (argc < 2) + usage(1); + if (argc > 2) + targetshouldbedirectory = 1; + + remin = remout = -1; + /* Command to be executed on remote system using "rsh". */ + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), + "rcp%s%s%s", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", + pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); + + signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); + + if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */ + toremote(targ, argc, argv); + else { + tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); + } + exit(errs); +} + +void +toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser; + + *targ++ = 0; + if (*targ == 0) + targ = "."; + + if ((thost = strchr(argv[argc - 1], '@'))) { + /* user@host */ + *thost++ = 0; + tuser = argv[argc - 1]; + if (*tuser == '\0') + tuser = NULL; + else if (!okname(tuser)) + exit(1); + } else { + thost = argv[argc - 1]; + tuser = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { + src = colon(argv[i]); + if (src) { /* remote to remote */ + *src++ = 0; + if (*src == 0) + src = "."; + host = strchr(argv[i], '@'); + if (host) { + *host++ = '\0'; + suser = argv[i]; + if (*suser == '\0') + suser = pwd->pw_name; + else if (!okname(suser)) + continue; + asprintf(&bp, + "%s %s -l %s -n %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", + _PATH_RSH, host, suser, cmd, src, + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); + } else { + asprintf(&bp, + "exec %s %s -n %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", + _PATH_RSH, argv[i], cmd, src, + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); + } + if (bp == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + susystem(bp, userid); + free(bp); + } else { /* local to remote */ + if (remin == -1) { + asprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ); + if (bp == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + host = thost; + + if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) + exit(1); + + if (response() < 0) + exit(1); + free(bp); + setuid(userid); + } + source(1, argv+i); + } + } +} + +void +tolocal(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + char *bp, *host, *src, *suser; + + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { + if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */ + asprintf(&bp, "exec %s%s%s %s %s", _PATH_CP, + iamrecursive ? " -PR" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", + argv[i], argv[argc - 1]); + if (bp == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + if (susystem(bp, userid)) + ++errs; + free(bp); + continue; + } + *src++ = 0; + if (*src == 0) + src = "."; + if ((host = strchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) { + host = argv[i]; + suser = pwd->pw_name; + } else { + *host++ = 0; + suser = argv[i]; + if (*suser == '\0') + suser = pwd->pw_name; + else if (!okname(suser)) + continue; + } + asprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s", cmd, src); + if (bp == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { + free(bp); + ++errs; + continue; + } + free(bp); + sink(1, argv + argc - 1); + seteuid(0); + close(remin); + remin = remout = -1; + } +} + +void +source(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct stat stb; + static BUF buffer; + BUF *bp; + off_t i; + int amt, fd, haderr, indx, result; + char *last, *name, buf[BUFSIZ]; + + for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { + name = argv[indx]; + if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) + goto syserr; + if (fstat(fd, &stb)) { +syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); + goto next; + } + switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFREG: + break; + case S_IFDIR: + if (iamrecursive) { + rsource(name, &stb); + goto next; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); + goto next; + } + if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) + last = name; + else + ++last; + if (pflag) { + /* + * Make it compatible with possible future + * versions expecting microseconds. + */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%ld 0 %ld 0\n", + (long)stb.st_mtime, + (long)stb.st_atime); + write(remout, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (response() < 0) + goto next; + } +#define MODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_ISVTX|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "C%04o %lu %s\n", + stb.st_mode & MODEMASK, + (unsigned long)stb.st_size, + last); + write(remout, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (response() < 0) + goto next; + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, BUFSIZ)) == NULL) { +next: close(fd); + continue; + } + + /* Keep writing after an error so that we stay sync'd up. */ + for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { + amt = bp->cnt; + if (i + amt > stb.st_size) + amt = stb.st_size - i; + if (!haderr) { + result = read(fd, bp->buf, amt); + if (result != amt) + haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + if (haderr) + write(remout, bp->buf, amt); + else { + result = write(remout, bp->buf, amt); + if (result != amt) + haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + } + if (close(fd) && !haderr) + haderr = errno; + if (!haderr) + write(remout, "", 1); + else + run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); + response(); + } +} + +void +rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) +{ + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *dp; + char *last, *vect[1], path[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { + run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + last = strrchr(name, '/'); + if (last == 0) + last = name; + else + last++; + if (pflag) { + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "T%ld 0 %ld 0\n", + (long)statp->st_mtime, + (long)statp->st_atime); + write(remout, path, strlen(path)); + if (response() < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + } + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), + "D%04o %d %s\n", statp->st_mode & MODEMASK, 0, last); + write(remout, path, strlen(path)); + if (response() < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + while ((dp = readdir(dirp))) { + if (dp->d_ino == 0) + continue; + if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) + continue; + if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= MAXPATHLEN - 1) { + run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); + continue; + } + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); + vect[0] = path; + source(1, vect); + } + closedir(dirp); + write(remout, "E\n", 2); + response(); +} + +void +sink(int argc, char **argv) +{ + static BUF buffer; + struct stat stb; + struct timeval tv[2]; + enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr; + BUF *bp; + off_t i, j, size; + int amt, count, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode; + int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; + char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[BUFSIZ]; + +#define atime tv[0] +#define mtime tv[1] +#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } + + setimes = targisdir = 0; + mask = umask(0); + if (!pflag) + umask(mask); + if (argc != 1) { + run_err("ambiguous target"); + exit(1); + } + targ = *argv; + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(targ); + write(remout, "", 1); + if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + targisdir = 1; + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { + cp = buf; + if (read(remin, cp, 1) <= 0) + return; + if (*cp++ == '\n') + SCREWUP("unexpected "); + do { + if (read(remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) + SCREWUP("lost connection"); + *cp++ = ch; + } while (cp < &buf[BUFSIZ - 1] && ch != '\n'); + *cp = 0; + + if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { + if (iamremote == 0) + write(STDERR_FILENO, + buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1)); + if (buf[0] == '\02') + exit(1); + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (buf[0] == 'E') { + write(remout, "", 1); + return; + } + + if (ch == '\n') + *--cp = 0; + + cp = buf; + if (*cp == 'T') { + setimes++; + cp++; + mtime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); + mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); + atime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); + atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0') + SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); + write(remout, "", 1); + continue; + } + if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { + /* + * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". + * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned + * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is + * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't + * followed. + */ + if (first) { + run_err("%s", cp); + exit(1); + } + SCREWUP("expected control record"); + } + mode = 0; + for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') + SCREWUP("bad mode"); + mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); + } + if (*cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); + + for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);) + size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0'); + if (*cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("size not delimited"); + if (targisdir) { + static char *namebuf; + static int cursize; + size_t need; + + need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; + if (need > cursize) { + if (!(namebuf = malloc(need))) + run_err("%s", strerror(errno)); + } + snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, + *targ ? "/" : "", cp); + np = namebuf; + } else + np = targ; + exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; + if (buf[0] == 'D') { + int mod_flag = pflag; + if (exists) { + if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { + errno = ENOTDIR; + goto bad; + } + if (pflag) + chmod(np, mode); + } else { + /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ + mod_flag = 1; + if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0) + goto bad; + } + vect[0] = np; + sink(1, vect); + if (setimes) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) + run_err("%s: set times: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + } + if (mod_flag) + chmod(np, mode); + continue; + } + omode = mode; + mode |= S_IWRITE; + if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { +bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + write(remout, "", 1); + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, BUFSIZ)) == NULL) { + close(ofd); + continue; + } + cp = bp->buf; + wrerr = NO; + for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += BUFSIZ) { + amt = BUFSIZ; + if (i + amt > size) + amt = size - i; + count += amt; + if((j = net_read(remin, cp, amt)) != amt) { + run_err("%s", j ? strerror(errno) : + "dropped connection"); + exit(1); + } + amt -= j; + cp += j; + if (count == bp->cnt) { + /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ + if (wrerr == NO) { + j = write(ofd, bp->buf, count); + if (j != count) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + } + count = 0; + cp = bp->buf; + } + } + if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && + (j = write(ofd, bp->buf, count)) != count) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + if (ftruncate(ofd, size)) { + run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + if (pflag) { + if (exists || omode != mode) + if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) + run_err("%s: set mode: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + } else { + if (!exists && omode != mode) + if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) + run_err("%s: set mode: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + } + close(ofd); + response(); + if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) { + run_err("%s: set times: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + } + switch(wrerr) { + case YES: + run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); + break; + case NO: + write(remout, "", 1); + break; + case DISPLAYED: + break; + } + } +screwup: + run_err("protocol error: %s", why); + exit(1); +} + +int +response(void) +{ + char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[BUFSIZ]; + + if (read(remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) + lostconn(0); + + cp = rbuf; + switch(resp) { + case 0: /* ok */ + return (0); + default: + *cp++ = resp; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ + case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ + do { + if (read(remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) + lostconn(0); + *cp++ = ch; + } while (cp < &rbuf[BUFSIZ] && ch != '\n'); + + if (!iamremote) + write(STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf); + ++errs; + if (resp == 1) + return (-1); + exit(1); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +#include + +void +run_err(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + static FILE *fp; + va_list ap; + + ++errs; + if (fp == NULL && !(fp = fdopen(remout, "w"))) + return; + va_start(ap, fmt); + fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); + fprintf(fp, "rcp: "); + vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); + fprintf(fp, "\n"); + fflush(fp); + va_end(ap); + + if (!iamremote) { + va_start(ap, fmt); + vwarnx(fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + } +} + +/* + * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the + * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This + * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. + * + * If it cannot create necessary pipes it exits with error message. + */ + +int +do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) +{ + int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; + + /* + * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get + * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. + */ + pipe(reserved); + + /* Create a socket pair for communicating with rsh. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0) { + perror("pipe"); + exit(255); + } + if (pipe(pout) < 0) { + perror("pipe"); + exit(255); + } + + /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ + close(reserved[0]); + close(reserved[1]); + + /* For a child to execute the command on the remote host using rsh. */ + if (fork() == 0) { + char *args[100]; + unsigned int i; + + /* Child. */ + close(pin[1]); + close(pout[0]); + dup2(pin[0], 0); + dup2(pout[1], 1); + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + + i = 0; + args[i++] = RSH_PROGRAM; + if (usekrb4) + args[i++] = "-4"; + if (usekrb5) + args[i++] = "-5"; + if (usebroken) + args[i++] = "-K"; + if (doencrypt) + args[i++] = "-x"; + if (forwardtkt) + args[i++] = "-F"; + if (noencrypt) + args[i++] = "-z"; + if (port != NULL) { + args[i++] = "-p"; + args[i++] = port; + } + if (remuser != NULL) { + args[i++] = "-l"; + args[i++] = remuser; + } + args[i++] = host; + args[i++] = cmd; + args[i++] = NULL; + + execvp(RSH_PROGRAM, args); + perror(RSH_PROGRAM); + exit(1); + } + /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ + close(pin[0]); + *fdout = pin[1]; + close(pout[1]); + *fdin = pout[0]; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4397c9f461 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/rcp_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: rcp_locl.h,v 1.3 2001/01/29 05:59:24 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "extern.h" + +#define _PATH_CP "/bin/cp" +#define _PATH_RSH "/usr/bin/rsh" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/util.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9cfda64439 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rcp/util.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if 0 +#ifndef lint +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)util.c 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/2/94"; +#endif +static const char rcsid[] = + "$FreeBSD: src/bin/rcp/util.c,v 1.9 1999/08/27 23:14:58 peter Exp $"; +#endif /* not lint */ +#endif + +#include "rcp_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: util.c,v 1.6 2001/09/04 14:35:58 assar Exp $"); + +char * +colon(cp) + char *cp; +{ + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return (0); + + for (; *cp; ++cp) { + if (*cp == ':') + return (cp); + if (*cp == '/') + return (0); + } + return (0); +} + +void +verifydir(cp) + char *cp; +{ + struct stat stb; + + if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { + if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + return; + errno = ENOTDIR; + } + run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); + exit(1); +} + +int +okname(cp0) + char *cp0; +{ + int c; + char *cp; + + cp = cp0; + do { + c = *cp; + if (c & 0200) + goto bad; + if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit(c) && c != '_' && c != '-') + goto bad; + } while (*++cp); + return (1); + +bad: warnx("%s: invalid user name", cp0); + return (0); +} + +int +susystem(s, userid) + int userid; + char *s; +{ + void (*istat)(int), (*qstat)(int); + int status; + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + switch (pid) { + case -1: + return (127); + + case 0: + (void)setuid(userid); + execl(_PATH_BSHELL, "sh", "-c", s, NULL); + _exit(127); + } + istat = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + qstat = signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); + if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + status = -1; + (void)signal(SIGINT, istat); + (void)signal(SIGQUIT, qstat); + return (status); +} + +#ifndef roundup +#define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) +#endif + +BUF * +allocbuf(bp, fd, blksize) + BUF *bp; + int fd, blksize; +{ + struct stat stb; + size_t size; + char *p; + + if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { + run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize); + if (size == 0) + size = blksize; + if (bp->cnt >= size) + return (bp); + if ((p = realloc(bp->buf, size)) == NULL) { + if (bp->buf) + free(bp->buf); + bp->buf = NULL; + bp->cnt = 0; + run_err("%s", strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + memset(p, 0, size); + bp->buf = p; + bp->cnt = size; + return (bp); +} + +void +lostconn(signo) + int signo; +{ + if (!iamremote) + warnx("lost connection"); + exit(1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1f33245d7d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,424 @@ +2003-04-16 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.c: use krb5_appdefault to get defaults for forward and + encrypt + + * rshd.c: use ARG_MAX + 1 + + * rshd.c (read_str): return allocated string + + * rsh_locl.h: set NCARGS to 8k if undefined + +2003-03-23 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (loop): only check errsock if it's valid + +2003-03-18 Love Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * rshd.c: do krb5_afslog when compling with afs support + + * rsh_locl.h: always include kafs.h + +2002-11-22 Johan Danielsson + + * rshd.8: clarify -x and kerberos 5 + +2002-11-01 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh_locl.h: bump COMMAND_SZ to NCARGS+1 + +2002-09-04 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.c: free some memory + +2002-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c: krb5_crypto_block_size -> krb5_crypto_getblocksize + +2002-09-04 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.1: document -P + +2002-09-03 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.c: revert to protocol v1 if not asked for specific protocol + + * rshd.c: handle protocol version 2 + + * rsh.c: handle protocol version 2 + + * common.c: handle protocol version 2 + + * rsh_locl.h: handle protocol version 2 + +2002-02-18 Johan Danielsson + + * rshd.c: don't show options that doesn't apply + + * rsh.c: don't show options that doesn't apply + + * rsh_locl.h: if we're not building with any kerberos support, + just call read/write directly + + * common.c: if we're not building with any kerberos support, just + call read/write directly + + * rshd.c: make this build without krb5; also use the addrinfo + interface to mini_inetd, and set the keepalive option if requested + + * rsh.c: make this build without krb5 + + * rsh_locl.h: make this build without krb5 + + * common.c: make this build without krb5 + +2001-11-30 Johan Danielsson + + * rshd.c: make the syslog messages somewhat more informative + +2001-08-15 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.c: only complain about encryption flag when old + authentication is requested + +2001-08-07 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.c: don't try broken auth if rresvport failed; try to give + some more informative error messages + +2001-07-31 Johan Danielsson + + * rshd.8: add an EXAMPLE + * rshd.8: manual page + * rshd.c: add some compat flags + * rsh.1: manual page + * rsh.c: iff -d, set the SO_DEBUG flags of the stdout and stderr + socket; implement parsing user@host + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (fatal): use vsnprintf correctly + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add login_access + * rshd.c (login_access): add prototype + (syslog_and_die, fatal): add printf attributes + (*): AIX -> _AIX + (doit): use login_access + based on patches from Ake Sandgren + +2001-01-09 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (save_krb5_creds): use krb5_rd_cred2 instead of + krb5_rd_cred + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + * rsh.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + +2000-12-05 Johan Danielsson + + * rshd.c: require encryption if passed -x + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (loop): check that the fd's aren't too large to select on + * rsh.c (loop, proto): check that the fd's aren't too large to + select on + +2000-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: move code to do config/command parsing correctly. + +2000-08-09 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): only fetch stuff from krb5.conf when no option has + been given + +2000-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (doit): loop until we create an error socket of an + supported socket family + +2000-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c: DCE stuff from Ake Sandgren + do not call syslog with a variable as format string + + * rsh_locl.h (_PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT): add + +2000-06-09 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): work-around for setuid and capabilities bug fixed + in Linux 2.2.16 + +2000-06-06 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh.c: nuke long option from -z + + * rsh.c: don't try to encrypt if auth is broken (Daniel Kouril) + +2000-06-03 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (doit): check return value of getspnam. From + + +2000-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (proto): select on the normal socket when waiting for the + daemon to connect back to the stderr port, so that we discover + when data arrives there before. when that happens, we assume that + the daemon did not manage to connect (because of NAT/whatever) and + continue as if `-e' was given + * rshd.c (doit): if we fail to connect back to the stderr port, + act as if `-e' was given on the client side, i.e. without the + special TCP-connection. This tries to make things better when + running the head against a NAT wall, for example. + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): make sure we use the heimdal libdes + +2000-02-06 Assar Westerlund + + * *: conditionalize des stuff on KRB4 + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (doit): addrinfo returned from getaddrinfo() is not usable + directly as hints. copy it and set AI_PASSIVE. + +1999-11-20 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): remember to close the priviledged sockets before + calling rlogin + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): redo the v4/v5 selection for consistency. -4 -> + try only v4 -5 -> try only v5 none, -45 -> try v5, v4 + +1999-10-26 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (main): ignore SIGPIPE + + * common.c (do_read): the encoded length can be longer than the + buffer being used, allocate memory for it dynamically. From Brian + A May + +1999-10-14 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (proto): be more careful and don't print errno when read() + returns 0 + +1999-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (recv_krb4_auth): set `iv' + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (do_read): be careful with the return value from + krb5_net_read + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: call freehostent + + * rsh.c: remove some dead code + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c: re-write the handling of forwarded credentials and + stuff. From Miroslav Ruda + + * rsh_locl.h: always include kafs.h + + * rsh.c: add `-z' and `-G' options + + * rsh.c (loop): shutdown one side of the TCP connection on EOF. + From Brian A May + + * common.c (do_read): handle EOF. From Brian A May + + +1999-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: const fixes + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c: v6-ify + + * rsh.c: v6-ify + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh_locl.h: move around kafs.h + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh_locl.h: + + * rsh.c, rshd.c: improve forwarding and implement unique ccache on + server. From Miroslav Ruda + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (construct_command): handle argc == 0 for generality + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: new option `-e' for not trying to open an stderr socket + +1999-06-17 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh_locl.h (RSH_BUFSIZ): bump to 16 * 1024 to be sure that we + don't leave any data inside des_enc_read. (that constant should + really be exported in some way...) + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: use get_default_username and resulting const pollution + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): try $USERNAME + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (doit): afslog correctly + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): add fallback to rlogin + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (send_krb5_auth): call krb5_sendauth with ccache == NULL. + check return value from krb5_crypto_init + + * common.c (do_write, do_read): always return -1 for failure + (net_write, net_read): remove. they already exist in libroken + +1999-05-09 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: make sure it tries with all other authentication methods + after one has failed + * rsh.c (main): detect the case of no command given. + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: new option --forwardable. use print_version + +Sat Apr 10 17:10:55 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (setup_copier): use `socketpair' instead of `pipe'. Some + shells don't think it's a rsh session if they find a pipe at the + other end. + (setup_environment): add SSH_CLIENT just to make bash happy + + * common.c (do_read): use krb5_get_wrapped_length + +Wed Mar 24 03:59:42 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (loop): more braces to make gcc happy + +Tue Mar 23 17:08:32 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh_locl.h: kafs.h + + * rshd.c: add `-P', `-v', and `-L' flags + +Thu Mar 18 11:37:24 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Tue Dec 1 14:44:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: update to new crypto framework + + * appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h: update to new crypto framework + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: update to new crypto framework + + * appl/rsh/common.c: update to new crypto framework + +Mon Nov 2 01:15:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c (main): initialize host + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c (recv_krb5_auth): disable `do_encrypt' if not + encrypting. + +Thu Jul 30 23:12:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: kludges for parsing `rsh hostname -l user' + +Thu Jul 23 19:49:03 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: use krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum + +Sat Apr 18 21:13:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: Don't try v5 if (only) `-4' is specified. + +Sun Dec 21 09:44:05 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c (recv_krb5_auth): swap the order of the + `local_user' and the `remote_user' + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c (send_krb5_auth): swap the order of the + `local_user' and the `remote_user' + +Sat Nov 29 07:10:11 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: updated to use getarg. + changed `struct fd_set' to `fd_set'. + implemented broken/BSD authentication (requires iruserok) + +Wed Nov 12 02:35:57 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h: add AUTH_BROKEN and PATH_RSH + + * appl/rsh/Makefile.am: set BINDIR + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: implemented BSD-style reserved port + `authentication' + +Sun Aug 24 08:06:54 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: syslog remote shells + +Tue Aug 12 01:29:46 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rshd/rshd.c: Use `krb5_sock_to_principal'. Send server + parameter to krb5_rd_req/krb5_recvauth. Set addresses in + auth_context. + +Fri Jul 25 17:32:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: implement forwarding + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: Use getarg. Implement forwarding. + +Sun Jul 13 00:32:16 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh: Conditionalize the krb4-support. + +Wed Jul 9 06:58:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: use the correct user for the checksum + +Mon Jul 7 11:15:51 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: Now works. Also implementd encryption and + `-p'. + + * appl/rsh/common.c: new file + +Mon Jun 30 06:08:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh: New program. + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2fbc8e0f4f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.17 2001/07/31 09:12:03 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) -I$(srcdir)/../login + +bin_PROGRAMS = rsh + +man_MANS = rsh.1 rshd.8 + +libexec_PROGRAMS = rshd + +rsh_SOURCES = rsh.c common.c rsh_locl.h + +rshd_SOURCES = rshd.c common.c login_access.c rsh_locl.h + +login_access.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../login/login_access.c . + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_kdfs) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04412b3719 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,913 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.17 2001/07/31 09:12:03 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(rsh_SOURCES) $(rshd_SOURCES) + +srcdir = 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then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +login_access.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../login/login_access.c . +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..69b0c9b5dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rsh_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.16 2002/09/04 15:50:36 assar Exp $"); + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + +#ifdef KRB5 +int key_usage = 1026; + +void *ivec_in[2]; +void *ivec_out[2]; + +void +init_ivecs(int client) +{ + size_t blocksize; + + krb5_crypto_getblocksize(context, crypto, &blocksize); + + ivec_in[0] = malloc(blocksize); + memset(ivec_in[0], client, blocksize); + + ivec_in[1] = malloc(blocksize); + memset(ivec_in[1], 2 | client, blocksize); + + ivec_out[0] = malloc(blocksize); + memset(ivec_out[0], !client, blocksize); + + ivec_out[1] = malloc(blocksize); + memset(ivec_out[1], 2 | !client, blocksize); +} +#endif + + +ssize_t +do_read (int fd, void *buf, size_t sz, void *ivec) +{ + if (do_encrypt) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (auth_method == AUTH_KRB4) { + return des_enc_read (fd, buf, sz, schedule, &iv); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#ifdef KRB5 + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB5) { + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t len, outer_len; + int status; + krb5_data data; + void *edata; + + ret = krb5_net_read (context, &fd, &len, 4); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + len = ntohl(len); + if (len > sz) + abort (); + /* ivec will be non null for protocol version 2 */ + if(ivec != NULL) + outer_len = krb5_get_wrapped_length (context, crypto, len + 4); + else + outer_len = krb5_get_wrapped_length (context, crypto, len); + edata = malloc (outer_len); + if (edata == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: cannot allocate %u bytes", outer_len); + ret = krb5_net_read (context, &fd, edata, outer_len); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + status = krb5_decrypt_ivec(context, crypto, key_usage, + edata, outer_len, &data, ivec); + free (edata); + + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "decrypting data"); + if(ivec != NULL) { + unsigned long l; + if(data.length < len + 4) + errx (1, "data received is too short"); + _krb5_get_int(data.data, &l, 4); + if(l != len) + errx (1, "inconsistency in received data"); + memcpy (buf, (unsigned char *)data.data+4, len); + } else + memcpy (buf, data.data, len); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return len; + } else +#endif /* KRB5 */ + abort (); + } else + return read (fd, buf, sz); +} + +ssize_t +do_write (int fd, void *buf, size_t sz, void *ivec) +{ + if (do_encrypt) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB4) { + return des_enc_write (fd, buf, sz, schedule, &iv); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#ifdef KRB5 + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB5) { + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_data data; + unsigned char len[4]; + int ret; + + _krb5_put_int(len, sz, 4); + if(ivec != NULL) { + unsigned char *tmp = malloc(sz + 4); + if(tmp == NULL) + err(1, "malloc"); + _krb5_put_int(tmp, sz, 4); + memcpy(tmp + 4, buf, sz); + status = krb5_encrypt_ivec(context, crypto, key_usage, + tmp, sz + 4, &data, ivec); + free(tmp); + } else + status = krb5_encrypt_ivec(context, crypto, key_usage, + buf, sz, &data, ivec); + + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "encrypting data"); + + ret = krb5_net_write (context, &fd, len, 4); + if (ret != 4) + return ret; + ret = krb5_net_write (context, &fd, data.data, data.length); + if (ret != data.length) + return ret; + free (data.data); + return sz; + } else +#endif /* KRB5 */ + abort(); + } else + return write (fd, buf, sz); +} +#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82c1f6c1f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.1 @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2002 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: rsh.1,v 1.6 2003/04/16 19:57:25 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 4, 2002 +.Dt RSH 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm rsh +.Nd +remote shell +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 45FGKdefnuxz +.Op Fl U Pa string +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl l Ar username +.Op Fl P Ar N|O +.Ar host [command] +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +authenticates to the +.Xr rshd 8 +daemon on the remote +.Ar host , +and then executes the specified +.Ar command . +.Pp +.Nm +copies its standard input to the remote command, and the standard +output and error of the remote command to its own. +.Pp +Valid options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -krb4 +.Xc +The +.Fl 4 +option requests Kerberos 4 authentication. Normally all supported +authentication mechanisms will be tried, but in some cases more +explicit control is desired. +.It Xo +.Fl 5 , +.Fl -krb5 +.Xc +The +.Fl 5 +option requests Kerberos 5 authentication. This is analogous to the +.Fl 4 +option. +.It Xo +.Fl K , +.Fl -broken +.Xc +The +.Fl K +option turns off all Kerberos authentication. The long name implies +that this is more or less totally unsecure. The security in this mode +relies on reserved ports, which is not very secure. +.It Xo +.Fl n , +.Fl -no-input +.Xc +The +.Fl n +option directs the input from the +.Pa /dev/null +device (see the +.Sx BUGS +section of this manual page). +.It Xo +.Fl e , +.Fl -no-stderr +.Xc +Don't use a separate socket for the stderr stream. This can be +necessary if rsh-ing through a NAT bridge. +.It Xo +.Fl x , +.Fl -encrypt +.Xc +The +.Fl x +option enables encryption for all data exchange. This is only valid +for Kerberos authenticated connections (see the +.Sx BUGS +section for limitations). +.It Xo +.Fl z +.Xc +The opposite of +.Fl x . +This is the default, but encryption can be enabled when using +Kerberos 5, by setting the +.Li libdefaults/encrypt +option in +.Xr krb5.conf 5 . +.It Xo +.Fl f , +.Fl -forward +.Xc +Forward Kerberos 5 credentials to the remote host. Also controlled by +.Li libdefaults/forward +in +.Xr krb5.conf 5 . +.It Xo +.Fl G +.Xc +The opposite of +.Fl f . +.It Xo +.Fl F , +.Fl -forwardable +.Xc +Make the forwarded credentials re-forwardable. Also controlled by +.Li libdefaults/forwardable +in +.Xr krb5.conf 5 . +.It Xo +.Fl u , +.Fl -unique +.Xc +Make sure the remote credentials cache is unique, that is, don't reuse +any existing cache. Mutually exclusive to +.Fl U . +.It Xo +.Fl U Pa string , +.Fl -tkfile= Ns Pa string +.Xc +Name of the remote credentials cache. Mutually exclusive to +.Fl u . +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar number-or-service , +.Fl -port= Ns Ar number-or-service +.Xc +Connect to this port instead of the default (which is 514 when using +old port based authentication, 544 for Kerberos 5 and non-encrypted +Kerberos 4, and 545 for encrytpted Kerberos 4; subject of course to +the contents of +.Pa /etc/services ) . +.It Xo +.Fl l Ar string , +.Fl -user= Ns Ar string +.Xc +By default the remote username is the same as the local. The +.Fl l +option or the +.Pa username@host +format allow the remote name to be specified. +.It Xo +.Fl P Ar N|O|1|2 , +.Fl -protocol= Ns Ar N|O|1|2 +.Xc +Specifies which protocol version to use with Kerberos 5. +.Ar N +and +.Ar 2 +selects protocol version 2, while +.Ar O +and +.Ar 1 +selects version 1. Version 2 is believed to be more secure, and is the +default. Unless asked for a specific version, +.Nm +will try both. This behaviour may change in the future. +.El +.\".Pp +.\"Without a +.\".Ar command +.\".Nm +.\"will just exec +.\".Xr rlogin 1 +.\"with the same arguments. +.Sh EXAMPLES +Care should be taken when issuing commands containing shell meta +characters. Without quoting, these will be expanded on the local +machine. +.Pp +The following command: +.Pp +.Dl rsh otherhost cat remotefile > localfile +.Pp +will write the contents of the remote +.Pa remotefile +to the local +.Pa localfile , +but: +.Pp +.Dl rsh otherhost 'cat remotefile > remotefile2' +.Pp +will write it to the remote +.Pa remotefile2 . +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width /etc/hosts -compact +.It Pa /etc/hosts +.El +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr rlogin 1 , +.Xr krb_realmofhost 3 , +.Xr krb_sendauth 3 , +.Xr hosts.equiv 5 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr rhosts 5 , +.Xr kerberos 8 +.Xr rshd 8 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . +.Sh AUTHORS +This implementation of +.Nm +was written as part of the Heimdal Kerberos 5 implementation. +.Sh BUGS +Some shells (notably +.Xr csh 1 ) +will cause +.Nm +to block if run in the background, unless the standard input is directed away from the terminal. This is what the +.Fl n +option is for. +.Pp +The +.Fl x +options enables encryption for the session, but for both Kerberos 4 +and 5 the actual command is sent unencrypted, so you should not send +any secret information in the command line (which is probably a bad +idea anyway, since the command line can usually be read with tools +like +.Xr ps 1 ) . +Forthermore in Kerberos 4 the command is not even integrity +protected, so anyone with the right tools can modify the command. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8af5096b7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.c @@ -0,0 +1,1115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rsh_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: rsh.c,v 1.71 2003/04/16 20:37:20 joda Exp $"); + +enum auth_method auth_method; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +int do_encrypt = -1; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +int do_unique_tkfile = 0; +char *unique_tkfile = NULL; +char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; +int do_forward = -1; +int do_forwardable = -1; +krb5_context context; +krb5_keyblock *keyblock; +krb5_crypto crypto; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock iv; +#endif +int sock_debug = 0; + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_v4 = -1; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +static int use_v5 = -1; +#endif +static int use_only_broken = 0; +static int use_broken = 1; +static char *port_str; +static const char *user; +static int do_version; +static int do_help; +static int do_errsock = 1; +static char *protocol_version_str; +static int protocol_version = 2; + +/* + * + */ + +static int input = 1; /* Read from stdin */ + +static int +loop (int s, int errsock) +{ + fd_set real_readset; + int count = 1; + +#ifdef KRB5 + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB5 && protocol_version == 2) + init_ivecs(1); +#endif + + if (s >= FD_SETSIZE || (errsock != -1 && errsock >= FD_SETSIZE)) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + + FD_ZERO(&real_readset); + FD_SET(s, &real_readset); + if (errsock != -1) { + FD_SET(errsock, &real_readset); + ++count; + } + if(input) + FD_SET(STDIN_FILENO, &real_readset); + + for (;;) { + int ret; + fd_set readset; + char buf[RSH_BUFSIZ]; + + readset = real_readset; + ret = select (max(s, errsock) + 1, &readset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + err (1, "select"); + } + if (FD_ISSET(s, &readset)) { + ret = do_read (s, buf, sizeof(buf), ivec_in[0]); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (s); + FD_CLR(s, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + return 0; + } else + net_write (STDOUT_FILENO, buf, ret); + } + if (errsock != -1 && FD_ISSET(errsock, &readset)) { + ret = do_read (errsock, buf, sizeof(buf), ivec_in[1]); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (errsock); + FD_CLR(errsock, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + return 0; + } else + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, buf, ret); + } + if (FD_ISSET(STDIN_FILENO, &readset)) { + ret = read (STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (STDIN_FILENO); + FD_CLR(STDIN_FILENO, &real_readset); + shutdown (s, SHUT_WR); + } else + do_write (s, buf, ret, ivec_out[0]); + } + } +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +send_krb4_auth(int s, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd) +{ + KTEXT_ST text; + CREDENTIALS cred; + MSG_DAT msg; + int status; + size_t len; + + /* the normal default for krb4 should be to disable encryption */ + status = krb_sendauth ((do_encrypt == 1) ? KOPT_DO_MUTUAL : 0, + s, &text, "rcmd", + (char *)hostname, krb_realmofhost (hostname), + getpid(), &msg, &cred, schedule, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thisaddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr, + KCMD_OLD_VERSION); + if (status != KSUCCESS) { + warnx("%s: %s", hostname, krb_get_err_text(status)); + return 1; + } + memcpy (iv, cred.session, sizeof(iv)); + + len = strlen(remote_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, remote_user, len) != len) { + warn("write"); + return 1; + } + if (net_write (s, cmd, cmd_len) != cmd_len) { + warn("write"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +/* + * Send forward information on `s' for host `hostname', them being + * forwardable themselves if `forwardable' + */ + +static int +krb5_forward_cred (krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int s, + const char *hostname, + int forwardable) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_data out_data; + krb5_principal principal; + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_cc_default: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_cc_get_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + creds.client = principal; + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &creds.server, + strlen(principal->realm), + principal->realm, + "krbtgt", + principal->realm, + NULL); + + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_build_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.forwarded = 1; + flags.b.forwardable = forwardable; + + ret = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags.i, + hostname, + &creds, + &out_data); + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_get_forwarded_creds: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, + (void *)&s, + &out_data); + krb5_data_free (&out_data); + + if (ret) + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_write_message: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 0; +} + +static int sendauth_version_error; + +static int +send_krb5_auth(int s, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd) +{ + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data cksum_data; + int status; + size_t len; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + const char *protocol_string = NULL; + krb5_flags ap_opts; + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, + hostname, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) { + warnx ("%s: %s", hostname, krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + if(do_encrypt == -1) { + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server), + "encrypt", + FALSE, + &do_encrypt); + } + + cksum_data.length = asprintf ((char **)&cksum_data.data, + "%u:%s%s%s", + ntohs(socket_get_port(thataddr)), + do_encrypt ? "-x " : "", + cmd, + remote_user); + + ap_opts = 0; + + if(do_encrypt) + ap_opts |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED; + + switch(protocol_version) { + case 2: + ap_opts |= AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY; + protocol_string = KCMD_NEW_VERSION; + break; + case 1: + protocol_string = KCMD_OLD_VERSION; + key_usage = KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED; + break; + default: + abort(); + } + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &s, + protocol_string, + NULL, + server, + ap_opts, + &cksum_data, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + + /* do this while we have a principal */ + if(do_forward == -1 || do_forwardable == -1) { + krb5_const_realm realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server); + if (do_forwardable == -1) + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, realm, + "forwardable", FALSE, + &do_forwardable); + if (do_forward == -1) + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, realm, + "forward", FALSE, + &do_forward); + } + + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + krb5_data_free(&cksum_data); + + if (status) { + if(status == KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED && + protocol_version == 2 && protocol_version_str == NULL) + sendauth_version_error = 1; + else + krb5_warn(context, status, "%s", hostname); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey (context, auth_context, &keyblock); + if(keyblock == NULL) + status = krb5_auth_con_getkey (context, auth_context, &keyblock); + if (status) { + warnx ("krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &s); + if (status) { + warnx("krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return(1); + } + + status = krb5_crypto_init(context, keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if(status) { + warnx ("krb5_crypto_init: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + len = strlen(remote_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, remote_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + if (do_encrypt && net_write (s, "-x ", 3) != 3) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + if (net_write (s, cmd, cmd_len) != cmd_len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + + if (do_unique_tkfile) { + if (net_write (s, tkfile, strlen(tkfile)) != strlen(tkfile)) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + } + len = strlen(local_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, local_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + + if (!do_forward + || krb5_forward_cred (auth_context, s, hostname, do_forwardable)) { + /* Empty forwarding info */ + + u_char zero[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0}; + write (s, &zero, 4); + } + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +static int +send_broken_auth(int s, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd) +{ + size_t len; + + len = strlen(local_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, local_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + len = strlen(remote_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, remote_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + if (net_write (s, cmd, cmd_len) != cmd_len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +proto (int s, int errsock, + const char *hostname, const char *local_user, const char *remote_user, + const char *cmd, size_t cmd_len, + int (*auth_func)(int s, + struct sockaddr *this, struct sockaddr *that, + const char *hostname, const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd)) +{ + int errsock2; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + char *p; + size_t len; + char reply; + struct sockaddr_storage thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thataddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage erraddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *erraddr = (struct sockaddr *)&erraddr_ss; + socklen_t addrlen; + int ret; + + addrlen = sizeof(thisaddr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname(%s)", hostname); + return 1; + } + addrlen = sizeof(thataddr_ss); + if (getpeername (s, thataddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("getpeername(%s)", hostname); + return 1; + } + + if (errsock != -1) { + + addrlen = sizeof(erraddr_ss); + if (getsockname (errsock, erraddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname"); + return 1; + } + + if (listen (errsock, 1) < 0) { + warn ("listen"); + return 1; + } + + p = buf; + snprintf (p, sizeof(buf), "%u", + ntohs(socket_get_port(erraddr))); + len = strlen(buf) + 1; + if(net_write (s, buf, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + close (errsock); + return 1; + } + + + for (;;) { + fd_set fdset; + + if (errsock >= FD_SETSIZE || s >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(errsock, &fdset); + FD_SET(s, &fdset); + + ret = select (max(errsock, s) + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + warn ("select"); + close (errsock); + return 1; + } + if (FD_ISSET(errsock, &fdset)) { + errsock2 = accept (errsock, NULL, NULL); + close (errsock); + if (errsock2 < 0) { + warn ("accept"); + return 1; + } + break; + } + + /* + * there should not arrive any data on this fd so if it's + * readable it probably indicates that the other side when + * away. + */ + + if (FD_ISSET(s, &fdset)) { + warnx ("socket closed"); + close (errsock); + errsock2 = -1; + break; + } + } + } else { + if (net_write (s, "0", 2) != 2) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + errsock2 = -1; + } + + if ((*auth_func)(s, thisaddr, thataddr, hostname, + remote_user, local_user, + cmd_len, cmd)) { + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } + + ret = net_read (s, &reply, 1); + if (ret < 0) { + warn ("read"); + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } else if (ret == 0) { + warnx ("unexpected EOF from %s", hostname); + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } + if (reply != 0) { + + warnx ("Error from rshd at %s:", hostname); + + while ((ret = read (s, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) + write (STDOUT_FILENO, buf, ret); + write (STDOUT_FILENO,"\n",1); + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } + + if (sock_debug) { + int one = 1; + if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn("setsockopt remote"); + if (errsock2 != -1 && + setsockopt(errsock2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn("setsockopt stderr"); + } + + return loop (s, errsock2); +} + +/* + * Return in `res' a copy of the concatenation of `argc, argv' into + * malloced space. */ + +static size_t +construct_command (char **res, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + size_t len = 0; + char *tmp; + + for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) + len += strlen(argv[i]) + 1; + len = max (1, len); + tmp = malloc (len); + if (tmp == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc %u failed", len); + + *tmp = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; ++i) { + strcat (tmp, argv[i]); + strcat (tmp, " "); + } + if (argc > 0) + strcat (tmp, argv[argc-1]); + *res = tmp; + return len; +} + +static char * +print_addr (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + char addr_str[256]; + char *res; + const char *as = NULL; + + if(sa->sa_family == AF_INET) + as = inet_ntop (sa->sa_family, &((struct sockaddr_in*)sa)->sin_addr, + addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)); +#ifdef HAVE_INET6 + else if(sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) + as = inet_ntop (sa->sa_family, &((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_addr, + addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)); +#endif + if(as == NULL) + return NULL; + res = strdup(as); + if (res == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + return res; +} + +static int +doit_broken (int argc, + char **argv, + int hostindex, + struct addrinfo *ai, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + int priv_socket1, + int priv_socket2, + const char *cmd, + size_t cmd_len) +{ + struct addrinfo *a; + + if (connect (priv_socket1, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + + close(priv_socket1); + close(priv_socket2); + + for (a = ai->ai_next; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + pid_t pid; + char *adr = print_addr(a->ai_addr); + if(adr == NULL) + continue; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + err (1, "fork"); + else if(pid == 0) { + char **new_argv; + int i = 0; + + new_argv = malloc((argc + 2) * sizeof(*new_argv)); + if (new_argv == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + new_argv[i] = argv[i]; + ++i; + if (hostindex == i) + new_argv[i++] = adr; + new_argv[i++] = "-K"; + for(; i <= argc; ++i) + new_argv[i] = argv[i - 1]; + if (hostindex > 1) + new_argv[hostindex + 1] = adr; + new_argv[argc + 1] = NULL; + execv(PATH_RSH, new_argv); + err(1, "execv(%s)", PATH_RSH); + } else { + int status; + free(adr); + + while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + ; + if(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + return 0; + } + } + errno = save_errno; + warn("%s", argv[hostindex]); + return 1; + } else { + int ret; + + ret = proto (priv_socket1, priv_socket2, + argv[hostindex], + local_user, remote_user, + cmd, cmd_len, + send_broken_auth); + return ret; + } +} + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +static int +doit (const char *hostname, + struct addrinfo *ai, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + const char *cmd, + size_t cmd_len, + int do_errsock, + int (*auth_func)(int s, + struct sockaddr *this, struct sockaddr *that, + const char *hostname, const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd)) +{ + int error; + struct addrinfo *a; + int socketfailed = 1; + int ret; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + int errsock; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + socketfailed = 0; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + char addr[128]; + if(getnameinfo(a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen, + addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0) + warn ("connect(%s [%s])", hostname, addr); + else + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + if (do_errsock) { + struct addrinfo *ea, *eai; + struct addrinfo hints; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = a->ai_socktype; + hints.ai_protocol = a->ai_protocol; + hints.ai_family = a->ai_family; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + errsock = -1; + + error = getaddrinfo (NULL, "0", &hints, &eai); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + for (ea = eai; ea != NULL; ea = ea->ai_next) { + errsock = socket (ea->ai_family, ea->ai_socktype, + ea->ai_protocol); + if (errsock < 0) + continue; + if (bind (errsock, ea->ai_addr, ea->ai_addrlen) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + break; + } + if (errsock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + freeaddrinfo (eai); + } else + errsock = -1; + + ret = proto (s, errsock, + hostname, + local_user, remote_user, + cmd, cmd_len, auth_func); + close (s); + return ret; + } + if(socketfailed) + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + return -1; +} +#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */ + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "krb4", '4', arg_flag, &use_v4, "Use Kerberos V4" }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { "krb5", '5', arg_flag, &use_v5, "Use Kerberos V5" }, + { "forward", 'f', arg_flag, &do_forward, "Forward credentials (krb5)"}, + { NULL, 'G', arg_negative_flag,&do_forward, "Don't forward credentials" }, + { "forwardable", 'F', arg_flag, &do_forwardable, + "Forward forwardable credentials" }, +#endif +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + { "broken", 'K', arg_flag, &use_only_broken, "Use only priv port" }, + { "encrypt", 'x', arg_flag, &do_encrypt, "Encrypt connection" }, + { NULL, 'z', arg_negative_flag, &do_encrypt, + "Don't encrypt connection", NULL }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { "unique", 'u', arg_flag, &do_unique_tkfile, + "Use unique remote tkfile (krb5)" }, + { "tkfile", 'U', arg_string, &unique_tkfile, + "Use that remote tkfile (krb5)" }, +#endif + { NULL, 'd', arg_flag, &sock_debug, "Enable socket debugging" }, + { "input", 'n', arg_negative_flag, &input, "Close stdin" }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "port" }, + { "user", 'l', arg_string, &user, "Run as this user", "login" }, + { "stderr", 'e', arg_negative_flag, &do_errsock, "Don't open stderr"}, + { "protocol", 'P', arg_string, &protocol_version_str, + "Protocol version", "protocol" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version, NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "[login@]host [command]"); + exit (ret); +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int priv_port1, priv_port2; + int priv_socket1, priv_socket2; + int argindex = 0; + int error; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai; + int ret = 1; + char *cmd; + char *tmp; + size_t cmd_len; + const char *local_user; + char *host = NULL; + int host_index = -1; +#ifdef KRB5 + int status; +#endif + uid_t uid; + + priv_port1 = priv_port2 = IPPORT_RESERVED-1; + priv_socket1 = rresvport(&priv_port1); + priv_socket2 = rresvport(&priv_port2); + uid = getuid (); + if (setuid (uid) || (uid != 0 && setuid(0) == 0)) + err (1, "setuid"); + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if (argc >= 2 && argv[1][0] != '-') { + host = argv[host_index = 1]; + argindex = 1; + } + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &argindex)) + usage (1); + + if (do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if(protocol_version_str != NULL) { + if(strcasecmp(protocol_version_str, "N") == 0) + protocol_version = 2; + else if(strcasecmp(protocol_version_str, "O") == 0) + protocol_version = 1; + else { + char *end; + int v; + v = strtol(protocol_version_str, &end, 0); + if(*end != '\0' || (v != 1 && v != 2)) { + errx(1, "unknown protocol version \"%s\"", + protocol_version_str); + } + protocol_version = v; + } + } + +#ifdef KRB5 + status = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (status) { + if(use_v5 == 1) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", status); + else + use_v5 = 0; + } + + /* request for forwardable on the command line means we should + also forward */ + if (do_forwardable == 1) + do_forward = 1; + +#endif + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5) + if(use_v4 == -1 && use_v5 == 1) + use_v4 = 0; + if(use_v5 == -1 && use_v4 == 1) + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + + if (use_only_broken) { +#ifdef KRB4 + use_v4 = 0; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + } + + if(priv_socket1 < 0) { + if (use_only_broken) + errx (1, "unable to bind reserved port: is rsh setuid root?"); + use_broken = 0; + } + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if (do_encrypt == 1 && use_only_broken) + errx (1, "encryption not supported with old style authentication"); +#endif + + + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (do_unique_tkfile && unique_tkfile != NULL) + errx (1, "Only one of -u and -U allowed."); + + if (do_unique_tkfile) + strcpy(tkfile,"-u "); + else if (unique_tkfile != NULL) { + if (strchr(unique_tkfile,' ') != NULL) { + warnx("Space is not allowed in tkfilename"); + usage(1); + } + do_unique_tkfile = 1; + snprintf (tkfile, sizeof(tkfile), "-U %s ", unique_tkfile); + } +#endif + + if (host == NULL) { + if (argc - argindex < 1) + usage (1); + else + host = argv[host_index = argindex++]; + } + + if((tmp = strchr(host, '@')) != NULL) { + *tmp++ = '\0'; + user = host; + host = tmp; + } + + if (argindex == argc) { + close (priv_socket1); + close (priv_socket2); + argv[0] = "rlogin"; + execvp ("rlogin", argv); + err (1, "execvp rlogin"); + } + + local_user = get_default_username (); + if (local_user == NULL) + errx (1, "who are you?"); + + if (user == NULL) + user = local_user; + + cmd_len = construct_command(&cmd, argc - argindex, argv + argindex); + + /* + * Try all different authentication methods + */ + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret && use_v5) { + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + if(port_str == NULL) { + error = getaddrinfo(host, "kshell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) + error = getaddrinfo(host, "544", &hints, &ai); + } else + error = getaddrinfo(host, port_str, &hints, &ai); + + if(error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + + auth_method = AUTH_KRB5; + again: + ret = doit (host, ai, user, local_user, cmd, cmd_len, + do_errsock, + send_krb5_auth); + if(ret != 0 && sendauth_version_error && + protocol_version == 2) { + protocol_version = 1; + goto again; + } + freeaddrinfo(ai); + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && use_v4) { + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + if(port_str == NULL) { + if(do_encrypt) { + error = getaddrinfo(host, "ekshell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) + error = getaddrinfo(host, "545", &hints, &ai); + } else { + error = getaddrinfo(host, "kshell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) + error = getaddrinfo(host, "544", &hints, &ai); + } + } else + error = getaddrinfo(host, port_str, &hints, &ai); + + if(error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + auth_method = AUTH_KRB4; + ret = doit (host, ai, user, local_user, cmd, cmd_len, + do_errsock, + send_krb4_auth); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + } +#endif + if (ret && use_broken) { + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + if(port_str == NULL) { + error = getaddrinfo(host, "shell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) + error = getaddrinfo(host, "514", &hints, &ai); + } else + error = getaddrinfo(host, port_str, &hints, &ai); + + if(error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + + auth_method = AUTH_BROKEN; + ret = doit_broken (argc, argv, host_index, ai, + user, local_user, + priv_socket1, + do_errsock ? priv_socket2 : -1, + cmd, cmd_len); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + } + free(cmd); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e6d46ff0d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ + +RSH(1) UNIX Reference Manual RSH(1) + +NNAAMMEE + rrsshh - remote shell + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + rrsshh [--4455FFGGKKddeeffnnuuxxzz] [--UU _s_t_r_i_n_g] [--pp _p_o_r_t] [--ll _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e] [--PP _N_|_O] _h_o_s_t + _[_c_o_m_m_a_n_d_] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + rrsshh authenticates to the rshd(8) daemon on the remote _h_o_s_t, and then exe- + cutes the specified _c_o_m_m_a_n_d. + + rrsshh copies its standard input to the remote command, and the standard + output and error of the remote command to its own. + + Valid options are: + + --44, ----kkrrbb44 + The --44 option requests Kerberos 4 authentication. Normally all + supported authentication mechanisms will be tried, but in some + cases more explicit control is desired. + + --55, ----kkrrbb55 + The --55 option requests Kerberos 5 authentication. This is analo- + gous to the --44 option. + + --KK, ----bbrrookkeenn + The --KK option turns off all Kerberos authentication. The long + name implies that this is more or less totally unsecure. The se- + curity in this mode relies on reserved ports, which is not very + secure. + + --nn, ----nnoo--iinnppuutt + The --nn option directs the input from the _/_d_e_v_/_n_u_l_l device (see + the _B_U_G_S section of this manual page). + + --ee, ----nnoo--ssttddeerrrr + Don't use a separate socket for the stderr stream. This can be + necessary if rsh-ing through a NAT bridge. + + --xx, ----eennccrryypptt + The --xx option enables encryption for all data exchange. This is + only valid for Kerberos authenticated connections (see the _B_U_G_S + section for limitations). + + --zz The opposite of --xx. This is the default, but encryption can be + enabled when using Kerberos 5, by setting the libdefaults/encrypt + option in krb5.conf(5). + + --ff, ----ffoorrwwaarrdd + Forward Kerberos 5 credentials to the remote host. Also con- + trolled by libdefaults/forward in krb5.conf(5). + + --GG The opposite of --ff. + + --FF, ----ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee + Make the forwarded credentials re-forwardable. Also controlled by + libdefaults/forwardable in krb5.conf(5). + + --uu, ----uunniiqquuee + Make sure the remote credentials cache is unique, that is, don't + + + reuse any existing cache. Mutually exclusive to --UU. + + --UU _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----ttkkffiillee==_s_t_r_i_n_g + Name of the remote credentials cache. Mutually exclusive to --uu. + + --pp _n_u_m_b_e_r_-_o_r_-_s_e_r_v_i_c_e, ----ppoorrtt==_n_u_m_b_e_r_-_o_r_-_s_e_r_v_i_c_e + Connect to this port instead of the default (which is 514 when + using old port based authentication, 544 for Kerberos 5 and non- + encrypted Kerberos 4, and 545 for encrytpted Kerberos 4; subject + of course to the contents of _/_e_t_c_/_s_e_r_v_i_c_e_s). + + --ll _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----uusseerr==_s_t_r_i_n_g + By default the remote username is the same as the local. The --ll + option or the _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e_@_h_o_s_t format allow the remote name to be + specified. + + --PP _N_|_O_|_1_|_2, ----pprroottooccooll==_N_|_O_|_1_|_2 + Specifies which protocol version to use with Kerberos 5. _N and _2 + selects protocol version 2, while _O and _1 selects version 1. Ver- + sion 2 is believed to be more secure, and is the default. Unless + asked for a specific version, rrsshh will try both. This behaviour + may change in the future. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + Care should be taken when issuing commands containing shell meta charac- + ters. Without quoting, these will be expanded on the local machine. + + The following command: + + rsh otherhost cat remotefile > localfile + + will write the contents of the remote _r_e_m_o_t_e_f_i_l_e to the local _l_o_c_a_l_f_i_l_e, + but: + + rsh otherhost 'cat remotefile > remotefile2' + + will write it to the remote _r_e_m_o_t_e_f_i_l_e_2. + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/hosts + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + rlogin(1), krb_realmofhost(3), krb_sendauth(3), hosts.equiv(5), + krb5.conf(5), rhosts(5), kerberos(8) rshd(8) + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + The rrsshh command appeared in 4.2BSD. + +AAUUTTHHOORRSS + This implementation of rrsshh was written as part of the Heimdal Kerberos 5 + implementation. + +BBUUGGSS + Some shells (notably csh(1)) will cause rrsshh to block if run in the back- + ground, unless the standard input is directed away from the terminal. + This is what the --nn option is for. + + The --xx options enables encryption for the session, but for both Kerberos + 4 and 5 the actual command is sent unencrypted, so you should not send + any secret information in the command line (which is probably a bad idea + anyway, since the command line can usually be read with tools like + ps(1)). Forthermore in Kerberos 4 the command is not even integrity pro- + tected, so anyone with the right tools can modify the command. + + HEIMDAL September 4, 2002 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..151a8887bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: rsh_locl.h,v 1.33 2003/04/16 20:05:39 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#include /* for _krb5_{get,put}_int */ +#endif +#include + +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEFPATH +#define _PATH_DEFPATH "/usr/bin:/bin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT +#define _PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT SYSCONFDIR "/environment" +#endif + +/* + * + */ + +enum auth_method { AUTH_KRB4, AUTH_KRB5, AUTH_BROKEN }; + +extern enum auth_method auth_method; +extern int do_encrypt; +#ifdef KRB5 +extern krb5_context context; +extern krb5_keyblock *keyblock; +extern krb5_crypto crypto; +extern int key_usage; +extern void *ivec_in[2]; +extern void *ivec_out[2]; +void init_ivecs(int); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +extern des_key_schedule schedule; +extern des_cblock iv; +#endif + +#define KCMD_OLD_VERSION "KCMDV0.1" +#define KCMD_NEW_VERSION "KCMDV0.2" + +#define USERNAME_SZ 16 +#ifndef ARG_MAX +#define ARG_MAX 8192 +#endif + +#define RSH_BUFSIZ (5 * 1024) /* MIT kcmd can't handle larger buffers */ + +#define PATH_RSH BINDIR "/rsh" + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +ssize_t do_read (int, void*, size_t, void*); +ssize_t do_write (int, void*, size_t, void*); +#else +#define do_write(F, B, L, I) write((F), (B), (L)) +#define do_read(F, B, L, I) read((F), (B), (L)) +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c7a3636c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: rshd.8,v 1.7 2003/04/16 19:58:42 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd November 22, 2002 +.Dt RSHD 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm rshd +.Nd +remote shell server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl aiklnvxPL +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is the server for +the +.Xr rsh 1 +program. It provides an authenticated remote command execution +service. Supported options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl n , +.Fl -no-keepalive +.Xc +Disables keep-alive messages. +Keep-alives are packets sent at certain intervals to make sure that the +client is still there, even when it doesn't send any data. +.It Xo +.Fl k , +.Fl -kerberos +.Xc +Assume that clients connecting to this server will use some form of +Kerberos authentication. See the +.Sx EXAMPLES +section for a sample +.Xr inetd.conf 5 +configuration. +.It Xo +.Fl x , +.Fl -encrypt +.Xc +For Kerberos 4 this means that the connections are encrypted. Kerberos +5 can negotiate encryption even without this option, but if it's +present +.Nm +will deny unencrypted connections. This option implies +.Fl k . +.\".It Xo +.\".Fl l , +.\".Fl -no-rhosts +.\".Xc +.\"When using old port-based authentication, the user's +.\".Pa .rhosts +.\"files are normally checked. This options disables this. +.It Xo +.Fl v , +.Fl -vacuous +.Xc +If the connecting client does not use any Kerberised authentication, +print a message that complains about this fact, and exit. This is +helpful if you want to move away from old port-based authentication. +.It Xo +.Fl P +.Xc +When using the AFS filesystem, users' authentication tokens are put in +something called a PAG (Process Authentication Group). Multiple +processes can share a PAG, but normally each login session has its own +PAG. This option disables the +.Fn setpag +call, so all tokens will be put in the default (uid-based) PAG, making +it possible to share tokens between sessions. This is only useful in +peculiar environments, such as some batch systems. +.It Xo +.Fl i , +.Fl -no-inetd +.Xc +The +.Fl i +option will cause +.Nm +to create a socket, instead of assuming that its stdin came from +.Xr inetd 8 . +This is mostly useful for debugging. +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port , +.Fl -port= Ns Ar port +.Xc +Port to use with +.Fl i . +.It Xo +.Fl a +.Xc +This flag is for backwards compatibility only. +.It Xo +.Fl L +.Xc +This flag enables logging of connections to +.Xr syslogd 8 . +This option is always on in this implementation. +.El +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width /etc/hosts.equiv -compact +.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +.It Pa ~/.rhosts +.El +.Sh EXAMPLES +The following can be used to enable Kerberised rsh in +.Xr inetd.cond 5 , +while disabling non-Kerberised connections: +.Bd -literal +shell stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/rshd rshd -v +kshell stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/rshd rshd -k +ekshell stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/rshd rshd -kx +.Ed +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr rsh 1 , +.Xr iruserok 3 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . +.Sh AUTHORS +This implementation of +.Nm +was written as part of the Heimdal Kerberos 5 implementation. +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1464fe1187 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.c @@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rsh_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: rshd.c,v 1.51.2.1 2003/08/19 11:36:17 joda Exp $"); + +int +login_access( struct passwd *user, char *from); + +enum auth_method auth_method; + +#ifdef KRB5 +krb5_context context; +krb5_keyblock *keyblock; +krb5_crypto crypto; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock iv; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +krb5_ccache ccache, ccache2; +int kerberos_status = 0; +#endif + +int do_encrypt = 0; + +static int do_unique_tkfile = 0; +static char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN] = ""; + +static int do_inetd = 1; +static char *port_str; +static int do_rhosts = 1; +static int do_kerberos = 0; +#define DO_KRB4 2 +#define DO_KRB5 4 +static int do_vacuous = 0; +static int do_log = 1; +static int do_newpag = 1; +static int do_addr_verify = 0; +static int do_keepalive = 1; +static int do_version; +static int do_help = 0; + +#if defined(KRB5) && defined(DCE) +int dfsk5ok = 0; +int dfspag = 0; +int dfsfwd = 0; +krb5_ticket *user_ticket; +#endif + +static void +syslog_and_die (const char *m, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); + +static void +syslog_and_die (const char *m, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, m); + vsyslog (LOG_ERR, m, args); + va_end(args); + exit (1); +} + +static void +fatal (int, const char*, const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))); + +static void +fatal (int sock, const char *what, const char *m, ...) +{ + va_list args; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + size_t len; + + *buf = 1; + va_start(args, m); + len = vsnprintf (buf + 1, sizeof(buf) - 1, m, args); + len = min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1); + va_end(args); + if(what != NULL) + syslog (LOG_ERR, "%s: %m: %s", what, buf + 1); + else + syslog (LOG_ERR, "%s", buf + 1); + net_write (sock, buf, len + 1); + exit (1); +} + +static char * +read_str (int s, size_t sz, char *expl) +{ + char *str = malloc(sz); + char *p = str; + if(str == NULL) + fatal(s, NULL, "%s too long", expl); + while(p < str + sz) { + if(net_read(s, p, 1) != 1) + syslog_and_die("read: %m"); + if(*p == '\0') + return str; + p++; + } + fatal(s, NULL, "%s too long", expl); +} + +static int +recv_bsd_auth (int s, u_char *buf, + struct sockaddr_in *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr_in *thataddr, + char **client_username, + char **server_username, + char **cmd) +{ + struct passwd *pwd; + + *client_username = read_str (s, USERNAME_SZ, "local username"); + *server_username = read_str (s, USERNAME_SZ, "remote username"); + *cmd = read_str (s, ARG_MAX + 1, "command"); + pwd = getpwnam(*server_username); + if (pwd == NULL) + fatal(s, NULL, "Login incorrect."); + if (iruserok(thataddr->sin_addr.s_addr, pwd->pw_uid == 0, + *client_username, *server_username)) + fatal(s, NULL, "Login incorrect."); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +recv_krb4_auth (int s, u_char *buf, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + char **client_username, + char **server_username, + char **cmd) +{ + int status; + int32_t options; + KTEXT_ST ticket; + AUTH_DAT auth; + char instance[INST_SZ + 1]; + char version[KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN + 1]; + + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, 4) != 0) + return -1; + if (net_read (s, buf + 4, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) != + KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) + syslog_and_die ("reading auth info: %m"); + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) + syslog_and_die("unrecognized auth protocol: %.8s", buf); + + options = KOPT_IGNORE_PROTOCOL; + if (do_encrypt) + options |= KOPT_DO_MUTUAL; + k_getsockinst (s, instance, sizeof(instance)); + status = krb_recvauth (options, + s, + &ticket, + "rcmd", + instance, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thisaddr, + &auth, + "", + schedule, + version); + if (status != KSUCCESS) + syslog_and_die ("recvauth: %s", krb_get_err_text(status)); + if (strncmp (version, KCMD_OLD_VERSION, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) + syslog_and_die ("bad version: %s", version); + + *server_username = read_str (s, USERNAME_SZ, "remote username"); + if (kuserok (&auth, *server_username) != 0) + fatal (s, NULL, "Permission denied."); + *cmd = read_str (s, ARG_MAX + 1, "command"); + + syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, + "kerberos v4 shell from %s on %s as %s, cmd '%.80s'", + krb_unparse_name_long(auth.pname, auth.pinst, auth.prealm), + + inet_ntoa(((struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr)->sin_addr), + *server_username, + *cmd); + + memcpy (iv, auth.session, sizeof(iv)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +save_krb5_creds (int s, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_principal client) + +{ + int ret; + krb5_data remote_cred; + + krb5_data_zero (&remote_cred); + ret= krb5_read_message (context, (void *)&s, &remote_cred); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free(&remote_cred); + return 0; + } + if (remote_cred.length == 0) + return 0; + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free(&remote_cred); + return 0; + } + + krb5_cc_initialize(context,ccache,client); + ret = krb5_rd_cred2(context, auth_context, ccache, &remote_cred); + if(ret != 0) + syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, + "reading creds: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + krb5_data_free (&remote_cred); + if (ret) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static void +krb5_start_session (void) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_cc_resolve (context, tkfile, &ccache2); + if (ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache (context, ccache, ccache2); + if (ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return ; + } + + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache2); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return; +} + +static int protocol_version; + +static krb5_boolean +match_kcmd_version(const void *data, const char *version) +{ + if(strcmp(version, KCMD_NEW_VERSION) == 0) { + protocol_version = 2; + return TRUE; + } + if(strcmp(version, KCMD_OLD_VERSION) == 0) { + protocol_version = 1; + key_usage = KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED; + return TRUE; + } + return FALSE; +} + + +static int +recv_krb5_auth (int s, u_char *buf, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + char **client_username, + char **server_username, + char **cmd) +{ + u_int32_t len; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_data cksum_data; + krb5_principal server; + + if (memcmp (buf, "\x00\x00\x00\x13", 4) != 0) + return -1; + len = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | (buf[3]); + + if (net_read(s, buf, len) != len) + syslog_and_die ("reading auth info: %m"); + if (len != sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + || memcmp (buf, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) != 0) + syslog_and_die ("bad sendauth version: %.8s", buf); + + status = krb5_sock_to_principal (context, + s, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_sock_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_recvauth_match_version(context, + &auth_context, + &s, + match_kcmd_version, + NULL, + server, + KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + NULL, + &ticket); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_recvauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + *server_username = read_str (s, USERNAME_SZ, "remote username"); + *cmd = read_str (s, ARG_MAX + 1, "command"); + *client_username = read_str (s, ARG_MAX + 1, "local username"); + + if(protocol_version == 2) { + status = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, auth_context, + &keyblock); + if(status != 0 || keyblock == NULL) + syslog_and_die("failed to get remote subkey"); + } else if(protocol_version == 1) { + status = krb5_auth_con_getkey (context, auth_context, &keyblock); + if(status != 0 || keyblock == NULL) + syslog_and_die("failed to get key"); + } + if (status != 0 || keyblock == NULL) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_crypto_init(context, keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if(status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_crypto_init: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + + cksum_data.length = asprintf ((char **)&cksum_data.data, + "%u:%s%s", + ntohs(socket_get_port (thisaddr)), + *cmd, + *server_username); + + status = krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum(context, + auth_context, + cksum_data.data, + cksum_data.length); + + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + free (cksum_data.data); + + if (strncmp (*client_username, "-u ", 3) == 0) { + do_unique_tkfile = 1; + memmove (*client_username, *client_username + 3, + strlen(*client_username) - 2); + } + + if (strncmp (*client_username, "-U ", 3) == 0) { + char *end, *temp_tkfile; + + do_unique_tkfile = 1; + if (strncmp (*client_username + 3, "FILE:", 5) == 0) { + temp_tkfile = tkfile; + } else { + strcpy (tkfile, "FILE:"); + temp_tkfile = tkfile + 5; + } + end = strchr(*client_username + 3,' '); + strncpy(temp_tkfile, *client_username + 3, end - *client_username - 3); + temp_tkfile[end - *client_username - 3] = '\0'; + memmove (*client_username, end + 1, strlen(end+1)+1); + } + + kerberos_status = save_krb5_creds (s, auth_context, ticket->client); + + if(!krb5_kuserok (context, + ticket->client, + *server_username)) + fatal (s, NULL, "Permission denied."); + + if (strncmp (*cmd, "-x ", 3) == 0) { + do_encrypt = 1; + memmove (*cmd, *cmd + 3, strlen(*cmd) - 2); + } else { + if(do_encrypt) + fatal (s, NULL, "Encryption is required."); + do_encrypt = 0; + } + + { + char *name; + + if (krb5_unparse_name (context, ticket->client, &name) == 0) { + char addr_str[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (thataddr->sa_family, + socket_get_address (thataddr), + addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)) == NULL) + strlcpy (addr_str, "unknown address", + sizeof(addr_str)); + + syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, + "kerberos v5 shell from %s on %s as %s, cmd '%.80s'", + name, + addr_str, + *server_username, + *cmd); + free (name); + } + } + +#if defined(DCE) + user_ticket = ticket; +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +static void +loop (int from0, int to0, + int to1, int from1, + int to2, int from2) +{ + fd_set real_readset; + int max_fd; + int count = 2; + + if(from0 >= FD_SETSIZE || from1 >= FD_SETSIZE || from2 >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + +#ifdef KRB5 + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB5 && protocol_version == 2) + init_ivecs(0); +#endif + + FD_ZERO(&real_readset); + FD_SET(from0, &real_readset); + FD_SET(from1, &real_readset); + FD_SET(from2, &real_readset); + max_fd = max(from0, max(from1, from2)) + 1; + for (;;) { + int ret; + fd_set readset = real_readset; + char buf[RSH_BUFSIZ]; + + ret = select (max_fd, &readset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + syslog_and_die ("select: %m"); + } + if (FD_ISSET(from0, &readset)) { + ret = do_read (from0, buf, sizeof(buf), ivec_in[0]); + if (ret < 0) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (from0); + close (to0); + FD_CLR(from0, &real_readset); + } else + net_write (to0, buf, ret); + } + if (FD_ISSET(from1, &readset)) { + ret = read (from1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (from1); + close (to1); + FD_CLR(from1, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + exit (0); + } else + do_write (to1, buf, ret, ivec_out[0]); + } + if (FD_ISSET(from2, &readset)) { + ret = read (from2, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (from2); + close (to2); + FD_CLR(from2, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + exit (0); + } else + do_write (to2, buf, ret, ivec_out[1]); + } + } +} + +/* + * Used by `setup_copier' to create some pipe-like means of + * communcation. Real pipes would probably be the best thing, but + * then the shell doesn't understand it's talking to rshd. If + * socketpair doesn't work everywhere, some autoconf magic would have + * to be added here. + * + * If it fails creating the `pipe', it aborts by calling fatal. + */ + +static void +pipe_a_like (int fd[2]) +{ + if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fd) < 0) + fatal (STDOUT_FILENO, "socketpair", "Pipe creation failed."); +} + +/* + * Start a child process and leave the parent copying data to and from it. */ + +static void +setup_copier (void) +{ + int p0[2], p1[2], p2[2]; + pid_t pid; + + pipe_a_like(p0); + pipe_a_like(p1); + pipe_a_like(p2); + pid = fork (); + if (pid < 0) + fatal (STDOUT_FILENO, "fork", "Could not create child process."); + if (pid == 0) { /* child */ + close (p0[1]); + close (p1[0]); + close (p2[0]); + dup2 (p0[0], STDIN_FILENO); + dup2 (p1[1], STDOUT_FILENO); + dup2 (p2[1], STDERR_FILENO); + close (p0[0]); + close (p1[1]); + close (p2[1]); + } else { /* parent */ + close (p0[0]); + close (p1[1]); + close (p2[1]); + + if (net_write (STDOUT_FILENO, "", 1) != 1) + fatal (STDOUT_FILENO, "net_write", "Write failure."); + + loop (STDIN_FILENO, p0[1], + STDOUT_FILENO, p1[0], + STDERR_FILENO, p2[0]); + } +} + +/* + * Is `port' a ``reserverd'' port? + */ + +static int +is_reserved(u_short port) +{ + return ntohs(port) < IPPORT_RESERVED; +} + +/* + * Set the necessary part of the environment in `env'. + */ + +static void +setup_environment (char ***env, const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + int i, j, path; + char **e; + + i = 0; + path = 0; + *env = NULL; + + i = read_environment(_PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT, env); + e = *env; + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (!strncmp(e[j], "PATH=", 5)) { + path = 1; + } + } + + e = *env; + e = realloc(e, (i + 7) * sizeof(char *)); + + asprintf (&e[i++], "USER=%s", pwd->pw_name); + asprintf (&e[i++], "HOME=%s", pwd->pw_dir); + asprintf (&e[i++], "SHELL=%s", pwd->pw_shell); + if (! path) { + asprintf (&e[i++], "PATH=%s", _PATH_DEFPATH); + } + asprintf (&e[i++], "SSH_CLIENT=only_to_make_bash_happy"); +#if defined(DCE) + if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) + asprintf (&e[i++], "KRB5CCNAME=%s", getenv("KRB5CCNAME")); +#else + if (do_unique_tkfile) + asprintf (&e[i++], "KRB5CCNAME=%s", tkfile); +#endif + e[i++] = NULL; + *env = e; +} + +static void +doit (void) +{ + u_char buf[BUFSIZ]; + u_char *p; + struct sockaddr_storage thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thataddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage erraddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *erraddr = (struct sockaddr *)&erraddr_ss; + socklen_t thisaddr_len, thataddr_len; + int port; + int errsock = -1; + char *client_user, *server_user, *cmd; + struct passwd *pwd; + int s = STDIN_FILENO; + char **env; + int ret; + char that_host[NI_MAXHOST]; + + thisaddr_len = sizeof(thisaddr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, thisaddr, &thisaddr_len) < 0) + syslog_and_die("getsockname: %m"); + thataddr_len = sizeof(thataddr_ss); + if (getpeername (s, thataddr, &thataddr_len) < 0) + syslog_and_die ("getpeername: %m"); + + /* check for V4MAPPED addresses? */ + + if (do_kerberos == 0 && !is_reserved(socket_get_port(thataddr))) + fatal(s, NULL, "Permission denied."); + + p = buf; + port = 0; + for(;;) { + if (net_read (s, p, 1) != 1) + syslog_and_die ("reading port number: %m"); + if (*p == '\0') + break; + else if (isdigit(*p)) + port = port * 10 + *p - '0'; + else + syslog_and_die ("non-digit in port number: %c", *p); + } + + if (do_kerberos == 0 && !is_reserved(htons(port))) + fatal(s, NULL, "Permission denied."); + + if (port) { + int priv_port = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1; + + /* + * There's no reason to require a ``privileged'' port number + * here, but for some reason the brain dead rsh clients + * do... :-( + */ + + erraddr->sa_family = thataddr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (erraddr, + socket_get_address (thataddr), + htons(port)); + + /* + * we only do reserved port for IPv4 + */ + + if (erraddr->sa_family == AF_INET) + errsock = rresvport (&priv_port); + else + errsock = socket (erraddr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (errsock < 0) + syslog_and_die ("socket: %m"); + if (connect (errsock, + erraddr, + socket_sockaddr_size (erraddr)) < 0) { + syslog (LOG_WARNING, "connect: %m"); + close (errsock); + } + } + + if(do_kerberos) { + if (net_read (s, buf, 4) != 4) + syslog_and_die ("reading auth info: %m"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if ((do_kerberos & DO_KRB4) && + recv_krb4_auth (s, buf, thisaddr, thataddr, + &client_user, + &server_user, + &cmd) == 0) + auth_method = AUTH_KRB4; + else +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#ifdef KRB5 + if((do_kerberos & DO_KRB5) && + recv_krb5_auth (s, buf, thisaddr, thataddr, + &client_user, + &server_user, + &cmd) == 0) + auth_method = AUTH_KRB5; + else +#endif /* KRB5 */ + syslog_and_die ("unrecognized auth protocol: %x %x %x %x", + buf[0], buf[1], buf[2], buf[3]); + } else { + if(recv_bsd_auth (s, buf, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thisaddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr, + &client_user, + &server_user, + &cmd) == 0) { + auth_method = AUTH_BROKEN; + if(do_vacuous) { + printf("Remote host requires Kerberos authentication\n"); + exit(0); + } + } else + syslog_and_die("recv_bsd_auth failed"); + } + +#if defined(DCE) && defined(_AIX) + esetenv("AUTHSTATE", "DCE", 1); +#endif + + pwd = getpwnam (server_user); + if (pwd == NULL) + fatal (s, NULL, "Login incorrect."); + + if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0') + pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + if (pwd->pw_uid != 0 && access (_PATH_NOLOGIN, F_OK) == 0) + fatal (s, NULL, "Login disabled."); + + + ret = getnameinfo_verified (thataddr, thataddr_len, + that_host, sizeof(that_host), + NULL, 0, 0); + if (ret) + fatal (s, NULL, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(ret)); + + if (login_access(pwd, that_host) == 0) { + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "Kerberos rsh denied to %s from %s", + server_user, that_host); + fatal(s, NULL, "Permission denied."); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + { + struct spwd *sp; + long today; + + sp = getspnam(server_user); + if (sp != NULL) { + today = time(0)/(24L * 60 * 60); + if (sp->sp_expire > 0) + if (today > sp->sp_expire) + fatal(s, NULL, "Account has expired."); + } + } +#endif + + +#ifdef KRB5 + { + int fd; + + if (!do_unique_tkfile) + snprintf(tkfile,sizeof(tkfile),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u",pwd->pw_uid); + else if (*tkfile=='\0') { + snprintf(tkfile,sizeof(tkfile),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_XXXXXX"); + fd = mkstemp(tkfile+5); + close(fd); + unlink(tkfile+5); + } + + if (kerberos_status) + krb5_start_session(); + } + chown(tkfile + 5, pwd->pw_uid, -1); + +#if defined(DCE) + if (kerberos_status) { + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME", tkfile, 1); + dfspag = krb5_dfs_pag(context, kerberos_status, user_ticket->client, server_user); + } +#endif + +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOGIN + if (setlogin(pwd->pw_name) < 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setlogin() failed: %m"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED + if (setpcred (pwd->pw_name, NULL) == -1) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setpcred() failure: %m"); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ + + if (initgroups (pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal (s, "initgroups", "Login incorrect."); + + if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal (s, "setgid", "Login incorrect."); + + if (setuid (pwd->pw_uid) < 0) + fatal (s, "setuid", "Login incorrect."); + + if (chdir (pwd->pw_dir) < 0) + fatal (s, "chdir", "Remote directory."); + + if (errsock >= 0) { + if (dup2 (errsock, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) + fatal (s, "dup2", "Cannot dup stderr."); + close (errsock); + } + + setup_environment (&env, pwd); + + if (do_encrypt) { + setup_copier (); + } else { + if (net_write (s, "", 1) != 1) + fatal (s, "net_write", "write failed"); + } + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if(k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + + if(do_newpag) + k_setpag(); +#ifdef KRB4 + if (k_afs_cell_of_file (pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog_uid_home (cell, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb_afslog_uid_home(NULL, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 + /* XXX */ + if (kerberos_status) { + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_error_code status; + + status = krb5_cc_resolve (context, tkfile, &ccache); + if (!status) { + if (k_afs_cell_of_file (pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb5_afslog_uid_home(context, ccache, cell, NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_afslog_uid_home(context, ccache, NULL, NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + } + } +#endif /* KRB5 */ + } +#endif /* KRB5 || KRB4 */ + execle (pwd->pw_shell, pwd->pw_shell, "-c", cmd, NULL, env); + err(1, "exec %s", pwd->pw_shell); +} + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, 'a', arg_flag, &do_addr_verify }, + { "keepalive", 'n', arg_negative_flag, &do_keepalive }, + { "inetd", 'i', arg_negative_flag, &do_inetd, + "Not started from inetd" }, +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + { "kerberos", 'k', arg_flag, &do_kerberos, + "Implement kerberised services" }, + { "encrypt", 'x', arg_flag, &do_encrypt, + "Implement encrypted service" }, +#endif + { "rhosts", 'l', arg_negative_flag, &do_rhosts, + "Don't check users .rhosts" }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "port" }, + { "vacuous", 'v', arg_flag, &do_vacuous, + "Don't accept non-kerberised connections" }, +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + { NULL, 'P', arg_negative_flag, &do_newpag, + "Don't put process in new PAG" }, +#endif + /* compatibility flag: */ + { NULL, 'L', arg_flag, &do_log }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + if(isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + ""); + else + syslog (LOG_ERR, "Usage: %s [-ikxlvPL] [-p port]", getprogname()); + exit (ret); +} + + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int on = 1; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + roken_openlog ("rshd", LOG_ODELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH); + + if (getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage(1); + + if(do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if (do_encrypt) + do_kerberos = 1; + + if(do_kerberos) + do_kerberos = DO_KRB4 | DO_KRB5; +#endif + + if (do_keepalive && + setsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (SO_KEEPALIVE): %m"); + + /* set SO_LINGER? */ + +#ifdef KRB5 + if((do_kerberos & DO_KRB5) && krb5_init_context (&context) != 0) + do_kerberos &= ~DO_KRB5; +#endif + + if (!do_inetd) { + int error; + struct addrinfo *ai = NULL, hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + + if(port_str != NULL) { + error = getaddrinfo (NULL, port_str, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + } + if (ai == NULL) { +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if (do_kerberos) { + if (do_encrypt) { + error = getaddrinfo(NULL, "ekshell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) { + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", 545); + error = getaddrinfo(NULL, portstr, &hints, &ai); + } + if(error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + } else { + error = getaddrinfo(NULL, "kshell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) { + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", 544); + error = getaddrinfo(NULL, portstr, &hints, &ai); + } + if(error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + } + } else +#endif + { + error = getaddrinfo(NULL, "shell", &hints, &ai); + if(error == EAI_NONAME) { + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", 514); + error = getaddrinfo(NULL, portstr, &hints, &ai); + } + if(error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + } + } + mini_inetd_addrinfo (ai); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + } + + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + doit (); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b09091aad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/rsh/rshd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ + +RSHD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual RSHD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + rrsshhdd - remote shell server + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + rrsshhdd [--aaiikkllnnvvxxPPLL] [--pp _p_o_r_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + rrsshhdd is the server for the rsh(1) program. It provides an authenticated + remote command execution service. Supported options are: + + --nn, ----nnoo--kkeeeeppaalliivvee + Disables keep-alive messages. Keep-alives are packets sent at + certain intervals to make sure that the client is still there, + even when it doesn't send any data. + + --kk, ----kkeerrbbeerrooss + Assume that clients connecting to this server will use some form + of Kerberos authentication. See the _E_X_A_M_P_L_E_S section for a sample + inetd.conf(5) configuration. + + --xx, ----eennccrryypptt + For Kerberos 4 this means that the connections are encrypted. + Kerberos 5 can negotiate encryption even without this option, but + if it's present rrsshhdd will deny unencrypted connections. This op- + tion implies --kk. + + --vv, ----vvaaccuuoouuss + If the connecting client does not use any Kerberised authentica- + tion, print a message that complains about this fact, and exit. + This is helpful if you want to move away from old port-based au- + thentication. + + --PP When using the AFS filesystem, users' authentication tokens are + put in something called a PAG (Process Authentication Group). + Multiple processes can share a PAG, but normally each login ses- + sion has its own PAG. This option disables the sseettppaagg() call, so + all tokens will be put in the default (uid-based) PAG, making it + possible to share tokens between sessions. This is only useful in + peculiar environments, such as some batch systems. + + --ii, ----nnoo--iinneettdd + The --ii option will cause rrsshhdd to create a socket, instead of as- + suming that its stdin came from inetd(8). This is mostly useful + for debugging. + + --pp _p_o_r_t, ----ppoorrtt==_p_o_r_t + Port to use with --ii. + + --aa This flag is for backwards compatibility only. + + --LL This flag enables logging of connections to syslogd(8). This op- + tion is always on in this implementation. + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/hosts.equiv + ~/.rhosts + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + The following can be used to enable Kerberised rsh in inetd.cond(5), + while disabling non-Kerberised connections: + + shell stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/rshd rshd -v + kshell stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/rshd rshd -k + ekshell stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/rshd rshd -kx + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + rsh(1), iruserok(3) + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + The rrsshhdd command appeared in 4.2BSD. + +AAUUTTHHOORRSS + This implementation of rrsshhdd was written as part of the Heimdal Kerberos 5 + implementation. + + HEIMDAL November 22, 2002 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7420d85ee3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +2003-05-06 Johan Danielsson + + * su.c: remove accidentally committed code that prints the command + being executed + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * su.c (krb5_start_session): krb5_afslog doesn't depend on KRB4 + any more + +2002-02-19 Johan Danielsson + + * su.c: make this build without krb5 + +2002-01-09 Jacques Vidrine + + * su.c: Don't use getlogin() to determine whether we are root. + Patch by joda. + +2001-06-12 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c: check memory allocations. add some const + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (krb5_verify): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + +2000-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * su.c: set KRBTKFILE + +2000-07-10 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: actually install su + * su.c (krb5_verify): try harder freeing. do not get upset on + interrupted password read + +2000-06-09 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (main): work-around for setuid and capabilities bug fixed + in Linux 2.2.16 + +2000-06-03 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (main): just ignore shadow information if getspnam returns + NULL + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: use LIB_roken + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (krb5_verify): use krb5_verify_user_lrealm + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c: add support for shadow passwords and rewrite some logic. + From Miroslav Ruda + + * Makefile.am: add libkafs + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (main): conditionalize `getlogin' + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (verfiy_krb5): get the name out of the ccache before + closing it + +1999-05-05 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c: some more error checking + +Wed Apr 21 21:04:36 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (-f): implement + + * su.c: implement -i + (verify_krb5): correct the ownership on the credential cache + +Tue Apr 20 13:26:13 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * su.c: don't depend on paths.h + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9cacaba7d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.7 2001/08/28 08:31:22 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) + +bin_PROGRAMS = su +bin_SUIDS = su +su_SOURCES = su.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f6eb06546e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/su/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,767 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.7 2001/08/28 08:31:22 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(su_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog +bin_PROGRAMS = su$(EXEEXT) +subdir = appl/su +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken2.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/c-attribute.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/capabilities.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-compile-et.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-declaration.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-man.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-type-extra.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-var.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-x.m4 \ + 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Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: su.c,v 1.26.2.1 2003/05/06 12:06:44 joda Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#include "crypto-headers.h" +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef _PATH_DEFPATH +#define _PATH_DEFPATH "/usr/bin:/bin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +int kerberos_flag = 1; +int csh_f_flag; +int full_login; +int env_flag; +char *kerberos_instance = "root"; +int help_flag; +int version_flag; +char *cmd; +char tkfile[256]; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "kerberos", 'K', arg_negative_flag, &kerberos_flag, + "don't use kerberos" }, + { NULL, 'f', arg_flag, &csh_f_flag, + "don't read .cshrc" }, + { "full", 'l', arg_flag, &full_login, + "simulate full login" }, + { NULL, 'm', arg_flag, &env_flag, + "leave environment unmodified" }, + { "instance", 'i', arg_string, &kerberos_instance, + "root instance to use" }, + { "command", 'c', arg_string, &cmd, + "command to execute" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, +}; + + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[login [shell arguments]]"); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +free_info(struct passwd *p) +{ + free (p->pw_name); + free (p->pw_passwd); + free (p->pw_dir); + free (p->pw_shell); + free (p); +} + +static struct passwd* +dup_info(const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + struct passwd *info; + + info = malloc(sizeof(*info)); + if(info == NULL) + return NULL; + info->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name); + info->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd); + info->pw_uid = pwd->pw_uid; + info->pw_gid = pwd->pw_gid; + info->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir); + info->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell); + if(info->pw_name == NULL || info->pw_passwd == NULL || + info->pw_dir == NULL || info->pw_shell == NULL) { + free_info (info); + return NULL; + } + return info; +} + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +static void +set_tkfile() +{ +#ifndef TKT_ROOT +#define TKT_ROOT "/tmp/tkt" +#endif + int fd; + if(*tkfile != '\0') + return; + snprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile), "%s_XXXXXX", TKT_ROOT); + fd = mkstemp(tkfile); + if(fd >= 0) + close(fd); +#ifdef KRB4 + krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile); +#endif +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_ccache ccache; + +static int +krb5_verify(const struct passwd *login_info, + const struct passwd *su_info, + const char *kerberos_instance) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal p; + char *login_name = NULL; + +#if defined(HAVE_GETLOGIN) && !defined(POSIX_GETLOGIN) + login_name = getlogin(); +#endif + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) { +#if 0 + warnx("krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (login_name == NULL || strcmp (login_name, "root") == 0) + login_name = login_info->pw_name; + if (strcmp (su_info->pw_name, "root") == 0) + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &p, NULL, + login_name, + kerberos_instance, + NULL); + else + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &p, NULL, + su_info->pw_name, + NULL); + if(ret) + return 1; + + if(su_info->pw_uid != 0 || krb5_kuserok(context, p, su_info->pw_name)) { + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); + if(ret) { +#if 1 + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_gen_new"); +#endif + krb5_free_principal (context, p); + return 1; + } + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(context, p, ccache, NULL, TRUE, NULL); + krb5_free_principal (context, p); + if(ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + switch (ret) { + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR : + break; + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: + krb5_warnx(context, "Password incorrect"); + break; + default : + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_verify_user"); + break; + } + return 1; + } + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal (context, p); + return 1; +} + +static int +krb5_start_session(void) +{ + krb5_ccache ccache2; + char *cc_name; + int ret; + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache2); + if (ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache(context, ccache, ccache2); + + asprintf(&cc_name, "%s:%s", krb5_cc_get_type(context, ccache2), + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache2)); + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME", cc_name, 1); + + /* we want to export this even if we don't directly support KRB4 */ + set_tkfile(); + esetenv("KRBTKFILE", tkfile, 1); + + /* convert creds? */ + if(k_hasafs()) { + if (k_setpag() == 0) + krb5_afslog(context, ccache2, NULL, NULL); + } + + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache2); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 + +static int +krb_verify(const struct passwd *login_info, + const struct passwd *su_info, + const char *kerberos_instance) +{ + int ret; + char *login_name = NULL; + char *name, *instance, realm[REALM_SZ]; + +#if defined(HAVE_GETLOGIN) && !defined(POSIX_GETLOGIN) + login_name = getlogin(); +#endif + + ret = krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1); + + if (login_name == NULL || strcmp (login_name, "root") == 0) + login_name = login_info->pw_name; + if (strcmp (su_info->pw_name, "root") == 0) { + name = login_name; + instance = (char*)kerberos_instance; + } else { + name = su_info->pw_name; + instance = ""; + } + + if(su_info->pw_uid != 0 || + krb_kuserok(name, instance, realm, su_info->pw_name) == 0) { + char password[128]; + char *prompt; + asprintf (&prompt, + "%s's Password: ", + krb_unparse_name_long (name, instance, realm)); + if (des_read_pw_string (password, sizeof (password), prompt, 0)) { + memset (password, 0, sizeof (password)); + free(prompt); + return (1); + } + free(prompt); + if (strlen(password) == 0) + return (1); /* Empty passwords are not allowed */ + set_tkfile(); + setuid(geteuid()); /* need to run as root here */ + ret = krb_verify_user(name, instance, realm, password, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL); + memset(password, 0, sizeof(password)); + + if(ret) { + warnx("%s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + chown (tkt_string(), su_info->pw_uid, su_info->pw_gid); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + + +static int +krb_start_session(void) +{ + esetenv("KRBTKFILE", tkfile, 1); + + /* convert creds? */ + if(k_hasafs() && k_setpag() == 0) + krb_afslog(NULL, NULL); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int +verify_unix(struct passwd *su) +{ + char prompt[128]; + char pw_buf[1024]; + char *pw; + int r; + if(su->pw_passwd != NULL && *su->pw_passwd != '\0') { + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's password: ", su->pw_name); + r = des_read_pw_string(pw_buf, sizeof(pw_buf), prompt, 0); + if(r != 0) + exit(0); + pw = crypt(pw_buf, su->pw_passwd); + memset(pw_buf, 0, sizeof(pw_buf)); + if(strcmp(pw, su->pw_passwd) != 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, optind = 0; + char *su_user; + struct passwd *su_info; + struct passwd *login_info; + + struct passwd *pwd; + + char *shell; + + int ok = 0; + int kerberos_error=1; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + for (i=0; i < optind; i++) + if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0) { + full_login = 1; + break; + } + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + if(optind >= argc) + su_user = "root"; + else + su_user = argv[optind++]; + + pwd = k_getpwnam(su_user); + if(pwd == NULL) + errx (1, "unknown login %s", su_user); + if (pwd->pw_uid == 0 && strcmp ("root", su_user) != 0) { + syslog (LOG_ALERT, "NIS attack, user %s has uid 0", su_user); + errx (1, "unknown login %s", su_user); + } + su_info = dup_info(pwd); + if (su_info == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + + pwd = getpwuid(getuid()); + if(pwd == NULL) + errx(1, "who are you?"); + login_info = dup_info(pwd); + if (login_info == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + if(env_flag) + shell = login_info->pw_shell; + else + shell = su_info->pw_shell; + if(shell == NULL || *shell == '\0') + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + +#ifdef KRB5 + if(kerberos_flag && ok == 0 && + (kerberos_error=krb5_verify(login_info, su_info, kerberos_instance)) == 0) + ok = 5; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if(kerberos_flag && ok == 0 && + (kerberos_error = krb_verify(login_info, su_info, kerberos_instance)) == 0) + ok = 4; +#endif + + if(ok == 0 && login_info->pw_uid && verify_unix(su_info) != 0) { + printf("Sorry!\n"); + exit(1); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + { struct spwd *sp; + long today; + + sp = getspnam(su_info->pw_name); + if (sp != NULL) { + today = time(0)/(24L * 60 * 60); + if (sp->sp_expire > 0) { + if (today >= sp->sp_expire) { + if (login_info->pw_uid) + errx(1,"Your account has expired."); + else + printf("Your account has expired."); + } + else if (sp->sp_expire - today < 14) + printf("Your account will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_expire - today)); + } + if (sp->sp_max > 0) { + if (today >= sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max) { + if (login_info->pw_uid) + errx(1,"Your password has expired. Choose a new one."); + else + printf("Your password has expired. Choose a new one."); + } + else if (today >= sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - sp->sp_warn) + printf("Your account will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max -today)); + } + } + } +#endif + { + char *tty = ttyname (STDERR_FILENO); + syslog (LOG_NOTICE | LOG_AUTH, tty ? "%s to %s" : "%s to %s on %s", + login_info->pw_name, su_info->pw_name, tty); + } + + + if(!env_flag) { + if(full_login) { + char *t = getenv ("TERM"); + + environ = malloc (10 * sizeof (char *)); + if (environ == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + environ[0] = NULL; + esetenv ("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1); + if (t) + esetenv ("TERM", t, 1); + if (chdir (su_info->pw_dir) < 0) + errx (1, "no directory"); + } + if (full_login || su_info->pw_uid) + esetenv ("USER", su_info->pw_name, 1); + esetenv("HOME", su_info->pw_dir, 1); + esetenv("SHELL", shell, 1); + } + + { + int i; + char **args; + char *p; + + p = strrchr(shell, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = shell; + + if (strcmp(p, "csh") != 0) + csh_f_flag = 0; + + args = malloc(((cmd ? 2 : 0) + 1 + argc - optind + 1 + csh_f_flag) * sizeof(*args)); + if (args == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + i = 0; + if(full_login) + asprintf(&args[i++], "-%s", p); + else + args[i++] = p; + if (cmd) { + args[i++] = "-c"; + args[i++] = cmd; + } + + if (csh_f_flag) + args[i++] = "-f"; + + for (argv += optind; *argv; ++argv) + args[i++] = *argv; + args[i] = NULL; + + if(setgid(su_info->pw_gid) < 0) + err(1, "setgid"); + if (initgroups (su_info->pw_name, su_info->pw_gid) < 0) + err (1, "initgroups"); + if(setuid(su_info->pw_uid) < 0 + || (su_info->pw_uid != 0 && setuid(0) == 0)) + err(1, "setuid"); + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ok == 5) + krb5_start_session(); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ok == 4) + krb_start_session(); +#endif + execv(shell, args); + } + + exit(1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..610655763d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,559 @@ +2004-06-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * telnet/network.c: 1.12: make network rings larger From: MAAAAA + MOOOR + + * telnetd/state.c: 1.14: make subbuffer larger XXX resize + dynamicly From: MAAAAA MOOOR + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: 1.54: (Data): allocate the data needed to + be send + From: MAAAAA MOOOR + +2004-03-22 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: call setprogname to make libvers happy + + * telnet/main.c: call setprogname to make libvers happy + +2002-09-02 Johan Danielsson + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: set AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/commands.c: remove extra "Toggle"'s + + * telnet/commands.c: IRIX == 4 -> IRIX4 + + * telnet/main.c: rename functions to what they're really called + + * telnet/commands.c: kill some might be uninitialized warnings + + * telnet/commands.c: add forward and forwardable toggle options, + and call set_forward_options() after parsing .telnetrc + + * telnet/externs.h: proto for set_forward_options + + * telnet/main.c: only register what forwarding options are asked + for when parsing command line, we have to set the actual flags + later after we have read .telnetrc + + * libtelnet/auth-proto.h: kerberos5_set_forward{,able} protos + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: add kerberos5_set_forward{,able} + functions suitable for the command parser + +2002-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: add --version as a special case + * telnet/main.c: add --version as a special case + +2002-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/telnet.c: only try to negotiate encryption if we're + talking to a real telnet + +2002-03-31 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/commands.c: fix an old cut-n-paste typo (via debian) + +2002-02-07 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/telnet.c: print a more informative message than "done" + after negotiating encryption + +2001-09-17 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: add a kludge to make it build on aix (that + defines NOERROR in both sys/stream.h and arpa/nameser.h and + considers that a fatal error) + + * telnet/telnet.c: undef PUTSHORT to avoid conflict + +2001-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/Makefile.am: also link with the library for logout + +2001-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c: include libutil.h if it exists + +2001-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (getpty): call openpty if it exists + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/global.c (output_data): make sure of not forwarding + `nfrontp' too far, thereby allowing writes after the end of + `netobuf' + +2001-06-18 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: update to new krb5_auth_con* names + +2001-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (start_login): give the correct error if exec + fails + * telnetd/utility.c (fatalperror_errno): add a new function with + explicit errno parameter + +2001-03-07 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c: some minimal more amount of + const-correctness + +2001-02-24 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/enc_des.c: learn to live with libcrypto (from openssl) + +2001-02-20 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): copy the hostname so it doesn't get + overwritten while reading ~/.telnetrc + (*): removed some unneeded externs + +2001-02-08 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (startslave, start_login): re-write code to + keep track both of remote hostname and utmp string to be used + * telnetd/telnetd.c (doit, my_telnet): re-write code to keep track + both of remote hostname and utmp string to be used + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/Makefile.am, telnetd/Makefile.am: add LIB_kdfs + +2001-01-09 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_is): use krb5_rd_cred2 instead + of krb5_rd_cred + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/main.c (krb5_init): check krb5_init_context for success + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_init): check krb5_init_context + for success + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (sourceroute): make it not break if the + rfc2292 api does not exist + +2000-12-09 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (scrub_env): add supporting non-file TERMCAP + variables + +2000-12-07 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.h: move include files around to avoid getting SE + from sys/*.h on HP to override SE from telnet.h + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (scrub_env): remove some const-ness + * telnetd/sys_term.c (scrub_env): add LOGNAME and POSIXLY_CORRECT + to the list of authorized environment variables to be compatible + with linux-telnetd + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (scrub_env): change filtering algoritm from + allowing everything except a few bad cases to not allowing + anything except a few non-dangerous cases + +2000-12-06 Johan Danielsson + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: de-pointerise auth_context parameter to + krb5_mk_rep + +2000-11-23 Johan Danielsson + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: print the principal we're trying to use + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c: print the principal we're trying to use + +2000-11-16 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/misc-proto.h (telnet_getenv): const-ize some + +2000-11-08 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/telnet.c: fake entry if no tgetent + +2000-10-08 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/utility.c (stilloob): check that fds are not too large + to select on + (ttloop): remove confusing output of errno + * telnetd/telnetd.c (my_telnet): check that fds are not too large + to select on + * telnet/utilities.c (EmptyTerminal): check that fds are not too + large to select on + * telnet/sys_bsd.c (process_rings): check that fds are not too + large to select on + * telnet/network.c (stilloob): check that fds are not too large to + select on + +2000-06-09 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c: remove all setuid(getuid()). we do not + support telnet being setuid root + +2000-05-05 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/externs.h (sourceroute): update prototype + * telnet/commands.c (tn): re-enable source routing + (sourceroute): make it work again based on the code from + itojun@kame.net + +2000-03-28 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): clean-up a tiny little bit. give-up if + we do not manage to connect to any address + +2000-03-26 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (*): make sure to always call time, ctime, + and gmtime with `time_t's. there were some types (like in + lastlog) that we believed to always be time_t. this has proven + wrong on Solaris 8 in 64-bit mode, where they are stored as 32-bit + quantities but time_t has gone up to 64 bits + +2000-03-03 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_init): check that we do have a + keytab before saying that we will support KERBEROS5 + +2000-02-12 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): only set tos for AF_INET. From + itojun@iijlab.net + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c (kerberos4_is): send a reject back to the + client when we're not authorized + +2000-02-06 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/ring.h (ring_encrypt): better proto + * telnet/ring.c (ring_encrypt): better proto + +2000-02-04 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/telnet_locl.h: klduge-around KLUDGELINEMODE + +2000-01-18 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/misc.c (auth_encrypt_user): const-ify + * libtelnet/misc.h (RemoteHostName, LocalHostName): const-ify + * libtelnet/misc.c (auth_encrypt_init, RemoteHostName, + LocalHostName): const-ify + * libtelnet/misc-proto.h (auth_encrypt_init, auth_encrypt_user): + const-ify + * libtelnet/encrypt.c (encrypt_init, Name): const-ify + * libtelnet/enc-proto.h (encrypt_init): const-ify + * libtelnet/auth.c (auth_init, Name): const-ify + * libtelnet/auth-proto.h (auth_init): const-ify + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): handle ai_canonname being set in any of + the addresses returnedby getaddrinfo. glibc apparently returns + the reverse lookup of every address in ai_canonname. remove some + unused variables. + +2000-01-01 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (addarg): make void (return value isn't check + anyway). fatal error when malloc fails + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (*): handle ai_canonname not being set + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c (doit): use getnameinfo_verified + * telnetd/telnetd.c: use getnameinfo + * telnet/commands.c: re-write to using getaddrinfo. disable + source-routing for the moment, it doesn't seem to be used anyways. + +1999-09-16 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c: revert 1.54, get_default_username should DTRT + now + +1999-09-05 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/utility.c (ttloop): make it return 1 if interrupted by a + signal, which must have been what was meant from the beginning + + * telnetd/ext.h (ttloop): update prototype + + * telnetd/authenc.c (telnet_spin): actually return the value from + ttloop (otherwise it's kind of bogus) + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (rmut): free utxp + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/main.c: add -G and config file support. From Miroslav + Ruda + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (rmut): work around utmpx strangness. From + Miroslav Ruda + +1999-08-02 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c (doit): only free hp if != NULL. From: Jonas + Oberg + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c (doit): remove unused variable mapped_sin + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/ext.h: update prototypes + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: make it handle v4 and v6 sockets. (it + doesn't handle being given a v6 socket that's really talking to an + v4 adress (mapped) because the rest of the code in telnetd is not + able to handle it anyway). please run two telnetd from your + inetd, one for v4 and one for v6. + +1999-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): extra bogus const-cast + +1999-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (start_login): print a different warning with + `-a otp' + +1999-06-24 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_send): set the addresses in the + auth_context + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): add $(INCLUDE_krb4) + + * telnet/commands.c (togkrbdebug): conditionalize on + krb_disable_debug + +1999-06-16 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/commands.c: add kerberos debugging option + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): use get_default_username + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/state.c (telrcv): magic patch to make it work against + DOS Clarkson Telnet. From Miroslav Ruda + +1999-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_send): use + `krb5_auth_setkeytype' instead of `krb5_auth_setenctype' to make + sure we get a DES session key. + +Thu Apr 1 16:59:27 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/Makefile.am: don't run check-local + + * telnet/Makefile.am: don't run check-local + +Mon Mar 29 16:11:33 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/sys_term.c: _CRAY -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + +Sat Mar 20 00:12:54 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/authenc.c (telnet_gets): remove old extern declarations + +Thu Mar 18 11:20:16 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * telnet/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * libtelnet/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Mon Mar 15 17:40:53 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: replace perror/exit with fatalperror + +Sat Mar 13 22:18:57 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c (main): 0 -> STDIN_FILENO. remove abs + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c (kerberos4_is): syslog root logins + +Thu Mar 11 14:48:54 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/Makefile.in: add WFLAGS + + * telnet/Makefile.in: add WFLAGS + + * libtelnet/Makefile.in: add WFLAGS + + * telnetd/sys_term.c: remove unused variables + + * telnet/telnet.c: fix some warnings + + * telnet/main.c: fix some warnings + + * telnet/commands.c: fix types in format string + + * libtelnet/auth.c: fix types in format string + +Mon Mar 1 10:50:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/sys_term.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + +Mon Feb 1 04:08:36 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): only call gethostbyname2 with AF_INET6 + if we actually have IPv6. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + +Sat Nov 21 16:51:00 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/sys_term.c (cleanup): don't call vhangup() on sgi:s + +Fri Aug 14 16:29:18 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c: krb_put_int -> KRB_PUT_INT + +Thu Jul 23 20:29:05 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: use krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum + +Mon Jul 13 22:00:09 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): don't advance hostent->h_addr_list, use + a copy instead + +Wed May 27 04:19:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/sys_bsd.c (process_rings): correct call to `stilloob' + +Fri May 15 19:38:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: Always print errors from mk_req. + +Fri May 1 07:16:59 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c: unifdef -DHAVE_H_ERRNO + +Sat Apr 4 15:00:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): moved the printing of `trying...' to the + loop + +Thu Mar 12 02:33:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/telnet_locl.h: include . From Gregory S. Stark + + +Sat Feb 21 15:12:38 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/ext.h: add prototype for login_tty + + * telnet/utilities.c (printsub): `direction' is now an int. + + * libtelnet/misc-proto.h: add prototype for `printsub' + +Tue Feb 17 02:45:01 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c (kerberos4_is): cred.pname should be + cred.pinst. From + +Sun Feb 15 02:46:39 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/*/*.c: renamed `telnet' to `my_telnet' to avoid + conflicts with system header files on mklinux. + +Tue Feb 10 02:09:03 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: new signature for `getterminaltype' and + `auth_wait' + + * libtelnet: changed the signature of the authentication method + `status' + +Sat Feb 7 07:21:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * */*.c: replace HAS_GETTOS by HAVE_PARSETOS and HAVE_GETTOSBYNAME + +Fri Dec 26 16:17:10 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/commands.c (tn): repair support for numeric addresses + +Sun Dec 21 09:40:31 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c: fix up lots of stuff related to the + forwarding of v4 tickets. + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_forward): zero out `creds'. + +Mon Dec 15 20:53:13 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/sys_bsd.c: Don't turn off OPOST in 8bit-mode. + +Tue Dec 9 19:26:50 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/main.c (main): add 'b' to getopt + +Sat Nov 29 03:28:54 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * telnet/telnet.c: Change binary mode to do just that, and add a + eight-bit mode for just passing all characters. + +Sun Nov 16 04:37:02 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_send): always ask for a session + key of type DES + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: remove old garbage and fix call to + krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd + +Fri Nov 14 20:35:18 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * telnetd/telnetd.c: Output contents of /etc/issue. + +Mon Nov 3 07:09:16 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * telnet/telnet_locl.h: only include iff + !defined(HAVE_TERMIOS_H) + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c (kerberos4_is): send the peer address to + krb_rd_req + + * telnetd/telnetd.c (terminaltypeok): always return OK. It used + to call `tgetent' to figure if it was a defined terminal type. + It's possible to overflow tgetent so that's a bad idea. The worst + that could happen by saying yes to all terminals is that the user + ends up with a terminal that has no definition on the local + system. And besides, most telnet client has no support for + falling back to a different terminal type. + +Mon Oct 20 05:47:19 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * libtelnet/kerberos5.c: remove lots of old junk. clean-up. + better error checking and reporting. tell the user permission + denied much earlier. + + * libtelnet/kerberos.c (kerberos4_is): only print + UserNameRequested if != NULL + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eec013bae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:15 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = libtelnet telnet telnetd + +dist-hook: + $(mkinstalldirs) $(distdir)/arpa + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/arpa/telnet.h $(distdir)/arpa + +EXTRA_DIST = README.ORIG telnet.state diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7c6296e41 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,781 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:15 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 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100644 index 0000000000..37b588fafd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/README.ORIG @@ -0,0 +1,743 @@ + +This is a distribution of both client and server telnet. These programs +have been compiled on: + telnet telnetd + 4.4 BSD-Lite x x + 4.3 BSD Reno X X + UNICOS 9.1 X X + UNICOS 9.0 X X + UNICOS 8.0 X X + BSDI 2.0 X X + Solaris 2.4 x x (no linemode in server) + SunOs 4.1.4 X X (no linemode in server) + Ultrix 4.3 X X (no linemode in server) + Ultrix 4.1 X X (no linemode in server) + +In addition, previous versions have been compiled on the following +machines, but were not available for testing this version. + telnet telnetd + Next1.0 X X + UNICOS 8.3 X X + UNICOS 7.C X X + UNICOS 7.0 X X + SunOs 4.0.3c X X (no linemode in server) + 4.3 BSD X X (no linemode in server) + DYNIX V3.0.12 X X (no linemode in server) + Ultrix 3.1 X X (no linemode in server) + Ultrix 4.0 X X (no linemode in server) + SunOs 3.5 X X (no linemode in server) + SunOs 4.1.3 X X (no linemode in server) + Solaris 2.2 x x (no linemode in server) + Solaris 2.3 x x (no linemode in server) + BSDI 1.0 X X + BSDI 1.1 X X + DYNIX V3.0.17.9 X X (no linemode in server) + HP-UX 8.0 x x (no linemode in server) + +This code should work, but there are no guarantees. + +May 30, 1995 + +This release represents what is on the 4.4BSD-Lite2 release, which +should be the final BSD release. I will continue to support of +telnet, The code (without encryption) is available via anonymous ftp +from ftp.cray.com, in src/telnet/telnet.YY.MM.DD.NE.tar.Z, where +YY.MM.DD is replaced with the year, month and day of the release. +If you can't find it at one of these places, at some point in the +near future information about the latest releases should be available +from ftp.borman.com. + +In addition, the version with the encryption code is available via +ftp from net-dist.mit.edu, in the directory /pub/telnet. There +is a README file there that gives further information on how +to get the distribution. + +Questions, comments, bug reports and bug fixes can be sent to +one of these addresses: + dab@borman.com + dab@cray.com + dab@bsdi.com + +This release is mainly bug fixes and code cleanup. + + Replace all calls to bcopy()/bzero() with calls to + memmove()/memset() and all calls to index()/rindex() + with calls to strchr()/strrchr(). + + Add some missing diagnostics for option tracing + to telnetd. + + Add support for BSDI 2.0 and Solaris 2.4. + + Add support for UNICOS 8.0 + + Get rid of expanded tabs and trailing white spaces. + + From Paul Vixie: + Fix for telnet going into an endless spin + when the session dies abnormally. + + From Jef Poskanzer: + Changes to allow telnet to compile + under SunOS 3.5. + + From Philip Guenther: + makeutx() doesn't expand utmpx, + use pututxline() instead. + + From Chris Torek: + Add a sleep(1) before execing login + to avoid race condition that can eat + up the login prompt. + Use terminal speed directly if it is + not an encoded value. + + From Steve Parker: + Fix to realloc() call. Fix for execing + login on solaris with no user name. + +January 19, 1994 + +This is a list of some of the changes since the last tar release +of telnet/telnetd. There are probably other changes that aren't +listed here, but this should hit a lot of the main ones. + + General: + Changed #define for AUTHENTICATE to AUTHENTICATION + Changed #define for ENCRYPT to ENCRYPTION + Changed #define for DES_ENCRYPT to DES_ENCRYPTION + + Added support for SPX authentication: -DSPX + + Added support for Kerberos Version 5 authentication: -DKRB5 + + Added support for ANSI C function prototypes + + Added support for the NEW-ENVIRON option (RFC-1572) + including support for USERVAR. + + Made support for the old Environment Option (RFC-1408) + conditional on -DOLD_ENVIRON + + Added #define ENV_HACK - support for RFC 1571 + + The encryption code is removed from the public distributions. + Domestic 4.4 BSD distributions contain the encryption code. + + ENV_HACK: Code to deal with systems that only implement + the old ENVIRON option, and have reversed definitions + of ENV_VAR and ENV_VAL. Also fixes ENV processing in + client to handle things besides just the default set... + + NO_BSD_SETJMP: UNICOS configuration for + UNICOS 6.1/6.0/5.1/5.0 systems. + + STREAMSPTY: Use /dev/ptmx to get a clean pty. This + is for SVr4 derivatives (Like Solaris) + + UTMPX: For systems that have /etc/utmpx. This is for + SVr4 derivatives (Like Solaris) + + Definitions for BSDI 1.0 + + Definitions for 4.3 Reno and 4.4 BSD. + + Definitions for UNICOS 8.0 and UNICOS 7.C + + Definitions for Solaris 2.0 + + Definitions for HP-UX 8.0 + + Latest Copyright notices from Berkeley. + + FLOW-CONTROL: support for RFC-XXXx + + + Client Specific: + + Fix the "send" command to not send garbage... + + Fix status message for "skiprc" + + Make sure to send NAWS after telnet has been suspended + or an external command has been run, if the window size + has changed. + + sysV88 support. + + Server Specific: + + Support flowcontrol option in non-linemode servers. + + -k Server supports Kludge Linemode, but will default to + either single character mode or real Linemode support. + The user will have to explicitly ask to switch into + kludge linemode. ("stty extproc", or escape back to + to telnet and say "mode line".) + + -u Specify the length of the hostname field in the utmp + file. Hostname longer than this length will be put + into the utmp file in dotted decimal notation, rather + than putting in a truncated hostname. + + -U Registered hosts only. If a reverse hostname lookup + fails, the connection will be refused. + + -f/-F + Allows forwarding of credentials for KRB5. + +Februrary 22, 1991: + + Features: + + This version of telnet/telnetd has support for both + the AUTHENTICATION and ENCRYPTION options. The + AUTHENTICATION option is fairly well defined, and + an option number has been assigned to it. The + ENCRYPTION option is still in a state of flux; an + option number has been assigned to, but it is still + subject to change. The code is provided in this release + for experimental and testing purposes. + + The telnet "send" command can now be used to send + do/dont/will/wont commands, with any telnet option + name. The rules for when do/dont/will/wont are sent + are still followed, so just because the user requests + that one of these be sent doesn't mean that it will + be sent... + + The telnet "getstatus" command no longer requires + that option printing be enabled to see the response + to the "DO STATUS" command. + + A -n flag has been added to telnetd to disable + keepalives. + + A new telnet command, "auth" has been added (if + AUTHENTICATE is defined). It has four sub-commands, + "status", "disable", "enable" and "help". + + A new telnet command, "encrypt" has been added (if + ENCRYPT is defined). It has many sub-commands: + "enable", "type", "start", "stop", "input", + "-input", "output", "-output", "status", and "help". + + The LOGOUT option is now supported by both telnet + and telnetd, a new command, "logout", was added + to support this. + + Several new toggle options were added: + "autoencrypt", "autodecrypt", "autologin", "authdebug", + "encdebug", "skiprc", "verbose_encrypt" + + An "rlogin" interface has been added. If the program + is named "rlogin", or the "-r" flag is given, then + an rlogin type of interface will be used. + ~. Terminates the session + ~ Suspend the session + ~^] Escape to telnet command mode + ~~ Pass through the ~. + BUG: If you type the rlogin escape character + in the middle of a line while in rlogin + mode, you cannot erase it or any characters + before it. Hopefully this can be fixed + in a future release... + + General changes: + + A "libtelnet.a" has now been created. This libraray + contains code that is common to both telnet and + telnetd. This is also where library routines that + are needed, but are not in the standard C library, + are placed. + + The makefiles have been re-done. All of the site + specific configuration information has now been put + into a single "Config.generic" file, in the top level + directory. Changing this one file will take care of + all three subdirectories. Also, to add a new/local + definition, a "Config.local" file may be created + at the top level; if that file exists, the subdirectories + will use that file instead of "Config.generic". + + Many 1-2 line functions in commands.c have been + removed, and just inserted in-line, or replaced + with a macro. + + Bug Fixes: + + The non-termio code in both telnet and telnetd was + setting/clearing CTLECH in the sg_flags word. This + was incorrect, and has been changed to set/clear the + LCTLECH bit in the local mode word. + + The SRCRT #define has been removed. If IP_OPTIONS + and IPPROTO_IP are defined on the system, then the + source route code is automatically enabled. + + The NO_GETTYTAB #define has been removed; there + is a compatability routine that can be built into + libtelnet to achive the same results. + + The server, telnetd, has been switched to use getopt() + for parsing the argument list. + + The code for getting the input/output speeds via + cfgetispeed()/cfgetospeed() was still not quite + right in telnet. Posix says if the ispeed is 0, + then it is really equal to the ospeed. + + The suboption processing code in telnet now has + explicit checks to make sure that we received + the entire suboption (telnetd was already doing this). + + The telnet code for processing the terminal type + could cause a core dump if an existing connection + was closed, and a new connection opened without + exiting telnet. + + Telnetd was doing a TCSADRAIN when setting the new + terminal settings; This is not good, because it means + that the tcsetattr() will hang waiting for output to + drain, and telnetd is the only one that will drain + the output... The fix is to use TCSANOW which does + not wait. + + Telnetd was improperly setting/clearing the ISTRIP + flag in the c_lflag field, it should be using the + c_iflag field. + + When the child process of telnetd was opening the + slave side of the pty, it was re-setting the EXTPROC + bit too early, and some of the other initialization + code was wiping it out. This would cause telnetd + to go out of linemode and into single character mode. + + One instance of leaving linemode in telnetd forgot + to send a WILL ECHO to the client, the net result + would be that the user would see double character + echo. + + If the MODE was being changed several times very + quickly, telnetd could get out of sync with the + state changes and the returning acks; and wind up + being left in the wrong state. + +September 14, 1990: + + Switch the client to use getopt() for parsing the + argument list. The 4.3Reno getopt.c is included for + systems that don't have getopt(). + + Use the posix _POSIX_VDISABLE value for what value + to use when disabling special characters. If this + is undefined, it defaults to 0x3ff. + + For non-termio systems, TIOCSETP was being used to + change the state of the terminal. This causes the + input queue to be flushed, which we don't want. This + is now changed to TIOCSETN. + + Take out the "#ifdef notdef" around the code in the + server that generates a "sync" when the pty oputput + is flushed. The potential problem is that some older + telnet clients may go into an infinate loop when they + receive a "sync", if so, the server can be compiled + with "NO_URGENT" defined. + + Fix the client where it was setting/clearing the OPOST + bit in the c_lflag field, not the c_oflag field. + + Fix the client where it was setting/clearing the ISTRIP + bit in the c_lflag field, not the c_iflag field. (On + 4.3Reno, this is the ECHOPRT bit in the c_lflag field.) + The client also had its interpretation of WILL BINARY + and DO BINARY reversed. + + Fix a bug in client that would cause a core dump when + attempting to remove the last environment variable. + + In the client, there were a few places were switch() + was being passed a character, and if it was a negative + value, it could get sign extended, and not match + the 8 bit case statements. The fix is to and the + switch value with 0xff. + + Add a couple more printoption() calls in the client, I + don't think there are any more places were a telnet + command can be received and not printed out when + "options" is on. + + A new flag has been added to the client, "-a". Currently, + this just causes the USER name to be sent across, in + the future this may be used to signify that automatic + authentication is requested. + + The USER variable is now only sent by the client if + the "-a" or "-l user" options are explicity used, or + if the user explicitly asks for the "USER" environment + variable to be exported. In the server, if it receives + the "USER" environment variable, it won't print out the + banner message, so that only "Password:" will be printed. + This makes the symantics more like rlogin, and should be + more familiar to the user. (People are not used to + getting a banner message, and then getting just a + "Password:" prompt.) + + Re-vamp the code for starting up the child login + process. The code was getting ugly, and it was + hard to tell what was really going on. What we + do now is after the fork(), in the child: + 1) make sure we have no controlling tty + 2) open and initialize the tty + 3) do a setsid()/setpgrp() + 4) makes the tty our controlling tty. + On some systems, #2 makes the tty our controlling + tty, and #4 is a no-op. The parent process does + a gets rid of any controlling tty after the child + is fork()ed. + + Use the strdup() library routine in telnet, instead + of the local savestr() routine. If you don't have + strdup(), you need to define NO_STRDUP. + + Add support for ^T (SIGINFO/VSTATUS), found in the + 4.3Reno distribution. This maps to the AYT character. + You need a 4-line bugfix in the kernel to get this + to work properly: + + > *** tty_pty.c.ORG Tue Sep 11 09:41:53 1990 + > --- tty_pty.c Tue Sep 11 17:48:03 1990 + > *************** + > *** 609,613 **** + > if ((tp->t_lflag&NOFLSH) == 0) + > ttyflush(tp, FREAD|FWRITE); + > ! pgsignal(tp->t_pgrp, *(unsigned int *)data); + > return(0); + > } + > --- 609,616 ---- + > if ((tp->t_lflag&NOFLSH) == 0) + > ttyflush(tp, FREAD|FWRITE); + > ! pgsignal(tp->t_pgrp, *(unsigned int *)data, 1); + > ! if ((*(unsigned int *)data == SIGINFO) && + > ! ((tp->t_lflag&NOKERNINFO) == 0)) + > ! ttyinfo(tp); + > return(0); + > } + + The client is now smarter when setting the telnet escape + character; it only sets it to one of VEOL and VEOL2 if + one of them is undefined, and the other one is not already + defined to the telnet escape character. + + Handle TERMIOS systems that have seperate input and output + line speed settings imbedded in the flags. + + Many other minor bug fixes. + +June 20, 1990: + Re-organize makefiles and source tree. The telnet/Source + directory is now gone, and all the source that was in + telnet/Source is now just in the telnet directory. + + Seperate makefile for each system are now gone. There + are two makefiles, Makefile and Makefile.generic. + The "Makefile" has the definitions for the various + system, and "Makefile.generic" does all the work. + There is a variable called "WHAT" that is used to + specify what to make. For example, in the telnet + directory, you might say: + make 4.4bsd WHAT=clean + to clean out the directory. + + Add support for the ENVIRON and XDISPLOC options. + In order for the server to work, login has to have + the "-p" option to preserve environment variables. + + Add the SOFT_TAB and LIT_ECHO modes in the LINEMODE support. + + Add the "-l user" option to command line and open command + (This is passed through the ENVIRON option). + + Add the "-e" command line option, for setting the escape + character. + + Add the "-D", diagnostic, option to the server. This allows + the server to print out debug information, which is very + useful when trying to debug a telnet that doesn't have any + debugging ability. + + Turn off the literal next character when not in LINEMODE. + + Don't recognize ^Y locally, just pass it through. + + Make minor modifications for Sun4.0 and Sun4.1 + + Add support for both FORW1 and FORW2 characters. The + telnet escpape character is set to whichever of the + two is not being used. If both are in use, the escape + character is not set, so when in linemode the user will + have to follow the escape character with a or + +libtelnet/Makefile.4.4: +telnet/Makefile.4.4: +telnetd/Makefile.4.4: + These are the makefiles that can be used on a 4.3Reno + system when this software is installed in /usr/src/lib/libtelnet, + /usr/src/libexec/telnetd, and /usr/src/usr.bin/telnet. + + +The following TELNET options are supported: + + LINEMODE: + The LINEMODE option is supported as per RFC1116. The + FORWARDMASK option is not currently supported. + + BINARY: The client has the ability to turn on/off the BINARY + option in each direction. Turning on BINARY from + server to client causes the LITOUT bit to get set in + the terminal driver on both ends, turning on BINARY + from the client to the server causes the PASS8 bit + to get set in the terminal driver on both ends. + + TERMINAL-TYPE: + This is supported as per RFC1091. On the server side, + when a terminal type is received, termcap/terminfo + is consulted to determine if it is a known terminal + type. It keeps requesting terminal types until it + gets one that it recongnizes, or hits the end of the + list. The server side looks up the entry in the + termcap/terminfo data base, and generates a list of + names which it then passes one at a time to each + request for a terminal type, duplicating the last + entry in the list before cycling back to the beginning. + + NAWS: The Negotiate about Window Size, as per RFC 1073. + + TERMINAL-SPEED: + Implemented as per RFC 1079 + + TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL: + Implemented as per RFC 1080 + + TIMING-MARK: + As per RFC 860 + + SGA: As per RFC 858 + + ECHO: As per RFC 857 + + LOGOUT: As per RFC 727 + + STATUS: + The server will send its current status upon + request. It does not ask for the clients status. + The client will request the servers current status + from the "send getstatus" command. + + ENVIRON: + This option is currently being defined by the IETF + Telnet Working Group, and an RFC has not yet been + issued, but should be in the near future... + + X-DISPLAY-LOCATION: + This functionality can be done through the ENVIRON + option, it is added here for completeness. + + AUTHENTICATION: + This option is currently being defined by the IETF + Telnet Working Group, and an RFC has not yet been + issued. The basic framework is pretty much decided, + but the definitions for the specific authentication + schemes is still in a state of flux. + + ENCRYPTION: + This option is currently being defined by the IETF + Telnet Working Group, and an RFC has not yet been + issued. The draft RFC is still in a state of flux, + so this code may change in the future. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/arpa/telnet.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/arpa/telnet.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d9ef60016 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/arpa/telnet.h @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)telnet.h 8.2 (Berkeley) 12/15/93 + */ + +#ifndef _TELNET_H_ +#define _TELNET_H_ + +/* + * Definitions for the TELNET protocol. + */ +#define IAC 255 /* interpret as command: */ +#define DONT 254 /* you are not to use option */ +#define DO 253 /* please, you use option */ +#define WONT 252 /* I won't use option */ +#define WILL 251 /* I will use option */ +#define SB 250 /* interpret as subnegotiation */ +#define GA 249 /* you may reverse the line */ +#define EL 248 /* erase the current line */ +#define EC 247 /* erase the current character */ +#define AYT 246 /* are you there */ +#define AO 245 /* abort output--but let prog finish */ +#define IP 244 /* interrupt process--permanently */ +#define BREAK 243 /* break */ +#define DM 242 /* data mark--for connect. cleaning */ +#define NOP 241 /* nop */ +#define SE 240 /* end sub negotiation */ +#define EOR 239 /* end of record (transparent mode) */ +#define ABORT 238 /* Abort process */ +#define SUSP 237 /* Suspend process */ +#define xEOF 236 /* End of file: EOF is already used... */ + +#define SYNCH 242 /* for telfunc calls */ + +#ifdef TELCMDS +char *telcmds[] = { + "EOF", "SUSP", "ABORT", "EOR", + "SE", "NOP", "DMARK", "BRK", "IP", "AO", "AYT", "EC", + "EL", "GA", "SB", "WILL", "WONT", "DO", "DONT", "IAC", 0, +}; +#else +extern char *telcmds[]; +#endif + +#define TELCMD_FIRST xEOF +#define TELCMD_LAST IAC +#define TELCMD_OK(x) ((unsigned int)(x) <= TELCMD_LAST && \ + (unsigned int)(x) >= TELCMD_FIRST) +#define TELCMD(x) telcmds[(x)-TELCMD_FIRST] + +/* telnet options */ +#define TELOPT_BINARY 0 /* 8-bit data path */ +#define TELOPT_ECHO 1 /* echo */ +#define TELOPT_RCP 2 /* prepare to reconnect */ +#define TELOPT_SGA 3 /* suppress go ahead */ +#define TELOPT_NAMS 4 /* approximate message size */ +#define TELOPT_STATUS 5 /* give status */ +#define TELOPT_TM 6 /* timing mark */ +#define TELOPT_RCTE 7 /* remote controlled transmission and echo */ +#define TELOPT_NAOL 8 /* negotiate about output line width */ +#define TELOPT_NAOP 9 /* negotiate about output page size */ +#define TELOPT_NAOCRD 10 /* negotiate about CR disposition */ +#define TELOPT_NAOHTS 11 /* negotiate about horizontal tabstops */ +#define TELOPT_NAOHTD 12 /* negotiate about horizontal tab disposition */ +#define TELOPT_NAOFFD 13 /* negotiate about formfeed disposition */ +#define TELOPT_NAOVTS 14 /* negotiate about vertical tab stops */ +#define TELOPT_NAOVTD 15 /* negotiate about vertical tab disposition */ +#define TELOPT_NAOLFD 16 /* negotiate about output LF disposition */ +#define TELOPT_XASCII 17 /* extended ascic character set */ +#define TELOPT_LOGOUT 18 /* force logout */ +#define TELOPT_BM 19 /* byte macro */ +#define TELOPT_DET 20 /* data entry terminal */ +#define TELOPT_SUPDUP 21 /* supdup protocol */ +#define TELOPT_SUPDUPOUTPUT 22 /* supdup output */ +#define TELOPT_SNDLOC 23 /* send location */ +#define TELOPT_TTYPE 24 /* terminal type */ +#define TELOPT_EOR 25 /* end or record */ +#define TELOPT_TUID 26 /* TACACS user identification */ +#define TELOPT_OUTMRK 27 /* output marking */ +#define TELOPT_TTYLOC 28 /* terminal location number */ +#define TELOPT_3270REGIME 29 /* 3270 regime */ +#define TELOPT_X3PAD 30 /* X.3 PAD */ +#define TELOPT_NAWS 31 /* window size */ +#define TELOPT_TSPEED 32 /* terminal speed */ +#define TELOPT_LFLOW 33 /* remote flow control */ +#define TELOPT_LINEMODE 34 /* Linemode option */ +#define TELOPT_XDISPLOC 35 /* X Display Location */ +#define TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON 36 /* Old - Environment variables */ +#define TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION 37/* Authenticate */ +#define TELOPT_ENCRYPT 38 /* Encryption option */ +#define TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON 39 /* New - Environment variables */ +#define TELOPT_EXOPL 255 /* extended-options-list */ + + +#define NTELOPTS (1+TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON) +#ifdef TELOPTS +char *telopts[NTELOPTS+1] = { + "BINARY", "ECHO", "RCP", "SUPPRESS GO AHEAD", "NAME", + "STATUS", "TIMING MARK", "RCTE", "NAOL", "NAOP", + "NAOCRD", "NAOHTS", "NAOHTD", "NAOFFD", "NAOVTS", + "NAOVTD", "NAOLFD", "EXTEND ASCII", "LOGOUT", "BYTE MACRO", + "DATA ENTRY TERMINAL", "SUPDUP", "SUPDUP OUTPUT", + "SEND LOCATION", "TERMINAL TYPE", "END OF RECORD", + "TACACS UID", "OUTPUT MARKING", "TTYLOC", + "3270 REGIME", "X.3 PAD", "NAWS", "TSPEED", "LFLOW", + "LINEMODE", "XDISPLOC", "OLD-ENVIRON", "AUTHENTICATION", + "ENCRYPT", "NEW-ENVIRON", + 0, +}; +#define TELOPT_FIRST TELOPT_BINARY +#define TELOPT_LAST TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON +#define TELOPT_OK(x) ((unsigned int)(x) <= TELOPT_LAST) +#define TELOPT(x) telopts[(x)-TELOPT_FIRST] +#endif + +/* sub-option qualifiers */ +#define TELQUAL_IS 0 /* option is... */ +#define TELQUAL_SEND 1 /* send option */ +#define TELQUAL_INFO 2 /* ENVIRON: informational version of IS */ +#define TELQUAL_REPLY 2 /* AUTHENTICATION: client version of IS */ +#define TELQUAL_NAME 3 /* AUTHENTICATION: client version of IS */ + +#define LFLOW_OFF 0 /* Disable remote flow control */ +#define LFLOW_ON 1 /* Enable remote flow control */ +#define LFLOW_RESTART_ANY 2 /* Restart output on any char */ +#define LFLOW_RESTART_XON 3 /* Restart output only on XON */ + +/* + * LINEMODE suboptions + */ + +#define LM_MODE 1 +#define LM_FORWARDMASK 2 +#define LM_SLC 3 + +#define MODE_EDIT 0x01 +#define MODE_TRAPSIG 0x02 +#define MODE_ACK 0x04 +#define MODE_SOFT_TAB 0x08 +#define MODE_LIT_ECHO 0x10 + +#define MODE_MASK 0x1f + +/* Not part of protocol, but needed to simplify things... */ +#define MODE_FLOW 0x0100 +#define MODE_ECHO 0x0200 +#define MODE_INBIN 0x0400 +#define MODE_OUTBIN 0x0800 +#define MODE_FORCE 0x1000 + +#define SLC_SYNCH 1 +#define SLC_BRK 2 +#define SLC_IP 3 +#define SLC_AO 4 +#define SLC_AYT 5 +#define SLC_EOR 6 +#define SLC_ABORT 7 +#define SLC_EOF 8 +#define SLC_SUSP 9 +#define SLC_EC 10 +#define SLC_EL 11 +#define SLC_EW 12 +#define SLC_RP 13 +#define SLC_LNEXT 14 +#define SLC_XON 15 +#define SLC_XOFF 16 +#define SLC_FORW1 17 +#define SLC_FORW2 18 + +#define NSLC 18 + +/* + * For backwards compatability, we define SLC_NAMES to be the + * list of names if SLC_NAMES is not defined. + */ +#define SLC_NAMELIST "0", "SYNCH", "BRK", "IP", "AO", "AYT", "EOR", \ + "ABORT", "EOF", "SUSP", "EC", "EL", "EW", "RP", \ + "LNEXT", "XON", "XOFF", "FORW1", "FORW2", 0, +#ifdef SLC_NAMES +char *slc_names[] = { + SLC_NAMELIST +}; +#else +extern char *slc_names[]; +#define SLC_NAMES SLC_NAMELIST +#endif + +#define SLC_NAME_OK(x) ((unsigned int)(x) <= NSLC) +#define SLC_NAME(x) slc_names[x] + +#define SLC_NOSUPPORT 0 +#define SLC_CANTCHANGE 1 +#define SLC_VARIABLE 2 +#define SLC_DEFAULT 3 +#define SLC_LEVELBITS 0x03 + +#define SLC_FUNC 0 +#define SLC_FLAGS 1 +#define SLC_VALUE 2 + +#define SLC_ACK 0x80 +#define SLC_FLUSHIN 0x40 +#define SLC_FLUSHOUT 0x20 + +#define OLD_ENV_VAR 1 +#define OLD_ENV_VALUE 0 +#define NEW_ENV_VAR 0 +#define NEW_ENV_VALUE 1 +#define ENV_ESC 2 +#define ENV_USERVAR 3 + +/* + * AUTHENTICATION suboptions + */ + +/* + * Who is authenticating who ... + */ +#define AUTH_WHO_CLIENT 0 /* Client authenticating server */ +#define AUTH_WHO_SERVER 1 /* Server authenticating client */ +#define AUTH_WHO_MASK 1 + +/* + * amount of authentication done + */ +#define AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY 0 +#define AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL 2 +#define AUTH_HOW_MASK 2 + +#define AUTHTYPE_NULL 0 +#define AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V4 1 +#define AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V5 2 +#define AUTHTYPE_SPX 3 +#define AUTHTYPE_MINK 4 +#define AUTHTYPE_SRA 5 +#define AUTHTYPE_CNT 6 +/* #define AUTHTYPE_UNSECURE 6 */ + +#define AUTHTYPE_TEST 99 + +#ifdef AUTH_NAMES +char *authtype_names[] = { + "NULL", "KERBEROS_V4", "KERBEROS_V5", "SPX", "MINK", + "SRA", 0, +}; +#else +extern char *authtype_names[]; +#endif + +#define AUTHTYPE_NAME_OK(x) ((unsigned int)(x) < AUTHTYPE_CNT) +#define AUTHTYPE_NAME(x) authtype_names[x] + +/* + * ENCRYPTion suboptions + */ +#define ENCRYPT_IS 0 /* I pick encryption type ... */ +#define ENCRYPT_SUPPORT 1 /* I support encryption types ... */ +#define ENCRYPT_REPLY 2 /* Initial setup response */ +#define ENCRYPT_START 3 /* Am starting to send encrypted */ +#define ENCRYPT_END 4 /* Am ending encrypted */ +#define ENCRYPT_REQSTART 5 /* Request you start encrypting */ +#define ENCRYPT_REQEND 6 /* Request you send encrypting */ +#define ENCRYPT_ENC_KEYID 7 +#define ENCRYPT_DEC_KEYID 8 +#define ENCRYPT_CNT 9 + +#define ENCTYPE_ANY 0 +#define ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64 1 +#define ENCTYPE_DES_OFB64 2 +#define ENCTYPE_CNT 3 + +#ifdef ENCRYPT_NAMES +char *encrypt_names[] = { + "IS", "SUPPORT", "REPLY", "START", "END", + "REQUEST-START", "REQUEST-END", "ENC-KEYID", "DEC-KEYID", + 0, +}; +char *enctype_names[] = { + "ANY", "DES_CFB64", "DES_OFB64", 0, +}; +#else +extern char *encrypt_names[]; +extern char *enctype_names[]; +#endif + + +#define ENCRYPT_NAME_OK(x) ((unsigned int)(x) < ENCRYPT_CNT) +#define ENCRYPT_NAME(x) encrypt_names[x] + +#define ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(x) ((unsigned int)(x) < ENCTYPE_CNT) +#define ENCTYPE_NAME(x) enctype_names[x] + +#endif /* !_TELNET_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2c30c2c002 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.9 2001/08/28 08:31:23 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/.. $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) + +noinst_LIBRARIES = libtelnet.a + +libtelnet_a_SOURCES = \ + auth-proto.h \ + auth.c \ + auth.h \ + enc-proto.h \ + enc_des.c \ + encrypt.c \ + encrypt.h \ + genget.c \ + kerberos.c \ + kerberos5.c \ + misc-proto.h \ + misc.c \ + misc.h + +EXTRA_DIST = krb4encpwd.c rsaencpwd.c spx.c diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e133fde7ef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,742 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.9 2001/08/28 08:31:23 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(libtelnet_a_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am 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$(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth-proto.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth-proto.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89f1fbc5e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth-proto.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)auth-proto.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +/* $Id: auth-proto.h,v 1.11 2002/08/28 20:56:14 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION +Authenticator *findauthenticator (int, int); + +int auth_wait (char *, size_t); +void auth_disable_name (char *); +void auth_finished (Authenticator *, int); +void auth_gen_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +void auth_init (const char *, int); +void auth_is (unsigned char *, int); +void auth_name(unsigned char*, int); +void auth_reply (unsigned char *, int); +void auth_request (void); +void auth_send (unsigned char *, int); +void auth_send_retry (void); +void auth_printsub(unsigned char*, int, unsigned char*, int); +int getauthmask(char *type, int *maskp); +int auth_enable(char *type); +int auth_disable(char *type); +int auth_onoff(char *type, int on); +int auth_togdebug(int on); +int auth_status(void); +int auth_sendname(unsigned char *cp, int len); +void auth_debug(int mode); +void auth_gen_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, + unsigned char *buf, int buflen); + +#ifdef UNSAFE +int unsafe_init (Authenticator *, int); +int unsafe_send (Authenticator *); +void unsafe_is (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +void unsafe_reply (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +int unsafe_status (Authenticator *, char *, int); +void unsafe_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +#endif + +#ifdef SRA +int sra_init (Authenticator *, int); +int sra_send (Authenticator *); +void sra_is (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +void sra_reply (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +int sra_status (Authenticator *, char *, int); +void sra_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +int kerberos4_init (Authenticator *, int); +int kerberos4_send_mutual (Authenticator *); +int kerberos4_send_oneway (Authenticator *); +void kerberos4_is (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +void kerberos4_reply (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +int kerberos4_status (Authenticator *, char *, size_t, int); +void kerberos4_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +int kerberos4_forward(Authenticator *ap, void *); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +int kerberos5_init (Authenticator *, int); +int kerberos5_send_mutual (Authenticator *); +int kerberos5_send_oneway (Authenticator *); +void kerberos5_is (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +void kerberos5_reply (Authenticator *, unsigned char *, int); +int kerberos5_status (Authenticator *, char *, size_t, int); +void kerberos5_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +int kerberos5_set_forward(int); +int kerberos5_set_forwardable(int); +#endif +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cbb7a78cf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,660 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: auth.c,v 1.25 2002/01/18 12:58:48 joda Exp $"); + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#include +#define AUTH_NAMES +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc-proto.h" +#include "auth-proto.h" + +#define typemask(x) (1<<((x)-1)) + +#ifdef KRB4_ENCPWD +extern krb4encpwd_init(); +extern krb4encpwd_send(); +extern krb4encpwd_is(); +extern krb4encpwd_reply(); +extern krb4encpwd_status(); +extern krb4encpwd_printsub(); +#endif + +#ifdef RSA_ENCPWD +extern rsaencpwd_init(); +extern rsaencpwd_send(); +extern rsaencpwd_is(); +extern rsaencpwd_reply(); +extern rsaencpwd_status(); +extern rsaencpwd_printsub(); +#endif + +int auth_debug_mode = 0; +int auth_has_failed = 0; +int auth_enable_encrypt = 0; +static const char *Name = "Noname"; +static int Server = 0; +static Authenticator *authenticated = 0; +static int authenticating = 0; +static int validuser = 0; +static unsigned char _auth_send_data[256]; +static unsigned char *auth_send_data; +static int auth_send_cnt = 0; + +/* + * Authentication types supported. Plese note that these are stored + * in priority order, i.e. try the first one first. + */ +Authenticator authenticators[] = { +#ifdef UNSAFE + { AUTHTYPE_UNSAFE, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, + unsafe_init, + unsafe_send, + unsafe_is, + unsafe_reply, + unsafe_status, + unsafe_printsub }, +#endif +#ifdef SRA + { AUTHTYPE_SRA, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, + sra_init, + sra_send, + sra_is, + sra_reply, + sra_status, + sra_printsub }, +#endif +#ifdef SPX + { AUTHTYPE_SPX, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, + spx_init, + spx_send, + spx_is, + spx_reply, + spx_status, + spx_printsub }, + { AUTHTYPE_SPX, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, + spx_init, + spx_send, + spx_is, + spx_reply, + spx_status, + spx_printsub }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V5, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, + kerberos5_init, + kerberos5_send_mutual, + kerberos5_is, + kerberos5_reply, + kerberos5_status, + kerberos5_printsub }, + { AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V5, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, + kerberos5_init, + kerberos5_send_oneway, + kerberos5_is, + kerberos5_reply, + kerberos5_status, + kerberos5_printsub }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + { AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V4, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, + kerberos4_init, + kerberos4_send_mutual, + kerberos4_is, + kerberos4_reply, + kerberos4_status, + kerberos4_printsub }, + { AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V4, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, + kerberos4_init, + kerberos4_send_oneway, + kerberos4_is, + kerberos4_reply, + kerberos4_status, + kerberos4_printsub }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4_ENCPWD + { AUTHTYPE_KRB4_ENCPWD, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, + krb4encpwd_init, + krb4encpwd_send, + krb4encpwd_is, + krb4encpwd_reply, + krb4encpwd_status, + krb4encpwd_printsub }, +#endif +#ifdef RSA_ENCPWD + { AUTHTYPE_RSA_ENCPWD, AUTH_WHO_CLIENT|AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, + rsaencpwd_init, + rsaencpwd_send, + rsaencpwd_is, + rsaencpwd_reply, + rsaencpwd_status, + rsaencpwd_printsub }, +#endif + { 0, }, +}; + +static Authenticator NoAuth = { 0 }; + +static int i_support = 0; +static int i_wont_support = 0; + +Authenticator * +findauthenticator(int type, int way) +{ + Authenticator *ap = authenticators; + + while (ap->type && (ap->type != type || ap->way != way)) + ++ap; + return(ap->type ? ap : 0); +} + +void +auth_init(const char *name, int server) +{ + Authenticator *ap = authenticators; + + Server = server; + Name = name; + + i_support = 0; + authenticated = 0; + authenticating = 0; + while (ap->type) { + if (!ap->init || (*ap->init)(ap, server)) { + i_support |= typemask(ap->type); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: I support auth type %d %d\r\n", + Name, + ap->type, ap->way); + } + else if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Init failed: auth type %d %d\r\n", + Name, ap->type, ap->way); + ++ap; + } +} + +void +auth_disable_name(char *name) +{ + int x; + for (x = 0; x < AUTHTYPE_CNT; ++x) { + if (!strcasecmp(name, AUTHTYPE_NAME(x))) { + i_wont_support |= typemask(x); + break; + } + } +} + +int +getauthmask(char *type, int *maskp) +{ + int x; + + if (!strcasecmp(type, AUTHTYPE_NAME(0))) { + *maskp = -1; + return(1); + } + + for (x = 1; x < AUTHTYPE_CNT; ++x) { + if (!strcasecmp(type, AUTHTYPE_NAME(x))) { + *maskp = typemask(x); + return(1); + } + } + return(0); +} + +int +auth_enable(char *type) +{ + return(auth_onoff(type, 1)); +} + +int +auth_disable(char *type) +{ + return(auth_onoff(type, 0)); +} + +int +auth_onoff(char *type, int on) +{ + int i, mask = -1; + Authenticator *ap; + + if (!strcasecmp(type, "?") || !strcasecmp(type, "help")) { + printf("auth %s 'type'\n", on ? "enable" : "disable"); + printf("Where 'type' is one of:\n"); + printf("\t%s\n", AUTHTYPE_NAME(0)); + mask = 0; + for (ap = authenticators; ap->type; ap++) { + if ((mask & (i = typemask(ap->type))) != 0) + continue; + mask |= i; + printf("\t%s\n", AUTHTYPE_NAME(ap->type)); + } + return(0); + } + + if (!getauthmask(type, &mask)) { + printf("%s: invalid authentication type\n", type); + return(0); + } + if (on) + i_wont_support &= ~mask; + else + i_wont_support |= mask; + return(1); +} + +int +auth_togdebug(int on) +{ + if (on < 0) + auth_debug_mode ^= 1; + else + auth_debug_mode = on; + printf("auth debugging %s\n", auth_debug_mode ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return(1); +} + +int +auth_status(void) +{ + Authenticator *ap; + int i, mask; + + if (i_wont_support == -1) + printf("Authentication disabled\n"); + else + printf("Authentication enabled\n"); + + mask = 0; + for (ap = authenticators; ap->type; ap++) { + if ((mask & (i = typemask(ap->type))) != 0) + continue; + mask |= i; + printf("%s: %s\n", AUTHTYPE_NAME(ap->type), + (i_wont_support & typemask(ap->type)) ? + "disabled" : "enabled"); + } + return(1); +} + +/* + * This routine is called by the server to start authentication + * negotiation. + */ +void +auth_request(void) +{ + static unsigned char str_request[64] = { IAC, SB, + TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, + TELQUAL_SEND, }; + Authenticator *ap = authenticators; + unsigned char *e = str_request + 4; + + if (!authenticating) { + authenticating = 1; + while (ap->type) { + if (i_support & ~i_wont_support & typemask(ap->type)) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf(">>>%s: Sending type %d %d\r\n", + Name, ap->type, ap->way); + } + *e++ = ap->type; + *e++ = ap->way; + } + ++ap; + } + *e++ = IAC; + *e++ = SE; + telnet_net_write(str_request, e - str_request); + printsub('>', &str_request[2], e - str_request - 2); + } +} + +/* + * This is called when an AUTH SEND is received. + * It should never arrive on the server side (as only the server can + * send an AUTH SEND). + * You should probably respond to it if you can... + * + * If you want to respond to the types out of order (i.e. even + * if he sends LOGIN KERBEROS and you support both, you respond + * with KERBEROS instead of LOGIN (which is against what the + * protocol says)) you will have to hack this code... + */ +void +auth_send(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Authenticator *ap; + static unsigned char str_none[] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, + TELQUAL_IS, AUTHTYPE_NULL, 0, + IAC, SE }; + if (Server) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf(">>>%s: auth_send called!\r\n", Name); + } + return; + } + + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf(">>>%s: auth_send got:", Name); + printd(data, cnt); printf("\r\n"); + } + + /* + * Save the data, if it is new, so that we can continue looking + * at it if the authorization we try doesn't work + */ + if (data < _auth_send_data || + data > _auth_send_data + sizeof(_auth_send_data)) { + auth_send_cnt = cnt > sizeof(_auth_send_data) + ? sizeof(_auth_send_data) + : cnt; + memmove(_auth_send_data, data, auth_send_cnt); + auth_send_data = _auth_send_data; + } else { + /* + * This is probably a no-op, but we just make sure + */ + auth_send_data = data; + auth_send_cnt = cnt; + } + while ((auth_send_cnt -= 2) >= 0) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: He supports %d\r\n", + Name, *auth_send_data); + if ((i_support & ~i_wont_support) & typemask(*auth_send_data)) { + ap = findauthenticator(auth_send_data[0], + auth_send_data[1]); + if (ap && ap->send) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Trying %d %d\r\n", + Name, auth_send_data[0], + auth_send_data[1]); + if ((*ap->send)(ap)) { + /* + * Okay, we found one we like + * and did it. + * we can go home now. + */ + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Using type %d\r\n", + Name, *auth_send_data); + auth_send_data += 2; + return; + } + } + /* else + * just continue on and look for the + * next one if we didn't do anything. + */ + } + auth_send_data += 2; + } + telnet_net_write(str_none, sizeof(str_none)); + printsub('>', &str_none[2], sizeof(str_none) - 2); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Sent failure message\r\n", Name); + auth_finished(0, AUTH_REJECT); + auth_has_failed = 1; +#ifdef KANNAN + /* + * We requested strong authentication, however no mechanisms worked. + * Therefore, exit on client end. + */ + printf("Unable to securely authenticate user ... exit\n"); + exit(0); +#endif /* KANNAN */ +} + +void +auth_send_retry(void) +{ + /* + * if auth_send_cnt <= 0 then auth_send will end up rejecting + * the authentication and informing the other side of this. + */ + auth_send(auth_send_data, auth_send_cnt); +} + +void +auth_is(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Authenticator *ap; + + if (cnt < 2) + return; + + if (data[0] == AUTHTYPE_NULL) { + auth_finished(0, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + + if ((ap = findauthenticator(data[0], data[1]))) { + if (ap->is) + (*ap->is)(ap, data+2, cnt-2); + } else if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Invalid authentication in IS: %d\r\n", + Name, *data); +} + +void +auth_reply(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Authenticator *ap; + + if (cnt < 2) + return; + + if ((ap = findauthenticator(data[0], data[1]))) { + if (ap->reply) + (*ap->reply)(ap, data+2, cnt-2); + } else if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Invalid authentication in SEND: %d\r\n", + Name, *data); +} + +void +auth_name(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + char savename[256]; + + if (cnt < 1) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Empty name in NAME\r\n", Name); + return; + } + if (cnt > sizeof(savename) - 1) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Name in NAME (%d) exceeds %lu length\r\n", + Name, cnt, (unsigned long)(sizeof(savename)-1)); + return; + } + memmove(savename, data, cnt); + savename[cnt] = '\0'; /* Null terminate */ + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Got NAME [%s]\r\n", Name, savename); + auth_encrypt_user(savename); +} + +int +auth_sendname(unsigned char *cp, int len) +{ + static unsigned char str_request[256+6] + = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, TELQUAL_NAME, }; + unsigned char *e = str_request + 4; + unsigned char *ee = &str_request[sizeof(str_request)-2]; + + while (--len >= 0) { + if ((*e++ = *cp++) == IAC) + *e++ = IAC; + if (e >= ee) + return(0); + } + *e++ = IAC; + *e++ = SE; + telnet_net_write(str_request, e - str_request); + printsub('>', &str_request[2], e - &str_request[2]); + return(1); +} + +void +auth_finished(Authenticator *ap, int result) +{ + if (!(authenticated = ap)) + authenticated = &NoAuth; + validuser = result; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +auth_intr(int sig) +{ + auth_finished(0, AUTH_REJECT); +} + +int +auth_wait(char *name, size_t name_sz) +{ + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: in auth_wait.\r\n", Name); + + if (Server && !authenticating) + return(0); + + signal(SIGALRM, auth_intr); + alarm(30); + while (!authenticated) + if (telnet_spin()) + break; + alarm(0); + signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + + /* + * Now check to see if the user is valid or not + */ + if (!authenticated || authenticated == &NoAuth) + return(AUTH_REJECT); + + if (validuser == AUTH_VALID) + validuser = AUTH_USER; + + if (authenticated->status) + validuser = (*authenticated->status)(authenticated, + name, name_sz, + validuser); + return(validuser); +} + +void +auth_debug(int mode) +{ + auth_debug_mode = mode; +} + +void +auth_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + Authenticator *ap; + + if ((ap = findauthenticator(data[1], data[2])) && ap->printsub) + (*ap->printsub)(data, cnt, buf, buflen); + else + auth_gen_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen); +} + +void +auth_gen_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + unsigned char *cp; + unsigned char tbuf[16]; + + cnt -= 3; + data += 3; + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; + buf[buflen-2] = '*'; + buflen -= 2; + for (; cnt > 0; cnt--, data++) { + snprintf((char*)tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), " %d", *data); + for (cp = tbuf; *cp && buflen > 0; --buflen) + *buf++ = *cp++; + if (buflen <= 0) + return; + } + *buf = '\0'; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83dd701c0a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)auth.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +/* $Id: auth.h,v 1.4 1998/06/09 19:24:41 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __AUTH__ +#define __AUTH__ + +#define AUTH_REJECT 0 /* Rejected */ +#define AUTH_UNKNOWN 1 /* We don't know who he is, but he's okay */ +#define AUTH_OTHER 2 /* We know him, but not his name */ +#define AUTH_USER 3 /* We know he name */ +#define AUTH_VALID 4 /* We know him, and he needs no password */ + +typedef struct XauthP { + int type; + int way; + int (*init) (struct XauthP *, int); + int (*send) (struct XauthP *); + void (*is) (struct XauthP *, unsigned char *, int); + void (*reply) (struct XauthP *, unsigned char *, int); + int (*status) (struct XauthP *, char *, size_t, int); + void (*printsub) (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +} Authenticator; + +#include "auth-proto.h" + +extern int auth_debug_mode; +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/enc-proto.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/enc-proto.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3078848a93 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/enc-proto.h @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)enc-proto.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + * + * @(#)enc-proto.h 5.2 (Berkeley) 3/22/91 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +/* $Id: enc-proto.h,v 1.11 2002/01/18 12:58:49 joda Exp $ */ + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +Encryptions *findencryption (int); +Encryptions *finddecryption(int); +int EncryptAutoDec(int); +int EncryptAutoEnc(int); +int EncryptDebug(int); +int EncryptDisable(char*, char*); +int EncryptEnable(char*, char*); +int EncryptStart(char*); +int EncryptStartInput(void); +int EncryptStartOutput(void); +int EncryptStatus(void); +int EncryptStop(char*); +int EncryptStopInput(void); +int EncryptStopOutput(void); +int EncryptType(char*, char*); +int EncryptVerbose(int); +void decrypt_auto(int); +void encrypt_auto(int); +void encrypt_debug(int); +void encrypt_dec_keyid(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_display(void); +void encrypt_enc_keyid(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_end(void); +void encrypt_gen_printsub(unsigned char*, int, unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_init(const char*, int); +void encrypt_is(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_list_types(void); +void encrypt_not(void); +void encrypt_printsub(unsigned char*, int, unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_reply(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_request_end(void); +void encrypt_request_start(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_send_end(void); +void encrypt_send_keyid(int, unsigned char*, int, int); +void encrypt_send_request_end(void); +int encrypt_is_encrypting(void); +void encrypt_send_request_start(void); +void encrypt_send_support(void); +void encrypt_session_key(Session_Key*, int); +void encrypt_start(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_start_output(int); +void encrypt_support(unsigned char*, int); +void encrypt_verbose_quiet(int); +void encrypt_wait(void); +int encrypt_delay(void); + +#ifdef TELENTD +void encrypt_wait (void); +#else +void encrypt_display (void); +#endif + +void cfb64_encrypt (unsigned char *, int); +int cfb64_decrypt (int); +void cfb64_init (int); +int cfb64_start (int, int); +int cfb64_is (unsigned char *, int); +int cfb64_reply (unsigned char *, int); +void cfb64_session (Session_Key *, int); +int cfb64_keyid (int, unsigned char *, int *); +void cfb64_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); + +void ofb64_encrypt (unsigned char *, int); +int ofb64_decrypt (int); +void ofb64_init (int); +int ofb64_start (int, int); +int ofb64_is (unsigned char *, int); +int ofb64_reply (unsigned char *, int); +void ofb64_session (Session_Key *, int); +int ofb64_keyid (int, unsigned char *, int *); +void ofb64_printsub (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/enc_des.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/enc_des.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..537d22fbba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/enc_des.c @@ -0,0 +1,673 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: enc_des.c,v 1.21 2002/09/10 20:03:47 joda Exp $"); + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) && defined(ENCRYPTION) && defined(DES_ENCRYPTION) +#include +#include +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "misc-proto.h" + +#include "crypto-headers.h" + +extern int encrypt_debug_mode; + +#define CFB 0 +#define OFB 1 + +#define NO_SEND_IV 1 +#define NO_RECV_IV 2 +#define NO_KEYID 4 +#define IN_PROGRESS (NO_SEND_IV|NO_RECV_IV|NO_KEYID) +#define SUCCESS 0 +#define FAILED -1 + + +struct stinfo { + des_cblock str_output; + des_cblock str_feed; + des_cblock str_iv; + des_cblock str_ikey; + des_key_schedule str_sched; + int str_index; + int str_flagshift; +}; + +struct fb { + des_cblock krbdes_key; + des_key_schedule krbdes_sched; + des_cblock temp_feed; + unsigned char fb_feed[64]; + int need_start; + int state[2]; + int keyid[2]; + int once; + struct stinfo streams[2]; +}; + +static struct fb fb[2]; + +struct keyidlist { + char *keyid; + int keyidlen; + char *key; + int keylen; + int flags; +} keyidlist [] = { + { "\0", 1, 0, 0, 0 }, /* default key of zero */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +#define KEYFLAG_MASK 03 + +#define KEYFLAG_NOINIT 00 +#define KEYFLAG_INIT 01 +#define KEYFLAG_OK 02 +#define KEYFLAG_BAD 03 + +#define KEYFLAG_SHIFT 2 + +#define SHIFT_VAL(a,b) (KEYFLAG_SHIFT*((a)+((b)*2))) + +#define FB64_IV 1 +#define FB64_IV_OK 2 +#define FB64_IV_BAD 3 + + +void fb64_stream_iv (des_cblock, struct stinfo *); +void fb64_init (struct fb *); +static int fb64_start (struct fb *, int, int); +int fb64_is (unsigned char *, int, struct fb *); +int fb64_reply (unsigned char *, int, struct fb *); +static void fb64_session (Session_Key *, int, struct fb *); +void fb64_stream_key (des_cblock, struct stinfo *); +int fb64_keyid (int, unsigned char *, int *, struct fb *); +void fb64_printsub(unsigned char *, int , + unsigned char *, int , char *); + +void cfb64_init(int server) +{ + fb64_init(&fb[CFB]); + fb[CFB].fb_feed[4] = ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64; + fb[CFB].streams[0].str_flagshift = SHIFT_VAL(0, CFB); + fb[CFB].streams[1].str_flagshift = SHIFT_VAL(1, CFB); +} + + +void ofb64_init(int server) +{ + fb64_init(&fb[OFB]); + fb[OFB].fb_feed[4] = ENCTYPE_DES_OFB64; + fb[CFB].streams[0].str_flagshift = SHIFT_VAL(0, OFB); + fb[CFB].streams[1].str_flagshift = SHIFT_VAL(1, OFB); +} + +void fb64_init(struct fb *fbp) +{ + memset(fbp,0, sizeof(*fbp)); + fbp->state[0] = fbp->state[1] = FAILED; + fbp->fb_feed[0] = IAC; + fbp->fb_feed[1] = SB; + fbp->fb_feed[2] = TELOPT_ENCRYPT; + fbp->fb_feed[3] = ENCRYPT_IS; +} + +/* + * Returns: + * -1: some error. Negotiation is done, encryption not ready. + * 0: Successful, initial negotiation all done. + * 1: successful, negotiation not done yet. + * 2: Not yet. Other things (like getting the key from + * Kerberos) have to happen before we can continue. + */ +int cfb64_start(int dir, int server) +{ + return(fb64_start(&fb[CFB], dir, server)); +} + +int ofb64_start(int dir, int server) +{ + return(fb64_start(&fb[OFB], dir, server)); +} + +static int fb64_start(struct fb *fbp, int dir, int server) +{ + int x; + unsigned char *p; + int state; + + switch (dir) { + case DIR_DECRYPT: + /* + * This is simply a request to have the other side + * start output (our input). He will negotiate an + * IV so we need not look for it. + */ + state = fbp->state[dir-1]; + if (state == FAILED) + state = IN_PROGRESS; + break; + + case DIR_ENCRYPT: + state = fbp->state[dir-1]; + if (state == FAILED) + state = IN_PROGRESS; + else if ((state & NO_SEND_IV) == 0) { + break; + } + + if (!VALIDKEY(fbp->krbdes_key)) { + fbp->need_start = 1; + break; + } + + state &= ~NO_SEND_IV; + state |= NO_RECV_IV; + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("Creating new feed\r\n"); + /* + * Create a random feed and send it over. + */ +#ifndef OLD_DES_RANDOM_KEY + des_new_random_key(&fbp->temp_feed); +#else + /* + * From des_cryp.man "If the des_check_key flag is non-zero, + * des_set_key will check that the key passed is + * of odd parity and is not a week or semi-weak key." + */ + do { + des_random_key(fbp->temp_feed); + des_set_odd_parity(fbp->temp_feed); + } while (des_is_weak_key(fbp->temp_feed)); +#endif + des_ecb_encrypt(&fbp->temp_feed, + &fbp->temp_feed, + fbp->krbdes_sched, 1); + p = fbp->fb_feed + 3; + *p++ = ENCRYPT_IS; + p++; + *p++ = FB64_IV; + for (x = 0; x < sizeof(des_cblock); ++x) { + if ((*p++ = fbp->temp_feed[x]) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + printsub('>', &fbp->fb_feed[2], p - &fbp->fb_feed[2]); + telnet_net_write(fbp->fb_feed, p - fbp->fb_feed); + break; + default: + return(FAILED); + } + return(fbp->state[dir-1] = state); +} + +/* + * Returns: + * -1: some error. Negotiation is done, encryption not ready. + * 0: Successful, initial negotiation all done. + * 1: successful, negotiation not done yet. + */ + +int cfb64_is(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + return(fb64_is(data, cnt, &fb[CFB])); +} + +int ofb64_is(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + return(fb64_is(data, cnt, &fb[OFB])); +} + + +int fb64_is(unsigned char *data, int cnt, struct fb *fbp) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int state = fbp->state[DIR_DECRYPT-1]; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + goto failure; + + switch (*data++) { + case FB64_IV: + if (cnt != sizeof(des_cblock)) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("CFB64: initial vector failed on size\r\n"); + state = FAILED; + goto failure; + } + + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("CFB64: initial vector received\r\n"); + + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("Initializing Decrypt stream\r\n"); + + fb64_stream_iv(data, &fbp->streams[DIR_DECRYPT-1]); + + p = fbp->fb_feed + 3; + *p++ = ENCRYPT_REPLY; + p++; + *p++ = FB64_IV_OK; + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + printsub('>', &fbp->fb_feed[2], p - &fbp->fb_feed[2]); + telnet_net_write(fbp->fb_feed, p - fbp->fb_feed); + + state = fbp->state[DIR_DECRYPT-1] = IN_PROGRESS; + break; + + default: + if (encrypt_debug_mode) { + printf("Unknown option type: %d\r\n", *(data-1)); + printd(data, cnt); + printf("\r\n"); + } + /* FALL THROUGH */ + failure: + /* + * We failed. Send an FB64_IV_BAD option + * to the other side so it will know that + * things failed. + */ + p = fbp->fb_feed + 3; + *p++ = ENCRYPT_REPLY; + p++; + *p++ = FB64_IV_BAD; + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + printsub('>', &fbp->fb_feed[2], p - &fbp->fb_feed[2]); + telnet_net_write(fbp->fb_feed, p - fbp->fb_feed); + + break; + } + return(fbp->state[DIR_DECRYPT-1] = state); +} + +/* + * Returns: + * -1: some error. Negotiation is done, encryption not ready. + * 0: Successful, initial negotiation all done. + * 1: successful, negotiation not done yet. + */ + +int cfb64_reply(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + return(fb64_reply(data, cnt, &fb[CFB])); +} + +int ofb64_reply(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + return(fb64_reply(data, cnt, &fb[OFB])); +} + + +int fb64_reply(unsigned char *data, int cnt, struct fb *fbp) +{ + int state = fbp->state[DIR_ENCRYPT-1]; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + goto failure; + + switch (*data++) { + case FB64_IV_OK: + fb64_stream_iv(fbp->temp_feed, &fbp->streams[DIR_ENCRYPT-1]); + if (state == FAILED) + state = IN_PROGRESS; + state &= ~NO_RECV_IV; + encrypt_send_keyid(DIR_ENCRYPT, (unsigned char *)"\0", 1, 1); + break; + + case FB64_IV_BAD: + memset(fbp->temp_feed, 0, sizeof(des_cblock)); + fb64_stream_iv(fbp->temp_feed, &fbp->streams[DIR_ENCRYPT-1]); + state = FAILED; + break; + + default: + if (encrypt_debug_mode) { + printf("Unknown option type: %d\r\n", data[-1]); + printd(data, cnt); + printf("\r\n"); + } + /* FALL THROUGH */ + failure: + state = FAILED; + break; + } + return(fbp->state[DIR_ENCRYPT-1] = state); +} + +void cfb64_session(Session_Key *key, int server) +{ + fb64_session(key, server, &fb[CFB]); +} + +void ofb64_session(Session_Key *key, int server) +{ + fb64_session(key, server, &fb[OFB]); +} + +static void fb64_session(Session_Key *key, int server, struct fb *fbp) +{ + + if (!key || key->type != SK_DES) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("Can't set krbdes's session key (%d != %d)\r\n", + key ? key->type : -1, SK_DES); + return; + } + memcpy(fbp->krbdes_key, key->data, sizeof(des_cblock)); + + fb64_stream_key(fbp->krbdes_key, &fbp->streams[DIR_ENCRYPT-1]); + fb64_stream_key(fbp->krbdes_key, &fbp->streams[DIR_DECRYPT-1]); + + if (fbp->once == 0) { +#if !defined(OLD_DES_RANDOM_KEY) && !defined(HAVE_OPENSSL) + des_init_random_number_generator(&fbp->krbdes_key); +#endif + fbp->once = 1; + } + des_key_sched(&fbp->krbdes_key, fbp->krbdes_sched); + /* + * Now look to see if krbdes_start() was was waiting for + * the key to show up. If so, go ahead an call it now + * that we have the key. + */ + if (fbp->need_start) { + fbp->need_start = 0; + fb64_start(fbp, DIR_ENCRYPT, server); + } +} + +/* + * We only accept a keyid of 0. If we get a keyid of + * 0, then mark the state as SUCCESS. + */ + +int cfb64_keyid(int dir, unsigned char *kp, int *lenp) +{ + return(fb64_keyid(dir, kp, lenp, &fb[CFB])); +} + +int ofb64_keyid(int dir, unsigned char *kp, int *lenp) +{ + return(fb64_keyid(dir, kp, lenp, &fb[OFB])); +} + +int fb64_keyid(int dir, unsigned char *kp, int *lenp, struct fb *fbp) +{ + int state = fbp->state[dir-1]; + + if (*lenp != 1 || (*kp != '\0')) { + *lenp = 0; + return(state); + } + + if (state == FAILED) + state = IN_PROGRESS; + + state &= ~NO_KEYID; + + return(fbp->state[dir-1] = state); +} + +void fb64_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, + unsigned char *buf, int buflen, char *type) +{ + char lbuf[32]; + int i; + char *cp; + + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure it's NULL terminated */ + buflen -= 1; + + switch(data[2]) { + case FB64_IV: + snprintf(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf), "%s_IV", type); + cp = lbuf; + goto common; + + case FB64_IV_OK: + snprintf(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf), "%s_IV_OK", type); + cp = lbuf; + goto common; + + case FB64_IV_BAD: + snprintf(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf), "%s_IV_BAD", type); + cp = lbuf; + goto common; + + default: + snprintf(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf), " %d (unknown)", data[2]); + cp = lbuf; + common: + for (; (buflen > 0) && (*buf = *cp++); buf++) + buflen--; + for (i = 3; i < cnt; i++) { + snprintf(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf), " %d", data[i]); + for (cp = lbuf; (buflen > 0) && (*buf = *cp++); buf++) + buflen--; + } + break; + } +} + +void cfb64_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, + unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + fb64_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen, "CFB64"); +} + +void ofb64_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, + unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + fb64_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen, "OFB64"); +} + +void fb64_stream_iv(des_cblock seed, struct stinfo *stp) +{ + + memcpy(stp->str_iv, seed,sizeof(des_cblock)); + memcpy(stp->str_output, seed, sizeof(des_cblock)); + + des_key_sched(&stp->str_ikey, stp->str_sched); + + stp->str_index = sizeof(des_cblock); +} + +void fb64_stream_key(des_cblock key, struct stinfo *stp) +{ + memcpy(stp->str_ikey, key, sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_key_sched((des_cblock*)key, stp->str_sched); + + memcpy(stp->str_output, stp->str_iv, sizeof(des_cblock)); + + stp->str_index = sizeof(des_cblock); +} + +/* + * DES 64 bit Cipher Feedback + * + * key --->+-----+ + * +->| DES |--+ + * | +-----+ | + * | v + * INPUT --(--------->(+)+---> DATA + * | | + * +-------------+ + * + * + * Given: + * iV: Initial vector, 64 bits (8 bytes) long. + * Dn: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of data to encrypt (decrypt). + * On: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of encrypted (decrypted) output. + * + * V0 = DES(iV, key) + * On = Dn ^ Vn + * V(n+1) = DES(On, key) + */ + +void cfb64_encrypt(unsigned char *s, int c) +{ + struct stinfo *stp = &fb[CFB].streams[DIR_ENCRYPT-1]; + int index; + + index = stp->str_index; + while (c-- > 0) { + if (index == sizeof(des_cblock)) { + des_cblock b; + des_ecb_encrypt(&stp->str_output, &b,stp->str_sched, 1); + memcpy(stp->str_feed, b, sizeof(des_cblock)); + index = 0; + } + + /* On encryption, we store (feed ^ data) which is cypher */ + *s = stp->str_output[index] = (stp->str_feed[index] ^ *s); + s++; + index++; + } + stp->str_index = index; +} + +int cfb64_decrypt(int data) +{ + struct stinfo *stp = &fb[CFB].streams[DIR_DECRYPT-1]; + int index; + + if (data == -1) { + /* + * Back up one byte. It is assumed that we will + * never back up more than one byte. If we do, this + * may or may not work. + */ + if (stp->str_index) + --stp->str_index; + return(0); + } + + index = stp->str_index++; + if (index == sizeof(des_cblock)) { + des_cblock b; + des_ecb_encrypt(&stp->str_output,&b, stp->str_sched, 1); + memcpy(stp->str_feed, b, sizeof(des_cblock)); + stp->str_index = 1; /* Next time will be 1 */ + index = 0; /* But now use 0 */ + } + + /* On decryption we store (data) which is cypher. */ + stp->str_output[index] = data; + return(data ^ stp->str_feed[index]); +} + +/* + * DES 64 bit Output Feedback + * + * key --->+-----+ + * +->| DES |--+ + * | +-----+ | + * +-----------+ + * v + * INPUT -------->(+) ----> DATA + * + * Given: + * iV: Initial vector, 64 bits (8 bytes) long. + * Dn: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of data to encrypt (decrypt). + * On: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of encrypted (decrypted) output. + * + * V0 = DES(iV, key) + * V(n+1) = DES(Vn, key) + * On = Dn ^ Vn + */ + +void ofb64_encrypt(unsigned char *s, int c) +{ + struct stinfo *stp = &fb[OFB].streams[DIR_ENCRYPT-1]; + int index; + + index = stp->str_index; + while (c-- > 0) { + if (index == sizeof(des_cblock)) { + des_cblock b; + des_ecb_encrypt(&stp->str_feed,&b, stp->str_sched, 1); + memcpy(stp->str_feed, b, sizeof(des_cblock)); + index = 0; + } + *s++ ^= stp->str_feed[index]; + index++; + } + stp->str_index = index; +} + +int ofb64_decrypt(int data) +{ + struct stinfo *stp = &fb[OFB].streams[DIR_DECRYPT-1]; + int index; + + if (data == -1) { + /* + * Back up one byte. It is assumed that we will + * never back up more than one byte. If we do, this + * may or may not work. + */ + if (stp->str_index) + --stp->str_index; + return(0); + } + + index = stp->str_index++; + if (index == sizeof(des_cblock)) { + des_cblock b; + des_ecb_encrypt(&stp->str_feed,&b,stp->str_sched, 1); + memcpy(stp->str_feed, b, sizeof(des_cblock)); + stp->str_index = 1; /* Next time will be 1 */ + index = 0; /* But now use 0 */ + } + + return(data ^ stp->str_feed[index]); +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fca8a4705f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,1002 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: encrypt.c,v 1.23 2002/01/18 12:58:49 joda Exp $"); + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + +#define ENCRYPT_NAMES +#include + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + + +/* + * These functions pointers point to the current routines + * for encrypting and decrypting data. + */ +void (*encrypt_output) (unsigned char *, int); +int (*decrypt_input) (int); +char *nclearto; + +int encrypt_debug_mode = 0; +static int decrypt_mode = 0; +static int encrypt_mode = 0; +static int encrypt_verbose = 0; +static int autoencrypt = 0; +static int autodecrypt = 0; +static int havesessionkey = 0; +static int Server = 0; +static const char *Name = "Noname"; + +#define typemask(x) ((x) > 0 ? 1 << ((x)-1) : 0) + +static long i_support_encrypt = typemask(ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64) + | typemask(ENCTYPE_DES_OFB64); + static long i_support_decrypt = typemask(ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64) + | typemask(ENCTYPE_DES_OFB64); + static long i_wont_support_encrypt = 0; + static long i_wont_support_decrypt = 0; +#define I_SUPPORT_ENCRYPT (i_support_encrypt & ~i_wont_support_encrypt) +#define I_SUPPORT_DECRYPT (i_support_decrypt & ~i_wont_support_decrypt) + + static long remote_supports_encrypt = 0; + static long remote_supports_decrypt = 0; + + static Encryptions encryptions[] = { +#if defined(DES_ENCRYPTION) + { "DES_CFB64", ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64, + cfb64_encrypt, + cfb64_decrypt, + cfb64_init, + cfb64_start, + cfb64_is, + cfb64_reply, + cfb64_session, + cfb64_keyid, + cfb64_printsub }, + { "DES_OFB64", ENCTYPE_DES_OFB64, + ofb64_encrypt, + ofb64_decrypt, + ofb64_init, + ofb64_start, + ofb64_is, + ofb64_reply, + ofb64_session, + ofb64_keyid, + ofb64_printsub }, +#endif + { 0, }, + }; + +static unsigned char str_send[64] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_ENCRYPT, + ENCRYPT_SUPPORT }; +static unsigned char str_suplen = 0; +static unsigned char str_start[72] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_ENCRYPT }; +static unsigned char str_end[] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 0, IAC, SE }; + +Encryptions * +findencryption(int type) +{ + Encryptions *ep = encryptions; + + if (!(I_SUPPORT_ENCRYPT & remote_supports_decrypt & typemask(type))) + return(0); + while (ep->type && ep->type != type) + ++ep; + return(ep->type ? ep : 0); +} + +Encryptions * +finddecryption(int type) +{ + Encryptions *ep = encryptions; + + if (!(I_SUPPORT_DECRYPT & remote_supports_encrypt & typemask(type))) + return(0); + while (ep->type && ep->type != type) + ++ep; + return(ep->type ? ep : 0); +} + +#define MAXKEYLEN 64 + +static struct key_info { + unsigned char keyid[MAXKEYLEN]; + int keylen; + int dir; + int *modep; + Encryptions *(*getcrypt)(); +} ki[2] = { + { { 0 }, 0, DIR_ENCRYPT, &encrypt_mode, findencryption }, + { { 0 }, 0, DIR_DECRYPT, &decrypt_mode, finddecryption }, +}; + +void +encrypt_init(const char *name, int server) +{ + Encryptions *ep = encryptions; + + Name = name; + Server = server; + i_support_encrypt = i_support_decrypt = 0; + remote_supports_encrypt = remote_supports_decrypt = 0; + encrypt_mode = 0; + decrypt_mode = 0; + encrypt_output = 0; + decrypt_input = 0; +#ifdef notdef + encrypt_verbose = !server; +#endif + + str_suplen = 4; + + while (ep->type) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: I will support %s\r\n", + Name, ENCTYPE_NAME(ep->type)); + i_support_encrypt |= typemask(ep->type); + i_support_decrypt |= typemask(ep->type); + if ((i_wont_support_decrypt & typemask(ep->type)) == 0) + if ((str_send[str_suplen++] = ep->type) == IAC) + str_send[str_suplen++] = IAC; + if (ep->init) + (*ep->init)(Server); + ++ep; + } + str_send[str_suplen++] = IAC; + str_send[str_suplen++] = SE; +} + +void +encrypt_list_types(void) +{ + Encryptions *ep = encryptions; + + printf("Valid encryption types:\n"); + while (ep->type) { + printf("\t%s (%d)\r\n", ENCTYPE_NAME(ep->type), ep->type); + ++ep; + } +} + +int +EncryptEnable(char *type, char *mode) +{ + if (isprefix(type, "help") || isprefix(type, "?")) { + printf("Usage: encrypt enable [input|output]\n"); + encrypt_list_types(); + return(0); + } + if (EncryptType(type, mode)) + return(EncryptStart(mode)); + return(0); +} + +int +EncryptDisable(char *type, char *mode) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + int ret = 0; + + if (isprefix(type, "help") || isprefix(type, "?")) { + printf("Usage: encrypt disable [input|output]\n"); + encrypt_list_types(); + } else if ((ep = (Encryptions *)genget(type, (char**)encryptions, + sizeof(Encryptions))) == 0) { + printf("%s: invalid encryption type\n", type); + } else if (Ambiguous(ep)) { + printf("Ambiguous type '%s'\n", type); + } else { + if ((mode == 0) || (isprefix(mode, "input") ? 1 : 0)) { + if (decrypt_mode == ep->type) + EncryptStopInput(); + i_wont_support_decrypt |= typemask(ep->type); + ret = 1; + } + if ((mode == 0) || (isprefix(mode, "output"))) { + if (encrypt_mode == ep->type) + EncryptStopOutput(); + i_wont_support_encrypt |= typemask(ep->type); + ret = 1; + } + if (ret == 0) + printf("%s: invalid encryption mode\n", mode); + } + return(ret); +} + +int +EncryptType(char *type, char *mode) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + int ret = 0; + + if (isprefix(type, "help") || isprefix(type, "?")) { + printf("Usage: encrypt type [input|output]\n"); + encrypt_list_types(); + } else if ((ep = (Encryptions *)genget(type, (char**)encryptions, + sizeof(Encryptions))) == 0) { + printf("%s: invalid encryption type\n", type); + } else if (Ambiguous(ep)) { + printf("Ambiguous type '%s'\n", type); + } else { + if ((mode == 0) || isprefix(mode, "input")) { + decrypt_mode = ep->type; + i_wont_support_decrypt &= ~typemask(ep->type); + ret = 1; + } + if ((mode == 0) || isprefix(mode, "output")) { + encrypt_mode = ep->type; + i_wont_support_encrypt &= ~typemask(ep->type); + ret = 1; + } + if (ret == 0) + printf("%s: invalid encryption mode\n", mode); + } + return(ret); +} + +int +EncryptStart(char *mode) +{ + int ret = 0; + if (mode) { + if (isprefix(mode, "input")) + return(EncryptStartInput()); + if (isprefix(mode, "output")) + return(EncryptStartOutput()); + if (isprefix(mode, "help") || isprefix(mode, "?")) { + printf("Usage: encrypt start [input|output]\n"); + return(0); + } + printf("%s: invalid encryption mode 'encrypt start ?' for help\n", mode); + return(0); + } + ret += EncryptStartInput(); + ret += EncryptStartOutput(); + return(ret); +} + +int +EncryptStartInput(void) +{ + if (decrypt_mode) { + encrypt_send_request_start(); + return(1); + } + printf("No previous decryption mode, decryption not enabled\r\n"); + return(0); +} + +int +EncryptStartOutput(void) +{ + if (encrypt_mode) { + encrypt_start_output(encrypt_mode); + return(1); + } + printf("No previous encryption mode, encryption not enabled\r\n"); + return(0); +} + +int +EncryptStop(char *mode) +{ + int ret = 0; + if (mode) { + if (isprefix(mode, "input")) + return(EncryptStopInput()); + if (isprefix(mode, "output")) + return(EncryptStopOutput()); + if (isprefix(mode, "help") || isprefix(mode, "?")) { + printf("Usage: encrypt stop [input|output]\n"); + return(0); + } + printf("%s: invalid encryption mode 'encrypt stop ?' for help\n", mode); + return(0); + } + ret += EncryptStopInput(); + ret += EncryptStopOutput(); + return(ret); +} + +int +EncryptStopInput(void) +{ + encrypt_send_request_end(); + return(1); +} + +int +EncryptStopOutput(void) +{ + encrypt_send_end(); + return(1); +} + +void +encrypt_display(void) +{ + printf("Autoencrypt for output is %s. Autodecrypt for input is %s.\r\n", + autoencrypt?"on":"off", autodecrypt?"on":"off"); + + if (encrypt_output) + printf("Currently encrypting output with %s\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(encrypt_mode)); + else + printf("Currently not encrypting output\r\n"); + + if (decrypt_input) + printf("Currently decrypting input with %s\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(decrypt_mode)); + else + printf("Currently not decrypting input\r\n"); +} + +int +EncryptStatus(void) +{ + printf("Autoencrypt for output is %s. Autodecrypt for input is %s.\r\n", + autoencrypt?"on":"off", autodecrypt?"on":"off"); + + if (encrypt_output) + printf("Currently encrypting output with %s\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(encrypt_mode)); + else if (encrypt_mode) { + printf("Currently output is clear text.\r\n"); + printf("Last encryption mode was %s\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(encrypt_mode)); + } else + printf("Currently not encrypting output\r\n"); + + if (decrypt_input) { + printf("Currently decrypting input with %s\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(decrypt_mode)); + } else if (decrypt_mode) { + printf("Currently input is clear text.\r\n"); + printf("Last decryption mode was %s\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(decrypt_mode)); + } else + printf("Currently not decrypting input\r\n"); + + return 1; +} + +void +encrypt_send_support(void) +{ + if (str_suplen) { + /* + * If the user has requested that decryption start + * immediatly, then send a "REQUEST START" before + * we negotiate the type. + */ + if (!Server && autodecrypt) + encrypt_send_request_start(); + telnet_net_write(str_send, str_suplen); + printsub('>', &str_send[2], str_suplen - 2); + str_suplen = 0; + } +} + +int +EncryptDebug(int on) +{ + if (on < 0) + encrypt_debug_mode ^= 1; + else + encrypt_debug_mode = on; + printf("Encryption debugging %s\r\n", + encrypt_debug_mode ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return(1); +} + +/* turn on verbose encryption, but dont keep telling the whole world + */ +void encrypt_verbose_quiet(int on) +{ + if(on < 0) + encrypt_verbose ^= 1; + else + encrypt_verbose = on ? 1 : 0; +} + +int +EncryptVerbose(int on) +{ + encrypt_verbose_quiet(on); + printf("Encryption %s verbose\r\n", + encrypt_verbose ? "is" : "is not"); + return(1); +} + +int +EncryptAutoEnc(int on) +{ + encrypt_auto(on); + printf("Automatic encryption of output is %s\r\n", + autoencrypt ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return(1); +} + +int +EncryptAutoDec(int on) +{ + decrypt_auto(on); + printf("Automatic decryption of input is %s\r\n", + autodecrypt ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return(1); +} + +/* Called when we receive a WONT or a DONT ENCRYPT after we sent a DO + encrypt */ +void +encrypt_not(void) +{ + if (encrypt_verbose) + printf("[ Connection is NOT encrypted ]\r\n"); + else + printf("\r\n*** Connection not encrypted! " + "Communication may be eavesdropped. ***\r\n"); +} + +/* + * Called when ENCRYPT SUPPORT is received. + */ +void +encrypt_support(unsigned char *typelist, int cnt) +{ + int type, use_type = 0; + Encryptions *ep; + + /* + * Forget anything the other side has previously told us. + */ + remote_supports_decrypt = 0; + + while (cnt-- > 0) { + type = *typelist++; + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: He is supporting %s (%d)\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME(type), type); + if ((type < ENCTYPE_CNT) && + (I_SUPPORT_ENCRYPT & typemask(type))) { + remote_supports_decrypt |= typemask(type); + if (use_type == 0) + use_type = type; + } + } + if (use_type) { + ep = findencryption(use_type); + if (!ep) + return; + type = ep->start ? (*ep->start)(DIR_ENCRYPT, Server) : 0; + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: (*ep->start)() returned %d\r\n", + Name, type); + if (type < 0) + return; + encrypt_mode = use_type; + if (type == 0) + encrypt_start_output(use_type); + } +} + +void +encrypt_is(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + int type, ret; + + if (--cnt < 0) + return; + type = *data++; + if (type < ENCTYPE_CNT) + remote_supports_encrypt |= typemask(type); + if (!(ep = finddecryption(type))) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Can't find type %s (%d) for initial negotiation\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(type) + ? ENCTYPE_NAME(type) : "(unknown)", + type); + return; + } + if (!ep->is) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: No initial negotiation needed for type %s (%d)\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(type) + ? ENCTYPE_NAME(type) : "(unknown)", + type); + ret = 0; + } else { + ret = (*ep->is)(data, cnt); + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("(*ep->is)(%p, %d) returned %s(%d)\n", data, cnt, + (ret < 0) ? "FAIL " : + (ret == 0) ? "SUCCESS " : "MORE_TO_DO ", ret); + } + if (ret < 0) { + autodecrypt = 0; + } else { + decrypt_mode = type; + if (ret == 0 && autodecrypt) + encrypt_send_request_start(); + } +} + +void +encrypt_reply(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + int ret, type; + + if (--cnt < 0) + return; + type = *data++; + if (!(ep = findencryption(type))) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Can't find type %s (%d) for initial negotiation\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(type) + ? ENCTYPE_NAME(type) : "(unknown)", + type); + return; + } + if (!ep->reply) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: No initial negotiation needed for type %s (%d)\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(type) + ? ENCTYPE_NAME(type) : "(unknown)", + type); + ret = 0; + } else { + ret = (*ep->reply)(data, cnt); + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf("(*ep->reply)(%p, %d) returned %s(%d)\n", + data, cnt, + (ret < 0) ? "FAIL " : + (ret == 0) ? "SUCCESS " : "MORE_TO_DO ", ret); + } + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: encrypt_reply returned %d\n", Name, ret); + if (ret < 0) { + autoencrypt = 0; + } else { + encrypt_mode = type; + if (ret == 0 && autoencrypt) + encrypt_start_output(type); + } +} + +/* + * Called when a ENCRYPT START command is received. + */ +void +encrypt_start(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + + if (!decrypt_mode) { + /* + * Something is wrong. We should not get a START + * command without having already picked our + * decryption scheme. Send a REQUEST-END to + * attempt to clear the channel... + */ + printf("%s: Warning, Cannot decrypt input stream!!!\r\n", Name); + encrypt_send_request_end(); + return; + } + + if ((ep = finddecryption(decrypt_mode))) { + decrypt_input = ep->input; + if (encrypt_verbose) + printf("[ Input is now decrypted with type %s ]\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(decrypt_mode)); + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Start to decrypt input with type %s\r\n", + Name, ENCTYPE_NAME(decrypt_mode)); + } else { + printf("%s: Warning, Cannot decrypt type %s (%d)!!!\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(decrypt_mode) + ? ENCTYPE_NAME(decrypt_mode) + : "(unknown)", + decrypt_mode); + encrypt_send_request_end(); + } +} + +void +encrypt_session_key(Session_Key *key, int server) +{ + Encryptions *ep = encryptions; + + havesessionkey = 1; + + while (ep->type) { + if (ep->session) + (*ep->session)(key, server); + ++ep; + } +} + +/* + * Called when ENCRYPT END is received. + */ +void +encrypt_end(void) +{ + decrypt_input = 0; + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Input is back to clear text\r\n", Name); + if (encrypt_verbose) + printf("[ Input is now clear text ]\r\n"); +} + +/* + * Called when ENCRYPT REQUEST-END is received. + */ +void +encrypt_request_end(void) +{ + encrypt_send_end(); +} + +/* + * Called when ENCRYPT REQUEST-START is received. If we receive + * this before a type is picked, then that indicates that the + * other side wants us to start encrypting data as soon as we + * can. + */ +void +encrypt_request_start(unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + if (encrypt_mode == 0) { + if (Server) + autoencrypt = 1; + return; + } + encrypt_start_output(encrypt_mode); +} + +static unsigned char str_keyid[(MAXKEYLEN*2)+5] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_ENCRYPT }; + +static void +encrypt_keyid(struct key_info *kp, unsigned char *keyid, int len) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + int dir = kp->dir; + int ret = 0; + + if (!(ep = (*kp->getcrypt)(*kp->modep))) { + if (len == 0) + return; + kp->keylen = 0; + } else if (len == 0) { + /* + * Empty option, indicates a failure. + */ + if (kp->keylen == 0) + return; + kp->keylen = 0; + if (ep->keyid) + (void)(*ep->keyid)(dir, kp->keyid, &kp->keylen); + + } else if ((len != kp->keylen) || (memcmp(keyid,kp->keyid,len) != 0)) { + /* + * Length or contents are different + */ + kp->keylen = len; + memcpy(kp->keyid,keyid, len); + if (ep->keyid) + (void)(*ep->keyid)(dir, kp->keyid, &kp->keylen); + } else { + if (ep->keyid) + ret = (*ep->keyid)(dir, kp->keyid, &kp->keylen); + if ((ret == 0) && (dir == DIR_ENCRYPT) && autoencrypt) + encrypt_start_output(*kp->modep); + return; + } + + encrypt_send_keyid(dir, kp->keyid, kp->keylen, 0); +} + +void encrypt_enc_keyid(unsigned char *keyid, int len) +{ + encrypt_keyid(&ki[1], keyid, len); +} + +void encrypt_dec_keyid(unsigned char *keyid, int len) +{ + encrypt_keyid(&ki[0], keyid, len); +} + + +void encrypt_send_keyid(int dir, unsigned char *keyid, int keylen, int saveit) +{ + unsigned char *strp; + + str_keyid[3] = (dir == DIR_ENCRYPT) + ? ENCRYPT_ENC_KEYID : ENCRYPT_DEC_KEYID; + if (saveit) { + struct key_info *kp = &ki[(dir == DIR_ENCRYPT) ? 0 : 1]; + memcpy(kp->keyid,keyid, keylen); + kp->keylen = keylen; + } + + for (strp = &str_keyid[4]; keylen > 0; --keylen) { + if ((*strp++ = *keyid++) == IAC) + *strp++ = IAC; + } + *strp++ = IAC; + *strp++ = SE; + telnet_net_write(str_keyid, strp - str_keyid); + printsub('>', &str_keyid[2], strp - str_keyid - 2); +} + +void +encrypt_auto(int on) +{ + if (on < 0) + autoencrypt ^= 1; + else + autoencrypt = on ? 1 : 0; +} + +void +decrypt_auto(int on) +{ + if (on < 0) + autodecrypt ^= 1; + else + autodecrypt = on ? 1 : 0; +} + +void +encrypt_start_output(int type) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + unsigned char *p; + int i; + + if (!(ep = findencryption(type))) { + if (encrypt_debug_mode) { + printf(">>>%s: Can't encrypt with type %s (%d)\r\n", + Name, + ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(type) + ? ENCTYPE_NAME(type) : "(unknown)", + type); + } + return; + } + if (ep->start) { + i = (*ep->start)(DIR_ENCRYPT, Server); + if (encrypt_debug_mode) { + printf(">>>%s: Encrypt start: %s (%d) %s\r\n", + Name, + (i < 0) ? "failed" : + "initial negotiation in progress", + i, ENCTYPE_NAME(type)); + } + if (i) + return; + } + p = str_start + 3; + *p++ = ENCRYPT_START; + for (i = 0; i < ki[0].keylen; ++i) { + if ((*p++ = ki[0].keyid[i]) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + telnet_net_write(str_start, p - str_start); + net_encrypt(); + printsub('>', &str_start[2], p - &str_start[2]); + /* + * If we are already encrypting in some mode, then + * encrypt the ring (which includes our request) in + * the old mode, mark it all as "clear text" and then + * switch to the new mode. + */ + encrypt_output = ep->output; + encrypt_mode = type; + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Started to encrypt output with type %s\r\n", + Name, ENCTYPE_NAME(type)); + if (encrypt_verbose) + printf("[ Output is now encrypted with type %s ]\r\n", + ENCTYPE_NAME(type)); +} + +void +encrypt_send_end(void) +{ + if (!encrypt_output) + return; + + str_end[3] = ENCRYPT_END; + telnet_net_write(str_end, sizeof(str_end)); + net_encrypt(); + printsub('>', &str_end[2], sizeof(str_end) - 2); + /* + * Encrypt the output buffer now because it will not be done by + * netflush... + */ + encrypt_output = 0; + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Output is back to clear text\r\n", Name); + if (encrypt_verbose) + printf("[ Output is now clear text ]\r\n"); +} + +void +encrypt_send_request_start(void) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int i; + + p = &str_start[3]; + *p++ = ENCRYPT_REQSTART; + for (i = 0; i < ki[1].keylen; ++i) { + if ((*p++ = ki[1].keyid[i]) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + telnet_net_write(str_start, p - str_start); + printsub('>', &str_start[2], p - &str_start[2]); + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Request input to be encrypted\r\n", Name); +} + +void +encrypt_send_request_end(void) +{ + str_end[3] = ENCRYPT_REQEND; + telnet_net_write(str_end, sizeof(str_end)); + printsub('>', &str_end[2], sizeof(str_end) - 2); + + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: Request input to be clear text\r\n", Name); +} + + +void encrypt_wait(void) +{ + if (encrypt_debug_mode) + printf(">>>%s: in encrypt_wait\r\n", Name); + if (!havesessionkey || !(I_SUPPORT_ENCRYPT & remote_supports_decrypt)) + return; + while (autoencrypt && !encrypt_output) + if (telnet_spin()) + return; +} + +int +encrypt_delay(void) +{ + if(!havesessionkey || + (I_SUPPORT_ENCRYPT & remote_supports_decrypt) == 0 || + (I_SUPPORT_DECRYPT & remote_supports_encrypt) == 0) + return 0; + if(!(encrypt_output && decrypt_input)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +int encrypt_is_encrypting() +{ + if (encrypt_output && decrypt_input) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +void +encrypt_debug(int mode) +{ + encrypt_debug_mode = mode; +} + +void encrypt_gen_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, + unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + char tbuf[16], *cp; + + cnt -= 2; + data += 2; + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; + buf[buflen-2] = '*'; + buflen -= 2;; + for (; cnt > 0; cnt--, data++) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), " %d", *data); + for (cp = tbuf; *cp && buflen > 0; --buflen) + *buf++ = *cp++; + if (buflen <= 0) + return; + } + *buf = '\0'; +} + +void +encrypt_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + Encryptions *ep; + int type = data[1]; + + for (ep = encryptions; ep->type && ep->type != type; ep++) + ; + + if (ep->printsub) + (*ep->printsub)(data, cnt, buf, buflen); + else + encrypt_gen_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b04bd5a71 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)encrypt.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + * + * @(#)encrypt.h 5.2 (Berkeley) 3/22/91 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +/* $Id: encrypt.h,v 1.8 2002/09/10 20:03:47 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ENCRYPT__ +#define __ENCRYPT__ + +#define DIR_DECRYPT 1 +#define DIR_ENCRYPT 2 + +#define VALIDKEY(key) ( key[0] | key[1] | key[2] | key[3] | \ + key[4] | key[5] | key[6] | key[7]) + +#define SAMEKEY(k1, k2) (!memcmp(k1, k2, sizeof(des_cblock))) + +typedef struct { + short type; + int length; + unsigned char *data; +} Session_Key; + +typedef struct { + char *name; + int type; + void (*output) (unsigned char *, int); + int (*input) (int); + void (*init) (int); + int (*start) (int, int); + int (*is) (unsigned char *, int); + int (*reply) (unsigned char *, int); + void (*session) (Session_Key *, int); + int (*keyid) (int, unsigned char *, int *); + void (*printsub) (unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); +} Encryptions; + +#define SK_DES 1 /* Matched Kerberos v5 KEYTYPE_DES */ + +#include "crypto-headers.h" +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#define des_new_random_key des_random_key +#endif + +#include "enc-proto.h" + +extern int encrypt_debug_mode; +extern int (*decrypt_input) (int); +extern void (*encrypt_output) (unsigned char *, int); +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/genget.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/genget.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27d1d6708b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/genget.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include "misc-proto.h" + +RCSID("$Id: genget.c,v 1.7 2001/09/03 05:54:14 assar Exp $"); + +#include + +#define LOWER(x) (isupper(x) ? tolower(x) : (x)) +/* + * The prefix function returns 0 if *s1 is not a prefix + * of *s2. If *s1 exactly matches *s2, the negative of + * the length is returned. If *s1 is a prefix of *s2, + * the length of *s1 is returned. + */ + +int +isprefix(char *s1, char *s2) +{ + char *os1; + char c1, c2; + + if (*s1 == '\0') + return(-1); + os1 = s1; + c1 = *s1; + c2 = *s2; + while (tolower((unsigned char)c1) == tolower((unsigned char)c2)) { + if (c1 == '\0') + break; + c1 = *++s1; + c2 = *++s2; + } + return(*s1 ? 0 : (*s2 ? (s1 - os1) : (os1 - s1))); +} + +static char *ambiguous; /* special return value for command routines */ + +char ** +genget(char *name, char **table, int stlen) + /* name to match */ + /* name entry in table */ + +{ + char **c, **found; + int n; + + if (name == 0) + return 0; + + found = 0; + for (c = table; *c != 0; c = (char **)((char *)c + stlen)) { + if ((n = isprefix(name, *c)) == 0) + continue; + if (n < 0) /* exact match */ + return(c); + if (found) + return(&ambiguous); + found = c; + } + return(found); +} + +/* + * Function call version of Ambiguous() + */ +int +Ambiguous(void *s) +{ + return((char **)s == &ambiguous); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..09d3073594 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos.c @@ -0,0 +1,722 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: kerberos.c,v 1.54 2001/08/22 20:30:22 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" + +int kerberos4_cksum (unsigned char *, int); +extern int auth_debug_mode; + +static unsigned char str_data[2048] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 0, + AUTHTYPE_KERBEROS_V4, }; + +#define KRB_AUTH 0 /* Authentication data follows */ +#define KRB_REJECT 1 /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ +#define KRB_ACCEPT 2 /* Accepted */ +#define KRB_CHALLENGE 3 /* Challenge for mutual auth. */ +#define KRB_RESPONSE 4 /* Response for mutual auth. */ + +#define KRB_FORWARD 5 /* */ +#define KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT 6 /* */ +#define KRB_FORWARD_REJECT 7 /* */ + +#define KRB_SERVICE_NAME "rcmd" + +static KTEXT_ST auth; +static char name[ANAME_SZ]; +static AUTH_DAT adat; +static des_cblock session_key; +static des_cblock cred_session; +static des_key_schedule sched; +static des_cblock challenge; +static int auth_done; /* XXX */ + +static int pack_cred(CREDENTIALS *cred, unsigned char *buf); +static int unpack_cred(unsigned char *buf, int len, CREDENTIALS *cred); + + +static int +Data(Authenticator *ap, int type, const void *d, int c) +{ + unsigned char *p = str_data + 4; + const unsigned char *cd = (const unsigned char *)d; + + if (c == -1) + c = strlen((const char *)cd); + + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("%s:%d: [%d] (%d)", + str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS ? ">>>IS" : ">>>REPLY", + str_data[3], + type, c); + printd(d, c); + printf("\r\n"); + } + *p++ = ap->type; + *p++ = ap->way; + *p++ = type; + while (c-- > 0) { + if ((*p++ = *cd++) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + if (str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS) + printsub('>', &str_data[2], p - (&str_data[2])); + return(telnet_net_write(str_data, p - str_data)); +} + +int +kerberos4_init(Authenticator *ap, int server) +{ + FILE *fp; + + if (server) { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_REPLY; + if ((fp = fopen(KEYFILE, "r")) == NULL) + return(0); + fclose(fp); + } else { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_IS; + } + return(1); +} + +char dst_realm_buf[REALM_SZ], *dest_realm = NULL; +int dst_realm_sz = REALM_SZ; + +static int +kerberos4_send(char *name, Authenticator *ap) +{ + KTEXT_ST auth; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char *realm; + CREDENTIALS cred; + int r; + + if (!UserNameRequested) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Kerberos V4: no user name supplied\r\n"); + } + return(0); + } + + memset(instance, 0, sizeof(instance)); + + strlcpy (instance, + krb_get_phost(RemoteHostName), + INST_SZ); + + realm = dest_realm ? dest_realm : krb_realmofhost(RemoteHostName); + + if (!realm) { + printf("Kerberos V4: no realm for %s\r\n", RemoteHostName); + return(0); + } + printf("[ Trying %s (%s.%s@%s) ... ]\r\n", name, + KRB_SERVICE_NAME, instance, realm); + r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB_SERVICE_NAME, instance, realm, 0L); + if (r) { + printf("mk_req failed: %s\r\n", krb_get_err_text(r)); + return(0); + } + r = krb_get_cred(KRB_SERVICE_NAME, instance, realm, &cred); + if (r) { + printf("get_cred failed: %s\r\n", krb_get_err_text(r)); + return(0); + } + if (!auth_sendname((unsigned char*)UserNameRequested, + strlen(UserNameRequested))) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Not enough room for user name\r\n"); + return(0); + } + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Sent %d bytes of authentication data\r\n", auth.length); + if (!Data(ap, KRB_AUTH, (void *)auth.dat, auth.length)) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Not enough room for authentication data\r\n"); + return(0); + } +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + /* create challenge */ + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK)==AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) { + int i; + + des_key_sched(&cred.session, sched); + memcpy (&cred_session, &cred.session, sizeof(cred_session)); +#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL + des_init_random_number_generator(&cred.session); +#endif + des_new_random_key(&session_key); + des_ecb_encrypt(&session_key, &session_key, sched, 0); + des_ecb_encrypt(&session_key, &challenge, sched, 0); + + /* + old code + Some CERT Advisory thinks this is a bad thing... + + des_init_random_number_generator(&cred.session); + des_new_random_key(&challenge); + des_ecb_encrypt(&challenge, &session_key, sched, 1); + */ + + /* + * Increment the challenge by 1, and encrypt it for + * later comparison. + */ + for (i = 7; i >= 0; --i) + if(++challenge[i] != 0) /* No carry! */ + break; + des_ecb_encrypt(&challenge, &challenge, sched, 1); + } + +#endif + + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("CK: %d:", kerberos4_cksum(auth.dat, auth.length)); + printd(auth.dat, auth.length); + printf("\r\n"); + printf("Sent Kerberos V4 credentials to server\r\n"); + } + return(1); +} +int +kerberos4_send_mutual(Authenticator *ap) +{ + return kerberos4_send("mutual KERBEROS4", ap); +} + +int +kerberos4_send_oneway(Authenticator *ap) +{ + return kerberos4_send("KERBEROS4", ap); +} + +void +kerberos4_is(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + struct sockaddr_in addr; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + int r; + socklen_t addr_len; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case KRB_AUTH: + if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)"No local V4 Realm.", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("No local realm\r\n"); + return; + } + memmove(auth.dat, data, auth.length = cnt); + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Got %d bytes of authentication data\r\n", cnt); + printf("CK: %d:", kerberos4_cksum(auth.dat, auth.length)); + printd(auth.dat, auth.length); + printf("\r\n"); + } + k_getsockinst(0, instance, sizeof(instance)); + addr_len = sizeof(addr); + if(getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addr_len) < 0) { + if(auth_debug_mode) + printf("getpeername failed\r\n"); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "getpeername failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + if (addr.sin_family != AF_INET) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("unknown address family: %d\r\n", addr.sin_family); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "bad address family", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + + r = krb_rd_req(&auth, KRB_SERVICE_NAME, + instance, addr.sin_addr.s_addr, &adat, ""); + if (r) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos failed him as %s\r\n", name); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)krb_get_err_text(r), -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + /* save the session key */ + memmove(session_key, adat.session, sizeof(adat.session)); + krb_kntoln(&adat, name); + + if (UserNameRequested && !kuserok(&adat, UserNameRequested)){ + char ts[MaxPathLen]; + struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(UserNameRequested); + + if(pw){ + snprintf(ts, sizeof(ts), + "%s%u", + TKT_ROOT, + (unsigned)pw->pw_uid); + esetenv("KRBTKFILE", ts, 1); + + if (pw->pw_uid == 0) + syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, + "ROOT Kerberos login from %s on %s\n", + krb_unparse_name_long(adat.pname, + adat.pinst, + adat.prealm), + RemoteHostName); + } + Data(ap, KRB_ACCEPT, NULL, 0); + } else { + char *msg; + + asprintf (&msg, "user `%s' is not authorized to " + "login as `%s'", + krb_unparse_name_long(adat.pname, + adat.pinst, + adat.prealm), + UserNameRequested ? UserNameRequested : ""); + if (msg == NULL) + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, NULL, 0); + else { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)msg, -1); + free(msg); + } + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + break; + } + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + break; + + case KRB_CHALLENGE: +#ifndef ENCRYPTION + Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, NULL, 0); +#else + if(!VALIDKEY(session_key)){ + Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, NULL, 0); + break; + } + des_key_sched(&session_key, sched); + { + des_cblock d_block; + int i; + Session_Key skey; + + memmove(d_block, data, sizeof(d_block)); + + /* make a session key for encryption */ + des_ecb_encrypt(&d_block, &session_key, sched, 1); + skey.type=SK_DES; + skey.length=8; + skey.data=session_key; + encrypt_session_key(&skey, 1); + + /* decrypt challenge, add one and encrypt it */ + des_ecb_encrypt(&d_block, &challenge, sched, 0); + for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) + if(++challenge[i] != 0) + break; + des_ecb_encrypt(&challenge, &challenge, sched, 1); + Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, (void *)challenge, sizeof(challenge)); + } +#endif + break; + + case KRB_FORWARD: + { + des_key_schedule ks; + unsigned char netcred[sizeof(CREDENTIALS)]; + CREDENTIALS cred; + int ret; + if(cnt > sizeof(cred)) + abort(); + + memcpy (session_key, adat.session, sizeof(session_key)); + des_set_key(&session_key, ks); + des_pcbc_encrypt((void*)data, (void*)netcred, cnt, + ks, &session_key, DES_DECRYPT); + unpack_cred(netcred, cnt, &cred); + { + if(strcmp(cred.service, KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET) || + strncmp(cred.instance, cred.realm, sizeof(cred.instance)) || + cred.lifetime < 0 || cred.lifetime > 255 || + cred.kvno < 0 || cred.kvno > 255 || + cred.issue_date < 0 || + cred.issue_date > time(0) + CLOCK_SKEW || + strncmp(cred.pname, adat.pname, sizeof(cred.pname)) || + strncmp(cred.pinst, adat.pinst, sizeof(cred.pinst))){ + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_REJECT, "Bad credentials", -1); + }else{ + if((ret = tf_setup(&cred, + cred.pname, + cred.pinst)) == KSUCCESS){ + struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(UserNameRequested); + + if (pw) + chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT, 0, 0); + } else{ + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_REJECT, + krb_get_err_text(ret), -1); + } + } + } + memset(data, 0, cnt); + memset(ks, 0, sizeof(ks)); + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + } + + break; + + default: + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Unknown Kerberos option %d\r\n", data[-1]); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, 0, 0); + break; + } +} + +void +kerberos4_reply(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + Session_Key skey; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case KRB_REJECT: + if(auth_done){ /* XXX Ick! */ + printf("[ Kerberos V4 received unknown opcode ]\r\n"); + }else{ + printf("[ Kerberos V4 refuses authentication "); + if (cnt > 0) + printf("because %.*s ", cnt, data); + printf("]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + } + return; + case KRB_ACCEPT: + printf("[ Kerberos V4 accepts you ]\r\n"); + auth_done = 1; + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) { + /* + * Send over the encrypted challenge. + */ + Data(ap, KRB_CHALLENGE, session_key, + sizeof(session_key)); + des_ecb_encrypt(&session_key, &session_key, sched, 1); + skey.type = SK_DES; + skey.length = 8; + skey.data = session_key; + encrypt_session_key(&skey, 0); +#if 0 + kerberos4_forward(ap, &cred_session); +#endif + return; + } + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + return; + case KRB_RESPONSE: + /* make sure the response is correct */ + if ((cnt != sizeof(des_cblock)) || + (memcmp(data, challenge, sizeof(challenge)))){ + printf("[ Kerberos V4 challenge failed!!! ]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + } + printf("[ Kerberos V4 challenge successful ]\r\n"); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + break; + case KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT: + printf("[ Kerberos V4 accepted forwarded credentials ]\r\n"); + break; + case KRB_FORWARD_REJECT: + printf("[ Kerberos V4 rejected forwarded credentials: `%.*s']\r\n", + cnt, data); + break; + default: + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Unknown Kerberos option %d\r\n", data[-1]); + return; + } +} + +int +kerberos4_status(Authenticator *ap, char *name, size_t name_sz, int level) +{ + if (level < AUTH_USER) + return(level); + + if (UserNameRequested && !kuserok(&adat, UserNameRequested)) { + strlcpy(name, UserNameRequested, name_sz); + return(AUTH_VALID); + } else + return(AUTH_USER); +} + +#define BUMP(buf, len) while (*(buf)) {++(buf), --(len);} +#define ADDC(buf, len, c) if ((len) > 0) {*(buf)++ = (c); --(len);} + +void +kerberos4_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + int i; + + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure its NULL terminated */ + buflen -= 1; + + switch(data[3]) { + case KRB_REJECT: /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " REJECT ", buflen); + goto common; + + case KRB_ACCEPT: /* Accepted (name might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " ACCEPT ", buflen); + common: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + if (cnt <= 4) + break; + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) + ADDC(buf, buflen, data[i]); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '\0'); + break; + + case KRB_AUTH: /* Authentication data follows */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " AUTH", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB_CHALLENGE: + strlcpy((char *)buf, " CHALLENGE", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB_RESPONSE: + strlcpy((char *)buf, " RESPONSE", buflen); + goto common2; + + default: + snprintf((char*)buf, buflen, " %d (unknown)", data[3]); + common2: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) { + snprintf((char*)buf, buflen, " %d", data[i]); + BUMP(buf, buflen); + } + break; + } +} + +int +kerberos4_cksum(unsigned char *d, int n) +{ + int ck = 0; + + /* + * A comment is probably needed here for those not + * well versed in the "C" language. Yes, this is + * supposed to be a "switch" with the body of the + * "switch" being a "while" statement. The whole + * purpose of the switch is to allow us to jump into + * the middle of the while() loop, and then not have + * to do any more switch()s. + * + * Some compilers will spit out a warning message + * about the loop not being entered at the top. + */ + switch (n&03) + while (n > 0) { + case 0: + ck ^= (int)*d++ << 24; + --n; + case 3: + ck ^= (int)*d++ << 16; + --n; + case 2: + ck ^= (int)*d++ << 8; + --n; + case 1: + ck ^= (int)*d++; + --n; + } + return(ck); +} + +static int +pack_cred(CREDENTIALS *cred, unsigned char *buf) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + memcpy (p, cred->service, ANAME_SZ); + p += ANAME_SZ; + memcpy (p, cred->instance, INST_SZ); + p += INST_SZ; + memcpy (p, cred->realm, REALM_SZ); + p += REALM_SZ; + memcpy(p, cred->session, 8); + p += 8; + p += KRB_PUT_INT(cred->lifetime, p, 4, 4); + p += KRB_PUT_INT(cred->kvno, p, 4, 4); + p += KRB_PUT_INT(cred->ticket_st.length, p, 4, 4); + memcpy(p, cred->ticket_st.dat, cred->ticket_st.length); + p += cred->ticket_st.length; + p += KRB_PUT_INT(0, p, 4, 4); + p += KRB_PUT_INT(cred->issue_date, p, 4, 4); + memcpy (p, cred->pname, ANAME_SZ); + p += ANAME_SZ; + memcpy (p, cred->pinst, INST_SZ); + p += INST_SZ; + return p - buf; +} + +static int +unpack_cred(unsigned char *buf, int len, CREDENTIALS *cred) +{ + char *p = (char*)buf; + u_int32_t tmp; + + strncpy (cred->service, p, ANAME_SZ); + cred->service[ANAME_SZ - 1] = '\0'; + p += ANAME_SZ; + strncpy (cred->instance, p, INST_SZ); + cred->instance[INST_SZ - 1] = '\0'; + p += INST_SZ; + strncpy (cred->realm, p, REALM_SZ); + cred->realm[REALM_SZ - 1] = '\0'; + p += REALM_SZ; + + memcpy(cred->session, p, 8); + p += 8; + p += krb_get_int(p, &tmp, 4, 0); + cred->lifetime = tmp; + p += krb_get_int(p, &tmp, 4, 0); + cred->kvno = tmp; + + p += krb_get_int(p, &cred->ticket_st.length, 4, 0); + memcpy(cred->ticket_st.dat, p, cred->ticket_st.length); + p += cred->ticket_st.length; + p += krb_get_int(p, &tmp, 4, 0); + cred->ticket_st.mbz = 0; + p += krb_get_int(p, (u_int32_t *)&cred->issue_date, 4, 0); + + strncpy (cred->pname, p, ANAME_SZ); + cred->pname[ANAME_SZ - 1] = '\0'; + p += ANAME_SZ; + strncpy (cred->pinst, p, INST_SZ); + cred->pinst[INST_SZ - 1] = '\0'; + p += INST_SZ; + return 0; +} + + +int +kerberos4_forward(Authenticator *ap, void *v) +{ + des_cblock *key = (des_cblock *)v; + CREDENTIALS cred; + char *realm; + des_key_schedule ks; + int len; + unsigned char netcred[sizeof(CREDENTIALS)]; + int ret; + + realm = krb_realmofhost(RemoteHostName); + if(realm == NULL) + return -1; + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + ret = krb_get_cred(KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, + realm, + realm, + &cred); + if(ret) + return ret; + des_set_key(key, ks); + len = pack_cred(&cred, netcred); + des_pcbc_encrypt((void*)netcred, (void*)netcred, len, + ks, key, DES_ENCRYPT); + memset(ks, 0, sizeof(ks)); + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD, netcred, len); + memset(netcred, 0, sizeof(netcred)); + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ea37590f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c @@ -0,0 +1,881 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America may + * require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: kerberos5.c,v 1.53.2.1 2004/06/21 08:21:07 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB5 + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#define Authenticator k5_Authenticator +#include +#undef Authenticator +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#if defined(DCE) +int dfsk5ok = 0; +int dfspag = 0; +int dfsfwd = 0; +#endif + +int forward_flags = 0; /* Flags get set in telnet/main.c on -f and -F */ + +int forward(int); +int forwardable(int); + +/* These values need to be the same as those defined in telnet/main.c. */ +/* Either define them in both places, or put in some common header file. */ +#define OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS 0x00000002 +#define OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS 0x00000001 + + +void kerberos5_forward (Authenticator *); + +static unsigned char str_data[4] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 0 }; + +#define KRB_AUTH 0 /* Authentication data follows */ +#define KRB_REJECT 1 /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ +#define KRB_ACCEPT 2 /* Accepted */ +#define KRB_RESPONSE 3 /* Response for mutual auth. */ + +#define KRB_FORWARD 4 /* Forwarded credentials follow */ +#define KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT 5 /* Forwarded credentials accepted */ +#define KRB_FORWARD_REJECT 6 /* Forwarded credentials rejected */ + +static krb5_data auth; +static krb5_ticket *ticket; + +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_auth_context auth_context; + +static int +Data(Authenticator *ap, int type, void *d, int c) +{ + unsigned char *cd = (unsigned char *)d; + unsigned char *p0, *p; + size_t len = sizeof(str_data) + 3 + 2; + int ret; + + if (c == -1) + c = strlen((char*)cd); + + for (p = cd; p - cd < c; p++, len++) + if (*p == IAC) + len++; + + p0 = malloc(len); + if (p0 == NULL) + return 0; + + memcpy(p0, str_data, sizeof(str_data)); + p = p0 + sizeof(str_data); + + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("%s:%d: [%d] (%d)", + str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS ? ">>>IS" : ">>>REPLY", + str_data[3], + type, c); + printd(d, c); + printf("\r\n"); + } + *p++ = ap->type; + *p++ = ap->way; + *p++ = type; + while (c-- > 0) { + if ((*p++ = *cd++) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + if (str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS) + printsub('>', &p0[2], len - 2); + ret = telnet_net_write(p0, len); + free(p0); + return ret; +} + +int +kerberos5_init(Authenticator *ap, int server) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + return 0; + if (server) { + krb5_keytab kt; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &kt); + if (ret) + return 0; + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get (context, kt, &cursor); + if (ret) { + krb5_kt_close (context, kt); + return 0; + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get (context, kt, &cursor); + krb5_kt_close (context, kt); + + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_REPLY; + } else + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_IS; + return(1); +} + +extern int net; +static int +kerberos5_send(char *name, Authenticator *ap) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache; + int ap_opts; + krb5_data cksum_data; + char foo[2]; + + if (!UserNameRequested) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Kerberos V5: no user name supplied\r\n"); + } + return(0); + } + + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Kerberos V5: could not get default ccache: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + } + return 0; + } + + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) + ap_opts = AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED; + else + ap_opts = 0; + + ap_opts |= AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Kerberos V5: krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } + return(0); + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &net); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf ("Kerberos V5:" + " krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } + return(0); + } + + krb5_auth_con_setkeytype (context, auth_context, KEYTYPE_DES); + + foo[0] = ap->type; + foo[1] = ap->way; + + cksum_data.length = sizeof(foo); + cksum_data.data = foo; + + + { + krb5_principal service; + char sname[128]; + + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + RemoteHostName, + NULL, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &service); + if(ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf ("Kerberos V5:" + " krb5_sname_to_principal(%s) failed (%s)\r\n", + RemoteHostName, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } + return 0; + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, service, sname, sizeof(sname)); + if(ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf ("Kerberos V5:" + " krb5_unparse_name_fixed failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } + return 0; + } + printf("[ Trying %s (%s)... ]\r\n", name, sname); + ret = krb5_mk_req_exact(context, &auth_context, ap_opts, + service, + &cksum_data, ccache, &auth); + krb5_free_principal (context, service); + + } + if (ret) { + if (1 || auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Kerberos V5: mk_req failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } + return(0); + } + + if (!auth_sendname((unsigned char *)UserNameRequested, + strlen(UserNameRequested))) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Not enough room for user name\r\n"); + return(0); + } + if (!Data(ap, KRB_AUTH, auth.data, auth.length)) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Not enough room for authentication data\r\n"); + return(0); + } + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Sent Kerberos V5 credentials to server\r\n"); + } + return(1); +} + +int +kerberos5_send_mutual(Authenticator *ap) +{ + return kerberos5_send("mutual KERBEROS5", ap); +} + +int +kerberos5_send_oneway(Authenticator *ap) +{ + return kerberos5_send("KERBEROS5", ap); +} + +void +kerberos5_is(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data outbuf; + krb5_keyblock *key_block; + char *name; + krb5_principal server; + int zero = 0; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case KRB_AUTH: + auth.data = (char *)data; + auth.length = cnt; + + auth_context = NULL; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (ret) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "krb5_auth_con_init failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &zero); + if (ret) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: " + "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_sock_to_principal (context, + 0, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "krb5_sock_to_principal failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: " + "krb5_sock_to_principal failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_rd_req(context, + &auth_context, + &auth, + server, + NULL, + NULL, + &ticket); + + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ret) { + char *errbuf; + + asprintf(&errbuf, + "Read req failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, errbuf, -1); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("%s\r\n", errbuf); + free (errbuf); + return; + } + + { + char foo[2]; + + foo[0] = ap->type; + foo[1] = ap->way; + + ret = krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum(context, + auth_context, + foo, + sizeof(foo)); + + if (ret) { + char *errbuf; + asprintf(&errbuf, "Bad checksum: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, errbuf, -1); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("%s\r\n", errbuf); + free(errbuf); + return; + } + } + ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey (context, + auth_context, + &key_block); + + if (ret) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: " + "krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return; + } + + if (key_block == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, + auth_context, + &key_block); + } + if (ret) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "krb5_auth_con_getkey failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: " + "krb5_auth_con_getkey failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return; + } + if (key_block == NULL) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, "no subkey received", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: " + "krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey returned NULL key\r\n"); + return; + } + + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) { + ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &outbuf); + if (ret) { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, + "krb5_mk_rep failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Kerberos V5: " + "krb5_mk_rep failed (%s)\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return; + } + Data(ap, KRB_RESPONSE, outbuf.data, outbuf.length); + } + if (krb5_unparse_name(context, ticket->client, &name)) + name = 0; + + if(UserNameRequested && krb5_kuserok(context, + ticket->client, + UserNameRequested)) { + Data(ap, KRB_ACCEPT, name, name ? -1 : 0); + if (auth_debug_mode) { + printf("Kerberos5 identifies him as ``%s''\r\n", + name ? name : ""); + } + + if(key_block->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 || + key_block->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 || + key_block->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) { + Session_Key skey; + + skey.type = SK_DES; + skey.length = 8; + skey.data = key_block->keyvalue.data; + encrypt_session_key(&skey, 0); + } + + } else { + char *msg; + + asprintf (&msg, "user `%s' is not authorized to " + "login as `%s'", + name ? name : "", + UserNameRequested ? UserNameRequested : ""); + if (msg == NULL) + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, NULL, 0); + else { + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, (void *)msg, -1); + free(msg); + } + auth_finished (ap, AUTH_REJECT); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block); + break; + } + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block); + + break; + case KRB_FORWARD: { + struct passwd *pwd; + char ccname[1024]; /* XXX */ + krb5_data inbuf; + krb5_ccache ccache; + inbuf.data = (char *)data; + inbuf.length = cnt; + + pwd = getpwnam (UserNameRequested); + if (pwd == NULL) + break; + + snprintf (ccname, sizeof(ccname), + "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u", pwd->pw_uid); + + ret = krb5_cc_resolve (context, ccname, &ccache); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("Kerberos V5: could not get ccache: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + break; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, + ccache, + ticket->client); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("Kerberos V5: could not init ccache: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + break; + } + +#if defined(DCE) + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME", ccname, 1); +#endif + ret = krb5_rd_cred2 (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + &inbuf); + if(ret) { + char *errbuf; + + asprintf (&errbuf, + "Read forwarded creds failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + if(errbuf == NULL) + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_REJECT, NULL, 0); + else + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_REJECT, errbuf, -1); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Could not read forwarded credentials: %s\r\n", + errbuf); + free (errbuf); + } else { + Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT, 0, 0); +#if defined(DCE) + dfsfwd = 1; +#endif + } + chown (ccname + 5, pwd->pw_uid, -1); + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Forwarded credentials obtained\r\n"); + break; + } + default: + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Unknown Kerberos option %d\r\n", data[-1]); + Data(ap, KRB_REJECT, 0, 0); + break; + } +} + +void +kerberos5_reply(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + static int mutual_complete = 0; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case KRB_REJECT: + if (cnt > 0) { + printf("[ Kerberos V5 refuses authentication because %.*s ]\r\n", + cnt, data); + } else + printf("[ Kerberos V5 refuses authentication ]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + case KRB_ACCEPT: { + krb5_error_code ret; + Session_Key skey; + krb5_keyblock *keyblock; + + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL && + !mutual_complete) { + printf("[ Kerberos V5 accepted you, but didn't provide mutual authentication! ]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + } + if (cnt) + printf("[ Kerberos V5 accepts you as ``%.*s'' ]\r\n", cnt, data); + else + printf("[ Kerberos V5 accepts you ]\r\n"); + + ret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey (context, + auth_context, + &keyblock); + if (ret) + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey (context, + auth_context, + &keyblock); + if(ret) { + printf("[ krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s ]\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + } + + skey.type = SK_DES; + skey.length = 8; + skey.data = keyblock->keyvalue.data; + encrypt_session_key(&skey, 0); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, keyblock); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + if (forward_flags & OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS) + kerberos5_forward(ap); + break; + } + case KRB_RESPONSE: + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) { + /* the rest of the reply should contain a krb_ap_rep */ + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *reply; + krb5_data inbuf; + krb5_error_code ret; + + inbuf.length = cnt; + inbuf.data = (char *)data; + + ret = krb5_rd_rep(context, auth_context, &inbuf, &reply); + if (ret) { + printf("[ Mutual authentication failed: %s ]\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + } + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, reply); + mutual_complete = 1; + } + return; + case KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT: + printf("[ Kerberos V5 accepted forwarded credentials ]\r\n"); + return; + case KRB_FORWARD_REJECT: + printf("[ Kerberos V5 refuses forwarded credentials because %.*s ]\r\n", + cnt, data); + return; + default: + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Unknown Kerberos option %d\r\n", data[-1]); + return; + } +} + +int +kerberos5_status(Authenticator *ap, char *name, size_t name_sz, int level) +{ + if (level < AUTH_USER) + return(level); + + if (UserNameRequested && + krb5_kuserok(context, + ticket->client, + UserNameRequested)) + { + strlcpy(name, UserNameRequested, name_sz); +#if defined(DCE) + dfsk5ok = 1; +#endif + return(AUTH_VALID); + } else + return(AUTH_USER); +} + +#define BUMP(buf, len) while (*(buf)) {++(buf), --(len);} +#define ADDC(buf, len, c) if ((len) > 0) {*(buf)++ = (c); --(len);} + +void +kerberos5_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + int i; + + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure its NULL terminated */ + buflen -= 1; + + switch(data[3]) { + case KRB_REJECT: /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " REJECT ", buflen); + goto common; + + case KRB_ACCEPT: /* Accepted (name might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " ACCEPT ", buflen); + common: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + if (cnt <= 4) + break; + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) + ADDC(buf, buflen, data[i]); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '\0'); + break; + + + case KRB_AUTH: /* Authentication data follows */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " AUTH", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB_RESPONSE: + strlcpy((char *)buf, " RESPONSE", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB_FORWARD: /* Forwarded credentials follow */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " FORWARD", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB_FORWARD_ACCEPT: /* Forwarded credentials accepted */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " FORWARD_ACCEPT", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB_FORWARD_REJECT: /* Forwarded credentials rejected */ + /* (reason might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " FORWARD_REJECT", buflen); + goto common2; + + default: + snprintf((char*)buf, buflen, " %d (unknown)", data[3]); + common2: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) { + snprintf((char*)buf, buflen, " %d", data[i]); + BUMP(buf, buflen); + } + break; + } +} + +void +kerberos5_forward(Authenticator *ap) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_data out_data; + krb5_principal principal; + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("KerberosV5: could not get default ccache: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("KerberosV5: could not get principal: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return; + } + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + creds.client = principal; + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &creds.server, + strlen(principal->realm), + principal->realm, + "krbtgt", + principal->realm, + NULL); + + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("KerberosV5: could not get principal: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return; + } + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.forwarded = 1; + if (forward_flags & OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS) + flags.b.forwardable = 1; + + ret = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags.i, + RemoteHostName, + &creds, + &out_data); + if (ret) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf ("Kerberos V5: error getting forwarded creds: %s\r\n", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return; + } + + if(!Data(ap, KRB_FORWARD, out_data.data, out_data.length)) { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Not enough room for authentication data\r\n"); + } else { + if (auth_debug_mode) + printf("Forwarded local Kerberos V5 credentials to server\r\n"); + } +} + +#if defined(DCE) +/* if this was a K5 authentication try and join a PAG for the user. */ +void +kerberos5_dfspag(void) +{ + if (dfsk5ok) { + dfspag = krb5_dfs_pag(context, dfsfwd, ticket->client, + UserNameRequested); + } +} +#endif + +int +kerberos5_set_forward(int on) +{ + if(on == 0) + forward_flags &= ~OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS; + if(on == 1) + forward_flags |= OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS; + if(on == -1) + forward_flags ^= OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS; + return 0; +} + +int +kerberos5_set_forwardable(int on) +{ + if(on == 0) + forward_flags &= ~OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS; + if(on == 1) + forward_flags |= OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS; + if(on == -1) + forward_flags ^= OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/krb4encpwd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/krb4encpwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a4ff86d85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/krb4encpwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,436 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: krb4encpwd.c,v 1.19 2001/02/15 04:20:52 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4_ENCPWD +/* + * COPYRIGHT (C) 1990 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION + * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + * + * "Digital Equipment Corporation authorizes the reproduction, + * distribution and modification of this software subject to the following + * restrictions: + * + * 1. Any partial or whole copy of this software, or any modification + * thereof, must include this copyright notice in its entirety. + * + * 2. This software is supplied "as is" with no warranty of any kind, + * expressed or implied, for any purpose, including any warranty of fitness + * or merchantibility. DIGITAL assumes no responsibility for the use or + * reliability of this software, nor promises to provide any form of + * support for it on any basis. + * + * 3. Distribution of this software is authorized only if no profit or + * remuneration of any kind is received in exchange for such distribution. + * + * 4. This software produces public key authentication certificates + * bearing an expiration date established by DIGITAL and RSA Data + * Security, Inc. It may cease to generate certificates after the expiration + * date. Any modification of this software that changes or defeats + * the expiration date or its effect is unauthorized. + * + * 5. Software that will renew or extend the expiration date of + * authentication certificates produced by this software may be obtained + * from RSA Data Security, Inc., 10 Twin Dolphin Drive, Redwood City, CA + * 94065, (415)595-8782, or from DIGITAL" + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" + +int krb_mk_encpwd_req (KTEXT, char *, char *, char *, char *, char *, char *); +int krb_rd_encpwd_req (KTEXT, char *, char *, u_long, AUTH_DAT *, char *, char *, char *, char *); + +extern auth_debug_mode; + +static unsigned char str_data[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 0, + AUTHTYPE_KRB4_ENCPWD, }; +static unsigned char str_name[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, + TELQUAL_NAME, }; + +#define KRB4_ENCPWD_AUTH 0 /* Authentication data follows */ +#define KRB4_ENCPWD_REJECT 1 /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ +#define KRB4_ENCPWD_ACCEPT 2 /* Accepted */ +#define KRB4_ENCPWD_CHALLENGE 3 /* Challenge for mutual auth. */ +#define KRB4_ENCPWD_ACK 4 /* Acknowledge */ + +#define KRB_SERVICE_NAME "rcmd" + +static KTEXT_ST auth; +static char name[ANAME_SZ]; +static char user_passwd[ANAME_SZ]; +static AUTH_DAT adat = { 0 }; +static des_key_schedule sched; +static char challenge[REALM_SZ]; + + static int +Data(ap, type, d, c) + Authenticator *ap; + int type; + void *d; + int c; +{ + unsigned char *p = str_data + 4; + unsigned char *cd = (unsigned char *)d; + + if (c == -1) + c = strlen(cd); + + if (0) { + printf("%s:%d: [%d] (%d)", + str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS ? ">>>IS" : ">>>REPLY", + str_data[3], + type, c); + printd(d, c); + printf("\r\n"); + } + *p++ = ap->type; + *p++ = ap->way; + *p++ = type; + while (c-- > 0) { + if ((*p++ = *cd++) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + if (str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS) + printsub('>', &str_data[2], p - (&str_data[2])); + return(telnet_net_write(str_data, p - str_data)); +} + + int +krb4encpwd_init(ap, server) + Authenticator *ap; + int server; +{ + char hostname[80], *cp, *realm; + des_clock skey; + + if (server) { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_REPLY; + } else { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_IS; + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + realm = krb_realmofhost(hostname); + cp = strchr(hostname, '.'); + if (*cp != NULL) *cp = NULL; + if (read_service_key(KRB_SERVICE_NAME, hostname, realm, 0, + KEYFILE, (char *)skey)) { + return(0); + } + } + return(1); +} + + int +krb4encpwd_send(ap) + Authenticator *ap; +{ + + printf("[ Trying KRB4ENCPWD ... ]\r\n"); + if (!UserNameRequested) { + return(0); + } + if (!auth_sendname(UserNameRequested, strlen(UserNameRequested))) { + return(0); + } + + if (!Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_ACK, NULL, 0)) { + return(0); + } + + return(1); +} + + void +krb4encpwd_is(ap, data, cnt) + Authenticator *ap; + unsigned char *data; + int cnt; +{ + Session_Key skey; + des_cblock datablock; + char r_passwd[ANAME_SZ], r_user[ANAME_SZ]; + char lhostname[ANAME_SZ], *cp; + int r; + time_t now; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case KRB4_ENCPWD_AUTH: + memmove(auth.dat, data, auth.length = cnt); + + gethostname(lhostname, sizeof(lhostname)); + if ((cp = strchr(lhostname, '.')) != 0) *cp = '\0'; + + if (r = krb_rd_encpwd_req(&auth, KRB_SERVICE_NAME, lhostname, 0, &adat, NULL, challenge, r_user, r_passwd)) { + Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_REJECT, "Auth failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + auth_encrypt_userpwd(r_passwd); + if (passwdok(UserNameRequested, UserPassword) == 0) { + /* + * illegal username and password + */ + Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_REJECT, "Illegal password", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + + memmove(session_key, adat.session, sizeof(des_cblock)); + Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_ACCEPT, 0, 0); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + break; + + case KRB4_ENCPWD_CHALLENGE: + /* + * Take the received random challenge text and save + * for future authentication. + */ + memmove(challenge, data, sizeof(des_cblock)); + break; + + + case KRB4_ENCPWD_ACK: + /* + * Receive ack, if mutual then send random challenge + */ + + /* + * If we are doing mutual authentication, get set up to send + * the challenge, and verify it when the response comes back. + */ + + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) { + int i; + + time(&now); + snprintf(challenge, sizeof(challenge), "%x", now); + Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_CHALLENGE, challenge, strlen(challenge)); + } + break; + + default: + Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_REJECT, 0, 0); + break; + } +} + + + void +krb4encpwd_reply(ap, data, cnt) + Authenticator *ap; + unsigned char *data; + int cnt; +{ + Session_Key skey; + KTEXT_ST krb_token; + des_cblock enckey; + CREDENTIALS cred; + int r; + char randchal[REALM_SZ], instance[ANAME_SZ], *cp; + char hostname[80], *realm; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case KRB4_ENCPWD_REJECT: + if (cnt > 0) { + printf("[ KRB4_ENCPWD refuses authentication because %.*s ]\r\n", + cnt, data); + } else + printf("[ KRB4_ENCPWD refuses authentication ]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + case KRB4_ENCPWD_ACCEPT: + printf("[ KRB4_ENCPWD accepts you ]\r\n"); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + return; + case KRB4_ENCPWD_CHALLENGE: + /* + * Verify that the response to the challenge is correct. + */ + + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + realm = krb_realmofhost(hostname); + memmove(challenge, data, cnt); + memset(user_passwd, 0, sizeof(user_passwd)); + des_read_pw_string(user_passwd, sizeof(user_passwd)-1, "Password: ", 0); + UserPassword = user_passwd; + Challenge = challenge; + strlcpy(instance, RemoteHostName, sizeof(instance)); + if ((cp = strchr(instance, '.')) != 0) *cp = '\0'; + + if (r = krb_mk_encpwd_req(&krb_token, KRB_SERVICE_NAME, instance, realm, Challenge, UserNameRequested, user_passwd)) { + krb_token.length = 0; + } + + if (!Data(ap, KRB4_ENCPWD_AUTH, krb_token.dat, krb_token.length)) { + return; + } + + break; + + default: + return; + } +} + + int +krb4encpwd_status(ap, name, name_sz, level) + Authenticator *ap; + char *name; + size_t name_sz; + int level; +{ + + if (level < AUTH_USER) + return(level); + + if (UserNameRequested && passwdok(UserNameRequested, UserPassword)) { + strlcpy(name, UserNameRequested, name_sz); + return(AUTH_VALID); + } else { + return(AUTH_USER); + } +} + +#define BUMP(buf, len) while (*(buf)) {++(buf), --(len);} +#define ADDC(buf, len, c) if ((len) > 0) {*(buf)++ = (c); --(len);} + + void +krb4encpwd_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen) + unsigned char *data, *buf; + int cnt, buflen; +{ + int i; + + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure its NULL terminated */ + buflen -= 1; + + switch(data[3]) { + case KRB4_ENCPWD_REJECT: /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " REJECT ", buflen); + goto common; + + case KRB4_ENCPWD_ACCEPT: /* Accepted (name might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " ACCEPT ", buflen); + common: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + if (cnt <= 4) + break; + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) + ADDC(buf, buflen, data[i]); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '\0'); + break; + + case KRB4_ENCPWD_AUTH: /* Authentication data follows */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " AUTH", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB4_ENCPWD_CHALLENGE: + strlcpy((char *)buf, " CHALLENGE", buflen); + goto common2; + + case KRB4_ENCPWD_ACK: + strlcpy((char *)buf, " ACK", buflen); + goto common2; + + default: + snprintf(buf, buflen, " %d (unknown)", data[3]); + common2: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) { + snprintf(buf, buflen, " %d", data[i]); + BUMP(buf, buflen); + } + break; + } +} + +int passwdok(name, passwd) +char *name, *passwd; +{ + char *crypt(); + char *salt, *p; + struct passwd *pwd; + int passwdok_status = 0; + + if (pwd = k_getpwnam(name)) + salt = pwd->pw_passwd; + else salt = "xx"; + + p = crypt(passwd, salt); + + if (pwd && !strcmp(p, pwd->pw_passwd)) { + passwdok_status = 1; + } else passwdok_status = 0; + return(passwdok_status); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef notdef + +prkey(msg, key) + char *msg; + unsigned char *key; +{ + int i; + printf("%s:", msg); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + printf(" %3d", key[i]); + printf("\r\n"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc-proto.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc-proto.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7bbafa5c94 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc-proto.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)misc-proto.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + * to require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + +/* $Id: misc-proto.h,v 1.9 2000/11/15 23:00:21 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __MISC_PROTO__ +#define __MISC_PROTO__ + +void auth_encrypt_init (const char *, const char *, const char *, int); +void auth_encrypt_user(const char *name); +void auth_encrypt_connect (int); +void printd (const unsigned char *, int); + +char** genget (char *name, char **table, int stlen); +int isprefix(char *s1, char *s2); +int Ambiguous(void *s); + +/* + * These functions are imported from the application + */ +int telnet_net_write (unsigned char *, int); +void net_encrypt (void); +int telnet_spin (void); +char *telnet_getenv (const char *); +char *telnet_gets (char *, char *, int, int); +void printsub(int direction, unsigned char *pointer, int length); +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7af23756b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: misc.c,v 1.15 2000/01/25 23:24:58 assar Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif +#include "misc.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "encrypt.h" + + +const char *RemoteHostName; +const char *LocalHostName; +char *UserNameRequested = 0; +int ConnectedCount = 0; + +void +auth_encrypt_init(const char *local, const char *remote, const char *name, + int server) +{ + RemoteHostName = remote; + LocalHostName = local; +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + auth_init(name, server); +#endif +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + encrypt_init(name, server); +#endif + if (UserNameRequested) { + free(UserNameRequested); + UserNameRequested = 0; + } +} + +void +auth_encrypt_user(const char *name) +{ + if (UserNameRequested) + free(UserNameRequested); + UserNameRequested = name ? strdup(name) : 0; +} + +void +auth_encrypt_connect(int cnt) +{ +} + +void +printd(const unsigned char *data, int cnt) +{ + if (cnt > 16) + cnt = 16; + while (cnt-- > 0) { + printf(" %02x", *data); + ++data; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e31556530a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)misc.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +extern char *UserNameRequested; +extern const char *LocalHostName; +extern const char *RemoteHostName; +extern int ConnectedCount; +extern int ReservedPort; + +#include "misc-proto.h" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/rsaencpwd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/rsaencpwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4c5e8751cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/rsaencpwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,487 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rsaencpwd.c,v 1.19 2002/08/12 15:09:17 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef RSA_ENCPWD +/* + * COPYRIGHT (C) 1990 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION + * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + * + * "Digital Equipment Corporation authorizes the reproduction, + * distribution and modification of this software subject to the following + * restrictions: + * + * 1. Any partial or whole copy of this software, or any modification + * thereof, must include this copyright notice in its entirety. + * + * 2. This software is supplied "as is" with no warranty of any kind, + * expressed or implied, for any purpose, including any warranty of fitness + * or merchantibility. DIGITAL assumes no responsibility for the use or + * reliability of this software, nor promises to provide any form of + * support for it on any basis. + * + * 3. Distribution of this software is authorized only if no profit or + * remuneration of any kind is received in exchange for such distribution. + * + * 4. This software produces public key authentication certificates + * bearing an expiration date established by DIGITAL and RSA Data + * Security, Inc. It may cease to generate certificates after the expiration + * date. Any modification of this software that changes or defeats + * the expiration date or its effect is unauthorized. + * + * 5. Software that will renew or extend the expiration date of + * authentication certificates produced by this software may be obtained + * from RSA Data Security, Inc., 10 Twin Dolphin Drive, Redwood City, CA + * 94065, (415)595-8782, or from DIGITAL" + * + */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "cdc.h" + +extern auth_debug_mode; + +static unsigned char str_data[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 0, + AUTHTYPE_RSA_ENCPWD, }; +static unsigned char str_name[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, + TELQUAL_NAME, }; + +#define RSA_ENCPWD_AUTH 0 /* Authentication data follows */ +#define RSA_ENCPWD_REJECT 1 /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ +#define RSA_ENCPWD_ACCEPT 2 /* Accepted */ +#define RSA_ENCPWD_CHALLENGEKEY 3 /* Challenge and public key */ + +#define NAME_SZ 40 +#define CHAL_SZ 20 +#define PWD_SZ 40 + +static KTEXT_ST auth; +static char name[NAME_SZ]; +static char user_passwd[PWD_SZ]; +static char key_file[2*NAME_SZ]; +static char lhostname[NAME_SZ]; +static char challenge[CHAL_SZ]; +static int challenge_len; + + static int +Data(ap, type, d, c) + Authenticator *ap; + int type; + void *d; + int c; +{ + unsigned char *p = str_data + 4; + unsigned char *cd = (unsigned char *)d; + + if (c == -1) + c = strlen((char *)cd); + + if (0) { + printf("%s:%d: [%d] (%d)", + str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS ? ">>>IS" : ">>>REPLY", + str_data[3], + type, c); + printd(d, c); + printf("\r\n"); + } + *p++ = ap->type; + *p++ = ap->way; + if (type != NULL) *p++ = type; + while (c-- > 0) { + if ((*p++ = *cd++) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + if (str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS) + printsub('>', &str_data[2], p - (&str_data[2])); + return(telnet_net_write(str_data, p - str_data)); +} + + int +rsaencpwd_init(ap, server) + Authenticator *ap; + int server; +{ + char *cp; + FILE *fp; + + if (server) { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_REPLY; + memset(key_file, 0, sizeof(key_file)); + gethostname(lhostname, sizeof(lhostname)); + if ((cp = strchr(lhostname, '.')) != 0) *cp = '\0'; + snprintf(key_file, sizeof(key_file), + SYSCONFDIR "/.%s_privkey", lhostname); + if ((fp=fopen(key_file, "r"))==NULL) return(0); + fclose(fp); + } else { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_IS; + } + return(1); +} + + int +rsaencpwd_send(ap) + Authenticator *ap; +{ + + printf("[ Trying RSAENCPWD ... ]\r\n"); + if (!UserNameRequested) { + return(0); + } + if (!auth_sendname(UserNameRequested, strlen(UserNameRequested))) { + return(0); + } + if (!Data(ap, NULL, NULL, 0)) { + return(0); + } + + + return(1); +} + + void +rsaencpwd_is(ap, data, cnt) + Authenticator *ap; + unsigned char *data; + int cnt; +{ + Session_Key skey; + des_cblock datablock; + char r_passwd[PWD_SZ], r_user[NAME_SZ]; + char *cp, key[160]; + char chalkey[160], *ptr; + FILE *fp; + int r, i, j, chalkey_len, len; + time_t now; + + cnt--; + switch (*data++) { + case RSA_ENCPWD_AUTH: + memmove(auth.dat, data, auth.length = cnt); + + if ((fp=fopen(key_file, "r"))==NULL) { + Data(ap, RSA_ENCPWD_REJECT, "Auth failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + /* + * get privkey + */ + fscanf(fp, "%x;", &len); + for (i=0;iway & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY) { + int i; + + + time(&now); + if ((now % 2) == 0) { + snprintf(challenge, sizeof(challenge), "%x", now); + challenge_len = strlen(challenge); + } else { + strlcpy(challenge, "randchal", sizeof(challenge)); + challenge_len = 8; + } + + if ((fp=fopen(key_file, "r"))==NULL) { + Data(ap, RSA_ENCPWD_REJECT, "Auth failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + /* + * skip privkey + */ + fscanf(fp, "%x;", &len); + for (i=0;i 0) { + printf("[ RSA_ENCPWD refuses authentication because %.*s ]\r\n", + cnt, data); + } else + printf("[ RSA_ENCPWD refuses authentication ]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + case RSA_ENCPWD_ACCEPT: + printf("[ RSA_ENCPWD accepts you ]\r\n"); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + return; + case RSA_ENCPWD_CHALLENGEKEY: + /* + * Verify that the response to the challenge is correct. + */ + + memmove(chalkey, data, cnt); + ptr = (char *) &chalkey[0]; + ptr += DecodeHeaderLength(chalkey); + if (*ptr != 0x04) { + return; + } + *ptr++; + challenge_len = DecodeValueLength(ptr); + ptr += NumEncodeLengthOctets(challenge_len); + memmove(challenge, ptr, challenge_len); + ptr += challenge_len; + if (*ptr != 0x04) { + return; + } + *ptr++; + pubkey_len = DecodeValueLength(ptr); + ptr += NumEncodeLengthOctets(pubkey_len); + memmove(pubkey, ptr, pubkey_len); + memset(user_passwd, 0, sizeof(user_passwd)); + des_read_pw_string(user_passwd, sizeof(user_passwd)-1, "Password: ", 0); + UserPassword = user_passwd; + Challenge = challenge; + r = init_rsa_encpwd(&token, user_passwd, challenge, challenge_len, pubkey); + if (r < 0) { + token.length = 1; + } + + if (!Data(ap, RSA_ENCPWD_AUTH, token.dat, token.length)) { + return; + } + + break; + + default: + return; + } +} + + int +rsaencpwd_status(ap, name, name_sz, level) + Authenticator *ap; + char *name; + size_t name_sz; + int level; +{ + + if (level < AUTH_USER) + return(level); + + if (UserNameRequested && rsaencpwd_passwdok(UserNameRequested, UserPassword)) { + strlcpy(name, UserNameRequested, name_sz); + return(AUTH_VALID); + } else { + return(AUTH_USER); + } +} + +#define BUMP(buf, len) while (*(buf)) {++(buf), --(len);} +#define ADDC(buf, len, c) if ((len) > 0) {*(buf)++ = (c); --(len);} + + void +rsaencpwd_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen) + unsigned char *data, *buf; + int cnt, buflen; +{ + int i; + + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure its NULL terminated */ + buflen -= 1; + + switch(data[3]) { + case RSA_ENCPWD_REJECT: /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " REJECT ", buflen); + goto common; + + case RSA_ENCPWD_ACCEPT: /* Accepted (name might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " ACCEPT ", buflen); + common: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + if (cnt <= 4) + break; + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) + ADDC(buf, buflen, data[i]); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '\0'); + break; + + case RSA_ENCPWD_AUTH: /* Authentication data follows */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " AUTH", buflen); + goto common2; + + case RSA_ENCPWD_CHALLENGEKEY: + strlcpy((char *)buf, " CHALLENGEKEY", buflen); + goto common2; + + default: + snprintf(buf, buflen, " %d (unknown)", data[3]); + common2: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) { + snprintf(buf, buflen, " %d", data[i]); + BUMP(buf, buflen); + } + break; + } +} + +int rsaencpwd_passwdok(name, passwd) +char *name, *passwd; +{ + char *crypt(); + char *salt, *p; + struct passwd *pwd; + int passwdok_status = 0; + + if (pwd = k_getpwnam(name)) + salt = pwd->pw_passwd; + else salt = "xx"; + + p = crypt(passwd, salt); + + if (pwd && !strcmp(p, pwd->pw_passwd)) { + passwdok_status = 1; + } else passwdok_status = 0; + return(passwdok_status); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef notdef + +prkey(msg, key) + char *msg; + unsigned char *key; +{ + int i; + printf("%s:", msg); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + printf(" %3d", key[i]); + printf("\r\n"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/spx.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/spx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9155ef2f3d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/libtelnet/spx.c @@ -0,0 +1,586 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: spx.c,v 1.17 1999/09/16 20:41:34 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef SPX +/* + * COPYRIGHT (C) 1990 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION + * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + * + * "Digital Equipment Corporation authorizes the reproduction, + * distribution and modification of this software subject to the following + * restrictions: + * + * 1. Any partial or whole copy of this software, or any modification + * thereof, must include this copyright notice in its entirety. + * + * 2. This software is supplied "as is" with no warranty of any kind, + * expressed or implied, for any purpose, including any warranty of fitness + * or merchantibility. DIGITAL assumes no responsibility for the use or + * reliability of this software, nor promises to provide any form of + * support for it on any basis. + * + * 3. Distribution of this software is authorized only if no profit or + * remuneration of any kind is received in exchange for such distribution. + * + * 4. This software produces public key authentication certificates + * bearing an expiration date established by DIGITAL and RSA Data + * Security, Inc. It may cease to generate certificates after the expiration + * date. Any modification of this software that changes or defeats + * the expiration date or its effect is unauthorized. + * + * 5. Software that will renew or extend the expiration date of + * authentication certificates produced by this software may be obtained + * from RSA Data Security, Inc., 10 Twin Dolphin Drive, Redwood City, CA + * 94065, (415)595-8782, or from DIGITAL" + * + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "gssapi_defs.h" +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include "encrypt.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" + +extern auth_debug_mode; + +static unsigned char str_data[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 0, + AUTHTYPE_SPX, }; +static unsigned char str_name[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, + TELQUAL_NAME, }; + +#define SPX_AUTH 0 /* Authentication data follows */ +#define SPX_REJECT 1 /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ +#define SPX_ACCEPT 2 /* Accepted */ + +static des_key_schedule sched; +static des_cblock challenge = { 0 }; + + +/*******************************************************************/ + +gss_OID_set actual_mechs; +gss_OID actual_mech_type, output_name_type; +int major_status, status, msg_ctx = 0, new_status; +int req_flags = 0, ret_flags, lifetime_rec; +gss_cred_id_t gss_cred_handle; +gss_ctx_id_t actual_ctxhandle, context_handle; +gss_buffer_desc output_token, input_token, input_name_buffer; +gss_buffer_desc status_string; +gss_name_t desired_targname, src_name; +gss_channel_bindings input_chan_bindings; +char lhostname[GSS_C_MAX_PRINTABLE_NAME]; +char targ_printable[GSS_C_MAX_PRINTABLE_NAME]; +int to_addr=0, from_addr=0; +char *address; +gss_buffer_desc fullname_buffer; +gss_OID fullname_type; +gss_cred_id_t gss_delegated_cred_handle; + +/*******************************************************************/ + + + + static int +Data(ap, type, d, c) + Authenticator *ap; + int type; + void *d; + int c; +{ + unsigned char *p = str_data + 4; + unsigned char *cd = (unsigned char *)d; + + if (c == -1) + c = strlen((char *)cd); + + if (0) { + printf("%s:%d: [%d] (%d)", + str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS ? ">>>IS" : ">>>REPLY", + str_data[3], + type, c); + printd(d, c); + printf("\r\n"); + } + *p++ = ap->type; + *p++ = ap->way; + *p++ = type; + while (c-- > 0) { + if ((*p++ = *cd++) == IAC) + *p++ = IAC; + } + *p++ = IAC; + *p++ = SE; + if (str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS) + printsub('>', &str_data[2], p - (&str_data[2])); + return(telnet_net_write(str_data, p - str_data)); +} + + int +spx_init(ap, server) + Authenticator *ap; + int server; +{ + gss_cred_id_t tmp_cred_handle; + + if (server) { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_REPLY; + gethostname(lhostname, sizeof(lhostname)); + snprintf (targ_printable, sizeof(targ_printable), + "SERVICE:rcmd@%s", lhostname); + input_name_buffer.length = strlen(targ_printable); + input_name_buffer.value = targ_printable; + major_status = gss_import_name(&status, + &input_name_buffer, + GSS_C_NULL_OID, + &desired_targname); + major_status = gss_acquire_cred(&status, + desired_targname, + 0, + GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET, + GSS_C_ACCEPT, + &tmp_cred_handle, + &actual_mechs, + &lifetime_rec); + if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) return(0); + } else { + str_data[3] = TELQUAL_IS; + } + return(1); +} + + int +spx_send(ap) + Authenticator *ap; +{ + des_cblock enckey; + int r; + + gss_OID actual_mech_type, output_name_type; + int msg_ctx = 0, new_status, status; + int req_flags = 0, ret_flags, lifetime_rec, major_status; + gss_buffer_desc output_token, input_token, input_name_buffer; + gss_buffer_desc output_name_buffer, status_string; + gss_name_t desired_targname; + gss_channel_bindings input_chan_bindings; + char targ_printable[GSS_C_MAX_PRINTABLE_NAME]; + int from_addr=0, to_addr=0, myhostlen, j; + int deleg_flag=1, mutual_flag=0, replay_flag=0, seq_flag=0; + char *address; + + printf("[ Trying SPX ... ]\r\n"); + snprintf (targ_printable, sizeof(targ_printable), + "SERVICE:rcmd@%s", RemoteHostName); + + input_name_buffer.length = strlen(targ_printable); + input_name_buffer.value = targ_printable; + + if (!UserNameRequested) { + return(0); + } + + major_status = gss_import_name(&status, + &input_name_buffer, + GSS_C_NULL_OID, + &desired_targname); + + + major_status = gss_display_name(&status, + desired_targname, + &output_name_buffer, + &output_name_type); + + printf("target is '%s'\n", output_name_buffer.value); fflush(stdout); + + major_status = gss_release_buffer(&status, &output_name_buffer); + + input_chan_bindings = (gss_channel_bindings) + malloc(sizeof(gss_channel_bindings_desc)); + + input_chan_bindings->initiator_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings->initiator_address.length = 4; + address = (char *) malloc(4); + input_chan_bindings->initiator_address.value = (char *) address; + address[0] = ((from_addr & 0xff000000) >> 24); + address[1] = ((from_addr & 0xff0000) >> 16); + address[2] = ((from_addr & 0xff00) >> 8); + address[3] = (from_addr & 0xff); + input_chan_bindings->acceptor_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings->acceptor_address.length = 4; + address = (char *) malloc(4); + input_chan_bindings->acceptor_address.value = (char *) address; + address[0] = ((to_addr & 0xff000000) >> 24); + address[1] = ((to_addr & 0xff0000) >> 16); + address[2] = ((to_addr & 0xff00) >> 8); + address[3] = (to_addr & 0xff); + input_chan_bindings->application_data.length = 0; + + req_flags = 0; + if (deleg_flag) req_flags = req_flags | 1; + if (mutual_flag) req_flags = req_flags | 2; + if (replay_flag) req_flags = req_flags | 4; + if (seq_flag) req_flags = req_flags | 8; + + major_status = gss_init_sec_context(&status, /* minor status */ + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, /* cred handle */ + &actual_ctxhandle, /* ctx handle */ + desired_targname, /* target name */ + GSS_C_NULL_OID, /* mech type */ + req_flags, /* req flags */ + 0, /* time req */ + input_chan_bindings, /* chan binding */ + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, /* input token */ + &actual_mech_type, /* actual mech */ + &output_token, /* output token */ + &ret_flags, /* ret flags */ + &lifetime_rec); /* time rec */ + + if ((major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) && + (major_status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) { + gss_display_status(&new_status, + status, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NULL_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + printf("%s\n", status_string.value); + return(0); + } + + if (!auth_sendname(UserNameRequested, strlen(UserNameRequested))) { + return(0); + } + + if (!Data(ap, SPX_AUTH, output_token.value, output_token.length)) { + return(0); + } + + return(1); +} + + void +spx_is(ap, data, cnt) + Authenticator *ap; + unsigned char *data; + int cnt; +{ + Session_Key skey; + des_cblock datablock; + int r; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case SPX_AUTH: + input_token.length = cnt; + input_token.value = (char *) data; + + gethostname(lhostname, sizeof(lhostname)); + + snprintf(targ_printable, sizeof(targ_printable), + "SERVICE:rcmd@%s", lhostname); + + input_name_buffer.length = strlen(targ_printable); + input_name_buffer.value = targ_printable; + + major_status = gss_import_name(&status, + &input_name_buffer, + GSS_C_NULL_OID, + &desired_targname); + + major_status = gss_acquire_cred(&status, + desired_targname, + 0, + GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET, + GSS_C_ACCEPT, + &gss_cred_handle, + &actual_mechs, + &lifetime_rec); + + major_status = gss_release_name(&status, desired_targname); + + input_chan_bindings = (gss_channel_bindings) + malloc(sizeof(gss_channel_bindings_desc)); + + input_chan_bindings->initiator_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings->initiator_address.length = 4; + address = (char *) malloc(4); + input_chan_bindings->initiator_address.value = (char *) address; + address[0] = ((from_addr & 0xff000000) >> 24); + address[1] = ((from_addr & 0xff0000) >> 16); + address[2] = ((from_addr & 0xff00) >> 8); + address[3] = (from_addr & 0xff); + input_chan_bindings->acceptor_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings->acceptor_address.length = 4; + address = (char *) malloc(4); + input_chan_bindings->acceptor_address.value = (char *) address; + address[0] = ((to_addr & 0xff000000) >> 24); + address[1] = ((to_addr & 0xff0000) >> 16); + address[2] = ((to_addr & 0xff00) >> 8); + address[3] = (to_addr & 0xff); + input_chan_bindings->application_data.length = 0; + + major_status = gss_accept_sec_context(&status, + &context_handle, + gss_cred_handle, + &input_token, + input_chan_bindings, + &src_name, + &actual_mech_type, + &output_token, + &ret_flags, + &lifetime_rec, + &gss_delegated_cred_handle); + + + if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + + major_status = gss_display_name(&status, + src_name, + &fullname_buffer, + &fullname_type); + Data(ap, SPX_REJECT, "auth failed", -1); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); + return; + } + + major_status = gss_display_name(&status, + src_name, + &fullname_buffer, + &fullname_type); + + + Data(ap, SPX_ACCEPT, output_token.value, output_token.length); + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + break; + + default: + Data(ap, SPX_REJECT, 0, 0); + break; + } +} + + + void +spx_reply(ap, data, cnt) + Authenticator *ap; + unsigned char *data; + int cnt; +{ + Session_Key skey; + + if (cnt-- < 1) + return; + switch (*data++) { + case SPX_REJECT: + if (cnt > 0) { + printf("[ SPX refuses authentication because %.*s ]\r\n", + cnt, data); + } else + printf("[ SPX refuses authentication ]\r\n"); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + case SPX_ACCEPT: + printf("[ SPX accepts you ]\r\n"); + if ((ap->way & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) { + /* + * Send over the encrypted challenge. + */ + input_token.value = (char *) data; + input_token.length = cnt; + + major_status = gss_init_sec_context(&status, /* minor stat */ + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, /* cred handle */ + &actual_ctxhandle, /* ctx handle */ + desired_targname, /* target name */ + GSS_C_NULL_OID, /* mech type */ + req_flags, /* req flags */ + 0, /* time req */ + input_chan_bindings, /* chan binding */ + &input_token, /* input token */ + &actual_mech_type, /* actual mech */ + &output_token, /* output token */ + &ret_flags, /* ret flags */ + &lifetime_rec); /* time rec */ + + if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + gss_display_status(&new_status, + status, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NULL_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + printf("[ SPX mutual response fails ... '%s' ]\r\n", + status_string.value); + auth_send_retry(); + return; + } + } + auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); + return; + + default: + return; + } +} + + int +spx_status(ap, name, name_sz, level) + Authenticator *ap; + char *name; + size_t name_sz; + int level; +{ + + gss_buffer_desc fullname_buffer, acl_file_buffer; + gss_OID fullname_type; + char acl_file[160], fullname[160]; + int major_status, status = 0; + struct passwd *pwd; + + /* + * hard code fullname to + * "SPX:/C=US/O=Digital/OU=LKG/OU=Sphinx/OU=Users/CN=Kannan Alagappan" + * and acl_file to "~kannan/.sphinx" + */ + + pwd = k_getpwnam(UserNameRequested); + if (pwd == NULL) { + return(AUTH_USER); /* not authenticated */ + } + + snprintf (acl_file, sizeof(acl_file), + "%s/.sphinx", pwd->pw_dir); + + acl_file_buffer.value = acl_file; + acl_file_buffer.length = strlen(acl_file); + + major_status = gss_display_name(&status, + src_name, + &fullname_buffer, + &fullname_type); + + if (level < AUTH_USER) + return(level); + + major_status = gss__check_acl(&status, &fullname_buffer, + &acl_file_buffer); + + if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + strlcpy(name, UserNameRequested, name_sz); + return(AUTH_VALID); + } else { + return(AUTH_USER); + } + +} + +#define BUMP(buf, len) while (*(buf)) {++(buf), --(len);} +#define ADDC(buf, len, c) if ((len) > 0) {*(buf)++ = (c); --(len);} + + void +spx_printsub(data, cnt, buf, buflen) + unsigned char *data, *buf; + int cnt, buflen; +{ + int i; + + buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure its NULL terminated */ + buflen -= 1; + + switch(data[3]) { + case SPX_REJECT: /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " REJECT ", buflen); + goto common; + + case SPX_ACCEPT: /* Accepted (name might follow) */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " ACCEPT ", buflen); + common: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + if (cnt <= 4) + break; + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) + ADDC(buf, buflen, data[i]); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); + ADDC(buf, buflen, '\0'); + break; + + case SPX_AUTH: /* Authentication data follows */ + strlcpy((char *)buf, " AUTH", buflen); + goto common2; + + default: + snprintf(buf, buflen, " %d (unknown)", data[3]); + common2: + BUMP(buf, buflen); + for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) { + snprintf(buf, buflen, " %d", data[i]); + BUMP(buf, buflen); + } + break; + } +} + +#endif + +#ifdef notdef + +prkey(msg, key) + char *msg; + unsigned char *key; +{ + int i; + printf("%s:", msg); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + printf(" %3d", key[i]); + printf("\r\n"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet.state b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet.state new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1927a2b4bb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet.state @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ + + Three pieces of state need to be kept for each side of each option. + (You need the localside, sending WILL/WONT & receiving DO/DONT, and + the remoteside, sending DO/DONT and receiving WILL/WONT) + + MY_STATE: What state am I in? + WANT_STATE: What state do I want? + WANT_RESP: How many requests have I initiated? + + Default values: + MY_STATE = WANT_STATE = DONT + WANT_RESP = 0 + + The local setup will change based on the state of the Telnet + variables. When we are the originator, we can either make the + local setup changes at option request time (in which case if + the option is denied we need to change things back) or when + the option is acknowledged. + + To initiate a switch to NEW_STATE: + + if ((WANT_RESP == 0 && NEW_STATE == MY_STATE) || + WANT_STATE == NEW_STATE) { + do nothing; + } else { + /* + * This is where the logic goes to change the local setup + * if we are doing so at request initiation + */ + WANT_STATE = NEW_STATE; + send NEW_STATE; + WANT_RESP += 1; + } + + When receiving NEW_STATE: + + if (WANT_RESP) { + --WANT_RESP; + if (WANT_RESP && (NEW_STATE == MY_STATE)) + --WANT_RESP; + } + if (WANT_RESP == 0) { + if (NEW_STATE != WANT_STATE) { + /* + * This is where the logic goes to decide if it is ok + * to switch to NEW_STATE, and if so, do any necessary + * local setup changes. + */ + if (ok_to_switch_to NEW_STATE) + WANT_STATE = NEW_STATE; + else + WANT_RESP++; +* if (MY_STATE != WANT_STATE) + reply with WANT_STATE; + } else { + /* + * This is where the logic goes to change the local setup + * if we are doing so at request acknowledgment + */ + } + } + MY_STATE = NEW_STATE; + +* This if() line is not needed, it should be ok to always do the + "reply with WANT_STATE". With the if() line, asking to turn on + an option that the other side doesn't understand is: + Send DO option + Recv WONT option + Without the if() line, it is: + Send DO option + Recv WONT option + Send DONT option + If the other side does not expect to receive the latter case, + but generates the latter case, then there is a potential for + option negotiation loops. An implementation that does not expect + to get the second case should not generate it, an implementation + that does expect to get it may or may not generate it, and things + will still work. Being conservative in what we send, we have the + if() statement in, but we expect the other side to generate the + last response. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb516cbd38 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 2001/08/28 11:21:16 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/.. $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) + +bin_PROGRAMS = telnet + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +telnet_SOURCES = authenc.c commands.c main.c network.c ring.c \ + sys_bsd.c telnet.c terminal.c \ + utilities.c defines.h externs.h ring.h telnet_locl.h types.h + +man_MANS = telnet.1 + +LDADD = ../libtelnet/libtelnet.a \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_tgetent) \ + $(LIB_kdfs) \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db1f4a7346 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,826 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 2001/08/28 11:21:16 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(telnet_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +bin_PROGRAMS = telnet$(EXEEXT) +subdir = appl/telnet/telnet +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + 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+.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/authenc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/authenc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1da7358d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/authenc.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: authenc.c,v 1.12 2001/12/20 20:39:51 joda Exp $"); + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) +int +telnet_net_write(unsigned char *str, int len) +{ + if (NETROOM() > len) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, str, len); + if (str[0] == IAC && str[1] == SE) + printsub('>', &str[2], len-2); + return(len); + } + return(0); +} + +void +net_encrypt(void) +{ +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (encrypt_output) + ring_encrypt(&netoring, encrypt_output); + else + ring_clearto(&netoring); +#endif +} + +int +telnet_spin(void) +{ + extern int scheduler_lockout_tty; + + scheduler_lockout_tty = 1; + Scheduler(0); + scheduler_lockout_tty = 0; + + return 0; + +} + +char * +telnet_getenv(const char *val) +{ + return((char *)env_getvalue((unsigned char *)val)); +} + +char * +telnet_gets(char *prompt, char *result, int length, int echo) +{ + int om = globalmode; + char *res; + + TerminalNewMode(-1); + if (echo) { + printf("%s", prompt); + res = fgets(result, length, stdin); + } else if ((res = getpass(prompt))) { + strlcpy(result, res, length); + res = result; + } + TerminalNewMode(om); + return(res); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c610a55e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c @@ -0,0 +1,2694 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: commands.c,v 1.72 2002/08/28 21:04:59 joda Exp $"); + +#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) +int tos = -1; +#endif /* defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) */ + +char *hostname; +static char _hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; + +typedef int (*intrtn_t)(int, char**); +static int call(intrtn_t, ...); + +typedef struct { + char *name; /* command name */ + char *help; /* help string (NULL for no help) */ + int (*handler)(); /* routine which executes command */ + int needconnect; /* Do we need to be connected to execute? */ +} Command; + +static char line[256]; +static char saveline[256]; +static int margc; +static char *margv[20]; + +static void +makeargv() +{ + char *cp, *cp2, c; + char **argp = margv; + + margc = 0; + cp = line; + if (*cp == '!') { /* Special case shell escape */ + /* save for shell command */ + strlcpy(saveline, line, sizeof(saveline)); + *argp++ = "!"; /* No room in string to get this */ + margc++; + cp++; + } + while ((c = *cp)) { + int inquote = 0; + while (isspace(c)) + c = *++cp; + if (c == '\0') + break; + *argp++ = cp; + margc += 1; + for (cp2 = cp; c != '\0'; c = *++cp) { + if (inquote) { + if (c == inquote) { + inquote = 0; + continue; + } + } else { + if (c == '\\') { + if ((c = *++cp) == '\0') + break; + } else if (c == '"') { + inquote = '"'; + continue; + } else if (c == '\'') { + inquote = '\''; + continue; + } else if (isspace(c)) + break; + } + *cp2++ = c; + } + *cp2 = '\0'; + if (c == '\0') + break; + cp++; + } + *argp++ = 0; +} + +/* + * Make a character string into a number. + * + * Todo: 1. Could take random integers (12, 0x12, 012, 0b1). + */ + +static char +special(char *s) +{ + char c; + char b; + + switch (*s) { + case '^': + b = *++s; + if (b == '?') { + c = b | 0x40; /* DEL */ + } else { + c = b & 0x1f; + } + break; + default: + c = *s; + break; + } + return c; +} + +/* + * Construct a control character sequence + * for a special character. + */ +static char * +control(cc_t c) +{ + static char buf[5]; + /* + * The only way I could get the Sun 3.5 compiler + * to shut up about + * if ((unsigned int)c >= 0x80) + * was to assign "c" to an unsigned int variable... + * Arggg.... + */ + unsigned int uic = (unsigned int)c; + + if (uic == 0x7f) + return ("^?"); + if (c == (cc_t)_POSIX_VDISABLE) { + return "off"; + } + if (uic >= 0x80) { + buf[0] = '\\'; + buf[1] = ((c>>6)&07) + '0'; + buf[2] = ((c>>3)&07) + '0'; + buf[3] = (c&07) + '0'; + buf[4] = 0; + } else if (uic >= 0x20) { + buf[0] = c; + buf[1] = 0; + } else { + buf[0] = '^'; + buf[1] = '@'+c; + buf[2] = 0; + } + return (buf); +} + + + +/* + * The following are data structures and routines for + * the "send" command. + * + */ + +struct sendlist { + char *name; /* How user refers to it (case independent) */ + char *help; /* Help information (0 ==> no help) */ + int needconnect; /* Need to be connected */ + int narg; /* Number of arguments */ + int (*handler)(); /* Routine to perform (for special ops) */ + int nbyte; /* Number of bytes to send this command */ + int what; /* Character to be sent (<0 ==> special) */ +}; + + +static int + send_esc (void), + send_help (void), + send_docmd (char *), + send_dontcmd (char *), + send_willcmd (char *), + send_wontcmd (char *); + +static struct sendlist Sendlist[] = { + { "ao", "Send Telnet Abort output", 1, 0, 0, 2, AO }, + { "ayt", "Send Telnet 'Are You There'", 1, 0, 0, 2, AYT }, + { "brk", "Send Telnet Break", 1, 0, 0, 2, BREAK }, + { "break", 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, BREAK }, + { "ec", "Send Telnet Erase Character", 1, 0, 0, 2, EC }, + { "el", "Send Telnet Erase Line", 1, 0, 0, 2, EL }, + { "escape", "Send current escape character", 1, 0, send_esc, 1, 0 }, + { "ga", "Send Telnet 'Go Ahead' sequence", 1, 0, 0, 2, GA }, + { "ip", "Send Telnet Interrupt Process", 1, 0, 0, 2, IP }, + { "intp", 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, IP }, + { "interrupt", 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, IP }, + { "intr", 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, IP }, + { "nop", "Send Telnet 'No operation'", 1, 0, 0, 2, NOP }, + { "eor", "Send Telnet 'End of Record'", 1, 0, 0, 2, EOR }, + { "abort", "Send Telnet 'Abort Process'", 1, 0, 0, 2, ABORT }, + { "susp", "Send Telnet 'Suspend Process'", 1, 0, 0, 2, SUSP }, + { "eof", "Send Telnet End of File Character", 1, 0, 0, 2, xEOF }, + { "synch", "Perform Telnet 'Synch operation'", 1, 0, dosynch, 2, 0 }, + { "getstatus", "Send request for STATUS", 1, 0, get_status, 6, 0 }, + { "?", "Display send options", 0, 0, send_help, 0, 0 }, + { "help", 0, 0, 0, send_help, 0, 0 }, + { "do", 0, 0, 1, send_docmd, 3, 0 }, + { "dont", 0, 0, 1, send_dontcmd, 3, 0 }, + { "will", 0, 0, 1, send_willcmd, 3, 0 }, + { "wont", 0, 0, 1, send_wontcmd, 3, 0 }, + { 0 } +}; + +#define GETSEND(name) ((struct sendlist *) genget(name, (char **) Sendlist, \ + sizeof(struct sendlist))) + +static int +sendcmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int count; /* how many bytes we are going to need to send */ + int i; + struct sendlist *s; /* pointer to current command */ + int success = 0; + int needconnect = 0; + + if (argc < 2) { + printf("need at least one argument for 'send' command\r\n"); + printf("'send ?' for help\r\n"); + return 0; + } + /* + * First, validate all the send arguments. + * In addition, we see how much space we are going to need, and + * whether or not we will be doing a "SYNCH" operation (which + * flushes the network queue). + */ + count = 0; + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + s = GETSEND(argv[i]); + if (s == 0) { + printf("Unknown send argument '%s'\r\n'send ?' for help.\r\n", + argv[i]); + return 0; + } else if (Ambiguous(s)) { + printf("Ambiguous send argument '%s'\r\n'send ?' for help.\r\n", + argv[i]); + return 0; + } + if (i + s->narg >= argc) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need %d argument%s to 'send %s' command. 'send %s ?' for help.\r\n", + s->narg, s->narg == 1 ? "" : "s", s->name, s->name); + return 0; + } + count += s->nbyte; + if (s->handler == send_help) { + send_help(); + return 0; + } + + i += s->narg; + needconnect += s->needconnect; + } + if (!connected && needconnect) { + printf("?Need to be connected first.\r\n"); + printf("'send ?' for help\r\n"); + return 0; + } + /* Now, do we have enough room? */ + if (NETROOM() < count) { + printf("There is not enough room in the buffer TO the network\r\n"); + printf("to process your request. Nothing will be done.\r\n"); + printf("('send synch' will throw away most data in the network\r\n"); + printf("buffer, if this might help.)\r\n"); + return 0; + } + /* OK, they are all OK, now go through again and actually send */ + count = 0; + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + if ((s = GETSEND(argv[i])) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Telnet 'send' error - argument disappeared!\r\n"); + quit(); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } + if (s->handler) { + count++; + success += (*s->handler)((s->narg > 0) ? argv[i+1] : 0, + (s->narg > 1) ? argv[i+2] : 0); + i += s->narg; + } else { + NET2ADD(IAC, s->what); + printoption("SENT", IAC, s->what); + } + } + return (count == success); +} + +static int +send_tncmd(void (*func)(), char *cmd, char *name); + +static int +send_esc() +{ + NETADD(escape); + return 1; +} + +static int +send_docmd(char *name) +{ + return(send_tncmd(send_do, "do", name)); +} + +static int +send_dontcmd(char *name) +{ + return(send_tncmd(send_dont, "dont", name)); +} + +static int +send_willcmd(char *name) +{ + return(send_tncmd(send_will, "will", name)); +} + +static int +send_wontcmd(char *name) +{ + return(send_tncmd(send_wont, "wont", name)); +} + +extern char *telopts[]; /* XXX */ + +static int +send_tncmd(void (*func)(), char *cmd, char *name) +{ + char **cpp; + int val = 0; + + if (isprefix(name, "help") || isprefix(name, "?")) { + int col, len; + + printf("Usage: send %s \r\n", cmd); + printf("\"value\" must be from 0 to 255\r\n"); + printf("Valid options are:\r\n\t"); + + col = 8; + for (cpp = telopts; *cpp; cpp++) { + len = strlen(*cpp) + 3; + if (col + len > 65) { + printf("\r\n\t"); + col = 8; + } + printf(" \"%s\"", *cpp); + col += len; + } + printf("\r\n"); + return 0; + } + cpp = genget(name, telopts, sizeof(char *)); + if (Ambiguous(cpp)) { + fprintf(stderr,"'%s': ambiguous argument ('send %s ?' for help).\r\n", + name, cmd); + return 0; + } + if (cpp) { + val = cpp - telopts; + } else { + char *cp = name; + + while (*cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9') { + val *= 10; + val += *cp - '0'; + cp++; + } + if (*cp != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('send %s ?' for help).\r\n", + name, cmd); + return 0; + } else if (val < 0 || val > 255) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': bad value ('send %s ?' for help).\r\n", + name, cmd); + return 0; + } + } + if (!connected) { + printf("?Need to be connected first.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + (*func)(val, 1); + return 1; +} + +static int +send_help() +{ + struct sendlist *s; /* pointer to current command */ + for (s = Sendlist; s->name; s++) { + if (s->help) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", s->name, s->help); + } + return(0); +} + +/* + * The following are the routines and data structures referred + * to by the arguments to the "toggle" command. + */ + +static int +lclchars() +{ + donelclchars = 1; + return 1; +} + +static int +togdebug() +{ +#ifndef NOT43 + if (net > 0 && + (SetSockOpt(net, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, debug)) < 0) { + perror("setsockopt (SO_DEBUG)"); + } +#else /* NOT43 */ + if (debug) { + if (net > 0 && SetSockOpt(net, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, 0, 0) < 0) + perror("setsockopt (SO_DEBUG)"); + } else + printf("Cannot turn off socket debugging\r\n"); +#endif /* NOT43 */ + return 1; +} + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(HAVE_KRB_DISABLE_DEBUG) +#include + +static int +togkrbdebug(void) +{ + if(krb_debug) + krb_enable_debug(); + else + krb_disable_debug(); + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int +togcrlf() +{ + if (crlf) { + printf("Will send carriage returns as telnet .\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Will send carriage returns as telnet .\r\n"); + } + return 1; +} + +int binmode; + +static int +togbinary(int val) +{ + donebinarytoggle = 1; + + if (val >= 0) { + binmode = val; + } else { + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY) && + my_want_state_is_do(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + binmode = 1; + } else if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY) && + my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + binmode = 0; + } + val = binmode ? 0 : 1; + } + + if (val == 1) { + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY) && + my_want_state_is_do(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + printf("Already operating in binary mode with remote host.\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Negotiating binary mode with remote host.\r\n"); + tel_enter_binary(3); + } + } else { + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY) && + my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + printf("Already in network ascii mode with remote host.\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Negotiating network ascii mode with remote host.\r\n"); + tel_leave_binary(3); + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int +togrbinary(int val) +{ + donebinarytoggle = 1; + + if (val == -1) + val = my_want_state_is_do(TELOPT_BINARY) ? 0 : 1; + + if (val == 1) { + if (my_want_state_is_do(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + printf("Already receiving in binary mode.\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Negotiating binary mode on input.\r\n"); + tel_enter_binary(1); + } + } else { + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + printf("Already receiving in network ascii mode.\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Negotiating network ascii mode on input.\r\n"); + tel_leave_binary(1); + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int +togxbinary(int val) +{ + donebinarytoggle = 1; + + if (val == -1) + val = my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY) ? 0 : 1; + + if (val == 1) { + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + printf("Already transmitting in binary mode.\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Negotiating binary mode on output.\r\n"); + tel_enter_binary(2); + } + } else { + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + printf("Already transmitting in network ascii mode.\r\n"); + } else { + printf("Negotiating network ascii mode on output.\r\n"); + tel_leave_binary(2); + } + } + return 1; +} + + +static int togglehelp (void); +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) +extern int auth_togdebug (int); +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +extern int EncryptAutoEnc (int); +extern int EncryptAutoDec (int); +extern int EncryptDebug (int); +extern int EncryptVerbose (int); +#endif + +struct togglelist { + char *name; /* name of toggle */ + char *help; /* help message */ + int (*handler)(); /* routine to do actual setting */ + int *variable; + char *actionexplanation; +}; + +static struct togglelist Togglelist[] = { + { "autoflush", + "flushing of output when sending interrupt characters", + 0, + &autoflush, + "flush output when sending interrupt characters" }, + { "autosynch", + "automatic sending of interrupt characters in urgent mode", + 0, + &autosynch, + "send interrupt characters in urgent mode" }, +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + { "autologin", + "automatic sending of login and/or authentication info", + 0, + &autologin, + "send login name and/or authentication information" }, + { "authdebug", + "authentication debugging", + auth_togdebug, + 0, + "print authentication debugging information" }, +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + { "autoencrypt", + "automatic encryption of data stream", + EncryptAutoEnc, + 0, + "automatically encrypt output" }, + { "autodecrypt", + "automatic decryption of data stream", + EncryptAutoDec, + 0, + "automatically decrypt input" }, + { "verbose_encrypt", + "verbose encryption output", + EncryptVerbose, + 0, + "print verbose encryption output" }, + { "encdebug", + "encryption debugging", + EncryptDebug, + 0, + "print encryption debugging information" }, +#endif +#if defined(KRB5) + { "forward", + "credentials forwarding", + kerberos5_set_forward, + 0, + "forward credentials" }, + { "forwardable", + "forwardable flag of forwarded credentials", + kerberos5_set_forwardable, + 0, + "forward forwardable credentials" }, +#endif + { "skiprc", + "don't read ~/.telnetrc file", + 0, + &skiprc, + "skip reading of ~/.telnetrc file" }, + { "binary", + "sending and receiving of binary data", + togbinary, + 0, + 0 }, + { "inbinary", + "receiving of binary data", + togrbinary, + 0, + 0 }, + { "outbinary", + "sending of binary data", + togxbinary, + 0, + 0 }, + { "crlf", + "sending carriage returns as telnet ", + togcrlf, + &crlf, + 0 }, + { "crmod", + "mapping of received carriage returns", + 0, + &crmod, + "map carriage return on output" }, + { "localchars", + "local recognition of certain control characters", + lclchars, + &localchars, + "recognize certain control characters" }, + { " ", "", 0 }, /* empty line */ + { "debug", + "debugging", + togdebug, + &debug, + "turn on socket level debugging" }, +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(HAVE_KRB_DISABLE_DEBUG) + { "krb_debug", + "kerberos 4 debugging", + togkrbdebug, + &krb_debug, + "turn on kerberos 4 debugging" }, +#endif + { "netdata", + "printing of hexadecimal network data (debugging)", + 0, + &netdata, + "print hexadecimal representation of network traffic" }, + { "prettydump", + "output of \"netdata\" to user readable format (debugging)", + 0, + &prettydump, + "print user readable output for \"netdata\"" }, + { "options", + "viewing of options processing (debugging)", + 0, + &showoptions, + "show option processing" }, + { "termdata", + "printing of hexadecimal terminal data (debugging)", + 0, + &termdata, + "print hexadecimal representation of terminal traffic" }, + { "?", + 0, + togglehelp }, + { "help", + 0, + togglehelp }, + { 0 } +}; + +static int +togglehelp() +{ + struct togglelist *c; + + for (c = Togglelist; c->name; c++) { + if (c->help) { + if (*c->help) + printf("%-15s toggle %s\r\n", c->name, c->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } + printf("\r\n"); + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", "?", "display help information"); + return 0; +} + +static void +settogglehelp(int set) +{ + struct togglelist *c; + + for (c = Togglelist; c->name; c++) { + if (c->help) { + if (*c->help) + printf("%-15s %s %s\r\n", c->name, set ? "enable" : "disable", + c->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } +} + +#define GETTOGGLE(name) (struct togglelist *) \ + genget(name, (char **) Togglelist, sizeof(struct togglelist)) + +static int +toggle(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int retval = 1; + char *name; + struct togglelist *c; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'toggle' command. 'toggle ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + argc--; + argv++; + while (argc--) { + name = *argv++; + c = GETTOGGLE(name); + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('toggle ?' for help).\r\n", + name); + return 0; + } else if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('toggle ?' for help).\r\n", + name); + return 0; + } else { + if (c->variable) { + *c->variable = !*c->variable; /* invert it */ + if (c->actionexplanation) { + printf("%s %s.\r\n", *c->variable? "Will" : "Won't", + c->actionexplanation); + } + } + if (c->handler) { + retval &= (*c->handler)(-1); + } + } + } + return retval; +} + +/* + * The following perform the "set" command. + */ + +struct termios new_tc = { 0 }; + +struct setlist { + char *name; /* name */ + char *help; /* help information */ + void (*handler)(); + cc_t *charp; /* where it is located at */ +}; + +static struct setlist Setlist[] = { +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + { "echo", "character to toggle local echoing on/off", 0, &echoc }, +#endif + { "escape", "character to escape back to telnet command mode", 0, &escape }, + { "rlogin", "rlogin escape character", 0, &rlogin }, + { "tracefile", "file to write trace information to", SetNetTrace, (cc_t *)NetTraceFile}, + { " ", "" }, + { " ", "The following need 'localchars' to be toggled true", 0, 0 }, + { "flushoutput", "character to cause an Abort Output", 0, &termFlushChar }, + { "interrupt", "character to cause an Interrupt Process", 0, &termIntChar }, + { "quit", "character to cause an Abort process", 0, &termQuitChar }, + { "eof", "character to cause an EOF ", 0, &termEofChar }, + { " ", "" }, + { " ", "The following are for local editing in linemode", 0, 0 }, + { "erase", "character to use to erase a character", 0, &termEraseChar }, + { "kill", "character to use to erase a line", 0, &termKillChar }, + { "lnext", "character to use for literal next", 0, &termLiteralNextChar }, + { "susp", "character to cause a Suspend Process", 0, &termSuspChar }, + { "reprint", "character to use for line reprint", 0, &termRprntChar }, + { "worderase", "character to use to erase a word", 0, &termWerasChar }, + { "start", "character to use for XON", 0, &termStartChar }, + { "stop", "character to use for XOFF", 0, &termStopChar }, + { "forw1", "alternate end of line character", 0, &termForw1Char }, + { "forw2", "alternate end of line character", 0, &termForw2Char }, + { "ayt", "alternate AYT character", 0, &termAytChar }, + { 0 } +}; + +static struct setlist * +getset(char *name) +{ + return (struct setlist *) + genget(name, (char **) Setlist, sizeof(struct setlist)); +} + +void +set_escape_char(char *s) +{ + if (rlogin != _POSIX_VDISABLE) { + rlogin = (s && *s) ? special(s) : _POSIX_VDISABLE; + printf("Telnet rlogin escape character is '%s'.\r\n", + control(rlogin)); + } else { + escape = (s && *s) ? special(s) : _POSIX_VDISABLE; + printf("Telnet escape character is '%s'.\r\n", control(escape)); + } +} + +static int +setcmd(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int value; + struct setlist *ct; + struct togglelist *c; + + if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) { + printf("Format is 'set Name Value'\r\n'set ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + if ((argc == 2) && (isprefix(argv[1], "?") || isprefix(argv[1], "help"))) { + for (ct = Setlist; ct->name; ct++) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", ct->name, ct->help); + printf("\r\n"); + settogglehelp(1); + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", "?", "display help information"); + return 0; + } + + ct = getset(argv[1]); + if (ct == 0) { + c = GETTOGGLE(argv[1]); + if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('set ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } else if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('set ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (c->variable) { + if ((argc == 2) || (strcmp("on", argv[2]) == 0)) + *c->variable = 1; + else if (strcmp("off", argv[2]) == 0) + *c->variable = 0; + else { + printf("Format is 'set togglename [on|off]'\r\n'set ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + if (c->actionexplanation) { + printf("%s %s.\r\n", *c->variable? "Will" : "Won't", + c->actionexplanation); + } + } + if (c->handler) + (*c->handler)(1); + } else if (argc != 3) { + printf("Format is 'set Name Value'\r\n'set ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } else if (Ambiguous(ct)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('set ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } else if (ct->handler) { + (*ct->handler)(argv[2]); + printf("%s set to \"%s\".\r\n", ct->name, (char *)ct->charp); + } else { + if (strcmp("off", argv[2])) { + value = special(argv[2]); + } else { + value = _POSIX_VDISABLE; + } + *(ct->charp) = (cc_t)value; + printf("%s character is '%s'.\r\n", ct->name, control(*(ct->charp))); + } + slc_check(); + return 1; +} + +static int +unsetcmd(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + struct setlist *ct; + struct togglelist *c; + char *name; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'unset' command. 'unset ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + if (isprefix(argv[1], "?") || isprefix(argv[1], "help")) { + for (ct = Setlist; ct->name; ct++) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", ct->name, ct->help); + printf("\r\n"); + settogglehelp(0); + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", "?", "display help information"); + return 0; + } + + argc--; + argv++; + while (argc--) { + name = *argv++; + ct = getset(name); + if (ct == 0) { + c = GETTOGGLE(name); + if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('unset ?' for help).\r\n", + name); + return 0; + } else if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('unset ?' for help).\r\n", + name); + return 0; + } + if (c->variable) { + *c->variable = 0; + if (c->actionexplanation) { + printf("%s %s.\r\n", *c->variable? "Will" : "Won't", + c->actionexplanation); + } + } + if (c->handler) + (*c->handler)(0); + } else if (Ambiguous(ct)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('unset ?' for help).\r\n", + name); + return 0; + } else if (ct->handler) { + (*ct->handler)(0); + printf("%s reset to \"%s\".\r\n", ct->name, (char *)ct->charp); + } else { + *(ct->charp) = _POSIX_VDISABLE; + printf("%s character is '%s'.\r\n", ct->name, control(*(ct->charp))); + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * The following are the data structures and routines for the + * 'mode' command. + */ +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + +static int +dokludgemode(void) +{ + kludgelinemode = 1; + send_wont(TELOPT_LINEMODE, 1); + send_dont(TELOPT_SGA, 1); + send_dont(TELOPT_ECHO, 1); + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int +dolinemode() +{ +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + if (kludgelinemode) + send_dont(TELOPT_SGA, 1); +#endif + send_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE, 1); + send_dont(TELOPT_ECHO, 1); + return 1; +} + +static int +docharmode() +{ +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + if (kludgelinemode) + send_do(TELOPT_SGA, 1); + else +#endif + send_wont(TELOPT_LINEMODE, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_ECHO, 1); + return 1; +} + +static int +dolmmode(int bit, int on) +{ + unsigned char c; + + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) { + printf("?Need to have LINEMODE option enabled first.\r\n"); + printf("'mode ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (on) + c = (linemode | bit); + else + c = (linemode & ~bit); + lm_mode(&c, 1, 1); + return 1; +} + +static int +tn_setmode(int bit) +{ + return dolmmode(bit, 1); +} + +static int +tn_clearmode(int bit) +{ + return dolmmode(bit, 0); +} + +struct modelist { + char *name; /* command name */ + char *help; /* help string */ + int (*handler)(); /* routine which executes command */ + int needconnect; /* Do we need to be connected to execute? */ + int arg1; +}; + +static int modehelp(void); + +static struct modelist ModeList[] = { + { "character", "Disable LINEMODE option", docharmode, 1 }, +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + { "", "(or disable obsolete line-by-line mode)", 0 }, +#endif + { "line", "Enable LINEMODE option", dolinemode, 1 }, +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + { "", "(or enable obsolete line-by-line mode)", 0 }, +#endif + { "", "", 0 }, + { "", "These require the LINEMODE option to be enabled", 0 }, + { "isig", "Enable signal trapping", tn_setmode, 1, MODE_TRAPSIG }, + { "+isig", 0, tn_setmode, 1, MODE_TRAPSIG }, + { "-isig", "Disable signal trapping", tn_clearmode, 1, MODE_TRAPSIG }, + { "edit", "Enable character editing", tn_setmode, 1, MODE_EDIT }, + { "+edit", 0, tn_setmode, 1, MODE_EDIT }, + { "-edit", "Disable character editing", tn_clearmode, 1, MODE_EDIT }, + { "softtabs", "Enable tab expansion", tn_setmode, 1, MODE_SOFT_TAB }, + { "+softtabs", 0, tn_setmode, 1, MODE_SOFT_TAB }, + { "-softtabs", "Disable tab expansion", tn_clearmode, 1, MODE_SOFT_TAB }, + { "litecho", "Enable literal character echo", tn_setmode, 1, MODE_LIT_ECHO }, + { "+litecho", 0, tn_setmode, 1, MODE_LIT_ECHO }, + { "-litecho", "Disable literal character echo", tn_clearmode, 1, MODE_LIT_ECHO }, + { "help", 0, modehelp, 0 }, +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + { "kludgeline", 0, dokludgemode, 1 }, +#endif + { "", "", 0 }, + { "?", "Print help information", modehelp, 0 }, + { 0 }, +}; + + +static int +modehelp(void) +{ + struct modelist *mt; + + printf("format is: 'mode Mode', where 'Mode' is one of:\r\n\r\n"); + for (mt = ModeList; mt->name; mt++) { + if (mt->help) { + if (*mt->help) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", mt->name, mt->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } + return 0; +} + +#define GETMODECMD(name) (struct modelist *) \ + genget(name, (char **) ModeList, sizeof(struct modelist)) + +static int +modecmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct modelist *mt; + + if (argc != 2) { + printf("'mode' command requires an argument\r\n"); + printf("'mode ?' for help.\r\n"); + } else if ((mt = GETMODECMD(argv[1])) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mode '%s' ('mode ?' for help).\r\n", argv[1]); + } else if (Ambiguous(mt)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Ambiguous mode '%s' ('mode ?' for help).\r\n", argv[1]); + } else if (mt->needconnect && !connected) { + printf("?Need to be connected first.\r\n"); + printf("'mode ?' for help.\r\n"); + } else if (mt->handler) { + return (*mt->handler)(mt->arg1); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * The following data structures and routines implement the + * "display" command. + */ + +static int +display(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + struct togglelist *tl; + struct setlist *sl; + +#define dotog(tl) if (tl->variable && tl->actionexplanation) { \ + if (*tl->variable) { \ + printf("will"); \ + } else { \ + printf("won't"); \ + } \ + printf(" %s.\r\n", tl->actionexplanation); \ + } + +#define doset(sl) if (sl->name && *sl->name != ' ') { \ + if (sl->handler == 0) \ + printf("%-15s [%s]\r\n", sl->name, control(*sl->charp)); \ + else \ + printf("%-15s \"%s\"\r\n", sl->name, (char *)sl->charp); \ + } + + if (argc == 1) { + for (tl = Togglelist; tl->name; tl++) { + dotog(tl); + } + printf("\r\n"); + for (sl = Setlist; sl->name; sl++) { + doset(sl); + } + } else { + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + sl = getset(argv[i]); + tl = GETTOGGLE(argv[i]); + if (Ambiguous(sl) || Ambiguous(tl)) { + printf("?Ambiguous argument '%s'.\r\n", argv[i]); + return 0; + } else if (!sl && !tl) { + printf("?Unknown argument '%s'.\r\n", argv[i]); + return 0; + } else { + if (tl) { + dotog(tl); + } + if (sl) { + doset(sl); + } + } + } + } +/*@*/optionstatus(); +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + EncryptStatus(); +#endif + return 1; +#undef doset +#undef dotog +} + +/* + * The following are the data structures, and many of the routines, + * relating to command processing. + */ + +/* + * Set the escape character. + */ +static int +setescape(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + char *arg; + char buf[50]; + + printf( + "Deprecated usage - please use 'set escape%s%s' in the future.\r\n", + (argc > 2)? " ":"", (argc > 2)? argv[1]: ""); + if (argc > 2) + arg = argv[1]; + else { + printf("new escape character: "); + fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin); + arg = buf; + } + if (arg[0] != '\0') + escape = arg[0]; + printf("Escape character is '%s'.\r\n", control(escape)); + + fflush(stdout); + return 1; +} + +static int +togcrmod() +{ + crmod = !crmod; + printf("Deprecated usage - please use 'toggle crmod' in the future.\r\n"); + printf("%s map carriage return on output.\r\n", crmod ? "Will" : "Won't"); + fflush(stdout); + return 1; +} + +static int +telnetsuspend() +{ +#ifdef SIGTSTP + setcommandmode(); + { + long oldrows, oldcols, newrows, newcols, err; + + err = (TerminalWindowSize(&oldrows, &oldcols) == 0) ? 1 : 0; + kill(0, SIGTSTP); + /* + * If we didn't get the window size before the SUSPEND, but we + * can get them now (?), then send the NAWS to make sure that + * we are set up for the right window size. + */ + if (TerminalWindowSize(&newrows, &newcols) && connected && + (err || ((oldrows != newrows) || (oldcols != newcols)))) { + sendnaws(); + } + } + /* reget parameters in case they were changed */ + TerminalSaveState(); + setconnmode(0); +#else + printf("Suspend is not supported. Try the '!' command instead\r\n"); +#endif + return 1; +} + +static int +shell(int argc, char **argv) +{ + long oldrows, oldcols, newrows, newcols, err; + + setcommandmode(); + + err = (TerminalWindowSize(&oldrows, &oldcols) == 0) ? 1 : 0; + switch(fork()) { + case -1: + perror("Fork failed\r\n"); + break; + + case 0: + { + /* + * Fire up the shell in the child. + */ + char *shellp, *shellname; + + shellp = getenv("SHELL"); + if (shellp == NULL) + shellp = "/bin/sh"; + if ((shellname = strrchr(shellp, '/')) == 0) + shellname = shellp; + else + shellname++; + if (argc > 1) + execl(shellp, shellname, "-c", &saveline[1], 0); + else + execl(shellp, shellname, 0); + perror("Execl"); + _exit(1); + } + default: + wait((int *)0); /* Wait for the shell to complete */ + + if (TerminalWindowSize(&newrows, &newcols) && connected && + (err || ((oldrows != newrows) || (oldcols != newcols)))) { + sendnaws(); + } + break; + } + return 1; +} + +static int +bye(int argc, char **argv) +{ + if (connected) { + shutdown(net, 2); + printf("Connection closed.\r\n"); + NetClose(net); + connected = 0; + resettermname = 1; +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) + auth_encrypt_connect(connected); +#endif + /* reset options */ + tninit(); + } + if ((argc != 2) || (strcmp(argv[1], "fromquit") != 0)) + longjmp(toplevel, 1); + return 0; /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +int +quit(void) +{ + call(bye, "bye", "fromquit", 0); + Exit(0); + return 0; /*NOTREACHED*/ +} + +static int +logout() +{ + send_do(TELOPT_LOGOUT, 1); + netflush(); + return 1; +} + + +/* + * The SLC command. + */ + +struct slclist { + char *name; + char *help; + void (*handler)(); + int arg; +}; + +static void slc_help(void); + +struct slclist SlcList[] = { + { "export", "Use local special character definitions", + slc_mode_export, 0 }, + { "import", "Use remote special character definitions", + slc_mode_import, 1 }, + { "check", "Verify remote special character definitions", + slc_mode_import, 0 }, + { "help", 0, slc_help, 0 }, + { "?", "Print help information", slc_help, 0 }, + { 0 }, +}; + +static void +slc_help(void) +{ + struct slclist *c; + + for (c = SlcList; c->name; c++) { + if (c->help) { + if (*c->help) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", c->name, c->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } +} + +static struct slclist * +getslc(char *name) +{ + return (struct slclist *) + genget(name, (char **) SlcList, sizeof(struct slclist)); +} + +static int +slccmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct slclist *c; + + if (argc != 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'slc' command. 'slc ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + c = getslc(argv[1]); + if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('slc ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('slc ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + (*c->handler)(c->arg); + slcstate(); + return 1; +} + +/* + * The ENVIRON command. + */ + +struct envlist { + char *name; + char *help; + void (*handler)(); + int narg; +}; + +static void env_help (void); + +struct envlist EnvList[] = { + { "define", "Define an environment variable", + (void (*)())env_define, 2 }, + { "undefine", "Undefine an environment variable", + env_undefine, 1 }, + { "export", "Mark an environment variable for automatic export", + env_export, 1 }, + { "unexport", "Don't mark an environment variable for automatic export", + env_unexport, 1 }, + { "send", "Send an environment variable", env_send, 1 }, + { "list", "List the current environment variables", + env_list, 0 }, + { "help", 0, env_help, 0 }, + { "?", "Print help information", env_help, 0 }, + { 0 }, +}; + +static void +env_help() +{ + struct envlist *c; + + for (c = EnvList; c->name; c++) { + if (c->help) { + if (*c->help) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", c->name, c->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } +} + +static struct envlist * +getenvcmd(char *name) +{ + return (struct envlist *) + genget(name, (char **) EnvList, sizeof(struct envlist)); +} + +static int +env_cmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct envlist *c; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'environ' command. 'environ ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + c = getenvcmd(argv[1]); + if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('environ ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('environ ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (c->narg + 2 != argc) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need %s%d argument%s to 'environ %s' command. 'environ ?' for help.\r\n", + c->narg < argc + 2 ? "only " : "", + c->narg, c->narg == 1 ? "" : "s", c->name); + return 0; + } + (*c->handler)(argv[2], argv[3]); + return 1; +} + +struct env_lst { + struct env_lst *next; /* pointer to next structure */ + struct env_lst *prev; /* pointer to previous structure */ + unsigned char *var; /* pointer to variable name */ + unsigned char *value; /* pointer to variable value */ + int export; /* 1 -> export with default list of variables */ + int welldefined; /* A well defined variable */ +}; + +struct env_lst envlisthead; + +struct env_lst * +env_find(unsigned char *var) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + for (ep = envlisthead.next; ep; ep = ep->next) { + if (strcmp((char *)ep->var, (char *)var) == 0) + return(ep); + } + return(NULL); +} + +#ifdef IRIX4 +#define environ _environ +#endif + +void +env_init(void) +{ + char **epp, *cp; + struct env_lst *ep; + + for (epp = environ; *epp; epp++) { + if ((cp = strchr(*epp, '='))) { + *cp = '\0'; + ep = env_define((unsigned char *)*epp, + (unsigned char *)cp+1); + ep->export = 0; + *cp = '='; + } + } + /* + * Special case for DISPLAY variable. If it is ":0.0" or + * "unix:0.0", we have to get rid of "unix" and insert our + * hostname. + */ + if ((ep = env_find((unsigned char*)"DISPLAY")) + && (*ep->value == ':' + || strncmp((char *)ep->value, "unix:", 5) == 0)) { + char hbuf[256+1]; + char *cp2 = strchr((char *)ep->value, ':'); + + /* XXX - should be k_gethostname? */ + gethostname(hbuf, 256); + hbuf[256] = '\0'; + + /* If this is not the full name, try to get it via DNS */ + if (strchr(hbuf, '.') == 0) { + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *a; + int error; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + error = getaddrinfo (hbuf, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error == 0) { + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + strlcpy (hbuf, + ai->ai_canonname, + 256); + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + } + } + + asprintf (&cp, "%s%s", hbuf, cp2); + free (ep->value); + ep->value = (unsigned char *)cp; + } + /* + * If USER is not defined, but LOGNAME is, then add + * USER with the value from LOGNAME. By default, we + * don't export the USER variable. + */ + if ((env_find((unsigned char*)"USER") == NULL) && + (ep = env_find((unsigned char*)"LOGNAME"))) { + env_define((unsigned char *)"USER", ep->value); + env_unexport((unsigned char *)"USER"); + } + env_export((unsigned char *)"DISPLAY"); + env_export((unsigned char *)"PRINTER"); + env_export((unsigned char *)"XAUTHORITY"); +} + +struct env_lst * +env_define(unsigned char *var, unsigned char *value) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + if ((ep = env_find(var))) { + if (ep->var) + free(ep->var); + if (ep->value) + free(ep->value); + } else { + ep = (struct env_lst *)malloc(sizeof(struct env_lst)); + ep->next = envlisthead.next; + envlisthead.next = ep; + ep->prev = &envlisthead; + if (ep->next) + ep->next->prev = ep; + } + ep->welldefined = opt_welldefined((char *)var); + ep->export = 1; + ep->var = (unsigned char *)strdup((char *)var); + ep->value = (unsigned char *)strdup((char *)value); + return(ep); +} + +void +env_undefine(unsigned char *var) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + if ((ep = env_find(var))) { + ep->prev->next = ep->next; + if (ep->next) + ep->next->prev = ep->prev; + if (ep->var) + free(ep->var); + if (ep->value) + free(ep->value); + free(ep); + } +} + +void +env_export(unsigned char *var) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + if ((ep = env_find(var))) + ep->export = 1; +} + +void +env_unexport(unsigned char *var) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + if ((ep = env_find(var))) + ep->export = 0; +} + +void +env_send(unsigned char *var) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + if (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON) +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + && my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) +#endif + ) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Cannot send '%s': Telnet ENVIRON option not enabled\r\n", + var); + return; + } + ep = env_find(var); + if (ep == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Cannot send '%s': variable not defined\r\n", + var); + return; + } + env_opt_start_info(); + env_opt_add(ep->var); + env_opt_end(0); +} + +void +env_list(void) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + for (ep = envlisthead.next; ep; ep = ep->next) { + printf("%c %-20s %s\r\n", ep->export ? '*' : ' ', + ep->var, ep->value); + } +} + +unsigned char * +env_default(int init, int welldefined) +{ + static struct env_lst *nep = NULL; + + if (init) { + nep = &envlisthead; + return NULL; + } + if (nep) { + while ((nep = nep->next)) { + if (nep->export && (nep->welldefined == welldefined)) + return(nep->var); + } + } + return(NULL); +} + +unsigned char * +env_getvalue(unsigned char *var) +{ + struct env_lst *ep; + + if ((ep = env_find(var))) + return(ep->value); + return(NULL); +} + + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) +/* + * The AUTHENTICATE command. + */ + +struct authlist { + char *name; + char *help; + int (*handler)(); + int narg; +}; + +static int + auth_help (void); + +struct authlist AuthList[] = { + { "status", "Display current status of authentication information", + auth_status, 0 }, + { "disable", "Disable an authentication type ('auth disable ?' for more)", + auth_disable, 1 }, + { "enable", "Enable an authentication type ('auth enable ?' for more)", + auth_enable, 1 }, + { "help", 0, auth_help, 0 }, + { "?", "Print help information", auth_help, 0 }, + { 0 }, +}; + +static int +auth_help() +{ + struct authlist *c; + + for (c = AuthList; c->name; c++) { + if (c->help) { + if (*c->help) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", c->name, c->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +auth_cmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct authlist *c; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'auth' command. 'auth ?' for help.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + + c = (struct authlist *) + genget(argv[1], (char **) AuthList, sizeof(struct authlist)); + if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('auth ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('auth ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (c->narg + 2 != argc) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need %s%d argument%s to 'auth %s' command. 'auth ?' for help.\r\n", + c->narg < argc + 2 ? "only " : "", + c->narg, c->narg == 1 ? "" : "s", c->name); + return 0; + } + return((*c->handler)(argv[2], argv[3])); +} +#endif + + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +/* + * The ENCRYPT command. + */ + +struct encryptlist { + char *name; + char *help; + int (*handler)(); + int needconnect; + int minarg; + int maxarg; +}; + +static int + EncryptHelp (void); + +struct encryptlist EncryptList[] = { + { "enable", "Enable encryption. ('encrypt enable ?' for more)", + EncryptEnable, 1, 1, 2 }, + { "disable", "Disable encryption. ('encrypt enable ?' for more)", + EncryptDisable, 0, 1, 2 }, + { "type", "Set encryptiong type. ('encrypt type ?' for more)", + EncryptType, 0, 1, 1 }, + { "start", "Start encryption. ('encrypt start ?' for more)", + EncryptStart, 1, 0, 1 }, + { "stop", "Stop encryption. ('encrypt stop ?' for more)", + EncryptStop, 1, 0, 1 }, + { "input", "Start encrypting the input stream", + EncryptStartInput, 1, 0, 0 }, + { "-input", "Stop encrypting the input stream", + EncryptStopInput, 1, 0, 0 }, + { "output", "Start encrypting the output stream", + EncryptStartOutput, 1, 0, 0 }, + { "-output", "Stop encrypting the output stream", + EncryptStopOutput, 1, 0, 0 }, + + { "status", "Display current status of authentication information", + EncryptStatus, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "help", 0, EncryptHelp, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "?", "Print help information", EncryptHelp, 0, 0, 0 }, + { 0 }, +}; + +static int +EncryptHelp() +{ + struct encryptlist *c; + + for (c = EncryptList; c->name; c++) { + if (c->help) { + if (*c->help) + printf("%-15s %s\r\n", c->name, c->help); + else + printf("\r\n"); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +encrypt_cmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct encryptlist *c; + + c = (struct encryptlist *) + genget(argv[1], (char **) EncryptList, sizeof(struct encryptlist)); + if (c == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': unknown argument ('encrypt ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + fprintf(stderr, "'%s': ambiguous argument ('encrypt ?' for help).\r\n", + argv[1]); + return 0; + } + argc -= 2; + if (argc < c->minarg || argc > c->maxarg) { + if (c->minarg == c->maxarg) { + fprintf(stderr, "Need %s%d argument%s ", + c->minarg < argc ? "only " : "", c->minarg, + c->minarg == 1 ? "" : "s"); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Need %s%d-%d arguments ", + c->maxarg < argc ? "only " : "", c->minarg, c->maxarg); + } + fprintf(stderr, "to 'encrypt %s' command. 'encrypt ?' for help.\r\n", + c->name); + return 0; + } + if (c->needconnect && !connected) { + if (!(argc && (isprefix(argv[2], "help") || isprefix(argv[2], "?")))) { + printf("?Need to be connected first.\r\n"); + return 0; + } + } + return ((*c->handler)(argc > 0 ? argv[2] : 0, + argc > 1 ? argv[3] : 0, + argc > 2 ? argv[4] : 0)); +} +#endif + + +/* + * Print status about the connection. + */ + +static int +status(int argc, char **argv) +{ + if (connected) { + printf("Connected to %s.\r\n", hostname); + if ((argc < 2) || strcmp(argv[1], "notmuch")) { + int mode = getconnmode(); + + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) { + printf("Operating with LINEMODE option\r\n"); + printf("%s line editing\r\n", (mode&MODE_EDIT) ? "Local" : "No"); + printf("%s catching of signals\r\n", + (mode&MODE_TRAPSIG) ? "Local" : "No"); + slcstate(); +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + } else if (kludgelinemode && my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_SGA)) { + printf("Operating in obsolete linemode\r\n"); +#endif + } else { + printf("Operating in single character mode\r\n"); + if (localchars) + printf("Catching signals locally\r\n"); + } + printf("%s character echo\r\n", (mode&MODE_ECHO) ? "Local" : "Remote"); + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_LFLOW)) + printf("%s flow control\r\n", (mode&MODE_FLOW) ? "Local" : "No"); +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + encrypt_display(); +#endif + } + } else { + printf("No connection.\r\n"); + } + printf("Escape character is '%s'.\r\n", control(escape)); + fflush(stdout); + return 1; +} + +#ifdef SIGINFO +/* + * Function that gets called when SIGINFO is received. + */ +RETSIGTYPE +ayt_status(int ignore) +{ + call(status, "status", "notmuch", 0); +} +#endif + +static Command *getcmd(char *name); + +static void +cmdrc(char *m1, char *m2) +{ + static char rcname[128]; + Command *c; + FILE *rcfile; + int gotmachine = 0; + int l1 = strlen(m1); + int l2 = strlen(m2); + char m1save[64]; + + if (skiprc) + return; + + strlcpy(m1save, m1, sizeof(m1save)); + m1 = m1save; + + if (rcname[0] == 0) { + char *home = getenv("HOME"); + + snprintf (rcname, sizeof(rcname), "%s/.telnetrc", + home ? home : ""); + } + + if ((rcfile = fopen(rcname, "r")) == 0) { + return; + } + + for (;;) { + if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), rcfile) == NULL) + break; + if (line[0] == 0) + break; + if (line[0] == '#') + continue; + if (gotmachine) { + if (!isspace(line[0])) + gotmachine = 0; + } + if (gotmachine == 0) { + if (isspace(line[0])) + continue; + if (strncasecmp(line, m1, l1) == 0) + strncpy(line, &line[l1], sizeof(line) - l1); + else if (strncasecmp(line, m2, l2) == 0) + strncpy(line, &line[l2], sizeof(line) - l2); + else if (strncasecmp(line, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) + strncpy(line, &line[7], sizeof(line) - 7); + else + continue; + if (line[0] != ' ' && line[0] != '\t' && line[0] != '\n') + continue; + gotmachine = 1; + } + makeargv(); + if (margv[0] == 0) + continue; + c = getcmd(margv[0]); + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + printf("?Ambiguous command: %s\r\n", margv[0]); + continue; + } + if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command: %s\r\n", margv[0]); + continue; + } + /* + * This should never happen... + */ + if (c->needconnect && !connected) { + printf("?Need to be connected first for %s.\r\n", margv[0]); + continue; + } + (*c->handler)(margc, margv); + } + fclose(rcfile); +} + +int +tn(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct servent *sp = 0; + char *cmd, *hostp = 0, *portp = 0; + char *user = 0; + int port = 0; + + /* clear the socket address prior to use */ + + if (connected) { + printf("?Already connected to %s\r\n", hostname); + return 0; + } + if (argc < 2) { + strlcpy(line, "open ", sizeof(line)); + printf("(to) "); + fgets(&line[strlen(line)], sizeof(line) - strlen(line), stdin); + makeargv(); + argc = margc; + argv = margv; + } + cmd = *argv; + --argc; ++argv; + while (argc) { + if (strcmp(*argv, "help") == 0 || isprefix(*argv, "?")) + goto usage; + if (strcmp(*argv, "-l") == 0) { + --argc; ++argv; + if (argc == 0) + goto usage; + user = strdup(*argv++); + --argc; + continue; + } + if (strcmp(*argv, "-a") == 0) { + --argc; ++argv; + autologin = 1; + continue; + } + if (hostp == 0) { + hostp = *argv++; + --argc; + continue; + } + if (portp == 0) { + portp = *argv++; + --argc; + continue; + } + usage: + printf("usage: %s [-l user] [-a] host-name [port]\r\n", cmd); + return 0; + } + if (hostp == 0) + goto usage; + + strlcpy (_hostname, hostp, sizeof(_hostname)); + hostp = _hostname; + if (hostp[0] == '@' || hostp[0] == '!') { + char *p; + hostname = NULL; + for (p = hostp + 1; *p; p++) { + if (*p == ',' || *p == '@') + hostname = p; + } + if (hostname == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: bad source route specification\n", hostp); + return 0; + } + *hostname++ = '\0'; + } else + hostname = hostp; + + if (portp) { + if (*portp == '-') { + portp++; + telnetport = 1; + } else + telnetport = 0; + port = atoi(portp); + if (port == 0) { + sp = roken_getservbyname(portp, "tcp"); + if (sp) + port = sp->s_port; + else { + printf("%s: bad port number\r\n", portp); + return 0; + } + } else { + port = htons(port); + } + } else { + if (sp == 0) { + sp = roken_getservbyname("telnet", "tcp"); + if (sp == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "telnet: tcp/telnet: unknown service\r\n"); + return 0; + } + port = sp->s_port; + } + telnetport = 1; + } + + { + struct addrinfo *ai, *a, hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s\r\n", hostname, gai_strerror (error)); + return 0; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL && connected == 0; a = a->ai_next) { + char addrstr[256]; + + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) + strlcpy (_hostname, a->ai_canonname, sizeof(_hostname)); + + if (getnameinfo (a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen, + addrstr, sizeof(addrstr), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + strlcpy (addrstr, "unknown address", sizeof(addrstr)); + + printf("Trying %s...\r\n", addrstr); + + net = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (net < 0) { + warn ("socket"); + continue; + } + +#if defined(IP_OPTIONS) && defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (hostp[0] == '@' || hostp[0] == '!') { + char *srp = 0; + int srlen; + int proto, opt; + + if ((srlen = sourceroute(a, hostp, &srp, &proto, &opt)) < 0) { + (void) NetClose(net); + net = -1; + continue; + } + if (srp && setsockopt(net, proto, opt, srp, srlen) < 0) + perror("setsockopt (source route)"); + } +#endif + +#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) + if (a->ai_family == AF_INET) { +# if defined(HAVE_GETTOSBYNAME) + struct tosent *tp; + if (tos < 0 && (tp = gettosbyname("telnet", "tcp"))) + tos = tp->t_tos; +# endif + if (tos < 0) + tos = 020; /* Low Delay bit */ + if (tos + && (setsockopt(net, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, + (void *)&tos, sizeof(int)) < 0) + && (errno != ENOPROTOOPT)) + perror("telnet: setsockopt (IP_TOS) (ignored)"); + } +#endif /* defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) */ + if (debug && SetSockOpt(net, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, 1) < 0) { + perror("setsockopt (SO_DEBUG)"); + } + + if (connect (net, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + fprintf (stderr, "telnet: connect to address %s: %s\n", + addrstr, strerror(errno)); + NetClose(net); + if (a->ai_next != NULL) { + continue; + } else { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 0; + } + } + ++connected; +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) + auth_encrypt_connect(connected); +#endif + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (connected == 0) + return 0; + } + cmdrc(hostp, hostname); + set_forward_options(); + if (autologin && user == NULL) + user = (char *)get_default_username (); + if (user) { + env_define((unsigned char *)"USER", (unsigned char *)user); + env_export((unsigned char *)"USER"); + } + call(status, "status", "notmuch", 0); + if (setjmp(peerdied) == 0) + my_telnet((char *)user); + NetClose(net); + ExitString("Connection closed by foreign host.\r\n",1); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + return 0; +} + +#define HELPINDENT ((int)sizeof ("connect")) + +static char + openhelp[] = "connect to a site", + closehelp[] = "close current connection", + logouthelp[] = "forcibly logout remote user and close the connection", + quithelp[] = "exit telnet", + statushelp[] = "print status information", + helphelp[] = "print help information", + sendhelp[] = "transmit special characters ('send ?' for more)", + sethelp[] = "set operating parameters ('set ?' for more)", + unsethelp[] = "unset operating parameters ('unset ?' for more)", + togglestring[] ="toggle operating parameters ('toggle ?' for more)", + slchelp[] = "change state of special charaters ('slc ?' for more)", + displayhelp[] = "display operating parameters", +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + authhelp[] = "turn on (off) authentication ('auth ?' for more)", +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + encrypthelp[] = "turn on (off) encryption ('encrypt ?' for more)", +#endif + zhelp[] = "suspend telnet", + shellhelp[] = "invoke a subshell", + envhelp[] = "change environment variables ('environ ?' for more)", + modestring[] = "try to enter line or character mode ('mode ?' for more)"; + +static int help(int argc, char **argv); + +static Command cmdtab[] = { + { "close", closehelp, bye, 1 }, + { "logout", logouthelp, logout, 1 }, + { "display", displayhelp, display, 0 }, + { "mode", modestring, modecmd, 0 }, + { "open", openhelp, tn, 0 }, + { "quit", quithelp, quit, 0 }, + { "send", sendhelp, sendcmd, 0 }, + { "set", sethelp, setcmd, 0 }, + { "unset", unsethelp, unsetcmd, 0 }, + { "status", statushelp, status, 0 }, + { "toggle", togglestring, toggle, 0 }, + { "slc", slchelp, slccmd, 0 }, +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + { "auth", authhelp, auth_cmd, 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + { "encrypt", encrypthelp, encrypt_cmd, 0 }, +#endif + { "z", zhelp, telnetsuspend, 0 }, + { "!", shellhelp, shell, 0 }, + { "environ", envhelp, env_cmd, 0 }, + { "?", helphelp, help, 0 }, + { 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +static char crmodhelp[] = "deprecated command -- use 'toggle crmod' instead"; +static char escapehelp[] = "deprecated command -- use 'set escape' instead"; + +static Command cmdtab2[] = { + { "help", 0, help, 0 }, + { "escape", escapehelp, setescape, 0 }, + { "crmod", crmodhelp, togcrmod, 0 }, + { 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + + +/* + * Call routine with argc, argv set from args (terminated by 0). + */ + +static int +call(intrtn_t routine, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *args[100]; + int argno = 0; + + va_start(ap, routine); + while ((args[argno++] = va_arg(ap, char *)) != 0); + va_end(ap); + return (*routine)(argno-1, args); +} + + +static Command +*getcmd(char *name) +{ + Command *cm; + + if ((cm = (Command *) genget(name, (char **) cmdtab, sizeof(Command)))) + return cm; + return (Command *) genget(name, (char **) cmdtab2, sizeof(Command)); +} + +void +command(int top, char *tbuf, int cnt) +{ + Command *c; + + setcommandmode(); + if (!top) { + putchar('\n'); + } else { + signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); + } + for (;;) { + if (rlogin == _POSIX_VDISABLE) + printf("%s> ", prompt); + if (tbuf) { + char *cp; + cp = line; + while (cnt > 0 && (*cp++ = *tbuf++) != '\n') + cnt--; + tbuf = 0; + if (cp == line || *--cp != '\n' || cp == line) + goto getline; + *cp = '\0'; + if (rlogin == _POSIX_VDISABLE) + printf("%s\r\n", line); + } else { + getline: + if (rlogin != _POSIX_VDISABLE) + printf("%s> ", prompt); + if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin) == NULL) { + if (feof(stdin) || ferror(stdin)) { + quit(); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } + break; + } + } + if (line[0] == 0) + break; + makeargv(); + if (margv[0] == 0) { + break; + } + c = getcmd(margv[0]); + if (Ambiguous(c)) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\r\n"); + continue; + } + if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\r\n"); + continue; + } + if (c->needconnect && !connected) { + printf("?Need to be connected first.\r\n"); + continue; + } + if ((*c->handler)(margc, margv)) { + break; + } + } + if (!top) { + if (!connected) { + longjmp(toplevel, 1); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } + setconnmode(0); + } +} + +/* + * Help command. + */ +static int +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + Command *c; + + if (argc == 1) { + printf("Commands may be abbreviated. Commands are:\r\n\r\n"); + for (c = cmdtab; c->name; c++) + if (c->help) { + printf("%-*s\t%s\r\n", HELPINDENT, c->name, + c->help); + } + return 0; + } + while (--argc > 0) { + char *arg; + arg = *++argv; + c = getcmd(arg); + if (Ambiguous(c)) + printf("?Ambiguous help command %s\r\n", arg); + else if (c == (Command *)0) + printf("?Invalid help command %s\r\n", arg); + else + printf("%s\r\n", c->help); + } + return 0; +} + + +#if defined(IP_OPTIONS) && defined(IPPROTO_IP) + +/* + * Source route is handed in as + * [!]@hop1@hop2...@dst + * + * If the leading ! is present, it is a strict source route, otherwise it is + * assmed to be a loose source route. Note that leading ! is effective + * only for IPv4 case. + * + * We fill in the source route option as + * hop1,hop2,hop3...dest + * and return a pointer to hop1, which will + * be the address to connect() to. + * + * Arguments: + * ai: The address (by struct addrinfo) for the final destination. + * + * arg: Pointer to route list to decipher + * + * cpp: Pointer to a pointer, so that sourceroute() can return + * the address of result buffer (statically alloc'ed). + * + * protop/optp: + * Pointer to an integer. The pointed variable + * lenp: pointer to an integer that contains the + * length of *cpp if *cpp != NULL. + * + * Return values: + * + * Returns the length of the option pointed to by *cpp. If the + * return value is -1, there was a syntax error in the + * option, either arg contained unknown characters or too many hosts, + * or hostname cannot be resolved. + * + * The caller needs to pass return value (len), *cpp, *protop and *optp + * to setsockopt(2). + * + * *cpp: Points to the result buffer. The region is statically + * allocated by the function. + * + * *protop: + * protocol # to be passed to setsockopt(2). + * + * *optp: option # to be passed to setsockopt(2). + * + */ +int +sourceroute(struct addrinfo *ai, + char *arg, + char **cpp, + int *protop, + int *optp) +{ + char *cp, *cp2, *lsrp = NULL, *lsrep = NULL; + struct addrinfo hints, *res; + int len, error; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + register char c; + static char lsr[44]; +#ifdef INET6 + struct cmsghdr *cmsg = NULL; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + static char rhbuf[1024]; +#endif + + /* + * Verify the arguments. + */ + if (cpp == NULL) + return -1; + + cp = arg; + + *cpp = NULL; + switch (ai->ai_family) { + case AF_INET: + lsrp = lsr; + lsrep = lsrp + sizeof(lsr); + + /* + * Next, decide whether we have a loose source + * route or a strict source route, and fill in + * the begining of the option. + */ + if (*cp == '!') { + cp++; + *lsrp++ = IPOPT_SSRR; + } else + *lsrp++ = IPOPT_LSRR; + if (*cp != '@') + return -1; + lsrp++; /* skip over length, we'll fill it in later */ + *lsrp++ = 4; + cp++; + *protop = IPPROTO_IP; + *optp = IP_OPTIONS; + break; +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: +/* this needs to be updated for rfc2292bis */ +#ifdef IPV6_PKTOPTIONS + cmsg = inet6_rthdr_init(rhbuf, IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_0); + if (*cp != '@') + return -1; + cp++; + *protop = IPPROTO_IPV6; + *optp = IPV6_PKTOPTIONS; + break; +#else + return -1; +#endif +#endif + default: + return -1; + } + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + for (c = 0;;) { + if (c == ':') + cp2 = 0; + else for (cp2 = cp; (c = *cp2) != '\0'; cp2++) { + if (c == ',') { + *cp2++ = '\0'; + if (*cp2 == '@') + cp2++; + } else if (c == '@') { + *cp2++ = '\0'; + } +#if 0 /*colon conflicts with IPv6 address*/ + else if (c == ':') { + *cp2++ = '\0'; + } +#endif + else + continue; + break; + } + if (!c) + cp2 = 0; + + error = getaddrinfo(cp, NULL, &hints, &res); + if (error) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", cp, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + if (ai->ai_family != res->ai_family) { + freeaddrinfo(res); + return -1; + } + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET) { + /* + * Check to make sure there is space for address + */ + if (lsrp + 4 > lsrep) { + freeaddrinfo(res); + return -1; + } + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr; + memcpy(lsrp, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); + lsrp += sizeof(struct in_addr); + } +#ifdef INET6 + else if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr; + inet6_rthdr_add(cmsg, &sin6->sin6_addr, + IPV6_RTHDR_LOOSE); + } +#endif + else { + freeaddrinfo(res); + return -1; + } + freeaddrinfo(res); + if (cp2) + cp = cp2; + else + break; + } + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET) { + /* record the last hop */ + if (lsrp + 4 > lsrep) + return -1; + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr; + memcpy(lsrp, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); + lsrp += sizeof(struct in_addr); +#ifndef sysV88 + lsr[IPOPT_OLEN] = lsrp - lsr; + if (lsr[IPOPT_OLEN] <= 7 || lsr[IPOPT_OLEN] > 40) + return -1; + *lsrp++ = IPOPT_NOP; /*32bit word align*/ + len = lsrp - lsr; + *cpp = lsr; +#else + ipopt.io_len = lsrp - lsr; + if (ipopt.io_len <= 5) /*is 3 better?*/ + return -1; + *cpp = (char 8)&ipopt; +#endif + } +#ifdef INET6 + else if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { + inet6_rthdr_lasthop(cmsg, IPV6_RTHDR_LOOSE); + len = cmsg->cmsg_len; + *cpp = rhbuf; + } +#endif + else + return -1; + return len; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/defines.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/defines.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c1ac2bcc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/defines.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)defines.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93 + */ + +#define settimer(x) clocks.x = clocks.system++ + +#define NETADD(c) { *netoring.supply = c; ring_supplied(&netoring, 1); } +#define NET2ADD(c1,c2) { NETADD(c1); NETADD(c2); } +#define NETBYTES() (ring_full_count(&netoring)) +#define NETROOM() (ring_empty_count(&netoring)) + +#define TTYADD(c) if (!(SYNCHing||flushout)) { \ + *ttyoring.supply = c; \ + ring_supplied(&ttyoring, 1); \ + } +#define TTYBYTES() (ring_full_count(&ttyoring)) +#define TTYROOM() (ring_empty_count(&ttyoring)) + +/* Various modes */ +#define MODE_LOCAL_CHARS(m) ((m)&(MODE_EDIT|MODE_TRAPSIG)) +#define MODE_LOCAL_ECHO(m) ((m)&MODE_ECHO) +#define MODE_COMMAND_LINE(m) ((m)==-1) + +#define CONTROL(x) ((x)&0x1f) /* CTRL(x) is not portable */ + + +/* XXX extra mode bits, these should be synced with */ + +#define MODE_OUT8 0x8000 /* binary mode sans -opost */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/externs.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/externs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..09f058c2be --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/externs.h @@ -0,0 +1,441 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)externs.h 8.3 (Berkeley) 5/30/95 + */ + +/* $Id: externs.h,v 1.25 2002/08/28 20:58:23 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef BSD +# define BSD 43 +#endif + +#ifndef _POSIX_VDISABLE +# ifdef sun +# include /* pick up VDISABLE definition, mayby */ +# endif +# ifdef VDISABLE +# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE +# else +# define _POSIX_VDISABLE ((cc_t)'\377') +# endif +#endif + +#define SUBBUFSIZE 256 + +extern int + autologin, /* Autologin enabled */ + skiprc, /* Don't process the ~/.telnetrc file */ + eight, /* use eight bit mode (binary in and/or out */ + binary, + flushout, /* flush output */ + connected, /* Are we connected to the other side? */ + globalmode, /* Mode tty should be in */ + telnetport, /* Are we connected to the telnet port? */ + localflow, /* Flow control handled locally */ + restartany, /* If flow control, restart output on any character */ + localchars, /* we recognize interrupt/quit */ + donelclchars, /* the user has set "localchars" */ + showoptions, + wantencryption, /* User has requested encryption */ + net, /* Network file descriptor */ + tin, /* Terminal input file descriptor */ + tout, /* Terminal output file descriptor */ + crlf, /* Should '\r' be mapped to (or )? */ + autoflush, /* flush output when interrupting? */ + autosynch, /* send interrupt characters with SYNCH? */ + SYNCHing, /* Is the stream in telnet SYNCH mode? */ + donebinarytoggle, /* the user has put us in binary */ + dontlecho, /* do we suppress local echoing right now? */ + crmod, + netdata, /* Print out network data flow */ + prettydump, /* Print "netdata" output in user readable format */ + termdata, /* Print out terminal data flow */ + debug; /* Debug level */ + +extern int intr_happened, intr_waiting; /* for interrupt handling */ + +extern cc_t escape; /* Escape to command mode */ +extern cc_t rlogin; /* Rlogin mode escape character */ +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE +extern cc_t echoc; /* Toggle local echoing */ +#endif + +extern char + *prompt; /* Prompt for command. */ + +extern char + doopt[], + dont[], + will[], + wont[], + do_dont_resp[], + will_wont_resp[], + options[], /* All the little options */ + *hostname; /* Who are we connected to? */ +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +extern void (*encrypt_output) (unsigned char *, int); +extern int (*decrypt_input) (int); +#endif + +/* + * We keep track of each side of the option negotiation. + */ + +#define MY_STATE_WILL 0x01 +#define MY_WANT_STATE_WILL 0x02 +#define MY_STATE_DO 0x04 +#define MY_WANT_STATE_DO 0x08 + +/* + * Macros to check the current state of things + */ + +#define my_state_is_do(opt) (options[opt]&MY_STATE_DO) +#define my_state_is_will(opt) (options[opt]&MY_STATE_WILL) +#define my_want_state_is_do(opt) (options[opt]&MY_WANT_STATE_DO) +#define my_want_state_is_will(opt) (options[opt]&MY_WANT_STATE_WILL) + +#define my_state_is_dont(opt) (!my_state_is_do(opt)) +#define my_state_is_wont(opt) (!my_state_is_will(opt)) +#define my_want_state_is_dont(opt) (!my_want_state_is_do(opt)) +#define my_want_state_is_wont(opt) (!my_want_state_is_will(opt)) + +#define set_my_state_do(opt) {options[opt] |= MY_STATE_DO;} +#define set_my_state_will(opt) {options[opt] |= MY_STATE_WILL;} +#define set_my_want_state_do(opt) {options[opt] |= MY_WANT_STATE_DO;} +#define set_my_want_state_will(opt) {options[opt] |= MY_WANT_STATE_WILL;} + +#define set_my_state_dont(opt) {options[opt] &= ~MY_STATE_DO;} +#define set_my_state_wont(opt) {options[opt] &= ~MY_STATE_WILL;} +#define set_my_want_state_dont(opt) {options[opt] &= ~MY_WANT_STATE_DO;} +#define set_my_want_state_wont(opt) {options[opt] &= ~MY_WANT_STATE_WILL;} + +/* + * Make everything symmetrical + */ + +#define HIS_STATE_WILL MY_STATE_DO +#define HIS_WANT_STATE_WILL MY_WANT_STATE_DO +#define HIS_STATE_DO MY_STATE_WILL +#define HIS_WANT_STATE_DO MY_WANT_STATE_WILL + +#define his_state_is_do my_state_is_will +#define his_state_is_will my_state_is_do +#define his_want_state_is_do my_want_state_is_will +#define his_want_state_is_will my_want_state_is_do + +#define his_state_is_dont my_state_is_wont +#define his_state_is_wont my_state_is_dont +#define his_want_state_is_dont my_want_state_is_wont +#define his_want_state_is_wont my_want_state_is_dont + +#define set_his_state_do set_my_state_will +#define set_his_state_will set_my_state_do +#define set_his_want_state_do set_my_want_state_will +#define set_his_want_state_will set_my_want_state_do + +#define set_his_state_dont set_my_state_wont +#define set_his_state_wont set_my_state_dont +#define set_his_want_state_dont set_my_want_state_wont +#define set_his_want_state_wont set_my_want_state_dont + + +extern FILE + *NetTrace; /* Where debugging output goes */ +extern char + NetTraceFile[]; /* Name of file where debugging output goes */ +extern void + SetNetTrace (char *); /* Function to change where debugging goes */ + +extern jmp_buf + peerdied, + toplevel; /* For error conditions. */ + +/* authenc.c */ + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) +int telnet_net_write(unsigned char *str, int len); +void net_encrypt(void); +int telnet_spin(void); +char *telnet_getenv(const char *val); +char *telnet_gets(char *prompt, char *result, int length, int echo); +#endif + +/* commands.c */ + +struct env_lst *env_define (unsigned char *, unsigned char *); +struct env_lst *env_find(unsigned char *var); +void env_init (void); +void env_undefine (unsigned char *); +void env_export (unsigned char *); +void env_unexport (unsigned char *); +void env_send (unsigned char *); +void env_list (void); +unsigned char * env_default(int init, int welldefined); +unsigned char * env_getvalue(unsigned char *var); + +void set_escape_char(char *s); +int sourceroute(struct addrinfo *ai, char *arg, char **cpp, + int *prototp, int *optp); + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) +int auth_enable (char *); +int auth_disable (char *); +int auth_status (void); +#endif + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +int EncryptEnable (char *, char *); +int EncryptDisable (char *, char *); +int EncryptType (char *, char *); +int EncryptStart (char *); +int EncryptStartInput (void); +int EncryptStartOutput (void); +int EncryptStop (char *); +int EncryptStopInput (void); +int EncryptStopOutput (void); +int EncryptStatus (void); +#endif + +#ifdef SIGINFO +RETSIGTYPE ayt_status(int); +#endif +int tn(int argc, char **argv); +void command(int top, char *tbuf, int cnt); + +/* main.c */ + +void tninit(void); +void usage(void); +void set_forward_options(void); + +/* network.c */ + +void init_network(void); +int stilloob(void); +void setneturg(void); +int netflush(void); + +/* sys_bsd.c */ + +void init_sys(void); +int TerminalWrite(char *buf, int n); +int TerminalRead(unsigned char *buf, int n); +int TerminalAutoFlush(void); +int TerminalSpecialChars(int c); +void TerminalFlushOutput(void); +void TerminalSaveState(void); +void TerminalDefaultChars(void); +void TerminalNewMode(int f); +cc_t *tcval(int func); +void TerminalSpeeds(long *input_speed, long *output_speed); +int TerminalWindowSize(long *rows, long *cols); +int NetClose(int fd); +void NetNonblockingIO(int fd, int onoff); +int process_rings(int netin, int netout, int netex, int ttyin, int ttyout, + int poll); + +/* telnet.c */ + +void init_telnet(void); + +void tel_leave_binary(int rw); +void tel_enter_binary(int rw); +int opt_welldefined(char *ep); +int telrcv(void); +int rlogin_susp(void); +void intp(void); +void sendbrk(void); +void sendabort(void); +void sendsusp(void); +void sendeof(void); +void sendayt(void); + +void xmitAO(void); +void xmitEL(void); +void xmitEC(void); + + +void Dump (char, unsigned char *, int); +void printoption (char *, int, int); +void printsub (int, unsigned char *, int); +void sendnaws (void); +void setconnmode (int); +void setcommandmode (void); +void setneturg (void); +void sys_telnet_init (void); +void my_telnet (char *); +void tel_enter_binary (int); +void TerminalFlushOutput (void); +void TerminalNewMode (int); +void TerminalRestoreState (void); +void TerminalSaveState (void); +void willoption (int); +void wontoption (int); + + +void send_do (int, int); +void send_dont (int, int); +void send_will (int, int); +void send_wont (int, int); + +void lm_will (unsigned char *, int); +void lm_wont (unsigned char *, int); +void lm_do (unsigned char *, int); +void lm_dont (unsigned char *, int); +void lm_mode (unsigned char *, int, int); + +void slc_init (void); +void slcstate (void); +void slc_mode_export (void); +void slc_mode_import (int); +void slc_import (int); +void slc_export (void); +void slc (unsigned char *, int); +void slc_check (void); +void slc_start_reply (void); +void slc_add_reply (unsigned char, unsigned char, cc_t); +void slc_end_reply (void); +int slc_update (void); + +void env_opt (unsigned char *, int); +void env_opt_start (void); +void env_opt_start_info (void); +void env_opt_add (unsigned char *); +void env_opt_end (int); + +unsigned char *env_default (int, int); +unsigned char *env_getvalue (unsigned char *); + +int get_status (void); +int dosynch (void); + +cc_t *tcval (int); + +int quit (void); + +/* terminal.c */ + +void init_terminal(void); +int ttyflush(int drop); +int getconnmode(void); + +/* utilities.c */ + +int SetSockOpt(int fd, int level, int option, int yesno); +void SetNetTrace(char *file); +void Dump(char direction, unsigned char *buffer, int length); +void printoption(char *direction, int cmd, int option); +void optionstatus(void); +void printsub(int direction, unsigned char *pointer, int length); +void EmptyTerminal(void); +void SetForExit(void); +void Exit(int returnCode); +void ExitString(char *string, int returnCode); + +extern struct termios new_tc; + +# define termEofChar new_tc.c_cc[VEOF] +# define termEraseChar new_tc.c_cc[VERASE] +# define termIntChar new_tc.c_cc[VINTR] +# define termKillChar new_tc.c_cc[VKILL] +# define termQuitChar new_tc.c_cc[VQUIT] + +# ifndef VSUSP +extern cc_t termSuspChar; +# else +# define termSuspChar new_tc.c_cc[VSUSP] +# endif +# if defined(VFLUSHO) && !defined(VDISCARD) +# define VDISCARD VFLUSHO +# endif +# ifndef VDISCARD +extern cc_t termFlushChar; +# else +# define termFlushChar new_tc.c_cc[VDISCARD] +# endif +# ifndef VWERASE +extern cc_t termWerasChar; +# else +# define termWerasChar new_tc.c_cc[VWERASE] +# endif +# ifndef VREPRINT +extern cc_t termRprntChar; +# else +# define termRprntChar new_tc.c_cc[VREPRINT] +# endif +# ifndef VLNEXT +extern cc_t termLiteralNextChar; +# else +# define termLiteralNextChar new_tc.c_cc[VLNEXT] +# endif +# ifndef VSTART +extern cc_t termStartChar; +# else +# define termStartChar new_tc.c_cc[VSTART] +# endif +# ifndef VSTOP +extern cc_t termStopChar; +# else +# define termStopChar new_tc.c_cc[VSTOP] +# endif +# ifndef VEOL +extern cc_t termForw1Char; +# else +# define termForw1Char new_tc.c_cc[VEOL] +# endif +# ifndef VEOL2 +extern cc_t termForw2Char; +# else +# define termForw2Char new_tc.c_cc[VEOL] +# endif +# ifndef VSTATUS +extern cc_t termAytChar; +#else +# define termAytChar new_tc.c_cc[VSTATUS] +#endif + +/* Ring buffer structures which are shared */ + +extern Ring + netoring, + netiring, + ttyoring, + ttyiring; + +extern int resettermname; +extern int linemode; +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE +extern int kludgelinemode; +#endif +extern int want_status_response; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/main.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3da300130e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +static char *copyright[] = { + "@(#) Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993\n" + "\tThe Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n", + (char*)copyright +}; + +#include "telnet_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.38.6.1 2004/03/22 18:16:35 lha Exp $"); + +#if KRB5 +#define FORWARD +#endif + +/* + * Initialize variables. + */ +void +tninit(void) +{ + init_terminal(); + + init_network(); + + init_telnet(); + + init_sys(); +} + +void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s %s%s%s%s\n", prompt, +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + "[-8] [-E] [-K] [-L] [-G] [-S tos] [-X atype] [-a] [-c] [-d] [-e char]", + "\n\t[-k realm] [-l user] [-f/-F] [-n tracefile] ", +#else + "[-8] [-E] [-L] [-S tos] [-a] [-c] [-d] [-e char] [-l user]", + "\n\t[-n tracefile]", +#endif + "[-r] ", +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + "[-x] [host-name [port]]" +#else + "[host-name [port]]" +#endif + ); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * main. Parse arguments, invoke the protocol or command parser. + */ + + +#ifdef FORWARD +int forward_option = 0; /* forward flags set from command line */ +#endif /* FORWARD */ +void +set_forward_options(void) +{ +#ifdef FORWARD + switch(forward_option) { + case 'f': + kerberos5_set_forward(1); + kerberos5_set_forwardable(0); + break; + case 'F': + kerberos5_set_forward(1); + kerberos5_set_forwardable(1); + break; + case 'G': + kerberos5_set_forward(0); + kerberos5_set_forwardable(0); + break; + default: + break; + } +#endif +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +/* XXX ugly hack to setup dns-proxy stuff */ +#define Authenticator asn1_Authenticator +#include +static void +krb5_init(void) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + return; + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) && defined(KRB5) && defined(FORWARD) + if (krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", "forward", NULL)) { + kerberos5_set_forward(1); + } + if (krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", "forwardable", NULL)) { + kerberos5_set_forwardable(1); + } +#endif +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", "encrypt", NULL)) { + encrypt_auto(1); + decrypt_auto(1); + wantencryption = 1; + EncryptVerbose(1); + } +#endif + + krb5_free_context(context); +} +#endif + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) && defined(KRB4) +extern char *dest_realm, dst_realm_buf[]; +extern int dst_realm_sz; +#endif + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch; + char *user; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_init(); +#endif + + tninit(); /* Clear out things */ + + TerminalSaveState(); + + if ((prompt = strrchr(argv[0], '/'))) + ++prompt; + else + prompt = argv[0]; + + user = NULL; + + rlogin = (strncmp(prompt, "rlog", 4) == 0) ? '~' : _POSIX_VDISABLE; + + /* + * if AUTHENTICATION and ENCRYPTION is set autologin will be + * se to true after the getopt switch; unless the -K option is + * passed + */ + autologin = -1; + + if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + while((ch = getopt(argc, argv, + "78DEKLS:X:abcde:fFk:l:n:rxG")) != -1) { + switch(ch) { + case '8': + eight = 3; /* binary output and input */ + break; + case '7': + eight = 0; + break; + case 'b': + binary = 3; + break; + case 'D': { + /* sometimes we don't want a mangled display */ + char *p; + if((p = getenv("DISPLAY"))) + env_define((unsigned char*)"DISPLAY", (unsigned char*)p); + break; + } + case 'E': + rlogin = escape = _POSIX_VDISABLE; + break; + case 'K': +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + autologin = 0; +#endif + break; + case 'L': + eight |= 2; /* binary output only */ + break; + case 'S': + { +#ifdef HAVE_PARSETOS + extern int tos; + + if ((tos = parsetos(optarg, "tcp")) < 0) + fprintf(stderr, "%s%s%s%s\n", + prompt, ": Bad TOS argument '", + optarg, + "; will try to use default TOS"); +#else + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: Warning: -S ignored, no parsetos() support.\n", + prompt); +#endif + } + break; + case 'X': +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + auth_disable_name(optarg); +#endif + break; + case 'a': + autologin = 1; + break; + case 'c': + skiprc = 1; + break; + case 'd': + debug = 1; + break; + case 'e': + set_escape_char(optarg); + break; + case 'f': + case 'F': + case 'G': +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) && defined(KRB5) && defined(FORWARD) + if (forward_option) { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: Only one of -f, -F and -G allowed.\n", + prompt); + usage(); + } + forward_option = ch; +#else + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: Warning: -%c ignored, no Kerberos V5 support.\n", + prompt, ch); +#endif + break; + case 'k': +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) && defined(KRB4) + { + dest_realm = dst_realm_buf; + strlcpy(dest_realm, optarg, dst_realm_sz); + } +#else + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: Warning: -k ignored, no Kerberos V4 support.\n", + prompt); +#endif + break; + case 'l': + if(autologin == 0){ + fprintf(stderr, "%s: Warning: -K ignored\n", prompt); + autologin = -1; + } + user = optarg; + break; + case 'n': + SetNetTrace(optarg); + break; + case 'r': + rlogin = '~'; + break; + case 'x': +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + encrypt_auto(1); + decrypt_auto(1); + wantencryption = 1; + EncryptVerbose(1); +#else + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: Warning: -x ignored, no ENCRYPT support.\n", + prompt); +#endif + break; + + case '?': + default: + usage(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + + if (autologin == -1) { /* esc@magic.fi; force */ +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + autologin = 1; +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + encrypt_auto(1); + decrypt_auto(1); + wantencryption = -1; +#endif + } + + if (autologin == -1) + autologin = (rlogin == _POSIX_VDISABLE) ? 0 : 1; + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc) { + char *args[7], **argp = args; + + if (argc > 2) + usage(); + *argp++ = prompt; + if (user) { + *argp++ = "-l"; + *argp++ = user; + } + *argp++ = argv[0]; /* host */ + if (argc > 1) + *argp++ = argv[1]; /* port */ + *argp = 0; + + if (setjmp(toplevel) != 0) + Exit(0); + if (tn(argp - args, args) == 1) + return (0); + else + return (1); + } + setjmp(toplevel); + for (;;) { + command(1, 0, 0); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/network.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/network.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1bce3a1780 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/network.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: network.c,v 1.11.12.1 2004/06/21 08:22:35 lha Exp $"); + +Ring netoring, netiring; +size_t netobufsize = 64*1024; +size_t netibufsize = 64*1024; + +/* + * Initialize internal network data structures. + */ + +void +init_network(void) +{ + void *obuf, *ibuf; + + if ((obuf = malloc(netobufsize)) == NULL) + exit(1); + if ((ibuf = malloc(netibufsize)) == NULL) + exit(1); + + if (ring_init(&netoring, obuf, netobufsize) != 1) { + exit(1); + } + if (ring_init(&netiring, ibuf, netibufsize) != 1) { + exit(1); + } + NetTrace = stdout; +} + + +/* + * Check to see if any out-of-band data exists on a socket (for + * Telnet "synch" processing). + */ + +int +stilloob(void) +{ + static struct timeval timeout = { 0 }; + fd_set excepts; + int value; + + do { + FD_ZERO(&excepts); + if (net >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(net, &excepts); + value = select(net+1, 0, 0, &excepts, &timeout); + } while ((value == -1) && (errno == EINTR)); + + if (value < 0) { + perror("select"); + quit(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + if (FD_ISSET(net, &excepts)) { + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + + +/* + * setneturg() + * + * Sets "neturg" to the current location. + */ + +void +setneturg(void) +{ + ring_mark(&netoring); +} + + +/* + * netflush + * Send as much data as possible to the network, + * handling requests for urgent data. + * + * The return value indicates whether we did any + * useful work. + */ + + +int +netflush(void) +{ + int n, n1; + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (encrypt_output) + ring_encrypt(&netoring, encrypt_output); +#endif + if ((n1 = n = ring_full_consecutive(&netoring)) > 0) { + if (!ring_at_mark(&netoring)) { + n = send(net, (char *)netoring.consume, n, 0); /* normal write */ + } else { + /* + * In 4.2 (and 4.3) systems, there is some question about + * what byte in a sendOOB operation is the "OOB" data. + * To make ourselves compatible, we only send ONE byte + * out of band, the one WE THINK should be OOB (though + * we really have more the TCP philosophy of urgent data + * rather than the Unix philosophy of OOB data). + */ + n = send(net, (char *)netoring.consume, 1, MSG_OOB);/* URGENT data */ + } + } + if (n < 0) { + if (errno != ENOBUFS && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { + setcommandmode(); + perror(hostname); + NetClose(net); + ring_clear_mark(&netoring); + longjmp(peerdied, -1); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } + n = 0; + } + if (netdata && n) { + Dump('>', netoring.consume, n); + } + if (n) { + ring_consumed(&netoring, n); + /* + * If we sent all, and more to send, then recurse to pick + * up the other half. + */ + if ((n1 == n) && ring_full_consecutive(&netoring)) { + netflush(); + } + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/ring.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/ring.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..597c79ab23 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/ring.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ring.c,v 1.11 2000/02/06 05:15:21 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * This defines a structure for a ring buffer. + * + * The circular buffer has two parts: + *((( + * full: [consume, supply) + * empty: [supply, consume) + *]]] + * + */ + +/* Internal macros */ + +#define ring_subtract(d,a,b) (((a)-(b) >= 0)? \ + (a)-(b): (((a)-(b))+(d)->size)) + +#define ring_increment(d,a,c) (((a)+(c) < (d)->top)? \ + (a)+(c) : (((a)+(c))-(d)->size)) + +#define ring_decrement(d,a,c) (((a)-(c) >= (d)->bottom)? \ + (a)-(c) : (((a)-(c))-(d)->size)) + + +/* + * The following is a clock, used to determine full, empty, etc. + * + * There is some trickiness here. Since the ring buffers are initialized + * to ZERO on allocation, we need to make sure, when interpreting the + * clock, that when the times are EQUAL, then the buffer is FULL. + */ +static u_long ring_clock = 0; + + +#define ring_empty(d) (((d)->consume == (d)->supply) && \ + ((d)->consumetime >= (d)->supplytime)) +#define ring_full(d) (((d)->supply == (d)->consume) && \ + ((d)->supplytime > (d)->consumetime)) + + + + + +/* Buffer state transition routines */ + +int +ring_init(Ring *ring, unsigned char *buffer, int count) +{ + memset(ring, 0, sizeof *ring); + + ring->size = count; + + ring->supply = ring->consume = ring->bottom = buffer; + + ring->top = ring->bottom+ring->size; + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + ring->clearto = 0; +#endif + + return 1; +} + +/* Mark routines */ + +/* + * Mark the most recently supplied byte. + */ + +void +ring_mark(Ring *ring) +{ + ring->mark = ring_decrement(ring, ring->supply, 1); +} + +/* + * Is the ring pointing to the mark? + */ + +int +ring_at_mark(Ring *ring) +{ + if (ring->mark == ring->consume) { + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * Clear any mark set on the ring. + */ + +void +ring_clear_mark(Ring *ring) +{ + ring->mark = 0; +} + +/* + * Add characters from current segment to ring buffer. + */ +void +ring_supplied(Ring *ring, int count) +{ + ring->supply = ring_increment(ring, ring->supply, count); + ring->supplytime = ++ring_clock; +} + +/* + * We have just consumed "c" bytes. + */ +void +ring_consumed(Ring *ring, int count) +{ + if (count == 0) /* don't update anything */ + return; + + if (ring->mark && + (ring_subtract(ring, ring->mark, ring->consume) < count)) { + ring->mark = 0; + } +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (ring->consume < ring->clearto && + ring->clearto <= ring->consume + count) + ring->clearto = 0; + else if (ring->consume + count > ring->top && + ring->bottom <= ring->clearto && + ring->bottom + ((ring->consume + count) - ring->top)) + ring->clearto = 0; +#endif + ring->consume = ring_increment(ring, ring->consume, count); + ring->consumetime = ++ring_clock; + /* + * Try to encourage "ring_empty_consecutive()" to be large. + */ + if (ring_empty(ring)) { + ring->consume = ring->supply = ring->bottom; + } +} + + + +/* Buffer state query routines */ + + +/* Number of bytes that may be supplied */ +int +ring_empty_count(Ring *ring) +{ + if (ring_empty(ring)) { /* if empty */ + return ring->size; + } else { + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->consume, ring->supply); + } +} + +/* number of CONSECUTIVE bytes that may be supplied */ +int +ring_empty_consecutive(Ring *ring) +{ + if ((ring->consume < ring->supply) || ring_empty(ring)) { + /* + * if consume is "below" supply, or empty, then + * return distance to the top + */ + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->top, ring->supply); + } else { + /* + * else, return what we may. + */ + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->consume, ring->supply); + } +} + +/* Return the number of bytes that are available for consuming + * (but don't give more than enough to get to cross over set mark) + */ + +int +ring_full_count(Ring *ring) +{ + if ((ring->mark == 0) || (ring->mark == ring->consume)) { + if (ring_full(ring)) { + return ring->size; /* nothing consumed, but full */ + } else { + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->supply, ring->consume); + } + } else { + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->mark, ring->consume); + } +} + +/* + * Return the number of CONSECUTIVE bytes available for consuming. + * However, don't return more than enough to cross over set mark. + */ +int +ring_full_consecutive(Ring *ring) +{ + if ((ring->mark == 0) || (ring->mark == ring->consume)) { + if ((ring->supply < ring->consume) || ring_full(ring)) { + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->top, ring->consume); + } else { + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->supply, ring->consume); + } + } else { + if (ring->mark < ring->consume) { + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->top, ring->consume); + } else { /* Else, distance to mark */ + return ring_subtract(ring, ring->mark, ring->consume); + } + } +} + +/* + * Move data into the "supply" portion of of the ring buffer. + */ +void +ring_supply_data(Ring *ring, unsigned char *buffer, int count) +{ + int i; + + while (count) { + i = min(count, ring_empty_consecutive(ring)); + memmove(ring->supply, buffer, i); + ring_supplied(ring, i); + count -= i; + buffer += i; + } +} + +#ifdef notdef + +/* + * Move data from the "consume" portion of the ring buffer + */ +void +ring_consume_data(Ring *ring, unsigned char *buffer, int count) +{ + int i; + + while (count) { + i = min(count, ring_full_consecutive(ring)); + memmove(buffer, ring->consume, i); + ring_consumed(ring, i); + count -= i; + buffer += i; + } +} +#endif + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +void +ring_encrypt(Ring *ring, void (*encryptor)(unsigned char *, int)) +{ + unsigned char *s, *c; + + if (ring_empty(ring) || ring->clearto == ring->supply) + return; + + if (!(c = ring->clearto)) + c = ring->consume; + + s = ring->supply; + + if (s <= c) { + (*encryptor)(c, ring->top - c); + (*encryptor)(ring->bottom, s - ring->bottom); + } else + (*encryptor)(c, s - c); + + ring->clearto = ring->supply; +} + +void +ring_clearto(Ring *ring) +{ + if (!ring_empty(ring)) + ring->clearto = ring->supply; + else + ring->clearto = 0; +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/ring.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/ring.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1644a96077 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/ring.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)ring.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93 + */ + +/* $Id: ring.h,v 1.4 2000/02/06 05:15:47 assar Exp $ */ + +/* + * This defines a structure for a ring buffer. + * + * The circular buffer has two parts: + *((( + * full: [consume, supply) + * empty: [supply, consume) + *]]] + * + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char *consume, /* where data comes out of */ + *supply, /* where data comes in to */ + *bottom, /* lowest address in buffer */ + *top, /* highest address+1 in buffer */ + *mark; /* marker (user defined) */ +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + unsigned char *clearto; /* Data to this point is clear text */ + unsigned char *encryyptedto; /* Data is encrypted to here */ +#endif + int size; /* size in bytes of buffer */ + u_long consumetime, /* help us keep straight full, empty, etc. */ + supplytime; +} Ring; + +/* Here are some functions and macros to deal with the ring buffer */ + +/* Initialization routine */ +extern int + ring_init (Ring *ring, unsigned char *buffer, int count); + +/* Data movement routines */ +extern void + ring_supply_data (Ring *ring, unsigned char *buffer, int count); +#ifdef notdef +extern void + ring_consume_data (Ring *ring, unsigned char *buffer, int count); +#endif + +/* Buffer state transition routines */ +extern void + ring_supplied (Ring *ring, int count), + ring_consumed (Ring *ring, int count); + +/* Buffer state query routines */ +extern int + ring_empty_count (Ring *ring), + ring_empty_consecutive (Ring *ring), + ring_full_count (Ring *ring), + ring_full_consecutive (Ring *ring); + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) +extern void + ring_encrypt (Ring *ring, void (*func)(unsigned char *, int)), + ring_clearto (Ring *ring); +#endif + +extern int ring_at_mark(Ring *ring); + +extern void + ring_clear_mark(Ring *ring), + ring_mark(Ring *ring); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/sys_bsd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/sys_bsd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1144e8fe9a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/sys_bsd.c @@ -0,0 +1,979 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sys_bsd.c,v 1.30 2002/04/18 16:18:43 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * The following routines try to encapsulate what is system dependent + * (at least between 4.x and dos) which is used in telnet.c. + */ + +int + tout, /* Output file descriptor */ + tin, /* Input file descriptor */ + net; + +struct termios old_tc = { 0 }; +extern struct termios new_tc; + +# ifndef TCSANOW +# ifdef TCSETS +# define TCSANOW TCSETS +# define TCSADRAIN TCSETSW +# define tcgetattr(f, t) ioctl(f, TCGETS, (char *)t) +# else +# ifdef TCSETA +# define TCSANOW TCSETA +# define TCSADRAIN TCSETAW +# define tcgetattr(f, t) ioctl(f, TCGETA, (char *)t) +# else +# define TCSANOW TIOCSETA +# define TCSADRAIN TIOCSETAW +# define tcgetattr(f, t) ioctl(f, TIOCGETA, (char *)t) +# endif +# endif +# define tcsetattr(f, a, t) ioctl(f, a, (char *)t) +# define cfgetospeed(ptr) ((ptr)->c_cflag&CBAUD) +# ifdef CIBAUD +# define cfgetispeed(ptr) (((ptr)->c_cflag&CIBAUD) >> IBSHIFT) +# else +# define cfgetispeed(ptr) cfgetospeed(ptr) +# endif +# endif /* TCSANOW */ + +static fd_set ibits, obits, xbits; + + +void +init_sys(void) +{ + tout = fileno(stdout); + tin = fileno(stdin); + FD_ZERO(&ibits); + FD_ZERO(&obits); + FD_ZERO(&xbits); + + errno = 0; +} + + +int +TerminalWrite(char *buf, int n) +{ + return write(tout, buf, n); +} + +int +TerminalRead(unsigned char *buf, int n) +{ + return read(tin, buf, n); +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +TerminalAutoFlush(void) +{ +#if defined(LNOFLSH) + int flush; + + ioctl(0, TIOCLGET, (char *)&flush); + return !(flush&LNOFLSH); /* if LNOFLSH, no autoflush */ +#else /* LNOFLSH */ + return 1; +#endif /* LNOFLSH */ +} + +/* + * TerminalSpecialChars() + * + * Look at an input character to see if it is a special character + * and decide what to do. + * + * Output: + * + * 0 Don't add this character. + * 1 Do add this character + */ + +int +TerminalSpecialChars(int c) +{ + if (c == termIntChar) { + intp(); + return 0; + } else if (c == termQuitChar) { +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + if (kludgelinemode) + sendbrk(); + else +#endif + sendabort(); + return 0; + } else if (c == termEofChar) { + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) { + sendeof(); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } else if (c == termSuspChar) { + sendsusp(); + return(0); + } else if (c == termFlushChar) { + xmitAO(); /* Transmit Abort Output */ + return 0; + } else if (!MODE_LOCAL_CHARS(globalmode)) { + if (c == termKillChar) { + xmitEL(); + return 0; + } else if (c == termEraseChar) { + xmitEC(); /* Transmit Erase Character */ + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + + +/* + * Flush output to the terminal + */ + +void +TerminalFlushOutput(void) +{ +#ifdef TIOCFLUSH + ioctl(fileno(stdout), TIOCFLUSH, (char *) 0); +#else + ioctl(fileno(stdout), TCFLSH, (char *) 0); +#endif +} + +void +TerminalSaveState(void) +{ + tcgetattr(0, &old_tc); + + new_tc = old_tc; + +#ifndef VDISCARD + termFlushChar = CONTROL('O'); +#endif +#ifndef VWERASE + termWerasChar = CONTROL('W'); +#endif +#ifndef VREPRINT + termRprntChar = CONTROL('R'); +#endif +#ifndef VLNEXT + termLiteralNextChar = CONTROL('V'); +#endif +#ifndef VSTART + termStartChar = CONTROL('Q'); +#endif +#ifndef VSTOP + termStopChar = CONTROL('S'); +#endif +#ifndef VSTATUS + termAytChar = CONTROL('T'); +#endif +} + +cc_t* +tcval(int func) +{ + switch(func) { + case SLC_IP: return(&termIntChar); + case SLC_ABORT: return(&termQuitChar); + case SLC_EOF: return(&termEofChar); + case SLC_EC: return(&termEraseChar); + case SLC_EL: return(&termKillChar); + case SLC_XON: return(&termStartChar); + case SLC_XOFF: return(&termStopChar); + case SLC_FORW1: return(&termForw1Char); + case SLC_FORW2: return(&termForw2Char); +# ifdef VDISCARD + case SLC_AO: return(&termFlushChar); +# endif +# ifdef VSUSP + case SLC_SUSP: return(&termSuspChar); +# endif +# ifdef VWERASE + case SLC_EW: return(&termWerasChar); +# endif +# ifdef VREPRINT + case SLC_RP: return(&termRprntChar); +# endif +# ifdef VLNEXT + case SLC_LNEXT: return(&termLiteralNextChar); +# endif +# ifdef VSTATUS + case SLC_AYT: return(&termAytChar); +# endif + + case SLC_SYNCH: + case SLC_BRK: + case SLC_EOR: + default: + return((cc_t *)0); + } +} + +void +TerminalDefaultChars(void) +{ + memmove(new_tc.c_cc, old_tc.c_cc, sizeof(old_tc.c_cc)); +# ifndef VDISCARD + termFlushChar = CONTROL('O'); +# endif +# ifndef VWERASE + termWerasChar = CONTROL('W'); +# endif +# ifndef VREPRINT + termRprntChar = CONTROL('R'); +# endif +# ifndef VLNEXT + termLiteralNextChar = CONTROL('V'); +# endif +# ifndef VSTART + termStartChar = CONTROL('Q'); +# endif +# ifndef VSTOP + termStopChar = CONTROL('S'); +# endif +# ifndef VSTATUS + termAytChar = CONTROL('T'); +# endif +} + +#ifdef notdef +void +TerminalRestoreState() +{ +} +#endif + +/* + * TerminalNewMode - set up terminal to a specific mode. + * MODE_ECHO: do local terminal echo + * MODE_FLOW: do local flow control + * MODE_TRAPSIG: do local mapping to TELNET IAC sequences + * MODE_EDIT: do local line editing + * + * Command mode: + * MODE_ECHO|MODE_EDIT|MODE_FLOW|MODE_TRAPSIG + * local echo + * local editing + * local xon/xoff + * local signal mapping + * + * Linemode: + * local/no editing + * Both Linemode and Single Character mode: + * local/remote echo + * local/no xon/xoff + * local/no signal mapping + */ + + +#ifdef SIGTSTP +static RETSIGTYPE susp(int); +#endif /* SIGTSTP */ +#ifdef SIGINFO +static RETSIGTYPE ayt(int); +#endif + +void +TerminalNewMode(int f) +{ + static int prevmode = 0; + struct termios tmp_tc; + int onoff; + int old; + cc_t esc; + + globalmode = f&~MODE_FORCE; + if (prevmode == f) + return; + + /* + * Write any outstanding data before switching modes + * ttyflush() returns 0 only when there is no more data + * left to write out, it returns -1 if it couldn't do + * anything at all, otherwise it returns 1 + the number + * of characters left to write. + */ + old = ttyflush(SYNCHing|flushout); + if (old < 0 || old > 1) { + tcgetattr(tin, &tmp_tc); + do { + /* + * Wait for data to drain, then flush again. + */ + tcsetattr(tin, TCSADRAIN, &tmp_tc); + old = ttyflush(SYNCHing|flushout); + } while (old < 0 || old > 1); + } + + old = prevmode; + prevmode = f&~MODE_FORCE; + tmp_tc = new_tc; + + if (f&MODE_ECHO) { + tmp_tc.c_lflag |= ECHO; + tmp_tc.c_oflag |= ONLCR; + if (crlf) + tmp_tc.c_iflag |= ICRNL; + } else { + tmp_tc.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; + tmp_tc.c_oflag &= ~ONLCR; +# ifdef notdef + if (crlf) + tmp_tc.c_iflag &= ~ICRNL; +# endif + } + + if ((f&MODE_FLOW) == 0) { + tmp_tc.c_iflag &= ~(IXOFF|IXON); /* Leave the IXANY bit alone */ + } else { + if (restartany < 0) { + tmp_tc.c_iflag |= IXOFF|IXON; /* Leave the IXANY bit alone */ + } else if (restartany > 0) { + tmp_tc.c_iflag |= IXOFF|IXON|IXANY; + } else { + tmp_tc.c_iflag |= IXOFF|IXON; + tmp_tc.c_iflag &= ~IXANY; + } + } + + if ((f&MODE_TRAPSIG) == 0) { + tmp_tc.c_lflag &= ~ISIG; + localchars = 0; + } else { + tmp_tc.c_lflag |= ISIG; + localchars = 1; + } + + if (f&MODE_EDIT) { + tmp_tc.c_lflag |= ICANON; + } else { + tmp_tc.c_lflag &= ~ICANON; + tmp_tc.c_iflag &= ~ICRNL; + tmp_tc.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; + tmp_tc.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; + } + + if ((f&(MODE_EDIT|MODE_TRAPSIG)) == 0) { +# ifdef VLNEXT + tmp_tc.c_cc[VLNEXT] = (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE); +# endif + } + + if (f&MODE_SOFT_TAB) { +# ifdef OXTABS + tmp_tc.c_oflag |= OXTABS; +# endif +# ifdef TABDLY + tmp_tc.c_oflag &= ~TABDLY; + tmp_tc.c_oflag |= TAB3; +# endif + } else { +# ifdef OXTABS + tmp_tc.c_oflag &= ~OXTABS; +# endif +# ifdef TABDLY + tmp_tc.c_oflag &= ~TABDLY; +# endif + } + + if (f&MODE_LIT_ECHO) { +# ifdef ECHOCTL + tmp_tc.c_lflag &= ~ECHOCTL; +# endif + } else { +# ifdef ECHOCTL + tmp_tc.c_lflag |= ECHOCTL; +# endif + } + + if (f == -1) { + onoff = 0; + } else { + if (f & MODE_INBIN) + tmp_tc.c_iflag &= ~ISTRIP; + else + tmp_tc.c_iflag |= ISTRIP; + if ((f & MODE_OUTBIN) || (f & MODE_OUT8)) { + tmp_tc.c_cflag &= ~(CSIZE|PARENB); + tmp_tc.c_cflag |= CS8; + if(f & MODE_OUTBIN) + tmp_tc.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; + else + tmp_tc.c_oflag |= OPOST; + } else { + tmp_tc.c_cflag &= ~(CSIZE|PARENB); + tmp_tc.c_cflag |= old_tc.c_cflag & (CSIZE|PARENB); + tmp_tc.c_oflag |= OPOST; + } + onoff = 1; + } + + if (f != -1) { + +#ifdef SIGTSTP + signal(SIGTSTP, susp); +#endif /* SIGTSTP */ +#ifdef SIGINFO + signal(SIGINFO, ayt); +#endif +#ifdef NOKERNINFO + tmp_tc.c_lflag |= NOKERNINFO; +#endif + /* + * We don't want to process ^Y here. It's just another + * character that we'll pass on to the back end. It has + * to process it because it will be processed when the + * user attempts to read it, not when we send it. + */ +# ifdef VDSUSP + tmp_tc.c_cc[VDSUSP] = (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE); +# endif + /* + * If the VEOL character is already set, then use VEOL2, + * otherwise use VEOL. + */ + esc = (rlogin != _POSIX_VDISABLE) ? rlogin : escape; + if ((tmp_tc.c_cc[VEOL] != esc) +# ifdef VEOL2 + && (tmp_tc.c_cc[VEOL2] != esc) +# endif + ) { + if (tmp_tc.c_cc[VEOL] == (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE)) + tmp_tc.c_cc[VEOL] = esc; +# ifdef VEOL2 + else if (tmp_tc.c_cc[VEOL2] == (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE)) + tmp_tc.c_cc[VEOL2] = esc; +# endif + } + } else { + sigset_t sm; + +#ifdef SIGINFO + signal(SIGINFO, ayt_status); +#endif +#ifdef SIGTSTP + signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_DFL); + sigemptyset(&sm); + sigaddset(&sm, SIGTSTP); + sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &sm, NULL); +#endif /* SIGTSTP */ + tmp_tc = old_tc; + } + if (tcsetattr(tin, TCSADRAIN, &tmp_tc) < 0) + tcsetattr(tin, TCSANOW, &tmp_tc); + + ioctl(tin, FIONBIO, (char *)&onoff); + ioctl(tout, FIONBIO, (char *)&onoff); + +} + +/* + * Try to guess whether speeds are "encoded" (4.2BSD) or just numeric (4.4BSD). + */ +#if B4800 != 4800 +#define DECODE_BAUD +#endif + +#ifdef DECODE_BAUD +#ifndef B7200 +#define B7200 B4800 +#endif + +#ifndef B14400 +#define B14400 B9600 +#endif + +#ifndef B19200 +# define B19200 B14400 +#endif + +#ifndef B28800 +#define B28800 B19200 +#endif + +#ifndef B38400 +# define B38400 B28800 +#endif + +#ifndef B57600 +#define B57600 B38400 +#endif + +#ifndef B76800 +#define B76800 B57600 +#endif + +#ifndef B115200 +#define B115200 B76800 +#endif + +#ifndef B230400 +#define B230400 B115200 +#endif + + +/* + * This code assumes that the values B0, B50, B75... + * are in ascending order. They do not have to be + * contiguous. + */ +struct termspeeds { + long speed; + long value; +} termspeeds[] = { + { 0, B0 }, { 50, B50 }, { 75, B75 }, + { 110, B110 }, { 134, B134 }, { 150, B150 }, + { 200, B200 }, { 300, B300 }, { 600, B600 }, + { 1200, B1200 }, { 1800, B1800 }, { 2400, B2400 }, + { 4800, B4800 }, { 7200, B7200 }, { 9600, B9600 }, + { 14400, B14400 }, { 19200, B19200 }, { 28800, B28800 }, + { 38400, B38400 }, { 57600, B57600 }, { 115200, B115200 }, + { 230400, B230400 }, { -1, B230400 } +}; +#endif /* DECODE_BAUD */ + +void +TerminalSpeeds(long *input_speed, long *output_speed) +{ +#ifdef DECODE_BAUD + struct termspeeds *tp; +#endif /* DECODE_BAUD */ + long in, out; + + out = cfgetospeed(&old_tc); + in = cfgetispeed(&old_tc); + if (in == 0) + in = out; + +#ifdef DECODE_BAUD + tp = termspeeds; + while ((tp->speed != -1) && (tp->value < in)) + tp++; + *input_speed = tp->speed; + + tp = termspeeds; + while ((tp->speed != -1) && (tp->value < out)) + tp++; + *output_speed = tp->speed; +#else /* DECODE_BAUD */ + *input_speed = in; + *output_speed = out; +#endif /* DECODE_BAUD */ +} + +int +TerminalWindowSize(long *rows, long *cols) +{ + struct winsize ws; + + if (get_window_size (STDIN_FILENO, &ws) == 0) { + *rows = ws.ws_row; + *cols = ws.ws_col; + return 1; + } else + return 0; +} + +int +NetClose(int fd) +{ + return close(fd); +} + + +void +NetNonblockingIO(int fd, int onoff) +{ + ioctl(fd, FIONBIO, (char *)&onoff); +} + + +/* + * Various signal handling routines. + */ + +static RETSIGTYPE deadpeer(int), + intr(int), intr2(int), susp(int), sendwin(int); +#ifdef SIGINFO +static RETSIGTYPE ayt(int); +#endif + + + /* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +deadpeer(int sig) +{ + setcommandmode(); + longjmp(peerdied, -1); +} + +int intr_happened = 0; +int intr_waiting = 0; + + /* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +intr(int sig) +{ + if (intr_waiting) { + intr_happened = 1; + return; + } + if (localchars) { + intp(); + return; + } + setcommandmode(); + longjmp(toplevel, -1); +} + + /* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +intr2(int sig) +{ + if (localchars) { +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + if (kludgelinemode) + sendbrk(); + else +#endif + sendabort(); + return; + } +} + +#ifdef SIGTSTP + /* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +susp(int sig) +{ + if ((rlogin != _POSIX_VDISABLE) && rlogin_susp()) + return; + if (localchars) + sendsusp(); +} +#endif + +#ifdef SIGWINCH + /* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +sendwin(int sig) +{ + if (connected) { + sendnaws(); + } +} +#endif + +#ifdef SIGINFO + /* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +ayt(int sig) +{ + if (connected) + sendayt(); + else + ayt_status(sig); +} +#endif + + +void +sys_telnet_init(void) +{ + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGQUIT, intr2); + signal(SIGPIPE, deadpeer); +#ifdef SIGWINCH + signal(SIGWINCH, sendwin); +#endif +#ifdef SIGTSTP + signal(SIGTSTP, susp); +#endif +#ifdef SIGINFO + signal(SIGINFO, ayt); +#endif + + setconnmode(0); + + NetNonblockingIO(net, 1); + + +#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) + if (SetSockOpt(net, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, 1) == -1) + perror("setsockopt (SO_OOBINLINE) (ignored)"); +#endif /* defined(SO_OOBINLINE) */ +} + +/* + * Process rings - + * + * This routine tries to fill up/empty our various rings. + * + * The parameter specifies whether this is a poll operation, + * or a block-until-something-happens operation. + * + * The return value is 1 if something happened, 0 if not. + */ + +int +process_rings(int netin, + int netout, + int netex, + int ttyin, + int ttyout, + int poll) /* If 0, then block until something to do */ +{ + int c; + /* One wants to be a bit careful about setting returnValue + * to one, since a one implies we did some useful work, + * and therefore probably won't be called to block next + * time (TN3270 mode only). + */ + int returnValue = 0; + static struct timeval TimeValue = { 0 }; + + if (net >= FD_SETSIZE + || tout >= FD_SETSIZE + || tin >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + + if (netout) { + FD_SET(net, &obits); + } + if (ttyout) { + FD_SET(tout, &obits); + } + if (ttyin) { + FD_SET(tin, &ibits); + } + if (netin) { + FD_SET(net, &ibits); + } +#if !defined(SO_OOBINLINE) + if (netex) { + FD_SET(net, &xbits); + } +#endif + if ((c = select(FD_SETSIZE, &ibits, &obits, &xbits, + (poll == 0)? (struct timeval *)0 : &TimeValue)) < 0) { + if (c == -1) { + /* + * we can get EINTR if we are in line mode, + * and the user does an escape (TSTP), or + * some other signal generator. + */ + if (errno == EINTR) { + return 0; + } + /* I don't like this, does it ever happen? */ + printf("sleep(5) from telnet, after select\r\n"); + sleep(5); + } + return 0; + } + + /* + * Any urgent data? + */ + if (FD_ISSET(net, &xbits)) { + FD_CLR(net, &xbits); + SYNCHing = 1; + ttyflush(1); /* flush already enqueued data */ + } + + /* + * Something to read from the network... + */ + if (FD_ISSET(net, &ibits)) { + int canread; + + FD_CLR(net, &ibits); + canread = ring_empty_consecutive(&netiring); +#if !defined(SO_OOBINLINE) + /* + * In 4.2 (and some early 4.3) systems, the + * OOB indication and data handling in the kernel + * is such that if two separate TCP Urgent requests + * come in, one byte of TCP data will be overlaid. + * This is fatal for Telnet, but we try to live + * with it. + * + * In addition, in 4.2 (and...), a special protocol + * is needed to pick up the TCP Urgent data in + * the correct sequence. + * + * What we do is: if we think we are in urgent + * mode, we look to see if we are "at the mark". + * If we are, we do an OOB receive. If we run + * this twice, we will do the OOB receive twice, + * but the second will fail, since the second + * time we were "at the mark", but there wasn't + * any data there (the kernel doesn't reset + * "at the mark" until we do a normal read). + * Once we've read the OOB data, we go ahead + * and do normal reads. + * + * There is also another problem, which is that + * since the OOB byte we read doesn't put us + * out of OOB state, and since that byte is most + * likely the TELNET DM (data mark), we would + * stay in the TELNET SYNCH (SYNCHing) state. + * So, clocks to the rescue. If we've "just" + * received a DM, then we test for the + * presence of OOB data when the receive OOB + * fails (and AFTER we did the normal mode read + * to clear "at the mark"). + */ + if (SYNCHing) { + int atmark; + static int bogus_oob = 0, first = 1; + + ioctl(net, SIOCATMARK, (char *)&atmark); + if (atmark) { + c = recv(net, netiring.supply, canread, MSG_OOB); + if ((c == -1) && (errno == EINVAL)) { + c = recv(net, netiring.supply, canread, 0); + if (clocks.didnetreceive < clocks.gotDM) { + SYNCHing = stilloob(); + } + } else if (first && c > 0) { + /* + * Bogosity check. Systems based on 4.2BSD + * do not return an error if you do a second + * recv(MSG_OOB). So, we do one. If it + * succeeds and returns exactly the same + * data, then assume that we are running + * on a broken system and set the bogus_oob + * flag. (If the data was different, then + * we probably got some valid new data, so + * increment the count...) + */ + int i; + i = recv(net, netiring.supply + c, canread - c, MSG_OOB); + if (i == c && + memcmp(netiring.supply, netiring.supply + c, i) == 0) { + bogus_oob = 1; + first = 0; + } else if (i < 0) { + bogus_oob = 0; + first = 0; + } else + c += i; + } + if (bogus_oob && c > 0) { + int i; + /* + * Bogosity. We have to do the read + * to clear the atmark to get out of + * an infinate loop. + */ + i = read(net, netiring.supply + c, canread - c); + if (i > 0) + c += i; + } + } else { + c = recv(net, netiring.supply, canread, 0); + } + } else { + c = recv(net, netiring.supply, canread, 0); + } + settimer(didnetreceive); +#else /* !defined(SO_OOBINLINE) */ + c = recv(net, (char *)netiring.supply, canread, 0); +#endif /* !defined(SO_OOBINLINE) */ + if (c < 0 && errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { + c = 0; + } else if (c <= 0) { + return -1; + } + if (netdata) { + Dump('<', netiring.supply, c); + } + if (c) + ring_supplied(&netiring, c); + returnValue = 1; + } + + /* + * Something to read from the tty... + */ + if (FD_ISSET(tin, &ibits)) { + FD_CLR(tin, &ibits); + c = TerminalRead(ttyiring.supply, ring_empty_consecutive(&ttyiring)); + if (c < 0 && errno == EIO) + c = 0; + if (c < 0 && errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { + c = 0; + } else { + /* EOF detection for line mode!!!! */ + if ((c == 0) && MODE_LOCAL_CHARS(globalmode) && isatty(tin)) { + /* must be an EOF... */ + *ttyiring.supply = termEofChar; + c = 1; + } + if (c <= 0) { + return -1; + } + if (termdata) { + Dump('<', ttyiring.supply, c); + } + ring_supplied(&ttyiring, c); + } + returnValue = 1; /* did something useful */ + } + + if (FD_ISSET(net, &obits)) { + FD_CLR(net, &obits); + returnValue |= netflush(); + } + if (FD_ISSET(tout, &obits)) { + FD_CLR(tout, &obits); + returnValue |= (ttyflush(SYNCHing|flushout) > 0); + } + + return returnValue; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82852a7329 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.1 @@ -0,0 +1,1369 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)telnet.1 8.6 (Berkeley) 6/1/94 +.\" +.Dd June 1, 1994 +.Dt TELNET 1 +.Os BSD 4.2 +.Sh NAME +.Nm telnet +.Nd user interface to the +.Tn TELNET +protocol +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm telnet +.Op Fl 78EFKLacdfrx +.Op Fl S Ar tos +.Op Fl X Ar authtype +.Op Fl e Ar escapechar +.Op Fl k Ar realm +.Op Fl l Ar user +.Op Fl n Ar tracefile +.Oo +.Ar host +.Op port +.Oc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm telnet +command +is used to communicate with another host using the +.Tn TELNET +protocol. +If +.Nm telnet +is invoked without the +.Ar host +argument, it enters command mode, +indicated by its prompt +.Pq Nm telnet\&> . +In this mode, it accepts and executes the commands listed below. +If it is invoked with arguments, it performs an +.Ic open +command with those arguments. +.Pp +Options: +.Bl -tag -width indent +.It Fl 8 +Specifies an 8-bit data path. This causes an attempt to +negotiate the +.Dv TELNET BINARY +option on both input and output. +.It Fl 7 +Do not try to negotiate +.Dv TELNET BINARY +option. +.It Fl E +Stops any character from being recognized as an escape character. +.It Fl F +If Kerberos V5 authentication is being used, the +.Fl F +option allows the local credentials to be forwarded +to the remote system, including any credentials that +have already been forwarded into the local environment. +.It Fl K +Specifies no automatic login to the remote system. +.It Fl L +Specifies an 8-bit data path on output. This causes the +BINARY option to be negotiated on output. +.It Fl S Ar tos +Sets the IP type-of-service (TOS) option for the telnet +connection to the value +.Ar tos , +which can be a numeric TOS value +or, on systems that support it, a symbolic +TOS name found in the /etc/iptos file. +.It Fl X Ar atype +Disables the +.Ar atype +type of authentication. +.It Fl a +Attempt automatic login. +Currently, this sends the user name via the +.Ev USER +variable +of the +.Ev ENVIRON +option if supported by the remote system. +The name used is that of the current user as returned by +.Xr getlogin 2 +if it agrees with the current user ID, +otherwise it is the name associated with the user ID. +.It Fl c +Disables the reading of the user's +.Pa \&.telnetrc +file. (See the +.Ic toggle skiprc +command on this man page.) +.It Fl d +Sets the initial value of the +.Ic debug +toggle to +.Dv TRUE +.It Fl e Ar escape char +Sets the initial +.Nm +.Nm telnet +escape character to +.Ar escape char . +If +.Ar escape char +is omitted, then +there will be no escape character. +.It Fl f +If Kerberos V5 authentication is being used, the +.Fl f +option allows the local credentials to be forwarded to the remote system. +.It Fl k Ar realm +If Kerberos authentication is being used, the +.Fl k +option requests that telnet obtain tickets for the remote host in +realm realm instead of the remote host's realm, as determined +by +.Xr krb_realmofhost 3 . +.It Fl l Ar user +When connecting to the remote system, if the remote system +understands the +.Ev ENVIRON +option, then +.Ar user +will be sent to the remote system as the value for the variable USER. +This option implies the +.Fl a +option. +This option may also be used with the +.Ic open +command. +.It Fl n Ar tracefile +Opens +.Ar tracefile +for recording trace information. +See the +.Ic set tracefile +command below. +.It Fl r +Specifies a user interface similar to +.Xr rlogin 1 . +In this +mode, the escape character is set to the tilde (~) character, +unless modified by the -e option. +.It Fl x +Turn on encryption of the data stream. When this option is turned on, +.B telnet +will exit with an error if authentication cannot be negotiated or if +encryption cannot be turned on. +.It Ar host +Indicates the official name, an alias, or the Internet address +of a remote host. +.It Ar port +Indicates a port number (address of an application). If a number is +not specified, the default +.Nm telnet +port is used. +.El +.Pp +When in rlogin mode, a line of the form ~. disconnects from the +remote host; ~ is the telnet escape character. +Similarly, the line ~^Z suspends the telnet session. +The line ~^] escapes to the normal telnet escape prompt. +.Pp +Once a connection has been opened, +.Nm telnet +will attempt to enable the +.Dv TELNET LINEMODE +option. +If this fails, then +.Nm telnet +will revert to one of two input modes: +either \*(Lqcharacter at a time\*(Rq +or \*(Lqold line by line\*(Rq +depending on what the remote system supports. +.Pp +When +.Dv LINEMODE +is enabled, character processing is done on the +local system, under the control of the remote system. When input +editing or character echoing is to be disabled, the remote system +will relay that information. The remote system will also relay +changes to any special characters that happen on the remote +system, so that they can take effect on the local system. +.Pp +In \*(Lqcharacter at a time\*(Rq mode, most +text typed is immediately sent to the remote host for processing. +.Pp +In \*(Lqold line by line\*(Rq mode, all text is echoed locally, +and (normally) only completed lines are sent to the remote host. +The \*(Lqlocal echo character\*(Rq (initially \*(Lq^E\*(Rq) may be used +to turn off and on the local echo +(this would mostly be used to enter passwords +without the password being echoed). +.Pp +If the +.Dv LINEMODE +option is enabled, or if the +.Ic localchars +toggle is +.Dv TRUE +(the default for \*(Lqold line by line\*(Lq; see below), +the user's +.Ic quit , +.Ic intr , +and +.Ic flush +characters are trapped locally, and sent as +.Tn TELNET +protocol sequences to the remote side. +If +.Dv LINEMODE +has ever been enabled, then the user's +.Ic susp +and +.Ic eof +are also sent as +.Tn TELNET +protocol sequences, +and +.Ic quit +is sent as a +.Dv TELNET ABORT +instead of +.Dv BREAK +There are options (see +.Ic toggle +.Ic autoflush +and +.Ic toggle +.Ic autosynch +below) +which cause this action to flush subsequent output to the terminal +(until the remote host acknowledges the +.Tn TELNET +sequence) and flush previous terminal input +(in the case of +.Ic quit +and +.Ic intr ) . +.Pp +While connected to a remote host, +.Nm telnet +command mode may be entered by typing the +.Nm telnet +\*(Lqescape character\*(Rq (initially \*(Lq^]\*(Rq). +When in command mode, the normal terminal editing conventions are available. +.Pp +The following +.Nm telnet +commands are available. +Only enough of each command to uniquely identify it need be typed +(this is also true for arguments to the +.Ic mode , +.Ic set , +.Ic toggle , +.Ic unset , +.Ic slc , +.Ic environ , +and +.Ic display +commands). +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width "mode type" +.It Ic auth Ar argument ... +The auth command manipulates the information sent through the +.Dv TELNET AUTHENTICATE +option. Valid arguments for the +auth command are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width "disable type" +.It Ic disable Ar type +Disables the specified type of authentication. To +obtain a list of available types, use the +.Ic auth disable ?\& +command. +.It Ic enable Ar type +Enables the specified type of authentication. To +obtain a list of available types, use the +.Ic auth enable ?\& +command. +.It Ic status +Lists the current status of the various types of +authentication. +.El +.It Ic close +Close a +.Tn TELNET +session and return to command mode. +.It Ic display Ar argument ... +Displays all, or some, of the +.Ic set +and +.Ic toggle +values (see below). +.It Ic encrypt Ar argument ... +The encrypt command manipulates the information sent through the +.Dv TELNET ENCRYPT +option. +.Pp +Note: Because of export controls, the +.Dv TELNET ENCRYPT +option is not supported outside of the United States and Canada. +.Pp +Valid arguments for the encrypt command are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ar +.It Ic disable Ar type Xo +.Op Cm input | output +.Xc +Disables the specified type of encryption. If you +omit the input and output, both input and output +are disabled. To obtain a list of available +types, use the +.Ic encrypt disable ?\& +command. +.It Ic enable Ar type Xo +.Op Cm input | output +.Xc +Enables the specified type of encryption. If you +omit input and output, both input and output are +enabled. To obtain a list of available types, use the +.Ic encrypt enable ?\& +command. +.It Ic input +This is the same as the +.Ic encrypt start input +command. +.It Ic -input +This is the same as the +.Ic encrypt stop input +command. +.It Ic output +This is the same as the +.Ic encrypt start output +command. +.It Ic -output +This is the same as the +.Ic encrypt stop output +command. +.It Ic start Op Cm input | output +Attempts to start encryption. If you omit +.Ic input +and +.Ic output , +both input and output are enabled. To +obtain a list of available types, use the +.Ic encrypt enable ?\& +command. +.It Ic status +Lists the current status of encryption. +.It Ic stop Op Cm input | output +Stops encryption. If you omit input and output, +encryption is on both input and output. +.It Ic type Ar type +Sets the default type of encryption to be used +with later +.Ic encrypt start +or +.Ic encrypt stop +commands. +.El +.It Ic environ Ar arguments ... +The +.Ic environ +command is used to manipulate the +the variables that my be sent through the +.Dv TELNET ENVIRON +option. +The initial set of variables is taken from the users +environment, with only the +.Ev DISPLAY +and +.Ev PRINTER +variables being exported by default. +The +.Ev USER +variable is also exported if the +.Fl a +or +.Fl l +options are used. +.Pp +Valid arguments for the +.Ic environ +command are: +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ic define Ar variable value +Define the variable +.Ar variable +to have a value of +.Ar value . +Any variables defined by this command are automatically exported. +The +.Ar value +may be enclosed in single or double quotes so +that tabs and spaces may be included. +.It Ic undefine Ar variable +Remove +.Ar variable +from the list of environment variables. +.It Ic export Ar variable +Mark the variable +.Ar variable +to be exported to the remote side. +.It Ic unexport Ar variable +Mark the variable +.Ar variable +to not be exported unless +explicitly asked for by the remote side. +.It Ic list +List the current set of environment variables. +Those marked with a +.Cm * +will be sent automatically, +other variables will only be sent if explicitly requested. +.It Ic ?\& +Prints out help information for the +.Ic environ +command. +.El +.It Ic logout +Sends the +.Dv TELNET LOGOUT +option to the remote side. +This command is similar to a +.Ic close +command; however, if the remote side does not support the +.Dv LOGOUT +option, nothing happens. +If, however, the remote side does support the +.Dv LOGOUT +option, this command should cause the remote side to close the +.Tn TELNET +connection. +If the remote side also supports the concept of +suspending a user's session for later reattachment, +the logout argument indicates that you +should terminate the session immediately. +.It Ic mode Ar type +.Ar Type +is one of several options, depending on the state of the +.Tn TELNET +session. +The remote host is asked for permission to go into the requested mode. +If the remote host is capable of entering that mode, the requested +mode will be entered. +.Bl -tag -width Ar +.It Ic character +Disable the +.Dv TELNET LINEMODE +option, or, if the remote side does not understand the +.Dv LINEMODE +option, then enter \*(Lqcharacter at a time\*(Lq mode. +.It Ic line +Enable the +.Dv TELNET LINEMODE +option, or, if the remote side does not understand the +.Dv LINEMODE +option, then attempt to enter \*(Lqold-line-by-line\*(Lq mode. +.It Ic isig Pq Ic \-isig +Attempt to enable (disable) the +.Dv TRAPSIG +mode of the +.Dv LINEMODE +option. +This requires that the +.Dv LINEMODE +option be enabled. +.It Ic edit Pq Ic \-edit +Attempt to enable (disable) the +.Dv EDIT +mode of the +.Dv LINEMODE +option. +This requires that the +.Dv LINEMODE +option be enabled. +.It Ic softtabs Pq Ic \-softtabs +Attempt to enable (disable) the +.Dv SOFT_TAB +mode of the +.Dv LINEMODE +option. +This requires that the +.Dv LINEMODE +option be enabled. +.It Ic litecho Pq Ic \-litecho +Attempt to enable (disable) the +.Dv LIT_ECHO +mode of the +.Dv LINEMODE +option. +This requires that the +.Dv LINEMODE +option be enabled. +.It Ic ?\& +Prints out help information for the +.Ic mode +command. +.El +.It Xo +.Ic open Ar host +.Op Fl l Ar user +.Op Oo Fl Oc Ns Ar port +.Xc +Open a connection to the named host. +If no port number +is specified, +.Nm telnet +will attempt to contact a +.Tn TELNET +server at the default port. +The host specification may be either a host name (see +.Xr hosts 5 ) +or an Internet address specified in the \*(Lqdot notation\*(Rq (see +.Xr inet 3 ) . +The +.Op Fl l +option may be used to specify the user name +to be passed to the remote system via the +.Ev ENVIRON +option. +When connecting to a non-standard port, +.Nm telnet +omits any automatic initiation of +.Tn TELNET +options. When the port number is preceded by a minus sign, +the initial option negotiation is done. +After establishing a connection, the file +.Pa \&.telnetrc +in the +users home directory is opened. Lines beginning with a # are +comment lines. Blank lines are ignored. Lines that begin +without white space are the start of a machine entry. The +first thing on the line is the name of the machine that is +being connected to. The rest of the line, and successive +lines that begin with white space are assumed to be +.Nm telnet +commands and are processed as if they had been typed +in manually to the +.Nm telnet +command prompt. +.It Ic quit +Close any open +.Tn TELNET +session and exit +.Nm telnet . +An end of file (in command mode) will also close a session and exit. +.It Ic send Ar arguments +Sends one or more special character sequences to the remote host. +The following are the arguments which may be specified +(more than one argument may be specified at a time): +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width escape +.It Ic abort +Sends the +.Dv TELNET ABORT +(Abort +processes) +sequence. +.It Ic ao +Sends the +.Dv TELNET AO +(Abort Output) sequence, which should cause the remote system to flush +all output +.Em from +the remote system +.Em to +the user's terminal. +.It Ic ayt +Sends the +.Dv TELNET AYT +(Are You There) +sequence, to which the remote system may or may not choose to respond. +.It Ic brk +Sends the +.Dv TELNET BRK +(Break) sequence, which may have significance to the remote +system. +.It Ic ec +Sends the +.Dv TELNET EC +(Erase Character) +sequence, which should cause the remote system to erase the last character +entered. +.It Ic el +Sends the +.Dv TELNET EL +(Erase Line) +sequence, which should cause the remote system to erase the line currently +being entered. +.It Ic eof +Sends the +.Dv TELNET EOF +(End Of File) +sequence. +.It Ic eor +Sends the +.Dv TELNET EOR +(End of Record) +sequence. +.It Ic escape +Sends the current +.Nm telnet +escape character (initially \*(Lq^\*(Rq). +.It Ic ga +Sends the +.Dv TELNET GA +(Go Ahead) +sequence, which likely has no significance to the remote system. +.It Ic getstatus +If the remote side supports the +.Dv TELNET STATUS +command, +.Ic getstatus +will send the subnegotiation to request that the server send +its current option status. +.It Ic ip +Sends the +.Dv TELNET IP +(Interrupt Process) sequence, which should cause the remote +system to abort the currently running process. +.It Ic nop +Sends the +.Dv TELNET NOP +(No OPeration) +sequence. +.It Ic susp +Sends the +.Dv TELNET SUSP +(SUSPend process) +sequence. +.It Ic synch +Sends the +.Dv TELNET SYNCH +sequence. +This sequence causes the remote system to discard all previously typed +(but not yet read) input. +This sequence is sent as +.Tn TCP +urgent +data (and may not work if the remote system is a +.Bx 4.2 +system -- if +it doesn't work, a lower case \*(Lqr\*(Rq may be echoed on the terminal). +.It Ic do Ar cmd +.It Ic dont Ar cmd +.It Ic will Ar cmd +.It Ic wont Ar cmd +Sends the +.Dv TELNET DO +.Ar cmd +sequence. +.Ar Cmd +can be either a decimal number between 0 and 255, +or a symbolic name for a specific +.Dv TELNET +command. +.Ar Cmd +can also be either +.Ic help +or +.Ic ?\& +to print out help information, including +a list of known symbolic names. +.It Ic ?\& +Prints out help information for the +.Ic send +command. +.El +.It Ic set Ar argument value +.It Ic unset Ar argument value +The +.Ic set +command will set any one of a number of +.Nm telnet +variables to a specific value or to +.Dv TRUE . +The special value +.Ic off +turns off the function associated with +the variable, this is equivalent to using the +.Ic unset +command. +The +.Ic unset +command will disable or set to +.Dv FALSE +any of the specified functions. +The values of variables may be interrogated with the +.Ic display +command. +The variables which may be set or unset, but not toggled, are +listed here. In addition, any of the variables for the +.Ic toggle +command may be explicitly set or unset using +the +.Ic set +and +.Ic unset +commands. +.Bl -tag -width escape +.It Ic ayt +If +.Tn TELNET +is in localchars mode, or +.Dv LINEMODE +is enabled, and the status character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET AYT +sequence (see +.Ic send ayt +preceding) is sent to the +remote host. The initial value for the "Are You There" +character is the terminal's status character. +.It Ic echo +This is the value (initially \*(Lq^E\*(Rq) which, when in +\*(Lqline by line\*(Rq mode, toggles between doing local echoing +of entered characters (for normal processing), and suppressing +echoing of entered characters (for entering, say, a password). +.It Ic eof +If +.Nm telnet +is operating in +.Dv LINEMODE +or \*(Lqold line by line\*(Rq mode, entering this character +as the first character on a line will cause this character to be +sent to the remote system. +The initial value of the eof character is taken to be the terminal's +.Ic eof +character. +.It Ic erase +If +.Nm telnet +is in +.Ic localchars +mode (see +.Ic toggle +.Ic localchars +below), +.Sy and +if +.Nm telnet +is operating in \*(Lqcharacter at a time\*(Rq mode, then when this +character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET EC +sequence (see +.Ic send +.Ic ec +above) +is sent to the remote system. +The initial value for the erase character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic erase +character. +.It Ic escape +This is the +.Nm telnet +escape character (initially \*(Lq^[\*(Rq) which causes entry +into +.Nm telnet +command mode (when connected to a remote system). +.It Ic flushoutput +If +.Nm telnet +is in +.Ic localchars +mode (see +.Ic toggle +.Ic localchars +below) +and the +.Ic flushoutput +character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET AO +sequence (see +.Ic send +.Ic ao +above) +is sent to the remote host. +The initial value for the flush character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic flush +character. +.It Ic forw1 +.It Ic forw2 +If +.Tn TELNET +is operating in +.Dv LINEMODE , +these are the +characters that, when typed, cause partial lines to be +forwarded to the remote system. The initial value for +the forwarding characters are taken from the terminal's +eol and eol2 characters. +.It Ic interrupt +If +.Nm telnet +is in +.Ic localchars +mode (see +.Ic toggle +.Ic localchars +below) +and the +.Ic interrupt +character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET IP +sequence (see +.Ic send +.Ic ip +above) +is sent to the remote host. +The initial value for the interrupt character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic intr +character. +.It Ic kill +If +.Nm telnet +is in +.Ic localchars +mode (see +.Ic toggle +.Ic localchars +below), +.Ic and +if +.Nm telnet +is operating in \*(Lqcharacter at a time\*(Rq mode, then when this +character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET EL +sequence (see +.Ic send +.Ic el +above) +is sent to the remote system. +The initial value for the kill character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic kill +character. +.It Ic lnext +If +.Nm telnet +is operating in +.Dv LINEMODE +or \*(Lqold line by line\*(Lq mode, then this character is taken to +be the terminal's +.Ic lnext +character. +The initial value for the lnext character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic lnext +character. +.It Ic quit +If +.Nm telnet +is in +.Ic localchars +mode (see +.Ic toggle +.Ic localchars +below) +and the +.Ic quit +character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET BRK +sequence (see +.Ic send +.Ic brk +above) +is sent to the remote host. +The initial value for the quit character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic quit +character. +.It Ic reprint +If +.Nm telnet +is operating in +.Dv LINEMODE +or \*(Lqold line by line\*(Lq mode, then this character is taken to +be the terminal's +.Ic reprint +character. +The initial value for the reprint character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic reprint +character. +.It Ic rlogin +This is the rlogin escape character. +If set, the normal +.Tn TELNET +escape character is ignored unless it is +preceded by this character at the beginning of a line. +This character, at the beginning of a line followed by +a "." closes the connection; when followed by a ^Z it +suspends the telnet command. The initial state is to +disable the rlogin escape character. +.It Ic start +If the +.Dv TELNET TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL +option has been enabled, +then this character is taken to +be the terminal's +.Ic start +character. +The initial value for the kill character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic start +character. +.It Ic stop +If the +.Dv TELNET TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL +option has been enabled, +then this character is taken to +be the terminal's +.Ic stop +character. +The initial value for the kill character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic stop +character. +.It Ic susp +If +.Nm telnet +is in +.Ic localchars +mode, or +.Dv LINEMODE +is enabled, and the +.Ic suspend +character is typed, a +.Dv TELNET SUSP +sequence (see +.Ic send +.Ic susp +above) +is sent to the remote host. +The initial value for the suspend character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic suspend +character. +.It Ic tracefile +This is the file to which the output, caused by +.Ic netdata +or +.Ic option +tracing being +.Dv TRUE , +will be written. If it is set to +.Dq Fl , +then tracing information will be written to standard output (the default). +.It Ic worderase +If +.Nm telnet +is operating in +.Dv LINEMODE +or \*(Lqold line by line\*(Lq mode, then this character is taken to +be the terminal's +.Ic worderase +character. +The initial value for the worderase character is taken to be +the terminal's +.Ic worderase +character. +.It Ic ?\& +Displays the legal +.Ic set +.Pq Ic unset +commands. +.El +.It Ic slc Ar state +The +.Ic slc +command (Set Local Characters) is used to set +or change the state of the the special +characters when the +.Dv TELNET LINEMODE +option has +been enabled. Special characters are characters that get +mapped to +.Tn TELNET +commands sequences (like +.Ic ip +or +.Ic quit ) +or line editing characters (like +.Ic erase +and +.Ic kill ) . +By default, the local special characters are exported. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ic check +Verify the current settings for the current special characters. +The remote side is requested to send all the current special +character settings, and if there are any discrepancies with +the local side, the local side will switch to the remote value. +.It Ic export +Switch to the local defaults for the special characters. The +local default characters are those of the local terminal at +the time when +.Nm telnet +was started. +.It Ic import +Switch to the remote defaults for the special characters. +The remote default characters are those of the remote system +at the time when the +.Tn TELNET +connection was established. +.It Ic ?\& +Prints out help information for the +.Ic slc +command. +.El +.It Ic status +Show the current status of +.Nm telnet . +This includes the peer one is connected to, as well +as the current mode. +.It Ic toggle Ar arguments ... +Toggle (between +.Dv TRUE +and +.Dv FALSE ) +various flags that control how +.Nm telnet +responds to events. +These flags may be set explicitly to +.Dv TRUE +or +.Dv FALSE +using the +.Ic set +and +.Ic unset +commands listed above. +More than one argument may be specified. +The state of these flags may be interrogated with the +.Ic display +command. +Valid arguments are: +.Bl -tag -width Ar +.It Ic authdebug +Turns on debugging information for the authentication code. +.It Ic autoflush +If +.Ic autoflush +and +.Ic localchars +are both +.Dv TRUE , +then when the +.Ic ao , +or +.Ic quit +characters are recognized (and transformed into +.Tn TELNET +sequences; see +.Ic set +above for details), +.Nm telnet +refuses to display any data on the user's terminal +until the remote system acknowledges (via a +.Dv TELNET TIMING MARK +option) +that it has processed those +.Tn TELNET +sequences. +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv TRUE +if the terminal user had not +done an "stty noflsh", otherwise +.Dv FALSE +(see +.Xr stty 1 ) . +.It Ic autodecrypt +When the +.Dv TELNET ENCRYPT +option is negotiated, by +default the actual encryption (decryption) of the data +stream does not start automatically. The autoencrypt +(autodecrypt) command states that encryption of the +output (input) stream should be enabled as soon as +possible. +.Pp +Note: Because of export controls, the +.Dv TELNET ENCRYPT +option is not supported outside the United States and Canada. +.It Ic autologin +If the remote side supports the +.Dv TELNET AUTHENTICATION +option +.Tn TELNET +attempts to use it to perform automatic authentication. If the +.Dv AUTHENTICATION +option is not supported, the user's login +name are propagated through the +.Dv TELNET ENVIRON +option. +This command is the same as specifying +.Ar a +option on the +.Ic open +command. +.It Ic autosynch +If +.Ic autosynch +and +.Ic localchars +are both +.Dv TRUE , +then when either the +.Ic intr +or +.Ic quit +characters is typed (see +.Ic set +above for descriptions of the +.Ic intr +and +.Ic quit +characters), the resulting +.Tn TELNET +sequence sent is followed by the +.Dv TELNET SYNCH +sequence. +This procedure +.Ic should +cause the remote system to begin throwing away all previously +typed input until both of the +.Tn TELNET +sequences have been read and acted upon. +The initial value of this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic binary +Enable or disable the +.Dv TELNET BINARY +option on both input and output. +.It Ic inbinary +Enable or disable the +.Dv TELNET BINARY +option on input. +.It Ic outbinary +Enable or disable the +.Dv TELNET BINARY +option on output. +.It Ic crlf +If this is +.Dv TRUE , +then carriage returns will be sent as +.Li . +If this is +.Dv FALSE , +then carriage returns will be send as +.Li . +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic crmod +Toggle carriage return mode. +When this mode is enabled, most carriage return characters received from +the remote host will be mapped into a carriage return followed by +a line feed. +This mode does not affect those characters typed by the user, only +those received from the remote host. +This mode is not very useful unless the remote host +only sends carriage return, but never line feed. +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic debug +Toggles socket level debugging (useful only to the +.Ic super user ) . +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic encdebug +Turns on debugging information for the encryption code. +.It Ic localchars +If this is +.Dv TRUE , +then the +.Ic flush , +.Ic interrupt , +.Ic quit , +.Ic erase , +and +.Ic kill +characters (see +.Ic set +above) are recognized locally, and transformed into (hopefully) appropriate +.Tn TELNET +control sequences +(respectively +.Ic ao , +.Ic ip , +.Ic brk , +.Ic ec , +and +.Ic el ; +see +.Ic send +above). +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv TRUE +in \*(Lqold line by line\*(Rq mode, +and +.Dv FALSE +in \*(Lqcharacter at a time\*(Rq mode. +When the +.Dv LINEMODE +option is enabled, the value of +.Ic localchars +is ignored, and assumed to always be +.Dv TRUE . +If +.Dv LINEMODE +has ever been enabled, then +.Ic quit +is sent as +.Ic abort , +and +.Ic eof +and +.Ic suspend +are sent as +.Ic eof +and +.Ic susp , +see +.Ic send +above). +.It Ic netdata +Toggles the display of all network data (in hexadecimal format). +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic options +Toggles the display of some internal +.Nm telnet +protocol processing (having to do with +.Tn TELNET +options). +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic prettydump +When the +.Ic netdata +toggle is enabled, if +.Ic prettydump +is enabled the output from the +.Ic netdata +command will be formatted in a more user readable format. +Spaces are put between each character in the output, and the +beginning of any +.Tn TELNET +escape sequence is preceded by a '*' to aid in locating them. +.It Ic skiprc +When the skiprc toggle is +.Dv TRUE , +.Tn TELNET +skips the reading of the +.Pa \&.telnetrc +file in the users home +directory when connections are opened. The initial +value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic termdata +Toggles the display of all terminal data (in hexadecimal format). +The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +.It Ic verbose_encrypt +When the +.Ic verbose_encrypt +toggle is +.Dv TRUE , +.Tn TELNET +prints out a message each time encryption is enabled or +disabled. The initial value for this toggle is +.Dv FALSE . +Note: Because of export controls, data encryption +is not supported outside of the United States and Canada. +.It Ic \&? +Displays the legal +.Ic toggle +commands. +.El +.It Ic z +Suspend +.Nm telnet . +This command only works when the user is using the +.Xr csh 1 . +.It Ic \&! Op Ar command +Execute a single command in a subshell on the local +system. If +.Ic command +is omitted, then an interactive +subshell is invoked. +.It Ic ?\& Op Ar command +Get help. With no arguments, +.Nm telnet +prints a help summary. +If a command is specified, +.Nm telnet +will print the help information for just that command. +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Nm Telnet +uses at least the +.Ev HOME , +.Ev SHELL , +.Ev DISPLAY , +and +.Ev TERM +environment variables. +Other environment variables may be propagated +to the other side via the +.Dv TELNET ENVIRON +option. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width ~/.telnetrc -compact +.It Pa ~/.telnetrc +user customized telnet startup values +.El +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm Telnet +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . +.Sh NOTES +.Pp +On some remote systems, echo has to be turned off manually when in +\*(Lqold line by line\*(Rq mode. +.Pp +In \*(Lqold line by line\*(Rq mode or +.Dv LINEMODE +the terminal's +.Ic eof +character is only recognized (and sent to the remote system) +when it is the first character on a line. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bbc99990e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.c @@ -0,0 +1,2399 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_TERMCAP_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: telnet.c,v 1.34 2002/05/03 10:19:43 joda Exp $"); + +#define strip(x) (eight ? (x) : ((x) & 0x7f)) + +static unsigned char subbuffer[SUBBUFSIZE], + *subpointer, *subend; /* buffer for sub-options */ +#define SB_CLEAR() subpointer = subbuffer; +#define SB_TERM() { subend = subpointer; SB_CLEAR(); } +#define SB_ACCUM(c) if (subpointer < (subbuffer+sizeof subbuffer)) { \ + *subpointer++ = (c); \ + } + +#define SB_GET() ((*subpointer++)&0xff) +#define SB_PEEK() ((*subpointer)&0xff) +#define SB_EOF() (subpointer >= subend) +#define SB_LEN() (subend - subpointer) + +char options[256]; /* The combined options */ +char do_dont_resp[256]; +char will_wont_resp[256]; + +int + eight = 3, + binary = 0, + autologin = 0, /* Autologin anyone? */ + skiprc = 0, + connected, + showoptions, + ISend, /* trying to send network data in */ + debug = 0, + crmod, + netdata, /* Print out network data flow */ + crlf, /* Should '\r' be mapped to (or )? */ + telnetport, + wantencryption = 0, + SYNCHing, /* we are in TELNET SYNCH mode */ + flushout, /* flush output */ + autoflush = 0, /* flush output when interrupting? */ + autosynch, /* send interrupt characters with SYNCH? */ + localflow, /* we handle flow control locally */ + restartany, /* if flow control enabled, restart on any character */ + localchars, /* we recognize interrupt/quit */ + donelclchars, /* the user has set "localchars" */ + donebinarytoggle, /* the user has put us in binary */ + dontlecho, /* do we suppress local echoing right now? */ + globalmode; + +char *prompt = 0; + +int scheduler_lockout_tty = 0; + +cc_t escape; +cc_t rlogin; +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE +cc_t echoc; +#endif + +/* + * Telnet receiver states for fsm + */ +#define TS_DATA 0 +#define TS_IAC 1 +#define TS_WILL 2 +#define TS_WONT 3 +#define TS_DO 4 +#define TS_DONT 5 +#define TS_CR 6 +#define TS_SB 7 /* sub-option collection */ +#define TS_SE 8 /* looking for sub-option end */ + +static int telrcv_state; +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON +unsigned char telopt_environ = TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON; +#else +# define telopt_environ TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON +#endif + +jmp_buf toplevel; +jmp_buf peerdied; + +int flushline; +int linemode; + +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE +int kludgelinemode = 1; +#endif + +/* + * The following are some clocks used to decide how to interpret + * the relationship between various variables. + */ + +Clocks clocks; + +static int is_unique(char *name, char **as, char **ae); + + +/* + * Initialize telnet environment. + */ + +void +init_telnet(void) +{ + env_init(); + + SB_CLEAR(); + memset(options, 0, sizeof options); + + connected = ISend = localflow = donebinarytoggle = 0; +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) + auth_encrypt_connect(connected); +#endif /* defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) */ + restartany = -1; + + SYNCHing = 0; + + /* Don't change NetTrace */ + + escape = CONTROL(']'); + rlogin = _POSIX_VDISABLE; +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + echoc = CONTROL('E'); +#endif + + flushline = 1; + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; +} + + +/* + * These routines are in charge of sending option negotiations + * to the other side. + * + * The basic idea is that we send the negotiation if either side + * is in disagreement as to what the current state should be. + */ + +void +send_do(int c, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if (((do_dont_resp[c] == 0) && my_state_is_do(c)) || + my_want_state_is_do(c)) + return; + set_my_want_state_do(c); + do_dont_resp[c]++; + } + NET2ADD(IAC, DO); + NETADD(c); + printoption("SENT", DO, c); +} + +void +send_dont(int c, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if (((do_dont_resp[c] == 0) && my_state_is_dont(c)) || + my_want_state_is_dont(c)) + return; + set_my_want_state_dont(c); + do_dont_resp[c]++; + } + NET2ADD(IAC, DONT); + NETADD(c); + printoption("SENT", DONT, c); +} + +void +send_will(int c, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if (((will_wont_resp[c] == 0) && my_state_is_will(c)) || + my_want_state_is_will(c)) + return; + set_my_want_state_will(c); + will_wont_resp[c]++; + } + NET2ADD(IAC, WILL); + NETADD(c); + printoption("SENT", WILL, c); +} + +void +send_wont(int c, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if (((will_wont_resp[c] == 0) && my_state_is_wont(c)) || + my_want_state_is_wont(c)) + return; + set_my_want_state_wont(c); + will_wont_resp[c]++; + } + NET2ADD(IAC, WONT); + NETADD(c); + printoption("SENT", WONT, c); +} + + +void +willoption(int option) +{ + int new_state_ok = 0; + + if (do_dont_resp[option]) { + --do_dont_resp[option]; + if (do_dont_resp[option] && my_state_is_do(option)) + --do_dont_resp[option]; + } + + if ((do_dont_resp[option] == 0) && my_want_state_is_dont(option)) { + + switch (option) { + + case TELOPT_ECHO: + case TELOPT_BINARY: + case TELOPT_SGA: + settimer(modenegotiated); + /* FALL THROUGH */ + case TELOPT_STATUS: +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: +#endif + new_state_ok = 1; + break; + + case TELOPT_TM: + if (flushout) + flushout = 0; + /* + * Special case for TM. If we get back a WILL, + * pretend we got back a WONT. + */ + set_my_want_state_dont(option); + set_my_state_dont(option); + return; /* Never reply to TM will's/wont's */ + + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: + default: + break; + } + + if (new_state_ok) { + set_my_want_state_do(option); + send_do(option, 0); + setconnmode(0); /* possibly set new tty mode */ + } else { + do_dont_resp[option]++; + send_dont(option, 0); + } + } + set_my_state_do(option); +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (option == TELOPT_ENCRYPT) + encrypt_send_support(); +#endif +} + +void +wontoption(int option) +{ + if (do_dont_resp[option]) { + --do_dont_resp[option]; + if (do_dont_resp[option] && my_state_is_dont(option)) + --do_dont_resp[option]; + } + + if ((do_dont_resp[option] == 0) && my_want_state_is_do(option)) { + + switch (option) { + +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + case TELOPT_SGA: + if (!kludgelinemode) + break; + /* FALL THROUGH */ +#endif + case TELOPT_ECHO: + settimer(modenegotiated); + break; + + case TELOPT_TM: + if (flushout) + flushout = 0; + set_my_want_state_dont(option); + set_my_state_dont(option); + return; /* Never reply to TM will's/wont's */ + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + encrypt_not(); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + set_my_want_state_dont(option); + if (my_state_is_do(option)) + send_dont(option, 0); + setconnmode(0); /* Set new tty mode */ + } else if (option == TELOPT_TM) { + /* + * Special case for TM. + */ + if (flushout) + flushout = 0; + set_my_want_state_dont(option); + } + set_my_state_dont(option); +} + +static void +dooption(int option) +{ + int new_state_ok = 0; + + if (will_wont_resp[option]) { + --will_wont_resp[option]; + if (will_wont_resp[option] && my_state_is_will(option)) + --will_wont_resp[option]; + } + + if (will_wont_resp[option] == 0) { + if (my_want_state_is_wont(option)) { + + switch (option) { + + case TELOPT_TM: + /* + * Special case for TM. We send a WILL, but pretend + * we sent WONT. + */ + send_will(option, 0); + set_my_want_state_wont(TELOPT_TM); + set_my_state_wont(TELOPT_TM); + return; + + case TELOPT_BINARY: /* binary mode */ + case TELOPT_NAWS: /* window size */ + case TELOPT_TSPEED: /* terminal speed */ + case TELOPT_LFLOW: /* local flow control */ + case TELOPT_TTYPE: /* terminal type option */ + case TELOPT_SGA: /* no big deal */ +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: /* encryption variable option */ +#endif + new_state_ok = 1; + break; + + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: /* New environment variable option */ +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + if (my_state_is_will(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) + send_wont(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, 1); /* turn off the old */ + goto env_common; + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: /* Old environment variable option */ + if (my_state_is_will(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON)) + break; /* Don't enable if new one is in use! */ + env_common: + telopt_environ = option; +#endif + new_state_ok = 1; + break; + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + if (autologin) + new_state_ok = 1; + break; +#endif + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: /* X Display location */ + if (env_getvalue((unsigned char *)"DISPLAY")) + new_state_ok = 1; + break; + + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + kludgelinemode = 0; + send_do(TELOPT_SGA, 1); +#endif + set_my_want_state_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE); + send_will(option, 0); + set_my_state_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE); + slc_init(); + return; + + case TELOPT_ECHO: /* We're never going to echo... */ + default: + break; + } + + if (new_state_ok) { + set_my_want_state_will(option); + send_will(option, 0); + setconnmode(0); /* Set new tty mode */ + } else { + will_wont_resp[option]++; + send_wont(option, 0); + } + } else { + /* + * Handle options that need more things done after the + * other side has acknowledged the option. + */ + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + kludgelinemode = 0; + send_do(TELOPT_SGA, 1); +#endif + set_my_state_will(option); + slc_init(); + send_do(TELOPT_SGA, 0); + return; + } + } + } + set_my_state_will(option); +} + +static void +dontoption(int option) +{ + + if (will_wont_resp[option]) { + --will_wont_resp[option]; + if (will_wont_resp[option] && my_state_is_wont(option)) + --will_wont_resp[option]; + } + + if ((will_wont_resp[option] == 0) && my_want_state_is_will(option)) { + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: + linemode = 0; /* put us back to the default state */ + break; +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: + /* + * The new environ option wasn't recognized, try + * the old one. + */ + send_will(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, 1); + telopt_environ = TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON; + break; +#endif +#if 0 +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + encrypt_not(); + break; +#endif +#endif + } + /* we always accept a DONT */ + set_my_want_state_wont(option); + if (my_state_is_will(option)) + send_wont(option, 0); + setconnmode(0); /* Set new tty mode */ + } + set_my_state_wont(option); +} + +/* + * Given a buffer returned by tgetent(), this routine will turn + * the pipe seperated list of names in the buffer into an array + * of pointers to null terminated names. We toss out any bad, + * duplicate, or verbose names (names with spaces). + */ + +static char *name_unknown = "UNKNOWN"; +static char *unknown[] = { 0, 0 }; + +static char ** +mklist(char *buf, char *name) +{ + int n; + char c, *cp, **argvp, *cp2, **argv, **avt; + + if (name) { + if ((int)strlen(name) > 40) { + name = 0; + unknown[0] = name_unknown; + } else { + unknown[0] = name; + strupr(name); + } + } else + unknown[0] = name_unknown; + /* + * Count up the number of names. + */ + for (n = 1, cp = buf; *cp && *cp != ':'; cp++) { + if (*cp == '|') + n++; + } + /* + * Allocate an array to put the name pointers into + */ + argv = (char **)malloc((n+3)*sizeof(char *)); + if (argv == 0) + return(unknown); + + /* + * Fill up the array of pointers to names. + */ + *argv = 0; + argvp = argv+1; + n = 0; + for (cp = cp2 = buf; (c = *cp); cp++) { + if (c == '|' || c == ':') { + *cp++ = '\0'; + /* + * Skip entries that have spaces or are over 40 + * characters long. If this is our environment + * name, then put it up front. Otherwise, as + * long as this is not a duplicate name (case + * insensitive) add it to the list. + */ + if (n || (cp - cp2 > 41)) + ; + else if (name && (strncasecmp(name, cp2, cp-cp2) == 0)) + *argv = cp2; + else if (is_unique(cp2, argv+1, argvp)) + *argvp++ = cp2; + if (c == ':') + break; + /* + * Skip multiple delimiters. Reset cp2 to + * the beginning of the next name. Reset n, + * the flag for names with spaces. + */ + while ((c = *cp) == '|') + cp++; + cp2 = cp; + n = 0; + } + /* + * Skip entries with spaces or non-ascii values. + * Convert lower case letters to upper case. + */ +#define ISASCII(c) (!((c)&0x80)) + if ((c == ' ') || !ISASCII(c)) + n = 1; + else if (islower((unsigned char)c)) + *cp = toupper(c); + } + + /* + * Check for an old V6 2 character name. If the second + * name points to the beginning of the buffer, and is + * only 2 characters long, move it to the end of the array. + */ + if ((argv[1] == buf) && (strlen(argv[1]) == 2)) { + --argvp; + for (avt = &argv[1]; avt < argvp; avt++) + *avt = *(avt+1); + *argvp++ = buf; + } + + /* + * Duplicate last name, for TTYPE option, and null + * terminate the array. If we didn't find a match on + * our terminal name, put that name at the beginning. + */ + cp = *(argvp-1); + *argvp++ = cp; + *argvp = 0; + + if (*argv == 0) { + if (name) + *argv = name; + else { + --argvp; + for (avt = argv; avt < argvp; avt++) + *avt = *(avt+1); + } + } + if (*argv) + return(argv); + else + return(unknown); +} + +static int +is_unique(char *name, char **as, char **ae) +{ + char **ap; + int n; + + n = strlen(name) + 1; + for (ap = as; ap < ae; ap++) + if (strncasecmp(*ap, name, n) == 0) + return(0); + return (1); +} + +static char termbuf[1024]; + +static int +telnet_setupterm(const char *tname, int fd, int *errp) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_TGETENT + if (tgetent(termbuf, tname) == 1) { + termbuf[1023] = '\0'; + if (errp) + *errp = 1; + return(0); + } + if (errp) + *errp = 0; + return(-1); +#else + strlcpy(termbuf, tname, sizeof(termbuf)); + if(errp) *errp = 1; + return 0; +#endif +} + +int resettermname = 1; + +static char * +gettermname() +{ + char *tname; + static char **tnamep = 0; + static char **next; + int err; + + if (resettermname) { + resettermname = 0; + if (tnamep && tnamep != unknown) + free(tnamep); + if ((tname = (char *)env_getvalue((unsigned char *)"TERM")) && + telnet_setupterm(tname, 1, &err) == 0) { + tnamep = mklist(termbuf, tname); + } else { + if (tname && ((int)strlen(tname) <= 40)) { + unknown[0] = tname; + strupr(tname); + } else + unknown[0] = name_unknown; + tnamep = unknown; + } + next = tnamep; + } + if (*next == 0) + next = tnamep; + return(*next++); +} +/* + * suboption() + * + * Look at the sub-option buffer, and try to be helpful to the other + * side. + * + * Currently we recognize: + * + * Terminal type, send request. + * Terminal speed (send request). + * Local flow control (is request). + * Linemode + */ + +static void +suboption() +{ + unsigned char subchar; + + printsub('<', subbuffer, SB_LEN()+2); + switch (subchar = SB_GET()) { + case TELOPT_TTYPE: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TTYPE)) + return; + if (SB_EOF() || SB_GET() != TELQUAL_SEND) { + return; + } else { + char *name; + unsigned char temp[50]; + int len; + + name = gettermname(); + len = strlen(name) + 4 + 2; + if (len < NETROOM()) { + snprintf((char *)temp, sizeof(temp), + "%c%c%c%c%s%c%c", IAC, SB, TELOPT_TTYPE, + TELQUAL_IS, name, IAC, SE); + ring_supply_data(&netoring, temp, len); + printsub('>', &temp[2], len-2); + } else { + ExitString("No room in buffer for terminal type.\n", 1); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } + } + break; + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TSPEED)) + return; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + if (SB_GET() == TELQUAL_SEND) { + long output_speed, input_speed; + unsigned char temp[50]; + int len; + + TerminalSpeeds(&input_speed, &output_speed); + + snprintf((char *)temp, sizeof(temp), + "%c%c%c%c%u,%u%c%c", IAC, SB, TELOPT_TSPEED, + TELQUAL_IS, + (unsigned)output_speed, + (unsigned)input_speed, IAC, SE); + len = strlen((char *)temp+4) + 4; /* temp[3] is 0 ... */ + + if (len < NETROOM()) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, temp, len); + printsub('>', temp+2, len - 2); + } +/*@*/ else printf("lm_will: not enough room in buffer\n"); + } + break; + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_LFLOW)) + return; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + switch(SB_GET()) { + case LFLOW_RESTART_ANY: + restartany = 1; + break; + case LFLOW_RESTART_XON: + restartany = 0; + break; + case LFLOW_ON: + localflow = 1; + break; + case LFLOW_OFF: + localflow = 0; + break; + default: + return; + } + setcommandmode(); + setconnmode(0); + break; + + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) + return; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + switch (SB_GET()) { + case WILL: + lm_will(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case WONT: + lm_wont(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case DO: + lm_do(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case DONT: + lm_dont(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case LM_SLC: + slc(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case LM_MODE: + lm_mode(subpointer, SB_LEN(), 0); + break; + default: + break; + } + break; + +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: +#endif + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + switch(SB_PEEK()) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + case TELQUAL_INFO: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(subchar)) + return; + break; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(subchar)) { + return; + } + break; + default: + return; + } + env_opt(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_XDISPLOC)) + return; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + if (SB_GET() == TELQUAL_SEND) { + unsigned char temp[50], *dp; + int len; + + if ((dp = env_getvalue((unsigned char *)"DISPLAY")) == NULL) { + /* + * Something happened, we no longer have a DISPLAY + * variable. So, turn off the option. + */ + send_wont(TELOPT_XDISPLOC, 1); + break; + } + snprintf((char *)temp, sizeof(temp), + "%c%c%c%c%s%c%c", IAC, SB, TELOPT_XDISPLOC, + TELQUAL_IS, dp, IAC, SE); + len = strlen((char *)temp+4) + 4; /* temp[3] is 0 ... */ + + if (len < NETROOM()) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, temp, len); + printsub('>', temp+2, len - 2); + } +/*@*/ else printf("lm_will: not enough room in buffer\n"); + } + break; + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: { + if (!autologin) + break; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + switch(SB_GET()) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) + return; + auth_is(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) + return; + auth_send(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case TELQUAL_REPLY: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) + return; + auth_reply(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case TELQUAL_NAME: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) + return; + auth_name(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + } + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + switch(SB_GET()) { + case ENCRYPT_START: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_start(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_END: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_end(); + break; + case ENCRYPT_SUPPORT: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_support(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_REQSTART: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_request_start(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_REQEND: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + /* + * We can always send an REQEND so that we cannot + * get stuck encrypting. We should only get this + * if we have been able to get in the correct mode + * anyhow. + */ + encrypt_request_end(); + break; + case ENCRYPT_IS: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_is(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_REPLY: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_reply(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_ENC_KEYID: + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_enc_keyid(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_DEC_KEYID: + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) + return; + encrypt_dec_keyid(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + default: + break; + } + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } +} + +static unsigned char str_lm[] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_LINEMODE, 0, 0, IAC, SE }; + +void +lm_will(unsigned char *cmd, int len) +{ + if (len < 1) { +/*@*/ printf("lm_will: no command!!!\n"); /* Should not happen... */ + return; + } + switch(cmd[0]) { + case LM_FORWARDMASK: /* We shouldn't ever get this... */ + default: + str_lm[3] = DONT; + str_lm[4] = cmd[0]; + if (NETROOM() > sizeof(str_lm)) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, str_lm, sizeof(str_lm)); + printsub('>', &str_lm[2], sizeof(str_lm)-2); + } +/*@*/ else printf("lm_will: not enough room in buffer\n"); + break; + } +} + +void +lm_wont(unsigned char *cmd, int len) +{ + if (len < 1) { +/*@*/ printf("lm_wont: no command!!!\n"); /* Should not happen... */ + return; + } + switch(cmd[0]) { + case LM_FORWARDMASK: /* We shouldn't ever get this... */ + default: + /* We are always DONT, so don't respond */ + return; + } +} + +void +lm_do(unsigned char *cmd, int len) +{ + if (len < 1) { +/*@*/ printf("lm_do: no command!!!\n"); /* Should not happen... */ + return; + } + switch(cmd[0]) { + case LM_FORWARDMASK: + default: + str_lm[3] = WONT; + str_lm[4] = cmd[0]; + if (NETROOM() > sizeof(str_lm)) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, str_lm, sizeof(str_lm)); + printsub('>', &str_lm[2], sizeof(str_lm)-2); + } +/*@*/ else printf("lm_do: not enough room in buffer\n"); + break; + } +} + +void +lm_dont(unsigned char *cmd, int len) +{ + if (len < 1) { +/*@*/ printf("lm_dont: no command!!!\n"); /* Should not happen... */ + return; + } + switch(cmd[0]) { + case LM_FORWARDMASK: + default: + /* we are always WONT, so don't respond */ + break; + } +} + +static unsigned char str_lm_mode[] = { + IAC, SB, TELOPT_LINEMODE, LM_MODE, 0, IAC, SE +}; + +void +lm_mode(unsigned char *cmd, int len, int init) +{ + if (len != 1) + return; + if ((linemode&MODE_MASK&~MODE_ACK) == *cmd) + return; + if (*cmd&MODE_ACK) + return; + linemode = *cmd&(MODE_MASK&~MODE_ACK); + str_lm_mode[4] = linemode; + if (!init) + str_lm_mode[4] |= MODE_ACK; + if (NETROOM() > sizeof(str_lm_mode)) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, str_lm_mode, sizeof(str_lm_mode)); + printsub('>', &str_lm_mode[2], sizeof(str_lm_mode)-2); + } +/*@*/ else printf("lm_mode: not enough room in buffer\n"); + setconnmode(0); /* set changed mode */ +} + + + +/* + * slc() + * Handle special character suboption of LINEMODE. + */ + +struct spc { + cc_t val; + cc_t *valp; + char flags; /* Current flags & level */ + char mylevel; /* Maximum level & flags */ +} spc_data[NSLC+1]; + +#define SLC_IMPORT 0 +#define SLC_EXPORT 1 +#define SLC_RVALUE 2 +static int slc_mode = SLC_EXPORT; + +void +slc_init() +{ + struct spc *spcp; + + localchars = 1; + for (spcp = spc_data; spcp < &spc_data[NSLC+1]; spcp++) { + spcp->val = 0; + spcp->valp = 0; + spcp->flags = spcp->mylevel = SLC_NOSUPPORT; + } + +#define initfunc(func, flags) { \ + spcp = &spc_data[func]; \ + if ((spcp->valp = tcval(func))) { \ + spcp->val = *spcp->valp; \ + spcp->mylevel = SLC_VARIABLE|flags; \ + } else { \ + spcp->val = 0; \ + spcp->mylevel = SLC_DEFAULT; \ + } \ + } + + initfunc(SLC_SYNCH, 0); + /* No BRK */ + initfunc(SLC_AO, 0); + initfunc(SLC_AYT, 0); + /* No EOR */ + initfunc(SLC_ABORT, SLC_FLUSHIN|SLC_FLUSHOUT); + initfunc(SLC_EOF, 0); + initfunc(SLC_SUSP, SLC_FLUSHIN); + initfunc(SLC_EC, 0); + initfunc(SLC_EL, 0); + initfunc(SLC_EW, 0); + initfunc(SLC_RP, 0); + initfunc(SLC_LNEXT, 0); + initfunc(SLC_XON, 0); + initfunc(SLC_XOFF, 0); + initfunc(SLC_FORW1, 0); + initfunc(SLC_FORW2, 0); + /* No FORW2 */ + + initfunc(SLC_IP, SLC_FLUSHIN|SLC_FLUSHOUT); +#undef initfunc + + if (slc_mode == SLC_EXPORT) + slc_export(); + else + slc_import(1); + +} + +void +slcstate() +{ + printf("Special characters are %s values\n", + slc_mode == SLC_IMPORT ? "remote default" : + slc_mode == SLC_EXPORT ? "local" : + "remote"); +} + +void +slc_mode_export() +{ + slc_mode = SLC_EXPORT; + if (my_state_is_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) + slc_export(); +} + +void +slc_mode_import(int def) +{ + slc_mode = def ? SLC_IMPORT : SLC_RVALUE; + if (my_state_is_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) + slc_import(def); +} + +unsigned char slc_import_val[] = { + IAC, SB, TELOPT_LINEMODE, LM_SLC, 0, SLC_VARIABLE, 0, IAC, SE +}; +unsigned char slc_import_def[] = { + IAC, SB, TELOPT_LINEMODE, LM_SLC, 0, SLC_DEFAULT, 0, IAC, SE +}; + +void +slc_import(int def) +{ + if (NETROOM() > sizeof(slc_import_val)) { + if (def) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, slc_import_def, sizeof(slc_import_def)); + printsub('>', &slc_import_def[2], sizeof(slc_import_def)-2); + } else { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, slc_import_val, sizeof(slc_import_val)); + printsub('>', &slc_import_val[2], sizeof(slc_import_val)-2); + } + } +/*@*/ else printf("slc_import: not enough room\n"); +} + +void +slc_export() +{ + struct spc *spcp; + + TerminalDefaultChars(); + + slc_start_reply(); + for (spcp = &spc_data[1]; spcp < &spc_data[NSLC+1]; spcp++) { + if (spcp->mylevel != SLC_NOSUPPORT) { + if (spcp->val == (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE)) + spcp->flags = SLC_NOSUPPORT; + else + spcp->flags = spcp->mylevel; + if (spcp->valp) + spcp->val = *spcp->valp; + slc_add_reply(spcp - spc_data, spcp->flags, spcp->val); + } + } + slc_end_reply(); + slc_update(); + setconnmode(1); /* Make sure the character values are set */ +} + +void +slc(unsigned char *cp, int len) +{ + struct spc *spcp; + int func,level; + + slc_start_reply(); + + for (; len >= 3; len -=3, cp +=3) { + + func = cp[SLC_FUNC]; + + if (func == 0) { + /* + * Client side: always ignore 0 function. + */ + continue; + } + if (func > NSLC) { + if ((cp[SLC_FLAGS] & SLC_LEVELBITS) != SLC_NOSUPPORT) + slc_add_reply(func, SLC_NOSUPPORT, 0); + continue; + } + + spcp = &spc_data[func]; + + level = cp[SLC_FLAGS]&(SLC_LEVELBITS|SLC_ACK); + + if ((cp[SLC_VALUE] == (unsigned char)spcp->val) && + ((level&SLC_LEVELBITS) == (spcp->flags&SLC_LEVELBITS))) { + continue; + } + + if (level == (SLC_DEFAULT|SLC_ACK)) { + /* + * This is an error condition, the SLC_ACK + * bit should never be set for the SLC_DEFAULT + * level. Our best guess to recover is to + * ignore the SLC_ACK bit. + */ + cp[SLC_FLAGS] &= ~SLC_ACK; + } + + if (level == ((spcp->flags&SLC_LEVELBITS)|SLC_ACK)) { + spcp->val = (cc_t)cp[SLC_VALUE]; + spcp->flags = cp[SLC_FLAGS]; /* include SLC_ACK */ + continue; + } + + level &= ~SLC_ACK; + + if (level <= (spcp->mylevel&SLC_LEVELBITS)) { + spcp->flags = cp[SLC_FLAGS]|SLC_ACK; + spcp->val = (cc_t)cp[SLC_VALUE]; + } + if (level == SLC_DEFAULT) { + if ((spcp->mylevel&SLC_LEVELBITS) != SLC_DEFAULT) + spcp->flags = spcp->mylevel; + else + spcp->flags = SLC_NOSUPPORT; + } + slc_add_reply(func, spcp->flags, spcp->val); + } + slc_end_reply(); + if (slc_update()) + setconnmode(1); /* set the new character values */ +} + +void +slc_check() +{ + struct spc *spcp; + + slc_start_reply(); + for (spcp = &spc_data[1]; spcp < &spc_data[NSLC+1]; spcp++) { + if (spcp->valp && spcp->val != *spcp->valp) { + spcp->val = *spcp->valp; + if (spcp->val == (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE)) + spcp->flags = SLC_NOSUPPORT; + else + spcp->flags = spcp->mylevel; + slc_add_reply(spcp - spc_data, spcp->flags, spcp->val); + } + } + slc_end_reply(); + setconnmode(1); +} + + +unsigned char slc_reply[128]; +unsigned char *slc_replyp; + +void +slc_start_reply() +{ + slc_replyp = slc_reply; + *slc_replyp++ = IAC; + *slc_replyp++ = SB; + *slc_replyp++ = TELOPT_LINEMODE; + *slc_replyp++ = LM_SLC; +} + +void +slc_add_reply(unsigned char func, unsigned char flags, cc_t value) +{ + if ((*slc_replyp++ = func) == IAC) + *slc_replyp++ = IAC; + if ((*slc_replyp++ = flags) == IAC) + *slc_replyp++ = IAC; + if ((*slc_replyp++ = (unsigned char)value) == IAC) + *slc_replyp++ = IAC; +} + +void +slc_end_reply() +{ + int len; + + *slc_replyp++ = IAC; + *slc_replyp++ = SE; + len = slc_replyp - slc_reply; + if (len <= 6) + return; + if (NETROOM() > len) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, slc_reply, slc_replyp - slc_reply); + printsub('>', &slc_reply[2], slc_replyp - slc_reply - 2); + } +/*@*/else printf("slc_end_reply: not enough room\n"); +} + +int +slc_update() +{ + struct spc *spcp; + int need_update = 0; + + for (spcp = &spc_data[1]; spcp < &spc_data[NSLC+1]; spcp++) { + if (!(spcp->flags&SLC_ACK)) + continue; + spcp->flags &= ~SLC_ACK; + if (spcp->valp && (*spcp->valp != spcp->val)) { + *spcp->valp = spcp->val; + need_update = 1; + } + } + return(need_update); +} + +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON +# define old_env_var OLD_ENV_VAR +# define old_env_value OLD_ENV_VALUE +#endif + +void +env_opt(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + unsigned char *ep = 0, *epc = 0; + int i; + + switch(buf[0]&0xff) { + case TELQUAL_SEND: + env_opt_start(); + if (len == 1) { + env_opt_add(NULL); + } else for (i = 1; i < len; i++) { + switch (buf[i]&0xff) { +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + case OLD_ENV_VAR: + case OLD_ENV_VALUE: + /* + * Although OLD_ENV_VALUE is not legal, we will + * still recognize it, just in case it is an + * old server that has VAR & VALUE mixed up... + */ + /* FALL THROUGH */ +#else + case NEW_ENV_VAR: +#endif + case ENV_USERVAR: + if (ep) { + *epc = 0; + env_opt_add(ep); + } + ep = epc = &buf[i+1]; + break; + case ENV_ESC: + i++; + /*FALL THROUGH*/ + default: + if (epc) + *epc++ = buf[i]; + break; + } + } + if (ep) { + *epc = 0; + env_opt_add(ep); + } + env_opt_end(1); + break; + + case TELQUAL_IS: + case TELQUAL_INFO: + /* Ignore for now. We shouldn't get it anyway. */ + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +#define OPT_REPLY_SIZE 256 +unsigned char *opt_reply; +unsigned char *opt_replyp; +unsigned char *opt_replyend; + +void +env_opt_start() +{ + if (opt_reply) { + void *tmp = realloc (opt_reply, OPT_REPLY_SIZE); + if (tmp != NULL) { + opt_reply = tmp; + } else { + free (opt_reply); + opt_reply = NULL; + } + } else + opt_reply = (unsigned char *)malloc(OPT_REPLY_SIZE); + if (opt_reply == NULL) { +/*@*/ printf("env_opt_start: malloc()/realloc() failed!!!\n"); + opt_reply = opt_replyp = opt_replyend = NULL; + return; + } + opt_replyp = opt_reply; + opt_replyend = opt_reply + OPT_REPLY_SIZE; + *opt_replyp++ = IAC; + *opt_replyp++ = SB; + *opt_replyp++ = telopt_environ; + *opt_replyp++ = TELQUAL_IS; +} + +void +env_opt_start_info() +{ + env_opt_start(); + if (opt_replyp) + opt_replyp[-1] = TELQUAL_INFO; +} + +void +env_opt_add(unsigned char *ep) +{ + unsigned char *vp, c; + + if (opt_reply == NULL) /*XXX*/ + return; /*XXX*/ + + if (ep == NULL || *ep == '\0') { + /* Send user defined variables first. */ + env_default(1, 0); + while ((ep = env_default(0, 0))) + env_opt_add(ep); + + /* Now add the list of well know variables. */ + env_default(1, 1); + while ((ep = env_default(0, 1))) + env_opt_add(ep); + return; + } + vp = env_getvalue(ep); + if (opt_replyp + (vp ? strlen((char *)vp) : 0) + + strlen((char *)ep) + 6 > opt_replyend) + { + int len; + void *tmp; + opt_replyend += OPT_REPLY_SIZE; + len = opt_replyend - opt_reply; + tmp = realloc(opt_reply, len); + if (tmp == NULL) { +/*@*/ printf("env_opt_add: realloc() failed!!!\n"); + opt_reply = opt_replyp = opt_replyend = NULL; + return; + } + opt_reply = tmp; + opt_replyp = opt_reply + len - (opt_replyend - opt_replyp); + opt_replyend = opt_reply + len; + } + if (opt_welldefined((char *)ep)) { +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + if (telopt_environ == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) + *opt_replyp++ = old_env_var; + else +#endif + *opt_replyp++ = NEW_ENV_VAR; + } else + *opt_replyp++ = ENV_USERVAR; + for (;;) { + while ((c = *ep++)) { + switch(c&0xff) { + case IAC: + *opt_replyp++ = IAC; + break; + case NEW_ENV_VAR: + case NEW_ENV_VALUE: + case ENV_ESC: + case ENV_USERVAR: + *opt_replyp++ = ENV_ESC; + break; + } + *opt_replyp++ = c; + } + if ((ep = vp)) { +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + if (telopt_environ == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) + *opt_replyp++ = old_env_value; + else +#endif + *opt_replyp++ = NEW_ENV_VALUE; + vp = NULL; + } else + break; + } +} + +int +opt_welldefined(char *ep) +{ + if ((strcmp(ep, "USER") == 0) || + (strcmp(ep, "DISPLAY") == 0) || + (strcmp(ep, "PRINTER") == 0) || + (strcmp(ep, "SYSTEMTYPE") == 0) || + (strcmp(ep, "JOB") == 0) || + (strcmp(ep, "ACCT") == 0)) + return(1); + return(0); +} + +void +env_opt_end(int emptyok) +{ + int len; + + len = opt_replyp - opt_reply + 2; + if (emptyok || len > 6) { + *opt_replyp++ = IAC; + *opt_replyp++ = SE; + if (NETROOM() > len) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, opt_reply, len); + printsub('>', &opt_reply[2], len - 2); + } +/*@*/ else printf("slc_end_reply: not enough room\n"); + } + if (opt_reply) { + free(opt_reply); + opt_reply = opt_replyp = opt_replyend = NULL; + } +} + + + +int +telrcv(void) +{ + int c; + int scc; + unsigned char *sbp = NULL; + int count; + int returnValue = 0; + + scc = 0; + count = 0; + while (TTYROOM() > 2) { + if (scc == 0) { + if (count) { + ring_consumed(&netiring, count); + returnValue = 1; + count = 0; + } + sbp = netiring.consume; + scc = ring_full_consecutive(&netiring); + if (scc == 0) { + /* No more data coming in */ + break; + } + } + + c = *sbp++ & 0xff, scc--; count++; +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (decrypt_input) + c = (*decrypt_input)(c); +#endif + + switch (telrcv_state) { + + case TS_CR: + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + if (c == '\0') { + break; /* Ignore \0 after CR */ + } + else if ((c == '\n') && my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ECHO) && !crmod) { + TTYADD(c); + break; + } + /* Else, fall through */ + + case TS_DATA: + if (c == IAC) { + telrcv_state = TS_IAC; + break; + } + /* + * The 'crmod' hack (see following) is needed + * since we can't set CRMOD on output only. + * Machines like MULTICS like to send \r without + * \n; since we must turn off CRMOD to get proper + * input, the mapping is done here (sigh). + */ + if ((c == '\r') && my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + if (scc > 0) { + c = *sbp&0xff; +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (decrypt_input) + c = (*decrypt_input)(c); +#endif + if (c == 0) { + sbp++, scc--; count++; + /* a "true" CR */ + TTYADD('\r'); + } else if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ECHO) && + (c == '\n')) { + sbp++, scc--; count++; + TTYADD('\n'); + } else { +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + if (decrypt_input) + (*decrypt_input)(-1); +#endif + + TTYADD('\r'); + if (crmod) { + TTYADD('\n'); + } + } + } else { + telrcv_state = TS_CR; + TTYADD('\r'); + if (crmod) { + TTYADD('\n'); + } + } + } else { + TTYADD(c); + } + continue; + + case TS_IAC: +process_iac: + switch (c) { + + case WILL: + telrcv_state = TS_WILL; + continue; + + case WONT: + telrcv_state = TS_WONT; + continue; + + case DO: + telrcv_state = TS_DO; + continue; + + case DONT: + telrcv_state = TS_DONT; + continue; + + case DM: + /* + * We may have missed an urgent notification, + * so make sure we flush whatever is in the + * buffer currently. + */ + printoption("RCVD", IAC, DM); + SYNCHing = 1; + ttyflush(1); + SYNCHing = stilloob(); + settimer(gotDM); + break; + + case SB: + SB_CLEAR(); + telrcv_state = TS_SB; + continue; + + + case IAC: + TTYADD(IAC); + break; + + case NOP: + case GA: + default: + printoption("RCVD", IAC, c); + break; + } + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_WILL: + printoption("RCVD", WILL, c); + willoption(c); + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_WONT: + printoption("RCVD", WONT, c); + wontoption(c); + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_DO: + printoption("RCVD", DO, c); + dooption(c); + if (c == TELOPT_NAWS) { + sendnaws(); + } else if (c == TELOPT_LFLOW) { + localflow = 1; + setcommandmode(); + setconnmode(0); + } + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_DONT: + printoption("RCVD", DONT, c); + dontoption(c); + flushline = 1; + setconnmode(0); /* set new tty mode (maybe) */ + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_SB: + if (c == IAC) { + telrcv_state = TS_SE; + } else { + SB_ACCUM(c); + } + continue; + + case TS_SE: + if (c != SE) { + if (c != IAC) { + /* + * This is an error. We only expect to get + * "IAC IAC" or "IAC SE". Several things may + * have happend. An IAC was not doubled, the + * IAC SE was left off, or another option got + * inserted into the suboption are all possibilities. + * If we assume that the IAC was not doubled, + * and really the IAC SE was left off, we could + * get into an infinate loop here. So, instead, + * we terminate the suboption, and process the + * partial suboption if we can. + */ + SB_ACCUM(IAC); + SB_ACCUM(c); + subpointer -= 2; + SB_TERM(); + + printoption("In SUBOPTION processing, RCVD", IAC, c); + suboption(); /* handle sub-option */ + telrcv_state = TS_IAC; + goto process_iac; + } + SB_ACCUM(c); + telrcv_state = TS_SB; + } else { + SB_ACCUM(IAC); + SB_ACCUM(SE); + subpointer -= 2; + SB_TERM(); + suboption(); /* handle sub-option */ + telrcv_state = TS_DATA; + } + } + } + if (count) + ring_consumed(&netiring, count); + return returnValue||count; +} + +static int bol = 1, local = 0; + +int +rlogin_susp(void) +{ + if (local) { + local = 0; + bol = 1; + command(0, "z\n", 2); + return(1); + } + return(0); +} + +static int +telsnd() +{ + int tcc; + int count; + int returnValue = 0; + unsigned char *tbp = NULL; + + tcc = 0; + count = 0; + while (NETROOM() > 2) { + int sc; + int c; + + if (tcc == 0) { + if (count) { + ring_consumed(&ttyiring, count); + returnValue = 1; + count = 0; + } + tbp = ttyiring.consume; + tcc = ring_full_consecutive(&ttyiring); + if (tcc == 0) { + break; + } + } + c = *tbp++ & 0xff, sc = strip(c), tcc--; count++; + if (rlogin != _POSIX_VDISABLE) { + if (bol) { + bol = 0; + if (sc == rlogin) { + local = 1; + continue; + } + } else if (local) { + local = 0; + if (sc == '.' || c == termEofChar) { + bol = 1; + command(0, "close\n", 6); + continue; + } + if (sc == termSuspChar) { + bol = 1; + command(0, "z\n", 2); + continue; + } + if (sc == escape) { + command(0, (char *)tbp, tcc); + bol = 1; + count += tcc; + tcc = 0; + flushline = 1; + break; + } + if (sc != rlogin) { + ++tcc; + --tbp; + --count; + c = sc = rlogin; + } + } + if ((sc == '\n') || (sc == '\r')) + bol = 1; + } else if (sc == escape) { + /* + * Double escape is a pass through of a single escape character. + */ + if (tcc && strip(*tbp) == escape) { + tbp++; + tcc--; + count++; + bol = 0; + } else { + command(0, (char *)tbp, tcc); + bol = 1; + count += tcc; + tcc = 0; + flushline = 1; + break; + } + } else + bol = 0; +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + if (kludgelinemode && (globalmode&MODE_EDIT) && (sc == echoc)) { + if (tcc > 0 && strip(*tbp) == echoc) { + tcc--; tbp++; count++; + } else { + dontlecho = !dontlecho; + settimer(echotoggle); + setconnmode(0); + flushline = 1; + break; + } + } +#endif + if (MODE_LOCAL_CHARS(globalmode)) { + if (TerminalSpecialChars(sc) == 0) { + bol = 1; + break; + } + } + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + switch (c) { + case '\n': + /* + * If we are in CRMOD mode (\r ==> \n) + * on our local machine, then probably + * a newline (unix) is CRLF (TELNET). + */ + if (MODE_LOCAL_CHARS(globalmode)) { + NETADD('\r'); + } + NETADD('\n'); + bol = flushline = 1; + break; + case '\r': + if (!crlf) { + NET2ADD('\r', '\0'); + } else { + NET2ADD('\r', '\n'); + } + bol = flushline = 1; + break; + case IAC: + NET2ADD(IAC, IAC); + break; + default: + NETADD(c); + break; + } + } else if (c == IAC) { + NET2ADD(IAC, IAC); + } else { + NETADD(c); + } + } + if (count) + ring_consumed(&ttyiring, count); + return returnValue||count; /* Non-zero if we did anything */ +} + +/* + * Scheduler() + * + * Try to do something. + * + * If we do something useful, return 1; else return 0. + * + */ + + + int +Scheduler(int block) /* should we block in the select ? */ +{ + /* One wants to be a bit careful about setting returnValue + * to one, since a one implies we did some useful work, + * and therefore probably won't be called to block next + * time (TN3270 mode only). + */ + int returnValue; + int netin, netout, netex, ttyin, ttyout; + + /* Decide which rings should be processed */ + + netout = ring_full_count(&netoring) && + (flushline || + (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_LINEMODE) +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + && (!kludgelinemode || my_want_state_is_do(TELOPT_SGA)) +#endif + ) || + my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY)); + ttyout = ring_full_count(&ttyoring); + + ttyin = ring_empty_count(&ttyiring); + + netin = !ISend && ring_empty_count(&netiring); + + netex = !SYNCHing; + + /* If we have seen a signal recently, reset things */ + + if (scheduler_lockout_tty) { + ttyin = ttyout = 0; + } + + /* Call to system code to process rings */ + + returnValue = process_rings(netin, netout, netex, ttyin, ttyout, !block); + + /* Now, look at the input rings, looking for work to do. */ + + if (ring_full_count(&ttyiring)) { + returnValue |= telsnd(); + } + + if (ring_full_count(&netiring)) { + returnValue |= telrcv(); + } + return returnValue; +} + +/* + * Select from tty and network... + */ +void +my_telnet(char *user) +{ + int printed_encrypt = 0; + + sys_telnet_init(); + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) + { + static char local_host[256] = { 0 }; + + if (!local_host[0]) { + /* XXX - should be k_gethostname? */ + gethostname(local_host, sizeof(local_host)); + local_host[sizeof(local_host)-1] = 0; + } + auth_encrypt_init(local_host, hostname, "TELNET", 0); + auth_encrypt_user(user); + } +#endif + if (telnetport) { +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + if (autologin) + send_will(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 1); +#endif +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + send_do(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); +#endif + send_do(TELOPT_SGA, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_TTYPE, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_NAWS, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_TSPEED, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_LFLOW, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_STATUS, 1); + if (env_getvalue((unsigned char *)"DISPLAY")) + send_will(TELOPT_XDISPLOC, 1); + if (binary) + tel_enter_binary(binary); + } + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + /* + * Note: we assume a tie to the authentication option here. This + * is necessary so that authentication fails, we don't spin + * forever. + */ + if (telnetport && wantencryption) { + extern int auth_has_failed; + time_t timeout = time(0) + 60; + + send_do(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); + while (1) { + if (my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) { + if (wantencryption == -1) { + break; + } else { + printf("\nServer refused to negotiate authentication,\n"); + printf("which is required for encryption.\n"); + Exit(1); + } + } + if (auth_has_failed) { + printf("\nAuthentication negotation has failed,\n"); + printf("which is required for encryption.\n"); + Exit(1); + } + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT) || + my_want_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) { + printf("\nServer refused to negotiate encryption.\n"); + Exit(1); + } + if (encrypt_is_encrypting()) + break; + if (time(0) > timeout) { + printf("\nEncryption could not be enabled.\n"); + Exit(1); + } + if (printed_encrypt == 0) { + printed_encrypt = 1; + printf("Waiting for encryption to be negotiated...\n"); + /* + * Turn on MODE_TRAPSIG and then turn off localchars + * so that ^C will cause telnet to exit. + */ + TerminalNewMode(getconnmode()|MODE_TRAPSIG); + intr_waiting = 1; + } + if (intr_happened) { + printf("\nUser interrupt.\n"); + Exit(1); + } + telnet_spin(); + } + if (printed_encrypt) { + printf("Encryption negotiated.\n"); + intr_waiting = 0; + setconnmode(0); + } + } +#endif + + for (;;) { + int schedValue; + + while ((schedValue = Scheduler(0)) != 0) { + if (schedValue == -1) { + setcommandmode(); + return; + } + } + + if (Scheduler(1) == -1) { + setcommandmode(); + return; + } + } +} + +/* + * netclear() + * + * We are about to do a TELNET SYNCH operation. Clear + * the path to the network. + * + * Things are a bit tricky since we may have sent the first + * byte or so of a previous TELNET command into the network. + * So, we have to scan the network buffer from the beginning + * until we are up to where we want to be. + * + * A side effect of what we do, just to keep things + * simple, is to clear the urgent data pointer. The principal + * caller should be setting the urgent data pointer AFTER calling + * us in any case. + */ + +static void +netclear() +{ +#if 0 /* XXX */ + char *thisitem, *next; + char *good; +#define wewant(p) ((nfrontp > p) && ((*p&0xff) == IAC) && \ + ((*(p+1)&0xff) != EC) && ((*(p+1)&0xff) != EL)) + + thisitem = netobuf; + + while ((next = nextitem(thisitem)) <= netobuf.send) { + thisitem = next; + } + + /* Now, thisitem is first before/at boundary. */ + + good = netobuf; /* where the good bytes go */ + + while (netoring.add > thisitem) { + if (wewant(thisitem)) { + int length; + + next = thisitem; + do { + next = nextitem(next); + } while (wewant(next) && (nfrontp > next)); + length = next-thisitem; + memmove(good, thisitem, length); + good += length; + thisitem = next; + } else { + thisitem = nextitem(thisitem); + } + } + +#endif /* 0 */ +} + +/* + * These routines add various telnet commands to the data stream. + */ + +static void +doflush() +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, DO); + NETADD(TELOPT_TM); + flushline = 1; + flushout = 1; + ttyflush(1); /* Flush/drop output */ + /* do printoption AFTER flush, otherwise the output gets tossed... */ + printoption("SENT", DO, TELOPT_TM); +} + +void +xmitAO(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, AO); + printoption("SENT", IAC, AO); + if (autoflush) { + doflush(); + } +} + + +void +xmitEL(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, EL); + printoption("SENT", IAC, EL); +} + +void +xmitEC(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, EC); + printoption("SENT", IAC, EC); +} + + +int +dosynch() +{ + netclear(); /* clear the path to the network */ + NETADD(IAC); + setneturg(); + NETADD(DM); + printoption("SENT", IAC, DM); + return 1; +} + +int want_status_response = 0; + +int +get_status() +{ + unsigned char tmp[16]; + unsigned char *cp; + + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_STATUS)) { + printf("Remote side does not support STATUS option\n"); + return 0; + } + cp = tmp; + + *cp++ = IAC; + *cp++ = SB; + *cp++ = TELOPT_STATUS; + *cp++ = TELQUAL_SEND; + *cp++ = IAC; + *cp++ = SE; + if (NETROOM() >= cp - tmp) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, tmp, cp-tmp); + printsub('>', tmp+2, cp - tmp - 2); + } + ++want_status_response; + return 1; +} + +void +intp(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, IP); + printoption("SENT", IAC, IP); + flushline = 1; + if (autoflush) { + doflush(); + } + if (autosynch) { + dosynch(); + } +} + +void +sendbrk(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, BREAK); + printoption("SENT", IAC, BREAK); + flushline = 1; + if (autoflush) { + doflush(); + } + if (autosynch) { + dosynch(); + } +} + +void +sendabort(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, ABORT); + printoption("SENT", IAC, ABORT); + flushline = 1; + if (autoflush) { + doflush(); + } + if (autosynch) { + dosynch(); + } +} + +void +sendsusp(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, SUSP); + printoption("SENT", IAC, SUSP); + flushline = 1; + if (autoflush) { + doflush(); + } + if (autosynch) { + dosynch(); + } +} + +void +sendeof(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, xEOF); + printoption("SENT", IAC, xEOF); +} + +void +sendayt(void) +{ + NET2ADD(IAC, AYT); + printoption("SENT", IAC, AYT); +} + +/* + * Send a window size update to the remote system. + */ + +void +sendnaws() +{ + long rows, cols; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + unsigned char *cp; + + if (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_NAWS)) + return; + +#undef PUTSHORT +#define PUTSHORT(cp, x) { if ((*cp++ = ((x)>>8)&0xff) == IAC) *cp++ = IAC; \ + if ((*cp++ = ((x))&0xff) == IAC) *cp++ = IAC; } + + if (TerminalWindowSize(&rows, &cols) == 0) { /* Failed */ + return; + } + + cp = tmp; + + *cp++ = IAC; + *cp++ = SB; + *cp++ = TELOPT_NAWS; + PUTSHORT(cp, cols); + PUTSHORT(cp, rows); + *cp++ = IAC; + *cp++ = SE; + if (NETROOM() >= cp - tmp) { + ring_supply_data(&netoring, tmp, cp-tmp); + printsub('>', tmp+2, cp - tmp - 2); + } +} + +void +tel_enter_binary(int rw) +{ + if (rw&1) + send_do(TELOPT_BINARY, 1); + if (rw&2) + send_will(TELOPT_BINARY, 1); +} + +void +tel_leave_binary(int rw) +{ + if (rw&1) + send_dont(TELOPT_BINARY, 1); + if (rw&2) + send_wont(TELOPT_BINARY, 1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58054bf5db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,722 @@ + +TELNET(1) UNIX Reference Manual TELNET(1) + +NNAAMMEE + tteellnneett - user interface to the TELNET protocol + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + tteellnneett [--7788EEFFKKLLaaccddffrrxx] [--SS _t_o_s] [--XX _a_u_t_h_t_y_p_e] [--ee _e_s_c_a_p_e_c_h_a_r] [--kk _r_e_a_l_m] + [--ll _u_s_e_r] [--nn _t_r_a_c_e_f_i_l_e] [_h_o_s_t [port]] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The tteellnneett command is used to communicate with another host using the + TELNET protocol. If tteellnneett is invoked without the _h_o_s_t argument, it en- + ters command mode, indicated by its prompt (tteellnneett>>). In this mode, it + accepts and executes the commands listed below. If it is invoked with + arguments, it performs an ooppeenn command with those arguments. + + Options: + + --88 Specifies an 8-bit data path. This causes an attempt to negoti- + ate the TELNET BINARY option on both input and output. + + --77 Do not try to negotiate TELNET BINARY option. + + --EE Stops any character from being recognized as an escape character. + + --FF If Kerberos V5 authentication is being used, the --FF option allows + the local credentials to be forwarded to the remote system, in- + cluding any credentials that have already been forwarded into the + local environment. + + --KK Specifies no automatic login to the remote system. + + --LL Specifies an 8-bit data path on output. This causes the BINARY + option to be negotiated on output. + + --SS _t_o_s Sets the IP type-of-service (TOS) option for the telnet connec- + tion to the value _t_o_s, which can be a numeric TOS value or, on + systems that support it, a symbolic TOS name found in the + /etc/iptos file. + + --XX _a_t_y_p_e + Disables the _a_t_y_p_e type of authentication. + + --aa Attempt automatic login. Currently, this sends the user name via + the USER variable of the ENVIRON option if supported by the re- + mote system. The name used is that of the current user as re- + turned by getlogin(2) if it agrees with the current user ID, oth- + erwise it is the name associated with the user ID. + + --cc Disables the reading of the user's _._t_e_l_n_e_t_r_c file. (See the + ttooggggllee sskkiipprrcc command on this man page.) + + --dd Sets the initial value of the ddeebbuugg toggle to TRUE + + --ee _e_s_c_a_p_e _c_h_a_r + Sets the initial tteellnneett tteellnneett escape character to _e_s_c_a_p_e _c_h_a_r. + If _e_s_c_a_p_e _c_h_a_r is omitted, then there will be no escape charac- + ter. + + --ff If Kerberos V5 authentication is being used, the --ff option allows + the local credentials to be forwarded to the remote system. + + --kk _r_e_a_l_m + If Kerberos authentication is being used, the --kk option requests + that telnet obtain tickets for the remote host in realm realm in- + stead of the remote host's realm, as determined by + krb_realmofhost(3). + + --ll _u_s_e_r + When connecting to the remote system, if the remote system under- + stands the ENVIRON option, then _u_s_e_r will be sent to the remote + system as the value for the variable USER. This option implies + the --aa option. This option may also be used with the ooppeenn com- + mand. + + --nn _t_r_a_c_e_f_i_l_e + Opens _t_r_a_c_e_f_i_l_e for recording trace information. See the sseett + ttrraacceeffiillee command below. + + --rr Specifies a user interface similar to rlogin(1). In this mode, + the escape character is set to the tilde (~) character, unless + modified by the -e option. + + --xx Turn on encryption of the data stream. When this option is + turned on, will exit with an error if authentication cannot be + negotiated or if encryption cannot be turned on. + + _h_o_s_t Indicates the official name, an alias, or the Internet address of + a remote host. + + _p_o_r_t Indicates a port number (address of an application). If a number + is not specified, the default tteellnneett port is used. + + When in rlogin mode, a line of the form ~. disconnects from the remote + host; ~ is the telnet escape character. Similarly, the line ~^Z suspends + the telnet session. The line ~^] escapes to the normal telnet escape + prompt. + + Once a connection has been opened, tteellnneett will attempt to enable the + TELNET LINEMODE option. If this fails, then tteellnneett will revert to one of + two input modes: either ``character at a time'' or ``old line by line'' + depending on what the remote system supports. + + When LINEMODE is enabled, character processing is done on the local sys- + tem, under the control of the remote system. When input editing or char- + acter echoing is to be disabled, the remote system will relay that infor- + mation. The remote system will also relay changes to any special charac- + ters that happen on the remote system, so that they can take effect on + the local system. + + In ``character at a time'' mode, most text typed is immediately sent to + the remote host for processing. + + In ``old line by line'' mode, all text is echoed locally, and (normally) + only completed lines are sent to the remote host. The ``local echo char- + acter'' (initially ``^E'') may be used to turn off and on the local echo + (this would mostly be used to enter passwords without the password being + echoed). + + If the LINEMODE option is enabled, or if the llooccaallcchhaarrss toggle is TRUE + (the default for ``old line by line``; see below), the user's qquuiitt, iinnttrr, + and fflluusshh characters are trapped locally, and sent as TELNET protocol se- + quences to the remote side. If LINEMODE has ever been enabled, then the + user's ssuusspp and eeooff are also sent as TELNET protocol sequences, and qquuiitt + is sent as a TELNET ABORT instead of BREAK There are options (see ttooggggllee + aauuttoofflluusshh and ttooggggllee aauuttoossyynncchh below) which cause this action to flush + subsequent output to the terminal (until the remote host acknowledges the + TELNET sequence) and flush previous terminal input (in the case of qquuiitt + and iinnttrr). + + + While connected to a remote host, tteellnneett command mode may be entered by + typing the tteellnneett ``escape character'' (initially ``^]''). When in com- + mand mode, the normal terminal editing conventions are available. + + The following tteellnneett commands are available. Only enough of each command + to uniquely identify it need be typed (this is also true for arguments to + the mmooddee, sseett, ttooggggllee, uunnsseett, ssllcc, eennvviirroonn, and ddiissppllaayy commands). + + aauutthh _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t _._._. + The auth command manipulates the information sent through the + TELNET AUTHENTICATE option. Valid arguments for the auth com- + mand are as follows: + + ddiissaabbllee _t_y_p_e Disables the specified type of authentication. + To obtain a list of available types, use the + aauutthh ddiissaabbllee ?? command. + + eennaabbllee _t_y_p_e Enables the specified type of authentication. + To obtain a list of available types, use the + aauutthh eennaabbllee ?? command. + + ssttaattuuss Lists the current status of the various types of + authentication. + + cclloossee Close a TELNET session and return to command mode. + + ddiissppllaayy _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t _._._. + Displays all, or some, of the sseett and ttooggggllee values (see be- + low). + + eennccrryypptt _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t _._._. + The encrypt command manipulates the information sent through + the TELNET ENCRYPT option. + + Note: Because of export controls, the TELNET ENCRYPT option + is not supported outside of the United States and Canada. + + Valid arguments for the encrypt command are as follows: + + ddiissaabbllee _t_y_p_e [iinnppuutt | oouuttppuutt] + Disables the specified type of encryption. If + you omit the input and output, both input and + output are disabled. To obtain a list of avail- + able types, use the eennccrryypptt ddiissaabbllee ?? command. + + eennaabbllee _t_y_p_e [iinnppuutt | oouuttppuutt] + Enables the specified type of encryption. If + you omit input and output, both input and output + are enabled. To obtain a list of available + types, use the eennccrryypptt eennaabbllee ?? command. + + iinnppuutt This is the same as the eennccrryypptt ssttaarrtt iinnppuutt com- + mand. + + --iinnppuutt This is the same as the eennccrryypptt ssttoopp iinnppuutt com- + mand. + + oouuttppuutt This is the same as the eennccrryypptt ssttaarrtt oouuttppuutt + command. + + --oouuttppuutt This is the same as the eennccrryypptt ssttoopp oouuttppuutt com- + mand. + + ssttaarrtt [iinnppuutt | oouuttppuutt] + Attempts to start encryption. If you omit iinnppuutt + and oouuttppuutt, both input and output are enabled. + To obtain a list of available types, use the + eennccrryypptt eennaabbllee ?? command. + + ssttaattuuss Lists the current status of encryption. + + ssttoopp [iinnppuutt | oouuttppuutt] + Stops encryption. If you omit input and output, + encryption is on both input and output. + + ttyyppee _t_y_p_e Sets the default type of encryption to be used + with later eennccrryypptt ssttaarrtt or eennccrryypptt ssttoopp com- + mands. + + eennvviirroonn _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t_s _._._. + The eennvviirroonn command is used to manipulate the the variables + that my be sent through the TELNET ENVIRON option. The ini- + tial set of variables is taken from the users environment, + with only the DISPLAY and PRINTER variables being exported by + default. The USER variable is also exported if the --aa or --ll + options are used. + + Valid arguments for the eennvviirroonn command are: + + ddeeffiinnee _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e _v_a_l_u_e + Define the variable _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e to have a value of + _v_a_l_u_e. Any variables defined by this command are + automatically exported. The _v_a_l_u_e may be enclosed + in single or double quotes so that tabs and spaces + may be included. + + uunnddeeffiinnee _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e + Remove _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e from the list of environment vari- + ables. + + eexxppoorrtt _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e + Mark the variable _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e to be exported to the + remote side. + + uunneexxppoorrtt _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e + Mark the variable _v_a_r_i_a_b_l_e to not be exported un- + less explicitly asked for by the remote side. + + lliisstt List the current set of environment variables. + Those marked with a ** will be sent automatically, + other variables will only be sent if explicitly + requested. + + ?? Prints out help information for the eennvviirroonn com- + mand. + + llooggoouutt Sends the TELNET LOGOUT option to the remote side. This com- + mand is similar to a cclloossee command; however, if the remote + side does not support the LOGOUT option, nothing happens. If, + however, the remote side does support the LOGOUT option, this + command should cause the remote side to close the TELNET con- + nection. If the remote side also supports the concept of sus- + pending a user's session for later reattachment, the logout + argument indicates that you should terminate the session imme- + diately. + + mmooddee _t_y_p_e _T_y_p_e is one of several options, depending on the state of the + TELNET session. The remote host is asked for permission to go + into the requested mode. If the remote host is capable of en- + + + tering that mode, the requested mode will be entered. + + cchhaarraacctteerr Disable the TELNET LINEMODE option, or, if the + remote side does not understand the LINEMODE op- + tion, then enter ``character at a time`` mode. + + lliinnee Enable the TELNET LINEMODE option, or, if the + remote side does not understand the LINEMODE op- + tion, then attempt to enter ``old-line-by-line`` + mode. + + iissiigg (--iissiigg) Attempt to enable (disable) the TRAPSIG mode of + the LINEMODE option. This requires that the + LINEMODE option be enabled. + + eeddiitt (--eeddiitt) Attempt to enable (disable) the EDIT mode of the + LINEMODE option. This requires that the + LINEMODE option be enabled. + + ssooffttttaabbss (--ssooffttttaabbss) + Attempt to enable (disable) the SOFT_TAB mode of + the LINEMODE option. This requires that the + LINEMODE option be enabled. + + lliitteecchhoo (--lliitteecchhoo) + Attempt to enable (disable) the LIT_ECHO mode of + the LINEMODE option. This requires that the + LINEMODE option be enabled. + + ?? Prints out help information for the mmooddee com- + mand. + + ooppeenn _h_o_s_t [--ll _u_s_e_r] [[--]_p_o_r_t] + Open a connection to the named host. If no port number is + specified, tteellnneett will attempt to contact a TELNET server at + the default port. The host specification may be either a host + name (see hosts(5)) or an Internet address specified in the + ``dot notation'' (see inet(3)). The [--ll] option may be used + to specify the user name to be passed to the remote system via + the ENVIRON option. When connecting to a non-standard port, + tteellnneett omits any automatic initiation of TELNET options. When + the port number is preceded by a minus sign, the initial op- + tion negotiation is done. After establishing a connection, + the file _._t_e_l_n_e_t_r_c in the users home directory is opened. + Lines beginning with a # are comment lines. Blank lines are + ignored. Lines that begin without white space are the start + of a machine entry. The first thing on the line is the name + of the machine that is being connected to. The rest of the + line, and successive lines that begin with white space are as- + sumed to be tteellnneett commands and are processed as if they had + been typed in manually to the tteellnneett command prompt. + + qquuiitt Close any open TELNET session and exit tteellnneett. An end of file + (in command mode) will also close a session and exit. + + sseenndd _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t_s + Sends one or more special character sequences to the remote + host. The following are the arguments which may be specified + (more than one argument may be specified at a time): + + aabboorrtt Sends the TELNET ABORT (Abort processes) sequence. + + aaoo Sends the TELNET AO (Abort Output) sequence, which + should cause the remote system to flush all output + + + _f_r_o_m the remote system _t_o the user's terminal. + + aayytt Sends the TELNET AYT (Are You There) sequence, to + which the remote system may or may not choose to re- + spond. + + bbrrkk Sends the TELNET BRK (Break) sequence, which may have + significance to the remote system. + + eecc Sends the TELNET EC (Erase Character) sequence, which + should cause the remote system to erase the last char- + acter entered. + + eell Sends the TELNET EL (Erase Line) sequence, which + should cause the remote system to erase the line cur- + rently being entered. + + eeooff Sends the TELNET EOF (End Of File) sequence. + + eeoorr Sends the TELNET EOR (End of Record) sequence. + + eessccaappee Sends the current tteellnneett escape character (initially + ``^''). + + ggaa Sends the TELNET GA (Go Ahead) sequence, which likely + has no significance to the remote system. + + ggeettssttaattuuss + If the remote side supports the TELNET STATUS command, + ggeettssttaattuuss will send the subnegotiation to request that + the server send its current option status. + + iipp Sends the TELNET IP (Interrupt Process) sequence, + which should cause the remote system to abort the cur- + rently running process. + + nnoopp Sends the TELNET NOP (No OPeration) sequence. + + ssuusspp Sends the TELNET SUSP (SUSPend process) sequence. + + ssyynncchh Sends the TELNET SYNCH sequence. This sequence causes + the remote system to discard all previously typed (but + not yet read) input. This sequence is sent as TCP ur- + gent data (and may not work if the remote system is a + 4.2BSD system -- if it doesn't work, a lower case + ``r'' may be echoed on the terminal). + + ddoo _c_m_d + + ddoonntt _c_m_d + + wwiillll _c_m_d + + wwoonntt _c_m_d + Sends the TELNET DO _c_m_d sequence. _C_m_d can be either a + decimal number between 0 and 255, or a symbolic name + for a specific TELNET command. _C_m_d can also be either + hheellpp or ?? to print out help information, including a + list of known symbolic names. + + ?? Prints out help information for the sseenndd command. + + sseett _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t _v_a_l_u_e + + uunnsseett _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t _v_a_l_u_e + The sseett command will set any one of a number of tteellnneett vari- + ables to a specific value or to TRUE. The special value ooffff + turns off the function associated with the variable, this is + equivalent to using the uunnsseett command. The uunnsseett command will + disable or set to FALSE any of the specified functions. The + values of variables may be interrogated with the ddiissppllaayy com- + mand. The variables which may be set or unset, but not tog- + gled, are listed here. In addition, any of the variables for + the ttooggggllee command may be explicitly set or unset using the + sseett and uunnsseett commands. + + aayytt If TELNET is in localchars mode, or LINEMODE is en- + abled, and the status character is typed, a TELNET AYT + sequence (see sseenndd aayytt preceding) is sent to the re- + mote host. The initial value for the "Are You There" + character is the terminal's status character. + + eecchhoo This is the value (initially ``^E'') which, when in + ``line by line'' mode, toggles between doing local + echoing of entered characters (for normal processing), + and suppressing echoing of entered characters (for en- + tering, say, a password). + + eeooff If tteellnneett is operating in LINEMODE or ``old line by + line'' mode, entering this character as the first + character on a line will cause this character to be + sent to the remote system. The initial value of the + eof character is taken to be the terminal's eeooff char- + acter. + + eerraassee If tteellnneett is in llooccaallcchhaarrss mode (see ttooggggllee llooccaallcchhaarrss + below), aanndd if tteellnneett is operating in ``character at a + time'' mode, then when this character is typed, a + TELNET EC sequence (see sseenndd eecc above) is sent to the + remote system. The initial value for the erase char- + acter is taken to be the terminal's eerraassee character. + + eessccaappee This is the tteellnneett escape character (initially ``^['') + which causes entry into tteellnneett command mode (when con- + nected to a remote system). + + fflluusshhoouuttppuutt + If tteellnneett is in llooccaallcchhaarrss mode (see ttooggggllee llooccaallcchhaarrss + below) and the fflluusshhoouuttppuutt character is typed, a + TELNET AO sequence (see sseenndd aaoo above) is sent to the + remote host. The initial value for the flush charac- + ter is taken to be the terminal's fflluusshh character. + + ffoorrww11 + + ffoorrww22 If TELNET is operating in LINEMODE, these are the + characters that, when typed, cause partial lines to be + forwarded to the remote system. The initial value for + the forwarding characters are taken from the termi- + nal's eol and eol2 characters. + + iinntteerrrruupptt + If tteellnneett is in llooccaallcchhaarrss mode (see ttooggggllee llooccaallcchhaarrss + below) and the iinntteerrrruupptt character is typed, a TELNET + IP sequence (see sseenndd iipp above) is sent to the remote + host. The initial value for the interrupt character + is taken to be the terminal's iinnttrr character. + + kkiillll If tteellnneett is in llooccaallcchhaarrss mode (see ttooggggllee llooccaallcchhaarrss + below), aanndd if tteellnneett is operating in ``character at a + time'' mode, then when this character is typed, a + TELNET EL sequence (see sseenndd eell above) is sent to the + remote system. The initial value for the kill charac- + ter is taken to be the terminal's kkiillll character. + + llnneexxtt If tteellnneett is operating in LINEMODE or ``old line by + line`` mode, then this character is taken to be the + terminal's llnneexxtt character. The initial value for the + lnext character is taken to be the terminal's llnneexxtt + character. + + qquuiitt If tteellnneett is in llooccaallcchhaarrss mode (see ttooggggllee llooccaallcchhaarrss + below) and the qquuiitt character is typed, a TELNET BRK + sequence (see sseenndd bbrrkk above) is sent to the remote + host. The initial value for the quit character is + taken to be the terminal's qquuiitt character. + + rreepprriinntt + If tteellnneett is operating in LINEMODE or ``old line by + line`` mode, then this character is taken to be the + terminal's rreepprriinntt character. The initial value for + the reprint character is taken to be the terminal's + rreepprriinntt character. + + rrllooggiinn This is the rlogin escape character. If set, the nor- + mal TELNET escape character is ignored unless it is + preceded by this character at the beginning of a line. + This character, at the beginning of a line followed by + a "." closes the connection; when followed by a ^Z it + suspends the telnet command. The initial state is to + disable the rlogin escape character. + + ssttaarrtt If the TELNET TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL option has been en- + abled, then this character is taken to be the termi- + nal's ssttaarrtt character. The initial value for the kill + character is taken to be the terminal's ssttaarrtt charac- + ter. + + ssttoopp If the TELNET TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL option has been en- + abled, then this character is taken to be the termi- + nal's ssttoopp character. The initial value for the kill + character is taken to be the terminal's ssttoopp charac- + ter. + + ssuusspp If tteellnneett is in llooccaallcchhaarrss mode, or LINEMODE is en- + abled, and the ssuussppeenndd character is typed, a TELNET + SUSP sequence (see sseenndd ssuusspp above) is sent to the re- + mote host. The initial value for the suspend charac- + ter is taken to be the terminal's ssuussppeenndd character. + + ttrraacceeffiillee + This is the file to which the output, caused by + nneettddaattaa or ooppttiioonn tracing being TRUE, will be written. + If it is set to ``--'', then tracing information will + be written to standard output (the default). + + wwoorrddeerraassee + If tteellnneett is operating in LINEMODE or ``old line by + line`` mode, then this character is taken to be the + terminal's wwoorrddeerraassee character. The initial value for + the worderase character is taken to be the terminal's + wwoorrddeerraassee character. + + ?? Displays the legal sseett (uunnsseett) commands. + + ssllcc _s_t_a_t_e The ssllcc command (Set Local Characters) is used to set or + change the state of the the special characters when the TELNET + LINEMODE option has been enabled. Special characters are + characters that get mapped to TELNET commands sequences (like + iipp or qquuiitt) or line editing characters (like eerraassee and kkiillll). + By default, the local special characters are exported. + + cchheecckk Verify the current settings for the current spe- + cial characters. The remote side is requested to + send all the current special character settings, + and if there are any discrepancies with the local + side, the local side will switch to the remote + value. + + eexxppoorrtt Switch to the local defaults for the special char- + acters. The local default characters are those of + the local terminal at the time when tteellnneett was + started. + + iimmppoorrtt Switch to the remote defaults for the special + characters. The remote default characters are + those of the remote system at the time when the + TELNET connection was established. + + ?? Prints out help information for the ssllcc command. + + ssttaattuuss Show the current status of tteellnneett. This includes the peer one + is connected to, as well as the current mode. + + ttooggggllee _a_r_g_u_m_e_n_t_s _._._. + Toggle (between TRUE and FALSE) various flags that control how + tteellnneett responds to events. These flags may be set explicitly + to TRUE or FALSE using the sseett and uunnsseett commands listed + above. More than one argument may be specified. The state of + these flags may be interrogated with the ddiissppllaayy command. + Valid arguments are: + + aauutthhddeebbuugg Turns on debugging information for the authenti- + cation code. + + aauuttoofflluusshh If aauuttoofflluusshh and llooccaallcchhaarrss are both TRUE, then + when the aaoo, or qquuiitt characters are recognized + (and transformed into TELNET sequences; see sseett + above for details), tteellnneett refuses to display + any data on the user's terminal until the remote + system acknowledges (via a TELNET TIMING MARK + option) that it has processed those TELNET se- + quences. The initial value for this toggle is + TRUE if the terminal user had not done an "stty + noflsh", otherwise FALSE (see stty(1)). + + aauuttooddeeccrryypptt When the TELNET ENCRYPT option is negotiated, by + default the actual encryption (decryption) of + the data stream does not start automatically. + The autoencrypt (autodecrypt) command states + that encryption of the output (input) stream + should be enabled as soon as possible. + + Note: Because of export controls, the TELNET + ENCRYPT option is not supported outside the + United States and Canada. + + aauuttoollooggiinn If the remote side supports the TELNET + AUTHENTICATION option TELNET attempts to use it + to perform automatic authentication. If the + AUTHENTICATION option is not supported, the us- + er's login name are propagated through the + TELNET ENVIRON option. This command is the same + + as specifying _a option on the ooppeenn command. + + aauuttoossyynncchh If aauuttoossyynncchh and llooccaallcchhaarrss are both TRUE, then + when either the iinnttrr or qquuiitt characters is typed + (see sseett above for descriptions of the iinnttrr and + qquuiitt characters), the resulting TELNET sequence + sent is followed by the TELNET SYNCH sequence. + This procedure sshhoouulldd cause the remote system to + begin throwing away all previously typed input + until both of the TELNET sequences have been + read and acted upon. The initial value of this + toggle is FALSE. + + bbiinnaarryy Enable or disable the TELNET BINARY option on + both input and output. + + iinnbbiinnaarryy Enable or disable the TELNET BINARY option on + input. + + oouuttbbiinnaarryy Enable or disable the TELNET BINARY option on + output. + + ccrrllff If this is TRUE, then carriage returns will be + sent as . If this is FALSE, then car- + riage returns will be send as . The + initial value for this toggle is FALSE. + + ccrrmmoodd Toggle carriage return mode. When this mode is + enabled, most carriage return characters re- + ceived from the remote host will be mapped into + a carriage return followed by a line feed. This + mode does not affect those characters typed by + the user, only those received from the remote + host. This mode is not very useful unless the + remote host only sends carriage return, but nev- + er line feed. The initial value for this toggle + is FALSE. + + ddeebbuugg Toggles socket level debugging (useful only to + the ssuuppeerr uusseerr). The initial value for this tog- + gle is FALSE. + + eennccddeebbuugg Turns on debugging information for the encryp- + tion code. + + llooccaallcchhaarrss If this is TRUE, then the fflluusshh, iinntteerrrruupptt, + qquuiitt, eerraassee, and kkiillll characters (see sseett above) + are recognized locally, and transformed into + (hopefully) appropriate TELNET control sequences + (respectively aaoo, iipp, bbrrkk, eecc, and eell; see sseenndd + above). The initial value for this toggle is + TRUE in ``old line by line'' mode, and FALSE in + ``character at a time'' mode. When the LINEMODE + option is enabled, the value of llooccaallcchhaarrss is + ignored, and assumed to always be TRUE. If + LINEMODE has ever been enabled, then qquuiitt is + sent as aabboorrtt, and eeooff and ssuussppeenndd are sent as + eeooff and ssuusspp, see sseenndd above). + + nneettddaattaa Toggles the display of all network data (in hex- + adecimal format). The initial value for this + toggle is FALSE. + + ooppttiioonnss Toggles the display of some internal tteellnneett pro- + tocol processing (having to do with TELNET op- + tions). The initial value for this toggle is + + FALSE. + + pprreettttyydduummpp When the nneettddaattaa toggle is enabled, if + pprreettttyydduummpp is enabled the output from the + nneettddaattaa command will be formatted in a more user + readable format. Spaces are put between each + character in the output, and the beginning of + any TELNET escape sequence is preceded by a '*' + to aid in locating them. + + sskkiipprrcc When the skiprc toggle is TRUE, TELNET skips the + reading of the _._t_e_l_n_e_t_r_c file in the users home + directory when connections are opened. The ini- + tial value for this toggle is FALSE. + + tteerrmmddaattaa Toggles the display of all terminal data (in + hexadecimal format). The initial value for this + toggle is FALSE. + + vveerrbboossee__eennccrryypptt + When the vveerrbboossee__eennccrryypptt toggle is TRUE, TELNET + prints out a message each time encryption is en- + abled or disabled. The initial value for this + toggle is FALSE. Note: Because of export con- + trols, data encryption is not supported outside + of the United States and Canada. + + ?? Displays the legal ttooggggllee commands. + + zz Suspend tteellnneett. This command only works when the user is using + the csh(1). + + !! [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d] + Execute a single command in a subshell on the local system. + If ccoommmmaanndd is omitted, then an interactive subshell is in- + voked. + + ?? [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d] + Get help. With no arguments, tteellnneett prints a help summary. + If a command is specified, tteellnneett will print the help informa- + tion for just that command. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + TTeellnneett uses at least the HOME, SHELL, DISPLAY, and TERM environment vari- + ables. Other environment variables may be propagated to the other side + via the TELNET ENVIRON option. + +FFIILLEESS + ~/.telnetrc user customized telnet startup values + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + The TTeellnneett command appeared in 4.2BSD. + +NNOOTTEESS + On some remote systems, echo has to be turned off manually when in ``old + line by line'' mode. + + In ``old line by line'' mode or LINEMODE the terminal's eeooff character is + only recognized (and sent to the remote system) when it is the first + character on a line. + +4.2 Berkeley Distribution June 1, 1994 11 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1183b677de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/telnet_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: telnet_locl.h,v 1.21 2001/12/20 20:39:52 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_BSDSETJMP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +/* termios.h *must* be included before curses.h */ +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#endif + +#if defined(SOCKS) && defined(HAVE_CURSES_H) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(HAVE_TERMIOS_H) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_TERMCAP_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +/* not with SunOS 4 */ +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#ifdef _AIX +struct sockaddr_dl; /* AIX fun */ +struct ether_addr; +#endif +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +/* krb.h? */ + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) || defined(ENCRYPTION) +#include +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#define LINEMODE +#ifndef KLUDGELINEMODE +#define KLUDGELINEMODE +#endif + +#include "ring.h" +#include "externs.h" +#include "defines.h" +#include "types.h" + +/* prototypes */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/terminal.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/terminal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..44e16111fc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/terminal.c @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: terminal.c,v 1.11 2001/03/06 20:10:14 assar Exp $"); + +Ring ttyoring, ttyiring; +unsigned char ttyobuf[2*BUFSIZ], ttyibuf[BUFSIZ]; + +int termdata; /* Debugging flag */ + +# ifndef VDISCARD +cc_t termFlushChar; +# endif +# ifndef VLNEXT +cc_t termLiteralNextChar; +# endif +# ifndef VSUSP +cc_t termSuspChar; +# endif +# ifndef VWERASE +cc_t termWerasChar; +# endif +# ifndef VREPRINT +cc_t termRprntChar; +# endif +# ifndef VSTART +cc_t termStartChar; +# endif +# ifndef VSTOP +cc_t termStopChar; +# endif +# ifndef VEOL +cc_t termForw1Char; +# endif +# ifndef VEOL2 +cc_t termForw2Char; +# endif +# ifndef VSTATUS +cc_t termAytChar; +# endif + +/* + * initialize the terminal data structures. + */ + +void +init_terminal(void) +{ + if (ring_init(&ttyoring, ttyobuf, sizeof ttyobuf) != 1) { + exit(1); + } + if (ring_init(&ttyiring, ttyibuf, sizeof ttyibuf) != 1) { + exit(1); + } + autoflush = TerminalAutoFlush(); +} + + +/* + * Send as much data as possible to the terminal. + * + * Return value: + * -1: No useful work done, data waiting to go out. + * 0: No data was waiting, so nothing was done. + * 1: All waiting data was written out. + * n: All data - n was written out. + */ + + +int +ttyflush(int drop) +{ + int n, n0, n1; + + n0 = ring_full_count(&ttyoring); + if ((n1 = n = ring_full_consecutive(&ttyoring)) > 0) { + if (drop) { + TerminalFlushOutput(); + /* we leave 'n' alone! */ + } else { + n = TerminalWrite((char *)ttyoring.consume, n); + } + } + if (n > 0) { + if (termdata && n) { + Dump('>', ttyoring.consume, n); + } + /* + * If we wrote everything, and the full count is + * larger than what we wrote, then write the + * rest of the buffer. + */ + if (n1 == n && n0 > n) { + n1 = n0 - n; + if (!drop) + n1 = TerminalWrite((char *)ttyoring.bottom, n1); + if (n1 > 0) + n += n1; + } + ring_consumed(&ttyoring, n); + } + if (n < 0) + return -1; + if (n == n0) { + if (n0) + return -1; + return 0; + } + return n0 - n + 1; +} + + +/* + * These routines decides on what the mode should be (based on the values + * of various global variables). + */ + + +int +getconnmode(void) +{ + int mode = 0; + + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_ECHO)) + mode |= MODE_ECHO; + + if (localflow) + mode |= MODE_FLOW; + + if ((eight & 1) || my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY)) + mode |= MODE_INBIN; + + if (eight & 2) + mode |= MODE_OUT8; + if (his_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_BINARY)) + mode |= MODE_OUTBIN; + +#ifdef KLUDGELINEMODE + if (kludgelinemode) { + if (my_want_state_is_dont(TELOPT_SGA)) { + mode |= (MODE_TRAPSIG|MODE_EDIT); + if (dontlecho && (clocks.echotoggle > clocks.modenegotiated)) { + mode &= ~MODE_ECHO; + } + } + return(mode); + } +#endif + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_LINEMODE)) + mode |= linemode; + return(mode); +} + + void +setconnmode(force) + int force; +{ +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + static int enc_passwd = 0; +#endif + int newmode; + + newmode = getconnmode()|(force?MODE_FORCE:0); + + TerminalNewMode(newmode); + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if ((newmode & (MODE_ECHO|MODE_EDIT)) == MODE_EDIT) { + if (my_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT) + && (enc_passwd == 0) && !encrypt_output) { + encrypt_request_start(0, 0); + enc_passwd = 1; + } + } else { + if (enc_passwd) { + encrypt_request_end(); + enc_passwd = 0; + } + } +#endif + +} + + + void +setcommandmode() +{ + TerminalNewMode(-1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/types.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..191d311fd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/types.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)types.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93 + */ + +typedef struct { + char *modedescriptions; + char modetype; +} Modelist; + +extern Modelist modelist[]; + +typedef struct { + int + system, /* what the current time is */ + echotoggle, /* last time user entered echo character */ + modenegotiated, /* last time operating mode negotiated */ + didnetreceive, /* last time we read data from network */ + gotDM; /* when did we last see a data mark */ +} Clocks; + +extern Clocks clocks; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/utilities.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/utilities.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c326d5aad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnet/utilities.c @@ -0,0 +1,864 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#define TELOPTS +#define TELCMDS +#define SLC_NAMES + +#include "telnet_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: utilities.c,v 1.25 2001/08/29 00:45:21 assar Exp $"); + +FILE *NetTrace = 0; /* Not in bss, since needs to stay */ +int prettydump; + +/* + * SetSockOpt() + * + * Compensate for differences in 4.2 and 4.3 systems. + */ + +int +SetSockOpt(int fd, int level, int option, int yesno) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SETSOCKOPT +#ifndef NOT43 + return setsockopt(fd, level, option, + (void *)&yesno, sizeof yesno); +#else /* NOT43 */ + if (yesno == 0) { /* Can't do that in 4.2! */ + fprintf(stderr, "Error: attempt to turn off an option 0x%x.\n", + option); + return -1; + } + return setsockopt(fd, level, option, 0, 0); +#endif /* NOT43 */ +#else + return -1; +#endif +} + +/* + * The following are routines used to print out debugging information. + */ + +char NetTraceFile[256] = "(standard output)"; + +void +SetNetTrace(char *file) +{ + if (NetTrace && NetTrace != stdout) + fclose(NetTrace); + if (file && (strcmp(file, "-") != 0)) { + NetTrace = fopen(file, "w"); + if (NetTrace) { + strlcpy(NetTraceFile, file, sizeof(NetTraceFile)); + return; + } + fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open %s.\n", file); + } + NetTrace = stdout; + strlcpy(NetTraceFile, "(standard output)", sizeof(NetTraceFile)); +} + +void +Dump(char direction, unsigned char *buffer, int length) +{ +# define BYTES_PER_LINE 32 + unsigned char *pThis; + int offset; + + offset = 0; + + while (length) { + /* print one line */ + fprintf(NetTrace, "%c 0x%x\t", direction, offset); + pThis = buffer; + if (prettydump) { + buffer = buffer + min(length, BYTES_PER_LINE/2); + while (pThis < buffer) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "%c%.2x", + (((*pThis)&0xff) == 0xff) ? '*' : ' ', + (*pThis)&0xff); + pThis++; + } + length -= BYTES_PER_LINE/2; + offset += BYTES_PER_LINE/2; + } else { + buffer = buffer + min(length, BYTES_PER_LINE); + while (pThis < buffer) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "%.2x", (*pThis)&0xff); + pThis++; + } + length -= BYTES_PER_LINE; + offset += BYTES_PER_LINE; + } + if (NetTrace == stdout) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\r\n"); + } else { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\n"); + } + if (length < 0) { + fflush(NetTrace); + return; + } + /* find next unique line */ + } + fflush(NetTrace); +} + + +void +printoption(char *direction, int cmd, int option) +{ + if (!showoptions) + return; + if (cmd == IAC) { + if (TELCMD_OK(option)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s IAC %s", direction, TELCMD(option)); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s IAC %d", direction, option); + } else { + char *fmt; + fmt = (cmd == WILL) ? "WILL" : (cmd == WONT) ? "WONT" : + (cmd == DO) ? "DO" : (cmd == DONT) ? "DONT" : 0; + if (fmt) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s %s ", direction, fmt); + if (TELOPT_OK(option)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s", TELOPT(option)); + else if (option == TELOPT_EXOPL) + fprintf(NetTrace, "EXOPL"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d", option); + } else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s %d %d", direction, cmd, option); + } + if (NetTrace == stdout) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\r\n"); + fflush(NetTrace); + } else { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\n"); + } + return; +} + +void +optionstatus(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (do_dont_resp[i]) { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf("resp DO_DONT %s: %d\n", TELOPT(i), do_dont_resp[i]); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf("resp DO_DONT %s: %d\n", TELCMD(i), do_dont_resp[i]); + else + printf("resp DO_DONT %d: %d\n", i, + do_dont_resp[i]); + if (my_want_state_is_do(i)) { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf("want DO %s\n", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf("want DO %s\n", TELCMD(i)); + else + printf("want DO %d\n", i); + } else { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf("want DONT %s\n", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf("want DONT %s\n", TELCMD(i)); + else + printf("want DONT %d\n", i); + } + } else { + if (my_state_is_do(i)) { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf(" DO %s\n", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf(" DO %s\n", TELCMD(i)); + else + printf(" DO %d\n", i); + } + } + if (will_wont_resp[i]) { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf("resp WILL_WONT %s: %d\n", TELOPT(i), will_wont_resp[i]); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf("resp WILL_WONT %s: %d\n", TELCMD(i), will_wont_resp[i]); + else + printf("resp WILL_WONT %d: %d\n", + i, will_wont_resp[i]); + if (my_want_state_is_will(i)) { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf("want WILL %s\n", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf("want WILL %s\n", TELCMD(i)); + else + printf("want WILL %d\n", i); + } else { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf("want WONT %s\n", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf("want WONT %s\n", TELCMD(i)); + else + printf("want WONT %d\n", i); + } + } else { + if (my_state_is_will(i)) { + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + printf(" WILL %s\n", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + printf(" WILL %s\n", TELCMD(i)); + else + printf(" WILL %d\n", i); + } + } + } + +} + +void +printsub(int direction, unsigned char *pointer, int length) +{ + int i; + unsigned char buf[512]; + + if (showoptions || direction == 0 || + (want_status_response && (pointer[0] == TELOPT_STATUS))) { + if (direction) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s IAC SB ", + (direction == '<')? "RCVD":"SENT"); + if (length >= 3) { + int j; + + i = pointer[length-2]; + j = pointer[length-1]; + + if (i != IAC || j != SE) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "(terminated by "); + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s ", TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s ", TELCMD(i)); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d ", i); + if (TELOPT_OK(j)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s", TELOPT(j)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(j)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s", TELCMD(j)); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d", j); + fprintf(NetTrace, ", not IAC SE!) "); + } + } + length -= 2; + } + if (length < 1) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "(Empty suboption??\?)"); + if (NetTrace == stdout) + fflush(NetTrace); + return; + } + switch (pointer[0]) { + case TELOPT_TTYPE: + fprintf(NetTrace, "TERMINAL-TYPE "); + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + fprintf(NetTrace, "IS \"%.*s\"", length-2, (char *)pointer+2); + break; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + fprintf(NetTrace, "SEND"); + break; + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, + "- unknown qualifier %d (0x%x).", + pointer[1], pointer[1]); + } + break; + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + fprintf(NetTrace, "TERMINAL-SPEED"); + if (length < 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + fprintf(NetTrace, " IS "); + fprintf(NetTrace, "%.*s", length-2, (char *)pointer+2); + break; + default: + if (pointer[1] == 1) + fprintf(NetTrace, " SEND"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[i]); + break; + } + break; + + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + fprintf(NetTrace, "TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL"); + if (length < 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case LFLOW_OFF: + fprintf(NetTrace, " OFF"); break; + case LFLOW_ON: + fprintf(NetTrace, " ON"); break; + case LFLOW_RESTART_ANY: + fprintf(NetTrace, " RESTART-ANY"); break; + case LFLOW_RESTART_XON: + fprintf(NetTrace, " RESTART-XON"); break; + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + } + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[i]); + break; + + case TELOPT_NAWS: + fprintf(NetTrace, "NAWS"); + if (length < 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + if (length == 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[1]); + break; + } + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d %d (%d)", + pointer[1], pointer[2], + (int)((((unsigned int)pointer[1])<<8)|((unsigned int)pointer[2]))); + if (length == 4) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[3]); + break; + } + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d %d (%d)", + pointer[3], pointer[4], + (int)((((unsigned int)pointer[3])<<8)|((unsigned int)pointer[4]))); + for (i = 5; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[i]); + break; + +#if defined(AUTHENTICATION) + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + fprintf(NetTrace, "AUTHENTICATION"); + if (length < 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_REPLY: + case TELQUAL_IS: + fprintf(NetTrace, " %s ", (pointer[1] == TELQUAL_IS) ? + "IS" : "REPLY"); + if (AUTHTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[2])) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s ", AUTHTYPE_NAME(pointer[2])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d ", pointer[2]); + if (length < 3) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "(partial suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s|%s", + ((pointer[3] & AUTH_WHO_MASK) == AUTH_WHO_CLIENT) ? + "CLIENT" : "SERVER", + ((pointer[3] & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) ? + "MUTUAL" : "ONE-WAY"); + + auth_printsub(&pointer[1], length - 1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s", buf); + break; + + case TELQUAL_SEND: + i = 2; + fprintf(NetTrace, " SEND "); + while (i < length) { + if (AUTHTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[i])) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s ", AUTHTYPE_NAME(pointer[i])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d ", pointer[i]); + if (++i >= length) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "(partial suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s|%s ", + ((pointer[i] & AUTH_WHO_MASK) == AUTH_WHO_CLIENT) ? + "CLIENT" : "SERVER", + ((pointer[i] & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) ? + "MUTUAL" : "ONE-WAY"); + ++i; + } + break; + + case TELQUAL_NAME: + i = 2; + fprintf(NetTrace, " NAME \""); + while (i < length) + putc(pointer[i++], NetTrace); + putc('"', NetTrace); + break; + + default: + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[i]); + break; + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + fprintf(NetTrace, "ENCRYPT"); + if (length < 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (empty suboption?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case ENCRYPT_START: + fprintf(NetTrace, " START"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_END: + fprintf(NetTrace, " END"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_REQSTART: + fprintf(NetTrace, " REQUEST-START"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_REQEND: + fprintf(NetTrace, " REQUEST-END"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_IS: + case ENCRYPT_REPLY: + fprintf(NetTrace, " %s ", (pointer[1] == ENCRYPT_IS) ? + "IS" : "REPLY"); + if (length < 3) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (partial suboption?)"); + break; + } + if (ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[2])) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s ", ENCTYPE_NAME(pointer[2])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d (unknown)", pointer[2]); + + encrypt_printsub(&pointer[1], length - 1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s", buf); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_SUPPORT: + i = 2; + fprintf(NetTrace, " SUPPORT "); + while (i < length) { + if (ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[i])) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s ", ENCTYPE_NAME(pointer[i])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d ", pointer[i]); + i++; + } + break; + + case ENCRYPT_ENC_KEYID: + fprintf(NetTrace, " ENC_KEYID "); + goto encommon; + + case ENCRYPT_DEC_KEYID: + fprintf(NetTrace, " DEC_KEYID "); + goto encommon; + + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + encommon: + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d", pointer[i]); + break; + } + break; +#endif + + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: + fprintf(NetTrace, "LINEMODE "); + if (length < 2) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case WILL: + fprintf(NetTrace, "WILL "); + goto common; + case WONT: + fprintf(NetTrace, "WONT "); + goto common; + case DO: + fprintf(NetTrace, "DO "); + goto common; + case DONT: + fprintf(NetTrace, "DONT "); + common: + if (length < 3) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "(no option??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[2]) { + case LM_FORWARDMASK: + fprintf(NetTrace, "Forward Mask"); + for (i = 3; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %x", pointer[i]); + break; + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d (unknown)", pointer[2]); + for (i = 3; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d", pointer[i]); + break; + } + break; + + case LM_SLC: + fprintf(NetTrace, "SLC"); + for (i = 2; i < length - 2; i += 3) { + if (SLC_NAME_OK(pointer[i+SLC_FUNC])) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %s", SLC_NAME(pointer[i+SLC_FUNC])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d", pointer[i+SLC_FUNC]); + switch (pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_LEVELBITS) { + case SLC_NOSUPPORT: + fprintf(NetTrace, " NOSUPPORT"); break; + case SLC_CANTCHANGE: + fprintf(NetTrace, " CANTCHANGE"); break; + case SLC_VARIABLE: + fprintf(NetTrace, " VARIABLE"); break; + case SLC_DEFAULT: + fprintf(NetTrace, " DEFAULT"); break; + } + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s%s%s", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_ACK ? "|ACK" : "", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_FLUSHIN ? "|FLUSHIN" : "", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_FLUSHOUT ? "|FLUSHOUT" : ""); + if (pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]& ~(SLC_ACK|SLC_FLUSHIN| + SLC_FLUSHOUT| SLC_LEVELBITS)) + fprintf(NetTrace, "(0x%x)", pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]); + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d;", pointer[i+SLC_VALUE]); + if ((pointer[i+SLC_VALUE] == IAC) && + (pointer[i+SLC_VALUE+1] == IAC)) + i++; + } + for (; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[i]); + break; + + case LM_MODE: + fprintf(NetTrace, "MODE "); + if (length < 3) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "(no mode??\?)"); + break; + } + { + char tbuf[64]; + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), + "%s%s%s%s%s", + pointer[2]&MODE_EDIT ? "|EDIT" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_TRAPSIG ? "|TRAPSIG" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_SOFT_TAB ? "|SOFT_TAB" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_LIT_ECHO ? "|LIT_ECHO" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_ACK ? "|ACK" : ""); + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s", tbuf[1] ? &tbuf[1] : "0"); + } + if (pointer[2]&~(MODE_MASK)) + fprintf(NetTrace, " (0x%x)", pointer[2]); + for (i = 3; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?0x%x?", pointer[i]); + break; + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d", pointer[i]); + } + break; + + case TELOPT_STATUS: { + char *cp; + int j, k; + + fprintf(NetTrace, "STATUS"); + + switch (pointer[1]) { + default: + if (pointer[1] == TELQUAL_SEND) + fprintf(NetTrace, " SEND"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " ?%d?", pointer[i]); + break; + case TELQUAL_IS: + if (--want_status_response < 0) + want_status_response = 0; + if (NetTrace == stdout) + fprintf(NetTrace, " IS\r\n"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, " IS\n"); + + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + switch(pointer[i]) { + case DO: cp = "DO"; goto common2; + case DONT: cp = "DONT"; goto common2; + case WILL: cp = "WILL"; goto common2; + case WONT: cp = "WONT"; goto common2; + common2: + i++; + if (TELOPT_OK((int)pointer[i])) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %s %s", cp, TELOPT(pointer[i])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, " %s %d", cp, pointer[i]); + + if (NetTrace == stdout) + fprintf(NetTrace, "\r\n"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "\n"); + break; + + case SB: + fprintf(NetTrace, " SB "); + i++; + j = k = i; + while (j < length) { + if (pointer[j] == SE) { + if (j+1 == length) + break; + if (pointer[j+1] == SE) + j++; + else + break; + } + pointer[k++] = pointer[j++]; + } + printsub(0, &pointer[i], k - i); + if (i < length) { + fprintf(NetTrace, " SE"); + i = j; + } else + i = j - 1; + + if (NetTrace == stdout) + fprintf(NetTrace, "\r\n"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "\n"); + + break; + + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d", pointer[i]); + break; + } + } + break; + } + break; + } + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: + fprintf(NetTrace, "X-DISPLAY-LOCATION "); + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + fprintf(NetTrace, "IS \"%.*s\"", length-2, (char *)pointer+2); + break; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + fprintf(NetTrace, "SEND"); + break; + default: + fprintf(NetTrace, "- unknown qualifier %d (0x%x).", + pointer[1], pointer[1]); + } + break; + + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: + fprintf(NetTrace, "NEW-ENVIRON "); +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + goto env_common1; + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: + fprintf(NetTrace, "OLD-ENVIRON"); + env_common1: +#endif + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + fprintf(NetTrace, "IS "); + goto env_common; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + fprintf(NetTrace, "SEND "); + goto env_common; + case TELQUAL_INFO: + fprintf(NetTrace, "INFO "); + env_common: + { + int noquote = 2; + for (i = 2; i < length; i++ ) { + switch (pointer[i]) { + case NEW_ENV_VALUE: +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + /* case NEW_ENV_OVAR: */ + if (pointer[0] == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" VAR " + noquote); + } else +#endif /* OLD_ENVIRON */ + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" VALUE " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + case NEW_ENV_VAR: +#ifdef OLD_ENVIRON + /* case OLD_ENV_VALUE: */ + if (pointer[0] == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" VALUE " + noquote); + } else +#endif /* OLD_ENVIRON */ + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" VAR " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + case ENV_ESC: + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" ESC " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + case ENV_USERVAR: + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" USERVAR " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + default: + if (isprint(pointer[i]) && pointer[i] != '"') { + if (noquote) { + putc('"', NetTrace); + noquote = 0; + } + putc(pointer[i], NetTrace); + } else { + fprintf(NetTrace, "\" %03o " + noquote, + pointer[i]); + noquote = 2; + } + break; + } + } + if (!noquote) + putc('"', NetTrace); + break; + } + } + break; + + default: + if (TELOPT_OK(pointer[0])) + fprintf(NetTrace, "%s (unknown)", TELOPT(pointer[0])); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "%d (unknown)", pointer[0]); + for (i = 1; i < length; i++) + fprintf(NetTrace, " %d", pointer[i]); + break; + } + if (direction) { + if (NetTrace == stdout) + fprintf(NetTrace, "\r\n"); + else + fprintf(NetTrace, "\n"); + } + if (NetTrace == stdout) + fflush(NetTrace); + } +} + +/* EmptyTerminal - called to make sure that the terminal buffer is empty. + * Note that we consider the buffer to run all the + * way to the kernel (thus the select). + */ + +void +EmptyTerminal(void) +{ + fd_set outs; + + FD_ZERO(&outs); + + if (tout >= FD_SETSIZE) + ExitString("fd too large", 1); + + if (TTYBYTES() == 0) { + FD_SET(tout, &outs); + select(tout+1, 0, &outs, 0, + (struct timeval *) 0); /* wait for TTLOWAT */ + } else { + while (TTYBYTES()) { + ttyflush(0); + FD_SET(tout, &outs); + select(tout+1, 0, &outs, 0, + (struct timeval *) 0); /* wait for TTLOWAT */ + } + } +} + +void +SetForExit(void) +{ + setconnmode(0); + do { + telrcv(); /* Process any incoming data */ + EmptyTerminal(); + } while (ring_full_count(&netiring)); /* While there is any */ + setcommandmode(); + fflush(stdout); + fflush(stderr); + setconnmode(0); + EmptyTerminal(); /* Flush the path to the tty */ + setcommandmode(); +} + +void +Exit(int returnCode) +{ + SetForExit(); + exit(returnCode); +} + +void +ExitString(char *string, int returnCode) +{ + SetForExit(); + fwrite(string, 1, strlen(string), stderr); + exit(returnCode); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19e10bc8b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.18 2001/08/28 11:21:17 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/.. $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) + +libexec_PROGRAMS = telnetd + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +telnetd_SOURCES = telnetd.c state.c termstat.c slc.c sys_term.c \ + utility.c global.c authenc.c defs.h ext.h telnetd.h + +man_MANS = telnetd.8 + +LDADD = \ + ../libtelnet/libtelnet.a \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_tgetent) \ + $(LIB_logwtmp) \ + $(LIB_logout) \ + $(LIB_openpty) \ + $(LIB_kdfs) \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a14fc4f3e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,831 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.18 2001/08/28 11:21:17 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(telnetd_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common 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"$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/authenc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/authenc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14594ea22c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/authenc.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: authenc.c,v 1.10 2000/11/15 23:20:43 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + +int +telnet_net_write(unsigned char *str, int len) +{ + if (nfrontp + len < netobuf + BUFSIZ) { + memmove(nfrontp, str, len); + nfrontp += len; + return(len); + } + return(0); +} + +void +net_encrypt(void) +{ +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + char *s = (nclearto > nbackp) ? nclearto : nbackp; + if (s < nfrontp && encrypt_output) { + (*encrypt_output)((unsigned char *)s, nfrontp - s); + } + nclearto = nfrontp; +#endif +} + +int +telnet_spin(void) +{ + return ttloop(); +} + +char * +telnet_getenv(const char *val) +{ + return(getenv(val)); +} + +char * +telnet_gets(char *prompt, char *result, int length, int echo) +{ + return NULL; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/defs.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/defs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..add8fd2151 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/defs.h @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)defs.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +/* + * Telnet server defines + */ + +#ifndef __DEFS_H__ +#define __DEFS_H__ + +#ifndef BSD +# define BSD 43 +#endif + +#if defined(PRINTOPTIONS) && defined(DIAGNOSTICS) +#define TELOPTS +#define TELCMDS +#define SLC_NAMES +#endif + +#if !defined(TIOCSCTTY) && defined(TCSETCTTY) +# define TIOCSCTTY TCSETCTTY +#endif + +#ifndef TIOCPKT_FLUSHWRITE +#define TIOCPKT_FLUSHWRITE 0x02 +#endif + +#ifndef TIOCPKT_NOSTOP +#define TIOCPKT_NOSTOP 0x10 +#endif + +#ifndef TIOCPKT_DOSTOP +#define TIOCPKT_DOSTOP 0x20 +#endif + +/* + * I/O data buffers defines + */ +#define NETSLOP 64 +#ifdef _CRAY +#undef BUFSIZ +#define BUFSIZ 2048 +#endif + +#define NIACCUM(c) { *netip++ = c; \ + ncc++; \ + } + +/* clock manipulations */ +#define settimer(x) (clocks.x = ++clocks.system) +#define sequenceIs(x,y) (clocks.x < clocks.y) + +/* + * Structures of information for each special character function. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char flag; /* the flags for this function */ + cc_t val; /* the value of the special character */ +} slcent, *Slcent; + +typedef struct { + slcent defset; /* the default settings */ + slcent current; /* the current settings */ + cc_t *sptr; /* a pointer to the char in */ + /* system data structures */ +} slcfun, *Slcfun; + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS +/* + * Diagnostics capabilities + */ +#define TD_REPORT 0x01 /* Report operations to client */ +#define TD_EXERCISE 0x02 /* Exercise client's implementation */ +#define TD_NETDATA 0x04 /* Display received data stream */ +#define TD_PTYDATA 0x08 /* Display data passed to pty */ +#define TD_OPTIONS 0x10 /* Report just telnet options */ +#endif /* DIAGNOSTICS */ + +/* + * We keep track of each side of the option negotiation. + */ + +#define MY_STATE_WILL 0x01 +#define MY_WANT_STATE_WILL 0x02 +#define MY_STATE_DO 0x04 +#define MY_WANT_STATE_DO 0x08 + +/* + * Macros to check the current state of things + */ + +#define my_state_is_do(opt) (options[opt]&MY_STATE_DO) +#define my_state_is_will(opt) (options[opt]&MY_STATE_WILL) +#define my_want_state_is_do(opt) (options[opt]&MY_WANT_STATE_DO) +#define my_want_state_is_will(opt) (options[opt]&MY_WANT_STATE_WILL) + +#define my_state_is_dont(opt) (!my_state_is_do(opt)) +#define my_state_is_wont(opt) (!my_state_is_will(opt)) +#define my_want_state_is_dont(opt) (!my_want_state_is_do(opt)) +#define my_want_state_is_wont(opt) (!my_want_state_is_will(opt)) + +#define set_my_state_do(opt) (options[opt] |= MY_STATE_DO) +#define set_my_state_will(opt) (options[opt] |= MY_STATE_WILL) +#define set_my_want_state_do(opt) (options[opt] |= MY_WANT_STATE_DO) +#define set_my_want_state_will(opt) (options[opt] |= MY_WANT_STATE_WILL) + +#define set_my_state_dont(opt) (options[opt] &= ~MY_STATE_DO) +#define set_my_state_wont(opt) (options[opt] &= ~MY_STATE_WILL) +#define set_my_want_state_dont(opt) (options[opt] &= ~MY_WANT_STATE_DO) +#define set_my_want_state_wont(opt) (options[opt] &= ~MY_WANT_STATE_WILL) + +/* + * Tricky code here. What we want to know is if the MY_STATE_WILL + * and MY_WANT_STATE_WILL bits have the same value. Since the two + * bits are adjacent, a little arithmatic will show that by adding + * in the lower bit, the upper bit will be set if the two bits were + * different, and clear if they were the same. + */ +#define my_will_wont_is_changing(opt) \ + ((options[opt]+MY_STATE_WILL) & MY_WANT_STATE_WILL) + +#define my_do_dont_is_changing(opt) \ + ((options[opt]+MY_STATE_DO) & MY_WANT_STATE_DO) + +/* + * Make everything symmetrical + */ + +#define HIS_STATE_WILL MY_STATE_DO +#define HIS_WANT_STATE_WILL MY_WANT_STATE_DO +#define HIS_STATE_DO MY_STATE_WILL +#define HIS_WANT_STATE_DO MY_WANT_STATE_WILL + +#define his_state_is_do my_state_is_will +#define his_state_is_will my_state_is_do +#define his_want_state_is_do my_want_state_is_will +#define his_want_state_is_will my_want_state_is_do + +#define his_state_is_dont my_state_is_wont +#define his_state_is_wont my_state_is_dont +#define his_want_state_is_dont my_want_state_is_wont +#define his_want_state_is_wont my_want_state_is_dont + +#define set_his_state_do set_my_state_will +#define set_his_state_will set_my_state_do +#define set_his_want_state_do set_my_want_state_will +#define set_his_want_state_will set_my_want_state_do + +#define set_his_state_dont set_my_state_wont +#define set_his_state_wont set_my_state_dont +#define set_his_want_state_dont set_my_want_state_wont +#define set_his_want_state_wont set_my_want_state_dont + +#define his_will_wont_is_changing my_do_dont_is_changing +#define his_do_dont_is_changing my_will_wont_is_changing + +#endif /* __DEFS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/ext.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/ext.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f9993415e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/ext.h @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)ext.h 8.2 (Berkeley) 12/15/93 + */ + +/* $Id: ext.h,v 1.23 2001/08/29 00:45:22 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __EXT_H__ +#define __EXT_H__ + +/* + * Telnet server variable declarations + */ +extern char options[256]; +extern char do_dont_resp[256]; +extern char will_wont_resp[256]; +extern int flowmode; /* current flow control state */ +extern int restartany; /* restart output on any character state */ +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS +extern int diagnostic; /* telnet diagnostic capabilities */ +#endif /* DIAGNOSTICS */ +extern int require_otp; +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION +extern int auth_level; +#endif +extern const char *new_login; + +extern slcfun slctab[NSLC + 1]; /* slc mapping table */ + +extern char *terminaltype; + +/* + * I/O data buffers, pointers, and counters. + */ +extern char ptyobuf[BUFSIZ+NETSLOP], *pfrontp, *pbackp; + +extern char netibuf[BUFSIZ], *netip; + +extern char netobuf[BUFSIZ+NETSLOP], *nfrontp, *nbackp; +extern char *neturg; /* one past last bye of urgent data */ + +extern int pcc, ncc; + +extern int ourpty, net; +extern char *line; +extern int SYNCHing; /* we are in TELNET SYNCH mode */ + +int telnet_net_write (unsigned char *str, int len); +void net_encrypt (void); +int telnet_spin (void); +char *telnet_getenv (const char *val); +char *telnet_gets (char *prompt, char *result, int length, int echo); +void get_slc_defaults (void); +void telrcv (void); +void send_do (int option, int init); +void willoption (int option); +void send_dont (int option, int init); +void wontoption (int option); +void send_will (int option, int init); +void dooption (int option); +void send_wont (int option, int init); +void dontoption (int option); +void suboption (void); +void doclientstat (void); +void send_status (void); +void init_termbuf (void); +void set_termbuf (void); +int spcset (int func, cc_t *valp, cc_t **valpp); +void set_utid (void); +int getpty (int *ptynum); +int tty_isecho (void); +int tty_flowmode (void); +int tty_restartany (void); +void tty_setecho (int on); +int tty_israw (void); +void tty_binaryin (int on); +void tty_binaryout (int on); +int tty_isbinaryin (void); +int tty_isbinaryout (void); +int tty_issofttab (void); +void tty_setsofttab (int on); +int tty_islitecho (void); +void tty_setlitecho (int on); +int tty_iscrnl (void); +void tty_tspeed (int val); +void tty_rspeed (int val); +void getptyslave (void); +int cleanopen (char *line); +void startslave (const char *host, const char *, int autologin, char *autoname); +void init_env (void); +void start_login (const char *host, int autologin, char *name); +void cleanup (int sig); +int main (int argc, char **argv); +int getterminaltype (char *name, size_t); +void _gettermname (void); +int terminaltypeok (char *s); +void my_telnet (int f, int p, const char*, const char *, int, char*); +void interrupt (void); +void sendbrk (void); +void sendsusp (void); +void recv_ayt (void); +void doeof (void); +void flowstat (void); +void clientstat (int code, int parm1, int parm2); +int ttloop (void); +int stilloob (int s); +void ptyflush (void); +char *nextitem (char *current); +void netclear (void); +void netflush (void); +void writenet (unsigned char *ptr, int len); +void fatal (int f, char *msg); +void fatalperror (int f, const char *msg); +void fatalperror_errno (int f, const char *msg, int error); +void edithost (char *pat, char *host); +void putstr (char *s); +void putchr (int cc); +void putf (char *cp, char *where); +void printoption (char *fmt, int option); +void printsub (int direction, unsigned char *pointer, int length); +void printdata (char *tag, char *ptr, int cnt); +int login_tty(int t); + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION +extern void (*encrypt_output) (unsigned char *, int); +extern int (*decrypt_input) (int); +extern char *nclearto; +#endif + + +/* + * The following are some clocks used to decide how to interpret + * the relationship between various variables. + */ + +struct clocks_t{ + int + system, /* what the current time is */ + echotoggle, /* last time user entered echo character */ + modenegotiated, /* last time operating mode negotiated */ + didnetreceive, /* last time we read data from network */ + ttypesubopt, /* ttype subopt is received */ + tspeedsubopt, /* tspeed subopt is received */ + environsubopt, /* environ subopt is received */ + oenvironsubopt, /* old environ subopt is received */ + xdisplocsubopt, /* xdisploc subopt is received */ + baseline, /* time started to do timed action */ + gotDM; /* when did we last see a data mark */ +}; +extern struct clocks_t clocks; + +extern int log_unauth; +extern int no_warn; + +extern int def_tspeed, def_rspeed; +#ifdef TIOCSWINSZ +extern int def_row, def_col; +#endif + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY +extern int really_stream; +#endif + +#ifndef USE_IM +# ifdef CRAY +# define USE_IM "Cray UNICOS (%h) (%t)" +# endif +# ifdef _AIX +# define USE_IM "%s %v.%r (%h) (%t)" +# endif +# ifndef USE_IM +# define USE_IM "%s %r (%h) (%t)" +# endif +#endif + +#define DEFAULT_IM "\r\n\r\n" USE_IM "\r\n\r\n\r\n" + +#endif /* __EXT_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/global.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/global.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..54d1a777ab --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/global.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* a *lot* of ugly global definitions that really should be removed... + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: global.c,v 1.13 2001/07/19 16:00:42 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Telnet server variable declarations + */ +char options[256]; +char do_dont_resp[256]; +char will_wont_resp[256]; +int linemode; /* linemode on/off */ +int flowmode; /* current flow control state */ +int restartany; /* restart output on any character state */ +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS +int diagnostic; /* telnet diagnostic capabilities */ +#endif /* DIAGNOSTICS */ +int require_otp; + +slcfun slctab[NSLC + 1]; /* slc mapping table */ + +char *terminaltype; + +/* + * I/O data buffers, pointers, and counters. + */ +char ptyobuf[BUFSIZ+NETSLOP], *pfrontp, *pbackp; + +char netibuf[BUFSIZ], *netip; + +char netobuf[BUFSIZ+NETSLOP], *nfrontp, *nbackp; +char *neturg; /* one past last bye of urgent data */ + +int pcc, ncc; + +int ourpty, net; +int SYNCHing; /* we are in TELNET SYNCH mode */ + +/* + * The following are some clocks used to decide how to interpret + * the relationship between various variables. + */ + +struct clocks_t clocks; + + +/* whether to log unauthenticated login attempts */ +int log_unauth; + +/* do not print warning if connection is not encrypted */ +int no_warn; + +/* + * This function appends data to nfrontp and advances nfrontp. + */ + +int +output_data (const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int remaining, ret; + + va_start(args, format); + remaining = BUFSIZ - (nfrontp - netobuf); + ret = vsnprintf (nfrontp, + remaining, + format, + args); + nfrontp += min(ret, remaining-1); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/slc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/slc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..799d2d807c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/slc.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: slc.c,v 1.10 1997/05/11 06:30:00 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * get_slc_defaults + * + * Initialize the slc mapping table. + */ +void +get_slc_defaults(void) +{ + int i; + + init_termbuf(); + + for (i = 1; i <= NSLC; i++) { + slctab[i].defset.flag = + spcset(i, &slctab[i].defset.val, &slctab[i].sptr); + slctab[i].current.flag = SLC_NOSUPPORT; + slctab[i].current.val = 0; + } + +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/state.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/state.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3bc7f63253 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/state.c @@ -0,0 +1,1357 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: state.c,v 1.14.12.1 2004/06/21 08:21:58 lha Exp $"); + +unsigned char doopt[] = { IAC, DO, '%', 'c', 0 }; +unsigned char dont[] = { IAC, DONT, '%', 'c', 0 }; +unsigned char will[] = { IAC, WILL, '%', 'c', 0 }; +unsigned char wont[] = { IAC, WONT, '%', 'c', 0 }; +int not42 = 1; + +/* + * Buffer for sub-options, and macros + * for suboptions buffer manipulations + */ +unsigned char subbuffer[1024*64], *subpointer= subbuffer, *subend= subbuffer; + +#define SB_CLEAR() subpointer = subbuffer +#define SB_TERM() { subend = subpointer; SB_CLEAR(); } +#define SB_ACCUM(c) if (subpointer < (subbuffer+sizeof subbuffer)) { \ + *subpointer++ = (c); \ + } +#define SB_GET() ((*subpointer++)&0xff) +#define SB_EOF() (subpointer >= subend) +#define SB_LEN() (subend - subpointer) + +#ifdef ENV_HACK +unsigned char *subsave; +#define SB_SAVE() subsave = subpointer; +#define SB_RESTORE() subpointer = subsave; +#endif + + +/* + * State for recv fsm + */ +#define TS_DATA 0 /* base state */ +#define TS_IAC 1 /* look for double IAC's */ +#define TS_CR 2 /* CR-LF ->'s CR */ +#define TS_SB 3 /* throw away begin's... */ +#define TS_SE 4 /* ...end's (suboption negotiation) */ +#define TS_WILL 5 /* will option negotiation */ +#define TS_WONT 6 /* wont -''- */ +#define TS_DO 7 /* do -''- */ +#define TS_DONT 8 /* dont -''- */ + +void +telrcv(void) +{ + int c; + static int state = TS_DATA; + + while (ncc > 0) { + if ((&ptyobuf[BUFSIZ] - pfrontp) < 2) + break; + c = *netip++ & 0377, ncc--; +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (decrypt_input) + c = (*decrypt_input)(c); +#endif + switch (state) { + + case TS_CR: + state = TS_DATA; + /* Strip off \n or \0 after a \r */ + if ((c == 0) || (c == '\n')) { + break; + } + /* FALL THROUGH */ + + case TS_DATA: + if (c == IAC) { + state = TS_IAC; + break; + } + /* + * We now map \r\n ==> \r for pragmatic reasons. + * Many client implementations send \r\n when + * the user hits the CarriageReturn key. + * + * We USED to map \r\n ==> \n, since \r\n says + * that we want to be in column 1 of the next + * printable line, and \n is the standard + * unix way of saying that (\r is only good + * if CRMOD is set, which it normally is). + */ + if ((c == '\r') && his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY)) { + int nc = *netip; +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (decrypt_input) + nc = (*decrypt_input)(nc & 0xff); +#endif + { +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (decrypt_input) + (void)(*decrypt_input)(-1); +#endif + state = TS_CR; + } + } + *pfrontp++ = c; + break; + + case TS_IAC: + gotiac: switch (c) { + + /* + * Send the process on the pty side an + * interrupt. Do this with a NULL or + * interrupt char; depending on the tty mode. + */ + case IP: + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: recv IAC", c)); + interrupt(); + break; + + case BREAK: + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: recv IAC", c)); + sendbrk(); + break; + + /* + * Are You There? + */ + case AYT: + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: recv IAC", c)); + recv_ayt(); + break; + + /* + * Abort Output + */ + case AO: + { + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: recv IAC", c)); + ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */ + init_termbuf(); + + if (slctab[SLC_AO].sptr && + *slctab[SLC_AO].sptr != (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE)) { + *pfrontp++ = + (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_AO].sptr; + } + + netclear(); /* clear buffer back */ + output_data ("%c%c", IAC, DM); + neturg = nfrontp-1; /* off by one XXX */ + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: send IAC", DM)); + break; + } + + /* + * Erase Character and + * Erase Line + */ + case EC: + case EL: + { + cc_t ch; + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: recv IAC", c)); + ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */ + init_termbuf(); + if (c == EC) + ch = *slctab[SLC_EC].sptr; + else + ch = *slctab[SLC_EL].sptr; + if (ch != (cc_t)(_POSIX_VDISABLE)) + *pfrontp++ = (unsigned char)ch; + break; + } + + /* + * Check for urgent data... + */ + case DM: + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: recv IAC", c)); + SYNCHing = stilloob(net); + settimer(gotDM); + break; + + + /* + * Begin option subnegotiation... + */ + case SB: + state = TS_SB; + SB_CLEAR(); + continue; + + case WILL: + state = TS_WILL; + continue; + + case WONT: + state = TS_WONT; + continue; + + case DO: + state = TS_DO; + continue; + + case DONT: + state = TS_DONT; + continue; + case EOR: + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_EOR)) + doeof(); + break; + + /* + * Handle RFC 10xx Telnet linemode option additions + * to command stream (EOF, SUSP, ABORT). + */ + case xEOF: + doeof(); + break; + + case SUSP: + sendsusp(); + break; + + case ABORT: + sendbrk(); + break; + + case IAC: + *pfrontp++ = c; + break; + } + state = TS_DATA; + break; + + case TS_SB: + if (c == IAC) { + state = TS_SE; + } else { + SB_ACCUM(c); + } + break; + + case TS_SE: + if (c != SE) { + if (c != IAC) { + /* + * bad form of suboption negotiation. + * handle it in such a way as to avoid + * damage to local state. Parse + * suboption buffer found so far, + * then treat remaining stream as + * another command sequence. + */ + + /* for DIAGNOSTICS */ + SB_ACCUM(IAC); + SB_ACCUM(c); + subpointer -= 2; + + SB_TERM(); + suboption(); + state = TS_IAC; + goto gotiac; + } + SB_ACCUM(c); + state = TS_SB; + } else { + /* for DIAGNOSTICS */ + SB_ACCUM(IAC); + SB_ACCUM(SE); + subpointer -= 2; + + SB_TERM(); + suboption(); /* handle sub-option */ + state = TS_DATA; + } + break; + + case TS_WILL: + willoption(c); + state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_WONT: + wontoption(c); + if (c==TELOPT_ENCRYPT && his_do_dont_is_changing(TELOPT_ENCRYPT) ) + dontoption(c); + state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_DO: + dooption(c); + state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + case TS_DONT: + dontoption(c); + state = TS_DATA; + continue; + + default: + syslog(LOG_ERR, "telnetd: panic state=%d\n", state); + printf("telnetd: panic state=%d\n", state); + exit(1); + } + } +} /* end of telrcv */ + +/* + * The will/wont/do/dont state machines are based on Dave Borman's + * Telnet option processing state machine. + * + * These correspond to the following states: + * my_state = the last negotiated state + * want_state = what I want the state to go to + * want_resp = how many requests I have sent + * All state defaults are negative, and resp defaults to 0. + * + * When initiating a request to change state to new_state: + * + * if ((want_resp == 0 && new_state == my_state) || want_state == new_state) { + * do nothing; + * } else { + * want_state = new_state; + * send new_state; + * want_resp++; + * } + * + * When receiving new_state: + * + * if (want_resp) { + * want_resp--; + * if (want_resp && (new_state == my_state)) + * want_resp--; + * } + * if ((want_resp == 0) && (new_state != want_state)) { + * if (ok_to_switch_to new_state) + * want_state = new_state; + * else + * want_resp++; + * send want_state; + * } + * my_state = new_state; + * + * Note that new_state is implied in these functions by the function itself. + * will and do imply positive new_state, wont and dont imply negative. + * + * Finally, there is one catch. If we send a negative response to a + * positive request, my_state will be the positive while want_state will + * remain negative. my_state will revert to negative when the negative + * acknowlegment arrives from the peer. Thus, my_state generally tells + * us not only the last negotiated state, but also tells us what the peer + * wants to be doing as well. It is important to understand this difference + * as we may wish to be processing data streams based on our desired state + * (want_state) or based on what the peer thinks the state is (my_state). + * + * This all works fine because if the peer sends a positive request, the data + * that we receive prior to negative acknowlegment will probably be affected + * by the positive state, and we can process it as such (if we can; if we + * can't then it really doesn't matter). If it is that important, then the + * peer probably should be buffering until this option state negotiation + * is complete. + * + */ +void +send_do(int option, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if ((do_dont_resp[option] == 0 && his_state_is_will(option)) || + his_want_state_is_will(option)) + return; + /* + * Special case for TELOPT_TM: We send a DO, but pretend + * that we sent a DONT, so that we can send more DOs if + * we want to. + */ + if (option == TELOPT_TM) + set_his_want_state_wont(option); + else + set_his_want_state_will(option); + do_dont_resp[option]++; + } + output_data((const char *)doopt, option); + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: send do", option)); +} + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION +extern void auth_request(void); +#endif +#ifdef ENCRYPTION +extern void encrypt_send_support(); +#endif + +void +willoption(int option) +{ + int changeok = 0; + void (*func)() = 0; + + /* + * process input from peer. + */ + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: recv will", option)); + + if (do_dont_resp[option]) { + do_dont_resp[option]--; + if (do_dont_resp[option] && his_state_is_will(option)) + do_dont_resp[option]--; + } + if (do_dont_resp[option] == 0) { + if (his_want_state_is_wont(option)) { + switch (option) { + + case TELOPT_BINARY: + init_termbuf(); + tty_binaryin(1); + set_termbuf(); + changeok++; + break; + + case TELOPT_ECHO: + /* + * See comments below for more info. + */ + not42 = 0; /* looks like a 4.2 system */ + break; + + case TELOPT_TM: + /* + * We never respond to a WILL TM, and + * we leave the state WONT. + */ + return; + + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + /* + * If we are going to support flow control + * option, then don't worry peer that we can't + * change the flow control characters. + */ + slctab[SLC_XON].defset.flag &= ~SLC_LEVELBITS; + slctab[SLC_XON].defset.flag |= SLC_DEFAULT; + slctab[SLC_XOFF].defset.flag &= ~SLC_LEVELBITS; + slctab[SLC_XOFF].defset.flag |= SLC_DEFAULT; + case TELOPT_TTYPE: + case TELOPT_SGA: + case TELOPT_NAWS: + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: + changeok++; + break; + + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + func = auth_request; + changeok++; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + func = encrypt_send_support; + changeok++; + break; +#endif + + default: + break; + } + if (changeok) { + set_his_want_state_will(option); + send_do(option, 0); + } else { + do_dont_resp[option]++; + send_dont(option, 0); + } + } else { + /* + * Option processing that should happen when + * we receive conformation of a change in + * state that we had requested. + */ + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_ECHO: + not42 = 0; /* looks like a 4.2 system */ + /* + * Egads, he responded "WILL ECHO". Turn + * it off right now! + */ + send_dont(option, 1); + /* + * "WILL ECHO". Kludge upon kludge! + * A 4.2 client is now echoing user input at + * the tty. This is probably undesireable and + * it should be stopped. The client will + * respond WONT TM to the DO TM that we send to + * check for kludge linemode. When the WONT TM + * arrives, linemode will be turned off and a + * change propogated to the pty. This change + * will cause us to process the new pty state + * in localstat(), which will notice that + * linemode is off and send a WILL ECHO + * so that we are properly in character mode and + * all is well. + */ + break; + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + func = auth_request; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + func = encrypt_send_support; + break; +#endif + + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + func = flowstat; + break; + } + } + } + set_his_state_will(option); + if (func) + (*func)(); +} /* end of willoption */ + +void +send_dont(int option, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if ((do_dont_resp[option] == 0 && his_state_is_wont(option)) || + his_want_state_is_wont(option)) + return; + set_his_want_state_wont(option); + do_dont_resp[option]++; + } + output_data((const char *)dont, option); + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: send dont", option)); +} + +void +wontoption(int option) +{ + /* + * Process client input. + */ + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: recv wont", option)); + + if (do_dont_resp[option]) { + do_dont_resp[option]--; + if (do_dont_resp[option] && his_state_is_wont(option)) + do_dont_resp[option]--; + } + if (do_dont_resp[option] == 0) { + if (his_want_state_is_will(option)) { + /* it is always ok to change to negative state */ + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_ECHO: + not42 = 1; /* doesn't seem to be a 4.2 system */ + break; + + case TELOPT_BINARY: + init_termbuf(); + tty_binaryin(0); + set_termbuf(); + break; + + case TELOPT_TM: + /* + * If we get a WONT TM, and had sent a DO TM, + * don't respond with a DONT TM, just leave it + * as is. Short circut the state machine to + * achive this. + */ + set_his_want_state_wont(TELOPT_TM); + return; + + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + /* + * If we are not going to support flow control + * option, then let peer know that we can't + * change the flow control characters. + */ + slctab[SLC_XON].defset.flag &= ~SLC_LEVELBITS; + slctab[SLC_XON].defset.flag |= SLC_CANTCHANGE; + slctab[SLC_XOFF].defset.flag &= ~SLC_LEVELBITS; + slctab[SLC_XOFF].defset.flag |= SLC_CANTCHANGE; + break; + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + auth_finished(0, AUTH_REJECT); + break; +#endif + + /* + * For options that we might spin waiting for + * sub-negotiation, if the client turns off the + * option rather than responding to the request, + * we have to treat it here as if we got a response + * to the sub-negotiation, (by updating the timers) + * so that we'll break out of the loop. + */ + case TELOPT_TTYPE: + settimer(ttypesubopt); + break; + + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + settimer(tspeedsubopt); + break; + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: + settimer(xdisplocsubopt); + break; + + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: + settimer(oenvironsubopt); + break; + + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: + settimer(environsubopt); + break; + + default: + break; + } + set_his_want_state_wont(option); + if (his_state_is_will(option)) + send_dont(option, 0); + } else { + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_TM: + break; + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + auth_finished(0, AUTH_REJECT); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + } + set_his_state_wont(option); + +} /* end of wontoption */ + +void +send_will(int option, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if ((will_wont_resp[option] == 0 && my_state_is_will(option))|| + my_want_state_is_will(option)) + return; + set_my_want_state_will(option); + will_wont_resp[option]++; + } + output_data ((const char *)will, option); + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: send will", option)); +} + +/* + * When we get a DONT SGA, we will try once to turn it + * back on. If the other side responds DONT SGA, we + * leave it at that. This is so that when we talk to + * clients that understand KLUDGELINEMODE but not LINEMODE, + * we'll keep them in char-at-a-time mode. + */ +int turn_on_sga = 0; + +void +dooption(int option) +{ + int changeok = 0; + + /* + * Process client input. + */ + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: recv do", option)); + + if (will_wont_resp[option]) { + will_wont_resp[option]--; + if (will_wont_resp[option] && my_state_is_will(option)) + will_wont_resp[option]--; + } + if ((will_wont_resp[option] == 0) && (my_want_state_is_wont(option))) { + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_ECHO: + { + init_termbuf(); + tty_setecho(1); + set_termbuf(); + } + changeok++; + break; + + case TELOPT_BINARY: + init_termbuf(); + tty_binaryout(1); + set_termbuf(); + changeok++; + break; + + case TELOPT_SGA: + turn_on_sga = 0; + changeok++; + break; + + case TELOPT_STATUS: + changeok++; + break; + + case TELOPT_TM: + /* + * Special case for TM. We send a WILL, but + * pretend we sent a WONT. + */ + send_will(option, 0); + set_my_want_state_wont(option); + set_my_state_wont(option); + return; + + case TELOPT_LOGOUT: + /* + * When we get a LOGOUT option, respond + * with a WILL LOGOUT, make sure that + * it gets written out to the network, + * and then just go away... + */ + set_my_want_state_will(TELOPT_LOGOUT); + send_will(TELOPT_LOGOUT, 0); + set_my_state_will(TELOPT_LOGOUT); + netflush(); + cleanup(0); + /* NOT REACHED */ + break; + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + changeok++; + break; +#endif + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: + case TELOPT_TTYPE: + case TELOPT_NAWS: + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: +#ifdef TELOPT_ENVIRON + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: +#endif + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: + default: + break; + } + if (changeok) { + set_my_want_state_will(option); + send_will(option, 0); + } else { + will_wont_resp[option]++; + send_wont(option, 0); + } + } + set_my_state_will(option); + +} /* end of dooption */ + +void +send_wont(int option, int init) +{ + if (init) { + if ((will_wont_resp[option] == 0 && my_state_is_wont(option)) || + my_want_state_is_wont(option)) + return; + set_my_want_state_wont(option); + will_wont_resp[option]++; + } + output_data ((const char *)wont, option); + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: send wont", option)); +} + +void +dontoption(int option) +{ + /* + * Process client input. + */ + + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printoption("td: recv dont", option)); + + if (will_wont_resp[option]) { + will_wont_resp[option]--; + if (will_wont_resp[option] && my_state_is_wont(option)) + will_wont_resp[option]--; + } + if ((will_wont_resp[option] == 0) && (my_want_state_is_will(option))) { + switch (option) { + case TELOPT_BINARY: + init_termbuf(); + tty_binaryout(0); + set_termbuf(); + break; + + case TELOPT_ECHO: /* we should stop echoing */ + { + init_termbuf(); + tty_setecho(0); + set_termbuf(); + } + break; + + case TELOPT_SGA: + set_my_want_state_wont(option); + if (my_state_is_will(option)) + send_wont(option, 0); + set_my_state_wont(option); + if (turn_on_sga ^= 1) + send_will(option, 1); + return; + + default: + break; + } + + set_my_want_state_wont(option); + if (my_state_is_will(option)) + send_wont(option, 0); + } + set_my_state_wont(option); + +} /* end of dontoption */ + +#ifdef ENV_HACK +int env_ovar = -1; +int env_ovalue = -1; +#else /* ENV_HACK */ +# define env_ovar OLD_ENV_VAR +# define env_ovalue OLD_ENV_VALUE +#endif /* ENV_HACK */ + +/* + * suboption() + * + * Look at the sub-option buffer, and try to be helpful to the other + * side. + * + * Currently we recognize: + * + * Terminal type is + * Linemode + * Window size + * Terminal speed + */ +void +suboption(void) +{ + int subchar; + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, {netflush(); printsub('<', subpointer, SB_LEN()+2);}); + + subchar = SB_GET(); + switch (subchar) { + case TELOPT_TSPEED: { + int xspeed, rspeed; + + if (his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TSPEED)) /* Ignore if option disabled */ + break; + + settimer(tspeedsubopt); + + if (SB_EOF() || SB_GET() != TELQUAL_IS) + return; + + xspeed = atoi((char *)subpointer); + + while (SB_GET() != ',' && !SB_EOF()); + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + + rspeed = atoi((char *)subpointer); + clientstat(TELOPT_TSPEED, xspeed, rspeed); + + break; + + } /* end of case TELOPT_TSPEED */ + + case TELOPT_TTYPE: { /* Yaaaay! */ + static char terminalname[41]; + + if (his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TTYPE)) /* Ignore if option disabled */ + break; + settimer(ttypesubopt); + + if (SB_EOF() || SB_GET() != TELQUAL_IS) { + return; /* ??? XXX but, this is the most robust */ + } + + terminaltype = terminalname; + + while ((terminaltype < (terminalname + sizeof terminalname-1)) && + !SB_EOF()) { + int c; + + c = SB_GET(); + if (isupper(c)) { + c = tolower(c); + } + *terminaltype++ = c; /* accumulate name */ + } + *terminaltype = 0; + terminaltype = terminalname; + break; + } /* end of case TELOPT_TTYPE */ + + case TELOPT_NAWS: { + int xwinsize, ywinsize; + + if (his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_NAWS)) /* Ignore if option disabled */ + break; + + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + xwinsize = SB_GET() << 8; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + xwinsize |= SB_GET(); + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + ywinsize = SB_GET() << 8; + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + ywinsize |= SB_GET(); + clientstat(TELOPT_NAWS, xwinsize, ywinsize); + + break; + + } /* end of case TELOPT_NAWS */ + + case TELOPT_STATUS: { + int mode; + + if (SB_EOF()) + break; + mode = SB_GET(); + switch (mode) { + case TELQUAL_SEND: + if (my_state_is_will(TELOPT_STATUS)) + send_status(); + break; + + case TELQUAL_IS: + break; + + default: + break; + } + break; + } /* end of case TELOPT_STATUS */ + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: { + if (SB_EOF() || SB_GET() != TELQUAL_IS) + return; + settimer(xdisplocsubopt); + subpointer[SB_LEN()] = '\0'; + esetenv("DISPLAY", (char *)subpointer, 1); + break; + } /* end of case TELOPT_XDISPLOC */ + +#ifdef TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: +#endif + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: { + int c; + char *cp, *varp, *valp; + + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + c = SB_GET(); + if (c == TELQUAL_IS) { + if (subchar == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) + settimer(oenvironsubopt); + else + settimer(environsubopt); + } else if (c != TELQUAL_INFO) { + return; + } + +#ifdef TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON + if (subchar == TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON) { + while (!SB_EOF()) { + c = SB_GET(); + if ((c == NEW_ENV_VAR) || (c == ENV_USERVAR)) + break; + } + } else +#endif + { +#ifdef ENV_HACK + /* + * We only want to do this if we haven't already decided + * whether or not the other side has its VALUE and VAR + * reversed. + */ + if (env_ovar < 0) { + int last = -1; /* invalid value */ + int empty = 0; + int got_var = 0, got_value = 0, got_uservar = 0; + + /* + * The other side might have its VALUE and VAR values + * reversed. To be interoperable, we need to determine + * which way it is. If the first recognized character + * is a VAR or VALUE, then that will tell us what + * type of client it is. If the fist recognized + * character is a USERVAR, then we continue scanning + * the suboption looking for two consecutive + * VAR or VALUE fields. We should not get two + * consecutive VALUE fields, so finding two + * consecutive VALUE or VAR fields will tell us + * what the client is. + */ + SB_SAVE(); + while (!SB_EOF()) { + c = SB_GET(); + switch(c) { + case OLD_ENV_VAR: + if (last < 0 || last == OLD_ENV_VAR + || (empty && (last == OLD_ENV_VALUE))) + goto env_ovar_ok; + got_var++; + last = OLD_ENV_VAR; + break; + case OLD_ENV_VALUE: + if (last < 0 || last == OLD_ENV_VALUE + || (empty && (last == OLD_ENV_VAR))) + goto env_ovar_wrong; + got_value++; + last = OLD_ENV_VALUE; + break; + case ENV_USERVAR: + /* count strings of USERVAR as one */ + if (last != ENV_USERVAR) + got_uservar++; + if (empty) { + if (last == OLD_ENV_VALUE) + goto env_ovar_ok; + if (last == OLD_ENV_VAR) + goto env_ovar_wrong; + } + last = ENV_USERVAR; + break; + case ENV_ESC: + if (!SB_EOF()) + c = SB_GET(); + /* FALL THROUGH */ + default: + empty = 0; + continue; + } + empty = 1; + } + if (empty) { + if (last == OLD_ENV_VALUE) + goto env_ovar_ok; + if (last == OLD_ENV_VAR) + goto env_ovar_wrong; + } + /* + * Ok, the first thing was a USERVAR, and there + * are not two consecutive VAR or VALUE commands, + * and none of the VAR or VALUE commands are empty. + * If the client has sent us a well-formed option, + * then the number of VALUEs received should always + * be less than or equal to the number of VARs and + * USERVARs received. + * + * If we got exactly as many VALUEs as VARs and + * USERVARs, the client has the same definitions. + * + * If we got exactly as many VARs as VALUEs and + * USERVARS, the client has reversed definitions. + */ + if (got_uservar + got_var == got_value) { + env_ovar_ok: + env_ovar = OLD_ENV_VAR; + env_ovalue = OLD_ENV_VALUE; + } else if (got_uservar + got_value == got_var) { + env_ovar_wrong: + env_ovar = OLD_ENV_VALUE; + env_ovalue = OLD_ENV_VAR; + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, { + output_data("ENVIRON VALUE and VAR are reversed!\r\n"); + }); + + } + } + SB_RESTORE(); +#endif + + while (!SB_EOF()) { + c = SB_GET(); + if ((c == env_ovar) || (c == ENV_USERVAR)) + break; + } + } + + if (SB_EOF()) + return; + + cp = varp = (char *)subpointer; + valp = 0; + + while (!SB_EOF()) { + c = SB_GET(); + if (subchar == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) { + if (c == env_ovar) + c = NEW_ENV_VAR; + else if (c == env_ovalue) + c = NEW_ENV_VALUE; + } + switch (c) { + + case NEW_ENV_VALUE: + *cp = '\0'; + cp = valp = (char *)subpointer; + break; + + case NEW_ENV_VAR: + case ENV_USERVAR: + *cp = '\0'; + if (valp) + esetenv(varp, valp, 1); + else + unsetenv(varp); + cp = varp = (char *)subpointer; + valp = 0; + break; + + case ENV_ESC: + if (SB_EOF()) + break; + c = SB_GET(); + /* FALL THROUGH */ + default: + *cp++ = c; + break; + } + } + *cp = '\0'; + if (valp) + esetenv(varp, valp, 1); + else + unsetenv(varp); + break; + } /* end of case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON */ +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + if (SB_EOF()) + break; + switch(SB_GET()) { + case TELQUAL_SEND: + case TELQUAL_REPLY: + /* + * These are sent by us and cannot be sent by + * the client. + */ + break; + case TELQUAL_IS: + auth_is(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case TELQUAL_NAME: + auth_name(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + if (SB_EOF()) + break; + switch(SB_GET()) { + case ENCRYPT_SUPPORT: + encrypt_support(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_IS: + encrypt_is(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_REPLY: + encrypt_reply(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_START: + encrypt_start(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_END: + encrypt_end(); + break; + case ENCRYPT_REQSTART: + encrypt_request_start(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_REQEND: + /* + * We can always send an REQEND so that we cannot + * get stuck encrypting. We should only get this + * if we have been able to get in the correct mode + * anyhow. + */ + encrypt_request_end(); + break; + case ENCRYPT_ENC_KEYID: + encrypt_enc_keyid(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + case ENCRYPT_DEC_KEYID: + encrypt_dec_keyid(subpointer, SB_LEN()); + break; + default: + break; + } + break; +#endif + + default: + break; + } /* end of switch */ + +} /* end of suboption */ + +void +doclientstat(void) +{ + clientstat(TELOPT_LINEMODE, WILL, 0); +} + +#undef ADD +#define ADD(c) *ncp++ = c +#define ADD_DATA(c) { *ncp++ = c; if (c == SE || c == IAC) *ncp++ = c; } + +void +send_status(void) +{ + unsigned char statusbuf[256]; + unsigned char *ncp; + unsigned char i; + + ncp = statusbuf; + + netflush(); /* get rid of anything waiting to go out */ + + ADD(IAC); + ADD(SB); + ADD(TELOPT_STATUS); + ADD(TELQUAL_IS); + + /* + * We check the want_state rather than the current state, + * because if we received a DO/WILL for an option that we + * don't support, and the other side didn't send a DONT/WONT + * in response to our WONT/DONT, then the "state" will be + * WILL/DO, and the "want_state" will be WONT/DONT. We + * need to go by the latter. + */ + for (i = 0; i < (unsigned char)NTELOPTS; i++) { + if (my_want_state_is_will(i)) { + ADD(WILL); + ADD_DATA(i); + } + if (his_want_state_is_will(i)) { + ADD(DO); + ADD_DATA(i); + } + } + + if (his_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_LFLOW)) { + ADD(SB); + ADD(TELOPT_LFLOW); + if (flowmode) { + ADD(LFLOW_ON); + } else { + ADD(LFLOW_OFF); + } + ADD(SE); + + if (restartany >= 0) { + ADD(SB); + ADD(TELOPT_LFLOW); + if (restartany) { + ADD(LFLOW_RESTART_ANY); + } else { + ADD(LFLOW_RESTART_XON); + } + ADD(SE); + } + } + + + ADD(IAC); + ADD(SE); + + writenet(statusbuf, ncp - statusbuf); + netflush(); /* Send it on its way */ + + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + {printsub('>', statusbuf, ncp - statusbuf); netflush();}); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/sys_term.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/sys_term.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..23b24682ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/sys_term.c @@ -0,0 +1,1899 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sys_term.c,v 1.104 2001/09/17 02:09:04 assar Exp $"); + +#if defined(_CRAY) || (defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_UTMPX_H)) +# define PARENT_DOES_UTMP +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +struct utmpx wtmp; +#elif defined(HAVE_UTMP_H) +struct utmp wtmp; +#endif /* HAVE_UTMPX_H */ + +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST +int utmp_len = sizeof(wtmp.ut_host); +#else +int utmp_len = MaxHostNameLen; +#endif + +#ifndef UTMP_FILE +#ifdef _PATH_UTMP +#define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP +#else +#define UTMP_FILE "/etc/utmp" +#endif +#endif + +#if !defined(WTMP_FILE) && defined(_PATH_WTMP) +#define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP +#endif + +#ifndef PARENT_DOES_UTMP +#ifdef WTMP_FILE +char wtmpf[] = WTMP_FILE; +#else +char wtmpf[] = "/usr/adm/wtmp"; +#endif +char utmpf[] = UTMP_FILE; +#else /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ +#ifdef WTMP_FILE +char wtmpf[] = WTMP_FILE; +#else +char wtmpf[] = "/etc/wtmp"; +#endif +#endif /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ + +#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H +#include +#endif /* CRAY */ + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + +#ifdef HAVE_SAC_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* STREAMSPTY */ + +#undef NOERROR + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef __hpux +#undef SE +#endif +#include +#endif +#if !(defined(__sgi) || defined(__linux) || defined(_AIX)) && defined(HAVE_SYS_TTY) +#include +#endif +#ifdef t_erase +#undef t_erase +#undef t_kill +#undef t_intrc +#undef t_quitc +#undef t_startc +#undef t_stopc +#undef t_eofc +#undef t_brkc +#undef t_suspc +#undef t_dsuspc +#undef t_rprntc +#undef t_flushc +#undef t_werasc +#undef t_lnextc +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#else +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIO_H +#include +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H +#include +#endif + +# ifndef TCSANOW +# ifdef TCSETS +# define TCSANOW TCSETS +# define TCSADRAIN TCSETSW +# define tcgetattr(f, t) ioctl(f, TCGETS, (char *)t) +# else +# ifdef TCSETA +# define TCSANOW TCSETA +# define TCSADRAIN TCSETAW +# define tcgetattr(f, t) ioctl(f, TCGETA, (char *)t) +# else +# define TCSANOW TIOCSETA +# define TCSADRAIN TIOCSETAW +# define tcgetattr(f, t) ioctl(f, TIOCGETA, (char *)t) +# endif +# endif +# define tcsetattr(f, a, t) ioctl(f, a, t) +# define cfsetospeed(tp, val) (tp)->c_cflag &= ~CBAUD; \ +(tp)->c_cflag |= (val) +# define cfgetospeed(tp) ((tp)->c_cflag & CBAUD) +# ifdef CIBAUD +# define cfsetispeed(tp, val) (tp)->c_cflag &= ~CIBAUD; \ + (tp)->c_cflag |= ((val)<c_cflag & CIBAUD)>>IBSHIFT) +# else +# define cfsetispeed(tp, val) (tp)->c_cflag &= ~CBAUD; \ + (tp)->c_cflag |= (val) +# define cfgetispeed(tp) ((tp)->c_cflag & CBAUD) +# endif +# endif /* TCSANOW */ + struct termios termbuf, termbuf2; /* pty control structure */ +# ifdef STREAMSPTY + static int ttyfd = -1; + int really_stream = 0; +# endif + + const char *new_login = _PATH_LOGIN; + +/* + * init_termbuf() + * copy_termbuf(cp) + * set_termbuf() + * + * These three routines are used to get and set the "termbuf" structure + * to and from the kernel. init_termbuf() gets the current settings. + * copy_termbuf() hands in a new "termbuf" to write to the kernel, and + * set_termbuf() writes the structure into the kernel. + */ + + void + init_termbuf(void) +{ +# ifdef STREAMSPTY + if (really_stream) + tcgetattr(ttyfd, &termbuf); + else +# endif + tcgetattr(ourpty, &termbuf); + termbuf2 = termbuf; +} + +void +set_termbuf(void) +{ + /* + * Only make the necessary changes. + */ + if (memcmp(&termbuf, &termbuf2, sizeof(termbuf))) +# ifdef STREAMSPTY + if (really_stream) + tcsetattr(ttyfd, TCSANOW, &termbuf); + else +# endif + tcsetattr(ourpty, TCSANOW, &termbuf); +} + + +/* + * spcset(func, valp, valpp) + * + * This function takes various special characters (func), and + * sets *valp to the current value of that character, and + * *valpp to point to where in the "termbuf" structure that + * value is kept. + * + * It returns the SLC_ level of support for this function. + */ + + +int +spcset(int func, cc_t *valp, cc_t **valpp) +{ + +#define setval(a, b) *valp = termbuf.c_cc[a]; \ + *valpp = &termbuf.c_cc[a]; \ + return(b); +#define defval(a) *valp = ((cc_t)a); *valpp = (cc_t *)0; return(SLC_DEFAULT); + + switch(func) { + case SLC_EOF: + setval(VEOF, SLC_VARIABLE); + case SLC_EC: + setval(VERASE, SLC_VARIABLE); + case SLC_EL: + setval(VKILL, SLC_VARIABLE); + case SLC_IP: + setval(VINTR, SLC_VARIABLE|SLC_FLUSHIN|SLC_FLUSHOUT); + case SLC_ABORT: + setval(VQUIT, SLC_VARIABLE|SLC_FLUSHIN|SLC_FLUSHOUT); + case SLC_XON: +#ifdef VSTART + setval(VSTART, SLC_VARIABLE); +#else + defval(0x13); +#endif + case SLC_XOFF: +#ifdef VSTOP + setval(VSTOP, SLC_VARIABLE); +#else + defval(0x11); +#endif + case SLC_EW: +#ifdef VWERASE + setval(VWERASE, SLC_VARIABLE); +#else + defval(0); +#endif + case SLC_RP: +#ifdef VREPRINT + setval(VREPRINT, SLC_VARIABLE); +#else + defval(0); +#endif + case SLC_LNEXT: +#ifdef VLNEXT + setval(VLNEXT, SLC_VARIABLE); +#else + defval(0); +#endif + case SLC_AO: +#if !defined(VDISCARD) && defined(VFLUSHO) +# define VDISCARD VFLUSHO +#endif +#ifdef VDISCARD + setval(VDISCARD, SLC_VARIABLE|SLC_FLUSHOUT); +#else + defval(0); +#endif + case SLC_SUSP: +#ifdef VSUSP + setval(VSUSP, SLC_VARIABLE|SLC_FLUSHIN); +#else + defval(0); +#endif +#ifdef VEOL + case SLC_FORW1: + setval(VEOL, SLC_VARIABLE); +#endif +#ifdef VEOL2 + case SLC_FORW2: + setval(VEOL2, SLC_VARIABLE); +#endif + case SLC_AYT: +#ifdef VSTATUS + setval(VSTATUS, SLC_VARIABLE); +#else + defval(0); +#endif + + case SLC_BRK: + case SLC_SYNCH: + case SLC_EOR: + defval(0); + + default: + *valp = 0; + *valpp = 0; + return(SLC_NOSUPPORT); + } +} + +#ifdef _CRAY +/* + * getnpty() + * + * Return the number of pty's configured into the system. + */ +int +getnpty() +{ +#ifdef _SC_CRAY_NPTY + int numptys; + + if ((numptys = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_NPTY)) != -1) + return numptys; + else +#endif /* _SC_CRAY_NPTY */ + return 128; +} +#endif /* CRAY */ + +/* + * getpty() + * + * Allocate a pty. As a side effect, the external character + * array "line" contains the name of the slave side. + * + * Returns the file descriptor of the opened pty. + */ + +static char Xline[] = "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"; +char *line = Xline; + +#ifdef _CRAY +char myline[] = "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"; +#endif /* CRAY */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_PTSNAME) && defined(STREAMSPTY) +static char *ptsname(int fd) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_TTYNAME + return ttyname(fd); +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} +#endif + +int getpty(int *ptynum) +{ +#ifdef __osf__ /* XXX */ + int master; + int slave; + if(openpty(&master, &slave, line, 0, 0) == 0){ + close(slave); + return master; + } + return -1; +#else +#ifdef HAVE__GETPTY + int master, slave; + char *p; + p = _getpty(&master, O_RDWR, 0600, 1); + if(p == NULL) + return -1; + strlcpy(line, p, sizeof(Xline)); + return master; +#else + + int p; + char *cp, *p1, *p2; + int i; +#if SunOS == 40 + int dummy; +#endif +#if __linux + int master; + int slave; + if(openpty(&master, &slave, line, 0, 0) == 0){ + close(slave); + return master; + } +#else +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + char *clone[] = { "/dev/ptc", "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/ptm", + "/dev/ptym/clone", 0 }; + + char **q; + for(q=clone; *q; q++){ + p=open(*q, O_RDWR); + if(p >= 0){ +#ifdef HAVE_GRANTPT + grantpt(p); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNLOCKPT + unlockpt(p); +#endif + strlcpy(line, ptsname(p), sizeof(Xline)); + really_stream = 1; + return p; + } + } +#endif /* STREAMSPTY */ +#ifndef _CRAY + +#ifndef __hpux + snprintf(line, sizeof(Xline), "/dev/ptyXX"); + p1 = &line[8]; + p2 = &line[9]; +#else + snprintf(line, sizeof(Xline), "/dev/ptym/ptyXX"); + p1 = &line[13]; + p2 = &line[14]; +#endif + + + for (cp = "pqrstuvwxyzPQRST"; *cp; cp++) { + struct stat stb; + + *p1 = *cp; + *p2 = '0'; + /* + * This stat() check is just to keep us from + * looping through all 256 combinations if there + * aren't that many ptys available. + */ + if (stat(line, &stb) < 0) + break; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + *p2 = "0123456789abcdef"[i]; + p = open(line, O_RDWR); + if (p > 0) { +#ifndef __hpux + line[5] = 't'; +#else + for (p1 = &line[8]; *p1; p1++) + *p1 = *(p1+1); + line[9] = 't'; +#endif + chown(line, 0, 0); + chmod(line, 0600); +#if SunOS == 40 + if (ioctl(p, TIOCGPGRP, &dummy) == 0 + || errno != EIO) { + chmod(line, 0666); + close(p); + line[5] = 'p'; + } else +#endif /* SunOS == 40 */ + return(p); + } + } + } +#else /* CRAY */ + extern lowpty, highpty; + struct stat sb; + + for (*ptynum = lowpty; *ptynum <= highpty; (*ptynum)++) { + snprintf(myline, sizeof(myline), "/dev/pty/%03d", *ptynum); + p = open(myline, 2); + if (p < 0) + continue; + snprintf(line, sizeof(Xline), "/dev/ttyp%03d", *ptynum); + /* + * Here are some shenanigans to make sure that there + * are no listeners lurking on the line. + */ + if(stat(line, &sb) < 0) { + close(p); + continue; + } + if(sb.st_uid || sb.st_gid || sb.st_mode != 0600) { + chown(line, 0, 0); + chmod(line, 0600); + close(p); + p = open(myline, 2); + if (p < 0) + continue; + } + /* + * Now it should be safe...check for accessability. + */ + if (access(line, 6) == 0) + return(p); + else { + /* no tty side to pty so skip it */ + close(p); + } + } +#endif /* CRAY */ +#endif /* STREAMSPTY */ +#endif /* OPENPTY */ + return(-1); +#endif +} + + +int +tty_isecho(void) +{ + return (termbuf.c_lflag & ECHO); +} + +int +tty_flowmode(void) +{ + return((termbuf.c_iflag & IXON) ? 1 : 0); +} + +int +tty_restartany(void) +{ + return((termbuf.c_iflag & IXANY) ? 1 : 0); +} + +void +tty_setecho(int on) +{ + if (on) + termbuf.c_lflag |= ECHO; + else + termbuf.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; +} + +int +tty_israw(void) +{ + return(!(termbuf.c_lflag & ICANON)); +} + +void +tty_binaryin(int on) +{ + if (on) { + termbuf.c_iflag &= ~ISTRIP; + } else { + termbuf.c_iflag |= ISTRIP; + } +} + +void +tty_binaryout(int on) +{ + if (on) { + termbuf.c_cflag &= ~(CSIZE|PARENB); + termbuf.c_cflag |= CS8; + termbuf.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; + } else { + termbuf.c_cflag &= ~CSIZE; + termbuf.c_cflag |= CS7|PARENB; + termbuf.c_oflag |= OPOST; + } +} + +int +tty_isbinaryin(void) +{ + return(!(termbuf.c_iflag & ISTRIP)); +} + +int +tty_isbinaryout(void) +{ + return(!(termbuf.c_oflag&OPOST)); +} + + +int +tty_issofttab(void) +{ +# ifdef OXTABS + return (termbuf.c_oflag & OXTABS); +# endif +# ifdef TABDLY + return ((termbuf.c_oflag & TABDLY) == TAB3); +# endif +} + +void +tty_setsofttab(int on) +{ + if (on) { +# ifdef OXTABS + termbuf.c_oflag |= OXTABS; +# endif +# ifdef TABDLY + termbuf.c_oflag &= ~TABDLY; + termbuf.c_oflag |= TAB3; +# endif + } else { +# ifdef OXTABS + termbuf.c_oflag &= ~OXTABS; +# endif +# ifdef TABDLY + termbuf.c_oflag &= ~TABDLY; + termbuf.c_oflag |= TAB0; +# endif + } +} + +int +tty_islitecho(void) +{ +# ifdef ECHOCTL + return (!(termbuf.c_lflag & ECHOCTL)); +# endif +# ifdef TCTLECH + return (!(termbuf.c_lflag & TCTLECH)); +# endif +# if !defined(ECHOCTL) && !defined(TCTLECH) + return (0); /* assumes ctl chars are echoed '^x' */ +# endif +} + +void +tty_setlitecho(int on) +{ +# ifdef ECHOCTL + if (on) + termbuf.c_lflag &= ~ECHOCTL; + else + termbuf.c_lflag |= ECHOCTL; +# endif +# ifdef TCTLECH + if (on) + termbuf.c_lflag &= ~TCTLECH; + else + termbuf.c_lflag |= TCTLECH; +# endif +} + +int +tty_iscrnl(void) +{ + return (termbuf.c_iflag & ICRNL); +} + +/* + * Try to guess whether speeds are "encoded" (4.2BSD) or just numeric (4.4BSD). + */ +#if B4800 != 4800 +#define DECODE_BAUD +#endif + +#ifdef DECODE_BAUD + +/* + * A table of available terminal speeds + */ +struct termspeeds { + int speed; + int value; +} termspeeds[] = { + { 0, B0 }, { 50, B50 }, { 75, B75 }, + { 110, B110 }, { 134, B134 }, { 150, B150 }, + { 200, B200 }, { 300, B300 }, { 600, B600 }, + { 1200, B1200 }, { 1800, B1800 }, { 2400, B2400 }, + { 4800, B4800 }, +#ifdef B7200 + { 7200, B7200 }, +#endif + { 9600, B9600 }, +#ifdef B14400 + { 14400, B14400 }, +#endif +#ifdef B19200 + { 19200, B19200 }, +#endif +#ifdef B28800 + { 28800, B28800 }, +#endif +#ifdef B38400 + { 38400, B38400 }, +#endif +#ifdef B57600 + { 57600, B57600 }, +#endif +#ifdef B115200 + { 115200, B115200 }, +#endif +#ifdef B230400 + { 230400, B230400 }, +#endif + { -1, 0 } +}; +#endif /* DECODE_BUAD */ + +void +tty_tspeed(int val) +{ +#ifdef DECODE_BAUD + struct termspeeds *tp; + + for (tp = termspeeds; (tp->speed != -1) && (val > tp->speed); tp++) + ; + if (tp->speed == -1) /* back up to last valid value */ + --tp; + cfsetospeed(&termbuf, tp->value); +#else /* DECODE_BUAD */ + cfsetospeed(&termbuf, val); +#endif /* DECODE_BUAD */ +} + +void +tty_rspeed(int val) +{ +#ifdef DECODE_BAUD + struct termspeeds *tp; + + for (tp = termspeeds; (tp->speed != -1) && (val > tp->speed); tp++) + ; + if (tp->speed == -1) /* back up to last valid value */ + --tp; + cfsetispeed(&termbuf, tp->value); +#else /* DECODE_BAUD */ + cfsetispeed(&termbuf, val); +#endif /* DECODE_BAUD */ +} + +#ifdef PARENT_DOES_UTMP +extern struct utmp wtmp; +extern char wtmpf[]; + +extern void utmp_sig_init (void); +extern void utmp_sig_reset (void); +extern void utmp_sig_wait (void); +extern void utmp_sig_notify (int); +# endif /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + +/* I_FIND seems to live a life of its own */ +static int my_find(int fd, char *module) +{ +#if defined(I_FIND) && defined(I_LIST) + static int flag; + static struct str_list sl; + int n; + int i; + + if(!flag){ + n = ioctl(fd, I_LIST, 0); + if(n < 0){ + perror("ioctl(fd, I_LIST, 0)"); + return -1; + } + sl.sl_modlist=(struct str_mlist*)malloc(n * sizeof(struct str_mlist)); + sl.sl_nmods = n; + n = ioctl(fd, I_LIST, &sl); + if(n < 0){ + perror("ioctl(fd, I_LIST, n)"); + return -1; + } + flag = 1; + } + + for(i=0; i= modules; p--){ + err = ioctl(fd, I_PUSH, *p); + if(err < 0 && errno != EINVAL) + fatalperror(net, "I_PUSH"); + } +} +#endif + +/* + * getptyslave() + * + * Open the slave side of the pty, and do any initialization + * that is necessary. The return value is a file descriptor + * for the slave side. + */ +void getptyslave(void) +{ + int t = -1; + + struct winsize ws; + /* + * Opening the slave side may cause initilization of the + * kernel tty structure. We need remember the state of + * if linemode was turned on + * terminal window size + * terminal speed + * so that we can re-set them if we need to. + */ + + + /* + * Make sure that we don't have a controlling tty, and + * that we are the session (process group) leader. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SETSID + if(setsid()<0) + fatalperror(net, "setsid()"); +#else +# ifdef TIOCNOTTY + t = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); + if (t >= 0) { + ioctl(t, TIOCNOTTY, (char *)0); + close(t); + } +# endif +#endif + +# ifdef PARENT_DOES_UTMP + /* + * Wait for our parent to get the utmp stuff to get done. + */ + utmp_sig_wait(); +# endif + + t = cleanopen(line); + if (t < 0) + fatalperror(net, line); + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + ttyfd = t; + + + /* + * Not all systems have (or need) modules ttcompat and pckt so + * don't flag it as a fatal error if they don't exist. + */ + + if (really_stream) + { + /* these are the streams modules that we want pushed. note + that they are in reverse order, ptem will be pushed + first. maybe_push_modules() will try to push all modules + before the first one that isn't already pushed. i.e if + ldterm is pushed, only ttcompat will be attempted. + + all this is because we don't know which modules are + available, and we don't know which modules are already + pushed (via autopush, for instance). + + */ + + char *ttymodules[] = { "ttcompat", "ldterm", "ptem", NULL }; + char *ptymodules[] = { "pckt", NULL }; + + maybe_push_modules(t, ttymodules); + maybe_push_modules(ourpty, ptymodules); + } +#endif + /* + * set up the tty modes as we like them to be. + */ + init_termbuf(); +# ifdef TIOCSWINSZ + if (def_row || def_col) { + memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); + ws.ws_col = def_col; + ws.ws_row = def_row; + ioctl(t, TIOCSWINSZ, (char *)&ws); + } +# endif + + /* + * Settings for sgtty based systems + */ + + /* + * Settings for UNICOS (and HPUX) + */ +# if defined(_CRAY) || defined(__hpux) + termbuf.c_oflag = OPOST|ONLCR|TAB3; + termbuf.c_iflag = IGNPAR|ISTRIP|ICRNL|IXON; + termbuf.c_lflag = ISIG|ICANON|ECHO|ECHOE|ECHOK; + termbuf.c_cflag = EXTB|HUPCL|CS8; +# endif + + /* + * Settings for all other termios/termio based + * systems, other than 4.4BSD. In 4.4BSD the + * kernel does the initial terminal setup. + */ +# if !(defined(_CRAY) || defined(__hpux)) && (BSD <= 43) +# ifndef OXTABS +# define OXTABS 0 +# endif + termbuf.c_lflag |= ECHO; + termbuf.c_oflag |= ONLCR|OXTABS; + termbuf.c_iflag |= ICRNL; + termbuf.c_iflag &= ~IXOFF; +# endif + tty_rspeed((def_rspeed > 0) ? def_rspeed : 9600); + tty_tspeed((def_tspeed > 0) ? def_tspeed : 9600); + + /* + * Set the tty modes, and make this our controlling tty. + */ + set_termbuf(); + if (login_tty(t) == -1) + fatalperror(net, "login_tty"); + if (net > 2) + close(net); + if (ourpty > 2) { + close(ourpty); + ourpty = -1; + } +} + +#ifndef O_NOCTTY +#define O_NOCTTY 0 +#endif +/* + * Open the specified slave side of the pty, + * making sure that we have a clean tty. + */ + +int cleanopen(char *line) +{ + int t; + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + if (!really_stream) +#endif + { + /* + * Make sure that other people can't open the + * slave side of the connection. + */ + chown(line, 0, 0); + chmod(line, 0600); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_REVOKE + revoke(line); +#endif + + t = open(line, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); + + if (t < 0) + return(-1); + + /* + * Hangup anybody else using this ttyp, then reopen it for + * ourselves. + */ +# if !(defined(_CRAY) || defined(__hpux)) && (BSD <= 43) && !defined(STREAMSPTY) + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); +#ifdef HAVE_VHANGUP + vhangup(); +#else +#endif + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + t = open(line, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); + if (t < 0) + return(-1); +# endif +# if defined(_CRAY) && defined(TCVHUP) + { + int i; + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + ioctl(t, TCVHUP, (char *)0); + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + + i = open(line, O_RDWR); + + if (i < 0) + return(-1); + close(t); + t = i; + } +# endif /* defined(CRAY) && defined(TCVHUP) */ + return(t); +} + +#if !defined(BSD4_4) + +int login_tty(int t) +{ +# if defined(TIOCSCTTY) && !defined(__hpux) + if (ioctl(t, TIOCSCTTY, (char *)0) < 0) + fatalperror(net, "ioctl(sctty)"); +# ifdef _CRAY + /* + * Close the hard fd to /dev/ttypXXX, and re-open through + * the indirect /dev/tty interface. + */ + close(t); + if ((t = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR)) < 0) + fatalperror(net, "open(/dev/tty)"); +# endif +# else + /* + * We get our controlling tty assigned as a side-effect + * of opening up a tty device. But on BSD based systems, + * this only happens if our process group is zero. The + * setsid() call above may have set our pgrp, so clear + * it out before opening the tty... + */ +#ifdef HAVE_SETPGID + setpgid(0, 0); +#else + setpgrp(0, 0); /* if setpgid isn't available, setpgrp + probably takes arguments */ +#endif + close(open(line, O_RDWR)); +# endif + if (t != 0) + dup2(t, 0); + if (t != 1) + dup2(t, 1); + if (t != 2) + dup2(t, 2); + if (t > 2) + close(t); + return(0); +} +#endif /* BSD <= 43 */ + +/* + * This comes from ../../bsd/tty.c and should not really be here. + */ + +/* + * Clean the tty name. Return a pointer to the cleaned version. + */ + +static char * +clean_ttyname (char *tty) +{ + char *res = tty; + + if (strncmp (res, _PATH_DEV, strlen(_PATH_DEV)) == 0) + res += strlen(_PATH_DEV); + if (strncmp (res, "pty/", 4) == 0) + res += 4; + if (strncmp (res, "ptym/", 5) == 0) + res += 5; + return res; +} + +/* + * Generate a name usable as an `ut_id', typically without `tty'. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID +static char * +make_id (char *tty) +{ + char *res = tty; + + if (strncmp (res, "pts/", 4) == 0) + res += 4; + if (strncmp (res, "tty", 3) == 0) + res += 3; + return res; +} +#endif + +/* + * startslave(host) + * + * Given a hostname, do whatever + * is necessary to startup the login process on the slave side of the pty. + */ + +/* ARGSUSED */ +void +startslave(const char *host, const char *utmp_host, + int autologin, char *autoname) +{ + int i; + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + if (!autoname || !autoname[0]) + autologin = 0; + + if (autologin < auth_level) { + fatal(net, "Authorization failed"); + exit(1); + } +#endif + + { + char *tbuf = + "\r\n*** Connection not encrypted! " + "Communication may be eavesdropped. ***\r\n"; +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (!no_warn && (encrypt_output == 0 || decrypt_input == 0)) +#endif + writenet((unsigned char*)tbuf, strlen(tbuf)); + } +# ifdef PARENT_DOES_UTMP + utmp_sig_init(); +# endif /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ + + if ((i = fork()) < 0) + fatalperror(net, "fork"); + if (i) { +# ifdef PARENT_DOES_UTMP + /* + * Cray parent will create utmp entry for child and send + * signal to child to tell when done. Child waits for signal + * before doing anything important. + */ + int pid = i; + void sigjob (int); + + setpgrp(); + utmp_sig_reset(); /* reset handler to default */ + /* + * Create utmp entry for child + */ + wtmp.ut_time = time(NULL); + wtmp.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; + wtmp.ut_pid = pid; + strncpy(wtmp.ut_user, "LOGIN", sizeof(wtmp.ut_user)); + strncpy(wtmp.ut_host, utmp_host, sizeof(wtmp.ut_host)); + strncpy(wtmp.ut_line, clean_ttyname(line), sizeof(wtmp.ut_line)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + strncpy(wtmp.ut_id, wtmp.ut_line + 3, sizeof(wtmp.ut_id)); +#endif + + pututline(&wtmp); + endutent(); + if ((i = open(wtmpf, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND)) >= 0) { + write(i, &wtmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(i); + } +#ifdef _CRAY + signal(WJSIGNAL, sigjob); +#endif + utmp_sig_notify(pid); +# endif /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ + } else { + getptyslave(); +#if defined(DCE) + /* if we authenticated via K5, try and join the PAG */ + kerberos5_dfspag(); +#endif + start_login(host, autologin, autoname); + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } +} + +char *envinit[3]; +extern char **environ; + +void +init_env(void) +{ + char **envp; + + envp = envinit; + if ((*envp = getenv("TZ"))) + *envp++ -= 3; +#if defined(_CRAY) || defined(__hpux) + else + *envp++ = "TZ=GMT0"; +#endif + *envp = 0; + environ = envinit; +} + +/* + * scrub_env() + * + * We only accept the environment variables listed below. + */ + +static void +scrub_env(void) +{ + static const char *reject[] = { + "TERMCAP=/", + NULL + }; + + static const char *accept[] = { + "XAUTH=", "XAUTHORITY=", "DISPLAY=", + "TERM=", + "EDITOR=", + "PAGER=", + "PRINTER=", + "LOGNAME=", + "POSIXLY_CORRECT=", + "TERMCAP=", + NULL + }; + + char **cpp, **cpp2; + const char **p; + + for (cpp2 = cpp = environ; *cpp; cpp++) { + int reject_it = 0; + + for(p = reject; *p; p++) + if(strncmp(*cpp, *p, strlen(*p)) == 0) { + reject_it = 1; + break; + } + if (reject_it) + continue; + + for(p = accept; *p; p++) + if(strncmp(*cpp, *p, strlen(*p)) == 0) + break; + if(*p != NULL) + *cpp2++ = *cpp; + } + *cpp2 = NULL; +} + + +struct arg_val { + int size; + int argc; + const char **argv; +}; + +static void addarg(struct arg_val*, const char*); + +/* + * start_login(host) + * + * Assuming that we are now running as a child processes, this + * function will turn us into the login process. + */ + +void +start_login(const char *host, int autologin, char *name) +{ + struct arg_val argv; + char *user; + int save_errno; + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H + int pid = getpid(); + struct utmpx utmpx; + char *clean_tty; + + /* + * Create utmp entry for child + */ + + clean_tty = clean_ttyname(line); + memset(&utmpx, 0, sizeof(utmpx)); + strncpy(utmpx.ut_user, ".telnet", sizeof(utmpx.ut_user)); + strncpy(utmpx.ut_line, clean_tty, sizeof(utmpx.ut_line)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + strncpy(utmpx.ut_id, make_id(clean_tty), sizeof(utmpx.ut_id)); +#endif + utmpx.ut_pid = pid; + + utmpx.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; + + gettimeofday (&utmpx.ut_tv, NULL); + if (pututxline(&utmpx) == NULL) + fatal(net, "pututxline failed"); +#endif + + scrub_env(); + + /* + * -h : pass on name of host. + * WARNING: -h is accepted by login if and only if + * getuid() == 0. + * -p : don't clobber the environment (so terminal type stays set). + * + * -f : force this login, he has already been authenticated + */ + + /* init argv structure */ + argv.size=0; + argv.argc=0; + argv.argv=malloc(0); /*so we can call realloc later */ + addarg(&argv, "login"); + addarg(&argv, "-h"); + addarg(&argv, host); + addarg(&argv, "-p"); + if(name[0]) + user = name; + else + user = getenv("USER"); +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + if (auth_level < 0 || autologin != AUTH_VALID) { + if(!no_warn) { + printf("User not authenticated. "); + if (require_otp) + printf("Using one-time password\r\n"); + else + printf("Using plaintext username and password\r\n"); + } + if (require_otp) { + addarg(&argv, "-a"); + addarg(&argv, "otp"); + } + if(log_unauth) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "unauthenticated access from %s (%s)", + host, user ? user : "unknown user"); + } + if (auth_level >= 0 && autologin == AUTH_VALID) + addarg(&argv, "-f"); +#endif + if(user){ + addarg(&argv, "--"); + addarg(&argv, strdup(user)); + } + if (getenv("USER")) { + /* + * Assume that login will set the USER variable + * correctly. For SysV systems, this means that + * USER will no longer be set, just LOGNAME by + * login. (The problem is that if the auto-login + * fails, and the user then specifies a different + * account name, he can get logged in with both + * LOGNAME and USER in his environment, but the + * USER value will be wrong. + */ + unsetenv("USER"); + } + closelog(); + /* + * This sleep(1) is in here so that telnetd can + * finish up with the tty. There's a race condition + * the login banner message gets lost... + */ + sleep(1); + + execv(new_login, argv.argv); + save_errno = errno; + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m\n", new_login); + fatalperror_errno(net, new_login, save_errno); + /*NOTREACHED*/ +} + +static void +addarg(struct arg_val *argv, const char *val) +{ + if(argv->size <= argv->argc+1) { + argv->argv = realloc(argv->argv, sizeof(char*) * (argv->size + 10)); + if (argv->argv == NULL) + fatal (net, "realloc: out of memory"); + argv->size+=10; + } + argv->argv[argv->argc++] = val; + argv->argv[argv->argc] = NULL; +} + + +/* + * rmut() + * + * This is the function called by cleanup() to + * remove the utmp entry for this person. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +static void +rmut(void) +{ + struct utmpx utmpx, *non_save_utxp; + char *clean_tty = clean_ttyname(line); + + /* + * This updates the utmpx and utmp entries and make a wtmp/x entry + */ + + setutxent(); + memset(&utmpx, 0, sizeof(utmpx)); + strncpy(utmpx.ut_line, clean_tty, sizeof(utmpx.ut_line)); + utmpx.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; + non_save_utxp = getutxline(&utmpx); + if (non_save_utxp) { + struct utmpx *utxp; + char user0; + + utxp = malloc(sizeof(struct utmpx)); + *utxp = *non_save_utxp; + user0 = utxp->ut_user[0]; + utxp->ut_user[0] = '\0'; + utxp->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_EXIT +#ifdef _STRUCT___EXIT_STATUS + utxp->ut_exit.__e_termination = 0; + utxp->ut_exit.__e_exit = 0; +#elif defined(__osf__) /* XXX */ + utxp->ut_exit.ut_termination = 0; + utxp->ut_exit.ut_exit = 0; +#else + utxp->ut_exit.e_termination = 0; + utxp->ut_exit.e_exit = 0; +#endif +#endif + gettimeofday(&utxp->ut_tv, NULL); + pututxline(utxp); +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + utxp->ut_user[0] = user0; + updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utxp); +#elif defined(WTMP_FILE) + /* This is a strange system with a utmpx and a wtmp! */ + { + int f = open(wtmpf, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND); + struct utmp wtmp; + if (f >= 0) { + strncpy(wtmp.ut_line, clean_tty, sizeof(wtmp.ut_line)); + strncpy(wtmp.ut_name, "", sizeof(wtmp.ut_name)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + strncpy(wtmp.ut_host, "", sizeof(wtmp.ut_host)); +#endif + wtmp.ut_time = time(NULL); + write(f, &wtmp, sizeof(wtmp)); + close(f); + } + } +#endif + free (utxp); + } + endutxent(); +} /* end of rmut */ +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_UTMPX_H) && !(defined(_CRAY) || defined(__hpux)) && BSD <= 43 +static void +rmut(void) +{ + int f; + int found = 0; + struct utmp *u, *utmp; + int nutmp; + struct stat statbf; + char *clean_tty = clean_ttyname(line); + + f = open(utmpf, O_RDWR); + if (f >= 0) { + fstat(f, &statbf); + utmp = (struct utmp *)malloc((unsigned)statbf.st_size); + if (!utmp) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "utmp malloc failed"); + if (statbf.st_size && utmp) { + nutmp = read(f, utmp, (int)statbf.st_size); + nutmp /= sizeof(struct utmp); + + for (u = utmp ; u < &utmp[nutmp] ; u++) { + if (strncmp(u->ut_line, + clean_tty, + sizeof(u->ut_line)) || + u->ut_name[0]==0) + continue; + lseek(f, ((long)u)-((long)utmp), L_SET); + strncpy(u->ut_name, "", sizeof(u->ut_name)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + strncpy(u->ut_host, "", sizeof(u->ut_host)); +#endif + u->ut_time = time(NULL); + write(f, u, sizeof(wtmp)); + found++; + } + } + close(f); + } + if (found) { + f = open(wtmpf, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND); + if (f >= 0) { + strncpy(wtmp.ut_line, clean_tty, sizeof(wtmp.ut_line)); + strncpy(wtmp.ut_name, "", sizeof(wtmp.ut_name)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + strncpy(wtmp.ut_host, "", sizeof(wtmp.ut_host)); +#endif + wtmp.ut_time = time(NULL); + write(f, &wtmp, sizeof(wtmp)); + close(f); + } + } + chmod(line, 0666); + chown(line, 0, 0); + line[strlen("/dev/")] = 'p'; + chmod(line, 0666); + chown(line, 0, 0); +} /* end of rmut */ +#endif /* CRAY */ + +#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_UTMPX_H) +static void +rmut (char *line) +{ + struct utmp utmp; + struct utmp *utptr; + int fd; /* for /etc/wtmp */ + + utmp.ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + strncpy(utmp.ut_line, clean_ttyname(line), sizeof(utmp.ut_line)); + setutent(); + utptr = getutline(&utmp); + /* write it out only if it exists */ + if (utptr) { + utptr->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; + utptr->ut_time = time(NULL); + pututline(utptr); + /* set wtmp entry if wtmp file exists */ + if ((fd = open(wtmpf, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) >= 0) { + write(fd, utptr, sizeof(utmp)); + close(fd); + } + } + endutent(); + + chmod(line, 0666); + chown(line, 0, 0); + line[14] = line[13]; + line[13] = line[12]; + line[8] = 'm'; + line[9] = '/'; + line[10] = 'p'; + line[11] = 't'; + line[12] = 'y'; + chmod(line, 0666); + chown(line, 0, 0); +} +#endif + +/* + * cleanup() + * + * This is the routine to call when we are all through, to + * clean up anything that needs to be cleaned up. + */ + +#ifdef PARENT_DOES_UTMP + +void +cleanup(int sig) +{ +#ifdef _CRAY + static int incleanup = 0; + int t; + int child_status; /* status of child process as returned by waitpid */ + int flags = WNOHANG|WUNTRACED; + + /* + * 1: Pick up the zombie, if we are being called + * as the signal handler. + * 2: If we are a nested cleanup(), return. + * 3: Try to clean up TMPDIR. + * 4: Fill in utmp with shutdown of process. + * 5: Close down the network and pty connections. + * 6: Finish up the TMPDIR cleanup, if needed. + */ + if (sig == SIGCHLD) { + while (waitpid(-1, &child_status, flags) > 0) + ; /* VOID */ + /* Check if the child process was stopped + * rather than exited. We want cleanup only if + * the child has died. + */ + if (WIFSTOPPED(child_status)) { + return; + } + } + t = sigblock(sigmask(SIGCHLD)); + if (incleanup) { + sigsetmask(t); + return; + } + incleanup = 1; + sigsetmask(t); + + t = cleantmp(&wtmp); + setutent(); /* just to make sure */ +#endif /* CRAY */ + rmut(line); + close(ourpty); + shutdown(net, 2); +#ifdef _CRAY + if (t == 0) + cleantmp(&wtmp); +#endif /* CRAY */ + exit(1); +} + +#else /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ + +void +cleanup(int sig) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_UTMPX_H) || !defined(HAVE_LOGWTMP) + rmut(); +#ifdef HAVE_VHANGUP +#ifndef __sgi + vhangup(); /* XXX */ +#endif +#endif +#else + char *p; + + p = line + sizeof("/dev/") - 1; + if (logout(p)) + logwtmp(p, "", ""); + chmod(line, 0666); + chown(line, 0, 0); + *p = 'p'; + chmod(line, 0666); + chown(line, 0, 0); +#endif + shutdown(net, 2); + exit(1); +} + +#endif /* PARENT_DOES_UTMP */ + +#ifdef PARENT_DOES_UTMP +/* + * _utmp_sig_rcv + * utmp_sig_init + * utmp_sig_wait + * These three functions are used to coordinate the handling of + * the utmp file between the server and the soon-to-be-login shell. + * The server actually creates the utmp structure, the child calls + * utmp_sig_wait(), until the server calls utmp_sig_notify() and + * signals the future-login shell to proceed. + */ +static int caught=0; /* NZ when signal intercepted */ +static void (*func)(); /* address of previous handler */ + +void +_utmp_sig_rcv(sig) + int sig; +{ + caught = 1; + signal(SIGUSR1, func); +} + +void +utmp_sig_init() +{ + /* + * register signal handler for UTMP creation + */ + if ((int)(func = signal(SIGUSR1, _utmp_sig_rcv)) == -1) + fatalperror(net, "telnetd/signal"); +} + +void +utmp_sig_reset() +{ + signal(SIGUSR1, func); /* reset handler to default */ +} + +# ifdef __hpux +# define sigoff() /* do nothing */ +# define sigon() /* do nothing */ +# endif + +void +utmp_sig_wait() +{ + /* + * Wait for parent to write our utmp entry. + */ + sigoff(); + while (caught == 0) { + pause(); /* wait until we get a signal (sigon) */ + sigoff(); /* turn off signals while we check caught */ + } + sigon(); /* turn on signals again */ +} + +void +utmp_sig_notify(pid) +{ + kill(pid, SIGUSR1); +} + +#ifdef _CRAY +static int gotsigjob = 0; + + /*ARGSUSED*/ +void +sigjob(sig) + int sig; +{ + int jid; + struct jobtemp *jp; + + while ((jid = waitjob(NULL)) != -1) { + if (jid == 0) { + return; + } + gotsigjob++; + jobend(jid, NULL, NULL); + } +} + +/* + * jid_getutid: + * called by jobend() before calling cleantmp() + * to find the correct $TMPDIR to cleanup. + */ + +struct utmp * +jid_getutid(jid) + int jid; +{ + struct utmp *cur = NULL; + + setutent(); /* just to make sure */ + while (cur = getutent()) { + if ( (cur->ut_type != NULL) && (jid == cur->ut_jid) ) { + return(cur); + } + } + + return(0); +} + +/* + * Clean up the TMPDIR that login created. + * The first time this is called we pick up the info + * from the utmp. If the job has already gone away, + * then we'll clean up and be done. If not, then + * when this is called the second time it will wait + * for the signal that the job is done. + */ +int +cleantmp(wtp) + struct utmp *wtp; +{ + struct utmp *utp; + static int first = 1; + int mask, omask, ret; + extern struct utmp *getutid (const struct utmp *_Id); + + + mask = sigmask(WJSIGNAL); + + if (first == 0) { + omask = sigblock(mask); + while (gotsigjob == 0) + sigpause(omask); + return(1); + } + first = 0; + setutent(); /* just to make sure */ + + utp = getutid(wtp); + if (utp == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't get /etc/utmp entry to clean TMPDIR"); + return(-1); + } + /* + * Nothing to clean up if the user shell was never started. + */ + if (utp->ut_type != USER_PROCESS || utp->ut_jid == 0) + return(1); + + /* + * Block the WJSIGNAL while we are in jobend(). + */ + omask = sigblock(mask); + ret = jobend(utp->ut_jid, utp->ut_tpath, utp->ut_user); + sigsetmask(omask); + return(ret); +} + +int +jobend(jid, path, user) + int jid; + char *path; + char *user; +{ + static int saved_jid = 0; + static int pty_saved_jid = 0; + static char saved_path[sizeof(wtmp.ut_tpath)+1]; + static char saved_user[sizeof(wtmp.ut_user)+1]; + + /* + * this little piece of code comes into play + * only when ptyreconnect is used to reconnect + * to an previous session. + * + * this is the only time when the + * "saved_jid != jid" code is executed. + */ + + if ( saved_jid && saved_jid != jid ) { + if (!path) { /* called from signal handler */ + pty_saved_jid = jid; + } else { + pty_saved_jid = saved_jid; + } + } + + if (path) { + strncpy(saved_path, path, sizeof(wtmp.ut_tpath)); + strncpy(saved_user, user, sizeof(wtmp.ut_user)); + saved_path[sizeof(saved_path)] = '\0'; + saved_user[sizeof(saved_user)] = '\0'; + } + if (saved_jid == 0) { + saved_jid = jid; + return(0); + } + + /* if the jid has changed, get the correct entry from the utmp file */ + + if ( saved_jid != jid ) { + struct utmp *utp = NULL; + struct utmp *jid_getutid(); + + utp = jid_getutid(pty_saved_jid); + + if (utp == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't get /etc/utmp entry to clean TMPDIR"); + return(-1); + } + + cleantmpdir(jid, utp->ut_tpath, utp->ut_user); + return(1); + } + + cleantmpdir(jid, saved_path, saved_user); + return(1); +} + +/* + * Fork a child process to clean up the TMPDIR + */ +cleantmpdir(jid, tpath, user) + int jid; + char *tpath; + char *user; +{ + switch(fork()) { + case -1: + syslog(LOG_ERR, "TMPDIR cleanup(%s): fork() failed: %m\n", + tpath); + break; + case 0: + execl(CLEANTMPCMD, CLEANTMPCMD, user, tpath, 0); + syslog(LOG_ERR, "TMPDIR cleanup(%s): execl(%s) failed: %m\n", + tpath, CLEANTMPCMD); + exit(1); + default: + /* + * Forget about child. We will exit, and + * /etc/init will pick it up. + */ + break; + } +} +#endif /* CRAY */ +#endif /* defined(PARENT_DOES_UTMP) */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fd7d0bde43 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,532 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1983, 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)telnetd.8 8.4 (Berkeley) 6/1/94 +.\" +.Dd June 1, 1994 +.Dt TELNETD 8 +.Os BSD 4.2 +.Sh NAME +.Nm telnetd +.Nd DARPA +.Tn TELNET +protocol server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm telnetd +.Op Fl BUhkln +.Op Fl D Ar debugmode +.Op Fl S Ar tos +.Op Fl X Ar authtype +.Op Fl a Ar authmode +.Op Fl r Ns Ar lowpty-highpty +.Op Fl u Ar len +.Op Fl debug +.Op Fl L Ar /bin/login +.Op Fl y +.Op Ar port +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm telnetd +command is a server which supports the +.Tn DARPA +standard +.Tn TELNET +virtual terminal protocol. +.Nm Telnetd +is normally invoked by the internet server (see +.Xr inetd 8 ) +for requests to connect to the +.Tn TELNET +port as indicated by the +.Pa /etc/services +file (see +.Xr services 5 ) . +The +.Fl debug +option may be used to start up +.Nm telnetd +manually, instead of through +.Xr inetd 8 . +If started up this way, +.Ar port +may be specified to run +.Nm telnetd +on an alternate +.Tn TCP +port number. +.Pp +The +.Nm telnetd +command accepts the following options: +.Bl -tag -width "-a authmode" +.It Fl a Ar authmode +This option may be used for specifying what mode should +be used for authentication. +Note that this option is only useful if +.Nm telnetd +has been compiled with support for the +.Dv AUTHENTICATION +option. +There are several valid values for +.Ar authmode : +.Bl -tag -width debug +.It debug +Turns on authentication debugging code. +.It user +Only allow connections when the remote user +can provide valid authentication information +to identify the remote user, +and is allowed access to the specified account +without providing a password. +.It valid +Only allow connections when the remote user +can provide valid authentication information +to identify the remote user. +The +.Xr login 1 +command will provide any additional user verification +needed if the remote user is not allowed automatic +access to the specified account. +.It other +Only allow connections that supply some authentication information. +This option is currently not supported +by any of the existing authentication mechanisms, +and is thus the same as specifying +.Fl a +.Cm valid . +.It otp +Only allow authenticated connections (as with +.Fl a +.Cm user ) +and also logins with one-time passwords (OTPs). This option will call +login with an option so that only OTPs are accepted. The user can of +course still type secret information at the prompt. +.It none +This is the default state. +Authentication information is not required. +If no or insufficient authentication information +is provided, then the +.Xr login 1 +program will provide the necessary user +verification. +.It off +This disables the authentication code. +All user verification will happen through the +.Xr login 1 +program. +.El +.It Fl B +Ignored. +.It Fl D Ar debugmode +This option may be used for debugging purposes. +This allows +.Nm telnetd +to print out debugging information +to the connection, allowing the user to see what +.Nm telnetd +is doing. +There are several possible values for +.Ar debugmode : +.Bl -tag -width exercise +.It Cm options +Prints information about the negotiation of +.Tn TELNET +options. +.It Cm report +Prints the +.Cm options +information, plus some additional information +about what processing is going on. +.It Cm netdata +Displays the data stream received by +.Nm telnetd . +.It Cm ptydata +Displays data written to the pty. +.It Cm exercise +Has not been implemented yet. +.El +.It Fl h +Disables the printing of host-specific information before +login has been completed. +.It Fl k +.It Fl l +Ignored. +.It Fl n +Disable +.Dv TCP +keep-alives. Normally +.Nm telnetd +enables the +.Tn TCP +keep-alive mechanism to probe connections that +have been idle for some period of time to determine +if the client is still there, so that idle connections +from machines that have crashed or can no longer +be reached may be cleaned up. +.It Fl r Ar lowpty-highpty +This option is only enabled when +.Nm telnetd +is compiled for +.Dv UNICOS . +It specifies an inclusive range of pseudo-terminal devices to +use. If the system has sysconf variable +.Dv _SC_CRAY_NPTY +configured, the default pty search range is 0 to +.Dv _SC_CRAY_NPTY ; +otherwise, the default range is 0 to 128. Either +.Ar lowpty +or +.Ar highpty +may be omitted to allow changing +either end of the search range. If +.Ar lowpty +is omitted, the - character is still required so that +.Nm telnetd +can differentiate +.Ar highpty +from +.Ar lowpty . +.It Fl S Ar tos +.It Fl u Ar len +This option is used to specify the size of the field +in the +.Dv utmp +structure that holds the remote host name. +If the resolved host name is longer than +.Ar len , +the dotted decimal value will be used instead. +This allows hosts with very long host names that +overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. +Specifying +.Fl u0 +indicates that only dotted decimal addresses +should be put into the +.Pa utmp +file. +.It Fl U +This option causes +.Nm telnetd +to refuse connections from addresses that +cannot be mapped back into a symbolic name +via the +.Xr gethostbyaddr 3 +routine. +.It Fl X Ar authtype +This option is only valid if +.Nm telnetd +has been built with support for the authentication option. +It disables the use of +.Ar authtype +authentication, and +can be used to temporarily disable +a specific authentication type without having to recompile +.Nm telnetd . +.It Fl L Ar pathname +Specify pathname to an alternative login program. +.It Fl y +Makes +.Nm +not warn when a user is trying to login with a cleartext password. +.El +.Pp +.Nm Telnetd +operates by allocating a pseudo-terminal device (see +.Xr pty 4 ) +for a client, then creating a login process which has +the slave side of the pseudo-terminal as +.Dv stdin , +.Dv stdout +and +.Dv stderr . +.Nm Telnetd +manipulates the master side of the pseudo-terminal, +implementing the +.Tn TELNET +protocol and passing characters +between the remote client and the login process. +.Pp +When a +.Tn TELNET +session is started up, +.Nm telnetd +sends +.Tn TELNET +options to the client side indicating +a willingness to do the +following +.Tn TELNET +options, which are described in more detail below: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +DO AUTHENTICATION +WILL ENCRYPT +DO TERMINAL TYPE +DO TSPEED +DO XDISPLOC +DO NEW-ENVIRON +DO ENVIRON +WILL SUPPRESS GO AHEAD +DO ECHO +DO LINEMODE +DO NAWS +WILL STATUS +DO LFLOW +DO TIMING-MARK +.Ed +.Pp +The pseudo-terminal allocated to the client is configured +to operate in +.Dq cooked +mode, and with +.Dv XTABS and +.Dv CRMOD +enabled (see +.Xr tty 4 ) . +.Pp +.Nm Telnetd +has support for enabling locally the following +.Tn TELNET +options: +.Bl -tag -width "DO AUTHENTICATION" +.It "WILL ECHO" +When the +.Dv LINEMODE +option is enabled, a +.Dv WILL ECHO +or +.Dv WONT ECHO +will be sent to the client to indicate the +current state of terminal echoing. +When terminal echo is not desired, a +.Dv WILL ECHO +is sent to indicate that +.Tn telnetd +will take care of echoing any data that needs to be +echoed to the terminal, and then nothing is echoed. +When terminal echo is desired, a +.Dv WONT ECHO +is sent to indicate that +.Tn telnetd +will not be doing any terminal echoing, so the +client should do any terminal echoing that is needed. +.It "WILL BINARY" +Indicates that the client is willing to send a +8 bits of data, rather than the normal 7 bits +of the Network Virtual Terminal. +.It "WILL SGA" +Indicates that it will not be sending +.Dv IAC GA , +go ahead, commands. +.It "WILL STATUS" +Indicates a willingness to send the client, upon +request, of the current status of all +.Tn TELNET +options. +.It "WILL TIMING-MARK" +Whenever a +.Dv DO TIMING-MARK +command is received, it is always responded +to with a +.Dv WILL TIMING-MARK +.It "WILL LOGOUT" +When a +.Dv DO LOGOUT +is received, a +.Dv WILL LOGOUT +is sent in response, and the +.Tn TELNET +session is shut down. +.It "WILL ENCRYPT" +Only sent if +.Nm telnetd +is compiled with support for data encryption, and +indicates a willingness to decrypt +the data stream. +.El +.Pp +.Nm Telnetd +has support for enabling remotely the following +.Tn TELNET +options: +.Bl -tag -width "DO AUTHENTICATION" +.It "DO BINARY" +Sent to indicate that +.Tn telnetd +is willing to receive an 8 bit data stream. +.It "DO LFLOW" +Requests that the client handle flow control +characters remotely. +.It "DO ECHO" +This is not really supported, but is sent to identify a 4.2BSD +.Xr telnet 1 +client, which will improperly respond with +.Dv WILL ECHO . +If a +.Dv WILL ECHO +is received, a +.Dv DONT ECHO +will be sent in response. +.It "DO TERMINAL-TYPE" +Indicates a desire to be able to request the +name of the type of terminal that is attached +to the client side of the connection. +.It "DO SGA" +Indicates that it does not need to receive +.Dv IAC GA , +the go ahead command. +.It "DO NAWS" +Requests that the client inform the server when +the window (display) size changes. +.It "DO TERMINAL-SPEED" +Indicates a desire to be able to request information +about the speed of the serial line to which +the client is attached. +.It "DO XDISPLOC" +Indicates a desire to be able to request the name +of the X windows display that is associated with +the telnet client. +.It "DO NEW-ENVIRON" +Indicates a desire to be able to request environment +variable information, as described in RFC 1572. +.It "DO ENVIRON" +Indicates a desire to be able to request environment +variable information, as described in RFC 1408. +.It "DO LINEMODE" +Only sent if +.Nm telnetd +is compiled with support for linemode, and +requests that the client do line by line processing. +.It "DO TIMING-MARK" +Only sent if +.Nm telnetd +is compiled with support for both linemode and +kludge linemode, and the client responded with +.Dv WONT LINEMODE . +If the client responds with +.Dv WILL TM , +the it is assumed that the client supports +kludge linemode. +Note that the +.Op Fl k +option can be used to disable this. +.It "DO AUTHENTICATION" +Only sent if +.Nm telnetd +is compiled with support for authentication, and +indicates a willingness to receive authentication +information for automatic login. +.It "DO ENCRYPT" +Only sent if +.Nm telnetd +is compiled with support for data encryption, and +indicates a willingness to decrypt +the data stream. +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width /etc/services -compact +.It Pa /etc/services +.It Pa /etc/inittab +(UNICOS systems only) +.It Pa /etc/iptos +(if supported) +.El +.Sh "SEE ALSO" +.Xr telnet 1 , +.Xr login 1 +.Sh STANDARDS +.Bl -tag -compact -width RFC-1572 +.It Cm RFC-854 +.Tn TELNET +PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION +.It Cm RFC-855 +TELNET OPTION SPECIFICATIONS +.It Cm RFC-856 +TELNET BINARY TRANSMISSION +.It Cm RFC-857 +TELNET ECHO OPTION +.It Cm RFC-858 +TELNET SUPPRESS GO AHEAD OPTION +.It Cm RFC-859 +TELNET STATUS OPTION +.It Cm RFC-860 +TELNET TIMING MARK OPTION +.It Cm RFC-861 +TELNET EXTENDED OPTIONS - LIST OPTION +.It Cm RFC-885 +TELNET END OF RECORD OPTION +.It Cm RFC-1073 +Telnet Window Size Option +.It Cm RFC-1079 +Telnet Terminal Speed Option +.It Cm RFC-1091 +Telnet Terminal-Type Option +.It Cm RFC-1096 +Telnet X Display Location Option +.It Cm RFC-1123 +Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support +.It Cm RFC-1184 +Telnet Linemode Option +.It Cm RFC-1372 +Telnet Remote Flow Control Option +.It Cm RFC-1416 +Telnet Authentication Option +.It Cm RFC-1411 +Telnet Authentication: Kerberos Version 4 +.It Cm RFC-1412 +Telnet Authentication: SPX +.It Cm RFC-1571 +Telnet Environment Option Interoperability Issues +.It Cm RFC-1572 +Telnet Environment Option +.El +.Sh BUGS +Some +.Tn TELNET +commands are only partially implemented. +.Pp +Because of bugs in the original 4.2 BSD +.Xr telnet 1 , +.Nm telnetd +performs some dubious protocol exchanges to try to discover if the remote +client is, in fact, a 4.2 BSD +.Xr telnet 1 . +.Pp +Binary mode +has no common interpretation except between similar operating systems +(Unix in this case). +.Pp +The terminal type name received from the remote client is converted to +lower case. +.Pp +.Nm Telnetd +never sends +.Tn TELNET +.Dv IAC GA +(go ahead) commands. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e57eed7169 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c @@ -0,0 +1,1377 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: telnetd.c,v 1.69.6.1 2004/03/22 18:17:25 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS +#include +#include +#include +#include +int secflag; +char tty_dev[16]; +struct secdev dv; +struct sysv sysv; +struct socksec ss; +#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */ + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION +int auth_level = 0; +#endif + +extern int utmp_len; +int registerd_host_only = 0; + +#undef NOERROR + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY +# include +# include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UIO_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef _AIX +#include +#endif +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTTY_H +# include +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_STR_TTY_H +# include +# endif +/* make sure we don't get the bsd version */ +/* what is this here for? solaris? /joda */ +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_TTY_H +# include "/usr/include/sys/tty.h" +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTYVAR_H +# include +# endif + +/* + * Because of the way ptyibuf is used with streams messages, we need + * ptyibuf+1 to be on a full-word boundary. The following wierdness + * is simply to make that happen. + */ +long ptyibufbuf[BUFSIZ/sizeof(long)+1]; +char *ptyibuf = ((char *)&ptyibufbuf[1])-1; +char *ptyip = ((char *)&ptyibufbuf[1])-1; +char ptyibuf2[BUFSIZ]; +unsigned char ctlbuf[BUFSIZ]; +struct strbuf strbufc, strbufd; + +int readstream(int, char*, int); + +#else /* ! STREAMPTY */ + +/* + * I/O data buffers, + * pointers, and counters. + */ +char ptyibuf[BUFSIZ], *ptyip = ptyibuf; +char ptyibuf2[BUFSIZ]; + +#endif /* ! STREAMPTY */ + +int hostinfo = 1; /* do we print login banner? */ + +#ifdef _CRAY +extern int newmap; /* nonzero if \n maps to ^M^J */ +int lowpty = 0, highpty; /* low, high pty numbers */ +#endif /* CRAY */ + +int debug = 0; +int keepalive = 1; +char *progname; + +static void usage (void); + +/* + * The string to pass to getopt(). We do it this way so + * that only the actual options that we support will be + * passed off to getopt(). + */ +char valid_opts[] = "Bd:hklnS:u:UL:y" +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + "a:X:z" +#endif +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS + "D:" +#endif +#ifdef _CRAY + "r:" +#endif + ; + +static void doit(struct sockaddr*, int); + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION +extern int des_check_key; +#endif + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int on = 1; + socklen_t sa_size; + int ch; +#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) + int tos = -1; +#endif +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + des_check_key = 1; /* Kludge for Mac NCSA telnet 2.6 /bg */ +#endif + pfrontp = pbackp = ptyobuf; + netip = netibuf; + nfrontp = nbackp = netobuf; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + progname = *argv; +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + nclearto = 0; +#endif + +#ifdef _CRAY + /* + * Get number of pty's before trying to process options, + * which may include changing pty range. + */ + highpty = getnpty(); +#endif /* CRAY */ + + if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, valid_opts)) != -1) { + switch(ch) { + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case 'a': + /* + * Check for required authentication level + */ + if (strcmp(optarg, "debug") == 0) { + auth_debug_mode = 1; + } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "none") == 0) { + auth_level = 0; + } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "otp") == 0) { + auth_level = 0; + require_otp = 1; + } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "other") == 0) { + auth_level = AUTH_OTHER; + } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "user") == 0) { + auth_level = AUTH_USER; + } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "valid") == 0) { + auth_level = AUTH_VALID; + } else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "off") == 0) { + /* + * This hack turns off authentication + */ + auth_level = -1; + } else { + fprintf(stderr, + "telnetd: unknown authorization level for -a\n"); + } + break; +#endif /* AUTHENTICATION */ + + case 'B': /* BFTP mode is not supported any more */ + break; + case 'd': + if (strcmp(optarg, "ebug") == 0) { + debug++; + break; + } + usage(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + break; + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS + case 'D': + /* + * Check for desired diagnostics capabilities. + */ + if (!strcmp(optarg, "report")) { + diagnostic |= TD_REPORT|TD_OPTIONS; + } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "exercise")) { + diagnostic |= TD_EXERCISE; + } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "netdata")) { + diagnostic |= TD_NETDATA; + } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "ptydata")) { + diagnostic |= TD_PTYDATA; + } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "options")) { + diagnostic |= TD_OPTIONS; + } else { + usage(); + /* NOT REACHED */ + } + break; +#endif /* DIAGNOSTICS */ + + + case 'h': + hostinfo = 0; + break; + + case 'k': /* Linemode is not supported any more */ + case 'l': + break; + + case 'n': + keepalive = 0; + break; + +#ifdef _CRAY + case 'r': + { + char *strchr(); + char *c; + + /* + * Allow the specification of alterations + * to the pty search range. It is legal to + * specify only one, and not change the + * other from its default. + */ + c = strchr(optarg, '-'); + if (c) { + *c++ = '\0'; + highpty = atoi(c); + } + if (*optarg != '\0') + lowpty = atoi(optarg); + if ((lowpty > highpty) || (lowpty < 0) || + (highpty > 32767)) { + usage(); + /* NOT REACHED */ + } + break; + } +#endif /* CRAY */ + + case 'S': +#ifdef HAVE_PARSETOS + if ((tos = parsetos(optarg, "tcp")) < 0) + fprintf(stderr, "%s%s%s\n", + "telnetd: Bad TOS argument '", optarg, + "'; will try to use default TOS"); +#else + fprintf(stderr, "%s%s\n", "TOS option unavailable; ", + "-S flag not supported\n"); +#endif + break; + + case 'u': { + char *eptr; + + utmp_len = strtol(optarg, &eptr, 0); + if (optarg == eptr) + fprintf(stderr, "telnetd: unknown utmp len (%s)\n", optarg); + break; + } + + case 'U': + registerd_host_only = 1; + break; + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case 'X': + /* + * Check for invalid authentication types + */ + auth_disable_name(optarg); + break; +#endif + case 'y': + no_warn = 1; + break; +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case 'z': + log_unauth = 1; + break; + +#endif /* AUTHENTICATION */ + + case 'L': + new_login = optarg; + break; + + default: + fprintf(stderr, "telnetd: %c: unknown option\n", ch); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '?': + usage(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (debug) { + int port = 0; + struct servent *sp; + + if (argc > 1) { + usage (); + } else if (argc == 1) { + sp = roken_getservbyname (*argv, "tcp"); + if (sp) + port = sp->s_port; + else + port = htons(atoi(*argv)); + } else { +#ifdef KRB5 + port = krb5_getportbyname (NULL, "telnet", "tcp", 23); +#else + port = k_getportbyname("telnet", "tcp", htons(23)); +#endif + } + mini_inetd (port); + } else if (argc > 0) { + usage(); + /* NOT REACHED */ + } + +#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS + secflag = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS); + + /* + * Get socket's security label + */ + if (secflag) { + socklen_t szss = sizeof(ss); + int sock_multi; + socklen_t szi = sizeof(int); + + memset(&dv, 0, sizeof(dv)); + + if (getsysv(&sysv, sizeof(struct sysv)) != 0) + fatalperror(net, "getsysv"); + + /* + * Get socket security label and set device values + * {security label to be set on ttyp device} + */ +#ifdef SO_SEC_MULTI /* 8.0 code */ + if ((getsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SECURITY, + (void *)&ss, &szss) < 0) || + (getsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SEC_MULTI, + (void *)&sock_multi, &szi) < 0)) + fatalperror(net, "getsockopt"); + else { + dv.dv_actlvl = ss.ss_actlabel.lt_level; + dv.dv_actcmp = ss.ss_actlabel.lt_compart; + if (!sock_multi) { + dv.dv_minlvl = dv.dv_maxlvl = dv.dv_actlvl; + dv.dv_valcmp = dv.dv_actcmp; + } else { + dv.dv_minlvl = ss.ss_minlabel.lt_level; + dv.dv_maxlvl = ss.ss_maxlabel.lt_level; + dv.dv_valcmp = ss.ss_maxlabel.lt_compart; + } + dv.dv_devflg = 0; + } +#else /* SO_SEC_MULTI */ /* 7.0 code */ + if (getsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SECURITY, + (void *)&ss, &szss) >= 0) { + dv.dv_actlvl = ss.ss_slevel; + dv.dv_actcmp = ss.ss_compart; + dv.dv_minlvl = ss.ss_minlvl; + dv.dv_maxlvl = ss.ss_maxlvl; + dv.dv_valcmp = ss.ss_maxcmp; + } +#endif /* SO_SEC_MULTI */ + } +#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */ + + roken_openlog("telnetd", LOG_PID | LOG_ODELAY, LOG_DAEMON); + sa_size = sizeof (__ss); + if (getpeername(STDIN_FILENO, sa, &sa_size) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", progname); + perror("getpeername"); + _exit(1); + } + if (keepalive && + setsockopt(STDIN_FILENO, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, + (void *)&on, sizeof (on)) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (SO_KEEPALIVE): %m"); + } + +#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { +# ifdef HAVE_GETTOSBYNAME + struct tosent *tp; + if (tos < 0 && (tp = gettosbyname("telnet", "tcp"))) + tos = tp->t_tos; +# endif + if (tos < 0) + tos = 020; /* Low Delay bit */ + if (tos + && sa->sa_family == AF_INET + && (setsockopt(STDIN_FILENO, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, + (void *)&tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) + && (errno != ENOPROTOOPT) ) + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (IP_TOS): %m"); + } +#endif /* defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) */ + net = STDIN_FILENO; + doit(sa, sa_size); + /* NOTREACHED */ + return 0; +} /* end of main */ + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: telnetd"); +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + fprintf(stderr, " [-a (debug|other|otp|user|valid|off|none)]\n\t"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, " [-debug]"); +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS + fprintf(stderr, " [-D (options|report|exercise|netdata|ptydata)]\n\t"); +#endif +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + fprintf(stderr, " [-edebug]"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, " [-h]"); + fprintf(stderr, " [-L login]"); + fprintf(stderr, " [-n]"); +#ifdef _CRAY + fprintf(stderr, " [-r[lowpty]-[highpty]]"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, "\n\t"); +#ifdef HAVE_GETTOSBYNAME + fprintf(stderr, " [-S tos]"); +#endif +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + fprintf(stderr, " [-X auth-type] [-y] [-z]"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, " [-u utmp_hostname_length] [-U]"); + fprintf(stderr, " [port]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * getterminaltype + * + * Ask the other end to send along its terminal type and speed. + * Output is the variable terminaltype filled in. + */ +static unsigned char ttytype_sbbuf[] = { + IAC, SB, TELOPT_TTYPE, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE +}; + +int +getterminaltype(char *name, size_t name_sz) +{ + int retval = -1; + + settimer(baseline); +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + /* + * Handle the Authentication option before we do anything else. + */ + send_do(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 1); + while (his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) + ttloop(); + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION)) { + retval = auth_wait(name, name_sz); + } +#endif + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + send_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_ENCRYPT, 1); /* esc@magic.fi */ +#endif + send_do(TELOPT_TTYPE, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_TSPEED, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_XDISPLOC, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, 1); + send_do(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, 1); + while ( +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + his_do_dont_is_changing(TELOPT_ENCRYPT) || +#endif + his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_TTYPE) || + his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_TSPEED) || + his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_XDISPLOC) || + his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON) || + his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) { + ttloop(); + } +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + /* + * Wait for the negotiation of what type of encryption we can + * send with. If autoencrypt is not set, this will just return. + */ + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_ENCRYPT)) { + encrypt_wait(); + } +#endif + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TSPEED)) { + static unsigned char sb[] = + { IAC, SB, TELOPT_TSPEED, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE }; + + telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2);); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_XDISPLOC)) { + static unsigned char sb[] = + { IAC, SB, TELOPT_XDISPLOC, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE }; + + telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2);); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON)) { + static unsigned char sb[] = + { IAC, SB, TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE }; + + telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2);); + } + else if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) { + static unsigned char sb[] = + { IAC, SB, TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, TELQUAL_SEND, IAC, SE }; + + telnet_net_write (sb, sizeof sb); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', sb + 2, sizeof sb - 2);); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TTYPE)) { + + telnet_net_write (ttytype_sbbuf, sizeof ttytype_sbbuf); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', ttytype_sbbuf + 2, + sizeof ttytype_sbbuf - 2);); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TSPEED)) { + while (sequenceIs(tspeedsubopt, baseline)) + ttloop(); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_XDISPLOC)) { + while (sequenceIs(xdisplocsubopt, baseline)) + ttloop(); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON)) { + while (sequenceIs(environsubopt, baseline)) + ttloop(); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) { + while (sequenceIs(oenvironsubopt, baseline)) + ttloop(); + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TTYPE)) { + char first[256], last[256]; + + while (sequenceIs(ttypesubopt, baseline)) + ttloop(); + + /* + * If the other side has already disabled the option, then + * we have to just go with what we (might) have already gotten. + */ + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_TTYPE) && !terminaltypeok(terminaltype)) { + strlcpy(first, terminaltype, sizeof(first)); + for(;;) { + /* + * Save the unknown name, and request the next name. + */ + strlcpy(last, terminaltype, sizeof(last)); + _gettermname(); + if (terminaltypeok(terminaltype)) + break; + if ((strncmp(last, terminaltype, sizeof(last)) == 0) || + his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TTYPE)) { + /* + * We've hit the end. If this is the same as + * the first name, just go with it. + */ + if (strncmp(first, terminaltype, sizeof(first)) == 0) + break; + /* + * Get the terminal name one more time, so that + * RFC1091 compliant telnets will cycle back to + * the start of the list. + */ + _gettermname(); + if (strncmp(first, terminaltype, sizeof(first)) != 0) + strcpy(terminaltype, first); + break; + } + } + } + } + return(retval); +} /* end of getterminaltype */ + +void +_gettermname(void) +{ + /* + * If the client turned off the option, + * we can't send another request, so we + * just return. + */ + if (his_state_is_wont(TELOPT_TTYPE)) + return; + settimer(baseline); + telnet_net_write (ttytype_sbbuf, sizeof ttytype_sbbuf); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', ttytype_sbbuf + 2, + sizeof ttytype_sbbuf - 2);); + while (sequenceIs(ttypesubopt, baseline)) + ttloop(); +} + +int +terminaltypeok(char *s) +{ + return 1; +} + + +char host_name[MaxHostNameLen]; +char remote_host_name[MaxHostNameLen]; +char remote_utmp_name[MaxHostNameLen]; + +/* + * Get a pty, scan input lines. + */ +static void +doit(struct sockaddr *who, int who_len) +{ + int level; + int ptynum; + char user_name[256]; + int error; + + /* + * Find an available pty to use. + */ + ourpty = getpty(&ptynum); + if (ourpty < 0) + fatal(net, "All network ports in use"); + +#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS + /* + * set ttyp line security label + */ + if (secflag) { + char slave_dev[16]; + + snprintf(tty_dev, sizeof(tty_dev), "/dev/pty/%03d", ptynum); + if (setdevs(tty_dev, &dv) < 0) + fatal(net, "cannot set pty security"); + snprintf(slave_dev, sizeof(slave_dev), "/dev/ttyp%03d", ptynum); + if (setdevs(slave_dev, &dv) < 0) + fatal(net, "cannot set tty security"); + } +#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */ + + error = getnameinfo_verified (who, who_len, + remote_host_name, + sizeof(remote_host_name), + NULL, 0, + registerd_host_only ? NI_NAMEREQD : 0); + if (error) + fatal(net, "Couldn't resolve your address into a host name.\r\n\ +Please contact your net administrator"); + + gethostname(host_name, sizeof (host_name)); + + strlcpy (remote_utmp_name, remote_host_name, sizeof(remote_utmp_name)); + + /* Only trim if too long (and possible) */ + if (strlen(remote_utmp_name) > utmp_len) { + char *domain = strchr(host_name, '.'); + char *p = strchr(remote_utmp_name, '.'); + if (domain != NULL && p != NULL && (strcmp(p, domain) == 0)) + *p = '\0'; /* remove domain part */ + } + + /* + * If hostname still doesn't fit utmp, use ipaddr. + */ + if (strlen(remote_utmp_name) > utmp_len) { + error = getnameinfo (who, who_len, + remote_utmp_name, + sizeof(remote_utmp_name), + NULL, 0, + NI_NUMERICHOST); + if (error) + fatal(net, "Couldn't get numeric address\r\n"); + } + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + auth_encrypt_init(host_name, remote_host_name, "TELNETD", 1); +#endif + + init_env(); + /* + * get terminal type. + */ + *user_name = 0; + level = getterminaltype(user_name, sizeof(user_name)); + esetenv("TERM", terminaltype ? terminaltype : "network", 1); + +#ifdef _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS + if (secflag) { + if (setulvl(dv.dv_actlvl) < 0) + fatal(net,"cannot setulvl()"); + if (setucmp(dv.dv_actcmp) < 0) + fatal(net, "cannot setucmp()"); + } +#endif /* _SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS */ + + /* begin server processing */ + my_telnet(net, ourpty, remote_host_name, remote_utmp_name, + level, user_name); + /*NOTREACHED*/ +} /* end of doit */ + +/* output contents of /etc/issue.net, or /etc/issue */ +static void +show_issue(void) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[128]; + f = fopen(SYSCONFDIR "/issue.net", "r"); + if(f == NULL) + f = fopen(SYSCONFDIR "/issue", "r"); + if(f){ + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-2, f)){ + strcpy(buf + strcspn(buf, "\r\n"), "\r\n"); + writenet((unsigned char*)buf, strlen(buf)); + } + fclose(f); + } +} + +/* + * Main loop. Select from pty and network, and + * hand data to telnet receiver finite state machine. + */ +void +my_telnet(int f, int p, const char *host, const char *utmp_host, + int level, char *autoname) +{ + int on = 1; + char *he; + char *IM; + int nfd; + int startslave_called = 0; + time_t timeout; + + /* + * Initialize the slc mapping table. + */ + get_slc_defaults(); + + /* + * Do some tests where it is desireable to wait for a response. + * Rather than doing them slowly, one at a time, do them all + * at once. + */ + if (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_SGA)) + send_will(TELOPT_SGA, 1); + /* + * Is the client side a 4.2 (NOT 4.3) system? We need to know this + * because 4.2 clients are unable to deal with TCP urgent data. + * + * To find out, we send out a "DO ECHO". If the remote system + * answers "WILL ECHO" it is probably a 4.2 client, and we note + * that fact ("WILL ECHO" ==> that the client will echo what + * WE, the server, sends it; it does NOT mean that the client will + * echo the terminal input). + */ + send_do(TELOPT_ECHO, 1); + + /* + * Send along a couple of other options that we wish to negotiate. + */ + send_do(TELOPT_NAWS, 1); + send_will(TELOPT_STATUS, 1); + flowmode = 1; /* default flow control state */ + restartany = -1; /* uninitialized... */ + send_do(TELOPT_LFLOW, 1); + + /* + * Spin, waiting for a response from the DO ECHO. However, + * some REALLY DUMB telnets out there might not respond + * to the DO ECHO. So, we spin looking for NAWS, (most dumb + * telnets so far seem to respond with WONT for a DO that + * they don't understand...) because by the time we get the + * response, it will already have processed the DO ECHO. + * Kludge upon kludge. + */ + while (his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_NAWS)) + ttloop(); + + /* + * But... + * The client might have sent a WILL NAWS as part of its + * startup code; if so, we'll be here before we get the + * response to the DO ECHO. We'll make the assumption + * that any implementation that understands about NAWS + * is a modern enough implementation that it will respond + * to our DO ECHO request; hence we'll do another spin + * waiting for the ECHO option to settle down, which is + * what we wanted to do in the first place... + */ + if (his_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_ECHO) && + his_state_is_will(TELOPT_NAWS)) { + while (his_will_wont_is_changing(TELOPT_ECHO)) + ttloop(); + } + /* + * On the off chance that the telnet client is broken and does not + * respond to the DO ECHO we sent, (after all, we did send the + * DO NAWS negotiation after the DO ECHO, and we won't get here + * until a response to the DO NAWS comes back) simulate the + * receipt of a will echo. This will also send a WONT ECHO + * to the client, since we assume that the client failed to + * respond because it believes that it is already in DO ECHO + * mode, which we do not want. + */ + if (his_want_state_is_will(TELOPT_ECHO)) { + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + {output_data("td: simulating recv\r\n"); + }); + willoption(TELOPT_ECHO); + } + + /* + * Finally, to clean things up, we turn on our echo. This + * will break stupid 4.2 telnets out of local terminal echo. + */ + + if (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_ECHO)) + send_will(TELOPT_ECHO, 1); + +#ifdef TIOCPKT +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + if (!really_stream) +#endif + /* + * Turn on packet mode + */ + ioctl(p, TIOCPKT, (char *)&on); +#endif + + + /* + * Call telrcv() once to pick up anything received during + * terminal type negotiation, 4.2/4.3 determination, and + * linemode negotiation. + */ + telrcv(); + + ioctl(f, FIONBIO, (char *)&on); + ioctl(p, FIONBIO, (char *)&on); + +#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + setsockopt(net, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, + (void *)&on, sizeof on); +#endif /* defined(SO_OOBINLINE) */ + +#ifdef SIGTSTP + signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN); +#endif +#ifdef SIGTTOU + /* + * Ignoring SIGTTOU keeps the kernel from blocking us + * in ttioct() in /sys/tty.c. + */ + signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN); +#endif + + signal(SIGCHLD, cleanup); + +#ifdef TIOCNOTTY + { + int t; + t = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); + if (t >= 0) { + ioctl(t, TIOCNOTTY, (char *)0); + close(t); + } + } +#endif + + show_issue(); + /* + * Show banner that getty never gave. + * + * We put the banner in the pty input buffer. This way, it + * gets carriage return null processing, etc., just like all + * other pty --> client data. + */ + + if (getenv("USER")) + hostinfo = 0; + + IM = DEFAULT_IM; + he = 0; + edithost(he, host_name); + if (hostinfo && *IM) + putf(IM, ptyibuf2); + + if (pcc) + strncat(ptyibuf2, ptyip, pcc+1); + ptyip = ptyibuf2; + pcc = strlen(ptyip); + + DIAG(TD_REPORT, { + output_data("td: Entering processing loop\r\n"); + }); + + + nfd = ((f > p) ? f : p) + 1; + timeout = time(NULL) + 5; + for (;;) { + fd_set ibits, obits, xbits; + int c; + + /* wait for encryption to be turned on, but don't wait + indefinitely */ + if(!startslave_called && (!encrypt_delay() || timeout > time(NULL))){ + startslave_called = 1; + startslave(host, utmp_host, level, autoname); + } + + if (ncc < 0 && pcc < 0) + break; + + FD_ZERO(&ibits); + FD_ZERO(&obits); + FD_ZERO(&xbits); + + if (f >= FD_SETSIZE + || p >= FD_SETSIZE) + fatal(net, "fd too large"); + + /* + * Never look for input if there's still + * stuff in the corresponding output buffer + */ + if (nfrontp - nbackp || pcc > 0) { + FD_SET(f, &obits); + } else { + FD_SET(p, &ibits); + } + if (pfrontp - pbackp || ncc > 0) { + FD_SET(p, &obits); + } else { + FD_SET(f, &ibits); + } + if (!SYNCHing) { + FD_SET(f, &xbits); + } + if ((c = select(nfd, &ibits, &obits, &xbits, + (struct timeval *)0)) < 1) { + if (c == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR) { + continue; + } + } + sleep(5); + continue; + } + + /* + * Any urgent data? + */ + if (FD_ISSET(net, &xbits)) { + SYNCHing = 1; + } + + /* + * Something to read from the network... + */ + if (FD_ISSET(net, &ibits)) { +#ifndef SO_OOBINLINE + /* + * In 4.2 (and 4.3 beta) systems, the + * OOB indication and data handling in the kernel + * is such that if two separate TCP Urgent requests + * come in, one byte of TCP data will be overlaid. + * This is fatal for Telnet, but we try to live + * with it. + * + * In addition, in 4.2 (and...), a special protocol + * is needed to pick up the TCP Urgent data in + * the correct sequence. + * + * What we do is: if we think we are in urgent + * mode, we look to see if we are "at the mark". + * If we are, we do an OOB receive. If we run + * this twice, we will do the OOB receive twice, + * but the second will fail, since the second + * time we were "at the mark", but there wasn't + * any data there (the kernel doesn't reset + * "at the mark" until we do a normal read). + * Once we've read the OOB data, we go ahead + * and do normal reads. + * + * There is also another problem, which is that + * since the OOB byte we read doesn't put us + * out of OOB state, and since that byte is most + * likely the TELNET DM (data mark), we would + * stay in the TELNET SYNCH (SYNCHing) state. + * So, clocks to the rescue. If we've "just" + * received a DM, then we test for the + * presence of OOB data when the receive OOB + * fails (and AFTER we did the normal mode read + * to clear "at the mark"). + */ + if (SYNCHing) { + int atmark; + + ioctl(net, SIOCATMARK, (char *)&atmark); + if (atmark) { + ncc = recv(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf), MSG_OOB); + if ((ncc == -1) && (errno == EINVAL)) { + ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf)); + if (sequenceIs(didnetreceive, gotDM)) { + SYNCHing = stilloob(net); + } + } + } else { + ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf)); + } + } else { + ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf)); + } + settimer(didnetreceive); +#else /* !defined(SO_OOBINLINE)) */ + ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof (netibuf)); +#endif /* !defined(SO_OOBINLINE)) */ + if (ncc < 0 && errno == EWOULDBLOCK) + ncc = 0; + else { + if (ncc <= 0) { + break; + } + netip = netibuf; + } + DIAG((TD_REPORT | TD_NETDATA), { + output_data("td: netread %d chars\r\n", ncc); + }); + DIAG(TD_NETDATA, printdata("nd", netip, ncc)); + } + + /* + * Something to read from the pty... + */ + if (FD_ISSET(p, &ibits)) { +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + if (really_stream) + pcc = readstream(p, ptyibuf, BUFSIZ); + else +#endif + pcc = read(p, ptyibuf, BUFSIZ); + + /* + * On some systems, if we try to read something + * off the master side before the slave side is + * opened, we get EIO. + */ + if (pcc < 0 && (errno == EWOULDBLOCK || +#ifdef EAGAIN + errno == EAGAIN || +#endif + errno == EIO)) { + pcc = 0; + } else { + if (pcc <= 0) + break; + if (ptyibuf[0] & TIOCPKT_FLUSHWRITE) { + netclear(); /* clear buffer back */ +#ifndef NO_URGENT + /* + * There are client telnets on some + * operating systems get screwed up + * royally if we send them urgent + * mode data. + */ + output_data ("%c%c", IAC, DM); + + neturg = nfrontp-1; /* off by one XXX */ + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, + printoption("td: send IAC", DM)); + +#endif + } + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_LFLOW) && + (ptyibuf[0] & + (TIOCPKT_NOSTOP|TIOCPKT_DOSTOP))) { + int newflow = + ptyibuf[0] & TIOCPKT_DOSTOP ? 1 : 0; + if (newflow != flowmode) { + flowmode = newflow; + output_data("%c%c%c%c%c%c", + IAC, SB, TELOPT_LFLOW, + flowmode ? LFLOW_ON + : LFLOW_OFF, + IAC, SE); + DIAG(TD_OPTIONS, printsub('>', + (unsigned char *)nfrontp-4, + 4);); + } + } + pcc--; + ptyip = ptyibuf+1; + } + } + + while (pcc > 0) { + if ((&netobuf[BUFSIZ] - nfrontp) < 3) + break; + c = *ptyip++ & 0377, pcc--; + if (c == IAC) + *nfrontp++ = c; + *nfrontp++ = c; + if ((c == '\r') && (my_state_is_wont(TELOPT_BINARY))) { + if (pcc > 0 && ((*ptyip & 0377) == '\n')) { + *nfrontp++ = *ptyip++ & 0377; + pcc--; + } else + *nfrontp++ = '\0'; + } + } + + if (FD_ISSET(f, &obits) && (nfrontp - nbackp) > 0) + netflush(); + if (ncc > 0) + telrcv(); + if (FD_ISSET(p, &obits) && (pfrontp - pbackp) > 0) + ptyflush(); + } + cleanup(0); +} + +#ifndef TCSIG +# ifdef TIOCSIG +# define TCSIG TIOCSIG +# endif +#endif + +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + + int flowison = -1; /* current state of flow: -1 is unknown */ + +int +readstream(int p, char *ibuf, int bufsize) +{ + int flags = 0; + int ret = 0; + struct termios *tsp; +#if 0 + struct termio *tp; +#endif + struct iocblk *ip; + char vstop, vstart; + int ixon; + int newflow; + + strbufc.maxlen = BUFSIZ; + strbufc.buf = (char *)ctlbuf; + strbufd.maxlen = bufsize-1; + strbufd.len = 0; + strbufd.buf = ibuf+1; + ibuf[0] = 0; + + ret = getmsg(p, &strbufc, &strbufd, &flags); + if (ret < 0) /* error of some sort -- probably EAGAIN */ + return(-1); + + if (strbufc.len <= 0 || ctlbuf[0] == M_DATA) { + /* data message */ + if (strbufd.len > 0) { /* real data */ + return(strbufd.len + 1); /* count header char */ + } else { + /* nothing there */ + errno = EAGAIN; + return(-1); + } + } + + /* + * It's a control message. Return 1, to look at the flag we set + */ + + switch (ctlbuf[0]) { + case M_FLUSH: + if (ibuf[1] & FLUSHW) + ibuf[0] = TIOCPKT_FLUSHWRITE; + return(1); + + case M_IOCTL: + ip = (struct iocblk *) (ibuf+1); + + switch (ip->ioc_cmd) { +#ifdef TCSETS + case TCSETS: + case TCSETSW: + case TCSETSF: + tsp = (struct termios *) + (ibuf+1 + sizeof(struct iocblk)); + vstop = tsp->c_cc[VSTOP]; + vstart = tsp->c_cc[VSTART]; + ixon = tsp->c_iflag & IXON; + break; +#endif +#if 0 + case TCSETA: + case TCSETAW: + case TCSETAF: + tp = (struct termio *) (ibuf+1 + sizeof(struct iocblk)); + vstop = tp->c_cc[VSTOP]; + vstart = tp->c_cc[VSTART]; + ixon = tp->c_iflag & IXON; + break; +#endif + default: + errno = EAGAIN; + return(-1); + } + + newflow = (ixon && (vstart == 021) && (vstop == 023)) ? 1 : 0; + if (newflow != flowison) { /* it's a change */ + flowison = newflow; + ibuf[0] = newflow ? TIOCPKT_DOSTOP : TIOCPKT_NOSTOP; + return(1); + } + } + + /* nothing worth doing anything about */ + errno = EAGAIN; + return(-1); +} +#endif /* STREAMSPTY */ + +/* + * Send interrupt to process on other side of pty. + * If it is in raw mode, just write NULL; + * otherwise, write intr char. + */ +void +interrupt() +{ + ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */ + +#if defined(STREAMSPTY) && defined(TIOCSIGNAL) + /* Streams PTY style ioctl to post a signal */ + if (really_stream) + { + int sig = SIGINT; + ioctl(ourpty, TIOCSIGNAL, &sig); + ioctl(ourpty, I_FLUSH, FLUSHR); + } +#else +#ifdef TCSIG + ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGINT); +#else /* TCSIG */ + init_termbuf(); + *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_IP].sptr ? + (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_IP].sptr : '\177'; +#endif /* TCSIG */ +#endif +} + +/* + * Send quit to process on other side of pty. + * If it is in raw mode, just write NULL; + * otherwise, write quit char. + */ +void +sendbrk() +{ + ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */ +#ifdef TCSIG + ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGQUIT); +#else /* TCSIG */ + init_termbuf(); + *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_ABORT].sptr ? + (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_ABORT].sptr : '\034'; +#endif /* TCSIG */ +} + +void +sendsusp() +{ +#ifdef SIGTSTP + ptyflush(); /* half-hearted */ +# ifdef TCSIG + ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGTSTP); +# else /* TCSIG */ + *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_SUSP].sptr ? + (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_SUSP].sptr : '\032'; +# endif /* TCSIG */ +#endif /* SIGTSTP */ +} + +/* + * When we get an AYT, if ^T is enabled, use that. Otherwise, + * just send back "[Yes]". + */ +void +recv_ayt() +{ +#if defined(SIGINFO) && defined(TCSIG) + if (slctab[SLC_AYT].sptr && *slctab[SLC_AYT].sptr != _POSIX_VDISABLE) { + ioctl(ourpty, TCSIG, (char *)SIGINFO); + return; + } +#endif + output_data("\r\n[Yes]\r\n"); +} + +void +doeof() +{ + init_termbuf(); + + *pfrontp++ = slctab[SLC_EOF].sptr ? + (unsigned char)*slctab[SLC_EOF].sptr : '\004'; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea599dc8c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ + +TELNETD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual TELNETD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + tteellnneettdd - DARPA TELNET protocol server + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + tteellnneettdd [--BBUUhhkkllnn] [--DD _d_e_b_u_g_m_o_d_e] [--SS _t_o_s] [--XX _a_u_t_h_t_y_p_e] [--aa _a_u_t_h_m_o_d_e] + [--rr_l_o_w_p_t_y_-_h_i_g_h_p_t_y] [--uu _l_e_n] [--ddeebbuugg] [--LL _/_b_i_n_/_l_o_g_i_n] [--yy] [_p_o_r_t] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The tteellnneettdd command is a server which supports the DARPA standard TELNET + virtual terminal protocol. TTeellnneettdd is normally invoked by the internet + server (see inetd(8)) for requests to connect to the TELNET port as in- + dicated by the _/_e_t_c_/_s_e_r_v_i_c_e_s file (see services(5)). The --ddeebbuugg option + may be used to start up tteellnneettdd manually, instead of through inetd(8). + If started up this way, _p_o_r_t may be specified to run tteellnneettdd on an alter- + nate TCP port number. + + The tteellnneettdd command accepts the following options: + + --aa _a_u_t_h_m_o_d_e This option may be used for specifying what mode should be + used for authentication. Note that this option is only use- + ful if tteellnneettdd has been compiled with support for the + AUTHENTICATION option. There are several valid values for + _a_u_t_h_m_o_d_e: + + debug Turns on authentication debugging code. + + user Only allow connections when the remote user can pro- + vide valid authentication information to identify the + remote user, and is allowed access to the specified + account without providing a password. + + valid Only allow connections when the remote user can pro- + vide valid authentication information to identify the + remote user. The login(1) command will provide any + additional user verification needed if the remote us- + er is not allowed automatic access to the specified + account. + + other Only allow connections that supply some authentica- + tion information. This option is currently not sup- + ported by any of the existing authentication mecha- + nisms, and is thus the same as specifying --aa vvaalliidd. + + otp Only allow authenticated connections (as with --aa + uusseerr) and also logins with one-time passwords (OTPs). + This option will call login with an option so that + only OTPs are accepted. The user can of course still + type secret information at the prompt. + + none This is the default state. Authentication informa- + tion is not required. If no or insufficient authen- + tication information is provided, then the login(1) + program will provide the necessary user verification. + + off This disables the authentication code. All user ver- + ification will happen through the login(1) program. + + --BB Ignored. + + --DD _d_e_b_u_g_m_o_d_e + This option may be used for debugging purposes. This allows + tteellnneettdd to print out debugging information to the connec- + tion, allowing the user to see what tteellnneettdd is doing. There + are several possible values for _d_e_b_u_g_m_o_d_e: + + ooppttiioonnss Prints information about the negotiation of TELNET + options. + + rreeppoorrtt Prints the ooppttiioonnss information, plus some addi- + tional information about what processing is going + on. + + nneettddaattaa Displays the data stream received by tteellnneettdd. + + ppttyyddaattaa Displays data written to the pty. + + eexxeerrcciissee Has not been implemented yet. + + --hh Disables the printing of host-specific information before + login has been completed. + + --kk + + --ll Ignored. + + --nn Disable TCP keep-alives. Normally tteellnneettdd enables the TCP + keep-alive mechanism to probe connections that have been + idle for some period of time to determine if the client is + still there, so that idle connections from machines that + have crashed or can no longer be reached may be cleaned up. + + --rr _l_o_w_p_t_y_-_h_i_g_h_p_t_y + This option is only enabled when tteellnneettdd is compiled for + UNICOS. It specifies an inclusive range of pseudo-terminal + devices to use. If the system has sysconf variable + _SC_CRAY_NPTY configured, the default pty search range is 0 + to _SC_CRAY_NPTY; otherwise, the default range is 0 to 128. + Either _l_o_w_p_t_y or _h_i_g_h_p_t_y may be omitted to allow changing + either end of the search range. If _l_o_w_p_t_y is omitted, the - + character is still required so that tteellnneettdd can differenti- + ate _h_i_g_h_p_t_y from _l_o_w_p_t_y. + + --SS _t_o_s + + --uu _l_e_n This option is used to specify the size of the field in the + utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the re- + solved host name is longer than _l_e_n, the dotted decimal val- + ue will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long + host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely + identified. Specifying --uu00 indicates that only dotted deci- + mal addresses should be put into the _u_t_m_p file. + + --UU This option causes tteellnneettdd to refuse connections from ad- + dresses that cannot be mapped back into a symbolic name via + the gethostbyaddr(3) routine. + + --XX _a_u_t_h_t_y_p_e This option is only valid if tteellnneettdd has been built with + support for the authentication option. It disables the use + of _a_u_t_h_t_y_p_e authentication, and can be used to temporarily + disable a specific authentication type without having to re- + compile tteellnneettdd. + + --LL _p_a_t_h_n_a_m_e Specify pathname to an alternative login program. + + --yy Makes tteellnneettdd not warn when a user is trying to login with a + cleartext password. + + + TTeellnneettdd operates by allocating a pseudo-terminal device (see pty(4)) for + a client, then creating a login process which has the slave side of the + pseudo-terminal as stdin, stdout and stderr. TTeellnneettdd manipulates the mas- + ter side of the pseudo-terminal, implementing the TELNET protocol and + passing characters between the remote client and the login process. + + When a TELNET session is started up, tteellnneettdd sends TELNET options to the + client side indicating a willingness to do the following TELNET options, + which are described in more detail below: + + DO AUTHENTICATION + WILL ENCRYPT + DO TERMINAL TYPE + DO TSPEED + DO XDISPLOC + DO NEW-ENVIRON + DO ENVIRON + WILL SUPPRESS GO AHEAD + DO ECHO + DO LINEMODE + DO NAWS + WILL STATUS + DO LFLOW + DO TIMING-MARK + + The pseudo-terminal allocated to the client is configured to operate in + ``cooked'' mode, and with XTABS and CRMOD enabled (see tty(4)). + + TTeellnneettdd has support for enabling locally the following TELNET options: + + WILL ECHO When the LINEMODE option is enabled, a WILL ECHO or + WONT ECHO will be sent to the client to indicate the + current state of terminal echoing. When terminal echo + is not desired, a WILL ECHO is sent to indicate that + telnetd will take care of echoing any data that needs + to be echoed to the terminal, and then nothing is + echoed. When terminal echo is desired, a WONT ECHO is + sent to indicate that telnetd will not be doing any + terminal echoing, so the client should do any terminal + echoing that is needed. + + WILL BINARY Indicates that the client is willing to send a 8 bits + of data, rather than the normal 7 bits of the Network + Virtual Terminal. + + WILL SGA Indicates that it will not be sending IAC GA, go + ahead, commands. + + WILL STATUS Indicates a willingness to send the client, upon re- + quest, of the current status of all TELNET options. + + WILL TIMING-MARK Whenever a DO TIMING-MARK command is received, it is + always responded to with a WILL TIMING-MARK + + WILL LOGOUT When a DO LOGOUT is received, a WILL LOGOUT is sent in + response, and the TELNET session is shut down. + + WILL ENCRYPT Only sent if tteellnneettdd is compiled with support for data + encryption, and indicates a willingness to decrypt the + data stream. + + TTeellnneettdd has support for enabling remotely the following TELNET options: + + DO BINARY Sent to indicate that telnetd is willing to receive an + + + 8 bit data stream. + + DO LFLOW Requests that the client handle flow control charac- + ters remotely. + + DO ECHO This is not really supported, but is sent to identify + a 4.2BSD telnet(1) client, which will improperly re- + spond with WILL ECHO. If a WILL ECHO is received, a + DONT ECHO will be sent in response. + + DO TERMINAL-TYPE Indicates a desire to be able to request the name of + the type of terminal that is attached to the client + side of the connection. + + DO SGA Indicates that it does not need to receive IAC GA, the + go ahead command. + + DO NAWS Requests that the client inform the server when the + window (display) size changes. + + DO TERMINAL-SPEED Indicates a desire to be able to request information + about the speed of the serial line to which the client + is attached. + + DO XDISPLOC Indicates a desire to be able to request the name of + the X windows display that is associated with the tel- + net client. + + DO NEW-ENVIRON Indicates a desire to be able to request environment + variable information, as described in RFC 1572. + + DO ENVIRON Indicates a desire to be able to request environment + variable information, as described in RFC 1408. + + DO LINEMODE Only sent if tteellnneettdd is compiled with support for + linemode, and requests that the client do line by line + processing. + + DO TIMING-MARK Only sent if tteellnneettdd is compiled with support for both + linemode and kludge linemode, and the client responded + with WONT LINEMODE. If the client responds with WILL + TM, the it is assumed that the client supports kludge + linemode. Note that the [--kk] option can be used to + disable this. + + DO AUTHENTICATION Only sent if tteellnneettdd is compiled with support for au- + thentication, and indicates a willingness to receive + authentication information for automatic login. + + DO ENCRYPT Only sent if tteellnneettdd is compiled with support for data + encryption, and indicates a willingness to decrypt the + data stream. + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/services + /etc/inittab (UNICOS systems only) + /etc/iptos (if supported) + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + telnet(1), login(1) + +SSTTAANNDDAARRDDSS + RRFFCC--885544 TELNET PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION + RRFFCC--885555 TELNET OPTION SPECIFICATIONS + + + RRFFCC--885566 TELNET BINARY TRANSMISSION + RRFFCC--885577 TELNET ECHO OPTION + RRFFCC--885588 TELNET SUPPRESS GO AHEAD OPTION + RRFFCC--885599 TELNET STATUS OPTION + RRFFCC--886600 TELNET TIMING MARK OPTION + RRFFCC--886611 TELNET EXTENDED OPTIONS - LIST OPTION + RRFFCC--888855 TELNET END OF RECORD OPTION + RRFFCC--11007733 Telnet Window Size Option + RRFFCC--11007799 Telnet Terminal Speed Option + RRFFCC--11009911 Telnet Terminal-Type Option + RRFFCC--11009966 Telnet X Display Location Option + RRFFCC--11112233 Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support + RRFFCC--11118844 Telnet Linemode Option + RRFFCC--11337722 Telnet Remote Flow Control Option + RRFFCC--11441166 Telnet Authentication Option + RRFFCC--11441111 Telnet Authentication: Kerberos Version 4 + RRFFCC--11441122 Telnet Authentication: SPX + RRFFCC--11557711 Telnet Environment Option Interoperability Issues + RRFFCC--11557722 Telnet Environment Option + +BBUUGGSS + Some TELNET commands are only partially implemented. + + Because of bugs in the original 4.2 BSD telnet(1), tteellnneettdd performs some + dubious protocol exchanges to try to discover if the remote client is, in + fact, a 4.2 BSD telnet(1). + + Binary mode has no common interpretation except between similar operating + systems (Unix in this case). + + The terminal type name received from the remote client is converted to + lower case. + + TTeellnneettdd never sends TELNET IAC GA (go ahead) commands. + +4.2 Berkeley Distribution June 1, 1994 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..65046073e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.h @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)telnetd.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +/* including both and in SunOS 4 generates a + lot of warnings */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H +#include +#endif + +#include "defs.h" + +#ifndef _POSIX_VDISABLE +# ifdef VDISABLE +# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE +# else +# define _POSIX_VDISABLE ((unsigned char)'\377') +# endif +#endif + + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTY_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTYIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif + +#include "ext.h" + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +/* This doesn't belong here. */ +struct tm *localtime(const time_t *); +struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION +#include +#include +#ifdef ENCRYPTION +#include +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +/* Don't use the system login, use our version instead */ + +/* BINDIR should be defined somewhere else... */ + +#ifndef BINDIR +#define BINDIR "/usr/athena/bin" +#endif + +#undef _PATH_LOGIN +#define _PATH_LOGIN BINDIR "/login" + +/* fallbacks */ + +#ifndef _PATH_DEV +#define _PATH_DEV "/dev/" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_TTY +#define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" +#endif /* _PATH_TTY */ + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS +#define DIAG(a,b) if (diagnostic & (a)) b +#else +#define DIAG(a,b) +#endif + +/* other external variables */ +extern char **environ; + +/* prototypes */ + +/* appends data to nfrontp and advances */ +int output_data (const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))) +#endif +; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/termstat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/termstat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a223269f03 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/termstat.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: termstat.c,v 1.12 2001/08/29 00:45:23 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * local variables + */ +int def_tspeed = -1, def_rspeed = -1; +#ifdef TIOCSWINSZ +int def_row = 0, def_col = 0; +#endif + +/* + * flowstat + * + * Check for changes to flow control + */ +void +flowstat(void) +{ + if (his_state_is_will(TELOPT_LFLOW)) { + if (tty_flowmode() != flowmode) { + flowmode = tty_flowmode(); + output_data("%c%c%c%c%c%c", + IAC, SB, TELOPT_LFLOW, + flowmode ? LFLOW_ON : LFLOW_OFF, + IAC, SE); + } + if (tty_restartany() != restartany) { + restartany = tty_restartany(); + output_data("%c%c%c%c%c%c", + IAC, SB, TELOPT_LFLOW, + restartany ? LFLOW_RESTART_ANY + : LFLOW_RESTART_XON, + IAC, SE); + } + } +} + +/* + * clientstat + * + * Process linemode related requests from the client. + * Client can request a change to only one of linemode, editmode or slc's + * at a time, and if using kludge linemode, then only linemode may be + * affected. + */ +void +clientstat(int code, int parm1, int parm2) +{ + /* + * Get a copy of terminal characteristics. + */ + init_termbuf(); + + /* + * Process request from client. code tells what it is. + */ + switch (code) { + case TELOPT_NAWS: +#ifdef TIOCSWINSZ + { + struct winsize ws; + + def_col = parm1; + def_row = parm2; + + /* + * Change window size as requested by client. + */ + + ws.ws_col = parm1; + ws.ws_row = parm2; + ioctl(ourpty, TIOCSWINSZ, (char *)&ws); + } +#endif /* TIOCSWINSZ */ + + break; + + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + { + def_tspeed = parm1; + def_rspeed = parm2; + /* + * Change terminal speed as requested by client. + * We set the receive speed first, so that if we can't + * store seperate receive and transmit speeds, the transmit + * speed will take precedence. + */ + tty_rspeed(parm2); + tty_tspeed(parm1); + set_termbuf(); + + break; + + } /* end of case TELOPT_TSPEED */ + + default: + /* What? */ + break; + } /* end of switch */ + + netflush(); + +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/utility.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/utility.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a98b3fc790 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/telnet/telnetd/utility.c @@ -0,0 +1,1170 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#define PRINTOPTIONS +#include "telnetd.h" + +RCSID("$Id: utility.c,v 1.27 2001/09/03 05:54:17 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * utility functions performing io related tasks + */ + +/* + * ttloop + * + * A small subroutine to flush the network output buffer, get some + * data from the network, and pass it through the telnet state + * machine. We also flush the pty input buffer (by dropping its data) + * if it becomes too full. + * + * return 0 if OK or 1 if interrupted by a signal. + */ + +int +ttloop(void) +{ + DIAG(TD_REPORT, { + output_data("td: ttloop\r\n"); + }); + if (nfrontp-nbackp) + netflush(); + ncc = read(net, netibuf, sizeof netibuf); + if (ncc < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + return 1; + syslog(LOG_INFO, "ttloop: read: %m\n"); + exit(1); + } else if (ncc == 0) { + syslog(LOG_INFO, "ttloop: peer died\n"); + exit(1); + } + DIAG(TD_REPORT, { + output_data("td: ttloop read %d chars\r\n", ncc); + }); + netip = netibuf; + telrcv(); /* state machine */ + if (ncc > 0) { + pfrontp = pbackp = ptyobuf; + telrcv(); + } + return 0; +} /* end of ttloop */ + +/* + * Check a descriptor to see if out of band data exists on it. + */ +int +stilloob(int s) +{ + static struct timeval timeout = { 0 }; + fd_set excepts; + int value; + + if (s >= FD_SETSIZE) + fatal(ourpty, "fd too large"); + + do { + FD_ZERO(&excepts); + FD_SET(s, &excepts); + value = select(s+1, 0, 0, &excepts, &timeout); + } while ((value == -1) && (errno == EINTR)); + + if (value < 0) { + fatalperror(ourpty, "select"); + } + if (FD_ISSET(s, &excepts)) { + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +void +ptyflush(void) +{ + int n; + + if ((n = pfrontp - pbackp) > 0) { + DIAG((TD_REPORT | TD_PTYDATA), { + output_data("td: ptyflush %d chars\r\n", n); + }); + DIAG(TD_PTYDATA, printdata("pd", pbackp, n)); + n = write(ourpty, pbackp, n); + } + if (n < 0) { + if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR) + return; + cleanup(0); + } + pbackp += n; + if (pbackp == pfrontp) + pbackp = pfrontp = ptyobuf; +} + +/* + * nextitem() + * + * Return the address of the next "item" in the TELNET data + * stream. This will be the address of the next character if + * the current address is a user data character, or it will + * be the address of the character following the TELNET command + * if the current address is a TELNET IAC ("I Am a Command") + * character. + */ +char * +nextitem(char *current) +{ + if ((*current&0xff) != IAC) { + return current+1; + } + switch (*(current+1)&0xff) { + case DO: + case DONT: + case WILL: + case WONT: + return current+3; + case SB:{ + /* loop forever looking for the SE */ + char *look = current+2; + + for (;;) { + if ((*look++&0xff) == IAC) { + if ((*look++&0xff) == SE) { + return look; + } + } + } + } + default: + return current+2; + } +} + + +/* + * netclear() + * + * We are about to do a TELNET SYNCH operation. Clear + * the path to the network. + * + * Things are a bit tricky since we may have sent the first + * byte or so of a previous TELNET command into the network. + * So, we have to scan the network buffer from the beginning + * until we are up to where we want to be. + * + * A side effect of what we do, just to keep things + * simple, is to clear the urgent data pointer. The principal + * caller should be setting the urgent data pointer AFTER calling + * us in any case. + */ +void +netclear(void) +{ + char *thisitem, *next; + char *good; +#define wewant(p) ((nfrontp > p) && ((*p&0xff) == IAC) && \ + ((*(p+1)&0xff) != EC) && ((*(p+1)&0xff) != EL)) + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + thisitem = nclearto > netobuf ? nclearto : netobuf; +#else + thisitem = netobuf; +#endif + + while ((next = nextitem(thisitem)) <= nbackp) { + thisitem = next; + } + + /* Now, thisitem is first before/at boundary. */ + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + good = nclearto > netobuf ? nclearto : netobuf; +#else + good = netobuf; /* where the good bytes go */ +#endif + + while (nfrontp > thisitem) { + if (wewant(thisitem)) { + int length; + + next = thisitem; + do { + next = nextitem(next); + } while (wewant(next) && (nfrontp > next)); + length = next-thisitem; + memmove(good, thisitem, length); + good += length; + thisitem = next; + } else { + thisitem = nextitem(thisitem); + } + } + + nbackp = netobuf; + nfrontp = good; /* next byte to be sent */ + neturg = 0; +} /* end of netclear */ + +extern int not42; + +/* + * netflush + * Send as much data as possible to the network, + * handling requests for urgent data. + */ +void +netflush(void) +{ + int n; + + if ((n = nfrontp - nbackp) > 0) { + DIAG(TD_REPORT, + { n += output_data("td: netflush %d chars\r\n", n); + }); +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (encrypt_output) { + char *s = nclearto ? nclearto : nbackp; + if (nfrontp - s > 0) { + (*encrypt_output)((unsigned char *)s, nfrontp-s); + nclearto = nfrontp; + } + } +#endif + /* + * if no urgent data, or if the other side appears to be an + * old 4.2 client (and thus unable to survive TCP urgent data), + * write the entire buffer in non-OOB mode. + */ +#if 1 /* remove this to make it work between solaris 2.6 and linux */ + if ((neturg == 0) || (not42 == 0)) { +#endif + n = write(net, nbackp, n); /* normal write */ +#if 1 /* remove this to make it work between solaris 2.6 and linux */ + } else { + n = neturg - nbackp; + /* + * In 4.2 (and 4.3) systems, there is some question about + * what byte in a sendOOB operation is the "OOB" data. + * To make ourselves compatible, we only send ONE byte + * out of band, the one WE THINK should be OOB (though + * we really have more the TCP philosophy of urgent data + * rather than the Unix philosophy of OOB data). + */ + if (n > 1) { + n = send(net, nbackp, n-1, 0); /* send URGENT all by itself */ + } else { + n = send(net, nbackp, n, MSG_OOB); /* URGENT data */ + } + } +#endif + } + if (n < 0) { + if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR) + return; + cleanup(0); + } + nbackp += n; +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (nbackp > nclearto) + nclearto = 0; +#endif + if (nbackp >= neturg) { + neturg = 0; + } + if (nbackp == nfrontp) { + nbackp = nfrontp = netobuf; +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + nclearto = 0; +#endif + } + return; +} + + +/* + * writenet + * + * Just a handy little function to write a bit of raw data to the net. + * It will force a transmit of the buffer if necessary + * + * arguments + * ptr - A pointer to a character string to write + * len - How many bytes to write + */ +void +writenet(unsigned char *ptr, int len) +{ + /* flush buffer if no room for new data) */ + while ((&netobuf[BUFSIZ] - nfrontp) < len) { + /* if this fails, don't worry, buffer is a little big */ + netflush(); + } + + memmove(nfrontp, ptr, len); + nfrontp += len; +} + + +/* + * miscellaneous functions doing a variety of little jobs follow ... + */ + + +void fatal(int f, char *msg) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "telnetd: %s.\r\n", msg); +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + if (encrypt_output) { + /* + * Better turn off encryption first.... + * Hope it flushes... + */ + encrypt_send_end(); + netflush(); + } +#endif + write(f, buf, (int)strlen(buf)); + sleep(1); /*XXX*/ + exit(1); +} + +void +fatalperror_errno(int f, const char *msg, int error) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s: %s", msg, strerror(error)); + fatal(f, buf); +} + +void +fatalperror(int f, const char *msg) +{ + fatalperror_errno(f, msg, errno); +} + +char editedhost[32]; + +void edithost(char *pat, char *host) +{ + char *res = editedhost; + + if (!pat) + pat = ""; + while (*pat) { + switch (*pat) { + + case '#': + if (*host) + host++; + break; + + case '@': + if (*host) + *res++ = *host++; + break; + + default: + *res++ = *pat; + break; + } + if (res == &editedhost[sizeof editedhost - 1]) { + *res = '\0'; + return; + } + pat++; + } + if (*host) + strlcpy (res, host, + sizeof editedhost - (res - editedhost)); + else + *res = '\0'; + editedhost[sizeof editedhost - 1] = '\0'; +} + +static char *putlocation; + +void +putstr(char *s) +{ + + while (*s) + putchr(*s++); +} + +void +putchr(int cc) +{ + *putlocation++ = cc; +} + +/* + * This is split on two lines so that SCCS will not see the M + * between two % signs and expand it... + */ +static char fmtstr[] = { "%l:%M" "%P on %A, %d %B %Y" }; + +void putf(char *cp, char *where) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_UNAME + struct utsname name; +#endif + char *slash; + time_t t; + char db[100]; + + /* if we don't have uname, set these to sensible values */ + char *sysname = "Unix", + *machine = "", + *release = "", + *version = ""; + +#ifdef HAVE_UNAME + uname(&name); + sysname=name.sysname; + machine=name.machine; + release=name.release; + version=name.version; +#endif + + putlocation = where; + + while (*cp) { + if (*cp != '%') { + putchr(*cp++); + continue; + } + switch (*++cp) { + + case 't': +#ifdef STREAMSPTY + /* names are like /dev/pts/2 -- we want pts/2 */ + slash = strchr(line+1, '/'); +#else + slash = strrchr(line, '/'); +#endif + if (slash == (char *) 0) + putstr(line); + else + putstr(&slash[1]); + break; + + case 'h': + putstr(editedhost); + break; + + case 's': + putstr(sysname); + break; + + case 'm': + putstr(machine); + break; + + case 'r': + putstr(release); + break; + + case 'v': + putstr(version); + break; + + case 'd': + time(&t); + strftime(db, sizeof(db), fmtstr, localtime(&t)); + putstr(db); + break; + + case '%': + putchr('%'); + break; + } + cp++; + } +} + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTICS +/* + * Print telnet options and commands in plain text, if possible. + */ +void +printoption(char *fmt, int option) +{ + if (TELOPT_OK(option)) + output_data("%s %s\r\n", + fmt, + TELOPT(option)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(option)) + output_data("%s %s\r\n", + fmt, + TELCMD(option)); + else + output_data("%s %d\r\n", + fmt, + option); + return; +} + +void +printsub(int direction, unsigned char *pointer, int length) + /* '<' or '>' */ + /* where suboption data sits */ + /* length of suboption data */ +{ + int i = 0; + unsigned char buf[512]; + + if (!(diagnostic & TD_OPTIONS)) + return; + + if (direction) { + output_data("td: %s suboption ", + direction == '<' ? "recv" : "send"); + if (length >= 3) { + int j; + + i = pointer[length-2]; + j = pointer[length-1]; + + if (i != IAC || j != SE) { + output_data("(terminated by "); + if (TELOPT_OK(i)) + output_data("%s ", + TELOPT(i)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(i)) + output_data("%s ", + TELCMD(i)); + else + output_data("%d ", + i); + if (TELOPT_OK(j)) + output_data("%s", + TELOPT(j)); + else if (TELCMD_OK(j)) + output_data("%s", + TELCMD(j)); + else + output_data("%d", + j); + output_data(", not IAC SE!) "); + } + } + length -= 2; + } + if (length < 1) { + output_data("(Empty suboption??\?)"); + return; + } + switch (pointer[0]) { + case TELOPT_TTYPE: + output_data("TERMINAL-TYPE "); + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + output_data("IS \"%.*s\"", + length-2, + (char *)pointer+2); + break; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + output_data("SEND"); + break; + default: + output_data("- unknown qualifier %d (0x%x).", + pointer[1], pointer[1]); + } + break; + case TELOPT_TSPEED: + output_data("TERMINAL-SPEED"); + if (length < 2) { + output_data(" (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + output_data(" IS %.*s", length-2, (char *)pointer+2); + break; + default: + if (pointer[1] == 1) + output_data(" SEND"); + else + output_data(" %d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?%d?", pointer[i]); + } + break; + } + break; + + case TELOPT_LFLOW: + output_data("TOGGLE-FLOW-CONTROL"); + if (length < 2) { + output_data(" (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case LFLOW_OFF: + output_data(" OFF"); + break; + case LFLOW_ON: + output_data(" ON"); + break; + case LFLOW_RESTART_ANY: + output_data(" RESTART-ANY"); + break; + case LFLOW_RESTART_XON: + output_data(" RESTART-XON"); + break; + default: + output_data(" %d (unknown)", + pointer[1]); + } + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + + case TELOPT_NAWS: + output_data("NAWS"); + if (length < 2) { + output_data(" (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + if (length == 2) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[1]); + break; + } + output_data(" %u %u(%u)", + pointer[1], + pointer[2], + (((unsigned int)pointer[1])<<8) + pointer[2]); + if (length == 4) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[3]); + break; + } + output_data(" %u %u(%u)", + pointer[3], + pointer[4], + (((unsigned int)pointer[3])<<8) + pointer[4]); + for (i = 5; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + + case TELOPT_LINEMODE: + output_data("LINEMODE "); + if (length < 2) { + output_data(" (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case WILL: + output_data("WILL "); + goto common; + case WONT: + output_data("WONT "); + goto common; + case DO: + output_data("DO "); + goto common; + case DONT: + output_data("DONT "); + common: + if (length < 3) { + output_data("(no option??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[2]) { + case LM_FORWARDMASK: + output_data("Forward Mask"); + for (i = 3; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" %x", pointer[i]); + } + break; + default: + output_data("%d (unknown)", + pointer[2]); + for (i = 3; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" %d", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + } + break; + + case LM_SLC: + output_data("SLC"); + for (i = 2; i < length - 2; i += 3) { + if (SLC_NAME_OK(pointer[i+SLC_FUNC])) + output_data(" %s", + SLC_NAME(pointer[i+SLC_FUNC])); + else + output_data(" %d", + pointer[i+SLC_FUNC]); + switch (pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_LEVELBITS) { + case SLC_NOSUPPORT: + output_data(" NOSUPPORT"); + break; + case SLC_CANTCHANGE: + output_data(" CANTCHANGE"); + break; + case SLC_VARIABLE: + output_data(" VARIABLE"); + break; + case SLC_DEFAULT: + output_data(" DEFAULT"); + break; + } + output_data("%s%s%s", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_ACK ? "|ACK" : "", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_FLUSHIN ? "|FLUSHIN" : "", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]&SLC_FLUSHOUT ? "|FLUSHOUT" : ""); + if (pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]& ~(SLC_ACK|SLC_FLUSHIN| + SLC_FLUSHOUT| SLC_LEVELBITS)) { + output_data("(0x%x)", + pointer[i+SLC_FLAGS]); + } + output_data(" %d;", + pointer[i+SLC_VALUE]); + if ((pointer[i+SLC_VALUE] == IAC) && + (pointer[i+SLC_VALUE+1] == IAC)) + i++; + } + for (; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + + case LM_MODE: + output_data("MODE "); + if (length < 3) { + output_data("(no mode??\?)"); + break; + } + { + char tbuf[32]; + snprintf(tbuf, + sizeof(tbuf), + "%s%s%s%s%s", + pointer[2]&MODE_EDIT ? "|EDIT" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_TRAPSIG ? "|TRAPSIG" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_SOFT_TAB ? "|SOFT_TAB" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_LIT_ECHO ? "|LIT_ECHO" : "", + pointer[2]&MODE_ACK ? "|ACK" : ""); + output_data("%s", + tbuf[1] ? &tbuf[1] : "0"); + } + if (pointer[2]&~(MODE_EDIT|MODE_TRAPSIG|MODE_ACK)) { + output_data(" (0x%x)", + pointer[2]); + } + for (i = 3; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?0x%x?", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + default: + output_data("%d (unknown)", + pointer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" %d", pointer[i]); + } + } + break; + + case TELOPT_STATUS: { + char *cp; + int j, k; + + output_data("STATUS"); + + switch (pointer[1]) { + default: + if (pointer[1] == TELQUAL_SEND) + output_data(" SEND"); + else + output_data(" %d (unknown)", + pointer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + case TELQUAL_IS: + output_data(" IS\r\n"); + + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + switch(pointer[i]) { + case DO: cp = "DO"; goto common2; + case DONT: cp = "DONT"; goto common2; + case WILL: cp = "WILL"; goto common2; + case WONT: cp = "WONT"; goto common2; + common2: + i++; + if (TELOPT_OK(pointer[i])) + output_data(" %s %s", + cp, + TELOPT(pointer[i])); + else + output_data(" %s %d", + cp, + pointer[i]); + + output_data("\r\n"); + break; + + case SB: + output_data(" SB "); + i++; + j = k = i; + while (j < length) { + if (pointer[j] == SE) { + if (j+1 == length) + break; + if (pointer[j+1] == SE) + j++; + else + break; + } + pointer[k++] = pointer[j++]; + } + printsub(0, &pointer[i], k - i); + if (i < length) { + output_data(" SE"); + i = j; + } else + i = j - 1; + + output_data("\r\n"); + + break; + + default: + output_data(" %d", + pointer[i]); + break; + } + } + break; + } + break; + } + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: + output_data("X-DISPLAY-LOCATION "); + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + output_data("IS \"%.*s\"", + length-2, + (char *)pointer+2); + break; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + output_data("SEND"); + break; + default: + output_data("- unknown qualifier %d (0x%x).", + pointer[1], pointer[1]); + } + break; + + case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON: + output_data("NEW-ENVIRON "); + goto env_common1; + case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON: + output_data("OLD-ENVIRON"); + env_common1: + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_IS: + output_data("IS "); + goto env_common; + case TELQUAL_SEND: + output_data("SEND "); + goto env_common; + case TELQUAL_INFO: + output_data("INFO "); + env_common: + { + int noquote = 2; + for (i = 2; i < length; i++ ) { + switch (pointer[i]) { + case NEW_ENV_VAR: + output_data("\" VAR " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + case NEW_ENV_VALUE: + output_data("\" VALUE " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + case ENV_ESC: + output_data("\" ESC " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + case ENV_USERVAR: + output_data("\" USERVAR " + noquote); + noquote = 2; + break; + + default: + if (isprint(pointer[i]) && pointer[i] != '"') { + if (noquote) { + output_data ("\""); + noquote = 0; + } + output_data ("%c", pointer[i]); + } else { + output_data("\" %03o " + noquote, + pointer[i]); + noquote = 2; + } + break; + } + } + if (!noquote) + output_data ("\""); + break; + } + } + break; + +#ifdef AUTHENTICATION + case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION: + output_data("AUTHENTICATION"); + + if (length < 2) { + output_data(" (empty suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case TELQUAL_REPLY: + case TELQUAL_IS: + output_data(" %s ", + (pointer[1] == TELQUAL_IS) ? + "IS" : "REPLY"); + if (AUTHTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[2])) + output_data("%s ", + AUTHTYPE_NAME(pointer[2])); + else + output_data("%d ", + pointer[2]); + if (length < 3) { + output_data("(partial suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + output_data("%s|%s", + ((pointer[3] & AUTH_WHO_MASK) == AUTH_WHO_CLIENT) ? + "CLIENT" : "SERVER", + ((pointer[3] & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) ? + "MUTUAL" : "ONE-WAY"); + + auth_printsub(&pointer[1], length - 1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + output_data("%s", + buf); + break; + + case TELQUAL_SEND: + i = 2; + output_data(" SEND "); + while (i < length) { + if (AUTHTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[i])) + output_data("%s ", + AUTHTYPE_NAME(pointer[i])); + else + output_data("%d ", + pointer[i]); + if (++i >= length) { + output_data("(partial suboption??\?)"); + break; + } + output_data("%s|%s ", + ((pointer[i] & AUTH_WHO_MASK) == AUTH_WHO_CLIENT) ? + "CLIENT" : "SERVER", + ((pointer[i] & AUTH_HOW_MASK) == AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL) ? + "MUTUAL" : "ONE-WAY"); + ++i; + } + break; + + case TELQUAL_NAME: + i = 2; + output_data(" NAME \"%.*s\"", + length - 2, + pointer); + break; + + default: + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" ?%d?", + pointer[i]); + } + break; + } + break; +#endif + +#ifdef ENCRYPTION + case TELOPT_ENCRYPT: + output_data("ENCRYPT"); + if (length < 2) { + output_data(" (empty suboption?)"); + break; + } + switch (pointer[1]) { + case ENCRYPT_START: + output_data(" START"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_END: + output_data(" END"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_REQSTART: + output_data(" REQUEST-START"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_REQEND: + output_data(" REQUEST-END"); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_IS: + case ENCRYPT_REPLY: + output_data(" %s ", + (pointer[1] == ENCRYPT_IS) ? + "IS" : "REPLY"); + if (length < 3) { + output_data(" (partial suboption?)"); + break; + } + if (ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[2])) + output_data("%s ", + ENCTYPE_NAME(pointer[2])); + else + output_data(" %d (unknown)", + pointer[2]); + + encrypt_printsub(&pointer[1], length - 1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + output_data("%s", + buf); + break; + + case ENCRYPT_SUPPORT: + i = 2; + output_data(" SUPPORT "); + while (i < length) { + if (ENCTYPE_NAME_OK(pointer[i])) + output_data("%s ", + ENCTYPE_NAME(pointer[i])); + else + output_data("%d ", + pointer[i]); + i++; + } + break; + + case ENCRYPT_ENC_KEYID: + output_data(" ENC_KEYID %d", pointer[1]); + goto encommon; + + case ENCRYPT_DEC_KEYID: + output_data(" DEC_KEYID %d", pointer[1]); + goto encommon; + + default: + output_data(" %d (unknown)", pointer[1]); + encommon: + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" %d", pointer[i]); + } + break; + } + break; +#endif + + default: + if (TELOPT_OK(pointer[0])) + output_data("%s (unknown)", + TELOPT(pointer[0])); + else + output_data("%d (unknown)", + pointer[i]); + for (i = 1; i < length; i++) { + output_data(" %d", pointer[i]); + } + break; + } + output_data("\r\n"); +} + +/* + * Dump a data buffer in hex and ascii to the output data stream. + */ +void +printdata(char *tag, char *ptr, int cnt) +{ + int i; + char xbuf[30]; + + while (cnt) { + /* flush net output buffer if no room for new data) */ + if ((&netobuf[BUFSIZ] - nfrontp) < 80) { + netflush(); + } + + /* add a line of output */ + output_data("%s: ", tag); + for (i = 0; i < 20 && cnt; i++) { + output_data("%02x", *ptr); + if (isprint((unsigned char)*ptr)) { + xbuf[i] = *ptr; + } else { + xbuf[i] = '.'; + } + if (i % 2) { + output_data(" "); + } + cnt--; + ptr++; + } + xbuf[i] = '\0'; + output_data(" %s\r\n", xbuf); + } +} +#endif /* DIAGNOSTICS */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..154b407644 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.14 2000/11/15 22:51:11 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +noinst_PROGRAMS = tcp_client tcp_server gssapi_server gssapi_client \ + uu_server uu_client nt_gss_server nt_gss_client + +tcp_client_SOURCES = tcp_client.c common.c test_locl.h + +tcp_server_SOURCES = tcp_server.c common.c test_locl.h + +gssapi_server_SOURCES = gssapi_server.c gss_common.c common.c \ + gss_common.h test_locl.h + +gssapi_client_SOURCES = gssapi_client.c gss_common.c common.c \ + gss_common.h test_locl.h + +uu_server_SOURCES = uu_server.c common.c test_locl.h + +uu_client_SOURCES = uu_client.c common.c test_locl.h + +gssapi_server_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la $(LDADD) + +gssapi_client_LDADD = $(gssapi_server_LDADD) + +nt_gss_client_SOURCES = nt_gss_client.c nt_gss_common.c common.c + +nt_gss_server_SOURCES = nt_gss_server.c nt_gss_common.c + +nt_gss_client_LDADD = $(gssapi_server_LDADD) + +nt_gss_server_LDADD = $(nt_gss_client_LDADD) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63ff46d46f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,821 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.14 2000/11/15 22:51:11 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(gssapi_client_SOURCES) $(gssapi_server_SOURCES) $(nt_gss_client_SOURCES) $(nt_gss_server_SOURCES) $(tcp_client_SOURCES) $(tcp_server_SOURCES) $(uu_client_SOURCES) $(uu_server_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : 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a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58b9fdf699 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.11 2000/08/27 04:29:34 assar Exp $"); + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +static char *keytab_str; +krb5_keytab keytab; +char *service = SERVICE; +int fork_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "service", 's', arg_string, &service, "service to use", "service" }, + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &keytab_str, "keytab to use", "keytab" }, + { "fork", 'f', arg_flag, &fork_flag, "do fork" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +server_usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +static void +client_usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "host"); + exit(code); +} + + +static int +common_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int)) +{ + int port = 0; + *argc = krb5_program_setup(context, *argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + (*usage)(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str){ + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, PORT, "tcp", 4711); + + return port; +} + +int +server_setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = common_setup(context, &argc, argv, server_usage); + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(argv[argc] != NULL) + server_usage(1, args, num_args); + if (keytab_str != NULL) + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (*context, keytab_str, &keytab); + else + ret = krb5_kt_default (*context, &keytab); + if (ret) + krb5_err (*context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve/default"); + return port; +} + +int +client_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = *argc; + int port = common_setup(context, &optind, argv, client_usage); + if(*argc - optind != 1) + client_usage(1, args, num_args); + *argc = optind; + return port; +} + +int +client_doit (const char *hostname, int port, const char *service, + int (*func)(int, const char *hostname, const char *service)) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + errx (1, "%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return (*func) (s, hostname, service); + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gss_common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gss_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b5319a1f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gss_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "gss_common.h" +RCSID("$Id: gss_common.c,v 1.9 2000/11/15 23:05:27 assar Exp $"); + +void +write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + u_int32_t len, net_len; + OM_uint32 min_stat; + + len = buf->length; + + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (net_write (sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "write"); + if (net_write (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "write"); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, buf); +} + +static void +enet_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = net_read (fd, buf, len); + if (ret == 0) + errx (1, "EOF in read"); + else if (ret < 0) + errx (1, "read"); +} + +void +read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + u_int32_t len, net_len; + + enet_read (sock, &net_len, 4); + len = ntohl(net_len); + buf->length = len; + buf->value = emalloc(len); + enet_read (sock, buf->value, len); +} + +void +gss_print_errors (int min_stat) +{ + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + OM_uint32 ret; + + do { + ret = gss_display_status (&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", (char *)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer (&new_stat, &status_string); + } while (!GSS_ERROR(ret) && msg_ctx != 0); +} + +void +gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + vwarnx (fmt, ap); + gss_print_errors (status); + exit (exitval); +} + +void +gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + gss_verr (exitval, status, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gss_common.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gss_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..775126b91b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gss_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gss_common.h,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $ */ + +void write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); +void read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); + +void gss_print_errors (int min_stat); + +void gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))); + +void gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gssapi_client.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gssapi_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..126ce910b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gssapi_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "gss_common.h" +RCSID("$Id: gssapi_client.c,v 1.16 2000/08/09 20:53:06 assar Exp $"); + +static int +do_trans (int sock, gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + gss_buffer_t input_token = &real_input_token, + output_token = &real_output_token; + + /* get_mic */ + + input_token->length = 3; + input_token->value = strdup("hej"); + + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, + context_hdl, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_get_mic"); + + write_token (sock, input_token); + write_token (sock, output_token); + + /* wrap */ + + input_token->length = 7; + input_token->value = "hemligt"; + + + maj_stat = gss_wrap (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + 1, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_wrap"); + + write_token (sock, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + socklen_t addrlen; + + int context_established = 0; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + gss_buffer_t input_token = &real_input_token, + output_token = &real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t server; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + struct gss_channel_bindings_struct input_chan_bindings; + u_char init_buf[4]; + u_char acct_buf[4]; + + name_token.length = asprintf ((char **)&name_token.value, + "%s@%s", service, hostname); + + maj_stat = gss_import_name (&min_stat, + &name_token, + GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &server); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, + "Error importing name `%s@%s':\n", service, hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname(%s)", hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername(%s)", hostname); + + input_token->length = 0; + output_token->length = 0; + + input_chan_bindings.initiator_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings.initiator_address.length = 4; + init_buf[0] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 24) & 0xFF; + init_buf[1] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 16) & 0xFF; + init_buf[2] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 8) & 0xFF; + init_buf[3] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 0) & 0xFF; + input_chan_bindings.initiator_address.value = init_buf; + + input_chan_bindings.acceptor_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings.acceptor_address.length = 4; + acct_buf[0] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 24) & 0xFF; + acct_buf[1] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 16) & 0xFF; + acct_buf[2] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 8) & 0xFF; + acct_buf[3] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 0) & 0xFF; + input_chan_bindings.acceptor_address.value = acct_buf; + +#if 0 + input_chan_bindings.application_data.value = emalloc(4); + * (unsigned short*)input_chan_bindings.application_data.value = local.sin_port; + * ((unsigned short *)input_chan_bindings.application_data.value + 1) = remote.sin_port; + input_chan_bindings.application_data.length = 4; +#else + input_chan_bindings.application_data.length = 0; + input_chan_bindings.application_data.value = NULL; +#endif + + while(!context_established) { + maj_stat = + gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &context_hdl, + server, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + | GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, + 0, + &input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_init_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + read_token (sock, input_token); + } else { + context_established = 1; + } + + } + if (fork_flag) { + pid_t pid; + int pipefd[2]; + + if (pipe (pipefd) < 0) + err (1, "pipe"); + + pid = fork (); + if (pid < 0) + err (1, "fork"); + if (pid != 0) { + gss_buffer_desc buf; + + maj_stat = gss_export_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + &buf); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_export_sec_context"); + write_token (pipefd[1], &buf); + exit (0); + } else { + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl; + gss_buffer_desc buf; + + close (pipefd[1]); + read_token (pipefd[0], &buf); + close (pipefd[0]); + maj_stat = gss_import_sec_context (&min_stat, &buf, &context_hdl); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_import_sec_context"); + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, &buf); + return do_trans (sock, context_hdl); + } + } else { + return do_trans (sock, context_hdl); + } +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; /* XXX */ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gssapi_server.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gssapi_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d4affd238 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/gssapi_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "gss_common.h" +RCSID("$Id: gssapi_server.c,v 1.15 2000/08/09 20:53:07 assar Exp $"); + +static int +process_it(int sock, + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl, + gss_name_t client_name + ) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + gss_buffer_t input_token = &real_input_token, + output_token = &real_output_token; + + maj_stat = gss_display_name (&min_stat, + client_name, + &name_token, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_display_name"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%.*s'\n", (int)name_token.length, + (char *)name_token.value); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, &name_token); + + /* gss_verify_mic */ + + read_token (sock, input_token); + read_token (sock, output_token); + + maj_stat = gss_verify_mic (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + input_token, + output_token, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_verify_mic"); + + fprintf (stderr, "gss_verify_mic: %.*s\n", (int)input_token->length, + (char *)input_token->value); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, input_token); + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, output_token); + + /* gss_unwrap */ + + read_token (sock, input_token); + + maj_stat = gss_unwrap (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + input_token, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_unwrap"); + + fprintf (stderr, "gss_unwrap: %.*s\n", (int)output_token->length, + (char *)output_token->value); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, input_token); + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + socklen_t addrlen; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + gss_buffer_t input_token = &real_input_token, + output_token = &real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t client_name; + struct gss_channel_bindings_struct input_chan_bindings; + gss_cred_id_t delegated_cred_handle = NULL; + krb5_ccache ccache; + u_char init_buf[4]; + u_char acct_buf[4]; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname)"); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername"); + + input_chan_bindings.initiator_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + input_chan_bindings.initiator_address.length = 4; + init_buf[0] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 24) & 0xFF; + init_buf[1] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 16) & 0xFF; + init_buf[2] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 8) & 0xFF; + init_buf[3] = (remote.sin_addr.s_addr >> 0) & 0xFF; + + input_chan_bindings.initiator_address.value = init_buf; + input_chan_bindings.acceptor_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET; + + input_chan_bindings.acceptor_address.length = 4; + acct_buf[0] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 24) & 0xFF; + acct_buf[1] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 16) & 0xFF; + acct_buf[2] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 8) & 0xFF; + acct_buf[3] = (local.sin_addr.s_addr >> 0) & 0xFF; + input_chan_bindings.acceptor_address.value = acct_buf; + input_chan_bindings.application_data.value = emalloc(4); +#if 0 + * (unsigned short *)input_chan_bindings.application_data.value = + remote.sin_port; + * ((unsigned short *)input_chan_bindings.application_data.value + 1) = + local.sin_port; + input_chan_bindings.application_data.length = 4; +#else + input_chan_bindings.application_data.length = 0; + input_chan_bindings.application_data.value = NULL; +#endif + + delegated_cred_handle = emalloc(sizeof(*delegated_cred_handle)); + memset((char*)delegated_cred_handle, 0, sizeof(*delegated_cred_handle)); + + do { + read_token (sock, input_token); + maj_stat = + gss_accept_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + input_token, + &input_chan_bindings, + &client_name, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL, + /*&delegated_cred_handle*/ NULL); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_accept_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + } while(maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + if (delegated_cred_handle->ccache) { + krb5_context context; + + maj_stat = krb5_init_context(&context); + maj_stat = krb5_cc_resolve(context, "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_test", &ccache); + maj_stat = krb5_cc_copy_cache(context, + delegated_cred_handle->ccache, ccache); + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, delegated_cred_handle->ccache); + } + + if (fork_flag) { + pid_t pid; + int pipefd[2]; + + if (pipe (pipefd) < 0) + err (1, "pipe"); + + pid = fork (); + if (pid < 0) + err (1, "fork"); + if (pid != 0) { + gss_buffer_desc buf; + + maj_stat = gss_export_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + &buf); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_export_sec_context"); + write_token (pipefd[1], &buf); + exit (0); + } else { + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl; + gss_buffer_desc buf; + + close (pipefd[1]); + read_token (pipefd[0], &buf); + close (pipefd[0]); + maj_stat = gss_import_sec_context (&min_stat, &buf, &context_hdl); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_import_sec_context"); + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, &buf); + return process_it (sock, context_hdl, client_name); + } + } else { + return process_it (sock, context_hdl, client_name); + } +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + int sock, sock2; + struct sockaddr_in my_addr; + int one = 1; + + sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + + memset (&my_addr, 0, sizeof(my_addr)); + my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + my_addr.sin_port = port; + my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); + + if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(my_addr)) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + + if (listen (sock, 1) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + + sock2 = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); + if (sock2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + + return proto (sock2, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context = NULL; /* XXX */ + int port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4fabd662b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "nt_gss_common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: nt_gss_client.c,v 1.4 2000/08/09 20:53:07 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * This program tries to act as a client for the sample in `Sample + * SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + */ + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + socklen_t addrlen; + + int context_established = 0; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_t input_token, output_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t server; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + + name_token.length = asprintf ((char **)&name_token.value, + "%s@%s", service, hostname); + + maj_stat = gss_import_name (&min_stat, + &name_token, + GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &server); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, + "Error importing name `%s@%s':\n", service, hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname(%s)", hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername(%s)", hostname); + + input_token = &real_input_token; + output_token = &real_output_token; + + input_token->length = 0; + output_token->length = 0; + + while(!context_established) { + maj_stat = + gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &context_hdl, + server, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, + 0, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_init_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + nt_read_token (sock, input_token); + } else { + context_established = 1; + } + + } + + /* get_mic */ + + input_token->length = 3; + input_token->value = strdup("hej"); + + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, + context_hdl, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_get_mic"); + + nt_write_token (sock, input_token); + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + /* wrap */ + + input_token->length = 7; + input_token->value = "hemligt"; + + + maj_stat = gss_wrap (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + 1, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_wrap"); + + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; /* XXX */ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab10355a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "nt_gss_common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: nt_gss_common.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * These are functions that are needed to interoperate with the + * `Sample SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + */ + +/* + * Write the `gss_buffer_t' in `buf' onto the fd `sock', but remember that + * the length is written in little-endian-order. + */ + +void +nt_write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + unsigned char net_len[4]; + u_int32_t len; + OM_uint32 min_stat; + + len = buf->length; + + net_len[0] = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + net_len[1] = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + net_len[2] = (len >> 16) & 0xFF; + net_len[3] = (len >> 24) & 0xFF; + + if (write (sock, net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "write"); + if (write (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "write"); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, buf); +} + +/* + * + */ + +void +nt_read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + unsigned char net_len[4]; + u_int32_t len; + + if (read(sock, net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "read"); + len = (net_len[0] << 0) + | (net_len[1] << 8) + | (net_len[2] << 16) + | (net_len[3] << 24); + + buf->length = len; + buf->value = malloc(len); + if (read (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "read"); +} + +void +gss_print_errors (int min_stat) +{ + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + OM_uint32 ret; + + do { + ret = gss_display_status (&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", (char *)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer (&new_stat, &status_string); + } while (!GSS_ERROR(ret) && msg_ctx != 0); +} + +void +gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + vwarnx (fmt, ap); + gss_print_errors (status); + exit (exitval); +} + +void +gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + gss_verr (exitval, status, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..07428ddcd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: nt_gss_common.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $ */ + +void nt_write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); +void nt_read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); + +void gss_print_errors (int min_stat); + +void gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))); + +void gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..05b6bcb992 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include "nt_gss_common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: nt_gss_server.c,v 1.5 2000/08/09 20:53:07 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * This program tries to act as a server for the sample in `Sample + * SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + * + * use --dump-auth to get a binary dump of the authorization data in the ticket + */ + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +char *service = SERVICE; +static char *auth_file; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "service", 's', arg_string, &service, "service to use", "service" }, + { "dump-auth", 0, arg_string, &auth_file, "dump authorization data", + "file" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + socklen_t addrlen; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_t input_token, output_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t client_name; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname)"); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername"); + + input_token = &real_input_token; + output_token = &real_output_token; + + do { + nt_read_token (sock, input_token); + maj_stat = + gss_accept_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + input_token, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + &client_name, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_accept_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + } while(maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + if (auth_file != NULL) { + int fd = open (auth_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0666); + krb5_ticket *ticket = context_hdl->ticket; + krb5_data *data = &ticket->ticket.authorization_data->val[0].ad_data; + + if(fd < 0) + err (1, "open %s", auth_file); + if (write (fd, data->data, data->length) != data->length) + errx (1, "write to %s failed", auth_file); + if (close (fd)) + err (1, "close %s", auth_file); + } + + maj_stat = gss_display_name (&min_stat, + client_name, + &name_token, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_display_name"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%.*s'\n", (int)name_token.length, + (char *)name_token.value); + + /* write something back */ + + output_token->value = strdup ("hejsan"); + output_token->length = strlen (output_token->value) + 1; + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + output_token->value = strdup ("hoppsan"); + output_token->length = strlen (output_token->value) + 1; + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + int sock, sock2; + struct sockaddr_in my_addr; + int one = 1; + + sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + + memset (&my_addr, 0, sizeof(my_addr)); + my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + my_addr.sin_port = port; + my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); + + if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(my_addr)) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + + if (listen (sock, 1) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + + sock2 = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); + if (sock2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + + return proto (sock2, service); +} + +static void +usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +static int +common_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int)) +{ + int port = 0; + *argc = krb5_program_setup(context, *argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + (*usage)(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str){ + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, PORT, "tcp", 4711); + + return port; +} + +static int +setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = common_setup(context, &argc, argv, usage); + if(argv[argc] != NULL) + usage(1, args, num_args); + return port; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context = NULL; /* XXX */ + int port = setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/tcp_client.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/tcp_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7affc432a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/tcp_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: tcp_client.c,v 1.15 1999/12/16 10:30:17 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data packet; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd"); + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + + data.data = "hej"; + data.length = 3; + + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_safe (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe"); + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + + data.data = "hemligt"; + data.length = 7; + + krb5_data_free (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/tcp_server.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/tcp_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4469c5850e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/tcp_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: tcp_server.c,v 1.16 1999/12/16 10:31:08 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *name; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_data data; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + ssize_t n; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd"); + + if(gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "gethostname"); + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + status = krb5_recvauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + server, + 0, + NULL, + &ticket); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_recvauth"); + + status = krb5_unparse_name (context, + ticket->client, + &name); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%s'\n", name); + free (name); + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, &net_len, 4); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + len = ntohl(net_len); + + krb5_data_alloc (&packet, len); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, packet.data, len); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + status = krb5_rd_safe (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_rd_safe"); + + fprintf (stderr, "safe packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, &net_len, 4); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + len = ntohl(net_len); + + krb5_data_alloc (&packet, len); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, packet.data, len); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + status = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_rd_priv"); + + fprintf (stderr, "priv packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + mini_inetd (port); + + return proto (STDIN_FILENO, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/test_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/test_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56f874574f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/test_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: test_locl.h,v 1.9 2000/08/27 04:29:54 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define SERVICE "test" + +#define PORT "test" + +extern char *service; +extern krb5_keytab keytab; +extern int fork_flag; +int server_setup(krb5_context*, int, char**); +int client_setup(krb5_context*, int*, char**); +int client_doit (const char *hostname, int port, const char *service, + int (*func)(int, const char *hostname, const char *service)); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/uu_client.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/uu_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fae5bcbdb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/uu_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: uu_client.c,v 1.7 2000/12/31 07:41:39 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + socklen_t addrlen; + krb5_address remote_addr, local_addr; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname(%s)", hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername(%s)", hostname); + + status = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (status) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", status); + + status = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_cc_default"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + local_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + local_addr.address.length = sizeof(local.sin_addr); + local_addr.address.data = &local.sin_addr; + + remote_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + remote_addr.address.length = sizeof(remote.sin_addr); + remote_addr.address.data = &remote.sin_addr; + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + &local_addr, + &remote_addr); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + + status = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &client); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + status = krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, + *krb5_princ_realm(context, client), + "krbtgt", + *krb5_princ_realm(context, client), + NULL); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_make_principal"); + + status = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_cc_retrieve_cred"); + + { + char *client_name; + krb5_data data; + status = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred.client, &client_name); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_unparse_name"); + data.data = client_name; + data.length = strlen(client_name) + 1; + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &data); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + free(client_name); + } + + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &cred.ticket); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setuserkey(context, auth_context, &cred.session); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setuserkey"); + + status = krb5_recvauth(context, &auth_context, &sock, + VERSION, client, 0, NULL, NULL); + + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_recvauth"); + + data.data = "hej"; + data.length = 3; + + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_safe (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe"); + + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + + data.data = "hemligt"; + data.length = 7; + + krb5_data_free (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/uu_server.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/uu_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34a0927795 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/test/uu_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: uu_server.c,v 1.7 2000/08/09 20:53:08 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + socklen_t addrlen; + krb5_address remote_addr, local_addr; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data client_name; + krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname)"); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_auth_con_init: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + local_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + local_addr.address.length = sizeof(local.sin_addr); + local_addr.address.data = &local.sin_addr; + + remote_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + remote_addr.address.length = sizeof(remote.sin_addr); + remote_addr.address.data = &remote.sin_addr; + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + &local_addr, + &remote_addr); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &client_name); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + status = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache); + status = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &in_creds.client); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &in_creds.second_ticket); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + status = krb5_parse_name(context, client_name.data, &in_creds.server); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_parse_name"); + + status = krb5_get_credentials(context, KRB5_GC_USER_USER, ccache, + &in_creds, &out_creds); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_get_credentials"); + + status = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache); + + status = krb5_sendauth(context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + in_creds.client, + in_creds.server, + AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY, + NULL, + out_creds, + ccache, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%.*s'\n", (int)client_name.length, + (char *)client_name.data); + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + status = krb5_rd_safe (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_rd_safe: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + fprintf (stderr, "safe packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + status = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_rd_priv: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + fprintf (stderr, "priv packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + int sock, sock2; + struct sockaddr_in my_addr; + int one = 1; + + sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + + memset (&my_addr, 0, sizeof(my_addr)); + my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + my_addr.sin_port = port; + my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); + + if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(my_addr)) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + + if (listen (sock, 1) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + + sock2 = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); + if (sock2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + + return proto (sock2, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca1da37506 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +2004-09-08 Johan Danielsson + + * xnlock.c: pull up 1.99->1.100: use krb5_appdefault_boolean + instead of krb5_config_get_bool + +2004-03-22 Johan Danielsson + + * xnlock.c: protect the world from des_encrypt in crypt.h + +2004-03-01 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * xnlock.c: include , From: Fredrik Ljungberg + + +2003-05-06 Johan Danielsson + + * no checks here + +2003-04-29 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * xnlock.c: include kafs.h in the krb5 case + +2003-04-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * xnlock.c (GetPasswd): cast argument to isprint to unsigned char, + From Christian Biere via NetBSD + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * xnlock.c: do krb5_afslog when compling with afs support + +2003-02-10 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (verify): move ret to where it's used + +2002-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c: add --version as a special case + +2001-06-24 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (verify_krb5): remove unused variable + +2001-03-15 Johan Danielsson + + * xnlock.c: don't explicitly set the krb4 ticket file + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + +2000-07-17 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: use conditional for X + +2000-04-09 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (verfiy_krb5): get the v4-realm from the v5-ticket and + not from the default one. + * xnlock.c (verify_krb5): add obtainting of v4 tickets. + +1999-11-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: only build when we have X11. From: Simon Josefsson + + +Thu Mar 18 11:21:44 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Wed Mar 17 23:35:51 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (verify): use KRB_VERIFY_SECURE instead of 1 + +Tue Mar 16 22:29:14 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c: krb_verify_user_multiple -> krb_verify_user + +Thu Mar 11 14:59:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * xnlock.c: add some if-braces to keep gcc happy + +Sun Nov 22 10:36:45 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Wed Jul 8 01:37:37 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (main): create place-holder ticket file with + open(O_EXCL | O_CREAT) instead of creat + +Sat Mar 28 12:53:46 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (install, uninstall): transform the man page + +Tue Mar 24 05:20:34 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c: remove redundant preprocessor stuff + +Sat Mar 21 14:36:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c (init_words): recognize both `-p' and `-prog' + +Sat Feb 7 10:08:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * xnlock.c: Don't use REALM_SZ + 1, just REALM_SZ + +Sat Nov 29 04:58:19 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * xnlock.c: Make it build w/o krb4. + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a5921e91a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15.12.1 2003/05/06 16:50:33 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(X_CFLAGS) + +WFLAGS += $(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT) + +if HAVE_X + +bin_PROGRAMS = xnlock + +else + +bin_PROGRAMS = + +endif + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +man_MANS = xnlock.1 + +EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS) nose.0.left nose.0.right nose.1.left nose.1.right \ + nose.down nose.front nose.left.front nose.right.front + +LDADD = \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(X_LIBS) -lXt $(X_PRE_LIBS) -lX11 $(X_EXTRA_LIBS) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9726a0b114 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,823 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15.12.1 2003/05/06 16:50:33 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# 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+# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/README b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5b16c522fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/README @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +xnlock -- Dan Heller, 1990 +"nlock" is a "new lockscreen" type program... something that prevents +screen burnout by making most of it "black" while providing something +of interest to be displayed in case anyone is watching. The program +also provides added security. + +"xnlock" is the X11 version of the program. + +Original sunview version written by Dan Heller 1985 (not included). + +For a real description of how this program works, read the +man page or just try running it. + +The one major outstanding bug with this program is that every +once in a while, two horizontal lines appear below the little +figure that runs around the screen. If someone can find and +fix this bug, *please* let me know -- I don't have time to +look and if I waited till I had time, you'd never see this +program... It has something to do with the "looking down" +position and then directly moving up and right or left... + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.0.left b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.0.left new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb3d152863 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.0.left @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_0_left_width 64 +#define nose_0_left_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_0_left_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0xff,0xff,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00,0xf0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x0e,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x01,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x40,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x02,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x08,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10, + 0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00, + 0x18,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0x07, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0xff,0x00,0x04,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x03,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x30,0x00,0x0c,0x01,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x98,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x03,0x60,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc2,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x20, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x42,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x21,0x00,0x00,0x01, + 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x21,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x21,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0xc0,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.0.right b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.0.right new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f387baa730 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.0.right @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_0_right_width 64 +#define nose_0_right_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_0_right_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xe0,0xff,0xff,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20, + 0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfc,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00, + 0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0xfc,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x0f, + 0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x70,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c, + 0xc0,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x03,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x01,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0xe0,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x80,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf0,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x20,0x00,0xff,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0xc0,0xc0,0x00,0x03,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x80,0x30,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x19,0x00,0x10, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x06,0xc0,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x03,0x00, + 0x43,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x42,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x80,0x00, + 0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0e,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0xf0,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.1.left b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.1.left new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a6b829526 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.1.left @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_1_left_width 64 +#define nose_1_left_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_1_left_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0xff,0xff,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00,0xf0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x0e,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x01,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x40,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x02,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x08,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00, + 0x18,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0xe4,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x26,0x03,0x00,0xfc,0x07, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x12,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x11,0x10,0x80,0x1f, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x20,0x60,0x60,0xc0,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x40,0x10, + 0xc0,0x20,0x08,0x00,0x1f,0x02,0x40,0x08,0x00,0x21,0x10,0xc0,0x60,0x02,0x40, + 0x04,0x00,0x12,0x20,0x20,0x80,0x02,0x20,0xc2,0x00,0x14,0x40,0x18,0x00,0x03, + 0x20,0x22,0x00,0x0c,0x80,0x04,0x03,0x02,0x10,0x12,0x00,0x08,0x80,0x86,0x00, + 0x04,0x10,0x12,0x00,0x10,0x80,0x42,0x00,0x18,0x08,0x12,0x00,0x10,0x40,0x42, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x02,0x00,0x20,0x40,0x42,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x20, + 0x42,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x04,0x00,0x00, + 0x20,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0x20,0x0c,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x80, + 0xff,0xff,0x0f,0x30,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0xff,0x0f,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.1.right b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.1.right new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f7c8962c02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.1.right @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_1_right_width 64 +#define nose_1_right_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_1_right_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xe0,0xff,0xff,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20, + 0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfc,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00, + 0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0xfc,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x0f, + 0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x70,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c, + 0xc0,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x03,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x10,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x27,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x01,0xc0,0x64,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0xc0,0x00,0x30,0x48,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0xe0,0x3f,0x00,0x08,0x88,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x10, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0x01,0x02,0x20,0x00,0x00,0xe0,0x03,0x06,0x06,0x02, + 0x40,0xf8,0x00,0x10,0x04,0x03,0x08,0x02,0x40,0x06,0x03,0x08,0x84,0x00,0x10, + 0x04,0x40,0x01,0x04,0x04,0x48,0x00,0x20,0x04,0xc0,0x00,0x18,0x02,0x28,0x00, + 0x43,0x08,0x40,0xc0,0x20,0x01,0x30,0x00,0x44,0x08,0x20,0x00,0x61,0x01,0x10, + 0x00,0x48,0x10,0x18,0x00,0x42,0x01,0x08,0x00,0x48,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x42,0x02, + 0x08,0x00,0x48,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x42,0x02,0x04,0x00,0x40,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x42, + 0x04,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x80,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x01, + 0x00,0x30,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x00, + 0x0c,0x00,0x0c,0xf0,0xff,0xff,0x01,0x00,0xf0,0xff,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.down b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.down new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8bdba4f45 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.down @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_down_width 64 +#define nose_down_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_down_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfc,0xff,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x03,0x00,0x1e,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x38,0x00,0x00,0xe0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x03,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x80, + 0x1f,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x60,0x60,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00, + 0x10,0x80,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x18,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x02,0x00, + 0x02,0x00,0x68,0x60,0x01,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x88,0x1f,0x01,0x00,0x02, + 0x00,0x02,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x10,0x80,0x00,0x00, + 0x03,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x60,0x60,0x00,0x80,0x02,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x80,0x1f,0x00, + 0x40,0x01,0x00,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x01,0x00,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0xa0,0x01,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x26,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x1e,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x11,0x00,0x00,0x80,0xe1, + 0x03,0x00,0x3c,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0e,0xfc,0xff,0x83,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0xf0,0x01,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfe,0xff,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x80,0x03,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x02,0x00,0x14,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x60,0x04,0x00,0x12,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x7f,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x22,0xe0, + 0x01,0x70,0xc0,0x18,0x08,0x00,0x61,0x1c,0x06,0x10,0x00,0x0f,0x30,0xc0,0x80, + 0x07,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x06,0xc0,0x3f,0x80,0x01,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x18,0x00,0x02, + 0xc0,0x00,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x05,0x30,0x00,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x80, + 0x08,0x18,0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x24,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x22,0x24,0x00, + 0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x22,0x44,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x11,0x84, + 0x01,0x00,0xc0,0x18,0x00,0xc0,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08, + 0x30,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x04,0xe0,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xf8,0xff,0xff, + 0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.front b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.front new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..64b82015c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.front @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_front_width 64 +#define nose_front_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_front_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0xff,0xff,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0xc0,0x1f,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x30,0x60,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0xf8,0xff,0x0f,0x80,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x02,0x00,0x82,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x84,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x81,0x00,0x00,0x08, + 0x01,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x40,0x00,0x00, + 0x10,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x20, + 0x00,0x00,0x20,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x10, + 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x10,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x10, + 0x00,0x00,0x10,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04, + 0x18,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x02,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x0c,0x80, + 0x01,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x30,0x60,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0xc0, + 0x1f,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfe,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x0f,0xc0,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x40,0x10,0x20,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x60,0x30,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x20,0xc0,0x18,0x20,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x7f,0x10,0x80,0x0d,0x40,0xe0, + 0x01,0x70,0xc0,0x18,0x00,0x05,0x40,0x1c,0x06,0x10,0x00,0x0f,0x00,0x05,0x80, + 0x07,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x05,0x80,0x01,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x18,0x00,0x05, + 0xc0,0x00,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x05,0x30,0x00,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x80, + 0x08,0x18,0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x04,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x24,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x22,0x24,0x00, + 0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x22,0x44,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x11,0x84, + 0x01,0x00,0xc0,0x18,0x00,0xc0,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08, + 0x30,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x04,0xe0,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xf8,0xff,0xff, + 0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.left.front b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.left.front new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3a871eaaa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.left.front @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_left_front_width 64 +#define nose_left_front_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_left_front_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0xff,0xff,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00, + 0x08,0x00,0xe0,0x0f,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x18,0x30,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0xf8,0xff,0x07,0xc0,0xff,0x3f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x01,0x00,0x81,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x83,0x00,0x00,0x82,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x00,0x00,0x04, + 0x01,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x08,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0x10,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x10, + 0x00,0x00,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x10, + 0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x10,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0x10,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x10, + 0x00,0x00,0x30,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x02, + 0x18,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x06,0xc0, + 0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x18,0x30,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0xe0, + 0x0f,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfe,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf8,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0xff,0x00,0x04,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xe0,0x00,0x07,0x02,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x30,0x00,0x8c,0x01,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x03,0x60,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc2,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x20, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x42,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x21,0x00,0x00,0x02, + 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x21,0x00,0x00,0x06,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x21,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0xc0,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.right.front b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.right.front new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8214174e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/nose.right.front @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#define nose_right_front_width 64 +#define nose_right_front_height 64 +static unsigned char nose_right_front_bits[] = { + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xe0,0xff,0xff,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00, + 0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20, + 0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xfc,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00, + 0x04,0x00,0xf0,0x07,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x0c,0x18,0x00,0x10,0x00, + 0x00,0xfc,0xff,0x03,0xe0,0xff,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x81,0x00,0x80,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x80,0x41,0x00,0x00,0xc1,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x82, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x10,0x00,0x00, + 0x04,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x08,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x06,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x08, + 0x00,0x00,0x08,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x08, + 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x00, + 0x08,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x08,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x08, + 0x00,0x00,0x08,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x01, + 0x04,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x80,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x03,0x60, + 0x00,0x06,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x0c,0x18,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0xf0, + 0x07,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x7f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf0,0x1f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x08,0x20,0x00,0xff,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x40,0xe0,0x00,0x07,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x04,0x80,0x31,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x09,0x00,0x30, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x06,0xc0,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x03,0x00, + 0x43,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x42,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x40,0x00, + 0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0xc0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0e,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0xf0,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c62417d062 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.1 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +.\" xnlock -- Dan Heller 1985 +.TH XNLOCK 1L "19 April 1990" +.SH NAME +xnlock \- amusing lock screen program with message for passers-by +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B xnlock +[ +\fIoptions\fP +] +[ +\fImessage\fP +] +.SH DESCRIPTION +.I xnlock +is a program that acts as a screen saver for workstations running X11. +It also "locks" the screen such that the workstation can be left +unattended without worry that someone else will walk up to it and +mess everything up. When \fIxnlock\fP is running, a little man with +a big nose and a hat runs around spewing out messages to the screen. +By default, the messages are "humorous", but that depends on your +sense of humor. +.LP +If a key or mouse button is pressed, a prompt is printed requesting the +user's password. If a RETURN is not typed within 30 seconds, +the little man resumes running around. +.LP +Text on the command line is used as the message. For example: +.br + % xnlock I\'m out to lunch for a couple of hours. +.br +Note the need to quote shell metacharacters. +.LP +In the absence of flags or text, \fIxnlock\fP displays random fortunes. +.SH OPTIONS +Command line options override all resource specifications. +All arguments that are not associated with a command line option +is taken to be message text that the little man will "say" every +once in a while. The resource \fBxnlock.text\fP may be set to +a string. +.TP +.BI \-fn " fontname" +The default font is the first 18 point font in the \fInew century schoolbook\fP +family. While larger fonts are recokmmended over smaller ones, any font +in the server's font list will work. The resource to use for this option +is \fBxnlock.font\fP. +.TP +.BI \-filename " filename" +Take the message to be displayed from the file \fIfilename\fP. +If \fIfilename\fP is not specified, \fI$HOME/.msgfile\fP is used. +If the contents of the file are changed during runtime, the most recent text +of the file is used (allowing the displayed message to be altered remotely). +Carriage returns within the text are allowed, but tabs or other control +characters are not translated and should not be used. +The resource available for this option is \fBxnlock.file\fP. +.TP +.BI \-ar +Accept root's password to unlock screen. This option is true by +default. The reason for this is so that someone's screen may be +unlocked by autorized users in case of emergency and the person +running the program is still out to lunch. The resource available +for specifying this option is \fBxnlock.acceptRootPasswd\fP. +.TP +.BI \-noar +Don't accept root's password. This option is for paranoids who +fear their peers might breakin using root's password and remove +their files anyway. Specifying this option on the command line +overrides the \fBxnlock.acceptRootPasswd\fP if set to True. +.TP +.BI \-ip +Ignore password prompt. +The resource available for this option is \fBxnlock.ignorePasswd\fP. +.TP +.BI \-noip +Don't ignore password prompt. This is available in order to +override the resource \fBignorePasswd\fP if set to True. +.TP +.BI -fg " color" +Specifies the foreground color. The resource available for this +is \fBxnlock.foreground\fP. +.TP +.BI -bg " color" +Specifies the background color. The resource available for this +is \fBxnlock.background\fP. +.TP +.BI \-rv +Reverse the foreground and background colors. +The resource for this is \fBxvnlock.reverseVideo\fP. +.TP +.BI \-norv +Don't use reverse video. This is available to override the reverseVideo +resource if set to True. +.TP +.BI \-prog " program" +Receive message text from the running program \fIprogram\fP. If there +are arguments to \fIprogram\fP, encase them with the name of the program in +quotes (e.g. xnlock -t "fortune -o"). +The resource for this is \fBxnlock.program\fP. +.SH RESOURCES +.br +xnlock.font: fontname +.br +xnlock.foreground: color +.br +xnlock.background: color +.br +xnlock.reverseVideo: True/False +.br +xnlock.text: Some random text string +.br +xnlock.program: program [args] +.br +xnlock.ignorePasswd: True/False +.br +xnlock.acceptRootPasswd: True/False +.SH FILES +\fIxnlock\fP executable file +.br +~/.msgfile default message file +.SH AUTHOR +Dan Heller Copyright (c) 1985, 1990. +.br +The original version of this program was written using pixrects on +a Sun 2 running SunOS 1.1. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84bba72f35 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.c @@ -0,0 +1,1145 @@ +/* + * xnlock -- Dan Heller, 1990 + * "nlock" is a "new lockscreen" type program... something that prevents + * screen burnout by making most of it "black" while providing something + * of interest to be displayed in case anyone is watching. + * "xnlock" is the X11 version of the program. + * Original sunview version written by Dan Heller 1985 (not included here). + */ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: xnlock.c,v 1.93.2.4 2004/09/08 09:16:00 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef strerror +#undef strerror +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +#undef des_encrypt +#define des_encrypt wingless_pigs_mostly_fail_to_fly +#include +#undef des_encrypt +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +#include +#endif + +#include +#include + +static char login[16]; +static char userprompt[128]; +#ifdef KRB4 +static char name[ANAME_SZ]; +static char inst[INST_SZ]; +static char realm[REALM_SZ]; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_principal client; +#endif + +#define font_height(font) (font->ascent + font->descent) + +static char *SPACE_STRING = " "; +static char STRING[] = "****************"; + +#define STRING_LENGTH (sizeof(STRING)) +#define MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH 256 +/* (sizeof(STRING)) */ + +#define PROMPT "Password: " +#define FAIL_MSG "Sorry, try again" +#define LEFT 001 +#define RIGHT 002 +#define DOWN 004 +#define UP 010 +#define FRONT 020 +#define X_INCR 3 +#define Y_INCR 2 +#define XNLOCK_CTRL 1 +#define XNLOCK_NOCTRL 0 + +static XtAppContext app; +static Display *dpy; +static unsigned short Width, Height; +static Widget widget; +static GC gc; +static XtIntervalId timeout_id; +static char *words; +static int x, y; +static Pixel Black, White; +static XFontStruct *font; +static char root_cpass[128]; +static char user_cpass[128]; +static int time_left, prompt_x, prompt_y, time_x, time_y; +static unsigned long interval; +static Pixmap left0, left1, right0, right1, left_front, + right_front, front, down; + +#define MAXLINES 40 + +#define IS_MOVING 1 +#define GET_PASSWD 2 +static int state; /* indicates states: walking or getting passwd */ + +static int ALLOW_LOGOUT = (60*10); /* Allow logout after nn seconds */ +#define LOGOUT_PASSWD "enuHDmTo5Lq4g" /* when given password "LOGOUT" */ +static time_t locked_at; + +struct appres_t { + Pixel bg; + Pixel fg; + XFontStruct *font; + Boolean ignore_passwd; + Boolean do_reverse; + Boolean accept_root; + char *text, *text_prog, *file, *logoutPasswd; + Boolean no_screensaver; + Boolean destroytickets; +} appres; + +static XtResource resources[] = { + { XtNbackground, XtCBackground, XtRPixel, sizeof(Pixel), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, bg), XtRString, "black" }, + + { XtNforeground, XtCForeground, XtRPixel, sizeof(Pixel), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, fg), XtRString, "white" }, + + { XtNfont, XtCFont, XtRFontStruct, sizeof (XFontStruct *), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, font), + XtRString, "-*-new century schoolbook-*-*-*-18-*" }, + + { "ignorePasswd", "IgnorePasswd", XtRBoolean, sizeof(Boolean), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t,ignore_passwd),XtRImmediate,(XtPointer)False }, + + { "acceptRootPasswd", "AcceptRootPasswd", XtRBoolean, sizeof(Boolean), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, accept_root), XtRImmediate, (XtPointer)True }, + + { "text", "Text", XtRString, sizeof(String), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, text), XtRString, "I'm out running around." }, + + { "program", "Program", XtRString, sizeof(String), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, text_prog), XtRImmediate, NULL }, + + { "file", "File", XtRString, sizeof(String), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t,file), XtRImmediate, NULL }, + + { "logoutPasswd", "logoutPasswd", XtRString, sizeof(String), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t, logoutPasswd), XtRString, LOGOUT_PASSWD }, + + { "noScreenSaver", "NoScreenSaver", XtRBoolean, sizeof(Boolean), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t,no_screensaver), XtRImmediate, (XtPointer)True }, + + { "destroyTickets", "DestroyTickets", XtRBoolean, sizeof(Boolean), + XtOffsetOf(struct appres_t,destroytickets), XtRImmediate, (XtPointer)True }, +}; + +static XrmOptionDescRec options[] = { + { "-fg", ".foreground", XrmoptionSepArg, NULL }, + { "-foreground", ".foreground", XrmoptionSepArg, NULL }, + { "-fn", ".font", XrmoptionSepArg, NULL }, + { "-font", ".font", XrmoptionSepArg, NULL }, + { "-ip", ".ignorePasswd", XrmoptionNoArg, "True" }, + { "-noip", ".ignorePasswd", XrmoptionNoArg, "False" }, + { "-ar", ".acceptRootPasswd", XrmoptionNoArg, "True" }, + { "-noar", ".acceptRootPasswd", XrmoptionNoArg, "False" }, + { "-nonoscreensaver", ".noScreenSaver", XrmoptionNoArg, "False" }, + { "-nodestroytickets", ".destroyTickets", XrmoptionNoArg, "False" }, +}; + +static char* +get_words(void) +{ + FILE *pp = NULL; + static char buf[512]; + long n; + + if (appres.text_prog) { + pp = popen(appres.text_prog, "r"); + if (!pp) { + warn("popen %s", appres.text_prog); + return appres.text; + } + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf) - 1, pp); + buf[n] = 0; + pclose(pp); + return buf; + } + if (appres.file) { + pp = fopen(appres.file, "r"); + if (!pp) { + warn("fopen %s", appres.file); + return appres.text; + } + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf) - 1, pp); + buf[n] = 0; + fclose(pp); + return buf; + } + + return appres.text; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [message]\n", getprogname()); + fprintf(stderr, "-fg color foreground color\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-bg color background color\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-rv reverse foreground/background colors\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-nrv no reverse video\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-ip ignore passwd\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-nip don't ignore passwd\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-ar accept root's passwd to unlock\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-nar don't accept root's passwd\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-f [file] message is read from file or ~/.msgfile\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-prog program text is gotten from executing `program'\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "-nodestroytickets keep kerberos tickets\n"); + exit(1); +} + +static void +init_words (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i = 0; + + while(argv[i]) { + if(strcmp(argv[i], "-p") == 0 + || strcmp(argv[i], "-prog") == 0) { + i++; + if(argv[i]) { + appres.text_prog = argv[i]; + i++; + } else { + warnx ("-p requires an argument"); + usage(); + } + } else if(strcmp(argv[i], "-f") == 0) { + i++; + if(argv[i]) { + appres.file = argv[i]; + i++; + } else { + asprintf (&appres.file, + "%s/.msgfile", getenv("HOME")); + if (appres.file == NULL) + errx (1, "cannot allocate memory for message"); + } + } else if(strcmp(argv[i], "--version") == 0) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } else { + int j; + int len = 1; + for(j = i; argv[j]; j++) + len += strlen(argv[j]) + 1; + appres.text = malloc(len); + if (appres.text == NULL) + errx (1, "cannot allocate memory for message"); + appres.text[0] = 0; + for(; i < j; i++){ + strlcat(appres.text, argv[i], len); + strlcat(appres.text, " ", len); + } + } + } +} + +static void +ScreenSaver(int save) +{ + static int timeout, interval, prefer_blank, allow_exp; + if(!appres.no_screensaver){ + if (save) { + XGetScreenSaver(dpy, &timeout, &interval, + &prefer_blank, &allow_exp); + XSetScreenSaver(dpy, 0, interval, prefer_blank, allow_exp); + } else + /* restore state */ + XSetScreenSaver(dpy, timeout, interval, prefer_blank, allow_exp); + } +} + +/* Forward decls necessary */ +static void talk(int force_erase); +static unsigned long look(void); + +static int +zrefresh(void) +{ + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + warn ("zrefresh: fork"); + return -1; + case 0: + /* Child */ + execlp("zrefresh", "zrefresh", 0); + execl(BINDIR "/zrefresh", "zrefresh", 0); + return -1; + default: + /* Parent */ + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +leave(void) +{ + XUngrabPointer(dpy, CurrentTime); + XUngrabKeyboard(dpy, CurrentTime); + ScreenSaver(0); + XCloseDisplay(dpy); + zrefresh(); + exit(0); +} + +static void +walk(int dir) +{ + int incr = 0; + static int lastdir; + static int up = 1; + static Pixmap frame; + + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, White); + XSetBackground(dpy, gc, Black); + if (dir & (LEFT|RIGHT)) { /* left/right movement (mabye up/down too) */ + up = -up; /* bouncing effect (even if hit a wall) */ + if (dir & LEFT) { + incr = X_INCR; + frame = (up < 0) ? left0 : left1; + } else { + incr = -X_INCR; + frame = (up < 0) ? right0 : right1; + } + if ((lastdir == FRONT || lastdir == DOWN) && dir & UP) { + /* workaround silly bug that leaves screen dust when + * guy is facing forward or down and moves up-left/right. + */ + XCopyPlane(dpy, frame, XtWindow(widget), gc, 0, 0, 64,64, x, y, 1L); + XFlush(dpy); + } + /* note that maybe neither UP nor DOWN is set! */ + if (dir & UP && y > Y_INCR) + y -= Y_INCR; + else if (dir & DOWN && y < (int)Height - 64) + y += Y_INCR; + } + /* Explicit up/down movement only (no left/right) */ + else if (dir == UP) + XCopyPlane(dpy, front, XtWindow(widget), gc, + 0,0, 64,64, x, y -= Y_INCR, 1L); + else if (dir == DOWN) + XCopyPlane(dpy, down, XtWindow(widget), gc, + 0,0, 64,64, x, y += Y_INCR, 1L); + else if (dir == FRONT && frame != front) { + if (up > 0) + up = -up; + if (lastdir & LEFT) + frame = left_front; + else if (lastdir & RIGHT) + frame = right_front; + else + frame = front; + XCopyPlane(dpy, frame, XtWindow(widget), gc, 0, 0, 64,64, x, y, 1L); + } + if (dir & LEFT) + while(--incr >= 0) { + XCopyPlane(dpy, frame, XtWindow(widget), gc, + 0,0, 64,64, --x, y+up, 1L); + XFlush(dpy); + } + else if (dir & RIGHT) + while(++incr <= 0) { + XCopyPlane(dpy, frame, XtWindow(widget), gc, + 0,0, 64,64, ++x, y+up, 1L); + XFlush(dpy); + } + lastdir = dir; +} + +static long +my_random (void) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM + return random(); +#else + return rand(); +#endif +} + +static int +think(void) +{ + if (my_random() & 1) + walk(FRONT); + if (my_random() & 1) { + words = get_words(); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +move(XtPointer _p, XtIntervalId *_id) +{ + static int length, dir; + + if (!length) { + int tries = 0; + dir = 0; + if ((my_random() & 1) && think()) { + talk(0); /* sets timeout to itself */ + return; + } + if (!(my_random() % 3) && (interval = look())) { + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, interval, move, NULL); + return; + } + interval = 20 + my_random() % 100; + do { + if (!tries) + length = Width/100 + my_random() % 90, tries = 8; + else + tries--; + switch (my_random() % 8) { + case 0: + if (x - X_INCR*length >= 5) + dir = LEFT; + case 1: + if (x + X_INCR*length <= (int)Width - 70) + dir = RIGHT; + case 2: + if (y - (Y_INCR*length) >= 5) + dir = UP, interval = 40; + case 3: + if (y + Y_INCR*length <= (int)Height - 70) + dir = DOWN, interval = 20; + case 4: + if (x - X_INCR*length >= 5 && y - (Y_INCR*length) >= 5) + dir = (LEFT|UP); + case 5: + if (x + X_INCR * length <= (int)Width - 70 && + y-Y_INCR * length >= 5) + dir = (RIGHT|UP); + case 6: + if (x - X_INCR * length >= 5 && + y + Y_INCR * length <= (int)Height - 70) + dir = (LEFT|DOWN); + case 7: + if (x + X_INCR*length <= (int)Width - 70 && + y + Y_INCR*length <= (int)Height - 70) + dir = (RIGHT|DOWN); + } + } while (!dir); + } + walk(dir); + --length; + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, interval, move, NULL); +} + +static void +post_prompt_box(Window window) +{ + int width = (Width / 3); + int height = font_height(font) * 6; + int box_x, box_y; + + /* make sure the entire nose icon fits in the box */ + if (height < 100) + height = 100; + + if(width < 105 + font->max_bounds.width*STRING_LENGTH) + width = 105 + font->max_bounds.width*STRING_LENGTH; + box_x = (Width - width) / 2; + time_x = prompt_x = box_x + 105; + + time_y = prompt_y = Height / 2; + box_y = prompt_y - 3 * font_height(font); + + /* erase current guy -- text message may still exist */ + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, Black); + XFillRectangle(dpy, window, gc, x, y, 64, 64); + talk(1); /* forcefully erase message if one is being displayed */ + /* Clear area in middle of screen for prompt box */ + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, White); + XFillRectangle(dpy, window, gc, box_x, box_y, width, height); + + /* make a box that's 5 pixels thick. Then add a thin box inside it */ + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, Black); + XSetLineAttributes(dpy, gc, 5, 0, 0, 0); + XDrawRectangle(dpy, window, gc, box_x+5, box_y+5, width-10, height-10); + XSetLineAttributes(dpy, gc, 0, 0, 0, 0); + XDrawRectangle(dpy, window, gc, box_x+12, box_y+12, width-23, height-23); + + XDrawString(dpy, window, gc, + prompt_x, prompt_y-font_height(font), + userprompt, strlen(userprompt)); + XDrawString(dpy, window, gc, prompt_x, prompt_y, PROMPT, strlen(PROMPT)); + /* set background for copyplane and DrawImageString; need reverse video */ + XSetBackground(dpy, gc, White); + XCopyPlane(dpy, right0, window, gc, 0,0, 64,64, + box_x + 20, box_y + (height - 64)/2, 1L); + prompt_x += XTextWidth(font, PROMPT, strlen(PROMPT)); + time_y += 2*font_height(font); +} + +static void +RaiseWindow(Widget w, XEvent *ev, String *s, Cardinal *n) +{ + Widget x; + if(!XtIsRealized(w)) + return; + x = XtParent(w); + XRaiseWindow(dpy, XtWindow(x)); +} + + +static void +ClearWindow(Widget w, XEvent *_event, String *_s, Cardinal *_n) +{ + XExposeEvent *event = (XExposeEvent *)_event; + if (!XtIsRealized(w)) + return; + XClearArea(dpy, XtWindow(w), event->x, event->y, + event->width, event->height, False); + if (state == GET_PASSWD) + post_prompt_box(XtWindow(w)); + if (timeout_id == 0 && event->count == 0) { + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, 1000L, move, NULL); + /* first grab the input focus */ + XSetInputFocus(dpy, XtWindow(w), RevertToPointerRoot, CurrentTime); + /* now grab the pointer and keyboard and contrain to this window */ + XGrabPointer(dpy, XtWindow(w), TRUE, 0, GrabModeAsync, + GrabModeAsync, XtWindow(w), None, CurrentTime); + } +} + +static void +countdown(XtPointer _t, XtIntervalId *_d) +{ + int *timeout = (int *)_t; + char buf[128]; + time_t seconds; + + if (--(*timeout) < 0) { + XExposeEvent event; + XtRemoveTimeOut(timeout_id); + state = IS_MOVING; + event.x = event.y = 0; + event.width = Width, event.height = Height; + ClearWindow(widget, (XEvent *)&event, 0, 0); + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, 200L, move, NULL); + return; + } + seconds = time(0) - locked_at; + if (seconds >= 3600) + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "Locked for %d:%02d:%02d ", + (int)seconds/3600, (int)seconds/60%60, (int)seconds%60); + else + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "Locked for %2d:%02d ", + (int)seconds/60, (int)seconds%60); + + XDrawImageString(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, + time_x, time_y, buf, strlen(buf)); + XtAppAddTimeOut(app, 1000L, countdown, timeout); + return; +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +verify_krb5(const char *password) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id; + krb5_boolean get_v4_tgt; + + krb5_cc_default(context, &id); + ret = krb5_verify_user(context, + client, + id, + password, + 0, + NULL); + if (ret == 0){ +#ifdef KRB4 + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, "xnlock", + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client), + "krb4_get_tickets", FALSE, &get_v4_tgt); + if(get_v4_tgt) { + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + + krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, + client->realm, + "krbtgt", + client->realm, + NULL); + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, id, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(context, id, &cred, &c); + if(ret == 0) + tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + } + krb5_free_principal(context, mcred.server); + } +#endif + if (k_hasafs()) + krb5_afslog(context, id, NULL, NULL); + return 0; + } + if (ret != KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "verify_krb5"); + + return -1; +} +#endif + +static int +verify(char *password) +{ + /* + * First try with root password, if allowed. + */ + if ( appres.accept_root + && strcmp(crypt(password, root_cpass), root_cpass) == 0) + return 0; + + /* + * Password that log out user + */ + if (getuid() != 0 && + geteuid() != 0 && + (time(0) - locked_at) > ALLOW_LOGOUT && + strcmp(crypt(password, appres.logoutPasswd), appres.logoutPasswd) == 0) + { + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + kill(-1, SIGHUP); + sleep(5); + /* If the X-server shut down then so will we, else + * continue */ + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + } + + /* + * Try copy of users password. + */ + if (strcmp(crypt(password, user_cpass), user_cpass) == 0) + return 0; + + /* + * Try to verify as user in case password change. + */ + if (unix_verify_user(login, password) == 0) + return 0; + +#ifdef KRB5 + /* + * Try to verify as user with kerberos 5. + */ + if(verify_krb5(password) == 0) + return 0; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 + { + int ret; + /* + * Try to verify as user with kerberos 4. + */ + ret = krb_verify_user(name, inst, realm, password, + KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE, NULL); + if (ret == KSUCCESS){ + if (k_hasafs()) + krb_afslog(NULL, NULL); + return 0; + } + if (ret != INTK_BADPW) + warnx ("warning: %s", + (ret < 0) ? strerror(ret) : krb_get_err_text(ret)); + } +#endif + + return -1; +} + + +static void +GetPasswd(Widget w, XEvent *_event, String *_s, Cardinal *_n) +{ + XKeyEvent *event = (XKeyEvent *)_event; + static char passwd[MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH]; + static int cnt; + static int is_ctrl = XNLOCK_NOCTRL; + char c; + KeySym keysym; + int echolen; + int old_state = state; + + if (event->type == ButtonPress) { + x = event->x, y = event->y; + return; + } + if (state == IS_MOVING) { + /* guy is running around--change to post prompt box. */ + XtRemoveTimeOut(timeout_id); + state = GET_PASSWD; + if (appres.ignore_passwd || !strlen(user_cpass)) + leave(); + post_prompt_box(XtWindow(w)); + cnt = 0; + time_left = 30; + countdown((XtPointer)&time_left, 0); + } + if (event->type == KeyRelease) { + keysym = XLookupKeysym(event, 0); + if (keysym == XK_Control_L || keysym == XK_Control_R) { + is_ctrl = XNLOCK_NOCTRL; + } + } + if (event->type != KeyPress) + return; + + time_left = 30; + + keysym = XLookupKeysym(event, 0); + if (keysym == XK_Control_L || keysym == XK_Control_R) { + is_ctrl = XNLOCK_CTRL; + return; + } + if (!XLookupString(event, &c, 1, &keysym, 0)) + return; + if (keysym == XK_Return || keysym == XK_Linefeed) { + passwd[cnt] = 0; + if(old_state == IS_MOVING) + return; + XtRemoveTimeOut(timeout_id); + + if(verify(passwd) == 0) + leave(); + + cnt = 0; + + XDrawImageString(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, + time_x, time_y, FAIL_MSG, strlen(FAIL_MSG)); + time_left = 0; + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, 2000L, countdown, &time_left); + return; + } + if (keysym == XK_BackSpace || keysym == XK_Delete || keysym == XK_Left) { + if (cnt) + passwd[cnt--] = ' '; + } else if (keysym == XK_u && is_ctrl == XNLOCK_CTRL) { + while (cnt) { + passwd[cnt--] = ' '; + echolen = min(cnt, STRING_LENGTH); + XDrawImageString(dpy, XtWindow(w), gc, + prompt_x, prompt_y, STRING, echolen); + XDrawImageString(dpy, XtWindow(w), gc, + prompt_x + XTextWidth(font, STRING, echolen), + prompt_y, SPACE_STRING, STRING_LENGTH - echolen + 1); + } + } else if (isprint((unsigned char)c)) { + if ((cnt + 1) >= MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH) + XBell(dpy, 50); + else + passwd[cnt++] = c; + } else + return; + echolen = min(cnt, STRING_LENGTH); + XDrawImageString(dpy, XtWindow(w), gc, + prompt_x, prompt_y, STRING, echolen); + XDrawImageString(dpy, XtWindow(w), gc, + prompt_x + XTextWidth(font, STRING, echolen), + prompt_y, SPACE_STRING, STRING_LENGTH - echolen +1); +} + +#include "nose.0.left" +#include "nose.1.left" +#include "nose.0.right" +#include "nose.1.right" +#include "nose.left.front" +#include "nose.right.front" +#include "nose.front" +#include "nose.down" + +static void +init_images(void) +{ + static Pixmap *images[] = { + &left0, &left1, &right0, &right1, + &left_front, &right_front, &front, &down + }; + static unsigned char *bits[] = { + nose_0_left_bits, nose_1_left_bits, nose_0_right_bits, + nose_1_right_bits, nose_left_front_bits, nose_right_front_bits, + nose_front_bits, nose_down_bits + }; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < XtNumber(images); i++) + if (!(*images[i] = + XCreatePixmapFromBitmapData(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), + (char*)(bits[i]), 64, 64, 1, 0, 1))) + XtError("Can't load nose images"); +} + +static void +talk(int force_erase) +{ + int width = 0, height, Z, total = 0; + static int X, Y, talking; + static struct { int x, y, width, height; } s_rect; + char *p, *p2; + char buf[BUFSIZ], args[MAXLINES][256]; + + /* clear what we've written */ + if (talking || force_erase) { + if (!talking) + return; + if (talking == 2) { + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, Black); + XDrawString(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, X, Y, words, strlen(words)); + } else if (talking == 1) { + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, Black); + XFillRectangle(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, s_rect.x-5, s_rect.y-5, + s_rect.width+10, s_rect.height+10); + } + talking = 0; + if (!force_erase) + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, 40L, + (XtTimerCallbackProc)move, + NULL); + return; + } + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, White); + talking = 1; + walk(FRONT); + strlcpy (buf, words, sizeof(buf)); + p = buf; + + /* possibly avoid a lot of work here + * if no CR or only one, then just print the line + */ + if (!(p2 = strchr(p, '\n')) || !p2[1]) { + int w; + + if (p2) + *p2 = 0; + w = XTextWidth(font, words, strlen(words)); + X = x + 32 - w/2; + Y = y - 5 - font_height(font); + /* give us a nice 5 pixel margin */ + if (X < 5) + X = 5; + else if (X + w + 15 > (int)Width + 5) + X = Width - w - 5; + if (Y < 5) + Y = y + 64 + 5 + font_height(font); + XDrawString(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, X, Y, words, strlen(words)); + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, 5000L, (XtTimerCallbackProc)talk, + NULL); + talking++; + return; + } + + /* p2 now points to the first '\n' */ + for (height = 0; p; height++) { + int w; + *p2 = 0; + if ((w = XTextWidth(font, p, p2 - p)) > width) + width = w; + total += p2 - p; /* total chars; count to determine reading time */ + strlcpy(args[height], p, sizeof(args[height])); + if (height == MAXLINES - 1) { + puts("Message too long!"); + break; + } + p = p2+1; + if (!(p2 = strchr(p, '\n'))) + break; + } + height++; + + /* Figure out the height and width in pixels (height, width) extend + * the new box by 15 pixels on the sides (30 total) top and bottom. + */ + s_rect.width = width + 30; + s_rect.height = height * font_height(font) + 30; + if (x - s_rect.width - 10 < 5) + s_rect.x = 5; + else + if ((s_rect.x = x+32-(s_rect.width+15)/2) + + s_rect.width+15 > (int)Width-5) + s_rect.x = Width - 15 - s_rect.width; + if (y - s_rect.height - 10 < 5) + s_rect.y = y + 64 + 5; + else + s_rect.y = y - 5 - s_rect.height; + + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, White); + XFillRectangle(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, + s_rect.x-5, s_rect.y-5, s_rect.width+10, s_rect.height+10); + + /* make a box that's 5 pixels thick. Then add a thin box inside it */ + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, Black); + XSetLineAttributes(dpy, gc, 5, 0, 0, 0); + XDrawRectangle(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, + s_rect.x, s_rect.y, s_rect.width-1, s_rect.height-1); + XSetLineAttributes(dpy, gc, 0, 0, 0, 0); + XDrawRectangle(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, + s_rect.x + 7, s_rect.y + 7, s_rect.width - 15, + s_rect.height - 15); + + X = 15; + Y = 15 + font_height(font); + + /* now print each string in reverse order (start at bottom of box) */ + for (Z = 0; Z < height; Z++) { + XDrawString(dpy, XtWindow(widget), gc, s_rect.x+X, s_rect.y+Y, + args[Z], strlen(args[Z])); + Y += font_height(font); + } + timeout_id = XtAppAddTimeOut(app, (total/15) * 1000, + (XtTimerCallbackProc)talk, NULL); +} + +static unsigned long +look(void) +{ + XSetForeground(dpy, gc, White); + XSetBackground(dpy, gc, Black); + if (my_random() % 3) { + XCopyPlane(dpy, (my_random() & 1)? down : front, XtWindow(widget), gc, + 0, 0, 64,64, x, y, 1L); + return 1000L; + } + if (!(my_random() % 5)) + return 0; + if (my_random() % 3) { + XCopyPlane(dpy, (my_random() & 1)? left_front : right_front, + XtWindow(widget), gc, 0, 0, 64,64, x, y, 1L); + return 1000L; + } + if (!(my_random() % 5)) + return 0; + XCopyPlane(dpy, (my_random() & 1)? left0 : right0, XtWindow(widget), gc, + 0, 0, 64,64, x, y, 1L); + return 1000L; +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + Widget override; + XGCValues gcvalues; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + /* + * Must be setuid root to read /etc/shadow, copy encrypted + * passwords here and then switch to sane uid. + */ + { + struct passwd *pw; + uid_t uid = getuid(); + if (!(pw = k_getpwuid(0))) + errx (1, "can't get root's passwd!"); + strlcpy(root_cpass, pw->pw_passwd, sizeof(root_cpass)); + + if (!(pw = k_getpwuid(uid))) + errx (1, "Can't get your password entry!"); + strlcpy(user_cpass, pw->pw_passwd, sizeof(user_cpass)); + setuid(uid); + if (uid != 0 && setuid(0) != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to drop privileges!\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* Now we're no longer running setuid root. */ + strlcpy(login, pw->pw_name, sizeof(login)); + } + +#if defined(HAVE_SRANDOMDEV) + srandomdev(); +#elif defined(HAVE_RANDOM) + srandom(time(NULL)); +#else + srand (time(NULL)); +#endif + for (i = 0; i < STRING_LENGTH; i++) + STRING[i] = ((unsigned long)my_random() % ('~' - ' ')) + ' '; + + locked_at = time(0); + + snprintf(userprompt, sizeof(userprompt), "User: %s", login); +#ifdef KRB4 + krb_get_default_principal(name, inst, realm); + snprintf(userprompt, sizeof(userprompt), "User: %s", + krb_unparse_name_long(name, inst, realm)); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { + krb5_error_code ret; + char *str; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + krb5_get_default_principal(context, &client); + krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &str); + snprintf(userprompt, sizeof(userprompt), "User: %s", str); + free(str); + } +#endif + + override = XtVaAppInitialize(&app, "XNlock", options, XtNumber(options), + (Cardinal*)&argc, argv, NULL, + XtNoverrideRedirect, True, + NULL); + + XtVaGetApplicationResources(override,(XtPointer)&appres, + resources,XtNumber(resources), + NULL); + /* the background is black and the little guy is white */ + Black = appres.bg; + White = appres.fg; + + if (appres.destroytickets) { +#ifdef KRB4 + int fd; + + dest_tkt(); /* Nuke old ticket file */ + /* but keep a place holder */ + fd = open (TKT_FILE, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600); + if (fd >= 0) + close (fd); +#endif + } + + dpy = XtDisplay(override); + + if (dpy == 0) + errx (1, "Error: Can't open display"); + + Width = DisplayWidth(dpy, DefaultScreen(dpy)) + 2; + Height = DisplayHeight(dpy, DefaultScreen(dpy)) + 2; + + for(i = 0; i < ScreenCount(dpy); i++){ + Widget shell, core; + + struct xxx{ + Pixel bg; + }res; + + XtResource Res[] = { + { XtNbackground, XtCBackground, XtRPixel, sizeof(Pixel), + XtOffsetOf(struct xxx, bg), XtRString, "black" } + }; + + if(i == DefaultScreen(dpy)) + continue; + + shell = XtVaAppCreateShell(NULL,NULL, applicationShellWidgetClass, dpy, + XtNscreen, ScreenOfDisplay(dpy, i), + XtNoverrideRedirect, True, + XtNx, -1, + XtNy, -1, + NULL); + + XtVaGetApplicationResources(shell, (XtPointer)&res, + Res, XtNumber(Res), + NULL); + + core = XtVaCreateManagedWidget("_foo", widgetClass, shell, + XtNwidth, DisplayWidth(dpy, i), + XtNheight, DisplayHeight(dpy, i), + XtNbackground, res.bg, + NULL); + XtRealizeWidget(shell); + } + + widget = XtVaCreateManagedWidget("_foo", widgetClass, override, + XtNwidth, Width, + XtNheight, Height, + XtNbackground, Black, + NULL); + + init_words(--argc, ++argv); + init_images(); + + gcvalues.foreground = Black; + gcvalues.background = White; + + + font = appres.font; + gcvalues.font = font->fid; + gcvalues.graphics_exposures = False; + gc = XCreateGC(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), + GCForeground | GCBackground | GCGraphicsExposures | GCFont, + &gcvalues); + + x = Width / 2; + y = Height / 2; + srand (time(0)); + state = IS_MOVING; + + { + static XtActionsRec actions[] = { + { "ClearWindow", ClearWindow }, + { "GetPasswd", GetPasswd }, + { "RaiseWindow", RaiseWindow }, + }; + XtAppAddActions(app, actions, XtNumber(actions)); + XtOverrideTranslations(widget, + XtParseTranslationTable( + ": ClearWindow() \n" + ": GetPasswd() \n" + ": RaiseWindow() \n" + ": GetPasswd() \n" + ": GetPasswd()")); + } + + XtRealizeWidget(override); + if((i = XGrabPointer(dpy, XtWindow(widget), True, 0, GrabModeAsync, + GrabModeAsync, XtWindow(widget), + None, CurrentTime)) != 0) + errx(1, "Failed to grab pointer (%d)", i); + + if((i = XGrabKeyboard(dpy, XtWindow(widget), True, GrabModeAsync, + GrabModeAsync, CurrentTime)) != 0) + errx(1, "Failed to grab keyboard (%d)", i); + ScreenSaver(1); + XtAppMainLoop(app); + exit(0); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dde8eef6cf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/appl/xnlock/xnlock.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ + + + +XNLOCK(1L) XNLOCK(1L) + + + +NAME + xnlock - amusing lock screen program with message for passers-by + +SYNOPSIS + xxnnlloocckk [ _o_p_t_i_o_n_s ] [ _m_e_s_s_a_g_e ] + +DESCRIPTION + _x_n_l_o_c_k is a program that acts as a screen saver for workstations running + X11. It also "locks" the screen such that the workstation can be left + unattended without worry that someone else will walk up to it and mess + everything up. When _x_n_l_o_c_k is running, a little man with a big nose and a + hat runs around spewing out messages to the screen. By default, the mes- + sages are "humorous", but that depends on your sense of humor. + + If a key or mouse button is pressed, a prompt is printed requesting the + user's password. If a RETURN is not typed within 30 seconds, the little + man resumes running around. + + Text on the command line is used as the message. For example: + % xnlock I'm out to lunch for a couple of hours. + Note the need to quote shell metacharacters. + + In the absence of flags or text, _x_n_l_o_c_k displays random fortunes. + +OPTIONS + Command line options override all resource specifications. All arguments + that are not associated with a command line option is taken to be message + text that the little man will "say" every once in a while. The resource + xxnnlloocckk..tteexxtt may be set to a string. + + --ffnn _f_o_n_t_n_a_m_e + The default font is the first 18 point font in the _n_e_w _c_e_n_t_u_r_y _s_c_h_o_o_l_- + _b_o_o_k family. While larger fonts are recokmmended over smaller ones, + any font in the server's font list will work. The resource to use for + this option is xxnnlloocckk..ffoonntt. + + --ffiilleennaammee _f_i_l_e_n_a_m_e + Take the message to be displayed from the file _f_i_l_e_n_a_m_e. If _f_i_l_e_n_a_m_e + is not specified, _$_H_O_M_E_/_._m_s_g_f_i_l_e is used. If the contents of the file + are changed during runtime, the most recent text of the file is used + (allowing the displayed message to be altered remotely). Carriage + returns within the text are allowed, but tabs or other control charac- + ters are not translated and should not be used. The resource avail- + able for this option is xxnnlloocckk..ffiillee. + + --aarr Accept root's password to unlock screen. This option is true by + default. The reason for this is so that someone's screen may be + unlocked by autorized users in case of emergency and the person run- + ning the program is still out to lunch. The resource available for + specifying this option is xxnnlloocckk..aacccceeppttRRoooottPPaasssswwdd. + + --nnooaarr + Don't accept root's password. This option is for paranoids who fear + their peers might breakin using root's password and remove their files + anyway. Specifying this option on the command line overrides the + xxnnlloocckk..aacccceeppttRRoooottPPaasssswwdd if set to True. + + --iipp Ignore password prompt. The resource available for this option is + xxnnlloocckk..iiggnnoorreePPaasssswwdd. + + --nnooiipp + Don't ignore password prompt. This is available in order to override + the resource iiggnnoorreePPaasssswwdd if set to True. + + --ffgg _c_o_l_o_r + Specifies the foreground color. The resource available for this is + xxnnlloocckk..ffoorreeggrroouunndd. + + --bbgg _c_o_l_o_r + Specifies the background color. The resource available for this is + xxnnlloocckk..bbaacckkggrroouunndd. + + --rrvv Reverse the foreground and background colors. The resource for this + is xxvvnnlloocckk..rreevveerrsseeVViiddeeoo. + + --nnoorrvv + Don't use reverse video. This is available to override the reverseV- + ideo resource if set to True. + + --pprroogg _p_r_o_g_r_a_m + Receive message text from the running program _p_r_o_g_r_a_m. If there are + arguments to _p_r_o_g_r_a_m, encase them with the name of the program in + quotes (e.g. xnlock -t "fortune -o"). The resource for this is + xxnnlloocckk..pprrooggrraamm. + +RESOURCES + xnlock.font: fontname + xnlock.foreground: color + xnlock.background: color + xnlock.reverseVideo: True/False + xnlock.text: Some random text string + xnlock.program: program [args] + xnlock.ignorePasswd: True/False + xnlock.acceptRootPasswd: True/False + +FILES + _x_n_l_o_c_k executable file + ~/.msgfile default message file + +AUTHOR + Dan Heller Copyright (c) 1985, 1990. + The original version of this program was written using pixrects on a Sun 2 + running SunOS 1.1. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1018925c9b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,815 @@ +2003-08-15 Love + + * check-compile-et.m4: 1.7->1.8: check if compile_et support + ``error_table N M'' also, don't be overly aggressivly reset CFLAGS + +2003-05-08 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: change install-data-local to + install-data-hook + +2003-05-05 Assar Westerlund + + * crypto.m4: define OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY + +2003-04-03 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * crypto.m4: check if libcrypto needs -lnsl or -lsocket + +2003-04-02 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * crypto.m4: in the case where se don't link with kerberos 4, use + ${with_openssl_include} if its are set (not + ${with_openssl}/include) same for with_openssl_lib + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * Makefile.am.common: always define LIB_kafs + +2003-03-12 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * check-compile-et.m4: check if the output of compile_et needs + initialize_error_table_r + +2003-02-17 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * check-var.m4: add a check if the variable is avaible when we + include the headerfiles + +2002-12-18 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: res_nsearch takes 6 parameters; spotted by Howard + Chu + +2002-10-25 Johan Danielsson + + * crypto.m4: do a better job at matching headers to libraries + +2002-10-16 Johan Danielsson + + * sunos.m4: more quoting + +2002-09-19 Johan Danielsson + + * make-proto.pl: check the processed string for closing ), not the + source + +2002-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * crypto.m4: use m4 macros for test cases, also test for older + hash names + + * test-package.m4: include dep libraries in LIB_* + + * crypto.m4: move krb4 test before test for openssl, and bail out + if krb4 is requested, but the crypto library is not the same as + krb4 + + * db.m4: filter contents of LDFLAGS + +2002-09-09 Johan Danielsson + + * auth-modules.m4: rename to rk_AUTH_MODULES + + * auth-modules.m4: only include modules explicitly asked for + +2002-09-04 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: test for res_nsearch + +2002-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: check for sys/mman.h and mmap (used by + parse_reply-test) + +2002-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-readline.m4: also add LIB_tgetent in the case of editline + + * crypto.m4: define HAVE_OPENSSL even if we got to hear about it + by krb4 + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * krb-readline.m4: add LIB_tgetent to LIB_readline if we have to + + * sunos.m4: various sunos tests + + * crypto.m4: try to extract the crypto compiler flags from + {INCLUDE,LIB}_krb4 + (XXX this is really horrible) + + * krb-readline.m4: don't add -rpath to LIB_readline (libtool + should to this for us), also don't append LIB_tgetent to + LIB_readline (TEST_PACKAGE should do this) + + * test-package.m4: add the possibility to use a *-config program + to get flags; rename to rk_TEST_PACKAGE while here + + * krb-bigendian.m4: move ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H tests here + + * aix.m4: rename to rk_AIX + + * telnet.m4: move telnet tests here + + * aix.m4: restructure this somewhat + + * dlopen.m4: test for dlopen suitable for AC_REQUIRE + + * irix.m4: move some stuff here and rename to irix.m4 + + * krb-sys-nextstep.m4: move SGTTY stuff to read_pwd.c + +2002-08-28 Jacques Vidrine + + * auth-modules.m4: do not build pam_krb4 on freebsd + +2002-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: test for the vis, strvis functions requiring + prototypes + +2002-08-23 Johan Danielsson + + * need-proto.m4: missing comma + +2002-08-22 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: some rototilling + + * need-proto.m4: use AS_TR_CPP + +2002-08-20 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: HAVE_TYPE instead of CHECK_TYPE ssize_t + + * krb-version.m4: use PACKAGE_TARNAME and PACKAGE_STRING + + * broken-getaddrinfo.m4: can't test for EAI_SERVICE here since AIX + is even more fsck:ed + + * roken-frag.m4: test for altzone + +2002-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: only define ROKEN_RENAME if do_roken_rename + +2002-08-13 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: add ROKEN_RENAME variable + +2002-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * make-proto.pl: include to get va_list + + * destdirs.m4: also define localstatedir and sysconfdir + +2002-08-01 Johan Danielsson + + * crypto.m4: newer openssl seems to take the address of the + schedule parameter to des_cbc_encrypt, so we need to feed it a + variable, not just NULL (from Magnus Holmberg) + +2002-05-24 Johan Danielsson + + * misc.m4: change \100 back to @; some m4's (probably some regex) + doesn't like this as a replacement regexp; the reason it was once + changed to \100 was probably because of some autoconf bug at the + time + +2002-05-20 Johan Danielsson + + * broken2.m4 []-less is apparently the way to go + +2002-05-19 Johan Danielsson + + * otp.m4: check db_type instead of precence of dbm_firstkey + + * roken-frag.m4: don't AC_LIBOBJ more than one function at a time + + * find-if-not-broken.m4: s/AC_LIBOBJ/rk_LIBOBJ/ + + * broken2.m4: s/AC_LIBOBJ/rk_LIBOBJ/ + + * broken.m4: s/AC_LIBOBJ/rk_LIBOBJ/ + + * misc.m4: automake can't handle macros passed to AC_LIBOBJ, so + add an alias to it called rk_LIBOBJ; this requires that the + relevant source are manually included in roken/Makefile.am + + * aix.m4: ac_enable --diable-dynamic-afs + + * roken-frag.m4: use AC_LIBOBJ + + * krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4: use AC_LIBOBJ + + * find-if-not-broken.m4: use AC_LIBOBJ + + * broken2.m4: use AC_LIBOBJ + + * broken.m4: use AC_LIBOBJ + + * aix.m4: recognise aix5 + +2002-05-17 Johan Danielsson + + * crypto.m4: am-conditionalise HAVE_OPENSSL + + * db.m4: make it possible to run this twice + + * Makefile.am.common: also install nodist_include_HEADERS + +2002-05-16 Johan Danielsson + + * make-proto.pl: make it possible to redefine the "private" regexp + +2002-05-02 Johan Danielsson + + * db.m4: am_cond HAVE_* + +2002-04-30 Johan Danielsson + + * krb-ipv6.m4: use AC_HELP_STRING; fix logic bug in AC_MSG_RESULT + call + + * test-package.m4: use AC_HELP_STRING + + * roken.m4: use AC_HELP_STRING + + * osfc2.m4: use AC_HELP_STRING + + * mips-abi.m4: use AC_HELP_STRING + + * krb-bigendian.m4: use AC_HELP_STRING + + * db.m4: rework this somewhat; check for db3/4 in subdirs, change + --with to --enable; it should really be possible to point it to + some directory --with-berkeley-db=/foo + + * otp.m4: OTP test + +2002-04-25 Johan Danielsson + + * destdirs.m4: define BINDIR et al + +2002-04-18 Johan Danielsson + + * misc.m4: remove some stuff that is defined elsewhere + + * make-proto.pl: optionally remove __P and parameter names + +2001-11-30 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: move ipv6 tests after -lsocket (to handle Solaris + 8) + +2001-09-29 Assar Westerlund + + * install-catman.sh: handle man pages without SYNOPSIS but looking + for both SYNOPSIS and DESCRIPTION + +2001-09-18 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: include freeaddrinfo if using getaddrinfo + +2001-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * db.m4: test for the ndbm database really being a .db one + and use it when moving/removing database files + +2001-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * db.m4: prefer ndbm.h to dbm.h + * roken-frag.m4: check for atexit and on_exit + +2001-09-02 Assar Westerlund + + * check-compile-et.m4: only add /usr/include/et to CPPFLAGS if + it's actually used + +2001-09-01 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS): set 1.4b here so that + users are warned if using earlier automake versions + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: ignore "no" as a library - another + special case to make it easy to send the result from this macro + into another invocation + +2001-08-30 Assar Westerlund + + * db.m4: check for ndbm functions in db3 library too + +2001-08-29 Jacques Vidrine + + * check-compile-et.m4: Check for already-installed com_err. + * Makefile.am.common: Use the compile_et discovered at + configuration time. + +2001-08-29 Assar Westerlund + + * crypto.m4: use AC_WITH_ALL to allow separate specification of + include and lib + * with-all.m4: new macro for doing --with-foo, --with-foo-include, + and --with-foo-lib in a sensible way + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: handle both -llib and lib in the second + argument also yes -> "" as a library, to ease callers that send in + results from this macro (this might be a little bit unclean) + +2001-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: test for issetugid + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common: change one += to = to AM_CFLAGS to avoid an + error with recent automake + +2001-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * crypto.m4: SHA1_CTX should be SHA_CTX + +2001-08-21 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: remove all winsock.h + for now, it does more harm than good under cygwin and if it should be + used, the correct conditional needs to be found + from + +2001-08-21 Johan Danielsson + + * check-var.m4: AC_TR_CPP -> AS_TR_CPP to make autoconf 2.52 happy + +2001-08-17 Johan Danielsson + + * krb-ipv6.m4: add test for non-existant in6addr_loopback in AIX + +2001-08-15 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: test for getaddrinfo's that doesn't like numeric + services + + * broken-getaddrinfo.m4: test for getaddrinfo's that doesn't like + numeric services + +2001-08-08 Assar Westerlund + + * db.m4: do a separate test for gdbm/ndbm.h and -lgdbm + +2001-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * db.m4: ac_cv_funclib_\func can be yes + * db.m4: use AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS to test in libc + anset cache variables after first attempt at finding dbm_firstkey (how + should this be done?) + * db.m4: do not test for ndbm library when ndbm-db was found in libc + * db.m4: test for ndbm-compatability with db + * db.m4: add forgotten AC_SUBST + * db.m4: first steps towards a new db test + + * roken-frag.m4: remove header files checked by rk_db + +2001-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: remove header files checked by rk_db + +2001-06-24 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: make sure of building getaddrinfo et al if + missing + +2001-06-20 Johan Danielsson + + * install-catman.sh: try to install links to manpages + +2001-06-19 Assar Westerlund + + * broken-glob.m4: try to handle FreeBSD's GLOB_MAXPATH + +2001-06-18 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: test for getaddrinfo needs netdb.h on Tru64 + +2001-06-17 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4 (AC_CHECK_HEADERS): test for random + * roken-frag.m4 (AC_CHECK_HEADERS): test for initstate and + setstate + + * roken-frag.m4 (AC_BROKEN): test for + emalloc,ecalloc,erealloc,estrdup + +2001-05-11 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: bswap{16,32} + +2001-03-26 Assar Westerlund + + * broken-glob.m4: also test for GLOB_LIMIT + * krb-ipv6.m4: restore CFLAGS if v6 is not detected + +2001-02-20 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: check for getprogname, setprogname + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (LIB_kdfs): set. use it. from Ake Sandgren + + +2000-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: remove some dnl that weren't the correct with + modern autoconf + +2000-12-15 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4 (inet_ntoa, inet_ntop, inet_pton): add necessary + includes when testing + * broken2.m4: new variant of broken, with includes and arguments + + * test-package.m4: s/ifval/m4_ifval/ to keep in sync with + autoconf. from Ake Sandgren + * check-var.m4: s/ifval/m4_ifval/ to keep in sync with autoconf. + from Ake Sandgren + +2000-12-13 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-irix.m4: need to set irix to no first. From Ake Sandgren + + +2000-12-12 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: move sa_len test to before test for broken + getnameinfo + +2000-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-frag.m4: only test for broken getnameinfo if it exists + +2000-12-10 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: ifaddrs.h + +2000-12-06 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: test for unvis, and vis.h + + * roken-frag.m4: test for strvis* + +2000-12-05 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: just warn if we fail to setuid a program + + * broken-getnameinfo.m4: add more quotes + + * roken-frag.m4: test for getifaddrs + + * roken-frag.m4: test for broken AIX getnameinfo + + * broken-getnameinfo.m4: test for broken getnameinfo + +2000-12-01 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common: add kludge for LIBS + +2000-11-30 Johan Danielsson + + * check-man.m4: update this after recent changes + + * Makefile.am.common: use install-catman.sh + + * install-catman.sh: script to install preformatted manual pages + + * Makefile.am.common: change cat handling + +2000-11-29 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: don't use AC_CONFIG_FILES here, since it doesn't + work with automake + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-readline.m4: link against the libtool-versions of + libeditline and libel_compat + + * Makefile.am.common (INCLUDES): add $(INCLUDES_roken) + * roken-frag.m4 (CPPFLAGS_roken): rename to INCLUDES_roken + +2000-11-05 Johan Danielsson + + * aix.m4: set aix + +2000-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-bigendian.m4: merge from arla: make it work better + +2000-08-07 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-frag.m4: check getsockname for proto compat + +2000-08-04 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: add library for pidfile + + * roken-frag.m4: tests for util.h and pidfile + +2000-07-19 Johan Danielsson + + * check-var.m4: rename to rk_CHECK_VAR, transposing the arguments, + and making the second optional, AU_DEFINE AC_CHECK_VAR to + rk_CHECK_VAR + + * roken-frag.m4: other roken tests + + * db.m4: db tests + +2000-07-18 Johan Danielsson + + * mips-abi.m4: AC_ERROR -> AC_MSG_ERROR + + * check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4: use cache_check, and make this work + with new autoconf + + * aix.m4: don't subst AFS_EXTRA_LD + +2000-07-15 Johan Danielsson + + * check-var.m4: workaround feature of newer autoconf + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: use cleaner autoheader trick + + * have-type.m4: use cleaner autoheader trick + + * have-types.m4: use cleaner autoheader trick + + * test-package.m4: add 6th parameter for now + + * broken.m4: use cleaner autoheader trick + + * retsigtype.m4: test for signal handler return type + + * broken-realloc.m4: test for broken realloc + +2000-07-08 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.m4: set CPPFLAGS_roken and call AC_CONFIG_SUBDIRS + +2000-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (CP): set and use + +2000-04-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (INCLUDE_openldap, LIB_openldap): add + +2000-03-28 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-prog-yacc.m4: AC_MSG_WARNING should be AC_MSG_WARN + + * shared-libs.m4: try to update to freebsd5 (and elf) + +2000-03-16 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-prog-yacc.m4: warn we do not find any yacc + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-bigendian.m4: new file, replacement for ac_c_bigendian + +2000-01-01 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: re-organize: test for type of stack first so that + we can find the libraries that we might have to link the test + program against. not linking the test program means we don't know + if the right stuff is in the libraries. also cosmetic changes to + make sure we print the checking for... nicely + +1999-12-21 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: try linking, not only compiling + * krb-ipv6.m4: add --without-ipv6 make sure we have `in6addr_any' + which we use in the code. This test avoids false positives on + OpenBSD + +1999-11-29 Johan Danielsson + + * grok-type.m4: inttypes.h + +1999-11-05 Assar Westerlund + + * check-x.m4: include X_PRE_LIBS and X_EXTRA_LIBS when testing + +1999-11-01 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install-build-headers): use `cp' instead of + INSTALL_DATA for copying header files inside the build tree. The + user might have redefined INSTALL_DATA to specify owners and other + information. + +1999-10-30 Assar Westerlund + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: add yet another argument to allow specify + linker flags that will be added _before_ the library when trying + to link + + * find-func-no-libs.m4: add yet another argument to allow specify + linker flags that will be added _before_ the library when trying + to link + +1999-10-12 Assar Westerlund + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4 (AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2): new argument + `extra libs' + + * find-func-no-libs.m4 (AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS): new argument `extra + libs' + +1999-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * capabilities.m4: sgi capabilities + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * have-struct-field.m4: quote macros when undefining + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install-build-headers): add dependencies + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * have-type.m4: try to get autoheader to co-operate + + * have-type.m4: stolen from Arla + + * krb-struct-sockaddr-sa-len.m4: not used any longer. removed. + +1999-06-13 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-struct-spwd.m4: consequent name of cache variables + + * krb-func-getlogin.m4: new file for testing for posix (broken) + getlogin + + * shared-libs.m4 (freebsd[34]): don't use ld -Bshareable + +1999-06-02 Johan Danielsson + + * check-x.m4: extended test for X + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4: proper autoheader tricks + + * check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4: new file for checking for + netinet/{ip,tcp}.h. These are special as they on Irix 6.5.3 + require to be included in advance. + + * check-xau.m4: we also need to check for XauFilename since it's + used by appl/kx. And on Irix 6.5 that function requires linking + with -lX11. + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-find-db.m4: try with more header files than ndbm.h + +1999-04-19 Assar Westerlund + + * test-package.m4: try to handle the case of --without-package + correctly + +1999-04-17 Assar Westerlund + + * make-aclocal: removed. Not used anymore, being replaced by + aclocal from automake. + +Thu Apr 15 14:17:26 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * make-proto.pl: handle __attribute__ + +Fri Apr 9 20:37:18 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * shared-libs.m4: quote $@ + (freebsd3): add install_symlink_command2 + +Wed Apr 7 20:40:22 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * shared-libs.m4 (hpux): no library dependencies + +Mon Apr 5 16:13:08 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * test-package.m4: compile and link, rather than looking for + files; also export more information, so it's possible to add rpath + information + +Tue Mar 30 13:49:54 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: CFLAGS -> AM_CFLAGS + +Mon Mar 29 16:51:12 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * check-xau.m4: check for XauWriteAuth before checking for + XauReadAuth to catch -lX11:s not containing XauWriteAuth, and IRIX + 6.5 that doesn't work with -lXau + +Sat Mar 27 18:03:58 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * osfc2.m4: --enable-osfc2 + +Fri Mar 19 15:34:52 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * shared-libs.m4: move shared lib stuff here + +Wed Mar 24 23:24:51 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install-build-headers): simplify loop + +Tue Mar 23 17:31:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4: check for getpwnam_r, and if it's + posix or not + +Tue Mar 23 00:00:13 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install_build_headers): try to make it work + better when list of headers is empty. handle make rewriting the + filenames. + + * Makefile.am.common: hesoid -> hesiod + +Sun Mar 21 14:48:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * grok-type.m4: + + * Makefile.am.common: fix for automake bug/feature; add more LIB_* + + * test-package.m4: fix typo + + * check-man.m4: fix some typos + + * auth-modules.m4: tests for authentication modules + +Thu Mar 18 11:02:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: make install-build-headers a multi + dependency target + + * Makefile.am.common: remove include_dir hack + + * Makefile.am.common: define LIB_kafs and LIB_gssapi + + * krb-find-db.m4: subst DBLIB also + + * check-xau.m4: test for Xau{Read,Write}Auth + +Wed Mar 10 19:29:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * wflags.m4: AC_WFLAGS + +Mon Mar 1 11:23:41 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * have-struct-field.m4: remove extra AC_MSG_RESULT + + * proto-compat.m4: typo + + * krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4: update to autoconf 2.13 + + * krb-find-db.m4: update to autoconf 2.13 + + * check-declaration.m4: typo + + * have-pragma-weak.m4: update to autoconf 2.13 + + * have-struct-field.m4: better handling of types with spaces + +Mon Feb 22 20:05:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * broken-glob.m4: check for broken glob + +Sun Jan 31 06:50:33 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: more magic for different v6 implementations. From + Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino + +Sun Nov 22 12:16:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-struct-spwd.m4: new file + +Thu Jun 4 04:07:41 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: new file + +Fri May 1 23:31:28 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * c-attribute.m4, c-function.m4: new files (from arla) + +Wed Mar 18 23:11:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: rename HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 to HAVE_IPV6 + +Thu Feb 26 02:37:49 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * make-proto.pl: should work with perl4 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/Makefile.am.common b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/Makefile.am.common new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ddb86a49ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/Makefile.am.common @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SUFFIXES = .et .h + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDES_roken) + +if do_roken_rename +ROKEN_RENAME = -DROKEN_RENAME +endif + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +CP = cp + +## set build_HEADERZ to headers that should just be installed in build tree + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +## these aren't detected by automake +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_openpty = @LIB_openpty@ +LIB_pidfile = @LIB_pidfile@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_openldap = @INCLUDE_openldap@ +LIB_openldap = @LIB_openldap@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +install-suid-programs: + @foo='$(bin_SUIDS)'; \ + for file in $$foo; do \ + x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + echo "*"; \ + echo "* Failed to install $$x setuid root"; \ + echo "*"; \ + fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(nodist_include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +SUFFIXES += .x + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +SUFFIXES += .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +## MAINTAINERCLEANFILES += + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +if KRB5 +LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la +endif + +if DCE +LIB_kdfs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kdfs/libkdfs.la +endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/aix.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/aix.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..155cef278e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/aix.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: aix.m4,v 1.9.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_AIX],[ + +aix=no +case "$host" in +*-*-aix3*) + aix=3 + ;; +*-*-aix4*|*-*-aix5*) + aix=4 + ;; +esac + +AM_CONDITIONAL(AIX, test "$aix" != no)dnl +AM_CONDITIONAL(AIX4, test "$aix" = 4) + + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(dynamic-afs, + AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-dynamic-afs], + [do not use loaded AFS library with AIX])) + +if test "$aix" != no; then + if test "$enable_dynamic_afs" != no; then + AC_REQUIRE([rk_DLOPEN]) + if test "$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = no; then + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(loadquery, ld) + fi + if test "$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != no; then + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS='$(LIB_dlopen)' + elif test "$ac_cv_func_loadquery" != no; then + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS='$(LIB_loadquery)' + else + AC_MSG_NOTICE([not using dynloaded AFS library]) + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS= + enable_dynamic_afs=no + fi + else + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS= + fi +fi + +AM_CONDITIONAL(AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS, test "$enable_dynamic_afs" != no)dnl +AC_SUBST(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS)dnl + +AH_BOTTOM([#if _AIX +#define _ALL_SOURCE +/* XXX this is gross, but kills about a gazillion warnings */ +struct ether_addr; +struct sockaddr; +struct sockaddr_dl; +struct sockaddr_in; +#endif]) + +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/auth-modules.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/auth-modules.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5fb88f3647 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/auth-modules.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +dnl $Id: auth-modules.m4,v 1.5.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Figure what authentication modules should be built +dnl +dnl rk_AUTH_MODULES(module-list) + +AC_DEFUN([rk_AUTH_MODULES],[ +AC_MSG_CHECKING([which authentication modules should be built]) + +z='m4_ifval([$1], $1, [sia pam afskauthlib])' +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS= +for i in $z; do +case $i in +sia) +if test "$ac_cv_header_siad_h" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS sia" +fi +;; +pam) +case "${host}" in +*-*-freebsd*) ac_cv_want_pam_krb4=no ;; +*) ac_cv_want_pam_krb4=yes ;; +esac + +if test "$ac_cv_want_pam_krb4" = yes -a \ + "$ac_cv_header_security_pam_modules_h" = yes -a \ + "$enable_shared" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS pam" +fi +;; +afskauthlib) +case "${host}" in +*-*-irix[[56]]*) LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS afskauthlib" ;; +esac +;; +esac +done +if test "$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT(none) +fi + +AC_SUBST(LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a97e438932 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +dnl $Id: broken-getaddrinfo.m4,v 1.3.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl test if getaddrinfo can handle numeric services + +AC_DEFUN([rk_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO],[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if getaddrinfo handles numeric services], ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo_numserv, +AC_TRY_RUN([[#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai; + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + if(getaddrinfo(NULL, "17", &hints, &ai) != 0) + return 1; + return 0; +} +]], ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo_numserv=yes, ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo_numserv=no))]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf2897b2cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +dnl $Id: broken-getnameinfo.m4,v 1.2.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for broken AIX getnameinfo + +AC_DEFUN([rk_BROKEN_GETNAMEINFO],[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if getnameinfo is broken], ac_cv_func_getnameinfo_broken, +AC_TRY_RUN([[#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct sockaddr_in sin; + char host[256]; + memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin); +#endif + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = 0xffffffff; + sin.sin_port = 0; + return getnameinfo((struct sockaddr*)&sin, sizeof(sin), host, sizeof(host), + NULL, 0, 0); +} +]], ac_cv_func_getnameinfo_broken=no, ac_cv_func_getnameinfo_broken=yes))]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-glob.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-glob.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4f4211a210 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-glob.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +dnl $Id: broken-glob.m4,v 1.4.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for glob(3) +dnl +AC_DEFUN([AC_BROKEN_GLOB],[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working glob, ac_cv_func_glob_working, +ac_cv_func_glob_working=yes +AC_TRY_LINK([ +#include +#include ],[ +glob(NULL, GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE| +#ifdef GLOB_MAXPATH +GLOB_MAXPATH +#else +GLOB_LIMIT +#endif +, +NULL, NULL); +],:,ac_cv_func_glob_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GLOB, 1, [define if you have a glob() that groks + GLOB_BRACE, GLOB_NOCHECK, GLOB_QUOTE, GLOB_TILDE, and GLOB_LIMIT]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include +#include ],glob) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-realloc.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-realloc.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e34d23d038 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-realloc.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: broken-realloc.m4,v 1.1.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Test for realloc that doesn't handle NULL as first parameter +dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_BROKEN_REALLOC], [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(if realloc if broken, ac_cv_func_realloc_broken, [ +ac_cv_func_realloc_broken=no +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include + +int main() +{ + return realloc(NULL, 17) == NULL; +} +],:, ac_cv_func_realloc_broken=yes, :) +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_realloc_broken" = yes ; then + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALLOC, 1, [Define if realloc(NULL) doesn't work.]) +fi +AH_BOTTOM([#ifdef BROKEN_REALLOC +#define realloc(X, Y) isoc_realloc((X), (Y)) +#define isoc_realloc(X, Y) ((X) ? realloc((X), (Y)) : malloc(Y)) +#endif]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8436733734 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +dnl $Id: broken-snprintf.m4,v 1.4.10.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN([AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working snprintf,ac_cv_func_snprintf_working, +ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=yes +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +int main() +{ + char foo[[3]]; + snprintf(foo, 2, "12"); + return strcmp(foo, "1"); +}],:,ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_SNPRINTF, 1, [define if you have a working snprintf]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ],snprintf) +fi +]) + +AC_DEFUN([AC_BROKEN_VSNPRINTF],[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working vsnprintf,ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working, +ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=yes +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#include + +int foo(int num, ...) +{ + char bar[[3]]; + va_list arg; + va_start(arg, num); + vsnprintf(bar, 2, "%s", arg); + va_end(arg); + return strcmp(bar, "1"); +} + + +int main() +{ + return foo(0, "12"); +}],:,ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_VSNPRINTF, 1, [define if you have a working vsnprintf]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ],vsnprintf) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92b84dd348 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +dnl $Id: broken.m4,v 1.6 2002/05/19 19:36:52 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Same as AC _REPLACE_FUNCS, just define HAVE_func if found in normal +dnl libraries + +AC_DEFUN([AC_BROKEN], +[AC_FOREACH([rk_func], [$1], + [AC_CHECK_FUNC(rk_func, + [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(AS_TR_CPP(HAVE_[]rk_func), 1, + [Define if you have the function `]rk_func['.])], + [rk_LIBOBJ(rk_func)])])]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken2.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken2.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56ed7a1109 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/broken2.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +dnl $Id: broken2.m4,v 1.4 2002/05/19 22:16:46 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_BROKEN but with more arguments + +dnl AC_BROKEN2(func, includes, arguments) +AC_DEFUN([AC_BROKEN2], +[AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_func_[]$1, +[AC_TRY_LINK([$2], +[ +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$1) || defined (__stub___$1) +choke me +#else +$1($3) +#endif +], [eval "ac_cv_func_[]$1=yes"], [eval "ac_cv_func_[]$1=no"])]) +if eval "test \"\${ac_cv_func_[]$1}\" = yes"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(AS_TR_CPP(HAVE_[]$1), 1, define) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + rk_LIBOBJ($1) +fi]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/c-attribute.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/c-attribute.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6641b7483e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/c-attribute.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: c-attribute.m4,v 1.2.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test for __attribute__ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_C___ATTRIBUTE__], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for __attribute__) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv___attribute__, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +], +[ +static void foo(void) __attribute__ ((noreturn)); + +static void +foo(void) +{ + exit(1); +} +], +ac_cv___attribute__=yes, +ac_cv___attribute__=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv___attribute__" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__, 1, [define if your compiler has __attribute__]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv___attribute__) +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/c-function.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/c-function.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..056b890a6c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/c-function.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: c-function.m4,v 1.2.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test for __FUNCTION__ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_C___FUNCTION__], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for __FUNCTION__) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv___function__, [ +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include + +static char *foo() +{ + return __FUNCTION__; +} + +int main() +{ + return strcmp(foo(), "foo") != 0; +} +], +ac_cv___function__=yes, +ac_cv___function__=no, +ac_cv___function__=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv___function__" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___FUNCTION__, 1, [define if your compiler has __FUNCTION__]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv___function__) +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/capabilities.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/capabilities.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b258d597b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/capabilities.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: capabilities.m4,v 1.2.20.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test SGI capabilities +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([KRB_CAPABILITIES],[ + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(capability.h sys/capability.h) + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(sgi_getcapabilitybyname cap_set_proc) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-compile-et.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-compile-et.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b71833c4d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-compile-et.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +dnl $Id: check-compile-et.m4,v 1.7.2.1 2003/08/15 14:40:42 lha Exp $ +dnl +dnl CHECK_COMPILE_ET +AC_DEFUN([CHECK_COMPILE_ET], [ + +AC_CHECK_PROG(COMPILE_ET, compile_et, [compile_et]) + +krb_cv_compile_et="no" +krb_cv_com_err_need_r="" +if test "${COMPILE_ET}" = "compile_et"; then + +dnl We have compile_et. Now let's see if it supports `prefix' and `index'. +AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether compile_et has the features we need) +cat > conftest_et.et <<'EOF' +error_table test conf +prefix CONFTEST +index 1 +error_code CODE1, "CODE1" +index 128 +error_code CODE2, "CODE2" +end +EOF +if ${COMPILE_ET} conftest_et.et >/dev/null 2>&1; then + dnl XXX Some systems have . + save_CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS}" + if test -d "/usr/include/et"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/include/et ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + dnl Check that the `prefix' and `index' directives were honored. + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#include "conftest_et.h" +int main(){ +#ifndef ERROR_TABLE_BASE_conf +#error compile_et does not handle error_table N M +#endif +return (CONFTEST_CODE2 - CONFTEST_CODE1) != 127;} + ], [krb_cv_compile_et="yes"],[CPPFLAGS="${save_CPPFLAGS}"]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT(${krb_cv_compile_et}) +if test "${krb_cv_compile_et}" = "yes"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for if com_err needs to have a initialize_error_table_r) + AC_EGREP_CPP(initialize_error_table_r,[#include "conftest_et.c"], + [krb_cv_com_err_need_r="initialize_error_table_r(0,0,0,0);"]) + if test X"$krb_cv_com_err_need_r" = X ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + fi +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +if test "${krb_cv_compile_et}" = "yes"; then + dnl Since compile_et seems to work, let's check libcom_err + krb_cv_save_LIBS="${LIBS}" + LIBS="${LIBS} -lcom_err" + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for com_err) + AC_TRY_LINK([#include ],[ + const char *p; + p = error_message(0); + $krb_cv_com_err_need_r + ],[krb_cv_com_err="yes"],[krb_cv_com_err="no"; CPPFLAGS="${save_CPPFLAGS}"]) + AC_MSG_RESULT(${krb_cv_com_err}) + LIBS="${krb_cv_save_LIBS}" +else + dnl Since compile_et doesn't work, forget about libcom_err + krb_cv_com_err="no" +fi + +dnl Only use the system's com_err if we found compile_et, libcom_err, and +dnl com_err.h. +if test "${krb_cv_com_err}" = "yes"; then + DIR_com_err="" + LIB_com_err="-lcom_err" + LIB_com_err_a="" + LIB_com_err_so="" + AC_MSG_NOTICE(Using the already-installed com_err) +else + COMPILE_ET="\$(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et" + DIR_com_err="com_err" + LIB_com_err="\$(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/libcom_err.la" + LIB_com_err_a="\$(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/.libs/libcom_err.a" + LIB_com_err_so="\$(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/.libs/libcom_err.so" + AC_MSG_NOTICE(Using our own com_err) +fi +AC_SUBST(DIR_com_err) +AC_SUBST(LIB_com_err) +AC_SUBST(LIB_com_err_a) +AC_SUBST(LIB_com_err_so) + +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-declaration.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-declaration.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18bdf8a7a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-declaration.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +dnl $Id: check-declaration.m4,v 1.3.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if we need the declaration of a variable +dnl + +dnl AC_HAVE_DECLARATION(includes, variable) +AC_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_DECLARATION], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $2 is properly declared]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_var_$2_declaration, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1 +extern struct { int foo; } $2;], +[$2.foo = 1;], +eval "ac_cv_var_$2_declaration=no", +eval "ac_cv_var_$2_declaration=yes") +]) + +define(foo, [HAVE_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_DECLARATION]) + +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_var_$2_declaration) +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_$2_declaration\" = yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if your system declares $2]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d3b1e0f0e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +dnl $Id: check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4,v 1.2.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for getpwnam_r, and if it's posix or not + +AC_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_GETPWNAM_R_POSIX],[ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(getpwnam_r,c_r) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r" = yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(if getpwnam_r is posix,ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix, + ac_libs="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $LIB_getpwnam_r" + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +int main() +{ + struct passwd pw, *pwd; + return getpwnam_r("", &pw, NULL, 0, &pwd) < 0; +} +],ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=yes,ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=no,:) +LIBS="$ac_libs") +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(POSIX_GETPWNAM_R, 1, [Define if getpwnam_r has POSIX flavour.]) +fi +fi +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-man.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-man.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd04666e54 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-man.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +dnl $Id: check-man.m4,v 1.3.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:32 joda Exp $ +dnl check how to format manual pages +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_CHECK_MAN], +[AC_PATH_PROG(NROFF, nroff) +AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(how to format man pages,ac_cv_sys_man_format, +[cat > conftest.1 << END +.Dd January 1, 1970 +.Dt CONFTEST 1 +.Sh NAME +.Nm conftest +.Nd +foobar +END + +if test "$NROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$NROFF" $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$NROFF $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format" = "" -a "$GROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$GROFF" -Tascii $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$GROFF -Tascii $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$ac_cv_sys_man_format \[$]< > \[$]@" +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + CATMAN="$ac_cv_sys_man_format" + AC_SUBST(CATMAN) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(CATMAN, test "$CATMAN") +AC_CACHE_CHECK(extension of pre-formatted manual pages,ac_cv_sys_catman_ext, +[if grep _suffix /etc/man.conf > /dev/null 2>&1; then + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=0 +else + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=number +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_sys_catman_ext" = number; then + CATMANEXT='$$section' +else + CATMANEXT=0 +fi +AC_SUBST(CATMANEXT) +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f169a4f6bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4,v 1.3.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl extra magic check for netinet/{ip.h,tcp.h} because on irix 6.5.3 +dnl you have to include standards.h before including these files + +AC_DEFUN([CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP], +[ +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(standards.h) +for i in netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h; do + +cv=`echo "$i" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for $i],ac_cv_header_$cv, +[AC_TRY_CPP([\ +#ifdef HAVE_STANDARDS_H +#include +#endif +#include <$i> +], +eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=yes", +eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=no")]) +ac_res=`eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv` +if test "$ac_res" = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $i | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_hdr, 1) +fi +done +if false;then + AC_CHECK_HEADERS(netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-type-extra.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-type-extra.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08471a7b82 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-type-extra.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +dnl $Id: check-type-extra.m4,v 1.2.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl ac_check_type + extra headers + +dnl AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA(TYPE, DEFAULT, HEADERS) +AC_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA], +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC])dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_type_$1, +[AC_EGREP_CPP(dnl +changequote(<<,>>)dnl +<<$1[^a-zA-Z_0-9]>>dnl +changequote([,]), [#include +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +$3], ac_cv_type_$1=yes, ac_cv_type_$1=no)])dnl +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_type_$1) +if test $ac_cv_type_$1 = no; then + AC_DEFINE($1, $2, [Define this to what the type $1 should be.]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-var.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-var.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1960f724d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-var.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +dnl $Id: check-var.m4,v 1.7 2003/02/17 00:44:57 lha Exp $ +dnl +dnl rk_CHECK_VAR(variable, includes) +AC_DEFUN([rk_CHECK_VAR], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_var_$1, [ +m4_ifval([$2],[ + AC_TRY_LINK([$2 + void * foo() { return &$1; }], + [foo()], + ac_cv_var_$1=yes, ac_cv_var_$1=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv_var_$1" != yes ; then +AC_TRY_LINK([extern int $1; +int foo() { return $1; }], + [foo()], + ac_cv_var_$1=yes, ac_cv_var_$1=no) +fi +]) +ac_foo=`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_$1` +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_foo) +if test "$ac_foo" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(AS_TR_CPP(HAVE_[]$1), 1, + [Define if you have the `]$1[' variable.]) + m4_ifval([$2], AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([$2],[$1])) +fi +]) + +AC_WARNING_ENABLE([obsolete]) +AU_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_VAR], [rk_CHECK_VAR([$2], [$1])], [foo]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-x.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-x.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..53a3d8c982 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-x.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +dnl +dnl See if there is any X11 present +dnl +dnl $Id: check-x.m4,v 1.2.20.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ + +AC_DEFUN([KRB_CHECK_X],[ +AC_PATH_XTRA + +# try to figure out if we need any additional ld flags, like -R +# and yes, the autoconf X test is utterly broken +if test "$no_x" != yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for special X linker flags,krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath,[ + ac_save_libs="$LIBS" + ac_save_cflags="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $X_CFLAGS" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs="" + for rflag in "" "-R" "-R " "-rpath "; do + if test "$rflag" = ""; then + foo="$X_LIBS" + else + foo="" + for flag in $X_LIBS; do + case $flag in + -L*) + foo="$foo $flag `echo $flag | sed \"s/-L/$rflag/\"`" + ;; + *) + foo="$foo $flag" + ;; + esac + done + fi + LIBS="$ac_save_libs $foo $X_PRE_LIBS -lX11 $X_EXTRA_LIBS" + AC_TRY_RUN([ + #include + foo() + { + XOpenDisplay(NULL); + } + main() + { + return 0; + } + ], krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="$rflag"; krb_cv_sys_x_libs="$foo"; break,:) + done + LIBS="$ac_save_libs" + CFLAGS="$ac_save_cflags" + ]) + X_LIBS="$krb_cv_sys_x_libs" +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-xau.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-xau.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94f9586b15 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/check-xau.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +dnl $Id: check-xau.m4,v 1.3.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for Xau{Read,Write}Auth and XauFileName +dnl +AC_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_XAU],[ +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$X_CFLAGS $CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +dnl LIBS="$X_LIBS $X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +LIBS="$X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $X_LIBS" + +## check for XauWriteAuth first, so we detect the case where +## XauReadAuth is in -lX11, but XauWriteAuth is only in -lXau this +## could be done by checking for XauReadAuth in -lXau first, but this +## breaks in IRIX 6.5 + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauWriteAuth, X11 Xau) +ac_xxx="$LIBS" +LIBS="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIBS" +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauReadAuth, X11 Xau) +LIBS="$LIB_XauReadAauth $LIBS" +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauFileName, X11 Xau) +LIBS="$ac_xxx" + +## set LIB_XauReadAuth to union of these tests, since this is what the +## Makefiles are using +case "$ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth" = yes; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + else + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +if test "$AUTOMAKE" != ""; then + AM_CONDITIONAL(NEED_WRITEAUTH, test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes") +else + AC_SUBST(NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE) + AC_SUBST(NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE) + if test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes"; then + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE= + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE='#' + else + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE='#' + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE= + fi +fi +CFLAGS=$save_CFLAGS +LIBS=$save_LIBS +LDFLAGS=$save_LDFLAGS +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/crypto.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/crypto.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c79ba4cfc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/crypto.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +dnl $Id: crypto.m4,v 1.16.2.1 2003/05/05 20:08:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for crypto libraries: +dnl - libcrypto (from openssl) +dnl - libdes (from krb4) +dnl - own-built libdes + +m4_define([test_headers], [ + #undef KRB5 /* makes md4.h et al unhappy */ + #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + #include + #include + #include + #define OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY + #include + #include + #include + #else + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #endif + #ifdef OLD_HASH_NAMES + typedef struct md4 MD4_CTX; + #define MD4_Init(C) md4_init((C)) + #define MD4_Update(C, D, L) md4_update((C), (D), (L)) + #define MD4_Final(D, C) md4_finito((C), (D)) + typedef struct md5 MD5_CTX; + #define MD5_Init(C) md5_init((C)) + #define MD5_Update(C, D, L) md5_update((C), (D), (L)) + #define MD5_Final(D, C) md5_finito((C), (D)) + typedef struct sha SHA_CTX; + #define SHA1_Init(C) sha_init((C)) + #define SHA1_Update(C, D, L) sha_update((C), (D), (L)) + #define SHA1_Final(D, C) sha_finito((C), (D)) + #endif + ]) +m4_define([test_body], [ + void *schedule = 0; + MD4_CTX md4; + MD5_CTX md5; + SHA_CTX sha1; + + MD4_Init(&md4); + MD5_Init(&md5); + SHA1_Init(&sha1); + #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + RAND_status(); + #endif + + des_cbc_encrypt(0, 0, 0, schedule, 0, 0); + RC4(0, 0, 0, 0);]) + + +AC_DEFUN([KRB_CRYPTO],[ +crypto_lib=unknown +AC_WITH_ALL([openssl]) + +DIR_des= + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for crypto library]) + +openssl=no +old_hash=no + +if test "$crypto_lib" = "unknown" -a "$with_krb4" != "no"; then + save_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + + cdirs= clibs= + for i in $LIB_krb4; do + case "$i" in + -L*) cdirs="$cdirs $i";; + -l*) clibs="$clibs $i";; + esac + done + + ires= + for i in $INCLUDE_krb4; do + CFLAGS="-DHAVE_OPENSSL $i $save_CFLAGS" + for j in $cdirs; do + for k in $clibs; do + LIBS="$j $k $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK(test_headers, test_body, + openssl=yes ires="$i" lres="$j $k"; break 3) + done + done + CFLAGS="$i $save_CFLAGS" + for j in $cdirs; do + for k in $clibs; do + LIBS="$j $k $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK(test_headers, test_body, + openssl=no ires="$i" lres="$j $k"; break 3) + done + done + CFLAGS="-DHAVE_OLD_HASH_NAMES $i $save_CFLAGS" + for j in $cdirs; do + for k in $clibs; do + LIBS="$j $k $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK(test_headers, test_body, + openssl=no ires="$i" lres="$j $k"; break 3) + done + done + done + + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + if test "$ires" -a "$lres"; then + INCLUDE_des="$ires" + LIB_des="$lres" + crypto_lib=krb4 + AC_MSG_RESULT([same as krb4]) + LIB_des_a='$(LIB_des)' + LIB_des_so='$(LIB_des)' + LIB_des_appl='$(LIB_des)' + fi +fi + +if test "$crypto_lib" = "unknown" -a "$with_openssl" != "no"; then + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + INCLUDE_des= + LIB_des= + if test "$with_openssl_include" != ""; then + INCLUDE_des="-I${with_openssl_include}" + fi + if test "$with_openssl_lib" != ""; then + LIB_des="-L${with_openssl_lib}" + fi + CFLAGS="-DHAVE_OPENSSL ${INCLUDE_des} ${CFLAGS}" + saved_LIB_des="$LIB_des" + for lres in "" "-lnsl -lsocket"; do + LIB_des="${saved_LIB_des} -lcrypto $lres" + LIB_des_a="$LIB_des" + LIB_des_so="$LIB_des" + LIB_des_appl="$LIB_des" + LIBS="${LIBS} ${LIB_des}" + AC_TRY_LINK(test_headers, test_body, [ + crypto_lib=libcrypto openssl=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([libcrypto]) + ]) + if test "$crypto_lib" = libcrypto ; then + break; + fi + done + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + LIBS="$save_LIBS" +fi + +if test "$crypto_lib" = "unknown"; then + + DIR_des='des' + LIB_des='$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la' + LIB_des_a='$(top_builddir)/lib/des/.libs/libdes.a' + LIB_des_so='$(top_builddir)/lib/des/.libs/libdes.so' + LIB_des_appl="-ldes" + + AC_MSG_RESULT([included libdes]) + +fi + +if test "$with_krb4" != no -a "$crypto_lib" != krb4; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([the crypto library used by krb4 lacks features +required by Kerberos 5; to continue, you need to install a newer +Kerberos 4 or configure --without-krb4]) +fi + +if test "$openssl" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], 1, [define to use openssl's libcrypto]) +fi +if test "$old_hash" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_HASH_NAMES], 1, + [define if you have hash functions like md4_finito()]) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_OPENSSL, test "$openssl" = yes)dnl + +AC_SUBST(DIR_des) +AC_SUBST(INCLUDE_des) +AC_SUBST(LIB_des) +AC_SUBST(LIB_des_a) +AC_SUBST(LIB_des_so) +AC_SUBST(LIB_des_appl) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/db.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/db.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7646bf640d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/db.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +dnl $Id: db.m4,v 1.9 2002/09/10 14:29:47 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl tests for various db libraries +dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_DB],[ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(berkeley-db, + AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-berkeley-db], + [if you don't want berkeley db]),[ +]) + +have_ndbm=no +db_type=unknown + +if test "$enable_berkeley_db" != no; then + + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + db4/db.h \ + db3/db.h \ + db.h \ + db_185.h \ + ]) + +dnl db_create is used by db3 and db4 + + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(db_create, db4 db3 db, [ + #include + #ifdef HAVE_DB4_DB_H + #include + #elif defined(HAVE_DB3_DB_H) + #include + #else + #include + #endif + ],[NULL, NULL, 0]) + + if test "$ac_cv_func_db_create" = "yes"; then + db_type=db3 + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_db_create" != "yes"; then + DBLIB="$ac_cv_funclib_db_create" + else + DBLIB="" + fi + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DB3, 1, [define if you have a berkeley db3/4 library]) + else + +dnl dbopen is used by db1/db2 + + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dbopen, db2 db, [ + #include + #if defined(HAVE_DB2_DB_H) + #include + #elif defined(HAVE_DB_185_H) + #include + #elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) + #include + #else + #error no db.h + #endif + ],[NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL]) + + if test "$ac_cv_func_dbopen" = "yes"; then + db_type=db1 + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dbopen" != "yes"; then + DBLIB="$ac_cv_funclib_dbopen" + else + DBLIB="" + fi + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DB1, 1, [define if you have a berkeley db1/2 library]) + fi + fi + +dnl test for ndbm compatability + + if test "$ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey" != yes; then + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2(dbm_firstkey, $ac_cv_funclib_dbopen $ac_cv_funclib_db_create, [ + #include + #define DB_DBM_HSEARCH 1 + #include + DBM *dbm; + ],[NULL]) + + if test "$ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey" = "yes"; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" != "yes"; then + LIB_NDBM="$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" + else + LIB_NDBM="" + fi + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DB_NDBM, 1, [define if you have ndbm compat in db]) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEW_DB, 1, [Define if NDBM really is DB (creates files *.db)]) + else + $as_unset ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey + $as_unset ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey + fi + fi + +fi # berkeley db + +if test "$db_type" = "unknown" -o "$ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey" = ""; then + + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + dbm.h \ + ndbm.h \ + ]) + + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dbm_firstkey, ndbm, [ + #include + #if defined(HAVE_NDBM_H) + #include + #elif defined(HAVE_DBM_H) + #include + #endif + DBM *dbm; + ],[NULL]) + + if test "$ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey" = "yes"; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" != "yes"; then + LIB_NDBM="$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" + else + LIB_NDBM="" + fi + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NDBM, 1, [define if you have a ndbm library])dnl + have_ndbm=yes + if test "$db_type" = "unknown"; then + db_type=ndbm + DBLIB="$LIB_NDBM" + fi + else + + $as_unset ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey + $as_unset ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey + + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + gdbm/ndbm.h \ + ]) + + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dbm_firstkey, gdbm, [ + #include + #include + DBM *dbm; + ],[NULL]) + + if test "$ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey" = "yes"; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" != "yes"; then + LIB_NDBM="$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" + else + LIB_NDBM="" + fi + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NDBM, 1, [define if you have a ndbm library])dnl + have_ndbm=yes + if test "$db_type" = "unknown"; then + db_type=ndbm + DBLIB="$LIB_NDBM" + fi + fi + fi + +fi # unknown + +if test "$have_ndbm" = "yes"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ndbm is implemented with db]) + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_GDBM_NDBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_NDBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DBM_H) +#include +#endif +int main() +{ + DBM *d; + + d = dbm_open("conftest", O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666); + if (d == NULL) + return 1; + dbm_close(d); + return 0; +}],[ + if test -f conftest.db; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEW_DB, 1, [Define if NDBM really is DB (creates files *.db)]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi],[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) +fi + +AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DB1, test "$db_type" = db1)dnl +AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DB3, test "$db_type" = db3)dnl +AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_NDBM, test "$db_type" = ndbm)dnl + +## it's probably not correct to include LDFLAGS here, but we might +## need it, for now just add any possible -L +z="" +for i in $LDFLAGS; do + case "$i" in + -L*) z="$z $i";; + esac +done +DBLIB="$z $DBLIB" +AC_SUBST(DBLIB)dnl +AC_SUBST(LIB_NDBM)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/destdirs.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/destdirs.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0d56e9cc41 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/destdirs.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: destdirs.m4,v 1.2 2002/08/12 15:12:50 joda Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_DESTDIRS], [ +# This is done by AC_OUTPUT but we need the result here. +test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix +test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}' + +AC_FOREACH([rk_dir], [bin lib libexec localstate sbin sysconf], [ + x="${rk_dir[]dir}" + eval y="$x" + while test "x$y" != "x$x"; do + x="$y" + eval y="$x" + done + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(AS_TR_CPP(rk_dir[]dir), "$x", [path to ]rk_dir[])]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/dlopen.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/dlopen.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..322f8b9e93 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/dlopen.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: dlopen.m4,v 1.1 2002/08/28 16:32:16 joda Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_DLOPEN], [ + AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dlopen, dl) + AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DLOPEN, test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" != no) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4410330d31 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl $Id: find-func-no-libs.m4,v 1.5.20.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Look for function in any of the specified libraries +dnl + +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(func, libraries, includes, arguments, extra libs, extra args) +AC_DEFUN([AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS], [ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2([$1], ["" $2], [$3], [$4], [$5], [$6])]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..566504af2f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +dnl $Id: find-func-no-libs2.m4,v 1.6.10.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Look for function in any of the specified libraries +dnl + +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2(func, libraries, includes, arguments, extra libs, extra args) +AC_DEFUN([AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2], [ + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_funclib_$1, +[ +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_$1\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in $2; do + case "$ac_lib" in + "") ;; + yes) ac_lib="" ;; + no) continue ;; + -l*) ;; + *) ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" ;; + esac + LIBS="$6 $ac_lib $5 $ac_save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$3],[$1($4)],eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_$1=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_$1=yes; fi";break) + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_$1=\${ac_cv_funclib_$1-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi +]) + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_$1" + +if false; then + AC_CHECK_FUNCS($1) +dnl AC_CHECK_LIBS($2, foo) +fi +# $1 +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_[]upcase($1)" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB[]upcase($ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//')" +eval "LIB_$1=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=yes" + eval "LIB_$1=" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=no" + eval "LIB_$1=" + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_lib) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, in $ac_res]) + ;; +esac +AC_SUBST(LIB_$1) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a5916cd2f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-func.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl $Id: find-func.m4,v 1.1.42.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC(func, libraries, includes, arguments) +AC_DEFUN([AC_FIND_FUNC], [ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS([$1], [$2], [$3], [$4]) +if test -n "$LIB_$1"; then + LIBS="$LIB_$1 $LIBS" +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87ea36169d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +dnl $Id: find-if-not-broken.m4,v 1.4.8.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Mix between AC_FIND_FUNC and AC_BROKEN +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN], +[AC_FIND_FUNC([$1], [$2], [$3], [$4]) +if eval "test \"$ac_cv_func_$1\" != yes"; then + rk_LIBOBJ([$1]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a13016ad87 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +dnl $Id: have-pragma-weak.m4,v 1.3.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN([AC_HAVE_PRAGMA_WEAK], [ +if test "${enable_shared}" = "yes"; then +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for pragma weak) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_have_pragma_weak, [ +ac_have_pragma_weak=no +cat > conftest_foo.$ac_ext <<'EOF' +[#]line __oline__ "configure" +#include "confdefs.h" +#pragma weak foo = _foo +int _foo = 17; +EOF +cat > conftest_bar.$ac_ext <<'EOF' +[#]line __oline__ "configure" +#include "confdefs.h" +extern int foo; + +int t() { + return foo; +} + +int main() { + return t(); +} +EOF +if AC_TRY_EVAL('CC -o conftest $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest_foo.$ac_ext conftest_bar.$ac_ext 1>&AC_FD_CC'); then +ac_have_pragma_weak=yes +fi +rm -rf conftest* +]) +if test "$ac_have_pragma_weak" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PRAGMA_WEAK, 1, [Define this if your compiler supports \`#pragma weak.'])dnl +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_have_pragma_weak) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-struct-field.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-struct-field.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..341970ae98 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-struct-field.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +dnl $Id: have-struct-field.m4,v 1.6.22.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for fields in a structure +dnl +dnl AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct, field, headers) + +AC_DEFUN([AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD], [ +define(cache_val, translit(ac_cv_type_$1_$2, [A-Z ], [a-z_])) +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for $2 in $1], cache_val,[ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$3],[$1 x; x.$2;], +cache_val=yes, +cache_val=no)]) +if test "$cache_val" = yes; then + define(foo, translit(HAVE_$1_$2, [a-z ], [A-Z_])) + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [Define if $1 has field $2.]) + undefine([foo]) +fi +undefine([cache_val]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-type.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-type.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c764ed6646 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-type.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +dnl $Id: have-type.m4,v 1.6.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for existance of a type + +dnl AC_HAVE_TYPE(TYPE,INCLUDES) +AC_DEFUN([AC_HAVE_TYPE], [ +AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC]) +cv=`echo "$1" | sed 'y%./+- %__p__%'` +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_type_$cv], +AC_TRY_COMPILE( +[#include +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +$2], +[$1 foo;], +eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes", +eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no"))dnl +ac_foo=`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_foo) +if test "$ac_foo" = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $1 | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` +if false; then + AC_CHECK_TYPES($1) +fi + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_hdr, 1, [Define if you have type `$1']) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-types.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-types.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e36991036d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/have-types.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: have-types.m4,v 1.2.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_HAVE_TYPES], [ +for i in $1; do + AC_HAVE_TYPE($i) +done +if false;then + AC_CHECK_FUNCS($1) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/install-catman.sh b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/install-catman.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4a5aa8ef77 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/install-catman.sh @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# $Id: install-catman.sh,v 1.3 2001/09/29 16:05:38 assar Exp $ +# +# install preformatted manual pages + +INSTALL_DATA="$1"; shift +mkinstalldirs="$1"; shift +srcdir="$1"; shift +manbase="$1"; shift +suffix="$1"; shift + +for f in "$@"; do + base=`echo "$f" | sed 's/\(.*\)\.\([^.]*\)$/\1/'` + section=`echo "$f" | sed 's/\(.*\)\.\([^.]*\)$/\2/'` + mandir="$manbase/man$section" + catdir="$manbase/cat$section" + c="$base.cat$section" + + if test -f "$srcdir/$c"; then + if test \! -d "$catdir"; then + eval "$mkinstalldirs $catdir" + fi + eval "echo $INSTALL_DATA $srcdir/$c $catdir/$base.$suffix" + eval "$INSTALL_DATA $srcdir/$c $catdir/$base.$suffix" + fi + for link in `sed -n -e '/SYNOPSIS/q;/DESCRIPTION/q;s/^\.Nm \([^ ]*\).*/\1/p' $srcdir/$f`; do + if [ "$link" != "$base" ]; then + target="$mandir/$link.$section" + for cmd in "ln -f $mandir/$base.$section $target" \ + "ln -s $base.$section $target" \ + "cp -f $mandir/$base.$section $target" + do + if eval "$cmd"; then + eval echo "$cmd" + break + fi + done + if test -f "$srcdir/$c"; then + target="$catdir/$link.$suffix" + for cmd in "ln -f $catdir/$base.$suffix $target" \ + "ln -fs $base.$suffix $target" \ + "cp -f $catdir/$base.$suffix $target" + do + if eval "$cmd"; then + eval echo "$cmd" + break + fi + done + fi + fi + done +done diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/irix.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/irix.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b62e2c3192 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/irix.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: irix.m4,v 1.1 2002/08/28 19:11:44 joda Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_IRIX], +[ +irix=no +case "$host" in +*-*-irix4*) + AC_DEFINE([IRIX4], 1, + [Define if you are running IRIX 4.]) + irix=yes + ;; +*-*-irix*) + irix=yes + ;; +esac +AM_CONDITIONAL(IRIX, test "$irix" != no)dnl + +AH_BOTTOM([ +/* IRIX 4 braindamage */ +#if IRIX == 4 && !defined(__STDC__) +#define __STDC__ 0 +#endif +]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..672cc25d31 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: krb-bigendian.m4,v 1.8.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:33 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl check if this computer is little or big-endian +dnl if we can figure it out at compile-time then don't define the cpp symbol +dnl otherwise test for it and define it. also allow options for overriding +dnl it when cross-compiling + +AC_DEFUN([KRB_C_BIGENDIAN], [ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(bigendian, + AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-bigendian],[the target is big endian]), +krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(littleendian, + AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-littleendian],[the target is little endian]), +krb_cv_c_bigendian=no) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether byte order is known at compile time, +krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile, +[AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include ],[ +#if !BYTE_ORDER || !BIG_ENDIAN || !LITTLE_ENDIAN + bogus endian macros +#endif], krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=yes, krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=no)]) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether byte ordering is bigendian, krb_cv_c_bigendian,[ + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "yes"; then + AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include ],[ +#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN + not big endian +#endif], krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes, krb_cv_c_bigendian=no) + else + AC_TRY_RUN([main () { + /* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */ + union + { + long l; + char c[sizeof (long)]; + } u; + u.l = 1; + exit (u.c[sizeof (long) - 1] == 1); + }], krb_cv_c_bigendian=no, krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes, + AC_MSG_ERROR([specify either --enable-bigendian or --enable-littleendian])) + fi +]) +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(WORDS_BIGENDIAN, 1, [define if target is big endian])dnl +fi +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H, 1, [define if sys/param.h defines the endiness])dnl +fi +AH_BOTTOM([ +#if ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H +# include +# include +# if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN +# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 +# endif +#endif +]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3f9372a6f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4,v 1.3.8.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl test for broken getcwd in (SunOS braindamage) +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_FUNC_GETCWD_BROKEN], [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_getcwd" = yes; then +AC_MSG_CHECKING(if getcwd is broken) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken, [ +ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken=no + +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +char *getcwd(char*, int); + +void *popen(char *cmd, char *mode) +{ + errno = ENOTTY; + return 0; +} + +int main() +{ + char *ret; + ret = getcwd(0, 1024); + if(ret == 0 && errno == ENOTTY) + return 0; + return 1; +} +], ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken=yes,:,:) +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETCWD, 1, [Define if getcwd is broken (like in SunOS 4).])dnl + AC_LIBOBJ(getcwd) + AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([seems ok]) +fi +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec091d7897 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: krb-func-getlogin.m4,v 1.1.32.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for POSIX (broken) getlogin +dnl + + +AC_DEFUN([AC_FUNC_GETLOGIN], [ +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getlogin setlogin) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes; then +AC_CACHE_CHECK(if getlogin is posix, ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix, [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes -a "$ac_cv_func_setlogin" = yes; then + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=no +else + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=yes +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(POSIX_GETLOGIN, 1, [Define if getlogin has POSIX flavour (and not BSD).]) +fi +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1afcbb2883 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-ipv6.m4,v 1.13.8.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for IPv6 +dnl +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_IPV6], [ +AC_ARG_WITH(ipv6, + AC_HELP_STRING([--without-ipv6],[do not enable IPv6 support]),[ +if test "$withval" = "no"; then + ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no +fi]) +save_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for IPv6 stack type], v6type, +[dnl check for different v6 implementations (by itojun) +v6type=unknown +v6lib=none + +for i in v6d toshiba kame inria zeta linux; do + case $i in + v6d) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [ +#include +#ifdef __V6D__ +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=v6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-I/usr/local/v6/include $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + toshiba) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [ +#include +#ifdef _TOSHIBA_INET6 +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + kame) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [ +#include +#ifdef __KAME__ +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + inria) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [ +#include +#ifdef IPV6_INRIA_VERSION +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + zeta) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [ +#include +#ifdef _ZETA_MINAMI_INET6 +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + linux) + if test -d /usr/inet6; then + v6type=$i + v6lib=inet6 + v6libdir=/usr/inet6 + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" + fi + ;; + esac + if test "$v6type" != "unknown"; then + break + fi +done + +if test "$v6lib" != "none"; then + for dir in $v6libdir /usr/local/v6/lib /usr/local/lib; do + if test -d $dir -a -f $dir/lib$v6lib.a; then + LIBS="-L$dir -l$v6lib $LIBS" + break + fi + done +fi +]) + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for IPv6], ac_cv_lib_ipv6, [ +AC_TRY_LINK([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +], +[ + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + int s; + + s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_port = htons(17); + sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); +], +ac_cv_lib_ipv6=yes, +ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv_lib_ipv6" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_IPV6, 1, [Define if you have IPv6.]) +else + CFLAGS="${save_CFLAGS}" +fi + +## test for AIX missing in6addr_loopback +if test "$ac_cv_lib_ipv6" = yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK([for in6addr_loopback],[ac_cv_var_in6addr_loopback],[ + AC_TRY_LINK([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif],[ +struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; +sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback; +],ac_cv_var_in6addr_loopback=yes,ac_cv_var_in6addr_loopback=no)]) + if test "$ac_cv_var_in6addr_loopback" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK, 1, + [Define if you have the in6addr_loopback variable]) + fi +fi +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16a4dff2de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-prog-ln-s.m4,v 1.1.42.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Better test for ln -s, ln or cp +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S], +[AC_MSG_CHECKING(for ln -s or something else) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_prog_LN_S, +[rm -f conftestdata +if ln -s X conftestdata 2>/dev/null +then + rm -f conftestdata + ac_cv_prog_LN_S="ln -s" +else + touch conftestdata1 + if ln conftestdata1 conftestdata2; then + rm -f conftestdata* + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=ln + else + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=cp + fi +fi])dnl +LN_S="$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_prog_LN_S) +AC_SUBST(LN_S)dnl +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf061936d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-prog-ranlib.m4,v 1.1.42.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Also look for EMXOMF for OS/2 +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_PROG_RANLIB], +[AC_CHECK_PROGS(RANLIB, ranlib EMXOMF, :)]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..54dd8b4e53 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-prog-yacc.m4,v 1.3.16.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl We prefer byacc or yacc because they do not use `alloca' +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_PROG_YACC], +[AC_CHECK_PROGS(YACC, byacc yacc 'bison -y') +if test "$YACC" = ""; then + AC_MSG_WARN([yacc not found - some stuff will not build]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-readline.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-readline.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed5aa0a33e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-readline.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-readline.m4,v 1.5.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Tests for readline functions +dnl + +dnl el_init + +AC_DEFUN([KRB_READLINE],[ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(el_init, edit, [], [], [$LIB_tgetent]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_el_init" = yes ; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for four argument el_init, ac_cv_func_el_init_four,[ + AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include + #include ], + [el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);], + ac_cv_func_el_init_four=yes, + ac_cv_func_el_init_four=no)]) + if test "$ac_cv_func_el_init_four" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_EL_INIT, 1, [Define if el_init takes four arguments.]) + fi +fi + +dnl readline + +ac_foo=no +if test "$with_readline" = yes; then + : +elif test "$ac_cv_func_readline" = yes; then + : +elif test "$ac_cv_func_el_init" = yes; then + ac_foo=yes + LIB_readline="\$(top_builddir)/lib/editline/libel_compat.la \$(LIB_el_init) \$(LIB_tgetent)" +else + LIB_readline="\$(top_builddir)/lib/editline/libeditline.la \$(LIB_tgetent)" +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(el_compat, test "$ac_foo" = yes) +AC_DEFINE(HAVE_READLINE, 1, + [Define if you have a readline compatible library.])dnl + +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..49d8efdbbe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-struct-spwd.m4,v 1.3.32.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Test for `struct spwd' + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_STRUCT_SPWD], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for struct spwd) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_struct_spwd, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE( +[#include +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif], +[struct spwd foo;], +ac_cv_struct_spwd=yes, +ac_cv_struct_spwd=no) +]) +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_struct_spwd) + +if test "$ac_cv_struct_spwd" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD, 1, [define if you have struct spwd]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3fcc527d5b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-struct-winsize.m4,v 1.3.10.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Search for struct winsize +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_STRUCT_WINSIZE], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for struct winsize) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_struct_winsize, [ +ac_cv_struct_winsize=no +for i in sys/termios.h sys/ioctl.h; do +AC_EGREP_HEADER( +struct[[ ]]*winsize,dnl +$i, ac_cv_struct_winsize=yes; break)dnl +done +]) +if test "$ac_cv_struct_winsize" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE, 1, [define if struct winsize is declared in sys/termios.h]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_struct_winsize) +AC_EGREP_HEADER(ws_xpixel, termios.h, + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WS_XPIXEL, 1, [define if struct winsize has ws_xpixel])) +AC_EGREP_HEADER(ws_ypixel, termios.h, + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WS_YPIXEL, 1, [define if struct winsize has ws_ypixel])) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..02ba58545d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-sys-aix.m4,v 1.1.42.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl AIX have a very different syscall convention +dnl +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_SYS_AIX], [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for AIX) +AC_CACHE_VAL(krb_cv_sys_aix, +AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, +[#ifdef _AIX + yes +#endif +], krb_cv_sys_aix=yes, krb_cv_sys_aix=no) ) +AC_MSG_RESULT($krb_cv_sys_aix) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d098bcf6d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-sys-nextstep.m4,v 1.4.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl NEXTSTEP is not posix compliant by default, +dnl you need a switch -posix to the compiler +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_SYS_NEXTSTEP], [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for NeXTSTEP, rk_cv_sys_nextstep, [ +AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, +[#if defined(NeXT) && !defined(__APPLE__) + yes +#endif +], rk_cv_sys_nextstep=yes, rk_cv_sys_nextstep=no)]) +if test "$rk_cv_sys_nextstep" = "yes"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -posix" + LIBS="$LIBS -posix" +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-version.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-version.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e452ad081e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/krb-version.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-version.m4,v 1.3.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl output a C header-file with some version strings +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([AC_KRB_VERSION],[ +cat > include/newversion.h.in </dev/null | sed 1q` + Date=`date` + mv -f include/newversion.h.in include/version.h.in + sed -e "s/@USER@/$User/" -e "s/@HOST@/$Host/" -e "s/@DATE@/$Date/" include/version.h.in > include/version.h +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/make-proto.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/make-proto.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..769d96cc02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/make-proto.pl @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +# Make prototypes from .c files +# $Id: make-proto.pl,v 1.16 2002/09/19 19:29:42 joda Exp $ + +##use Getopt::Std; +require 'getopts.pl'; + +$brace = 0; +$line = ""; +$debug = 0; +$oproto = 1; +$private_func_re = "^_"; + +do Getopts('o:p:dqR:P:') || die "foo"; + +if($opt_d) { + $debug = 1; +} + +if($opt_q) { + $oproto = 0; +} + +if($opt_R) { + $private_func_re = $opt_R; +} + +while(<>) { + print $brace, " ", $_ if($debug); + if(/^\#if 0/) { + $if_0 = 1; + } + if($if_0 && /^\#endif/) { + $if_0 = 0; + } + if($if_0) { next } + if(/^\s*\#/) { + next; + } + if(/^\s*$/) { + $line = ""; + next; + } + if(/\{/){ + if (!/\}/) { + $brace++; + } + $_ = $line; + while(s/\*\//\ca/){ + s/\/\*(.|\n)*\ca//; + } + s/^\s*//; + s/\s*$//; + s/\s+/ /g; + if($_ =~ /\)$/){ + if(!/^static/ && !/^PRIVATE/){ + if(/(.*)(__attribute__\s?\(.*\))/) { + $attr = $2; + $_ = $1; + } else { + $attr = ""; + } + # remove outer () + s/\s*\(//; + # remove , within () + while(s/\(([^()]*),(.*)\)/($1\$$2)/g){} + s/\<\s*void\s*\>/<>/; + # remove parameter names + if($opt_P eq "remove") { + s/(\s*)([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)([,>])/$3/g; + s/\(\*(\s*)([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)\)/(*)/g; + } elsif($opt_P eq "comment") { + s/([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)([,>])/\/\*$1\*\/$2/g; + s/\(\*([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)\)/(*\/\*$1\*\/)/g; + } + s/\<\>//; + # add newlines before parameters + s/,\s*/,\n\t/g; + # fix removed , + s/\$/,/g; + # match function name + /([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)\s*\/$RP/; + # insert newline before function name + s/(.*)\s([a-zA-Z0-9_]+ \Q$LP\E)/$1\n$2/; + if($attr ne "") { + $_ .= "\n $attr"; + } + $_ = $_ . ";"; + $funcs{$f} = $_; + } + } + $line = ""; + } + if(/\}/){ + $brace--; + } + if(/^\}/){ + $brace = 0; + } + if($brace == 0) { + $line = $line . " " . $_; + } +} + +sub foo { + local ($arg) = @_; + $_ = $arg; + s/.*\/([^\/]*)/$1/; + s/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/_/g; + "__" . $_ . "__"; +} + +if($opt_o) { + open(OUT, ">$opt_o"); + $block = &foo($opt_o); +} else { + $block = "__public_h__"; +} + +if($opt_p) { + open(PRIV, ">$opt_p"); + $private = &foo($opt_p); +} else { + $private = "__private_h__"; +} + +$public_h = ""; +$private_h = ""; + +$public_h_header = "/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef $block +#define $block + +"; +if ($oproto) { +$public_h_header .= "#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +"; +} else { + $public_h_header .= "#include + +"; +} + +$private_h_header = "/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef $private +#define $private + +"; +if($oproto) { +$private_h_header .= "#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +"; +} else { + $private_h_header .= "#include + +"; +} +foreach(sort keys %funcs){ + if(/^(main)$/) { next } + if(/$private_func_re/) { + $private_h .= $funcs{$_} . "\n\n"; + if($funcs{$_} =~ /__attribute__/) { + $private_attribute_seen = 1; + } + } else { + $public_h .= $funcs{$_} . "\n\n"; + if($funcs{$_} =~ /__attribute__/) { + $public_attribute_seen = 1; + } + } +} + +if ($public_attribute_seen) { + $public_h_header .= "#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +"; +} + +if ($private_attribute_seen) { + $private_h_header .= "#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +"; +} + + +if ($public_h ne "") { + $public_h = $public_h_header . $public_h . "#endif /* $block */\n"; +} +if ($private_h ne "") { + $private_h = $private_h_header . $private_h . "#endif /* $private */\n"; +} + +if($opt_o) { + print OUT $public_h; +} +if($opt_p) { + print PRIV $private_h; +} + +close OUT; +close PRIV; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/mips-abi.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/mips-abi.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..401ee9114a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/mips-abi.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +dnl $Id: mips-abi.m4,v 1.6.8.1 2004/04/01 07:27:34 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check for MIPS/IRIX ABI flags. Sets $abi and $abilibdirext to some +dnl value. + +AC_DEFUN([AC_MIPS_ABI], [ +AC_ARG_WITH(mips_abi, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-mips-abi=abi],[ABI to use for IRIX (32, n32, or 64)])) + +case "$host_os" in +irix*) +with_mips_abi="${with_mips_abi:-yes}" +if test -n "$GCC"; then + +# GCC < 2.8 only supports the O32 ABI. GCC >= 2.8 has a flag to select +# which ABI to use, but only supports (as of 2.8.1) the N32 and 64 ABIs. +# +# Default to N32, but if GCC doesn't grok -mabi=n32, we assume an old +# GCC and revert back to O32. The same goes if O32 is asked for - old +# GCCs doesn't like the -mabi option, and new GCCs can't output O32. +# +# Don't you just love *all* the different SGI ABIs? + +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-mabi=32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-mabi=n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-mabi=64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) AC_MSG_ERROR("Invalid ABI specified") ;; +esac +if test -n "$abi" ; then +ac_foo=krb_cv_gcc_`echo $abi | tr =- __` +dnl +dnl can't use AC_CACHE_CHECK here, since it doesn't quote CACHE-ID to +dnl AC_MSG_RESULT +dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports the $abi option]) +AC_CACHE_VAL($ac_foo, [ +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $abi" +AC_TRY_COMPILE(,int x;, eval $ac_foo=yes, eval $ac_foo=no) +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +]) +ac_res=`eval echo \\\$$ac_foo` +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) +if test $ac_res = no; then +# Try to figure out why that failed... +case $abi in + -mabi=32) + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -mabi=n32" + AC_TRY_COMPILE(,int x;, ac_res=yes, ac_res=no) + CLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + if test $ac_res = yes; then + # New GCC + AC_MSG_ERROR([$CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI]) + fi + # Old GCC + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + ;; + -mabi=n32|-mabi=64) + if test $with_mips_abi = yes; then + # Old GCC, default to O32 + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + else + # Some broken GCC + AC_MSG_ERROR([$CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI]) + fi + ;; +esac +fi #if test $ac_res = no; then +fi #if test -n "$abi" ; then +else +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) AC_MSG_ERROR("Invalid ABI specified") ;; +esac +fi #if test -n "$GCC"; then +;; +esac +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/misc.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/misc.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a825834f81 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/misc.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ + +dnl $Id: misc.m4,v 1.5 2002/05/24 15:35:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN([upcase],[`echo $1 | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`])dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_LIBOBJ],[AC_LIBOBJ([$1])])dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_CONFIG_HEADER],[AH_TOP([#ifndef RCSID +#define RCSID(msg) \ +static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "@(#)" msg } +#endif + +/* Maximum values on all known systems */ +#define MaxHostNameLen (64+4) +#define MaxPathLen (1024+4) + +])]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/need-proto.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/need-proto.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3190766e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/need-proto.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +dnl $Id: need-proto.m4,v 1.4.6.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if we need the prototype for a function +dnl + +dnl AC_NEED_PROTO(includes, function) + +AC_DEFUN([AC_NEED_PROTO], [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_$2" = yes; then +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $2 needs a prototype], ac_cv_func_$2_noproto, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1], +[struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int $2 (struct foo*); +$2(&xx); +], +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_noproto=yes", +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_noproto=no")) +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2_noproto" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(AS_TR_CPP(NEED_[]$2[]_PROTO), 1, + [define if the system is missing a prototype for $2()]) +fi +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/osfc2.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/osfc2.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ae889b24f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/osfc2.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +dnl $Id: osfc2.m4,v 1.3.8.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl enable OSF C2 stuff + +AC_DEFUN([AC_CHECK_OSFC2],[ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(osfc2, + AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-osfc2],[enable some OSF C2 support])) +LIB_security= +if test "$enable_osfc2" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OSFC2, 1, [Define to enable basic OSF C2 support.]) + LIB_security=-lsecurity +fi +AC_SUBST(LIB_security) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/otp.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/otp.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37265ef291 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/otp.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +dnl $Id: otp.m4,v 1.2 2002/05/19 20:51:08 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check requirements for OTP library +dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_OTP],[ +AC_REQUIRE([rk_DB])dnl +AC_ARG_ENABLE(otp, + AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-otp],[if you don't want OTP support])) +if test "$enable_otp" = yes -a "$db_type" = unknown; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([OTP requires a NDBM/DB compatible library]) +fi +if test "$enable_otp" != no; then + if test "$db_type" != unknown; then + enable_otp=yes + else + enable_otp=no + fi +fi +if test "$enable_otp" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(OTP, 1, [Define if you want OTP support in applications.]) + LIB_otp='$(top_builddir)/lib/otp/libotp.la' + AC_SUBST(LIB_otp) +fi +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable OTP library]) +AC_MSG_RESULT($enable_otp) +AM_CONDITIONAL(OTP, test "$enable_otp" = yes)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/proto-compat.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/proto-compat.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a666a558d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/proto-compat.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl $Id: proto-compat.m4,v 1.3.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if the prototype of a function is compatible with another one +dnl + +dnl AC_PROTO_COMPAT(includes, function, prototype) + +AC_DEFUN([AC_PROTO_COMPAT], [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $2 is compatible with system prototype], +ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1], +[$3;], +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat=yes", +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat=no")) +define([foo], translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_PROTO_COMPATIBLE]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if prototype of $2 is compatible with + $3]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/retsigtype.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/retsigtype.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..465c654540 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/retsigtype.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: retsigtype.m4,v 1.1.12.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Figure out return type of signal handlers, and define SIGRETURN macro +dnl that can be used to return from one +dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_RETSIGTYPE],[ +AC_TYPE_SIGNAL +if test "$ac_cv_type_signal" = "void" ; then + AC_DEFINE(VOID_RETSIGTYPE, 1, [Define if signal handlers return void.]) +fi +AC_SUBST(VOID_RETSIGTYPE) +AH_BOTTOM([#ifdef VOID_RETSIGTYPE +#define SIGRETURN(x) return +#else +#define SIGRETURN(x) return (RETSIGTYPE)(x) +#endif]) +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/roken-frag.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/roken-frag.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..569777a0f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/roken-frag.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,651 @@ +dnl $Id: roken-frag.m4,v 1.45.2.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl some code to get roken working +dnl +dnl rk_ROKEN(subdir) +dnl +AC_DEFUN([rk_ROKEN], [ + +AC_REQUIRE([rk_CONFIG_HEADER]) + +DIR_roken=roken +LIB_roken='$(top_builddir)/$1/libroken.la' +INCLUDES_roken='-I$(top_builddir)/$1 -I$(top_srcdir)/$1' + +dnl Checks for programs +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_AWK]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_OBJEXT]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_EXEEXT]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_LIBTOOL]) + +AC_REQUIRE([AC_MIPS_ABI]) + +dnl C characteristics + +AC_REQUIRE([AC_C___ATTRIBUTE__]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_C_INLINE]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_C_CONST]) +AC_WFLAGS(-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs) + +AC_REQUIRE([rk_DB]) + +dnl C types + +AC_REQUIRE([AC_TYPE_SIZE_T]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([ssize_t],[#include ]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_TYPE_PID_T]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_TYPE_UID_T]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([long long]) + +AC_REQUIRE([rk_RETSIGTYPE]) + +dnl Checks for header files. +AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_TIME]) + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([\ + arpa/inet.h \ + arpa/nameser.h \ + config.h \ + crypt.h \ + dirent.h \ + errno.h \ + err.h \ + fcntl.h \ + grp.h \ + ifaddrs.h \ + net/if.h \ + netdb.h \ + netinet/in.h \ + netinet/in6.h \ + netinet/in_systm.h \ + netinet6/in6.h \ + netinet6/in6_var.h \ + paths.h \ + pwd.h \ + resolv.h \ + rpcsvc/ypclnt.h \ + shadow.h \ + sys/bswap.h \ + sys/ioctl.h \ + sys/mman.h \ + sys/param.h \ + sys/proc.h \ + sys/resource.h \ + sys/socket.h \ + sys/sockio.h \ + sys/stat.h \ + sys/sysctl.h \ + sys/time.h \ + sys/tty.h \ + sys/types.h \ + sys/uio.h \ + sys/utsname.h \ + sys/wait.h \ + syslog.h \ + termios.h \ + unistd.h \ + userconf.h \ + usersec.h \ + util.h \ + vis.h \ +]) + +AC_REQUIRE([CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP]) + +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_err_h, test "$ac_cv_header_err_h" = yes) +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_fnmatch_h, test "$ac_cv_header_fnmatch_h" = yes) +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_ifaddrs_h, test "$ac_cv_header_ifaddrs_h" = yes) +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_vis_h, test "$ac_cv_header_vis_h" = yes) + +dnl Check for functions and libraries + +AC_FIND_FUNC(socket, socket) +AC_FIND_FUNC(gethostbyname, nsl) +AC_FIND_FUNC(syslog, syslog) + +AC_KRB_IPV6 + +AC_FIND_FUNC(gethostbyname2, inet6 ip6) + +AC_FIND_FUNC(res_search, resolv, +[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +], +[0,0,0,0,0]) + +AC_FIND_FUNC(res_nsearch, resolv, +[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +], +[0,0,0,0,0,0]) + +AC_FIND_FUNC(dn_expand, resolv, +[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +], +[0,0,0,0,0]) + +rk_CHECK_VAR(_res, +[#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif]) + + +AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF +AC_BROKEN_VSNPRINTF + +AC_BROKEN_GLOB +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" != yes; then + AC_LIBOBJ(glob) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_glob_h, test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes) + + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + asnprintf \ + asprintf \ + atexit \ + cgetent \ + getconfattr \ + getprogname \ + getrlimit \ + getspnam \ + initstate \ + issetugid \ + on_exit \ + random \ + setprogname \ + setstate \ + strsvis \ + strunvis \ + strvis \ + strvisx \ + svis \ + sysconf \ + sysctl \ + uname \ + unvis \ + vasnprintf \ + vasprintf \ + vis \ +]) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_cgetent" = no; then + AC_LIBOBJ(getcap) +fi + +AC_REQUIRE([AC_FUNC_GETLOGIN]) + +AC_REQUIRE([AC_FUNC_MMAP]) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(getsockopt,, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif], +[0,0,0,0,0]) +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(setsockopt,, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif], +[0,0,0,0,0]) + +AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN(hstrerror, resolv, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +17) +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +hstrerror) + +AC_FOREACH([rk_func], [asprintf vasprintf asnprintf vasnprintf], + [AC_NEED_PROTO([ + #include + #include ], + rk_func)]) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(bswap16,, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSWAP_H +#include +#endif],0) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(bswap32,, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSWAP_H +#include +#endif],0) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(pidfile,util, +[#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif],0) + +AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN(getaddrinfo,, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif],[0,0,0,0]) + +AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN(getnameinfo,, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif],[0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) + +AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN(freeaddrinfo,, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif],[0]) + +AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN(gai_strerror,, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif],[0]) + +AC_BROKEN([ \ + chown \ + copyhostent \ + daemon \ + ecalloc \ + emalloc \ + erealloc \ + estrdup \ + err \ + errx \ + fchown \ + flock \ + fnmatch \ + freehostent \ + getcwd \ + getdtablesize \ + getegid \ + geteuid \ + getgid \ + gethostname \ + getifaddrs \ + getipnodebyaddr \ + getipnodebyname \ + getopt \ + gettimeofday \ + getuid \ + getusershell \ + initgroups \ + innetgr \ + iruserok \ + localtime_r \ + lstat \ + memmove \ + mkstemp \ + putenv \ + rcmd \ + readv \ + recvmsg \ + sendmsg \ + setegid \ + setenv \ + seteuid \ + strcasecmp \ + strdup \ + strerror \ + strftime \ + strlcat \ + strlcpy \ + strlwr \ + strncasecmp \ + strndup \ + strnlen \ + strptime \ + strsep \ + strsep_copy \ + strtok_r \ + strupr \ + swab \ + unsetenv \ + verr \ + verrx \ + vsyslog \ + vwarn \ + vwarnx \ + warn \ + warnx \ + writev \ +]) + +AC_FOREACH([rk_func], [strndup strsep strtok_r], + [AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], rk_func)]) + +AC_FOREACH([rk_func], [strsvis strunvis strvis strvisx svis unvis vis], +[AC_NEED_PROTO([#ifdef HAVE_VIS_H +#include +#endif], rk_func)]) + +AC_BROKEN2(inet_aton, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif], +[0,0]) + +AC_BROKEN2(inet_ntop, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif], +[0, 0, 0, 0]) + +AC_BROKEN2(inet_pton, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif], +[0,0,0]) + +dnl +dnl Check for sa_len in struct sockaddr, +dnl needs to come before the getnameinfo test +dnl +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct sockaddr, sa_len, [#include +#include ]) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getnameinfo" = "yes"; then + rk_BROKEN_GETNAMEINFO + if test "$ac_cv_func_getnameinfo_broken" = yes; then + AC_LIBOBJ(getnameinfo) + fi +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "yes"; then + rk_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO + if test "$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo_numserv" = no; then + AC_LIBOBJ(getaddrinfo) + AC_LIBOBJ(freeaddrinfo) + fi +fi + +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], setenv) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], unsetenv) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], gethostname) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], mkstemp) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], getusershell) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif], +inet_aton) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(crypt, crypt)dnl + +AC_REQUIRE([rk_BROKEN_REALLOC])dnl + +dnl AC_KRB_FUNC_GETCWD_BROKEN + +dnl +dnl Checks for prototypes and declarations +dnl + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +], +gethostbyname, struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +], +gethostbyaddr, struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const void *, size_t, int)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +], +getservbyname, struct servent *getservbyname(const char *, const char *)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +], +getsockname, int getsockname(int, struct sockaddr*, socklen_t*)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +], +openlog, void openlog(const char *, int, int)) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +], +crypt) + +dnl variables + +rk_CHECK_VAR(h_errno, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif]) + +rk_CHECK_VAR(h_errlist, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif]) + +rk_CHECK_VAR(h_nerr, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif]) + +rk_CHECK_VAR([__progname], +[#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +#include +#endif]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], optarg) +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], optind) +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], opterr) +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], optopt) + +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include ], environ) + +dnl +dnl Check for fields in struct tm +dnl + +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct tm, tm_gmtoff, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct tm, tm_zone, [#include ]) + +dnl +dnl or do we have a variable `timezone' ? +dnl + +rk_CHECK_VAR(timezone,[#include ]) +rk_CHECK_VAR(altzone,[#include ]) + +AC_HAVE_TYPE([sa_family_t],[#include ]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([socklen_t],[#include ]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct sockaddr], [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct sockaddr_storage], [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct addrinfo], [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct ifaddrs], [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct iovec],[ +#include +#include +]) +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct msghdr],[ +#include +#include +]) + +dnl +dnl Check for struct winsize +dnl + +AC_KRB_STRUCT_WINSIZE + +dnl +dnl Check for struct spwd +dnl + +AC_KRB_STRUCT_SPWD + +dnl won't work with automake +dnl moved to AC_OUTPUT in configure.in +dnl AC_CONFIG_FILES($1/Makefile) + +LIB_roken="${LIB_roken} \$(LIB_crypt) \$(LIB_dbopen)" + +AC_SUBST(DIR_roken)dnl +AC_SUBST(LIB_roken)dnl +AC_SUBST(INCLUDES_roken)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/roken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/roken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04a8076c83 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/roken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +dnl $Id: roken.m4,v 1.3.8.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl try to look for an installed roken library with sufficient stuff +dnl +dnl set LIB_roken to the what we should link with +dnl set DIR_roken to if the directory should be built +dnl set CPPFLAGS_roken to stuff to add to CPPFLAGS + +dnl AC_ROKEN(version,directory-to-try,roken-dir,fallback-library,fallback-cppflags) +AC_DEFUN([AC_ROKEN], [ + +AC_ARG_WITH(roken, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-roken=dir],[use the roken library in dir]), +[if test "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR(roken is required) +fi]) + +save_CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS}" + +case $with_roken in +yes|"") + dirs="$2" ;; +*) + dirs="$with_roken" ;; +esac + +roken_installed=no + +for i in $dirs; do + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for roken in $i) + +CPPFLAGS="-I$i/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + +AC_TRY_CPP( +[#include +#if ROKEN_VERSION < $1 +#error old roken version, should be $1 +fail +#endif +],[roken_installed=yes; break]) + +AC_MSG_RESULT($roken_installed) + +done + +CPPFLAGS="$save_CPPFLAGS" + +if test "$roken_installed" != "yes"; then + DIR_roken="roken" + LIB_roken='$4' + CPPFLAGS_roken='$5' + AC_CONFIG_SUBDIRS(lib/roken) +else + LIB_roken="$i/lib/libroken.la" + CPPFLAGS_roken="-I$i/include" +fi + +LIB_roken="${LIB_roken} \$(LIB_crypt) \$(LIB_dbopen)" + +AC_SUBST(LIB_roken)dnl +AC_SUBST(DIR_roken)dnl +AC_SUBST(CPPFLAGS_roken)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/sunos.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/sunos.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6572d0b80f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/sunos.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: sunos.m4,v 1.2 2002/10/16 14:42:13 joda Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN([rk_SUNOS],[ +sunos=no +case "$host" in +*-*-sunos4*) + sunos=40 + ;; +*-*-solaris2.7) + sunos=57 + ;; +*-*-solaris2.[[89]]) + sunos=58 + ;; +*-*-solaris2*) + sunos=50 + ;; +esac +if test "$sunos" != no; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SunOS, $sunos, + [Define to what version of SunOS you are running.]) +fi +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/telnet.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/telnet.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..add065c3d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/telnet.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: telnet.m4,v 1.1 2002/08/28 19:19:01 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl stuff used by telnet + +AC_DEFUN([rk_TELNET],[ +AC_DEFINE(AUTHENTICATION, 1, + [Define if you want authentication support in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(ENCRYPTION, 1, + [Define if you want encryption support in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(DES_ENCRYPTION, 1, + [Define if you want to use DES encryption in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(DIAGNOSTICS, 1, + [Define this to enable diagnostics in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(OLD_ENVIRON, 1, + [Define this to enable old environment option in telnet.])dnl +if false; then + AC_DEFINE(ENV_HACK, 1, + [Define this if you want support for broken ENV_{VAR,VAL} telnets.]) +fi + +# Simple test for streamspty, based on the existance of getmsg(), alas +# this breaks on SunOS4 which have streams but BSD-like ptys +# +# And also something wierd has happend with dec-osf1, fallback to bsd-ptys + +case "$host" in +*-*-aix3*|*-*-sunos4*|*-*-osf*|*-*-hpux1[[01]]*) + ;; +*) + AC_CHECK_FUNC(getmsg) + if test "$ac_cv_func_getmsg" = "yes"; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK([if getmsg works], ac_cv_func_getmsg_works, + AC_TRY_RUN([ + #include + #include + + int main() + { + int ret; + ret = getmsg(open("/dev/null", 0), NULL, NULL, NULL); + if(ret < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) + return 1; + return 0; + } + ], ac_cv_func_getmsg_works=yes, + ac_cv_func_getmsg_works=no, + ac_cv_func_getmsg_works=no)) + if test "$ac_cv_func_getmsg_works" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETMSG, 1, + [Define if you have a working getmsg.]) + AC_DEFINE(STREAMSPTY, 1, + [Define if you have streams ptys.]) + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +AH_BOTTOM([ +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) && !defined(AUTHENTICATION) +#define AUTHENTICATION 1 +#endif + +/* Set this to the default system lead string for telnetd + * can contain %-escapes: %s=sysname, %m=machine, %r=os-release + * %v=os-version, %t=tty, %h=hostname, %d=date and time + */ +#undef USE_IM + +/* Used with login -p */ +#undef LOGIN_ARGS + +/* set this to a sensible login */ +#ifndef LOGIN_PATH +#define LOGIN_PATH BINDIR "/login" +#endif +]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/test-package.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/test-package.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd38e1e623 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/test-package.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +dnl $Id: test-package.m4,v 1.12.4.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl rk_TEST_PACKAGE(package,headers,libraries,extra libs, +dnl default locations, conditional, config-program) + +AC_DEFUN([rk_TEST_PACKAGE],[ +AC_ARG_WITH($1, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1=dir],[use $1 in dir])) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-lib, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1-lib=dir],[use $1 libraries in dir]), +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-lib]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-include, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1-include=dir],[use $1 headers in dir]), +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-include]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-config, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1-config=path],[config program for $1])) + +m4_ifval([$6], + m4_define([rk_pkgname], $6), + m4_define([rk_pkgname], AS_TR_CPP($1))) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) + +case "$with_$1" in +yes|"") d='$5' ;; +no) d= ;; +*) d="$with_$1" ;; +esac + +header_dirs= +lib_dirs= +for i in $d; do + if test "$with_$1_include" = ""; then + if test -d "$i/include/$1"; then + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include/$1" + fi + if test -d "$i/include"; then + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include" + fi + fi + if test "$with_$1_lib" = ""; then + if test -d "$i/lib$abilibdirext"; then + lib_dirs="$lib_dirs $i/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + fi +done + +if test "$with_$1_include"; then + header_dirs="$with_$1_include $header_dirs" +fi +if test "$with_$1_lib"; then + lib_dirs="$with_$1_lib $lib_dirs" +fi + +if test "$with_$1_config" = ""; then + with_$1_config='$7' +fi + +$1_cflags= +$1_libs= + +case "$with_$1_config" in +yes|no|"") + ;; +*) + $1_cflags="`$with_$1_config --cflags 2>&1`" + $1_libs="`$with_$1_config --libs 2>&1`" + ;; +esac + +found=no +if test "$with_$1" != no; then + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + if test "$[]$1_cflags" -a "$[]$1_libs"; then + CFLAGS="$[]$1_cflags $save_CFLAGS" + LIBS="$[]$1_libs $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$2],,[ + INCLUDE_$1="$[]$1_cflags" + LIB_$1="$[]$1_libs" + AC_MSG_RESULT([from $with_$1_config]) + found=yes]) + fi + if test "$found" = no; then + ires= lres= + for i in $header_dirs; do + CFLAGS="-I$i $save_CFLAGS" + AC_TRY_COMPILE([$2],,ires=$i;break) + done + for i in $lib_dirs; do + LIBS="-L$i $3 $4 $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$2],,lres=$i;break) + done + if test "$ires" -a "$lres" -a "$with_$1" != "no"; then + INCLUDE_$1="-I$ires" + LIB_$1="-L$lres $3 $4" + found=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([headers $ires, libraries $lres]) + fi + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + LIBS="$save_LIBS" +fi + +if test "$found" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(rk_pkgname, 1, [Define if you have the $1 package.]) + with_$1=yes +else + with_$1=no + INCLUDE_$1= + LIB_$1= + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) +fi + +AC_SUBST(INCLUDE_$1) +AC_SUBST(LIB_$1) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/wflags.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/wflags.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4051f29887 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/wflags.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +dnl $Id: wflags.m4,v 1.3.34.1 2004/04/01 07:27:35 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl set WFLAGS + +AC_DEFUN([AC_WFLAGS],[ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="" +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="" +if test -z "$WFLAGS" -a "$GCC" = "yes"; then + # -Wno-implicit-int for broken X11 headers + # leave these out for now: + # -Wcast-align doesn't work well on alpha osf/1 + # -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast + # -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs + WFLAGS="ifelse($#, 0,-Wall, $1)" + WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="-Wno-unused" + WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="-Wno-implicit-int" +fi +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS)dnl +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS_NOUNUSED)dnl +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/with-all.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/with-all.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b9d39ff14 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/cf/with-all.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: with-all.m4,v 1.1 2001/08/29 17:01:23 assar Exp $ +dnl + +dnl AC_WITH_ALL(name) + +AC_DEFUN([AC_WITH_ALL], [ +AC_ARG_WITH($1, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1=dir], + [use $1 in dir])) + +AC_ARG_WITH($1-lib, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1-lib=dir], + [use $1 libraries in dir]), +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-lib]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) + +AC_ARG_WITH($1-include, + AC_HELP_STRING([--with-$1-include=dir], + [use $1 headers in dir]), +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-include]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) + +case "$with_$1" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +"") ;; +*) if test "$with_$1_include" = ""; then + with_$1_include="$with_$1/include" + fi + if test "$with_$1_lib" = ""; then + with_$1_lib="$with_$1/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + ;; +esac +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/compile b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/compile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a81e000ae1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/compile @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Wrapper for compilers which do not understand `-c -o'. + +scriptversion=2003-11-09.00 + +# Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Written by Tom Tromey . +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# This file is maintained in Automake, please report +# bugs to or send patches to +# . + +case $1 in + '') + echo "$0: No command. Try \`$0 --help' for more information." 1>&2 + exit 1; + ;; + -h | --h*) + cat <<\EOF +Usage: compile [--help] [--version] PROGRAM [ARGS] + +Wrapper for compilers which do not understand `-c -o'. +Remove `-o dest.o' from ARGS, run PROGRAM with the remaining +arguments, and rename the output as expected. + +If you are trying to build a whole package this is not the +right script to run: please start by reading the file `INSTALL'. + +Report bugs to . +EOF + exit 0 + ;; + -v | --v*) + echo "compile $scriptversion" + exit 0 + ;; +esac + + +prog=$1 +shift + +ofile= +cfile= +args= +while test $# -gt 0; do + case "$1" in + -o) + # configure might choose to run compile as `compile cc -o foo foo.c'. + # So we do something ugly here. + ofile=$2 + shift + case "$ofile" in + *.o | *.obj) + ;; + *) + args="$args -o $ofile" + ofile= + ;; + esac + ;; + *.c) + cfile=$1 + args="$args $1" + ;; + *) + args="$args $1" + ;; + esac + shift +done + +if test -z "$ofile" || test -z "$cfile"; then + # If no `-o' option was seen then we might have been invoked from a + # pattern rule where we don't need one. That is ok -- this is a + # normal compilation that the losing compiler can handle. If no + # `.c' file was seen then we are probably linking. That is also + # ok. + exec "$prog" $args +fi + +# Name of file we expect compiler to create. +cofile=`echo $cfile | sed -e 's|^.*/||' -e 's/\.c$/.o/'` + +# Create the lock directory. +# Note: use `[/.-]' here to ensure that we don't use the same name +# that we are using for the .o file. Also, base the name on the expected +# object file name, since that is what matters with a parallel build. +lockdir=`echo $cofile | sed -e 's|[/.-]|_|g'`.d +while true; do + if mkdir $lockdir > /dev/null 2>&1; then + break + fi + sleep 1 +done +# FIXME: race condition here if user kills between mkdir and trap. +trap "rmdir $lockdir; exit 1" 1 2 15 + +# Run the compile. +"$prog" $args +status=$? + +if test -f "$cofile"; then + mv "$cofile" "$ofile" +fi + +rmdir $lockdir +exit $status + +# Local Variables: +# mode: shell-script +# sh-indentation: 2 +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion=" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H" +# time-stamp-end: "$" +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/config.guess b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/config.guess new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0773d0f631 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/config.guess @@ -0,0 +1,1456 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Attempt to guess a canonical system name. +# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, +# 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +timestamp='2004-03-03' + +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Originally written by Per Bothner . +# Please send patches to . Submit a context +# diff and a properly formatted ChangeLog entry. +# +# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to +# config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and +# exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1. +# +# The plan is that this can be called by configure scripts if you +# don't specify an explicit build system type. + +me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION] + +Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on. + +Operation modes: + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit + -v, --version print version number, then exit + +Report bugs and patches to ." + +version="\ +GNU config.guess ($timestamp) + +Originally written by Per Bothner. +Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO +warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +help=" +Try \`$me --help' for more information." + +# Parse command line +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) + echo "$timestamp" ; exit 0 ;; + --version | -v ) + echo "$version" ; exit 0 ;; + --help | --h* | -h ) + echo "$usage"; exit 0 ;; + -- ) # Stop option processing + shift; break ;; + - ) # Use stdin as input. + break ;; + -* ) + echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2 + exit 1 ;; + * ) + break ;; + esac +done + +if test $# != 0; then + echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15 + +# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a +# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires +# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a +# headache to deal with in a portable fashion. + +# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still +# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated. + +# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team. + +set_cc_for_build=' +trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ; +trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ; +: ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ; + { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d -q "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } || + { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } || + { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } || + { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ; +dummy=$tmp/dummy ; +tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ; +case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in + ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ; + for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do + if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ; + fi ; + done ; + if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then + CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ; + fi + ;; + ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;; + ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;; +esac ;' + +# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. +# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24) +if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH +fi + +UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown +UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown +UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown +UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown + +# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive. + +case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in + *:NetBSD:*:*) + # NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or + # more of the tupples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*, + # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently + # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old + # object file format. This provides both forward + # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the + # object file format. + # + # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor + # portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown". + sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch" + UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \ + /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)` + case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in + armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;; + arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;; + sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;; + sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;; + *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;; + esac + # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched + # to ELF recently, or will in the future. + case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in + arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax) + eval $set_cc_for_build + if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ + | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null + then + # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout). + # Return netbsd for either. FIX? + os=netbsd + else + os=netbsdelf + fi + ;; + *) + os=netbsd + ;; + esac + # The OS release + # Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and + # thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need + # kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a + # suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu. + case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in + Debian*) + release='-gnu' + ;; + *) + release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` + ;; + esac + # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM: + # contains redundant information, the shorter form: + # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used. + echo "${machine}-${os}${release}" + exit 0 ;; + amd64:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo x86_64-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + amiga:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + arc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + cats:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo arm-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + hp300:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mac68k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + macppc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvme68k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvme88k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m88k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvmeppc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + pegasos:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + pmax:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sgi:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipseb-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun3:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + wgrisc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:ekkoBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + macppc:MirBSD:*:*) + echo powerppc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:MirBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + alpha:OSF1:*:*) + case $UNAME_RELEASE in + *4.0) + UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'` + ;; + *5.*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'` + ;; + esac + # According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on + # OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995. I hope that + # covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU + # types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0. + ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1` + case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in + "EV4 (21064)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; + "EV4.5 (21064)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; + "LCA4 (21066/21068)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; + "EV5 (21164)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;; + "EV5.6 (21164A)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;; + "EV5.6 (21164PC)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;; + "EV5.7 (21164PC)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca57" ;; + "EV6 (21264)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;; + "EV6.7 (21264A)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;; + "EV6.8CB (21264C)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; + "EV6.8AL (21264B)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; + "EV6.8CX (21264D)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; + "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev69" ;; + "EV7 (21364)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev7" ;; + "EV7.9 (21364A)") + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev79" ;; + esac + # A Pn.n version is a patched version. + # A Vn.n version is a released version. + # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. + # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. + # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` + exit 0 ;; + Alpha*:OpenVMS:*:*) + echo alpha-hp-vms + exit 0 ;; + Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*) + # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? + # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead + # of the specific Alpha model? + echo alpha-pc-interix + exit 0 ;; + 21064:Windows_NT:50:3) + echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5 + exit 0 ;; + Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*) + echo m68k-unknown-sysv4 + exit 0;; + *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos + exit 0 ;; + *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos + exit 0 ;; + *:OS/390:*:*) + echo i370-ibm-openedition + exit 0 ;; + *:OS400:*:*) + echo powerpc-ibm-os400 + exit 0 ;; + arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*) + echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0;; + SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp + exit 0;; + Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*) + # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE. + if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then + echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 + else + echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + NILE*:*:*:dcosx) + echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 + exit 0 ;; + DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*) + echo sparc-icl-nx6 + exit 0 ;; + DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7*) + case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in + sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7 && exit 0 ;; + esac ;; + sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + i86pc:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:6*:*) + # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize + # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but + # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4. + echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:*:*) + case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in + Series*|S4*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v` + ;; + esac + # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'. + echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'` + exit 0 ;; + sun3*:SunOS:*:*) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` + test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3 + case "`/bin/arch`" in + sun3) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + sun4) + echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + esac + exit 0 ;; + aushp:SunOS:*:*) + echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name + # can be virtually everything (everything which is not + # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor + # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT" + # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally + # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not + # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should + # be no problem. + atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + m68k:machten:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + powerpc:machten:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + RISC*:Mach:*:*) + echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3 + exit 0 ;; + RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*) + echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*) + echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*) + echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c +#ifdef __cplusplus +#include /* for printf() prototype */ + int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { +#else + int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { +#endif + #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB) + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #endif + exit (-1); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c \ + && $dummy `echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` \ + && exit 0 + echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) + echo powerpc-motorola-powermax + exit 0 ;; + Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*) + echo powerpc-harris-powermax + exit 0 ;; + Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) + echo powerpc-harris-powermax + exit 0 ;; + Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) + echo powerpc-harris-powerunix + exit 0 ;; + m88k:CX/UX:7*:*) + echo m88k-harris-cxux7 + exit 0 ;; + m88k:*:4*:R4*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + m88k:*:3*:R3*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + AViiON:dgux:*:*) + # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` + if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ] + then + if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \ + [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ] + then + echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + else + echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3) + echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + M88*:*:R3*:*) + # Delta 88k system running SVR3 + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3) + echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD) + echo m68k-tektronix-bsd + exit 0 ;; + *:IRIX*:*:*) + echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'` + exit 0 ;; + ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX. + echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id + exit 0 ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX ' + i*86:AIX:*:*) + echo i386-ibm-aix + exit 0 ;; + ia64:AIX:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` + else + IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:2:3) + if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + + main() + { + if (!__power_pc()) + exit(1); + puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5"); + exit(0); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && $dummy && exit 0 + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 + elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 + else + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2 + fi + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:*:[45]) + IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'` + if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then + IBM_ARCH=rs6000 + else + IBM_ARCH=powerpc + fi + if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` + else + IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:*:*) + echo rs6000-ibm-aix + exit 0 ;; + ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) + echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4 + exit 0 ;; + ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and + echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to + exit 0 ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3 + *:BOSX:*:*) + echo rs6000-bull-bosx + exit 0 ;; + DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*) + echo m68k-bull-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*) + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;; + 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;; + 9000/[678][0-9][0-9]) + if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then + sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null` + sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null` + case "${sc_cpu_version}" in + 523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0 + 528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1 + 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0 + case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in + 32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;; + 64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;; + '') HP_ARCH="hppa2.0" ;; # HP-UX 10.20 + esac ;; + esac + fi + if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + + #define _HPUX_SOURCE + #include + #include + + int main () + { + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS); + #endif + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + switch (bits) + { + case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break; + case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break; + default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + } break; + #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */ + puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + #endif + default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + } + exit (0); + } +EOF + (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy` + test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa + fi ;; + esac + if [ ${HP_ARCH} = "hppa2.0w" ] + then + # avoid double evaluation of $set_cc_for_build + test -n "$CC_FOR_BUILD" || eval $set_cc_for_build + if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E -) | grep __LP64__ >/dev/null + then + HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" + else + HP_ARCH="hppa64" + fi + fi + echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit 0 ;; + ia64:HP-UX:*:*) + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit 0 ;; + 3050*:HI-UX:*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + int + main () + { + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns + true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct + results, however. */ + if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu)) + { + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + } + } + else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu)) + puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + exit (0); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && $dummy && exit 0 + echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix + exit 0 ;; + hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-osf + exit 0 ;; + hp8??:OSF1:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-osf + exit 0 ;; + i*86:OSF1:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1 + fi + exit 0 ;; + parisc*:Lites*:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hp-lites + exit 0 ;; + C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) + echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \ + | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \ + -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \ + -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*TS:*:*:*) + echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*T3E:*:*:*) + echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*SV1:*:*:*) + echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + *:UNICOS/mp:*:*) + echo nv1-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` + FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'` + FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'` + echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" + exit 0 ;; + 5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) + FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'` + FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/ /_/'` + echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" + exit 0 ;; + i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:FreeBSD:*:*) + # Determine whether the default compiler uses glibc. + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + #if __GLIBC__ >= 2 + LIBC=gnu + #else + LIBC= + #endif +EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^LIBC=` + # GNU/KFreeBSD systems have a "k" prefix to indicate we are using + # FreeBSD's kernel, but not the complete OS. + case ${LIBC} in gnu) kernel_only='k' ;; esac + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-${kernel_only}freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`${LIBC:+-$LIBC} + exit 0 ;; + i*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin + exit 0 ;; + i*:MINGW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32 + exit 0 ;; + i*:PW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32 + exit 0 ;; + x86:Interix*:[34]*) + echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/\..*//' + exit 0 ;; + [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*) + echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks + exit 0 ;; + i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*) + # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? + # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we + # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386? + echo i586-pc-interix + exit 0 ;; + i*:UWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin + exit 0 ;; + p*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin + exit 0 ;; + prep*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + *:GNU:*:*) + # the GNU system + echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'` + exit 0 ;; + *:GNU/*:*:*) + # other systems with GNU libc and userland + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-gnu + exit 0 ;; + i*86:Minix:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix + exit 0 ;; + arm*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + cris:Linux:*:*) + echo cris-axis-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + ia64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + m68*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + mips:Linux:*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #undef CPU + #undef mips + #undef mipsel + #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) + CPU=mipsel + #else + #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) + CPU=mips + #else + CPU= + #endif + #endif +EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^CPU=` + test x"${CPU}" != x && echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu" && exit 0 + ;; + mips64:Linux:*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #undef CPU + #undef mips64 + #undef mips64el + #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) + CPU=mips64el + #else + #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) + CPU=mips64 + #else + CPU= + #endif + #endif +EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^CPU=` + test x"${CPU}" != x && echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu" && exit 0 + ;; + ppc:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + ppc64:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + alpha:Linux:*:*) + case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in + EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;; + EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;; + PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; + PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; + EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;; + EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;; + EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; + esac + objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep ld.so.1 >/dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; else LIBC="" ; fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC} + exit 0 ;; + parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*) + # Look for CPU level + case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in + PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-gnu ;; + PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-gnu ;; + *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-gnu ;; + esac + exit 0 ;; + parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*) + echo hppa64-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux + exit 0 ;; + sh64*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + sh*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + x86_64:Linux:*:*) + echo x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + i*86:Linux:*:*) + # The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so + # first see if it will tell us. cd to the root directory to prevent + # problems with other programs or directories called `ld' in the path. + # Set LC_ALL=C to ensure ld outputs messages in English. + ld_supported_targets=`cd /; LC_ALL=C ld --help 2>&1 \ + | sed -ne '/supported targets:/!d + s/[ ][ ]*/ /g + s/.*supported targets: *// + s/ .*// + p'` + case "$ld_supported_targets" in + elf32-i386) + TENTATIVE="${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnu" + ;; + a.out-i386-linux) + echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout" + exit 0 ;; + coff-i386) + echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnucoff" + exit 0 ;; + "") + # Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld) or + # one that does not give us useful --help. + echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuoldld" + exit 0 ;; + esac + # Determine whether the default compiler is a.out or elf + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + #ifdef __ELF__ + # ifdef __GLIBC__ + # if __GLIBC__ >= 2 + LIBC=gnu + # else + LIBC=gnulibc1 + # endif + # else + LIBC=gnulibc1 + # endif + #else + #ifdef __INTEL_COMPILER + LIBC=gnu + #else + LIBC=gnuaout + #endif + #endif + #ifdef __dietlibc__ + LIBC=dietlibc + #endif +EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^LIBC=` + test x"${LIBC}" != x && echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}" && exit 0 + test x"${TENTATIVE}" != x && echo "${TENTATIVE}" && exit 0 + ;; + i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) + # ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there. + # earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both + # sysname and nodename. + echo i386-sequent-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*) + # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version + # number series starting with 2... + # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this, + # I just have to hope. -- rms. + # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION} + exit 0 ;; + i*86:OS/2:*:*) + # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility + # is probably installed. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx + exit 0 ;; + i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop + exit 0 ;; + i*86:atheos:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos + exit 0 ;; + i*86:syllable:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable + exit 0 ;; + i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.0*:*) + echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*DOS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*) + UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'` + if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL} + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL} + fi + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*:5:[78]*) + case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in + *486*) UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;; + *Pentium) UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;; + *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;; + esac + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION} + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*:3.2:*) + if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then + UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' /dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` + (/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32 + fi + exit 0 ;; + pc:*:*:*) + # Left here for compatibility: + # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about + # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i386. + echo i386-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit 0 ;; + Intel:Mach:3*:*) + echo i386-pc-mach3 + exit 0 ;; + paragon:*:*:*) + echo i860-intel-osf1 + exit 0 ;; + i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4 + if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4 + else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered. + echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4 + fi + exit 0 ;; + mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*) + # "miniframe" + echo m68010-convergent-sysv + exit 0 ;; + mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m) + echo m68k-convergent-sysv + exit 0 ;; + M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*) + echo m68k-diab-dnix + exit 0 ;; + M68*:*:R3V[567]*:*) + test -r /sysV68 && echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv' && exit 0 ;; + 3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0) + OS_REL='' + test -r /etc/.relid \ + && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ + && echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 ;; + 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*) + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && echo i486-ncr-sysv4 && exit 0 ;; + m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) + echo m68k-atari-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.0*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*) + echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + RM*:SINIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:SINIX-*:*:*) + if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4 + else + echo ns32k-sni-sysv + fi + exit 0 ;; + PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort + # says + echo i586-unisys-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*) + # From Gerald Hewes . + # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm + echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:*:*:FTX*) + # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com. + echo i860-stratus-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:VOS:*:*) + # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. + echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos + exit 0 ;; + mc68*:A/UX:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*) + echo mips-sony-newsos6 + exit 0 ;; + R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*) + if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then + echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only. + echo powerpc-be-beos + exit 0 ;; + BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only. + echo powerpc-apple-beos + exit 0 ;; + BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible. + echo i586-pc-beos + exit 0 ;; + SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + Power*:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Darwin:*:*) + case `uname -p` in + *86) UNAME_PROCESSOR=i686 ;; + powerpc) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;; + esac + echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*) + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` + if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = "x86"; then + UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386 + UNAME_MACHINE=pc + fi + echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:QNX:*:4*) + echo i386-pc-qnx + exit 0 ;; + NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) + echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:NonStop-UX:*:*) + echo mips-compaq-nonstopux + exit 0 ;; + BS2000:POSIX*:*:*) + echo bs2000-siemens-sysv + exit 0 ;; + DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Plan9:*:*) + # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386 + # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86 + # operating systems. + if test "$cputype" = "386"; then + UNAME_MACHINE=i386 + else + UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype" + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9 + exit 0 ;; + *:TOPS-10:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tops10 + exit 0 ;; + *:TENEX:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tenex + exit 0 ;; + KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-dec-tops20 + exit 0 ;; + XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-xkl-tops20 + exit 0 ;; + *:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tops20 + exit 0 ;; + *:ITS:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-its + exit 0 ;; + SEI:*:*:SEIUX) + echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:DragonFly:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` + exit 0 ;; +esac + +#echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2 +#echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" 1>&2 + +eval $set_cc_for_build +cat >$dummy.c < +# include +#endif +main () +{ +#if defined (sony) +#if defined (MIPSEB) + /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed, + I don't know.... */ + printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#else +#include + printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n", +#ifdef NEWSOS4 + "4" +#else + "" +#endif + ); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix) + printf ("arm-acorn-riscix"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux) + printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (NeXT) +#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__) +#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k" +#endif + int version; + version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`; + if (version < 4) + printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version); + else + printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version); + exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16) +#if defined (UMAXV) + printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0); +#else +#if defined (CMU) + printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0); +#else + printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (__386BSD__) + printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (sequent) +#if defined (i386) + printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#if defined (ns32000) + printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (_SEQUENT_) + struct utsname un; + + uname(&un); + + if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) { + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0); + } + if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */ + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0); + } + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0); + +#endif + +#if defined (vax) +# if !defined (ultrix) +# include +# if defined (BSD) +# if BSD == 43 + printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0); +# else +# if BSD == 199006 + printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0); +# else + printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0); +# endif +# endif +# else + printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0); +# endif +# else + printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0); +# endif +#endif + +#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860) + printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + + exit (1); +} +EOF + +$CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null && $dummy && exit 0 + +# Apollos put the system type in the environment. + +test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit 0; } + +# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1) + +if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ] +then + case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in + c1*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c2*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + c34*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c38*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c4*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + esac +fi + +cat >&2 < in order to provide the needed +information to handle your system. + +config.guess timestamp = $timestamp + +uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` + +/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null` + +hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null` + +UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE} +UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE} +UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM} +UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION} +EOF + +exit 1 + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" +# time-stamp-end: "'" +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/config.sub b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/config.sub new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..264f820aa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/config.sub @@ -0,0 +1,1549 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Configuration validation subroutine script. +# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, +# 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +timestamp='2004-02-23' + +# This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software. +# The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software +# can handle that machine. It does not imply ALL GNU software can. +# +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, +# Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Please send patches to . Submit a context +# diff and a properly formatted ChangeLog entry. +# +# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type. +# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument. +# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1. +# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed. + +# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages +# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases +# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software. +# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations +# it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish +# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless +# configuration. + +# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given +# machine specification into a single specification in the form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# or in some cases, the newer four-part form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification. + +me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS + $0 [OPTION] ALIAS + +Canonicalize a configuration name. + +Operation modes: + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit + -v, --version print version number, then exit + +Report bugs and patches to ." + +version="\ +GNU config.sub ($timestamp) + +Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO +warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +help=" +Try \`$me --help' for more information." + +# Parse command line +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) + echo "$timestamp" ; exit 0 ;; + --version | -v ) + echo "$version" ; exit 0 ;; + --help | --h* | -h ) + echo "$usage"; exit 0 ;; + -- ) # Stop option processing + shift; break ;; + - ) # Use stdin as input. + break ;; + -* ) + echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" + exit 1 ;; + + *local*) + # First pass through any local machine types. + echo $1 + exit 0;; + + * ) + break ;; + esac +done + +case $# in + 0) echo "$me: missing argument$help" >&2 + exit 1;; + 1) ;; + *) echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 + exit 1;; +esac + +# Separate what the user gave into CPU-COMPANY and OS or KERNEL-OS (if any). +# Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations. +maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'` +case $maybe_os in + nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-dietlibc | linux-uclibc* | uclinux-uclibc* | uclinux-gnu* | \ + kfreebsd*-gnu* | knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* | storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*) + os=-$maybe_os + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'` + ;; + *) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/-[^-]*$//'` + if [ $basic_machine != $1 ] + then os=`echo $1 | sed 's/.*-/-/'` + else os=; fi + ;; +esac + +### Let's recognize common machines as not being operating systems so +### that things like config.sub decstation-3100 work. We also +### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we +### can provide default operating systems below. +case $os in + -sun*os*) + # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input. + ;; + -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \ + -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \ + -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \ + -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\ + -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \ + -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \ + -apple | -axis) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -scout) + ;; + -wrs) + os=-vxworks + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -chorusos*) + os=-chorusos + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -chorusrdb) + os=-chorusrdb + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -hiux*) + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + -sco5) + os=-sco3.2v5 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco4) + os=-sco3.2v4 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2.[4-9]*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'` + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2v[4-9]*) + # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco*) + os=-sco3.2v2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -udk*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -isc) + os=-isc2.2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -clix*) + basic_machine=clipper-intergraph + ;; + -isc*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -lynx*) + os=-lynxos + ;; + -ptx*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'` + ;; + -windowsnt*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'` + ;; + -psos*) + os=-psos + ;; + -mint | -mint[0-9]*) + basic_machine=m68k-atari + os=-mint + ;; +esac + +# Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations. +case $basic_machine in + # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name. + # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below. + 1750a | 580 \ + | a29k \ + | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] | alphapca5[67] \ + | alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] | alpha64pca5[67] \ + | am33_2.0 \ + | arc | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | avr \ + | c4x | clipper \ + | d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \ + | fr30 | frv \ + | h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \ + | i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \ + | ip2k | iq2000 \ + | m32r | m68000 | m68k | m88k | mcore \ + | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \ + | mips16 \ + | mips64 | mips64el \ + | mips64vr | mips64vrel \ + | mips64orion | mips64orionel \ + | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \ + | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \ + | mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \ + | mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \ + | mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \ + | mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \ + | mipsisa64r2 | mipsisa64r2el \ + | mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \ + | mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \ + | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ + | mn10200 | mn10300 \ + | msp430 \ + | ns16k | ns32k \ + | openrisc | or32 \ + | pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl \ + | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle | ppcbe \ + | pyramid \ + | sh | sh[1234] | sh[23]e | sh[34]eb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \ + | sh64 | sh64le \ + | sparc | sparc64 | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite | sparcv9 | sparcv9b \ + | strongarm \ + | tahoe | thumb | tic4x | tic80 | tron \ + | v850 | v850e \ + | we32k \ + | x86 | xscale | xstormy16 | xtensa \ + | z8k) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + ;; + m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12) + # Motorola 68HC11/12. + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + os=-none + ;; + m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | v70 | w65 | z8k) + ;; + + # We use `pc' rather than `unknown' + # because (1) that's what they normally are, and + # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users. + i*86 | x86_64) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc + ;; + # Object if more than one company name word. + *-*-*) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name. + 580-* \ + | a29k-* \ + | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphaev6[78]-* \ + | alpha64-* | alpha64ev[4-8]-* | alpha64ev56-* | alpha64ev6[78]-* \ + | alphapca5[67]-* | alpha64pca5[67]-* | arc-* \ + | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armeb-* | armv*-* \ + | avr-* \ + | bs2000-* \ + | c[123]* | c30-* | [cjt]90-* | c4x-* | c54x-* | c55x-* | c6x-* \ + | clipper-* | cydra-* \ + | d10v-* | d30v-* | dlx-* \ + | elxsi-* \ + | f30[01]-* | f700-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \ + | h8300-* | h8500-* \ + | hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \ + | i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \ + | ip2k-* | iq2000-* \ + | m32r-* \ + | m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \ + | m88110-* | m88k-* | mcore-* \ + | mips-* | mipsbe-* | mipseb-* | mipsel-* | mipsle-* \ + | mips16-* \ + | mips64-* | mips64el-* \ + | mips64vr-* | mips64vrel-* \ + | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ + | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* \ + | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \ + | mips64vr5000-* | mips64vr5000el-* \ + | mipsisa32-* | mipsisa32el-* \ + | mipsisa32r2-* | mipsisa32r2el-* \ + | mipsisa64-* | mipsisa64el-* \ + | mipsisa64r2-* | mipsisa64r2el-* \ + | mipsisa64sb1-* | mipsisa64sb1el-* \ + | mipsisa64sr71k-* | mipsisa64sr71kel-* \ + | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* \ + | msp430-* \ + | none-* | np1-* | nv1-* | ns16k-* | ns32k-* \ + | orion-* \ + | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | pj-* | pjl-* | pn-* | power-* \ + | powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* | ppcbe-* \ + | pyramid-* \ + | romp-* | rs6000-* \ + | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | shbe-* \ + | shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \ + | sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* | sparclite-* \ + | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | strongarm-* | sv1-* | sx?-* \ + | tahoe-* | thumb-* \ + | tic30-* | tic4x-* | tic54x-* | tic55x-* | tic6x-* | tic80-* \ + | tron-* \ + | v850-* | v850e-* | vax-* \ + | we32k-* \ + | x86-* | x86_64-* | xps100-* | xscale-* | xstormy16-* \ + | xtensa-* \ + | ymp-* \ + | z8k-*) + ;; + # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand + # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS. + 386bsd) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-bsd + ;; + 3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc) + basic_machine=m68000-att + ;; + 3b*) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + a29khif) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + abacus) + basic_machine=abacus-unknown + ;; + adobe68k) + basic_machine=m68010-adobe + os=-scout + ;; + alliant | fx80) + basic_machine=fx80-alliant + ;; + altos | altos3068) + basic_machine=m68k-altos + ;; + am29k) + basic_machine=a29k-none + os=-bsd + ;; + amd64) + basic_machine=x86_64-pc + ;; + amd64-*) + basic_machine=x86_64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + amdahl) + basic_machine=580-amdahl + os=-sysv + ;; + amiga | amiga-*) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + ;; + amigaos | amigados) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-amigaos + ;; + amigaunix | amix) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-sysv4 + ;; + apollo68) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-sysv + ;; + apollo68bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-bsd + ;; + aux) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + os=-aux + ;; + balance) + basic_machine=ns32k-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + c90) + basic_machine=c90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + convex-c1) + basic_machine=c1-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c2) + basic_machine=c2-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c32) + basic_machine=c32-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c34) + basic_machine=c34-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c38) + basic_machine=c38-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + cray | j90) + basic_machine=j90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + cr16c) + basic_machine=cr16c-unknown + os=-elf + ;; + crds | unos) + basic_machine=m68k-crds + ;; + cris | cris-* | etrax*) + basic_machine=cris-axis + ;; + crx) + basic_machine=crx-unknown + os=-elf + ;; + da30 | da30-*) + basic_machine=m68k-da30 + ;; + decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn) + basic_machine=mips-dec + ;; + decsystem10* | dec10*) + basic_machine=pdp10-dec + os=-tops10 + ;; + decsystem20* | dec20*) + basic_machine=pdp10-dec + os=-tops20 + ;; + delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \ + | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola) + basic_machine=m68k-motorola + ;; + delta88) + basic_machine=m88k-motorola + os=-sysv3 + ;; + dpx20 | dpx20-*) + basic_machine=rs6000-bull + os=-bosx + ;; + dpx2* | dpx2*-bull) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv3 + ;; + ebmon29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-ebmon + ;; + elxsi) + basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi + os=-bsd + ;; + encore | umax | mmax) + basic_machine=ns32k-encore + ;; + es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE) + basic_machine=m68k-ericsson + os=-ose + ;; + fx2800) + basic_machine=i860-alliant + ;; + genix) + basic_machine=ns32k-ns + ;; + gmicro) + basic_machine=tron-gmicro + os=-sysv + ;; + go32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-go32 + ;; + h3050r* | hiux*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + h8300hms) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + h8300xray) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-xray + ;; + h8500hms) + basic_machine=h8500-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + harris) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-sysv3 + ;; + hp300-*) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp300bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-bsd + ;; + hp300hpux) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-hpux + ;; + hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9]) + basic_machine=m68000-hp + ;; + hp9k3[2-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9]) + # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893) + # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679]) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hppa-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + hppaosf) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + os=-osf + ;; + hppro) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + os=-proelf + ;; + i370-ibm* | ibm*) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + ;; +# I'm not sure what "Sysv32" means. Should this be sysv3.2? + i*86v32) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv32 + ;; + i*86v4*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv4 + ;; + i*86v) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv + ;; + i*86sol2) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-solaris2 + ;; + i386mach) + basic_machine=i386-mach + os=-mach + ;; + i386-vsta | vsta) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-vsta + ;; + iris | iris4d) + basic_machine=mips-sgi + case $os in + -irix*) + ;; + *) + os=-irix4 + ;; + esac + ;; + isi68 | isi) + basic_machine=m68k-isi + os=-sysv + ;; + m88k-omron*) + basic_machine=m88k-omron + ;; + magnum | m3230) + basic_machine=mips-mips + os=-sysv + ;; + merlin) + basic_machine=ns32k-utek + os=-sysv + ;; + mingw32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-mingw32 + ;; + miniframe) + basic_machine=m68000-convergent + ;; + *mint | -mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*) + basic_machine=m68k-atari + os=-mint + ;; + mips3*-*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'` + ;; + mips3*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown + ;; + mmix*) + basic_machine=mmix-knuth + os=-mmixware + ;; + monitor) + basic_machine=m68k-rom68k + os=-coff + ;; + morphos) + basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + os=-morphos + ;; + msdos) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-msdos + ;; + mvs) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + os=-mvs + ;; + ncr3000) + basic_machine=i486-ncr + os=-sysv4 + ;; + netbsd386) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-netbsd + ;; + netwinder) + basic_machine=armv4l-rebel + os=-linux + ;; + news | news700 | news800 | news900) + basic_machine=m68k-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news1000) + basic_machine=m68030-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news-3600 | risc-news) + basic_machine=mips-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + necv70) + basic_machine=v70-nec + os=-sysv + ;; + next | m*-next ) + basic_machine=m68k-next + case $os in + -nextstep* ) + ;; + -ns2*) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + *) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + esac + ;; + nh3000) + basic_machine=m68k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nh[45]000) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nindy960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-nindy + ;; + mon960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-mon960 + ;; + nonstopux) + basic_machine=mips-compaq + os=-nonstopux + ;; + np1) + basic_machine=np1-gould + ;; + nv1) + basic_machine=nv1-cray + os=-unicosmp + ;; + nsr-tandem) + basic_machine=nsr-tandem + ;; + op50n-* | op60c-*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + os=-proelf + ;; + or32 | or32-*) + basic_machine=or32-unknown + os=-coff + ;; + os400) + basic_machine=powerpc-ibm + os=-os400 + ;; + OSE68000 | ose68000) + basic_machine=m68000-ericsson + os=-ose + ;; + os68k) + basic_machine=m68k-none + os=-os68k + ;; + pa-hitachi) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + paragon) + basic_machine=i860-intel + os=-osf + ;; + pbd) + basic_machine=sparc-tti + ;; + pbb) + basic_machine=m68k-tti + ;; + pc532 | pc532-*) + basic_machine=ns32k-pc532 + ;; + pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen | viac3) + basic_machine=i586-pc + ;; + pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon | athlon_*) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentiumii | pentium2 | pentiumiii | pentium3) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentium4) + basic_machine=i786-pc + ;; + pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*) + basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumii-* | pentium2-* | pentiumiii-* | pentium3-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentium4-*) + basic_machine=i786-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pn) + basic_machine=pn-gould + ;; + power) basic_machine=power-ibm + ;; + ppc) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + ;; + ppc-*) basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little) + basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown + ;; + ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*) + basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppc64) basic_machine=powerpc64-unknown + ;; + ppc64-*) basic_machine=powerpc64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppc64le | powerpc64little | ppc64-le | powerpc64-little) + basic_machine=powerpc64le-unknown + ;; + ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*) + basic_machine=powerpc64le-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ps2) + basic_machine=i386-ibm + ;; + pw32) + basic_machine=i586-unknown + os=-pw32 + ;; + rom68k) + basic_machine=m68k-rom68k + os=-coff + ;; + rm[46]00) + basic_machine=mips-siemens + ;; + rtpc | rtpc-*) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + s390 | s390-*) + basic_machine=s390-ibm + ;; + s390x | s390x-*) + basic_machine=s390x-ibm + ;; + sa29200) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + sb1) + basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1-unknown + ;; + sb1el) + basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1el-unknown + ;; + sei) + basic_machine=mips-sei + os=-seiux + ;; + sequent) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + ;; + sh) + basic_machine=sh-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + sh64) + basic_machine=sh64-unknown + ;; + sparclite-wrs | simso-wrs) + basic_machine=sparclite-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + sps7) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv2 + ;; + spur) + basic_machine=spur-unknown + ;; + st2000) + basic_machine=m68k-tandem + ;; + stratus) + basic_machine=i860-stratus + os=-sysv4 + ;; + sun2) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + ;; + sun2os3) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun2os4) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun3os3) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun3os4) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4os3) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun4os4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4sol2) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-solaris2 + ;; + sun3 | sun3-*) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + ;; + sun4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner) + basic_machine=i386-sun + ;; + sv1) + basic_machine=sv1-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + symmetry) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + t3e) + basic_machine=alphaev5-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + t90) + basic_machine=t90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + tic54x | c54x*) + basic_machine=tic54x-unknown + os=-coff + ;; + tic55x | c55x*) + basic_machine=tic55x-unknown + os=-coff + ;; + tic6x | c6x*) + basic_machine=tic6x-unknown + os=-coff + ;; + tx39) + basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown + ;; + tx39el) + basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown + ;; + toad1) + basic_machine=pdp10-xkl + os=-tops20 + ;; + tower | tower-32) + basic_machine=m68k-ncr + ;; + tpf) + basic_machine=s390x-ibm + os=-tpf + ;; + udi29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + ultra3) + basic_machine=a29k-nyu + os=-sym1 + ;; + v810 | necv810) + basic_machine=v810-nec + os=-none + ;; + vaxv) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-sysv + ;; + vms) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-vms + ;; + vpp*|vx|vx-*) + basic_machine=f301-fujitsu + ;; + vxworks960) + basic_machine=i960-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks68) + basic_machine=m68k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks29k) + basic_machine=a29k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + w65*) + basic_machine=w65-wdc + os=-none + ;; + w89k-*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond + os=-proelf + ;; + xps | xps100) + basic_machine=xps100-honeywell + ;; + ymp) + basic_machine=ymp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + z8k-*-coff) + basic_machine=z8k-unknown + os=-sim + ;; + none) + basic_machine=none-none + os=-none + ;; + +# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in +# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular. + w89k) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond + ;; + op50n) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + ;; + op60c) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + ;; + romp) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + rs6000) + basic_machine=rs6000-ibm + ;; + vax) + basic_machine=vax-dec + ;; + pdp10) + # there are many clones, so DEC is not a safe bet + basic_machine=pdp10-unknown + ;; + pdp11) + basic_machine=pdp11-dec + ;; + we32k) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + sh3 | sh4 | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele) + basic_machine=sh-unknown + ;; + sh64) + basic_machine=sh64-unknown + ;; + sparc | sparcv9 | sparcv9b) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + cydra) + basic_machine=cydra-cydrome + ;; + orion) + basic_machine=orion-highlevel + ;; + orion105) + basic_machine=clipper-highlevel + ;; + mac | mpw | mac-mpw) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + ;; + pmac | pmac-mpw) + basic_machine=powerpc-apple + ;; + *-unknown) + # Make sure to match an already-canonicalized machine name. + ;; + *) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers. +case $basic_machine in + *-digital*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'` + ;; + *-commodore*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'` + ;; + *) + ;; +esac + +# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems. + +if [ x"$os" != x"" ] +then +case $os in + # First match some system type aliases + # that might get confused with valid system types. + # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception. + -solaris1 | -solaris1.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'` + ;; + -solaris) + os=-solaris2 + ;; + -svr4*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -unixware*) + os=-sysv4.2uw + ;; + -gnu/linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + # First accept the basic system types. + # The portable systems comes first. + # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number. + # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4. + -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \ + | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\ + | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -solaris* | -sym* \ + | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \ + | -aos* \ + | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \ + | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \ + | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* | -openbsd* \ + | -ekkobsd* | -kfreebsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* | -lynxos* \ + | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \ + | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \ + | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \ + | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* \ + | -cygwin* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \ + | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-uclibc* | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \ + | -interix* | -uwin* | -mks* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \ + | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \ + | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* \ + | -os2* | -vos* | -palmos* | -uclinux* | -nucleus* \ + | -morphos* | -superux* | -rtmk* | -rtmk-nova* | -windiss* \ + | -powermax* | -dnix* | -nx6 | -nx7 | -sei* | -dragonfly*) + # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number. + ;; + -qnx*) + case $basic_machine in + x86-* | i*86-*) + ;; + *) + os=-nto$os + ;; + esac + ;; + -nto-qnx*) + ;; + -nto*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|nto|nto-qnx|'` + ;; + -sim | -es1800* | -hms* | -xray | -os68k* | -none* | -v88r* \ + | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* \ + | -macos* | -mpw* | -magic* | -mmixware* | -mon960* | -lnews*) + ;; + -mac*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'` + ;; + -linux-dietlibc) + os=-linux-dietlibc + ;; + -linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + -sunos5*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'` + ;; + -sunos6*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'` + ;; + -opened*) + os=-openedition + ;; + -os400*) + os=-os400 + ;; + -wince*) + os=-wince + ;; + -osfrose*) + os=-osfrose + ;; + -osf*) + os=-osf + ;; + -utek*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -dynix*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -acis*) + os=-aos + ;; + -atheos*) + os=-atheos + ;; + -syllable*) + os=-syllable + ;; + -386bsd) + os=-bsd + ;; + -ctix* | -uts*) + os=-sysv + ;; + -nova*) + os=-rtmk-nova + ;; + -ns2 ) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + -nsk*) + os=-nsk + ;; + # Preserve the version number of sinix5. + -sinix5.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'` + ;; + -sinix*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -tpf*) + os=-tpf + ;; + -triton*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -oss*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -svr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -svr3) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -sysvr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + # This must come after -sysvr4. + -sysv*) + ;; + -ose*) + os=-ose + ;; + -es1800*) + os=-ose + ;; + -xenix) + os=-xenix + ;; + -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) + os=-mint + ;; + -aros*) + os=-aros + ;; + -kaos*) + os=-kaos + ;; + -none) + ;; + *) + # Get rid of the `-' at the beginning of $os. + os=`echo $os | sed 's/[^-]*-//'` + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': system \`$os\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac +else + +# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines. +# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their +# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine. + +# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say, +# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top +# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system. Otherwise, code above +# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating +# system, and we'll never get to this point. + +case $basic_machine in + *-acorn) + os=-riscix1.2 + ;; + arm*-rebel) + os=-linux + ;; + arm*-semi) + os=-aout + ;; + c4x-* | tic4x-*) + os=-coff + ;; + # This must come before the *-dec entry. + pdp10-*) + os=-tops20 + ;; + pdp11-*) + os=-none + ;; + *-dec | vax-*) + os=-ultrix4.2 + ;; + m68*-apollo) + os=-domain + ;; + i386-sun) + os=-sunos4.0.2 + ;; + m68000-sun) + os=-sunos3 + # This also exists in the configure program, but was not the + # default. + # os=-sunos4 + ;; + m68*-cisco) + os=-aout + ;; + mips*-cisco) + os=-elf + ;; + mips*-*) + os=-elf + ;; + or32-*) + os=-coff + ;; + *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os. + os=-sysv3 + ;; + sparc-* | *-sun) + os=-sunos4.1.1 + ;; + *-be) + os=-beos + ;; + *-ibm) + os=-aix + ;; + *-wec) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-winbond) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-oki) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-hp) + os=-hpux + ;; + *-hitachi) + os=-hiux + ;; + i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-cbm) + os=-amigaos + ;; + *-dg) + os=-dgux + ;; + *-dolphin) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + m68k-ccur) + os=-rtu + ;; + m88k-omron*) + os=-luna + ;; + *-next ) + os=-nextstep + ;; + *-sequent) + os=-ptx + ;; + *-crds) + os=-unos + ;; + *-ns) + os=-genix + ;; + i370-*) + os=-mvs + ;; + *-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + *-gould) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-highlevel) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-encore) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-sgi) + os=-irix + ;; + *-siemens) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + *-masscomp) + os=-rtu + ;; + f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu) + os=-uxpv + ;; + *-rom68k) + os=-coff + ;; + *-*bug) + os=-coff + ;; + *-apple) + os=-macos + ;; + *-atari*) + os=-mint + ;; + *) + os=-none + ;; +esac +fi + +# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the +# manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer. +vendor=unknown +case $basic_machine in + *-unknown) + case $os in + -riscix*) + vendor=acorn + ;; + -sunos*) + vendor=sun + ;; + -aix*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -beos*) + vendor=be + ;; + -hpux*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -mpeix*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -hiux*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -unos*) + vendor=crds + ;; + -dgux*) + vendor=dg + ;; + -luna*) + vendor=omron + ;; + -genix*) + vendor=ns + ;; + -mvs* | -opened*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -os400*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -ptx*) + vendor=sequent + ;; + -tpf*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -windiss*) + vendor=wrs + ;; + -aux*) + vendor=apple + ;; + -hms*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -mpw* | -macos*) + vendor=apple + ;; + -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) + vendor=atari + ;; + -vos*) + vendor=stratus + ;; + esac + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"` + ;; +esac + +echo $basic_machine$os +exit 0 + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" +# time-stamp-end: "'" +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6507fff9f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6.26.1 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = no-texinfo.tex + +info_TEXINFOS = heimdal.texi +heimdal_TEXINFOS = intro.texi install.texi setup.texi kerberos4.texi diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ebf43954f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,786 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6.26.1 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) 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next, previous, up +@appendix Acknowledgments + +Eric Young wrote ``libdes''. + +The University of California at Berkeley initially wrote @code{telnet}, +and @code{telnetd}. The authentication and encryption code of +@code{telnet} and @code{telnetd} was added by David Borman (then of Cray +Research, Inc). The encryption code was removed when this was exported +and then added back by Juha Eskelinen, @email{esc@@magic.fi}. + +The @code{popper} was also a Berkeley program initially. + +Some of the functions in @file{libroken} also come from Berkeley by way +of NetBSD/FreeBSD. + +@code{editline} was written by Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. + +The @code{getifaddrs} implementation for Linux was written by Hideaki +YOSHIFUJI for the Usagi project. + +Bugfixes, documentation, encouragement, and code has been contributed by: +@table @asis +@item Derrick J Brashear +@email{shadow@@dementia.org} +@item Ken Hornstein +@email{kenh@@cmf.nrl.navy.mil} +@item Johan Ihrén +@email{johani@@pdc.kth.se} +@item Love Hörnquist-Åstrand +@email{lha@@stacken.kth.se} +@item Magnus Ahltorp +@email{map@@stacken.kth.se} +@item Mark Eichin +@email{eichin@@cygnus.com} +@item Marc Horowitz +@email{marc@@cygnus.com} +@item Luke Howard +@email{lukeh@@PADL.COM} +@item Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH +@email{allbery@@kf8nh.apk.net} +@item Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino +@email{itojun@@kame.net} +@item Daniel Kouril +@email{kouril@@informatics.muni.cz} +@item Åke Sandgren +@email{ake@@cs.umu.se} +@item Michal Vocu +@email{michal@@karlin.mff.cuni.cz} +@item Miroslav Ruda +@email{ruda@@ics.muni.cz} +@item Brian A May +@email{bmay@@snoopy.apana.org.au} +@item Chaskiel M Grundman +@email{cg2v@@andrew.cmu.edu} +@item Richard Nyberg +@email{rnyberg@@it.su.se} +@item Frank van der Linden +@email{fvdl@@netbsd.org} +@item Cizzi Storm +@email{cizzi@@it.su.se} +@item and we hope that those not mentioned here will forgive us. +@end table + +All bugs were introduced by ourselves. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..54337fca33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +This is Info file heimdal.info, produced by Makeinfo version 1.68 from +the input file heimdal.texi. + +INFO-DIR-SECTION Heimdal +START-INFO-DIR-ENTRY +* Heimdal: (heimdal). The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH +END-INFO-DIR-ENTRY + + +Indirect: +heimdal.info-1: 236 +heimdal.info-2: 48957 + +Tag Table: +(Indirect) +Node: Top236 +Node: Introduction591 +Node: What is Kerberos?3469 +Node: Building and Installing8542 +Node: Setting up a realm12154 +Node: Configuration file12905 +Node: Creating the database15662 +Node: keytabs18261 +Node: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver19105 +Node: Remote administration20553 +Node: Password changing22489 +Node: Testing clients and servers24298 +Node: Slave Servers24618 +Node: Incremental propagation26366 +Node: Salting28894 +Node: Cross realm30628 +Node: Transit policy33178 +Node: Setting up DNS34421 +Node: Things in search for a better place36071 +Node: Kerberos 4 issues41083 +Node: Principal conversion issues41585 +Node: Converting a version 4 database43929 +Node: kaserver48957 +Node: Windows 2000 compatability50696 +Node: Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC51882 +Node: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC53634 +Node: Create account mappings56082 +Node: Encryption types56672 +Node: Authorization data57413 +Node: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC58557 +Node: Useful links when reading about the Windows 200059799 +Node: Programming with Kerberos61871 +Node: Kerberos 5 API Overview62285 +Node: Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client63839 +Node: Validating a password in a server application71655 +Node: Migration71936 +Node: Acknowledgments73189 + +End Tag Table diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info-1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info-1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9650a80a90 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info-1 @@ -0,0 +1,1290 @@ +This is Info file heimdal.info, produced by Makeinfo version 1.68 from +the input file heimdal.texi. + +INFO-DIR-SECTION Heimdal +START-INFO-DIR-ENTRY +* Heimdal: (heimdal). The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH +END-INFO-DIR-ENTRY + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Top, Next: Introduction, Prev: (dir), Up: (dir) + +Heimdal +******* + +* Menu: + +* Introduction:: +* What is Kerberos?:: +* Building and Installing:: +* Setting up a realm:: +* Things in search for a better place:: +* Kerberos 4 issues:: +* Windows 2000 compatability:: +* Programming with Kerberos:: +* Migration:: +* Acknowledgments:: + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Introduction, Next: What is Kerberos?, Prev: Top, Up: Top + +Introduction +************ + +What is Heimdal? +================ + +Heimdal is a free implementation of Kerberos 5. The goals are to: + + * have an implementation that can be freely used by anyone + + * be protocol compatible with existing implementations and, if not in + conflict, with RFC 1510 (and any future updated RFC) + + * be reasonably compatible with the M.I.T Kerberos V5 API + + * have support for Kerberos V5 over GSS-API (RFC1964) + + * include the most important and useful application programs (rsh, + telnet, popper, etc.) + + * include enough backwards compatibility with Kerberos V4 + +Status +====== + +Heimdal has the following features (this does not mean any of this +works): + + * a stub generator and a library to encode/decode/whatever ASN.1/DER + stuff + + * a `libkrb5' library that should be possible to get to work with + simple applications + + * a GSS-API library that should have all the important functions for + building applications + + * Eric Young's `libdes' + + * `kinit', `klist', `kdestroy' + + * `telnet', `telnetd' + + * `rsh', `rshd' + + * `popper', `push' (a movemail equivalent) + + * `ftp', and `ftpd' + + * a library `libkafs' for authenticating to AFS and a program + `afslog' that uses it + + * some simple test programs + + * a KDC that supports most things; optionally, it may also support + Kerberos V4 and kaserver, + + * simple programs for distributing databases between a KDC master and + slaves + + * a password changing daemon `kpasswdd', library functions for + changing passwords and a simple client + + * some kind of administration system + + * Kerberos V4 support in many of the applications. + +Bug reports +=========== + +If you find bugs in this software, make sure it is a genuine bug and not +just a part of the code that isn't implemented. + +Bug reports should be sent to . Please include +information on what machine and operating system (including version) +you are running, what you are trying to do, what happens, what you +think should have happened, an example for us to repeat, the output you +get when trying the example, and a patch for the problem if you have +one. Please make any patches with `diff -u' or `diff -c'. + +Suggestions, comments and other non bug reports are also welcome. + +Mailing list +============ + +There are two mailing lists with talk about Heimdal. + is a low-volume announcement list, while + is for general discussion. Send a message to + to subscribe. + +Heimdal source code, binaries and the manual +============================================ + +The source code for heimdal, links to binaries and the manual (this +document) can be found on our web-page at +`http://www.pdc.kth.se/heimdal/'. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: What is Kerberos?, Next: Building and Installing, Prev: Introduction, Up: Top + +What is Kerberos? +***************** + + Now this Cerberus had three heads of dogs, + the tail of a dragon, and on his back the + heads of all sorts of snakes. + -- Pseudo-Apollodorus Library 2.5.12 + +Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services on a network. +It is built upon the assumption that the network is "unsafe". For +example, data sent over the network can be eavesdropped and altered, and +addresses can also be faked. Therefore they cannot be used for +authentication purposes. + +Kerberos is a trusted third-party service. That means that there is a +third party (the kerberos server) that is trusted by all the entities on +the network (users and services, usually called "principals"). All +principals share a secret password (or key) with the kerberos server and +this enables principals to verify that the messages from the kerberos +server are authentic. Thus trusting the kerberos server, users and +services can authenticate each other. + +Basic mechanism +=============== + + *Note:* This discussion is about Kerberos version 4, but version 5 + works similarly. + +In Kerberos, principals use "tickets" to prove that they are who they +claim to be. In the following example, A is the initiator of the +authentication exchange, usually a user, and B is the service that A +wishes to use. + +To obtain a ticket for a specific service, A sends a ticket request to +the kerberos server. The request contains A's and B's names (along with +some other fields). The kerberos server checks that both A and B are +valid principals. + +Having verified the validity of the principals, it creates a packet +containing A's and B's names, A's network address (A), the +current time (T), the lifetime of the ticket (LIFE), and a +secret "session key" (K). This packet is encrypted with B's secret +key (K). The actual ticket (T) looks like this: ({A, B, +A, T, LIFE, K}K). + +The reply to A consists of the ticket (T), B's name, the current +time, the lifetime of the ticket, and the session key, all encrypted in +A's secret key ({B, T, LIFE, K, T}K). A decrypts the +reply and retains it for later use. + +Before sending a message to B, A creates an authenticator consisting of +A's name, A's address, the current time, and a "checksum" chosen by A, +all encrypted with the secret session key ({A, A, T, +CHECKSUM}K). This is sent together with the ticket received from +the kerberos server to B. Upon reception, B decrypts the ticket using +B's secret key. Since the ticket contains the session key that the +authenticator was encrypted with, B can now also decrypt the +authenticator. To verify that A really is A, B now has to compare the +contents of the ticket with that of the authenticator. If everything +matches, B now considers A as properly authenticated. + +Different attacks +================= + +Impersonating A +--------------- + +An impostor, C could steal the authenticator and the ticket as it is +transmitted across the network, and use them to impersonate A. The +address in the ticket and the authenticator was added to make it more +difficult to perform this attack. To succeed C will have to either use +the same machine as A or fake the source addresses of the packets. By +including the time stamp in the authenticator, C does not have much +time in which to mount the attack. + +Impersonating B +--------------- + +C can hijack B's network address, and when A sends her credentials, C +just pretend to verify them. C can't be sure that she is talking to A. + +Defense strategies +================== + +It would be possible to add a "replay cache" to the server side. The +idea is to save the authenticators sent during the last few minutes, so +that B can detect when someone is trying to retransmit an already used +message. This is somewhat impractical (mostly regarding efficiency), +and is not part of Kerberos 4; MIT Kerberos 5 contains it. + +To authenticate B, A might request that B sends something back that +proves that B has access to the session key. An example of this is the +checksum that A sent as part of the authenticator. One typical +procedure is to add one to the checksum, encrypt it with the session +key and send it back to A. This is called "mutual authentication". + +The session key can also be used to add cryptographic checksums to the +messages sent between A and B (known as "message integrity"). +Encryption can also be added ("message confidentiality"). This is +probably the best approach in all cases. + +Further reading +=============== + +The original paper on Kerberos from 1988 is `Kerberos: An +Authentication Service for Open Network Systems', by Jennifer Steiner, +Clifford Neuman and Jeffrey I. Schiller. + +A less technical description can be found in `Designing an +Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes' by Bill Bryant, also +from 1988. + +These documents can be found on our web-page at +`http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/'. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Building and Installing, Next: Setting up a realm, Prev: What is Kerberos?, Up: Top + +Building and Installing +*********************** + +Heimdal uses GNU Autoconf to configure for specific hosts, and GNU +Automake to manage makefiles. If this is new to you, the short +instruction is to run the `configure' script in the top level +directory, and when that finishes `make'. + +If you want to build the distribution in a different directory from the +source directory, you will need a make that implements VPATH correctly, +such as GNU make. + +You will need to build the distribution: + + * A compiler that supports a "loose" ANSI C mode, such as `gcc'. + + * lex or flex + + * awk + + * yacc or bison + + * a socket library + + * NDBM or Berkeley DB for building the server side. + +When everything is built, you can install by doing `make install'. The +default location for installation is `/usr/heimdal', but this can be +changed by running `configure' with `--prefix=/some/other/place'. + +If you need to change the default behavior, configure understands the +following options: + +`--without-berkeley-db' + DB is preferred before NDBM, but if you for some reason want to + use NDBM instead, you can use this option. + +`--with-krb4=`dir'' + Gives the location of Kerberos 4 libraries and headers. This + enables Kerberos 4 support in the applications (telnet, rsh, + popper, etc) and the KDC. It is automatically check for in + `/usr/athena'. If you keep libraries and headers in different + places, you can instead give the path to each with the + `--with-krb4-lib=`dir'', and `--with-krb4-include=`dir'' options. + + You will need a fairly recent version of our Kerberos 4 + distribution for `rshd' and `popper' to support version 4 clients. + +`--enable-dce' + Enables support for getting DCE credentials and tokens. See the + README files in `appl/dceutils' for more information. + +`--disable-otp' + By default some of the application programs will build with + support for one-time passwords (OTP). Use this option to disable + that support. + +`--enable-osfc2' + Enable some C2 support for OSF/Digital Unix/Tru64. Use this + option if you are running your OSF operating system in C2 mode. + +`--with-readline=`dir'' + Gives the path for the GNU Readline library, which will be used in + some programs. If no readline library is found, the (simpler) + editline library will be used instead. + +`--with-hesiod=`dir'' + Enables hesiod support in push. + +`--enable-netinfo' + Add support for using netinfo to lookup configuration information. + Probably only useful (and working) on NextStep/Mac OS X. + +`--without-ipv6' + Disable the IPv6 support. + +`--with-openldap' + Compile Heimdal with support for storing the database in LDAP. + Requires OpenLDAP `http://www.openldap.org'. See + `http://www.padl.com/~lukeh/heimdal/' for more information. + +`--enable-bigendian' + +`--enable-littleendian' + Normally, the build process will figure out by itself if the + machine is big or little endian. It might fail in some cases when + cross-compiling. If it does fail to figure it out, use the + relevant of these two options. + +`--with-mips-abi=ABI' + On Irix there are three different ABIs that can be used (`32', + `n32', or `64'). This option allows you to override the automatic + selection. + +`--disable-mmap' + Do not use the mmap system call. Normally, configure detects if + there is a working mmap and it is only used if there is one. Only + try this option if it fails to work anyhow. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Setting up a realm, Next: Things in search for a better place, Prev: Building and Installing, Up: Top + +Setting up a realm +****************** + +* Menu: + +* Configuration file:: +* Creating the database:: +* keytabs:: +* Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver:: +* Remote administration:: +* Password changing:: +* Testing clients and servers:: +* Slave Servers:: +* Incremental propagation:: +* Salting:: +* Cross realm:: +* Transit policy:: +* Setting up DNS:: + +A realm is an administrative domain. The name of a Kerberos realm is +usually the Internet domain name in uppercase. Call your realm the same +as your Internet domain name if you do not have strong reasons for not +doing so. It will make life easier for you and everyone else. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Configuration file, Next: Creating the database, Prev: Setting up a realm, Up: Setting up a realm + +Configuration file +================== + +To setup a realm you will first have to create a configuration file: +`/etc/krb5.conf'. The `krb5.conf' file can contain many configuration +options, some of which are described here. + +There is a sample `krb5.conf' supplied with the distribution. + +The configuration file is a hierarchical structure consisting of +sections, each containing a list of bindings (either variable +assignments or subsections). A section starts with `[section-name]'. A +binding consists of a left hand side, an equal (`=') and a right hand +side (the left hand side tag must be separated from the equal with some +whitespace.) Subsections has a `{' as the first non-whitespace +character after the equal. All other bindings are treated as variable +assignments. The value of a variable extends to the end of the line. + + [section1] + a-subsection = { + var = value1 + other-var = value with {} + sub-sub-section = { + var = 123 + } + } + var = some other value + [section2] + var = yet another value + +In this manual, names of sections and bindings will be given as strings +separated by slashes (`/'). The `other-var' variable will thus be +`section1/a-subsection/other-var'. + +For in-depth information about the contents of the configuration file, +refer to the `krb5.conf' manual page. Some of the more important +sections are briefly described here. + +The `libdefaults' section contains a list of library configuration +parameters, such as the default realm and the timeout for KDC +responses. The `realms' section contains information about specific +realms, such as where they hide their KDC. This section serves the same +purpose as the Kerberos 4 `krb.conf' file, but can contain more +information. Finally the `domain_realm' section contains a list of +mappings from domains to realms, equivalent to the Kerberos 4 +`krb.realms' file. + +To continue with the realm setup, you will have to create a +configuration file, with contents similar to the following. + + [libdefaults] + default_realm = MY.REALM + [realms] + MY.REALM = { + kdc = my.kdc my.slave.kdc + kdc = my.third.kdc + } + [domain_realm] + .my.domain = MY.REALM + +If you use a realm name equal to your domain name, you can omit the +`libdefaults', and `domain_realm', sections. If you have a SRV-record +for your realm, or your Kerberos server has CNAME called +`kerberos.my.realm', you can omit the `realms' section too. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Creating the database, Next: keytabs, Prev: Configuration file, Up: Setting up a realm + +Creating the database +===================== + +The database library will look for the database in the directory +`/var/heimdal', so you should probably create that directory. Make +sure the directory have restrictive permissions. + + # mkdir /var/heimdal + +The keys of all the principals are stored in the database. If you +choose to, these can be encrypted with a master key. You do not have to +remember this key (or password), but just to enter it once and it will +be stored in a file (`/var/heimdal/m-key'). If you want to have a +master key, run `kstash' to create this master key: + + # kstash + Master key: + Verifying password - Master key: + +To initialise the database use the `kadmin' program, with the `-l' +option (to enable local database mode). First issue a `init MY.REALM' +command. This will create the database and insert default principals +for that realm. You can have more than one realm in one database, so +`init' does not destroy any old database. + +Before creating the database, `init' will ask you some questions about +max ticket lifetimes. + +After creating the database you should probably add yourself to it. You +do this with the `add' command. It takes as argument the name of a +principal. The principal should contain a realm, so if you haven't setup +a default realm, you will need to explicitly include the realm. + + # kadmin -l + kadmin> init MY.REALM + Realm max ticket life [unlimited]: + Realm max renewable ticket life [unlimited]: + kadmin> add me + Max ticket life [unlimited]: + Max renewable life [unlimited]: + Attributes []: + Password: + Verifying password - Password: + +Now start the KDC and try getting a ticket. + + # kdc & + # kinit me + me@MY.REALMS's Password: + # klist + Credentials cache: /tmp/krb5cc_0 + Principal: me@MY.REALM + + Issued Expires Principal + Aug 25 07:25:55 Aug 25 17:25:55 krbtgt/MY.REALM@MY.REALM + +If you are curious you can use the `dump' command to list all the +entries in the database. It should look something similar to the +following example (note that the entries here are truncated for +typographical reasons): + + kadmin> dump + me@MY.REALM 1:0:1:0b01d3cb7c293b57:-:0:7:8aec316b9d1629e3baf8 ... + kadmin/admin@MY.REALM 1:0:1:e5c8a2675b37a443:-:0:7:cb913ebf85 ... + krbtgt/MY.REALM@MY.REALM 1:0:1:52b53b61c875ce16:-:0:7:c8943be ... + kadmin/changepw@MY.REALM 1:0:1:f48c8af2b340e9fb:-:0:7:e3e6088 ... + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: keytabs, Next: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver, Prev: Creating the database, Up: Setting up a realm + +keytabs +======= + +To extract a service ticket from the database and put it in a keytab you +need to first create the principal in the database with `ank' (using +the `--random-key' flag to get a random key) and then extract it with +`ext_keytab'. + + kadmin> add --random-key host/my.host.name + Max ticket life [unlimited]: + Max renewable life [unlimited]: + Attributes []: + kadmin> ext host/my.host.name + # ktutil list + Version Type Principal + 1 des-cbc-md5 host/my.host.name@MY.REALM + 1 des-cbc-md4 host/my.host.name@MY.REALM + 1 des-cbc-crc host/my.host.name@MY.REALM + 1 des3-cbc-sha1 host/my.host.name@MY.REALM + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver, Next: Remote administration, Prev: keytabs, Up: Setting up a realm + +Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver +=============================== + +Heimdal can be configured to support 524, Kerberos 4 or kaserver. All +theses services are default turned off. Kerberos 4 support also depends +on if Kerberos 4 support is compiled in with Heimdal. + +524 +--- + +524 is a service that allows the KDC to convert Kerberos 5 tickets to +Kerberos 4 tickets for backward compatibility. See also Using 2b tokens +with AFS in *Note Things in search for a better place::. + +524 can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file + + [kdc] + enable-524 = yes + +Kerberos 4 +---------- + +Kerberos 4 is the predecessor to to Kerberos 5. It only support single +DES. You should only enable Kerberos 4 support if you have a need for +for compatibility with an installed base of Kerberos 4 clients/servers. + +Kerberos 4 can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file + + [kdc] + enable-kerberos4 = yes + +kaserver +-------- + +Kaserver is a Kerberos 4 that is used in AFS, the protocol have some +features over plain Kerberos 4, but like Kerberos 4 only use single DES +too. + +You should only enable Kerberos 4 support if you have a need for for +compatibility with an installed base of AFS machines. + +Kaserver can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file + + [kdc] + enable-kaserver = yes + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Remote administration, Next: Password changing, Prev: Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver, Up: Setting up a realm + +Remote administration +===================== + +The administration server, `kadmind', can be started by `inetd' (which +isn't recommended) or run as a normal daemon. If you want to start it +from `inetd' you should add a line similar to the one below to your +`/etc/inetd.conf'. + + kerberos-adm stream tcp nowait root /usr/heimdal/libexec/kadmind kadmind + +You might need to add `kerberos-adm' to your `/etc/services' as 749/tcp. + +Access to the administration server is controlled by an acl-file, +(default `/var/heimdal/kadmind.acl'.) The lines in the access file, has +the following syntax: + principal [priv1,priv2,...] [glob-pattern] + +The matching is from top to bottom for matching principal (and if given, +glob-pattern). When there is a match, the rights of that lines are +used. + +The privileges you can assign to a principal are: `add', +`change-password' (or `cpw' for short), `delete', `get', `list', and +`modify', or the special privilege `all'. All of these roughly +corresponds to the different commands in `kadmin'. + +If a GLOB-PATTERN is given on a line, it restricts the right for the +principal to only apply for the subjects that match the pattern. The +patters are of the same type as those used in shell globbing, see +`none,,fnmatch(3)'. + +In the example below `lha/admin' can change every principal in the +database. `jimmy/admin' can only modify principals that belong to the +realm `E.KTH.SE'. `mille/admin' is working at the help desk, so he +should only be able to change the passwords for single component +principals (ordinary users). He will not be able to change any `/admin' +principal. + + lha/admin@E.KTH.SE all + jimmy/admin@E.KTH.SE all *@E.KTH.SE + jimmy/admin@E.KTH.SE all */*@E.KTH.SE + mille/admin@E.KTH.SE change-password *@E.KTH.SE + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Password changing, Next: Testing clients and servers, Prev: Remote administration, Up: Setting up a realm + +Password changing +================= + +To allow users to change their passwords, you should run `kpasswdd'. +It is not run from `inetd'. + +You might need to add `kpasswd' to your `/etc/services' as 464/udp. + +Password quality assurance +-------------------------- + +It is important that users have good passwords, both to make it harder +to guess them and to avoid off-line attacks (pre-authentication provides +some defense against off-line attacks). To ensure that the users choose +good passwords, you can enable password quality controls in `kpasswdd'. +The controls themselves are done in a shared library that is used by +`kpasswdd'. To configure in these controls, add lines similar to the +following to your `/etc/krb5.conf': + + [password_quality] + check_library = LIBRARY + check_function = FUNCTION + +The function FUNCTION in the shared library LIBRARY will be called for +proposed new passwords. The function should be declared as: + + const char * + function(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal, krb5_data *pwd); + +The function should verify that PWD is a good password for PRINCIPAL +and if so return `NULL'. If it is deemed to be of low quality, it +should return a string explaining why that password should not be used. + +Code for a password quality checking function that uses the cracklib +library can be found in `lib/kadm5/sample_password_check.c' in the +source code distribution. It requires the cracklib library built with +the patch available at +`ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/krb/src/cracklib.patch'. + +If no password quality checking function is configured, it is only +verified that it is at least six characters of length. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Testing clients and servers, Next: Slave Servers, Prev: Password changing, Up: Setting up a realm + +Testing clients and servers +=========================== + +Now you should be able to run all the clients and servers. Refer to the +appropriate man pages for information on how to use them. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Slave Servers, Next: Incremental propagation, Prev: Testing clients and servers, Up: Setting up a realm + +Slave servers, Incremental propagation, Testing clients and servers, Setting up a realm +======================================================================================= + +It is desirable to have at least one backup (slave) server in case the +master server fails. It is possible to have any number of such slave +servers but more than three usually doesn't buy much more redundancy. + +All Kerberos servers for a realm shall have the same database so that +they present the same service to all the users. The `hprop' program, +running on the master, will propagate the database to the slaves, +running `hpropd' processes. + +Every slave needs a database directory, the master key (if it was used +for the database) and a keytab with the principal `hprop/HOSTNAME'. +Add the principal with the `ktutil' command and start `propd', as +follows: + + slave# ktutil get -p foo/admin hprop/`hostname` + slave# mkdir /var/heimdal + slave# hpropd + +The master will use the principal `kadmin/hprop' to authenticate to the +slaves. This principal should be added when running `kadmin -l init' +but if you do not have it in your database for whatever reason, please +add it with `kadmin -l add'. + +Then run `hprop' on the master: + + master# hprop slave + +This was just an on-hands example to make sure that everything was +working properly. Doing it manually is of course the wrong way and to +automate this you will want to start `hpropd' from `inetd' on the +slave(s) and regularly run `hprop' on the master to regularly propagate +the database. Starting the propagation once an hour from `cron' is +probably a good idea. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Incremental propagation, Next: Salting, Prev: Slave Servers, Up: Setting up a realm + +Incremental propagation +======================= + +There is also a newer and still somewhat experimental mechanism for +doing incremental propagation in Heimdal. Instead of sending the whole +database regularly, it sends the changes as they happen on the master to +the slaves. The master keeps track of all the changes by assigned a +version number to every change to the database. The slaves know which +was the latest version they saw and in this way it can be determined if +they are in sync or not. A log of all the changes is kept on the master +and when a slave is at an older versioner than the oldest one in the +log, the whole database has to be sent. + +Protocol-wise, all the slaves connects to the master and as a greeting +tell it the latest version that they have (`IHAVE' message). The +master then responds by sending all the changes between that version and +the current version at the master (a series of `FORYOU' messages) or +the whole database in a `TELLYOUEVERYTHING' message. + +Configuring incremental propagation +----------------------------------- + +The program that runs on the master is `ipropd-master' and all clients +run `ipropd-slave'. + +Create the file `/var/heimdal/slaves' on the master containing all the +slaves that the database should be propagated to. Each line contains +the full name of the principal (for example +`iprop/hemligare.foo.se@FOO.SE'). + +You should already have `iprop/tcp' defined as 2121, in your +`/etc/services'. Otherwise, or if you need to use a different port for +some peculiar reason, you can use the `--port' option. This is useful +when you have multiple realms to distribute from one server. + +Then you need to create these principals that you added in the +configuration file. Create one `iprop/hostname' for the master and for +every slave. + + master# /usr/heimdal/sbin/ktutil get iprop/`hostname` + +The next step is to start the `ipropd-master' process on the master +server. The `ipropd-master' listens on the UNIX-socket +`/var/heimdal/signal' to know when changes have been made to the +database so they can be propagated to the slaves. There is also a +safety feature of testing the version number regularly (every 30 +seconds) to see if it has been modified by some means that do not raise +this signal. Then, start `ipropd-slave' on all the slaves: + + master# /usr/heimdal/libexec/ipropd-master & + slave# /usr/heimdal/libexec/ipropd-slave master & + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Salting, Next: Cross realm, Prev: Incremental propagation, Up: Setting up a realm + +Salting +======= + +Salting is used to make it harder to precalculate all possible keys. +Using a salt increases the search space to make it almost impossible to +precalculate all keys. Salting is the process of mixing a public string +(the salt) with the password, then sending it through an +encryption-type specific string-to-key function that will output the +fixed size encryption key. + +In Kerberos 5 the salt is determined by the encryption-type, except in +some special cases. + +In `des' there is the Kerberos 4 salt (none at all) or the afs-salt +(using the cell (realm in afs-lingo)). + +In `arcfour' (the encryption type that Microsoft Windows 2000 uses) +there is no salt. This is to be compatible with NTLM keys in Windows NT +4. + +`[kadmin]default_keys' in `krb5.conf' controls what salting to use, + +The syntax of `[kadmin]default_keys' is +`[etype:]salt-type[:salt-string]'. `etype' is the encryption type (des, +des3, arcfour), `salt-type' is the type of salt (pw-salt or afs3-salt), +and the salt-string is the string that will be used as salt (remember +that if the salt is appended/prepended, the empty salt "" is the same +thing as no salt at all). + +Common types of salting includes + + * `v4' (or `des:pw-salt:') + + The Kerberos 4 salting is using no salt att all. Reason there is + colon that the end or the salt string is that it makes the salt + the empty string (same as no salt). + + * `v5' (or `pw-salt') + + `pw-salt' means all regular encryption-types that is regular + + * `afs3-salt' + + `afs3-salt' is the salting that is used with Transarc kaserver. Its + the cell appended to the password. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Cross realm, Next: Transit policy, Prev: Salting, Up: Setting up a realm + +Cross realm +=========== + +Suppose you are residing in the realm `MY.REALM', how do you +authenticate to a server in `OTHER.REALM'? Having valid tickets in +`MY.REALM' allows you to communicate with kerberised services in that +realm. However, the computer in the other realm does not have a secret +key shared with the Kerberos server in your realm. + +It is possible to add a share keys between two realms that trust each +other. When a client program, such as `telnet' or `ssh', finds that the +other computer is in a different realm, it will try to get a ticket +granting ticket for that other realm, but from the local Kerberos +server. With that ticket granting ticket, it will then obtain service +tickets from the Kerberos server in the other realm. + +For a two way trust between `MY.REALM' and `OTHER.REALM' add the +following principals to each realm. The principals should be +`krbtgt/OTHER.REALM@MY.REALM' and `krbtgt/MY.REALM@OTHER.REALM' in +`MY.REALM', and `krbtgt/MY.REALM@OTHER.REALM' and +`krbtgt/OTHER.REALM@MY.REALM'in `OTHER.REALM'. + +In Kerberos 5 the trust can be one configured to be one way. So that +users from `MY.REALM' can authenticate to services in `OTHER.REALM', +but not the opposite. In the example above, the +`krbtgt/MY.REALM@OTHER.REALM' then should be removed. + +The two principals must have the same key, key version number, and the +same set of encryption types. Remember to transfer the two keys in a +safe manner. + + vr$ klist + Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_913.console + Principal: lha@E.KTH.SE + + Issued Expires Principal + May 3 13:55:52 May 3 23:55:54 krbtgt/E.KTH.SE@E.KTH.SE + + vr$ telnet -l lha hummel.it.su.se + Trying 2001:6b0:5:1095:250:fcff:fe24:dbf... + Connected to hummel.it.su.se. + Escape character is '^]'. + Waiting for encryption to be negotiated... + [ Trying mutual KERBEROS5 (host/hummel.it.su.se@SU.SE)... ] + [ Kerberos V5 accepts you as ``lha@E.KTH.SE'' ] + Encryption negotiated. + Last login: Sat May 3 14:11:47 from vr.l.nxs.se + hummel$ exit + + vr$ klist + Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_913.console + Principal: lha@E.KTH.SE + + Issued Expires Principal + May 3 13:55:52 May 3 23:55:54 krbtgt/E.KTH.SE@E.KTH.SE + May 3 13:55:56 May 3 23:55:54 krbtgt/SU.SE@E.KTH.SE + May 3 14:10:54 May 3 23:55:54 host/hummel.it.su.se@SU.SE + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Transit policy, Next: Setting up DNS, Prev: Cross realm, Up: Setting up a realm + +Transit policy +============== + +If you want to use cross realm authentication through an intermediate +realm it must be explicitly allowed by either the KDCs or the server +receiving the request. This is done in `krb5.conf' in the `[capaths]' +section. + +When the ticket transits through a realm to another realm, the +destination realm adds its peer to the "transited-realms" field in the +ticket. The field is unordered, this is since there is no way to know if +know if one of the transited-realms changed the order of the list. + +The syntax for `[capaths]' section: + + [capaths] + CLIENT-REALM = { + SERVER-REALM = PERMITTED-CROSS-REALMS ... + } + +The realm `STACKEN.KTH.SE' allows clients from `SU.SE' and `DSV.SU.SE' +to cross in. Since `STACKEN.KTH.SE' only have direct cross realm with +`KTH.SE', and `DSV.SU.SE' only have direct cross realm with `SU.SE' +they need to use both `SU.SE' and `KTH.SE' as transit realms. + + [capaths] + SU.SE = { + STACKEN.KTH.SE = KTH.SE + } + DSV.SU.SE = { + STACKEN.KTH.SE = SU.SE KTH.SE + } + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Setting up DNS, Prev: Transit policy, Up: Setting up a realm + +Setting up DNS +============== + +If there is information about where to find the KDC or kadmind for a +realm in the `krb5.conf' for a realm, that information will be +preferred and DNS will not be queried. + +Heimdal will try to use DNS to find the KDCs for a realm. First it will +try to find `SRV' resource record (RR) for the realm. If no SRV RRs are +found, it will fall back to looking for a `A' RR for a machine named +kerberos.REALM, and then kerberos-1.REALM, etc + +Adding this information to DNS makes the client have less configuration +(in the common case, no configuration) and allows the system +administrator to change the number of KDCs and on what machines they +are running without caring about clients. + +The backside of using DNS that the client might be fooled to use the +wrong server if someone fakes DNS replies/data, but storing the IP +addresses of the KDC on all the clients makes it very hard to change +the infrastructure. + +Example of the configuration for the realm `EXAMPLE.COM', + + + $ORIGIN example.com. + _kerberos._tcp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos.example.com. + _kerberos._udp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos.example.com. + _kerberos._tcp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos-1.example.com. + _kerberos._udp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos-1.example.com. + _kpasswd._udp SRV 10 1 464 kerberos.example.com. + _kerberos-adm._tcp SRV 10 1 749 kerberos.example.com. + +More information about DNS SRV resource records can be found in +RFC-2782 (A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)). + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Things in search for a better place, Next: Kerberos 4 issues, Prev: Setting up a realm, Up: Top + +Things in search for a better place +*********************************** + +Making things work on Ciscos +============================ + +Modern versions of Cisco IOS has some support for authenticating via +Kerberos 5. This can be used both by having the router get a ticket when +you login (boring), and by using Kerberos authenticated telnet to access +your router (less boring). The following has been tested on IOS +11.2(12), things might be different with other versions. Old versions +are known to have bugs. + +To make this work, you will first have to configure your router to use +Kerberos (this is explained in the documentation). A sample +configuration looks like the following: + + aaa new-model + aaa authentication login default krb5-telnet krb5 enable + aaa authorization exec krb5-instance + kerberos local-realm FOO.SE + kerberos srvtab entry host/router.foo.se 0 891725446 4 1 8 012345678901234567 + kerberos server FOO.SE 10.0.0.1 + kerberos instance map admin 15 + +This tells you (among other things) that when logging in, the router +should try to authenticate with kerberised telnet, and if that fails try +to verify a plain text password via a Kerberos ticket exchange (as +opposed to a local database, RADIUS or something similar), and if that +fails try the local enable password. If you're not careful when you +specify the `login default' authentication mechanism, you might not be +able to login at all. The `instance map' and `authorization exec' lines +says that people with `admin' instances should be given `enabled' shells +when logging in. + +The numbers after the principal on the `srvtab' line are principal type, +time stamp (in seconds since 1970), key version number (4), keytype (1 +== des), key length (always 8 with des), and then the key. + +To make the Heimdal KDC produce tickets that the Cisco can decode you +might have to turn on the `encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep' flag in the KDC. +You will also have to specify that the router can't handle anything but +`des-cbc-crc'. This can be done with the `del_enctype' command of +`kadmin'. + +This all fine and so, but unless you have an IOS version with encryption +(available only in the U.S) it doesn't really solve any problems. Sure +you don't have to send your password over the wire, but since the telnet +connection isn't protected it's still possible for someone to steal your +session. This won't be fixed until someone adds integrity to the telnet +protocol. + +A working solution would be to hook up a machine with a real operating +system to the console of the Cisco and then use it as a backwards +terminal server. + +Making things work on Transarc/OpenAFS AFS +========================================== + +How to get a KeyFile +-------------------- + +`ktutil -k AFSKEYFILE:KeyFile get afs@MY.REALM' + +or you can extract it with kadmin + + kadmin> ext -k AFSKEYFILE:/usr/afs/etc/KeyFile afs@My.CELL.NAME + +You have to make sure you have a `des-cbc-md5' encryption type since +that is the key that will be converted. + +How to convert a srvtab to a KeyFile +------------------------------------ + +You need a `/usr/vice/etc/ThisCell' containing the cellname of you +AFS-cell. + +`ktutil copy krb4:/root/afs-srvtab AFSKEYFILE:/usr/afs/etc/KeyFile'. + +If keyfile already exists, this will add the new key in afs-srvtab to +KeyFile. + +Using 2b tokens with AFS +======================== + +What is 2b ? +------------ + +2b is the name of the proposal that was implemented to give basic +Kerberos 5 support to AFS in rxkad. Its not real Kerberos 5 support +since it still uses fcrypt for data encryption and not Kerberos +encryption types. + +Its only possible (in all cases) to do this for DES encryption types +because only then the token (the AFS equivalent of a ticket) will be be +smaller than the maximum size that can fit in the token cache in +OpenAFS/Transarc client. Its so tight fit that some extra wrapping on +the ASN1/DER encoding is removed from the Kerberos ticket. + +2b uses a Kerberos 5 EncTicketPart instead of a Kerberos 4 ditto for +the part of the ticket that is encrypted with the service's key. The +client doesn't know what's inside the encrypted data so to the client +it doesn't matter. + +To differentiate between Kerberos 4 tickets and Kerberos 5 tickets 2b +uses a special kvno, 213 for 2b tokens and 255 for Kerberos 5 tokens. + +Its a requirement that all AFS servers that support 2b also support +native Kerberos 5 in rxkad. + +Configuring Heimdal to use 2b tokens +------------------------------------ + +Support for 2b tokens are turned on for specific principals by adding +them to the string list option `[kdc]use_2b' in the kdc's `krb5.conf' +file. + + [kdc] + use_2b = { + afs@SU.SE = yes + afs/it.su.se@SU.SE = yes + } + +Configuring AFS clients +----------------------- + +There is no need to configure AFS clients. The only software that needs +to be installed/upgrade is a Kerberos 5 enabled `afslog'. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Kerberos 4 issues, Next: Windows 2000 compatability, Prev: Things in search for a better place, Up: Top + +Kerberos 4 issues +***************** + +If compiled with version 4 support, the KDC can serve requests from a +Kerberos 4 client. There are a few things you must do for this to work. + +The KDC will also have kaserver emulation and be able to handle +AFS-clients that use `klog'. + +* Menu: + +* Principal conversion issues:: +* Converting a version 4 database:: +* kaserver:: + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Principal conversion issues, Next: Converting a version 4 database, Prev: Kerberos 4 issues, Up: Kerberos 4 issues + +Principal conversion issues +=========================== + +First, Kerberos 4 and Kerberos 5 principals are different. A version 4 +principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A version 5 +principal has one or more components, and a realm (the terms "name" and +"instance" are still used, for the first and second component, +respectively). Also, in some cases the name of a version 4 principal +differs from the first component of the corresponding version 5 +principal. One notable example is the "host" type principals, where the +version 4 name is `rcmd' (for "remote command"), and the version 5 name +is `host'. For the class of principals that has a hostname as instance, +there is an other major difference, Kerberos 4 uses only the first +component of the hostname, whereas Kerberos 5 uses the fully qualified +hostname. + +Because of this it can be hard or impossible to correctly convert a +version 4 principal to a version 5 principal (1). The biggest problem is +to know if the conversion resulted in a valid principal. To give an +example, suppose you want to convert the principal `rcmd.foo'. + +The `rcmd' name suggests that the instance is a hostname (even if there +are exceptions to this rule). To correctly convert the instance `foo' +to a hostname, you have to know which host it is referring to. You can +to this by either guessing (from the realm) which domain name to +append, or you have to have a list of possible hostnames. In the +simplest cases you can cover most principals with the first rule. If you +have several domains sharing a single realm this will not usually work. +If the exceptions are few you can probably come by with a lookup table +for the exceptions. + +In a complex scenario you will need some kind of host lookup mechanism. +Using DNS for this is tempting, but DNS is error prone, slow and unsafe +(2). + +Fortunately, the KDC has a trump on hand: it can easily tell if a +principal exists in the database. The KDC will use +`krb5_425_conv_principal_ext' to convert principals when handling to +version 4 requests. + +---------- Footnotes ---------- + +(1) the other way is not always trivial either, but usually easier + +(2) at least until secure DNS is commonly available + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Converting a version 4 database, Next: kaserver, Prev: Principal conversion issues, Up: Kerberos 4 issues + +Converting a version 4 database +=============================== + +If you want to convert an existing version 4 database, the principal +conversion issue arises too. + +If you decide to convert your database once and for all, you will only +have to do this conversion once. It is also possible to run a version 5 +KDC as a slave to a version 4 KDC. In this case this conversion will +happen every time the database is propagated. When doing this +conversion, there are a few things to look out for. If you have stale +entries in the database, these entries will not be converted. This might +be because these principals are not used anymore, or it might be just +because the principal couldn't be converted. + +You might also see problems with a many-to-one mapping of principals. +For instance, if you are using DNS lookups and you have two principals +`rcmd.foo' and `rcmd.bar', where `foo' is a CNAME for `bar', the +resulting principals will be the same. Since the conversion function +can't tell which is correct, these conflicts will have to be resolved +manually. + +Conversion example +------------------ + +Given the following set of hosts and services: + + foo.se rcmd + mail.foo.se rcmd, pop + ftp.bar.se rcmd, ftp + +you have a database that consists of the following principals: + +`rcmd.foo', `rcmd.mail', `pop.mail', `rcmd.ftp', and `ftp.ftp'. + +lets say you also got these extra principals: `rcmd.gone', +`rcmd.old-mail', where `gone.foo.se' was a machine that has now passed +away, and `old-mail.foo.se' was an old mail machine that is now a CNAME +for `mail.foo.se'. + +When you convert this database you want the following conversions to be +done: + rcmd.foo host/foo.se + rcmd.mail host/mail.foo.se + pop.mail pop/mail.foo.se + rcmd.ftp host/ftp.bar.se + ftp.ftp ftp/ftp.bar.se + rcmd.gone removed + rcmd.old-mail removed + +A `krb5.conf' that does this looks like: + + [realms] + FOO.SE = { + v4_name_convert = { + host = { + ftp = ftp + pop = pop + rcmd = host + } + } + v4_instance_convert = { + foo = foo.se + ftp = ftp.bar.se + } + default_domain = foo.se + } + +The `v4_name_convert' section says which names should be considered +having an instance consisting of a hostname, and it also says how the +names should be converted (for instance `rcmd' should be converted to +`host'). The `v4_instance_convert' section says how a hostname should +be qualified (this is just a hosts-file in disguise). Host-instances +that aren't covered by `v4_instance_convert' are qualified by appending +the contents of the `default_domain'. + +Actually, this example doesn't work. Or rather, it works to well. Since +it has no way of knowing which hostnames are valid and which are not, it +will happily convert `rcmd.gone' to `host/gone.foo.se'. This isn't a +big problem, but if you have run your kerberos realm for a few years, +chances are big that you have quite a few `junk' principals. + +If you don't want this you can remove the `default_domain' statement, +but then you will have to add entries for *all* your hosts in the +`v4_instance_convert' section. + +Instead of doing this you can use DNS to convert instances. This is not +a solution without problems, but it is probably easier than adding lots +of static host entries. + +To enable DNS lookup you should turn on `v4_instance_resolve' in the +`[libdefaults]' section. + +Converting a database +--------------------- + +The database conversion is done with `hprop'. You can run this command +to propagate the database to the machine called `slave-server' (which +should be running a `hpropd'). + + hprop --source=krb4-db --master-key=/.m slave-server + +This command can also be to use for converting the v4 database on the +server: + + hprop -n --source=krb4-db -d /var/kerberos/principal --master-key=/.m | hpropd -n + +Version 4 Kadmin +================ + +`kadmind' can act as a version 4 kadmind, and you can do most +operations, but with some restrictions (since the version 4 kadmin +protocol is, lets say, very ad hoc.) One example is that it only passes +des keys when creating principals and changing passwords (modern kpasswd +clients do send the password, so it's possible to to password quality +checks). Because of this you can only create principals with des keys, +and you can't set any flags or do any other fancy stuff. + +To get this to work, you have to add another entry to inetd (since +version 4 uses port 751, not 749). + +*And then there are a many more things you can do; more on this in a +later version of this manual. Until then, UTSL.* + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info-2 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info-2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42d7466fd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.info-2 @@ -0,0 +1,756 @@ +This is Info file heimdal.info, produced by Makeinfo version 1.68 from +the input file heimdal.texi. + +INFO-DIR-SECTION Heimdal +START-INFO-DIR-ENTRY +* Heimdal: (heimdal). The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH +END-INFO-DIR-ENTRY + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: kaserver, Prev: Converting a version 4 database, Up: Kerberos 4 issues + +kaserver +======== + +kaserver emulation +------------------ + +The Heimdal kdc can emulate a kaserver. The kaserver is a Kerberos 4 +server with pre-authentication using Rx as the on-wire protocol. The kdc +contains a minimalistic Rx implementation. + +There are three parts of the kaserver; KAA (Authentication), KAT (Ticket +Granting), and KAM (Maintenance). The KAA interface and KAT interface +both passes over DES encrypted data-blobs (just like the +Kerberos-protocol) and thus do not need any other protection. The KAM +interface uses `rxkad' (Kerberos authentication layer for Rx) for +security and data protection, and is used for example for changing +passwords. This part is not implemented in the kdc. + +Another difference between the ka-protocol and the Kerberos 4 protocol +is that the pass-phrase is salted with the cellname in the `string to +key' function in the ka-protocol, while in the Kerberos 4 protocol there +is no salting of the password at all. To make sure AFS-compatible keys +are added to each principals when they are created or their password are +changed, `afs3-salt' should be added to `[kadmin]default_keys'. + +Transarc AFS Windows client +--------------------------- + +The Transarc Windows client uses Kerberos 4 to obtain tokens, and thus +does not need a kaserver. The Windows client assumes that the Kerberos +server is on the same machine as the AFS-database server. If you do not +like to do that you can add a small program that runs on the database +servers that forward all kerberos requests to the real kerberos server. +A program that does this is `krb-forward' +(`ftp://ftp.stacken.kth.se/pub/projekts/krb-forward'). + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Windows 2000 compatability, Next: Programming with Kerberos, Prev: Kerberos 4 issues, Up: Top + +Windows 2000 compatability +************************** + +Windows 2000 (formerly known as Windows NT 5) from Microsoft implements +Kerberos 5. Their implementation, however, has some quirks, +peculiarities, and bugs. This chapter is a short summary of the things +that we have found out while trying to test Heimdal against Windows +2000. Another big problem with the Kerberos implementation in Windows +2000 is that the available documentation is more focused on getting +things to work rather than how they work and not that useful in figuring +out how things really work. + +This information should apply to Heimdal 0.3a and Windows 2000 +Professional. It's of course subject all the time and mostly consists +of our not so inspired guesses. Hopefully it's still somewhat useful. + +* Menu: + +* Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC:: +* Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC:: +* Create account mappings:: +* Encryption types:: +* Authorization data:: +* Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC:: +* Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000:: + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC, Next: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC, Prev: Windows 2000 compatability, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC +============================================= + +You need the command line program called `ksetup.exe' which is available +in the file `SUPPORT/TOOLS/SUPPORT.CAB' on the Windows 2000 Professional +CD-ROM. This program is used to configure the Kerberos settings on a +Workstation. + +`Ksetup' store the domain information under the registry key: +`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\Kerberos\Domains'. + +Use the kadmin program in Heimdal to create a host principal in the +Kerberos realm. + + unix% kadmin + kadmin> ank -pw password host/datan.my.domain + +You must configure the Workstation as a member of a workgroup, as +opposed to a member in an NT domain, and specify the KDC server of the +realm as follows: + C:> ksetup /setdomain MY.REALM + C:> ksetup /addkdc MY.REALM kdc.my.domain + +Set the machine password, i.e. create the local keytab: + C:> ksetup /setmachpassword password + +The workstation must now be rebooted. + +A mapping between local NT users and Kerberos principals must be +specified, you have two choices: + + C:> ksetup /mapuser user@MY.REALM nt_user + +This will map a user to a specific principal, this allows you to have +other usernames in the realm than in your NT user database. (Don't ask +me why on earth you would want that...) + +You can also say: + C:> ksetup /mapuser * * +The Windows machine will now map any user to the corresponding +principal, for example `nisse' to the principal `nisse@MY.REALM'. +(This is most likely what you want.) + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC, Next: Create account mappings, Prev: Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC +=============================================================== + +See also the Step-by-Step guide from Microsoft, referenced below. + +Install Windows 2000, and create a new controller (Active Directory +Server) for the domain. + +By default the trust will be non-transitive. This means that only users +directly from the trusted domain may authenticate. This can be changed +to transitive by using the `netdom.exe' tool. + +You need to tell Windows 2000 on what hosts to find the KDCs for the +non-Windows realm with `ksetup', see *Note Configuring Windows 2000 to +use a Heimdal KDC::. + +This need to be done on all computers that want enable cross-realm +login with `Mapped Names'. + +Then you need to add the inter-realm keys on the Windows kdc. Start the +Domain Tree Management tool. (Found in Programs, Administrative tools, +Active Directory Domains and Trusts). + +Right click on Properties of your domain, select the Trust tab. Press +Add on the appropriate trust windows and enter domain name and +password. When prompted if this is a non-Windows Kerberos realm, press +OK. + +Do not forget to add trusts in both directions. + +You also need to add the inter-realm keys to the Heimdal KDC. There are +some tweaks that you need to do to `krb5.conf' beforehand. + + [libdefaults] + default_etypes = des-cbc-crc + default_etypes_des = des-cbc-crc + +since otherwise checksum types that are not understood by Windows 2000 +will be generated (*Note Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC::.). + +Another issue is salting. Since Windows 2000 does not seem to +understand Kerberos 4 salted hashes you might need to turn off anything +similar to the following if you have it, at least while adding the +principals that are going to share keys with Windows 2000. + + [kadmin]default_keys = v5 v4 + +You must also set: + +Once that is also done, you can add the required inter-realm keys: + + kadmin add krbtgt/NT.REALM.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM + kadmin add krbtgt/REALM.EXAMPLE.COM@NT.EXAMPLE.COM + +Use the same passwords for both keys. + +Do not forget to reboot before trying the new realm-trust (after running +`ksetup'). It looks like it might work, but packets are never sent to +the non-Windows KDC. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Create account mappings, Next: Encryption types, Prev: Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Create account mappings +======================= + +Start the `Active Directory Users and Computers' tool. Select the View +menu, that is in the left corner just below the real menu (or press +Alt-V), and select Advanced Features. Right click on the user that you +are going to do a name mapping for and choose Name mapping. + +Click on the Kerberos Names tab and add a new principal from the +non-Windows domain. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Encryption types, Next: Authorization data, Prev: Create account mappings, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Encryption types +================ + +Windows 2000 supports both the standard DES encryptions (des-cbc-crc and +des-cbc-md5) and its own proprietary encryption that is based on MD4 and +rc4 that is documented in and is supposed to be described in +`draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt'. New users will get both MD4 +and DES keys. Users that are converted from a NT4 database, will only +have MD4 passwords and will need a password change to get a DES key. + +Heimdal implements both of these encryption types, but since DES is the +standard and the hmac-code is somewhat newer, it is likely to work +better. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Authorization data, Next: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC, Prev: Encryption types, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Authorization data +================== + +The Windows 2000 KDC also adds extra authorization data in tickets. It +is at this point unclear what triggers it to do this. The format of +this data is only available under a "secret" license from Microsoft, +which prohibits you implementing it. + +A simple way of getting hold of the data to be able to understand it +better is described here. + + 1. Find the client example on using the SSPI in the SDK documentation. + + 2. Change "AuthSamp" in the source code to lowercase. + + 3. Build the program. + + 4. Add the "authsamp" principal with a known password to the + database. Make sure it has a DES key. + + 5. Run `ktutil add' to add the key for that principal to a keytab. + + 6. Run `appl/test/nt_gss_server -p 2000 -s authsamp --dump-auth=file' + where file is an appropriate file. + + 7. It should authenticate and dump for you the authorization data in + the file. + + 8. The tool `lib/asn1/asn1_print' is somewhat useful for analyzing + the data. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC, Next: Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000, Prev: Authorization data, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC +========================== + +There are some issues with salts and Windows 2000. Using an empty salt, +which is the only one that Kerberos 4 supported and is therefore known +as a Kerberos 4 compatible salt does not work, as far as we can tell +from out experiments and users reports. Therefore, you have to make +sure you keep around keys with all the different types of salts that are +required. + +Microsoft seems also to have forgotten to implement the checksum +algorithms `rsa-md4-des' and `rsa-md5-des'. This can make Name mapping +(*note Create account mappings::.) fail if a `des-cbc-md5' key is used. +To make the KDC return only `des-cbc-crc' you must delete the +`des-cbc-md5' key from the kdc using the `kadmin del_enctype' command. + + kadmin del_enctype lha des-cbc-md5 + +You should also add the following entries to the `krb5.conf' file: + + [libdefaults] + default_etypes = des-cbc-crc + default_etypes_des = des-cbc-crc + +These configuration options will make sure that no checksums of the +unsupported types are generated. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000, Prev: Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC, Up: Windows 2000 compatability + +Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000 +================================================ + +See also our paper presented at the 2001 usenix Annual Technical +Conference, available in the proceedings or at +`http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/usenix01/freenix01/westerlund.html'. + +There are lots of text about Kerberos on Microsoft's web site, here is a +short list of the interesting documents that we have managed to find. + + * Step-by-Step Guide to Kerberos 5 (krb5 1.0) Interoperability - + + + + + + + + + + + + `http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/library/planning/security/kerbsteps.asp' + Kerberos GSS-API (in Windows-ize SSPI), Windows as a client in a + non-Windows KDC realm, adding unix clients to a Windows 2000 KDC, + and adding cross-realm trust (*Note Inter-Realm keys (trust) + between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC::.). + + * Windows 2000 Kerberos Authentication - + + + + + + + `http://www.microsoft.com/TechNet/win2000/win2ksrv/technote/kerberos.asp' + White paper that describes how Kerberos is used in Windows 2000. + + * Overview of kerberos - + `http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q248/7/58.ASP' + Links to useful other links. + + * Klist for windows - + + + + `http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/periodic/period00/security0500.htm' + Describes where to get a klist for Windows 2000. + + * Event logging for kerberos - + `http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q262/1/77.ASP'. + Basicly it say that you can add a registry key + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters\LogLevel' + with value DWORD equal to 1, and then you'll get logging in the + Event Logger. + + * Access to the active directory through LDAP + `http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/techart/kerberossamp.htm' + +Other useful programs include these: + + * pwdump2 `http://www.webspan.net/~tas/pwdump2/' + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Programming with Kerberos, Next: Migration, Prev: Windows 2000 compatability, Up: Top + +Programming with Kerberos +************************* + +First you need to know how the Kerberos model works, go read the +introduction text (*note What is Kerberos?::.). + +* Menu: + +* Kerberos 5 API Overview:: +* Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client:: +* Validating a password in a server application:: + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Kerberos 5 API Overview, Next: Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client, Prev: Programming with Kerberos, Up: Programming with Kerberos + +Kerberos 5 API Overview +======================= + +Most functions are documenteded in manual pages. This overview only +tries to point to where to look for a specific function. + +Kerberos context +---------------- + +A kerberos context (`krb5_context') holds all per thread state. All +global variables that are context specific are stored in this struture, +including default encryption types, credential-cache (ticket file), and +default realms. + +See the manual pages for `krb5_context(3)' and `krb5_init_context(3)'. + +Kerberos authenication context +------------------------------ + +Kerberos authentication context (`krb5_auth_context') holds all context +related to an authenticated connection, in a similar way to the +kerberos context that holds the context for the thread or process. + +The `krb5_auth_context' is used by various functions that are directly +related to authentication between the server/client. Example of data +that this structure contains are various flags, addresses of client and +server, port numbers, keyblocks (and subkeys), sequence numbers, replay +cache, and checksum types. + +See the manual page for `krb5_auth_context(3)'. + +Keytab management +----------------- + +A keytab is a storage for locally stored keys. Heimdal includes keytab +support for Kerberos 5 keytabs, Kerberos 4 srvtab, AFS-KeyFile's, and +for storing keys in memory. + +See also manual page for `krb5_keytab(3)' + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client, Next: Validating a password in a server application, Prev: Kerberos 5 API Overview, Up: Programming with Kerberos + +Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client +=================================== + +This example contains parts of a sample TCP Kerberos 5 clients, if you +want a real working client, please look in `appl/test' directory in the +Heimdal distribution. + +All Kerberos error-codes that are returned from kerberos functions in +this program are passed to `krb5_err', that will print a descriptive +text of the error code and exit. Graphical programs can convert +error-code to a humal readable error-string with the +`krb5_get_err_text(3)' function. + +Note that you should not use any Kerberos function before +`krb5_init_context()' have completed successfully. That is the reson +`err()' is used when `krb5_init_context()' fails. + +First the client needs to call `krb5_init_context' to initialize the +Kerberos 5 library. This is only needed once per thread in the program. +If the function returns a non-zero value it indicates that either the +Kerberos implemtation is failing or its disabled on this host. + + #include + + int + main(int argc, char **argv) + { + krb5_context context; + + if (krb5_context(&context)) + errx (1, "krb5_context"); + +Now the client wants to connect to the host at the other end. The +preferred way of doing this is using `getaddrinfo(3)' (for operating +system that have this function implemented), since getaddrinfo is +neutral to the address type and can use any protocol that is available. + + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, "pop3", &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + ai = NULL; + } + if (ai) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + errx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + } + +Before authenticating, an authentication context needs to be created. +This context keeps all information for one (to be) authenticated +connection (see `krb5_auth_context(3)'). + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + +For setting the address in the authentication there is a help function +`krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd' that does everthing that is needed +when given a connected file descriptor to the socket. + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, + "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd"); + +The next step is to build a server principal for the service we want to +connect to. (See also `krb5_sname_to_principal(3)'.) + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + +The client principal is not passed to `krb5_sendauth(3)' function, this +causes the `krb5_sendauth' function to try to figure it out itself. + +The server program is using the function `krb5_recvauth(3)' to receive +the Kerberos 5 authenticator. + +In this case, mutual authenication will be tried. That means that the +server will authenticate to the client. Using mutual authenication is +good since it enables the user to verify that they are talking to the +right server (a server that knows the key). + +If you are using a non-blocking socket you will need to do all work of +`krb5_sendauth' yourself. Basically you need to send over the +authenticator from `krb5_mk_req(3)' and, in case of mutual +authentication, verifying the result from the server with +`krb5_rd_rep(3)'. + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + +Once authentication has been performed, it is time to send some data. +First we create a krb5_data structure, then we sign it with +`krb5_mk_safe(3)' using the `auth_context' that contains the +session-key that was exchanged in the +`krb5_sendauth(3)'/`krb5_recvauth(3)' authentication sequence. + + data.data = "hej"; + data.length = 3; + + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_safe (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe"); + +And send it over the network. + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + +To send encrypted (and signed) data `krb5_mk_priv(3)' should be used +instead. `krb5_mk_priv(3)' works the same way as `krb5_mk_safe(3)', +with the exception that it encrypts the data in addition to signing it. + + data.data = "hemligt"; + data.length = 7; + + krb5_data_free (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + +And send it over the network. + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + +The server is using `krb5_rd_safe(3)' and `krb5_rd_priv(3)' to verify +the signature and decrypt the packet. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Validating a password in a server application, Prev: Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client, Up: Programming with Kerberos + +Validating a password in an application +======================================= + +See the manual page for `krb5_verify_user(3)'. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Migration, Next: Acknowledgments, Prev: Programming with Kerberos, Up: Top + +Migration +********* + +General issues +============== + +When migrating from a Kerberos 4 KDC. + +Order in what to do things: +=========================== + + * Convert the database, check all principals that hprop complains + about. + + `hprop -n --source=| hpropd -n' + + Replace with whatever source you have, like krb4-db or + krb4-dump. + + * Run a Kerberos 5 slave for a while. + + * Figure out if it does everything you want it to. + + Make sure that all things that you use works for you. + + * Let a small number of controlled users use Kerberos 5 tools. + + Find a sample population of your users and check what programs + they use, you can also check the kdc-log to check what ticket are + checked out. + + * Burn the bridge and change the master. + + * Let all users use the Kerberos 5 tools by default. + + * Turn off services that do not need Kerberos 4 authentication. + + Things that might be hard to get away is old programs with support + for Kerberos 4. Example applications are old Eudora installations + using KPOP, and Zephyr. Eudora can use the Kerberos 4 kerberos in + the Heimdal kdc. + + +File: heimdal.info, Node: Acknowledgments, Prev: Migration, Up: Top + +Acknowledgments +*************** + +Eric Young wrote "libdes". + +The University of California at Berkeley initially wrote `telnet', and +`telnetd'. The authentication and encryption code of `telnet' and +`telnetd' was added by David Borman (then of Cray Research, Inc). The +encryption code was removed when this was exported and then added back +by Juha Eskelinen, . + +The `popper' was also a Berkeley program initially. + +Some of the functions in `libroken' also come from Berkeley by way of +NetBSD/FreeBSD. + +`editline' was written by Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. + +The `getifaddrs' implementation for Linux was written by Hideaki +YOSHIFUJI for the Usagi project. + +Bugfixes, documentation, encouragement, and code has been contributed +by: +Derrick J Brashear + + +Ken Hornstein + + +Johan Ihrén + + +Love Hörnquist-Åstrand + + +Magnus Ahltorp + + +Mark Eichin + + +Marc Horowitz + + +Luke Howard + + +Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH + + +Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino + + +Daniel Kouril + + +Åke Sandgren + + +Michal Vocu + + +Miroslav Ruda + + +Brian A May + + +Chaskiel M Grundman + + +Richard Nyberg + + +Frank van der Linden + + +Cizzi Storm + + +and we hope that those not mentioned here will forgive us. +All bugs were introduced by ourselves. + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6bc92a92eb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/heimdal.texi @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +\input texinfo @c -*- texinfo -*- +@c %**start of header +@c $Id: heimdal.texi,v 1.17 2001/02/24 05:09:24 assar Exp $ +@setfilename heimdal.info +@settitle HEIMDAL +@iftex +@afourpaper +@end iftex +@c some sensible characters, please? +@tex +\input latin1.tex +@end tex +@setchapternewpage on +@syncodeindex pg cp +@c %**end of header + +@c not yet @include version.texi +@set UPDATED $Date: 2001/02/24 05:09:24 $ +@set EDITION 0.1 +@set VERSION 0.3a + +@ifinfo +@dircategory Heimdal +@direntry +* Heimdal: (heimdal). The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH +@end direntry +@end ifinfo + +@c title page +@titlepage +@title Heimdal +@subtitle Kerberos 5 from KTH +@subtitle Edition @value{EDITION}, for version @value{VERSION} +@subtitle 1999 +@author Johan Danielsson +@author Assar Westerlund +@author last updated @value{UPDATED} + +@def@copynext{@vskip 20pt plus 1fil@penalty-1000} +@def@copyrightstart{} +@def@copyrightend{} +@page +@copyrightstart +Copyright (c) 1997-2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +(Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +@copynext + +Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@@mincom.oz.au) +All rights reserved. + +This package is an DES implementation written by Eric Young (eay@@mincom.oz.au). +The implementation was written so as to conform with MIT's libdes. + +This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as +the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions +apply to all code found in this distribution. + +Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in +the code are not to be removed. +If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution +as the author of that the SSL library. This can be in the form of a textual +message at program startup or in documentation (online or textual) provided +with the package. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay@@mincom.oz.au) + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +@copynext + +Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + +Export of this software from the United States of America may +require a specific license from the United States Government. +It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating +export to obtain such a license before exporting. + +WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and +distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and +without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright +notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and +this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that +the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining +to distribution of the software without specific, written prior +permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of +this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express +or implied warranty. + +@copynext + +Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + This product includes software developed by the University of + California, Berkeley and its contributors. + +4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +@copynext + +Copyright 1992 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved. + +This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone +and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + +Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on +any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it freely, subject +to the following restrictions: + +1. The authors are not responsible for the consequences of use of this + software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + +2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by + explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, + credits must appear in the documentation. + +3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be + misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users + ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + +4. This notice may not be removed or altered. + +@copyrightend +@end titlepage + +@c Less filling! Tastes great! +@iftex +@parindent=0pt +@global@parskip 6pt plus 1pt +@global@chapheadingskip = 15pt plus 4pt minus 2pt +@global@secheadingskip = 12pt plus 3pt minus 2pt +@global@subsecheadingskip = 9pt plus 2pt minus 2pt +@end iftex +@ifinfo +@paragraphindent 0 +@end ifinfo + +@ifinfo +@node Top, Introduction, (dir), (dir) +@top Heimdal +@end ifinfo + +@menu +* Introduction:: +* What is Kerberos?:: +* Building and Installing:: +* Setting up a realm:: +* Things in search for a better place:: +* Kerberos 4 issues:: +* Windows 2000 compatability:: +* Programming with Kerberos:: +* Migration:: +* Acknowledgments:: + +@end menu + +@include intro.texi +@include whatis.texi +@include install.texi +@include setup.texi +@include misc.texi +@include kerberos4.texi +@include win2k.texi +@include programming.texi +@include migration.texi +@include ack.texi + +@c @shortcontents +@contents + +@bye diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/init-creds b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/init-creds new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13667e0434 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/init-creds @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +Currently, getting an initial ticket for a user involves many function +calls, especially when a full set of features including password +expiration and challenge preauthentication is desired. In order to +solve this problem, a new api is proposed. + +typedef struct _krb5_prompt { + char *prompt; + int hidden; + krb5_data *reply; +} krb5_prompt; + +typedef int (*krb5_prompter_fct)(krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]); + +typedef struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_deltat tkt_life; + krb5_deltat renew_life; + int forwardable; + int proxiable; + krb5_enctype *etype_list; + int etype_list_length; + krb5_address **address_list; + /* XXX the next three should not be used, as they may be + removed later */ + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list; + int preauth_list_length; + krb5_data *salt; +} krb5_get_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE 0x0001 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE 0x0002 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE 0x0004 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE 0x0008 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST 0x0010 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST 0x0020 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST 0x0040 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT 0x0080 + +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt); + +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat tkt_life); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat renew_life); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int forwardable); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int proxiable); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_enctype *etype_list, + int etype_list_length); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_address **addresses); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list, + int preauth_list_length); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_data *salt); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_password(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_deltat start_time, + char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options); + +This function will attempt to acquire an initial ticket. The function +will perform whatever tasks are necessary to do so. This may include +changing an expired password, preauthentication. + +The arguments divide into two types. Some arguments are basically +invariant and arbitrary across all initial tickets, and if not +specified are determined by configuration or library defaults. Some +arguments are different for each execution or application, and if not +specified can be determined correctly from system configuration or +environment. The former arguments are contained in a structure whose +pointer is passed to the function. A bitmask specifies which elements +of the structure should be used. In most cases, a NULL pointer can be +used. The latter arguments are specified as individual arguments to +the function. + +If a pointer to a credential is specified, the initial credential is +filled in. If the caller only wishes to do a simple password check +and will not be doing any other kerberos functions, then a NULL +pointer may be specified, and the credential will be destroyed. + +If the client name is non-NULL, the initial ticket requested will be +for that principal. Otherwise, the principal will be the the username +specified by the USER environment variable, or if the USER environment +variable is not set, the username corresponding to the real user id of +the caller. + +If the password is non-NULL, then this string is used as the password. +Otherwise, the prompter function will be used to prompt the user for +the password. + +If a prompter function is non-NULL, it will be used if additional user +input is required, such as if the user's password has expired and +needs to be changed, or if input preauthentication is necessary. If +no function is specified and input is required, then the login will +fail. + + The context argument is the same as that passed to krb5_login. + The data argument is passed unmodified to the prompter + function and is intended to be used to pass application data + (such as a display handle) to the prompter function. + + The banner argument, if non-NULL, will indicate what sort of + input is expected from the user (for example, "Password has + expired and must be changed" or "Enter Activcard response for + challenge 012345678"), and should be displayed accordingly. + + The num_prompts argument indicates the number of values which + should be prompted for. If num_prompts == 0, then the banner + contains an informational message which should be displayed to + the user. + + The prompts argument contains an array describing the values + for which the user should be prompted. The prompt member + indicates the prompt for each value ("Enter new + password"/"Enter it again", or "Challenge response"). The + hidden member is nonzero if the response should not be + displayed back to the user. The reply member is a pointer to + krb5_data structure which has already been allocated. The + prompter should fill in the structure with the NUL-terminated + response from the user. + + If the response data does not fit, or if any other error + occurs, then the prompter function should return a non-zero + value which will be returned by the krb5_get_init_creds + function. Otherwise, zero should be returned. + + The library function krb5_prompter_posix() implements + a prompter using a posix terminal for user in. This function + does not use the data argument. + +If the start_time is zero, then the requested ticket will be valid +beginning immediately. Otherwise, the start_time indicates how far in +the future the ticket should be postdated. + +If the in_tkt_service name is non-NULL, that principal name will be +used as the server name for the initial ticket request. The realm of +the name specified will be ignored and will be set to the realm of the +client name. If no in_tkt_service name is specified, +krbtgt/CLIENT-REALM@CLIENT-REALM will be used. + +For the rest of arguments, a configuration or library default will be +used if no value is specified in the options structure. + +If a tkt_life is specified, that will be the lifetime of the ticket. +The library default is 10 hours; there is no configuration variable +(there should be, but it's not there now). + +If a renew_life is specified and non-zero, then the RENEWABLE option +on the ticket will be set, and the value of the argument will be the +the renewable lifetime. The configuration variable [libdefaults] +"renew_lifetime" is the renewable lifetime if none is passed in. The +library default is not to set the RENEWABLE option. + +If forwardable is specified, the FORWARDABLE option on the ticket will +be set if and only if forwardable is non-zero. The configuration +variable [libdefaults] "forwardable" is used if no value is passed in. +The option will be set if and only if the variable is "y", "yes", +"true", "t", "1", or "on", case insensitive. The library default is +not to set the FORWARDABLE option. + +If proxiable is specified, the PROXIABLE option on the ticket will be +set if and only if proxiable is non-zero. The configuration variable +[libdefaults] "proxiable" is used if no value is passed in. The +option will be set if and only if the variable is "y", "yes", "true", +"t", "1", or "on", case insensitive. The library default is not to +set the PROXIABLE option. + +If etype_list is specified, it will be used as the list of desired +encryption algorithms in the request. The configuration variable +[libdefaults] "default_tkt_enctypes" is used if no value is passed in. +The library default is "des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-crc". + +If address_list is specified, it will be used as the list of addresses +for which the ticket will be valid. The library default is to use all +local non-loopback addresses. There is no configuration variable. + +If preauth_list is specified, it names preauth data types which will +be included in the request. The library default is to interact with +the kdc to determine the required preauth types. There is no +configuration variable. + +If salt is specified, it specifies the salt which will be used when +converting the password to a key. The library default is to interact +with the kdc to determine the correct salt. There is no configuration +variable. + +================================================================ + +typedef struct _krb5_verify_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + int ap_req_nofail; +} krb5_verify_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL 0x0001 + +void krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_init_creds_opt *options); +void krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(krb5_init_creds_opt *options, + int ap_req_nofail); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_init_creds(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal ap_req_server, + krb5_keytab ap_req_keytab, + krb5_ccache *ccache, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options); + +This function will use the initial ticket in creds to make an AP_REQ +and verify it to insure that the AS_REP has not been spoofed. + +If the ap_req_server name is non-NULL, then this service name will be +used for the AP_REQ; otherwise, the default host key +(host/hostname.domain@LOCAL-REALM) will be used. + +If ap_req_keytab is non-NULL, the service key for the verification +will be read from that keytab; otherwise, the service key will be read +from the default keytab. + +If the service of the ticket in creds is the same as the service name +for the AP_REQ, then this ticket will be used directly. If the ticket +is a tgt, then it will be used to obtain credentials for the service. +Otherwise, the verification will fail, and return an error. + +Other failures of the AP_REQ verification may or may not be considered +errors, as described below. + +If a pointer to a credential cache handle is specified, and the handle +is NULL, a credential cache handle referring to all credentials +obtained in the course of verifying the user will be returned. In +order to avoid potential setuid race conditions and other problems +related to file system access, this handle will refer to a memory +credential cache. If the handle is non-NULL, then the credentials +will be added to the existing ccache. If the caller only wishes to +verify the password and will not be doing any other kerberos +functions, then a NULL pointer may be specified, and the credentials +will be deleted before the function returns. + +If ap_req_nofail is specified, then failures of the AP_REQ +verification are considered errors if and only if ap_req_nofail is +non-zero. + +Whether or not AP_REQ validation is performed and what failures mean +depends on these inputs: + + A) The appropriate keytab exists and contains the named key. + + B) An AP_REQ request to the kdc succeeds, and the resulting AP_REQ +can be decrypted and verified. + + C) The administrator has specified in a configuration file that +AP_REQ validation must succeed. This is basically a paranoid bit, and +can be overridden by the application based on a command line flag or +other application-specific info. This flag is especially useful if +the admin is concerned that DNS might be spoofed while determining the +host/FQDN name. The configuration variable [libdefaults] +"verify_ap_req_nofail" is used if no value is passed in. The library +default is not to set this option. + +Initial ticket verification will succeed if and only if: + + - A && B or + - !A && !C + +================================================================ + +For illustrative purposes, here's the invocations I expect some +programs will use. Of course, error checking needs to be added. + +kinit: + + /* Fill in client from the command line || existing ccache, and, + start_time, and options.{tkt_life,renew_life,forwardable,proxiable} + from the command line. Some or all may remain unset. */ + + krb5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_posix, NULL, + start_time, NULL, &options); + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, &creds); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + +login: + + krb5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_posix, NULL, + 0, NULL, NULL); + krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, &vcc, NULL); + /* setuid */ + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, &creds); + krb5_cc_copy(context, vcc, ccache); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, vcc); + +xdm: + + krb5_get_initial_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_xt, (void *) &xtstuff, + 0, NULL, NULL); + krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, &vcc, NULL); + /* setuid */ + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, &creds); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + krb5_cc_copy(context, vcc, ccache); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, vcc); + +passwd: + + krb5_init_creds_opt_init(&options); + krb5_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life = 300; + krb5_get_initial_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_posix, NULL, + 0, "kadmin/changepw", &options); + /* change password */ + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + +pop3d (simple password validator when no user interation possible): + + krb5_get_initial_creds(context, &creds, client, + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, &vcc, NULL); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, vcc); + +================================================================ + +password expiration has a subtlety. When a password expires and is +changed, there is a delay between when the master gets the new key +(immediately), and the slaves (propogation interval). So, when +getting an in_tkt, if the password is expired, the request should be +reissued to the master (this kind of sucks if you have SAM, oh well). +If this says expired, too, then the password should be changed, and +then the initial ticket request should be issued to the master again. +If the master times out, then a message that the password has expired +and cannot be changed due to the master being unreachable should be +displayed. + +================================================================ + +get_init_creds reads config stuff from: + +[libdefaults] + varname1 = defvalue + REALM = { + varname1 = value + varname2 = value + } + +typedef struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_deltat tkt_life; /* varname = "ticket_lifetime" */ + krb5_deltat renew_life; /* varname = "renew_lifetime" */ + int forwardable; /* varname = "forwardable" */ + int proxiable; /* varname = "proxiable" */ + krb5_enctype *etype_list; /* varname = "default_tkt_enctypes" */ + int etype_list_length; + krb5_address **address_list; /* no varname */ + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list; /* no varname */ + int preauth_list_length; + krb5_data *salt; +} krb5_get_init_creds_opt; + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/install.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/install.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d12ace9bf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/install.texi @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +@c $Id: install.texi,v 1.18 2002/09/04 03:18:48 assar Exp $ + +@node Building and Installing, Setting up a realm, What is Kerberos?, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Building and Installing + +Heimdal uses GNU Autoconf to configure for specific hosts, and GNU +Automake to manage makefiles. If this is new to you, the short +instruction is to run the @code{configure} script in the top level +directory, and when that finishes @code{make}. + +If you want to build the distribution in a different directory from the +source directory, you will need a make that implements VPATH correctly, +such as GNU make. + +You will need to build the distribution: + +@itemize @bullet +@item +A compiler that supports a ``loose'' ANSI C mode, such as @code{gcc}. +@item +lex or flex +@item +awk +@item +yacc or bison +@item +a socket library +@item +NDBM or Berkeley DB for building the server side. +@end itemize + +When everything is built, you can install by doing @kbd{make +install}. The default location for installation is @file{/usr/heimdal}, +but this can be changed by running @code{configure} with +@samp{--prefix=/some/other/place}. + +If you need to change the default behavior, configure understands the +following options: + +@table @asis +@item @kbd{--without-berkeley-db} +DB is preferred before NDBM, but if you for some reason want to use NDBM +instead, you can use this option. + +@item @kbd{--with-krb4=@file{dir}} +Gives the location of Kerberos 4 libraries and headers. This enables +Kerberos 4 support in the applications (telnet, rsh, popper, etc) and +the KDC. It is automatically check for in @file{/usr/athena}. If you +keep libraries and headers in different places, you can instead give the +path to each with the @kbd{--with-krb4-lib=@file{dir}}, and +@kbd{--with-krb4-include=@file{dir}} options. + +You will need a fairly recent version of our Kerberos 4 distribution for +@code{rshd} and @code{popper} to support version 4 clients. + +@item @kbd{--enable-dce} +Enables support for getting DCE credentials and tokens. See the README +files in @file{appl/dceutils} for more information. + +@item @kbd{--disable-otp} +By default some of the application programs will build with support for +one-time passwords (OTP). Use this option to disable that support. + +@item @kbd{--enable-osfc2} +Enable some C2 support for OSF/Digital Unix/Tru64. Use this option if +you are running your OSF operating system in C2 mode. + +@item @kbd{--with-readline=@file{dir}} +Gives the path for the GNU Readline library, which will be used in some +programs. If no readline library is found, the (simpler) editline +library will be used instead. + +@item @kbd{--with-hesiod=@file{dir}} +Enables hesiod support in push. + +@item @kbd{--enable-netinfo} +Add support for using netinfo to lookup configuration information. +Probably only useful (and working) on NextStep/Mac OS X. + +@item @kbd{--without-ipv6} +Disable the IPv6 support. + +@item @kbd{--with-openldap} +Compile Heimdal with support for storing the database in LDAP. Requires +OpenLDAP @url{http://www.openldap.org}. See +@url{http://www.padl.com/~lukeh/heimdal/} for more information. + +@item @kbd{--enable-bigendian} +@item @kbd{--enable-littleendian} +Normally, the build process will figure out by itself if the machine is +big or little endian. It might fail in some cases when +cross-compiling. If it does fail to figure it out, use the relevant of +these two options. + +@item @kbd{--with-mips-abi=@var{abi}} +On Irix there are three different ABIs that can be used (@samp{32}, +@samp{n32}, or @samp{64}). This option allows you to override the +automatic selection. + +@item @kbd{--disable-mmap} +Do not use the mmap system call. Normally, configure detects if there +is a working mmap and it is only used if there is one. Only try this +option if it fails to work anyhow. + +@end table diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/intro.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/intro.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c190fe2182 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/intro.texi @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +@c $Id: intro.texi,v 1.13 2003/03/15 13:42:16 lha Exp $ + +@node Introduction, What is Kerberos?, Top, Top +@c @node Introduction, What is Kerberos?, Top, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Introduction + +@heading What is Heimdal? + +Heimdal is a free implementation of Kerberos 5. The goals are to: + +@itemize @bullet +@item +have an implementation that can be freely used by anyone +@item +be protocol compatible with existing implementations and, if not in +conflict, with RFC 1510 (and any future updated RFC) +@item +be reasonably compatible with the M.I.T Kerberos V5 API +@item +have support for Kerberos V5 over GSS-API (RFC1964) +@item +include the most important and useful application programs (rsh, telnet, +popper, etc.) +@item +include enough backwards compatibility with Kerberos V4 +@end itemize + +@heading Status + +Heimdal has the following features (this does not mean any of this +works): + +@itemize @bullet +@item +a stub generator and a library to encode/decode/whatever ASN.1/DER +stuff +@item +a @code{libkrb5} library that should be possible to get to work with +simple applications +@item +a GSS-API library that should have all the important functions for +building applications +@item +Eric Young's @file{libdes} +@item +@file{kinit}, @file{klist}, @file{kdestroy} +@item +@file{telnet}, @file{telnetd} +@item +@file{rsh}, @file{rshd} +@item +@file{popper}, @file{push} (a movemail equivalent) +@item +@file{ftp}, and @file{ftpd} +@item +a library @file{libkafs} for authenticating to AFS and a program +@file{afslog} that uses it +@item +some simple test programs +@item +a KDC that supports most things; optionally, it may also support +Kerberos V4 and kaserver, +@item +simple programs for distributing databases between a KDC master and +slaves +@item +a password changing daemon @file{kpasswdd}, library functions for +changing passwords and a simple client +@item +some kind of administration system +@item +Kerberos V4 support in many of the applications. +@end itemize + +@heading Bug reports + +If you find bugs in this software, make sure it is a genuine bug and not +just a part of the code that isn't implemented. + +Bug reports should be sent to @email{heimdal-bugs@@pdc.kth.se}. Please +include information on what machine and operating system (including +version) you are running, what you are trying to do, what happens, what +you think should have happened, an example for us to repeat, the output +you get when trying the example, and a patch for the problem if you have +one. Please make any patches with @code{diff -u} or @code{diff -c}. + +Suggestions, comments and other non bug reports are also welcome. + +@heading Mailing list + +There are two mailing lists with talk about +Heimdal. @email{heimdal-announce@@sics.se} is a low-volume announcement +list, while @email{heimdal-discuss@@sics.se} is for general discussion. +Send a message to @email{majordomo@@sics.se} to subscribe. + +@heading Heimdal source code, binaries and the manual + +The source code for heimdal, links to binaries and the manual (this +document) can be found on our web-page at +@url{http://www.pdc.kth.se/heimdal/}. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/kerberos4.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/kerberos4.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42a5f898f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/kerberos4.texi @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +@c $Id: kerberos4.texi,v 1.16 2001/07/19 17:17:46 assar Exp $ + +@node Kerberos 4 issues, Windows 2000 compatability, Things in search for a better place, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Kerberos 4 issues + +If compiled with version 4 support, the KDC can serve requests from a +Kerberos 4 client. There are a few things you must do for this to work. + +The KDC will also have kaserver emulation and be able to handle +AFS-clients that use @code{klog}. + +@menu +* Principal conversion issues:: +* Converting a version 4 database:: +* kaserver:: +@end menu + +@node Principal conversion issues, Converting a version 4 database, Kerberos 4 issues, Kerberos 4 issues +@section Principal conversion issues + +First, Kerberos 4 and Kerberos 5 principals are different. A version 4 +principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A version 5 +principal has one or more components, and a realm (the terms ``name'' +and ``instance'' are still used, for the first and second component, +respectively). Also, in some cases the name of a version 4 principal +differs from the first component of the corresponding version 5 +principal. One notable example is the ``host'' type principals, where +the version 4 name is @samp{rcmd} (for ``remote command''), and the +version 5 name is @samp{host}. For the class of principals that has a +hostname as instance, there is an other major difference, Kerberos 4 +uses only the first component of the hostname, whereas Kerberos 5 uses +the fully qualified hostname. + +Because of this it can be hard or impossible to correctly convert a +version 4 principal to a version 5 principal @footnote{the other way is +not always trivial either, but usually easier}. The biggest problem is +to know if the conversion resulted in a valid principal. To give an +example, suppose you want to convert the principal @samp{rcmd.foo}. + +The @samp{rcmd} name suggests that the instance is a hostname (even if +there are exceptions to this rule). To correctly convert the instance +@samp{foo} to a hostname, you have to know which host it is referring +to. You can to this by either guessing (from the realm) which domain +name to append, or you have to have a list of possible hostnames. In the +simplest cases you can cover most principals with the first rule. If you +have several domains sharing a single realm this will not usually +work. If the exceptions are few you can probably come by with a lookup +table for the exceptions. + +In a complex scenario you will need some kind of host lookup mechanism. +Using DNS for this is tempting, but DNS is error prone, slow and unsafe +@footnote{at least until secure DNS is commonly available}. + +Fortunately, the KDC has a trump on hand: it can easily tell if a +principal exists in the database. The KDC will use +@code{krb5_425_conv_principal_ext} to convert principals when handling +to version 4 requests. + +@node Converting a version 4 database, kaserver , Principal conversion issues, Kerberos 4 issues +@section Converting a version 4 database + +If you want to convert an existing version 4 database, the principal +conversion issue arises too. + +If you decide to convert your database once and for all, you will only +have to do this conversion once. It is also possible to run a version 5 +KDC as a slave to a version 4 KDC. In this case this conversion will +happen every time the database is propagated. When doing this +conversion, there are a few things to look out for. If you have stale +entries in the database, these entries will not be converted. This might +be because these principals are not used anymore, or it might be just +because the principal couldn't be converted. + +You might also see problems with a many-to-one mapping of +principals. For instance, if you are using DNS lookups and you have two +principals @samp{rcmd.foo} and @samp{rcmd.bar}, where `foo' is a CNAME +for `bar', the resulting principals will be the same. Since the +conversion function can't tell which is correct, these conflicts will +have to be resolved manually. + +@subsection Conversion example + +Given the following set of hosts and services: + +@example +foo.se rcmd +mail.foo.se rcmd, pop +ftp.bar.se rcmd, ftp +@end example + +you have a database that consists of the following principals: + +@samp{rcmd.foo}, @samp{rcmd.mail}, @samp{pop.mail}, @samp{rcmd.ftp}, and +@samp{ftp.ftp}. + +lets say you also got these extra principals: @samp{rcmd.gone}, +@samp{rcmd.old-mail}, where @samp{gone.foo.se} was a machine that has +now passed away, and @samp{old-mail.foo.se} was an old mail machine that +is now a CNAME for @samp{mail.foo.se}. + +When you convert this database you want the following conversions to be +done: +@example +rcmd.foo host/foo.se +rcmd.mail host/mail.foo.se +pop.mail pop/mail.foo.se +rcmd.ftp host/ftp.bar.se +ftp.ftp ftp/ftp.bar.se +rcmd.gone @i{removed} +rcmd.old-mail @i{removed} +@end example + +A @file{krb5.conf} that does this looks like: + +@example +[realms] + FOO.SE = @{ + v4_name_convert = @{ + host = @{ + ftp = ftp + pop = pop + rcmd = host + @} + @} + v4_instance_convert = @{ + foo = foo.se + ftp = ftp.bar.se + @} + default_domain = foo.se + @} +@end example + +The @samp{v4_name_convert} section says which names should be considered +having an instance consisting of a hostname, and it also says how the +names should be converted (for instance @samp{rcmd} should be converted +to @samp{host}). The @samp{v4_instance_convert} section says how a +hostname should be qualified (this is just a hosts-file in +disguise). Host-instances that aren't covered by +@samp{v4_instance_convert} are qualified by appending the contents of +the @samp{default_domain}. + +Actually, this example doesn't work. Or rather, it works to well. Since +it has no way of knowing which hostnames are valid and which are not, it +will happily convert @samp{rcmd.gone} to @samp{host/gone.foo.se}. This +isn't a big problem, but if you have run your kerberos realm for a few +years, chances are big that you have quite a few `junk' principals. + +If you don't want this you can remove the @samp{default_domain} +statement, but then you will have to add entries for @emph{all} your hosts +in the @samp{v4_instance_convert} section. + +Instead of doing this you can use DNS to convert instances. This is not +a solution without problems, but it is probably easier than adding lots +of static host entries. + +To enable DNS lookup you should turn on @samp{v4_instance_resolve} in +the @samp{[libdefaults]} section. + +@subsection Converting a database + +The database conversion is done with @samp{hprop}. You can run this +command to propagate the database to the machine called +@samp{slave-server} (which should be running a @samp{hpropd}). + +@example +hprop --source=krb4-db --master-key=/.m slave-server +@end example + +This command can also be to use for converting the v4 database on the +server: + +@example +hprop -n --source=krb4-db -d /var/kerberos/principal --master-key=/.m | hpropd -n +@end example + +@section Version 4 Kadmin + +@samp{kadmind} can act as a version 4 kadmind, and you can do most +operations, but with some restrictions (since the version 4 kadmin +protocol is, lets say, very ad hoc.) One example is that it only passes +des keys when creating principals and changing passwords (modern kpasswd +clients do send the password, so it's possible to to password quality +checks). Because of this you can only create principals with des keys, +and you can't set any flags or do any other fancy stuff. + +To get this to work, you have to add another entry to inetd (since +version 4 uses port 751, not 749). + +@emph{And then there are a many more things you can do; more on this in +a later version of this manual. Until then, UTSL.} + +@node kaserver, , Converting a version 4 database, Kerberos 4 issues +@section kaserver + +@subsection kaserver emulation + +The Heimdal kdc can emulate a kaserver. The kaserver is a Kerberos 4 +server with pre-authentication using Rx as the on-wire protocol. The kdc +contains a minimalistic Rx implementation. + +There are three parts of the kaserver; KAA (Authentication), KAT (Ticket +Granting), and KAM (Maintenance). The KAA interface and KAT interface +both passes over DES encrypted data-blobs (just like the +Kerberos-protocol) and thus do not need any other protection. The KAM +interface uses @code{rxkad} (Kerberos authentication layer for Rx) for +security and data protection, and is used for example for changing +passwords. This part is not implemented in the kdc. + +Another difference between the ka-protocol and the Kerberos 4 protocol +is that the pass-phrase is salted with the cellname in the @code{string to +key} function in the ka-protocol, while in the Kerberos 4 protocol there +is no salting of the password at all. To make sure AFS-compatible keys +are added to each principals when they are created or their password are +changed, @samp{afs3-salt} should be added to +@samp{[kadmin]default_keys}. + +@subsection Transarc AFS Windows client + +The Transarc Windows client uses Kerberos 4 to obtain tokens, and thus +does not need a kaserver. The Windows client assumes that the Kerberos +server is on the same machine as the AFS-database server. If you do not +like to do that you can add a small program that runs on the database +servers that forward all kerberos requests to the real kerberos +server. A program that does this is @code{krb-forward} +(@url{ftp://ftp.stacken.kth.se/pub/projekts/krb-forward}). diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/latin1.tex b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/latin1.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e683dd271d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/latin1.tex @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +% ISO Latin 1 (ISO 8859/1) encoding for Computer Modern fonts. +% Jan Michael Rynning 1990-10-12 +\def\inmathmode#1{\relax\ifmmode#1\else$#1$\fi} +\global\catcode`\^^a0=\active \global\let^^a0=~ % no-break space +\global\catcode`\^^a1=\active \global\def^^a1{!`} % inverted exclamation mark +\global\catcode`\^^a2=\active \global\def^^a2{{\rm\rlap/c}} % cent sign +\global\catcode`\^^a3=\active \global\def^^a3{{\it\$}} % pound sign +% currency sign, yen sign, broken bar +\global\catcode`\^^a7=\active \global\let^^a7=\S % section sign +\global\catcode`\^^a8=\active \global\def^^a8{\"{}} % diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^a9=\active \global\let^^a9=\copyright % copyright sign +% feminine ordinal indicator, left angle quotation mark +\global\catcode`\^^ac=\active \global\def^^ac{\inmathmode\neg}% not sign +\global\catcode`\^^ad=\active \global\let^^ad=\- % soft hyphen +% registered trade mark sign +\global\catcode`\^^af=\active \global\def^^af{\={}} % macron +% ... +\global\catcode`\^^b1=\active \global\def^^b1{\inmathmode\pm} % plus minus +\global\catcode`\^^b2=\active \global\def^^b2{\inmathmode{{^2}}} +\global\catcode`\^^b3=\active \global\def^^b3{\inmathmode{{^3}}} +\global\catcode`\^^b4=\active \global\def^^b4{\'{}} % acute accent +\global\catcode`\^^b5=\active \global\def^^b5{\inmathmode\mu} % mu +\global\catcode`\^^b6=\active \global\let^^b6=\P % pilcroy +\global\catcode`\^^b7=\active \global\def^^b7{\inmathmode{{\cdot}}} +\global\catcode`\^^b8=\active \global\def^^b8{\c{}} % cedilla +\global\catcode`\^^b9=\active \global\def^^b9{\inmathmode{{^1}}} +% ... +\global\catcode`\^^bc=\active \global\def^^bc{\inmathmode{{1\over4}}} +\global\catcode`\^^bd=\active \global\def^^bd{\inmathmode{{1\over2}}} +\global\catcode`\^^be=\active \global\def^^be{\inmathmode{{3\over4}}} +\global\catcode`\^^bf=\active \global\def^^bf{?`} % inverted question mark +\global\catcode`\^^c0=\active \global\def^^c0{\`A} +\global\catcode`\^^c1=\active \global\def^^c1{\'A} +\global\catcode`\^^c2=\active \global\def^^c2{\^A} +\global\catcode`\^^c3=\active \global\def^^c3{\~A} +\global\catcode`\^^c4=\active \global\def^^c4{\"A} % capital a with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^c5=\active \global\let^^c5=\AA % capital a with ring above +\global\catcode`\^^c6=\active \global\let^^c6=\AE +\global\catcode`\^^c7=\active \global\def^^c7{\c C} +\global\catcode`\^^c8=\active \global\def^^c8{\`E} +\global\catcode`\^^c9=\active \global\def^^c9{\'E} +\global\catcode`\^^ca=\active \global\def^^ca{\^E} +\global\catcode`\^^cb=\active \global\def^^cb{\"E} +\global\catcode`\^^cc=\active \global\def^^cc{\`I} +\global\catcode`\^^cd=\active \global\def^^cd{\'I} +\global\catcode`\^^ce=\active \global\def^^ce{\^I} +\global\catcode`\^^cf=\active \global\def^^cf{\"I} +% capital eth +\global\catcode`\^^d1=\active \global\def^^d1{\~N} +\global\catcode`\^^d2=\active \global\def^^d2{\`O} +\global\catcode`\^^d3=\active \global\def^^d3{\'O} +\global\catcode`\^^d4=\active \global\def^^d4{\^O} +\global\catcode`\^^d5=\active \global\def^^d5{\~O} +\global\catcode`\^^d6=\active \global\def^^d6{\"O} % capital o with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^d7=\active \global\def^^d7{\inmathmode\times}% multiplication sign +\global\catcode`\^^d8=\active \global\let^^d8=\O +\global\catcode`\^^d9=\active \global\def^^d9{\`U} +\global\catcode`\^^da=\active \global\def^^da{\'U} +\global\catcode`\^^db=\active \global\def^^db{\^U} +\global\catcode`\^^dc=\active \global\def^^dc{\"U} +\global\catcode`\^^dd=\active \global\def^^dd{\'Y} +% capital thorn +\global\catcode`\^^df=\active \global\def^^df{\ss} +\global\catcode`\^^e0=\active \global\def^^e0{\`a} +\global\catcode`\^^e1=\active \global\def^^e1{\'a} +\global\catcode`\^^e2=\active \global\def^^e2{\^a} +\global\catcode`\^^e3=\active \global\def^^e3{\~a} +\global\catcode`\^^e4=\active \global\def^^e4{\"a} % small a with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^e5=\active \global\let^^e5=\aa % small a with ring above +\global\catcode`\^^e6=\active \global\let^^e6=\ae +\global\catcode`\^^e7=\active \global\def^^e7{\c c} +\global\catcode`\^^e8=\active \global\def^^e8{\`e} +\global\catcode`\^^e9=\active \global\def^^e9{\'e} +\global\catcode`\^^ea=\active \global\def^^ea{\^e} +\global\catcode`\^^eb=\active \global\def^^eb{\"e} +\global\catcode`\^^ec=\active \global\def^^ec{\`\i} +\global\catcode`\^^ed=\active \global\def^^ed{\'\i} +\global\catcode`\^^ee=\active \global\def^^ee{\^\i} +\global\catcode`\^^ef=\active \global\def^^ef{\"\i} +% small eth +\global\catcode`\^^f1=\active \global\def^^f1{\~n} +\global\catcode`\^^f2=\active \global\def^^f2{\`o} +\global\catcode`\^^f3=\active \global\def^^f3{\'o} +\global\catcode`\^^f4=\active \global\def^^f4{\^o} +\global\catcode`\^^f5=\active \global\def^^f5{\~o} +\global\catcode`\^^f6=\active \global\def^^f6{\"o} % small o with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^f7=\active \global\def^^f7{\inmathmode\div}% division sign +\global\catcode`\^^f8=\active \global\let^^f8=\o +\global\catcode`\^^f9=\active \global\def^^f9{\`u} +\global\catcode`\^^fa=\active \global\def^^fa{\'u} +\global\catcode`\^^fb=\active \global\def^^fb{\^u} +\global\catcode`\^^fc=\active \global\def^^fc{\"u} +\global\catcode`\^^fd=\active \global\def^^fd{\'y} +% capital thorn +\global\catcode`\^^ff=\active \global\def^^ff{\"y} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/layman.asc b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/layman.asc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d4fbe64be9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/layman.asc @@ -0,0 +1,1855 @@ +A Layman's Guide to a Subset of ASN.1, BER, and DER + +An RSA Laboratories Technical Note +Burton S. Kaliski Jr. +Revised November 1, 1993 + + +Supersedes June 3, 1991 version, which was also published as +NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-17. +PKCS documents are available by electronic mail to +. + +Copyright (C) 1991-1993 RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA +Data Security, Inc. License to copy this document is granted +provided that it is identified as "RSA Data Security, Inc. +Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material +mentioning or referencing this document. +003-903015-110-000-000 + + +Abstract. This note gives a layman's introduction to a +subset of OSI's Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), Basic +Encoding Rules (BER), and Distinguished Encoding Rules +(DER). The particular purpose of this note is to provide +background material sufficient for understanding and +implementing the PKCS family of standards. + + +1. Introduction + +It is a generally accepted design principle that abstraction +is a key to managing software development. With abstraction, +a designer can specify a part of a system without concern +for how the part is actually implemented or represented. +Such a practice leaves the implementation open; it +simplifies the specification; and it makes it possible to +state "axioms" about the part that can be proved when the +part is implemented, and assumed when the part is employed +in another, higher-level part. Abstraction is the hallmark +of most modern software specifications. + +One of the most complex systems today, and one that also +involves a great deal of abstraction, is Open Systems +Interconnection (OSI, described in X.200). OSI is an +internationally standardized architecture that governs the +interconnection of computers from the physical layer up to +the user application layer. Objects at higher layers are +defined abstractly and intended to be implemented with +objects at lower layers. For instance, a service at one +layer may require transfer of certain abstract objects +between computers; a lower layer may provide transfer +services for strings of ones and zeroes, using encoding +rules to transform the abstract objects into such strings. +OSI is called an open system because it supports many +different implementations of the services at each layer. + +OSI's method of specifying abstract objects is called ASN.1 +(Abstract Syntax Notation One, defined in X.208), and one +set of rules for representing such objects as strings of +ones and zeros is called the BER (Basic Encoding Rules, +defined in X.209). ASN.1 is a flexible notation that allows +one to define a variety data types, from simple types such +as integers and bit strings to structured types such as sets +and sequences, as well as complex types defined in terms of +others. BER describes how to represent or encode values of +each ASN.1 type as a string of eight-bit octets. There is +generally more than one way to BER-encode a given value. +Another set of rules, called the Distinguished Encoding +Rules (DER), which is a subset of BER, gives a unique +encoding to each ASN.1 value. + +The purpose of this note is to describe a subset of ASN.1, +BER and DER sufficient to understand and implement one OSI- +based application, RSA Data Security, Inc.'s Public-Key +Cryptography Standards. The features described include an +overview of ASN.1, BER, and DER and an abridged list of +ASN.1 types and their BER and DER encodings. Sections 2-4 +give an overview of ASN.1, BER, and DER, in that order. +Section 5 lists some ASN.1 types, giving their notation, +specific encoding rules, examples, and comments about their +application to PKCS. Section 6 concludes with an example, +X.500 distinguished names. + +Advanced features of ASN.1, such as macros, are not +described in this note, as they are not needed to implement +PKCS. For information on the other features, and for more +detail generally, the reader is referred to CCITT +Recommendations X.208 and X.209, which define ASN.1 and BER. + +Terminology and notation. In this note, an octet is an eight- +bit unsigned integer. Bit 8 of the octet is the most +significant and bit 1 is the least significant. + +The following meta-syntax is used for in describing ASN.1 +notation: + + BIT monospace denotes literal characters in the type + and value notation; in examples, it generally + denotes an octet value in hexadecimal + + n1 bold italics denotes a variable + + [] bold square brackets indicate that a term is + optional + + {} bold braces group related terms + + | bold vertical bar delimits alternatives with a + group + + ... bold ellipsis indicates repeated occurrences + + = bold equals sign expresses terms as subterms + + +2. Abstract Syntax Notation One + +Abstract Syntax Notation One, abbreviated ASN.1, is a +notation for describing abstract types and values. + +In ASN.1, a type is a set of values. For some types, there +are a finite number of values, and for other types there are +an infinite number. A value of a given ASN.1 type is an +element of the type's set. ASN.1 has four kinds of type: +simple types, which are "atomic" and have no components; +structured types, which have components; tagged types, which +are derived from other types; and other types, which include +the CHOICE type and the ANY type. Types and values can be +given names with the ASN.1 assignment operator (::=) , and +those names can be used in defining other types and values. + +Every ASN.1 type other than CHOICE and ANY has a tag, which +consists of a class and a nonnegative tag number. ASN.1 +types are abstractly the same if and only if their tag +numbers are the same. In other words, the name of an ASN.1 +type does not affect its abstract meaning, only the tag +does. There are four classes of tag: + + Universal, for types whose meaning is the same in all + applications; these types are only defined in + X.208. + + Application, for types whose meaning is specific to an + application, such as X.500 directory services; + types in two different applications may have the + same application-specific tag and different + meanings. + + Private, for types whose meaning is specific to a given + enterprise. + + Context-specific, for types whose meaning is specific + to a given structured type; context-specific tags + are used to distinguish between component types + with the same underlying tag within the context of + a given structured type, and component types in + two different structured types may have the same + tag and different meanings. + +The types with universal tags are defined in X.208, which +also gives the types' universal tag numbers. Types with +other tags are defined in many places, and are always +obtained by implicit or explicit tagging (see Section 2.3). +Table 1 lists some ASN.1 types and their universal-class +tags. + + Type Tag number Tag number + (decimal) (hexadecimal) + INTEGER 2 02 + BIT STRING 3 03 + OCTET STRING 4 04 + NULL 5 05 + OBJECT IDENTIFIER 6 06 + SEQUENCE and SEQUENCE OF 16 10 + SET and SET OF 17 11 + PrintableString 19 13 + T61String 20 14 + IA5String 22 16 + UTCTime 23 17 + + Table 1. Some types and their universal-class tags. + +ASN.1 types and values are expressed in a flexible, +programming-language-like notation, with the following +special rules: + + o Layout is not significant; multiple spaces and + line breaks can be considered as a single space. + + o Comments are delimited by pairs of hyphens (--), + or a pair of hyphens and a line break. + + o Identifiers (names of values and fields) and type + references (names of types) consist of upper- and + lower-case letters, digits, hyphens, and spaces; + identifiers begin with lower-case letters; type + references begin with upper-case letters. + +The following four subsections give an overview of simple +types, structured types, implicitly and explicitly tagged +types, and other types. Section 5 describes specific types +in more detail. + + +2.1 Simple types + +Simple types are those not consisting of components; they +are the "atomic" types. ASN.1 defines several; the types +that are relevant to the PKCS standards are the following: + + BIT STRING, an arbitrary string of bits (ones and + zeroes). + + IA5String, an arbitrary string of IA5 (ASCII) + characters. + + INTEGER, an arbitrary integer. + + NULL, a null value. + + OBJECT IDENTIFIER, an object identifier, which is a + sequence of integer components that identify an + object such as an algorithm or attribute type. + + OCTET STRING, an arbitrary string of octets (eight-bit + values). + + PrintableString, an arbitrary string of printable + characters. + + T61String, an arbitrary string of T.61 (eight-bit) + characters. + + UTCTime, a "coordinated universal time" or Greenwich + Mean Time (GMT) value. + +Simple types fall into two categories: string types and non- +string types. BIT STRING, IA5String, OCTET STRING, +PrintableString, T61String, and UTCTime are string types. + +String types can be viewed, for the purposes of encoding, as +consisting of components, where the components are +substrings. This view allows one to encode a value whose +length is not known in advance (e.g., an octet string value +input from a file stream) with a constructed, indefinite- +length encoding (see Section 3). + +The string types can be given size constraints limiting the +length of values. + + +2.2 Structured types + +Structured types are those consisting of components. ASN.1 +defines four, all of which are relevant to the PKCS +standards: + + SEQUENCE, an ordered collection of one or more types. + + SEQUENCE OF, an ordered collection of zero or more + occurrences of a given type. + + SET, an unordered collection of one or more types. + + SET OF, an unordered collection of zero or more + occurrences of a given type. + +The structured types can have optional components, possibly +with default values. + + +2.3 Implicitly and explicitly tagged types + +Tagging is useful to distinguish types within an +application; it is also commonly used to distinguish +component types within a structured type. For instance, +optional components of a SET or SEQUENCE type are typically +given distinct context-specific tags to avoid ambiguity. + +There are two ways to tag a type: implicitly and explicitly. + +Implicitly tagged types are derived from other types by +changing the tag of the underlying type. Implicit tagging is +denoted by the ASN.1 keywords [class number] IMPLICIT (see +Section 5.1). + +Explicitly tagged types are derived from other types by +adding an outer tag to the underlying type. In effect, +explicitly tagged types are structured types consisting of +one component, the underlying type. Explicit tagging is +denoted by the ASN.1 keywords [class number] EXPLICIT (see +Section 5.2). + +The keyword [class number] alone is the same as explicit +tagging, except when the "module" in which the ASN.1 type is +defined has implicit tagging by default. ("Modules" are +among the advanced features not described in this note.) + +For purposes of encoding, an implicitly tagged type is +considered the same as the underlying type, except that the +tag is different. An explicitly tagged type is considered +like a structured type with one component, the underlying +type. Implicit tags result in shorter encodings, but +explicit tags may be necessary to avoid ambiguity if the tag +of the underlying type is indeterminate (e.g., the +underlying type is CHOICE or ANY). + + +2.4 Other types + +Other types in ASN.1 include the CHOICE and ANY types. The +CHOICE type denotes a union of one or more alternatives; the +ANY type denotes an arbitrary value of an arbitrary type, +where the arbitrary type is possibly defined in the +registration of an object identifier or integer value. + + +3. Basic Encoding Rules + +The Basic Encoding Rules for ASN.1, abbreviated BER, give +one or more ways to represent any ASN.1 value as an octet +string. (There are certainly other ways to represent ASN.1 +values, but BER is the standard for interchanging such +values in OSI.) + +There are three methods to encode an ASN.1 value under BER, +the choice of which depends on the type of value and whether +the length of the value is known. The three methods are +primitive, definite-length encoding; constructed, definite- +length encoding; and constructed, indefinite-length +encoding. Simple non-string types employ the primitive, +definite-length method; structured types employ either of +the constructed methods; and simple string types employ any +of the methods, depending on whether the length of the value +is known. Types derived by implicit tagging employ the +method of the underlying type and types derived by explicit +tagging employ the constructed methods. + +In each method, the BER encoding has three or four parts: + + Identifier octets. These identify the class and tag + number of the ASN.1 value, and indicate whether + the method is primitive or constructed. + + Length octets. For the definite-length methods, these + give the number of contents octets. For the + constructed, indefinite-length method, these + indicate that the length is indefinite. + + Contents octets. For the primitive, definite-length + method, these give a concrete representation of + the value. For the constructed methods, these + give the concatenation of the BER encodings of the + components of the value. + + End-of-contents octets. For the constructed, indefinite- + length method, these denote the end of the + contents. For the other methods, these are absent. + +The three methods of encoding are described in the following +sections. + + +3.1 Primitive, definite-length method + +This method applies to simple types and types derived from +simple types by implicit tagging. It requires that the +length of the value be known in advance. The parts of the +BER encoding are as follows: + +Identifier octets. There are two forms: low tag number (for +tag numbers between 0 and 30) and high tag number (for tag +numbers 31 and greater). + + Low-tag-number form. One octet. Bits 8 and 7 specify + the class (see Table 2), bit 6 has value "0," + indicating that the encoding is primitive, and + bits 5-1 give the tag number. + + Class Bit Bit + 8 7 + universal 0 0 + application 0 1 + context-specific 1 0 + private 1 1 + + Table 2. Class encoding in identifier octets. + + High-tag-number form. Two or more octets. First octet + is as in low-tag-number form, except that bits 5-1 + all have value "1." Second and following octets + give the tag number, base 128, most significant + digit first, with as few digits as possible, and + with the bit 8 of each octet except the last set + to "1." + +Length octets. There are two forms: short (for lengths +between 0 and 127), and long definite (for lengths between 0 +and 21008-1). + + Short form. One octet. Bit 8 has value "0" and bits 7-1 + give the length. + + Long form. Two to 127 octets. Bit 8 of first octet has + value "1" and bits 7-1 give the number of + additional length octets. Second and following + octets give the length, base 256, most significant + digit first. + +Contents octets. These give a concrete representation of the +value (or the value of the underlying type, if the type is +derived by implicit tagging). Details for particular types +are given in Section 5. + + +3.2 Constructed, definite-length method + +This method applies to simple string types, structured +types, types derived simple string types and structured +types by implicit tagging, and types derived from anything +by explicit tagging. It requires that the length of the +value be known in advance. The parts of the BER encoding are +as follows: + +Identifier octets. As described in Section 3.1, except that +bit 6 has value "1," indicating that the encoding is +constructed. + +Length octets. As described in Section 3.1. + +Contents octets. The concatenation of the BER encodings of +the components of the value: + + o For simple string types and types derived from + them by implicit tagging, the concatenation of the + BER encodings of consecutive substrings of the + value (underlying value for implicit tagging). + + o For structured types and types derived from them + by implicit tagging, the concatenation of the BER + encodings of components of the value (underlying + value for implicit tagging). + + o For types derived from anything by explicit + tagging, the BER encoding of the underlying value. + +Details for particular types are given in Section 5. + + +3.3 Constructed, indefinite-length method + +This method applies to simple string types, structured +types, types derived simple string types and structured +types by implicit tagging, and types derived from anything +by explicit tagging. It does not require that the length of +the value be known in advance. The parts of the BER encoding +are as follows: + +Identifier octets. As described in Section 3.2. + +Length octets. One octet, 80. + +Contents octets. As described in Section 3.2. + +End-of-contents octets. Two octets, 00 00. + +Since the end-of-contents octets appear where an ordinary +BER encoding might be expected (e.g., in the contents octets +of a sequence value), the 00 and 00 appear as identifier and +length octets, respectively. Thus the end-of-contents octets +is really the primitive, definite-length encoding of a value +with universal class, tag number 0, and length 0. + + +4. Distinguished Encoding Rules + +The Distinguished Encoding Rules for ASN.1, abbreviated DER, +are a subset of BER, and give exactly one way to represent +any ASN.1 value as an octet string. DER is intended for +applications in which a unique octet string encoding is +needed, as is the case when a digital signature is computed +on an ASN.1 value. DER is defined in Section 8.7 of X.509. + +DER adds the following restrictions to the rules given in +Section 3: + + 1. When the length is between 0 and 127, the short + form of length must be used + + 2. When the length is 128 or greater, the long form + of length must be used, and the length must be + encoded in the minimum number of octets. + + 3. For simple string types and implicitly tagged + types derived from simple string types, the + primitive, definite-length method must be + employed. + + 4. For structured types, implicitly tagged types + derived from structured types, and explicitly + tagged types derived from anything, the + constructed, definite-length method must be + employed. + +Other restrictions are defined for particular types (such as +BIT STRING, SEQUENCE, SET, and SET OF), and can be found in +Section 5. + + +5. Notation and encodings for some types + +This section gives the notation for some ASN.1 types and +describes how to encode values of those types under both BER +and DER. + +The types described are those presented in Section 2. They +are listed alphabetically here. + +Each description includes ASN.1 notation, BER encoding, and +DER encoding. The focus of the encodings is primarily on the +contents octets; the tag and length octets follow Sections 3 +and 4. The descriptions also explain where each type is used +in PKCS and related standards. ASN.1 notation is generally +only for types, although for the type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, +value notation is given as well. + + +5.1 Implicitly tagged types + +An implicitly tagged type is a type derived from another +type by changing the tag of the underlying type. + +Implicit tagging is used for optional SEQUENCE components +with underlying type other than ANY throughout PKCS, and for +the extendedCertificate alternative of PKCS #7's +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +[[class] number] IMPLICIT Type + +class = UNIVERSAL | APPLICATION | PRIVATE + +where Type is a type, class is an optional class name, and +number is the tag number within the class, a nonnegative +integer. + +In ASN.1 "modules" whose default tagging method is implicit +tagging, the notation [[class] number] Type is also +acceptable, and the keyword IMPLICIT is implied. (See +Section 2.3.) For definitions stated outside a module, the +explicit inclusion of the keyword IMPLICIT is preferable to +prevent ambiguity. + +If the class name is absent, then the tag is context- +specific. Context-specific tags can only appear in a +component of a structured or CHOICE type. + +Example: PKCS #8's PrivateKeyInfo type has an optional +attributes component with an implicit, context-specific tag: + +PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version Version, + privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + privateKey PrivateKey, + attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } + +Here the underlying type is Attributes, the class is absent +(i.e., context-specific), and the tag number within the +class is 0. + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed, depending on the +underlying type. Contents octets are as for the BER encoding +of the underlying value. + +Example: The BER encoding of the attributes component of a +PrivateKeyInfo value is as follows: + + o the identifier octets are 80 if the underlying + Attributes value has a primitive BER encoding and + a0 if the underlying Attributes value has a + constructed BER encoding + + o the length and contents octets are the same as the + length and contents octets of the BER encoding of + the underlying Attributes value + +DER encoding. Primitive or constructed, depending on the +underlying type. Contents octets are as for the DER encoding +of the underlying value. + + +5.2 Explicitly tagged types + +Explicit tagging denotes a type derived from another type by +adding an outer tag to the underlying type. + +Explicit tagging is used for optional SEQUENCE components +with underlying type ANY throughout PKCS, and for the +version component of X.509's Certificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +[[class] number] EXPLICIT Type + +class = UNIVERSAL | APPLICATION | PRIVATE + +where Type is a type, class is an optional class name, and +number is the tag number within the class, a nonnegative +integer. + +If the class name is absent, then the tag is context- +specific. Context-specific tags can only appear in a +component of a SEQUENCE, SET or CHOICE type. + +In ASN.1 "modules" whose default tagging method is explicit +tagging, the notation [[class] number] Type is also +acceptable, and the keyword EXPLICIT is implied. (See +Section 2.3.) For definitions stated outside a module, the +explicit inclusion of the keyword EXPLICIT is preferable to +prevent ambiguity. + +Example 1: PKCS #7's ContentInfo type has an optional +content component with an explicit, context-specific tag: + +ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + contentType ContentType, + content + [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } + +Here the underlying type is ANY DEFINED BY contentType, the +class is absent (i.e., context-specific), and the tag number +within the class is 0. + +Example 2: X.509's Certificate type has a version component +with an explicit, context-specific tag, where the EXPLICIT +keyword is omitted: + +Certificate ::= ... + version [0] Version DEFAULT v1988, +... + +The tag is explicit because the default tagging method for +the ASN.1 "module" in X.509 that defines the Certificate +type is explicit tagging. + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the BER +encoding of the underlying value. + +Example: the BER encoding of the content component of a +ContentInfo value is as follows: + + o identifier octets are a0 + + o length octets represent the length of the BER + encoding of the underlying ANY DEFINED BY + contentType value + + o contents octets are the BER encoding of the + underlying ANY DEFINED BY contentType value + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the DER +encoding of the underlying value. + + +5.3 ANY + +The ANY type denotes an arbitrary value of an arbitrary +type, where the arbitrary type is possibly defined in the +registration of an object identifier or associated with an +integer index. + +The ANY type is used for content of a particular content +type in PKCS #7's ContentInfo type, for parameters of a +particular algorithm in X.509's AlgorithmIdentifier type, +and for attribute values in X.501's Attribute and +AttributeValueAssertion types. The Attribute type is used by +PKCS #6, #7, #8, #9 and #10, and the AttributeValueAssertion +type is used in X.501 distinguished names. + +ASN.1 notation: + +ANY [DEFINED BY identifier] + +where identifier is an optional identifier. + +In the ANY form, the actual type is indeterminate. + +The ANY DEFINED BY identifier form can only appear in a +component of a SEQUENCE or SET type for which identifier +identifies some other component, and that other component +has type INTEGER or OBJECT IDENTIFIER (or a type derived +from either of those by tagging). In that form, the actual +type is determined by the value of the other component, +either in the registration of the object identifier value, +or in a table of integer values. + +Example: X.509's AlgorithmIdentifier type has a component of +type ANY: + +AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + +Here the actual type of the parameter component depends on +the value of the algorithm component. The actual type would +be defined in the registration of object identifier values +for the algorithm component. + +BER encoding. Same as the BER encoding of the actual value. + +Example: The BER encoding of the value of the parameter +component is the BER encoding of the value of the actual +type as defined in the registration of object identifier +values for the algorithm component. + +DER encoding. Same as the DER encoding of the actual value. + + +5.4 BIT STRING + +The BIT STRING type denotes an arbitrary string of bits +(ones and zeroes). A BIT STRING value can have any length, +including zero. This type is a string type. + +The BIT STRING type is used for digital signatures on +extended certificates in PKCS #6's ExtendedCertificate type, +for digital signatures on certificates in X.509's +Certificate type, and for public keys in certificates in +X.509's SubjectPublicKeyInfo type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +BIT STRING + +Example: X.509's SubjectPublicKeyInfo type has a component +of type BIT STRING: + +SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + publicKey BIT STRING } + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the first contents octet gives the number of bits +by which the length of the bit string is less than the next +multiple of eight (this is called the "number of unused +bits"). The second and following contents octets give the +value of the bit string, converted to an octet string. The +conversion process is as follows: + + 1. The bit string is padded after the last bit with + zero to seven bits of any value to make the length + of the bit string a multiple of eight. If the + length of the bit string is a multiple of eight + already, no padding is done. + + 2. The padded bit string is divided into octets. The + first eight bits of the padded bit string become + the first octet, bit 8 to bit 1, and so on through + the last eight bits of the padded bit string. + +In a constructed encoding, the contents octets give the +concatenation of the BER encodings of consecutive substrings +of the bit string, where each substring except the last has +a length that is a multiple of eight bits. + +Example: The BER encoding of the BIT STRING value +"011011100101110111" can be any of the following, among +others, depending on the choice of padding bits, the form of +length octets, and whether the encoding is primitive or +constructed: + +03 04 06 6e 5d c0 DER encoding + +03 04 06 6e 5d e0 padded with "100000" + +03 81 04 06 6e 5d c0 long form of length octets + +23 09 constructed encoding: "0110111001011101" + "11" + 03 03 00 6e 5d + 03 02 06 c0 + +DER encoding. Primitive. The contents octects are as for a +primitive BER encoding, except that the bit string is padded +with zero-valued bits. + +Example: The DER encoding of the BIT STRING value +"011011100101110111" is + +03 04 06 6e 5d c0 + + +5.5 CHOICE + +The CHOICE type denotes a union of one or more alternatives. + +The CHOICE type is used to represent the union of an +extended certificate and an X.509 certificate in PKCS #7's +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +CHOICE { + [identifier1] Type1, + ..., + [identifiern] Typen } + +where identifier1 , ..., identifiern are optional, distinct +identifiers for the alternatives, and Type1, ..., Typen are +the types of the alternatives. The identifiers are primarily +for documentation; they do not affect values of the type or +their encodings in any way. + +The types must have distinct tags. This requirement is +typically satisfied with explicit or implicit tagging on +some of the alternatives. + +Example: PKCS #7's ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate type is +a CHOICE type: + +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { + certificate Certificate, -- X.509 + extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate +} + +Here the identifiers for the alternatives are certificate +and extendedCertificate, and the types of the alternatives +are Certificate and [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate. + +BER encoding. Same as the BER encoding of the chosen +alternative. The fact that the alternatives have distinct +tags makes it possible to distinguish between their BER +encodings. + +Example: The identifier octets for the BER encoding are 30 +if the chosen alternative is certificate, and a0 if the +chosen alternative is extendedCertificate. + +DER encoding. Same as the DER encoding of the chosen +alternative. + + +5.6 IA5String + +The IA5String type denotes an arbtrary string of IA5 +characters. IA5 stands for International Alphabet 5, which +is the same as ASCII. The character set includes non- +printing control characters. An IA5String value can have any +length, including zero. This type is a string type. + +The IA5String type is used in PKCS #9's electronic-mail +address, unstructured-name, and unstructured-address +attributes. + +ASN.1 notation: + +IA5String + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the IA5 +string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed encoding, the +contents octets give the concatenation of the BER encodings +of consecutive substrings of the IA5 string. + +Example: The BER encoding of the IA5String value +"test1@rsa.com" can be any of the following, among others, +depending on the form of length octets and whether the +encoding is primitive or constructed: + +16 0d 74 65 73 74 31 40 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d DER encoding + +16 81 0d long form of length octets + 74 65 73 74 31 40 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d + +36 13 constructed encoding: "test1" + "@" + "rsa.com" + 16 05 74 65 73 74 31 + 16 01 40 + 16 07 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The DER encoding of the IA5String value +"test1@rsa.com" is + +16 0d 74 65 73 74 31 40 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d + + +5.7 INTEGER + +The INTEGER type denotes an arbitrary integer. INTEGER +values can be positive, negative, or zero, and can have any +magnitude. + +The INTEGER type is used for version numbers throughout +PKCS, cryptographic values such as modulus, exponent, and +primes in PKCS #1's RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey types and +PKCS #3's DHParameter type, a message-digest iteration count +in PKCS #5's PBEParameter type, and version numbers and +serial numbers in X.509's Certificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +INTEGER [{ identifier1(value1) ... identifiern(valuen) }] + +where identifier1, ..., identifiern are optional distinct +identifiers and value1, ..., valuen are optional integer +values. The identifiers, when present, are associated with +values of the type. + +Example: X.509's Version type is an INTEGER type with +identified values: + +Version ::= INTEGER { v1988(0) } + +The identifier v1988 is associated with the value 0. X.509's +Certificate type uses the identifier v1988 to give a default +value of 0 for the version component: + +Certificate ::= ... + version Version DEFAULT v1988, +... + +BER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets give the value of +the integer, base 256, in two's complement form, most +significant digit first, with the minimum number of octets. +The value 0 is encoded as a single 00 octet. + +Some example BER encodings (which also happen to be DER +encodings) are given in Table 3. + + Integer BER encoding + value + 0 02 01 00 + 127 02 01 7F + 128 02 02 00 80 + 256 02 02 01 00 + -128 02 01 80 + -129 02 02 FF 7F + + Table 3. Example BER encodings of INTEGER values. + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + + +5.8 NULL + +The NULL type denotes a null value. + +The NULL type is used for algorithm parameters in several +places in PKCS. + +ASN.1 notation: + +NULL + +BER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are empty. + +Example: The BER encoding of a NULL value can be either of +the following, as well as others, depending on the form of +the length octets: + +05 00 + +05 81 00 + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are empty; the DER +encoding of a NULL value is always 05 00. + + +5.9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER + +The OBJECT IDENTIFIER type denotes an object identifier, a +sequence of integer components that identifies an object +such as an algorithm, an attribute type, or perhaps a +registration authority that defines other object +identifiers. An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value can have any number +of components, and components can generally have any +nonnegative value. This type is a non-string type. + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER values are given meanings by registration +authorities. Each registration authority is responsible for +all sequences of components beginning with a given sequence. +A registration authority typically delegates responsibility +for subsets of the sequences in its domain to other +registration authorities, or for particular types of object. +There are always at least two components. + +The OBJECT IDENTIFIER type is used to identify content in +PKCS #7's ContentInfo type, to identify algorithms in +X.509's AlgorithmIdentifier type, and to identify attributes +in X.501's Attribute and AttributeValueAssertion types. The +Attribute type is used by PKCS #6, #7, #8, #9, and #10, and +the AttributeValueAssertion type is used in X.501 +distinguished names. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values are defined +throughout PKCS. + +ASN.1 notation: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER + +The ASN.1 notation for values of the OBJECT IDENTIFIER type +is + +{ [identifier] component1 ... componentn } + +componenti = identifieri | identifieri (valuei) | valuei + +where identifier, identifier1, ..., identifiern are +identifiers, and value1, ..., valuen are optional integer +values. + +The form without identifier is the "complete" value with all +its components; the form with identifier abbreviates the +beginning components with another object identifier value. +The identifiers identifier1, ..., identifiern are intended +primarily for documentation, but they must correspond to the +integer value when both are present. These identifiers can +appear without integer values only if they are among a small +set of identifiers defined in X.208. + +Example: The following values both refer to the object +identifier assigned to RSA Data Security, Inc.: + +{ iso(1) member-body(2) 840 113549 } +{ 1 2 840 113549 } + +(In this example, which gives ASN.1 value notation, the +object identifier values are decimal, not hexadecimal.) +Table 4 gives some other object identifier values and their +meanings. + + Object identifier value Meaning + { 1 2 } ISO member bodies + { 1 2 840 } US (ANSI) + { 1 2 840 113549 } RSA Data Security, Inc. + { 1 2 840 113549 1 } RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS + { 2 5 } directory services (X.500) + { 2 5 8 } directory services-algorithms + + Table 4. Some object identifier values and their meanings. + +BER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as follows, +where value1, ..., valuen denote the integer values of the +components in the complete object identifier: + + 1. The first octet has value 40 * value1 + value2. + (This is unambiguous, since value1 is limited to + values 0, 1, and 2; value2 is limited to the range + 0 to 39 when value1 is 0 or 1; and, according to + X.208, n is always at least 2.) + + 2. The following octets, if any, encode value3, ..., + valuen. Each value is encoded base 128, most + significant digit first, with as few digits as + possible, and the most significant bit of each + octet except the last in the value's encoding set + to "1." + +Example: The first octet of the BER encoding of RSA Data +Security, Inc.'s object identifier is 40 * 1 + 2 = 42 = +2a16. The encoding of 840 = 6 * 128 + 4816 is 86 48 and the +encoding of 113549 = 6 * 1282 + 7716 * 128 + d16 is 86 f7 +0d. This leads to the following BER encoding: + +06 06 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + + +5.10 OCTET STRING + +The OCTET STRING type denotes an arbitrary string of octets +(eight-bit values). An OCTET STRING value can have any +length, including zero. This type is a string type. + +The OCTET STRING type is used for salt values in PKCS #5's +PBEParameter type, for message digests, encrypted message +digests, and encrypted content in PKCS #7, and for private +keys and encrypted private keys in PKCS #8. + +ASN.1 notation: + +OCTET STRING [SIZE ({size | size1..size2})] + +where size, size1, and size2 are optional size constraints. +In the OCTET STRING SIZE (size) form, the octet string must +have size octets. In the OCTET STRING SIZE (size1..size2) +form, the octet string must have between size1 and size2 +octets. In the OCTET STRING form, the octet string can have +any size. + +Example: PKCS #5's PBEParameter type has a component of type +OCTET STRING: + +PBEParameter ::= SEQUENCE { + salt OCTET STRING SIZE(8), + iterationCount INTEGER } + +Here the size of the salt component is always eight octets. + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the value of the octet +string, first octet to last octet. In a constructed +encoding, the contents octets give the concatenation of the +BER encodings of substrings of the OCTET STRING value. + +Example: The BER encoding of the OCTET STRING value 01 23 45 +67 89 ab cd ef can be any of the following, among others, +depending on the form of length octets and whether the +encoding is primitive or constructed: + +04 08 01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef DER encoding + +04 81 08 01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef long form of length octets + +24 0c constructed encoding: 01 ... 67 + 89 ... ef + 04 04 01 23 45 67 + 04 04 89 ab cd ef + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The BER encoding of the OCTET STRING value 01 23 45 +67 89 ab cd ef is + +04 08 01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef + + +5.11 PrintableString + +The PrintableString type denotes an arbitrary string of +printable characters from the following character set: + + A, B, ..., Z + a, b, ..., z + 0, 1, ..., 9 + (space) ' ( ) + , - . / : = ? + +This type is a string type. + +The PrintableString type is used in PKCS #9's challenge- +password and unstructuerd-address attributes, and in several +X.521 distinguished names attributes. + +ASN.1 notation: + +PrintableString + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the +printable string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed +encoding, the contents octets give the concatenation of the +BER encodings of consecutive substrings of the string. + +Example: The BER encoding of the PrintableString value "Test +User 1" can be any of the following, among others, depending +on the form of length octets and whether the encoding is +primitive or constructed: + +13 0b 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 DER encoding + +13 81 0b long form of length octets + 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + +33 0f constructed encoding: "Test " + "User 1" + 13 05 54 65 73 74 20 + 13 06 55 73 65 72 20 31 + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The DER encoding of the PrintableString value "Test +User 1" is + +13 0b 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + + +5.12 SEQUENCE + +The SEQUENCE type denotes an ordered collection of one or +more types. + +The SEQUENCE type is used throughout PKCS and related +standards. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SEQUENCE { + [identifier1] Type1 [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT value1}], + ..., + [identifiern] Typen [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT valuen}]} + +where identifier1 , ..., identifiern are optional, distinct +identifiers for the components, Type1, ..., Typen are the +types of the components, and value1, ..., valuen are optional +default values for the components. The identifiers are +primarily for documentation; they do not affect values of +the type or their encodings in any way. + +The OPTIONAL qualifier indicates that the value of a +component is optional and need not be present in the +sequence. The DEFAULT qualifier also indicates that the +value of a component is optional, and assigns a default +value to the component when the component is absent. + +The types of any consecutive series of components with the +OPTIONAL or DEFAULT qualifier, as well as of any component +immediately following that series, must have distinct tags. +This requirement is typically satisfied with explicit or +implicit tagging on some of the components. + +Example: X.509's Validity type is a SEQUENCE type with two +components: + +Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + start UTCTime, + end UTCTime } + +Here the identifiers for the components are start and end, +and the types of the components are both UTCTime. + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +components of the sequence, in order of definition, with the +following rules for components with the OPTIONAL and DEFAULT +qualifiers: + + o if the value of a component with the OPTIONAL or + DEFAULT qualifier is absent from the sequence, + then the encoding of that component is not + included in the contents octets + + o if the value of a component with the DEFAULT + qualifier is the default value, then the encoding + of that component may or may not be included in + the contents octets + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the same as +the BER encoding, except that if the value of a component +with the DEFAULT qualifier is the default value, the +encoding of that component is not included in the contents +octets. + + +5.13 SEQUENCE OF + +The SEQUENCE OF type denotes an ordered collection of zero +or more occurrences of a given type. + +The SEQUENCE OF type is used in X.501 distinguished names. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SEQUENCE OF Type + +where Type is a type. + +Example: X.501's RDNSequence type consists of zero or more +occurences of the RelativeDistinguishedName type, most +significant occurrence first: + +RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +occurrences in the collection, in order of occurence. + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the DER encodings of the values of the +occurrences in the collection, in order of occurence. + + +5.14 SET + +The SET type denotes an unordered collection of one or more +types. + +The SET type is not used in PKCS. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SET { + [identifier1] Type1 [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT value1}], + ..., + [identifiern] Typen [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT valuen}]} + +where identifier1, ..., identifiern are optional, distinct +identifiers for the components, Type1, ..., Typen are the +types of the components, and value1, ..., valuen are +optional default values for the components. The identifiers +are primarily for documentation; they do not affect values +of the type or their encodings in any way. + +The OPTIONAL qualifier indicates that the value of a +component is optional and need not be present in the set. +The DEFAULT qualifier also indicates that the value of a +component is optional, and assigns a default value to the +component when the component is absent. + +The types must have distinct tags. This requirement is +typically satisfied with explicit or implicit tagging on +some of the components. + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +components of the set, in any order, with the following +rules for components with the OPTIONAL and DEFAULT +qualifiers: + + o if the value of a component with the OPTIONAL or + DEFAULT qualifier is absent from the set, then the + encoding of that component is not included in the + contents octets + + o if the value of a component with the DEFAULT + qualifier is the default value, then the encoding + of that component may or may not be included in + the contents octets + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the same as +for the BER encoding, except that: + + 1. If the value of a component with the DEFAULT + qualifier is the default value, the encoding of + that component is not included. + + 2. There is an order to the components, namely + ascending order by tag. + + +5.15 SET OF + +The SET OF type denotes an unordered collection of zero or +more occurrences of a given type. + +The SET OF type is used for sets of attributes in PKCS #6, +#7, #8, #9 and #10, for sets of message-digest algorithm +identifiers, signer information, and recipient information +in PKCS #7, and in X.501 distinguished names. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SET OF Type + +where Type is a type. + +Example: X.501's RelativeDistinguishedName type consists of +zero or more occurrences of the AttributeValueAssertion +type, where the order is unimportant: + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + SET OF AttributeValueAssertion + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +occurrences in the collection, in any order. + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the same as +for the BER encoding, except that there is an order, namely +ascending lexicographic order of BER encoding. Lexicographic +comparison of two different BER encodings is done as +follows: Logically pad the shorter BER encoding after the +last octet with dummy octets that are smaller in value than +any normal octet. Scan the BER encodings from left to right +until a difference is found. The smaller-valued BER encoding +is the one with the smaller-valued octet at the point of +difference. + + +5.16 T61String + +The T61String type denotes an arbtrary string of T.61 +characters. T.61 is an eight-bit extension to the ASCII +character set. Special "escape" sequences specify the +interpretation of subsequent character values as, for +example, Japanese; the initial interpretation is Latin. The +character set includes non-printing control characters. The +T61String type allows only the Latin and Japanese character +interepretations, and implementors' agreements for directory +names exclude control characters [NIST92]. A T61String value +can have any length, including zero. This type is a string +type. + +The T61String type is used in PKCS #9's unstructured-address +and challenge-password attributes, and in several X.521 +attributes. + +ASN.1 notation: + +T61String + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the +T.61 string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed encoding, +the contents octets give the concatenation of the BER +encodings of consecutive substrings of the T.61 string. + +Example: The BER encoding of the T61String value "cl'es +publiques" (French for "public keys") can be any of the +following, among others, depending on the form of length +octets and whether the encoding is primitive or constructed: + +14 0f DER encoding + 63 6c c2 65 73 20 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + +14 81 0f long form of length octets + 63 6c c2 65 73 20 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + +34 15 constructed encoding: "cl'es" + " " + "publiques" + 14 05 63 6c c2 65 73 + 14 01 20 + 14 09 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + +The eight-bit character c2 is a T.61 prefix that adds an +acute accent (') to the next character. + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The DER encoding of the T61String value "cl'es +publiques" is + +14 0f 63 6c c2 65 73 20 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + + +5.17 UTCTime + +The UTCTime type denotes a "coordinated universal time" or +Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) value. A UTCTime value includes +the local time precise to either minutes or seconds, and an +offset from GMT in hours and minutes. It takes any of the +following forms: + +YYMMDDhhmmZ +YYMMDDhhmm+hh'mm' +YYMMDDhhmm-hh'mm' +YYMMDDhhmmssZ +YYMMDDhhmmss+hh'mm' +YYMMDDhhmmss-hh'mm' + +where: + + YY is the least significant two digits of the year + + MM is the month (01 to 12) + + DD is the day (01 to 31) + + hh is the hour (00 to 23) + + mm are the minutes (00 to 59) + + ss are the seconds (00 to 59) + + Z indicates that local time is GMT, + indicates that + local time is later than GMT, and - indicates that + local time is earlier than GMT + + hh' is the absolute value of the offset from GMT in + hours + + mm' is the absolute value of the offset from GMT in + minutes + +This type is a string type. + +The UTCTime type is used for signing times in PKCS #9's +signing-time attribute and for certificate validity periods +in X.509's Validity type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +UTCTime + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the +string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed encoding, the +contents octets give the concatenation of the BER encodings +of consecutive substrings of the string. (The constructed +encoding is not particularly interesting, since UTCTime +values are so short, but the constructed encoding is +permitted.) + +Example: The time this sentence was originally written was +4:45:40 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time on May 6, 1991, which can +be represented with either of the following UTCTime values, +among others: + +"910506164540-0700" + +"910506234540Z" + +These values have the following BER encodings, among others: + +17 0d 39 31 30 35 30 36 32 33 34 35 34 30 5a + +17 11 39 31 30 35 30 36 31 36 34 35 34 30 2D 30 37 30 + 30 + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + + +6. An example + +This section gives an example of ASN.1 notation and DER +encoding: the X.501 type Name. + + +6.1 Abstract notation + +This section gives the ASN.1 notation for the X.501 type +Name. + +Name ::= CHOICE { + RDNSequence } + +RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + SET OF AttributeValueAssertion + +AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE { + AttributeType, + AttributeValue } + +AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + +AttributeValue ::= ANY + +The Name type identifies an object in an X.500 directory. +Name is a CHOICE type consisting of one alternative: +RDNSequence. (Future revisions of X.500 may have other +alternatives.) + +The RDNSequence type gives a path through an X.500 directory +tree starting at the root. RDNSequence is a SEQUENCE OF type +consisting of zero or more occurences of +RelativeDistinguishedName. + +The RelativeDistinguishedName type gives a unique name to an +object relative to the object superior to it in the +directory tree. RelativeDistinguishedName is a SET OF type +consisting of zero or more occurrences of +AttributeValueAssertion. + +The AttributeValueAssertion type assigns a value to some +attribute of a relative distinguished name, such as country +name or common name. AttributeValueAssertion is a SEQUENCE +type consisting of two components, an AttributeType type and +an AttributeValue type. + +The AttributeType type identifies an attribute by object +identifier. The AttributeValue type gives an arbitrary +attribute value. The actual type of the attribute value is +determined by the attribute type. + + +6.2 DER encoding + +This section gives an example of a DER encoding of a value +of type Name, working from the bottom up. + +The name is that of the Test User 1 from the PKCS examples +[Kal93]. The name is represented by the following path: + + (root) + | + countryName = "US" + | + organizationName = "Example Organization" + | + commonName = "Test User 1" + +Each level corresponds to one RelativeDistinguishedName +value, each of which happens for this name to consist of one +AttributeValueAssertion value. The AttributeType value is +before the equals sign, and the AttributeValue value (a +printable string for the given attribute types) is after the +equals sign. + +The countryName, organizationName, and commonUnitName are +attribute types defined in X.520 as: + +attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 } + +countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { attributeType 6 } +organizationName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { attributeType 10 } +commonUnitName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { attributeType 3 } + + +6.2.1 AttributeType + +The three AttributeType values are OCTET STRING values, so +their DER encoding follows the primitive, definite-length +method: + +06 03 55 04 06 countryName + +06 03 55 04 0a organizationName + +06 03 55 04 03 commonName + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag form, since the tag +is 6 for OBJECT IDENTIFIER. Bits 8 and 7 have value "0," +indicating universal class, and bit 6 has value "0," +indicating that the encoding is primitive. The length octets +follow the short form. The contents octets are the +concatenation of three octet strings derived from +subidentifiers (in decimal): 40 * 2 + 5 = 85 = 5516; 4; and +6, 10, or 3. + + +6.2.2 AttributeValue + +The three AttributeValue values are PrintableString values, +so their encodings follow the primitive, definite-length +method: + +13 02 55 53 "US" + +13 14 "Example Organization" + 45 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 20 4f 72 67 61 6e 69 7a 61 + 74 69 6f 6e + +13 0b "Test User 1" + 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for PrintableString, 19 (decimal), is between 0 and +30. Bits 8 and 7 have value "0" since PrintableString is in +the universal class. Bit 6 has value "0" since the encoding +is primitive. The length octets follow the short form, and +the contents octets are the ASCII representation of the +attribute value. + + +6.2.3 AttributeValueAssertion + +The three AttributeValueAssertion values are SEQUENCE +values, so their DER encodings follow the constructed, +definite-length method: + +30 09 countryName = "US" + 06 03 55 04 06 + 13 02 55 53 + +30 1b organizationName = "Example Organizaiton" + 06 03 55 04 0a + 13 14 ... 6f 6e + +30 12 commonName = "Test User 1" + 06 03 55 04 0b + 13 0b ... 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for SEQUENCE, 16 (decimal), is between 0 and 30. +Bits 8 and 7 have value "0" since SEQUENCE is in the +universal class. Bit 6 has value "1" since the encoding is +constructed. The length octets follow the short form, and +the contents octets are the concatenation of the DER +encodings of the attributeType and attributeValue +components. + + +6.2.4 RelativeDistinguishedName + +The three RelativeDistinguishedName values are SET OF +values, so their DER encodings follow the constructed, +definite-length method: + +31 0b + 30 09 ... 55 53 + +31 1d + 30 1b ... 6f 6e + +31 14 + 30 12 ... 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for SET OF, 17 (decimal), is between 0 and 30. Bits +8 and 7 have value "0" since SET OF is in the universal +class Bit 6 has value "1" since the encoding is constructed. +The lengths octets follow the short form, and the contents +octets are the DER encodings of the respective +AttributeValueAssertion values, since there is only one +value in each set. + + +6.2.5 RDNSequence + +The RDNSequence value is a SEQUENCE OF value, so its DER +encoding follows the constructed, definite-length method: + +30 42 + 31 0b ... 55 53 + 31 1d ... 6f 6e + 31 14 ... 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for SEQUENCE OF, 16 (decimal), is between 0 and 30. +Bits 8 and 7 have value "0" since SEQUENCE OF is in the +universal class. Bit 6 has value "1" since the encoding is +constructed. The lengths octets follow the short form, and +the contents octets are the concatenation of the DER +encodings of the three RelativeDistinguishedName values, in +order of occurrence. + + +6.2.6 Name + +The Name value is a CHOICE value, so its DER encoding is the +same as that of the RDNSequence value: + +30 42 + 31 0b + 30 09 + 06 03 55 04 06 attributeType = countryName + 13 02 55 53 attributeValue = "US" + 31 1d + 30 1b + 06 03 55 04 0a attributeType = organizationName + 13 14 attributeValue = "Example Organization" + 45 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 20 4f 72 67 61 6e 69 7a 61 + 74 69 6f 6e + + 31 14 + 30 12 + 06 03 55 04 03 attributeType = commonName + 13 0b attributeValue = "Test User 1" + 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + + +References + +PKCS #1 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1: RSA Encryption + Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #3 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key- + Agreement Standard. Version 1.4, November 1993. + +PKCS #5 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #5: Password-Based + Encryption Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #6 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate + Syntax Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #7 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message + Syntax Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #8 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information + Syntax Standard. Version 1.2, November 1993. + +PKCS #9 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #9: Selected Attribute + Types. Version 1.1, November 1993. + +PKCS #10 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #10: Certification Request + Syntax Standard. Version 1.0, November 1993. + +X.200 CCITT. Recommendation X.200: Reference Model of + Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT + Applications. 1984. + +X.208 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of + Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. + +X.209 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of + Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1). 1988. + +X.500 CCITT. Recommendation X.500: The + Directory--Overview of Concepts, Models and + Services. 1988. + +X.501 CCITT. Recommendation X.501: The Directory-- + Models. 1988. + +X.509 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory-- + Authentication Framework. 1988. + +X.520 CCITT. Recommendation X.520: The Directory-- + Selected Attribute Types. 1988. + +[Kal93] Burton S. Kaliski Jr. Some Examples of the PKCS + Standards. RSA Laboratories, November 1993. + +[NIST92] NIST. Special Publication 500-202: Stable + Implementation Agreements for Open Systems + Interconnection Protocols. Part 11 (Directory + Services Protocols). December 1992. + + +Revision history + + +June 3, 1991 version + +The June 3, 1991 version is part of the initial public +release of PKCS. It was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' +Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-17. + + +November 1, 1993 version + +The November 1, 1993 version incorporates several editorial +changes, including the addition of a revision history. It is +updated to be consistent with the following versions of the +PKCS documents: + + PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard. Version 1.5, November + 1993. + + PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard. Version + 1.4, November 1993. + + PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard. Version + 1.5, November 1993. + + PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard. Version + 1.5, November 1993. + + PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard. Version + 1.5, November 1993. + + PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard. + Version 1.2, November 1993. + + PKCS #9: Selected Attribute Types. Version 1.1, + November 1993. + + PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard. + Version 1.0, November 1993. + +The following substantive changes were made: + + Section 5: Description of T61String type is added. + + Section 6: Names are changed, consistent with other + PKCS examples. + + +Author's address + +Burton S. Kaliski Jr., Ph.D. +Chief Scientist +RSA Laboratories (415) 595-7703 +100 Marine Parkway (415) 595-4126 (fax) +Redwood City, CA 94065 USA burt@rsa.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/mdate-sh b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/mdate-sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37171f21fb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/mdate-sh @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Get modification time of a file or directory and pretty-print it. +# Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# written by Ulrich Drepper , June 1995 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, +# Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + +# Prevent date giving response in another language. +LANG=C +export LANG +LC_ALL=C +export LC_ALL +LC_TIME=C +export LC_TIME + +# Get the extended ls output of the file or directory. +# On HPUX /bin/sh, "set" interprets "-rw-r--r--" as options, so the "x" below. +if ls -L /dev/null 1>/dev/null 2>&1; then + set - x`ls -L -l -d $1` +else + set - x`ls -l -d $1` +fi +# The month is at least the fourth argument +# (3 shifts here, the next inside the loop). +shift +shift +shift + +# Find the month. Next argument is day, followed by the year or time. +month= +until test $month +do + shift + case $1 in + Jan) month=January; nummonth=1;; + Feb) month=February; nummonth=2;; + Mar) month=March; nummonth=3;; + Apr) month=April; nummonth=4;; + May) month=May; nummonth=5;; + Jun) month=June; nummonth=6;; + Jul) month=July; nummonth=7;; + Aug) month=August; nummonth=8;; + Sep) month=September; nummonth=9;; + Oct) month=October; nummonth=10;; + Nov) month=November; nummonth=11;; + Dec) month=December; nummonth=12;; + esac +done + +day=$2 + +# Here we have to deal with the problem that the ls output gives either +# the time of day or the year. +case $3 in + *:*) set `date`; eval year=\$$# + case $2 in + Jan) nummonthtod=1;; + Feb) nummonthtod=2;; + Mar) nummonthtod=3;; + Apr) nummonthtod=4;; + May) nummonthtod=5;; + Jun) nummonthtod=6;; + Jul) nummonthtod=7;; + Aug) nummonthtod=8;; + Sep) nummonthtod=9;; + Oct) nummonthtod=10;; + Nov) nummonthtod=11;; + Dec) nummonthtod=12;; + esac + # For the first six month of the year the time notation can also + # be used for files modified in the last year. + if (expr $nummonth \> $nummonthtod) > /dev/null; + then + year=`expr $year - 1` + fi;; + *) year=$3;; +esac + +# The result. +echo $day $month $year diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/migration.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/migration.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67b843ae75 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/migration.texi @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +@c $Id: migration.texi,v 1.3 2001/02/24 05:09:24 assar Exp $ + +@node Migration, Acknowledgments, Programming with Kerberos, Top +@chapter Migration + +@section General issues + +When migrating from a Kerberos 4 KDC. + +@section Order in what to do things: + +@itemize @bullet + +@item Convert the database, check all principals that hprop complains +about. + +@samp{hprop -n --source=| hpropd -n} + +Replace with whatever source you have, like krb4-db or krb4-dump. + +@item Run a Kerberos 5 slave for a while. + +@c XXX Add you slave first to your kdc list in you kdc. + +@item Figure out if it does everything you want it to. + +Make sure that all things that you use works for you. + +@item Let a small number of controlled users use Kerberos 5 tools. + +Find a sample population of your users and check what programs they use, +you can also check the kdc-log to check what ticket are checked out. + +@item Burn the bridge and change the master. +@item Let all users use the Kerberos 5 tools by default. +@item Turn off services that do not need Kerberos 4 authentication. + +Things that might be hard to get away is old programs with support for +Kerberos 4. Example applications are old Eudora installations using +KPOP, and Zephyr. Eudora can use the Kerberos 4 kerberos in the Heimdal +kdc. + +@end itemize diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/misc.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/misc.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83c2a4ad8b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/misc.texi @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +@c $Id: misc.texi,v 1.13 2003/03/30 21:30:59 lha Exp $ + +@node Things in search for a better place, Kerberos 4 issues, Setting up a realm, Top +@chapter Things in search for a better place + +@section Making things work on Ciscos + +Modern versions of Cisco IOS has some support for authenticating via +Kerberos 5. This can be used both by having the router get a ticket when +you login (boring), and by using Kerberos authenticated telnet to access +your router (less boring). The following has been tested on IOS +11.2(12), things might be different with other versions. Old versions +are known to have bugs. + +To make this work, you will first have to configure your router to use +Kerberos (this is explained in the documentation). A sample +configuration looks like the following: + +@example +aaa new-model +aaa authentication login default krb5-telnet krb5 enable +aaa authorization exec krb5-instance +kerberos local-realm FOO.SE +kerberos srvtab entry host/router.foo.se 0 891725446 4 1 8 012345678901234567 +kerberos server FOO.SE 10.0.0.1 +kerberos instance map admin 15 +@end example + +This tells you (among other things) that when logging in, the router +should try to authenticate with kerberised telnet, and if that fails try +to verify a plain text password via a Kerberos ticket exchange (as +opposed to a local database, RADIUS or something similar), and if that +fails try the local enable password. If you're not careful when you +specify the `login default' authentication mechanism, you might not be +able to login at all. The `instance map' and `authorization exec' lines +says that people with `admin' instances should be given `enabled' shells +when logging in. + +The numbers after the principal on the `srvtab' line are principal type, +time stamp (in seconds since 1970), key version number (4), keytype (1 == +des), key length (always 8 with des), and then the key. + +To make the Heimdal KDC produce tickets that the Cisco can decode you +might have to turn on the @samp{encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep} flag in the +KDC. You will also have to specify that the router can't handle anything +but @samp{des-cbc-crc}. This can be done with the @samp{del_enctype} +command of @samp{kadmin}. + +This all fine and so, but unless you have an IOS version with encryption +(available only in the U.S) it doesn't really solve any problems. Sure +you don't have to send your password over the wire, but since the telnet +connection isn't protected it's still possible for someone to steal your +session. This won't be fixed until someone adds integrity to the telnet +protocol. + +A working solution would be to hook up a machine with a real operating +system to the console of the Cisco and then use it as a backwards +terminal server. + +@section Making things work on Transarc/OpenAFS AFS + +@subsection How to get a KeyFile + +@file{ktutil -k AFSKEYFILE:KeyFile get afs@@MY.REALM} + +or you can extract it with kadmin + +@example +kadmin> ext -k AFSKEYFILE:/usr/afs/etc/KeyFile afs@@My.CELL.NAME +@end example + +You have to make sure you have a @code{des-cbc-md5} encryption type since that +is the key that will be converted. + +@subsection How to convert a srvtab to a KeyFile + +You need a @file{/usr/vice/etc/ThisCell} containing the cellname of you +AFS-cell. + +@file{ktutil copy krb4:/root/afs-srvtab AFSKEYFILE:/usr/afs/etc/KeyFile}. + +If keyfile already exists, this will add the new key in afs-srvtab to +KeyFile. + +@section Using 2b tokens with AFS + +@subsection What is 2b ? + +2b is the name of the proposal that was implemented to give basic +Kerberos 5 support to AFS in rxkad. Its not real Kerberos 5 support +since it still uses fcrypt for data encryption and not Kerberos +encryption types. + +Its only possible (in all cases) to do this for DES encryption types because +only then the token (the AFS equivalent of a ticket) will be be smaller +than the maximum size that can fit in the token cache in +OpenAFS/Transarc client. Its so tight fit that some extra wrapping on the ASN1/DER encoding is removed from the Kerberos ticket. + +2b uses a Kerberos 5 EncTicketPart instead of a Kerberos 4 ditto for +the part of the ticket that is encrypted with the service's key. The +client doesn't know what's inside the encrypted data so to the client it doesn't matter. + +To differentiate between Kerberos 4 tickets and Kerberos 5 tickets 2b +uses a special kvno, 213 for 2b tokens and 255 for Kerberos 5 tokens. + +Its a requirement that all AFS servers that support 2b also support +native Kerberos 5 in rxkad. + +@subsection Configuring Heimdal to use 2b tokens + +Support for 2b tokens are turned on for specific principals by adding +them to the string list option @code{[kdc]use_2b} in the kdc's +@file{krb5.conf} file. + +@example +[kdc] + use_2b = @{ + afs@@SU.SE = yes + afs/it.su.se@@SU.SE = yes + @} +@end example + +@subsection Configuring AFS clients + +There is no need to configure AFS clients. The only software that +needs to be installed/upgrade is a Kerberos 5 enabled @file{afslog}. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/programming.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/programming.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63f07150fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/programming.texi @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +@c $Id: programming.texi,v 1.2.8.1 2003/04/24 11:55:45 lha Exp $ + +@node Programming with Kerberos +@chapter Programming with Kerberos + +First you need to know how the Kerberos model works, go read the +introduction text (@pxref{What is Kerberos?}). + +@macro manpage{man, section} +@cite{\man\(\section\)} +@end macro + +@menu +* Kerberos 5 API Overview:: +* Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client:: +* Validating a password in a server application:: +@end menu + +@node Kerberos 5 API Overview, Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client, Programming with Kerberos, Programming with Kerberos +@section Kerberos 5 API Overview + +Most functions are documenteded in manual pages. This overview only +tries to point to where to look for a specific function. + +@subsection Kerberos context + +A kerberos context (@code{krb5_context}) holds all per thread state. All global variables that +are context specific are stored in this struture, including default +encryption types, credential-cache (ticket file), and default realms. + +See the manual pages for @manpage{krb5_context,3} and +@manpage{krb5_init_context,3}. + +@subsection Kerberos authenication context + +Kerberos authentication context (@code{krb5_auth_context}) holds all +context related to an authenticated connection, in a similar way to the +kerberos context that holds the context for the thread or process. + +The @code{krb5_auth_context} is used by various functions that are +directly related to authentication between the server/client. Example of +data that this structure contains are various flags, addresses of client +and server, port numbers, keyblocks (and subkeys), sequence numbers, +replay cache, and checksum types. + +See the manual page for @manpage{krb5_auth_context,3}. + +@subsection Keytab management + +A keytab is a storage for locally stored keys. Heimdal includes keytab +support for Kerberos 5 keytabs, Kerberos 4 srvtab, AFS-KeyFile's, +and for storing keys in memory. + +See also manual page for @manpage{krb5_keytab,3} + +@node Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client, Validating a password in a server application, Kerberos 5 API Overview, Programming with Kerberos +@section Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client + +This example contains parts of a sample TCP Kerberos 5 clients, if you +want a real working client, please look in @file{appl/test} directory in +the Heimdal distribution. + +All Kerberos error-codes that are returned from kerberos functions in +this program are passed to @code{krb5_err}, that will print a +descriptive text of the error code and exit. Graphical programs can +convert error-code to a humal readable error-string with the +@manpage{krb5_get_err_text,3} function. + +Note that you should not use any Kerberos function before +@code{krb5_init_context()} have completed successfully. That is the +reson @code{err()} is used when @code{krb5_init_context()} fails. + +First the client needs to call @code{krb5_init_context} to initialize +the Kerberos 5 library. This is only needed once per thread +in the program. If the function returns a non-zero value it indicates +that either the Kerberos implemtation is failing or its disabled on +this host. + +@example +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +@{ + krb5_context context; + + if (krb5_context(&context)) + errx (1, "krb5_context"); +@end example + +Now the client wants to connect to the host at the other end. The +preferred way of doing this is using @manpage{getaddrinfo,3} (for +operating system that have this function implemented), since getaddrinfo +is neutral to the address type and can use any protocol that is available. + +@example + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, "pop3", &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) @{ + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) @{ + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + @} + freeaddrinfo (ai); + ai = NULL; + @} + if (ai) @{ + freeaddrinfo (ai); + errx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + @} +@end example + +Before authenticating, an authentication context needs to be +created. This context keeps all information for one (to be) authenticated +connection (see @manpage{krb5_auth_context,3}). + +@example + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); +@end example + +For setting the address in the authentication there is a help function +@code{krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd} that does everthing that is needed +when given a connected file descriptor to the socket. + +@example + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, + "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd"); +@end example + +The next step is to build a server principal for the service we want +to connect to. (See also @manpage{krb5_sname_to_principal,3}.) + +@example + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); +@end example + +The client principal is not passed to @manpage{krb5_sendauth,3} +function, this causes the @code{krb5_sendauth} function to try to figure it +out itself. + +The server program is using the function @manpage{krb5_recvauth,3} to +receive the Kerberos 5 authenticator. + +In this case, mutual authenication will be tried. That means that the server +will authenticate to the client. Using mutual authenication +is good since it enables the user to verify that they are talking to the +right server (a server that knows the key). + +If you are using a non-blocking socket you will need to do all work of +@code{krb5_sendauth} yourself. Basically you need to send over the +authenticator from @manpage{krb5_mk_req,3} and, in case of mutual +authentication, verifying the result from the server with +@manpage{krb5_rd_rep,3}. + +@example + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth"); +@end example + +Once authentication has been performed, it is time to send some +data. First we create a krb5_data structure, then we sign it with +@manpage{krb5_mk_safe,3} using the @code{auth_context} that contains the +session-key that was exchanged in the +@manpage{krb5_sendauth,3}/@manpage{krb5_recvauth,3} authentication +sequence. + +@example + data.data = "hej"; + data.length = 3; + + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_safe (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe"); +@end example + +And send it over the network. + +@example + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); +@end example + +To send encrypted (and signed) data @manpage{krb5_mk_priv,3} should be +used instead. @manpage{krb5_mk_priv,3} works the same way as +@manpage{krb5_mk_safe,3}, with the exception that it encrypts the data +in addition to signing it. + +@example + data.data = "hemligt"; + data.length = 7; + + krb5_data_free (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); +@end example + +And send it over the network. + +@example + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + +@end example + +The server is using @manpage{krb5_rd_safe,3} and +@manpage{krb5_rd_priv,3} to verify the signature and decrypt the packet. + +@node Validating a password in a server application, , Walkthru a sample Kerberos 5 client, Programming with Kerberos +@section Validating a password in an application + +See the manual page for @manpage{krb5_verify_user,3}. + +@c @node Why you should use GSS-API for new applications, Walkthru a sample GSS-API client, Validating a password in a server application, Programming with Kerberos +@c @section Why you should use GSS-API for new applications +@c +@c SSPI, bah, bah, microsoft, bah, bah, almost GSS-API. +@c +@c It would also be possible for other mechanisms then Kerberos, but that +@c doesn't exist any other GSS-API implementations today. +@c +@c @node Walkthru a sample GSS-API client, , Why you should use GSS-API for new applications, Programming with Kerberos +@c @section Walkthru a sample GSS-API client +@c +@c Write about how gssapi_clent.c works. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/setup.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/setup.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55f321cba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/setup.texi @@ -0,0 +1,664 @@ +@c $Id: setup.texi,v 1.27.2.2 2003/10/21 21:37:56 lha Exp $ + +@node Setting up a realm, Things in search for a better place, Building and Installing, Top + +@chapter Setting up a realm + +@menu +* Configuration file:: +* Creating the database:: +* keytabs:: +* Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver:: +* Remote administration:: +* Password changing:: +* Testing clients and servers:: +* Slave Servers:: +* Incremental propagation:: +* Salting:: +* Cross realm:: +* Transit policy:: +* Setting up DNS:: +@end menu + +A +@cindex realm +realm is an administrative domain. The name of a Kerberos realm is +usually the Internet domain name in uppercase. Call your realm the same +as your Internet domain name if you do not have strong reasons for not +doing so. It will make life easier for you and everyone else. + +@node Configuration file, Creating the database, Setting up a realm, Setting up a realm +@section Configuration file + +To setup a realm you will first have to create a configuration file: +@file{/etc/krb5.conf}. The @file{krb5.conf} file can contain many +configuration options, some of which are described here. + +There is a sample @file{krb5.conf} supplied with the distribution. + +The configuration file is a hierarchical structure consisting of +sections, each containing a list of bindings (either variable +assignments or subsections). A section starts with +@samp{[section-name]}. A binding consists of a left hand side, an equal +(@samp{=}) and a right hand side (the left hand side tag must be +separated from the equal with some whitespace.) Subsections has a +@samp{@{} as the first non-whitespace character after the equal. All +other bindings are treated as variable assignments. The value of a +variable extends to the end of the line. + +@example +[section1] + a-subsection = @{ + var = value1 + other-var = value with @{@} + sub-sub-section = @{ + var = 123 + @} + @} + var = some other value +[section2] + var = yet another value +@end example + +In this manual, names of sections and bindings will be given as strings +separated by slashes (@samp{/}). The @samp{other-var} variable will thus +be @samp{section1/a-subsection/other-var}. + +For in-depth information about the contents of the configuration file, refer to +the @file{krb5.conf} manual page. Some of the more important sections +are briefly described here. + +The @samp{libdefaults} section contains a list of library configuration +parameters, such as the default realm and the timeout for KDC +responses. The @samp{realms} section contains information about specific +realms, such as where they hide their KDC. This section serves the same +purpose as the Kerberos 4 @file{krb.conf} file, but can contain more +information. Finally the @samp{domain_realm} section contains a list of +mappings from domains to realms, equivalent to the Kerberos 4 +@file{krb.realms} file. + +To continue with the realm setup, you will have to create a configuration file, +with contents similar to the following. + +@example +[libdefaults] + default_realm = MY.REALM +[realms] + MY.REALM = @{ + kdc = my.kdc my.slave.kdc + kdc = my.third.kdc + @} +[domain_realm] + .my.domain = MY.REALM + +@end example + +If you use a realm name equal to your domain name, you can omit the +@samp{libdefaults}, and @samp{domain_realm}, sections. If you have a +SRV-record for your realm, or your Kerberos server has CNAME called +@samp{kerberos.my.realm}, you can omit the @samp{realms} section too. + +@node Creating the database, keytabs, Configuration file, Setting up a realm +@section Creating the database + +The database library will look for the database in the directory +@file{/var/heimdal}, so you should probably create that directory. +Make sure the directory have restrictive permissions. + +@example +# mkdir /var/heimdal +@end example + +The keys of all the principals are stored in the database. If you +choose to, these can be encrypted with a master key. You do not have to +remember this key (or password), but just to enter it once and it will +be stored in a file (@file{/var/heimdal/m-key}). If you want to have a +master key, run @samp{kstash} to create this master key: + +@example +# kstash +Master key: +Verifying password - Master key: +@end example + +To initialise the database use the @code{kadmin} program, with the +@samp{-l} option (to enable local database mode). First issue a +@kbd{init MY.REALM} command. This will create the database and insert +default principals for that realm. You can have more than one realm in +one database, so @samp{init} does not destroy any old database. + +Before creating the database, @samp{init} will ask you some questions +about max ticket lifetimes. + +After creating the database you should probably add yourself to it. You +do this with the @samp{add} command. It takes as argument the name of a +principal. The principal should contain a realm, so if you haven't setup +a default realm, you will need to explicitly include the realm. + +@example +# kadmin -l +kadmin> init MY.REALM +Realm max ticket life [unlimited]: +Realm max renewable ticket life [unlimited]: +kadmin> add me +Max ticket life [unlimited]: +Max renewable life [unlimited]: +Attributes []: +Password: +Verifying password - Password: +@end example + +Now start the KDC and try getting a ticket. + +@example +# kdc & +# kinit me +me@@MY.REALMS's Password: +# klist +Credentials cache: /tmp/krb5cc_0 + Principal: me@@MY.REALM + + Issued Expires Principal +Aug 25 07:25:55 Aug 25 17:25:55 krbtgt/MY.REALM@@MY.REALM +@end example + +If you are curious you can use the @samp{dump} command to list all the +entries in the database. It should look something similar to the +following example (note that the entries here are truncated for +typographical reasons): + +@smallexample +kadmin> dump +me@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:0b01d3cb7c293b57:-:0:7:8aec316b9d1629e3baf8 ... +kadmin/admin@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:e5c8a2675b37a443:-:0:7:cb913ebf85 ... +krbtgt/MY.REALM@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:52b53b61c875ce16:-:0:7:c8943be ... +kadmin/changepw@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:f48c8af2b340e9fb:-:0:7:e3e6088 ... +@end smallexample + +@node keytabs, Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver, Creating the database, Setting up a realm +@section keytabs + +To extract a service ticket from the database and put it in a keytab you +need to first create the principal in the database with @samp{ank} +(using the @kbd{--random-key} flag to get a random key) and then +extract it with @samp{ext_keytab}. + +@example +kadmin> add --random-key host/my.host.name +Max ticket life [unlimited]: +Max renewable life [unlimited]: +Attributes []: +kadmin> ext host/my.host.name +# ktutil list +Version Type Principal + 1 des-cbc-md5 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM + 1 des-cbc-md4 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM + 1 des-cbc-crc host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM + 1 des3-cbc-sha1 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM +@end example + +@node Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver, Remote administration, keytabs, Setting up a realm +@section Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver + +Heimdal can be configured to support 524, Kerberos 4 or kaserver. All +theses services are default turned off. Kerberos 4 support also +depends on if Kerberos 4 support is compiled in with Heimdal. + +@subsection 524 + +524 is a service that allows the KDC to convert Kerberos 5 tickets to +Kerberos 4 tickets for backward compatibility. See also Using 2b +tokens with AFS in @xref{Things in search for a better place}. + +524 can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file + +@example +[kdc] + enable-524 = yes +@end example + +@subsection Kerberos 4 + +Kerberos 4 is the predecessor to to Kerberos 5. It only support single +DES. You should only enable Kerberos 4 support if you have a need for +for compatibility with an installed base of Kerberos 4 clients/servers. + +Kerberos 4 can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file + +@example +[kdc] + enable-kerberos4 = yes +@end example + +@subsection kaserver + +Kaserver is a Kerberos 4 that is used in AFS, the protocol have some +features over plain Kerberos 4, but like Kerberos 4 only use single +DES too. + +You should only enable Kerberos 4 support if you have a need for for +compatibility with an installed base of AFS machines. + +Kaserver can be turned on by adding this to the configuration file + +@example +[kdc] + enable-kaserver = yes +@end example + +@node Remote administration, Password changing, Serving Kerberos 4/524/kaserver, Setting up a realm +@section Remote administration + +The administration server, @samp{kadmind}, can be started by +@samp{inetd} (which isn't recommended) or run as a normal daemon. If you +want to start it from @samp{inetd} you should add a line similar to the +one below to your @file{/etc/inetd.conf}. + +@example +kerberos-adm stream tcp nowait root /usr/heimdal/libexec/kadmind kadmind +@end example + +You might need to add @samp{kerberos-adm} to your @file{/etc/services} +as 749/tcp. + +Access to the administration server is controlled by an acl-file, (default +@file{/var/heimdal/kadmind.acl}.) The lines in the access file, has the +following syntax: +@smallexample +principal [priv1,priv2,...] [glob-pattern] +@end smallexample + +The matching is from top to bottom for matching principal (and if given, +glob-pattern). When there is a match, the rights of that lines are +used. + +The privileges you can assign to a principal are: @samp{add}, +@samp{change-password} (or @samp{cpw} for short), @samp{delete}, +@samp{get}, @samp{list}, and @samp{modify}, or the special privilege +@samp{all}. All of these roughly corresponds to the different commands +in @samp{kadmin}. + +If a @var{glob-pattern} is given on a line, it restricts the right for +the principal to only apply for the subjects that match the pattern. +The patters are of the same type as those used in shell globbing, see +@url{none,,fnmatch(3)}. + +In the example below @samp{lha/admin} can change every principal in the +database. @samp{jimmy/admin} can only modify principals that belong to +the realm @samp{E.KTH.SE}. @samp{mille/admin} is working at the +help desk, so he should only be able to change the passwords for single +component principals (ordinary users). He will not be able to change any +@samp{/admin} principal. + +@example +lha/admin@@E.KTH.SE all +jimmy/admin@@E.KTH.SE all *@@E.KTH.SE +jimmy/admin@@E.KTH.SE all */*@@E.KTH.SE +mille/admin@@E.KTH.SE change-password *@@E.KTH.SE +@end example + +@node Password changing, Testing clients and servers, Remote administration, Setting up a realm +@section Password changing + +To allow users to change their passwords, you should run @samp{kpasswdd}. +It is not run from @samp{inetd}. + +You might need to add @samp{kpasswd} to your @file{/etc/services} as +464/udp. + +@subsection Password quality assurance + +It is important that users have good passwords, both to make it harder +to guess them and to avoid off-line attacks (pre-authentication provides +some defense against off-line attacks). To ensure that the users choose +good passwords, you can enable password quality controls in +@samp{kpasswdd}. The controls themselves are done in a shared library +that is used by @samp{kpasswdd}. To configure in these controls, add +lines similar to the following to your @file{/etc/krb5.conf}: + +@example +[password_quality] + check_library = @var{library} + check_function = @var{function} +@end example + +The function @var{function} in the shared library @var{library} will be +called for proposed new passwords. The function should be declared as: + +@example +const char * +function(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal, krb5_data *pwd); +@end example + +The function should verify that @var{pwd} is a good password for +@var{principal} and if so return @code{NULL}. If it is deemed to be of +low quality, it should return a string explaining why that password +should not be used. + +Code for a password quality checking function that uses the cracklib +library can be found in @file{lib/kadm5/sample_password_check.c} in the +source code distribution. It requires the cracklib library built with +the patch available at +@url{ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/krb/src/cracklib.patch}. + +If no password quality checking function is configured, it is only +verified that it is at least six characters of length. + +@node Testing clients and servers, Slave Servers, Password changing, Setting up a realm +@section Testing clients and servers + +Now you should be able to run all the clients and servers. Refer to the +appropriate man pages for information on how to use them. + +@node Slave Servers, Incremental propagation, Testing clients and servers, Setting up a realm +@section Slave servers, Incremental propagation, Testing clients and servers, Setting up a realm + +It is desirable to have at least one backup (slave) server in case the +master server fails. It is possible to have any number of such slave +servers but more than three usually doesn't buy much more redundancy. + +All Kerberos servers for a realm shall have the same database so that +they present the same service to all the users. The +@pindex hprop +@code{hprop} program, running on the master, will propagate the database +to the slaves, running +@pindex hpropd +@code{hpropd} processes. + +Every slave needs a database directory, the master key (if it was used +for the database) and a keytab with the principal +@samp{hprop/@var{hostname}}. Add the principal with the +@pindex ktutil +@code{ktutil} command and start +@pindex hpropd +@code{propd}, as follows: + +@example +slave# ktutil get -p foo/admin hprop/`hostname` +slave# mkdir /var/heimdal +slave# hpropd +@end example + +The master will use the principal @samp{kadmin/hprop} to authenticate to +the slaves. This principal should be added when running @kbd{kadmin -l +init} but if you do not have it in your database for whatever reason, +please add it with @kbd{kadmin -l add}. + +Then run +@pindex hprop +@code{hprop} on the master: + +@example +master# hprop slave +@end example + +This was just an on-hands example to make sure that everything was +working properly. Doing it manually is of course the wrong way and to +automate this you will want to start +@pindex hpropd +@code{hpropd} from @code{inetd} on the slave(s) and regularly run +@pindex hprop +@code{hprop} on the master to regularly propagate the database. +Starting the propagation once an hour from @code{cron} is probably a +good idea. + +@node Incremental propagation, Salting , Slave Servers, Setting up a realm +@section Incremental propagation + +There is also a newer and still somewhat experimental mechanism for +doing incremental propagation in Heimdal. Instead of sending the whole +database regularly, it sends the changes as they happen on the master to +the slaves. The master keeps track of all the changes by assigned a +version number to every change to the database. The slaves know which +was the latest version they saw and in this way it can be determined if +they are in sync or not. A log of all the changes is kept on the master +and when a slave is at an older versioner than the oldest one in the +log, the whole database has to be sent. + +Protocol-wise, all the slaves connects to the master and as a greeting +tell it the latest version that they have (@samp{IHAVE} message). The +master then responds by sending all the changes between that version and +the current version at the master (a series of @samp{FORYOU} messages) +or the whole database in a @samp{TELLYOUEVERYTHING} message. + +@subsection Configuring incremental propagation + +The program that runs on the master is @code{ipropd-master} and all +clients run @code{ipropd-slave}. + +Create the file @file{/var/heimdal/slaves} on the master containing all +the slaves that the database should be propagated to. Each line contains +the full name of the principal (for example +@samp{iprop/hemligare.foo.se@@FOO.SE}). + +You should already have @samp{iprop/tcp} defined as 2121, in your +@file{/etc/services}. Otherwise, or if you need to use a different port +for some peculiar reason, you can use the @kbd{--port} option. This is +useful when you have multiple realms to distribute from one server. + +Then you need to create these principals that you added in the +configuration file. Create one @samp{iprop/hostname} for the master and +for every slave. + + +@example +master# /usr/heimdal/sbin/ktutil get iprop/`hostname` +@end example + +The next step is to start the @code{ipropd-master} process on the master +server. The @code{ipropd-master} listens on the UNIX-socket +@file{/var/heimdal/signal} to know when changes have been made to the +database so they can be propagated to the slaves. There is also a +safety feature of testing the version number regularly (every 30 +seconds) to see if it has been modified by some means that do not raise +this signal. Then, start @code{ipropd-slave} on all the slaves: + +@example +master# /usr/heimdal/libexec/ipropd-master & +slave# /usr/heimdal/libexec/ipropd-slave master & +@end example + +@node Salting, Cross realm, Incremental propagation, Setting up a realm +@section Salting +@cindex Salting + +Salting is used to make it harder to precalculate all possible +keys. Using a salt increases the search space to make it almost +impossible to precalculate all keys. Salting is the process of mixing a +public string (the salt) with the password, then sending it through an +encryption-type specific string-to-key function that will output the +fixed size encryption key. + +In Kerberos 5 the salt is determined by the encryption-type, except +in some special cases. + +In @code{des} there is the Kerberos 4 salt +(none at all) or the afs-salt (using the cell (realm in +afs-lingo)). + +In @code{arcfour} (the encryption type that Microsoft Windows 2000 uses) +there is no salt. This is to be compatible with NTLM keys in Windows +NT 4. + +@code{[kadmin]default_keys} in @file{krb5.conf} controls +what salting to use, + +The syntax of @code{[kadmin]default_keys} is +@samp{[etype:]salt-type[:salt-string]}. @samp{etype} is the encryption +type (des, des3, arcfour), @code{salt-type} is the type of salt (pw-salt +or afs3-salt), and the salt-string is the string that will be used as +salt (remember that if the salt is appended/prepended, the empty salt "" +is the same thing as no salt at all). + +Common types of salting includes + +@itemize @bullet +@item @code{v4} (or @code{des:pw-salt:}) + +The Kerberos 4 salting is using no salt att all. Reason there is colon +that the end or the salt string is that it makes the salt the empty +string (same as no salt). + +@item @code{v5} (or @code{pw-salt}) + +@code{pw-salt} means all regular encryption-types that is regular + +@item @code{afs3-salt} + +@code{afs3-salt} is the salting that is used with Transarc kaserver. Its +the cell appended to the password. + +@end itemize + +@node Cross realm, Transit policy , Salting, Setting up a realm +@section Cross realm +@cindex Cross realm + +Suppose you are residing in the realm @samp{MY.REALM}, how do you +authenticate to a server in @samp{OTHER.REALM}? Having valid tickets in +@samp{MY.REALM} allows you to communicate with kerberised services in that +realm. However, the computer in the other realm does not have a secret +key shared with the Kerberos server in your realm. + +It is possible to add a share keys between two realms that trust each +other. When a client program, such as @code{telnet} or @code{ssh}, +finds that the other computer is in a different realm, it will try to +get a ticket granting ticket for that other realm, but from the local +Kerberos server. With that ticket granting ticket, it will then obtain +service tickets from the Kerberos server in the other realm. + +For a two way trust between @samp{MY.REALM} and @samp{OTHER.REALM} +add the following principals to each realm. The principals should be +@samp{krbtgt/OTHER.REALM@@MY.REALM} and +@samp{krbtgt/MY.REALM@@OTHER.REALM} in @samp{MY.REALM}, and +@samp{krbtgt/MY.REALM@@OTHER.REALM} and +@samp{krbtgt/OTHER.REALM@@MY.REALM}in @samp{OTHER.REALM}. + +In Kerberos 5 the trust can be one configured to be one way. So that +users from @samp{MY.REALM} can authenticate to services in +@samp{OTHER.REALM}, but not the opposite. In the example above, the +@samp{krbtgt/MY.REALM@@OTHER.REALM} then should be removed. + +The two principals must have the same key, key version number, and the +same set of encryption types. Remember to transfer the two keys in a +safe manner. + +@example +@cartouche +vr$ klist +Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_913.console + Principal: lha@@E.KTH.SE + + Issued Expires Principal +May 3 13:55:52 May 3 23:55:54 krbtgt/E.KTH.SE@@E.KTH.SE + +vr$ telnet -l lha hummel.it.su.se +Trying 2001:6b0:5:1095:250:fcff:fe24:dbf... +Connected to hummel.it.su.se. +Escape character is '^]'. +Waiting for encryption to be negotiated... +[ Trying mutual KERBEROS5 (host/hummel.it.su.se@@SU.SE)... ] +[ Kerberos V5 accepts you as ``lha@@E.KTH.SE'' ] +Encryption negotiated. +Last login: Sat May 3 14:11:47 from vr.l.nxs.se +hummel$ exit + +vr$ klist +Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_913.console + Principal: lha@@E.KTH.SE + + Issued Expires Principal +May 3 13:55:52 May 3 23:55:54 krbtgt/E.KTH.SE@@E.KTH.SE +May 3 13:55:56 May 3 23:55:54 krbtgt/SU.SE@@E.KTH.SE +May 3 14:10:54 May 3 23:55:54 host/hummel.it.su.se@@SU.SE + +@end cartouche +@end example + +@node Transit policy, Setting up DNS , Cross realm, Setting up a realm +@section Transit policy +@cindex Transit policy + +If you want to use cross realm authentication through an intermediate +realm it must be explicitly allowed by either the KDCs or the server +receiving the request. This is done in @file{krb5.conf} in the +@code{[capaths]} section. + +When the ticket transits through a realm to another realm, the +destination realm adds its peer to the "transited-realms" field in the +ticket. The field is unordered, this is since there is no way to know if +know if one of the transited-realms changed the order of the list. + +The syntax for @code{[capaths]} section: + +@example +@cartouche +[capaths] + CLIENT-REALM = @{ + SERVER-REALM = PERMITTED-CROSS-REALMS ... + @} +@end cartouche +@end example + +The realm @code{STACKEN.KTH.SE} allows clients from @code{SU.SE} and +@code{DSV.SU.SE} to cross in. Since @code{STACKEN.KTH.SE} only have +direct cross realm with @code{KTH.SE}, and @code{DSV.SU.SE} only have direct cross +realm with @code{SU.SE} they need to use both @code{SU.SE} and +@code{KTH.SE} as transit realms. + +@example +@cartouche +[capaths] + SU.SE = @{ + STACKEN.KTH.SE = KTH.SE + @} + DSV.SU.SE = @{ + STACKEN.KTH.SE = SU.SE KTH.SE + @} + +@end cartouche +@end example + +@c To test the cross realm configuration, use: +@c kmumble transit-check client server transit-realms ... + +@node Setting up DNS, , Transit policy, Setting up a realm +@section Setting up DNS +@cindex Setting up DNS + +If there is information about where to find the KDC or kadmind for a +realm in the @file{krb5.conf} for a realm, that information will be +preferred and DNS will not be queried. + +Heimdal will try to use DNS to find the KDCs for a realm. First it +will try to find @code{SRV} resource record (RR) for the realm. If no +SRV RRs are found, it will fall back to looking for a @code{A} RR for +a machine named kerberos.REALM, and then kerberos-1.REALM, etc + +Adding this information to DNS makes the client have less +configuration (in the common case, no configuration) and allows the +system administrator to change the number of KDCs and on what machines +they are running without caring about clients. + +The backside of using DNS that the client might be fooled to use the +wrong server if someone fakes DNS replies/data, but storing the IP +addresses of the KDC on all the clients makes it very hard to change +the infrastructure. + +Example of the configuration for the realm @code{EXAMPLE.COM}, + +@example + +$ORIGIN example.com. +_kerberos._tcp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos.example.com. +_kerberos._udp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos.example.com. +_kerberos._tcp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos-1.example.com. +_kerberos._udp SRV 10 1 88 kerberos-1.example.com. +_kpasswd._udp SRV 10 1 464 kerberos.example.com. +_kerberos-adm._tcp SRV 10 1 749 kerberos.example.com. + +@end example + +More information about DNS SRV resource records can be found in +RFC-2782 (A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)). + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a97ef9d191 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,412 @@ +CAT working group M. Swift +Internet Draft J. Brezak +Document: draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt Microsoft +Category: Informational October 1999 + + + The Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption type + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be + updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It + is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to + cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new + encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an + MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using + the existing DES based encryption types. + + The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing + Windows NT environments, provide strong crypto (128-bit key + lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government + export restriction requirements) encryption. + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos contains new encryption + and checksum types for two reasons: for export reasons early in the + development process, 56 bit DES encryption could not be exported, + and because upon upgrade from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000, + accounts will not have the appropriate DES keying material to do the + standard DES encryption. Furthermore, 3DES is not available for + export, and there was a desire to use a single flavor of encryption + in the product for both US and international products. + + As a result, there are two new encryption types and one new checksum + type introduced in Windows 2000. + + +2. Conventions used in this document + + + +Swift Category - Informational 1 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. Key Generation + + On upgrade from existing Windows NT domains, the user accounts would + not have a DES based key available to enable the use of DES base + encryption types specified in RFC 1510. The key used for RC4-HMAC is + the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash) for + compatibility reasons. Once the account password is changed, the DES + based keys are created and maintained. Once the DES keys are + available DES based encryption types can be used with Kerberos. + + The RC4-HMAC String to key function is defined as follow: + + String2Key(password) + + K = MD4(UNICODE(password)) + + The RC4-HMAC keys are generated by using the Windows UNICODE version + of the password. Each Windows UNICODE character is encoded in + little-endian format of 2 octets each. Then performing an MD4 [6] + hash operation on just the UNICODE characters of the password (not + including the terminating zero octets). + +4. Basic Operations + + The MD5 HMAC function is defined in [3]. It is used in this + encryption type for checksum operations. Refer to [3] for details on + its operation. In this document this function is referred to as + HMAC(Key, Data) returning the checksum using the specified key on + the data. + + The basic MD5 hash operation is used in this encryption type and + defined in [7]. In this document this function is referred to as + MD5(Data) returning the checksum of the data. + + The basic RC4 encryption operation is used in this encryption type + and defined in [8]. In this document the function is referred to as + RC4(Key, Data) returning the encrypted data using the specified key + on the data. + + These encryption types use key derivation as defined in [9] (RFC- + 1510BIS) in Section titled "Key Derivation". With each message, the + message type (T) is used as a component of the keying material. + + All strings in this document are ASCII unless otherwise specified. + The lengths of ASCII encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + The concat(a,b,c,...) function will return the logical concatenation + (left to right) of the values of the arguments. + +Swift Category - Informational 2 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + + The nonce(n) function returns a pseudo-random number of "n" octets. + +5. Checksum Types + + There is one checksum type used in this encryption type. The + Kerberos constant for this type is: + #define KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5 (-138) + + The function is defined as follows: + + K - is the Key + T - the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer + + CHKSUM(K, T, data) + + Ksign = HMAC(K, "signature key") //includes zero octet at end + tmp = MD5(concat(T, data)) + CHKSUM = HMAC(Ksign, tmp) + + +6. Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types used in these encryption types. The + Kerberos constants for these types are: + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC 23 + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP 24 + + The basic encryption function is defined as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + + ENCRYPT(K, T, data) + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + L = concat("fortybits", T) //includes zero octet at + //end of string constant + Else + L = T + Ksign = HMAC(K,L) + Confounder = nonce(8) // get an 8 octet nonce for a confounder + Checksum = HMAC(Ksign, concat(Confounder, data)) + Ke = Ksign + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + memset(&Ke[7], 0x0ab, 9) + Ke2 = HMAC(Ke, Checksum) + data = RC4(Ke2, data) + + The header field on the encrypted data in KDC messages is: + + typedef struct _RC4_MDx_HEADER { + UCHAR Checksum[16]; + UCHAR Confounder[8]; + } RC4_MDx_HEADER, *PRC4_MDx_HEADER; + +Swift Category - Informational 3 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +7. Key Strength Negotiation + + A Kerberos client and server can negotiate over key length if they + are using mutual authentication. If the client is unable to perform + full strength encryption, it may propose a key in the "subkey" field + of the authenticator, using a weaker encryption type. The server + must then either return the same key or suggest its own key in the + subkey field of the AP reply message. The key used to encrypt data + is derived from the key returned by the server. If the client is + able to perform strong encryption but the server is not, it may + propose a subkey in the AP reply without first being sent a subkey + in the authenticator. + +8. GSSAPI Kerberos V5 Mechanism Type + +8.1 Mechanism Specific Changes + + The GSSAPI per-message tokens also require new checksum and + encryption types. The GSS-API per-message tokens must be changed to + support these new encryption types (See [5] Section 1.2.2). The + sealing algorithm identifier (SEAL_ALG) for an RC4 based encryption + is: + Byte 4..5 SEAL_ALG 0x10 0x00 - RC4 + + The signing algorithm identifier (SGN_ALG) for MD5 HMAC is: + Byte 2..3 SGN ALG 0x11 0x00 - HMAC + + The only support quality of protection is: + #define GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0x0 + + In addition, when using an RC4 based encryption type, the sequence + number is sent in big-endian rather than little-endian order. + +8.2 GSSAPI Checksum Type + + The GSSAPI checksum type and algorithm is defined in Section 5. Only + the first 8 octets of the checksum are used. The resulting checksum + is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field (See [5] Section 1.2) for + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(conf_flag=FALSE). + +8.3 GSSAPI Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types for GSSAPI message tokens, one that + is 128 bits in strength, and one that is 56 bits in strength as + defined in Section 6. + + + +Swift Category - Informational 4 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + All padding is rounded up to 1 byte. One byte is needed to say that + there is 1 byte of padding. The DES based mechanism type uses 8 byte + padding. See [5] Section 1.2.2.3. + + The encryption mechanism used for GSS based messages is as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + + GSS-ENCRYPT(K, T, data) + IV = SND_SEQ + K = XOR(K, 0xf0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0) + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + L = concat("fortybits", T) //includes zero octet at end + else + L = T + Ksign = HMAC(K, L) + Ke = Ksign + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + memset(&Ke[7], 0x0ab, 9) + Ke2 = HMAC(Ke, IV) + Data = RC4(Ke2, data) + SND_SEQ = RC4(Ke, seq#) + + The sequence number (SND_SEQ) and IV are used as defined in [5] + Section 1.2.2. + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +8. Security Considerations + + Care must be taken in implementing this encryption type because it + uses a stream cipher. If a different IV isnÆt used in each direction + when using a session key, the encryption is weak. By using the + sequence number as an IV, this is avoided. + +9. References + + 1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + 2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + 3 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.,"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997 + + 4 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 + + + +Swift Category - Informational 5 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + + 5 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC-1964, + June 1996 + + 6 R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320, April + 1992 + + 7 R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1321, April + 1992 + + 8 RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under license + from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information, + contact: + RSA Data Security, Inc. + 100 Marine Parkway + Redwood City, CA 94065-1031 + + 9 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- + 04.txt, June 25, 1999 + + +10. Author's Addresses + + Mike Swift + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: mikesw@microsoft.com + + John Brezak + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 6 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + +11. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph + are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 7 + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1fc9927dea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,589 @@ + + +CAT working group M. Swift +Internet Draft J. Brezak +Document: draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-02.txt Microsoft +Category: Informational November 2000 + + + The Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption type + + +tatus of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be + updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It + is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to + cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +. Abstract + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new + encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an + MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using + the existing DES based encryption types. + + The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing + Windows NT environments, provide strong crypto (128-bit key + lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government + export restriction requirements) encryption. + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos contains new encryption + and checksum types for two reasons: for export reasons early in the + development process, 56 bit DES encryption could not be exported, + and because upon upgrade from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000, + accounts will not have the appropriate DES keying material to do the + standard DES encryption. Furthermore, 3DES is not available for + export, and there was a desire to use a single flavor of encryption + in the product for both US and international products. + + As a result, there are two new encryption types and one new checksum + type introduced in Windows 2000. + + +. Conventions used in this document + + + +wift Category - Informational 1 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +. Key Generation + + On upgrade from existing Windows NT domains, the user accounts would + not have a DES based key available to enable the use of DES base + encryption types specified in RFC 1510. The key used for RC4-HMAC is + the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash) for + compatibility reasons. Once the account password is changed, the DES + based keys are created and maintained. Once the DES keys are + available DES based encryption types can be used with Kerberos. + + The RC4-HMAC String to key function is defined as follow: + + String2Key(password) + + K = MD4(UNICODE(password)) + + The RC4-HMAC keys are generated by using the Windows UNICODE version + of the password. Each Windows UNICODE character is encoded in + little-endian format of 2 octets each. Then performing an MD4 [6] + hash operation on just the UNICODE characters of the password (not + including the terminating zero octets). + + For an account with a password of "foo", this String2Key("foo") will + return: + + 0xac, 0x8e, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x83, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xbe, + 0xea, 0x5d, 0x43, 0xbd, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x00, 0xcc + +. Basic Operations + + The MD5 HMAC function is defined in [3]. It is used in this + encryption type for checksum operations. Refer to [3] for details on + its operation. In this document this function is referred to as + HMAC(Key, Data) returning the checksum using the specified key on + the data. + + The basic MD5 hash operation is used in this encryption type and + defined in [7]. In this document this function is referred to as + MD5(Data) returning the checksum of the data. + + RC4 is a stream cipher licensed by RSA Data Security [RSADSI]. A + compatible cipher is described in [8]. In this document the function + is referred to as RC4(Key, Data) returning the encrypted data using + the specified key on the data. + + These encryption types use key derivation as defined in [9] (RFC- + 1510BIS) in Section titled "Key Derivation". With each message, the + message type (T) is used as a component of the keying material. This + summarizes the different key derivation values used in the various + +wift Category - Informational 2 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + operations. Note that these differ from the key derivations used in + other Kerberos encryption types. + + T = 1 for TS-ENC-TS in the AS-Request + T = 8 for the AS-Reply + T = 7 for the Authenticator in the TGS-Request + T = 8 for the TGS-Reply + T = 2 for the Server Ticket in the AP-Request + T = 11 for the Authenticator in the AP-Request + T = 12 for the Server returned AP-Reply + T = 15 in the generation of checksum for the MIC token + T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the MIC token + T = 13 in the generation of checksum for the WRAP token + T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the WRAP token + T = 0 in the generation of encrypted data for the WRAPPED token + + All strings in this document are ASCII unless otherwise specified. + The lengths of ASCII encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + The concat(a,b,c,...) function will return the logical concatenation + (left to right) of the values of the arguments. + + The nonce(n) function returns a pseudo-random number of "n" octets. + +. Checksum Types + + There is one checksum type used in this encryption type. The + Kerberos constant for this type is: + #define KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5 (-138) + + The function is defined as follows: + + K - is the Key + T - the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer + + CHKSUM(K, T, data) + + Ksign = HMAC(K, "signaturekey") //includes zero octet at end + tmp = MD5(concat(T, data)) + CHKSUM = HMAC(Ksign, tmp) + + +. Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types used in these encryption types. The + Kerberos constants for these types are: + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC 23 + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP 24 + + The basic encryption function is defined as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + +wift Category - Informational 3 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + + BYTE L40[14] = "fortybits"; + BYTE SK = "signaturekey"; + + ENCRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, data, data_len, edata, edata_len) + { + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 10 + 4, K1); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1); + } + memcpy (K2, K1, 16); + if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9); + add_8_random_bytes(data, data_len, conf_plus_data); + HMAC (K2, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, checksum); + HMAC (K1, checksum, 16, K3); + RC4(K3, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, edata + 16); + memcpy (edata, checksum, 16); + edata_len = 16 + 8 + data_len; + } + + DECRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, edata, edata_len, data, data_len) + { + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K1); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1); + } + memcpy (K2, K1, 16); + if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC (K1, edata, 16, K3); // checksum is at edata + RC4(K3, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, edata + 16); + data_len = edata_len - 16 - 8; + memcpy (data, edata + 16 + 8, data_len); + + // verify generated and received checksums + HMAC (K2, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, checksum); + if (memcmp(edata, checksum, 16) != 0) + printf("CHECKSUM ERROR !!!!!!\n"); + } + + The header field on the encrypted data in KDC messages is: + + typedef struct _RC4_MDx_HEADER { + UCHAR Checksum[16]; + UCHAR Confounder[8]; + } RC4_MDx_HEADER, *PRC4_MDx_HEADER; + + The KDC message is encrypted using the ENCRYPT function not + including the Checksum in the RC4_MDx_HEADER. + + +wift Category - Informational 4 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +. Key Strength Negotiation + + A Kerberos client and server can negotiate over key length if they + are using mutual authentication. If the client is unable to perform + full strength encryption, it may propose a key in the "subkey" field + of the authenticator, using a weaker encryption type. The server + must then either return the same key or suggest its own key in the + subkey field of the AP reply message. The key used to encrypt data + is derived from the key returned by the server. If the client is + able to perform strong encryption but the server is not, it may + propose a subkey in the AP reply without first being sent a subkey + in the authenticator. + +. GSSAPI Kerberos V5 Mechanism Type + +.1 Mechanism Specific Changes + + The GSSAPI per-message tokens also require new checksum and + encryption types. The GSS-API per-message tokens must be changed to + support these new encryption types (See [5] Section 1.2.2). The + sealing algorithm identifier (SEAL_ALG) for an RC4 based encryption + is: + Byte 4..5 SEAL_ALG 0x10 0x00 - RC4 + + The signing algorithm identifier (SGN_ALG) for MD5 HMAC is: + Byte 2..3 SGN ALG 0x11 0x00 - HMAC + + The only support quality of protection is: + #define GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0x0 + + In addition, when using an RC4 based encryption type, the sequence + number is sent in big-endian rather than little-endian order. + + The Windows 2000 implementation also defines new GSSAPI flags in the + initial token passed when initializing a security context. These + flags are passed in the checksum field of the authenticator (See [5] + Section 1.1.1). + + GSS_C_DCE_STYLE - This flag was added for use with MicrosoftÆs + implementation of DCE RPC, which initially expected three legs of + authentication. Setting this flag causes an extra AP reply to be + sent from the client back to the server after receiving the serverÆs + AP reply. In addition, the context negotiation tokens do not have + GSSAPI framing - they are raw AP message and do not include object + identifiers. + #define GSS_C_DCE_STYLE 0x1000 + + + +wift Category - Informational 5 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG - This flag allows the client to indicate to the + server that it should only allow the server application to identify + the client by name and ID, but not to impersonate the client. + #define GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG 0x2000 + + GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG - Setting this flag indicates that the + client wants to be informed of extended error information. In + particular, Windows 2000 status codes may be returned in the data + field of a Kerberos error message. This allows the client to + understand a server failure more precisely. In addition, the server + may return errors to the client that are normally handled at the + application layer in the server, in order to let the client try to + recover. After receiving an error message, the client may attempt to + resubmit an AP request. + #define GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG 0x4000 + + These flags are only used if a client is aware of these conventions + when using the SSPI on the Windows platform, they are not generally + used by default. + + When NetBIOS addresses are used in the GSSAPI, they are identified + by the GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS value. This value is defined as: + #define GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS 0x14 + NetBios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to th 15 characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16 + octet of 0x0. + +.2 GSSAPI Checksum Type + + The GSSAPI checksum type and algorithm is defined in Section 5. Only + the first 8 octets of the checksum are used. The resulting checksum + is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field (See [5] Section 1.2) for + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(conf_flag=FALSE). + + MIC (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, MIC_hdr, msg, msg_len, + MIC_seq, MIC_checksum) + { + HMAC (K, SK, 13, K4); + T = 15; + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 00, &T, 4); + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 04, MIC_hdr, 8); + // 0101 1100 FFFFFFFF + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 12, msg, msg_len); + MD5 (T_hdr_msg, 4 + 8 + msg_len, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg); + HMAC (K4, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg, CHKSUM); + memcpy (MIC_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 bytes + + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K5); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K5); + +wift Category - Informational 6 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + } + if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K5+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC(K5, MIT_checksum, 8, K6); + copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction); + //0x12345678 + copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction + + 4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF + RC4(K6, seq_plus_direction, 8, MIC_seq); + } + +.3 GSSAPI Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types for GSSAPI message tokens, one that + is 128 bits in strength, and one that is 56 bits in strength as + defined in Section 6. + + All padding is rounded up to 1 byte. One byte is needed to say that + there is 1 byte of padding. The DES based mechanism type uses 8 byte + padding. See [5] Section 1.2.2.3. + + The encryption mechanism used for GSS wrap based messages is as + follow: + + + WRAP (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, WRAP_hdr, msg, msg_len, + WRAP_seq, WRAP_checksum, edata, edata_len) + { + HMAC (K, SK, 13, K7); + T = 13; + PAD = 1; + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 00, &T, 4); + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 04, WRAP_hdr, 8); // 0101 1100 + FFFFFFFF + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12, msg, msg_len); + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12 + msg_len, &PAD, 1); + MD5 (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, + 4 + 8 + 8 + msg_len + 1, + MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad); + HMAC (K7, MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, CHKSUM); + memcpy (WRAP_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 + bytes + + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K8); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K8); + } + if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K8+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC(K8, WRAP_checksum, 8, K9); + copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction); + //0x12345678 + +wift Category - Informational 7 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction + + 4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF + RC4(K9, seq_plus_direction, 8, WRAP_seq); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) K10 [i] ^= 0xF0; // XOR each byte + of key with 0xF0 + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *(DWORD *)(L40+10) = T; + HMAC(K10, L40, 14, K11); + memset(K11+7, 0xAB, 9); + }else{ + HMAC(K10, &T, 4, K11); + } + HMAC(K11, seq_num, 4, K12); + RC4(K12, T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 4 + 8, 8 + msg_len + 1, + edata); /* skip T & hdr */ + edata_len = 8 + msg_len + 1; // conf + msg_len + pad + } + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +. Security Considerations + + Care must be taken in implementing this encryption type because it + uses a stream cipher. If a different IV isnÆt used in each direction + when using a session key, the encryption is weak. By using the + sequence number as an IV, this is avoided. + +0. Acknowledgements + + We would like to thank Salil Dangi for the valuable input in + refining the descriptions of the functions and review input. + +1. References + + 1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + 2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + 3 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.,"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997 + + 4 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 + + + +wift Category - Informational 8 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + + 5 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC-1964, + June 1996 + + 6 R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320, April + 1992 + + 7 R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1321, April + 1992 + + 8 Thayer, R. and K. Kaukonen, "A Stream Cipher Encryption + Algorithm", Work in Progress. + + 9 RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under license + from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information, contact: + + RSA Data Security, Inc. + 100 Marine Parkway + Redwood City, CA 94065-1031 + + 10 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- + 04.txt, June 25, 1999 + + +2. Author's Addresses + + Mike Swift + Dept. of Computer Science + Sieg Hall + University of Washington + Seattle, WA 98105 + Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu + + John Brezak + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +wift Category - Informational 9 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + +3. Full Copyright Statement + + "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and + furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or + otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be + prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in + part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above + copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such + copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may + not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright + notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet + organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing + Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights + defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or + as required to translate it into languages other than English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will + not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or + assigns. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +wift Category - Informational 10 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..202d44e863 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +CAT working group M. Swift +Internet Draft J. Brezak +Document: draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt Microsoft +Category: Informational June 2000 + + + The Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption type + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be + updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It + is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to + cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new + encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an + MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using + the existing DES based encryption types. + + The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing + Windows NT environments, provide strong crypto (128-bit key + lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government + export restriction requirements) encryption. + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos contains new encryption + and checksum types for two reasons: for export reasons early in the + development process, 56 bit DES encryption could not be exported, + and because upon upgrade from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000, + accounts will not have the appropriate DES keying material to do the + standard DES encryption. Furthermore, 3DES is not available for + export, and there was a desire to use a single flavor of encryption + in the product for both US and international products. + + As a result, there are two new encryption types and one new checksum + type introduced in Windows 2000. + + +2. Conventions used in this document + + + +Swift Category - Informational 1 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. Key Generation + + On upgrade from existing Windows NT domains, the user accounts would + not have a DES based key available to enable the use of DES base + encryption types specified in RFC 1510. The key used for RC4-HMAC is + the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash) for + compatibility reasons. Once the account password is changed, the DES + based keys are created and maintained. Once the DES keys are + available DES based encryption types can be used with Kerberos. + + The RC4-HMAC String to key function is defined as follow: + + String2Key(password) + + K = MD4(UNICODE(password)) + + The RC4-HMAC keys are generated by using the Windows UNICODE version + of the password. Each Windows UNICODE character is encoded in + little-endian format of 2 octets each. Then performing an MD4 [6] + hash operation on just the UNICODE characters of the password (not + including the terminating zero octets). + + For an account with a password of "foo", this String2Key("foo") will + return: + + 0xac, 0x8e, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x83, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xbe, + 0xea, 0x5d, 0x43, 0xbd, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x00, 0xcc + +4. Basic Operations + + The MD5 HMAC function is defined in [3]. It is used in this + encryption type for checksum operations. Refer to [3] for details on + its operation. In this document this function is referred to as + HMAC(Key, Data) returning the checksum using the specified key on + the data. + + The basic MD5 hash operation is used in this encryption type and + defined in [7]. In this document this function is referred to as + MD5(Data) returning the checksum of the data. + + RC4 is a stream cipher licensed by RSA Data Security [RSADSI]. A + compatible cipher is described in [8]. In this document the function + is referred to as RC4(Key, Data) returning the encrypted data using + the specified key on the data. + + These encryption types use key derivation as defined in [9] (RFC- + 1510BIS) in Section titled "Key Derivation". With each message, the + message type (T) is used as a component of the keying material. This + summarizes the different key derivation values used in the various + +Swift Category - Informational 2 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + operations. Note that these differ from the key derivations used in + other Kerberos encryption types. + + T = 1 for TS-ENC-TS in the AS-Request + T = 8 for the AS-Reply + T = 7 for the Authenticator in the TGS-Request + T = 8 for the TGS-Reply + T = 2 for the Server Ticket in the AP-Request + T = 11 for the Authenticator in the AP-Request + T = 12 for the Server returned AP-Reply + T = 15 in the generation of checksum for the MIC token + T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the MIC token + T = 13 in the generation of checksum for the WRAP token + T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the WRAP token + T = 0 in the generation of encrypted data for the WRAPPED token + + All strings in this document are ASCII unless otherwise specified. + The lengths of ASCII encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + The concat(a,b,c,...) function will return the logical concatenation + (left to right) of the values of the arguments. + + The nonce(n) function returns a pseudo-random number of "n" octets. + +5. Checksum Types + + There is one checksum type used in this encryption type. The + Kerberos constant for this type is: + #define KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5 (-138) + + The function is defined as follows: + + K - is the Key + T - the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer + + CHKSUM(K, T, data) + + Ksign = HMAC(K, "signaturekey") //includes zero octet at end + tmp = MD5(concat(T, data)) + CHKSUM = HMAC(Ksign, tmp) + + +6. Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types used in these encryption types. The + Kerberos constants for these types are: + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC 23 + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP 24 + + The basic encryption function is defined as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + +Swift Category - Informational 3 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + + BYTE L40[14] = "fortybits"; + BYTE SK = "signaturekey"; + + ENCRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, data, data_len, edata, edata_len) + { + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 10 + 4, K1); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1); + } + memcpy (K2, K1, 16); + if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9); + add_8_random_bytes(data, data_len, conf_plus_data); + HMAC (K2, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, checksum); + HMAC (K1, checksum, 16, K3); + RC4(K3, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, edata + 16); + memcpy (edata, checksum, 16); + edata_len = 16 + 8 + data_len; + } + + DECRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, edata, edata_len, data, data_len) + { + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K1); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1); + } + memcpy (K2, K1, 16); + if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC (K1, edata, 16, K3); // checksum is at edata + RC4(K3, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, edata + 16); + data_len = edata_len - 16 - 8; + memcpy (data, edata + 16 + 8, data_len); + + // verify generated and received checksums + HMAC (K2, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, checksum); + if (memcmp(edata, checksum, 16) != 0) + printf("CHECKSUM ERROR !!!!!!\n"); + } + + The header field on the encrypted data in KDC messages is: + + typedef struct _RC4_MDx_HEADER { + UCHAR Checksum[16]; + UCHAR Confounder[8]; + } RC4_MDx_HEADER, *PRC4_MDx_HEADER; + + The KDC message is encrypted using the ENCRYPT function not + including the Checksum in the RC4_MDx_HEADER. + + +Swift Category - Informational 4 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +7. Key Strength Negotiation + + A Kerberos client and server can negotiate over key length if they + are using mutual authentication. If the client is unable to perform + full strength encryption, it may propose a key in the "subkey" field + of the authenticator, using a weaker encryption type. The server + must then either return the same key or suggest its own key in the + subkey field of the AP reply message. The key used to encrypt data + is derived from the key returned by the server. If the client is + able to perform strong encryption but the server is not, it may + propose a subkey in the AP reply without first being sent a subkey + in the authenticator. + +8. GSSAPI Kerberos V5 Mechanism Type + +8.1 Mechanism Specific Changes + + The GSSAPI per-message tokens also require new checksum and + encryption types. The GSS-API per-message tokens must be changed to + support these new encryption types (See [5] Section 1.2.2). The + sealing algorithm identifier (SEAL_ALG) for an RC4 based encryption + is: + Byte 4..5 SEAL_ALG 0x10 0x00 - RC4 + + The signing algorithm identifier (SGN_ALG) for MD5 HMAC is: + Byte 2..3 SGN ALG 0x11 0x00 - HMAC + + The only support quality of protection is: + #define GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0x0 + + In addition, when using an RC4 based encryption type, the sequence + number is sent in big-endian rather than little-endian order. + + The Windows 2000 implementation also defines new GSSAPI flags in the + initial token passed when initializing a security context. These + flags are passed in the checksum field of the authenticator (See [5] + Section 1.1.1). + + GSS_C_DCE_STYLE - This flag was added for use with Microsoft’s + implementation of DCE RPC, which initially expected three legs of + authentication. Setting this flag causes an extra AP reply to be + sent from the client back to the server after receiving the server’s + AP reply. In addition, the context negotiation tokens do not have + GSSAPI framing - they are raw AP message and do not include object + identifiers. + #define GSS_C_DCE_STYLE 0x1000 + + + +Swift Category - Informational 5 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG - This flag allows the client to indicate to the + server that it should only allow the server application to identify + the client by name and ID, but not to impersonate the client. + #define GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG 0x2000 + + GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG - Setting this flag indicates that the + client wants to be informed of extended error information. In + particular, Windows 2000 status codes may be returned in the data + field of a Kerberos error message. This allows the client to + understand a server failure more precisely. In addition, the server + may return errors to the client that are normally handled at the + application layer in the server, in order to let the client try to + recover. After receiving an error message, the client may attempt to + resubmit an AP request. + #define GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG 0x4000 + + These flags are only used if a client is aware of these conventions + when using the SSPI on the Windows platform, they are not generally + used by default. + + When NetBIOS addresses are used in the GSSAPI, they are identified + by the GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS value. This value is defined as: + #define GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS 0x14 + NetBios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to th 15 characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16 + octet of 0x0. + +8.2 GSSAPI Checksum Type + + The GSSAPI checksum type and algorithm is defined in Section 5. Only + the first 8 octets of the checksum are used. The resulting checksum + is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field (See [5] Section 1.2) for + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(conf_flag=FALSE). + + MIC (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, MIC_hdr, msg, msg_len, + MIC_seq, MIC_checksum) + { + HMAC (K, SK, 13, K4); + T = 15; + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 00, &T, 4); + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 04, MIC_hdr, 8); + // 0101 1100 FFFFFFFF + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 12, msg, msg_len); + MD5 (T_hdr_msg, 4 + 8 + msg_len, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg); + HMAC (K4, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg, CHKSUM); + memcpy (MIC_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 bytes + + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K5); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K5); + +Swift Category - Informational 6 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + } + if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K5+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC(K5, MIT_checksum, 8, K6); + copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction); + //0x12345678 + copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction + + 4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF + RC4(K6, seq_plus_direction, 8, MIC_seq); + } + +8.3 GSSAPI Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types for GSSAPI message tokens, one that + is 128 bits in strength, and one that is 56 bits in strength as + defined in Section 6. + + All padding is rounded up to 1 byte. One byte is needed to say that + there is 1 byte of padding. The DES based mechanism type uses 8 byte + padding. See [5] Section 1.2.2.3. + + The encryption mechanism used for GSS wrap based messages is as + follow: + + + WRAP (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, WRAP_hdr, msg, msg_len, + WRAP_seq, WRAP_checksum, edata, edata_len) + { + HMAC (K, SK, 13, K7); + T = 13; + PAD = 1; + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 00, &T, 4); + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 04, WRAP_hdr, 8); // 0101 1100 + FFFFFFFF + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12, msg, msg_len); + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12 + msg_len, &PAD, 1); + MD5 (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, + 4 + 8 + 8 + msg_len + 1, + MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad); + HMAC (K7, MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, CHKSUM); + memcpy (WRAP_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 + bytes + + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K8); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K8); + } + if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K8+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC(K8, WRAP_checksum, 8, K9); + copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction); + //0x12345678 + +Swift Category - Informational 7 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction + + 4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF + RC4(K9, seq_plus_direction, 8, WRAP_seq); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) K10 [i] ^= 0xF0; // XOR each byte + of key with 0xF0 + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *(DWORD *)(L40+10) = T; + HMAC(K10, L40, 14, K11); + memset(K11+7, 0xAB, 9); + }else{ + HMAC(K10, &T, 4, K11); + } + HMAC(K11, seq_num, 4, K12); + RC4(K12, T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 4 + 8, 8 + msg_len + 1, + edata); /* skip T & hdr */ + edata_len = 8 + msg_len + 1; // conf + msg_len + pad + } + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +9. Security Considerations + + Care must be taken in implementing this encryption type because it + uses a stream cipher. If a different IV isn’t used in each direction + when using a session key, the encryption is weak. By using the + sequence number as an IV, this is avoided. + +10. Acknowledgements + + We would like to thank Salil Dangi for the valuable input in + refining the descriptions of the functions and review input. + +11. References + + 1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + 2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + 3 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.,"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997 + + 4 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 + + + +Swift Category - Informational 8 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + + 5 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC-1964, + June 1996 + + 6 R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320, April + 1992 + + 7 R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1321, April + 1992 + + 8 Thayer, R. and K. Kaukonen, "A Stream Cipher Encryption + Algorithm", Work in Progress. + + 9 RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under license + from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information, contact: + + RSA Data Security, Inc. + 100 Marine Parkway + Redwood City, CA 94065-1031 + + 10 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- + 04.txt, June 25, 1999 + + +12. Author's Addresses + + Mike Swift + Dept. of Computer Science + Sieg Hall + University of Washington + Seattle, WA 98105 + Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu + + John Brezak + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 9 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + +13. Full Copyright Statement + + "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and + furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or + otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be + prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in + part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above + copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such + copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may + not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright + notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet + organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing + Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights + defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or + as required to translate it into languages other than English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will + not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or + assigns. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 10 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8174d4678f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft October, 1997 +Expire in six months + + Kerberos over IPv6 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + This document specifies the address types and transport types + necessary for using Kerberos [RFC1510] over IPv6 [RFC1883]. + +Specification + + IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). + + The following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any + Kerberos packet: + + the Unspecified Address + the Loopback Address + Link-Local addresses + + IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type + 2. + + + + +Westerlund [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over IPv6 October, 1997 + + + Communication with the KDC over IPv6 MUST be done as in section 8.2.1 + of [RFC1510]. + +Discussion + + [RFC1510] suggests using the address family constants in + from BSD. This cannot be done for IPv6 as these + numbers have diverged and are different on different BSD-derived + systems. [RFC2133] does not either specify a value for AF_INET6. + Thus a value has to be decided and the implementations have to + convert between the value used in Kerberos HostAddress and the local + AF_INET6. + + There are a few different address types in IPv6, see [RFC1884]. Some + of these are used for quite special purposes and it makes no sense to + include them in Kerberos packets. + + It is necessary to represent IPv4-mapped addresses as Internet + addresses (type 2) to be compatible with Kerberos implementations + that only support IPv4. + +Security considerations + + This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in + addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + [RFC1883] Deering, S., Hinden, R., "Internet Protocol, Version 6 + (IPv6) Specification", RFC 1883, December 1995. + + [RFC1884] Hinden, R., Deering, S., "IP Version 6 Addressing + Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995. + + [RFC2133] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., Stevens, W., "Basic + Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC2133, April 1997. + +Author's Address + + Assar Westerlund + Swedish Institute of Computer Science + Box 1263 + S-164 29 KISTA + Sweden + + + + +Westerlund [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over IPv6 October, 1997 + + + Phone: +46-8-7521526 + Fax: +46-8-7517230 + EMail: assar@sics.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Westerlund [Page 3] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62b109afa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +.pl 10.0i +.po 0 +.ll 7.2i +.lt 7.2i +.nr LL 7.2i +.nr LT 7.2i +.ds LF Westerlund +.ds RF [Page %] +.ds CF +.ds LH Internet Draft +.ds RH October, 1997 +.ds CH Kerberos over IPv6 +.hy 0 +.ad l +.in 0 +.ta \n(.luR +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft October, 1997 +Expire in six months + +.ce +Kerberos over IPv6 + +.ti 0 +Status of this Memo + +.in 3 +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its +areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also +distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six +months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other +documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- +Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as +"work in progress." + +To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check +the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net +(Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East +Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + +Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +.ti 0 +Abstract + +.in 3 +This document specifies the address types and transport types +necessary for using Kerberos [RFC1510] over IPv6 [RFC1883]. + +.ti 0 +Specification + +.in 3 +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). + +The following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any +Kerberos packet: + +the Unspecified Address +.br +the Loopback Address +.br +Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +Communication with the KDC over IPv6 MUST be done as in section +8.2.1 of [RFC1510]. + +.ti 0 +Discussion + +.in 3 +[RFC1510] suggests using the address family constants in + from BSD. This cannot be done for IPv6 as these +numbers have diverged and are different on different BSD-derived +systems. [RFC2133] does not either specify a value for AF_INET6. +Thus a value has to be decided and the implementations have to convert +between the value used in Kerberos HostAddress and the local AF_INET6. + +There are a few different address types in IPv6, see [RFC1884]. Some +of these are used for quite special purposes and it makes no sense to +include them in Kerberos packets. + +It is necessary to represent IPv4-mapped addresses as Internet +addresses (type 2) to be compatible with Kerberos implementations that +only support IPv4. + +.ti 0 +Security considerations + +.in 3 +This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in +addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +.ti 0 +References + +.in 3 +[RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network +Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +[RFC1883] Deering, S., Hinden, R., "Internet Protocol, Version 6 +(IPv6) Specification", RFC 1883, December 1995. + +[RFC1884] Hinden, R., Deering, S., "IP Version 6 Addressing +Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995. + +[RFC2133] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., Stevens, W., "Basic +Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC2133, April 1997. + +.ti 0 +Author's Address + +Assar Westerlund +.br +Swedish Institute of Computer Science +.br +Box 1263 +.br +S-164 29 KISTA +.br +Sweden + +Phone: +46-8-7521526 +.br +Fax: +46-8-7517230 +.br +EMail: assar@sics.se diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0fa695f640 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +November, 1997 PDC, KTH +Expire in six months + + Kerberos over TCP + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + This document specifies how the communication should be done between + a client and a KDC using Kerberos [RFC1510] with TCP as the transport + protocol. + +Specification + + This draft specifies an extension to section 8.2.1 of RFC1510. + + A Kerberos server MAY accept requests on TCP port 88 (decimal). + + The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes + containing the length, in network byte order, of the Kerberos + request, followed by the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The + reply from the KDC should consist of the length of the reply packet + (4 bytes, network byte order) followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, + TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR). + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over TCP November, 1997 + + + C->S: Open connection to TCP port 88 at the server + C->S: length of request + C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ + S->C: length of reply + S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR + +Discussion + + Even though the preferred way of sending kerberos packets is over UDP + there are several occasions when it's more practical to use TCP. + + Mainly, it's usually much less cumbersome to get TCP through + firewalls than UDP. + + In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that + information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos + packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to + decode the ASN.1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read. + + Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be + to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the + reply. This does not work well with all kinds of firewalls. + +Security considerations + + This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in + addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +Authors' Addresses + + Assar Westerlund + Swedish Institute of Computer Science + Box 1263 + S-164 29 KISTA + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7521526 + Fax: +46-8-7517230 + EMail: assar@sics.se + + Johan Danielsson + PDC, KTH + S-100 44 STOCKHOLM + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over TCP November, 1997 + + + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7907885 + Fax: +46-8-247784 + EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 3] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e0fa0a628 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.pl 10.0i +.po 0 +.ll 7.2i +.lt 7.2i +.nr LL 7.2i +.nr LT 7.2i +.ds LF Westerlund, Danielsson +.ds RF [Page %] +.ds CF +.ds LH Internet Draft +.ds RH November, 1997 +.ds CH Kerberos over TCP +.hy 0 +.ad l +.in 0 +.ta \n(.luR +.nf +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +November, 1997 PDC, KTH +Expire in six months +.fi + +.ce +Kerberos over TCP + +.ti 0 +Status of this Memo + +.in 3 +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its +areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also +distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six +months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other +documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- +Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as +"work in progress." + +To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check +the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net +(Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East +Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + +Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +.ti 0 +Abstract + +.in 3 +This document specifies how the communication should be done between a +client and a KDC using Kerberos [RFC1510] with TCP as the transport +protocol. + +.ti 0 +Specification + +This draft specifies an extension to section 8.2.1 of RFC1510. + +A Kerberos server MAY accept requests on TCP port 88 (decimal). + +The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes +containing the length, in network byte order, of the Kerberos request, +followed by the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The reply from +the KDC should consist of the length of the reply packet (4 bytes, +network byte order) followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, TGS-REP, or +KRB-ERROR). + +.nf +C->S: Open connection to TCP port 88 at the server +C->S: length of request +C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ +S->C: length of reply +S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR +.fi + +.ti 0 +Discussion + +Even though the preferred way of sending kerberos packets is over UDP +there are several occasions when it's more practical to use TCP. + +Mainly, it's usually much less cumbersome to get TCP through firewalls +than UDP. + +In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that +information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos +packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to +decode the ASN.1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read. + +Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be +to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the reply. +This does not work well with all kinds of firewalls. + +.ti 0 +Security considerations + +.in 3 +This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in +addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +.ti 0 +References + +.in 3 +[RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network +Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +.ti 0 +Authors' Addresses + +Assar Westerlund +.br +Swedish Institute of Computer Science +.br +Box 1263 +.br +S-164 29 KISTA +.br +Sweden + +Phone: +46-8-7521526 +.br +Fax: +46-8-7517230 +.br +EMail: assar@sics.se + +Johan Danielsson +.br +PDC, KTH +.br +S-100 44 STOCKHOLM +.br +Sweden + +Phone: +46-8-7907885 +.br +Fax: +46-8-247784 +.br +EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b8b7bb577 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +November, 1997 PDC, KTH +Expire in six months + + Kerberos vs firewalls + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + +Introduction + + Kerberos[RFC1510] is a protocol for authenticating parties + communicating over insecure networks. + + Firewalling is a technique for achieving an illusion of security by + putting restrictions on what kinds of packets and how these are sent + between the internal (so called "secure") network and the global (or + "insecure") Internet. + +Definitions + + client: the user, process, and host acquiring tickets from the KDC + and authenticating itself to the kerberised server. + + KDC: the Kerberos Key Distribution Center + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997 + + + Kerberised server: the server using Kerberos to authenticate the + client, for example telnetd. + +Firewalls + + A firewall is usually placed between the "inside" and the "outside" + networks, and is supposed to protect the inside from the evils on the + outside. There are different kinds of firewalls. The main + differences are in the way they forward packets. + + o+ The most straight forward type is the one that just imposes + restrictions on incoming packets. Such a firewall could be + described as a router that filters packets that match some + criteria. + + o+ They may also "hide" some or all addresses on the inside of the + firewall, replacing the addresses in the outgoing packets with the + address of the firewall (aka network address translation, or NAT). + NAT can also be used without any packet filtering, for instance + when you have more than one host sharing a single address (for + example, with a dialed-in PPP connection). + + There are also firewalls that does NAT both on the inside and the + outside (a server on the inside will see this as a connection from + the firewall). + + o+ A third type is the proxy type firewall, that parses the contents + of the packets, basically acting as a server to the client, and as + a client to the server (man-in-the-middle). If Kerberos is to be + used with this kind of firewall, a protocol module that handles + KDC requests has to be written. + + This type of firewall might also cause extra trouble when used with + kerberised versions of protocols that the proxy understands, in + addition to the ones mentioned below. This is the case with the FTP + Security Extensions [RFC2228], that adds a new set of commands to the + FTP protocol [RFC959], for integrity, confidentiality, and privacy + protecting commands. When transferring data, the FTP protocol uses a + separate data channel, and an FTP proxy will have to look out for + commands that start a data transfer. If all commands are encrypted, + this is impossible. A protocol that doesn't suffer from this is the + Telnet Authentication Option [RFC1416] that does all authentication + and encryption in-bound. + +Scenarios + + Here the different scenarios we have considered are described, the + problems they introduce and the proposed ways of solving them. + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997 + + + Combinations of these can also occur. + + Client behind firewall + + This is the most typical and common scenario. First of all the + client needs some way of communicating with the KDC. This can be + done with whatever means and is usually much simpler when the KDC is + able to communicate over TCP. + + Apart from that, the client needs to be sure that the ticket it will + acquire from the KDC can be used to authenticate to a server outside + its firewall. For this, it needs to add the address(es) of potential + firewalls between itself and the KDC/server, to the list of its own + addresses when requesting the ticket. We are not aware of any + protocol for determining this set of addresses, thus this will have + to be manually configured in the client. + + The client could also request a ticket with no addresses, but some + KDCs and servers might not accept such a ticket. + + With the ticket in possession, communication with the kerberised + server will not need to be any different from communicating between a + non-kerberised client and server. + + Kerberised server behind firewall + + The kerberised server does not talk to the KDC at all so nothing + beyond normal firewall-traversal techniques for reaching the server + itself needs to be applied. + + The kerberised server needs to be able to retrieve the original + address (before its firewall) that the request was sent for. If this + is done via some out-of-band mechanism or it's directly able to see + it doesn't matter. + + KDC behind firewall + + The same restrictions applies for a KDC as for any other server. + +Specification + +Security considerations + + This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in + addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +References + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997 + + + [RFC959] Postel, J. and Reynolds, J., "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)", + RFC 969, October 1985 + + [RFC1416] Borman, D., "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 1416, + February 1993. + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + [RFC2228] Horowitz, M. and Lunt, S., "FTP Security Extensions", + RFC2228, October 1997. + +Authors' Addresses + + Assar Westerlund + Swedish Institute of Computer Science + Box 1263 + S-164 29 KISTA + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7521526 + Fax: +46-8-7517230 + EMail: assar@sics.se + + Johan Danielsson + PDC, KTH + S-100 44 STOCKHOLM + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7907885 + Fax: +46-8-247784 + EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 4] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c024ca355c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +.\" even if this file is called .ms, it's using the me macros. +.\" to format try something like `nroff -me' +.\" level 2 heading +.de HH +.$p "\\$2" "" "\\$1" +.$0 "\\$2" +.. +.\" make sure footnotes produce the right thing with nroff +.ie t \ +\{\ +.ds { \v'-0.4m'\x'\\n(0x=0*-0.2m'\s-3 +.ds } \s0\v'0.4m' +.\} +.el \ +\{\ +.ds { [ +.ds } ] +.\} +.ds * \\*{\\n($f\\*}\k* +.\" page footer +.fo 'Westerlund, Danielsson''[Page %]' +.\" date +.ds RH \*(mo, 19\n(yr +.\" left margin +.nr lm 6 +.\" heading indent per level +.nr si 3n +.\" footnote indent +.nr fi 0 +.\" paragraph indent +.nr po 0 +.\" don't hyphenate +.hy 0 +.\" left adjustment +.ad l +.\" indent 0 +.in 0 +.\" line length 16cm and page length 25cm (~10 inches) +.ll 16c +.pl 25c +.ta \n(.luR +.nf +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +\*(RH PDC, KTH +Expire in six months +.fi + +.\" page header, has to be set here so it won't appear on page 1 +.he 'Internet Draft'Kerberos vs firewalls'\*(RH' +.ce +.b "Kerberos vs firewalls" + +.HH 1 "Status of this Memo" +.lp +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, +and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute +working documents as Internet-Drafts. +.lp +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months +and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any +time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference +material or to cite them other than as \*(lqwork in progress.\*(rq +.lp +To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the +\*(lq1id-abstracts.txt\*(rq listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), +munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). +.lp +Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. +.HH 1 "Abstract" +.lp +Kerberos and firewalls both deal with security, but doesn't get along +very well. This memo discusses ways to use Kerberos in a firewalled +environment. +.HH 1 "Introduction" +.lp +Kerberos[RFC1510] +.(d +[RFC1510] +Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., \*(lqThe Kerberos Network Authentication +Service (V5)\*(rq, RFC 1510, September 1993. +.)d +is a protocol for authenticating parties communicating over insecure +networks. Firewalling is a technique for achieving an illusion of +security by putting restrictions on what kinds of packets and how +these are sent between the internal (so called \*(lqsecure\*(rq) +network and the global (or \*(lqinsecure\*(rq) Internet. The problems +with firewalls are many, but to name a few: +.np +Firewalls usually doesn't allow people to use UDP. The reason for this +is that UDP is (by firewall advocates) considered insecure. This +belief is probably based on the fact that many \*(lqinsecure\*(rq +protocols (like NFS) use UDP. UDP packets are also considered easy to +fake. +.np +Firewalls usually doesn't allow people to connect to arbitrary ports, +such as the ports used when talking to the KDC. +.np +In many non-computer organisations, the computer staff isn't what +you'd call \*(lqwizards\*(rq; a typical case is an academic +institution, where someone is taking care of the computers part time, +and is doing research the rest of the time. Adding a complex device +like a firewall to an environment like this, often leads to poorly run +systems that is more a hindrance for the legitimate users than to +possible crackers. +.lp +The easiest way to deal with firewalls is to ignore them, however in +some cases this just isn't possible. You might have users that are +stuck behind a firewall, but also has to access your system, or you +might find yourself behind a firewall, for instance when out +travelling. +.lp +To make it possible for people to use Kerberos from behind a firewall, +there are several things to consider. +.(q +.i +Add things to do when stuck behind a firewall, like talking about the +problem with local staff, making them open some port in the firewall, +using some other port, or proxy. +.r +.)q +.HH 1 "Firewalls" +.lp +A firewall is usually placed between the \*(lqinside\*(rq and the +\*(lqoutside\*(rq networks, and is supposed to protect the inside from the +evils on the outside. There are different kinds of firewalls. The +main differences are in the way they forward (or doesn't) packets. +.ip \(bu +The most straight forward type is the one that just imposes +restrictions on incoming packets. Such a firewall could be described +as a router that filters packets that match some criteria. +.ip \(bu +They may also \*(lqhide\*(rq some or all addresses on the inside of the +firewall, replacing the addresses in the outgoing packets with the +address of the firewall (aka network address translation, or NAT). NAT +can also be used without any packet filtering, for instance when you +have more than one host sharing a single address (e.g with a dialed-in +PPP connection). +.ip +There are also firewalls that does NAT both on the inside and the +outside (a server on the inside will see this as a connection from the +firewall). +.ip \(bu +A third type is the proxy type firewall, that parses the contents of +the packets, basically acting as a server to the client, and as a +client to the server (man-in-the-middle). If Kerberos is to be used +with this kind of firewall, a protocol module that handles KDC +requests has to be written\**. +.(f +\**Instead of writing a new module for Kerberos, it can be possible to +hitch a ride on some other protocol, that's already beeing handled by +the proxy. +.)f +.lp +The last type of firewall might also cause extra trouble when used +with kerberised versions of protocols that the proxy understands, in +addition to the ones mentioned below. This is the case with the FTP +Security Extensions [RFC2228], +.(d +[RFC2228] +Horowitz, M. and Lunt, S., \*(lqFTP Security Extensions\*(rq, RFC2228, +October 1997. +.)d +that adds a new set of commands to the FTP protocol [RFC959], +.(d +[RFC959] Postel, J. and Reynolds, J., \*(lqFile Transfer Protocol +(FTP)\*(rq, RFC 969, October 1985 +.)d +for integrity, confidentiality, and privacy protecting commands, and +data. When transferring data, the FTP protocol uses a separate data +channel, and an FTP proxy will have to look out for commands that +start a data transfer. If all commands are encrypted, this is +impossible. A protocol that doesn't suffer from this is the Telnet +Authentication Option [RFC1416] +.(d +[RFC1416] +Borman, D., \*(lqTelnet Authentication Option\*(rq, RFC 1416, February +1993. +.)d +that does all +authentication and encryption in-bound. +.HH 1 "Scenarios" +.lp +Here the different scenarios we have considered are described, the +problems they introduce and the proposed ways of solving them. +Combinations of these can also occur. +.HH 2 "Client behind firewall" +.lp +This is the most typical and common scenario. First of all the client +needs some way of communicating with the KDC. This can be done with +whatever means and is usually much simpler when the KDC is able to +communicate over TCP. +.lp +Apart from that, the client needs to be sure that the ticket it will +acquire from the KDC can be used to authenticate to a server outside +its firewall. For this, it needs to add the address(es) of potential +firewalls between itself and the KDC/server, to the list of its own +addresses when requesting the ticket. We are not aware of any +protocol for determining this set of addresses, thus this will have to +be manually configured in the client. +.lp +The client could also request a ticket with no addresses. This is not +a recommended way to solve this problem. The address was put into the +ticket to make it harder to use a stolen ticket. A ticket without +addresses will therefore be less \*(lqsecure.\*(rq RFC1510 also says that +the KDC may refuse to issue, and the server may refuse to accept an +address-less ticket. +.lp +With the ticket in possession, communication with the kerberised +server will not need to be any different from communicating between a +non-kerberised client and server. +.HH 2 "Kerberised server behind firewall" +.lp +The kerberised server does not talk to the KDC at all, so nothing +beyond normal firewall-traversal techniques for reaching the server +itself needs to be applied. +.lp +If the firewall rewrites the clients address, the server will have to +use some other (possibly firewall specific) protocol to retrieve the +original address. If this is not possible, the address field will have +to be ignored. This has the same effect as if there were no addresses +in the ticket (see the discussion above). +.HH 2 "KDC behind firewall" +.lp +The KDC is in this respect basically just like any other server. +.\" .uh "Specification" +.HH 1 "Security considerations" +.lp +Since the whole network behind a NAT-type firewall looks like one +computer from the outside, any security added by the addresses in the +ticket will be lost. +.HH 1 "References" +.lp +.pd +.HH 1 "Authors' Addresses" +.lp +.nf +Assar Westerlund +Swedish Institute of Computer Science +Box 1263 +S-164 29 KISTA +.sp +Phone: +46-8-7521526 +Fax: +46-8-7517230 +EMail: assar@sics.se +.sp 2 +Johan Danielsson +Center for Parallel Computers +KTH +S-100 44 STOCKHOLM +.sp +Phone: +46-8-7906356 +Fax: +46-8-247784 +EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se +.fi \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-hornstein-dhc-kerbauth-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-hornstein-dhc-kerbauth-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89e64524c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-hornstein-dhc-kerbauth-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1594 @@ + +DHC Working Group Ken Hornstein +INTERNET-DRAFT NRL +Category: Standards Track Ted Lemon + Internet Engines, Inc. +20 February 2000 Bernard Aboba +Expires: September 1, 2000 Microsoft + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + + DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V + +This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all +provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + +Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task +Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups +may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months +and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any +time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material +or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + +The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + +The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +1. Copyright Notice + +Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + +2. Abstract + +The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) provides a mechanism for +host configuration. In some circumstances, it is useful for the DHCP +client and server to be able to mutually authenticate as well as to +guarantee the integrity of DHCP packets in transit. This document +describes how Kerberos V may be used in order to allow a DHCP client and +server to mutually authenticate as well as to protect the integrity of +the DHCP exchange. The protocol described in this document is capable of +handling both intra-realm and inter-realm authentication. + + + + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +3. Introduction + +The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) provides a mechanism for +host configuration. In some circumstances, it is useful for the DHCP +client and server to be able to mutually authenticate as well as to +guarantee the integrity of DHCP packets in transit. This document +describes how Kerberos V may be used in order to allow a DHCP client and +server to mutually authenticate as well as to protect the integrity of +the DHCP exchange. The protocol described in this document is capable +of handling both intra-realm and inter-realm authentication. + +3.1. Terminology + +This document uses the following terms: + +DHCP client + A DHCP client or "client" is an Internet host using DHCP to + obtain configuration parameters such as a network address. + +DHCP server + A DHCP server or "server" is an Internet host that returns + configuration parameters to DHCP clients. + +Home KDC The KDC corresponding to the DHCP client's realm. + +Local KDC The KDC corresponding to the DHCP server's realm. + +3.2. Requirements language + +In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional", +"recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as +described in [1]. + +4. Protocol overview + +In DHCP authentication via Kerberos V, DHCP clients and servers utilize +a Kerberos session key in order to compute a message integrity check +value included within the DHCP authentication option. The message +integrity check serves to authenticate as well as integrity protect the +messages, while remaining compatible with the operation of a DHCP relay. +Replay protection is also provided by a replay counter within the +authentication option, as described in [3]. + +Each server maintains a list of session keys and identifiers for +clients, so that the server can retrieve the session key and identifier +used by a client to which the server has provided previous configuration +information. Each server MUST save the replay counter from the previous +authenticated message. To avoid replay attacks, the server MUST discard + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +any incoming message whose replay counter is not strictly greater than +the replay counter from the previous message. + +DHCP authentication, described in [3], must work within the existing +DHCP state machine described in [4]. For a client in INIT state, this +means that the client must obtain a valid TGT, as well as a session key, +within the two round-trips provided by the +DHCPDISCOVER/OFFER/REQUEST/ACK sequence. + +In INIT state, the DHCP client submits an incomplete AS_REQ to the DHCP +server within the DHCPDISCOVER message. The DHCP server then completes +the AS_REQ using the IP address to be assigned to the client, and +submits this to the client's home KDC in order to obtain a TGT on the +client's behalf. Once the home KDC responds with an AS_REP, the DHCP +server extracts the client TGT and submits this along with its own TGT +to the home KDC, in order to obtain a user-to-user ticket to the DHCP +client. The AS_REP as well as the AP_REQ are included by the DHCP server +in the DHCPOFFER. The DHCP client can then decrypt the AS_REP to obtain +a home realm TGT and TGT session key, using the latter to decrypt the +user-to-user ticket to obtain the user-to-user session key. It is the +user-to-user session key that is used to authenticate and integrity +protect the client's DHCPREQUEST, and DHCPDECLINE messages. Similarly, +this same session key is used to compute the integrity attribute in the +server's DHCPOFFER, DHCPACK and DHCPNAK messages, as described in [3]. + +In the INIT-REBOOT, REBINDING, or RENEWING states, the server can submit +the home realm TGT in the DHCPREQUEST, along with authenticating and +integrity protecting the message using an integrity attribute within the +authentication option. The integrity attribute is computed using the +existing session key. The DHCP server can then return a renewed user- +to-user ticket within the DHCPACK message. The authenticated DHCPREQUEST +message from a client in INIT-REBOOT state can only be validated by +servers that used the same session key to compute the integrity +attribute in their DHCPOFFER messages. + +Other servers will discard the DHCPREQUEST messages. Thus, only servers +that used the user-to-user session key selected by the client will be +able to determine that their offered configuration information was not +selected, returning the offered network address to the server's pool of +available addresses. The servers that cannot validate the DHCPREQUEST +message will eventually return their offered network addresses to their +pool of available addresses as described in section 3.1 of the DHCP +specification [4]. + +When sending a DHCPINFORM, there are two possible procedures. If the +client knows the DHCP server it will be interacting with, then it can +obtain a ticket to the DHCP server from the local realm KDC. This will +require obtaining a TGT to its home realm, as well as possibly a cross- + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +realm TGT to the local realm if the local and home realms differ. Once +the DHCP client has a local realm TGT, it can then request a DHCP server +ticket in a TGS_REQ. The DHCP client can then include AP_REQ and +integrity attributes within the DHCPINFORM. The integrity attribute is +computed as described in [3], using the session key obtained from the +TGS_REP. The DHCP server replies with a DHCPACK/DHCPNAK, authenticated +using the same session key. + +If the DHCP client does not know the DHCP server it is interacting with +then it will not be able to obtain a ticket to it and a different +procedure is needed. In this case, the client will include in the +DHCPINFORM an authentication option with a ticket attribute containing +its home realm TGT. The DHCP server will then use this TGT in order to +request a user-to-user ticket from the home KDC in a TGS_REQ. The DHCP +server will return the user-to-user ticket and will authenticate and +integrity protect the DHCPACK/DHCPNAK message. This is accomplished by +including AP_REQ and integrity attributes within the authentication +option included with the DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages. + +In order to support the DHCP client's ability to authenticate the DHCP +server in the case where the server name is unknown, the Kerberos +principal name for the DHCP server must be of type KRB_NT_SRV_HST with +the service name component equal to 'dhcp'. For example, the DHCP server +principal name for the host srv.foo.org would be of the form +dhcp/srv.foo.org. The client MUST validate that the DHCP server +principal name has the above format. This convention requires that the +administrator ensure that non-DHCP server principals do not have names +that match the above format. + +4.1. Authentication Option Format + +A summary of the authentication option format for DHCP authentication +via Kerberos V is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to +right. + +0 1 2 3 +0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Code | Length | Protocol | Algorithm | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Global Replay Counter | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Global Replay Counter | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Attributes... ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +Code + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + TBD - DHCP Authentication + +Length + + The length field is a single octet and indicates the length of the + Protocol, Algorith, and Authentication Information fields. Octets + outside the range of the length field should be ignored on reception. + +Protocol + + TBD - DHCP Kerberos V authentication + +Algorithm + + The algorithm field is a single octet and defines the specific + algorithm to be used for computation of the authentication option. + Values for the field are as follows: + + 0 - reserved + 1 - HMAC-MD5 + 2 - HMAC-SHA + 3 - 255 reserved + +Global Replay Counter + + As described in [3], the global replay counter field is 8 octets in + length. It MUST be set to the value of a monotonically increasing + counter. Using a counter value such as the current time of day (e.g., + an NTP-format timestamp [10]) can reduce the danger of replay + attacks. + +Attributes + + The attributes field consists of type-length-value attributes of the + following format: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Type | Reserved | Payload Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Attribute value... + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +Type + The type field is a single octet and is defined as follows: + + 0 - Integrity check + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + 1 - TICKET + 2 - Authenticator + 3 - EncTicketPart + 10 - AS_REQ + 11 - AS_REP + 12 - TGS_REQ + 13 - TGS_REP + 14 - AP_REQ + 15 - AP_REP + 20 - KRB_SAFE + 21 - KRB_PRIV + 22 - KRB_CRED + 25 - EncASRepPart + 26 - EncTGSRepPart + 27 - EncAPRepPart + 28 - EncKrbPrvPart + 29 - EncKrbCredPart + 30 - KRB_ERROR + + Note that the values of the Type field are the same as in the + Kerberos MSG-TYPE field. As a result, no new number spaces are + created for IANA administration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + The following attribute types are allowed within the following + messages: + + DISCOVER OFFER REQUEST DECLINE # Attribute + -------------------------------------------------------- + 0 1 1 1 0 Integrity check + 0 0 0-1 0 1 Ticket + 1 0 0 0 10 AS_REQ + 0 1 0 0 11 AS_REP + 0 1 0 0 14 AP_REQ + 0 0-1 0 0 30 KRB_ERROR + + RELEASE ACK NAK INFORM INFORM # Attribute + w/known w/unknown + server server + --------------------------------------------------------------- + 1 1 1 1 0 0 Integrity check + 0 0 0 0 1 1 Ticket + 0 0 0 0 0 10 AS_REQ + 0 0 0 0 0 11 AS_REP + 0 0-1 0 1 0 14 AP_REQ + 0 0 0-1 0 0 30 KRB_ERROR + +4.2. Client behavior + +The following section, which incorporates material from [3], describes +client behavior in detail. + +4.2.1. INIT state + +When in INIT state, the client behaves as follows: + + +[1] As described in [3], the client MUST include the authentication + request option in its DHCPDISCOVER message along with option 61 + [11] to identify itself uniquely to the server. An AS_REQ attribute + MUST be included within the authentication request option. This + (incomplete) AS_REQ will set the FORWARDABLE and RENEWABLE flags + and MAY include pre-authentication data (PADATA) if the client + knows what PADATA its home KDC will require. The ADDRESSES field in + the AS_REQ will be ommitted since the client does not yet know its + IP address. The ETYPE field will be set to an encryption type that + the client can accept. + +[2] The client MUST validate DHCPOFFER messages that include an + authentication option. Messages including an authentication option + with a KRB_ERROR attribute and no integrity attribute are treated + as though they are unauthenticated. More typically, authentication + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + options within the DHCPOFFER message will include AS_REP, AP_REQ, + and integrity attributes. To validate the authentication option, + the client decrypts the enc-part of the AS_REP in order to obtain + the TGT session key. This is used to decrypt the enc-part of the + AP_REQ in order to obtain the user-to-user session key. The user- + to-user session key is then used to compute the message integrity + check as described in [3], and the computed value is compared to + the value within the integrity attribute. The client MUST discard + any messages which fail to pass validation and MAY log the + validation failure. + + As described in [3], the client selects one DHCPOFFER message as + its selected configuration. If none of the DHCPOFFER messages + received by the client include an authentication option, the client + MAY choose an unauthenticated message as its selected + configuration. DHCPOFFER messages including an authentication + option with a KRB_ERROR attribute and no integrity attribute are + treated as though they are unauthenticated. The client SHOULD be + configurable to accept or reject unauthenticated DHCPOFFER + messages. + +[3] The client replies with a DHCPREQUEST message that MUST include an + authentication option. The authentication option MUST include an + integrity attribute, computed as described in [3], using the user + to user session key recovered in step 2. + +[4] As noted in [3], the client MUST validate a DHCPACK message from + the server that includes an authentication option. DHCPACK or + DHCPNAK messages including an authentication option with a + KRB_ERROR attribute and no integrity attribute are treated as + though they are unauthenticated. The client MUST silently discard + the DHCPACK if the message fails to pass validation and MAY log the + validation failure. If the DHCPACK fails to pass validation, the + client MUST revert to the INIT state and return to step 1. The + client MAY choose to remember which server replied with an invalid + DHCPACK message and discard subsequent messages from that server. + +4.2.2. INIT-REBOOT state + +When in INIT-REBOOT state, if the user-to-user ticket is still valid, +the client MUST re-use the session key from the DHCP server user-to-user +ticket in its DHCPREQUEST message. This is used to generate the +integrity attribute contained within the authentication option, as +described in [3]. In the DHCPREQUEST, the DHCP client also includes its +home realm TGT in a ticket attribute in the authentication option in +order to assist the DHCP server in renewing the user-to-user ticket. To +ensure that the user-to-user ticket remains valid throughout the DHCP +lease period so that the renewal process can proceed, the Kerberos + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +ticket lifetime SHOULD be set to exceed the DHCP lease time. If the +user-to-user ticket is expired, then the client MUST return to the INIT +state. + +The client MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages +if no authenticated messages were received. DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages +with an authentication option containing a KRB_ERROR attribute and no +integrity attribute are treated as though they are unauthenticated. The +client MUST treat the receipt (or lack thereof) of any DHCPACK/DHCPNAK +messages as specified in section 3.2 of the DHCP specification [4]. + +4.2.3. RENEWING state + +When in RENEWING state, the DHCP client can be assumed to have a valid +IP address, as well as a TGT to the home realm, a user-to-user ticket +provided by the DHCP server, and a session key with the DHCP server, all +obtained during the original DHCP conversation. If the user-to-user +ticket is still valid, the client MUST re-use the session key from the +user-to-user ticket in its DHCPREQUEST message to generate the integrity +attribute contained within the authentication option. + +Since the DHCP client can renew the TGT to the home realm, it is +possible for it to continue to hold a valid home realm TGT. However, +since the DHCP client did not obtain the user-to-user ticket on its own, +it will need to rely on the DHCP server to renew this ticket. In the +DHCPREQUEST, the DHCP client includes its home realm TGT in a ticket +attribute in the authentication option in order to assist the DHCP +server in renewing the user-to-user ticket. + +If the DHCP server user-to-user ticket is expired, then the client MUST +return to INIT state. To ensure that the user-to-user ticket remains +valid throughout the DHCP lease period so that the renewal process can +proceed, the Kerberos ticket lifetime SHOULD be set to exceed the DHCP +lease time. If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the +DHCPACK messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not +received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP specification +[4]. + +4.2.4. REBINDING state + +When in REBINDING state, the DHCP client can be assumed to have a valid +IP address, as well as a TGT to the home realm, a user-to-user ticket +and a session key with the DHCP server, all obtained during the original +DHCP conversation. If the user-to-user ticket is still valid, the +client MUST re-use the session key from the user-to-user ticket in its +DHCPREQUEST message to generate the integrity attribute contained within +the authentication option, as described in [3]. + + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +Since the DHCP client can renew the TGT to the home realm, it is +possible for it to continue to hold a valid home realm TGT. However, +since the DHCP client did not obtain the user-to-user ticket on its own, +it will need to rely on the DHCP server to renew this ticket. In the +DHCPREQUEST, the DHCP client includes its home realm TGT in a ticket +attribute in the authentication option in order to assist the DHCP +server in renewing the user-to-user ticket. + +If the user-to-user ticket is expired, then the client MUST return to +INIT state. To ensure that the user-to-user ticket remains valid +throughout the DHCP lease period so that the renewal process can +proceed, the Kerberos ticket lifetime SHOULD be set to exceed the DHCP +lease time. If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the +DHCPACK messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not +received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP specification +[4]. + +4.2.5. DHCPRELEASE message + +Clients sending a DHCPRELEASE MUST include an authentication option. The +authentication option MUST include an integrity attribute, computed as +described in [3], using the user to user session key. + +4.2.6. DHCPDECLINE message + +Clients sending a DHCPDECLINE MUST include an authentication option. The +authentication option MUST include an integrity attribute, computed as +described in [3], using the user to user session key. + +4.2.7. DHCPINFORM message + +Since the client already has some configuration information, it can be +assumed that it has the ability to obtain a home or local realm TGT +prior to sending the DHCPINFORM. + +If the DHCP client knows which DHCP server it will be interacting with, +then it SHOULD include an authentication option containing AP_REQ and +integrity attributes within the DHCPINFORM. The DHCP client first +requests a TGT to the local realm via an AS_REQ and then using the TGT +returned in the AS_REP to request a ticket to the DHCP server from the +local KDC in a TGS_REQ. The session key obtained from the TGS_REP will +be used to generate the integrity attribute as described in [3]. + +If the DHCP client does not know what DHCP server it will be talking to, +then it cannot obtain a ticket to the DHCP server. In this case, the +DHCP client MAY send an unauthenticated DHCPINFORM or it MAY include an +authentication option including a ticket attribute only. The ticket +attribute includes a TGT for the home realm. The client MUST validate + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +that the DHCP server name in the received Kerberos AP_REQ message is of +the form dhcp/.... as described in section 4. + +The client MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages +if no authenticated messages were received. DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages +with an authentication option containing a KRB_ERROR attribute and no +integrity attribute are treated as though they are unauthenticated. The +client MUST treat the receipt (or lack thereof) of any DHCPACK/DHCPNAK +messages as specified in section 3.2 of the DHCP specification [4]. + +4.3. Server behavior + +This section, which relies on material from [3], describes the behavior +of a server in response to client messages. + +4.3.1. After receiving a DHCPDISCOVER message + +For installations where IP addresses are required within tickets, the +DHCP server MAY complete the AS_REQ by filling in the ADDRESSES field +based on the IP address that it will include in the DHCPOFFER. The DHCP +server sends the AS_REQ to the home KDC with the FORWARDABLE flag set. +The home KDC then replies to the DHCP server with an AS_REP. The DHCP +server extracts the client TGT from the AS_REP and forms a TGS_REQ, +which it sends to the home KDC. + +If the DHCP server and client are in different realms, then the DHCP +server will need to obtain a TGT to the home realm from the KDC of its +own (local) realm prior to sending the TGS_REQ. The TGS_REQ includes the +DHCP server's TGT within the home realm, has the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY flag +set and includes the client home realm TGT in the ADDITIONAL-TICKETS +field, thus requesting a user-to ticket to the DHCP client. The home +KDC then returns a user-to-user ticket in a TGS_REP. The user-to-user +ticket is encrypted in the client's home realm TGT session key. + +In order to recover the user-to-user session key, the DHCP server +decrypts the enc-part of the TGS_REP. To accomplish this, the DHCP +server uses the session key that it shares with the home realm, obtained +in the AS_REQ/AS_REP conversation that it used to obtain its own TGT to +the home realm. + +The DHCP server then sends a DHCPOFFER to the client, including AS_REP, +AP_REQ and integrity attributes within the authentication option. The +AS_REP attribute encapsulates the AS_REP sent to the DHCP server by the +home KDC. The AP_REQ attribute includes an AP_REQ constructed by the +DHCP server based on the TGS_REP sent to it by the home KDC. The server +also includes an integrity attribute generated as specified in [3] from +the user-to-user session key. The server MUST record the user-to-user +session key selected for the client and use that session key for + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +validating subsequent messages with the client. + +4.3.2. After receiving a DHCPREQUEST message + +The DHCP server uses the user-to-user session key in order to validate +the integrity attribute contained within the authentication option, +using the method specified in [3]. If the message fails to pass +validation, it MUST discard the message and MAY choose to log the +validation failure. + +If the message passes the validation procedure, the server responds as +described in [4], including an integrity attribute computed as specified +in [3] within the DHCPACK or DHCPNAK message. + +If the authentication option included within the DHCPREQUEST message +contains a ticket attribute then the DHCP server will use the home realm +TGT included in the ticket attribute in order to renew the user-to-user +ticket, which it returns in an AP_REQ attribute within the DHCPACK. +DHCPACK or DHCPNAK messages then include an integrity attribute +generated as specified in [3], using the new user-to-user session key +included within the AP_REQ. + +4.3.3. After receiving a DHCPINFORM message + +The server MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPINFORM messages, or +only accept authenticated DHCPINFORM messages based on a site policy. + +When a client includes an authentication option in a DHCPINFORM message, +the server MUST respond with an authenticated DHCPACK or DHCPNAK +message. If the DHCPINFORM message includes an authentication option +including AP_REQ and integrity attributes, the DHCP server decrypts the +AP_REQ attribute and then recovers the session key. The DHCP server than +validates the integrity attribute included in the authentication option +using the session key. If the integrity attribute is invalid then the +DHCP server MUST silently discard the DHCPINFORM message. + +If the authentication option only includes a ticket attribute and no +integrity or AP_REQ attributes, then the DHCP server should assume that +the client needs the server to obtain a user-to-user ticket from the +home realm KDC. In this case, the DHCP server includes the client home +realm TGT and its own home realm TGT in a TGS_REQ to the home realm KDC. +It then receives a user-to-user ticket from the home realm KDC in a +TGS_REP. The DHCP server will then include AP_REQ and integrity +attributes within the DHCPACK/DHCPNAK. + +If the client does not include an authentication option in the +DHCPINFORM, the server can either respond with an unauthenticated +DHCPACK message, or a DHCPNAK if the server does not accept + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +unauthenticated clients. + +4.3.4. After receiving a DHCPRELEASE message + +The DHCP server uses the session key in order to validate the integrity +attribute contained within the authentication option, using the method +specified in [3]. If the message fails to pass validation, it MUST +discard the message and MAY choose to log the validation failure. + +If the message passes the validation procedure, the server responds as +described in [4], marking the client's network address as not allocated. + +4.3.5. After receiving a DHCPDECLINE message + +The DHCP server uses the session key in order to validate the integrity +attribute contained within the authentication option, using the method +specified in [3]. If the message fails to pass validation, it MUST +discard the message and MAY choose to log the validation failure. + +If the message passes the validation procedure, the server proceeds as +described in [4]. + +4.4. Error handling + +When an error condition occurs during a Kerberos exchange, Kerberos +error messages can be returned by either side. These Kerberos error +messages MAY be logged by the receiving and sending parties. + +In some cases, it may be possible for these error messages to be +included within the authentication option via the KRB_ERROR attribute. +However, in most cases, errors will result in messages being silently +discarded and so no response will be returned. + +For example, if the home KDC returns a KRB_ERROR in response to the +AS_REQ submitted by the DHCP server on the client's behalf, then the +DHCP server will conclude that the DHCPDISCOVER was not authentic, and +will silently discard it. + +However, if the AS_REQ included PADATA and the home KDC responds with an +AS_REP, then the DHCP server can conclude that the client is authentic. +If the subsequent TGS_REQ is unsuccessful, with a KRB_ERROR returned by +the home KDC in the TGS_REP, then the fault may lie with the DHCP server +rather than with the client. In this case, the DHCP server MAY choose to +return a KRB_ERROR within the authentication option included in the +DHCPOFFER. The client will then treat this as an unauthenticated +DHCPOFFER. + + + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +Similarly, if the integrity attribute contained in the DHCPOFFER proves +invalid, the client will silently discard the DHCPOFFER and instead +accept an offer from another server if one is available. If the +integrity attribute included in the DHCPACK/DHCPNAK proves invalid, then +the client behaves as if it did not receive a DHCPACK/DHCPNAK. + +When in INIT-REBOOT, REBINDING or RENEWING state, the client will +include a ticket attribute and integrity attribute within the +authentication option of the DHCPREQUEST, in order to assist the DHCP +server in renewing the user-to-user ticket. If the integrity attribute +is invalid, then the DHCP server MUST silently discard the DHCPREQUEST. + +However, if the integrity attribute is successfully validated by the +DHCP server, but the home realm TGT included in the ticket attribute is +invalid (e.g. expired), then the DHCP server will receive a KRB_ERROR in +response to its TGS_REQ to the home KDC. In this case, the DHCP server +MAY respond with a DHCPNAK including a KRB_ERROR attribute and no +integrity attribute within the authentication option. This will force +the client back to the INIT state, where it can receive a valid home +realm TGT. + +Where the client included PADATA in the AS_REQ attribute of the +authentication option within the DHCPDISCOVER and the AS_REQ was +successfully validated by the KDC, the DHCP server will conclude that +the DHCP client is authentic. In this case if the client successfully +validates the integrity attribute in the DHCPOFFER, but the server does +not validate the integrity attribute in the client's DHCPREQUEST, the +server MAY choose to respond with an authenticated DHCPNAK containing a +KRB_ERROR attribute. + +4.5. PKINIT issues + +When public key authentication is supported with Kerberos as described +in [8], the client certificate and a signature accompany the initial +request in the preauthentication fields. As a result, it is conceivable +that the incomplete AS_REQ included in the DHCPDISCOVER packet may +exceed the size of a single DHCP option, or even the MTU size. As noted +in [4], a single option may be as large as 255 octets. If the value to +be passed is larger than this the client concatenates together the +values of multiple instances of the same option. + +4.6. Examples + +4.6.1. INIT state + +In the intra-realm case where the DHCP Kerberos mutual authentication is +successful, the conversation will appear as follows: + + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPOFFER, + (AS_REP, + AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPREQUEST + (Integrity) -> + <- DHCPACK + (Integrity) + +In the case where the KDC returns a KRB_ERROR in response to the AS_REQ, +the server will silently discard the DHCPDISCOVER and the conversation +will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- KRB_ERROR + +In the inter-realm case where the DHCP Kerberos mutual authentication is +successful, the conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER +(Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ -> + (cross realm, + for home + KDC) + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + <- TGS_REP + + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPOFFER, + (AS_REP, + AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPREQUEST + (Integrity) -> + <- DHCPACK + (Integrity) + +In the case where the client includes PADATA in the AS_REQ attribute +within the authentication option of the DHCPDISCOVER and the KDC returns +an error-free AS_REP indicating successful validation of the PADATA, the +DHCP server will conclude that the DHCP client is authentic. If the KDC +then returns a KRB_ERROR in response to the TGS_REQ, indicating a fault +that lies with the DHCP server, the server MAY choose not to silently +discard the DHCPDISCOVER. Instead it MAY respond with a DHCPOFFER +including a KRB_ERROR attribute within the authentication option. The +client will then treat this as an unauthenticated DHCPOFFER. The +conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ + w/PADATA) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- KRB_ERROR + <- DHCPOFFER, + (KRB_ERROR) +DHCPREQUEST -> + <- DHCPACK + +In the intra-realm case where the client included PADATA in the AS_REQ +attribute of the authentication option and the AS_REQ was successfully +validated by the KDC, the DHCP server will conclude that the DHCP client +is authentic. In this case if the client successfully validates the +integrity attribute in the DHCPOFFER, but the server does not validate +the integrity attribute in the client's DHCPREQUEST, the server MAY + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +choose to respond with an authenticated DHCPNAK containing a KRB_ERROR +attribute. The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ + w/PADATA) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPOFFER, + (AS_REP, + AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPREQUEST + (Integrity) -> + <- DHCNAK + (KRB_ERROR, + Integrity) +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + +In the intra-realm case where the DHCP client cannot validate the +integrity attribute in the DHCPOFFER, the client silently discards the +DHCPOFFER. The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPOFFER, + (AS_REP, + AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPREQUEST + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + [To another server] + (Integrity) -> + +In the intra-realm case where the DHCP client cannot validate the +integrity attribute in the DHCPACK, the client reverts to INIT state. +The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +DHCPDISCOVER +(Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPOFFER, + (AS_REP, + AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPREQUEST + (Integrity) -> + <- DHCPACK + (Integrity) +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + +4.6.2. INIT-REBOOT, RENEWING or REBINDING + +In the intra-realm or inter-realm case where the original user-to-user +ticket is still valid, and the DHCP server still has a valid TGT to the +home realm, the conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- + +DHCPREQUEST + (TGT, + Integrity) -> + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPACK + (AP_REQ, + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + Integrity) + +In the intra-realm or inter-realm case where the DHCP server validates +the integrity attribute in the DHCPREQUEST, but receives a KRB_ERROR in +response to the TGS_REQ to the KDC, the DHCP sever MAY choose not to +silently discard the DHCPREQUEST and MAY return an authenticated DHCPNAK +to the client instead, using the user-to-user session key previously +established with the client. The conversation appears as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- + +DHCPREQUEST + (TGT, + Integrity) -> + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- KRB_ERROR + <- DHCPNAK + (KRB_ERROR, + Integrity) +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + +In the intra-realm or inter-realm case where the DHCP server cannot +validate the integrity attribute in the DHCPREQUEST, the DHCP server +MUST silently discard the DHCPREQUEST and the conversation will appear +as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- + +DHCPREQUEST + (TGT, + Integrity) -> + Silent discard +[Sequence repeats + until timeout] + +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + +In the intra-realm or inter-realm case where the original user-to-user +ticket is still valid, the server validates the integrity attribute in + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 19] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +the DHCPREQUEST, but the client fails to validate the integrity +attribute in the DHCPACK, the client will silently discard the DHCPACK. +The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- + +DHCPREQUEST + (TGT, + Integrity) -> + + <- DHCPACK + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPDISCOVER + (Incomplete + AS_REQ) -> + +4.6.3. DHCPINFORM (with known DHCP server) + +In the case where the DHCP client knows the DHCP server it will be +interacting with, the DHCP client will obtain a ticket to the DHCP +server and will include AP_REQ and integrity attributes within the +DHCPINFORM. + +Where the DHCP Kerberos mutual authentication is successful, the +conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) -> + <- DHCPACK + (Integrity) + +In the inter-realm case where the DHCP Kerberos mutual authentication is +successful, the conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) -> + <- DHCPACK + (Integrity) + +In the inter-realm case where the DHCP server fails to validate the +integrity attribute in the DHCPINFORM, the server MUST silently discard +the DHCPINFORM. The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) -> + <- DHCPACK + (Integrity) +DHCPINFORM + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) -> + +In the inter-realm case where the DHCP client fails to validate the +integrity attribute in the DHCPACK, the client MUST silently discard the +DHCPACK. The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +TGS_REQ -> + <- TGS_REP +DHCPINFORM + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 21] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) -> + +4.6.4. DHCPINFORM (with unknown DHCP server) + +In the case where the DHCP client does not know the DHCP server it will +be interacting with, the DHCP client will only include a ticket +attribute within the DHCPINFORM. Thus the DHCP server will not be able +to validate the authentication option. + +Where the DHCP client is able to validate the DHCPACK and no error +occur, the onversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP + Client Server KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (Ticket) -> + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPACK + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) + +In the inter-realm case where the DHCP server needs to obtain a TGT to +the home realm, and where the client successfully validates the DHCPACK, +the conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (Ticket) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ -> + (cross realm, + for home + KDC) + <- TGS_REP + + TGS_REQ + U-2-U -> + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 22] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPACK + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) + +In the inter-realm case where the local KDC returns a KRB_ERROR in +response to the TGS_REQ from the DHCP server, the DHCP server MAY return +a KRB_ERROR within the DHCP authentication option included in a DHCPNAK. +The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (Ticket) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ -> + (cross realm, + for home + KDC) + <- KRB_ERROR + <- DHCPNAK + (KRB_ERROR) + + +In the inter-realm case where the DHCP client fails to validate the +integrity attribute in the DHCPACK, the client MUST silently discard the +DHCPACK. The conversation will appear as follows: + + DHCP DHCP Home Local + Client Server KDC KDC +-------------- ------------- --------- --------- +AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP +DHCPINFORM + (Ticket) -> + AS_REQ -> + <- AS_REP + TGS_REQ -> + (cross realm, + for home + KDC) + <- TGS_REP + + TGS_REQ + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 23] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + + U-2-U -> + <- TGS_REP + <- DHCPACK + (AP_REQ, + Integrity) +DHCPINFORM + (Ticket) -> + +5. References + + +[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + +[2] Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service + (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +[3] Droms, R., Arbaugh, W., "Authentication for DHCP Messages", + Internet draft (work in progress), draft-ietf-dhc- + authentication-11.txt, June 1999. + +[4] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131, March + 1997. + +[5] Alexander, S., Droms, R., "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor + Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997. + +[6] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, October 1996. + +[7] Jain, V., Congdon, P., Roese, J., "Network Port Authentication", + IEEE 802.1 PAR submission, June 1999. + +[8] Tung, B., Neuman, C., Hur, M., Medvinsky, A., Medvinsky, S., Wray, + J., Trostle, J., "Public Key Cryptography for Initial + Authentication in Kerberos", Internet draft (work in progress), + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-09.txt, June 1999. + +[9] Tung, B., Ryutov, T., Neuman, C., Tsudik, G., Sommerfeld, B., + Medvinsky, A., Hur, M., "Public Key Cryptography for Cross-Realm + Authentication in Kerberos", Internet draft (work in progress), + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-04.txt, June 1999. + +[10] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)", RFC-1305, March + 1992. + +[11] Henry, M., "DHCP Option 61 UUID Type Definition", Internet draft + (work in progress), draft-henry-DHCP-opt61-UUID-type-00.txt, + November 1998. + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 24] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +6. Security Considerations + +DHCP authentication, described in [3], addresses the following threats: + + Modification of messages + Rogue servers + Unauthorized clients + +This section describes how DHCP authentication via Kerberos V addresses +each of these threats. + +6.1. Client security + +As noted in [3], it may be desirable to ensure that IP addresses are +only allocated to authorized clients. This can serve to protect against +denial of service attacks. To address this issue it is necessary for +DHCP client messages to be authenticated. In order to guard against +message modification, it is also necessary for DHCP client messages to +be integrity protected. + +Note that this protocol does not make use of KRB_SAFE, so as to allow +modification of mutable fields by the DHCP relay. Replay protection is +therefore provided within the DHCP authentication option itself. + +In DHCP authentication via Kerberos V the DHCP client will authenticate, +integrity and replay-protect the DHCPREQUEST, DHCPDECLINE and +DHCPRELEASE messages using a user-to-user session key obtained by the +DHCP server from the home KDC. If the DHCP client knows the DHCP server +it will be interacting with, then the DHCP client MAY also authenticate, +integrity and replay-protect the DHCPINFORM message using a session key +obtained from the local realm KDC for the DHCP server it expects to +converse with. + +Since the client has not yet obtained a session key, DHCPDISCOVER +packets cannot be authenticated using the session key. However, the +client MAY include pre-authentication data in the PADATA field included +in the DHCPDISCOVER packet. Since the PADATA will then be used by the +DHCP server to request a ticket on the client's behalf, the DHCP server +will learn from the AS_REP whether the PADATA was acceptable or not. +Therefore in this case, the DHCPDISCOVER will be authenticated but not +integrity protected. + +Where the DHCP client does not know the DHCP server it will be +interacting with ahead of time, the DHCPINFORM message will not be +authenticated, integrity or replay protected. + +Note that snooping of PADATA and TGTs on the wire may provide an +attacker with a means of mounting a dictionary attack, since these items + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 25] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +are typically encrypted with a key derived from the user's password. +Thus use of strong passwords and/or pre-authentication methods utilizing +strong cryptography (see [8]) are recommended. + +6.2. Network access control + +DHCP authentication has been proposed as a method of limiting access to +network media that are not physically secured such as wireless LANs and +ports in college residence halls. However, it is not particularly well +suited to this purpose since even if address allocation is denied an +inauthentic client may use a statically assigned IP address instead, or +may attempt to access the network using non-IP protocols. As a result, +other methods, described in [6]-[7], have been proposed for controlling +access to wireless media and switched LANs. + +6.3. Server security + +As noted in [3], it may be desirable to protect against rogue DHCP +servers put on the network either intentionally or by accident. To +address this issue it is necessary for DHCP server messages to be +authenticated. In order to guard against message modification, it is +also necessary for DHCP server messages to be integrity protected. +Replay protection is also provided within the DHCP authentication +option. + +All messages sent by the DHCP server are authenticated and integrity and +replaly protected using a session key. This includes the DHCPOFFER, +DHCPACK, and DHCPNAK messages. The session key is used to compute the +DHCP authentication option, which is verified by the client. + +In order to provide protection against rogue servers it is necessary to +prevent rogue servers from obtaining the credentials necessary to act as +a DHCP server. As noted in Section 4, the Kerberos principal name for +the DHCP server must be of type KRB_NT_SRV_HST with the service name +component equal to 'dhcp'. The client MUST validate that the DHCP server +principal name has the above format. This convention requires that the +administrator ensure that non-DHCP server principals do not have names +that match the above format. + +7. IANA Considerations + +This draft does not create any new number spaces for IANA +administration. + +8. Acknowledgements + +The authors would like to acknowledge Ralph Droms and William Arbaugh, +authors of the DHCP authentication draft [3]. This draft incorporates + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 26] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +material from their work; however, any mistakes in this document are +solely the responsibility of the authors. + +9. Authors' Addresses + +Ken Hornstein +US Naval Research Laboratory +Bldg A-49, Room 2 +4555 Overlook Avenue +Washington DC 20375 USA + +Phone: +1 (202) 404-4765 +EMail: kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil + +Ted Lemon +Internet Engines, Inc. +950 Charter Street +Redwood City, CA 94063 + +Phone: +1 (650) 779 6031 +Email: mellon@iengines.net + +Bernard Aboba +Microsoft Corporation +One Microsoft Way +Redmond, WA 98052 + +Phone: +1 (425) 936-6605 +EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com + +Jonathan Trostle +170 W. Tasman Dr. +San Jose, CA 95134, U.S.A. + +Email: jtrostle@cisco.com +Phone: +1 (408) 527-6201 + + +10. Intellectual Property Statement + +The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any +intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain +to the implementation or use of the technology described in this +document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or +might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any +effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's +procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards- +related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 27] + + +INTERNET-DRAFT DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V 20 February 2000 + + +rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to +be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general +license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by +implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the +IETF Secretariat. + +The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any +copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights +which may cover technology that may be required to practice this +standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive +Director. + +11. Full Copyright Statement + +Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. +This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to +others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or +assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and +distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, +provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included +on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself +may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice +or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, +except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in +which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet +Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into +languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are +perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its +successors or assigns. This document and the information contained +herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE +INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE +INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +12. Expiration Date + +This memo is filed as , and +expires October 1, 2000. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Hornstein, et al. Standards Track [Page 28] + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4dcff486b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions +Internet-Draft March, 1997 + + + Key Derivation for Authentication, Integrity, and Privacy + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + author. + +Abstract + + Recent advances in cryptography have made it desirable to use longer + cryptographic keys, and to make more careful use of these keys. In + particular, it is considered unwise by some cryptographers to use the + same key for multiple purposes. Since most cryptographic-based + systems perform a range of functions, such as authentication, key + exchange, integrity, and encryption, it is desirable to use different + cryptographic keys for these purposes. + + This RFC does not define a particular protocol, but defines a set of + cryptographic transformations for use with arbitrary network + protocols and block cryptographic algorithm. + + +Deriving Keys + + In order to use multiple keys for different functions, there are two + possibilities: + + - Each protocol ``key'' contains multiple cryptographic keys. The + implementation would know how to break up the protocol ``key'' for + use by the underlying cryptographic routines. + + - The protocol ``key'' is used to derive the cryptographic keys. + The implementation would perform this derivation before calling + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation March, 1997 + + + the underlying cryptographic routines. + + In the first solution, the system has the opportunity to provide + separate keys for different functions. This has the advantage that + if one of these keys is broken, the others remain secret. However, + this comes at the cost of larger ``keys'' at the protocol layer. In + addition, since these ``keys'' may be encrypted, compromising the + cryptographic key which is used to encrypt them compromises all the + component keys. Also, the not all ``keys'' are used for all possible + functions. Some ``keys'', especially those derived from passwords, + are generated from limited amounts of entropy. Wasting some of this + entropy on cryptographic keys which are never used is unwise. + + The second solution uses keys derived from a base key to perform + cryptographic operations. By carefully specifying how this key is + used, all of the advantages of the first solution can be kept, while + eliminating some disadvantages. In particular, the base key must be + used only for generating the derived keys, and this derivation must + be non-invertible and entropy-preserving. Given these restrictions, + compromise of one derived keys does not compromise the other subkeys. + Attack of the base key is limited, since it is only used for + derivation, and is not exposed to any user data. + + Since the derived key has as much entropy as the base keys (if the + cryptosystem is good), password-derived keys have the full benefit of + all the entropy in the password. + + To generate a derived key from a base key: + + Derived Key = DK(Base Key, Well-Known Constant) + + where + + DK(Key, Constant) = n-truncate(E(Key, Constant)) + + In this construction, E(Key, Plaintext) is a block cipher, Constant + is a well-known constant defined by the protocol, and n-truncate + truncates its argument by taking the first n bits; here, n is the key + size of E. + + If the output of E is is shorter than n bits, then some entropy in + the key will be lost. If the Constant is smaller than the block size + of E, then it must be padded so it may be encrypted. If the Constant + is larger than the block size, then it must be folded down to the + block size to avoid chaining, which affects the distribution of + entropy. + + In any of these situations, a variation of the above construction is + used, where the folded Constant is encrypted, and the resulting + output is fed back into the encryption as necessary (the | indicates + concatentation): + + K1 = E(Key, n-fold(Constant)) + K2 = E(Key, K1) + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation March, 1997 + + + K3 = E(Key, K2) + K4 = ... + + DK(Key, Constant) = n-truncate(K1 | K2 | K3 | K4 ...) + + n-fold is an algorithm which takes m input bits and ``stretches'' + them to form n output bits with no loss of entropy, as described in + [Blumenthal96]. In this document, n-fold is always used to produce n + bits of output, where n is the key size of E. + + If the size of the Constant is not equal to the block size of E, then + the Constant must be n-folded to the block size of E. This number is + used as input to E. If the block size of E is less than the key + size, then the output from E is taken as input to a second invocation + of E. This process is repeated until the number of bits accumulated + is greater than or equal to the key size of E. When enough bits have + been computed, the first n are taken as the derived key. + + Since the derived key is the result of one or more encryptions in the + base key, deriving the base key from the derived key is equivalent to + determining the key from a very small number of plaintext/ciphertext + pairs. Thus, this construction is as strong as the cryptosystem + itself. + + +Deriving Keys from Passwords + + When protecting information with a password or other user data, it is + necessary to convert an arbitrary bit string into an encryption key. + In addition, it is sometimes desirable that the transformation from + password to key be difficult to reverse. A simple variation on the + construction in the prior section can be used: + + Key = DK(n-fold(Password), Well-Known Constant) + + The n-fold algorithm is reversible, so recovery of the n-fold output + is equivalent to recovery of Password. However, recovering the n- + fold output is difficult for the same reason recovering the base key + from a derived key is difficult. + + + + Traditionally, the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext, or + vice versa, is determined by the cryptographic algorithm and the key. + A simple way to think of derived keys is that the transformation is + determined by the cryptographic algorithm, the constant, and the key. + + For interoperability, the constants used to derive keys for different + purposes must be specified in the protocol specification. The + constants must not be specified on the wire, or else an attacker who + determined one derived key could provide the associated constant and + spoof data using that derived key, rather than the one the protocol + designer intended. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation March, 1997 + + + Determining which parts of a protocol require their own constants is + an issue for the designer of protocol using derived keys. + + +Security Considerations + + This entire document deals with security considerations relating to + the use of cryptography in network protocols. + + +Acknowledgements + + I would like to thank Uri Blumenthal, Hugo Krawczyk, and Bill + Sommerfeld for their contributions to this document. + + +References + + [Blumenthal96] Blumenthal, U., "A Better Key Schedule for DES-Like + Ciphers", Proceedings of PRAGOCRYPT '96, 1996. + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + Email: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-iakerb-04.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-iakerb-04.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..208d057f24 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-iakerb-04.txt @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Mike Swift +draft-ietf-cat-iakerb-04.txt Microsoft +Updates: RFC 1510 Jonathan Trostle +July 2000 Cisco Systems + + + Initial Authentication and Pass Through Authentication + Using Kerberos V5 and the GSS-API (IAKERB) + + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance + with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- + Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This draft expires on January 31st, 2001. + + +1. Abstract + + This document defines an extension to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510 [1]) and GSSAPI Kerberos mechanism (RFC + 1964 [2]) that enables a client to obtain Kerberos tickets for + services where: + + (1) The client knows its principal name and password, but not + its realm name (applicable in the situation where a user is already + on the network but needs to authenticate to an ISP, and the user + does not know his ISP realm name). + (2) The client is able to obtain the IP address of the service in + a realm which it wants to send a request to, but is otherwise unable + to locate or communicate with a KDC in the service realm or one of + the intermediate realms. (One example would be a dial up user who + does not have direct IP connectivity). + (3) The client does not know the realm name of the service. + + +2. Motivation + + When authenticating using Kerberos V5, clients obtain tickets from + a KDC and present them to services. This method of operation works + + well in many situations, but is not always applicable since it + requires the client to know its own realm, the realm of the target + service, the names of the KDC's, and to be able to connect to the + KDC's. + + This document defines an extension to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510) [1] that enables a client to obtain + Kerberos tickets for services where: + + (1) The client knows its principal name and password, but not + its realm name (applicable in the situation where a user is already + on the network but needs to authenticate to an ISP, and the user + does not know his ISP realm name). + (2) The client is able to obtain the IP address of the service in + a realm which it wants to send a request to, but is otherwise unable + to locate or communicate with a KDC in the service realm or one of + the intermediate realms. (One example would be a dial up user who + does not have direct IP connectivity). + (3) The client does not know the realm name of the service. + + In this proposal, the client sends KDC request messages directly + to application servers if one of the above failure cases develops. + The application server acts as a proxy, forwarding messages back + and forth between the client and various KDC's (see Figure 1). + + + Client <---------> App Server <----------> KDC + proxies + + + Figure 1: IAKERB proxying + + + In the case where the client has sent a TGS_REQ message to the + application server without a realm name in the request, the + application server will forward an error message to the client + with its realm name in the e-data field of the error message. + The client will attempt to proceed using conventional Kerberos. + +3. When Clients Should Use IAKERB + + We list several, but possibly not all, cases where the client + should use IAKERB. In general, the existing Kerberos paradigm + where clients contact the KDC to obtain service tickets should + be preserved where possible. + + (a) AS_REQ cases: + + (i) The client is unable to locate the user's KDC or the KDC's + in the user's realm are not responding, or + (ii) The user has not entered a name which can be converted + into a realm name (and the realm name cannot be derived from + a certificate). + + (b) TGS_REQ cases: + + (i) the client determines that the KDC(s) in either an + intermediate realm or the service realm are not responding or + + the client is unable to locate a KDC, + + (ii) the client is not able to generate the application server + realm name. + + +4. GSSAPI Encapsulation + + The mechanism ID for IAKERB GSS-API Kerberos, in accordance with the + mechanism proposed by SPNEGO for negotiating protocol variations, is: + {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) + gssapi(2) krb5(2) initialauth(4)} + + The AS request, AS reply, TGS request, and TGS reply messages are all + encapsulated using the format defined by RFC1964 [2]. This consists + of the GSS-API token framing defined in appendix B of RFC1508 [3]: + + InitialContextToken ::= + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType + -- MechType is OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- representing "Kerberos V5" + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + -- contents mechanism-specific; + -- ASN.1 usage within innerContextToken + -- is not required + } + + The innerContextToken consists of a 2-byte TOK_ID field (defined + below), followed by the Kerberos V5 KRB-AS-REQ, KRB-AS-REP, + KRB-TGS-REQ, or KRB-TGS-REP messages, as appropriate. The TOK_ID field + shall be one of the following values, to denote that the message is + either a request to the KDC or a response from the KDC. + + Message TOK_ID + KRB-KDC-REQ 00 03 + KRB-KDC-REP 01 03 + + +5. The Protocol + + a. The user supplies a password (AS_REQ): Here the Kerberos client + will send an AS_REQ message to the application server if it cannot + locate a KDC for the user's realm, or such KDC's do not respond, + or the user does not enter a name from which the client can derive + the user's realm name. The client sets the realm field of the + request equal to its own realm if the realm name is known, + otherwise the realm length is set to 0. Upon receipt of the AS_REQ + message, the application server checks if the client has included + a realm. + + If the realm was not included in the original request, the + application server must determine the realm and add it to the + AS_REQ message before forwarding it. If the application server + cannot determine the client realm, it returns the + KRB_AP_ERR_REALM_REQUIRED error-code in an error message to + the client: + + KRB_AP_ERR_REALM_REQUIRED 77 + + The error message can be sent in response to either an AS_REQ + message, or in response to a TGS_REQ message, in which case the + realm and principal name of the application server are placed + into the realm and sname fields respectively, of the KRB-ERROR + message. In the AS_REQ case, once the realm is filled in, the + application server forwards the request to a KDC in the user's + realm. It will retry the request if necessary, and forward the + KDC response back to the client. + + At the time the user enters a username and password, the client + should create a new credential with an INTERNAL NAME [3] that can + be used as an input into the GSS_Acquire_cred function call. + + This functionality is useful when there is no trust relationship + between the user's logon realm and the target realm (Figure 2). + + + User Realm KDC + / + / + / + / 2,3 + 1,4 / + Client<-------------->App Server + + + 1 Client sends AS_REQ to App Server + 2 App server forwards AS_REQ to User Realm KDC + 3 App server receives AS_REP from User Realm KDC + 4 App server sends AS_REP back to Client + + + Figure 2: IAKERB AS_REQ + + + + b. The user does not supply a password (TGS_REQ): The user includes a + TGT targetted at the user's realm, or an intermediate realm, in a + TGS_REQ message. The TGS_REQ message is sent to the application + server. + + If the client has included the realm name in the TGS request, then + the application server will forward the request to a KDC in the + request TGT srealm. It will forward the response back to the client. + + If the client has not included the realm name in the TGS request, + then the application server will return its realm name and principal + name to the client using the KRB_AP_ERR_REALM_REQUIRED error + described above. Sending a TGS_REQ message to the application server + without a realm name in the request, followed by a TGS request using + the returned realm name and then sending an AP request with a mutual + authentication flag should be subject to a local policy decision + (see security considerations below). Using the returned server + principal name in a TGS request followed by sending an AP request + message using the received ticket MUST NOT set any mutual + authentication flags. + + +6. Addresses in Tickets + + In IAKERB, the machine sending requests to the KDC is the server and + not the client. As a result, the client should not include its + addresses in any KDC requests for two reasons. First, the KDC may + reject the forwarded request as being from the wrong client. Second, + in the case of initial authentication for a dial-up client, the client + machine may not yet possess a network address. Hence, as allowed by + RFC1510 [1], the addresses field of the AS and TGS requests should be + blank and the caddr field of the ticket should similarly be left blank. + + +7. Combining IAKERB with Other Kerberos Extensions + + This protocol is usable with other proposed Kerberos extensions such as + PKINIT (Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos + [4]). In such cases, the messages which would normally be sent to the + KDC by the GSS runtime are instead sent by the client application to the + server, which then forwards them to a KDC. + + +8. Security Considerations + + A principal is identified by its principal name and realm. A client + that sends a TGS request to an application server without the request + realm name will only be able to mutually authenticate the server + up to its principal name. Thus when requesting mutual authentication, + it is preferable if clients can either determine the server realm name + beforehand, or apply some policy checks to the realm name obtained from + the returned error message. + + +9. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments 1510. + + [2] J. Linn. The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism. Request + for Comments 1964 + + [3] J. Linn. Generic Security Service Application Program Interface. + Request for Comments 1508 + + [4] B. Tung, C. Neuman, M. Hur, A. Medvinsky, S. Medvinsky, J. Wray, + J. Trostle, Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in + Kerberos, http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos- + pkinit-10.txt. + + +10. This draft expires on January 31st, 2001. + + +11. Authors' Addresses + + Michael Swift + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington, 98052, U.S.A. + Email: mikesw@microsoft.com + + Jonathan Trostle + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134, U.S.A. + Email: jtrostle@cisco.com + Phone: (408) 527-6201 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e235bec58c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Stonecast, Inc. +Internet-Draft August, 1998 + + Kerberos Change Password Protocol + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + The Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] does not describe any mechanism + for users to change their own passwords. In order to promote + interoperability between workstations, personal computers, terminal + servers, routers, and KDC's from multiple vendors, a common password + changing protocol is required. + + + +Overview + + When a user wishes to change his own password, or is required to by + local policy, a simple request of a password changing service is + necessary. This service must be implemented on at least one host for + each Kerberos realm, probably on one of the kdc's for that realm. + The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 (kpasswd), and may + accept requests on TCP port 464 as well. + + The protocol itself consists of a single request message followed by + a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be + fully contained in a single UDP packet. + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Request Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REQ length | AP-REQ data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + message length (16 bits) + Contains the length of the message, including this field, in bytes + (big-endian integer) + protocol version number (16 bits) + Contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian integer) + AP-REQ length (16 bits) + length (big-endian integer) of AP-REQ data, in bytes. + AP-REQ data, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + This AP-REQ must be for the service principal + kadmin/changepw@REALM, where REALM is the REALM of the user who + wishes to change his password. The Ticket in the AP-REQ must be + derived from an AS request (thus having the INITIAL flag set), and + must include a subkey in the Authenticator. + KRB-PRIV message, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + This KRB-PRIV message must be generated using the subkey in the + Authenticator in the AP-REQ data. The user-data component of the + message must consist of the user's new password. + + The server must verify the AP-REQ message, decrypt the new password, + perform any local policy checks (such as password quality, history, + authorization, etc.) required, then set the password to the new value + specified. + + The principal whose password is to be changed is the principal which + authenticated to the password changing service. This protocol does + not address administrators who want to change passwords of principal + besides their own. + + +Reply Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REP length | AP-REP data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + message length (16 bits) + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + + Contains the length of the message, including this field, in bytes + (big-endian integer), + protocol version number (16 bits) + Contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian integer) + AP-REP length (16 bits) + length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the the length is zero, then + the last field will contain a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB- + PRIV message. + AP-REP data, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + The AP-REP corresponding to the AP-REQ in the request packet. + KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message, as described in RFC1510 (variable + length) + If the AP-REP length is zero, then this field contains a KRB-ERROR + message. Otherwise, it contains a KRB-PRIV message. This KRB- + PRIV message must be generated using the subkey in the + Authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data + component of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following + data: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | result code | result string / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + result code (16 bits) + The result code must have one of the following values (big- + endian integer): + 0x0000 if the request succeeds. (This value is not permitted + in a KRB-ERROR message.) + 0x0001 if the request fails due to being malformed + 0x0002 if the request fails due to a "hard" error processing + the request (for example, there is a resource or other + problem causing the request to fail) + 0x0003 if the request fails due to an error in authentication + processing + 0x0004 if the request fails due to a "soft" error processing + the request (for example, some policy or other similar + consideration is causing the request to be rejected). + 0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason. + Although only a few non-zero result codes are specified here, + the client should accept any non-zero result code as indicating + failure. + result string (variable length) + This field should contain information which the server thinks + might be useful to the user, such as feedback about policy + failures. The string must be encoded in UTF-8. It may be + omitted if the server does not wish to include it. If it is + present, the client should display the string to the user. + This field is analogous to the string which follows the numeric + code in SMTP, FTP, and similar protocols. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Dropped and Modified Messages + + An attacker (or simply a lossy network) could cause either the + request or reply to be dropped, or modified by substituting a KRB- + ERROR message in the reply. + + If a request is dropped, no modification of the password/key database + will take place. If a reply is dropped, the server will (assuming a + valid request) make the password change. However, the client cannot + distinguish between these two cases. + + In this situation, the client should construct a new authenticator, + re-encrypt the request, and retransmit. If the original request was + lost, the server will treat this as a valid request, and the password + will be changed normally. If the reply was lost, then the server + should take care to notice that the request was a duplicate of the + prior request, because the "new" password is the current password, + and the password change time is within some implementation-defined + replay time window. The server should then return a success reply + (an AP-REP message with result code == 0x0000) without actually + changing the password or any other information (such as modification + timestamps). + + If a success reply was replaced with an error reply, then the + application performing the request would return an error to the user. + In this state, the user's password has been changed, but the user + believes that it has not. If the user attempts to change the + password again, this will probably fail, because the user cannot + successfully provide the old password to get an INITIAL ticket to + make the request. This situation requires administrative + intervention as if a password was lost. This situation is, + unfortunately, impossible to prevent. + + +Security Considerations + + This document deals with changing passwords for Kerberos. Because + Kerberos is used for authentication and key distribution, it is + important that this protocol use the highest level of security + services available to a particular installation. Mutual + authentication is performed, so that the server knows the request is + valid, and the client knows that the request has been received and + processed by the server. + + There are also security issues relating to dropped or modified + messages which are addressed explicitly. + + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Stonecast, Inc. + 108 Stow Road + Harvard, MA 01451 + + Phone: +1 978 456 9103 + Email: marc@stonecast.net + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 5] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2583a84da0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions +Internet-Draft November, 1996 + + + Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + This document defines a new encryption type and a new checksum type + for use with Kerberos V5 [RFC1510]. This encryption type is based on + the Triple DES cryptosystem and the HMAC-SHA1 [Krawczyk96] message + authentication algorithm. + + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value 7. + The hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 12. + + +Encryption Type des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 + + EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC + mode. The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. Unless otherwise + specified, a zero IV must be used. If the length of the input data + is not a multiple of the block size, zero octets must be used to pad + the plaintext to the next eight-octet boundary. The counfounder must + be eight random octets (one block). + + +Checksum Type hmac-sha1-des3 + + Checksums using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 November, 1996 + + +Common Requirements + + Where the Triple DES key is represented as an EncryptionKey, it shall + be represented as three DES keys, with parity bits, concatenated + together. The key shall be represented with the most significant bit + first. + + When keys are generated by the derivation function, a key length of + 168 bits shall be used. The output bit string will be converted to a + valid Triple DES key by inserting DES parity bits after every seventh + bit. + + Any implementation which implements either of the encryption or + checksum types in this document must support both. + + +Security Considerations + + This entire document defines encryption and checksum types for use + with Kerberos V5. + + +References + + [Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt, November 1996. + [Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + Email: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..46a4158527 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions +Internet-Draft November, 1996 + + + Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + In the Kerberos protocol [RFC1510], cryptographic keys are used in a + number of places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a + key, it is desirable to use a different key for each of these places. + Key derivation [Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys + for each operation from the keys transported on the network. For + this to be possible, a small change to the specification is + necessary. + + +Overview + + Under RFC1510 as stated, key derivation could be specified as a set + of encryption types which share the same key type. The constant for + each derivation would be a function of the encryption type. However, + it is generally accepted that, for interoperability, key types and + encryption types must map one-to-one onto each other. (RFC 1510 is + being revised to address this issue.) Therefore, to use key + derivcation with Kerberos V5 requires a small change to the + specification. + + For each place where a key is used in Kerberos, a ``key usage'' must + be specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, and + encryption/checksum type together describe the transformation from + plaintext to ciphertext, or plaintext to checksum. For backward + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 November, 1996 + + + compatibility, old encryption types would be defined independently of + the key usage. + + +Key Usage Values + + This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos + protocol, with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) + + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) + + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) + + 16. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be encrypted using an RFC1510 encryption type. + 17. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be checksummed using an RFC1510 checksum type. + + A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service + which receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket + was part of an AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 November, 1996 + + + be used for generating a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- + REQ or TGS-REQ. + + There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of + the RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would + not know about key usages. In order that these documents continue to + be meaningful until they are updated, key usages 16 and 17 must be + used to derive keys for encryption and checksums, respectively. New + protocols defined in terms of the Kerberos encryption and checksum + types should use their own key usages. Key usages may be registered + with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key usages shall be unsigned 32 bit + integers. Zero is not permitted. + + +Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + + Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be + tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption + and integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. + So, for each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for + encryption (Ke), and one for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + + where the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network + byte order. The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as + follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) + + The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm + E. + + When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or + padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be + generated from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + + MAC = H(Kc, length | plaintext) + + Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and + a keyed hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a + keyed hash algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is + recommended for use as H. + + +Security Considerations + + This entire document addresses shortcomings in the use of + cryptographic keys in Kerberos V5. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 November, 1996 + + +Acknowledgements + + I would like to thank Uri Blumenthal, Sam Hartman, and Bill + Sommerfeld for their contributions to this document. + + +References + + [Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-00.txt, + November 1996. [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos + Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + Email: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c5e4d05e7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Ari Medvinsky +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt Matt Hur +Updates: RFC 1510 Dominique Brezinski +expires September 30, 1997 CyberSafe Corporation + Gene Tsudik + Brian Tung + ISI + +Integrity Protection for the Kerberos Error Message + +0. Status Of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt, and expires June xx, 1997. + Please send comments to the authors. + +1. Abstract + + The Kerberos error message, as defined in RFC 1510, is transmitted + to the client without any integrity assurance. Therefore, the + client has no means to distinguish between a valid error message + sent from the KDC and one sent by an attacker. This draft describes + a method for assuring the integrity of Kerberos error messages, and + proposes a consistent format for the e-data field in the KRB_ERROR + message. This e-data format enables the storage of cryptographic + checksums by providing an extensible mechanism for specifying e-data + types. + + +2. Motivation + + In the Kerberos protocol [1], if an error occurs for AS_REQ, + TGS_REQ, or AP_REQ, a clear text error message is returned to the + client. An attacker may exploit this vulnerability by sending a + false error message as a reply to any of the above requests. For + example, an attacker may send the KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED error message + in order to force a user to change their password in hope that the + new key will not be as strong as the current key, and thus, easier + to break. + + Since false error messages may be utilized by an attacker, a + Kerberos client should have a means for determining how much trust + to place in a given error message. The rest of this draft + describes a method for assuring the integrity of Kerberos error + messages. + + +3. Approach + + We propose taking a cryptographic checksum over the entire KRB-ERROR + message. This checksum would be returned as part of the error + message and would enable the client to verify the integrity of the + error message. For interoperability reasons, no new fields are + added to the KRB-ERROR message. Instead, the e-data field (see + figure 1) is utilized to carry the cryptographic checksum. + + +3.1 Cryptographic checksums in error messages for AS_REQ, + TGS_REQ & AP_REQ + + If an error occurs for the AS request, the only key that is + available to the KDC is the shared secret (the key derived from the + clients password) registered in the KDCs database. The KDC will + use this key to sign the error message, if and only if, the client + already proved knowledge of the shared secret in the AS request + (e.g. via PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP in preauth data). This policy is needed + to prevent an attacker from getting the KDC to send a signed error + message and then launching an off-line attack in order to obtain a + key of a given principal. + + If an error occurs for a TGS or an AP request, the server will use + the session key sealed in the clients ticket granting ticket to + compute the checksum over the error message. If the checksum could + not be computed (e.g. error while decrypting the ticket) the error + message is returned to the client without the checksum. The client + then has the option to treat unprotected error messages differently. + + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] integer, + msg-type [1] integer, + ctime [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime [4] KerberosTime, + susec [5] INTEGER, + error-code [6] INTEGER, + crealm [7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname [8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm [9] Realm, --Correct realm + sname [10] PrincipalName, --Correct name + e-text [11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + Figure 1 + + +3.2 Format of the e-data field + + We propose to place the cryptographic checksum in the e-data field. + First, we review the format of the e-data field, as specified in + RFC 1510. The format of e-data is specified only in two cases [2]. + "If the error code is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data + field will contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields": + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type [1] INTEGER, + padata-value [2] OCTET STRING + } + + The second case deals with the KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD error code. The + e-data field will contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type [0] INTEGER, + method-data [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type indicates the required alternate authentication method. + + It should be noted that, in the case of KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, a signed + checksum is not returned as part of the error message, since the + error code indicates that the Kerberos credentials provided in the + AP_REQ message are unacceptable. + + We propose that the e-data field have the following format for all + error-codes (except KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD): + + E-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type [1] INTEGER, + data-value [2] OCTET STRING, + } + + The data-type field specifies the type of information that is + carried in the data-value field. Thus, to send a cryptographic + checksum back to the client, the data-type is set to CHECKSUM, the + data-value is set to the ASN.1 encoding of the following sequence: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype [0] INTEGER, + checksum [1] OCTET STRING + } + + +3.3 Computing the checksum + + After the error message is filled out, the error structure is + converted into ASN.1 representation. A cryptographic checksum is + then taken over the encoded error message; the result is placed in + the error message structure, as the last item in the e-data field. + To send the error message, ASN.1 encoding is again performed over + the error message, which now includes the cryptographic checksum. + + +3.4 Verifying the integrity of the error message + + In addition to verifying the cryptographic checksum for the error + message, the client must verify that the error message is bound to + its request. This is done by comparing the ctime field in the + error message to its counterpart in the request message. + + +4. E-DATA types + + Since the e-data types must not conflict with preauthentication data + types, we propose that the preauthentication data types in the range + of 2048 and above be reserved for use as e-data types. + + We define the following e-data type in support of integrity checking + for the Kerberos error message: + + CHECKSUM = 2048 -- the keyed checksum described above + + +5. Discussion + + +5.1 e-data types + + The extension for Kerberos error messages, as outlined above, is + extensible to allow for definition of other error data types. + We propose that the following e-data types be reserved: + + KDCTIME = 2049 + The error data would consist of the KDCs time in KerberosTime. + This data would be used by the client to adjust for clock skew. + + REDIRECT = 2050 + The error data would consist of a hostname. The hostname would + indicate the authoritative KDC from which to obtain a TGT. + + +5.2 e-data types vs. error code specific data formats + + Since RFC 1510 does not define an error data type, the data format + must be explicitly specified for each error code. This draft has + proposed an extension to RFC 1510 that would introduce the concept + of error data types. This would allow for a manageable set of data + types to be used for any error message. The authors assume that + the introduction of this e-data structure will not break any + existing Kerberos implementations. + + +6. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments: 1510 + [2] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments: 1510 p.67 + + +7. Authors + + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + Dominique Brezinski + + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road + Suite 310 + Issaquah, WA 98027-5378 + Phone: (206) 391-6000 + Fax: (206) 391-0508 + http:/www.cybersafe.com + + + Brian Tung + Gene Tsudik + + USC Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695 + Phone: (310) 822-1511 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3ec336b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Jonathan Trostle +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-02.txt Cisco Systems +Updates: RFC 1510 Michael M. Swift +expires January 30, 2000 University of WA + + + Extension to Kerberos V5 For Additional Initial Encryption + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance + with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- + Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + This document defines an extension to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510) [1] to enable a preauthentication field in + the AS_REQ message to carry a ticket granting ticket. The session + key from this ticket granting ticket will be used to + cryptographically strengthen the initial exchange in either the + conventional Kerberos V5 case or in the case the user stores their + encrypted private key on the KDC [2]. + + +2. Motivation + + In Kerberos V5, the initial exchange with the KDC consists of the + AS_REQ and AS_REP messages. For users, the encrypted part of the + AS_REP message is encrypted in a key derived from a password. + Although a password policy may be in place to prevent dictionary + attacks, brute force attacks may still be a concern due to + insufficient key length. + + This draft specifies an extension to the Kerberos V5 protocol to + allow a ticket granting ticket to be included in an AS_REQ message + preauthentication field. The session key from this ticket granting + ticket will be used to cryptographically strengthen the initial + + exchange in either the conventional Kerberos V5 case or in the case + the user stores their encrypted private key on the KDC [2]. The + session key from the ticket granting ticket is combined with the + user password key (key K2 in the encrypted private key on KDC + option) using HMAC to obtain a new triple des key that is used in + place of the user key in the initial exchange. The ticket granting + ticket could be obtained by the workstation using its host key. + +3. The Extension + + The following new preauthentication type is proposed: + + PA-EXTRA-TGT 22 + + The preauthentication-data field contains a ticket granting ticket + encoded as an ASN.1 octet string. The server realm of the ticket + granting ticket must be equal to the realm in the KDC-REQ-BODY of + the AS_REQ message. In the absence of a trust relationship, the + local Kerberos client should send the AS_REQ message without this + extension. + + In the conventional (non-pkinit) case, we require the RFC 1510 + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication field in the AS_REQ message. + If neither it or the PA-PK-KEY-REQ preauthentication field is + included in the AS_REQ message, the KDC will reply with a + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED error message. + + We propose the following new etypes: + + des3-cbc-md5-xor 16 + des3-cbc-sha1-xor 17 + + The encryption key is obtained by: + + (1) Obtaining an output M from the HMAC-SHA1 function [3] using + the user password key (the key K2 in the encrypted private + key on KDC option of pkinit) as the text and the triple des + session key as the K input in HMAC: + + M = H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text)) where H = SHA1. + + The session key from the accompanying ticket granting ticket + must be a triple des key when one of the triple des xor + encryption types is used. + (2) Concatenate the output M (20 bytes) with the first 8 non-parity + bits of the triple-des ticket granting ticket session key to + get 168 bits that will be used for the new triple-des encryption + key. + (3) Set the parity bits of the resulting key. + + The resulting triple des key is used to encrypt the timestamp + for the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication value (or in the + encrypted private key on KDC option of pkinit, it is used in + place of the key K2 to both sign in the PA-PK-KEY-REQ and for + encryption in the PA-PK-KEY-REP preauthentication types). + + If the KDC decrypts the encrypted timestamp and it is not within + the appropriate clock skew period, the KDC will reply with the + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED error. The same error will also be sent if + the above ticket granting ticket fails to decrypt properly, or if + it is not a valid ticket. + + The KDC will create the shared triple des key from the ticket + granting ticket session key and the user password key (the key K2 + in the encrypted private key on KDC case) using HMAC as specified + above and use it to validate the AS_REQ message and then to + encrypt the encrypted part of the AS_REP message (use it in place + of the key K2 for encryption in the PA-PK-KEY-REP preauthentication + field). + + Local workstation policy will determine the exact behaviour of + the Kerberos client with respect to the extension protocol. For + example, the client should consult policy to decide when to use + use the extension. This policy could be dependent on the user + identity, or whether the workstation is in the same realm as the + user. One possibility is for the workstation logon to fail if + the extension is not used. Another possibility is for the KDC + to set a flag in tickets issued when this extension is used. + + A similar idea was proposed in OSF DCE RFC 26.0 [4]; there a + preauthentication field containing a ticket granting ticket, + a randomly generated subkey encrypted in the session key from + the ticket, and a timestamp structure encrypted in the user + password and then the randomly generated subkey was proposed. + Some advantages of the current proposal are that the KDC has two + fewer decryptions to perform per request and the client does not + have to generate a random key. + +4. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments 1510. + + [2] B. Tung, C. Neuman, J. Wray, A. Medvinsky, M. Hur, J. Trostle. + Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos. + ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/ + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pkinit-08.txt + + [3] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti. HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication. Request for Comments 2104. + + [4] J. Pato. Using Pre-authentication to Avoid Password Guessing + Attacks. OSF DCE SIG Request for Comments 26.0. + +5. Acknowledgement: We thank Ken Hornstein for some helpful comments. + +6. Expires January 30, 2000. + +7. Authors' Addresses + + Jonathan Trostle + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134, U.S.A. + + Email: jtrostle@cisco.com + Phone: (408) 527-6201 + + Michael Swift + Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d09a2ded5b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-extra-tgt-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +This Internet-Draft has expired and is no longer available. + +Unrevised documents placed in the Internet-Drafts directories have a +maximum life of six months. After that time, they must be updated, or +they will be deleted. This document was deleted on March 20, 2000. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b193c5739 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt Tatyana Ryutov +Updates: RFC 1510 Clifford Neuman +expires September 30, 1997 Gene Tsudik + ISI + Bill Sommerfeld + Hewlett-Packard + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + + + Public Key Cryptography for Cross-Realm Authentication in Kerberos + + +0. Status Of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in + progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt, and expires September 30, + 1997. Please send comments to the authors. + + +1. Abstract + + This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510, "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", September 1993) to provide a method for using + public key cryptography during cross-realm authentication. The + methods defined here specify the way in which message exchanges + are to be used to transport cross-realm secret keys protected by + encryption under public keys certified as belonging to KDCs. + + +2. Motivation + + The advantages provided by public key cryptography--ease of + recoverability in the event of a compromise, the possibility of + an autonomous authentication infrastructure, to name a few--have + produced a demand for use by Kerberos authentication protocol. A + draft describing the use of public key cryptography in the initial + authentication exchange in Kerberos has already been submitted. + This draft describes its use in cross-realm authentication. + + The principal advantage provided by public key cryptography in + cross-realm authentication lies in the ability to leverage the + existing public key infrastructure. It frees the Kerberos realm + administrator from having to maintain separate keys for each other + realm with which it wishes to exchange authentication information, + or to utilize a hierarchical arrangement, which may pose problems + of trust. + + Even with the multi-hop cross-realm authentication, there must be + some way to locate the path by which separate realms are to be + transited. The current method, which makes use of the DNS-like + realm names typical to Kerberos, requires trust of the intermediate + KDCs. + + The methods described in this draft allow a realm to specify, at + the time of authentication, which certification paths it will + trust. A shared key for cross-realm authentication can be + established, for a period of time. Furthermore, these methods are + transparent to the client, so that only the KDC's need to be + modified to use them. + + It is not necessary to implement the changes described in the + "Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication" draft to make + use of the changes in this draft. We solicit comments about the + interaction between the two protocol changes, but as of this + writing, the authors do not perceive any obstacles to using both. + + +3. Protocol Amendments + + We assume that the user has already obtained a TGT. To perform + cross-realm authentication, the user sends a request to the local + KDC as per RFC 1510. If the two realms share a secret key, then + cross-realm authentication proceeds as usual. Otherwise, the + local KDC may attempt to establish a shared key with the remote + KDC using public key cryptography, and exchange this key through + the cross-realm ticket granting ticket. + + We will consider the specific channel on which the message + exchanges take place in Section 5 below. + + +3.1. Changes to the Cross-Realm Ticket Granting Ticket + + In order to avoid the need for changes to the "installed base" of + Kerberos application clients and servers, the only protocol change + is to the way in which cross-realm ticket granting tickets (TGTs) + are encrypted; as these tickets are opaque to clients and servers, + the only change visible to them will be the increased size of the + tickets. + + Cross-realm TGTs are granted by a local KDC to authenticate a user + to a remote KDC's ticket granting service. In standard Kerberos, + they are encrypted using a shared secret key manually configured + into each KDC. + + In order to incorporate public key cryptography, we define a new + encryption type, "ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS". Operationally, this encryption + type transforms an OCTET STRING of plaintext (normally an EncTktPart) + into the following SEQUENCE: + + PKCrossOutput ::= SEQUENCE { + certificate [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- public key certificate + -- of local KDC + encSharedKey [1] EncryptedData, + -- of type EncryptionKey + -- containing random symmetric key + -- encrypted using public key + -- of remote KDC + sigSharedKey [2] Signature, + -- of encSharedKey + -- using signature key + -- of local KDC + pkEncData [3] EncryptedData, + -- (normally) of type EncTktPart + -- encrypted using encryption key + -- found in encSharedKey + } + + PKCROSS operates as follows: when a client submits a request for + cross-realm authentication, the local KDC checks to see if it has + a long-term shared key established for that realm. If so, it uses + this key as per RFC 1510. + + If not, it sends a request for information to the remote KDC. The + content of this message is immaterial, as it does not need to be + processed by the remote KDC; for the sake of consistency, we define + it as follows: + + RemoteRequest ::= [APPLICATION 41] SEQUENCE { + nonce [0] INTEGER + } + + The remote KDC replies with a list of all trusted certifiers and + all its (the remote KDC's) certificates. We note that this response + is universal and does not depend on which KDC makes the request: + + RemoteReply ::= [APPLICATION 42] SEQUENCE { + trustedCertifiers [0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName, + certificates[1] SEQUENCE OF Certificate, + encTypeToUse [1] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER + -- encryption types usable + -- for encrypting pkEncData + } + + Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + CertType [0] INTEGER, + -- type of certificate + -- 1 = X.509v3 (DER encoding) + -- 2 = PGP (per PGP draft) + CertData [1] OCTET STRING + -- actual certificate + -- type determined by CertType + } -- from pk-init draft + + Upon receiving this reply, the local KDC determines whether it has + a certificate the remote KDC trusts, and whether the remote KDC has + a certificate the local KDC trusts. If so, it issues a ticket + encrypted using the ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS encryption type defined above. + + +3.2. Profile Caches + + We observe that using PKCROSS as specified above requires two + private key operations: a signature generation by the local KDC and + a decryption by the remote KDC. This cost can be reduced in the + long term by judicious caching of the encSharedKey and the + sigSharedKey. + + Let us define a "profile" as the encSharedKey and sigSharedKey, in + conjunction with the associated remote realm name and decrypted + shared key (the key encrypted in the encSharedKey). + + To optimize these interactions, each KDC maintains two caches, one + for outbound profiles and one for inbound profiles. When generating + an outbound TGT for another realm, the local KDC first checks to see + if the corresponding entry exists in the outbound profile cache; if + so, it uses its contents to form the first three fields of the + PKCrossOutput; the shared key is used to encrypt the data for the + fourth field. If not, the components are generated fresh and stored + in the outbound profile cache. + + Upon receipt of the TGT, the remote realm checks its inbound profile + cache for the corresponding entry. If it exists, then it uses the + contents of the entry to decrypt the data encrypted in the pkEncData. + If not, then it goes through the full process of verifying and + extracting the shared key; if this is successful, then a new entry + is created in the inbound profile cache. + + The inbound profile cache should support multiple entries per realm, + in the event that the initiating realm is replicated. + + +4. Finding Realms Supporting PKCROSS + + If either the local realm or the destination realm does not support + PKCROSS, or both do not, the mechanism specified in Section 3 can + still be used in obtaining the desired remote TGT. + + In the reference Kerberos implementations, the default behavior is + to traverse a path up and down the realm name hierarchy, if the + two realms do not share a key. There is, however, the possibility + of using cross links--i.e., keys shared between two realms that + are non-contiguous in the realm name hierarchy--to shorten the + path, both to minimize delay and the number of intermediate realms + that need to be trusted. + + PKCROSS can be used as a way to provide cross-links even in the + absence of shared keys. If the client is aware that one or two + intermediate realms support PKCROSS, then a combination of + PKCROSS and conventional cross-realm authentication can be used + to reach the final destination realm. + + We solicit discussion on the best methods for clients and KDCs to + determine or advertise support for PKCROSS. + + +5. Message Ports + + We have not specified the port on which KDCs supporting PKCROSS + should listen to receive the request for information messages noted + above. We solicit discussion on which port should be used. We + propose to use the standard Kerberos ports (well-known 88 or 750), + but another possibility is to use a completely different port. + + We also solicit discussion on what other approaches can be taken to + obtain the information in the RemoteReply (e.g., secure DNS or some + other repository). + + +6. Expiration Date + + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 1997. + + +7. Authors' Addresses + + Brian Tung + Tatyana Ryutov + Clifford Neuman + Gene Tsudik + USC/Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695 + Phone: +1 310 822 1511 + E-Mail: {brian, tryutov, bcn, gts}@isi.edu + + Bill Sommerfeld + Hewlett Packard + 300 Apollo Drive + Chelmsford MA 01824 + Phone: +1 508 436 4352 + E-Mail: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com + + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road Suite 310 + Issaquah WA 98027-5378 + Phone: +1 206 391 6000 + E-mail: {ari.medvinsky, matt.hur}@cybersafe.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-06.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-06.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1ab2b03e07 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-06.txt @@ -0,0 +1,523 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Matthew Hur +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-06.txt CyberSafe Corporation +Updates: RFC 1510 Brian Tung +expires October 10, 2000 Tatyana Ryutov + Clifford Neuman + Gene Tsudik + ISI + Ari Medvinsky + Keen.com + Bill Sommerfeld + Hewlett-Packard + + + Public Key Cryptography for Cross-Realm Authentication in Kerberos + + +0. Status Of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), + its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may + also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in + progress.'' + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-06.txt, and expires May 15, 1999. + Please send comments to the authors. + + +1. Abstract + + This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol + specification [1] to provide a method for using public key + cryptography to enable cross-realm authentication. The methods + defined here specify the way in which message exchanges are to be + used to transport cross-realm secret keys protected by encryption + under public keys certified as belonging to KDCs. + + +2. Introduction + + The Kerberos authentication protocol [2] can leverage the + advantages provided by public key cryptography. PKINIT [3] + describes the use of public key cryptography in the initial + authentication exchange in Kerberos. PKTAPP [4] describes how an + application service can essentially issue a kerberos ticket to + itself after utilizing public key cryptography for authentication. + Another informational document species the use of public key + crypography for anonymous authentication in Kerberos [5]. This + specification describes the use of public key crpytography in cross- + realm authentication. + + Without the use of public key cryptography, administrators must + maintain separate keys for every realm which wishes to exchange + authentication information with another realm (which implies n(n-1) + keys), or they must utilize a hierachichal arrangement of realms, + which may complicate the trust model by requiring evaluation of + transited realms. + + Even with the multi-hop cross-realm authentication, there must be + some way to locate the path by which separate realms are to be + transited. The current method, which makes use of the DNS-like + realm names typical to Kerberos, requires trust of the intermediate + KDCs. + + PKCROSS utilizes a public key infrastructure (PKI) [6] to simplify + the administrative burden of maintaining cross-realm keys. Such + usage leverages a PKI for a non-centrally-administratable environment + (namely, inter-realm). Thus, a shared key for cross-realm + authentication can be established for a set period of time, and a + remote realm is able to issue policy information that is returned to + itself when a client requests cross-realm authentication. Such policy + information may be in the form of restrictions [7]. Furthermore, + these methods are transparent to the client; therefore, only the KDCs + need to be modified to use them. In this way, we take advantage of + the the distributed trust management capabilities of public key + crypography while maintaining the advantages of localized trust + management provided by Kerberos. + + + Although this specification utilizes the protocol specfied in the + PKINIT specification, it is not necessary to implement client + changes in order to make use of the changes in this document. + + +3. Objectives + + The objectives of this specification are as follows: + + 1. Simplify the administration required to establish Kerberos + cross-realm keys. + + 2. Avoid modification of clients and application servers. + + 3. Allow remote KDC to control its policy on cross-realm + keys shared between KDCs, and on cross-realm tickets + presented by clients. + + 4. Remove any need for KDCs to maintain state about keys + shared with other KDCs. + + 5. Leverage the work done for PKINIT to provide the public key + protocol for establishing symmetric cross realm keys. + + +4. Definitions + + The following notation is used throughout this specification: + KDC_l ........... local KDC + KDC_r ........... remote KDC + XTKT_(l,r) ...... PKCROSS ticket that the remote KDC issues to the + local KDC + TGT_(c,r) ....... cross-realm TGT that the local KDC issues to the + client for presentation to the remote KDC + + This specification defines the following new types to be added to the + Kerberos specification: + PKCROSS kdc-options field in the AS_REQ is bit 9 + TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC 2 + TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 + + This specification defines the following ASN.1 type for conveying + policy information: + CrossRealmTktData ::= SEQUENCE OF TypedData + + This specification defines the following types for policy information + conveyed in CrossRealmTktData: + PLC_LIFETIME 1 + PLC_SET_TKT_FLAGS 2 + PLC_NOSET_TKT_FLAGS 3 + + TicketExtensions are defined per the Kerberos specification [8]: + TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF TypedData + Where + TypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type[0] INTEGER, + data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + +5. Protocol Specification + + We assume that the client has already obtained a TGT. To perform + cross-realm authentication, the client does exactly what it does + with ordinary (i.e. non-public-key-enabled) Kerberos; the only + changes are in the KDC; although the ticket which the client + forwards to the remote realm may be changed. This is acceptable + since the client treats the ticket as opaque. + + +5.1. Overview of Protocol + + The basic operation of the PKCROSS protocol is as follows: + + 1. The client submits a request to the local KDC for + credentials for the remote realm. This is just a typical + cross realm request that may occur with or without PKCROSS. + + 2. The local KDC submits a PKINIT request to the remote KDC to + obtain a "special" PKCROSS ticket. This is a standard + PKINIT request, except that PKCROSS flag (bit 9) is set in + the kdc-options field in the AS_REQ. + + 3. The remote KDC responds as per PKINIT, except that + the ticket contains a TicketExtension, which contains + policy information such as lifetime of cross realm tickets + issued by KDC_l to a client. The local KDC must reflect + this policy information in the credentials it forwards to + the client. Call this ticket XTKT_(l,r) to indicate that + this ticket is used to authenticate the local KDC to the + remote KDC. + + 4. The local KDC passes a ticket, TGT_(c,r) (the cross realm + TGT between the client and remote KDC), to the client. + This ticket contains in its TicketExtension field the + ticket, XTKT_(l,r), which contains the cross-realm key. + The TGT_(c,r) ticket is encrypted using the key sealed in + XTKT_(l,r). (The TicketExtension field is not encrypted.) + The local KDC may optionally include another TicketExtension + type that indicates the hostname and/or IP address for the + remote KDC. + + 5. The client submits the request directly to the remote + KDC, as before. + + 6. The remote KDC extracts XTKT_(l,r) from the TicketExtension + in order to decrypt the encrypted part of TGT_(c,r). + + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + + Client Local KDC (KDC_l) Remote KDC (KDC_r) + ------ ----------------- ------------------ + Normal Kerberos + request for + cross-realm + ticket for KDC_r + ----------------------> + + PKINIT request for + XTKT(l,r) - PKCROSS flag + set in the AS-REQ + * -------------------------> + + PKINIT reply with + XTKT_(l,r) and + policy info in + ticket extension + <-------------------------- * + + Normal Kerberos reply + with TGT_(c,r) and + XTKT(l,r) in ticket + extension + <--------------------------------- + + Normal Kerberos + cross-realm TGS-REQ + for remote + application + service with + TGT_(c,r) and + XTKT(l,r) in ticket + extension + -------------------------------------------------> + + Normal Kerberos + cross-realm + TGS-REP + <--------------------------------------------------------------- + + * Note that the KDC to KDC messages occur only periodically, since + the local KDC caches the XTKT_(l,r). + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + Sections 5.2 through 5.4 describe in detail steps 2 through 4 + above. Section 5.6 describes the conditions under which steps + 2 and 3 may be skipped. + + Note that the mechanism presented above requires infrequent KDC to + KDC communication (as dictated by policy - this is discussed + later). Without such an exchange, there are the following issues: + 1) KDC_l would have to issue a ticket with the expectation that + KDC_r will accept it. + 2) In the message that the client sends to KDC_r, KDC_l would have + to authenticate KDC_r with credentials that KDC_r trusts. + 3) There is no way for KDC_r to convey policy information to KDC_l. + 4) If, based on local policy, KDC_r does not accept a ticket from + KDC_l, then the client gets stuck in the middle. To address such + an issue would require modifications to standard client + processing behavior. + Therefore, the infreqeunt use of KDC to KDC communication assures + that inter-realm KDC keys may be established in accordance with local + policies and that clients may continue to operate without + modification. + + +5.2. Local KDC's Request to Remote KDC + + When the local KDC receives a request for cross-realm authentication, + it first checks its ticket cache to see if it has a valid PKCROSS + ticket, XTKT_(l,r). If it has a valid XTKT_(l,r), then it does not + need to send a request to the remote KDC (see section 5.5). + + If the local KDC does not have a valid XTKT_(l,r), it sends a + request to the remote KDC in order to establish a cross realm key and + obtain the XTKT_(l,r). This request is in fact a PKINIT request as + described in the PKINIT specification; i.e., it consists of an AS-REQ + with a PA-PK-AS-REQ included as a preauthentication field. Note, + that the AS-REQ MUST have the PKCROSS flag (bit 9) set in the + kdc_options field of the AS-REQ. Otherwise, this exchange exactly + follows the description given in the PKINIT specification. In + addition, the naming + + +5.3. Remote KDC's Response to Local KDC + + When the remote KDC receives the PKINIT/PKCROSS request from the + local KDC, it sends back a PKINIT response as described in + the PKINIT specification with the following exception: the encrypted + part of the Kerberos ticket is not encrypted with the krbtgt key; + instead, it is encrypted with the ticket granting server's PKCROSS + key. This key, rather than the krbtgt key, is used because it + encrypts a ticket used for verifying a cross realm request rather + than for issuing an application service ticket. Note that, as a + matter of policy, the session key for the XTKT_(l,r) MAY be of + greater strength than that of a session key for a normal PKINIT + reply, since the XTKT_(l,r) SHOULD be much longer lived than a + normal application service ticket. + + In addition, the remote KDC SHOULD include policy information in the + XTKT_(l,r). This policy information would then be reflected in the + cross-realm TGT, TGT_(c,r). Otherwise, the policy for TGT_(c,r) + would be dictated by KDC_l rather than by KDC_r. The local KDC MAY + enforce a more restrictive local policy when creating a cross-realm + ticket, TGT_(c,r). For example, KDC_r may dictate a lifetime + policy of eight hours, but KDC_l may create TKT_(c,r) with a + lifetime of four hours, as dictated by local policy. Also, the + remote KDC MAY include other information about itself along with the + PKCROSS ticket. These items are further discussed in section 6 + below. + + +5.4. Local KDC's Response to Client + + Upon receipt of the PKINIT/CROSS response from the remote KDC, + the local KDC formulates a response to the client. This reply + is constructed exactly as in the Kerberos specification, except + for the following: + + A) The local KDC places XTKT_(l,r) in the TicketExtension field of + the client's cross-realm, ticket, TGT_(c,r), for the remote realm. + Where + data-type equals 3 for TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT + data-value is ASN.1 encoding of XTKT_(l,r) + + B) The local KDC adds the name of its CA to the transited field of + TGT_(c,r). + + +5.5 Remote KDC's Processing of Client Request + + When the remote KDC, KDC_r, receives a cross-realm ticket, + TGT_(c,r), and it detects that the ticket contains a ticket + extension of type TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT, KDC_r must first decrypt + the ticket, XTKT_(l,r), that is encoded in the ticket extension. + KDC_r uses its PKCROSS key in order to decrypt XTKT_(l,r). KDC_r + then uses the key obtained from XTKT_(l,r) in order to decrypt the + cross-realm ticket, TGT_(c,r). + + KDC_r MUST verify that the cross-realm ticket, TGT_(c,r) is in + compliance with any policy information contained in XTKT_(l,r) (see + section 6). If the TGT_(c,r) is not in compliance with policy, then + the KDC_r responds to the client with a KRB-ERROR message of type + KDC_ERR_POLICY. + + +5.6. Short-Circuiting the KDC-to-KDC Exchange + + As we described earlier, the KDC to KDC exchange is required only + for establishing a symmetric, inter-realm key. Once this key is + established (via the PKINIT exchange), no KDC to KDC communication + is required until that key needs to be renewed. This section + describes the circumstances under which the KDC to KDC exchange + described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 may be skipped. + + The local KDC has a known lifetime for TGT_(c,r). This lifetime may + be determined by policy information included in XTKT_(l,r), and/or + it may be determined by local KDC policy. If the local KDC already + has a ticket XTKT(l,r), and the start time plus the lifetime for + TGT_(c,r) does not exceed the expiration time for XTGT_(l,r), then + the local KDC may skip the exchange with the remote KDC, and issue a + cross-realm ticket to the client as described in Section 5.4. + + Since the remote KDC may change its PKCROSS key (referred to in + Section 5.2) while there are PKCROSS tickets still active, it SHOULD + cache the old PKCROSS keys until the last issued PKCROSS ticket + expires. Otherwise, the remote KDC will respond to a client with a + KRB-ERROR message of type KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED. + + +6. Extensions for the PKCROSS Ticket + + As stated in section 5.3, the remote KDC SHOULD include policy + information in XTKT_(l,r). This policy information is contained in + a TicketExtension, as defined by the Kerberos specification, and the + authorization data of the ticket will contain an authorization + record of type AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions. The TicketExtension defined + for use by PKCROSS is TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC. + Where + data-type equals 2 for TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC + data-value is ASN.1 encoding of CrossRealmTktData + + CrossRealmTktData ::= SEQUENCE OF TypedData + + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + CrossRealmTktData types and the corresponding data are interpreted + as follows: + + ASN.1 data + type value interpretation encoding + ---------------- ----- -------------- ---------- + PLC_LIFETIME 1 lifetime (in seconds) INTEGER + for TGT_(c,r) + - cross-realm tickets + issued for clients by + TGT_l + + PLC_SET_TKT_FLAGS 2 TicketFlags that must BITSTRING + be set + - format defined by + Kerberos specification + + PLC_NOSET_TKT_FLAGS 3 TicketFlags that must BITSTRING + not be set + - format defined by + Kerberos specification + + Further types may be added to this table. + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + +7. Usage of Certificates + + In the cases of PKINIT and PKCROSS, the trust in a certification + authority is equivalent to Kerberos cross realm trust. For this + reason, an implementation MAY choose to use the same KDC certificate + when the KDC is acting in any of the following three roles: + 1) KDC is authenticating clients via PKINIT + 2) KDC is authenticating another KDC for PKCROSS + 3) KDC is the client in a PKCROSS exchange with another KDC + + Note that per PKINIT, the KDC X.509 certificate (the server in a + PKINIT exchange) MUST contain the principal name of the KDC in the + subjectAltName field. + + +8. Transport Issues + + Because the messages between the KDCs involve PKINIT exchanges, and + PKINIT recommends TCP as a transport mechanism (due to the length of + the messages and the likelihood that they will fragment), the same + recommendation for TCP applies to PKCROSS as well. + + +9. Security Considerations + + Since PKCROSS utilizes PKINIT, it is subject to the same security + considerations as PKINIT. Administrators should assure adherence + to security policy - for example, this affects the PKCROSS policies + for cross realm key lifetime and for policy propogation from the + PKCROSS ticket, issued from a remote KDC to a local KDC, to + cross realm tickets that are issued by a local KDC to a client. + + +10. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service + (V5). Request for Comments 1510. + + [2] B.C. Neuman, Theodore Ts'o. Kerberos: An Authentication Service + for Computer Networks, IEEE Communications, 32(9):33-38. September + 1994. + + [3] B. Tung, C. Neuman, M. Hur, A. Medvinsky, S.Medvinsky, J. Wray + J. Trostle. Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication + in Kerberos. + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt + + [4] A. Medvinsky, M. Hur, S. Medvinsky, B. Clifford Neuman. Public + Key Utilizing Tickets for Application Servers (PKTAPP). draft-ietf- + cat-pktapp-02.txt + + [5] A. Medvinsky, J. Cargille, M. Hur. Anonymous Credentials in + Kerberos. draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-anoncred-01.txt + + [6] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information technology - Open Systems + Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework + Recommendation X.509 ISO/IEC 9594-8 + + [7] B.C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May 1993. + + [8] C.Neuman, J. Kohl, T. Ts'o. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt + + +11. Authors' Addresses + + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road + Issaquah WA 98027-5378 + Phone: +1 425 391 6000 + E-mail: matt.hur@cybersafe.com + + Brian Tung + Tatyana Ryutov + Clifford Neuman + Gene Tsudik + USC/Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695 + Phone: +1 310 822 1511 + E-Mail: {brian, tryutov, bcn, gts}@isi.edu + + Ari Medvinsky + Keen.com + 2480 Sand Hill Road, Suite 200 + Menlo Park, CA 94025 + Phone +1 650 289 3134 + E-mail: ari@keen.com + + Bill Sommerfeld + Hewlett Packard + 300 Apollo Drive + Chelmsford MA 01824 + Phone: +1 508 436 4352 + E-Mail: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b0e76adad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1059 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt Clifford Neuman +Updates: RFC 1510 USC/ISI +expires September 15, 2000 Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + Ari Medvinsky + Keen.com, Inc. + Sasha Medvinsky + Motorola + John Wray + Iris Associates, Inc. + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco + + Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), + its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt, and expires September 15, + 2000. Please send comments to the authors. + +1. Abstract + + This document defines extensions (PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510 [1]) to provide a method for using public + key cryptography during initial authentication. The methods + defined specify the ways in which preauthentication data fields and + error data fields in Kerberos messages are to be used to transport + public key data. + +2. Introduction + + The popularity of public key cryptography has produced a desire for + its support in Kerberos [2]. The advantages provided by public key + cryptography include simplified key management (from the Kerberos + perspective) and the ability to leverage existing and developing + public key certification infrastructures. + + Public key cryptography can be integrated into Kerberos in a number + of ways. One is to associate a key pair with each realm, which can + then be used to facilitate cross-realm authentication; this is the + topic of another draft proposal. Another way is to allow users with + public key certificates to use them in initial authentication. This + is the concern of the current document. + + PKINIT utilizes ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys in + combination with digital signature keys as the primary, required + mechanism. It also allows for the use of RSA keys and/or (static) + Diffie-Hellman certificates. Note in particular that PKINIT supports + the use of separate signature and encryption keys. + + PKINIT enables access to Kerberos-secured services based on initial + authentication utilizing public key cryptography. PKINIT utilizes + standard public key signature and encryption data formats within the + standard Kerberos messages. The basic mechanism is as follows: The + user sends an AS-REQ message to the KDC as before, except that if that + user is to use public key cryptography in the initial authentication + step, his certificate and a signature accompany the initial request + in the preauthentication fields. Upon receipt of this request, the + KDC verifies the certificate and issues a ticket granting ticket + (TGT) as before, except that the encPart from the AS-REP message + carrying the TGT is now encrypted utilizing either a Diffie-Hellman + derived key or the user's public key. This message is authenticated + utilizing the public key signature of the KDC. + + Note that PKINIT does not require the use of certificates. A KDC + may store the public key of a principal as part of that principal's + record. In this scenario, the KDC is the trusted party that vouches + for the principal (as in a standard, non-cross realm, Kerberos + environment). Thus, for any principal, the KDC may maintain a + secret key, a public key, or both. + + The PKINIT specification may also be used as a building block for + other specifications. PKCROSS [3] utilizes PKINIT for establishing + the inter-realm key and associated inter-realm policy to be applied + in issuing cross realm service tickets. As specified in [4], + anonymous Kerberos tickets can be issued by applying a NULL + signature in combination with Diffie-Hellman in the PKINIT exchange. + Additionally, the PKINIT specification may be used for direct peer + to peer authentication without contacting a central KDC. This + application of PKINIT is described in PKTAPP [5] and is based on + concepts introduced in [6, 7]. For direct client-to-server + authentication, the client uses PKINIT to authenticate to the end + server (instead of a central KDC), which then issues a ticket for + itself. This approach has an advantage over TLS [8] in that the + server does not need to save state (cache session keys). + Furthermore, an additional benefit is that Kerberos tickets can + facilitate delegation (see [9]). + +3. Proposed Extensions + + This section describes extensions to RFC 1510 for supporting the + use of public key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket + granting ticket (TGT). + + In summary, the following change to RFC 1510 is proposed: + + * Users may authenticate using either a public key pair or a + conventional (symmetric) key. If public key cryptography is + used, public key data is transported in preauthentication + data fields to help establish identity. The user presents + a public key certificate and obtains an ordinary TGT that may + be used for subsequent authentication, with such + authentication using only conventional cryptography. + + Section 3.1 provides definitions to help specify message formats. + Section 3.2 describes the extensions for the initial authentication + method. + +3.1. Definitions + + The extensions involve new preauthentication fields; we introduce + the following preauthentication types: + + PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 + PA-PK-AS-REP 15 + + The extensions also involve new error types; we introduce the + following types: + + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 + KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 + KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG 64 + KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 + KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 + KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 + KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 + KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 + KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 + + We utilize the following typed data for errors: + + TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 + TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 + TD-KRB-REALM 103 + TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 + TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 + + We utilize the following encryption types (which map directly to + OIDs): + + dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 + md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 + sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 + rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 + rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS#1 v1.5) 13 + rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID (PKCS#1 v2.0) 14 + des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 + + These mappings are provided so that a client may send the + appropriate enctypes in the AS-REQ message in order to indicate + support for the corresponding OIDs (for performing PKINIT). + + In many cases, PKINIT requires the encoding of the X.500 name of a + certificate authority as a Realm. When such a name appears as + a realm it will be represented using the "other" form of the realm + name as specified in the naming constraints section of RFC1510. + For a realm derived from an X.500 name, NAMETYPE will have the value + X500-RFC2253. The full realm name will appear as follows: + + + ":" + + + where nametype is "X500-RFC2253" and string is the result of doing + an RFC2253 encoding of the distinguished name, i.e. + + "X500-RFC2253:" + RFC2253Encode(DistinguishedName) + + where DistinguishedName is an X.500 name, and RFC2253Encode is a + function returing a readable UTF encoding of an X.500 name, as + defined by RFC 2253 [14] (part of LDAPv3 [18]). + + To ensure that this encoding is unique, we add the following rule + to those specified by RFC 2253: + + The order in which the attributes appear in the RFC 2253 + encoding must be the reverse of the order in the ASN.1 + encoding of the X.500 name that appears in the public key + certificate. The order of the relative distinguished names + (RDNs), as well as the order of the AttributeTypeAndValues + within each RDN, will be reversed. (This is despite the fact + that an RDN is defined as a SET of AttributeTypeAndValues, where + an order is normally not important.) + + Similarly, in cases where the KDC does not provide a specific + policy based mapping from the X.500 name or X.509 Version 3 + SubjectAltName extension in the user's certificate to a Kerberos + principal name, PKINIT requires the direct encoding of the X.500 + name as a PrincipalName. In this case, the name-type of the + principal name shall be set to KRB_NT-X500-PRINCIPAL. This new + name type is defined in RFC 1510 as: + + KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 + + The name-string shall be set as follows: + + RFC2253Encode(DistinguishedName) + + as described above. When this name type is used, the principal's + realm shall be set to the certificate authority's distinguished + name using the X500-RFC2253 realm name format described earlier in + this section + + RFC 1510 specifies the ASN.1 structure for PrincipalName as follows: + + PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString + } + + For the purposes of encoding an X.500 name as a Kerberos name for + use in Kerberos structures, the name-string shall be encoded as a + single GeneralString. The name-type should be KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL, + as noted above. All Kerberos names must conform to validity + requirements as given in RFC 1510. Note that name mapping may be + required or optional, based on policy. + + We also define the following similar ASN.1 structure: + + CertPrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF UTF8String + } + + When a Kerberos PrincipalName is to be placed within an X.509 data + structure, the CertPrincipalName structure is to be used, with the + name-string encoded as a single UTF8String. The name-type should be + as identified in the original PrincipalName structure. The mapping + between the GeneralString and UTF8String formats can be found in + [19]. + + The following rules relate to the the matching of PrincipalNames (or + corresponding CertPrincipalNames) with regard to the PKI name + constraints for CAs as laid out in RFC 2459 [15]. In order to be + regarded as a match (for permitted and excluded name trees), the + following must be satisfied. + + 1. If the constraint is given as a user plus realm name, or + as a user plus instance plus realm name (as specified in + RFC 1510), the realm name must be valid (see 2.a-d below) + and the match must be exact, byte for byte. + + 2. If the constraint is given only as a realm name, matching + depends on the type of the realm: + + a. If the realm contains a colon (':') before any equal + sign ('='), it is treated as a realm of type Other, + and must match exactly, byte for byte. + + b. Otherwise, if the realm contains an equal sign, it + is treated as an X.500 name. In order to match, every + component in the constraint MUST be in the principal + name, and have the same value. For example, 'C=US' + matches 'C=US/O=ISI' but not 'C=UK'. + + c. Otherwise, if the realm name conforms to rules regarding + the format of DNS names, it is considered a realm name of + type Domain. The constraint may be given as a realm + name 'FOO.BAR', which matches any PrincipalName within + the realm 'FOO.BAR' but not those in subrealms such as + 'CAR.FOO.BAR'. A constraint of the form '.FOO.BAR' + matches PrincipalNames in subrealms of the form + 'CAR.FOO.BAR' but not the realm 'FOO.BAR' itself. + + d. Otherwise, the realm name is invalid and does not match + under any conditions. + +3.1.1. Encryption and Key Formats + + In the exposition below, we use the terms public key and private + key generically. It should be understood that the term "public + key" may be used to refer to either a public encryption key or a + signature verification key, and that the term "private key" may be + used to refer to either a private decryption key or a signature + generation key. The fact that these are logically distinct does + not preclude the assignment of bitwise identical keys for RSA + keys. + + In the case of Diffie-Hellman, the key shall be produced from the + agreed bit string as follows: + + * Truncate the bit string to the appropriate length. + * Rectify parity in each byte (if necessary) to obtain the key. + + For instance, in the case of a DES key, we take the first eight + bytes of the bit stream, and then adjust the least significant bit + of each byte to ensure that each byte has odd parity. + +3.1.2. Algorithm Identifiers + + PKINIT does not define, but does permit, the algorithm identifiers + listed below. + +3.1.2.1. Signature Algorithm Identifiers + + The following signature algorithm identifiers specified in [11] and + in [15] shall be used with PKINIT: + + id-dsa-with-sha1 (DSA with SHA1) + md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5) + sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1) + +3.1.2.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Algorithm Identifier + + The following algorithm identifier shall be used within the + SubjectPublicKeyInfo data structure: dhpublicnumber + + This identifier and the associated algorithm parameters are + specified in RFC 2459 [15]. + +3.1.2.3. Algorithm Identifiers for RSA Encryption + + These algorithm identifiers are used inside the EnvelopedData data + structure, for encrypting the temporary key with a public key: + + rsaEncryption (RSA encryption, PKCS#1 v1.5) + id-RSAES-OAEP (RSA encryption, PKCS#1 v2.0) + + Both of the above RSA encryption schemes are specified in [16]. + Currently, only PKCS#1 v1.5 is specified by CMS [11], although the + CMS specification says that it will likely include PKCS#1 v2.0 in + the future. (PKCS#1 v2.0 addresses adaptive chosen ciphertext + vulnerability discovered in PKCS#1 v1.5.) + +3.1.2.4. Algorithm Identifiers for Encryption with Secret Keys + + These algorithm identifiers are used inside the EnvelopedData data + structure in the PKINIT Reply, for encrypting the reply key with the + temporary key: + des-ede3-cbc (3-key 3-DES, CBC mode) + rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode) + + The full definition of the above algorithm identifiers and their + corresponding parameters (an IV for block chaining) is provided in + the CMS specification [11]. + +3.2. Public Key Authentication + + Implementation of the changes in this section is REQUIRED for + compliance with PKINIT. + +3.2.1. Client Request + + Public keys may be signed by some certification authority (CA), or + they may be maintained by the KDC in which case the KDC is the + trusted authority. Note that the latter mode does not require the + use of certificates. + + The initial authentication request is sent as per RFC 1510, except + that a preauthentication field containing data signed by the user's + private key accompanies the request: + + PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 14 + signedAuthPack [0] SignedData + -- Defined in CMS [11]; + -- AuthPack (below) defines the + -- data that is signed. + trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCas OPTIONAL, + -- This is a list of CAs that the + -- client trusts and that certify + -- KDCs. + kdcCert [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL + -- As defined in CMS [11]; + -- specifies a particular KDC + -- certificate if the client + -- already has it. + encryptionCert [3] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL + -- For example, this may be the + -- client's Diffie-Hellman + -- certificate, or it may be the + -- client's RSA encryption + -- certificate. + } + + TrustedCas ::= CHOICE { + principalName [0] KerberosName, + -- as defined below + caName [1] Name + -- fully qualified X.500 name + -- as defined by X.509 + issuerAndSerial [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber + -- Since a CA may have a number of + -- certificates, only one of which + -- a client trusts + } + + Usage of SignedData: + + The SignedData data type is specified in the Cryptographic + Message Syntax, a product of the S/MIME working group of the + IETF. The following describes how to fill in the fields of + this data: + + 1. The encapContentInfo field must contain the PKAuthenticator + and, optionally, the client's Diffie Hellman public value. + + a. The eContentType field shall contain the OID value for + pkdata: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5) + kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkdata (1) + + b. The eContent field is data of the type AuthPack (below). + + 2. The signerInfos field contains the signature of AuthPack. + + 3. The Certificates field, when non-empty, contains the client's + certificate chain. If present, the KDC uses the public key + from the client's certificate to verify the signature in the + request. Note that the client may pass different certificate + chains that are used for signing or for encrypting. Thus, + the KDC may utilize a different client certificate for + signature verification than the one it uses to encrypt the + reply to the client. For example, the client may place a + Diffie-Hellman certificate in this field in order to convey + its static Diffie Hellman certificate to the KDC to enable + static-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman mode for the reply; in this + case, the client does NOT place its public value in the + AuthPack (defined below). As another example, the client may + place an RSA encryption certificate in this field. However, + there must always be (at least) a signature certificate. + + AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE { + pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator, + clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL + -- if client is using Diffie-Hellman + -- (ephemeral-ephemeral only) + } + + PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE { + kdcName [0] PrincipalName, + kdcRealm [1] Realm, + cusec [2] INTEGER, + -- for replay prevention as in RFC1510 + ctime [3] KerberosTime, + -- for replay prevention as in RFC1510 + nonce [4] INTEGER + } + + SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + -- dhKeyAgreement + subjectPublicKey BIT STRING + -- for DH, equals + -- public exponent (INTEGER encoded + -- as payload of BIT STRING) + } -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation [10] + + AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm ALGORITHM.&id, + parameters ALGORITHM.&type + } -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation [10] + + If the client passes an issuer and serial number in the request, + the KDC is requested to use the referred-to certificate. If none + exists, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH. It also returns this error if, on the + other hand, the client does not pass any trustedCertifiers, + believing that it has the KDC's certificate, but the KDC has more + than one certificate. The KDC should include information in the + KRB-ERROR message that indicates the KDC certificate(s) that a + client may utilize. This data is specified in the e-data, which + is defined in RFC 1510 revisions as a SEQUENCE of TypedData: + + TypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type [0] INTEGER, + data-value [1] OCTET STRING, + } -- per Kerberos RFC 1510 revisions + + where: + data-type = TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES = 101 + data-value = CertificateSet // as specified by CMS [11] + + The PKAuthenticator carries information to foil replay attacks, and + to bind the request and response. The PKAuthenticator is signed + with the client's signature key. + +3.2.2. KDC Response + + Upon receipt of the AS_REQ with PA-PK-AS-REQ pre-authentication + type, the KDC attempts to verify the user's certificate chain + (userCert), if one is provided in the request. This is done by + verifying the certification path against the KDC's policy of + legitimate certifiers. This may be based on a certification + hierarchy, or it may be simply a list of recognized certifiers in a + system like PGP. + + If the client's certificate chain contains no certificate signed by + a CA trusted by the KDC, then the KDC sends back an error message + of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data + is a SEQUENCE of one TypedData (with type TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS=104) + whose data-value is an OCTET STRING which is the DER encoding of + + TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + -- X.500 name encoded as a principal name + -- see Section 3.1 + + If while verifying a certificate chain the KDC determines that the + signature on one of the certificates in the CertificateSet from + the signedAuthPack fails verification, then the KDC returns an + error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying + e-data is a SEQUENCE of one TypedData (with type + TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX=105) whose data-value is an OCTET STRING + which is the DER encoding of the index into the CertificateSet + ordered as sent by the client. + + CertificateIndex ::= INTEGER + -- 0 = 1st certificate, + -- (in order of encoding) + -- 1 = 2nd certificate, etc + + The KDC may also check whether any of the certificates in the + client's chain has been revoked. If one of the certificates has + been revoked, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if such a query reveals that + the certificate's revocation status is unknown or not + available, then if required by policy, the KDC returns the + appropriate error of type KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN or + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE. In any of these three + cases, the affected certificate is identified by the accompanying + e-data, which contains a CertificateIndex as described for + KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. + + If the certificate chain can be verified, but the name of the + client in the certificate does not match the client's name in the + request, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data + field in this case. + + Finally, if the certificate chain is verified, but the KDC's name + or realm as given in the PKAuthenticator does not match the KDC's + actual principal name, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH. The accompanying e-data field is again + a SEQUENCE of one TypedData (with type TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL=102 or + TD-KRB-REALM=103 as appropriate) whose data-value is an OCTET + STRING whose data-value is the DER encoding of a PrincipalName or + Realm as defined in RFC 1510 revisions. + + Even if all succeeds, the KDC may--for policy reasons--decide not + to trust the client. In this case, the KDC returns an error message + of type KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. One specific case of this is + the presence or absence of an Enhanced Key Usage (EKU) OID within + the certificate extensions. The rules regarding acceptability of + an EKU sequence (or the absence of any sequence) are a matter of + local policy. For the benefit of implementers, we define a PKINIT + EKU OID as the following: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) + security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkekuoid (2). + + If a trust relationship exists, the KDC then verifies the client's + signature on AuthPack. If that fails, the KDC returns an error + message of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. Otherwise, the KDC uses the + timestamp (ctime and cusec) in the PKAuthenticator to assure that + the request is not a replay. The KDC also verifies that its name + is specified in the PKAuthenticator. + + If the clientPublicValue field is filled in, indicating that the + client wishes to use Diffie-Hellman key agreement, then the KDC + checks to see that the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do + not (e.g., the prime size is insufficient for the expected + encryption type), then the KDC sends back an error message of type + KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK. Otherwise, it generates its own public and + private values for the response. + + The KDC also checks that the timestamp in the PKAuthenticator is + within the allowable window and that the principal name and realm + are correct. If the local (server) time and the client time in the + authenticator differ by more than the allowable clock skew, then the + KDC returns an error message of type KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW as defined in 1510. + + Assuming no errors, the KDC replies as per RFC 1510, except as + follows. The user's name in the ticket is determined by the + following decision algorithm: + + 1. If the KDC has a mapping from the name in the certificate + to a Kerberos name, then use that name. + Else + 2. If the certificate contains the SubjectAltName extention + and the local KDC policy defines a mapping from the + SubjectAltName to a Kerberos name, then use that name. + Else + 3. Use the name as represented in the certificate, mapping + mapping as necessary (e.g., as per RFC 2253 for X.500 + names). In this case the realm in the ticket shall be the + name of the certifier that issued the user's certificate. + + Note that a principal name may be carried in the subject alt name + field of a certificate. This name may be mapped to a principal + record in a security database based on local policy, for example + the subject alt name may be kerberos/principal@realm format. In + this case the realm name is not that of the CA but that of the + local realm doing the mapping (or some realm name chosen by that + realm). + + If a non-KDC X.509 certificate contains the principal name within + the subjectAltName version 3 extension , that name may utilize + KerberosName as defined below, or, in the case of an S/MIME + certificate [17], may utilize the email address. If the KDC + is presented with an S/MIME certificate, then the email address + within subjectAltName will be interpreted as a principal and realm + separated by the "@" sign, or as a name that needs to be + canonicalized. If the resulting name does not correspond to a + registered principal name, then the principal name is formed as + defined in section 3.1. + + The trustedCertifiers field contains a list of certification + authorities trusted by the client, in the case that the client does + not possess the KDC's public key certificate. If the KDC has no + certificate signed by any of the trustedCertifiers, then it returns + an error of type KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED. + + KDCs should try to (in order of preference): + 1. Use the KDC certificate identified by the serialNumber included + in the client's request. + 2. Use a certificate issued to the KDC by the client's CA (if in the + middle of a CA key roll-over, use the KDC cert issued under same + CA key as user cert used to verify request). + 3. Use a certificate issued to the KDC by one of the client's + trustedCertifier(s); + If the KDC is unable to comply with any of these options, then the + KDC returns an error message of type KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED to the + client. + + The KDC encrypts the reply not with the user's long-term key, but + with the Diffie Hellman derived key or a random key generated + for this particular response which is carried in the padata field of + the TGS-REP message. + + PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE { + -- PA TYPE 15 + dhSignedData [0] SignedData, + -- Defined in CMS and used only with + -- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (if the + -- client public value was present in the + -- request). + -- This choice MUST be supported + -- by compliant implementations. + encKeyPack [1] EnvelopedData, + -- Defined in CMS + -- The temporary key is encrypted + -- using the client public key + -- key + -- SignedReplyKeyPack, encrypted + -- with the temporary key, is also + -- included. + } + + Usage of SignedData: + + When the Diffie-Hellman option is used, dhSignedData in + PA-PK-AS-REP provides authenticated Diffie-Hellman parameters + of the KDC. The reply key used to encrypt part of the KDC reply + message is derived from the Diffie-Hellman exchange: + + 1. Both the KDC and the client calculate a secret value + (g^ab mod p), where a is the client's private exponent and + b is the KDC's private exponent. + + 2. Both the KDC and the client take the first N bits of this + secret value and convert it into a reply key. N depends on + the reply key type. + + 3. If the reply key is DES, N=64 bits, where some of the bits + are replaced with parity bits, according to FIPS PUB 74. + + 4. If the reply key is (3-key) 3-DES, N=192 bits, where some + of the bits are replaced with parity bits, according to + FIPS PUB 74. + + 5. The encapContentInfo field must contain the KdcDHKeyInfo as + defined below. + + a. The eContentType field shall contain the OID value for + pkdata: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5) + kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkdata (1) + + b. The eContent field is data of the type KdcDHKeyInfo + (below). + + 6. The certificates field must contain the certificates + necessary for the client to establish trust in the KDC's + certificate based on the list of trusted certifiers sent by + the client in the PA-PK-AS-REQ. This field may be empty if + the client did not send to the KDC a list of trusted + certifiers (the trustedCertifiers field was empty, meaning + that the client already possesses the KDC's certificate). + + 7. The signerInfos field is a SET that must contain at least + one member, since it contains the actual signature. + + KdcDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + -- used only when utilizing Diffie-Hellman + nonce [0] INTEGER, + -- binds responce to the request + subjectPublicKey [2] BIT STRING + -- Equals public exponent (g^a mod p) + -- INTEGER encoded as payload of + -- BIT STRING + } + + Usage of EnvelopedData: + + The EnvelopedData data type is specified in the Cryptographic + Message Syntax, a product of the S/MIME working group of the + IETF. It contains a temporary key encrypted with the PKINIT + client's public key. It also contains a signed and encrypted + reply key. + + 1. The originatorInfo field is not required, since that + information may be presented in the signedData structure + that is encrypted within the encryptedContentInfo field. + + 2. The optional unprotectedAttrs field is not required for + PKINIT. + + 3. The recipientInfos field is a SET which must contain exactly + one member of the KeyTransRecipientInfo type for encryption + with an RSA public key. + + a. The encryptedKey field (in KeyTransRecipientInfo) + contains the temporary key which is encrypted with the + PKINIT client's public key. + + 4. The encryptedContentInfo field contains the signed and + encrypted reply key. + + a. The contentType field shall contain the OID value for + id-signedData: iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) + rsadsi (113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) + + b. The encryptedContent field is encrypted data of the CMS + type signedData as specified below. + + i. The encapContentInfo field must contains the + ReplyKeyPack. + + * The eContentType field shall contain the OID value + for pkdata: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) + security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkdata (1) + + * The eContent field is data of the type ReplyKeyPack + (below). + + ii. The certificates field must contain the certificates + necessary for the client to establish trust in the + KDC's certificate based on the list of trusted + certifiers sent by the client in the PA-PK-AS-REQ. + This field may be empty if the client did not send + to the KDC a list of trusted certifiers (the + trustedCertifiers field was empty, meaning that the + client already possesses the KDC's certificate). + + iii. The signerInfos field is a SET that must contain at + least one member, since it contains the actual + signature. + + ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE { + -- not used for Diffie-Hellman + replyKey [0] EncryptionKey, + -- used to encrypt main reply + -- ENCTYPE is at least as strong as + -- ENCTYPE of session key + nonce [1] INTEGER, + -- binds response to the request + -- must be same as the nonce + -- passed in the PKAuthenticator + } + + Since each certifier in the certification path of a user's + certificate is equivalent to a separate Kerberos realm, the name + of each certifier in the certificate chain must be added to the + transited field of the ticket. The format of these realm names is + defined in Section 3.1 of this document. If applicable, the + transit-policy-checked flag should be set in the issued ticket. + + The KDC's certificate(s) must bind the public key(s) of the KDC to + a name derivable from the name of the realm for that KDC. X.509 + certificates shall contain the principal name of the KDC + (defined in section 8.2 of RFC 1510) as the SubjectAltName version + 3 extension. Below is the definition of this version 3 extension, + as specified by the X.509 standard: + + subjectAltName EXTENSION ::= { + SYNTAX GeneralNames + IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectAltName + } + + GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF GeneralName + + GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + otherName [0] OtherName, + ... + } + + OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id + } + + For the purpose of specifying a Kerberos principal name, the value + in OtherName shall be a KerberosName as defined in RFC 1510, but with + the PrincipalName replaced by CertPrincipalName as mentioned in + Section 3.1: + + KerberosName ::= SEQUENCE { + realm [0] Realm, + principalName [1] CertPrincipalName -- defined above + } + + This specific syntax is identified within subjectAltName by setting + the type-id in OtherName to krb5PrincipalName, where (from the + Kerberos specification) we have + + krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso (1) + org (3) + dod (6) + internet (1) + security (5) + kerberosv5 (2) } + + krb5PrincipalName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { krb5 2 } + + (This specification may also be used to specify a Kerberos name + within the user's certificate.) The KDC's certificate may be signed + directly by a CA, or there may be intermediaries if the server resides + within a large organization, or it may be unsigned if the client + indicates possession (and trust) of the KDC's certificate. + + The client then extracts the random key used to encrypt the main + reply. This random key (in encPaReply) is encrypted with either the + client's public key or with a key derived from the DH values + exchanged between the client and the KDC. The client uses this + random key to decrypt the main reply, and subsequently proceeds as + described in RFC 1510. + +3.2.3. Required Algorithms + + Not all of the algorithms in the PKINIT protocol specification have + to be implemented in order to comply with the proposed standard. + Below is a list of the required algorithms: + + * Diffie-Hellman public/private key pairs + * utilizing Diffie-Hellman ephemeral-ephemeral mode + * SHA1 digest and DSA for signatures + * 3-key triple DES keys derived from the Diffie-Hellman Exchange + * 3-key triple DES Temporary and Reply keys + +4. Logistics and Policy + + This section describes a way to define the policy on the use of + PKINIT for each principal and request. + + The KDC is not required to contain a database record for users + who use public key authentication. However, if these users are + registered with the KDC, it is recommended that the database record + for these users be modified to an additional flag in the attributes + field to indicate that the user should authenticate using PKINIT. + If this flag is set and a request message does not contain the + PKINIT preauthentication field, then the KDC sends back as error of + type KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED indicating that a preauthentication + field of type PA-PK-AS-REQ must be included in the request. + +5. Security Considerations + + PKINIT raises a few security considerations, which we will address + in this section. + + First of all, PKINIT introduces a new trust model, where KDCs do not + (necessarily) certify the identity of those for whom they issue + tickets. PKINIT does allow KDCs to act as their own CAs, in the + limited capacity of self-signing their certificates, but one of the + additional benefits is to align Kerberos authentication with a global + public key infrastructure. Anyone using PKINIT in this way must be + aware of how the certification infrastructure they are linking to + works. + + Secondly, PKINIT also introduces the possibility of interactions + between different cryptosystems, which may be of widely varying + strengths. Many systems, for instance, allow the use of 512-bit + public keys. Using such keys to wrap data encrypted under strong + conventional cryptosystems, such as triple-DES, is inappropriate; + it adds a weak link to a strong one at extra cost. Implementors + and administrators should take care to avoid such wasteful and + deceptive interactions. + + Lastly, PKINIT calls for randomly generated keys for conventional + cryptosystems. Many such systems contain systematically "weak" + keys. PKINIT implementations MUST avoid use of these keys, either + by discarding those keys when they are generated, or by fixing them + in some way (e.g., by XORing them with a given mask). These + precautions vary from system to system; it is not our intention to + give an explicit recipe for them here. + +6. Transport Issues + + Certificate chains can potentially grow quite large and span several + UDP packets; this in turn increases the probability that a Kerberos + message involving PKINIT extensions will be broken in transit. In + light of the possibility that the Kerberos specification will + require KDCs to accept requests using TCP as a transport mechanism, + we make the same recommendation with respect to the PKINIT + extensions as well. + +7. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service + (V5). Request for Comments 1510. + + [2] B.C. Neuman, Theodore Ts'o. Kerberos: An Authentication Service + for Computer Networks, IEEE Communications, 32(9):33-38. September + 1994. + + [3] B. Tung, T. Ryutov, C. Neuman, G. Tsudik, B. Sommerfeld, + A. Medvinsky, M. Hur. Public Key Cryptography for Cross-Realm + Authentication in Kerberos. draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-04.txt + + [4] A. Medvinsky, J. Cargille, M. Hur. Anonymous Credentials in + Kerberos. draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-anoncred-00.txt + + [5] Ari Medvinsky, M. Hur, Alexander Medvinsky, B. Clifford Neuman. + Public Key Utilizing Tickets for Application Servers (PKTAPP). + draft-ietf-cat-pktapp-02.txt + + [6] M. Sirbu, J. Chuang. Distributed Authentication in Kerberos + Using Public Key Cryptography. Symposium On Network and Distributed + System Security, 1997. + + [7] B. Cox, J.D. Tygar, M. Sirbu. NetBill Security and Transaction + Protocol. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Electronic + Commerce, July 1995. + + [8] T. Dierks, C. Allen. The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0 + Request for Comments 2246, January 1999. + + [9] B.C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May 1993. + + [10] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information technology - Open Systems + Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework + Recommendation X.509 ISO/IEC 9594-8 + + [11] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax. + draft-ietf-smime-cms-13.txt, April 1999, approved for publication + as RFC. + + [12] PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, + An RSA Laboratories Technical Note Version 1.5 + Revised November 1, 1993 + + [13] R. Rivest, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and RSA Data + Security, Inc. A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm + March 1998. + Request for Comments 2268. + + [14] M. Wahl, S. Kille, T. Howes. Lightweight Directory Access + Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of Distinguished Names. + Request for Comments 2253. + + [15] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public + Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile, January 1999. + Request for Comments 2459. + + [16] B. Kaliski, J. Staddon. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography + Specifications, October 1998. Request for Comments 2437. + + [17] S. Dusse, P. Hoffman, B. Ramsdell, J. Weinstein. S/MIME + Version 2 Certificate Handling, March 1998. Request for + Comments 2312. + + [18] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille. Lightweight Directory Access + Protocol (v3), December 1997. Request for Comments 2251. + + [19] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information Processing Systems - Open + Systems Interconnection - Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1) Rec. X.680 ISO/IEC 8824-1 + +8. Acknowledgements + + Some of the ideas on which this proposal is based arose during + discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF + CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos + and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system. + These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an + attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this + proposal approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos + perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas + in DCE have been invaluable. + +9. Expiration Date + + This draft expires September 15, 2000. + +10. Authors + + Brian Tung + Clifford Neuman + USC Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695 + Phone: +1 310 822 1511 + E-mail: {brian, bcn}@isi.edu + + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road + Issaquah WA 98027-5378 + Phone: +1 425 391 6000 + E-mail: matt.hur@cybersafe.com + + Ari Medvinsky + Keen.com, Inc. + 150 Independence Drive + Menlo Park CA 94025 + Phone: +1 650 289 3134 + E-mail: ari@keen.com + + Sasha Medvinsky + Motorola + 6450 Sequence Drive + San Diego, CA 92121 + Phone +1 619 404 2825 + E-mail: smedvinsky@gi.com + + John Wray + Iris Associates, Inc. + 5 Technology Park Dr. + Westford, MA 01886 + E-mail: John_Wray@iris.com + + Jonathan Trostle + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134 + E-mail: jtrostle@cisco.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-12.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-12.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1e596836e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-12.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1080 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-12.txt Clifford Neuman +Updates: RFC 1510 USC/ISI +expires January 15, 2001 Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + Ari Medvinsky + Keen.com, Inc. + Sasha Medvinsky + Motorola + John Wray + Iris Associates, Inc. + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco + + Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), + its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt, and expires January 15, + 2001. Please send comments to the authors. + +1. Abstract + + This document defines extensions (PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510 [1]) to provide a method for using public + key cryptography during initial authentication. The methods + defined specify the ways in which preauthentication data fields and + error data fields in Kerberos messages are to be used to transport + public key data. + +2. Introduction + + The popularity of public key cryptography has produced a desire for + its support in Kerberos [2]. The advantages provided by public key + cryptography include simplified key management (from the Kerberos + perspective) and the ability to leverage existing and developing + public key certification infrastructures. + + Public key cryptography can be integrated into Kerberos in a number + of ways. One is to associate a key pair with each realm, which can + then be used to facilitate cross-realm authentication; this is the + topic of another draft proposal. Another way is to allow users with + public key certificates to use them in initial authentication. This + is the concern of the current document. + + PKINIT utilizes ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys in + combination with digital signature keys as the primary, required + mechanism. It also allows for the use of RSA keys and/or (static) + Diffie-Hellman certificates. Note in particular that PKINIT supports + the use of separate signature and encryption keys. + + PKINIT enables access to Kerberos-secured services based on initial + authentication utilizing public key cryptography. PKINIT utilizes + standard public key signature and encryption data formats within the + standard Kerberos messages. The basic mechanism is as follows: The + user sends an AS-REQ message to the KDC as before, except that if that + user is to use public key cryptography in the initial authentication + step, his certificate and a signature accompany the initial request + in the preauthentication fields. Upon receipt of this request, the + KDC verifies the certificate and issues a ticket granting ticket + (TGT) as before, except that the encPart from the AS-REP message + carrying the TGT is now encrypted utilizing either a Diffie-Hellman + derived key or the user's public key. This message is authenticated + utilizing the public key signature of the KDC. + + Note that PKINIT does not require the use of certificates. A KDC + may store the public key of a principal as part of that principal's + record. In this scenario, the KDC is the trusted party that vouches + for the principal (as in a standard, non-cross realm, Kerberos + environment). Thus, for any principal, the KDC may maintain a + secret key, a public key, or both. + + The PKINIT specification may also be used as a building block for + other specifications. PKCROSS [3] utilizes PKINIT for establishing + the inter-realm key and associated inter-realm policy to be applied + in issuing cross realm service tickets. As specified in [4], + anonymous Kerberos tickets can be issued by applying a NULL + signature in combination with Diffie-Hellman in the PKINIT exchange. + Additionally, the PKINIT specification may be used for direct peer + to peer authentication without contacting a central KDC. This + application of PKINIT is described in PKTAPP [5] and is based on + concepts introduced in [6, 7]. For direct client-to-server + authentication, the client uses PKINIT to authenticate to the end + server (instead of a central KDC), which then issues a ticket for + itself. This approach has an advantage over TLS [8] in that the + server does not need to save state (cache session keys). + Furthermore, an additional benefit is that Kerberos tickets can + facilitate delegation (see [9]). + +3. Proposed Extensions + + This section describes extensions to RFC 1510 for supporting the + use of public key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket + granting ticket (TGT). + + In summary, the following change to RFC 1510 is proposed: + + * Users may authenticate using either a public key pair or a + conventional (symmetric) key. If public key cryptography is + used, public key data is transported in preauthentication + data fields to help establish identity. The user presents + a public key certificate and obtains an ordinary TGT that may + be used for subsequent authentication, with such + authentication using only conventional cryptography. + + Section 3.1 provides definitions to help specify message formats. + Section 3.2 describes the extensions for the initial authentication + method. + +3.1. Definitions + + The extensions involve new preauthentication fields; we introduce + the following preauthentication types: + + PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 + PA-PK-AS-REP 15 + + The extensions also involve new error types; we introduce the + following types: + + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 + KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 + KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG 64 + KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 + KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 + KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 + KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 + KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 + KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 + + We utilize the following typed data for errors: + + TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 + TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 + TD-KRB-REALM 103 + TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 + TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 + + We utilize the following encryption types (which map directly to + OIDs): + + dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 + md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 + sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 + rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 + rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS#1 v1.5) 13 + rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID (PKCS#1 v2.0) 14 + des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 + + These mappings are provided so that a client may send the + appropriate enctypes in the AS-REQ message in order to indicate + support for the corresponding OIDs (for performing PKINIT). + + In many cases, PKINIT requires the encoding of the X.500 name of a + certificate authority as a Realm. When such a name appears as + a realm it will be represented using the "other" form of the realm + name as specified in the naming constraints section of RFC1510. + For a realm derived from an X.500 name, NAMETYPE will have the value + X500-RFC2253. The full realm name will appear as follows: + + + ":" + + + where nametype is "X500-RFC2253" and string is the result of doing + an RFC2253 encoding of the distinguished name, i.e. + + "X500-RFC2253:" + RFC2253Encode(DistinguishedName) + + where DistinguishedName is an X.500 name, and RFC2253Encode is a + function returing a readable UTF encoding of an X.500 name, as + defined by RFC 2253 [14] (part of LDAPv3 [18]). + + To ensure that this encoding is unique, we add the following rule + to those specified by RFC 2253: + + The order in which the attributes appear in the RFC 2253 + encoding must be the reverse of the order in the ASN.1 + encoding of the X.500 name that appears in the public key + certificate. The order of the relative distinguished names + (RDNs), as well as the order of the AttributeTypeAndValues + within each RDN, will be reversed. (This is despite the fact + that an RDN is defined as a SET of AttributeTypeAndValues, where + an order is normally not important.) + + Similarly, in cases where the KDC does not provide a specific + policy based mapping from the X.500 name or X.509 Version 3 + SubjectAltName extension in the user's certificate to a Kerberos + principal name, PKINIT requires the direct encoding of the X.500 + name as a PrincipalName. In this case, the name-type of the + principal name shall be set to KRB_NT-X500-PRINCIPAL. This new + name type is defined in RFC 1510 as: + + KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 + + The name-string shall be set as follows: + + RFC2253Encode(DistinguishedName) + + as described above. When this name type is used, the principal's + realm shall be set to the certificate authority's distinguished + name using the X500-RFC2253 realm name format described earlier in + this section + + RFC 1510 specifies the ASN.1 structure for PrincipalName as follows: + + PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString + } + + For the purposes of encoding an X.500 name as a Kerberos name for + use in Kerberos structures, the name-string shall be encoded as a + single GeneralString. The name-type should be KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL, + as noted above. All Kerberos names must conform to validity + requirements as given in RFC 1510. Note that name mapping may be + required or optional, based on policy. + + We also define the following similar ASN.1 structure: + + CertPrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF UTF8String + } + + When a Kerberos PrincipalName is to be placed within an X.509 data + structure, the CertPrincipalName structure is to be used, with the + name-string encoded as a single UTF8String. The name-type should be + as identified in the original PrincipalName structure. The mapping + between the GeneralString and UTF8String formats can be found in + [19]. + + The following rules relate to the the matching of PrincipalNames (or + corresponding CertPrincipalNames) with regard to the PKI name + constraints for CAs as laid out in RFC 2459 [15]. In order to be + regarded as a match (for permitted and excluded name trees), the + following must be satisfied. + + 1. If the constraint is given as a user plus realm name, or + as a user plus instance plus realm name (as specified in + RFC 1510), the realm name must be valid (see 2.a-d below) + and the match must be exact, byte for byte. + + 2. If the constraint is given only as a realm name, matching + depends on the type of the realm: + + a. If the realm contains a colon (':') before any equal + sign ('='), it is treated as a realm of type Other, + and must match exactly, byte for byte. + + b. Otherwise, if the realm contains an equal sign, it + is treated as an X.500 name. In order to match, every + component in the constraint MUST be in the principal + name, and have the same value. For example, 'C=US' + matches 'C=US/O=ISI' but not 'C=UK'. + + c. Otherwise, if the realm name conforms to rules regarding + the format of DNS names, it is considered a realm name of + type Domain. The constraint may be given as a realm + name 'FOO.BAR', which matches any PrincipalName within + the realm 'FOO.BAR' but not those in subrealms such as + 'CAR.FOO.BAR'. A constraint of the form '.FOO.BAR' + matches PrincipalNames in subrealms of the form + 'CAR.FOO.BAR' but not the realm 'FOO.BAR' itself. + + d. Otherwise, the realm name is invalid and does not match + under any conditions. + +3.1.1. Encryption and Key Formats + + In the exposition below, we use the terms public key and private + key generically. It should be understood that the term "public + key" may be used to refer to either a public encryption key or a + signature verification key, and that the term "private key" may be + used to refer to either a private decryption key or a signature + generation key. The fact that these are logically distinct does + not preclude the assignment of bitwise identical keys for RSA + keys. + + In the case of Diffie-Hellman, the key shall be produced from the + agreed bit string as follows: + + * Truncate the bit string to the appropriate length. + * Rectify parity in each byte (if necessary) to obtain the key. + + For instance, in the case of a DES key, we take the first eight + bytes of the bit stream, and then adjust the least significant bit + of each byte to ensure that each byte has odd parity. + +3.1.2. Algorithm Identifiers + + PKINIT does not define, but does permit, the algorithm identifiers + listed below. + +3.1.2.1. Signature Algorithm Identifiers + + The following signature algorithm identifiers specified in [11] and + in [15] shall be used with PKINIT: + + id-dsa-with-sha1 (DSA with SHA1) + md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5) + sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1) + +3.1.2.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Algorithm Identifier + + The following algorithm identifier shall be used within the + SubjectPublicKeyInfo data structure: dhpublicnumber + + This identifier and the associated algorithm parameters are + specified in RFC 2459 [15]. + +3.1.2.3. Algorithm Identifiers for RSA Encryption + + These algorithm identifiers are used inside the EnvelopedData data + structure, for encrypting the temporary key with a public key: + + rsaEncryption (RSA encryption, PKCS#1 v1.5) + id-RSAES-OAEP (RSA encryption, PKCS#1 v2.0) + + Both of the above RSA encryption schemes are specified in [16]. + Currently, only PKCS#1 v1.5 is specified by CMS [11], although the + CMS specification says that it will likely include PKCS#1 v2.0 in + the future. (PKCS#1 v2.0 addresses adaptive chosen ciphertext + vulnerability discovered in PKCS#1 v1.5.) + +3.1.2.4. Algorithm Identifiers for Encryption with Secret Keys + + These algorithm identifiers are used inside the EnvelopedData data + structure in the PKINIT Reply, for encrypting the reply key with the + temporary key: + des-ede3-cbc (3-key 3-DES, CBC mode) + rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode) + + The full definition of the above algorithm identifiers and their + corresponding parameters (an IV for block chaining) is provided in + the CMS specification [11]. + +3.2. Public Key Authentication + + Implementation of the changes in this section is REQUIRED for + compliance with PKINIT. + +3.2.1. Client Request + + Public keys may be signed by some certification authority (CA), or + they may be maintained by the KDC in which case the KDC is the + trusted authority. Note that the latter mode does not require the + use of certificates. + + The initial authentication request is sent as per RFC 1510, except + that a preauthentication field containing data signed by the user's + private key accompanies the request: + + PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 14 + signedAuthPack [0] SignedData + -- Defined in CMS [11]; + -- AuthPack (below) defines the + -- data that is signed. + trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCas OPTIONAL, + -- This is a list of CAs that the + -- client trusts and that certify + -- KDCs. + kdcCert [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL + -- As defined in CMS [11]; + -- specifies a particular KDC + -- certificate if the client + -- already has it. + encryptionCert [3] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL + -- For example, this may be the + -- client's Diffie-Hellman + -- certificate, or it may be the + -- client's RSA encryption + -- certificate. + } + + TrustedCas ::= CHOICE { + principalName [0] KerberosName, + -- as defined below + caName [1] Name + -- fully qualified X.500 name + -- as defined by X.509 + issuerAndSerial [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber + -- Since a CA may have a number of + -- certificates, only one of which + -- a client trusts + } + + Usage of SignedData: + + The SignedData data type is specified in the Cryptographic + Message Syntax, a product of the S/MIME working group of the + IETF. The following describes how to fill in the fields of + this data: + + 1. The encapContentInfo field must contain the PKAuthenticator + and, optionally, the client's Diffie Hellman public value. + + a. The eContentType field shall contain the OID value for + pkauthdata: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) + security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkauthdata (1) + + b. The eContent field is data of the type AuthPack (below). + + 2. The signerInfos field contains the signature of AuthPack. + + 3. The Certificates field, when non-empty, contains the client's + certificate chain. If present, the KDC uses the public key + from the client's certificate to verify the signature in the + request. Note that the client may pass different certificate + chains that are used for signing or for encrypting. Thus, + the KDC may utilize a different client certificate for + signature verification than the one it uses to encrypt the + reply to the client. For example, the client may place a + Diffie-Hellman certificate in this field in order to convey + its static Diffie Hellman certificate to the KDC to enable + static-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman mode for the reply; in this + case, the client does NOT place its public value in the + AuthPack (defined below). As another example, the client may + place an RSA encryption certificate in this field. However, + there must always be (at least) a signature certificate. + + AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE { + pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator, + clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL + -- if client is using Diffie-Hellman + -- (ephemeral-ephemeral only) + } + + PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE { + cusec [0] INTEGER, + -- for replay prevention as in RFC1510 + ctime [1] KerberosTime, + -- for replay prevention as in RFC1510 + nonce [2] INTEGER, + pachecksum [3] Checksum + -- Checksum over KDC-REQ-BODY + -- Defined by Kerberos spec + } + + SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + -- dhKeyAgreement + subjectPublicKey BIT STRING + -- for DH, equals + -- public exponent (INTEGER encoded + -- as payload of BIT STRING) + } -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation [10] + + AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + -- for dhKeyAgreement, this is + -- { iso (1) member-body (2) US (840) + -- rsadsi (113459) pkcs (1) 3 1 } + -- from PKCS #3 [20] + parameters ANY DEFINED by algorithm OPTIONAL + -- for dhKeyAgreement, this is + -- DHParameter + } -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation [10] + + DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE { + prime INTEGER, + -- p + base INTEGER, + -- g + privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + -- l + } -- as defined in PKCS #3 [20] + + If the client passes an issuer and serial number in the request, + the KDC is requested to use the referred-to certificate. If none + exists, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH. It also returns this error if, on the + other hand, the client does not pass any trustedCertifiers, + believing that it has the KDC's certificate, but the KDC has more + than one certificate. The KDC should include information in the + KRB-ERROR message that indicates the KDC certificate(s) that a + client may utilize. This data is specified in the e-data, which + is defined in RFC 1510 revisions as a SEQUENCE of TypedData: + + TypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type [0] INTEGER, + data-value [1] OCTET STRING, + } -- per Kerberos RFC 1510 revisions + + where: + data-type = TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES = 101 + data-value = CertificateSet // as specified by CMS [11] + + The PKAuthenticator carries information to foil replay attacks, to + bind the pre-authentication data to the KDC-REQ-BODY, and to bind the + request and response. The PKAuthenticator is signed with the client's + signature key. + +3.2.2. KDC Response + + Upon receipt of the AS_REQ with PA-PK-AS-REQ pre-authentication + type, the KDC attempts to verify the user's certificate chain + (userCert), if one is provided in the request. This is done by + verifying the certification path against the KDC's policy of + legitimate certifiers. This may be based on a certification + hierarchy, or it may be simply a list of recognized certifiers in a + system like PGP. + + If the client's certificate chain contains no certificate signed by + a CA trusted by the KDC, then the KDC sends back an error message + of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data + is a SEQUENCE of one TypedData (with type TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS=104) + whose data-value is an OCTET STRING which is the DER encoding of + + TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + -- X.500 name encoded as a principal name + -- see Section 3.1 + + If while verifying a certificate chain the KDC determines that the + signature on one of the certificates in the CertificateSet from + the signedAuthPack fails verification, then the KDC returns an + error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying + e-data is a SEQUENCE of one TypedData (with type + TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX=105) whose data-value is an OCTET STRING + which is the DER encoding of the index into the CertificateSet + ordered as sent by the client. + + CertificateIndex ::= INTEGER + -- 0 = 1st certificate, + -- (in order of encoding) + -- 1 = 2nd certificate, etc + + The KDC may also check whether any of the certificates in the + client's chain has been revoked. If one of the certificates has + been revoked, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if such a query reveals that + the certificate's revocation status is unknown or not + available, then if required by policy, the KDC returns the + appropriate error of type KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN or + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE. In any of these three + cases, the affected certificate is identified by the accompanying + e-data, which contains a CertificateIndex as described for + KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. + + If the certificate chain can be verified, but the name of the + client in the certificate does not match the client's name in the + request, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data + field in this case. + + Finally, if the certificate chain is verified, but the KDC's name + or realm as given in the PKAuthenticator does not match the KDC's + actual principal name, then the KDC returns an error of type + KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH. The accompanying e-data field is again + a SEQUENCE of one TypedData (with type TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL=102 or + TD-KRB-REALM=103 as appropriate) whose data-value is an OCTET + STRING whose data-value is the DER encoding of a PrincipalName or + Realm as defined in RFC 1510 revisions. + + Even if all succeeds, the KDC may--for policy reasons--decide not + to trust the client. In this case, the KDC returns an error message + of type KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. One specific case of this is + the presence or absence of an Enhanced Key Usage (EKU) OID within + the certificate extensions. The rules regarding acceptability of + an EKU sequence (or the absence of any sequence) are a matter of + local policy. For the benefit of implementers, we define a PKINIT + EKU OID as the following: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) + security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkekuoid (2). + + If a trust relationship exists, the KDC then verifies the client's + signature on AuthPack. If that fails, the KDC returns an error + message of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. Otherwise, the KDC uses the + timestamp (ctime and cusec) in the PKAuthenticator to assure that + the request is not a replay. The KDC also verifies that its name + is specified in the PKAuthenticator. + + If the clientPublicValue field is filled in, indicating that the + client wishes to use Diffie-Hellman key agreement, then the KDC + checks to see that the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do + not (e.g., the prime size is insufficient for the expected + encryption type), then the KDC sends back an error message of type + KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK. Otherwise, it generates its own public and + private values for the response. + + The KDC also checks that the timestamp in the PKAuthenticator is + within the allowable window and that the principal name and realm + are correct. If the local (server) time and the client time in the + authenticator differ by more than the allowable clock skew, then the + KDC returns an error message of type KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW as defined in 1510. + + Assuming no errors, the KDC replies as per RFC 1510, except as + follows. The user's name in the ticket is determined by the + following decision algorithm: + + 1. If the KDC has a mapping from the name in the certificate + to a Kerberos name, then use that name. + Else + 2. If the certificate contains the SubjectAltName extention + and the local KDC policy defines a mapping from the + SubjectAltName to a Kerberos name, then use that name. + Else + 3. Use the name as represented in the certificate, mapping + mapping as necessary (e.g., as per RFC 2253 for X.500 + names). In this case the realm in the ticket shall be the + name of the certifier that issued the user's certificate. + + Note that a principal name may be carried in the subject alt name + field of a certificate. This name may be mapped to a principal + record in a security database based on local policy, for example + the subject alt name may be kerberos/principal@realm format. In + this case the realm name is not that of the CA but that of the + local realm doing the mapping (or some realm name chosen by that + realm). + + If a non-KDC X.509 certificate contains the principal name within + the subjectAltName version 3 extension , that name may utilize + KerberosName as defined below, or, in the case of an S/MIME + certificate [17], may utilize the email address. If the KDC + is presented with an S/MIME certificate, then the email address + within subjectAltName will be interpreted as a principal and realm + separated by the "@" sign, or as a name that needs to be + canonicalized. If the resulting name does not correspond to a + registered principal name, then the principal name is formed as + defined in section 3.1. + + The trustedCertifiers field contains a list of certification + authorities trusted by the client, in the case that the client does + not possess the KDC's public key certificate. If the KDC has no + certificate signed by any of the trustedCertifiers, then it returns + an error of type KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED. + + KDCs should try to (in order of preference): + 1. Use the KDC certificate identified by the serialNumber included + in the client's request. + 2. Use a certificate issued to the KDC by the client's CA (if in the + middle of a CA key roll-over, use the KDC cert issued under same + CA key as user cert used to verify request). + 3. Use a certificate issued to the KDC by one of the client's + trustedCertifier(s); + If the KDC is unable to comply with any of these options, then the + KDC returns an error message of type KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED to the + client. + + The KDC encrypts the reply not with the user's long-term key, but + with the Diffie Hellman derived key or a random key generated + for this particular response which is carried in the padata field of + the TGS-REP message. + + PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE { + -- PA TYPE 15 + dhSignedData [0] SignedData, + -- Defined in CMS and used only with + -- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (if the + -- client public value was present in the + -- request). + -- This choice MUST be supported + -- by compliant implementations. + encKeyPack [1] EnvelopedData, + -- Defined in CMS + -- The temporary key is encrypted + -- using the client public key + -- key + -- SignedReplyKeyPack, encrypted + -- with the temporary key, is also + -- included. + } + + Usage of SignedData: + + When the Diffie-Hellman option is used, dhSignedData in + PA-PK-AS-REP provides authenticated Diffie-Hellman parameters + of the KDC. The reply key used to encrypt part of the KDC reply + message is derived from the Diffie-Hellman exchange: + + 1. Both the KDC and the client calculate a secret value + (g^ab mod p), where a is the client's private exponent and + b is the KDC's private exponent. + + 2. Both the KDC and the client take the first N bits of this + secret value and convert it into a reply key. N depends on + the reply key type. + + 3. If the reply key is DES, N=64 bits, where some of the bits + are replaced with parity bits, according to FIPS PUB 74. + + 4. If the reply key is (3-key) 3-DES, N=192 bits, where some + of the bits are replaced with parity bits, according to + FIPS PUB 74. + + 5. The encapContentInfo field must contain the KdcDHKeyInfo as + defined below. + + a. The eContentType field shall contain the OID value for + pkdhkeydata: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) + security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkdhkeydata (2) + + b. The eContent field is data of the type KdcDHKeyInfo + (below). + + 6. The certificates field must contain the certificates + necessary for the client to establish trust in the KDC's + certificate based on the list of trusted certifiers sent by + the client in the PA-PK-AS-REQ. This field may be empty if + the client did not send to the KDC a list of trusted + certifiers (the trustedCertifiers field was empty, meaning + that the client already possesses the KDC's certificate). + + 7. The signerInfos field is a SET that must contain at least + one member, since it contains the actual signature. + + KdcDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + -- used only when utilizing Diffie-Hellman + nonce [0] INTEGER, + -- binds responce to the request + subjectPublicKey [2] BIT STRING + -- Equals public exponent (g^a mod p) + -- INTEGER encoded as payload of + -- BIT STRING + } + + Usage of EnvelopedData: + + The EnvelopedData data type is specified in the Cryptographic + Message Syntax, a product of the S/MIME working group of the + IETF. It contains a temporary key encrypted with the PKINIT + client's public key. It also contains a signed and encrypted + reply key. + + 1. The originatorInfo field is not required, since that + information may be presented in the signedData structure + that is encrypted within the encryptedContentInfo field. + + 2. The optional unprotectedAttrs field is not required for + PKINIT. + + 3. The recipientInfos field is a SET which must contain exactly + one member of the KeyTransRecipientInfo type for encryption + with an RSA public key. + + a. The encryptedKey field (in KeyTransRecipientInfo) + contains the temporary key which is encrypted with the + PKINIT client's public key. + + 4. The encryptedContentInfo field contains the signed and + encrypted reply key. + + a. The contentType field shall contain the OID value for + id-signedData: iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) + rsadsi (113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) + + b. The encryptedContent field is encrypted data of the CMS + type signedData as specified below. + + i. The encapContentInfo field must contains the + ReplyKeyPack. + + * The eContentType field shall contain the OID value + for pkrkeydata: iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) + security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkrkeydata (3) + + * The eContent field is data of the type ReplyKeyPack + (below). + + ii. The certificates field must contain the certificates + necessary for the client to establish trust in the + KDC's certificate based on the list of trusted + certifiers sent by the client in the PA-PK-AS-REQ. + This field may be empty if the client did not send + to the KDC a list of trusted certifiers (the + trustedCertifiers field was empty, meaning that the + client already possesses the KDC's certificate). + + iii. The signerInfos field is a SET that must contain at + least one member, since it contains the actual + signature. + + ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE { + -- not used for Diffie-Hellman + replyKey [0] EncryptionKey, + -- used to encrypt main reply + -- ENCTYPE is at least as strong as + -- ENCTYPE of session key + nonce [1] INTEGER, + -- binds response to the request + -- must be same as the nonce + -- passed in the PKAuthenticator + } + + Since each certifier in the certification path of a user's + certificate is equivalent to a separate Kerberos realm, the name + of each certifier in the certificate chain must be added to the + transited field of the ticket. The format of these realm names is + defined in Section 3.1 of this document. If applicable, the + transit-policy-checked flag should be set in the issued ticket. + + The KDC's certificate(s) must bind the public key(s) of the KDC to + a name derivable from the name of the realm for that KDC. X.509 + certificates shall contain the principal name of the KDC + (defined in section 8.2 of RFC 1510) as the SubjectAltName version + 3 extension. Below is the definition of this version 3 extension, + as specified by the X.509 standard: + + subjectAltName EXTENSION ::= { + SYNTAX GeneralNames + IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectAltName + } + + GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF GeneralName + + GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + otherName [0] OtherName, + ... + } + + OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id + } + + For the purpose of specifying a Kerberos principal name, the value + in OtherName shall be a KerberosName as defined in RFC 1510, but with + the PrincipalName replaced by CertPrincipalName as mentioned in + Section 3.1: + + KerberosName ::= SEQUENCE { + realm [0] Realm, + principalName [1] CertPrincipalName -- defined above + } + + This specific syntax is identified within subjectAltName by setting + the type-id in OtherName to krb5PrincipalName, where (from the + Kerberos specification) we have + + krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso (1) + org (3) + dod (6) + internet (1) + security (5) + kerberosv5 (2) } + + krb5PrincipalName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { krb5 2 } + + (This specification may also be used to specify a Kerberos name + within the user's certificate.) The KDC's certificate may be signed + directly by a CA, or there may be intermediaries if the server resides + within a large organization, or it may be unsigned if the client + indicates possession (and trust) of the KDC's certificate. + + The client then extracts the random key used to encrypt the main + reply. This random key (in encPaReply) is encrypted with either the + client's public key or with a key derived from the DH values + exchanged between the client and the KDC. The client uses this + random key to decrypt the main reply, and subsequently proceeds as + described in RFC 1510. + +3.2.3. Required Algorithms + + Not all of the algorithms in the PKINIT protocol specification have + to be implemented in order to comply with the proposed standard. + Below is a list of the required algorithms: + + * Diffie-Hellman public/private key pairs + * utilizing Diffie-Hellman ephemeral-ephemeral mode + * SHA1 digest and DSA for signatures + * SHA1 digest also for the Checksum in the PKAuthenticator + * 3-key triple DES keys derived from the Diffie-Hellman Exchange + * 3-key triple DES Temporary and Reply keys + +4. Logistics and Policy + + This section describes a way to define the policy on the use of + PKINIT for each principal and request. + + The KDC is not required to contain a database record for users + who use public key authentication. However, if these users are + registered with the KDC, it is recommended that the database record + for these users be modified to an additional flag in the attributes + field to indicate that the user should authenticate using PKINIT. + If this flag is set and a request message does not contain the + PKINIT preauthentication field, then the KDC sends back as error of + type KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED indicating that a preauthentication + field of type PA-PK-AS-REQ must be included in the request. + +5. Security Considerations + + PKINIT raises a few security considerations, which we will address + in this section. + + First of all, PKINIT introduces a new trust model, where KDCs do not + (necessarily) certify the identity of those for whom they issue + tickets. PKINIT does allow KDCs to act as their own CAs, in the + limited capacity of self-signing their certificates, but one of the + additional benefits is to align Kerberos authentication with a global + public key infrastructure. Anyone using PKINIT in this way must be + aware of how the certification infrastructure they are linking to + works. + + Secondly, PKINIT also introduces the possibility of interactions + between different cryptosystems, which may be of widely varying + strengths. Many systems, for instance, allow the use of 512-bit + public keys. Using such keys to wrap data encrypted under strong + conventional cryptosystems, such as triple-DES, is inappropriate; + it adds a weak link to a strong one at extra cost. Implementors + and administrators should take care to avoid such wasteful and + deceptive interactions. + + Lastly, PKINIT calls for randomly generated keys for conventional + cryptosystems. Many such systems contain systematically "weak" + keys. PKINIT implementations MUST avoid use of these keys, either + by discarding those keys when they are generated, or by fixing them + in some way (e.g., by XORing them with a given mask). These + precautions vary from system to system; it is not our intention to + give an explicit recipe for them here. + +6. Transport Issues + + Certificate chains can potentially grow quite large and span several + UDP packets; this in turn increases the probability that a Kerberos + message involving PKINIT extensions will be broken in transit. In + light of the possibility that the Kerberos specification will + require KDCs to accept requests using TCP as a transport mechanism, + we make the same recommendation with respect to the PKINIT + extensions as well. + +7. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service + (V5). Request for Comments 1510. + + [2] B.C. Neuman, Theodore Ts'o. Kerberos: An Authentication Service + for Computer Networks, IEEE Communications, 32(9):33-38. September + 1994. + + [3] B. Tung, T. Ryutov, C. Neuman, G. Tsudik, B. Sommerfeld, + A. Medvinsky, M. Hur. Public Key Cryptography for Cross-Realm + Authentication in Kerberos. draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-04.txt + + [4] A. Medvinsky, J. Cargille, M. Hur. Anonymous Credentials in + Kerberos. draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-anoncred-00.txt + + [5] Ari Medvinsky, M. Hur, Alexander Medvinsky, B. Clifford Neuman. + Public Key Utilizing Tickets for Application Servers (PKTAPP). + draft-ietf-cat-pktapp-02.txt + + [6] M. Sirbu, J. Chuang. Distributed Authentication in Kerberos + Using Public Key Cryptography. Symposium On Network and Distributed + System Security, 1997. + + [7] B. Cox, J.D. Tygar, M. Sirbu. NetBill Security and Transaction + Protocol. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Electronic + Commerce, July 1995. + + [8] T. Dierks, C. Allen. The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0 + Request for Comments 2246, January 1999. + + [9] B.C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May 1993. + + [10] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information technology - Open Systems + Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework + Recommendation X.509 ISO/IEC 9594-8 + + [11] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax. + draft-ietf-smime-cms-13.txt, April 1999, approved for publication + as RFC. + + [12] PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, + An RSA Laboratories Technical Note Version 1.5 + Revised November 1, 1993 + + [13] R. Rivest, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and RSA Data + Security, Inc. A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm + March 1998. + Request for Comments 2268. + + [14] M. Wahl, S. Kille, T. Howes. Lightweight Directory Access + Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of Distinguished Names. + Request for Comments 2253. + + [15] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public + Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile, January 1999. + Request for Comments 2459. + + [16] B. Kaliski, J. Staddon. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography + Specifications, October 1998. Request for Comments 2437. + + [17] S. Dusse, P. Hoffman, B. Ramsdell, J. Weinstein. S/MIME + Version 2 Certificate Handling, March 1998. Request for + Comments 2312. + + [18] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille. Lightweight Directory Access + Protocol (v3), December 1997. Request for Comments 2251. + + [19] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information Processing Systems - Open + Systems Interconnection - Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1) Rec. X.680 ISO/IEC 8824-1 + + [20] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA + Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993. + +8. Acknowledgements + + Some of the ideas on which this proposal is based arose during + discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF + CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos + and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system. + These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an + attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this + proposal approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos + perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas + in DCE have been invaluable. + +9. Expiration Date + + This draft expires January 15, 2001. + +10. Authors + + Brian Tung + Clifford Neuman + USC Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695 + Phone: +1 310 822 1511 + E-mail: {brian, bcn}@isi.edu + + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road + Issaquah WA 98027-5378 + Phone: +1 425 391 6000 + E-mail: matt.hur@cybersafe.com + + Ari Medvinsky + Keen.com, Inc. + 150 Independence Drive + Menlo Park CA 94025 + Phone: +1 650 289 3134 + E-mail: ari@keen.com + + Sasha Medvinsky + Motorola + 6450 Sequence Drive + San Diego, CA 92121 + +1 858 404 2367 + E-mail: smedvinsky@gi.com + + John Wray + Iris Associates, Inc. + 5 Technology Park Dr. + Westford, MA 01886 + E-mail: John_Wray@iris.com + + Jonathan Trostle + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134 + E-mail: jtrostle@cisco.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-tapp-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-tapp-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6581dd5810 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-tapp-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Ari Medvinsky +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-tapp-03.txt Keen.com, Inc. +Expires January 14, 2001 Matthew Hur +Informational CyberSafe Corporation + Sasha Medvinsky + Motorola + Clifford Neuman + USC/ISI + +Public Key Utilizing Tickets for Application Servers (PKTAPP) + + +0. Status Of this Memo + +This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with +all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are +working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), +its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also +distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six +months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other +documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts +as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in +progress." + +The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + +The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check +the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), +nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or +munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-10.txt, and expires April 30, +2000. Please send comments to the authors. + +1. Abstract + +Public key based Kerberos for Distributed Authentication[1], (PKDA) +proposed by Sirbu & Chuang, describes PK based authentication that +eliminates the use of a centralized key distribution center while +retaining the advantages of Kerberos tickets. This draft describes how, +without any modification, the PKINIT specification[2] may be used to +implement the ideas introduced in PKDA. The benefit is that only a +single PK Kerberos extension is needed to address the goals of PKINIT & +PKDA. + + + +2. Introduction + +With the proliferation of public key cryptography, a number of public +key extensions to Kerberos have been proposed to provide +interoperability with the PK infrastructure and to improve the Kerberos +authentication system [4]. Among these are PKINIT[2] (under development +in the CAT working group) and more recently PKDA [1] proposed by Sirbu & +Chuang of CMU. One of the principal goals of PKINIT is to provide for +interoperability between a PK infrastructure and Kerberos. Using +PKINIT, a user can authenticate to the KDC via a public key certificate. +A ticket granting ticket (TGT), returned by the KDC, enables a PK user +to obtain tickets and authenticate to kerberized services. The PKDA +proposal goes a step further. It supports direct client to server +authentication, eliminating the need for an online key distribution +center. In this draft, we describe how, without any modification, the +PKINIT protocol may be applied to achieve the goals of PKDA. For direct +client to server authentication, the client will use PKINIT to +authenticate to the end server (instead of a central KDC), which then, +will issue a ticket for itself. The benefit of this proposal, is that a +single PK extension to Kerberos can addresses the goals of PKINIT and +PKDA. + + +3. PKDA background + +The PKDA proposal provides direct client to server authentication, thus +eliminating the need for an online key distribution center. A client +and server take part in an initial PK based authentication exchange, +with an added caveat that the server acts as a Kerberos ticket granting +service and issues a traditional Kerberos ticket for itself. In +subsequent communication, the client makes use of the Kerberos ticket, +thus eliminating the need for public key operations on the server. This +approach has an advantage over SSL in that the server does not need to +save state (cache session keys). Furthermore, an additional benefit, is +that Kerberos tickets can facilitate delegation (see Neuman[3]). + +Below is a brief overview of the PKDA protocol. For a more detailed +description see [1]. + +SCERT_REQ: Client to Server +The client requests a certificate from the server. If the serverÆs +certificate is cached locally, SCERT_REQ and SCERT_REP are omitted. + +SCERT_REP: Server to Client +The server returns its certificate to the client. + +PKTGS_REQ: Client to Server +The client sends a request for a service ticket to the server. To +authenticate the request, the client signs, among other fields, a time +stamp and a newly generated symmetric key . The time stamp is used to +foil replay attacks; the symmetric key is used by the server to secure +the PKTGS_REP message. +The client provides a certificate in the request (the certificate +enables the server to verify the validity of the clientÆs signature) and +seals it along with the signed information using the serverÆs public +key. + + +PKTGS_REP: Server to Client +The server returns a service ticket (which it issued for itself) along +with the session key for the ticket. The session key is protected by +the client-generated key from the PKTGS_REQ message. + +AP_REQ: Client to Server +After the above exchange, the client can proceed in a normal fashion, +using the conventional Kerberos ticket in an AP_REQ message. + + +4. PKINIT background + +One of the principal goals of PKINIT is to provide for interoperability +between a public key infrastructure and Kerberos. Using a public key +certificate, a client can authenticate to the KDC and receive a TGT +which enables the client to obtain service tickets to kerberized +services.. In PKINIT, the AS-REQ and AS-REP messages remain the same; +new preauthentication data types are used to conduct the PK exchange. +Client and server certificates are exchanged via the preauthentication +data. Thus, the exchange of certificates , PK authentication, and +delivery of a TGT can occur in two messages. + +Below is a brief overview of the PKINIT protocol. For a more detailed +description see [2]. + +PreAuthentication data of AS-REQ: Client to Server +The client sends a list of trusted certifiers, a signed PK +authenticator, and its certificate. The PK authenticator, based on the +Kerberos authenticator, contains the name of the KDC, a timestamp, and a +nonce. + +PreAuthentication data of AS-REP: Server to Client +The server responds with its certificate and the key used for decrypting +the encrypted part of the AS-REQ. This key is encrypted with the +clientÆs public key. + +AP_REQ: Client to Server +After the above exchange, the client can proceed in a normal fashion, +using the conventional Kerberos ticket in an AP_REQ message. + + +5. Application of PKINIT to achieve equivalence to PKDA + +While PKINIT is normally used to retrieve a ticket granting ticket +(TGT), it may also be used to request an end service ticket. When used +in this fashion, PKINIT is functionally equivalent to PKDA. We +introduce the concept of a local ticket granting server (LTGS) to +illustrate how PKINIT may be used for issuing end service tickets based +on public key authentication. It is important to note that the LTGS may +be built into an application server, or it may be a stand-alone server +used for issuing tickets within a well-defined realm, such as a single +machine. We will discuss both of these options. + + +5.1. The LTGS + +The LTGS processes the Kerberos AS-REQ and AS-REP messages with PKINIT +preauthentication data. When a client submits an AS-REQ to the LTGS, it +specifies an application server, in order to receive an end service +ticket instead of a TGT. + + +5.1.1. The LTGS as a standalone server + +The LTGS may run as a separate process that serves applications which +reside on the same machine. This serves to consolidate administrative +functions and provide an easier migration path for a heterogeneous +environment consisting of both public key and Kerberos. The LTGS would +use one well-known port (port #88 - same as the KDC) for all message +traffic and would share a symmetric with each service. After the client +receives a service ticket, it then contacts the application server +directly. This approach is similar to the one suggested by Sirbu , et +al [1]. + +5.1.1.1. Ticket Policy for PKTAPP Clients + +It is desirable for the LTGS to have access to a PKTAPP client ticket +policy. This policy will contain information for each client, such as +the maximum lifetime of a ticket, whether or not a ticket can be +forwardable, etc. PKTAPP clients, however, use the PKINIT protocol for +authentication and are not required to be registered as Kerberos +principals. + +As one possible solution, each public key Certification Authority could +be registered in a secure database, along with the ticket policy +information for all PKTAPP clients that are certified by this +Certification Authority. + +5.1.1.2. LTGS as a Kerberos Principal + +Since the LTGS serves only PKTAPP clients and returns only end service +tickets for other services, it does not require a Kerberos service key +or a Kerberos principal identity. It is therefore not necessary for the +LTGS to even be registered as a Kerberos principal. + +The LTGS still requires public key credentials for the PKINIT exchange, +and it may be desired to have some global restrictions on the Kerberos +tickets that it can issue. It is recommended (but not required) that +this information be associated with a Kerberos principal entry for the +LTGS. + + +5.1.1.3. Kerberos Principal Database + +Since the LTGS issues tickets for Kerberos services, it will require +access to a Kerberos principal database containing entries for at least +the end services. Each entry must contain a service key and may also +contain restrictions on the service tickets that are issued to clients. +It is recommended that (for ease of administration) this principal +database be centrally administered and distributed (replicated) to all +hosts where an LTGS may be running. + +In the case that there are other clients that do not support PKINIT +protocol, but still need access to the same Kerberos services, this +principal database will also require entries for Kerberos clients and +for the TGS entries. + +5.1.2. The LTGS as part of an application server + +The LTGS may be combined with an application server. This accomplishes +direct client to application server authentication; however, it requires +that applications be modified to process AS-REQ and AS-REP messages. +The LTGS would communicate over the port assigned to the application +server or over the well known Kerberos port for that particular +application. + +5.1.2.2. Ticket Policy for PKTAPP Clients + +Application servers normally do not have access to a distributed +principal database. Therefore, they will have to find another means of +keeping track of the ticket policy information for PKTAPP clients. It is +recommended that this ticket policy be kept in a directory service (such +as LDAP). + +It is critical, however, that both read and write access to this ticket +policy is restricted with strong authentication and encryption to only +the correct application server. An unauthorized party should not have +the authority to modify the ticket policy. Disclosing the ticket policy +to a 3rd party may aid an adversary in determining the best way to +compromise the network. + +It is just as critical for the application server to authenticate the +directory service. Otherwise an adversary could use a man-in-the-middle +attack to substitute a false ticket policy with a false directory +service. + +5.1.2.3. LTGS Credentials + +Each LTGS (combined with an application service) will require public key +credentials in order to use the PKINIT protocol. These credentials can +be stored in a single file that is both encrypted with a password- +derived symmetric key and also secured by an operating system. This +symmetric key may be stashed somewhere on the machine for convenience, +although such practice potentially weakens the overall system security +and is strongly discouraged. + +For added security, it is recommended that the LTGS private keys are +stored inside a temper-resistant hardware module that requires a pin +code for access. + + +5.1.2.4. Compatibility With Standard Kerberos + +Even though an application server is combined with the LTGS, for +backward compatibility it should still accept service tickets that have +been issued by the KDC. This will allow Kerberos clients that do not +support PKTAPP to authenticate to the same application server (with the +help of a KDC). + +5.1.3. Cross-Realm Authentication + +According to the PKINIT draft, the client's realm is the X.500 name of +the Certification Authority that issued the client certificate. A +Kerberos application service will be in a standard Kerberos realm, which +implies that the LTGS will need to issue cross-realm end service +tickets. This is the only case, where cross-realm end service tickets +are issued. In a standard Kerberos model, a client first acquires a +cross-realm TGT, and then gets an end service ticket from the KDC that +is in the same realm as the application service. + +6. Protocol differences between PKINIT and PKDA + +Both PKINIT and PKDA will accomplish the same goal of issuing end +service tickets, based on initial public key authentication. A PKINIT- +based implementation and a PKDA implementation would be functionally +equivalent. The primary differences are that 1)PKDA requires the client +to create the symmetric key while PKINIT requires the server to create +the key and 2)PKINIT accomplishes in two messages what PKDA accomplishes +in four messages. + +7. Summary + +The PKINIT protocol can be used, without modification to facilitate +client to server authentication without the use of a central KDC. The +approach described in this draft (and originally proposed in PKDA[1]) +is essentially a public key authentication protocol that retains the +advantages of Kerberos tickets. + +Given that PKINIT has progressed through the CAT working group of the +IETF, with plans for non-commercial distribution (via MITÆs v5 Kerberos) +as well as commercial support, it is worthwhile to provide PKDA +functionality, under the PKINIT umbrella. + +8. Security Considerations + +PKTAPP is based on the PKINIT protocol and all security considerations +already listed in [2] apply here. + +When the LTGS is implemented as part of each application server, the +secure storage of its public key credentials and of its ticket policy +are both a concern. The respective security considerations are already +covered in sections 5.1.2.3 and 5.1.2.2 of this document. + + +9. Bibliography + +[1] M. Sirbu, J. Chuang. Distributed Authentication in Kerberos Using +Public Key Cryptography. Symposium On Network and Distributed System +Security, 1997. + +[2] B. Tung, C. Neuman, M. Hur, A. Medvinsky, S. Medvinsky, J. Wray, +J. Trostle. Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in +Kerberos. Internet Draft, October 1999. +(ftp://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-10.txt) + +[3] C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for +Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th International +Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May 1993. + +[4] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service +(V5). Request for Comments 1510. + +10. Expiration Date + +This draft expires April 24, 2000. + +11. Authors + +Ari Medvinsky +Keen.com, Inc. +150 Independence Dr. +Menlo Park, CA 94025 +Phone +1 650 289 3134 +E-mail: ari@keen.com + +Matthew Hur +CyberSafe Corporation +1605 NW Sammamish Road +Issaquah, WA 98027-5378 +Phone: +1 425 391 6000 +E-mail: matt.hur@cybersafe.com + +Alexander Medvinsky +Motorola +6450 Sequence Dr. +San Diego, CA 92121 +Phone: +1 858 404 2367 +E-mail: smedvinsky@gi.com + +Clifford Neuman +USC Information Sciences Institute +4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 +Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695 +Phone: +1 310 822 1511 +E-mail: bcn@isi.edu diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2284c3c6b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8277 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + 11 July 1997 + + + + The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts +are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force +(IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other +groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- +Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum +of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by +other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use +Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other +than as "work in progress." + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, +please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in +the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net +(US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US +West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is +filed as draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt, and expires +11 January 1998. Please send comments to: + + krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + + + This document provides an overview and specification of +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to +clarify aspects of the protocol and its intended use that +require more detailed or clearer explanation than was pro- +vided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a +detailed description of the protocol, suitable for implemen- +tation, together with descriptions of the appropriate use of +protocol messages and fields within those messages. + + This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to +__________________________ +Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of +the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No +commercial use of these trademarks may be made without +prior written permission of MIT. + + + +Overview - 1 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +the end user, system administrator, or application +developer. Higher level papers describing Version 5 of the +Kerberos system [1] and documenting version 4 [23], are +available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + + This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model +upon which the Kerberos network authentication system is +based. It also specifies Version 5 of the Kerberos proto- +col. + + The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale +behind most design decisions are treated cursorily; they are +more fully described in a paper available in IEEE communica- +tions [1] and earlier in the Kerberos portion of the Athena +Technical Plan [2]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft +standard through the IETF standard process. Comments are +encouraged on the presentation, but only minor refinements +to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit within +current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + + Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for +discussion of Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed +to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. This mailing list is gatewayed +onto the Usenet as the group comp.protocols.kerberos. +Requests for further information, including documents and +code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + + The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and +Schroeder's trusted third-party authentication protocol [4] +and on modifications suggested by Denning and Sacco [5]. +The original design and implementation of Kerberos Versions +1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff +members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and +Clifford Neuman (now at the Information Sciences Institute +of the University of Southern California), along with Jerome +Saltzer, Technical Director of Project Athena, and Jeffrey +Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members of +Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Ker- +beros. + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this +document) has evolved from Version 4 based on new require- +ments and desires for features not available in Version 4. +The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was led by +Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the com- +munity. The development of the MIT reference implementation +was led at MIT by John Kohl and Theodore T'so, with help and +contributed code from many others. Reference implementa- +tions of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are pub- +licly available and commercial implementations have been + +Overview - 2 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +developed and are widely used. + + Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 +and 5 can be found in [6]. + +1. Introduction + + Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities +of principals, (e.g. a workstation user or a network server) +on an open (unprotected) network. This is accomplished +without relying on assertions by the host operating system, +without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring +physical security of all the hosts on the network, and under +the assumption that packets traveling along the network can +be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. Kerberos per- +forms authentication under these conditions as a trusted +third-party authentication service by using conventional +(shared secret key[2]) cryptography. Kerberos extensions +have been proposed and implemented that provide for the use +of public key cryptography during certain phases of the +authentication protocol. These extensions provide for +authentication of users registered with public key certifi- +cation authorities, and allow the system to provide certain +benefits of public key cryptography in situations where they +are needed. + + The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as +follows: A client sends a request to the authentication +server (AS) requesting "credentials" for a given server. +The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the +client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a "ticket" for +the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a +"session key"). The client transmits the ticket (which con- +tains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, +all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The ses- +sion key (now shared by the client and server) is used to +authenticate the client, and may optionally be used to +__________________________ +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' +functions only upon the initiation of a stream-based +network connection. Unless an application subsequently +provides integrity protection for the data stream, the +identity verification applies only to the initiation of +the connection, and does not guarantee that subsequent +messages on the connection originate from the same +principal. +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably +in the literature. In our usage, it takes two (or +more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key is a +secret key. Something is only private when no one but +its owner knows it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, +one has a public and a private key. + + + +Section 1. - 3 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authenticate the server. It may also be used to encrypt +further communication between the two parties or to exchange +a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further +communication. + + Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or +more authentication servers running on physically secure +hosts. The authentication servers maintain a database of +principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret keys. +Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos +protocol. In order to add authentication to its transac- +tions, a typical network application adds one or two calls +to the Kerberos library directly or through the Generic +Security Services Application Programming Interface, GSSAPI, +described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authenti- +cation. + + The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols +(or exchanges). There are two basic methods by which a +client can ask a Kerberos server for credentials. In the +first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for a +ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent +encrypted in the client's secret key. Usually this request +is for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) which can later be +used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). In the second +method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client +uses the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same +manner as if it were contacting any other application server +that requires Kerberos authentication. The reply is +encrypted in the session key from the TGT. Though the pro- +tocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different pro- +tocol entry points within a single Kerberos server. + + Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the +identity of the principals in a transaction, to ensure the +integrity of messages exchanged between them, or to preserve +privacy of the messages. The application is free to choose +whatever protection may be necessary. + + To verify the identities of the principals in a tran- +saction, the client transmits the ticket to the application +server. Since the ticket is sent "in the clear" (parts of +it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart replay) +and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, addi- +tional information is sent to prove that the message ori- +ginated with the principal to whom the ticket was issued. +This information (called the authenticator) is encrypted in +the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp +proves that the message was recently generated and is not a +replay. Encrypting the authenticator in the session key +proves that it was generated by a party possessing the ses- +sion key. Since no one except the requesting principal and + + +Section 1. - 4 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +the server know the session key (it is never sent over the +network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the +client. + + The integrity of the messages exchanged between princi- +pals can also be guaranteed using the session key (passed in +the ticket and contained in the credentials). This approach +provides detection of both replay attacks and message stream +modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a +hash or digest function) of the client's message, keyed with +the session key. Privacy and integrity of the messages +exchanged between principals can be secured by encrypting +the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + + The authentication exchanges mentioned above require +read-only access to the Kerberos database. Sometimes, how- +ever, the entries in the database must be modified, such as +when adding new principals or changing a principal's key. +This is done using a protocol between a client and a third +Kerberos server, the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). +There is also a protocol for maintaining multiple copies of +the Kerberos database. Neither of these protocols are +described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + + The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across +organizational boundaries. A client in one organization can +be authenticated to a server in another. Each organization +wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its own +"realm". The name of the realm in which a client is +registered is part of the client's name, and can be used by +the end-service to decide whether to honor a request. + + By establishing "inter-realm" keys, the administrators +of two realms can allow a client authenticated in the local +realm to prove its identity to servers in other realms[3]. +The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key may be used +for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of +each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is +then able to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote +realm's ticket-granting service from its local realm. When +that ticket-granting ticket is used, the remote ticket- +granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +__________________________ +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client +could arrange registration of a separately-named prin- +cipal in a remote realm, and engage in normal exchanges +with that realm's services. However, for even small +numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more +automatic methods as described here are necessary. + + +Section 1.1. - 5 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket- +granting ticket, and is thus certain that it was issued by +the client's own TGS. Tickets issued by the remote ticket- +granting service will indicate to the end-service that the +client was authenticated from another realm. + + A realm is said to communicate with another realm if +the two realms share an inter-realm key, or if the local +realm shares an inter-realm key with an intermediate realm +that communicates with the remote realm. An authentication +path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are tran- +sited in communicating from one realm to another. + + Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each +realm shares a key with its parent and a different key with +each child. If an inter-realm key is not directly shared by +two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an authen- +tication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical +organization is not used, it may be necessary to consult a +database in order to construct an authentication path +between realms. + + Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermedi- +ate realms may be bypassed to achieve cross-realm authenti- +cation through alternate authentication paths (these might +be established to make communication between two realms more +efficient). It is important for the end-service to know +which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to +place in the authentication process. To facilitate this +decision, a field in each ticket contains the names of the +realms that were involved in authenticating the client. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of +verifying the identity of principals on a network. Authen- +tication is usually useful primarily as a first step in the +process of authorization, determining whether a client may +use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos +does not, by itself, provide authorization. Possession of a +client ticket for a service provides only for authentication +of the client to that service, and in the absence of a +separate authorization procedure, it should not be con- +sidered by an application as authorizing the use of that +service. + + Such separate authorization methods may be implemented +as application specific access control functions and may be +based on files such as the application server, or on +separately issued authorization credentials such as those +based on proxies [7] , or on other authorization services. + + Applications should not be modified to accept the +issuance of a service ticket by the Kerberos server (even by + +Section 1.2. - 6 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +an modified Kerberos server) as granting authority to use +the service, since such applications may become vulnerable +to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment +where they interoperate with other KDCs or where other +options for application authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP pro- +posal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in +which it can properly function: + ++ "Denial of service" attacks are not solved with Ker- + beros. There are places in these protocols where an + intruder can prevent an application from participating + in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to + be not-uncommon "normal" failure modes for the system) + is usually best left to the human administrators and + users. + ++ Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an + intruder somehow steals a principal's key, it will be + able to masquerade as that principal or impersonate any + server to the legitimate principal. + ++ "Password guessing" attacks are not solved by Kerberos. + If a user chooses a poor password, it is possible for + an attacker to successfully mount an offline dictionary + attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt, with suc- + cessive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained + which are encrypted under a key derived from the user's + password. + ++ Each host on the network must have a clock which is + "loosely synchronized" to the time of the other hosts; + this synchronization is used to reduce the bookkeeping + needs of application servers when they do replay detec- + tion. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 + minutes. If the clocks are synchronized over the net- + work, the clock synchronization protocol must itself be + secured from network attackers. + ++ Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term + basis. A typical mode of access control will use + access control lists (ACLs) to grant permissions to + particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains + for a deleted principal and the principal identifier is + reused, the new principal will inherit rights specified + in the stale ACL entry. By not re-using principal + identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + + + +Section 1.3. - 7 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + + +Authentication Verifying the claimed identity of a + principal. + + +Authentication headerA record containing a Ticket and an + Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication + process. + + +Authentication path A sequence of intermediate realms tran- + sited in the authentication process when + communicating from one realm to another. + + +Authenticator A record containing information that can + be shown to have been recently generated + using the session key known only by the + client and server. + + +Authorization The process of determining whether a + client may use a service, which objects + the client is allowed to access, and the + type of access allowed for each. + + +Capability A token that grants the bearer permis- + sion to access an object or service. In + Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose + use is restricted by the contents of the + authorization data field, but which + lists no network addresses, together + with the session key necessary to use + the ticket. + + +Ciphertext The output of an encryption function. + Encryption transforms plaintext into + ciphertext. + + +Client A process that makes use of a network + service on behalf of a user. Note that + in some cases a Server may itself be a + client of some other server (e.g. a + print server may be a client of a file + server). + + + +Section 1.4. - 8 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +Credentials A ticket plus the secret session key + necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. + + +KDC Key Distribution Center, a network ser- + vice that supplies tickets and temporary + session keys; or an instance of that + service or the host on which it runs. + The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The + initial ticket portion is sometimes + referred to as the Authentication Server + (or service). The ticket-granting + ticket portion is sometimes referred to + as the ticket-granting server (or ser- + vice). + + +Kerberos Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding + Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the + protocol used by that service, or the + code used to implement the authentica- + tion service. + + +Plaintext The input to an encryption function or + the output of a decryption function. + Decryption transforms ciphertext into + plaintext. + + +Principal A uniquely named client or server + instance that participates in a network + communication. + + +Principal identifierThe name used to uniquely identify each + different principal. + + +Seal To encipher a record containing several + fields in such a way that the fields + cannot be individually replaced without + either knowledge of the encryption key + or leaving evidence of tampering. + + +Secret key An encryption key shared by a principal + and the KDC, distributed outside the + bounds of the system, with a long life- + time. In the case of a human user's + principal, the secret key is derived + + +Section 1.4. - 9 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + from a password. + + +Server A particular Principal which provides a + resource to network clients. The server + is sometimes refered to as the Applica- + tion Server. + + +Service A resource provided to network clients; + often provided by more than one server + (for example, remote file service). + + +Session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, with a lifetime limited + to the duration of a single login "ses- + sion". + + +Sub-session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, selected and exchanged + by the principals using the session key, + and with a lifetime limited to the dura- + tion of a single association. + + +Ticket A record that helps a client authenti- + cate itself to a server; it contains the + client's identity, a session key, a + timestamp, and other information, all + sealed using the server's secret key. + It only serves to authenticate a client + when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used +to indicate various attributes of that ticket. Most flags +may be requested by a client when the ticket is obtained; +some are automatically turned on and off by a Kerberos +server as required. The following sections explain what the +various flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use +such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + + The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued +using the AS protocol and not issued based on a ticket- +granting ticket. Application servers that want to require +the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set +in any tickets they accept, and thus be assured that the + + +Section 2.1. - 10 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +client's key was recently presented to the application +client. + + The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition +information about the initial authentication, regardless of +whether the current ticket was issued directly (in which +case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of a +ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is +clear, but the PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried +forward from the ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + + The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. +Application servers must reject tickets which have this flag +set. A postdated ticket will usually be issued in this +form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC before +use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the +VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only validate tick- +ets after their starttime has passed. The validation is +required so that postdated tickets which have been stolen +before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid +(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + + Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be +valid for long periods of time. However, this can expose +their credentials to potential theft for equally long +periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until +the expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short- +lived tickets and obtaining new ones periodically would +require the client to have long-term access to its secret +key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be used to +mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have +two "expiration times": the first is when the current +instance of the ticket expires, and the second is the latest +permissible value for an individual expiration time. An +application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the +RENEW option set in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a +new ticket with a new session key and a later expiration +time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified by +the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration +time arrives, the ticket expires permanently. At each +renewal, the KDC may consult a hot-list to determine if the +ticket had been reported stolen since its last renewal; it +will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the +usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only inter- +preted by the ticket-granting service (discussed below in +section 3.3). It can usually be ignored by application +servers. However, some particularly careful application + + +Section 2.3. - 11 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + + If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration +time, the KDC will not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag +is reset by default, but a client may request it be set by +setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. If +it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains +the time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + + Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets +for use much later, e.g. a batch submission system would +need tickets to be valid at the time the batch job is ser- +viced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in a +batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more +prone to theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain +these tickets from the KDC at job submission time, but to +leave them "dormant" until they are activated and validated +by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were +reported in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate +the ticket, and the thief would be foiled. + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only +interpreted by the ticket-granting service. It can be +ignored by application servers. This flag must be set in a +ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket +based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it +may be requested by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE +option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow +a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting ticket; post- +dated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by +requesting the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The +life (endtime-starttime) of a postdated ticket will be the +remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at the time of +the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in +which case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of +the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how far in +the future a ticket may be postdated. + + The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been +postdated. The application server can check the authtime +field in the ticket to see when the original authentication +occurred. Some services may choose to reject postdated +tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain +period after the original authentication. When the KDC +issues a POSTDATED ticket, it will also be marked as +INVALID, so that the application client must present the +ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + + At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a +service to perform an operation on its behalf. The service + + +Section 2.5. - 12 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +must be able to take on the identity of the client, but only +for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a service +to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose +by granting it a proxy. + + The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and +proxiable flags is used to provide credentials for use with +specific services. Though conceptually also a proxy, user's +wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must use +the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next sec- +tion to forward a ticket granting ticket. + + The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only inter- +preted by the ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by +application servers. When set, this flag tells the ticket- +granting server that it is OK to issue a new ticket (but not +a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address +based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the +client on initial authentication. By default, the client +will request that it be set when requesting a ticket grant- +ing ticket, and reset when requesting any other ticket. + + This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server +to perform a remote request on its behalf, e.g. a print ser- +vice client can give the print server a proxy to access the +client's files on a particular file server in order to +satisfy a print request. + + In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, +Kerberos tickets are usually valid from only those network +addresses specifically included in the ticket[4]. When +granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network +address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that +the proxy is to be issued for use from any address. + + The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it +issues a proxy ticket. Application servers may check this +flag and at their option they may require additional authen- +tication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to +provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + + Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy +where the service is granted complete use of the client's +identity. An example where it might be used is when a user +logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to work +from that system as if the login were local. + + The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only +__________________________ +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- +ets with no network addresses specified. + + +Section 2.6. - 13 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +interpreted by the ticket-granting service. It can be +ignored by application servers. The FORWARDABLE flag has an +interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE flag, except +ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users +may request that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option +in the AS request when they request their initial ticket- +granting ticket. + + This flag allows for authentication forwarding without +requiring the user to enter a password again. If the flag +is not set, then authentication forwarding is not permitted, +but the same result can still be achieved if the user +engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + + The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client +presents a ticket with the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests +a forwarded ticket by specifying the FORWARDED KDC option +and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It is +also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the +FORWARDED flag set. Application servers may choose to pro- +cess FORWARDED tickets differently than non-FORWARDED tick- +ets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + + There are two additional options which may be set in a +client's request of the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indi- +cates that the client will accept a renewable ticket if a +ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be provided. +If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then +the KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal +to the the requested endtime. The value of the renew-till +field may still be adjusted by site-determined limits or +limits imposed by the individual principal or server. + + The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the +ticket-granting service. It indicates that the ticket to be +issued for the end server is to be encrypted in the session +key from the a additional second ticket-granting ticket pro- +vided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific +details. + +__________________________ +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored +unless the requester can provide the old password (the +user's current secret key). Otherwise, it would be +possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- +sion and change another user's password. +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local sys- +tem, the credentials obtained in the AS exchange may +first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain credentials + + +Section 3.1. - 14 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between +network clients and servers and the messages involved in +those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + + The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the +client and the Kerberos Authentication Server is initiated +by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication creden- +tials for a given server but currently holds no credentials. +In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for en- +cryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at +the initiation of a login session to obtain credentials for +a Ticket-Granting Server which will subsequently be used to +obtain credentials for other servers (see section 3.3) +without requiring further use of the client's secret key. +This exchange is also used to request credentials for ser- +vices which must not be mediated through the Ticket-Granting +Service, but rather require a principal's secret key, such +as the password-changing service[5]. This exchange does not +by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the +user[6]. + + The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from +the client to Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in +reply. The formats for these messages are described in sec- +tions 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + + In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own +identity and the identity of the server for which it is +requesting credentials. The response, KRB_AS_REP, contains +a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a ses- +sion key that will be shared by the client and the server. +The session key and additional information are encrypted in +the client's secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message contains +information which can be used to detect replays, and to +associate it with the message to which it replies. Various +errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response +(KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error +__________________________ +for a local server. Those credentials must then be +verified by a local server through successful comple- +tion of the Client/Server exchange. + + + +Section 3.1. - 15 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +message is not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains +information which can be used to associate it with the mes- +sage to which it replies. The lack of encryption in the +KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays, +fabrications, or modifications of such messages. + + Without preautentication, the authentication server +does not know whether the client is actually the principal +named in the request. It simply sends a reply without know- +ing or caring whether they are the same. This is acceptable +because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in +the request will be able to use the reply. Its critical +information is encrypted in that principal's key. The ini- +tial request supports an optional field that can be used to +pass additional information that might be needed for the +initial exchange. This field may be used for pre- +authentication as described in section <>. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + + The client may specify a number of options in the ini- +tial request. Among these options are whether pre- +authentication is to be performed; whether the requested +ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; +whether it should be postdated or allow postdating of +derivative tickets; and whether a renewable ticket will be +accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the requested +ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non- +renewable ticket (due to configuration constraints; see sec- +tion 4). See section A.1 for pseudocode. + + The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it +to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + + If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message +will result in the creation of a ticket for the client to +present to the server. The format for the ticket is +described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are +determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + + The authentication server looks up the client and +server principals named in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, +extracting their respective keys. If required, the server +pre-authenticates the request, and if the pre-authentication +check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot +accommodate the requested encryption type, an error message +with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP is returned. Otherwise it +generates a "random" session key[7]. +__________________________ + + +Section 3.1.3. - 16 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a +client in the Kerberos database (or if the key registered +supports multiple encryption types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and +DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS request is +used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used +for encrypting the response to the client. If there is more +than one supported, strong encryption type in the etype +list, the first valid etype for which an encryption key is +available is used. The encryption method used to respond to +a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key +found in the ticket granting ticket. + + When the etype field is present in a KDC request, +whether an AS or TGS request, the KDC will attempt to assign +the type of the random session key from the list of methods +in the etype field. The KDC will select the appropriate +type using the list of methods provided together with infor- +mation from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable +encryption methods for the application server. The KDC will +not issue tickets with a weak session key encryption type. + + If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time +in the past, or is within the window of acceptable clock +skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE option has not been speci- +fied, then the start time of the ticket is set to the +authentication server's current time. If it indicates a +time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the +POSTDATED option has not been specified then the error +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise the +requested start time is checked against the policy of the +local realm (the administrator might decide to prohibit cer- +tain types or ranges of postdated tickets), and if accept- +able, the ticket's start time is set as requested and the +INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated ticket +must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC +after the start time has been reached. + + + + + + + + + +__________________________ +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should +be impossible to guess the next session key based on +knowledge of past session keys. This can only be +achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is +based on cryptographic principles. It is more desir- +able to use a truly random number generator, such as +one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + + + +Section 3.1.3. - 17 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum +of the following: + ++The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ + message. + ++The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the client principal (the authentication + server's database includes a maximum ticket lifetime field + in each principal's record; see section 4). + ++The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the server principal. + ++The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + + If the requested expiration time minus the start time +(as determined above) is less than a site-determined minimum +lifetime, an error message with code KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is +returned. If the requested expiration time for the ticket +exceeds what was determined as above, and if the +"RENEWABLE-OK" option was requested, then the "RENEWABLE" +flag is set in the new ticket, and the renew-till value is +set as if the "RENEWABLE" option were requested (the field +and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the +RENEWABLE-OK option has been set and a renewable ticket is +to be issued, then the renew-till field is set to the +minimum of: + ++Its requested value. + ++The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two + maximum renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' + database entries. + ++The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable + lifetime set by the policy of the local realm. + + The flags field of the new ticket will have the follow- +ing options set if they have been requested and if the pol- +icy of the local realm allows: FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, +POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new ticket is post- +dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + + If all of the above succeed, the server formats a +KRB_AS_REP message (see section 5.4.2), copying the +addresses in the request into the caddr of the response, +placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata +of the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the +client's key using the requested encryption method, and + + +Section 3.1.3. - 18 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +sends it to the client. See section A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + + Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server +responds by returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the +client, with the error-code and e-text fields set to +appropriate values. The error message contents and details +are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + + If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the +client verifies that the cname and crealm fields in the +cleartext portion of the reply match what it requested. If +any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive +the proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client +decrypts the encrypted part of the response using its secret +key, verifies that the nonce in the encrypted part matches +the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect replays). +It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response +match those in the request (or are otherwise expected +values), and that the host address field is also correct. +It then stores the ticket, session key, start and expiration +times, and other information for later use. The key- +expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may +be checked to notify the user of impending key expiration +(the client program could then suggest remedial action, such +as a password change). See section A.3 for pseudocode. + + Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not suf- +ficient to verify the identity of the user; the user and an +attacker could cooperate to generate a KRB_AS_REP format +message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper +KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, +it must require the user to present application credentials +which can be verified using a securely-stored secret key for +the host. If those credentials can be verified, then the +identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + + If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client +interprets it as an error and performs whatever +application-specific tasks are necessary to recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + + +Section 3.2. - 19 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used +by network applications to authenticate the client to the +server and vice versa. The client must have already +acquired credentials for the server using the AS or TGS +exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + + The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information +which should be part of the first message in an authenti- +cated transaction. It contains a ticket, an authenticator, +and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insuf- +ficient to authenticate a client, since tickets are passed +across the network in cleartext[8], so the authenticator is +used to prevent invalid replay of tickets by proving to the +server that the client knows the session key of the ticket +and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ mes- +sage is referred to elsewhere as the "authentication +header." + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + + When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a +server, it obtains (either through a credentials cache, the +AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a ticket and session key +for the desired service. The client may re-use any tickets +it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client con- +structs a new Authenticator from the the system time, its +name, and optionally an application specific checksum, an +initial sequence number to be used in KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV +messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in negotiations +for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if +replayed to a server[9]. If a sequence number is to be +included, it should be randomly chosen so that even after +many messages have been exchanged it is not likely to col- +lide with other sequence numbers in use. + + The client may indicate a requirement of mutual +__________________________ +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted +portion, so cleartext here refers to the entire unit, +which can be copied from one message and replayed in +another without any cryptographic skill. +[9] Note that this can make applications based on un- +reliable transports difficult to code correctly. If the +transport might deliver duplicated messages, either a +new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies +and replay the first reply in response to a detected +duplicate. + + + +Section 3.2.2. - 20 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authentication or the use of a session-key based ticket by +setting the appropriate flag(s) in the ap-options field of +the message. + + The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and +combined with the ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message +which is then sent to the end server along with any addi- +tional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + + Authentication is based on the server's current time of +day (clocks must be loosely synchronized), the authentica- +tor, and the ticket. Several errors are possible. If an +error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client +with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated +in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not accept- +able to the protocol. The format of error messages is +described in section 5.9.1. + + The algorithm for verifying authentication information +is as follows. If the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the +server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key +version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not one +the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the +server no longer possesses a copy of the old key), the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE- +SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it indi- +cates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the ses- +sion key from the server's ticket-granting ticket rather +than its secret key[10]. Since it is possible for the +server to be registered in multiple realms, with different +keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of +the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret +key the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server +doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + + The ticket is decrypted using the version of the +server's key specified by the ticket. If the decryption +routines detect a modification of the ticket (each encryp- +tion system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY +error is returned (chances are good that different keys were +used to encrypt and decrypt). + + The authenticator is decrypted using the session key +extracted from the decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it +to have been modified, the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is +__________________________ +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as +described in [8]. + + +Section 3.2.3. - 21 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +returned. The name and realm of the client from the ticket +are compared against the same fields in the authenticator. +If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is +returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong +session key was used to encrypt the authenticator). The +addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for an +address matching the operating-system reported address of +the client. If no match is found or the server insists on +ticket addresses but none are present in the ticket, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + + If the local (server) time and the client time in the +authenticator differ by more than the allowable clock skew +(e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. +If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is +returned[11]. The server must remember any authenticator +presented within the allowable clock skew, so that a replay +attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses track of +any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, +it must reject all requests until the clock skew interval +has passed. This assures that any lost or re-played authen- +ticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew and can +no longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an +attacker could conceivably record the ticket and authentica- +tor sent over the network to a server, then disable the +client's host, pose as the disabled host, and replay the +ticket and authenticator to subvert the authentication.). +If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the +server saves it for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or +KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is present, the server +either saves it for later use or uses it to help generate +its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP +message. + + The server computes the age of the ticket: local +(server) time minus the start time inside the Ticket. If +the start time is later than the current time by more than +the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Oth- +erwise, if the current time is later than end time by more +than the allowable clock skew, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED +error is returned. + + If all these checks succeed without an error, the +__________________________ +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to au- +thenticators from the same principal to the same +server. Other client principals communicating with the +same server principal should not be have their authen- +ticators rejected if the time and microsecond fields +happen to match some other client's authenticator. + + +Section 3.2.3. - 22 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +server is assured that the client possesses the credentials +of the principal named in the ticket and thus, the client +has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for +pseudocode. + + Passing these checks provides only authentication of +the named principal; it does not imply authorization to use +the named service. Applications must make a separate +authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of +the user, the requested operation, local acces control +information such as that contained in a .k5login or .k5users +file, and possibly a separate distributed authorization ser- +vice. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + + Typically, a client's request will include both the +authentication information and its initial request in the +same message, and the server need not explicitly reply to +the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication (not only +authenticating the client to the server, but also the server +to the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message +will have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a +KRB_AP_REP message is required in response. As with the +error message, this message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable to +the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond +field used in the reply must be the client's timestamp and +microsecond field (as provided in the authenticator)[12]. +If a sequence number is to be included, it should be ran- +domly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A +subkey may be included if the server desires to negotiate a +different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in +the session key extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + + + If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses +the session key from the credentials obtained for the +server[13] to decrypt the message, and verifies that the +__________________________ +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp +in the reply was the client's timestamp plus one. This +is not necessary in version 5 because version 5 mes- +sages are formatted in such a way that it is not possi- +ble to create the reply by judicious message surgery +(even in encrypted form) without knowledge of the ap- +propriate encryption keys. +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, +the sub-session key is not used, even if present in the +Authenticator. + + +Section 3.2.5. - 23 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the Authen- +ticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the +client is assured that the server is genuine. The sequence +number and subkey (if present) are retained for later use. +See section A.12 for pseudocode. + + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + + After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, +the client and server share an encryption key which can be +used by the application. The "true session key" to be used +for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other application-specific uses +may be chosen by the application based on the subkeys in the +KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some +cases, the use of this session key will be implicit in the +protocol; in others the method of use must be chosen from +several alternatives. We leave the protocol negotiations of +how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or check- +sum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos proto- +col does not constrain the implementation options, but an +example of how this might be done follows. + + One way that an application may choose to negotiate a +key to be used for subequent integrity and privacy protec- +tion is for the client to propose a key in the subkey field +of the authenticator. The server can then choose a key +using the proposed key from the client as input, returning +the new subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. +This key could then be used for subsequent communication. +To make this example more concrete, if the encryption method +in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever reason, one +of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than +40 unknown bits, this method would allow the the party which +is prevented from using more than 40 bits to either propose +(if the client) an initial key with a known quantity for 16 +of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if the server) +with the known quantity. The application implementor is +warned, however, that this is only an example, and that an +analysis of the particular crytosystem to be used, and the +reasons for limiting the key length, must be made before +deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits of the key. + + With both the one-way and mutual authentication +exchanges, the peers should take care not to send sensitive +information to each other without proper assurances. In +particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client +__________________________ +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to pro- +vide routines to choose subkeys based on session keys +and random numbers and to generate a negotiated key to +be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + + +Section 3.2.6. - 24 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +to assure both client and server of their peer's identity. +If an application protocol requires privacy of its messages, +it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section 3.5). The KRB_SAFE +message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + + The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos +Ticket-Granting Server is initiated by a client when it +wishes to obtain authentication credentials for a given +server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when +it wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when +it wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the first case, the +client must already have acquired a ticket for the Ticket- +Granting Service using the AS exchange (the ticket-granting +ticket is usually obtained when a client initially authenti- +cates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The mes- +sage format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that +for the AS exchange. The primary difference is that encryp- +tion and decryption in the TGS exchange does not take place +under the client's key. Instead, the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session +key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for all +application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the +TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, +the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid +tickets. + + The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request +(KRB_TGS_REQ) from the client to the Kerberos Ticket- +Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or KRB_ERROR). +The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating +the client plus a request for credentials. The authentica- +tion information consists of the authentication header +(KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the client's previously obtained +ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. In the +ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may +include one or more of: a list of network addresses, a col- +lection of typed authorization data to be sealed in the +ticket for authorization use by the application server, or +additional tickets (the use of which are described later). +The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested creden- +tials, encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket, or if present, in the sub- +session key from the Authenticator (part of the authentica- +tion header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code + + +Section 3.3. - 25 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +and text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message +is not encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message contains informa- +tion which can be used to detect replays, and to associate +it with the message to which it replies. The KRB_ERROR mes- +sage also contains information which can be used to associ- +ate it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of +encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to +detect replays or fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + Before sending a request to the ticket-granting ser- +vice, the client must determine in which realm the applica- +tion server is registered[15]. If the client does not +already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted +by requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the destination +realm from a Kerberos server for which the client does +posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ mes- +sage recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for +the desired realm in which case one can proceed. Alterna- +tively, the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm +which is "closer" to the desired realm (further along the +standard hierarchical path), in which case this step must be +repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in +the returned TGT. If neither are returned, then the request +must be retried with a Kerberos server for a realm higher in +the hierarchy. This request will itself require a ticket- +granting ticket for the higher realm which must be obtained +by recursively applying these directions. + + + Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for +the appropriate realm, it determines which Kerberos servers +serve that realm, and contacts one. The list might be +obtained through a configuration file or network service or +it may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as +the secret keys exchanged by realms are kept secret, only +denial of service results from using a false Kerberos +server. +__________________________ +[15] This can be accomplished in several ways. It +might be known beforehand (since the realm is part of +the principal identifier), it might be stored in a +nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- +tion file. If the realm to be used is obtained from a +nameserver, there is a danger of being spoofed if the +nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- +cated. This might result in the use of a realm which +has been compromised, and would result in an attacker's +ability to compromise the authentication of the appli- +cation server to the client. + + + +Section 3.3.1. - 26 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number +of options in the KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares +the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing an authentication header +as an element of the padata field, and including the same +fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for appli- +cation server use and additional tickets required by some +options. + + In preparing the authentication header, the client can +select a sub-session key under which the response from the +Kerberos server will be encrypted[16]. If the sub-session +key is not specified, the session key from the ticket- +granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data +is present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if +present, from the authenticator portion of the authentica- +tion header, or if not present, using the session key from +the ticket-granting ticket. + + Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server +for the destination realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner simi- +lar to the KRB_AS_REQ message, but there are many additional +checks to be performed. First, the Kerberos server must +determine which server the accompanying ticket is for and it +must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting ser- +vice, and the TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued +by another realm, then the appropriate inter-realm key must +be used. If the accompanying ticket is not a ticket grant- +ing ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY +options are specified in the request, and the server for +which a ticket is requested is the server named in the +accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the ticket in +the authentication header using the key of the server for +which it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the +padata field, the KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. + + Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the +user-supplied checksum in the Authenticator must be verified +against the contents of the request, and the message +rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +__________________________ +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must +be taken to ensure the randomness of the selected sub- +session key. One approach would be to generate a ran- +dom number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + + +Section 3.3.2. - 27 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or +not collision-proof (with an error code of +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the checksum type is not sup- +ported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. If +the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + + If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity +checks, the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + + The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the +KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to +KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in section +5.4.2. + + The response will include a ticket for the requested +server. The Kerberos database is queried to retrieve the +record for the requested server (including the key with +which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request is for +a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key +is shared with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server +will select the realm "closest" to the requested realm with +which it does share a key, and use that realm instead. This +is the only case where the response from the KDC will be for +a different server than that requested by the client. + + By default, the address field, the client's name and +realm, the list of transited realms, the time of initial +authentication, the expiration time, and the authorization +data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from the +ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the +transited field needs to be updated, but the transited type +is not supported, the KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. + + If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime +of the new ticket is set to the minimum of (a) that request, +(b) the endtime from the TGT, and (c) the starttime of the +TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the application +server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when +the TGT was issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, +then the endtime above is replaced by the minimum of (a) the +value of the renew_till field of the ticket and (b) the +starttime for the new ticket plus the life (endtime- +starttime) of the old ticket. + + If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the +resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. This option will only be honored if the FORWARDABLE +flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is similar; the +resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the + + +Section 3.3.3. - 28 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in +the TGT is set. The PROXY option will not be honored on +requests for additional ticket-granting tickets. + + If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time +in the past, or is within the window of acceptable clock +skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE option has not been speci- +fied, then the start time of the ticket is set to the +authentication server's current time. If it indicates a +time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the +POSTDATED option has not been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE +flag is not set in the TGT, then the error +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the +ticket-granting ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then +the resulting ticket will be postdated and the requested +starttime is checked against the policy of the local realm. +If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, +and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be +validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the +starttime has been reached. However, in no case may the +starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued +postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the +ticket-granting ticket. + + If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an +additional ticket has been included in the request, the KDC +will decrypt the additional ticket using the key for the +server to which the additional ticket was issued and verify +that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the +requested server is missing from the request, the name of +the client in the additional ticket will be used. Otherwise +the name of the requested server will be compared to the +name of the client in the additional ticket and if dif- +ferent, the request will be rejected. If the request +succeeds, the session key from the additional ticket will be +used to encrypt the new ticket that is issued instead of +using the key of the server for which the new ticket will be +used[17]. + + If the name of the server in the ticket that is +presented to the KDC as part of the authentication header is +not that of the ticket-granting server itself, the server is +registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW option is +requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag +is set in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in +the ticket, and that the renew_till time is still in the +future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, the KDC will +__________________________ +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user +authentication [8], which uses ticket-granting ticket +session keys in lieu of secret server keys in situa- +tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- +ised. + + +Section 3.3.3. - 29 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is +set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will +check that the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the +tests succeed, and the ticket passes the hotlist check +described in the next paragraph, the KDC will issue the +appropriate new ticket. + + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + + Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting +server, the presented ticket(s) is(are) checked against a +hot-list of tickets which have been canceled. This hot-list +might be implemented by storing a range of issue timestamps +for "suspect tickets"; if a presented ticket had an authtime +in that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen +ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to +gain additional tickets (renewals or otherwise) once the +theft has been reported. Any normal ticket obtained before +it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their +normal expiration time. + + The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP +message is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authen- +ticator, if present, or the session key key from the +ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's +expiration date and the key version number fields are left +out since these values are stored along with the client's +database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy a +request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 +for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + + If the identity of the server in the TGT that is +presented to the KDC as part of the authentication header is +that of the ticket-granting service, but the TGT was issued +from another realm, the KDC will look up the inter-realm key +shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the +request, subject to the constraints outlined above in the +section describing the AS exchange. The realm part of the +client's identity will be taken from the ticket-granting +ticket. The name of the realm that issued the ticket- +granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the +ticket to be issued. This is accomplished by reading the +transited field from the ticket-granting ticket (which is +treated as an unordered set of realm names), adding the new +realm to the set, then constructing and writing out its +encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement +of the existing encoding). + + + +Section 3.3.3.2. - 30 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the +name of its own realm. Instead, its responsibility is to +add the name of the previous realm. This prevents a mali- +cious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its own +name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + + The names of neither the local realm nor the +principal's realm are to be included in the transited field. +They appear elsewhere in the ticket and both are known to +have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the +endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop +inter-realm authentication result in a transited field that +is empty. + + Because the name of each realm transited is added to +this field, it might potentially be very long. To decrease +the length of this field, its contents are encoded. The +initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal +case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrange- +ment of realms using either domain or X.500 style realm +names. This encoding (called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now +described. + + Realm names in the transited field are separated by a +",". The ",", "\", trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") +are special characters, and if they are part of a realm +name, they must be quoted in the transited field by preced- +ing them with a "\". + + A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being +prepended to the previous realm. For example, we can encode +traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, +and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end- +points, that they would not be included in this field, and +we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being +appended to the previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by +itself, then it should be preceded by a space (" "). For +example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, /COM/HP, +/COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". +__________________________ +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding +the first listed realm is considered to be the null +realm (""). + + +Section 3.3.3.2. - 31 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are +endpoints, they they would not be included in this field, +and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + + + A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates +that all realms between the previous realm and the next +realm have been traversed[19]. Thus, "," means that all +realms along the path between the client and the server have +been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms +from the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierar- +chy) have been traversed, and that everything from /COM down +to the server's realm in an X.500 style has also been +traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierar- +chy shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm +in another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is pro- +cessed in the same manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing +described above. The primary difference is that the cipher- +text part of the response must be decrypted using the ses- +sion key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the +client's secret key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + + The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring +the ability to detect modifications of messages they +exchange. It achieves this by including a keyed collision- +proof checksum of the user data and some control informa- +tion. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually +the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if +no negotiation has occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it +collects its data and the appropriate control information +and computes a checksum over them. The checksum algorithm +should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the RSA- +MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or +the DES MAC), generated using the sub-session key if +present, or the session key. Different algorithms may be +__________________________ +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, +the client's realm is considered to precede those in +the transited field, and the server's realm is con- +sidered to follow them. + + +Section 3.4.1. - 32 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +selected by changing the checksum type in the message. +Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable +for this use. + + The control information for the KRB_SAFE message +includes both a timestamp and a sequence number. The +designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE message must +choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice +should be based on the needs of the application protocol. + + Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will +be received by one's peer. Connection state is presently +required to maintain the session key, so maintaining the +next sequence number should not present an additional prob- +lem. + + If the application protocol is expected to tolerate +lost messages without them being resent, the use of the +timestamp is the appropriate replay detection mechanism. +Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common +sub-session key, but some messages will be sent to a subset +of one's peers. + + After computing the checksum, the client then transmits +the information and checksum to the recipient in the message +format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies +it as follows. If any error occurs, an error code is +reported for use by the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the pro- +tocol version and type fields match the current version and +KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application verifies that the checksum used is a collision- +proof keyed checksum, and if it is not, a +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The recipient +verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's +address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if +a recipient address is specified or the recipient requires +an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears as +the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for +either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the +timestamp and usec and/or the sequence number fields are +checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and not +present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, +along with the client name, time and microsecond fields from +the Authenticator match any recently-seen (sent or +received[20] ) such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is +__________________________ +[20] This means that a client and server running on the + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or +a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time- +stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. Finally, the check- +sum is computed over the data and control information, and +if it doesn't match the received checksum, a +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application is assured +that the message was generated by its peer and was not modi- +fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + + The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring +confidentiality and the ability to detect modifications of +exchanged messages. It achieves this by encrypting the mes- +sages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it +collects its data and the appropriate control information +(specified in section 5.7.1) and encrypts them under an +encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, +or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part +of the control information, the client must choose to use +either a timestamp or a sequence number (or both); see the +discussion in section 3.4.1 for guidelines on which to use. +After the user data and control information are encrypted, +the client transmits the ciphertext and some "envelope" +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies +it as follows. If any error occurs, an error code is +reported for use by the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the pro- +tocol version and type fields match the current version and +KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the +resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have +been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is gen- +erated. The recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address +__________________________ +same host and communicating with one another using the +KRB_SAFE messages should not share a common replay +cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + + + +Section 3.5.2. - 34 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or +the recipient requires an address) that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in +the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec +and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp +and usec are expected and not present, or they are present +but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If +the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is +generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or +a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time- +stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application can assume +the message was generated by its peer, and was securely +transmitted (without intruders able to see the unencrypted +contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + + The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring +the ability to send Kerberos credentials from one host to +another. It achieves this by sending the tickets together +with encrypted data containing the session keys and other +information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it +first (using the KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be +sent to the remote host. It then constructs a KRB_CRED mes- +sage using the ticket or tickets so obtained, placing the +session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of +the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part +of the the KRB_CRED message. + + Other information associated with each ticket and +obtained during the KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in the encrypted part of +the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if specifically +required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r- +address fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the +KRB_CRED message which is then encrypted under an encryption +key previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP exchange (usually the +last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no +negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies + + +Section 3.6.2. - 35 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +it. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use +by the application. The message is verified by checking +that the protocol version and type fields match the current +version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the +resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have +been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is gen- +erated. + + If present or required, the recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches +the sender's address in the message, and that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in +the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields +(and the nonce field if required) are checked next. If the +timestamp and usec are not present, or they are present but +not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application stores each +of the new tickets in its ticket cache together with the +session key and other information in the corresponding +KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED +message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- +ing the principal identifiers and secret keys of principals +to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following +fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identif- +ier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +__________________________ +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not +combine the database and the server on the same +machine; it is feasible to store the principal database +in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries +stored therein are protected from disclosure to and +modification by unauthorized parties. However, we +recommend against such strategies, as they can make +system management and threat analysis quite complex. + + +Section 4.1. - 36 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. +The key field contains an encryption key. This key is the +principal's secret key. (The key can be encrypted before +storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it in case +the database is compromised but the master key is not. In +that case, an extra field must be added to indicate the mas- +ter key version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is the +key version number of the principal's secret key. The +max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (end- +time - starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. +The max_renewable_life field contains the maximum allowable +total lifetime for any renewable Ticket issued for this +principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these +lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given +Ticket.) + + A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as +long as the database representation provides a mechanism to +distinguish between principal records with identifiers which +differ only in the realm name. + + When an application server's key changes, if the change +is routine (i.e. not the result of disclosure of the old +key), the old key should be retained by the server until all +tickets that had been issued using that key have expired. +Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be +active for a single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a +principal's key is always tagged with the version of the key +that was used for encryption, to help the recipient find the +proper key for decryption. + + When more than one key is active for a particular prin- +cipal, the principal will have more than one record in the +Kerberos database. The keys and key version numbers will +differ between the records (the rest of the fields may or +may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or +responds to a request for initial authentication, the most +recent key (known by the Kerberos server) will be used for +encryption. This is the key with the highest key version +number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields +in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification + + +Section 4.2. - 37 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos +master key under which the principal's secret key is +encrypted. + + After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC +will return an error to any client attempting to gain tick- +ets as or for the principal. (A database may want to main- +tain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one +for the principal's current key. This allows password aging +to work independently of the principal's expiration date. +However, due to the limited space in the responses, the KDC +must combine the key expiration and principal expiration +date into a single value called "key_exp", which is used as +a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + + The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the +operations involving the principal. This field might be +useful in conjunction with user registration procedures, for +site-specific policy implementations (Project Athena +currently uses it for their user registration process con- +trolled by the system-wide database service, Moira [9]), to +identify whether a principal can play the role of a client +or server or both, to note whether a server is appropriate +trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a client, or to +identify the "string to key" conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that +certain ticket options should not be allowed in tickets +encrypted under a principal's key (one bit each): Disallow +issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing forwardable +tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentica- +tion, disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing +proxiable tickets, and disallow issuing tickets for which +the principal is the server. + + The mod_date field contains the time of last modifica- +tion of the entry, and the mod_name field contains the name +of the principal which last modified the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + + Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last +time that a request was made by a particular principal. +Information that might be maintained includes the time of +the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a +ticket-granting ticket, or other times. This information +can then be returned to the user in the last-req field (see +__________________________ +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section +5.4.2 for details on why this can be useful. + + +Section 4.3. - 38 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +section 5.2). + + Other frequently changing information that can be main- +tained is the latest expiration time for any tickets that +have been issued using each key. This field would be used +to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow the +continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + + The KDC implementation should have the following confi- +gurable constants or options, to allow an administrator to +make and enforce policy decisions: + ++ The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether + the KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This + constant should reflect reasonable expectations of + round-trip time to the KDC, encryption/decryption time, + and processing time by the client and target server, and + it should allow for a minimum "useful" lifetime. + ++ The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a + ticket (renew_till - starttime). + ++ The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - + starttime). + ++ Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address + fields (including the ability to specify that such tick- + ets may only be issued if the request specifies some + authorization_data). + ++ Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable + tickets are to be issued. + + +5. Message Specifications + + The following sections describe the exact contents and +encoding of protocol messages and objects. The ASN.1 base +definitions are presented in the first subsection. The +remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryp- +tion and checksum techniques, and the fields related to +them, appear in section 6. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + + All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Dis- +tinguished Encoding Representation of the data elements as +described in the X.509 specification, section 8.7 [10]. + + + + + +Section 5.1. - 39 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + + The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the +rest of this section. Note that since the underscore char- +acter (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 names, the hyphen (-) is +used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall +not contain a character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). +Most realms will usually consist of several components +separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet Domain +Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 +names. Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in +section 7. A PrincipalName is a typed sequence of com- +ponents consisting of the following sub-fields: + +name-type This field specifies the type of name that fol- + lows. Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two + names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the + components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. + +name-stringThis field encodes a sequence of components that + form a name, each component encoded as a General- + String. Taken together, a PrincipalName and a + Realm form a principal identifier. Most Princi- + palNames will have only a few components (typi- + cally one or two). + + + + KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + + + The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as General- +izedTimes. An encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) +and shall not include any fractional portions of the +seconds. It further shall not include any separators. +Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 +seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + + HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + + +Section 5.2. - 40 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + } + + HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + } + + + The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type This field specifies the type of address that + follows. Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 8.1. + + +address This field encodes a single address of type addr- + type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly +one address; HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly +many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + +ad-data This field contains authorization data to be + interpreted according to the value of the + corresponding ad-type field. + +ad-type This field specifies the format for the ad-data + subfield. All negative values are reserved for + local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + } + + + TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + + +Section 5.2. - 41 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11), + transited-policy-checked(12), + ok-as-delegate(13) + } + + + KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + unused12(12), + unused13(13), + disable-transited-check(26), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) + } + + ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When + used in Kerberos for the APOptions, TicketFlags, + and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on + generated values should be the smallest multiple + of 32 bits needed to include the highest order bit + that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. + Implementations should accept values of bit + strings of any length and treat the value of flags + cooresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit + string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparisonof + bit strings of different length should treat the + smaller string as if it were padded with zeros + beyond the high order bits to the length of the + longer string[23]. + +__________________________ +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack +data structures during the generation and verification +of embedded checksums: Because any checksums applied to +data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within +a data structure between the time that a checksum is +generated through transmission to the time that the +checksum is verified. + + + +Section 5.2. - 42 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime + } + + +lr-type This field indicates how the following lr-value + field is to be interpreted. Negative values indi- + cate that the information pertains only to the + responding server. Non-negative values pertain to + all servers for the realm. + + If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no informa- + tion is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the + absolute value of the lr-type field is one (1), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of last + initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of last initial + request. If it is three (3), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of the last + renewal. If it is five (5), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last request (of any + type). + + +lr-value This field contains the time of the last request. + The time must be interpreted according to the con- + tents of the accompanying lr-type subfield. + + See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, Check- +sumType, EncryptedData, EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and +KeyType. + + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + + This section describes the format and encryption param- +eters for tickets and authenticators. When a ticket or +authenticator is included in a protocol message it is +treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + + A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate +to a service. A Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + + +Section 5.3.1. - 43 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared +by Kerberos and the end server (the server's secret key). +See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno This field specifies the version number for the + ticket format. This document describes version + number 5. + + +realm This field specifies the realm that issued a + ticket. It also serves to identify the realm part + of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers + within its realm, the two will always be identi- + cal. + + +sname This field specifies the name part of the server's + identity. + + +enc-part This field holds the encrypted encoding of the + EncTicketPart sequence. + + +flags This field indicates which of various options were + used or requested when the ticket was issued. It + is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + unselected options and reserved fields being reset + (0). Bit 0 is the most significant bit. The + encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the flags are: + + +Section 5.3.1. - 44 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + + + + + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 45 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 46 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + +Section 5.3.1. - 47 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 48 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + + +key This field exists in the ticket and the KDC + response and is used to pass the session key from + Kerberos to the application server and the client. + The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +crealm This field contains the name of the realm in which + the client is registered and in which initial + authentication took place. + + +cname This field contains the name part of the client's + principal identifier. + + +transited This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms + that took part in authenticating the user to whom + this ticket was issued. It does not specify the + order in which the realms were transited. See + section 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field + encodes the traversed realms. + + +authtime This field indicates the time of initial authenti- + cation for the named principal. It is the time of + issue for the original ticket on which this ticket + is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to + provide the necessary information for implementa- + tion of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An end + service that is particularly paranoid could refuse + to accept tickets for which the initial authenti- + cation occurred "too far" in the past. + + This field is also returned as part of the + response from the KDC. When returned as part of + the response to initial authentication + + +Section 5.3.1. - 49 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- + beros server[24]. + + +starttime This field in the ticket specifies the time after + which the ticket is valid. Together with endtime, + this field specifies the life of the ticket. If + it is absent from the ticket, its value should be + treated as that of the authtime field. + + +endtime This field contains the time after which the + ticket will not be honored (its expiration time). + Note that individual services may place their own + limits on the life of a ticket and may reject + tickets which have not yet expired. As such, this + is really an upper bound on the expiration time + for the ticket. + + +renew-tillThis field is only present in tickets that have + the RENEWABLE flag set in the flags field. It + indicates the maximum endtime that may be included + in a renewal. It can be thought of as the abso- + lute expiration time for the ticket, including all + renewals. + + +caddr This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) + or more (if present) host addresses. These are + the addresses from which the ticket can be used. + If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used + from any location. The decision by the KDC to + issue or by the end server to accept zero-address + tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may + refuse to issue or accept such tickets. The sug- + gested and default policy, however, is that such + tickets will only be issued or accepted when addi- + tional information that can be used to restrict + the use of the ticket is included in the + authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to + make it harder for an attacker to use stolen + credentials. Because the session key is not sent + over the network in cleartext, credentials can't +__________________________ +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used +to adjust the workstation's clock since the workstation +cannot reliably determine that such a KRB_AS_REP actu- +ally came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + + +Section 5.3.1. - 50 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + be stolen simply by listening to the network; an + attacker has to gain access to the session key + (perhaps through operating system security + breaches or a careless user's unattended session) + to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address + from which a connection is received cannot be + reliably determined. Even if it could be, an + attacker who has compromised the client's worksta- + tion could use the credentials from there. + Including the network addresses only makes it more + difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk + off with stolen credentials and then use them from + a "safe" location. + + +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass + authorization data from the principal on whose + behalf a ticket was issued to the application ser- + vice. If no authorization data is included, this + field will be left out. Experience has shown that + the name of this field is confusing, and that a + better name for this field would be restrictions. + Unfortunately, it is not possible to change the + name of this field at this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority + obtained on the bases of authentication using the + ticket. It is possible for any principal in + posession of credentials to add entries to the + authorization data field since these entries + further restrict what can be done with the ticket. + Such additions can be made by specifying the addi- + tional entries when a new ticket is obtained dur- + ing the TGS exchange, or they may be added during + chained delegation using the authorization data + field of the authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the + holder of credentials, it is not allowable for the + presence of an entry in the authorization data + field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end + service; the field will contain the names of ser- + vice specific objects, and the rights to those + objects. The format for this field is described + in section 5.2. Although Kerberos is not con- + cerned with the format of the contents of the sub- + fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 51 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal + is able to issue a proxy that is valid for a + specific purpose. For example, a client wishing + to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to + be passed to the print server. By specifying the + name of the file in the authorization_data field, + the file server knows that the print server can + only use the client's rights when accessing the + particular file to be printed. + + A separate service providing providing authoriza- + tion or certifying group membership may be built + using the authorization-data field. In this case, + the entity granting authorization (not the author- + ized entity), obtains a ticket in its own name + (e.g. the ticket is issued in the name of a + privelege server), and this entity adds restric- + tions on its own authority and delegates the res- + tricted authority through a proxy to the client. + The client would then present this authorization + credential to the application server separately + from the authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data + field of a proxy and leaves the host addresses + blank, the resulting ticket and session key can be + treated as a capability. See [7] for some sug- + gested uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does + not have to be included in a ticket. + + +5.3.2. Authenticators + + An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a +server to certify the client's knowledge of the encryption +key in the ticket, to help the server detect replays, and to +help choose a "true session key" to use with the particular +session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session +key shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + + +Section 5.3.2. - 52 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the + format of the authenticator. This document speci- + fies version 5. + + +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for + the ticket in section 5.3.1. + + +cksum This field contains a checksum of the the applica- + tion data that accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. + + +cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the + client's timestamp. Its value (before encryption) + ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears along + with ctime. The two fields are used together to + specify a reasonably accurate timestamp. + + +ctime This field contains the current time on the + client's host. + + +subkey This field contains the client's choice for an + encryption key which is to be used to protect this + specific application session. Unless an applica- + tion specifies otherwise, if this field is left + out the session key from the ticket will be used. + +seq-numberThis optional field includes the initial sequence + number to be used by the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE mes- + sages when sequence numbers are used to detect + replays (It may also be used by application + specific messages). When included in the authen- + ticator this field specifies the initial sequence + number for messages from the client to the server. + When included in the AP-REP message, the initial + sequence number is that for messages from the + server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after + each message is sent. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the + detection of replays they should be non-repeating, + even across connection boundaries. The initial + sequence number should be random and uniformly + distributed across the full space of possible + sequence numbers, so that it cannot be guessed by + an attacker and so that it and the successive + sequence numbers do not repeat other sequences. + + + +Section 5.3.2. - 53 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket + in section 5.3.1. It is optional and will only + appear when additional restrictions are to be + placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those car- + ried in the ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + + This section specifies the format of the messages used +in the exchange between the client and the Kerberos server. +The format of possible error messages appears in section +5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + + The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. +Instead, its type is one of KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ +depending on whether the request is for an initial ticket or +an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent +from the client to the Authentication Server to request +credentials for a service. + + The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + + +Section 5.4.1. - 54 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +The fields in this message are: + + +pvno This field is included in each message, and speci- + fies the protocol version number. This document + specifies protocol version 5. + + +msg-type This field indicates the type of a protocol mes- + sage. It will almost always be the same as the + application identifier associated with a message. + It is included to make the identifier more readily + accessible to the application. For the KDC-REQ + message, this type will be KRB_AS_REQ or + KRB_TGS_REQ. + + +padata The padata (pre-authentication data) field con- + tains a sequence of authentication information + which may be needed before credentials can be + issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for + additional tickets (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will + include an element with padata-type of PA-TGS-REQ + and data of an authentication header (ticket- + granting ticket and authenticator). The checksum + in the authenticator (which must be collision- + proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY + encoding. In most requests for initial authenti- + cation (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies (KDC-REP), + the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by + certain extensions to the Kerberos protocol. For + example, it might be used to initially verify the + identity of a client before any response is + returned. This is accomplished with a padata + field with padata-type equal to PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + and padata-value defined as follows: + +padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP +padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + +PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and + + +Section 5.4.1. - 55 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + pausec containing the microseconds which may be + omitted if a client will not generate more than + one request per second. The ciphertext (padata- + value) consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, + encrypted using the client's secret key. + + The padata field can also contain information + needed to help the KDC or the client select the + key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for + supporting the use of certain token cards with + Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [11] for + additional uses of this field. + +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indi- + cates the way that the padata-value element is to + be interpreted. Negative values of padata-type + are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative + values are used for a registered interpretation of + the element type. + + +req-body This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent + of the remaining fields. If a checksum is to be + calculated over the request, it is calculated over + an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. + + +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and + KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the KDC and indicates the + flags that the client wants set on the tickets as + well as other information that is to modify the + behavior of the KDC. Where appropriate, the name + of an option may be the same as the flag that is + set by that option. Although in most case, the + bit in the options field will be the same as that + in the flags field, this is not guaranteed, so it + is not acceptable to simply copy the options field + to the flags field. There are various checks that + must be made before honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the + selected options are indicated by the bit being + set (1), and the unselected options and reserved + fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits + is specified in section 5.2. The options are + described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the options are: + + + + +Section 5.4.1. - 56 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a request + for forwarding. The address(es) of the + host from which the resulting ticket is + to be valid are included in the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set on + the initial request, or in a subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this is + a request for a proxy. This option will + only be honored if the ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the host + from which the resulting ticket is to be + valid are included in the addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + + + + + + +Section 5.4.1. - 57 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that this + is a request for a postdated ticket. + This option will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket on which it is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may be + reset by a subsequent request to the KDC + after the starttime in the ticket has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or when the + ticket-granting ticket on which the + request is based is also renewable. If + this option is requested, then the rtime + field in the request contains the + desired absolute expiration time for the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not to + identify the user to which it was + issued. Instead, the principal identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified by + the policy of the realm (e.g. usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of the + ticket is only to securely distribute a + session key, and not to identify the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the ticket + to be returned should be set. If the + local realms policy does not permit + anonymous credentials, the request is to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited field + is disabled. Tickets issued without the + performance of this check will be noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + + +Section 5.4.1. - 58 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if a + ticket with the requested life cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket with + the requested life cannot be provided, + then a renewable ticket may be issued + with a renew-till equal to the the + requested endtime. The value of the + renew-till field may still be limited by + local limits, or limits selected by the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for the + end server is to be encrypted in the + session key from the additional ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The RENEW option + indicates that the present request is + for a renewal. The ticket provided is + encrypted in the secret key for the + server on which it is valid. This + option will only be honored if the + ticket to be renewed has its RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its renew- + till field has not passed. The ticket + to be renewed is passed in the padata + field as part of the authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE option + indicates that the request is to vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will only + be honored if the ticket presented is + postdated, presently has its INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be vali- + dated before its starttime. The ticket + presented for validation is encrypted in + the key of the server for which it is + valid and is passed in the padata field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for + the ticket in section 5.3.1. sname may only be + + +Section 5.4.1. - 59 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is speci- + fied. If absent, the name of the server is taken + from the name of the client in the ticket passed + as additional-tickets. + + +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can + only be present in the TGS_REQ form), is an encod- + ing of the desired authorization-data encrypted + under the sub-session key if present in the + Authenticator, or alternatively from the session + key in the ticket-granting ticket, both from the + padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. + + +realm This field specifies the realm part of the + server's principal identifier. In the AS + exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. + + +from This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and + KRB_TGS_REQ ticket requests when the requested + ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the + desired start time for the requested ticket. + + + +till This field contains the expiration date requested + by the client in a ticket request. It is option + and if omitted the requested ticket is to have the + maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy + for the parties to the authentication exchange as + limited by expiration date of the ticket granting + ticket or other preauthentication credentials. + + +rtime This field is the requested renew-till time sent + from a client to the KDC in a ticket request. It + is optional. + + +nonce This field is part of the KDC request and + response. It it intended to hold a random number + generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, + it provides evidence that the response is fresh + and has not been replayed by an attacker. Nonces + must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be gen- + erated randomly, but if the correct time is known, + it may suffice[25]. +__________________________ +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the + +Section 5.4.1. - 60 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +etype This field specifies the desired encryption algo- + rithm to be used in the response. + + +addresses This field is included in the initial request for + tickets, and optionally included in requests for + additional tickets from the ticket-granting + server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it + includes the addresses for the client's host. If + a proxy is requested, this field will contain + other addresses. The contents of this field are + usually copied by the KDC into the caddr field of + the resulting ticket. + + +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a + request to the ticket-granting server. If the + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified, then + the session key from the additional ticket will be + used in place of the server's key to encrypt the + new ticket. If more than one option which + requires additional tickets has been specified, + then the additional tickets are used in the order + specified by the ordering of the options bits (see + kdc-options, above). + + + The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve +(12) depending on whether the request is for an initial +ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional ticket (TGS-REQ). + + The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and +additional-tickets) are only included if necessary to per- +form the operation specified in the kdc-options field. + + It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol +version number appears twice and two different message types +appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message contains these fields as +does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is passed +in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + + The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply +from the KDC for either an initial (AS) request or a subse- +quent (TGS) request. There is no message type for +__________________________ +nonce, one must make sure that the workstation time is +monotonically increasing. If the time is ever reset +backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability +that a nonce will be reused. + + + +Section 5.4.2. - 61 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or +KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of +the reply depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the client's secret key, and the +client's key version number is included in the key version +number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the cipher- +text is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenti- +cator, or if absent, the session key from the ticket- +granting ticket used in the request. In that case, no ver- +sion number will be present in the EncryptedData sequence. + + The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + + + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is either KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +__________________________ +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a +message provides an additional check that the message +was decrypted properly. + + +Section 5.4.2. - 62 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +padata This field is described in detail in section + 5.4.1. One possible use for this field is to + encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is + described in section 6.3.2). This ability is use- + ful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to + change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such + a case all existing password-derived entries in + the KDC database would be flagged as needing a + special mix-in string until the next password + change. + + +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for + the ticket in section 5.3.1. + + +ticket The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. + + +enc-part This field is a place holder for the ciphertext + and related information that forms the encrypted + part of a message. The description of the + encrypted part of the message follows each appear- + ance of this field. The encrypted part is encoded + as described in section 6.1. + + +key This field is the same as described for the ticket + in section 5.3.1. + + +last-req This field is returned by the KDC and specifies + the time(s) of the last request by a principal. + Depending on what information is available, this + might be the last time that a request for a + ticket-granting ticket was made, or the last time + that a request based on a ticket-granting ticket + was successful. It also might cover all servers + for a realm, or just the particular server. Some + implementations may display this information to + the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of + one's identity. It is similar in spirit to the + last login time displayed when logging into + timesharing systems. + + +nonce This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response + from the KDC and specifies the time that the + + +Section 5.4.2. - 63 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + client's secret key is due to expire. The expira- + tion might be the result of password aging or an + account expiration. This field will usually be + left out of the TGS reply since the response to + the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and + no client information need be retrieved from the + KDC database. It is up to the application client + (usually the login program) to take appropriate + action (such as notifying the user) if the expira- + tion time is imminent. + + +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the + encrypted portion of the attached ticket (see sec- + tion 5.3.1), provided so the client may verify + they match the intended request and to assist in + proper ticket caching. If the message is of type + KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will only be filled + in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded + ticket, or if the user is substituting a subset of + the addresses from the ticket granting ticket. If + the client-requested addresses are not present or + not used, then the addresses contained in the + ticket will be the same as those included in the + ticket-granting ticket. + + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + + This section specifies the format of the messages used +for the authentication of the client to the application +server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + + The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol +version number, the message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options +field to indicate any options in use, and the ticket and +authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often +referred to as the "authentication header". + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + + +Section 5.5.1. - 64 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +} + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REQ. + + +ap-optionsThis field appears in the application request + (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects the way the request is + processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), + and the unselected options and reserved fields + being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is + specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the + options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + + +ticket This field is a ticket authenticating the client + to the server. + + +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes + the client's choice of a subkey. Its encoding is + described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + + The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol +version number, the message type, and an encrypted time- +stamp. The message is sent in in response to an application +request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual authentication option + + +Section 5.5.2. - 65 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session +key of the ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in +an application-arranged negotiation to choose a per associa- +tion session key. + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REP. + + +enc-part This field is described above in section 5.4.2. + + +ctime This field contains the current time on the + client's host. + + +cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the + client's timestamp. + + +subkey This field contains an encryption key which is to + be used to protect this specific application ses- + sion. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on how this + field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is + left out, the sub-session key from the authentica- + tor, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + + + +__________________________ +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a +message provides an additional check that the message +was decrypted properly. + + + +Section 5.5.2. - 66 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +5.5.3. Error message reply + + If an error occurs while processing the application +request, the KRB_ERROR message will be sent in response. +See section 5.9.1 for the format of the error message. The +cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server cannot +determine their appropriate values from the corresponding +KRB_AP_REQ message. If the authenticator was decipherable, +the ctime and cusec fields will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can +be used by either side (client or server) of an application +to send a tamper-proof message to its peer. It presumes +that a session key has previously been exchanged (for exam- +ple, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + + The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a +collision-proof checksum keyed with the last encryption key +negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation +has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_SAFE. + + +safe-body This field is a placeholder for the body of the + KRB-SAFE message. It is to be encoded separately + and then have the checksum computed over it, for + use in the cksum field. + + + +Section 5.6.1. - 67 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +cksum This field contains the checksum of the applica- + tion data. Checksum details are described in sec- + tion 6.4. The checksum is computed over the + encoding of the KRB-SAFE-BODY sequence. + + +user-data This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV + messages and contain the application specific data + that is being passed from the sender to the reci- + pient. + + +timestamp This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV + messages. Its contents are the current time as + known by the sender of the message. By checking + the timestamp, the recipient of the message is + able to make sure that it was recently generated, + and is not a replay. + + +usec This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV + headers. It contains the microsecond part of the + timestamp. + + +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + + +s-address This field specifies the address in use by the + sender of the message. + + +r-address This field specifies the address in use by the + recipient of the message. It may be omitted for + some uses (such as broadcast protocols), but the + recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. + This field along with s-address can be used to + help detect messages which have been incorrectly + or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can +be used by either side (client or server) of an application +to securely and privately send a message to its peer. It +presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged +(for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + + The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in +the Session Key. The message fields are: + +__________________________ +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_PRIV. + + +enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart + sequence encrypted under the session key[32]. + This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part + field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for + the format of the ciphertext. + + +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. + + +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can +be used to send Kerberos credentials from one principal to +__________________________ +message provides an additional check that the message +was decrypted properly. +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an +initialization vector may be passed to the encryption +procedure, in order to achieve proper cipher chaining. +The initialization vector might come from the last +block of the ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV mes- +sage, but it is the application's choice whether or not +to use such an initialization vector. If left out, the +default initialization vector for the encryption algo- +rithm will be used. + + +Section 5.8. - 69 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +another. It is presented here to encourage a common mechan- +ism to be used by applications when forwarding tickets or +providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that +a session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using +the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + + The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to +be sent and information needed to use the tickets, including +the session key from each. The information needed to use +the tickets is encrypted under an encryption key previously +exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. +The message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + + + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_CRED. + + + + +Section 5.8.1. - 70 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC + specifically for use by the intended recipient. + Successive tickets are paired with the correspond- + ing KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the + KRB-CRED message. + + +enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart + sequence encrypted under the session key shared + between the sender and the intended recipient. + This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part + field of the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for + the format of the ciphertext. + + +nonce If practical, an application may require the + inclusion of a nonce generated by the recipient of + the message. If the same value is included as the + nonce in the message, it provides evidence that + the message is fresh and has not been replayed by + an attacker. A nonce must never be re-used; it + should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the mes- + sage in an application specific manner. + + +timestamp and usec + + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED + message was generated. The time is used to pro- + vide assurance that the message is fresh. + + +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. + They are used optionally to provide additional + assurance of the integrity of the KRB-CRED mes- + sage. + + +key This field exists in the corresponding ticket + passed by the KRB-CRED message and is used to pass + the session key from the sender to the intended + recipient. The field's encoding is described in + section 6.2. + + The following fields are optional. If present, they +can be associated with the credentials in the remote ticket +file. If left out, then it is assumed that the recipient of +the credentials already knows their value. + + +prealm and pname + + +Section 5.8.1. - 71 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + The name and realm of the delegated principal + identity. + + +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, + sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- + ing fields from the ticket found in the ticket + field. Descriptions of the fields are identical + to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + + This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR +message. The fields included in the message are intended to +return as much information as possible about an error. It +is not expected that all the information required by the +fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is +composed, the corresponding field will be left out of the +message. + + Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected +by any encryption, it is quite possible for an intruder to +synthesize or modify such a message. In particular, this +means that the client should not use any fields in this mes- +sage for security-critical purposes, such as setting a sys- +tem clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The message +can be useful, however, for advising a user on the reason +for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + + The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL +} + + + + + +Section 5.9.1. - 72 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_ERROR. + + +ctime This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + + +cusec This field is described above in section 5.5.2. + + +stime This field contains the current time on the + server. It is of type KerberosTime. + + +susec This field contains the microsecond part of the + server's timestamp. Its value ranges from 0 to + 999999. It appears along with stime. The two + fields are used in conjunction to specify a rea- + sonably accurate timestamp. + + +error-codeThis field contains the error code returned by + Kerberos or the server when a request fails. To + interpret the value of this field see the list of + error codes in section 8. Implementations are + encouraged to provide for national language sup- + port in the display of error messages. + + +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. + + +e-text This field contains additional text to help + explain the error code associated with the failed + request (for example, it might include a principal + name which was unknown). + + +e-data This field contains additional data about the + error for use by the application to help it + recover from or handle the error. If the error- + code is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data + field will contain an encoding of a sequence of + padata fields, each corresponding to an acceptable + pre-authentication method and optionally contain- + ing data for the method: + + +e-cksum This field contains an optional checksum for the + KRB-ERROR message. The checksum is calculated + over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the KRB-ERROR + + +Section 5.9.1. - 73 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + message with the checksum absent. The checksum is + then added to the KRB-ERROR structure and the mes- + sage is re-encoded. The Checksum should be calcu- + lated using the session key from the ticket grant- + ing ticket or service ticket, where available. If + the error is in response to a TGS or AP request, + the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the + error is in response to an AS request, then the + checksum should be calulated using the client's + secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preau- + thentication to prove knowledge of the secret key + by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be com- + puted because the key to be used is not available, + no checksum will be included. + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the + e-data field will contain an encoding of the fol- + lowing sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate + method; method-data will contain any required + additional information. + + + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are +designed to use stream encryption ciphers, which can be +simulated using commonly available block encryption ciphers, +such as the Data Encryption Standard, [12] in conjunction +with block chaining and checksum methods [13]. Encryption +is used to prove the identities of the network entities par- +ticipating in message exchanges. The Key Distribution +Center for each realm is trusted by all principals +registered in that realm to store a secret key in confi- +dence. Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to +verify the authenticity of a principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS +__________________________ +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an in- +correct AS request from obtaining verifiable plaintext +for use in an off-line password guessing attack. + + +Section 6. - 74 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +exchange) or a shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to +encrypt responses to ticket requests; the ability to obtain +the secret key or session key implies the knowledge of the +appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability +of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and present a +Ticket and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with +the session key from the KDC response) to a service verifies +the identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the +service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove +its knowledge thereof in a response verifies the identity of +the service. + + The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the +encryption used is secure from cryptanalysis; however, in +some cases, the order of fields in the encrypted portions of +messages are arranged to minimize the effects of poorly +chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If +keys are derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords +need to be well chosen to make brute force attacks more dif- +ficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy targets for +intruders. + + The following sections specify the encryption and +checksum mechanisms currently defined for Kerberos. The +encodings, chaining, and padding requirements for each are +described. For encryption methods, it is often desirable to +place random information (often referred to as a confounder) +at the start of the message. The requirements for a con- +founder are specified with each encryption mechanism. + + Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to +improve the the security characteristics of the ciphertext. +However, these chaining methods often don't provide an +integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such as DES +in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain- +text which can be verified at decryption and used to detect +any tampering or damage. Such checksums should be good at +detecting burst errors in the input. If any damage is +detected, the decryption routine is expected to return an +error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an +appropriate checksum. The specification of each encryption +method sets out its checksum requirements. + + Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's +password, an algorithm for converting the password to a key +of the appropriate type is included. It is desirable for +the string to key function to be one-way, and for the map- +ping to be different in different realms. This is important +because users who are registered in more than one realm will +often use the same password in each, and it is desirable +that an attacker compromising the Kerberos server in one +realm not obtain or derive the user's key in another. + + + +Section 6. - 75 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of +the candidate encryption and checksum methods considered for +Kerberos, the the reader is referred to [14]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + + The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted +messages. The enc-part field which appears in the unen- +crypted part of messages in section 5 is a sequence consist- +ing of an encryption type, an optional key version number, +and the ciphertext. + + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + + +etype This field identifies which encryption algorithm + was used to encipher the cipher. Detailed specif- + ications for selected encryption types appear + later in this section. + + +kvno This field contains the version number of the key + under which data is encrypted. It is only present + in messages encrypted under long lasting keys, + such as principals' secret keys. + + +cipher This field contains the enciphered text, encoded + as an OCTET STRING. + + + The cipher field is generated by applying the specified +encryption algorithm to data composed of the message and +algorithm-specific inputs. Encryption mechanisms defined +for use with Kerberos must take sufficient measures to +guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend +they also take measures to protect against precomputed dic- +tionary attacks. If the encryption algorithm is not itself +capable of doing so, the protections can often be enhanced +by adding a checksum and a confounder. + + The suggested format for the data to be encrypted +includes a confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, +and any necessary padding. The msg-seq field contains the +part of the protocol message described in section 5 which is +to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are +all untagged and untyped, and their length is exactly suffi- +cient to hold the appropriate item. The type and length is +implicit and specified by the particular encryption type + + +Section 6.1. - 76 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted +is described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + + + One generates a random confounder of the appropriate +length, placing it in confounder; zeroes out check; calcu- +lates the appropriate checksum over confounder, check, and +msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the necessary +padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type +and the appropriate key. + + Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryp- +tion algorithm that specifies a checksum, a length for the +confounder field, or an octet boundary for padding uses this +ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which are not specified +will be omitted. + + In the interest of allowing all implementations using a +__________________________ +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET +STRING(length) is the notation for an octet string with +its tag and length removed. It is not a valid ASN.1 +type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so +that the message starts with random data, but the tag +and its length are fixed. For other fields, the length +and tag would be redundant if they were included be- +cause they are specified by the encryption type. +[36] The ordering of the fields in the CipherText is +important. Additionally, messages encoded in this for- +mat must include a length as part of the msg-seq field. +This allows the recipient to verify that the message +has not been truncated. Without a length, an attacker +could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a mes- +sage which could be truncated, while leaving the check- +sum intact. Note that if the msg-seq is an encoding of +an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length is +part of that encoding. + + + +Section 6.1. - 77 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +particular encryption type to communicate with all others +using that type, the specification of an encryption type +defines any checksum that is needed as part of the encryp- +tion process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + + Some cryptosystems require additional information +beyond the key and the data to be encrypted. For example, +DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining mode, requires an +initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such addi- +tional information. + +6.2. Encryption Keys + + The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption +key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + + +keytype This field specifies the type of encryption key + that follows in the keyvalue field. It will + almost always correspond to the encryption algo- + rithm used to generate the EncryptedData, though + more than one algorithm may use the same type of + key (the mapping is many to one). This might hap- + pen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses + an alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity + check, or a different chaining mechanism. + + +keyvalue This field contains the key itself, encoded as an + octet string. + + All negative values for the encryption key type are +reserved for local use. All non-negative values are +reserved for officially assigned type fields and interpreta- +tions. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + + If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is +said to be the NULL encryption system. In the NULL encryp- +tion system there is no checksum, confounder or padding. +The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key is +used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in +length, with keytype zero (0). + + + +Section 6.3.1. - 78 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + + The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information +under the Data Encryption Standard [12] using the cipher +block chaining mode [13]. A CRC-32 checksum (described in +ISO 3309 [15]) is applied to the confounder and message +sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES +blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted +(the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) +must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The +details of the encryption of this data are identical to +those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision- +proof, an attacker could use a probabilistic chosen- +plaintext attack to generate a valid message even if a con- +founder is used [14]. The use of collision-proof checksums +is recommended for environments where such attacks represent +a significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum +for ticket or authenticator is no longer mandated as an +interoperability requirement for Kerberos Version 5 Specifi- +cation 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information +under the Data Encryption Standard [12] using the cipher +block chaining mode [13]. An MD4 checksum (described in +[16]) is applied to the confounder and message sequence +(msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concate- +nation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded +to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the +encryption of this data are identical to those for the des- +cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information +under the Data Encryption Standard [12] using the cipher +block chaining mode [13]. An MD5 checksum (described in +[17].) is applied to the confounder and message sequence +(msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concate- +nation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded +to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. + + Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as 8-octet +blocks which are concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for +the DES algorithms. The first octet supplies the 8 most +significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as the DES +input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 + + +Section 6.3.4. - 79 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least signi- +ficant bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining +requires an additional input in the form of an initializa- +tion vector. Unless otherwise specified, zero should be +used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8-octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semi- +weak" keys; those keys shall not be used for encrypting mes- +sages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way +that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, keys +shall not be used that yield "weak" or "semi-weak" keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). +This consists of 56 bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per +octet). The key is encoded as a series of 8 octets written +in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are also +encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) +where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and +P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity bits, the first octet of the key +would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the +FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), +the text string normally must have the realm and each com- +ponent of the principal's name appended[37], then padded +with ASCII nulls to an 8 byte boundary. This string is then +fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte +DES key. The parity is corrected on the key, and it is used +to generate a DES CBC checksum on the initial string (with +the realm and name appended). Next, parity is corrected on +the CBC checksum. If the result matches a "weak" or "semi- +weak" key as described in the DES specification, it is +eXclusive-ORed with the constant 00000000000000F0. Finally, +the result is returned as the key. Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + odd = 1; + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { +__________________________ +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a dif- +ferent "mix-in" string for compatibility reasons; see +the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + + +Section 6.3.4. - 80 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + fixparity(tempkey); + key = DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES EDE in outer CBC mode with an SHA1 check- +sum (des3-cbc-sha1) + + The des3-cbc-sha1 encryption encodes information using +three Data Encryption Standard transformations with three +DES keys. The first key is used to perform a DES ECB +encryption on an eight-octet data block using the first DES +key, followed by a DES ECB decryption of the result using +the second DES key, and a DES ECB encryption of the result +using the third DES key. Because DES blocks are 8 bytes, +the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, +checksum, and message) must first be padded to an 8 byte +boundary before encryption. To support the outer CBC mode, +the input is padded an eight-octet boundary. The first 8 +octets of the data to be encrypted (the confounder) is +exclusive-ored with an initialization vector of zero and +then ECB encrypted using triple DES as described above. +Subsequent blocks of 8 octets are exclusive-ored with the +ciphertext produced by the encryption on the previous block +before ECB encryption. + + An HMAC-SHA1 checksum (described in [18].) is applied +to the confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed +in the cksum field. + + Plaintext are encoded as 8-octet blocks which are con- +catenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. +The first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with +the octet's MSbit used as the DES input block's MSbit, +etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth +octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + + Encryption under Triple DES using cipher block chaining +requires an additional input in the form of an initializa- +tion vector. Unless otherwise specified, zero should be +used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8-octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semi- + + +Section 6.3.5. - 81 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +weak" keys; those keys shall not be used for encrypting mes- +sages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way +that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, keys +shall not be used that yield "weak" or "semi-weak" keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + A Triple DES key is 24 octets of data, with keytype +seven (7). This consists of 168 bits of key, and 24 parity +bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a series of 24 +octets written in MSB-first order, with the first 8 octets +treated as the first DES key, the second 8 octets as the +second key, and the third 8 octets the third DES key. The +bits within each key are also encoded in MSB order. For +example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) +where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and +P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity bits, the first octet of the key +would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the +FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), +the text string normally must have the realm and each com- +ponent of the principal's name appended[38], + + The input string (with any salt data appended to it) is +n-folded into a 24 octet (192 bit) string. To n-fold a +number X, replicate the input value to a length that is the +least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before each +repetition, the input X is rotated to the right by 13 bit +positions. The successive n-bit chunks are added together +using 1's-complement addition (addition with end-around +carry) to yield a n-bit result. (This transformation was +proposed by Richard Basch) + + Each successive set of 8 octets is taken as a DES key, +and its parity is adjusted in the same manner as previously +described. If any of the three sets of 8 octets match a +"weak" or "semi-weak" key as described in the DES specifica- +tion, that chunk is eXclusive-ORed with the constant +00000000000000F0. The resulting DES keys are then used in +sequence to perform a Triple-DES CBC encryption of the n- +folded input string (appended with any salt data), using a +zero initial vector. Parity, weak, and semi-weak keys are +once again corrected and the result is returned as the 24 +octet key. + + Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { +__________________________ +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a dif- +ferent "mix-in" string for compatibility reasons; see +the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + + +Section 6.3.5. - 82 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tkey[24] = fold(s); + fixparity(tkey); + if(isweak(tkey[0-7])) tkey[0-7] = tkey[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(isweak(tkey[8-15])) tkey[8-15] = tkey[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(tkey[16-23])) tkey[16-23] = tkey[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + key[24] = 3DES-CBC(data=fold(s),key=tkey,iv=0); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak(key[0-7])) key[0-7] = key[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[8-15])) key[8-15] = key[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[16-23])) key[16-23] = key[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.4. Checksums + + The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a check- +sum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + + +cksumtype This field indicates the algorithm used to gen- + erate the accompanying checksum. + +checksum This field contains the checksum itself, encoded + as an octet string. + + Detailed specification of selected checksum types +appear later in this section. Negative values for the +checksum type are reserved for local use. All non-negative +values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + + Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two +properties: whether they are collision-proof, and whether +they are keyed. It is infeasible to find two plaintexts +which generate the same checksum value for a collision-proof +checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the +algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream +modification by an active attacker, unkeyed checksums should +only be used when the checksum and message will be subse- +quently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as part of the +encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + + Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if +the checksum value is encrypted before inclusion in a mes- +sage. In such cases, the composition of the checksum and + + +Section 6.4. - 83 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a +new checksum algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed +checksums, as well as for the encrypted forms of unkeyed +collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a confounder +before the checksum is calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a +cyclic redundancy check as described in ISO 3309 [15]. The +resulting checksum is four (4) octets in length. The CRC-32 +is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The use of this +checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a proba- +bilistic chosen-plaintext attack as described in [14] might +be able to generate an alternative message that satisfies +the checksum. The use of collision-proof checksums is +recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the +RSA MD4 algorithm [16]. The algorithm takes as input an +input message of arbitrary length and produces as output a +128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to be +collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4- +des) + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision- +proof checksum by prepending an 8 octet confounder before +the text, applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm, and +encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES in +cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, +where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key +with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization +vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets +long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum is +tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and +__________________________ +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a +key to a particular function, separating the functions +of generating a checksum from other encryption per- +formed using the session key. The constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was chosen because it maintains key +parity. The properties of DES precluded the use of the +complement. The same constant is used for similar pur- +pose in the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy +Enhanced Mail standard. + + +Section 6.4.3. - 84 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +"semi-weak keys"; those keys shall not be used for generat- +ing RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- +ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + + + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the +RSA MD5 algorithm. [17]. The algorithm takes as input an +input message of arbitrary length and produces as output a +128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to be +collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5- +des) + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision- +proof checksum by prepending an 8 octet confounder before +the text, applying the RSA MD5 checksum algorithm, and +encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES in +cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, +where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key +with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vec- +tor should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets +long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum is +tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and +"semi-weak keys"; those keys shall not be used for encrypt- +ing RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- +ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who + + +Section 6.4.5. - 85 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 +octet confounder to the plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode +encryption on the result using the key and an initialization +vector of zero, taking the last block of the ciphertext, +prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of +the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing +the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initializa- +tion vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 +bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- +ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semi- +weak" keys; those keys shall not be used for generating +DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos, nor shall a key be +used whose variant is "weak" or "semi-weak". + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative +(rsa-md4-des-k) + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed +collision-proof checksum by applying the RSA MD4 checksum +algorithm and encrypting the results using DES in cipher- +block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets +long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be +collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old +method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no + + +Section 6.4.7. - 86 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des- +mac-k) + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES +CBC-mode encryption of the plaintext, and using the last +block of the ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed +with an encryption key and an initialization vector; any +uses which do not specify an additional initialization vec- +tor will use the key as both key and initialization vector. +The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that +this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DES- +MAC checksum and it is no longer recommended. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and +"semi-weak keys"; those keys shall not be used for generat- +ing DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + + +7.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and +although a realm can technically select any name it chooses, +interoperability across realm boundaries requires agreement +on how realm names are to be assigned, and what information +they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform +to the conventions itself, and it must require that any +realms with which inter-realm keys are shared also conform +to the conventions and require the same from its neighbors. + + Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names +that differ only in the case of the characters are not +equivalent. There are presently four styles of realm names: +domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each style +follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of +components separated by periods (.) and they contain neither +colons (:) nor slashes (/). Domain names must be converted +to upper case when used as realm names. + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a + + +Section 7.1. - 87 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +colon (:) before the equal. The realm names for X.500 names +will be string representations of the names with components +separated by slashes. Leading and trailing slashes will not +be included. + + Names that fall into the other category must begin with +a prefix that contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the +prefix must be followed by a colon (:) and the rest of the +name. All prefixes must be assigned before they may be +used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not +fall into the first three categories. All names in this +category are reserved. It is unlikely that names will be +assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the "other" category. + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts +between the various name styles. The following additional +constraints apply to the assignment of realm names in the +domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for the +domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organiza- +tion owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet domain +name or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are +registered, authority to use a realm name may be derived +from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if +there is no domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the adminis- +trator of the MIT.EDU realm can authorize the creation of a +realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which +the parent is assigned is presumably the organization +authorized to assign names to its children in the X.500 and +domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 +hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make sure +that there will not in the future exists a name identical to +the realm name of the child unless it is assigned to the +same entity as the realm name. + + +7.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed +to ensure that all agree on what information is implied by a +principal name. The name-type field that is part of the +principal name indicates the kind of information implied by +the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. +Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. +at least one of the components, or the realm, must be dif- +ferent). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +The following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + + +Section 7.2. - 88 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness +at a particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. +The principal name type should be used for users, and it +might also be used for a unique server. If the name is a +unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed never to be +reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note +that it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any +type since stale entries might remain in access control +lists). + + If the first component of a name identifies a service +and the remaining components identify an instance of the +service in a server specified manner, then the name type of +SRV-INST should be used. An example of this name type is +the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first +component of krbtgt and a second component identifying the +realm for which the ticket is valid. + + If instance is a single component following the service +name and the instance identifies the host on which the +server is running, then the name type SRV-HST should be +used. This type is typically used for Internet services +such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components +following the name of the service, then the name type SRV- +XHST should be used. This type might be used to identify +servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash (/) might +otherwise be ambiguous. + + A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of +the name is not known. When comparing names, a name of type +UNKNOWN will match principals authenticated with names of +any type. A principal authenticated with a name of type +UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNK- +NOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of "krbtgt" +are reserved for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See +section 8.2.3 for the form of such names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will +generally be composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC +with which the server is registered, and (2) a two-component + + +Section 7.2.1. - 89 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an Internet +domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if +the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows +slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or +multi-component name will identify the service and the +latter components will identify the host. Where the name of +the host is not case sensitive (for example, with Internet +domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If +specified by the application protocol for services such as +telnet and the Berkeley R commands which run with system +privileges, the first component may be the string "host" +instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has +an official name and one or more aliases, the official name +of the host must be used when constructing the name of the +server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + + +8.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are +reserved for local use. All non-negative values are +reserved for officially assigned type fields and interpreta- +tions. + + The values of the types for the following addresses are +chosen to match the defined address family constants in the +Berkeley Standard Distributions of Unix. They can be found +in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is +an abbreviation of the address family name). + + +Internet addresses + + Internet addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, +encoded in MSB order. The type of internet addresses is two +(2). + +CHAOSnet addresses + + CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, +encoded in MSB order. The type of CHAOSnet addresses is +five (5). + +ISO addresses + + ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO +addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + + XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded +in MSB order. The type of XNS addresses is six (6). + + +Section 8.1. - 90 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + + AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number +and a 16-bit network number. The first octet of the address +is the node number; the remaining two octets encode the net- +work number in MSB order. The type of AppleTalk DDP +addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded +in LSB order. The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is +twelve (12). + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. IP transport + + When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a +KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP IP transport, the client shall +send a UDP datagram containing only an encoding of the +request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an +encoding of the reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a +KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at the sender's IP address. + + Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must accept +UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). Servers may also accept +TCP requests on port 88 (decimal). When the KRB_KDC_REQ +message is sent to the KDC by TCP, a new connection will be +established for each authentication exchange and the +KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the +client on the TCP stream that was established for the +request. The connection will be broken after the reply has +been received (or upon time-out). Care must be taken in +managing TCP/IP connections with the KDC to prevent denial +of service attacks based on the number of TCP/IP connections +with the KDC that remain open. + +8.2.2. OSI transport + + During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI +server, the mutual authentication of an OSI server to an OSI +client, the transfer of credentials from an OSI client to an +OSI server, or during exchange of private or integrity +checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be treated +as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechan- +ism will be: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), security(5), + kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an +authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply +(KRB_AP_REP), a safe message (KRB_SAFE), a private message + + +Section 8.2.2. - 91 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +(KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message (KRB_CRED). The opaque +data contains an application code as specified in the ASN.1 +description for each message. The application code may be +used by Kerberos to determine the message type. + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service +shall be composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC +issuing the TGS ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRV- +INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the second part the +name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting +ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the +ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the +ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") +(name). A ticket-granting ticket issued by the +ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the +MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" +(realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-priv 9 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-pub 10 (pkinit) +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 10 20 (I had this as 10, is it 12) + + +Section 8.3. - 92 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (pkinit) + +authorization data type ad-type value +reserved values 0-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + + + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + + +Section 8.3. - 93 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired- +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message + + + +Section 8.3. - 94 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) + + +9. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of +options. Among these are multiple encryption and checksum +types, alternative encoding schemes for the transited field, +optional mechanisms for pre-authentication, the handling of +tickets with no addresses, options for mutual authentica- +tion, user to user authentication, support for proxies, for- +warding, postdating, and renewing tickets, the format of +realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it +is necessary to define a minimal configuration which must be +supported by all implementations. This minimal configura- +tion is subject to change as technology does. For example, +if at some later date it is discovered that one of the +required encryption or checksum algorithms is not secure, it +will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 1 + + This section defines the first specification of these +options. Implementations which are configured in this way +can be said to support Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 +(5.1). + +Encryption and checksum methods + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be +supported. Implementations may support other mechanisms as +well, but the additional mechanisms may only be used when +communicating with principals known to also support them: +This list is to be determined. +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + + +__________________________ +- This error carries additional information in the e- +data field. The contents of the e-data field for this +message is described in section 5.9.1. + + + +Section 9.1. - 95 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in +both the Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket +granting ticket for an unknown realm is requested, the KDC +must be able to determine the names of the intermediate +realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be +supported. Alternative encodings may be supported, but they +may be used only when that encoding is supported by ALL +intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is +not used on the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP +method must be supported by clients but whether it is +enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC- +TIMESTAMP as an acceptable method, the client should retry +the initial request using the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre- +authentication method. Servers need not support the PA- +ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should +ignore the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication +in a request. + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be +supported. + + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. +if a TGT contains no addresses, the KDC will return deriva- +tive tickets), but each realm may set its own policy for +issuing such tickets, and each application server will set +its own policy with respect to accepting them. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Indi- +vidual realms and application servers can set their own pol- +icy on when such tickets will be accepted. + + All implementations must recognize renewable and post- +dated tickets, but need not actually implement them. If +these options are not supported, the starttime and endtime +in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful life. +When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all imple- +mentations shall make the presence of the postdated flag + + +Section 9.1. - 96 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +visible to the calling server. + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT- +IN-SKEY KDC option) must be provided by implementations, but +individual realms may decide as a matter of policy to reject +such requests on a per-principal or realm-wide basis. + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields +from ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets +unless directed to suppress a subfield as part of the defin- +ition of that registered subfield type (it is never +incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered subfield +types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + + Implementations must make the contents of any authori- +zation data subfields available to the server when a ticket +is used. Implementations are not required to allow clients +to specify the contents of the authorization data fields. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC imple- +mentation, based on the list of suggested configuration con- +stants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes + +maximum renewable lifetime1 week + +maximum ticket lifetime1 day + +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data + +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Section 9.2. - 97 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +10. REFERENCES + + + +1. B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +2. S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +3. J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +4. Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +5. Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +6. John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +7. B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +8. Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +9. P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +10. CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +11. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + + + +Section 10. - 98 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +12. National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + +13. National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +14. Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +15. International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +16. R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +17. R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +18. H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Section 10. - 99 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + + This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the +messages are to be constructed and interpreted by clients +and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + +Section A.2. - 100 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + +Section A.2. - 101 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + + +Section A.2. - 102 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + + + +Section A.2. - 103 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that */ + /* should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + + +Section A.4. - 104 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly */ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + + +Section A.5. - 105 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + +Section A.6. - 106 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(server)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(server); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + + +Section A.6. - 107 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + +Section A.6. - 108 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would */ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so */ + /* there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till >= kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + + +Section A.6. - 109 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + + + +Section A.6. - 110 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + + + +Section A.7. - 111 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +A.8. Authenticator generation + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + + +Section A.10. - 112 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + +Section A.11. - 113 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + +Section A.13. - 114 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + +Section A.15. - 115 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + + +Section A.17. - 116 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + + +Section A.18. - 117 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + using negotiated encryption key; + + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + + +Section A.20. - 118 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - 119 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - cxx - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + + + + Table of Contents + + + + +Overview .............................................. 2 + +Background ............................................ 2 + +1. Introduction ....................................... 3 + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation ............................ 5 + +1.2. Authorization .................................... 6 + +1.3. Environmental assumptions ........................ 7 + +1.4. Glossary of terms ................................ 8 + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests ...................... 10 + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets ............ 10 + +2.2. Invalid tickets .................................. 11 + +2.3. Renewable tickets ................................ 11 + +2.4. Postdated tickets ................................ 12 + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets ...................... 12 + +2.6. Forwardable tickets .............................. 13 + +2.7. Other KDC options ................................ 14 + +3. Message Exchanges .................................. 14 + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange .............. 14 + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message ............... 16 + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message .................. 16 + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message ............... 16 + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message ................ 19 + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message .................. 19 + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message ................... 19 + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange ........ 19 + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message ......................... 20 + + + - i - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message ............. 20 + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message .................. 21 + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message ............. 23 + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message .................. 23 + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key ....................... 24 + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange ....... 25 + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message .............. 26 + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message ................. 27 + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message .............. 28 + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets ................. 30 + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field ................. 30 + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message ................. 32 + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange ............................ 32 + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message ............... 32 + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message .................... 33 + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange ............................ 34 + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message ............... 34 + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message .................... 34 + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange ............................ 35 + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message ............... 35 + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message .................... 35 + +4. The Kerberos Database .............................. 36 + +4.1. Database contents ................................ 36 + +4.2. Additional fields ................................ 37 + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields ....................... 38 + +4.4. Site Constants ................................... 39 + +5. Message Specifications ............................. 39 + + + + - ii - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation ...... 39 + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions ........................... 40 + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators ....................... 43 + +5.3.1. Tickets ........................................ 43 + +5.3.2. Authenticators ................................. 52 + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges ...... 54 + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition ......................... 54 + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition ......................... 61 + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications ........ 64 + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition .......................... 64 + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition .......................... 65 + +5.5.3. Error message reply ............................ 67 + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification ................... 67 + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition ............................ 67 + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification ................... 68 + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition ............................ 68 + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification ................... 69 + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition ............................ 70 + +5.9. Error message specification ...................... 72 + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition ........................... 72 + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications ............. 74 + +6.1. Encryption Specifications ........................ 76 + +6.2. Encryption Keys .................................. 78 + +6.3. Encryption Systems ............................... 78 + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) .............. 78 + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des- +cbc-crc) .............................................. 79 + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des- + + + - iii - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +cbc-md4) .............................................. 79 + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des- +cbc-md5) .............................................. 79 + +6.3.5. Triple DES EDE in outer CBC mode with an SHA1 +checksum (des3-cbc-sha1) .............................. 81 + +6.4. Checksums ........................................ 83 + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) .................... 84 + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) ................. 84 + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES +(rsa-md4-des) ......................................... 84 + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) ................. 85 + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES +(rsa-md5-des) ......................................... 85 + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES +alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) ........................... 86 + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative +(des-mac-k) ........................................... 87 + +7. Naming Constraints ................................. 87 + +7.1. Realm Names ...................................... 87 + +7.2. Principal Names .................................. 88 + +7.2.1. Name of server principals ...................... 89 + +8. Constants and other defined values ................. 90 + +8.1. Host address types ............................... 90 + +8.2. KDC messages ..................................... 91 + +8.2.1. IP transport ................................... 91 + +8.2.2. OSI transport .................................. 91 + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS ................................ 92 + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values ......... 92 + +9. Interoperability requirements ...................... 95 + + + + - iv - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +9.1. Specification 1 .................................. 95 + +9.2. Recommended KDC values ........................... 97 + +10. REFERENCES ........................................ 98 + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing ................ 100 + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation ............................ 100 + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP genera- +tion .................................................. 100 + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification .......................... 104 + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks ......... 104 + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation ........................... 105 + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP gen- +eration ............................................... 106 + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification ......................... 111 + +A.8. Authenticator generation ......................... 112 + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation ............................ 112 + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification ......................... 112 + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation ........................... 113 + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification ......................... 114 + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation ............................. 114 + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification ........................... 115 + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks ............. 115 + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation ............................. 116 + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification ........................... 116 + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation ............................. 117 + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification ........................... 118 + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation ............................ 118 + + + + + + + + - v - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..78db9d78f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6214 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + 21 November 1997 + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of +the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is +inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them +other than as 'work in progress.' + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +'1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow +Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01.txt, and expires 21 May 1998. Please send +comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos +network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol. + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard through +the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the presentation, but +only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit +within current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested by +Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of Kerberos +Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff +members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman +(now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern +California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project +Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members +of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was +led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the community. The +development of the MIT reference implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl +and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from many others. +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. + +Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and 5 can be found in +[KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. a +workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. This +is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system, +without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical security +of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that packets +traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. +Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted +third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared secret key +[2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and implemented +that provide for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of +the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for authentication of +users registered with public key certification authorities, and allow the +system to provide certain benefits of public key cryptography in situations +where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the +client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server and 2) +a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The client +transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of the +session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session +key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the +client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also +be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to +exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further +communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret +keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos protocol. +In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical network +application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly or +through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for +a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted in +the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client uses +the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it were +contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry points +within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent "in +the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart +replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, additional +information is sent to prove that the message originated with the principal +to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the authenticator) +is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp +proves that the message was recently generated and is not a replay. +Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated +by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting +principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over the +network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to the +Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must be +modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's key. +This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos server, +the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol for +maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server in +another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its +own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is part +of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide whether +to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key +may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of +each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share an +inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is not +directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical organization +is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in order to construct +an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in authenticating +the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93] , or on other authorization services. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the issuance of a service +ticket by the Kerberos server (even by an modified Kerberos server) as +granting authority to use the service, since such applications may become +vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment if +they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for application +authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to successfully + mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt, + with successive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained which are + encrypted under a key derived from the user's password. + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A typical + mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to grant + permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains for + a deleted principal and the principal identifier is reused, the new + principal will inherit rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not + re-using principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been recently + generated using the session key known only by the client and server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access allowed + for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted by + the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. Note + that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other server + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and ticket-granting + ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is sometimes referred to as + the Authentication Server (or service). The ticket-granting ticket + portion is sometimes referred to as the ticket-granting server (or + service). +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than one + server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the various +flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC +before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the VALIDATE +option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their starttime +has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets which have +been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid +(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set in +the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key and +a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified +by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration time arrives, +the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a +hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last +renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the usable +lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in +a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to theft. +Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC at job +submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are activated and +validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported +in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief +would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This flag +must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket +based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be requested +by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. +This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting +ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting +the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) of a +postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at +the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in which +case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting +ticket. The KDC may limit how far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the identity +of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a +service to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose by +granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must +use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to forward +a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When set, +this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a new +ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address +based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client on initial +authentication. By default, the client will request that it be set when +requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any other +ticket. + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print server +a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in order to +satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in the +ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network +address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the proxy is to +be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may require +additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to +provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request that +it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when they +request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user to +enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It +is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED flag + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets differently +than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients and +servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the Kerberos +Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain +authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the initiation +of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting Server which +will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other servers (see +section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's secret key. This +exchange is also used to request credentials for services which must not be +mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a +principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. This +exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the +user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The response, +KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a +session key that will be shared by the client and the server. The session + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +key and additional information are encrypted in the client's secret key. The +KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect replays, +and to associate it with the message to which it replies. Various errors can +occur; these are indicated by an error response (KRB_ERROR) instead of the +KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR +message contains information which can be used to associate it with the +message to which it replies. The lack of encryption in the KRB_ERROR message +precludes the ability to detect replays, fabrications, or modifications of +such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends a +reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is encrypted +in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional field that +can be used to pass additional information that might be needed for the +initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as described +in section [hl<>]. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether the +requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether it +should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; and whether a +renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the +requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable +ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 +for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format for +the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are +determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named in +the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS +request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used for + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one supported, +strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype for which an +encryption key is available is used. The encryption method used to respond +to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key found in the +ticket granting ticket. + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise +the requested start time is checked against the policy of the local realm +(the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of +postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as +requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated +ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the +start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has +been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field +is set to the minimum of: + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using the +requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section A.2 for +pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, start +and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate a +KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper +KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must require +the user to present application credentials which can be verified using a +securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can be +verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS or +TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a +ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use of +a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors are + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client +with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If the +message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE +error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not +one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the server no +longer possesses a copy of the old key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is +returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it +indicates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from +the server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key[10]. Since it +is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms, with +different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of the +ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key the server +should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is +returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the client +from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the authenticator. +If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is returned (they might +not match, for example, if the wrong session key was used to encrypt the +authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for +an address matching the operating-system reported address of the client. If +no match is found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are +present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW +error is returned. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The server must +remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, so +that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses track of any +authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it must reject all +requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This assures that any +lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew +and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an attacker +could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator sent over the network +to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as the disabled host, and +replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the authentication.). If a +sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the server saves it for +later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is +present, the server either saves it for later use or uses it to help +generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that the +client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket and +thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for +pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; it +does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of +the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such as +that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server need +not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication +(not only authenticating the client to the server, but also the server to +the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will have +MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is +required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable +to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in +the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided +in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should +be randomly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A subkey may be +included if the server desires to negotiate a different subkey. The +KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key extracted from the +ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and server +share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The 'true +session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or +checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not +constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might be +done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever reason, +one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 unknown +bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from using +more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key with a +known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if the +server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server is +initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication credentials +for a given server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when it +wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain +a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already have acquired a +ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the +ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client initially +authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The message +format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. +The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS exchange +does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the session key from +the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session key from an +Authenticator is used. As is the case for all application servers, expired +tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +ticket expires, the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid +tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization +data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application +server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). The +TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, encrypted in the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or if +present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part of the +authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code and +text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The +KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect +replays, and to associate it with the message to which it replies. The +KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used to associate +it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of encryption in the +KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays or fabrications of +such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15]. If the +client does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by requesting a +ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a Kerberos server for +which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ +message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for the desired +realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, the Kerberos server may +return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further +along the standard hierarchical path), in which case this step must be +repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. +If neither are returned, then the request must be retried with a Kerberos +server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request will itself require +a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm which must be obtained by +recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. The +list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service or it +may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret keys +exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results from +using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server use +and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be encrypted[16]. +If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data is +present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from the +authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, using +the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which it +was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP), +but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in +section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. This is the only case where the response from the KDC +will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited field +needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. The +PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional ticket-granting +tickets. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting +ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be +postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the +local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, and +the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated before use +by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been reached. However, +in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued +postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the ticket-granting +ticket. + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket +using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and +verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the requested +server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the additional +ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be +compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as part +of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is set +in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that the +renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, +the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is +set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that the +PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the ticket +passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC will issue +the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration +time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and the +key version number fields are left out since these values are stored along +with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy +a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, subject +to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS exchange. +The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket to +be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous realm. +This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its +own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the +endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its contents +are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal +case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of realms +using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding (called +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that they +would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. Thus, +"," means that all realms along the path between the client and the server +have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from the +client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been traversed, +and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an X.500 style +has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierarchy +shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in another hierarchy. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC), +generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by one's +peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session key, so +maintaining the next sequence number should not present an additional +problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The +recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's +address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient +address is specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A +failed match for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the +timestamp and usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If +timestamp and usec are expected and not present, or they are present but not +current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along +with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator +match any recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, the +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number is +included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. +Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and control information, and +if it doesn't match the received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is +generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. The recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears +as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either case +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the +sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and +not present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error +is generated. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence +number is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It then +constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED +message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in +the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r-address +fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message which is +then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP +exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if +no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption +shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is +generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address +in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce field +if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not present, or +they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets in +its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED +message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- ing the +principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The key +can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it +in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. In that case, +an extra field must be added to indicate the master key version used, see +below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the principal's secret +key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime - +starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life +field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable Ticket +issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these +lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal records +with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. not +the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be retained by +the server until all tickets that had been issued using that key have +expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be active for a +single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged +with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to help the +recipient find the proper key for decryption. + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to a +request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error to +any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A database +may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one +for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether a +server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a client, +or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user in +the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow +the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 specification, +section 8.7 [X509-88]. + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A PrincipalName +is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same + (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An encoding +shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any fractional +portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any separators. +Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm +on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the interpretation +of the encapsulating element determines which of the embedded elements must +be interpreted, and which may be ignored. Definitions for these common +elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11), + transited-policy-checked(12), + ok-as-delegate(13) +} + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + unused12(12), + unused13(13), + disable-transited-check(26), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) +} + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest multiple of 32 bits needed to +include the highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 +bits. Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length and +treat the value of flags cooresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit +string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparisonof bit strings of different +length should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with zeros +beyond the high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute value + of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is the time + of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three (3), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A Ticket +contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos and +the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format of +the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies the name part of the server's identity. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + This optional field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used + to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support + several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext + authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other + information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the + application server. See Appendix C for definitions of some common + extensions. + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of the + appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The meanings + of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the necessary + information for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An + end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to accept + tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" in the + past. This field is also returned as part of the response from the KDC. + When returned as part of the response to initial authentication + (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- beros server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated as + that of the authtime field. +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be honored + (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place their + own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which have + not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is that + such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not sent + over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply by + listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the session + key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a careless + user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's worksta- tion could + use the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only + makes it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off + with stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, and + that a better name for this field would be restrictions. Unfortunately, + it is not possible to change the name of this field at this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the basis + of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any principal in + posession of credentials to add entries to the authorization data field + since these entries further restrict what can be done with the ticket. + Such additions can be made by specifying the additional entries when a + new ticket is obtained during the TGS exchange, or they may be added + during chained delegation using the authorization data field of the + authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, it is not allowable for the presence of an entry in the + authorization data field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + obtains a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the name + of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its own + authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy to the + client. The client would then present this authorization credential to + the application server separately from the authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy and + leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key + can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested uses of + this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. Its + value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears + along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify a + reasonably accurate timestamp. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that for + messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is sent. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. It + is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are to be + placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket + itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an initial +ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent from the +client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +The fields in this message are: + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket + and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which must be + collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies + (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions to + the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. This + is accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing the + microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate more + than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of + the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC or + the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets as + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the KDC. + Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the flag + that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field to + the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a request + for forwarding. The address(es) of the + host from which the resulting ticket is + to be valid are included in the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set on + the initial request, or in a subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this is + a request for a proxy. This option will + only be honored if the ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the host + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + from which the resulting ticket is to be + valid are included in the addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that this + is a request for a postdated ticket. + This option will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket on which it is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may be + reset by a subsequent request to the KDC + after the starttime in the ticket has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or when the + ticket-granting ticket on which the + request is based is also renewable. If + this option is requested, then the rtime + field in the request contains the + desired absolute expiration time for the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not to + identify the user to which it was + issued. Instead, the principal identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified by + the policy of the realm (e.g. usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of the + ticket is only to securely distribute a + session key, and not to identify the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the ticket + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + to be returned should be set. If the + local realms policy does not permit + anonymous credentials, the request is to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited field + is disabled. Tickets issued without the + performance of this check will be noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if a + ticket with the requested life cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket with + the requested life cannot be provided, + then a renewable ticket may be issued + with a renew-till equal to the the + requested endtime. The value of the + renew-till field may still be limited by + local limits, or limits selected by the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for the + end server is to be encrypted in the + session key from the additional ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The RENEW option + indicates that the present request is + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + for a renewal. The ticket provided is + encrypted in the secret key for the + server on which it is valid. This + option will only be honored if the + ticket to be renewed has its RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its renew- + till field has not passed. The ticket + to be renewed is passed in the padata + field as part of the authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE option + indicates that the request is to vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will only + be honored if the ticket presented is + postdated, presently has its INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be vali- + dated before its starttime. The ticket + presented for validation is encrypted in + the key of the server for which it is + valid and is passed in the padata field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, or + alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, both + from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the + desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is omitted + then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date of + the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated randomly, + but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in the + response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses for + the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will contain + other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied by the + KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be used + in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. If more than + one option which requires additional tickets has been specified, then + the additional tickets are used in the order specified by the ordering + of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is +passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for either +an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no message +type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or +KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if +absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. +In that case, no version number will be present in the EncryptedData +sequence. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section 6.3.2). + This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to + change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all existing + password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged as + needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related information + that forms the encrypted part of a message. The description of the + encrypted part of the message follows each appearance of this field. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + The encrypted part is encoded as described in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the last + request by a principal. Depending on what information is available, + this might be the last time that a request for a ticket-granting ticket + was made, or the last time that a request based on a ticket-granting + ticket was successful. It also might cover all servers for a realm, or + just the particular server. Some implementations may display this + information to the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of one's + identity. It is similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when + logging into timesharing systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up to + the application client (usually the login program) to take appropriate + action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will be + the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often +referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits + is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. It is + to be encoded separately and then have the checksum computed over it, + for use in the cksum field. +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over the + encoding of the KRB-SAFE-BODY sequence. +user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By checking + the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make sure that + it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast protocols), + but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. This field + along with s-address can be used to help detect messages which have + been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format of + the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by the + intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must + never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the message in an application + specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected by any encryption, it +is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such a message. In +particular, this means that the client should not use any fields in this +message for security-critical purposes, such as setting a system clock or +generating a fresh authenticator. The message can be useful, however, for +advising a user on the reason for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, + e-typed-data[14] SEQUENCE of ETypedData OPTIONAL +} + +ETypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + e-data-type [1] INTEGER, + e-data-value [2] OCTET STRING, +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. Its + value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The two + fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the list + of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to provide + for national language support in the display of error messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If the + errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields, each corresponding + to an acceptable pre-authentication method and optionally containing + data for the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate method; method-data + will contain any required additional information. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. The + checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to an + AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the client's + secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication to prove + knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be + computed because the key to be used is not available, no checksum will + be included. +e-typed-data + [This field for discussion, may be deleted from final spec] This field + contains optional data that may be used to help the client recover from + the indicated error. [This could contain the METHOD-DATA specified + since I don't think anyone actually uses it yet. It could also contain + the PA-DATA sequence for the preauth required error if we had a clear + way to transition to the use of this field from the use of the untype + e-data field.] For example, this field may specify the key version of + the key used to verify preauthentication: + + e-data-type := 20 -- Key version number + e-data-value := Integer -- Key version number used to verify + preauthentication + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use stream +encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly available block +encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption Standard, [DES77] in +conjunction with block chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption is +used to prove the identities of the network entities participating in +message exchanges. The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by +all principals registered in that realm to store a secret key in confidence. +Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the authenticity of +a principal. + +The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a shared +session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to ticket requests; +the ability to obtain the secret key or session key implies the knowledge of +the appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability of a principal +to decrypt the KDC response and present a Ticket and a properly formed +Authenticator (generated with the session key from the KDC response) to a +service verifies the identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the +service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge +thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is secure +from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields in the +encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the effects of +poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If keys are +derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords need to be well chosen to +make brute force attacks more difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy +targets for intruders. + +The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms +currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding +requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is often +desirable to place random information (often referred to as a confounder) at +the start of the message. The requirements for a confounder are specified +with each encryption mechanism. + +Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the +security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining methods +often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such +as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain-text +which can be verified at decryption and used to detect any tampering or +damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting burst errors in the +input. If any damage is detected, the decryption routine is expected to +return an error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. +The specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum +requirements. + +Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an algorithm +for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type is included. It +is desirable for the string to key function to be one-way, and for the +mapping to be different in different realms. This is important because users +who are registered in more than one realm will often use the same password +in each, and it is desirable that an attacker compromising the Kerberos +server in one realm not obtain or derive the user's key in another. + +For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate +encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the the reader is +referred to [SG92]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + +The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The +enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in section +5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional key version +number, and the ciphertext. + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + + + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to encipher + the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected encryption types + appear later in this section. +kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data is + encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long lasting + keys, such as principals' secret keys. +cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET STRING. + +The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption algorithm +to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific inputs. Encryption +mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take sufficient measures to +guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend they also take +measures to protect against precomputed dictionary attacks. If the +encryption algorithm is not itself capable of doing so, the protections can +often be enhanced by adding a checksum and a confounder. + +The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a confounder, a +checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary padding. The msg-seq +field contains the part of the protocol message described in section 5 which +is to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are all untagged +and untyped, and their length is exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate +item. The type and length is implicit and specified by the particular +encryption type being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted +is described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + +One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing it in +confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate checksum over +confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the +necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type and the +appropriate key. + +Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm that +specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an octet +boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which are +not specified will be omitted. + +In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the +specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is needed as +part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + +Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and the +data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining +mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such additional information. +6.2. Encryption Keys + +The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + +keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption key that follows in the + keyvalue field. It will almost always correspond to the encryption + algorithm used to generate the EncryptedData, though more than one + algorithm may use the same type of key (the mapping is many to one). + This might happen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a different + chaining mechanism. +keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + +All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpreta- tions. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + +If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the NULL +encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no checksum, +confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key +is used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in length, with +keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + +The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. A +CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is applied to the +confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES +blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation +of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an attacker +could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid +message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum for ticket or +authenticator is no longer mandated as an interoperability requirement for +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + +The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + +The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. + +Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are +concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first +octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as +the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., +and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + +Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an additional +input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise specified, +zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, +because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, +keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of 56 +bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a +series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are +also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity +bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the +MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), the text string +normally must have the realm and each component of the principal's name +appended[37], then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 byte boundary. This +string is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte +DES key. The parity is corrected on the key, and it is used to generate a +DES CBC checksum on the initial string (with the realm and name appended). +Next, parity is corrected on the CBC checksum. If the result matches a +'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES specification, it is +eXclusive-ORed with the constant 00000000000000F0. Finally, the result is +returned as the key. Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + odd = 1; + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + fixparity(tempkey); + key = DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES EDE in outer CBC mode with an SHA1 check-sum +(des3-cbc-sha1) + +The des3-cbc-sha1 encryption encodes information using three Data Encryption +Standard transformations with three DES keys. The first key is used to +perform a DES ECB encryption on an eight-octet data block using the first +DES key, followed by a DES ECB decryption of the result using the second DES +key, and a DES ECB encryption of the result using the third DES key. Because +DES blocks are 8 bytes, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must first be padded to an 8 byte +boundary before encryption. To support the outer CBC mode, the input is +padded to an eight-octet boundary. The first 8 octets of the data to be +encrypted (the confounder) is exclusive-ored with an initialization vector +of zero and then ECB encrypted using triple DES as described above. +Subsequent blocks of 8 octets are exclusive-ored with the ciphertext +produced by the encryption on the previous block before ECB encryption. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +An HMAC-SHA1 checksum (described in [KBC96].) is applied to the confounder +and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. + +Plaintext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are concatenated to make +the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first octet supplies the 8 +most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as the DES input block's +MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet +supplies the 8 least significant bits. + +Encryption under Triple DES using cipher block chaining requires an +additional input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise +specified, zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use +of DES requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, +because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, +keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A Triple DES key is 24 octets of data, with keytype seven (7). This consists +of 168 bits of key, and 24 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded +as a series of 24 octets written in MSB-first order, with the first 8 octets +treated as the first DES key, the second 8 octets as the second key, and the +third 8 octets the third DES key. The bits within each key are also encoded +in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity +bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the +MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + +Key derivation for specified operations (Horowitz) + +[Discussion is needed for this section, especially since it does not simply +derive key generation, but also specifies encryption using triple DES in a +manner that is different than the basic template that was specified for +single DES and similar systems] + +In the Kerberos protocol cryptographic keys are used in a number of places. +In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is desirable to +use a different key in each of these places. Key derivation [Horowitz96] can +be used to construct different keys for each operation from the keys +transported on the network or derived from the password specified by the +user. + +For each place where a key is used in Kerberos, a ``key usage'' is specified +for that purpose. The key, key usage, and encryption/checksum type together +describe the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext. For backwards +compatibility, this key derivation is only specified here for encryption +methods based on triple DES. Encryption methods specified for use by +Kerberos in the future should specify the key derivation function to be +used. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be +tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and +integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, for +each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption (Ke), and one +for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + +where the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network byte +order. The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) + +The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + +When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or +padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be generated +from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + MAC = H(Kc, length | plaintext) + + +Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a keyed +hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed hash +algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is recommended for use as H. + +The key usage value will be taken from the following list of places where +keys are used in the Kerberos protocol, with key usage values and Kerberos +specification section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) + + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 15. KRB-SAFE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) + + 16. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be encrypted using Kerberos encryption type. + 17. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be checksummed using Kerberos checksum type. + + 18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) + 19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) + 20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) + 21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), the text string +normally must have the realm and each component of the principal's name +appended[38]. + +The input string (with any salt data appended to it) is n-folded into a 24 +octet (192 bit) string. To n-fold a number X, replicate the input value to a +length that is the least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before +each repetition, the input X is rotated to the right by 13 bit positions. +The successive n-bit chunks are added together using 1's-complement addition +(addition with end-around carry) to yield a n-bit result. (This +transformation was proposed by Richard Basch) + +Each successive set of 8 octets is taken as a DES key, and its parity is +adjusted in the same manner as previously described. If any of the three +sets of 8 octets match a 'weak' or 'semi-weak key as described in the DES +specification, that chunk is eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant +00000000000000F0. The resulting DES keys are then used in sequence to +perform a Triple-DES CBC encryption of the n-folded input string (appended +with any salt data), using a zero initial vector. Parity, weak, and +semi-weak keys are once again corrected and the result is returned as the 24 +octet key. + +Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + s = string + realm; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tkey[24] = fold(s); + fixparity(tkey); + if(isweak(tkey[0-7])) tkey[0-7] = tkey[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(isweak(tkey[8-15])) tkey[8-15] = tkey[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(tkey[16-23])) tkey[16-23] = tkey[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + key[24] = 3DES-CBC(data=fold(s),key=tkey,iv=0); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak(key[0-7])) key[0-7] = key[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[8-15])) key[8-15] = key[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[16-23])) key[16-23] = key[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.4. Checksums + +The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + +cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the accompanying + checksum. +checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet string. + +Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this +section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + +Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: whether they +are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is infeasible to find +two plaintexts which generate the same checksum value for a collision-proof +checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the algorithm in a +keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream modification by an active +attacker, unkeyed checksums should only be used when the checksum and +message will be subsequently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as part +of the encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + +Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum value is +encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the composition of +the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a new checksum +algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed checksums, as well as for the +encrypted forms of unkeyed collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a +confounder before the checksum is calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy check +as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is four (4) +octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The use +of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a probabilistic +chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be able to generate an +alternative message that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + +The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm +[MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to +be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + +The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD4 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + +The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 algorithm. +[MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to +be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD5 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The resulting +checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum +is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder to the +plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result using the key +and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last block of the +ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The resulting +checksum is 128 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos, nor + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or 'semi-weak'. + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) + +The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. Note that this +checksum type is the old method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it +is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + +The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode encryption +of the plaintext, and using the last block of the ciphertext as the checksum +value. It is keyed with an encryption key and an initialization vector; any +uses which do not specify an additional initialization vector will use the +key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits +(8 octets) long. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note +that this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DES-MAC checksum +and it is no longer recommended. The DES specifications identify some 'weak +keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys shall not be used for generating +DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + +Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm can +technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across realm +boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be assigned, and +what information they imply. + +To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the conventions +itself, and it must require that any realms with which inter-realm keys are +shared also conform to the conventions and require the same from its +neighbors. + +Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only in the +case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently four styles +of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each style +follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components +separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor slashes +(/). Domain names must be converted to upper case when used as realm names. + +X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before the + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string representations of the +names with components separated by slashes. Leading and trailing slashes +will not be included. + +Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that +contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by a +colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned before +they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + +The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first +three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is unlikely +that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the 'other' category. + +These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the various +name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the assignment of +realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for the +domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organization owning (to +whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name or X.500 name, or in the case +that no such names are registered, authority to use a realm name may be +derived from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no +domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can +authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + +This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is assigned +is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to its children in +the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 hierarchy, it +is the parent's responsibility to make sure that there will not in the +future exists a name identical to the realm name of the child unless it is +assigned to the same entity as the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + +As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that all +agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The name-type +field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind of information +implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. Ignoring the +name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the +components, or the realm, must be different). The following name types are +defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a particular +time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal name type should + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +be used for users, and it might also be used for a unique server. If the +name is a unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed never to be +reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note that it is +generally a bad idea to reassign names of any type since stale entries might +remain in access control lists). + +If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining +components identify an instance of the service in a server specified manner, +then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of this name type +is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first component of +krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm for which the ticket is +valid. + +If instance is a single component following the service name and the +instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the name +type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for Internet +services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components following the +name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should be used. This type +might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash +(/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + +A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an X.509 +certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of the X.509 +name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding rules specified +in RFC 1779. + +A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not +known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match principals +authenticated with names of any type. A principal authenticated with a name +of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNKNOWN. + +Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved for the +Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the form of such +names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + +The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be composed +of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server is registered, +and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an +Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if the +name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows slash (/) +separators. The first component of the two- or multi-component name will +identify the service and the latter components will identify the host. Where +the name of the host is not case sensitive (for example, with Internet +domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If specified by the +application protocol for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands +which run with system privileges, the first component may be the string +'host' instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official +name and one or more aliases, the official name of the host must be used +when constructing the name of the server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +8.1. Host address types + +All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + +The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match the +defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard Distributions of +Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an +abbreviation of the address family name). + +Internet (IPv4) Addresses + +Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + +Internet (IPv6) Addresses + +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. The +following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos packet: + + * the Unspecified Address + * the Loopback Address + * Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +CHAOSnet addresses + +CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. +The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + +ISO addresses + +ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + +XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of XNS addresses is six (6). + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + +AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit network +number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the remaining two +octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type of AppleTalk DDP +addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + +DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. The +type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + +When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP +IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an +encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an encoding of the +reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at +the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must +accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made +through UDP/IP transport must also use UDP/IP transport. + +8.2.2. TCP/IP transport + +Kerberos servers (KDC's) must accept TCP requests on port 88 (decimal). When +the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP stream, a new +connection will be established for each authentication exchange (request and +response). The KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the +client on the same TCP stream that was established for the request. The +connection will be broken after the reply has been received (or upon +time-out). Care must be taken in managing TCP/IP connections with the KDC to +prevent denial of service attacks based on the number of TCP/IP connections +with the KDC that remain open. If multiple exchanges with the KDC are needed +for certain forms of preauthentication, multiple TCP connections will be +required. The response to a request made through TCP/IP transport must also +use TCP/IP transport. + +The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request request +will encode in network byte order the length of the request (KRB_KDC_REQ), +and the length will be followed by the request itself. The response will +similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in network byte order of the +length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR message and will be followed by +the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR response. + +8.2.3. OSI transport + +During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual +authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of +credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of +private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be +treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechanism will +be: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication +header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message +(KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message +(KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as specified in the +ASN.1 description for each message. The application code may be used by +Kerberos to determine the message type. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + +The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be composed of +three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS ticket (2) a two-part +name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the second part +the name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting ticket. For +example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be +used to get tickets from the ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier +of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A +ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get +tickets from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-priv 9 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-pub 10 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-md5 11 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-sha1 12 (pkinit) +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 10 20 (I had this as 10, is it 12) + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (pkinit) +PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + +authorization data type ad-type value +AD-KDC-ISSUED 1 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 +AD-IF-RELEVANT 4 +AD-OR 5 +AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 +AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 +reserved values 8-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +Ticket Extension Types + +TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension +TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data + 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations) +TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket +TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations) + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID +KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not + supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password + to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired [40] +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message +KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) + +9. Interoperability requirements + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among these +are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding schemes for +the transited field, optional mechanisms for pre-authentication, the +handling of tickets with no addresses, options for mutual authentication, +user to user authentication, support for proxies, forwarding, postdating, +and renewing tickets, the format of realm names, and the handling of +authorization data. + +In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to define +a minimal configuration which must be supported by all implementations. This +minimal configuration is subject to change as technology does. For example, +if at some later date it is discovered that one of the required encryption +or checksum algorithms is not secure, it will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 2 + +This section defines the second specification of these options. +Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (depricated) may +be found in RFC1510. + +Transport + +TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming conformance +to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance to specification 2 +must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the KDC and may support +TCP/IP transport. + +Encryption and checksum methods + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. +Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the additional +mechanisms may only be used when communicating with principals known to also +support them: This list is to be determined. + +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the Internet +Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for an unknown +realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the names of the +intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. +Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when that +encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on the +initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by clients +but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an +acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should ignore the +presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request. + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT +contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but each +realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each application +server will set its own policy with respect to accepting them. + +Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and +application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will be +accepted. + +All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but need +not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, the +starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful +life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all implementations +shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible to the calling server. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC option) +must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may decide as a +matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal or realm-wide +basis. + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from +ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to +suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered subfield +type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered +subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + +Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data subfields +available to the server when a ticket is used. Implementations are not +required to allow clients to specify the contents of the authorization data +fields. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, based on +the list of suggested configuration constants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes +maximum renewable lifetime 1 week +maximum ticket lifetime 1 day +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +10. REFERENCES + +[NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +[MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +[SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +[KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +[Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +[DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +[LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +[X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +[Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + +[DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + +[DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +[SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +[IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +[MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +[MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + +This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to be +constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that */ + /* should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly */ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would */ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so */ + /* there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) then + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == OK) + set new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not present) + then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + +B. Definition of common authorization data elements + +This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data +elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly defined, +meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of +authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the encapsulating +element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating element, the +encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted as issued +directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate plaintext part of +the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements are specified as part of +the Kerberos specification ebcause the behavior based on these values should +be understood across implementations whereas other elements need only be +understood by the applications which they affect. + +In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the element +will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of the ad-data +will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection heading. + +B.1. KDC Issued + +AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. +} + +ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the ticket + itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same encryption + algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key derived from the + same key used to protect the ticket. +i-realm, i-sname + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC itself. + This field would be used when the KDC can verify the authenticity of + elements signed by the issuing principal and it allows this KDC to + notify the application server of the validity of those elements. +elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + +The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for Kerberos +principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege attributes and +other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying the priveleges of +the principal beyond what can be done using a credentials without such an +a-data element. + +This can not be provided without this element because the definition of the +authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the bearer +of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and elements may also +be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the authenticator. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are signed by +the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's key (the same +key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from that key). Elements +encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be ignored by the +application server if this "signature" is not present. Further, elements +encapsulated within this element from a ticket granting ticket may be +interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis according to policy for +including new signed elements within derivative tickets, but they will not +be copied to a derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a +derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the signature +will not be correct for the application ticket elements, and the field will +be ignored by the application server. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.2. Intended for server + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be +ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names of +intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application server +can remove this element if the application server is not in the list of +intended servers. + +Application servers should check for their principal name in the +intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not found, +this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated elements +should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present in the top +level authorization data field. Applications and application servers that do +not implement this element should reject tickets that contain authorization +data elements of this type. + +B.3. Intended for application class + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { intended-application-class[0] +SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] AuthorizationData } AD elements +encapsulated within the intended-for-application-class element may be +ignored if the application server is not in one of the named classes of +application servers. Examples of application server classes include +"FILESYSTEM", and other kinds of servers. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.4. If relevant + +AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended for +interpretation only by application servers that understand the particular +ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do not understand +the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant element may ignore +the uninterpretable element. This element promotes interoperability across +implementations which may have local extensions for authorization. + +B.5. And-Or + +AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are +encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the +encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. This +element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the +condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by setting +the condition count to the number of embedded elements. Application servers +that do not implement this element must reject tickets that contain +authorization data elements of this type. + +B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + +AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions specifies +a collision-proof checksum using the same has angorithm used to protect the +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be calculated over the +entire extensions field. If there are more than one extension, all will be +covered by the checksum. This restriction indicates that the ticket should +not be accepted if the checksum does not match that calculated over the +ticket extensions. Application servers that do not implement this element +must reject tickets that contain authorization data elements of this type. + +B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + +AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a +collision-proof checksum using the same has angorithm used to protect the +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a separate +external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket extensions. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. Application servers +that do implement this element will search the ticket extensions for +authorization data fields, calculate the specified checksum over each +authorization data field and look for one matching the checksum in this +in-ticket-extensions element. If not found, then the ticket must be +rejected. If found, the corresponding authorization data elements will be +interpreted in the same manner as if they were contained in the top level +authorization data field. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in a +ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type in-ticket-extensions +in the top level authorization data field, and the external entries will be +linked to the corresponding element by their checksums. + +C. Definition of common ticket extensions + +This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. Support +for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions have +associated authorization data elements that may require rejection of a +ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not implement +the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined beyond those +described in this specification. Such extensions are described elswhere and +for some of those extensions the reserved number may be found in the list of +constants. + +It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, and +that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they parse and +then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application servers. The +presence of the extension will not break such clients, but any functionaly +dependent on the extensions will not work when such tickets are handled by +old clients. In such situations, some implementation may use alternate +methods to transmit the information in the extensions field. + +C.1. Null ticket extension + +TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + +The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of lenght +zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket so that the +KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting ticket whether the +client software will strip the extensions field. + +C.2. External Authorization Data + +TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + +The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension is +field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization data +elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element will be +present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and that element +will contain a checksum of the external authorization data ticket extension. +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +[TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the +Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these +trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon +the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an application +subsequently provides integrity protection for the data stream, the identity +verification applies only to the initiation of the connection, and does not +guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate from the same +principal. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the literature. In +our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key +is a secret key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows +it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private key. + +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange +registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and engage +in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for even small +numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more automatic methods as +described here are necessary. + +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no network +addresses specified. + +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the requester +can provide the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it +would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- sion and +change another user's password. + +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials +obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain +credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be verified by a +local server through successful completion of the Client/Server exchange. + +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to +guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. This can +only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is based on +cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly random number +generator, such as one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext +here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one message and +replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + +[9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports +difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated +messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies and replay the first +reply in response to a detected duplicate. + +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from the +same principal to the same server. Other client principals communicating +with the same server principal should not be have their authenticators +rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to match some other +client's authenticator. + +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was the +client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 because +version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not possible to +create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) +without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key is +not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to choose +subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a +negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + +[15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known beforehand +(since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it might be stored in +a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- tion file. If the +realm to be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of being +spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- cated. +This might result in the use of a realm which has been compromised, and +would result in an attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of +the application server to the client. + +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to ensure +the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach would be to +generate a random number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication [8], +which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server keys +in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- ised. + +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first listed +realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's realm is +considered to precede those in the transited field, and the server's realm +is considered to follow them. + +[20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and +communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not share +a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the database +and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store the principal +database in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries stored +therein are protected from disclosure to and modification by unauthorized +parties. However, we recommend against such strategies, as they can make +system management and threat analysis quite complex. + +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for details on +why this can be useful. + +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data structures +during the generation and verification of embedded checksums: Because any +checksums applied to data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within a data structure +between the time that a checksum is generated through transmission to the +time that the checksum is verified. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the +workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine that +such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must make +sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If the time is +ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability that a nonce +will be reused. + +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization vector +may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve proper cipher +chaining. The initialization vector might come from the last block of the +ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the application's +choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. If left out, the +default initialization vector for the encryption algorithm will be used. + +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request from +obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password guessing +attack. + +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the +notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is not a +valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the message starts +with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. For other fields, +the length and tag would be redundant if they were included because they are +specified by the encryption type. [36] The ordering of the fields in the +CipherText is important. Additionally, messages encoded in this format must +include a length as part of the msg-seq field. This allows the recipient to +verify that the message has not been truncated. Without a length, an +attacker could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a message which +could be truncated, while leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the +msg-seq is an encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length +is part of that encoding. + +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a particular +function, separating the functions of generating a checksum from other +encryption performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 +was chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +the use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar purpose in +the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + +[40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. The +contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section 5.9.1. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..06d997d48c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6766 @@ + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + November 18th, 1998 + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents +of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It +is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite +them other than as 'work in progress.' + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +'1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow +Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt, and expires May 18th, 1999. +Please send comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the +Kerberos network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version +5 of the Kerberos protocol. + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard +through the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the +presentation, but only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or +extensions that fit within current protocol framework will be considered at + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested +by Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of +Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena +staff members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford +Neuman (now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of +Southern California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of +Project Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many +other members of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on +Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol +was led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the +community. The development of the MIT reference implementation was led at +MIT by John Kohl and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from +many others. Since RFC1510 was issued, extensions and revisions to the +protocol have been proposed by many individuals. Some of these proposals +are reflected in this document. Where such changes involved significant +effort, the document cites the contribution of the proposer. + +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and +5 can be found in [KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. +a workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. +This is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating +system, without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical +security of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that +packets traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at +will[1]. Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a +trusted third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared +secret key [2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and +implemented that provide for the use of public key cryptography during +certain phases of the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for +authentication of users registered with public key certification +authorities, and allow the system to provide certain benefits of public key +cryptography in situations where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in +the client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server +and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +client transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a +copy of the session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. +The session key (now shared by the client and server) is used to +authenticate the client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the +server. It may also be used to encrypt further communication between the +two parties or to exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt +further communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their +secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos +protocol. In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical +network application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly +or through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request +for a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted +in the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client +uses the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it +were contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry +points within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent +"in the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't +thwart replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, +additional information is sent to prove that the message originated with +the principal to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the +authenticator) is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. +The timestamp proves that the message was recently generated and is not a +replay. Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was +generated by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the +requesting principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent +over the network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to +the Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must +be modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's +key. This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos +server, the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol +for maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server +in another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes +its own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is +part of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide +whether to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate +key may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service +of each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share +an inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is +not directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical +organization is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in +order to construct an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in +authenticating the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93] , or on other authorization services. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the issuance of a service +ticket by the Kerberos server (even by an modified Kerberos server) as +granting authority to use the service, since such applications may become +vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment if +they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for application +authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a dictionary, + messages obtained which are encrypted under a key derived from the + user's password. + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to + grant permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + remains for a deleted principal and the principal identifier is + reused, the new principal will inherit rights specified in the stale + ACL entry. By not re-using principal identifiers, the danger of + inadvertent access is removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been + recently generated using the session key known only by the client and + server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access + allowed for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted + by the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. + Note that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other + server (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use + that ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is + sometimes referred to as the Authentication Server (or service). The + ticket-granting ticket portion is sometimes referred to as the + ticket-granting server (or service). +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than + one server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a + lifetime limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the +various flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the +VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their +starttime has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets +which have been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently +invalid (through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set +in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key +and a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left +unmodified by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration +time arrives, the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may +consult a hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen +since its last renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and +thus the usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets +in a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to +theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC +at job submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are +activated and validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft +were reported in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, +and the thief would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This +flag must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated +ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be +requested by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the +KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated +ticket-granting ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by +obtained by requesting the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life +(endtime-starttime) of a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +ticket-granting ticket at the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE +option is also set, in which case it can be the full life +(endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how +far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the +identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can +allow a service to take on the principal's identity for a particular +purpose by granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose +must use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to +forward a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When +set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a +new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network +address based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client +on initial authentication. By default, the client will request that it be +set when requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any +other ticket. + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print +server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in +order to satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in +the ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new +network address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the +proxy is to be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may +require additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in +order to provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request +that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when +they request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user +to enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. +It is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED +flag set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets +differently than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients +and servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the +Kerberos Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to +obtain authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the +initiation of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting +Server which will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other +servers (see section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's +secret key. This exchange is also used to request credentials for services + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +which must not be mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather +require a principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. +This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity +of the user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The +response, KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the +server, and a session key that will be shared by the client and the server. +The session key and additional information are encrypted in the client's +secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used +to detect replays, and to associate it with the message to which it +replies. Various errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response +(KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not +encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains information which can be used to +associate it with the message to which it replies. The lack of encryption +in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays, +fabrications, or modifications of such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends +a reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is +encrypted in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional +field that can be used to pass additional information that might be needed +for the initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as +described in section [hl<>]. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether +the requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether +it should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; and +whether a renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable +ticket if the requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a +non-renewable ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See +section A.1 for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format +for the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket +are determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named +in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS +request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used for +encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one supported, +strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype for which +an encryption key is available is used. The encryption method used to +respond to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key found +in the ticket granting ticket. + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. +Otherwise the requested start time is checked against the policy of the +local realm (the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or +ranges of postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is +set as requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The +postdated ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC +after the start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option +has been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till +field is set to the minimum of: + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set + by the policy of the local realm. + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using +the requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section +A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, +start and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate +a KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the +proper KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must +require the user to present application credentials which can be verified +using a securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can +be verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS +or TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message +is referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) +a ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use +of a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors +are possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the +client with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If +the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in +the KRB_AP_REQ is not one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old +key, and the server no longer possesses a copy of the old key), the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set +in the ap-options field, it indicates to the server that the ticket is +encrypted in the session key from the server's ticket-granting ticket +rather than its secret key[10]. Since it is possible for the server to be +registered in multiple realms, with different keys in each, the srealm +field in the unencrypted portion of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to +specify which secret key the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server doesn't have the +proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the +client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the +authenticator. If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is +returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong session key was +used to encrypt the authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) +are then searched for an address matching the operating-system reported +address of the client. If no match is found or the server insists on ticket +addresses but none are present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error +is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The +server must remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock +skew, so that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses +track of any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it +must reject all requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This +assures that any lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the +allowable clock skew and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is +not done, an attacker could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator +sent over the network to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as +the disabled host, and replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the +authentication.). If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, +the server saves it for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV +messages. If a subkey is present, the server either saves it for later use +or uses it to help generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a +KRB_AP_REP message. + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +the client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket +and thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 +for pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; +it does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name +of the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such +as that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server +need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual +authentication (not only authenticating the client to the server, but also +the server to the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will +have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message +is required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not +acceptable to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond +field used in the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond +field (as provided in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be +included, it should be randomly chosen as described above for the +authenticator. A subkey may be included if the server desires to negotiate +a different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key +extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and +server share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The +'true session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption +or checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does +not constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might +be done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +reason, one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 +unknown bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from +using more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key +with a known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if +the server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server +is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication +credentials for a given server (which might be registered in a remote +realm), when it wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it +wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already +have acquired a ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS +exchange (the ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client +initially authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The +message format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS +exchange. The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the +TGS exchange does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or +sub-session key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for all +application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a +renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, the client must use a separate +exchange to obtain valid tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed +authorization data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the +application server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described +later). The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, +encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable +ticket, or if present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part +of the authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code +and text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not +encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +to detect replays, and to associate it with the message to which it +replies. The KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used +to associate it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of +encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays +or fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15]. If the +client does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the +appropriate realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by +requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a +Kerberos server for which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket +(using the KRB_TGS_REQ message recursively). The Kerberos server may return +a TGT for the desired realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, +the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the +desired realm (further along the standard hierarchical path), in which case +this step must be repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in +the returned TGT. If neither are returned, then the request must be retried +with a Kerberos server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request +will itself require a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm which +must be obtained by recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. +The list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service +or it may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret +keys exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results +from using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server +use and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be +encrypted[16]. If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key +from the ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data +is present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from +the authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, +using the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which +it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP +(KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed +specification is in section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. This is the only case where the response from the KDC +will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited +field needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. +The PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional +ticket-granting tickets. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the +ticket-granting ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting +ticket will be postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the +policy of the local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as +requested, and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be +validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has +been reached. However, in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till +time of a newly-issued postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time +of the ticket-granting ticket. + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional +ticket using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was +issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the +requested server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the +additional ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server +will be compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is +set in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that +the renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is +rqeuested, the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID +flag is set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that +the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the +ticket passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC +will issue the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal +expiration time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and +the key version number fields are left out since these values are stored +along with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +satisfy a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for +pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, +subject to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS +exchange. The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket +to be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous +realm. This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving +out its own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since +the endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its +contents are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the +normal case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of +realms using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding +(called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. +Thus, "," means that all realms along the path between the client and the +server have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from +the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been +traversed, and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an +X.500 style has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in +one hierarchy shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in +another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES +MAC), generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by +one's peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session +key, so maintaining the next sequence number should not present an +additional problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and +type fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A +mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. +The application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. +The recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's +address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient +address is specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A +failed match for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the +timestamp and usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If +timestamp and usec are expected and not present, or they are present but +not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, +along with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the +Authenticator match any recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, +the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number +is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. +Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and control information, +and if it doesn't match the received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error +is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and +type fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A +mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. +The application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. The recipient verifies that +the operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses +appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for +either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and +usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec +are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an +incorrect sequence number is included, or a sequence number is expected but +not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a +time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED +error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It +then constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the +KRB_CRED message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence +in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and +r-address fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message +which is then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the +KRB_AP exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates +a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If +decryption shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +error is generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's +address in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce +field if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not +present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is +generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets +in its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in +the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the +KRB_CRED message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- ing the +principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be +authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The +key can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to +protect it in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. +In that case, an extra field must be added to indicate the master key +version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the +principal's secret key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable +lifetime (endtime - starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. +The max_renewable_life field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime +for any renewable Ticket issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a +description of how these lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of +a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal +records with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. +not the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be +retained by the server until all tickets that had been issued using that +key have expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be +active for a single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is +always tagged with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to +help the recipient find the proper key for decryption. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to +a request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error +to any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A +database may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, +and one for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether +a server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a +client, or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user +in the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to +allow the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +Optional field in ASN.1 sequences + +For optional integer value and date fields in ASN.1 sequences where a +default value has been specified, certain default values will not be +allowed in the encoding because these values will always be represented +through defaulting by the absence of the optional field. For example, one +will not send a microsecond zero value because one must make sure that +there is only one way to encode this value. + +Additional fields in ASN.1 sequences + +Implementations receiving Kerberos messages with additional fields present +in ASN.1 sequences should carry the those fields through unmodified when +the message is forwarded. Implementation should drop such fields if the +sequence is reencoded. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 +specification, section 8.7 [X509-88]. + +5.3. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A +PrincipalName is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following +sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the + same (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be + different). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An +encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any +fractional portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any +separators. Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 +seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved + for registered use. + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the +interpretation of the encapsulating element determines which of the +embedded elements must be interpreted, and which may be ignored. +Definitions for these common elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved + for registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + -- unused10(10), + -- unused11(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest number of bits needed to include +the highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. +The ASN.1 representation of the bit strings uses unnamed bits, with the +meaning of the individual bits defined by the comments in the specification +above. Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length +and treat the value of flags corresponding to bits beyond the end of the +bit string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparison of bit strings of +different length should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with +zeros beyond the high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute + value of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is + the time of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three + (3), then the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). If it is + (6), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the password will + expire. +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A +Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be +registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos +and the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format +of the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies the name part of the server's identity. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + This optional field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used + to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support + several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext + authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other + information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + application server. See Appendix C for definitions of some common + extensions. + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of + the appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal + identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. + When the names of CA's are to be embedded inthe transited field (as + specified for some extentions to the protocol), the X.500 names of the + CA's should be mapped into items in the transited field using the + mapping defined by RFC2253. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the + necessary information for implementation of a `hot list' service at + the KDC. An end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to + accept tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" + in the past. This field is also returned as part of the response from + the KDC. When returned as part of the response to initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- + beros server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated + as that of the authtime field. +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be + honored (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place + their own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which + have not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is + that such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not + sent over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply + by listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the + session key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a + careless user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's worksta- tion could + use the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + makes it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off + with stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, + and that a better name for this field would be restrictions. + Unfortunately, it is not possible to change the name of this field at + this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the + basis of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any + principal in posession of credentials to add entries to the + authorization data field since these entries further restrict what can + be done with the ticket. Such additions can be made by specifying the + additional entries when a new ticket is obtained during the TGS + exchange, or they may be added during chained delegation using the + authorization data field of the authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, it is not allowable for the presence of an entry in the + authorization data field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + obtains a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the + name of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its + own authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy + to the client. The client would then present this authorization + credential to the application server separately from the + authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy + and leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session + key can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested + uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. + Its value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often + appears along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify + a reasonably accurate timestamp. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that + for messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is + sent. Sequence numbers fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and + wrap to zero following the value 2^32 - 1. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. + It is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are + to be placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the + ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an +initial ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent +from the client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a +service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The fields in this message are: + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting + ticket and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which + must be collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY + encoding. In most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and + most replies (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions + to the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. This + is accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing + the microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate + more than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) + consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's + secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC + or the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets + as well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the + KDC. Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the + flag that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field + to the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of +this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + forwardable flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also +for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only +specified + in a request to the +ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket in the +request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. +This + option indicates that this is a +request + for forwarding. The address(es) of +the + host from which the resulting ticket +is + to be valid are included in +the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have its +prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set +on + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + the initial request, or in a +subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket +on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this +is + a request for a proxy. This option +will + only be honored if the +ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its +PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the +host + from which the resulting ticket is to +be + valid are included in the +addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that +this + is a request for a postdated +ticket. + This option will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket on which + it is based has its MAY-POSTDATE + flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have +its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may +be + reset by a subsequent request to the +KDC + after the starttime in the ticket +has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have +its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be +set + on the initial request, or when +the + ticket-granting ticket on which +the + request is based is also renewable. +If + this option is requested, then the +rtime + field in the request contains +the + desired absolute expiration time for +the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option +indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not +to + identify the user to which it +was + issued. Instead, the principal +identif- + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + ier is to be generic, as specified +by + the policy of the realm (e.g. +usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of +the + ticket is only to securely distribute +a + session key, and not to identify +the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the +ticket + to be returned should be set. If +the + local realms policy does not +permit + anonymous credentials, the request is +to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited +field + is disabled. Tickets issued without +the + performance of this check will be +noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be +checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that +a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if +a + ticket with the requested life +cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket +with + the requested life cannot be +provided, + then a renewable ticket may be +issued + with a renew-till equal to the +the + requested endtime. The value of +the + renew-till field may still be limited +by + local limits, or limits selected by +the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The +ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for +the + end server is to be encrypted in +the + session key from the additional +ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The RENEW +option + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + indicates that the present request +is + for a renewal. The ticket provided +is + encrypted in the secret key for +the + server on which it is valid. +This + option will only be honored if +the + ticket to be renewed has its +RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its +renew- + till field has not passed. The +ticket + to be renewed is passed in the +padata + field as part of the +authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE +option + indicates that the request is to +vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will +only + be honored if the ticket presented +is + postdated, presently has its +INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise +usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be +vali- + dated before its starttime. The +ticket + presented for validation is encrypted +in + the key of the server for which it +is + valid and is passed in the padata +field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, + or alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, + both from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies + the desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is + omitted then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date + of the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated + randomly, but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in + the response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses + for the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will + contain other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied + by the KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be + used in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. If more + than one option which requires additional tickets has been specified, + then the additional tickets are used in the order specified by the + ordering of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that +is passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for +either an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no +message type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP +or KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or +if absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the +request. In that case, no version number will be present in the +EncryptedData sequence. + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section + 6.3.2). This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name + needs to change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all + existing password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged + as needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related + information that forms the encrypted part of a message. The + description of the encrypted part of the message follows each + appearance of this field. The encrypted part is encoded as described + in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the + last request by a principal. Depending on what information is + available, this might be the last time that a request for a + ticket-granting ticket was made, or the last time that a request based + on a ticket-granting ticket was successful. It also might cover all + servers for a realm, or just the particular server. Some + implementations may display this information to the user to aid in + discovering unauthorized use of one's identity. It is similar in + spirit to the last login time displayed when logging into timesharing + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up + to the application client (usually the login program) to take + appropriate action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time + is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will + be the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +often referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the + selected options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + unselected options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding + of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options + are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of +this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option +indicates + that the ticket the client is +presenting + to a server is encrypted in the +session + key from the server's +ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not +speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in +the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells +the + server that the client requires +mutual + authentication, and that it must +respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over + the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence. First, the cksum is zeroed and + the checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence, + then the checksum is set to the result of that computation, and + finally the KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again. +user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By + checking the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make + sure that it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast + protocols), but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. + This field along with s-address can be used to help detect messages + which have been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong + recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's +addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's +addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format + of the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by + the intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce + must never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the + recipient of the message and provided to the sender of the message in + an application specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected by any encryption, +it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such a +message. In particular, this means that the client should not use any +fields in this message for security-critical purposes, such as setting a +system clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The message can be +useful, however, for advising a user on the reason for some failure. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, + e-typed-data[14] SEQUENCE of ETypedData +OPTIONAL +} + +ETypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + e-data-type [1] INTEGER, + e-data-value [2] OCTET STRING, +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. + Its value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The + two fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the + list of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to + provide for national language support in the display of error + messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If the + errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields, each corresponding + to an acceptable pre-authentication method and optionally containing + data for the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate method; method-data + will contain any required additional information. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. + The checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to + an AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the + client's secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication + to prove knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum + can not be computed because the key to be used is not available, no + checksum will be included. +e-typed-data + [This field for discussion, may be deleted from final spec] This field + contains optional data that may be used to help the client recover + from the indicated error. [This could contain the METHOD-DATA + specified since I don't think anyone actually uses it yet. It could + also contain the PA-DATA sequence for the preauth required error if we + had a clear way to transition to the use of this field from the use of + the untype e-data field.] For example, this field may specify the key + version of the key used to verify preauthentication: + + e-data-type := 20 -- Key version number + e-data-value := Integer -- Key version number used to verify +preauthentication + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use +stream encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly available +block encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption Standard, [DES77] in +conjunction with block chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption +is used to prove the identities of the network entities participating in +message exchanges. The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by +all principals registered in that realm to store a secret key in +confidence. Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the +authenticity of a principal. + +The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a shared +session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to ticket requests; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +the ability to obtain the secret key or session key implies the knowledge +of the appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability of a +principal to decrypt the KDC response and present a Ticket and a properly +formed Authenticator (generated with the session key from the KDC response) +to a service verifies the identity of the principal; likewise the ability +of the service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its +knowledge thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + +The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is secure +from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields in the +encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the effects of +poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If keys are +derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords need to be well chosen +to make brute force attacks more difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make +easy targets for intruders. + +The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms +currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding +requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is often +desirable to place random information (often referred to as a confounder) +at the start of the message. The requirements for a confounder are +specified with each encryption mechanism. + +Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the +security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining methods +often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such +as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain-text +which can be verified at decryption and used to detect any tampering or +damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting burst errors in the +input. If any damage is detected, the decryption routine is expected to +return an error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. +The specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum +requirements. + +Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an algorithm +for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type is included. +It is desirable for the string to key function to be one-way, and for the +mapping to be different in different realms. This is important because +users who are registered in more than one realm will often use the same +password in each, and it is desirable that an attacker compromising the +Kerberos server in one realm not obtain or derive the user's key in +another. + +For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate +encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the the reader is +referred to [SG92]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + +The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The +enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in section +5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional key version +number, and the ciphertext. + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +} + + + +etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to encipher + the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected encryption types + appear later in this section. +kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data is + encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long lasting + keys, such as principals' secret keys. +cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET STRING. + +The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption +algorithm to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific inputs. +Encryption mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take sufficient +measures to guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend they +also take measures to protect against precomputed dictionary attacks. If +the encryption algorithm is not itself capable of doing so, the protections +can often be enhanced by adding a checksum and a confounder. + +The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a confounder, a +checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary padding. The msg-seq +field contains the part of the protocol message described in section 5 +which is to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are all +untagged and untyped, and their length is exactly sufficient to hold the +appropriate item. The type and length is implicit and specified by the +particular encryption type being used (etype). The format for the data to +be encrypted is described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + +One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing it in +confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate checksum over +confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the +necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type and +the appropriate key. + +Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm that +specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an octet +boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which +are not specified will be omitted. + +In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular +encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is needed as +part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + +Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and the +data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining +mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such additional +information. 6.2. Encryption Keys + +The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + +keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption key that follows in the + keyvalue field. It will almost always correspond to the encryption + algorithm used to generate the EncryptedData, though more than one + algorithm may use the same type of key (the mapping is many to one). + This might happen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a different + chaining mechanism. +keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + +All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields +and interpreta- tions. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + +If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the NULL +encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no checksum, +confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key +is used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in length, with +keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + +The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +A CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is applied to the +confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. +DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the +concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 +byte boundary before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data +are identical to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an attacker +could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid +message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum for ticket or +authenticator is no longer mandated as an interoperability requirement for + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + +The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + +The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. + +Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are +concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first +octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as +the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., +and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + +Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an additional +input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise specified, +zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those +keys shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. +Additionally, because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption +of checksums, keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys +when eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of 56 +bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a +series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are +also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the +parity bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 +as the MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), a "salt" is +concatenated to the text string, and then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 +byte boundary. This "salt" is normally the realm and each component of the +principal's name appended. However, sometimes different salts are used --- +for example, when a realm is renamed, or if a user changes her username, or +for compatibility with Kerberos V4 (whose string-to-key algorithm uses a +null string for the salt). This string is then fan-folded and +eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte DES key. Before + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +eXclusive-ORing a block, every byte is shifted one bit to the left to leave +the lowest bit zero. The key is the "corrected" by correcting the parity on +the key, and if the key matches a 'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in +the DES specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with the constant +00000000000000F0. This key is then used to generate a DES CBC checksum on +the initial string (with the salt appended). The result of the CBC checksum +is the "corrected" as described above to form the result which is return as +the key. Pseudocode follows: + + name_to_default_salt(realm, name) { + s = realm + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + return s; + } + + key_correction(key) { + fixparity(key); + if (is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + string_to_key(string,salt) { + + odd = 1; + s = string + salt; + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + left shift every byte in 8byteblock one bit; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + tempkey = key_correction(tempkey); + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type with Key +Derivation [Horowitz] + +NOTE: This description currently refers to documents, the contents of which +might be bettered included by value in this spec. The description below was +provided by Marc Horowitz, and the form in which it will finally appear is +yet to be determined. This description is included in this version of the +draft because it does describe the implemenation ready for use with the MIT +implementation. Note also that the encryption identifier has been left +unspecified here because the value from Marc Horowitz's spec conflicted +with some other impmenentations implemented based on perevious versions of +the specification. + +This encryption type is based on the Triple DES cryptosystem, the HMAC-SHA1 +[Krawczyk96] message authentication algorithm, and key derivation for + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Kerberos V5 [HorowitzB96]. + +The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value ??. The +hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 12. + +Encryption Type des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 + +EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in +[Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC mode. The +keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. Unless otherwise specified, a zero IV +must be used. If the length of the input data is not a multiple of the +block size, zero octets must be used to pad the plaintext to the next +eight-octet boundary. The counfounder must be eight random octets (one +block). + +Checksum Type hmac-sha1-des3 + +Checksums using this type must be generated as described in [Horowitz96]. +The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. + +Common Requirements + +The EncryptionKey value is 24 octets long. The 7 most significant bits of +each octet contain key bits, and the least significant bit is the inverse +of the xor of the key bits. + +For the purposes of key derivation, the block size is 64 bits, and the key +size is 168 bits. The 168 bits output by key derivation are converted to an +EncryptionKey value as follows. First, the 168 bits are divided into three +groups of 56 bits, which are expanded individually into 64 bits as follows: + + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p + 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p +25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p +33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p +41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p +49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p +56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p + +The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output of the +three expansions are concatenated to form the EncryptionKey value. + +When the HMAC-SHA1 of a string is computed, the key is used in the +EncryptedKey form. + +Key Derivation + +In the Kerberos protocol, cryptographic keys are used in a number of +places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is +desirable to use a different key for each of these places. Key derivation +[Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys for each operation +from the keys transported on the network. For this to be possible, a small +change to the specification is necessary. + +This section specifies a profile for the use of key derivation [Horowitz96] +with Kerberos. For each place where a key is used, a ``key usage'' must is +specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, and encryption/checksum +type together describe the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext, or + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +plaintext to checksum. + +Key Usage Values + +This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos protocol, +with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) +10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) +11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) +12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) +13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) +14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) +15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) +18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) +19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) +20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) +21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + +Key usage values between 1024 and 2047 (inclusive) are reserved for +application use. Applications should use even values for encryption and odd +values for checksums within this range. + +A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service which +receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket was part of an +AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always be used for +generating a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- REQ or TGS-REQ. + +There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of the +RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would not know +about key usages. In order that these documents continue to be meaningful +until they are updated, key usages 1024 and 1025 must be used to derive +keys for encryption and checksums, respectively. New protocols defined in + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +terms of the Kerberos encryption and checksum types should use their own +key usages. Key usages may be registered with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key +usages must be unsigned 32 bit integers. Zero is not permitted. + +Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + +Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be +tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and +integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, for +each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption (Ke), and +one for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + +where the protocol key is from the EncryptionKey from the wire protocol, +and the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network byte order. +The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | plaintext | padding) + +The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + +When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or +padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be generated +from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + + MAC = H(Kc, plaintext) + +Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a +keyed hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed hash +algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is recommended for use as H. + +Key Derivation from Passwords + +The well-known constant for password key derivation must be the byte string +{0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values correspond to the +ASCII encoding for the string "kerberos". + +6.4. Checksums + +The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + +cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the accompanying + checksum. +checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet string. + +Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this +section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local use. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields +and interpretations. + +Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: whether +they are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is infeasible to +find two plaintexts which generate the same checksum value for a +collision-proof checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the +algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream modification by an +active attacker, unkeyed checksums should only be used when the checksum +and message will be subsequently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as +part of the encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + +Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum value is +encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the composition of +the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a new checksum +algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed checksums, as well as for +the encrypted forms of unkeyed collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends +a confounder before the checksum is calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + +The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy +check as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is four +(4) octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The +use of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a probabilistic +chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be able to generate an +alternative message that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + +The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm +[MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed +to be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + +The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD4 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where +the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). +This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in +Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + +The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 algorithm. +[MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed +to be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + +The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD5 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where +the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal +constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). +This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; +those keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in +Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder to the +plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result using the key +and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last block of the +ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of the key, where +the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal +constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 128 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are +redundant. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those +keys shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in +Kerberos, nor shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or 'semi-weak'. + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) + +The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. Note that this +checksum type is the old method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and +it is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + +The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode encryption +of the plaintext, and using the last block of the ciphertext as the +checksum value. It is keyed with an encryption key and an initialization +vector; any uses which do not specify an additional initialization vector +will use the key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting +checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This checksum is tamper-proof and +collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for +encoding the DES-MAC checksum and it is no longer recommended. The DES +specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys +shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + +Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm can +technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across realm +boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be assigned, and +what information they imply. + +To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the conventions +itself, and it must require that any realms with which inter-realm keys are +shared also conform to the conventions and require the same from its +neighbors. + +Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only in +the case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently four +styles of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each +style follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components +separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor slashes +(/). Domain names must be converted to upper case when used as realm names. + +X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before the +equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string representations of +the names with components separated by slashes. Leading and trailing +slashes will not be included. + +Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that +contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by a +colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned before +they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + +The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first +three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is unlikely +that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the 'other' category. + +These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the various +name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the assignment +of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for +the domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organization owning +(to whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name or X.500 name, or in the +case that no such names are registered, authority to use a realm name may +be derived from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is +no domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm +can authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + +This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is assigned +is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to its children +in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 hierarchy, it +is the parent's responsibility to make sure that there will not in the +future exists a name identical to the realm name of the child unless it is +assigned to the same entity as the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + +As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that all +agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The name-type +field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind of information +implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. Ignoring +the name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the +components, or the realm, must be different). The following name types are +defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE +principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a +particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal name +type should be used for users, and it might also be used for a unique +server. If the name is a unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed +never to be reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note that +it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any type since stale +entries might remain in access control lists). + +If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining +components identify an instance of the service in a server specified +manner, then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of this +name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first +component of krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm for which +the ticket is valid. + +If instance is a single component following the service name and the +instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the name +type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for Internet +services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components following the +name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should be used. This type +might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash +(/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + +A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an X.509 +certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of the X.509 +name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding rules specified +in RFC 2253. + +A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not +known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match principals +authenticated with names of any type. A principal authenticated with a name +of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNKNOWN. + +Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved for +the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the form of +such names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + +The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be composed +of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server is registered, +and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an +Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if the +name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows slash (/) +separators. The first component of the two- or multi-component name will +identify the service and the latter components will identify the host. +Where the name of the host is not case sensitive (for example, with +Internet domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If +specified by the application protocol for services such as telnet and the +Berkeley R commands which run with system privileges, the first component +may be the string 'host' instead of a service specific identifier. When a +host has an official name and one or more aliases, the official name of the +host must be used when constructing the name of the server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + +8.1. Host address types + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields +and interpretations. + +The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match the +defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard Distributions of +Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an +abbreviation of the address family name). + +Internet (IPv4) Addresses + +Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + +Internet (IPv6) Addresses [Westerlund] + +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. The +following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos packet: + + * the Unspecified Address + * the Loopback Address + * Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +CHAOSnet addresses + +CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. +The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + +ISO addresses + +ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + +XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of XNS addresses is six (6). + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + +AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit +network number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the +remaining two octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type of +AppleTalk DDP addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + +DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. The +type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + +Netbios addresses + +Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to 15 +characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16th octet of +0x0. The type of Netbios addresses is 20 (0x14). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + +When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP +IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an +encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an encoding of the +reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at +the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must +accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made +through UDP/IP transport must also use UDP/IP transport. + +8.2.2. TCP/IP transport [Westerlund,Danielsson] + +Kerberos servers (KDC's) should accept TCP requests on port 88 (decimal) +and clients should support the sending of TCP requests on port 88 +(decimal). When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP +stream, a new connection will be established for each authentication +exchange (request and response). The KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will +be returned to the client on the same TCP stream that was established for +the request. The response to a request made through TCP/IP transport must +also use TCP/IP transport. Implementors should note that some extentions to +the Kerberos protocol will not work if any implementation not supporting +the TCP transport is involved (client or KDC). Implementors are strongly +urged to support the TCP transport on both the client and server and are +advised that the current notation of "should" support will likely change in +the future to must support. The KDC may close the TCP stream after sending +a response, but may leave the stream open if it expects a followup - in +which case it may close the stream at any time if resource constratints or +other factors make it desirable to do so. Care must be taken in managing +TCP/IP connections with the KDC to prevent denial of service attacks based +on the number of TCP/IP connections with the KDC that remain open. If +multiple exchanges with the KDC are needed for certain forms of +preauthentication, multiple TCP connections may be required. A client may +close the stream after receiving response, and should close the stream if +it does not expect to send followup messages. The client must be prepared +to have the stream closed by the KDC at anytime, in which case it must +simply connect again when it is ready to send subsequent messages. + +The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request +request will encode in network byte order the length of the request +(KRB_KDC_REQ), and the length will be followed by the request itself. The +response will similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in network byte +order of the length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR message and will be +followed by the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR response. If the sign bit is +set on integer represented by the first 4 octets, then the next 4 octets +will be read, extending the length of the field by another 4 octets (less 1 +bit). + +8.2.3. OSI transport + +During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual +authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of +credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of +private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be +treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechanism will +be: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), +security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication +header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message +(KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message +(KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as specified in +the ASN.1 description for each message. The application code may be used by +Kerberos to determine the message type. + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + +The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be composed +of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS ticket (2) a +two-part name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the +second part the name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting +ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU +realm to be used to get tickets from the ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal +identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") +(name). A ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be +used to get tickets from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section that limit +the values of constants for which values are defined here. This allows +implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that will be +received for these constants. Implementation receiving values outside the +range specified in the "specification" section may reject the request, but +they must recover cleanly. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder +size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-priv 9 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-pub 10 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-md5 11 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-sha1 12 (pkinit) +des3kd-cbc-sha1 ?? 8 0 8 +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 12 20 (I had this as 10, is it +12) + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (pkinit) +PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + +authorization data type ad-type value +AD-KDC-ISSUED 1 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 +AD-IF-RELEVANT 4 +AD-OR 5 +AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 +AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 +reserved values 8-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +Ticket Extension Types + +TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension +TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data + 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations) +TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket +TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations) + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward +credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for +users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID +KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not +supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end +time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password +to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was +invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired +[40] +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user +only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field +failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not +available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method +required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in +message +KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path +KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this +implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) + +9. Interoperability requirements + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among +these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding +schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for +pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, options for +mutual authentication, user to user authentication, support for proxies, +forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, the format of realm names, +and the handling of authorization data. + +In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to +define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all +implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as +technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered that +one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not secure, it +will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 2 + +This section defines the second specification of these options. +Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (depricated) may +be found in RFC1510. + +Transport + +TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming conformance +to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance to specification +2 must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the KDC and should +support TCP/IP transport. + +Encryption and checksum methods + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. +Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the additional +mechanisms may only be used when communicating with principals known to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +also support them: This list is to be determined. + +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the +Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for an +unknown realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the names of +the intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. +Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when that +encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on the +initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by clients +but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an +acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should ignore the +presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request. + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT +contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but each +realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each application +server will set its own policy with respect to accepting them. + +Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and +application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will be +accepted. + +All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but +need not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, the +starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful +life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all implementations +shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible to the calling +server. + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC +option) must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may +decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal or +realm-wide basis. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from +ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to +suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered subfield +type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered +subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + +Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data subfields +available to the server when a ticket is used. Implementations are not +required to allow clients to specify the contents of the authorization data +fields. + +Constant ranges + +All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values unless +further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit is provided to +allow implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that +will be received for these constants. Implementation receiving values +outside this range may reject the request, but they must recover cleanly. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, based +on the list of suggested configuration constants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes +maximum renewable lifetime 1 week +maximum ticket lifetime 1 day +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +10. REFERENCES + +[NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +[MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +[SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +[KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +[Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +[DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +[LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +[X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +[Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + +[DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + +[DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +[SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +[IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +[MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + +[Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, + August 1998. + +[HorowitzB96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-01.txt, September 1998. + +[Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + +This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to be +constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) +then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that +*/ + /* should be are set +*/ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly +*/ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket +*/ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing +the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The +realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and +keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would +*/ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so +*/ + /* there is no need to check again here +*/ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing +*/ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field +out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into +decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data ++ + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + +tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) then + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == OK) + set new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), +second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, +server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of +resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session +key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and keyed) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not present) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + +B. Definition of common authorization data elements + +This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data +elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly defined, +meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of +authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the encapsulating +element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating element, the +encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted as issued +directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate plaintext part +of the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements are specified as +part of the Kerberos specification because the behavior based on these +values should be understood across implementations whereas other elements +need only be understood by the applications which they affect. + +In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the element +will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of the ad-data +will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection +heading. + +B.1. KDC Issued + +AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. +} + +ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the ticket + itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same encryption + algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key derived from the + same key used to protect the ticket. +i-realm, i-sname + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC itself. + This field would be used when the KDC can verify the authenticity of + elements signed by the issuing principal and it allows this KDC to + notify the application server of the validity of those elements. +elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + +The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for Kerberos +principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege attributes and +other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying the priveleges of +the principal beyond what can be done using a credentials without such an +a-data element. + +This can not be provided without this element because the definition of the +authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the bearer +of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and elements may +also be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the authenticator. + +For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are signed +by the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's key (the +same key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from that key). +Elements encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be ignored by the +application server if this "signature" is not present. Further, elements +encapsulated within this element from a ticket granting ticket may be +interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis according to policy for +including new signed elements within derivative tickets, but they will not +be copied to a derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a +derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the signature +will not be correct for the application ticket elements, and the field will +be ignored by the application server. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.2. Intended for server + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be +ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names of +intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application server +can remove this element if the application server is not in the list of +intended servers. + +Application servers should check for their principal name in the +intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not +found, this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated +elements should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present in +the top level authorization data field. Applications and application +servers that do not implement this element should reject tickets that +contain authorization data elements of this type. + +B.3. Intended for application class + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { intended-application-class[0] + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] AuthorizationData } AD elements +encapsulated within the intended-for-application-class element may be +ignored if the application server is not in one of the named classes of +application servers. Examples of application server classes include +"FILESYSTEM", and other kinds of servers. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.4. If relevant + +AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + +AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended for +interpretation only by application servers that understand the particular +ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do not understand +the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant element may ignore +the uninterpretable element. This element promotes interoperability across +implementations which may have local extensions for authorization. + +B.5. And-Or + +AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are +encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the +encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. This +element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the +condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by +setting the condition count to the number of embedded elements. Application +servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets that contain +authorization data elements of this type. + +B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + +AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions specifies +a collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect +the integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be calculated over +an individual extension field. If there are more than one extension, +multiple Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions authorization data elements may be +present, each with a checksum for a different extension field. This +restriction indicates that the ticket should not be accepted if a ticket +extension is not present in the ticket for which the checksum does not +match that checksum specified in the authorization data element. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. + +B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + +AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a +collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a separate +external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket extensions. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. Application servers +that do implement this element will search the ticket extensions for +authorization data fields, calculate the specified checksum over each +authorization data field and look for one matching the checksum in this +in-ticket-extensions element. If not found, then the ticket must be +rejected. If found, the corresponding authorization data elements will be +interpreted in the same manner as if they were contained in the top level +authorization data field. + +Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in a +ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type in-ticket-extensions +in the top level authorization data field, and the external entries will be +linked to the corresponding element by their checksums. + +C. Definition of common ticket extensions + +This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. Support +for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions have +associated authorization data elements that may require rejection of a +ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not implement +the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined beyond those +described in this specification. Such extensions are described elswhere and +for some of those extensions the reserved number may be found in the list +of constants. + +It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, and +that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they parse and +then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application servers. The +presence of the extension will not break such clients, but any functionaly +dependent on the extensions will not work when such tickets are handled by +old clients. In such situations, some implementation may use alternate +methods to transmit the information in the extensions field. + +C.1. Null ticket extension + +TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + +The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of lenght +zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket so that +the KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting ticket whether +the client software will strip the extensions field. + +C.2. External Authorization Data + +TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + +The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension is +field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization data +elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element will be +present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and that element +will contain a checksum of the external authorization data ticket +extension. + ------------------------------------------------------------------------ +[TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the +Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these +trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon +the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an application +subsequently provides integrity protection for the data stream, the +identity verification applies only to the initiation of the connection, and +does not guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate +from the same principal. + +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the literature. In +our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key +is a secret key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows +it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private key. + +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange +registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and +engage in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for even +small numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more automatic +methods as described here are necessary. + +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no network +addresses specified. + +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the requester +can provide the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it +would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- sion and +change another user's password. + +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials +obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain +credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be verified by +a local server through successful completion of the Client/Server exchange. + +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to +guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. This +can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is based on +cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly random number +generator, such as one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext +here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one message and +replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + +[9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports +difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated +messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies and replay the first +reply in response to a detected duplicate. + +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from the +same principal to the same server. Other client principals communicating +with the same server principal should not be have their authenticators +rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to match some other +client's authenticator. + +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was the +client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 because +version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not possible to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) +without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key +is not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to choose +subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a +negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + +[15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known beforehand +(since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it might be stored +in a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- tion file. If +the realm to be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of +being spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- +cated. This might result in the use of a realm which has been compromised, +and would result in an attacker's ability to compromise the authentication +of the application server to the client. + +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to ensure +the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach would be to +generate a random number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication [8], +which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server +keys in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- ised. + +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first listed +realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's realm is +considered to precede those in the transited field, and the server's realm +is considered to follow them. + +[20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and +communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not share +a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the +database and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store the +principal database in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries +stored therein are protected from disclosure to and modification by +unauthorized parties. However, we recommend against such strategies, as +they can make system management and threat analysis quite complex. + +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for details on +why this can be useful. + +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data structures +during the generation and verification of embedded checksums: Because any +checksums applied to data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within a data structure +between the time that a checksum is generated through transmission to the +time that the checksum is verified. + +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the +workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine that +such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must make +sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If the time is +ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability that a +nonce will be reused. + +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization vector +may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve proper +cipher chaining. The initialization vector might come from the last block +of the ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the +application's choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. +If left out, the default initialization vector for the encryption algorithm +will be used. + +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request from +obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password guessing +attack. + +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the +notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is not a +valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the message +starts with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. For other +fields, the length and tag would be redundant if they were included because +they are specified by the encryption type. [36] The ordering of the fields +in the CipherText is important. Additionally, messages encoded in this +format must include a length as part of the msg-seq field. This allows the +recipient to verify that the message has not been truncated. Without a +length, an attacker could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a +message which could be truncated, while leaving the checksum intact. Note +that if the msg-seq is an encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, +then the length is part of that encoding. + +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a particular +function, separating the functions of generating a checksum from other +encryption performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 +was chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded +the use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar purpose in +the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + +[40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. The +contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section +5.9.1. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15921248c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6866 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + March 10, 2000 + Expires September 10, 2000 + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all +provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents +of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is +inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them +other than as "work in progress." + +The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + +The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +"1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow +Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt, and expires September 10, 2000. +Please send comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos +network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol. + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard through +the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the presentation, but +only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit +within current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested by +Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of Kerberos +Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff +members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman +(now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern +California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project +Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members +of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was +led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the community. The +development of the MIT reference implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl +and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from many others. Since +RFC1510 was issued, extensions and revisions to the protocol have been +proposed by many individuals. Some of these proposals are reflected in this +document. Where such changes involved significant effort, the document cites +the contribution of the proposer. + +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and +5 can be found in [KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. a +workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. This +is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system, +without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical security +of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that packets +traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. +Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted +third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared secret key +[2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and implemented +that provide for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of +the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for authentication of +users registered with public key certification authorities, and allow the +system to provide certain benefits of public key cryptography in situations +where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the +client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server and 2) +a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The client +transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of the +session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session +key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the +client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also +be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to +exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further +communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret +keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos protocol. +In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical network +application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly or +through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for +a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted in +the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client uses +the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it were +contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry points +within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent "in +the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart +replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, additional +information is sent to prove that the message originated with the principal +to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the authenticator) +is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp +proves that the message was recently generated and is not a replay. +Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated +by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting +principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over the +network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to the +Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must be +modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's key. +This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos server, +the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol for +maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server in +another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its +own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is part +of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide whether +to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key +may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of +each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share an +inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is not +directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical organization +is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in order to construct +an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in authenticating +the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93], or on other authorization services. +Separately authenticated authorization credentials may be embedded in a +tickets authorization data when encapsulated by the kdc-issued authorization +data element. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the mere issuance of a service +ticket by the Kerberos server (even by a modified Kerberos server) as +granting authority to use the service, since such applications may become +vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment if +they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for application +authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to successfully + mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt, + with successive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained which are + encrypted under a key derived from the user's password. + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A typical + mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to grant + permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains for + a deleted principal and the principal identifier is reused, the new + principal will inherit rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not + re-using principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been recently + generated using the session key known only by the client and server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access allowed + for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted by + the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. Note + that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other server + (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and ticket-granting + ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is sometimes referred to as + the Authentication Server (or service). The ticket-granting ticket + portion is sometimes referred to as the ticket-granting server (or + service). +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than one + server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the various +flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC +before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the VALIDATE +option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their starttime +has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets which have +been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid +(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set in +the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key and +a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified +by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration time arrives, +the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a +hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last +renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the usable +lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in +a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to theft. +Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC at job +submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are activated and +validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported +in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief +would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This flag +must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket +based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be requested + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. +This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting +ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting +the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) of a +postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at +the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in which +case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting +ticket. The KDC may limit how far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the identity +of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a +service to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose by +granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must +use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to forward +a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When set, +this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a new +ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address +based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client on initial +authentication. By default, the client will request that it be set when +requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any other +ticket. + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print server +a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in order to +satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in the +ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network +address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the proxy is to +be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may require +additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to +provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request that +it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when they +request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user to +enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It +is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED flag +set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets differently +than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients and +servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the Kerberos +Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain +authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the initiation + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting Server which +will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other servers (see +section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's secret key. This +exchange is also used to request credentials for services which must not be +mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a +principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. This +exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the +user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The response, +KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a +session key that will be shared by the client and the server. The session +key and additional information are encrypted in the client's secret key. The +KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect replays, +and to associate it with the message to which it replies. Various errors can +occur; these are indicated by an error response (KRB_ERROR) instead of the +KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR +message contains information which can be used to associate it with the +message to which it replies. The lack of encryption in the KRB_ERROR message +precludes the ability to detect replays, fabrications, or modifications of +such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends a +reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is encrypted +in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional field that +can be used to pass additional information that might be needed for the +initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as described +in section [hl<>]. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether the +requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether it +should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; and whether a +renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the +requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable +ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 +for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format for +the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are +determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named in +the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS +request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used for +encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one supported, +strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype for which an +encryption key is available is used. The encryption method used to respond +to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key found in the +ticket granting ticket. [***I will change the example keytypes to be 3DES +based examples 7/14***] + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise +the requested start time is checked against the policy of the local realm +(the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of +postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as +requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated +ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the +start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has +been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field +is set to the minimum of: + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using the +requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section A.2 for +pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, start +and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate a +KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper +KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must require +the user to present application credentials which can be verified using a +securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can be +verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS or +TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a +ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use of +a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors are +possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client +with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If the +message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE +error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not +one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the server no +longer possesses a copy of the old key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is +returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it +indicates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from +the server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key[10]. Since it +is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms, with +different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of the +ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key the server +should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is +returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the client +from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the authenticator. +If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is returned (they might +not match, for example, if the wrong session key was used to encrypt the +authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for +an address matching the operating-system reported address of the client. If +no match is found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are +present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW +error is returned. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The server must +remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, so +that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses track of any +authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it must reject all +requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This assures that any +lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew +and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an attacker +could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator sent over the network +to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as the disabled host, and +replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the authentication.). If a +sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the server saves it for +later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is +present, the server either saves it for later use or uses it to help +generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that the +client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket and +thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for +pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; it +does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of +the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such as +that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server need +not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication +(not only authenticating the client to the server, but also the server to +the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will have +MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is +required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable +to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in +the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided +in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should +be randomly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A subkey may be +included if the server desires to negotiate a different subkey. The +KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key extracted from the +ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and server +share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The 'true +session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or +checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not +constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might be +done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever reason, +one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 unknown +bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from using +more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key with a +known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if the +server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server is +initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication credentials +for a given server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when it +wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain +a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already have acquired a +ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the +ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client initially +authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The message +format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. +The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS exchange +does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the session key from +the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session key from an +Authenticator is used. As is the case for all application servers, expired +tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting +ticket expires, the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid +tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization +data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application +server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). The +TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, encrypted in the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or if +present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part of the +authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code and + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The +KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect +replays, and to associate it with the message to which it replies. The +KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used to associate +it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of encryption in the +KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays or fabrications of +such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15]. If the +client does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by requesting a +ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a Kerberos server for +which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ +message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for the desired +realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, the Kerberos server may +return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further +along the standard hierarchical path), in which case this step must be +repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. +If neither are returned, then the request must be retried with a Kerberos +server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request will itself require +a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm which must be obtained by +recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. The +list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service or it +may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret keys +exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results from +using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server use +and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be encrypted[16]. +If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data is +present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from the +authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, using +the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which it +was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP), +but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in +section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. This is the only case where the response from the KDC +will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited field +needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. The +PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional ticket-granting + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +tickets. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting +ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be +postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the +local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, and +the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated before use +by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been reached. However, +in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued +postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the ticket-granting +ticket. + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket +using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and +verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the requested +server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the additional +ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be +compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as part +of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is set +in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that the +renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, +the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is +set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that the +PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the ticket +passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC will issue +the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration +time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +key version number fields are left out since these values are stored along +with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy +a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, subject +to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS exchange. +The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket to +be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous realm. +This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its +own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the +endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its contents +are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal +case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of realms +using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding (called +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that they +would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. Thus, +"," means that all realms along the path between the client and the server +have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from the +client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been traversed, +and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an X.500 style +has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierarchy +shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC), +generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by one's +peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session key, so +maintaining the next sequence number should not present an additional +problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. If +the sender's address was included in the control information, the recipient +verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches +the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is +specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's +addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match +for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and +usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec +are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT +error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a +sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error +is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is +present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. Finally, the checksum is +computed over the data and control information, and if it doesn't match the +received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. If the sender's address was +included in the control information, the recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears +as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either case +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the +sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and +not present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error +is generated. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence +number is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It then +constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED +message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in +the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r-address +fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message which is +then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP +exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if +no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption +shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address +in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce field +if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not present, or +they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets in +its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED +message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database containing the principal +identifiers and secret keys of principals to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The key +can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it +in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. In that case, +an extra field must be added to indicate the master key version used, see +below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the principal's secret +key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime - +starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life +field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable Ticket +issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these +lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal records +with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. not +the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be retained by +the server until all tickets that had been issued using that key have +expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be active for a +single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged +with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to help the +recipient find the proper key for decryption. + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to a +request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error to +any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A database +may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one +for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether a +server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a client, +or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user in +the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow +the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +Optional field in ASN.1 sequences + +For optional integer value and date fields in ASN.1 sequences where a +default value has been specified, certain default values will not be allowed +in the encoding because these values will always be represented through +defaulting by the absence of the optional field. For example, one will not +send a microsecond zero value because one must make sure that there is only +one way to encode this value. + +Additional fields in ASN.1 sequences + +Implementations receiving Kerberos messages with additional fields present +in ASN.1 sequences should carry the those fields through, unmodified, when +the message is forwarded. Implementations should not drop such fields if the +sequence is reencoded. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 specification, +section 8.7 [X509-88]. + +5.3. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A PrincipalName +is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same + (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An encoding +shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any fractional +portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any separators. +Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm +on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the interpretation +of the encapsulating element determines which of the embedded elements must +be interpreted, and which may be ignored. Definitions for these common +elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + -- unused10(10), + -- unused11(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest number of bits needed to include the +highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. The +ASN.1 representation of the bit strings uses unnamed bits, with the meaning +of the individual bits defined by the comments in the specification above. +Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length and treat +the value of flags corresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit string as +if the bit were reset (0). Comparison of bit strings of different length +should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with zeros beyond the +high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute value + of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is the time + of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three (3), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). If it is + (6), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the password will + expire. +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A Ticket +contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos and +the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format of +the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies all components of the name part of the server's + identity, including those parts that identify a specific instance of a + service. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + This optional field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used + to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support + several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext + authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other + information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the + application server. See Appendix C for definitions of some common + extensions. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of the + appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The meanings + of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + When the names of CA's are to be embedded inthe transited field (as + specified for some extentions to the protocol), the X.500 names of the + CA's should be mapped into items in the transited field using the + mapping defined by RFC2253. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the necessary + information for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An + end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to accept + tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" in the + past. This field is also returned as part of the response from the KDC. + When returned as part of the response to initial authentication + (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Kerberos server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated as + that of the authtime field. +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be honored + (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place their + own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which have + not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is that + such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not sent + over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply by + listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the session + key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a careless + user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's workstation could use + the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only makes + it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off with + stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, and + that a better name for this field would be restrictions. Unfortunately, + it is not possible to change the name of this field at this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the basis + of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any principal in + posession of credentials to add entries to the authorization data field + since these entries further restrict what can be done with the ticket. + Such additions can be made by specifying the additional entries when a + new ticket is obtained during the TGS exchange, or they may be added + during chained delegation using the authorization data field of the + authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, except when an entry is separately authenticated by + encapulation in the kdc-issued element, it is not allowable for the + presence of an entry in the authorization data field of a ticket to + amplify the priveleges one would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + may obtain a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the + name of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its + own authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy to + the client. The client would then present this authorization credential + to the application server separately from the authentication exchange. + Alternatively, such authorization credentials may be embedded in the + ticket authenticating the authorized entity, when the authorization is + separately authenticated using the kdc-issued authorization data + element (see B.4). + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy and + leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key + can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested uses of + this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. Its + value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears + along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify a + reasonably accurate timestamp. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that for + messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is sent. + Sequence numbers fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and wrap to + zero following the value 2^32 - 1. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. +authorization-data + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. It + is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are to be + placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket + itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an initial +ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent from the +client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +The fields in this message are: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket + and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which must be + collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In + most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies + (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions to + the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. This + is accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing the + microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate more + than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of + the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC or + the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. +padata-type + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets as + well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the KDC. + Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the flag + that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field to + the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a request + for forwarding. The address(es) of the + host from which the resulting ticket is + to be valid are included in the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set on + the initial request, or in a subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based is also proxiable. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this is + a request for a proxy. This option will + only be honored if the ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the host + from which the resulting ticket is to be + valid are included in the addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that this + is a request for a postdated ticket. + This option will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket on which it is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may be + reset by a subsequent request to the KDC + after the starttime in the ticket has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or when the + ticket-granting ticket on which the + request is based is also renewable. If + this option is requested, then the rtime + field in the request contains the + desired absolute expiration time for the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not to + identify the user to which it was + issued. Instead, the principal identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified by + the policy of the realm (e.g. usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of the + ticket is only to securely distribute a + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + session key, and not to identify the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the ticket + to be returned should be set. If the + local realms policy does not permit + anonymous credentials, the request is to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited field + is disabled. Tickets issued without the + performance of this check will be noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if a + ticket with the requested life cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket with + the requested life cannot be provided, + then a renewable ticket may be issued + with a renew-till equal to the the + requested endtime. The value of the + renew-till field may still be limited by + local limits, or limits selected by the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for the + end server is to be encrypted in the + session key from the additional ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The RENEW option + indicates that the present request is + for a renewal. The ticket provided is + encrypted in the secret key for the + server on which it is valid. This + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + option will only be honored if the + ticket to be renewed has its RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its renew- + till field has not passed. The ticket + to be renewed is passed in the padata + field as part of the authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE option + indicates that the request is to vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will only + be honored if the ticket presented is + postdated, presently has its INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be vali- + dated before its starttime. The ticket + presented for validation is encrypted in + the key of the server for which it is + valid and is passed in the padata field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, or + alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, both + from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the + desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is omitted + then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date of + the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated randomly, + but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in the + response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses for + the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will contain + other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied by the + KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be used + in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. If more than + one option which requires additional tickets has been specified, then + the additional tickets are used in the order specified by the ordering + of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is +passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for either +an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no message +type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or +KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if +absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. +In that case, no version number will be present in the EncryptedData +sequence. + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section 6.3.2). + This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to + change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all existing + password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged as + needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related information + that forms the encrypted part of a message. The description of the + encrypted part of the message follows each appearance of this field. + The encrypted part is encoded as described in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the last + request by a principal. Depending on what information is available, + this might be the last time that a request for a ticket-granting ticket + was made, or the last time that a request based on a ticket-granting + ticket was successful. It also might cover all servers for a realm, or + just the particular server. Some implementations may display this + information to the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of one's + identity. It is similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when + logging into timesharing systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up to + the application client (usually the login program) to take appropriate + action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will be + the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often +referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits + is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over the + encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence. First, the cksum is zeroed and the + checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence, then + the checksum is set to the result of that computation, and finally the + KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again. +user-data + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By checking + the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make sure that + it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. + It may be omitted if not required by the application protocol. The + application designer considering omission of this field is warned, that + the inclusion of this address prevents some kinds of replay attacks + (e.g., reflection attacks) and that it is only acceptable to omit this + address if there is sufficient information in the integrity protected + part of the application message for the recipient to unambiguously + determine if it was the intended recipient. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast protocols), + but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. This field + along with s-address can be used to help detect messages which have + been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format of + the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by the + intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must + never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the message in an application + specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is only optionally integrity +protected, it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such +a message. In particular, this means that unless appropriate integrity +protection mechanisms have been applied to the KRB_ERROR message, the client +should not use any fields in this message for security-critical purposes, +such as setting a system clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The +message can be useful, however, for advising a user on the reason for some +failure. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. Its + value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The two + fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the list + of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to provide + for national language support in the display of error messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If present, + this field will contain the encoding of a sequence of TypedData + (TYPED-DATA below), unless the errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, + in which case it will contain the encoding of a sequence of of padata + fields (METHOD-DATA below), each corresponding to an acceptable + pre-authentication method and optionally containing data for the + method: + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of TypeData + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + TypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type[0] INTEGER, + data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + Note that e-data-types have been reserved for all PA data types defined + prior to July 1999. For the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message, when + using new PA data types defined in July 1999 or later, the METHOD-DATA + sequence must itself be encapsulated in an TypedData element of type + TD-PADATA. All new implementations interpreting the METHOD-DATA field + for the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message must accept a type of + TD-PADATA, extract the typed data field and interpret the use any + elements encapsulated in the TD-PADATA elements as if they were present + in the METHOD-DATA sequence. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. The + checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to an + AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the client's + secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication to prove + knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be + computed because the key to be used is not available, no checksum will + be included. + + 6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + + The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use + stream encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly + available block encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption + Standard [DES77], and triple DES variants, in conjunction with block + chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption is used to prove the + identities of the network entities participating in message exchanges. + The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by all principals + registered in that realm to store a secret key in confidence. Proof of + knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the authenticity of a + principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a + shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to ticket + requests; the ability to obtain the secret key or session key implies + the knowledge of the appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The + ability of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and present a Ticket + and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with the session key + from the KDC response) to a service verifies the identity of the + principal; likewise the ability of the service to extract the session + key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge thereof in a response + verifies the identity of the service. + + The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is + secure from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + in the encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the + effects of poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good + keys. If keys are derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords + need to be well chosen to make brute force attacks more difficult. + Poorly chosen keys still make easy targets for intruders. + + The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms + currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding + requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is + often desirable to place random information (often referred to as a + confounder) at the start of the message. The requirements for a + confounder are specified with each encryption mechanism. + + Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the + security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining + methods often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such + systems (such as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of + the plain-text which can be verified at decryption and used to detect + any tampering or damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting + burst errors in the input. If any damage is detected, the decryption + routine is expected to return an error indicating the failure of an + integrity check. Each encryption type is expected to provide and verify + an appropriate checksum. The specification of each encryption method + sets out its checksum requirements. + + Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an + algorithm for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type + is included. It is desirable for the string to key function to be + one-way, and for the mapping to be different in different realms. This + is important because users who are registered in more than one realm + will often use the same password in each, and it is desirable that an + attacker compromising the Kerberos server in one realm not obtain or + derive the user's key in another. + + For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate + encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the reader is + referred to [SG92]. + + 6.1. Encryption Specifications + + The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The + enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in + section 5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional + key version number, and the ciphertext. + + EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + } + + + + etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to + encipher the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected + encryption types appear later in this section. + kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + is encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long + lasting keys, such as principals' secret keys. + cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET + STRING. + The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption + algorithm to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific + inputs. Encryption mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take + sufficient measures to guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we + recommend they also take measures to protect against precomputed + dictionary attacks. If the encryption algorithm is not itself capable + of doing so, the protections can often be enhanced by adding a checksum + and a confounder. + + The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a + confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary + padding. The msg-seq field contains the part of the protocol message + described in section 5 which is to be encrypted. The confounder, + checksum, and padding are all untagged and untyped, and their length is + exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate item. The type and length is + implicit and specified by the particular encryption type being used + (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted for some methods is + described in the following diagram, but other methods may deviate from + this layour - so long as the definition of the method defines the + layout actually in use. + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL + } + + One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing it + in confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate checksum + over confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds + the necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption + type and the appropriate key. + + Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm + that specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an + octet boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those + fields which are not specified will be omitted. + + In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular + encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the + specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is needed + as part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum is to be + used, a new encryption type must be defined. + + Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and + the data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + cipher-block-chaining mode, requires an initialization vector. If + required, the description for each encryption type must specify the + source of such additional information. 6.2. Encryption Keys + + The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + + keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption that is to be + performed using the key that follows in the keyvalue field. It + will always correspond to the etype to be used to generate or + decode the EncryptedData. In cases when multiple algorithms use a + common kind of key (e.g., if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a + different chaining mechanism), the keytype provides information + needed to determine which algorithm is to be used. + keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type + fields and interpreta- tions. + + 6.3. Encryption Systems + + 6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + + If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the + NULL encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no + checksum, confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the + plaintext. The NULL Key is used by the null encryption system and is + zero octets in length, with keytype zero (0). + + 6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + + The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. A CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is + applied to the confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in + the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be + encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must + be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the + encryption of this data are identical to those for the des-cbc-md5 + encryption mode. + + Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an + attacker could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate + a valid message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of + collision-proof checksums is recommended for environments where such + attacks represent a significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the + checksum for ticket or authenticator is no longer mandated as an + interoperability requirement for Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 + (See section 9.1 for specific details). + + 6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the + confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum + field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted + (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded + to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the encryption + of this data are identical to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption + mode. + + 6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the + confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum + field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted + (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded + to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. + + Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which + are concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The + first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's + MSbit used as the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the + next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least significant + bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an additional + input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise + specified, zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' + use of DES requires an 8 octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those + keys shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. + Additionally, because of the way that keys are derived for the + encryption of checksums, keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or + 'semi-weak' keys when eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant + F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of + 56 bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded + as a series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the + key are also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key + is (B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where + B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the + parity bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with + B1 as the MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + String to key transformation + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), a "salt" is + concatenated to the text string, and then padded with ASCII nulls to an + 8 byte boundary. This "salt" is normally the realm and each component + of the principal's name appended. However, sometimes different salts + are used --- for example, when a realm is renamed, or if a user changes + her username, or for compatibility with Kerberos V4 (whose + string-to-key algorithm uses a null string for the salt). This string + is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte DES + key. Before eXclusive-ORing a block, every byte is shifted one bit to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + the left to leave the lowest bit zero. The key is the "corrected" by + correcting the parity on the key, and if the key matches a 'weak' or + 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES specification, it is + eXclusive-ORed with the constant 00000000000000F0. This key is then + used to generate a DES CBC checksum on the initial string (with the + salt appended). The result of the CBC checksum is the "corrected" as + described above to form the result which is return as the key. + Pseudocode follows: + + name_to_default_salt(realm, name) { + s = realm + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + return s; + } + + key_correction(key) { + fixparity(key); + if (is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + string_to_key(string,salt) { + + odd = 1; + s = string + salt; + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + left shift every byte in 8byteblock one bit; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + tempkey = key_correction(tempkey); + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + return(key); + } + + 6.3.5. Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type with and + without Key Derivation [Original draft by Marc Horowitz, revisions by + David Miller] + + This encryption type is based on the Triple DES cryptosystem, the + HMAC-SHA1 [Krawczyk96] message authentication algorithm, and key + derivation for Kerberos V5 [HorowitzB96]. Key derivation may or may not + be used in conjunction with the use of Triple DES keys. + + Algorithm Identifiers + + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value 7. + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd encryption type, specifying the key + derivation variant of the encryption type, has been assigned the value + 16. The hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 13. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + The hmac-sha1-des3-kd checksum type, specifying the key derivation + variant of the checksum, has been assigned the value 12. + + Triple DES Key Production + + The EncryptionKey value is 24 octets long. The 7 most significant bits + of each octet contain key bits, and the least significant bit is the + inverse of the xor of the key bits. + + For the purposes of key derivation, the block size is 64 bits, and the + key size is 168 bits. The 168 bits output by key derivation are + converted to an EncryptionKey value as follows. First, the 168 bits are + divided into three groups of 56 bits, which are expanded individually + into 64 bits as follows: + + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p + 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p + 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p + 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p + 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p + 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p + 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p + 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p + + The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output of + the three expansions are concatenated to form the EncryptionKey value. + + When the HMAC-SHA1 of a string is computed, the key is used in the + EncryptedKey form. + + The string-to-key function is used to tranform UNICODE passwords into + DES3 keys. The DES3 string-to-key function relies on the "N-fold" + algorithm, which is detailed in [9]. The description of the N-fold + algorithm in that document is as follows: + o To n-fold a number X, replicate the input value to a length that + is the least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before each + repetition, the input is rotated to the right by 13 bit positions. + The successive n-bit chunks are added together using + 1's-complement addition (that is, addition with end-around carry) + to yield an n-bit result" + o The n-fold algorithm, as with DES string-to-key, is applied to the + password string concatenated with a salt value. The salt value is + derived in the same was as for the DES string-to-key algorithm. + For 3-key triple DES then, the operation will involve a 168-fold + of the input password string. The remainder of the string-to-key + function for DES3 is shown here in pseudocode: + + DES3string-to-key(passwordString, key) + + salt = name_to_default_salt(realm, name) + s = passwordString + salt + tmpKey1 = 168-fold(s) + parityFix(tmpKey1); + if not weakKey(tmpKey1) + /* + * Encrypt temp key in itself with a + * zero initialization vector + * + * Function signature is DES3encrypt(plain, key, iv) + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + * with cipher as the return value + */ + tmpKey2 = DES3encrypt(tmpKey1, tmpKey1, zeroIvec) + /* + * Encrypt resultant temp key in itself with third component + * of first temp key as initialization vector + */ + key = DES3encrypt(tmpKey2, tmpKey1, tmpKey1[2]) + parityFix(key) + if not weakKey(key) + return SUCCESS + else + return FAILURE + else + return FAILURE + + The weakKey function above is the same weakKey function used with DES + keys, but applied to each of the three single DES keys that comprise + the triple DES key. + + The lengths of UNICODE encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + Encryption Types des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 and des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd + + EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC mode. + The checksum algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. If the key derivation variant of + the encryption type is used, encryption key values are modified + according to the method under the Key Derivation section below. + + Unless otherwise specified, a zero IV must be used. + + If the length of the input data is not a multiple of the block size, + zero octets must be used to pad the plaintext to the next eight-octet + boundary. The counfounder must be eight random octets (one block). + + Checksum Types hmac-sha1-des3 and hmac-sha1-des3-kd + + Checksums using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. If the key + derivation variant of the checksum type is used, checksum key values + are modified according to the method under the Key Derivation section + below. + + Key Derivation + + In the Kerberos protocol, cryptographic keys are used in a number of + places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is + desirable to use a different key for each of these places. Key + derivation [Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys for + each operation from the keys transported on the network. For this to be + possible, a small change to the specification is necessary. + + This section specifies a profile for the use of key derivation + [Horowitz96] with Kerberos. For each place where a key is used, a ``key + usage'' must is specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, and + encryption/checksum type together describe the transformation from + plaintext to ciphertext, or plaintext to checksum. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + Key Usage Values + + This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos + protocol, with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) + 18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) + 19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) + 20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) + 21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + + Key usage values between 1024 and 2047 (inclusive) are reserved for + application use. Applications should use even values for encryption and + odd values for checksums within this range. + + A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service which + receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket was part + of an AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always be used for + generating a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- REQ or + TGS-REQ. + + There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of + the RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would + not know about key usages. In order that these documents continue to be + meaningful until they are updated, key usages 1024 and 1025 must be + used to derive keys for encryption and checksums, respectively. New + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + protocols defined in terms of the Kerberos encryption and checksum + types should use their own key usages. Key usages may be registered + with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key usages must be unsigned 32 bit + integers. Zero is not permitted. + + Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + + Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be + tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and + integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, + for each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption + (Ke), and one for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + + where the protocol key is from the EncryptionKey from the wire + protocol, and the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in + network byte order. The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext + as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | plaintext | padding) + + The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + + When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or + padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be + generated from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + MAC = H(Kc, plaintext) + + Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a + keyed hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed + hash algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is required for use + as H. + + Key Derivation from Passwords + + The well-known constant for password key derivation must be the byte + string {0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values + correspond to the ASCII encoding for the string "kerberos". + + 6.4. Checksums + + The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + + cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the + accompanying checksum. + checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet + string. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this + section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type + fields and interpretations. + + Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: whether + they are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is infeasible + to find two plaintexts which generate the same checksum value for a + collision-proof checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize + the algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream + modification by an active attacker, unkeyed checksums should only be + used when the checksum and message will be subsequently encrypted (e.g. + the checksums defined as part of the encryption algorithms covered + earlier in this section). + + Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum + value is encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the + composition of the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be + considered a separate checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using + DES is a new checksum algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed + checksums, as well as for the encrypted forms of unkeyed + collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a confounder before the + checksum is calculated. + + 6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy + check as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is + four (4) octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor + collision-proof. The use of this checksum is not recommended. An + attacker using a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack as described in + [SG92] might be able to generate an alternative message that satisfies + the checksum. The use of collision-proof checksums is recommended for + environments where such attacks represent a significant threat. + + 6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm + [MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary + length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is + believed to be collision-proof. + + 6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by + prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD4 + checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the + key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the + constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be + zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are + redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; + those keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use + in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + + 6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 algorithm. + [MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary + length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is + believed to be collision-proof. + + 6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by + prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD5 + checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the + key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the + hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should + be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which + are redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; + those keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use + in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + + 6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder to + the plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result using + the key and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last block of + the ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of the + key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the + hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits + of which are redundant. This checksum is tamper-proof and + collision-proof. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + | des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) + } + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those + keys shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in + Kerberos, nor shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or + 'semi-weak'. + + 6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative + (rsa-md4-des-k) + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum + by applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both + key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets + long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + Note that this checksum type is the old method for encoding the + RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no longer recommended. + + 6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode + encryption of the plaintext, and using the last block of the ciphertext + as the checksum value. It is keyed with an encryption key and an + initialization vector; any uses which do not specify an additional + initialization vector will use the key as both key and initialization + vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This + checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that this checksum + type is the old method for encoding the DES-MAC checksum and it is no + longer recommended. The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' + and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys shall not be used for generating + DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + + 7. Naming Constraints + + 7.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm + can technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across + realm boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be + assigned, and what information they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the + conventions itself, and it must require that any realms with which + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + inter-realm keys are shared also conform to the conventions and require + the same from its neighbors. + + Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only + in the case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently + four styles of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples + of each style follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + + Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components + separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor + slashes (/). Domain names must be converted to upper case when used as + realm names. + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before + the equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string + representations of the names with components separated by slashes. + Leading and trailing slashes will not be included. + + Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that + contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by + a colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned + before they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first + three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is + unlikely that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a + very strong argument for not using the 'other' category. + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the + various name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the + assignment of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name + of a realm for the domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the + organization owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name + or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are registered, + authority to use a realm name may be derived from the authority of the + parent realm. For example, if there is no domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, + then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can authorize the creation + of a realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is + assigned is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to + its children in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the + parent assigns a realm name without also registering it in the domain + name or X.500 hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make sure + that there will not in the future exists a name identical to the realm + name of the child unless it is assigned to the same entity as the realm + name. + + 7.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that + all agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The + name-type field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind + of information implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at + least one of the components, or the realm, must be different). The + following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + + When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a + particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal + name type should be used for users, and it might also be used for a + unique server. If the name is a unique machine generated ID that is + guaranteed never to be reassigned then the name type of UID should be + used (note that it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any + type since stale entries might remain in access control lists). + + If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining + components identify an instance of the service in a server specified + manner, then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of + this name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a + first component of krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm + for which the ticket is valid. + + If instance is a single component following the service name and the + instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the + name type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for + Internet services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the + separate components of the host name appear as successive components + following the name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should + be used. This type might be used to identify servers on hosts with + X.500 names where the slash (/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + + A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an + X.509 certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of + the X.509 name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding + rules specified in RFC 2253. + + A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not + known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match + principals authenticated with names of any type. A principal + authenticated with a name of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match + other names of type UNKNOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved + for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the + form of such names. + + 7.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be + composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server + is registered, and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the + host name is an Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + NT-SRV-XHST if the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that + allows slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or + multi-component name will identify the service and the latter + components will identify the host. Where the name of the host is not + case sensitive (for example, with Internet domain names) the name of + the host must be lower case. If specified by the application protocol + for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands which run with + system privileges, the first component may be the string 'host' instead + of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official name and + one or more aliases, the official name of the host must be used when + constructing the name of the server principal. + + 8. Constants and other defined values + + 8.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type + fields and interpretations. + + The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match + the defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard + Distributions of Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx + (where xxx is an abbreviation of the address family name). + + Internet (IPv4) Addresses + + Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in + MSB order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + + Internet (IPv6) Addresses [Westerlund] + + IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. + The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. + The following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos + packet: + o the Unspecified Address + o the Loopback Address + o Link-Local addresses + IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + + CHAOSnet addresses + + CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + + ISO addresses + + ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven + (7). + + Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + + XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. + The type of XNS addresses is six (6). + + AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + + AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + network number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the + remaining two octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type + of AppleTalk DDP addresses is sixteen (16). + + DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. + The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + + Netbios addresses + + Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to 15 + characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16th octet of + 0x0. The type of Netbios addresses is 20 (0x14). + + 8.2. KDC messages + + 8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + + When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using + UDP IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only + an encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP + address; the KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an + encoding of the reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to + the sending port at the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers + supporting IP transport must accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). + The response to a request made through UDP/IP transport must also use + UDP/IP transport. + + 8.2.2. TCP/IP transport [Westerlund,Danielsson] + + Kerberos servers (KDC's) should accept TCP requests on port 88 + (decimal) and clients should support the sending of TCP requests on + port 88 (decimal). When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over + a TCP stream, a new connection will be established for each + authentication exchange (request and response). The KRB_KDC_REP or + KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the client on the same TCP stream + that was established for the request. The response to a request made + through TCP/IP transport must also use TCP/IP transport. Implementors + should note that some extentions to the Kerberos protocol will not work + if any implementation not supporting the TCP transport is involved + (client or KDC). Implementors are strongly urged to support the TCP + transport on both the client and server and are advised that the + current notation of "should" support will likely change in the future + to must support. The KDC may close the TCP stream after sending a + response, but may leave the stream open if it expects a followup - in + which case it may close the stream at any time if resource constratints + or other factors make it desirable to do so. Care must be taken in + managing TCP/IP connections with the KDC to prevent denial of service + attacks based on the number of TCP/IP connections with the KDC that + remain open. If multiple exchanges with the KDC are needed for certain + forms of preauthentication, multiple TCP connections may be required. A + client may close the stream after receiving response, and should close + the stream if it does not expect to send followup messages. The client + must be prepared to have the stream closed by the KDC at anytime, in + which case it must simply connect again when it is ready to send + subsequent messages. + + The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + request will encode in network byte order the length of the request + (KRB_KDC_REQ), and the length will be followed by the request itself. + The response will similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in + network byte order of the length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR + message and will be followed by the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR + response. If the sign bit is set on the integer represented by the + first 4 octets, then the next 4 octets will be read, extending the + length of the field by another 4 octets (less the sign bit which is + reserved for future expansion). + + 8.2.3. OSI transport + + During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual + authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of + credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of + private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may + be treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication + mechanism will be: + + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + + Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication + header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe + message (KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials + message (KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as + specified in the ASN.1 description for each message. The application + code may be used by Kerberos to determine the message type. + + 8.2.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be + composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS + ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part + "krbtgt" and the second part the name of the realm which will accept + the ticket-granting ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), + ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + + 8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + + The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines + their meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section + that limit the values of constants for which values are defined here. + This allows implementations to make assumptions about the maximum + values that will be received for these constants. Implementation + receiving values outside the range specified in the "specification" + section may reject the request, but they must recover cleanly. + + Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder size + NULL 0 1 0 0 + des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 + des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 + des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 + des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + 6 + des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 + dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 (pkinit) + md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 (pkinit) + sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 (pkinit) + rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 (pkinit) + rsaEncryption-EnvOID 13 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v1.5) + rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID 14 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v2.0) + des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 (pkinit) + des3-cbc-sha1-kd 16 (Tom Yu) + rc4-hmac 23 (swift) + rc4-hmac-exp 24 (swift) + + ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + + Checksum type sumtype value checksum size + CRC32 1 4 + rsa-md4 2 16 + rsa-md4-des 3 24 + des-mac 4 16 + des-mac-k 5 8 + rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 (drop rsa ?) + rsa-md5 7 16 (drop rsa ?) + rsa-md5-des 8 24 (drop rsa ?) + rsa-md5-des3 9 24 (drop rsa ?) + hmac-sha1-des3-kd 12 20 + hmac-sha1-des3 13 20 + + padata type padata-type value + + PA-TGS-REQ 1 + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 + PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 + PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 (depricated) + PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 + PA-SESAME 7 + PA-OSF-DCE 8 + PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 + PA-AFS3-SALT 10 + PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 + PA-SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) + PA-SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) + PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) + PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + PA-SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp) + PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 + PA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO 23 (sam/otp) + +data-type value form of typed-data + + 1-21 +TD-PADATA 22 +TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS +TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 +TD-KRB-REALM 103 +TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 + +authorization data type ad-type value +AD-IF-RELEVANT 1 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 +AD-KDC-ISSUED 4 +AD-OR 5 +AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 +AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 +reserved values 8-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 +AD-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID 66 (hemsath@us.ibm.com) + +Ticket Extension Types + +TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension +TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data + 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations) +TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket +TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations) + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID +KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested prot vers number not supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired [40] +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE 29 A service is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message +KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path +KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + +KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) +KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT 67 (user-to-user) +KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM 68 (user-to-user) +KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED 69 (user-to-user) +KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 (pkinit) + + 9. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among + these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding + schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for + pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, options + for mutual authentication, user to user authentication, support for + proxies, forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, the format of + realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to + define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all + implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as + technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered + that one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not + secure, it will be replaced. + + 9.1. Specification 2 + + This section defines the second specification of these options. + Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support + Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (depricated) + may be found in RFC1510. + + Transport + + TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming + conformance to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance + to specification 2 must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the + KDC and should support TCP/IP transport. + + Encryption and checksum methods + + The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. + Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the + additional mechanisms may only be used when communicating with + principals known to also support them: This list is to be determined. + + Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5, one triple des variant (tbd) + Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 (tbd) + + Realm Names + + All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the + Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for + an unknown realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the + names of the intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + requested realm. + + Transited field encoding + + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. + Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when + that encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + + Pre-authentication methods + + The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on + the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by + clients but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a + realm by realm basis. If not used in the initial request and the error + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an + acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using + the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support + the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should + ignore the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a + request. + + Mutual authentication + + Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + + Ticket addresses and flags + + All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT + contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but + each realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each + application server will set its own policy with respect to accepting + them. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and + application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will + be accepted. + + All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but + need not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, + the starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire + useful life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all + implementations shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible + to the calling server. + + User-to-user authentication + + Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC + option) must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may + decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal + or realm-wide basis. + + Authorization data + + Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from + ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to + suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered + subfield type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no + registered subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data + subfields available to the server when a ticket is used. + Implementations are not required to allow clients to specify the + contents of the authorization data fields. + + Constant ranges + + All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values unless + further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit is provided + to allow implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values + that will be received for these constants. Implementation receiving + values outside this range may reject the request, but they must recover + cleanly. + + 9.2. Recommended KDC values + + Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, + based on the list of suggested configuration constants (see section + 4.4). + + minimum lifetime 5 minutes + maximum renewable lifetime 1 week + maximum ticket lifetime 1 day + empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data + proxiable, etc. Allowed. + + 10. REFERENCES + + [NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + + [MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + + [SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + + [NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + + [DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + + [KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + + [Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + + [DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + + [LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + + [X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + + [Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + + [DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + + [DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + + [SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + + [IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + + [MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + + [MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + + [KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + + [Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, + August 1998. + + [HorowitzB96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-01.txt, September 1998. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + [Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + + A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + + This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to + be constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + + A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", + "localrealm" */ + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) + then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + + A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + + A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that */ + /* should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly */ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and + choosing the correct key for decryption. The name of the + server appears in the plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is + operating is determined by the instance from the + ticket-granting ticket. The realm in the ticket-granting + ticket is the realm under which the ticket granting + ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) + then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would */ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so */ + /* there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the + renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into + decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := + req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := + compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not + set) then + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == OK) + set new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), + second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), + server.key, server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + + A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of + resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of + resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and + tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + + A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + + A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using + retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + + A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + + A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + receive packet; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + + A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + + A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + + A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number + not present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + + A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + + A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + + A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + + A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + + A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + B. Definition of common authorization data elements + + This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data + elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly + defined, meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a + sequence of authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the + encapsulating element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating + element, the encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted + as issued directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate + plaintext part of the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements + are specified as part of the Kerberos specification because the + behavior based on these values should be understood across + implementations whereas other elements need only be understood by the + applications which they affect. + + In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the + element will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of + the ad-data will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the + subsection heading. + + B.1. If relevant + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + + AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended + for interpretation only by application servers that understand the + particular ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do + not understand the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant + element may ignore the uninterpretable element. This element promotes + interoperability across implementations which may have local extensions + for authorization. + + B.2. Intended for server + + AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData + } + + AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be + ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names + of intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application + server can remove this element if the application server is not in the + list of intended servers. + + Application servers should check for their principal name in the + intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not + found, this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated + elements should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present + in the top level authorization data field. Applications and application + servers that do not implement this element should reject tickets that + contain authorization data elements of this type. + + B.3. Intended for application class + + AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { + intended-application-class[0] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] + AuthorizationData } AD elements encapsulated within the + intended-for-application-class element may be ignored if the + application server is not in one of the named classes of application + servers. Examples of application server classes include "FILESYSTEM", + and other kinds of servers. + + This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by + applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this + element. + + B.4. KDC Issued + + AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. + } + + ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the + ticket itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same + encryption algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + derived from the same key used to protect the ticket. + i-realm, i-sname + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC + itself. This field would be used when the KDC can verify the + authenticity of elements signed by the issuing principal and it + allows this KDC to notify the application server of the validity + of those elements. + elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for + Kerberos principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege + attributes and other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying + the priveleges of the principal beyond what can be done using a + credentials without such an a-data element. + + This can not be provided without this element because the definition of + the authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the + bearer of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and + elements may also be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the + authenticator. + + For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are + signed by the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's + key (the same key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from + that key). Elements encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be + ignored by the application server if this "signature" is not present. + Further, elements encapsulated within this element from a ticket + granting ticket may be interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis + according to policy for including new signed elements within derivative + tickets, but they will not be copied to a derivative ticket directly. + If they are copied directly to a derivative ticket by a KDC that is not + aware of this element, the signature will not be correct for the + application ticket elements, and the field will be ignored by the + application server. + + This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by + applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this + element. + + B.5. And-Or + + AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData + } + + When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are + encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the + encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. + This element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the + condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by + setting the condition count to the number of embedded elements. + Application servers that do not implement this element must reject + tickets that contain authorization data elements of this type. + + B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + + AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions + specifies a collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used + to protect the integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be + calculated over an individual extension field. If there are more than + one extension, multiple Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions authorization data + elements may be present, each with a checksum for a different extension + field. This restriction indicates that the ticket should not be + accepted if a ticket extension is not present in the ticket for which + the checksum does not match that checksum specified in the + authorization data element. Application servers that do not implement + this element must reject tickets that contain authorization data + elements of this type. + + B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + + AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + + An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a + collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect + the integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a + separate external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket + extensions. Application servers that do not implement this element must + reject tickets that contain authorization data elements of this type. + Application servers that do implement this element will search the + ticket extensions for authorization data fields, calculate the + specified checksum over each authorization data field and look for one + matching the checksum in this in-ticket-extensions element. If not + found, then the ticket must be rejected. If found, the corresponding + authorization data elements will be interpreted in the same manner as + if they were contained in the top level authorization data field. + + Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in + a ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type + in-ticket-extensions in the top level authorization data field, and the + external entries will be linked to the corresponding element by their + checksums. + + C. Definition of common ticket extensions + + This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. + Support for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions + have associated authorization data elements that may require rejection + of a ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not + implement the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined + beyond those described in this specification. Such extensions are + described elswhere and for some of those extensions the reserved number + may be found in the list of constants. + + It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, + and that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they + parse and then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application + servers. The presence of the extension will not break such clients, but + any functionaly dependent on the extensions will not work when such + tickets are handled by old clients. In such situations, some + implementation may use alternate methods to transmit the information in + the extensions field. + + C.1. Null ticket extension + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + + The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of + lenght zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket + so that the KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting + ticket whether the client software will strip the extensions field. + + C.2. External Authorization Data + + TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + + The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension + is field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization + data elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element + will be present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and + that element will contain a checksum of the external authorization data + ticket extension. + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + [TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the + Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these + trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + + [1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only + upon the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an + application subsequently provides integrity protection for the data + stream, the identity verification applies only to the initiation of the + connection, and does not guarantee that subsequent messages on the + connection originate from the same principal. + + [2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the + literature. In our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, + thus a shared DES key is a secret key. Something is only private when + no one but its owner knows it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one + has a public and a private key. + + [3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange + registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and + engage in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for + even small numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more + automatic methods as described here are necessary. + + [4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no + network addresses specified. + + [5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the + requester can provide the old password (the user's current secret key). + Otherwise, it would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended + ses- sion and change another user's password. + + [6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the + credentials obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS + exchange to obtain credentials for a local server. Those credentials + must then be verified by a local server through successful completion + of the Client/Server exchange. + + [7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to + guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. + This can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is + based on cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + random number generator, such as one based on measurements of random + physical phenomena. + + [8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so + cleartext here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one + message and replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + + [9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports + difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated + messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, + or the application server must match requests and replies and replay + the first reply in response to a detected duplicate. + + [10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + + [11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from + the same principal to the same server. Other client principals + communicating with the same server principal should not be have their + authenticators rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to + match some other client's authenticator. + + [12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was + the client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 + because version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not + possible to create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in + encrypted form) without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + + [13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session + key is not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + + [14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to + choose subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate + a negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + + [15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known + beforehand (since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it + might be stored in a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a + configura- tion file. If the realm to be used is obtained from a + nameserver, there is a danger of being spoofed if the nameservice + providing the realm name is not authenti- cated. This might result in + the use of a realm which has been compromised, and would result in an + attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of the application + server to the client. + + [16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to + ensure the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach + would be to generate a random number and XOR it with the session key + from the ticket-granting ticket. + + [17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication + [8], which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret + server keys in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily + comprom- ised. + + [18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first listed + realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + + [19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's realm + is considered to precede those in the transited field, and the server's + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + realm is considered to follow them. + + [20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and + communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not + share a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + + [21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the + database and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store + the principal database in, say, a network name service, as long as the + entries stored therein are protected from disclosure to and + modification by unauthorized parties. However, we recommend against + such strategies, as they can make system management and threat analysis + quite complex. + + [22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for + details on why this can be useful. + + [23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data structures + during the generation and verification of embedded checksums: Because + any checksums applied to data structures must be checked against the + original data the length of bit strings must be preserved within a data + structure between the time that a checksum is generated through + transmission to the time that the checksum is verified. + + [24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the + workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine + that such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely + manner. + + [25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must + make sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If the + time is ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability + that a nonce will be reused. + + [27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an + additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + [29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an + additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + [31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an + additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + [32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization + vector may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve + proper cipher chaining. The initialization vector might come from the + last block of the ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but it + is the application's choice whether or not to use such an + initialization vector. If left out, the default initialization vector + for the encryption algorithm will be used. + + [33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request + from obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password + guessing attack. + + [35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the + notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is not + a valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the + confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the message + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 10 September, 2000 + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05 June 25, 1999 + + starts with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. For + other fields, the length and tag would be redundant if they were + included because they are specified by the encryption type. [36] The + ordering of the fields in the CipherText is important. Additionally, + messages encoded in this format must include a length as part of the + msg-seq field. This allows the recipient to verify that the message has + not been truncated. Without a length, an attacker could use a chosen + plaintext attack to generate a message which could be truncated, while + leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the msg-seq is an encoding of + an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length is part of that + encoding. + + [37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" + string for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in + section 5.4.2. + + [38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" + string for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in + section 5.4.2. + + [39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a + particular function, separating the functions of generating a checksum + from other encryption performed using the session key. The constant + F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was chosen because it maintains key parity. The + properties of DES precluded the use of the complement. The same + constant is used for similar purpose in the Message Integrity Check in + the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + + [40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. + The contents of the e-data field for this message is described in + section 5.9.1. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae79e8a7c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7301 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + July 14, 2000 + Expires January 14, 2001 + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06.txt + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all +provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents +of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It +is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite +them other than as "work in progress." + +The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + +The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +"1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow +Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06.txt, and expires January 14, 2001. +Please send comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + + This document is getting closer to a last call, but there are several + issues to be discussed. Some, but not all of these issues, are + highlighted in comments in the draft. We hope to resolve these issues + on the mailing list for the Kerberos working group, leading up to and + during the Pittsburgh IETF on a section by section basis, since this + is a long document, and it has been difficult to consider it as a + whole. Once sections are agreed to, it is out intent to issue the more + formal WG and IETF last calls. + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the +Kerberos network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version +5 of the Kerberos protocol. + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard +through the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the +presentation, but only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or +extensions that fit within current protocol framework will be considered at +this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested +by Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of +Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena +staff members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford +Neuman (now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of +Southern California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of +Project Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many +other members of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on +Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol +was led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the +community. The development of the MIT reference implementation was led at +MIT by John Kohl and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from +many others. Since RFC1510 was issued, extensions and revisions to the +protocol have been proposed by many individuals. Some of these proposals +are reflected in this document. Where such changes involved significant +effort, the document cites the contribution of the proposer. + +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and +5 can be found in [KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. +a workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. +This is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating +system, without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical +security of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that +packets traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at +will[1]. Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a +trusted third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared +secret key [2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and +implemented that provide for the use of public key cryptography during +certain phases of the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +authentication of users registered with public key certification +authorities, and allow the system to provide certain benefits of public key +cryptography in situations where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in +the client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server +and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The +client transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a +copy of the session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. +The session key (now shared by the client and server) is used to +authenticate the client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the +server. It may also be used to encrypt further communication between the +two parties or to exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt +further communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their +secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos +protocol. In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical +network application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly +or through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request +for a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted +in the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client +uses the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it +were contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry +points within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent +"in the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't +thwart replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, +additional information is sent to prove that the message originated with +the principal to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the +authenticator) is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. +The timestamp proves that the message was recently generated and is not a +replay. Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was +generated by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the +requesting principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent +over the network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to +the Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must +be modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's +key. This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos +server, the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol +for maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server +in another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes +its own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is +part of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide +whether to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate +key may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service +of each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share +an inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is +not directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical +organization is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in +order to construct an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in +authenticating the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + [JBrezak] Should there be a section here on how clients determine what + realm a service is in? Something like: + + The client may not immediately know what realm a particular service + principal is in. There are 2 basic mechanisms that can be used to + determine the realm of a service. The first requires that the client + fully specify the service principal including the realm in the + Kerberos protocol request. If the Kerberos server for the specified + realm does not have a principal that exactly matches the service in + the request, the Kerberos server will return an error indicating that + the service principal was not found. Alternatively the client can make + a request providing just the service principal name and requesting + name canonicalization from the Kerberos server. The Kerberos server + will attempt to locate a service principal in its database that best + matches the request principal or provide a referral to another + Kerberos realm that may be contain the requested service principal. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93], or on other authorization services. +Separately authenticated authorization credentials may be embedded in a +tickets authorization data when encapsulated by the kdc-issued +authorization data element. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the mere issuance of a +service ticket by the Kerberos server (even by a modified Kerberos server) +as granting authority to use the service, since such applications may +become vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an +environment if they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for +application authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a dictionary, + messages obtained which are encrypted under a key derived from the + user's password. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to + grant permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry + remains for a deleted principal and the principal identifier is + reused, the new principal will inherit rights specified in the stale + ACL entry. By not re-using principal identifiers, the danger of + inadvertent access is removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been + recently generated using the session key known only by the client and + server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access + allowed for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted + by the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. + Note that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other + server (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use + that ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is + sometimes referred to as the Authentication Server (or service). The + ticket-granting ticket portion is sometimes referred to as the + ticket-granting server (or service). +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than + one server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a + lifetime limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the +various flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the +KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the +VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their +starttime has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets +which have been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently +invalid (through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set +in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key +and a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left +unmodified by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration +time arrives, the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may +consult a hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen +since its last renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and +thus the usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets +in a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to +theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC +at job submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are +activated and validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft +were reported in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, +and the thief would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This +flag must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated +ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be +requested by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the +KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated +ticket-granting ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by +obtained by requesting the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life +(endtime-starttime) of a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the +ticket-granting ticket at the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE +option is also set, in which case it can be the full life +(endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how +far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the +identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can +allow a service to take on the principal's identity for a particular +purpose by granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose +must use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to +forward a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When +set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a +new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network +address based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client +on initial authentication. By default, the client will request that it be +set when requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any +other ticket. + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print +server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in +order to satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in +the ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new +network address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the +proxy is to be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may +require additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in +order to provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request +that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when +they request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user +to enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. +It is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED +flag set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets +differently than non-FORWARDED tickets. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +2.7 Name canonicalization [JBrezak] + +If a client does not have the full name information for a principal, it can +request that the Kerberos server attempt to lookup the name in its database +and return a canonical form of the requested principal or a referral to a +realm that has the requested principal in its namespace. Name +canonicalization allows a principal to have alternate names. Name +canonicalization must not be used to locate principal names supplied from +wildcards and is not a mechanism to be used to search a Kerberos database. + +The CANONICALIZE flag in a ticket request is used to indicate to the +Kerberos server that the client will accept an alternative name to the +principal in the request or a referral to another realm. Both the AS and +TGS must be able to interpret requests with this flag. + +By using this flag, the client can avoid extensive configuration needed to +map specific host names to a particular realm. + +2.8. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients +and servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the +Kerberos Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to +obtain authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the +initiation of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting +Server which will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other +servers (see section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's +secret key. This exchange is also used to request credentials for services +which must not be mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather +require a principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. +This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity +of the user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The +response, KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the +server, and a session key that will be shared by the client and the server. +The session key and additional information are encrypted in the client's +secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used +to detect replays, and to associate it with the message to which it +replies. Various errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response +(KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not +encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains information which can be used to +associate it with the message to which it replies. The lack of encryption +in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays, +fabrications, or modifications of such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends +a reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is +encrypted in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional +field that can be used to pass additional information that might be needed +for the initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as +described in section [hl<>]. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether +the requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether +it should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; whether +the client requests name-canonicalization; and whether a renewable ticket +will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the requested ticket +expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable ticket (due to +configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format +for the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket +are determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named +in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +the requested client principal named in the request is not found in its +database, then an error message with a KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN is +returned. If the request had the CANONICALIZE option set, then the AS can +attempt to lookup the client principal name in an alternate database, if it +is found an error message with a KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error code and the +cname and crealm in the error message must contain the true client +principal name and realm. + +If required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES3-CBC-SHA1 and DES3-CBC-SHA1-KD), then the etype field from +the AS request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be +used for encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one +supported, strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype +for which an encryption key is available is used. The encryption method +used to respond to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session +key found in the ticket granting ticket. + + JBrezak - the behavior of PW-SALT, and ETYPE-INFO should be explained + here; also about using keys that have different string-to-key + functions like AFSsalt + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. +Otherwise the requested start time is checked against the policy of the +local realm (the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or +ranges of postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is +set as requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The +postdated ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC +after the start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option +has been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till +field is set to the minimum of: + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set + by the policy of the local realm. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using +the requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section +A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, +start and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate +a KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the +proper KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must +require the user to present application credentials which can be verified +using a securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can +be verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. If the client set the CANONICALIZE option and a +KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error was returned, the AS request should be retried to +the realm and client principal name specified in the error message crealm +and cname field respectively. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS +or TGS exchange. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message +is referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) +a ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use +of a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors +are possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the +client with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If +the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in +the KRB_AP_REQ is not one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old +key, and the server no longer possesses a copy of the old key), the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set +in the ap-options field, it indicates to the server that the ticket is +encrypted in the session key from the server's ticket-granting ticket +rather than its secret key[10]. Since it is possible for the server to be +registered in multiple realms, with different keys in each, the srealm +field in the unencrypted portion of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to +specify which secret key the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server doesn't have the +proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the +client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the +authenticator. If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is +returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong session key was +used to encrypt the authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) +are then searched for an address matching the operating-system reported +address of the client. If no match is found or the server insists on ticket +addresses but none are present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error +is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The +server must remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock +skew, so that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses +track of any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it +must reject all requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This +assures that any lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the +allowable clock skew and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is +not done, an attacker could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator +sent over the network to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as +the disabled host, and replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the +authentication.). If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, +the server saves it for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV +messages. If a subkey is present, the server either saves it for later use +or uses it to help generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a +KRB_AP_REP message. + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that +the client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket +and thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 +for pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; +it does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name +of the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such +as that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server +need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual +authentication (not only authenticating the client to the server, but also +the server to the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message +is required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not +acceptable to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond +field used in the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond +field (as provided in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be +included, it should be randomly chosen as described above for the +authenticator. A subkey may be included if the server desires to negotiate +a different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key +extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and +server share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The +'true session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption +or checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does +not constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might +be done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever +reason, one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 +unknown bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from +using more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key +with a known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if +the server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server +is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication +credentials for a given server (which might be registered in a remote +realm), when it wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it +wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already +have acquired a ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS +exchange (the ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client +initially authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The +message format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS +exchange. The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the +TGS exchange does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or +sub-session key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for all +application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a +renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, the client must use a separate +exchange to obtain valid tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed +authorization data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the +application server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described +later). The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, +encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable +ticket, or if present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part +of the authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code +and text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not +encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used +to detect replays, and to associate it with the message to which it +replies. The KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used +to associate it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of +encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays +or fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15], if it is +known. If the client does know the service principal name and realm and it +does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by requesting a +ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a Kerberos server for +which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the +KRB_TGS_REQ message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for +the desired realm in which case one can proceed. + +If the client does not know the realm of the service or the true service +principal name, then the CANONICALIZE option must be used in the request. +This will cause the TGS to locate the service principal based on the target +service name in the ticket and return the service principal name in the +response. Alternatively, the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm +which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further along the standard + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +hierarchical path) or the realm that may contain the requested service +principal name in a request with the CANONCALIZE option set [JBrezak], in +which case this step must be repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm +specified in the returned TGT. If neither are returned, then the request +must be retried with a Kerberos server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. +This request will itself require a ticket-granting ticket for the higher +realm which must be obtained by recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. +The list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service +or it may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret +keys exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results +from using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server +use and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be +encrypted[16]. If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key +from the ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data +is present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from +the authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, +using the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which +it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. If the CANONICALIZE option is +set in the KRB_TGS_REQ, then the requested service name may not be the true +principal name or the service may not be in the TGS realm. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP +(KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed +specification is in section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. If the CANONICALIZE option is set, the TGS may return a +ticket containing the server name of the true service principal. If the +requested server cannot be found in the TGS database, then a TGT for +another trusted realm may be returned instead of a ticket for the service. +This TGT is a referral mechanism to cause the client to retry the request +to the realm of the TGT. These are the only cases where the response for +the KDC will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited +field needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. +The PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional +ticket-granting tickets. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the +ticket-granting ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting +ticket will be postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the +policy of the local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as +requested, and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be +validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has +been reached. However, in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till +time of a newly-issued postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time +of the ticket-granting ticket. + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional +ticket using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was +issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +requested server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the +additional ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server +will be compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is +set in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that +the renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is +rqeuested, the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID +flag is set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that +the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the +ticket passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC +will issue the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal +expiration time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and +the key version number fields are left out since these values are stored +along with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to +satisfy a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for +pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, +subject to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS +exchange. The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket +to be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous +realm. This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving +out its own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since +the endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its +contents are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the +normal case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of +realms using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding +(called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. +Thus, "," means that all realms along the path between the client and the +server have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from +the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been +traversed, and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an +X.500 style has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in +one hierarchy shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in +another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. The server name returned in the reply is the true principal name of +the service. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES +MAC), generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by +one's peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session +key, so maintaining the next sequence number should not present an +additional problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and +type fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A +mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. +The application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. If +the sender's address was included in the control information, the recipient +verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches +the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is +specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's +addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match +for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp +and usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and +usec are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT +error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a +sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error +is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is +present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. Finally, the checksum is +computed over the data and control information, and if it doesn't match the +received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and +type fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A +mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. +The application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. If the sender's address was +included in the control information, the recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses +appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for +either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and +usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec +are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an +incorrect sequence number is included, or a sequence number is expected but +not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a +time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED +error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It +then constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the +KRB_CRED message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence +in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and +r-address fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message +which is then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the +KRB_AP exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates +a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If +decryption shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY +error is generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's +address in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce +field if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not +present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is +generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets +in its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in +the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the +KRB_CRED message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database containing the principal +identifiers and secret keys of principals to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The +key can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to +protect it in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. +In that case, an extra field must be added to indicate the master key + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the +principal's secret key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable +lifetime (endtime - starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. +The max_renewable_life field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime +for any renewable Ticket issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a +description of how these lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of +a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal +records with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. +not the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be +retained by the server until all tickets that had been issued using that +key have expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be +active for a single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is +always tagged with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to +help the recipient find the proper key for decryption. + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to +a request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error +to any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A +database may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, +and one for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether +a server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a +client, or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user +in the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to +allow the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +Optional field in ASN.1 sequences + +For optional integer value and date fields in ASN.1 sequences where a +default value has been specified, certain default values will not be +allowed in the encoding because these values will always be represented +through defaulting by the absence of the optional field. For example, one +will not send a microsecond zero value because one must make sure that +there is only one way to encode this value. + +Additional fields in ASN.1 sequences + +Implementations receiving Kerberos messages with additional fields present +in ASN.1 sequences should carry the those fields through, unmodified, when +the message is forwarded. Implementations should not drop such fields if +the sequence is reencoded. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 +specification, section 8.7 [X509-88]. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A +PrincipalName is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following +sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the + same (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be + different). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An +encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any +fractional portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any +separators. Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 +seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved + for registered use. + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the +interpretation of the encapsulating element determines which of the +embedded elements must be interpreted, and which may be ignored. +Definitions for these common elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved + for registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING io + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + -- unused10(10), + -- unused11(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- requestanonymous(14), + -- canonicalize(15), + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest number of bits needed to include +the highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. +The ASN.1 representation of the bit strings uses unnamed bits, with the +meaning of the individual bits defined by the comments in the specification +above. Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length +and treat the value of flags corresponding to bits beyond the end of the +bit string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparison of bit strings of +different length should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with +zeros beyond the high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute + value of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is + the time of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three + (3), then the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). If it is + (6), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the password will + expire. +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A +Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be +registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos +and the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format +of the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies all components of the name part of the server's + identity, including those parts that identify a specific instance of a + service. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + This optional field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used + to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support + several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext + authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other + information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the + application server. See Appendix C for definitions of some common + extensions. + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of + the appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal + identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. + When the names of CA's are to be embedded inthe transited field (as + specified for some extentions to the protocol), the X.500 names of the + CA's should be mapped into items in the transited field using the + mapping defined by RFC2253. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the + necessary information for implementation of a `hot list' service at + the KDC. An end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to + accept tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" + in the past. This field is also returned as part of the response from + the KDC. When returned as part of the response to initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Kerberos + server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated + as that of the authtime field. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be + honored (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place + their own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which + have not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is + that such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not + sent over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply + by listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the + session key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a + careless user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's workstation could use + the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only makes + it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off with + stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, + and that a better name for this field would be restrictions. + Unfortunately, it is not possible to change the name of this field at + this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the + basis of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any + principal in posession of credentials to add entries to the + authorization data field since these entries further restrict what can + be done with the ticket. Such additions can be made by specifying the + additional entries when a new ticket is obtained during the TGS + exchange, or they may be added during chained delegation using the + authorization data field of the authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, except when an entry is separately authenticated by + encapulation in the kdc-issued element, it is not allowable for the + presence of an entry in the authorization data field of a ticket to + amplify the priveleges one would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + may obtain a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the + name of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its + own authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy + to the client. The client would then present this authorization + credential to the application server separately from the + authentication exchange. Alternatively, such authorization credentials + may be embedded in the ticket authenticating the authorized entity, + when the authorization is separately authenticated using the + kdc-issued authorization data element (see B.4). + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy + and leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session + key can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested + uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. + Its value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often + appears along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify + a reasonably accurate timestamp. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that + for messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is + sent. Sequence numbers fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and + wrap to zero following the value 2^32 - 1. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. + It is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are + to be placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the + ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an +initial ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent +from the client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a +service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +The fields in this message are: + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting + ticket and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which + must be collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY + encoding. In most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and + most replies (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions + to the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. When + this field is used to authenticate or pre-authenticate a request, it + should contain a keyed checksum over the KDC-REQ-BODY to bind the + pre-authentication data to rest of the request. The KDC, as a matter + of policy, may decide whether to honor a KDC-REQ which includes any + pre-authentication data that does not contain the checksum field. + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP defines a pre-authentication data type that is used + for authenticating a client by way of an encrypted timestamp. This is + accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows (query: the + checksum is new in this definition. If the optional field will break + things we can keep the old PA-ENC-TS-ENC, and define a new alternate + form that includes the checksum). : + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + pachecksum[2] checksum OPTIONAL + -- keyed checksum of +KDC-REQ-BODY + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing + the microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate + more than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) + consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's + secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC + or the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets + as well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the + KDC. Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the + flag that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field + to the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of +this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + forwardable flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also +for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only +specified + in a request to the +ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket in the +request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. +This + option indicates that this is a +request + for forwarding. The address(es) of +the + host from which the resulting ticket +is + to be valid are included in +the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have its +prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set +on + the initial request, or in a +subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket +on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this +is + a request for a proxy. This option +will + only be honored if the +ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its +PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the +host + from which the resulting ticket is to +be + valid are included in the +addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that +this + is a request for a postdated +ticket. + This option will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket on which it +is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag +set. + The resulting ticket will also have +its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may +be + reset by a subsequent request to the +KDC + after the starttime in the ticket +has + been reached. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have +its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be +set + on the initial request, or when +the + ticket-granting ticket on which +the + request is based is also renewable. +If + this option is requested, then the +rtime + field in the request contains +the + desired absolute expiration time for +the + ticket. + + 9 RESERVED + Reserved for PK-Cross + + 10-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option +indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not +to + identify the user to which it +was + issued. Instead, the principal +identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified +by + the policy of the realm (e.g. +usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of +the + ticket is only to securely distribute +a + session key, and not to identify +the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the +ticket + to be returned should be set. If +the + local realms policy does not +permit + anonymous credentials, the request is +to + be rejected. + + 15 CANONICALIZE + The CANONICALIZE option indicates that + the client will accept the return of a + true server name instead of the name + specified in the request. In addition + the client will be able to process + any TGT referrals that will direct + the client to another realm to locate + the requested server. If a KDC does + not support name- canonicalization, + the option is ignored and the + appropriate + KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or + KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN error is + returned. [JBrezak] + + 16-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited +field + is disabled. Tickets issued without +the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + performance of this check will be +noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be +checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that +a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if +a + ticket with the requested life +cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket +with + the requested life cannot be +provided, + then a renewable ticket may be +issued + with a renew-till equal to the +the + requested endtime. The value of +the + renew-till field may still be limited +by + local limits, or limits selected by +the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The +ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for +the + end server is to be encrypted in +the + session key from the additional +ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The RENEW +option + indicates that the present request +is + for a renewal. The ticket provided +is + encrypted in the secret key for +the + server on which it is valid. +This + option will only be honored if +the + ticket to be renewed has its +RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its +renew- + till field has not passed. The +ticket + to be renewed is passed in the +padata + field as part of the +authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE +option + indicates that the request is to +vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will +only + be honored if the ticket presented +is + postdated, presently has its +INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise +usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be +vali- + dated before its starttime. The +ticket + presented for validation is encrypted +in + the key of the server for which it +is + valid and is passed in the padata +field + as part of the authentication header. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, + or alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, + both from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. If the CANONICALIZE option is set, the + realm is used as a hint to the KDC for its database lookup. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies + the desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is + omitted then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date + of the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated + randomly, but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in + the response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses + for the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will + contain other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied + by the KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be + used in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. When he + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is used for user-to-user authentication, this + addional ticket may be a TGT issued by the local realm or an + inter-realm TGT issued for the current KDC's realm by a remote KDC. If + more than one option which requires additional tickets has been + specified, then the additional tickets are used in the order specified + by the ordering of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that +is passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for +either an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no +message type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP +or KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or +if absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the +request. In that case, no version number will be present in the +EncryptedData sequence. + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section + 6.3.2). This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name + needs to change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all + existing password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged + as needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related + information that forms the encrypted part of a message. The + description of the encrypted part of the message follows each + appearance of this field. The encrypted part is encoded as described + in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the + last request by a principal. Depending on what information is + available, this might be the last time that a request for a + ticket-granting ticket was made, or the last time that a request based + on a ticket-granting ticket was successful. It also might cover all + servers for a realm, or just the particular server. Some + implementations may display this information to the user to aid in + discovering unauthorized use of one's identity. It is similar in + spirit to the last login time displayed when logging into timesharing + systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up + to the application client (usually the login program) to take + appropriate action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time + is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will + be the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +often referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the + selected options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + unselected options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding + of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options + are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over + the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence. First, the cksum is zeroed and + the checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence, + then the checksum is set to the result of that computation, and + finally the KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again. +user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By + checking the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make + sure that it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. + It may be omitted if not required by the application protocol. The + application designer considering omission of this field is warned, + that the inclusion of this address prevents some kinds of replay + attacks (e.g., reflection attacks) and that it is only acceptable to + omit this address if there is sufficient information in the integrity + protected part of the application message for the recipient to + unambiguously determine if it was the intended recipient. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast + protocols), but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. + This field along with s-address can be used to help detect messages + which have been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong + recipient. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's +addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's +addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format + of the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by + the intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce + must never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the + recipient of the message and provided to the sender of the message in + an application specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is only optionally integrity +protected, it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify +such a message. In particular, this means that unless appropriate integrity +protection mechanisms have been applied to the KRB_ERROR message, the +client should not use any fields in this message for security-critical +purposes, such as setting a system clock or generating a fresh +authenticator. The message can be useful, however, for advising a user on +the reason for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. + Its value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The + two fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the + list of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to + provide for national language support in the display of error + messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If present, + this field will contain the encoding of a sequence of TypedData + (TYPED-DATA below), unless the errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, + in which case it will contain the encoding of a sequence of of padata + fields (METHOD-DATA below), each corresponding to an acceptable + pre-authentication method and optionally containing data for the + method: + + TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of TypeData + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + TypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type[0] INTEGER, + data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + Note that e-data-types have been reserved for all PA data types + defined prior to July 1999. For the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message, + when using new PA data types defined in July 1999 or later, the + METHOD-DATA sequence must itself be encapsulated in an TypedData + element of type TD-PADATA. All new implementations interpreting the + METHOD-DATA field for the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message must accept + a type of TD-PADATA, extract the typed data field and interpret the + use any elements encapsulated in the TD-PADATA elements as if they + were present in the METHOD-DATA sequence. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. + The checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to + an AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the + client's secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication + to prove knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum + can not be computed because the key to be used is not available, no + checksum will be included. + + 6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + + The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use + stream encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly + available block encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption + Standard [DES77], and triple DES variants, in conjunction with block + chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption is used to prove + the identities of the network entities participating in message + exchanges. The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by + all principals registered in that realm to store a secret key in + confidence. Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify + the authenticity of a principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a + shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to + ticket requests; the ability to obtain the secret key or session key + implies the knowledge of the appropriate keys and the identity of the + KDC. The ability of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and + present a Ticket and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + the session key from the KDC response) to a service verifies the + identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the service to + extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge + thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + + The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is + secure from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields + in the encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the + effects of poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good + keys. If keys are derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords + need to be well chosen to make brute force attacks more difficult. + Poorly chosen keys still make easy targets for intruders. + + The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms + currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding + requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is + often desirable to place random information (often referred to as a + confounder) at the start of the message. The requirements for a + confounder are specified with each encryption mechanism. + + Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the + security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining + methods often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such + systems (such as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of + the plain-text which can be verified at decryption and used to detect + any tampering or damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting + burst errors in the input. If any damage is detected, the decryption + routine is expected to return an error indicating the failure of an + integrity check. Each encryption type is expected to provide and + verify an appropriate checksum. The specification of each encryption + method sets out its checksum requirements. + + Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an + algorithm for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type + is included. It is desirable for the string to key function to be + one-way, and for the mapping to be different in different realms. This + is important because users who are registered in more than one realm + will often use the same password in each, and it is desirable that an + attacker compromising the Kerberos server in one realm not obtain or + derive the user's key in another. + + For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate + encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the reader is + referred to [SG92]. + + 6.1. Encryption Specifications + + The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The + enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in + section 5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional + key version number, and the ciphertext. + + EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + } + + + + etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to + encipher the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected + encryption types appear later in this section. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which + data is encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under + long lasting keys, such as principals' secret keys. + cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET + STRING. + The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption + algorithm to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific + inputs. Encryption mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take + sufficient measures to guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and + we recommend they also take measures to protect against precomputed + dictionary attacks. If the encryption algorithm is not itself capable + of doing so, the protections can often be enhanced by adding a + checksum and a confounder. + + The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a + confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary + padding. The msg-seq field contains the part of the protocol message + described in section 5 which is to be encrypted. The confounder, + checksum, and padding are all untagged and untyped, and their length + is exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate item. The type and + length is implicit and specified by the particular encryption type + being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted for some + methods is described in the following diagram, but other methods may + deviate from this layour - so long as the definition of the method + defines the layout actually in use. + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) +OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) +OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL + } + + One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing + it in confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate + checksum over confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in + check; adds the necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified + encryption type and the appropriate key. + + Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm + that specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an + octet boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those + fields which are not specified will be omitted. + + In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular + encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the + specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is + needed as part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum + is to be used, a new encryption type must be defined. + + Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and + the data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in + cipher-block-chaining mode, requires an initialization vector. If + required, the description for each encryption type must specify the + source of such additional information. 6.2. Encryption Keys + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + + keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption that is to be + performed using the key that follows in the keyvalue field. It + will always correspond to the etype to be used to generate or + decode the EncryptedData. In cases when multiple algorithms use a + common kind of key (e.g., if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a + different chaining mechanism), the keytype provides information + needed to determine which algorithm is to be used. + keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type + fields and interpreta- tions. + + 6.3. Encryption Systems + + 6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + + If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the + NULL encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no + checksum, confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the + plaintext. The NULL Key is used by the null encryption system and is + zero octets in length, with keytype zero (0). + + 6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + + The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. A CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is + applied to the confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in + the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be + encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) + must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of + the encryption of this data are identical to those for the des-cbc-md5 + encryption mode. + + Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an + attacker could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate + a valid message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of + collision-proof checksums is recommended for environments where such + attacks represent a significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the + checksum for ticket or authenticator is no longer mandated as an + interoperability requirement for Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 + (See section 9.1 for specific details). + + 6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the + confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum + field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted + (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be + padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the + encryption of this data are identical to those for the des-cbc-md5 + encryption mode. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the + confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum + field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted + (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be + padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. + + Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which + are concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The + first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's + MSbit used as the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the + next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least + significant bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an + additional input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless + otherwise specified, zero should be used as the initialization vector. + Kerberos' use of DES requires an 8 octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; + those keys shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in + Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way that keys are derived for + the encryption of checksums, keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' + or 'semi-weak' keys when eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant + F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of + 56 bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded + as a series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within + the key are also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption + key is (B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) + where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 + are the parity bits, the first octet of the key would be + B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction + for reference.] + + String to key transformation + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), a "salt" is + concatenated to the text string, and then padded with ASCII nulls to + an 8 byte boundary. This "salt" is normally the realm and each + component of the principal's name appended. However, sometimes + different salts are used --- for example, when a realm is renamed, or + if a user changes her username, or for compatibility with Kerberos V4 + (whose string-to-key algorithm uses a null string for the salt). This + string is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 + byte DES key. Before eXclusive-ORing a block, every byte is shifted + one bit to the left to leave the lowest bit zero. The key is the + "corrected" by correcting the parity on the key, and if the key + matches a 'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES + specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with the constant + 00000000000000F0. This key is then used to generate a DES CBC checksum + on the initial string (with the salt appended). The result of the CBC + checksum is the "corrected" as described above to form the result + which is return as the key. Pseudocode follows: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + name_to_default_salt(realm, name) { + s = realm + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + return s; + } + + key_correction(key) { + fixparity(key); + if (is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + string_to_key(string,salt) { + + odd = 1; + s = string + salt; + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + left shift every byte in 8byteblock one bit; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + tempkey = key_correction(tempkey); + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + return(key); + } + + 6.3.5. Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type with and + without Key Derivation [Original draft by Marc Horowitz, revisions by + David Miller] + + There are still a few pieces of this specification to be included + by falue, rather than by reference. This will be done before the + Pittsburgh IETF. + This encryption type is based on the Triple DES cryptosystem, the + HMAC-SHA1 [Krawczyk96] message authentication algorithm, and key + derivation for Kerberos V5 [HorowitzB96]. Key derivation may or may + not be used in conjunction with the use of Triple DES keys. + + Algorithm Identifiers + + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value 7. + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd encryption type, specifying the key + derivation variant of the encryption type, has been assigned the value + 16. The hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 13. + The hmac-sha1-des3-kd checksum type, specifying the key derivation + variant of the checksum, has been assigned the value 12. + + Triple DES Key Production + + The EncryptionKey value is 24 octets long. The 7 most significant bits + of each octet contain key bits, and the least significant bit is the + inverse of the xor of the key bits. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + For the purposes of key derivation, the block size is 64 bits, and the + key size is 168 bits. The 168 bits output by key derivation are + converted to an EncryptionKey value as follows. First, the 168 bits + are divided into three groups of 56 bits, which are expanded + individually into 64 bits as follows: + + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p + 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p + 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p + 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p + 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p + 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p + 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p + 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p + + The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output + of the three expansions are concatenated to form the EncryptionKey + value. + + When the HMAC-SHA1 of a string is computed, the key is used in the + EncryptedKey form. + + The string-to-key function is used to tranform UNICODE passwords into + DES3 keys. The DES3 string-to-key function relies on the "N-fold" + algorithm, which is detailed in [9]. The description of the N-fold + algorithm in that document is as follows: + o To n-fold a number X, replicate the input value to a length that + is the least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before + each repetition, the input is rotated to the right by 13 bit + positions. The successive n-bit chunks are added together using + 1's-complement addition (that is, addition with end-around carry) + to yield an n-bit result" + o The n-fold algorithm, as with DES string-to-key, is applied to + the password string concatenated with a salt value. The salt + value is derived in the same was as for the DES string-to-key + algorithm. For 3-key triple DES then, the operation will involve + a 168-fold of the input password string. The remainder of the + string-to-key function for DES3 is shown here in pseudocode: + + DES3string-to-key(passwordString, key) + + salt = name_to_default_salt(realm, name) + s = passwordString + salt + tmpKey1 = 168-fold(s) + parityFix(tmpKey1); + if not weakKey(tmpKey1) + /* + * Encrypt temp key in itself with a + * zero initialization vector + * + * Function signature is DES3encrypt(plain, key, iv) + * with cipher as the return value + */ + tmpKey2 = DES3encrypt(tmpKey1, tmpKey1, zeroIvec) + /* + * Encrypt resultant temp key in itself with third component + * of first temp key as initialization vector + */ + key = DES3encrypt(tmpKey2, tmpKey1, tmpKey1[2]) + parityFix(key) + if not weakKey(key) + return SUCCESS + else + return FAILURE + else + return FAILURE + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + The weakKey function above is the same weakKey function used with DES + keys, but applied to each of the three single DES keys that comprise + the triple DES key. + + The lengths of UNICODE encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + Encryption Types des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 and des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd + + EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC + mode. The checksum algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. If the key derivation + variant of the encryption type is used, encryption key values are + modified according to the method under the Key Derivation section + below. + + Unless otherwise specified, a zero IV must be used. + + If the length of the input data is not a multiple of the block size, + zero octets must be used to pad the plaintext to the next eight-octet + boundary. The counfounder must be eight random octets (one block). + + Checksum Types hmac-sha1-des3 and hmac-sha1-des3-kd + + Checksums using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. If the key + derivation variant of the checksum type is used, checksum key values + are modified according to the method under the Key Derivation section + below. + + Key Derivation + + In the Kerberos protocol, cryptographic keys are used in a number of + places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is + desirable to use a different key for each of these places. Key + derivation [Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys for + each operation from the keys transported on the network. For this to + be possible, a small change to the specification is necessary. + + This section specifies a profile for the use of key derivation + [Horowitz96] with Kerberos. For each place where a key is used, a + ``key usage'' must is specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, + and encryption/checksum type together describe the transformation from + plaintext to ciphertext, or plaintext to checksum. + + Key Usage Values + + This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos + protocol, with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) + 18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) + 19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) + 20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) + 21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + + Key usage values between 1024 and 2047 (inclusive) are reserved for + application use. Applications should use even values for encryption + and odd values for checksums within this range. + + A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service which + receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket was part + of an AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always be used + for generating a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- REQ or + TGS-REQ. + + There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of + the RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would + not know about key usages. In order that these documents continue to + be meaningful until they are updated, key usages 1024 and 1025 must be + used to derive keys for encryption and checksums, respectively. New + protocols defined in terms of the Kerberos encryption and checksum + types should use their own key usages. Key usages may be registered + with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key usages must be unsigned 32 bit + integers. Zero is not permitted. + + Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + + Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be + tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and + integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, + for each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption + (Ke), and one for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + + where the protocol key is from the EncryptionKey from the wire + protocol, and the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in + network byte order. The ciphertest must be generated from the + plaintext as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | plaintext | padding) + + The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or + padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be + generated from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + MAC = H(Kc, plaintext) + + Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a + keyed hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed + hash algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is required for use + as H. + + Key Derivation from Passwords + + The well-known constant for password key derivation must be the byte + string {0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values + correspond to the ASCII encoding for the string "kerberos". + + 6.4. Checksums + + The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + + cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the + accompanying checksum. + checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet + string. + Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this + section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type + fields and interpretations. + + Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: + whether they are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is + infeasible to find two plaintexts which generate the same checksum + value for a collision-proof checksum. A key is required to perturb or + initialize the algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent + message-stream modification by an active attacker, unkeyed checksums + should only be used when the checksum and message will be subsequently + encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as part of the encryption + algorithms covered earlier in this section). + + Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum + value is encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the + composition of the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be + considered a separate checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using + DES is a new checksum algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed + checksums, as well as for the encrypted forms of unkeyed + collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a confounder before the + checksum is calculated. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy + check as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is + four (4) octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor + collision-proof. The use of this checksum is not recommended. An + attacker using a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack as described in + [SG92] might be able to generate an alternative message that satisfies + the checksum. The use of collision-proof checksums is recommended for + environments where such attacks represent a significant threat. + + 6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm + [MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary + length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 + is believed to be collision-proof. + + 6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD4 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the + key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the + constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be + zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are + redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; + those keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use + in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) +| + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + + 6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 + algorithm. [MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. + RSA-MD5 is believed to be collision-proof. + + 6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD5 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the + key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the + hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector + should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of + which are redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; + those keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use + in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) +| + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + + 6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder + to the plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result + using the key and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last + block of the ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting + the pair using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The + initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 + bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This checksum + is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + | des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) +| + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) + } + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; + those keys shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use + in Kerberos, nor shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or + 'semi-weak'. + + 6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative + (rsa-md4-des-k) + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum + by applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results + using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both + key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets + long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for + encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no longer recommended. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode + encryption of the plaintext, and using the last block of the + ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed with an encryption key + and an initialization vector; any uses which do not specify an + additional initialization vector will use the key as both key and + initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) + long. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that + this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DES-MAC checksum + and it is no longer recommended. The DES specifications identify some + 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys shall not be used for + generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + + 7. Naming Constraints + + 7.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a + realm can technically select any name it chooses, interoperability + across realm boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to + be assigned, and what information they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the + conventions itself, and it must require that any realms with which + inter-realm keys are shared also conform to the conventions and + require the same from its neighbors. + + Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only + in the case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently + four styles of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. + Examples of each style follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + + Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components + separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor + slashes (/). Though domain names themselves are case insensitive, in + order for realms to match, the case must match as well. When + establishing a new realm name based on an internet domain name it is + recommended by convention that the characters be converted to upper + case. + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before + the equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string + representations of the names with components separated by slashes. + Leading and trailing slashes will not be included. + + Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that + contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by + a colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned + before they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the + first three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is + unlikely that names will be assigned to this category unless there is + a very strong argument for not using the 'other' category. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the + various name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the + assignment of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name + of a realm for the domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the + organization owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name + or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are registered, + authority to use a realm name may be derived from the authority of the + parent realm. For example, if there is no domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, + then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can authorize the creation + of a realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is + assigned is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to + its children in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the + parent assigns a realm name without also registering it in the domain + name or X.500 hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make + sure that there will not in the future exists a name identical to the + realm name of the child unless it is assigned to the same entity as + the realm name. + + 7.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that + all agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The + name-type field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind + of information implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as + a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at + least one of the components, or the realm, must be different). The + following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, DCE +principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcmds) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + NT-SMTP-NAME 7 Name in form of SMTP email name (e.g. +user@foo.com) + + When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a + particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal + name type should be used for users, and it might also be used for a + unique server. If the name is a unique machine generated ID that is + guaranteed never to be reassigned then the name type of UID should be + used (note that it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any + type since stale entries might remain in access control lists). + + If the first component of a name identifies a service and the + remaining components identify an instance of the service in a server + specified manner, then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An + example of this name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting service + whose name has a first component of krbtgt and a second component + identifying the realm for which the ticket is valid. + + If instance is a single component following the service name and the + instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the + name type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for + Internet services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the + separate components of the host name appear as successive components + following the name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should + be used. This type might be used to identify servers on hosts with + X.500 names where the slash (/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an + X.509 certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of + the X.509 name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding + rules specified in RFC 2253. + + A name type of SMTP allows a name to be of a form that resembles a + SMTP email name. This name type can be used in conjunction with + name-canonicalization to allow a free-form of username to be specified + as a client name and allow the KDC to determine the Kerberos principal + name for the requested name. [JBrezak] + + A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not + known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match + principals authenticated with names of any type. A principal + authenticated with a name of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match + other names of type UNKNOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved + for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the + form of such names. + + 7.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be + composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server + is registered, and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the + host name is an Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type + NT-SRV-XHST if the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that + allows slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or + multi-component name will identify the service and the latter + components will identify the host. Where the name of the host is not + case sensitive (for example, with Internet domain names) the name of + the host must be lower case. If specified by the application protocol + for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands which run with + system privileges, the first component may be the string 'host' + instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official + name and one or more aliases, the official name of the host must be + used when constructing the name of the server principal. + + 8. Constants and other defined values + + 8.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type + fields and interpretations. + + The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to + match the defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard + Distributions of Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx + (where xxx is an abbreviation of the address family name). + + Internet (IPv4) Addresses + + Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in + MSB order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + + Internet (IPv6) Addresses [Westerlund] + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] + [RFC1884]. The following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in + any Kerberos packet: + o the Unspecified Address + o the Loopback Address + o Link-Local addresses + IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + + CHAOSnet addresses + + CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + + ISO addresses + + ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven + (7). + + Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + + XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. + The type of XNS addresses is six (6). + + AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + + AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit + network number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the + remaining two octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type + of AppleTalk DDP addresses is sixteen (16). + + DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. + The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + + Netbios addresses + + Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to 15 + characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16th octet + of 0x0. The type of Netbios addresses is 20 (0x14). + + 8.2. KDC messages + + 8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + + When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request + using UDP IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram + containing only an encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the + KDC's IP address; the KDC will respond with a reply datagram + containing only an encoding of the reply message (either a KRB_ERROR + or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at the sender's IP address. + Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must accept UDP requests on + port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made through UDP/IP + transport must also use UDP/IP transport. + + 8.2.2. TCP/IP transport [Westerlund,Danielsson] + + Kerberos servers (KDC's) should accept TCP requests on port 88 + (decimal) and clients should support the sending of TCP requests on + port 88 (decimal). When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC + over a TCP stream, a new connection will be established for each + authentication exchange (request and response). The KRB_KDC_REP or + KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the client on the same TCP + stream that was established for the request. The response to a request + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + made through TCP/IP transport must also use TCP/IP transport. + Implementors should note that some extentions to the Kerberos protocol + will not work if any implementation not supporting the TCP transport + is involved (client or KDC). Implementors are strongly urged to + support the TCP transport on both the client and server and are + advised that the current notation of "should" support will likely + change in the future to must support. The KDC may close the TCP stream + after sending a response, but may leave the stream open if it expects + a followup - in which case it may close the stream at any time if + resource constratints or other factors make it desirable to do so. + Care must be taken in managing TCP/IP connections with the KDC to + prevent denial of service attacks based on the number of TCP/IP + connections with the KDC that remain open. If multiple exchanges with + the KDC are needed for certain forms of preauthentication, multiple + TCP connections may be required. A client may close the stream after + receiving response, and should close the stream if it does not expect + to send followup messages. The client must be prepared to have the + stream closed by the KDC at anytime, in which case it must simply + connect again when it is ready to send subsequent messages. + + The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request + request will encode in network byte order the length of the request + (KRB_KDC_REQ), and the length will be followed by the request itself. + The response will similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in + network byte order of the length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR + message and will be followed by the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR + response. If the sign bit is set on the integer represented by the + first 4 octets, then the next 4 octets will be read, extending the + length of the field by another 4 octets (less the sign bit which is + reserved for future expansion). + + 8.2.3. OSI transport + + During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual + authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of + credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of + private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may + be treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication + mechanism will be: + + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), +security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + + Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an + authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply + (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message (KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), + or a credentials message (KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an + application code as specified in the ASN.1 description for each + message. The application code may be used by Kerberos to determine the + message type. + + 8.2.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be + composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS + ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part + "krbtgt" and the second part the name of the realm which will accept + the ticket-granting ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), + ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + 8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + + The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines + their meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section + that limit the values of constants for which values are defined here. + This allows implementations to make assumptions about the maximum + values that will be received for these constants. Implementation + receiving values outside the range specified in the "specification" + section may reject the request, but they must recover cleanly. + + Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad confounder +size + NULL 0 1 0 0 + des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 + des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 + des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + reserved 4 + des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + reserved 6 + des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 + dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 +(pkinit) + md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 +(pkinit) + sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 +(pkinit) + rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 +(pkinit) + rsaEncryption-EnvOID 13 (pkinit from PKCS#1 +v1.5) + rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID 14 (pkinit from PKCS#1 +v2.0) + des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 +(pkinit) + des3-cbc-sha1-kd 16 (Tom +Yu) + rc4-hmac 23 +(swift) + rc4-hmac-exp 24 +(swift) + + reserved 0x8003 + + Checksum type sumtype value checksum size + CRC32 1 4 + rsa-md4 2 16 + rsa-md4-des 3 24 + des-mac 4 16 + des-mac-k 5 8 + rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 (drop rsa ?) + rsa-md5 7 16 (drop rsa ?) + rsa-md5-des 8 24 (drop rsa ?) + rsa-md5-des3 9 24 (drop rsa ?) + hmac-sha1-des3-kd 12 20 + hmac-sha1-des3 13 20 + sha1 (unkeyed) 14 20 + + padata type padata-type value + + PA-TGS-REQ 1 + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 + PA-PW-SALT 3 + reserved 4 + PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 (depricated) + PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 + PA-SESAME 7 + PA-OSF-DCE 8 + PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 + PA-AFS3-SALT 10 + PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 + PA-SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) + PA-SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) + PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) + PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + PA-SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp) + PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 + PA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO 23 (sam/otp) + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + data-type value form of typed-data + + reserved 1-21 + TD-PADATA 22 + TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS + TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 + TD-KRB-REALM 103 + TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 + TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 + TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR 106 + + authorization data type ad-type value + AD-IF-RELEVANT 1 + AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 + AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 + AD-KDC-ISSUED 4 + AD-OR 5 + AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 + AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 + reserved values 8-63 + OSF-DCE 64 + SESAME 65 + AD-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID 66 (hemsath@us.ibm.com) + AD-WIN200-PAC 128 +(jbrezak@exchange.microsoft.com) + + Ticket Extension Types + + TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension + TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization +data + reserved 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC + TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket + TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + reserved 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST + + alternate authentication type method-type value + reserved values 0-63 + ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + + transited encoding type tr-type value + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 + reserved values all others + + Label Value Meaning or MIT code + + pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + + message types + + KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication + KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request + KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT + KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request + KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server + KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL + KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message + KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message + KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward +credentials + KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + name types + + KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or +for users + KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) + KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components + KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID + KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + + error codes + + KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error + KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has +expired + KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has +expired + KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number +not supported + KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old +master key + KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old +master key + KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos +database + KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos +database + KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in +database + KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key + KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than +end time + KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request + KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested +option + KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption +type + KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum +type + KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type + KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited +type + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been +revoked + KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been +revoked + KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again +later + KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again +later + KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change +password to reset + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was +invalid + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional +pre-authenticationrequired [40] + KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't +match + KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for +user2user only + KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path + KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE 29 A service is not available + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field +failed + KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired + KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid + KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay + KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us + KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't +match + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address + KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type + KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified + KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order + KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not +available + KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available + KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed + KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction + KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method +required + KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in +message + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in +message + KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path + KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry +with TCP + KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in +e-text) + KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this +implementation + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) + KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) + KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) + KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT 67 (user-to-user) + KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM 68 (user-to-user) + KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED 69 (user-to-user) + KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 (pkinit) + KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 (pkinit) + + 9. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among + these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding + schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for + pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, options + for mutual authentication, user to user authentication, support for + proxies, forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, the format of + realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to + define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all + implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as + technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered + that one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not + secure, it will be replaced. + + 9.1. Specification 2 + + This section defines the second specification of these options. + Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to + support Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 + (depricated) may be found in RFC1510. + + Transport + + TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming + conformance to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance + to specification 2 must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the + KDC and should support TCP/IP transport. + + Encryption and checksum methods + + The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. + Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the + additional mechanisms may only be used when communicating with + principals known to also support them: This list is to be determined. + + Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5, one triple des variant (tbd) + Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 (tbd) + + Realm Names + + All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the + Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for + an unknown realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the + names of the intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the + requested realm. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + Transited field encoding + + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. + Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when + that encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + + Pre-authentication methods + + The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used + on the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported + by clients but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a + realm by realm basis. If not used in the initial request and the error + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an + acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using + the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not + support the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server + should ignore the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a + request. + + Mutual authentication + + Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + + Ticket addresses and flags + + All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT + contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but + each realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each + application server will set its own policy with respect to accepting + them. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and + application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will + be accepted. + + All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, + but need not actually implement them. If these options are not + supported, the starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a + ticket's entire useful life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a + server, all implementations shall make the presence of the postdated + flag visible to the calling server. + + User-to-user authentication + + Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC + option) must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may + decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on a + per-principal or realm-wide basis. + + Authorization data + + Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from + ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to + suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered + subfield type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no + registered subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + + Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data + subfields available to the server when a ticket is used. + Implementations are not required to allow clients to specify the + contents of the authorization data fields. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + Constant ranges + + All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values + unless further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit is + provided to allow implementations to make assumptions about the + maximum values that will be received for these constants. + Implementation receiving values outside this range may reject the + request, but they must recover cleanly. + + 9.2. Recommended KDC values + + Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, + based on the list of suggested configuration constants (see section + 4.4). + + minimum lifetime 5 minutes + maximum renewable lifetime 1 week + maximum ticket lifetime 1 day + empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data + proxiable, etc. Allowed. + + 10. REFERENCES + + [NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + + [MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + + [SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + + [NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + + [DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + + [KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + + [Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + + [DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + [LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + + [X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + + [Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + + [DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + + [DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + + [SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + + [IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + + [MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + + [MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + + [KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + + [Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + Integrity, and Privacy", +draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, + August 1998. + + [HorowitzB96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-01.txt, September 1998. + + [Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", +draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + + A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + + This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to + be constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", +"localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable +skew) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted +*/ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE +*/ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, +server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + + A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) +then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, +resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + + A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all +that */ + /* should be are set +*/ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) +then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly +*/ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting +ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or +servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and +choosing the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in +the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is +operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. +The realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the +ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single +Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not +req.sname) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof +and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket +would */ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so +*/ + /* there is no need to check again here +*/ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + +new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later +processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till +field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into +decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := +req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + +tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) +then + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept +it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == +OK) + set +new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), +second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, +server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, +tgt.key; + + send(resp); + + A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key +from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of +resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of +resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's +session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + + A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using +session_key; + + A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + retrieve service key for + +packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved +key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) +then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent +details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + + A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + + A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session +key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + + A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + + A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and +keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + + A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it +*/ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not +present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + + A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, +PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + + A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + + A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it +*/ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + + A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + B. Definition of common authorization data elements + + This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data + elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly + defined, meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a + sequence of authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the + encapsulating element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating + element, the encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be + interpreted as issued directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in + a separate plaintext part of the ticket. The types of the + encapsulating elements are specified as part of the Kerberos + specification because the behavior based on these values should be + understood across implementations whereas other elements need only be + understood by the applications which they affect. + + In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the + element will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of + the ad-data will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the + subsection heading. + + B.1. If relevant + + AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + + AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended + for interpretation only by application servers that understand the + particular ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that + do not understand the type of an element embedded within the + if-relevant element may ignore the uninterpretable element. This + element promotes interoperability across implementations which may + have local extensions for authorization. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + B.2. Intended for server + + AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData + } + + AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be + ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal + names of intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an + application server can remove this element if the application server + is not in the list of intended servers. + + Application servers should check for their principal name in the + intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not + found, this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated + elements should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were + present in the top level authorization data field. Applications and + application servers that do not implement this element should reject + tickets that contain authorization data elements of this type. + + B.3. Intended for application class + + AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { + intended-application-class[0] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] + AuthorizationData } AD elements encapsulated within the + intended-for-application-class element may be ignored if the + application server is not in one of the named classes of application + servers. Examples of application server classes include "FILESYSTEM", + and other kinds of servers. + + This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by + applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this + element. + + B.4. KDC Issued + + AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. + } + + ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the + ticket itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same + encryption algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key + derived from the same key used to protect the ticket. + i-realm, i-sname + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC + itself. This field would be used when the KDC can verify the + authenticity of elements signed by the issuing principal and it + allows this KDC to notify the application server of the validity + of those elements. + elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for + Kerberos principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege + attributes and other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying + the priveleges of the principal beyond what can be done using a + credentials without such an a-data element. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + This can not be provided without this element because the definition + of the authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by + the bearer of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and + elements may also be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the + authenticator. + + For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are + signed by the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's + key (the same key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from + that key). Elements encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will + be ignored by the application server if this "signature" is not + present. Further, elements encapsulated within this element from a + ticket granting ticket may be interpreted by the KDC, and used as a + basis according to policy for including new signed elements within + derivative tickets, but they will not be copied to a derivative ticket + directly. If they are copied directly to a derivative ticket by a KDC + that is not aware of this element, the signature will not be correct + for the application ticket elements, and the field will be ignored by + the application server. + + This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by + applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this + element. + + B.5. And-Or + + AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData + } + + When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element + are encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the + encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. + This element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the + condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by + setting the condition count to the number of embedded elements. + Application servers that do not implement this element must reject + tickets that contain authorization data elements of this type. + + B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + + AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-checksum[0] Checksum + } + + An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions + specifies the type and a collision-proof checksum using the same hash + algorithm used to protect the integrity of the ticket itself. This + checksum will be calculated over an individual extension field of the + type indicated. If there are more than one extension, multiple + Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions authorization data elements may be + present, each with a checksum for a different extension field. This + restriction indicates that the ticket should not be accepted if a + ticket extension is not present in the ticket for which the type and + checksum do not match that checksum specified in the authorization + data element. Note that although the type is redundant for the + purposes of the comparison, it makes the comparison easier when + multiple extensions are present. Application servers that do not + implement this element must reject tickets that contain authorization + data elements of this type. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + + AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + + An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a + collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect + the integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a + separate external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket + extensions. Application servers that do not implement this element + must reject tickets that contain authorization data elements of this + type. Application servers that do implement this element will search + the ticket extensions for authorization data fields, calculate the + specified checksum over each authorization data field and look for one + matching the checksum in this in-ticket-extensions element. If not + found, then the ticket must be rejected. If found, the corresponding + authorization data elements will be interpreted in the same manner as + if they were contained in the top level authorization data field. + + Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present + in a ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type + in-ticket-extensions in the top level authorization data field, and + the external entries will be linked to the corresponding element by + their checksums. + + C. Definition of common ticket extensions + + This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. + Support for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions + have associated authorization data elements that may require rejection + of a ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not + implement the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined + beyond those described in this specification. Such extensions are + described elswhere and for some of those extensions the reserved + number may be found in the list of constants. + + It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this + field, and that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when + they parse and then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the + application servers. The presence of the extension will not break such + clients, but any functionaly dependent on the extensions will not work + when such tickets are handled by old clients. In such situations, some + implementation may use alternate methods to transmit the information + in the extensions field. + + C.1. Null ticket extension + + TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + + The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of + lenght zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting + ticket so that the KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket + granting ticket whether the client software will strip the extensions + field. + + C.2. External Authorization Data + + TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + + The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension + is field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more + authorization data elements. If present, a corresponding authorization + data element will be present in the primary authorization data for the + ticket and that element will contain a checksum of the external + authorization data ticket extension. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + [TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the + Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of + these trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + + [1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only + upon the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an + application subsequently provides integrity protection for the data + stream, the identity verification applies only to the initiation of + the connection, and does not guarantee that subsequent messages on the + connection originate from the same principal. + + [2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the + literature. In our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, + thus a shared DES key is a secret key. Something is only private when + no one but its owner knows it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one + has a public and a private key. + + [3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange + registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and + engage in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for + even small numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more + automatic methods as described here are necessary. + + [4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no + network addresses specified. + + [5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the + requester can provide the old password (the user's current secret + key). Otherwise, it would be possible for someone to walk up to an + unattended ses- sion and change another user's password. + + [6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the + credentials obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS + exchange to obtain credentials for a local server. Those credentials + must then be verified by a local server through successful completion + of the Client/Server exchange. + + [7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible + to guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. + This can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is + based on cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly + random number generator, such as one based on measurements of random + physical phenomena. + + [8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so + cleartext here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one + message and replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + + [9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable + transports difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver + duplicated messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for + each retry, or the application server must match requests and replies + and replay the first reply in response to a detected duplicate. + + [10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + + [11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from + the same principal to the same server. Other client principals + communicating with the same server principal should not be have their + authenticators rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to + match some other client's authenticator. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + [12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply + was the client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version + 5 because version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is + not possible to create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in + encrypted form) without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + + [13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session + key is not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + + [14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to + choose subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to + generate a negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + + [15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known + beforehand (since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it + might be stored in a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a + configura- tion file. If the realm to be used is obtained from a + nameserver, there is a danger of being spoofed if the nameservice + providing the realm name is not authenti- cated. This might result in + the use of a realm which has been compromised, and would result in an + attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of the application + server to the client. + + [16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to + ensure the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach + would be to generate a random number and XOR it with the session key + from the ticket-granting ticket. + + [17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication + [8], which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret + server keys in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily + comprom- ised. + + [18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first + listed realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + + [19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's + realm is considered to precede those in the transited field, and the + server's realm is considered to follow them. + + [20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and + communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not + share a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + + [21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the + database and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store + the principal database in, say, a network name service, as long as the + entries stored therein are protected from disclosure to and + modification by unauthorized parties. However, we recommend against + such strategies, as they can make system management and threat + analysis quite complex. + + [22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for + details on why this can be useful. + + [23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data + structures during the generation and verification of embedded + checksums: Because any checksums applied to data structures must be + checked against the original data the length of bit strings must be + preserved within a data structure between the time that a checksum is + generated through transmission to the time that the checksum is + verified. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 14 January +2001 + +^L + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-06 July 14, +2000 + + [24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the + workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine + that such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely + manner. + + [25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must + make sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If + the time is ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, + probability that a nonce will be reused. + + [27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides + an additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + [29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides + an additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + [31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides + an additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + [32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization + vector may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve + proper cipher chaining. The initialization vector might come from the + last block of the ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but + it is the application's choice whether or not to use such an + initialization vector. If left out, the default initialization vector + for the encryption algorithm will be used. + + [33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request + from obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password + guessing attack. + + [35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the + notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is + not a valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from + the confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the + message starts with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. + For other fields, the length and tag would be redundant if they were + included because they are specified by the encryption type. [36] The + ordering of the fields in the CipherText is important. Additionally, + messages encoded in this format must include a length as part of the + msg-seq field. This allows the recipient to verify that the message + has not been truncated. Without a length, an attacker could use a + chosen plaintext attack to generate a message which could be + truncated, while leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the msg-seq + is an encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length + is part of that encoding. + + [37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" + string for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in + section 5.4.2. + + [38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" + string for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in + section 5.4.2. + + [39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a + particular function, separating the functions of generating a checksum + from other encryption performed using the session key. The constant + F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was chosen because it maintains key parity. The + properties of DES precluded the use of the complement. The same + constant is used for similar purpose in the Message Integrity Check in + the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + + [40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. + The contents of the e-data field for this message is described in + section 5.9.1. + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f7dae0dea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Mike Swift +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-02.txt Microsoft +March 2000 Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + John Brezak + Microsoft + Bill Gossman + Cybersafe + + Kerberos Set/Change Password: Version 2 + + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- + Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Comments and suggestions on this document are encouraged. Comments + on this document should be sent to the CAT working group discussion + list: + ietf-cat-wg@stanford.edu + +1. Abstract + + The Kerberos (RFC 1510 [3]) change password protocol (Horowitz [4]), + does not allow for an administrator to set a password for a new user. + This functionality is useful in some environments, and this proposal + extends [4] to allow password setting. The changes are: adding new + fields to the request message to indicate the principal which is + having its password set, not requiring the initial flag in the service + ticket, using a new protocol version number, and adding three new + result codes. We also extend the set/change protocol to allow a + client to send a sequence of keys to the KDC instead of a cleartext + password. If in the cleartext password case, the cleartext password + fails to satisfy password policy, the server should use the result + code KRB5_KPASSWD_POLICY_REJECT. + +2. Conventions used in this document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. The Protocol + + The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 and TCP port 464 as + well. The protocol consists of a single request message followed by + a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be fully + contained in a single UDP packet. + + For TCP transport, there is a 4 octet header in network byte order + precedes the message and specifies the length of the message. This + requirement is consistent with the TCP transport header in 1510bis. + +Request Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REQ length | AP-REQ data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + All 16 bit fields are in network byte order. + + message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message + including this field. + + protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0002 (network + byte order). + + AP-REQ length: length of AP-REQ data, in bytes. If the length is zero, + then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV + message. + + AP-REQ data: (see [3]) The AP-REQ message must be for the service + principal kadmin/changepw@REALM, where REALM is the REALM of the user + who wishes to change/set his password. The ticket in the AP-REQ must + must include a subkey in the Authenticator. To enable setting of + passwords/keys, it is not required that the initial flag be set in the + Kerberos service ticket. The initial flag is required for change requests, + but not for set password requests. We have the following definitions: + + old passwd initial flag target principal can be + in request? required? distinct from + authenticating principal? + + change password: yes yes no + + set password: no no yes + + set key: no policy yes + determined + + KRB-PRIV message (see [3]) This KRB-PRIV message must be generated + using the subkey from the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The user-data component of the message consists of the following ASN.1 + structure encoded as an OCTET STRING: + + ChangePasswdData :: = SEQUENCE { + newpasswdorkeys[0] NewPasswdOrKeys, + targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- only present in set password: the principal + -- which will have its password set + targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL, + -- only present in set password: the realm for + -- the principal which will have its password set + + } + + NewPasswdOrKeys :: = CHOICE { + passwords[0] PasswordSequence, + keyseq[1] KeySequences + } + + KeySequences :: = SEQUENCE OF KeySequence + + KeySequence :: = SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + salt-type[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + PasswordSequence :: = SEQUENCE { + newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING, + oldpasswd[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- oldpasswd always present for change password + -- but not present for set password + } + + The server must verify the AP-REQ message, check whether the client + principal in the ticket is authorized to set or change the password + (either for that principal, or for the principal in the targname + field if present), and decrypt the new password/keys. The server + also checks whether the initial flag is required for this request, + replying with status 0x0007 if it is not set and should be. An + authorization failure is cause to respond with status 0x0005. For + forward compatibility, the server should be prepared to ignore fields + after targrealm in the structure that it does not understand. + + The newpasswdorkeys field contains either the new cleartext password + (with the old cleartext password for a change password operation), + or a sequence of encryption keys with their respective salts. + + In the cleartext password case, if the old password is sent in the + request, the request is defined to be a change password request. If + the old password is not present in the request, the request is a set + password request. The server should apply policy checks to the old + and new password after verifying that the old password is valid. + The server can check validity by obtaining a key from the old + password with a keytype that is present in the KDC database for the + user and comparing the keys for equality. The server then generates + the appropriate keytypes from the password and stores them in the KDC + + database. If all goes well, status 0x0000 is returned to the client + in the reply message (see below). For a change password operation, + the initial flag in the service ticket MUST be set. + + In the key sequence case, the sequence of keys is sent to the set + password service. For a principal that can act as a server, its + preferred keytype should be sent as the first key in the sequence, + but the KDC is not required to honor this preference. Application + servers should use the key sequence option for changing/setting their + keys. The set password service should check that all keys are in the + proper format, returning the KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED error otherwise. + +Reply Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REP length | AP-REP data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + + All 16 bit fields are in network byte order. + + message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message + including this field. + + protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0002 (network + byte order). (The reply message has the same format as in [4]). + + AP-REP length: length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the length is zero, + then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV + message. + + AP-REP data: the AP-REP is the response to the AP-REQ in the request + packet. + + KRB-PRIV from [4]: This KRB-PRIV message must be generated using the + subkey in the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The server will respond with a KRB-PRIV message unless it cannot + validate the client AP-REQ or KRB-PRIV message, in which case it will + respond with a KRB-ERROR message. NOTE: Unlike change password version + 1, the KRB-ERROR message will be sent back without any encapsulation. + + The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data component + of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following data. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | result code | result string / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | edata / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + result code (16 bits) (result codes 0-4 are from [4]): + The result code must have one of the following values (network + byte order): + KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS 0 request succeeds (This value is not + allowed in a KRB-ERROR message) + KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED 1 request fails due to being malformed + KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR 2 request fails due to "hard" error in + processing the request (for example, + there is a resource or other problem + causing the request to fail) + KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR 3 request fails due to an error in + authentication processing + KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR 4 request fails due to a soft error + in processing the request + KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED 5 requestor not authorized + KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION 6 protocol version unsupported + KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED 7 initial flag required + KRB5_KPASSWD_POLICY_REJECT 8 new cleartext password fails policy; + the result string should include a text message to be presented + to the user. + KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_PRINCIPAL 9 target principal does not exist + (only in response to a set password request). + KRB5_KPASSWD_ETYPE_NOSUPP 10 the request contains a key sequence + containing at least one etype that is not supported by the KDC. + The response edata contains an ASN.1 encoded PKERB-ETYPE-INFO + type that specifies the etypes that the KDC supports: + + KERB-ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY :: = SEQUENCE { + encryption-type[0] INTEGER, + salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- not sent + } + + PKERB-ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF KERB-ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + + The client should retry the request using only etypes (keytypes) + that are contained within the PKERB-ETYPE-INFO structure in the + previous response. + 0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason. + The client must interpret any non-zero result code as a failure. + result string - from [4]: + This field is a UTF-8 encoded string which should be displayed + to the user by the client. Specific reasons for a password + set/change policy failure is one use for this string. + edata: used to convey additional information as defined by the + result code. + +4. References + + [1] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + [2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + [3] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5), Request for Comments 1510. + + [4] M. Horowitz. Kerberos Change Password Protocol, + ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/ + draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt + +5. Expiration Date + + This draft expires in September 2000. + +6. Authors' Addresses + + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134 + Email: jtrostle@cisco.com + + Mike Swift + 1 Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + Email: mikesw@microsoft.com + + John Brezak + 1 Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + Bill Gossman + Cybersafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Rd. + Issaquah, WA 98027-5378 + Email: bill.gossman@cybersafe.com + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0319f8bf34 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Mike Swift +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-03.txt Microsoft +April 2000 Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + John Brezak + Microsoft + Bill Gossman + Cybersafe + + Kerberos Set/Change Password: Version 2 + + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- + Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Comments and suggestions on this document are encouraged. Comments + on this document should be sent to the CAT working group discussion + list: + ietf-cat-wg@stanford.edu + +1. Abstract + + The Kerberos (RFC 1510 [3]) change password protocol (Horowitz [4]), + does not allow for an administrator to set a password for a new user. + This functionality is useful in some environments, and this proposal + extends [4] to allow password setting. The changes are: adding new + fields to the request message to indicate the principal which is + having its password set, not requiring the initial flag in the service + ticket, using a new protocol version number, and adding three new + result codes. We also extend the set/change protocol to allow a + client to send a sequence of keys to the KDC instead of a cleartext + password. If in the cleartext password case, the cleartext password + fails to satisfy password policy, the server should use the result + code KRB5_KPASSWD_POLICY_REJECT. + +2. Conventions used in this document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. The Protocol + + The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 and TCP port 464 as + well. The protocol consists of a single request message followed by + a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be fully + contained in a single UDP packet. + + For TCP transport, there is a 4 octet header in network byte order + precedes the message and specifies the length of the message. This + requirement is consistent with the TCP transport header in 1510bis. + +Request Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REQ length | AP-REQ data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + All 16 bit fields are in network byte order. + + message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message + including this field. + + protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0002 (network + byte order). + + AP-REQ length: length of AP-REQ data, in bytes. If the length is zero, + then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV + message. + + AP-REQ data: (see [3]) For a change password/key request, the AP-REQ + message service ticket sname, srealm principal identifier is + kadmin/changepw@REALM where REALM is the realm of the change password + service. The same applies to a set password/key request except the + principal identifier is kadmin/setpw@REALM. The ticket in the AP-REQ + must include a subkey in the Authenticator. To enable setting of + passwords/keys, it is not required that the initial flag be set in the + Kerberos service ticket. The initial flag is required for change requests, + but not for set requests. We have the following definitions: + + old passwd initial flag target principal can be + in request? required? distinct from + authenticating principal? + + change password: yes yes no + + set password: no policy (*) yes + + set key: no policy (*) yes + + change key: no yes no + + policy (*): implementations SHOULD allow administrators to set the + initial flag required for set requests policy to either yes or no. + Clients MUST be able to retry set requests that fail due to error 7 + (initial flag required) with an initial ticket. Clients SHOULD NOT + cache service tickets targetted at kadmin/changepw. + + KRB-PRIV message (see [3]) This KRB-PRIV message must be generated + using the subkey from the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The user-data component of the message consists of the following ASN.1 + structure encoded as an OCTET STRING: + + ChangePasswdData :: = SEQUENCE { + newpasswdorkeys[0] NewPasswdOrKeys, + targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- only present in set password/key: the principal + -- which will have its password or keys set. Not + -- present in a set request if the client principal + -- from the ticket is the principal having its + -- passwords or keys set. + targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL, + -- only present in set password/key: the realm for + -- the principal which will have its password or + -- keys set. Not present in a set request if the + -- client principal from the ticket is the principal + -- having its passwords or keys set. + } + + NewPasswdOrKeys :: = CHOICE { + passwords[0] PasswordSequence, -- change/set passwd + keyseq[1] KeySequences -- change/set key + } + + KeySequences :: = SEQUENCE OF KeySequence + + KeySequence :: = SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + salt-type[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + PasswordSequence :: = SEQUENCE { + newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING, + oldpasswd[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- oldpasswd always present for change password + -- but not present for set password, set key, or + -- change key + } + + The server must verify the AP-REQ message, check whether the client + principal in the ticket is authorized to set or change the password + (either for that principal, or for the principal in the targname + field if present), and decrypt the new password/keys. The server + also checks whether the initial flag is required for this request, + replying with status 0x0007 if it is not set and should be. An + authorization failure is cause to respond with status 0x0005. For + forward compatibility, the server should be prepared to ignore fields + after targrealm in the structure that it does not understand. + + The newpasswdorkeys field contains either the new cleartext password + (with the old cleartext password for a change password operation), + or a sequence of encryption keys with their respective salts. + + In the cleartext password case, if the old password is sent in the + request, the request MUST be a change password request. If the old + password is not present in the request, the request MUST be a set + password request. The server should apply policy checks to the old + and new password after verifying that the old password is valid. + The server can check validity by obtaining a key from the old + password with a keytype that is present in the KDC database for the + user and comparing the keys for equality. The server then generates + the appropriate keytypes from the password and stores them in the KDC + database. If all goes well, status 0x0000 is returned to the client + in the reply message (see below). For a change password operation, + the initial flag in the service ticket MUST be set. + + In the key sequence case, the sequence of keys is sent to the change + or set password service (kadmin/changepw or kadmin/setpw respectively). + For a principal that can act as a server, its preferred keytype should + be sent as the first key in the sequence, but the KDC is not required + to honor this preference. Application servers should use the key + sequence option for changing/setting their keys. The change/set password + services should check that all keys are in the proper format, returning + the KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED error otherwise. + +Reply Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REP length | AP-REP data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + + All 16 bit fields are in network byte order. + + message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message + including this field. + + protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0002 (network + byte order). (The reply message has the same format as in [4]). + + AP-REP length: length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the length is zero, + then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV + message. + + AP-REP data: the AP-REP is the response to the AP-REQ in the request + packet. + + KRB-PRIV from [4]: This KRB-PRIV message must be generated using the + subkey in the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The server will respond with a KRB-PRIV message unless it cannot + validate the client AP-REQ or KRB-PRIV message, in which case it will + respond with a KRB-ERROR message. NOTE: Unlike change password version + 1, the KRB-ERROR message will be sent back without any encapsulation. + + The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data component + of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following data. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | result code | result string / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | edata / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + result code (16 bits) (result codes 0-4 are from [4]): + The result code must have one of the following values (network + byte order): + KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS 0 request succeeds (This value is not + allowed in a KRB-ERROR message) + KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED 1 request fails due to being malformed + KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR 2 request fails due to "hard" error in + processing the request (for example, + there is a resource or other problem + causing the request to fail) + KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR 3 request fails due to an error in + authentication processing + KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR 4 request fails due to a soft error + in processing the request + KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED 5 requestor not authorized + KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION 6 protocol version unsupported + KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED 7 initial flag required + KRB5_KPASSWD_POLICY_REJECT 8 new cleartext password fails policy; + the result string should include a text message to be presented + to the user. + KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_PRINCIPAL 9 target principal does not exist + (only in response to a set password request). + KRB5_KPASSWD_ETYPE_NOSUPP 10 the request contains a key sequence + containing at least one etype that is not supported by the KDC. + The response edata contains an ASN.1 encoded PKERB-ETYPE-INFO + type that specifies the etypes that the KDC supports: + + KERB-ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY :: = SEQUENCE { + encryption-type[0] INTEGER, + salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- not sent + } + + PKERB-ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF KERB-ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + + The client should retry the request using only etypes (keytypes) + that are contained within the PKERB-ETYPE-INFO structure in the + previous response. + 0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason. + The client must interpret any non-zero result code as a failure. + result string - from [4]: + This field is a UTF-8 encoded string which should be displayed + to the user by the client. Specific reasons for a password + + set/change policy failure is one use for this string. + edata: used to convey additional information as defined by the + result code. + +4. Acknowledgements + + The authors thank Tony Andrea for his input to the document. + +5. References + + [1] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + [2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + [3] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5), Request for Comments 1510. + + [4] M. Horowitz. Kerberos Change Password Protocol, + ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/ + draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt + +6. Expiration Date + + This draft expires in October 2000. + +7. Authors' Addresses + + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134 + Email: jtrostle@cisco.com + + Mike Swift + 1 Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + Email: mikesw@microsoft.com + + John Brezak + 1 Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + Bill Gossman + Cybersafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Rd. + Issaquah, WA 98027-5378 + Email: bill.gossman@cybersafe.com + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e76a0e402a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Ken Hornstein + NRL +June 21, 1999 Jeffrey Altman +Expires: December 21, 1999 Columbia University + + Distributing Kerberos KDC and Realm Information with DNS + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as , and expires on December 21, 1999. Please + send comments to the authors. + +Abstract + + Neither the Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] nor the Kerberos V4 proto- + col [RFC????] describe any mechanism for clients to learn critical + configuration information necessary for proper operation of the pro- + tocol. Such information includes the location of Kerberos key dis- + tribution centers or a mapping between DNS domains and Kerberos + realms. + + Current Kerberos implementations generally store such configuration + information in a file on each client machine. Experience has shown + this method of storing configuration information presents problems + with out-of-date information and scaling problems, especially when + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 1] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + using cross-realm authentication. + + This memo describes a method for using the Domain Name System + [RFC1035] for storing such configuration information. Specifically, + methods for storing KDC location and hostname/domain name to realm + mapping information are discussed. + +Overview - KDC location information + + KDC location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kerberos is always "_kerberos". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_udp" record MUST be included. If the Kerberos implementa- + tion supports TCP transport, a "_tcp" record SHOULD be included. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + +Example - KDC location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has two Ker- + beros servers, kdc1.asdf.com and kdc2.asdf.com. Queries should be + directed to kdc1.asdf.com first as per the specified priority. + Weights are not used in these records. + + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.asdf.com. + +Overview - KAdmin location information + + Kadmin location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kadmin is always "_kadmin". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_tcp" record MUST be included. If the Kadmin implementation + supports UDP transport, a "_udp" record SHOULD be included. + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 2] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + +Example - Kadmin location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has one Kad- + min server, kdc1.asdf.com. + + _kadmin._tcp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + +Overview - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + Information on the mapping of DNS hostnames and domain names to Ker- + beros realms is stored using DNS TXT records [RFC 1035]. These + records have the following format. + + Service.Name TTL Class TXT Realm + + The Service field is always "_kerberos", and prefixes all entries of + this type. + + The Name is a DNS hostname or domain name. This is explained in + greater detail below. + + TTL, Class, and TXT have the standard DNS meaning as defined in RFC + 1035. + + The Realm is the data for the TXT RR, and consists simply of the Ker- + beros realm that corresponds to the Name specified. + + When a Kerberos client wishes to utilize a host-specific service, it + will perform a DNS TXT query, using the hostname in the Name field of + the DNS query. If the record is not found, the first label of the + name is stripped and the query is retried. + + Compliant implementations MUST query the full hostname and the most + specific domain name (the hostname with the first label removed). + Compliant implementations SHOULD try stripping all subsequent labels + until a match is found or the Name field is empty. + +Example - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + For the previously mentioned ASDF.COM realm and domain, some sample + records might be as follows: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT "ASDF.COM" + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 3] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + _kerberos.mrkserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "MARKETING.ASDF.COM" + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "SALES.ASDF.COM" + + Let us suppose that in this case, a Kerberos client wishes to use a + Kerberized service on the host foo.asdf.com. It would first query: + + _kerberos.foo.asdf.com. IN TXT + + Finding no match, it would then query: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT + + And find an answer of ASDF.COM. This would be the realm that + foo.asdf.com resides in. + + If another Kerberos client wishes to use a Kerberized service on the + host salesserver.asdf.com, it would query: + + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com IN TXT + + And find an answer of SALES.ASDF.COM. + +Security considerations + + As DNS is deployed today, it is an unsecure service. Thus the infor- + mation returned by it cannot be trusted. However, the use of DNS to + store this configuration information does not introduce any new secu- + rity risks to the Kerberos protocol. + + Current practice is to use hostnames to indicate KDC hosts (stored in + some implementation-dependent location, but generally a local config + file). These hostnames are vulnerable to the standard set of DNS + attacks (denial of service, spoofed entries, etc). The design of the + Kerberos protocol limits attacks of this sort to denial of service. + However, the use of SRV records does not change this attack in any + way. They have the same vulnerabilities that already exist in the + common practice of using hostnames for KDC locations. + + The same holds true for the TXT records used to indicate the domain + name to realm mapping. Current practice is to configure these map- + pings locally. But this again is vulnerable to spoofing via CNAME + records that point to hosts in other domains. This has the same + effect as a spoofed TXT record. + + While the described protocol does not introduce any new security + risks to the best of our knowledge, implementations SHOULD provide a + way of specifying this information locally without the use of DNS. + However, to make this feature worthwhile a lack of any configuration + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 4] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + information on a client should be interpretted as permission to use + DNS. + +Expiration + + This Internet-Draft expires on December 21, 1999. + +References + + [RFC1510] + The Kerberos Network Authentication System; Kohl, Newman; Sep- + tember 1993. + + [RFC1035] + Domain Names - Implementation and Specification; Mockapetris; + November 1987 + + [RFC2052] + A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV); Gul- + brandsen, Vixie; October 1996 + +Authors' Addresses + + Ken Hornstein + US Naval Research Laboratory + Bldg A-49, Room 2 + 4555 Overlook Avenue + Washington DC 20375 USA + + Phone: +1 (202) 404-4765 + EMail: kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil + + Jeffrey Altman + The Kermit Project + Columbia University + 612 West 115th Street #716 + New York NY 10025-7799 USA + + Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344 + EMail: jaltman@columbia.edu + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 5] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd31750a15 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ + + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Ken Hornstein + NRL +March 10, 2000 Jeffrey Altman +Expires: September 10, 2000 Columbia University + + + + Distributing Kerberos KDC and Realm Information with DNS + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as , and expires on September 10, 2000. Please + send comments to the authors. + +Abstract + + Neither the Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] nor the Kerberos V4 proto- + col [RFC????] describe any mechanism for clients to learn critical + configuration information necessary for proper operation of the pro- + tocol. Such information includes the location of Kerberos key dis- + tribution centers or a mapping between DNS domains and Kerberos + realms. + + Current Kerberos implementations generally store such configuration + information in a file on each client machine. Experience has shown + this method of storing configuration information presents problems + with out-of-date information and scaling problems, especially when + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 1] + +RFC DRAFT March 10, 2000 + + + using cross-realm authentication. + + This memo describes a method for using the Domain Name System + [RFC1035] for storing such configuration information. Specifically, + methods for storing KDC location and hostname/domain name to realm + mapping information are discussed. + +DNS vs. Kerberos - Case Sensitivity of Realm Names + + In Kerberos, realm names are case sensitive. While it is strongly + encouraged that all realm names be all upper case this recommendation + has not been adopted by all sites. Some sites use all lower case + names and other use mixed case. DNS on the other hand is case insen- + sitive for queries but is case preserving for responses to TXT + queries. Since "MYREALM", "myrealm", and "MyRealm" are all different + it is necessary that the DNS entries be distinguishable. + + Since the recommend realm names are all upper case, we will not + require any quoting to be applied to upper case names. If the realm + name contains lower case characters each character is to be quoted by + a '=' character. So "MyRealm" would be represented as "M=yR=e=a=l=m" + and "myrealm" as "=m=y=r=e=a=l=m". If the realm name contains the + '=' character it will be represented as "==". + + +Overview - KDC location information + + KDC location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kerberos is always "_kerberos". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_udp" record MUST be included. If the Kerberos implementa- + tion supports TCP transport, a "_tcp" record SHOULD be included. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + +Example - KDC location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has two Ker- + beros servers, kdc1.asdf.com and kdc2.asdf.com. Queries should be + directed to kdc1.asdf.com first as per the specified priority. + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 2] + +RFC DRAFT March 10, 2000 + + + Weights are not used in these records. + + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.asdf.com. + +Overview - Kerberos password changing server location information + + Kerberos password changing server [KERB-CHG] location is to be stored + using the DNS SRV RR [RFC 2052]. The format of this RR is as fol- + lows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for the password server is always "_kpasswd". + + The Proto MUST be "_udp". + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + +Overview - Kerberos admin server location information + + Kerberos admin location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV + RR [RFC 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for the admin server is always "_kerberos-adm". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_tcp" record MUST be included. If the Kerberos admin imple- + mentation supports UDP transport, a "_udp" record SHOULD be included. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + + Note that there is no formal definition of a Kerberos admin protocol, + so the use of this record is optional and implementation-dependent. + +Example - Kerberos administrative server location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has one + administrative server, kdc1.asdf.com. + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 3] + +RFC DRAFT March 10, 2000 + + + _kerberos-adm._tcp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + +Overview - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + Information on the mapping of DNS hostnames and domain names to Ker- + beros realms is stored using DNS TXT records [RFC 1035]. These + records have the following format. + + Service.Name TTL Class TXT Realm + + The Service field is always "_kerberos", and prefixes all entries of + this type. + + The Name is a DNS hostname or domain name. This is explained in + greater detail below. + + TTL, Class, and TXT have the standard DNS meaning as defined in RFC + 1035. + + The Realm is the data for the TXT RR, and consists simply of the Ker- + beros realm that corresponds to the Name specified. + + When a Kerberos client wishes to utilize a host-specific service, it + will perform a DNS TXT query, using the hostname in the Name field of + the DNS query. If the record is not found, the first label of the + name is stripped and the query is retried. + + Compliant implementations MUST query the full hostname and the most + specific domain name (the hostname with the first label removed). + Compliant implementations SHOULD try stripping all subsequent labels + until a match is found or the Name field is empty. + +Example - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + For the previously mentioned ASDF.COM realm and domain, some sample + records might be as follows: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT "ASDF.COM" + _kerberos.mrkserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "MARKETING.ASDF.COM" + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "SALES.ASDF.COM" + + Let us suppose that in this case, a Kerberos client wishes to use a + Kerberized service on the host foo.asdf.com. It would first query: + + _kerberos.foo.asdf.com. IN TXT + + Finding no match, it would then query: + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 4] + +RFC DRAFT March 10, 2000 + + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT + + And find an answer of ASDF.COM. This would be the realm that + foo.asdf.com resides in. + + If another Kerberos client wishes to use a Kerberized service on the + host salesserver.asdf.com, it would query: + + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com IN TXT + + And find an answer of SALES.ASDF.COM. + +Security considerations + + As DNS is deployed today, it is an unsecure service. Thus the infor- + mation returned by it cannot be trusted. + + Current practice for REALM to KDC mapping is to use hostnames to + indicate KDC hosts (stored in some implementation-dependent location, + but generally a local config file). These hostnames are vulnerable + to the standard set of DNS attacks (denial of service, spoofed + entries, etc). The design of the Kerberos protocol limits attacks of + this sort to denial of service. However, the use of SRV records does + not change this attack in any way. They have the same vulnerabili- + ties that already exist in the common practice of using hostnames for + KDC locations. + + Current practice for HOSTNAME to REALM mapping is to provide a local + configuration of mappings of hostname or domain name to realm which + are then mapped to KDCs. But this again is vulnerable to spoofing + via CNAME records that point to hosts in other domains. This has the + same effect as when a TXT record is spoofed. In a realm with no + cross-realm trusts this is a DoS attack. However, when cross-realm + trusts are used it is possible to redirect a client to use a comprom- + ised realm. + + This is not an exploit of the Kerberos protocol but of the Kerberos + trust model. The same can be done to any application that must + resolve the hostname in order to determine which domain a non-FQDN + belongs to. + + Implementations SHOULD provide a way of specifying this information + locally without the use of DNS. However, to make this feature + worthwhile a lack of any configuration information on a client should + be interpretted as permission to use DNS. + + + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 5] + +RFC DRAFT March 10, 2000 + + +Expiration + + This Internet-Draft expires on September 10, 2000. + +References + + + [RFC1510] + The Kerberos Network Authentication System; Kohl, Newman; Sep- + tember 1993. + + [RFC1035] + Domain Names - Implementation and Specification; Mockapetris; + November 1987 + + [RFC2782] + A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV); Gul- + brandsen, Vixie; Feburary 2000 + + [KERB-CHG] + Kerberos Change Password Protocol; Horowitz; + ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg- + password-02.txt + +Authors' Addresses + + Ken Hornstein + US Naval Research Laboratory + Bldg A-49, Room 2 + 4555 Overlook Avenue + Washington DC 20375 USA + + Phone: +1 (202) 404-4765 + EMail: kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil + + Jeffrey Altman + The Kermit Project + Columbia University + 612 West 115th Street #716 + New York NY 10025-7799 USA + + Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344 + EMail: jaltman@columbia.edu + + + + + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 6] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb5gss-mech2-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb5gss-mech2-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11e5dc9f95 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb5gss-mech2-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1333 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Tom Yu +Common Authentication Technology WG MIT +draft-ietf-cat-krb5gss-mech2-03.txt 04 March 2000 + + The Kerberos Version 5 GSSAPI Mechanism, Version 2 + +Status of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Comments on this document should be sent to + "ietf-cat-wg@lists.stanford.edu", the IETF Common Authentication + Technology WG discussion list. + +Abstract + + This document defines protocols, procedures, and conventions to be + employed by peers implementing the Generic Security Service + Application Program Interface (as specified in RFC 2743) when using + Kerberos Version 5 technology (as specified in RFC 1510). This + obsoletes RFC 1964. + +Acknowledgements + + Much of the material in this specification is based on work done for + Cygnus Solutions by Marc Horowitz. + +Table of Contents + + Status of This Memo ............................................ 1 + Abstract ....................................................... 1 + Acknowledgements ............................................... 1 + Table of Contents .............................................. 1 + 1. Introduction ............................................... 3 + 2. Token Formats .............................................. 3 + 2.1. Packet Notation ....................................... 3 + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + 2.2. Mechanism OID ......................................... 4 + 2.3. Context Establishment ................................. 4 + 2.3.1. Option Format .................................... 4 + 2.3.1.1. Delegated Credentials Option ................ 5 + 2.3.1.2. Null Option ................................. 5 + 2.3.2. Initial Token .................................... 6 + 2.3.2.1. Data to be Checksummed in APREQ ............. 8 + 2.3.3. Response Token ................................... 10 + 2.4. Per-message Tokens .................................... 12 + 2.4.1. Sequence Number Usage ............................ 12 + 2.4.2. MIC Token ........................................ 12 + 2.4.2.1. Data to be Checksummed in MIC Token ......... 13 + 2.4.3. Wrap Token ....................................... 14 + 2.4.3.1. Wrap Token With Integrity Only .............. 14 + 2.4.3.2. Wrap Token With Integrity and Encryption + ............................................. 15 + 2.4.3.2.1. Data to be Encrypted in Wrap Token ..... 16 + 3. ASN.1 Encoding of Octet Strings ............................ 17 + 4. Name Types ................................................. 18 + 4.1. Mandatory Name Forms .................................. 18 + 4.1.1. Kerberos Principal Name Form ..................... 18 + 4.1.2. Exported Name Object Form for Kerberos5 + Mechanism ........................................ 19 + 5. Credentials ................................................ 20 + 6. Parameter Definitions ...................................... 20 + 6.1. Minor Status Codes .................................... 20 + 6.1.1. Non-Kerberos-specific codes ...................... 21 + 6.1.2. Kerberos-specific-codes .......................... 21 + 7. Kerberos Protocol Dependencies ............................. 22 + 8. Security Considerations .................................... 22 + 9. References ................................................. 22 + 10. Author's Address .......................................... 23 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + +1. Introduction + + The original Kerberos 5 GSSAPI mechanism[RFC1964] has a number of + shortcomings. This document attempts to remedy them by defining a + completely new Kerberos 5 GSSAPI mechanism. + + The context establishment token format requires that the + authenticator of AP-REQ messages contain a cleartext data structure + in its checksum field, which is a needless and potentially confusing + overloading of that field. This is implemented by a special checksum + algorithm whose purpose is to copy the input data directly into the + checksum field of the authenticator. + + The number assignments for checksum algorithms and for encryption + types are inconsistent between the Kerberos protocol and the original + GSSAPI mechanism. If new encryption or checksum algorithms are added + to the Kerberos protocol at some point, the GSSAPI mechanism will + need to be separately updated to use these new algorithms. + + The original mechanism specifies a crude method of key derivation (by + using the XOR of the context key with a fixed constant), which is + incompatible with newer cryptosystems which specify key derivation + procedures themselves. The original mechanism also assumes that both + checksums and cryptosystem blocksizes are eight bytes. + + Defining all GSSAPI tokens for the new Kerberos 5 mechanism in terms + of the Kerberos protocol specification ensures that new encryption + types and checksum types may be automatically used as they are + defined for the Kerberos protocol. + +2. Token Formats + + All tokens, not just the initial token, are framed as the + InitialContextToken described in RFC 2743 section 3.1. The + innerContextToken element of the token will not itself be encoded in + ASN.1, with the exception of caller-provided application data. + + One rationale for avoiding the use of ASN.1 in the inner token is + that some implementors may wish to implement this mechanism in a + kernel or other similarly constrained application where handling of + full ASN.1 encoding may be cumbersome. Also, due to the poor + availability of the relevant standards documents, ASN.1 encoders and + decoders are difficult to implement completely correctly, so keeping + ASN.1 usage to a minimum decreases the probability of bugs in the + implementation of the mechanism. In particular, bit strings need to + be transferred at certain points in this mechanism. There are many + conflicting common misunderstandings of how to encode and decode + ASN.1 bit strings, which have led difficulties in the implementaion + of the Kerberos protocol. + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + +2.1. Packet Notation + + The order of transmission of this protocol is described at the octet + level. Packet diagrams depict bits in the order of transmission, + assuming that individual octets are transmitted with the most + significant bit (MSB) first. The diagrams read from left to right + and from top to bottom, as in printed English. In each octet, bit + number 7 is the MSB and bit number 0 is the LSB. + + Numbers prefixed by the characters "0x" are in hexadecimal notation, + as in the C programming language. Even though packet diagrams are + drawn 16 bits wide, no padding should be used to align the ends of + variable-length fields to a 32-bit or 16-bit boundary. + + All integer fields are in network byte order. All other fields have + the size shown in the diagrams, with the exception of variable length + fields. + +2.2. Mechanism OID + + The Object Identifier (OID) of the new krb5 v2 mechanism is: + + {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + krb5v2(3)} + + +2.3. Context Establishment + +2.3.1. Option Format + + Context establishment tokens, i.e., the initial ones that the + GSS_Init_sec_context() and the GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls emit + while a security context is being set up, may contain options that + influence the subsequent behavior of the context. This document + describes only a small set of options, but additional types may be + added by documents intended to supplement this one. The generic + format is as follows: + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | option type | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | | + +-- option length (32 bits) --+ + 4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | . | + / option data (variable length) / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + option type (16 bits) + The type identifier of the following option. + + option length (32 bits) + The length in bytes of the following option. + + option data (variable length) + The actual option data. + + Any number of options may appear in an initator or acceptor token. + The final option in a token must be the null option, in order to mark + the end of the list. Option type 0xffff is reserved. + + The initiator and acceptor shall ignore any options that they do not + understand. + +2.3.1.1. Delegated Credentials Option + + Only the initiator may use this option. The format of the delegated + credentials option is as follows: + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | option type = 0x00001 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | | + +-- KRB-CRED length --+ + 4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | . | + / KRB-CRED message / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + option type (16 bits) + The option type for this option shall be 0x0001. + + KRB-CRED length (32 bits) + The length in bytes of the following KRB-CRED message. + + KRB-CRED message (variable length) + The option data for this option shall be the KRB-CRED message + that contains the credentials being delegated (forwarded) to the + context acceptor. Only the initiator may use this option. + +2.3.1.2. Null Option + + The Null option terminates the option list, and must be used by both + the initiator and the acceptor. Its format is as follows: + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | option type = 0 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | | + +-- length = 0 --+ + 4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + option type (16 bits) + The option type of this option must be zero. + + option length (32 bits) + The length of this option must be zero. + +2.3.2. Initial Token + + This is the initial token sent by the context initiator, generated by + GSS_Init_sec_context(). + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | initial token id = 0x0101 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | | + +-- reserved flag bits +-----------------------+ + 4 | | I | C | S | R | M | D | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | checksum type count | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 8 | . | + / checksum type list / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n | . | + / options / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + m | | + +-- AP-REQ length --+ + m+2 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + m+4 | . | + / AP-REQ data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + initial token ID (16 bits) + Contains the integer 0x0101, which identifies this as the + initial token in the context setup. + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + reserved flag bits (26 bits) + These bits are reserved for future expansion. They must be set + to zero by the initiator and be ignored by the acceptor. + + I flag (1 bit) + 0x00000020 -- GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + + C flag (1 bit) + 0x00000010 -- GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + + S flag (1 bit) + 0x00000008 -- GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + + R flag (1 bit) + 0x00000004 -- GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + + M flag (1 bit) + 0x00000002 -- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + + D flag (1 bit) + 0x00000001 -- GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; This flag must be set if the + "delegated credentials" option is included. + + checksum type count (16 bits) + The number of checksum types supported by the initiator. + + checksum type list (variable length) + A list of Kerberos checksum types, as defined in RFC 1510 + section 6.4. These checksum types must be collision-proof and + keyed with the context key; no checksum types that are + incompatible with the encryption key shall be used. Each + checksum type number shall be 32 bits wide. This list should + contain all the checksum types supported by the initiator. If + mutual authentication is not used, then this list shall contain + only one checksum type. + + options (variable length) + The context initiation options, described in section 2.3.1. + + AP-REQ length (32 bits) + The length of the following KRB_AP_REQ message. + + AP-REQ data (variable length) + The AP-REQ message as described in RFC 1510. The checksum in + the authenticator will be computed over the items listed in the + next section. + + The optional sequence number field shall be used in the AP-REQ. The + initiator should generate a subkey in the authenticator, and the + acceptor should generate a subkey in the AP-REP. The key used for + the per-message tokens will be the AP-REP subkey, or if that is not + present, the authenticator subkey, or if that is not present, the + session key. When subkeys are generated, it is strongly recommended + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + that they be of the same type as the associated session key. + + XXX The above is not secure. There should be an algorithmic process + to arrive at a subsession key which both sides of the authentication + exchange can perform based on the ticket sessions key and data known + to both parties, and this should probably be part of the revised + Kerberos protocol rather than bound to the GSSAPI mechanism. + +2.3.2.1. Data to be Checksummed in AP-REQ + + The checksum in the AP-REQ message is calculated over the following + items. Like in the actual tokens, no padding should be added to + force integer fields to align on 32 bit boundaries. This particular + set of data should not be sent as a part of any token; it merely + specifies what is to be checksummed in the AP-REQ. The items in this + encoding that precede the initial token ID correspond to the channel + bindings passed to GSS_Init_sec_context(). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | | + +-- initiator address type --+ + 2 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 4 | initiator address length | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | . | + / initiator address / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n | | + +-- acceptor address type --+ + | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n+4 | acceptor address length | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n+6 | . | + / acceptor address / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + m | . | + / application data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + k | initial token id = 0x0101 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + k+2 | | + +-- flags --+ + k+4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + k+6 | checksum type count | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + k+8 | . | + / checksum type list / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + j | . | + / options / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + initiator address type (32 bits) + The initiator address type, as defined in the Kerberos protocol + specification. If no initiator address is provided, this must + be zero. + + initiator address length (16 bits) + The length in bytes of the following initiator address. If + there is no inititator address provided, this must be zero. + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + initiator address (variable length) + The actual initiator address, in network byte order. + + acceptor address type (32 bits) + The acceptor address type, as defined in the Kerberos protocol + specification. If no acceptor address is provided, this must be + zero. + + acceptor address length (16 bits) + The length in bytes of the following acceptor address. This + must be zero is there is no acceptor address provided. + + initiator address (variable length) + The actual acceptor address, in network byte order. + + applicatation data (variable length) + The application data, if provided, encoded as a ASN.1 octet + string using DER. If no application data are passed as input + channel bindings, this shall be a zero-length ASN.1 octet + string. + + initial token ID (16 bits) + The initial token ID from the initial token. + + flags (32 bits) + The context establishment flags from the initial token. + + checksum type count (16 bits) + The number of checksum types supported by the initiator. + + checksum type list (variable length) + The same list of checksum types contained in the initial token. + + options (variable length) + The options list from the initial token. + +2.3.3. Response Token + + This is the reponse token sent by the context acceptor, if mutual + authentication is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | response token id = 0x0202 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | | + +-- reserved flag bits +-------+ + 4 | | D | E | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | | + +-- checksum type --+ + 8 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 10 | . | + / options / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n | | + +-- AP-REP or KRB-ERROR length --+ + n+2 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n+4 | . | + / AP-REP or KRB-ERROR data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + m | . | + / MIC data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + response token id (16 bits) + Contains the integer 0x0202, which identifies this as the + response token in the context setup. + + reserved flag bits (30 bits) + These bits are reserved for future expansion. They must be set + to zero by the acceptor and be ignored by the initiator. + + D flag -- delegated creds accepted (1 bit) + 0x00000002 -- If this flag is set, the acceptor processed the + delegated credentials, and GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG should be returned + to the caller. + + E flag -- error (1 bit) + 0x00000001 -- If this flag is set, a KRB-ERROR message shall be + present, rather than an AP-REP message. If this flag is not + set, an AP-REP message shall be present. + + checksum type count (16 bits) + The number of checksum types supported by both the initiator and + the acceptor. + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + checksum type (32 bits) + A Kerberos checksum type, as defined in RFC 1510 section 6.4. + This checksum type must be among the types listed by the + initiator, and will be used in for subsequent checksums + generated during this security context. + + options (variable length) + The option list, as described earlier. At this time, no options + are defined for the acceptor, but an implementation might make + use of these options to acknowledge an option from the initial + token. After all the options are specified, a null option must + be used to terminate the list. + + AP-REP or KRB-ERROR length (32 bits) + Depending on the value of the error flag, length in bytes of the + AP-REP or KRB-ERROR message. + + AP-REP or KRB-ERROR data (variable length) + Depending on the value of the error flag, the AP-REP or + KRB-ERROR message as described in RFC 1510. If this field + contains an AP-REP message, the sequence number field in the + AP-REP shall be filled. If this is a KRB-ERROR message, no + further fields will be in this message. + + MIC data (variable length) + A MIC token, as described in section 2.4.2, computed over the + concatentation of the response token ID, flags, checksum length + and type fields, and all option fields. This field and the + preceding length field must not be present if the error flag is + set. + +2.4. Per-message Tokens + +2.4.1. Sequence Number Usage + + Sequence numbers for per-message tokens are 31 bit unsigned integers, + which are incremented by 1 after each token. An overflow condition + should result in a wraparound of the sequence number to zero. The + initiator and acceptor each keep their own sequence numbers per + connection. + + The intial sequence number for tokens sent from the initiator to the + acceptor shall be the least significant 31 bits of sequence number in + the AP-REQ message. The initial sequence number for tokens sent from + the acceptor to the initiator shall be the least significant 31 bits + of the sequence number in the AP-REP message if mutual authentication + is used; if mutual authentication is not used, the initial sequence + number from acceptor to initiator shall be the least significant 31 + bits of the sequence number in the AP-REQ message. + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + +2.4.2. MIC Token + + Use of the GSS_GetMIC() call yields a token, separate from the user + data being protected, which can be used to verify the integrity of + that data when it is received. The MIC token has the following + format: + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | MIC token id = 0x0303 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | D | | + +---+ sequence number --+ + 4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | checksum length | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 8 | . | + / checksum data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + MIC token id (16 bits) + Contains the integer 0x0303, which identifies this as a MIC + token. + + D -- direction bit (1 bit) + This bit shall be zero if the message is sent from the context + initiator. If the message is sent from the context acceptor, + this bit shall be one. + + sequence number (31 bits) + The sequence number. + + checksum length (16 bits) + The number of bytes in the following checksum data field. + + checksum data (variable length) + The checksum itself, as defined in RFC 1510 section 6.4. The + checksum is calculated over the encoding described in the + following section. The key usage GSS_TOK_MIC -- 22 [XXX need to + register this] shall be used in cryptosystems that support key + derivation. + + The mechanism implementation shall only use the checksum type + returned by the acceptor in the case of mutual authentication. If + mutual authentication is not requested, then only the checksum type + in the initiator token shall be used. + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + +2.4.2.1. Data to be Checksummed in MIC Token + + The checksum in the MIC token shall be calculated over the following + elements. This set of data is not actually included in the token as + is; the description only appears for the purpose of specifying the + method of calculating the checksum. + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | MIC token id = 0x0303 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | D | | + +---+ sequence number --+ + 4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | . | + / application data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + MIC token ID (16 bits) + The MIC token ID from the MIC message. + + D -- direction bit (1 bit) + This bit shall be zero if the message is sent from the context + initiator. If the message is sent from the context acceptor, + this bit shall be one. + + sequence number (31 bits) + The sequence number. + + application data (variable length) + The application-supplied data, encoded as an ASN.1 octet string + using DER. + +2.4.3. Wrap Token + + Use of the GSS_Wrap() call yields a token which encapsulates the + input user data (optionally encrypted) along with associated + integrity check quantities. + +2.4.3.1. Wrap Token With Integrity Only + + + + + + + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 14] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | integrity wrap token id = 0x0404 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | D | | + +---+ sequence number --+ + 4 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 6 | . | + / application data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n | checksum length | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + n+2 | . | + / checksum data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + integrity wrap token id (16 bits) + Contains the integer 0x0404, which identifies this as a Wrap + token with integrity only. + + D -- direction bit (1 bit) + This bit shall be zero if the message is sent from the context + initiator. If the message is sent from the context acceptor, + this bit shall be one. + + sequence number (31 bits) + The sequence number. + + application data (variable length) + The application-supplied data, encoded as an ASN.1 octet string + using DER. + + checksum length (16 bits) + The number of bytes in the following checksum data field. + + checksum data (variable length) + The checksum itself, as defined in RFC 1510 section 6.4, + computed over the concatenation of the token ID, sequence + number, direction field, application data length, and + application data, as in the MIC token checksum in the previous + section. The key usage GSS_TOK_WRAP_INTEG -- 23 [XXX need to + register this] shall be used in cryptosystems that support key + derivation. + + The mechanism implementation should only use checksum types which it + knows to be valid for both peers, as described for MIC tokens. + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 15] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + +2.4.3.2. Wrap Token With Integrity and Encryption + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + | encrypted wrap token id = 0x0505 | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 2 | . | + / encrypted data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + encrypted wrap token id (16 bits) + Contains the integer 0x0505, which identifies this as a Wrap + token with integrity and encryption. + + encrypted data (variable length) + The encrypted data itself, as defined in RFC 1510 section 6.3, + encoded as an ASN.1 octet string using DER. Note that this is + not the ASN.1 type EncryptedData as defined in RFC 1510 + section 6.1, but rather the ciphertext without encryption type + or kvno information. The encryption is performed using the + key/enctype exchanged during context setup. The confounder and + checksum are as specified in the Kerberos protocol + specification. The key usage GSS_TOK_WRAP_PRIV -- 24 [XXX need + to register this] shall be used in cryptosystems that support + key derivation. The actual data to be encrypted are specified + below. + +2.4.3.2.1. Data to be Encrypted in Wrap Token + + bit| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +byte +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 0 | D | | + +---+ sequence number --+ + 2 | | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + 4 | . | + / application data / + | . | + +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ + + + D -- direction bit (1 bit) + This bit shall be zero if the message is sent from the context + initiator. If the message is sent from the context acceptor, + this bit shall be one. + + sequence number (31 bits) + The sequence number. + + application data (variable length) + The application-supplied data, encoded as an ASN.1 octet string + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + using DER. + +3. ASN.1 Encoding of Octet Strings + + In order to encode arbitirarly-sized application data, ASN.1 octet + string encoding is in this protocol. The Distinguished Encoding + Rules (DER) shall always be used in such cases. For reference + purposes, the DER encoding of an ASN.1 octet string, adapted from + ITU-T X.690, follows: + + +--------+-------//-------+-------//-------+ + |00000100| length octets |contents octets | + +--------+-------//-------+-------//-------+ + | + +-- identifier octet = 0x04 = [UNIVERSAL 4] + + + In this section only, the bits in each octet shall be numbered as in + the ASN.1 specification, from 8 to 1, with bit 8 being the MSB of the + octet, and with bit 1 being the LSB of the octet. + + identifier octet (8 bits) + Contains the constant 0x04, the tag for primitive encoding of an + octet string with the default (UNIVERSAL 4) tag. + + length octets (variable length) + Contains the length of the contents octets, in definite form + (since this encoding uses DER). + + contents octets (variable length) + The contents of the octet string. + + The length octets shall consist of either a short form (one byte + only), which is to be used only if the number of octets in the + contents octets is less than or equal to 127, or a long form, which + is to be used in all other cases. The short form shall consist of a + single octet with bit 8 (the MSB) equal to zero, and the remaining + bits encoding the number of contents octets (which may be zero) as an + unsigned binary integer. + + The long form shall consist of an initial octet and one or more + subsequent octets. The first octet shall have bit 8 (the MSB) set to + one, and the remaining bits shall encode the number of subsequent + octets in the length encoding as an unsigned binary integer. The + length must be encoded in the minimum number of octets. An initial + octet of 0xFF is reserved by the ASN.1 specification. Bits 8 to 1 of + the first subsequent octet, followed by bits 8 to 1 of each + subsequent octet in order, shall be the encoding of an unsigned + binary integer, with bit 8 of the first octet being the most + significant bit. Thus, the length encoding within is in network byte + order. + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + An initial length octet of 0x80 shall not be used, as that is + reserved by the ASN.1 specification for indefinite lengths in + conjunction with constructed contents encodings, which are not to be + used with DER. + +4. Name Types + + This section discusses the name types which may be passed as input to + the Kerberos 5 GSSAPI mechanism's GSS_Import_name() call, and their + associated identifier values. It defines interface elements in + support of portability, and assumes use of C language bindings per + RFC 2744. In addition to specifying OID values for name type + identifiers, symbolic names are included and recommended to GSSAPI + implementors in the interests of convenience to callers. It is + understood that not all implementations of the Kerberos 5 GSSAPI + mechanism need support all name types in this list, and that + additional name forms will likely be added to this list over time. + Further, the definitions of some or all name types may later migrate + to other, mechanism-independent, specifications. The occurrence of a + name type in this specification is specifically not intended to + suggest that the type may be supported only by an implementation of + the Kerberos 5 mechanism. In particular, the occurrence of the + string "_KRB5_" in the symbolic name strings constitutes a means to + unambiguously register the name strings, avoiding collision with + other documents; it is not meant to limit the name types' usage or + applicability. + + For purposes of clarification to GSSAPI implementors, this section's + discussion of some name forms describes means through which those + forms can be supported with existing Kerberos technology. These + discussions are not intended to preclude alternative implementation + strategies for support of the name forms within Kerberos mechanisms + or mechanisms based on other technologies. To enhance application + portability, implementors of mechanisms are encouraged to support + name forms as defined in this section, even if their mechanisms are + independent of Kerberos 5. + +4.1. Mandatory Name Forms + + This section discusses name forms which are to be supported by all + conformant implementations of the Kerberos 5 GSSAPI mechanism. + +4.1.1. Kerberos Principal Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) us(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) krb5(2) + krb5_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME". + + This name type corresponds to the single-string representation of a + Kerberos name. (Within the MIT Kerberos 5 implementation, such names + are parseable with the krb5_parse_name() function.) The elements + included within this name representation are as follows, proceeding + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + from the beginning of the string: + + (1) One or more principal name components; if more than one + principal name component is included, the components are + separated by '/'. Arbitrary octets may be included within + principal name components, with the following constraints and + special considerations: + + (1a) Any occurrence of the characters '@' or '/' within a + name component must be immediately preceded by the '\' + quoting character, to prevent interpretation as a component + or realm separator. + + (1b) The ASCII newline, tab, backspace, and null characters + may occur directly within the component or may be + represented, respectively, by '\n', '\t', '\b', or '\0'. + + (1c) If the '\' quoting character occurs outside the contexts + described in (1a) and (1b) above, the following character is + interpreted literally. As a special case, this allows the + doubled representation '\\' to represent a single occurrence + of the quoting character. + + (1d) An occurrence of the '\' quoting character as the last + character of a component is illegal. + + (2) Optionally, a '@' character, signifying that a realm name + immediately follows. If no realm name element is included, the + local realm name is assumed. The '/' , ':', and null characters + may not occur within a realm name; the '@', newline, tab, and + backspace characters may be included using the quoting + conventions described in (1a), (1b), and (1c) above. + +4.1.2. Exported Name Object Form for Kerberos 5 Mechanism + + When generated by the Kerberos 5 mechanism, the Mechanism OID within + the exportable name shall be that of the original Kerberos 5 + mechanism[RFC1964]. The Mechanism OID for the original Kerberos 5 + mechanism is: + + {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + krb5(2)} + + The name component within the exportable name shall be a contiguous + string with structure as defined for the Kerberos Principal Name + Form. + + In order to achieve a distinguished encoding for comparison purposes, + the following additional constraints are imposed on the export + operation: + + (1) all occurrences of the characters '@', '/', and '\' within + principal components or realm names shall be quoted with an + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + immediately-preceding '\'. + + (2) all occurrences of the null, backspace, tab, or newline + characters within principal components or realm names will be + represented, respectively, with '\0', '\b', '\t', or '\n'. + + (3) the '\' quoting character shall not be emitted within an + exported name except to accomodate cases (1) and (2). + +5. Credentials + + The Kerberos 5 protocol uses different credentials (in the GSSAPI + sense) for initiating and accepting security contexts. Normal + clients receive a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) and an associated + session key at "login" time; the pair of a TGT and its corresponding + session key forms a credential which is suitable for initiating + security contexts. A ticket-granting ticket, its session key, and + any other (ticket, key) pairs obtained through use of the + ticket-granting-ticket, are typically stored in a Kerberos 5 + credentials cache, sometimes known as a ticket file. + + The encryption key used by the Kerberos server to seal tickets for a + particular application service forms the credentials suitable for + accepting security contexts. These service keys are typically stored + in a Kerberos 5 key table (keytab), or srvtab file (the Kerberos 4 + terminology). In addition to their use as accepting credentials, + these service keys may also be used to obtain initiating credentials + for their service principal. + + The Kerberos 5 mechanism's credential handle may contain references + to either or both types of credentials. It is a local matter how the + Kerberos 5 mechanism implementation finds the appropriate Kerberos 5 + credentials cache or key table. + + However, when the Kerberos 5 mechanism attempts to obtain initiating + credentials for a service principal which are not available in a + credentials cache, and the key for that service principal is + available in a Kerberos 5 key table, the mechanism should use the + service key to obtain initiating credentials for that service. This + should be accomplished by requesting a ticket-granting-ticket from + the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC), and decrypting the KDC's + reply using the service key. + +6. Parameter Definitions + + This section defines parameter values used by the Kerberos V5 GSSAPI + mechanism. It defines interface elements in support of portability, + and assumes use of C language bindings per RFC 2744. + +6.1. Minor Status Codes + + This section recommends common symbolic names for minor_status values + to be returned by the Kerberos 5 GSSAPI mechanism. Use of these + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 20] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + definitions will enable independent implementors to enhance + application portability across different implementations of the + mechanism defined in this specification. (In all cases, + implementations of GSS_Display_status() will enable callers to + convert minor_status indicators to text representations.) Each + implementation should make available, through include files or other + means, a facility to translate these symbolic names into the concrete + values which a particular GSSAPI implementation uses to represent the + minor_status values specified in this section. + + It is recognized that this list may grow over time, and that the need + for additional minor_status codes specific to particular + implementations may arise. It is recommended, however, that + implementations should return a minor_status value as defined on a + mechanism-wide basis within this section when that code is accurately + representative of reportable status rather than using a separate, + implementation-defined code. + +6.1.1. Non-Kerberos-specific codes + + These symbols should likely be incorporated into the generic GSSAPI + C-bindings document, since they really are more general. + +GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_SERVICE_NAME + /* "No @ in SERVICE-NAME name string" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_STRING_UID + /* "STRING-UID-NAME contains nondigits" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_NOUSER + /* "UID does not resolve to username" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_VALIDATE_FAILED + /* "Validation error" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_BUFFER_ALLOC + /* "Couldn't allocate gss_buffer_t data" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_MSG_CTX + /* "Message context invalid" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_WRONG_SIZE + /* "Buffer is the wrong size" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE + /* "Credential usage type is unknown" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_G_UNKNOWN_QOP + /* "Unknown quality of protection specified" */ + + +6.1.2. Kerberos-specific-codes + + + + + + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 21] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH + /* "Principal in credential cache does not match desired name" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_KEYTAB_NOMATCH + /* "No principal in keytab matches desired name" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_TGT_MISSING + /* "Credential cache has no TGT" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_NO_SUBKEY + /* "Authenticator has no subkey" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED + /* "Context is already fully established" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_SIGN_TYPE + /* "Unknown signature type in token" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_LENGTH + /* "Invalid field length in token" */ +GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE + /* "Attempt to use incomplete security context" */ + + +7. Kerberos Protocol Dependencies + + This protocol makes several assumptions about the Kerberos protocol, + which may require changes to the successor of RFC 1510. + + Sequence numbers, checksum types, and address types are assumed to be + no wider than 32 bits. The Kerberos protocol specification might + need to be modified to accomodate this. This obviously requires some + further discussion. + + Key usages need to be registered within the Kerberos protocol for use + with GSSAPI per-message tokens. The current specification of the + Kerberos protocol does not include descriptions of key derivations or + key usages, but planned revisions to the protocol will include them. + + This protocol also makes the assumption that any cryptosystem used + with the session key will include integrity protection, i.e., it + assumes that no "raw" cryptosystems will be used. + +8. Security Considerations + + The GSSAPI is a security protocol; therefore, security considerations + are discussed throughout this document. The original Kerberos 5 + GSSAPI mechanism's constraints on possible cryptosystems and checksum + types do not permit it to be readily extended to accomodate more + secure cryptographic technologies with larger checksums or encryption + block sizes. Sites are strongly encouraged to adopt the mechanism + specified in this document in the light of recent publicity about the + deficiencies of DES. + +9. References + + [X.680] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T X.680 (1997) | + ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998 + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 22] + +Internet-Draft krb5-gss-mech2-03 March 2000 + + [X.690] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: + Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules + (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T X.690 (1997) | + ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998. + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J., Neumann, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510. + + [RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", + RFC 1964. + + [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface, Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743. + + [RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2: + C-bindings", RFC 2744. + +10. Author's Address + + Tom Yu + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + Room E40-345 + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + USA + + email: tlyu@mit.edu + phone: +1 617 253 1753 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Yu Document Expiration: 04 Sep 2000 [Page 23] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..885cf49676 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3415 @@ +FTPEXT Working Group R. Elz +Internet Draft University of Melbourne +Expiration Date: April 2000 + P. Hethmon + Hethmon Brothers + + October 1999 + + + Extensions to FTP + + + draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is NOT offered in accordance + with Section 10 of RFC2026, and the author does not provide the IETF + with any rights other than to publish as an Internet-Draft. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. + + To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This entire section has been prepended to this document automatically + during formatting without any direct involvement by the author(s) of + this draft. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 1] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +Abstract + + In order to overcome the problems caused by the undefined format of + the current FTP LIST command output, a new command is needed to + transfer standardized listing information from Server-FTP to User- + FTP. Commands to enable this are defined in this document. + + In order to allow consenting clients and servers to interact more + freely, a quite basic, and optional, virtual file store structure is + defined. + + This proposal also extends the FTP protocol to allow character sets + other than US-ASCII[1] by allowing the transmission of 8-bit + characters and the recommended use of UTF-8[2] encoding. + + Much implemented, but long undocumented, mechanisms to permit + restarts of interrupted data transfers in STREAM mode, are also + included here. + + Lastly, the HOST command has been added to allow a style of "virtual + site" to be constructed. + + Changed in this version of this document: Minor corrections as + discussed on the mailing list, including fixing many typographical + errors; Additional examples. This paragraph will be deleted from the + final version of this document. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 2] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + + +Table of Contents + + Abstract ................................................ 2 + 1 Introduction ............................................ 4 + 2 Document Conventions .................................... 4 + 2.1 Basic Tokens ............................................ 5 + 2.2 Pathnames ............................................... 5 + 2.3 Times ................................................... 7 + 2.4 Server Replies .......................................... 8 + 3 File Modification Time (MDTM) ........................... 8 + 3.1 Syntax .................................................. 9 + 3.2 Error responses ......................................... 9 + 3.3 FEAT response for MDTM .................................. 9 + 3.4 MDTM Examples ........................................... 10 + 4 File SIZE ............................................... 11 + 4.1 Syntax .................................................. 11 + 4.2 Error responses ......................................... 11 + 4.3 FEAT response for SIZE .................................. 12 + 4.4 Size Examples ........................................... 12 + 5 Restart of Interrupted Transfer (REST) .................. 13 + 5.1 Restarting in STREAM Mode ............................... 13 + 5.2 Error Recovery and Restart .............................. 14 + 5.3 Syntax .................................................. 14 + 5.4 FEAT response for REST .................................. 16 + 5.5 REST Example ............................................ 16 + 6 Virtual FTP servers ..................................... 16 + 6.1 The HOST command ........................................ 18 + 6.2 Syntax of the HOST command .............................. 18 + 6.3 HOST command semantics .................................. 19 + 6.4 HOST command errors ..................................... 21 + 6.5 FEAT response for HOST command .......................... 22 + 7 A Trivial Virtual File Store (TVFS) ..................... 23 + 7.1 TVFS File Names ......................................... 23 + 7.2 TVFS Path Names ......................................... 24 + 7.3 FEAT Response for TVFS .................................. 25 + 7.4 OPTS for TVFS ........................................... 26 + 7.5 TVFS Examples ........................................... 26 + 8 Listings for Machine Processing (MLST and MLSD) ......... 28 + 8.1 Format of MLSx Requests ................................. 29 + 8.2 Format of MLSx Response ................................. 29 + 8.3 Filename encoding ....................................... 32 + 8.4 Format of Facts ......................................... 33 + 8.5 Standard Facts .......................................... 33 + 8.6 System Dependent and Local Facts ........................ 41 + 8.7 MLSx Examples ........................................... 42 + 8.8 FEAT response for MLSx .................................. 50 + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 3] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + 8.9 OPTS parameters for MLST ................................ 51 + 9 Impact On Other FTP Commands ............................ 55 + 10 Character sets and Internationalization ................. 56 + 11 IANA Considerations ..................................... 56 + 11.1 The OS specific fact registry ........................... 56 + 11.2 The OS specific filetype registry ....................... 57 + 12 Security Considerations ................................. 57 + 13 References .............................................. 58 + Acknowledgments ......................................... 59 + Copyright ............................................... 60 + Editors' Addresses ...................................... 60 + + + + +1. Introduction + + This document amends the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [3]. Five new + commands are added: "SIZE", "HOST", "MDTM", "MLST", and "MLSD". The + existing command "REST" is modified. Of those, the "SIZE" and "MDTM" + commands, and the modifications to "REST" have been in wide use for + many years. The others are new. + + These commands allow a client to restart an interrupted transfer in + transfer modes not previously supported in any documented way, to + support the notion of virtual hosts, and to obtain a directory + listing in a machine friendly, predictable, format. + + An optional structure for the server's file store (NVFS) is also + defined, allowing servers that support such a structure to convey + that information to clients in a standard way, thus allowing clients + more certainty in constructing and interpreting path names. + +2. Document Conventions + + This document makes use of the document conventions defined in BCP14 + [4]. That provides the interpretation of capitalized imperative + words like MUST, SHOULD, etc. + + This document also uses notation defined in STD 9 [3]. In + particular, the terms "reply", "user", "NVFS", "file", "pathname", + "FTP commands", "DTP", "user-FTP process", "user-PI", "user-DTP", + "server-FTP process", "server-PI", "server-DTP", "mode", "type", + "NVT", "control connection", "data connection", and "ASCII", are all + used here as defined there. + + Syntax required is defined using the Augmented BNF defined in [5]. + Some general ABNF definitions are required throughout the document, + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 4] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + those will be defined later in this section. At first reading, it + may be wise to simply recall that these definitions exist here, and + skip to the next section. + +2.1. Basic Tokens + + This document imports the core definitions given in Appendix A of + [5]. There definitions will be found for basic ABNF elements like + ALPHA, DIGIT, SP, etc. To that, the following terms are added for + use in this document. + + TCHAR = VCHAR / SP / HTAB ; visible plus white space + RCHAR = ALPHA / DIGIT / "," / "." / ":" / "!" / + "@" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "^" / + "&" / "(" / ")" / "-" / "_" / + "+" / "?" / "/" / "\" / "'" / + DQUOTE ; <"> -- double quote character (%x22) + + The VCHAR (from [5]), TCHAR, and RCHAR types give basic character + types from varying sub-sets of the ASCII character set for use in + various commands and responses. + + token = 1*RCHAR + + A "token" is a string whose precise meaning depends upon the context + in which it is used. In some cases it will be a value from a set of + possible values maintained elsewhere. In others it might be a string + invented by one party to an FTP conversation from whatever sources it + finds relevant. + + Note that in ABNF, string literals are case insensitive. That + convention is preserved in this document, and implies that FTP + commands added by this specification have names that can be + represented in any case. That is, "MDTM" is the same as "mdtm", + "Mdtm" and "MdTm" etc. However note that ALPHA, in particular, is + case sensitive. That implies that a "token" is a case sensitive + value. That implication is correct. + +2.2. Pathnames + + Various FTP commands take pathnames as arguments, or return pathnames + in responses. When the MLST command is supported, as indicated in + the response to the FEAT command [6], pathnames are to be transferred + in one of the following two formats. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 5] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + pathname = utf-8-name / raw + utf-8-name = + raw = + + Which format is used is at the option of the user-PI or server-PI + sending the pathname. UTF-8 encodings [2] contain enough internal + structure that it is always, in practice, possible to determine + whether a UTF-8 or raw encoding has been used, in those cases where + it matters. While it is useful for the user-PI to be able to + correctly display a pathname received from the server-PI to the user, + it is far more important for the user-PI to be able to retain and + retransmit the identical pathname when required. Implementations are + advised against converting a UTF-8 pathname to a local encoding, and + then attempting to invert the encoding later. Note that ASCII is a + subset of UTF-8. + + Unless otherwise specified, the pathname is terminated by the CRLF + that terminates the FTP command, or by the CRLF that ends a reply. + Any trailing spaces preceding that CRLF form part of the name. + Exactly one space will precede the pathname and serve as a separator + from the preceding syntax element. Any additional spaces form part + of the pathname. See [7] for a fuller explanation of the character + encoding issues. All implementations supporting MLST MUST support + [7]. + + Implementations should also beware that the control connection uses + Telnet NVT conventions [8], and that the Telnet IAC character, if + part of a pathname sent over the control connection, MUST be + correctly escaped as defined by the Telnet protocol. + + Implementors should also be aware that although Telnet NVT + conventions are used over the control connections, Telnet option + negotiation MUST NOT be attempted. See section 4.1.2.12 of [9]. + +2.2.1. Pathname Syntax + + Except where TVFS is supported (see section 7) this specification + imposes no syntax upon pathnames. Nor does it restrict the character + set from which pathnames are created. This does not imply that the + NVFS is required to make sense of all possible pathnames. Server-PIs + may restrict the syntax of valid pathnames in their NVFS in any + manner appropriate to their implementation or underlying file system. + Similarly, a server-PI may parse the pathname, and assign meaning to + the components detected. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 6] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +2.2.2. Wildcarding + + For the commands defined in this specification, all pathnames are to + be treated literally. That is, for a pathname given as a parameter + to a command, the file whose name is identical to the pathname given + is implied. No characters from the pathname may be treated as + special or "magic", thus no pattern matching (other than for exact + equality) between the pathname given and the files present in the + NVFS of the Server-FTP is permitted. + + Clients that desire some form of pattern matching functionality must + obtain a listing of the relevant directory, or directories, and + implement their own filename selection procedures. + +2.3. Times + + The syntax of a time value is: + + time-val = 14DIGIT [ "." 1*DIGIT ] + + The leading, mandatory, fourteen digits are to be interpreted as, in + order from the leftmost, four digits giving the year, with a range of + 1000-9999, two digits giving the month of the year, with a range of + 01-12, two digits giving the day of the month, with a range of 01-31, + two digits giving the hour of the day, with a range of 00-23, two + digits giving minutes past the hour, with a range of 00-59, and + finally, two digits giving seconds past the minute, with a range of + 00-60 (with 60 being used only at a leap second). Years in the tenth + century, and earlier, cannot be expressed. This is not considered a + serious defect of the protocol. + + The optional digits, which are preceded by a period, give decimal + fractions of a second. These may be given to whatever precision is + appropriate to the circumstance, however implementations MUST NOT add + precision to time-vals where that precision does not exist in the + underlying value being transmitted. + + Symbolically, a time-val may be viewed as + + YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.sss + + The "." and subsequent digits ("sss") are optional. However the "." + MUST NOT appear unless at least one following digit also appears. + + Time values are always represented in UTC (GMT), and in the Gregorian + calendar regardless of what calendar may have been in use at the date + and time indicated at the location of the server-PI. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 7] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The technical differences between GMT, TAI, UTC, UT1, UT2, etc, are + not considered here. A server-FTP process should always use the same + time reference, so the times it returns will be consistent. Clients + are not expected to be time synchronized with the server, so the + possible difference in times that might be reported by the different + time standards is not considered important. + +2.4. Server Replies + + Section 4.2 of [3] defines the format and meaning of replies by the + server-PI to FTP commands from the user-PI. Those reply conventions + are used here without change. + + error-response = error-code SP *TCHAR CRLF + error-code = ("4" / "5") 2DIGIT + + Implementors should note that the ABNF syntax (which was not used in + [3]) used in this document, and other FTP related documents, + sometimes shows replies using the one line format. Unless otherwise + explicitly stated, that is not intended to imply that multi-line + responses are not permitted. Implementors should assume that, unless + stated to the contrary, any reply to any FTP command (including QUIT) + may be of the multi-line format described in [3]. + + Throughout this document, replies will be identified by the three + digit code that is their first element. Thus the term "500 reply" + means a reply from the server-PI using the three digit code "500". + +3. File Modification Time (MDTM) + + The FTP command, MODIFICATION TIME (MDTM), can be used to determine + when a file in the server NVFS was last modified. This command has + existed in many FTP servers for many years, as an adjunct to the REST + command for STREAM mode, thus is widely available. However, where + supported, the "modify" fact which can be provided in the result from + the new MLST command is recommended as a superior alternative. + + When attempting to restart a RETRieve, if the User-FTP makes use of + the MDTM command, or "modify" fact, it can check and see if the + modification time of the source file is more recent than the + modification time of the partially transferred file. If it is, then + most likely the source file has changed and it would be unsafe to + restart the previously incomplete file transfer. + + When attempting to restart a STORe, the User FTP can use the MDTM + command to discover the modification time of the partially + transferred file. If it is older than the modification time of the + file that is about to be STORed, then most likely the source file has + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 8] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + changed and it would be unsafe to restart the file transfer. + + Note that using MLST (described below) where available, can provide + this information, and much more, thus giving an even better + indication that a file has changed, and that restarting a transfer + would not give valid results. + + Note that this is applicable to any RESTart attempt, regardless of + the mode of the file transfer. + +3.1. Syntax + + The syntax for the MDTM command is: + + mdtm = "MdTm" SP pathname CRLF + + As with all FTP commands, the "MDTM" command label is interpreted in + a case insensitive manner. + + The "pathname" specifies an object in the NVFS which may be the + object of a RETR command. Attempts to query the modification time of + files that are unable to be retrieved generate undefined responses. + + The server-PI will respond to the MDTM command with a 213 reply + giving the last modification time of the file whose pathname was + supplied, or a 550 reply if the file does not exist, the modification + time is unavailable, or some other error has occurred. + + mdtm-response = "213" SP time-val CRLF / + error-response + +3.2. Error responses + + Where the command is correctly parsed, but the modification time is + not available, either because the pathname identifies no existing + entity, or because the information is not available for the entity + named, then a 550 reply should be sent. Where the command cannot be + correctly parsed, a 500 or 501 reply should be sent, as specified in + [3]. + +3.3. FEAT response for MDTM + + When replying to the FEAT command [6], an FTP server process that + supports the MDTM command MUST include a line containing the single + word "MDTM". This MAY be sent in upper or lower case, or a mixture + of both (it is case insensitive) but SHOULD be transmitted in upper + case only. That is, the response SHOULD be + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 9] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + C> Feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> MDTM + S> ... + S> 211 End + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + +3.4. MDTM Examples + + If we assume the existence of three files, A B and C, and a directory + D, and no other files at all, then the MTDM command may behave as + indicated. The "C>" lines are commands from user-PI to server-PI, + the "S>" lines are server-PI replies. + + C> MDTM A + S> 213 19980615100045.014 + C> MDTM B + S> 213 19980615100045.014 + C> MDTM C + S> 213 19980705132316 + C> MDTM D + S> 550 D is not retrievable + C> MDTM E + S> 550 No file named "E" + C> mdtm file6 + S> 213 19990929003355 + C> MdTm 19990929043300 File6 + S> 213 19991005213102 + C> MdTm 19990929043300 file6 + S> 550 19990929043300 file6: No such file or directory. + + From that we can conclude that both A and B were last modified at the + same time (to the nearest millisecond), and that C was modified 21 + days and several hours later. + + The times are in GMT, so file A was modified on the 15th of June, + 1998, at approximately 11am in London (summer time was then in + effect), or perhaps at 8pm in Melbourne, Australia, or at 6am in New + York. All of those represent the same absolute time of course. The + location where the file was modified, and consequently the local wall + clock time at that location, is not available. + + There is no file named "E" in the current directory, but there are + files named both "file6" and "19990929043300 File6". The + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 10] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + modification times of those files were obtained. There is no file + named "19990929043300 file6". + +4. File SIZE + + The FTP command, SIZE OF FILE (SIZE), is used to obtain the transfer + size of a file from the server-FTP process. That is, the exact + number of octets (8 bit bytes) which would be transmitted over the + data connection should that file be transmitted. This value will + change depending on the current STRUcture, MODE and TYPE of the data + connection, or a data connection which would be created were one + created now. Thus, the result of the SIZE command is dependent on + the currently established STRU, MODE and TYPE parameters. + + The SIZE command returns how many octets would be transferred if the + file were to be transferred using the current transfer structure, + mode and type. This command is normally used in conjunction with the + RESTART (REST) command. The server-PI might need to read the + partially transferred file, do any appropriate conversion, and count + the number of octets that would be generated when sending the file in + order to correctly respond to this command. Estimates of the file + transfer size MUST NOT be returned, only precise information is + acceptable. + +4.1. Syntax + + The syntax of the SIZE command is: + + size = "Size" SP pathname CRLF + + The server-PI will respond to the SIZE command with a 213 reply + giving the transfer size of the file whose pathname was supplied, or + an error response if the file does not exist, the size is + unavailable, or some other error has occurred. The value returned is + in a format suitable for use with the RESTART (REST) command for mode + STREAM, provided the transfer mode and type are not altered. + + size-response = "213" SP 1*DIGIT CRLF / + error-response + +4.2. Error responses + + Where the command is correctly parsed, but the size is not available, + either because the pathname identifies no existing entity, or because + the entity named cannot be transferred in the current MODE and TYPE + (or at all), then a 550 reply should be sent. Where the command + cannot be correctly parsed, a 500 or 501 reply should be sent, as + specified in [3]. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 11] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +4.3. FEAT response for SIZE + + When replying to the FEAT command [6], an FTP server process that + supports the SIZE command MUST include a line containing the single + word "SIZE". This word is case insensitive, and MAY be sent in any + mixture of upper or lower case, however it SHOULD be sent in upper + case. That is, the response SHOULD be + + C> FEAT + S> 211- + S> ... + S> SIZE + S> ... + S> 211 END + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + +4.4. Size Examples + + Consider a text file "Example" stored on a Unix(TM) server where each + end of line is represented by a single octet. Assume the file + contains 112 lines, and 1830 octets total. Then the SIZE command + would produce: + + C> TYPE I + S> 200 Type set to I. + C> size Example + S> 213 1830 + C> TYPE A + S> 200 Type set to A. + C> Size Example + S> 213 1942 + + Notice that with TYPE=A the SIZE command reports an extra 112 octets. + Those are the extra octets that need to be inserted, one at the end + of each line, to provide correct end of line semantics for a transfer + using TYPE=A. Other systems might need to make other changes to the + transfer format of files when converting between TYPEs and MODEs. + The SIZE command takes all of that into account. + + Since calculating the size of a file with this degree of precision + may take considerable effort on the part of the server-PI, user-PIs + should not used this command unless this precision is essential (such + as when about to restart an interrupted transfer). For other uses, + the "Size" fact of the MLST command (see section 8.5.7) ought be + requested. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 12] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +5. Restart of Interrupted Transfer (REST) + + To avoid having to resend the entire file if the file is only + partially transferred, both sides need some way to be able to agree + on where in the data stream to restart the data transfer. + + The FTP specification [3] includes three modes of data transfer, + Stream, Block and Compressed. In Block and Compressed modes, the + data stream that is transferred over the data connection is + formatted, allowing the embedding of restart markers into the stream. + The sending DTP can include a restart marker with whatever + information it needs to be able to restart a file transfer at that + point. The receiving DTP can keep a list of these restart markers, + and correlate them with how the file is being saved. To restart the + file transfer, the receiver just sends back that last restart marker, + and both sides know how to resume the data transfer. Note that there + are some flaws in the description of the restart mechanism in RFC 959 + [3]. See section 4.1.3.4 of RFC 1123 [9] for the corrections. + +5.1. Restarting in STREAM Mode + + In Stream mode, the data connection contains just a stream of + unformatted octets of data. Explicit restart markers thus cannot be + inserted into the data stream, they would be indistinguishable from + data. For this reason, the FTP specification [3] did not provide the + ability to do restarts in stream mode. However, there is not really + a need to have explicit restart markers in this case, as restart + markers can be implied by the octet offset into the data stream. + + Because the data stream defines the file in STREAM mode, a different + data stream would represent a different file. Thus, an offset will + always represent the same position within a file. On the other hand, + in other modes than STREAM, the same file can be transferred using + quite different octet sequences, and yet be reconstructed into the + one identical file. Thus an offset into the data stream in transfer + modes other than STREAM would not give an unambiguous restart point. + + If the data representation TYPE is IMAGE, and the STRUcture is File, + for many systems the file will be stored exactly in the same format + as it is sent across the data connection. It is then usually very + easy for the receiver to determine how much data was previously + received, and notify the sender of the offset where the transfer + should be restarted. In other representation types and structures + more effort will be required, but it remains always possible to + determine the offset with finite, but perhaps non-negligible, effort. + In the worst case an FTP process may need to open a data connection + to itself, set the appropriate transfer type and structure, and + actually transmit the file, counting the transmitted octets. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 13] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + If the user-FTP process is intending to restart a retrieve, it will + directly calculate the restart marker, and send that information in + the RESTart command. However, if the user-FTP process is intending + to restart sending the file, it needs to be able to determine how + much data was previously sent, and correctly received and saved. A + new FTP command is needed to get this information. This is the + purpose of the SIZE command, as documented in section 4. + +5.2. Error Recovery and Restart + + STREAM MODE transfers with FILE STRUcture may be restarted even + though no restart marker has been transferred in addition to the data + itself. This is done by using the SIZE command, if needed, in + combination with the RESTART (REST) command, and one of the standard + file transfer commands. + + When using TYPE ASCII or IMAGE, the SIZE command will return the + number of octets that would actually be transferred if the file were + to be sent between the two systems. I.e. with type IMAGE, the SIZE + normally would be the number of octets in the file. With type ASCII, + the SIZE would be the number of octets in the file including any + modifications required to satisfy the TYPE ASCII CR-LF end of line + convention. + +5.3. Syntax + + The syntax for the REST command when the current transfer mode is + STREAM is: + + rest = "Rest" SP 1*DIGIT CRLF + + The numeric value gives the number of octets of the immediately + following transfer to not actually send, effectively causing the + transmission to be restarted at a later point. A value of zero + effectively disables restart, causing the entire file to be + transmitted. The server-PI will respond to the REST command with a + 350 reply, indicating that the REST parameter has been saved, and + that another command, which should be either RETR or STOR, should + then follow to complete the restart. + + rest-response = "350" SP *TCHAR CRLF / + error-response + + Server-FTP processes may permit transfer commands other than RETR and + STOR, such as APPE and STOU, to complete a restart, however, this is + not recommended. STOU (store unique) is undefined in this usage, as + storing the remainder of a file into a unique filename is rarely + going to be useful. If APPE (append) is permitted, it MUST act + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 14] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + identically to STOR when a restart marker has been set. That is, in + both cases, octets from the data connection are placed into the file + at the location indicated by the restart marker value. + + The REST command is intended to complete a failed transfer. Use with + RETR is comparatively well defined in all cases, as the client bears + the responsibility of merging the retrieved data with the partially + retrieved file. If it chooses to use the data obtained other than to + complete an earlier transfer, or if it chooses to re-retrieve data + that had been retrieved before, that is its choice. With STOR, + however, the server must insert the data into the file named. The + results are undefined if a client uses REST to do other than restart + to complete a transfer of a file which had previously failed to + completely transfer. In particular, if the restart marker set with a + REST command is not at the end of the data currently stored at the + server, as reported by the server, or if insufficient data are + provided in a STOR that follows a REST to extend the destination file + to at least its previous size, then the effects are undefined. + + The REST command must be the last command issued before the data + transfer command which is to cause a restarted rather than complete + file transfer. The effect of issuing a REST command at any other + time is undefined. The server-PI may react to a badly positioned + REST command by issuing an error response to the following command, + not being a restartable data transfer command, or it may save the + restart value and apply it to the next data transfer command, or it + may silently ignore the inappropriate restart attempt. Because of + this, a user-PI that has issued a REST command, but which has not + successfully transmitted the following data transfer command for any + reason, should send another REST command before the next data + transfer command. If that transfer is not to be restarted, then + "REST 0" should be issued. + + An error-response will follow a REST command only when the server + does not implement the command, or the restart marker value is + syntactically invalid for the current transfer mode. That is, in + STREAM mode, if something other than one or more digits appears in + the parameter to the REST command. Any other errors, including such + problems as restart marker out of range, should be reported when the + following transfer command is issued. Such errors will cause that + transfer request to be rejected with an error indicating the invalid + restart attempt. + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 15] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +5.4. FEAT response for REST + + Where a server-FTP process supports RESTart in STREAM mode, as + specified here, it MUST include in the response to the FEAT command + [6], a line containing exactly the string "REST STREAM". This string + is not case sensitive, but SHOULD be transmitted in upper case. + Where REST is not supported at all, or supported only in block or + compressed modes, the REST line MUST NOT be included in the FEAT + response. Where required, the response SHOULD be + + C> feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> REST STREAM + S> ... + S> 211 end + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + +5.5. REST Example + + Assume that the transfer of a largish file has previously been + interrupted after 802816 octets had been received, that the previous + transfer was with TYPE=I, and that it has been verified that the file + on the server has not since changed. + + C> TYPE I + S> 200 Type set to I. + C> PORT 127,0,0,1,15,107 + S> 200 PORT command successful. + C> REST 802816 + S> 350 Restarting at 802816. Send STORE or RETRIEVE + C> RETR cap60.pl198.tar + S> 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection + [...] + S> 226 Transfer complete. + +6. Virtual FTP servers + + It has become common in the Internet for many domain names to be + allocated to a single IP address. This has introduced the concept of + a "virtual host", where a host appears to exist as an independent + entity, but in reality shares all of its resources with one, or more, + other such hosts. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 16] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + Such an arrangement presents some problems for FTP Servers, as all + the FTP Server can detect is an incoming FTP connection to a + particular IP address. That is, all domain names which share the IP + address also share the FTP server, and more importantly, its NVFS. + This means that the various virtual hosts cannot offer different + virtual file systems to clients, nor can they offer different + authentication systems. + + No scheme can overcome this without modifications of some kind to the + user-PI and the user-FTP process. That process is the only entity + that knows which virtual host is required. It has performed the + domain name to IP address translation, and thus has the original + domain name available. + + One method which could be used to allow a style of virtual host would + be for the client to simply send a "CWD" command after connecting, + using the virtual host name as the argument to the CWD command. This + would allow the server-FTP process to implement the file stores of + the virtual hosts as sub-directories in its NVFS. This is simple, + and supported by essentially all server-FTP implementations without + requiring any code changes. + + While that method is simple to describe, and to implement, it suffers + from several drawbacks. First, the "CWD" command is available only + after the user-PI has authenticated itself to the server-FTP process. + Thus, all virtual hosts would be required to share a common + authentication scheme. Second, either the server-FTP process needs + to be modified to understand the special nature of this first CWD + command, negating most of the advantage of this scheme, or all users + must see the same identical NVFS view upon connecting (they must + connect in the same initial directory) or the NVFS must implement the + full set of virtual host directories at each possible initial + directory for any possible user, or the virtual host will not be + truly transparent. Third, and again unless the server is specially + modified, a user connecting this way to a virtual host would be able + to trivially move to any other virtual host supported at the same + server-FTP process, exposing the nature of the virtual host. + + Other schemes overloading other existing FTP commands have also been + proposed. None of those have sufficient merit to be worth + discussion. + + The conclusion from the examination of the possibilities seems to be + that to obtain an adequate emulation of "real" FTP servers, server + modifications to support virtual hosts are required. A new command + seems most likely to provide the support required. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 17] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +6.1. The HOST command + + A new command "HOST" is added to the FTP command set to allow + server-FTP process to determine to which of possibly many virtual + hosts the client wishes to connect. This command is intended to be + issued before the user is authenticated, allowing the authentication + scheme, and set of legal users, to be dependent upon the virtual host + chosen. Server-FTP processes may, if they desire, permit the HOST + command to be issued after the user has been authenticated, or may + treat that as an erroneous sequence of commands. The behavior of the + server-FTP process which does allow late HOST commands is undefined. + One reasonable interpretation would be for the user-PI to be returned + to the state that existed after the TCP connection was first + established, before user authentication. + + Servers should note that the response to the HOST command is a + sensible time to send their "welcome" message. This allows the + message to be personalized for any virtual hosts that are supported, + and also allows the client to have determined supported languages, or + representations, for the message, and other messages, via the FEAT + response, and selected an appropriate one via the LANG command. See + [7] for more information. + +6.2. Syntax of the HOST command + + The HOST command is defined as follows. + + host-command = "Host" SP hostname CRLF + hostname = 1*DNCHAR 1*( "." 1*DNCHAR ) [ "." ] + DNCHAR = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / "$" / + "!" / "%" / "[" / "]" / ":" + host-response = host-ok / error-response + host-ok = "220" [ SP *TCHAR ] CRLF + + As with all FTP commands, the "host" command word is case + independent, and may be specified in any character case desired. + + The "hostname" given as a parameter specifies the virtual host to + which access is desired. It should normally be the same name that + was used to obtain the IP address to which the FTP control connection + was made, after any client conversions to convert an abbreviated or + local alias to a complete (fully qualified) domain name, but before + resolving a DNS alias (owner of a CNAME resource record) to its + canonical name. + + If the client was given a network literal address, and consequently + was not required to derive it from a hostname, it should send the + HOST command with the network address, as specified to it, enclosed + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 18] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + in brackets (after eliminating any syntax, which might also be + brackets, but is not required to be, from which the server deduced + that a literal address had been specified.) That is, for example + + HOST [10.1.2.3] + + should be sent if the client had been instructed to connect to + "10.1.2.3", or "[10.1.2.3]", or perhaps even IPv4:10.1.2.3. The + method of indicating to a client that a literal address is to be used + is beyond the scope of this specification. + + The parameter is otherwise to be treated as a "complete domain name", + as that term is defined in section 3.1 of RFC 1034 [10]. That + implies that the name is to be treated as a case independent string, + in that upper case ASCII characters are to be treated as equivalent + to the corresponding lower case ASCII characters, but otherwise + preserved as given. It also implies some limits on the length of the + parameter and of the components that create its internal structure. + Those limits are not altered in any way here. + + RFC 1034 imposes no other restrictions upon what kinds of names can + be stored in the DNS. Nor does RFC 1035. This specification, + however, allows only a restricted set of names for the purposes of + the HOST command. Those restrictions can be inferred from the ABNF + grammar given for the "hostname". + +6.3. HOST command semantics + + Upon receiving the HOST command, before authenticating the user-PI, a + server-FTP process should validate that the hostname given represents + a valid virtual host for that server, and if so, establish the + appropriate environment for that virtual host. The meaning of that + is not specified here, and may range from doing nothing at all, or + performing a simple change of working directory, to much more + elaborate state changes, as required. + + If the hostname specified is unknown at the server, or if the server + is otherwise unwilling to treat the particular connection as a + connection to the hostname specified, the server will respond with a + 504 reply. + + Note: servers may require that the name specified is in some sense + equivalent to the particular network address that was used to reach + the server. + + If the hostname specified would normally be acceptable, but for any + reason is temporarily unavailable, the server SHOULD reply to the + HOST command with a 434 reply. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 19] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The "220" reply code for the HOST command is the same as the code + used on the initial connection established "welcome" message. This + is done deliberately so as to allow the implementation to implement + the front end FTP server as a wrapper which simply waits for the HOST + command, and then invokes an older, RFC959 compliant, server in the + appropriate environment for the particular hostname received. + +6.3.1. The REIN command + + As specified in [3], the REIN command returns the state of the + connection to that it was immediately after the transport connection + was opened. That is not changed here. The effect of a HOST command + will be lost if a REIN command is performed, a new HOST command must + be issued. + + Implementors of user-FTP should be aware that server-FTP + implementations which implement the HOST command as a wrapper around + older implementations will be unable to correctly implement the REIN + command. In such an implementation, REIN will typically return the + server-FTP to the state that existed immediately after the HOST + command was issued, instead of to the state immediately after the + connection was opened. + +6.3.2. User-PI usage of HOST + + A user-PI that conforms to this specification, MUST send the HOST + command after opening the transport connection, or after any REIN + command, before attempting to authenticate the user with the USER + command. + + The following state diagram shows a typical sequence of flow of + control, where the "B" (begin) state is assumed to occur after the + transport connection has opened, or a REIN command has succeeded. + Other commands (such as FEAT [6]) which require no authentication may + have intervened. This diagram is modeled upon (and largely borrowed + from) the similar diagram in section 6 of [3]. + + In this diagram, a three digit reply indicates that precise server + reply code, a single digit on a reply path indicates any server reply + beginning with that digit, other than any three digit replies that + might take another path. + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 20] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + + +---+ HOST +---+ 1,3,5 + | B |---------->| W |----------------- + +---+ +---+ | + | | | + 2,500,502 | | 4,501,503,504 | + -------------- ------------- | + | | | + V 1 | V + +---+ USER +---+-------------->+---+ + | |---------->| W | 2 ----->| E | + +---+ +---+------ | --->+---+ + | | | | | | + 3 | | 4,5 | | | | + -------------- ----- | | | | + | | | | | | + | | | | | | + | --------- | | + | 1| | | | | + V | | | | | + +---+ PASS +---+ 2 | ------->+---+ + | |---------->| W |-------------->| S | + +---+ +---+ ----------->+---+ + | | | | | | + 3 | |4,5| | | | + -------------- -------- | | + | | | | | ---- + | | | | | | + | ----------- | + | 1,3| | | | | + V | 2| | | V + +---+ ACCT +---+-- | ------>+---+ + | |---------->| W | 4,5 --------->| F | + +---+ +---+-------------->+---+ + +6.4. HOST command errors + + The server-PI shall reply with a 500 or 502 reply if the HOST command + is unrecognized or unimplemented. A 503 reply may be sent if the + HOST command is given after a previous HOST command, or after a user + has been authenticated. Alternately, the server may accept the + command at such a time, with server defined behavior. A 501 reply + should be sent if the hostname given is syntactically invalid, and a + 504 reply if a syntactically valid hostname is not a valid virtual + host name for the server. + + In all such cases the server-FTP process should act as if no HOST + command had been given. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 21] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + A user-PI receiving a 500 or 502 reply should assume that the + server-PI does not implement the HOST command style virtual server. + It may then proceed to login as if the HOST command had succeeded, + and perhaps, attempt a CWD command to the hostname after + authenticating the user. + + A user-PI receiving some other error reply should assume that the + virtual HOST is unavailable, and terminate communications. + + A server-PI that receives a USER command, beginning the + authentication sequence, without having received a HOST command + SHOULD NOT reject the USER command. Clients conforming to earlier + FTP specifications do not send HOST commands. In this case the + server may act as if some default virtual host had been explicitly + selected, or may enter an environment different from that of all + supported virtual hosts, perhaps one in which a union of all + available accounts exists, and which presents a NVFS which appears to + contain sub-directories containing the NVFS for all virtual hosts + supported. + +6.5. FEAT response for HOST command + + A server-FTP process that supports the host command, and virtual FTP + servers, MUST include in the response to the FEAT command [6], a + feature line indicating that the HOST command is supported. This + line should contain the single word "HOST". This MAY be sent in + upper or lower case, or a mixture of both (it is case insensitive) + but SHOULD be transmitted in upper case only. That is, the response + SHOULD be + + C> Feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> HOST + S> ... + S> 211 End + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 22] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +7. A Trivial Virtual File Store (TVFS) + + Traditionally, FTP has placed almost no constraints upon the file + store (NVFS) provided by a server. This specification does not alter + that. However, it has become common for servers to attempt to + provide at least file system naming conventions modeled loosely upon + those of the UNIX(TM) file system. That is, a tree structured file + system, built of directories, each of which can contain other + directories, or other kinds of files, or both. Each file and + directory has a file name relative to the directory that contains it, + except for the directory at the root of the tree, which is contained + in no other directory, and hence has no name of its own. + + That which has so far been described is perfectly consistent with the + standard FTP NVFS and access mechanisms. The "CWD" command is used + to move from one directory to an embedded directory. "CDUP" may be + provided to return to the parent directory, and the various file + manipulation commands ("RETR", "STOR", the rename commands, etc) are + used to manipulate files within the current directory. + + However, it is often useful to be able to reference files other than + by changing directories, especially as FTP provides no guaranteed + mechanism to return to a previous directory. The Trivial Virtual + File Store (TVFS), if implemented, provides that mechanism. + +7.1. TVFS File Names + + Where a server implements the TVFS, no elementary filename shall + contain the character "/". Where the underlying natural file store + permits files, or directories, to contain the "/" character in their + names, a server-PI implementing TVFS must encode that character in + some manner whenever file or directory names are being returned to + the user-PI, and reverse that encoding whenever such names are being + accepted from the user-PI. + + The encoding method to be used is not specified here. Where some + other character is illegal in file and directory names in the + underlying file store, a simple transliteration may be sufficient. + Where there is no suitable substitute character a more complex + encoding scheme, possibly using an escape character, is likely to be + required. + + With the one exception of the unnamed root directory, a TVFS file + name may not be empty. That is, all other file names contain at + least one character. + + With the sole exception of the "/" character, any valid IS10646 + character [11] may be used in a TVFS filename. When transmitted, + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 23] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + file name characters are encoded using the UTF-8 encoding [2]. + +7.2. TVFS Path Names + + A TVFS "Path Name" combines the file or directory name of a target + file or directory, with the directory names of zero or more enclosing + directories, so as to allow the target file or directory to be + referenced other than when the server's "current working directory" + is the directory directly containing the target file or directory. + + By definition, every TVFS file or directory name is also a TVFS path + name. Such a path name is valid to reference the file from the + directory containing the name, that is, when that directory is the + server-FTP's current working directory. + + Other TVFS path names are constructed by prefixing a path name by a + name of a directory from which the path is valid, and separating the + two with the "/" character. Such a path name is valid to reference + the file or directory from the directory containing the newly added + directory name. + + Where a path name has been extended to the point where the directory + added is the unnamed root directory, the path name will begin with + the "/" character. Such a path is known as a fully qualified path + name. Fully qualified paths may, obviously, not be further extended, + as, by definition, no directory contains the root directory. Being + unnamed, it cannot be represented in any other directory. A fully + qualified path name is valid to reference the named file or directory + from any location (that is, regardless of what the current working + directory may be) in the virtual file store. + + Any path name which is not a fully qualified path name may be + referred to as a "relative path name" and will only correctly + reference the intended file when the current working directory of the + server-FTP is a directory from which the relative path name is valid. + + As a special case, the path name "/" is defined to be a fully + qualified path name referring to the root directory. That is, the + root directory does not have a directory (or file) name, but does + have a path name. This special path name may be used only as is as a + reference to the root directory. It may not be combined with other + path names using the rules above, as doing so would lead to a path + name containing two consecutive "/" characters, which is an undefined + sequence. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 24] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +7.2.1. Notes + + + It is not required, or expected, that there be only one fully + qualified path name that will reference any particular file or + directory. + + As a caveat, though the TVFS file store is basically tree + structured, there is no requirement that any file or directory + have only one parent directory. + + As defined, no TVFS path name will ever contain two consecutive + "/" characters. Such a name is not illegal however, and may be + defined by the server for any purpose that suits it. Clients + implementing this specification should not assume any semantics + at all for such names. + + Similarly, other than the special case path that refers to the + root directory, no TVFS path name constructed as defined here + will ever end with the "/" character. Such names are also not + illegal, but are undefined. + + While any legal IS10646 character is permitted to occur in a TVFS + file or directory name, other than "/", server FTP + implementations are not required to support all possible IS10646 + characters. The subset supported is entirely at the discretion + of the server. The case (where it exists) of the characters that + make up file, directory, and path names may be significant. + Unless determined otherwise by means unspecified here, clients + should assume that all such names are comprised of characters + whose case is significant. Servers are free to treat case (or + any other attribute) of a name as irrelevant, and hence map two + names which appear to be distinct onto the same underlying file. + + There are no defined "magic" names, like ".", ".." or "C:". + Servers may implement such names, with any semantics they choose, + but are not required to do so. + + TVFS imposes no particular semantics or properties upon files, + guarantees no access control schemes, or any of the other common + properties of a file store. Only the naming scheme is defined. + +7.3. FEAT Response for TVFS + + In response to the FEAT command [6] a server that wishes to indicate + support for the TVFS as defined here will include a line that begins + with the four characters "TVFS" (in any case, or mixture of cases, + upper case is not required). Servers SHOULD send upper case. + + Such a response to the FEAT command MUST NOT be returned unless the + server implements TVFS as defined here. + + Later specifications may add to the TVFS definition. Such additions + should be notified by means of additional text appended to the TVFS + feature line. Such specifications, if any, will define the extra + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 25] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + text. + + Until such a specification is defined, servers should not include + anything after "TVFS" in the TVFS feature line. Clients, however, + should be prepared to deal with arbitrary text following the four + defined characters, and simply ignore it if unrecognized. + + A typical response to the FEAT command issued by a server + implementing only this specification would be: + + C> feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> TVFS + S> ... + S> 211 end + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6], and is not counted as one of the + first four characters for the purposes of this feature listing. + + The TVFS feature adds no new commands to the FTP command repertoire. + +7.4. OPTS for TVFS + + There are no options in this TVFS specification, and hence there is + no OPTS command defined. + +7.5. TVFS Examples + + Assume a TVFS file store is comprised of a root directory, which + contains two directories (A and B) and two non-directory files (X and + Y). The A directory contains two directories (C and D) and one other + file (Z). The B directory contains just two non-directory files (P + and Q) and the C directory also two non-directory files (also named P + and Q, by chance). The D directory is empty, that is, contains no + files or directories. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 26] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + This structure may depicted graphically as... + + (unnamed root) + / | \ \ + / | \ \ + A X B Y + /|\ / \ + / | \ / \ + C D Z P Q + / \ + / \ + P Q + + Given this structure, the following fully qualified path names exist. + + / + /A + /B + /X + /Y + /A/C + /A/D + /A/Z + /A/C/P + /A/C/Q + /B/P + /B/Q + + It is clear that none of the paths / /A /B or /A/D refer to the same + directory, as the contents of each is different. Nor do any of / /A + /A/C or /A/D. However /A/C and /B might be the same directory, there + is insufficient information given to tell. Any of the other path + names (/X /Y /A/Z /A/C/P /A/C/Q /B/P and /B/Q) may refer to the same + underlying files, in almost any combination. + + If the current working directory of the server-FTP is /A then the + following path names, in addition to all the fully qualified path + names, are valid + + C + D + Z + C/P + C/Q + + These all refer to the same files or directories as the corresponding + fully qualified path with "/A/" prepended. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 27] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + That those path names all exist does not imply that the TVFS sever + will necessarily grant any kind of access rights to the named paths, + or that access to the same file via different path names will + necessarily be granted equal rights. + + None of the following relative paths are valid when the current + directory is /A + + A + B + X + Y + B/P + B/Q + P + Q + + Any of those could be made valid by changing the server-FTP's current + working directory to the appropriate directory. Note that the paths + "P" and "Q" might refer to different files depending upon which + directory is selected to cause those to become valid TVFS relative + paths. + +8. Listings for Machine Processing (MLST and MLSD) + + The MLST and MLSD commands are intended to standardize the file and + directory information returned by the Server-FTP process. These + commands differ from the LIST command in that the format of the + replies is strictly defined although extensible. + + Two commands are defined, MLST which provides data about exactly the + object named on its command line, and no others. MLSD on the other + hand will list the contents of a directory if a directory is named, + otherwise a 501 reply will be returned. In either case, if no object + is named, the current directory is assumed. That will cause MLST to + send a one line response, describing the current directory itself, + and MLSD to list the contents of the current directory. + + In the following, the term MLSx will be used wherever either MLST or + MLSD may be inserted. + + The MLST and MLSD commands also extend the FTP protocol as presented + in RFC 959 [3] and RFC 1123 [9] to allow that transmission of 8-bit + data over the control connection. Note this is not specifying + character sets which are 8-bit, but specifying that FTP + implementations are to specifically allow the transmission and + reception of 8-bit bytes, with all bits significant, over the control + connection. That is, all 256 possible octet values are permitted. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 28] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The MLSx command allows both UTF-8/Unicode and "raw" forms as + arguments, and in responses both to the MLST and MLSD commands, and + all other FTP commands which take pathnames as arguments. + +8.1. Format of MLSx Requests + + The MLST and MLSD commands each allow a single optional argument. + This argument may be either a directory name or, for MLST only, a + filename. For these purposes, a "filename" is the name of any entity + in the server NVFS which is not a directory. Where TVFS is + supported, any TVFS relative path name valid in the current working + directory, or any TVFS fully qualified path name, may be given. If a + directory name is given then MLSD must return a listing of the + contents of the named directory, otherwise it issues a 501 reply, and + does not open a data connection. In all cases for MLST, a single set + of fact lines (usually a single fact line) containing the information + about the named file or directory shall be returned over the control + connection, without opening a data connection. + + If no argument is given then MLSD must return a listing of the + contents of the current working directory, and MLST must return a + listing giving information about the current working directory + itself. For these purposes, the contents of a directory are whatever + filenames (not pathnames) the server-PI will allow to be referenced + when the current working directory is the directory named, and which + the server-PI desires to reveal to the user-PI. + + No title, header, or summary, lines, or any other formatting, other + than as is specified below, is ever returned in the output of an MLST + or MLSD command. + + If the Client-FTP sends an invalid argument, the Server-FTP MUST + reply with an error code of 501. + + The syntax for the MLSx command is: + + mlst = "MLst" [ SP pathname ] CRLF + mlsd = "MLsD" [ SP pathname ] CRLF + +8.2. Format of MLSx Response + + The format of a response to an MLSx command is as follows: + + mlst-response = control-response / error-response + mlsd-response = ( initial-response final-response ) / + error-response + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 29] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + control-response = "250-" [ response-message ] CRLF + 1*( SP entry CRLF ) + "250" [ SP response-message ] CRLF + + initial-response = "150" [ SP response-message ] CRLF + final-response = "226" SP response-message CRLF + + response-message = *TCHAR + + data-response = *( entry CRLF ) + + entry = [ facts ] SP pathname + facts = 1*( fact ";" ) + fact = factname "=" value + factname = "Size" / "Modify" / "Create" / + "Type" / "Unique" / "Perm" / + "Lang" / "Media-Type" / "CharSet" / + os-depend-fact / local-fact + os-depend-fact = "." token + local-fact = "X." token + value = *RCHAR + + Upon receipt of a MLSx command, the server will verify the parameter, + and if invalid return an error-response. For this purpose, the + parameter should be considered to be invalid if the client issuing + the command does not have permission to perform the request + operation. + + If valid, then for an MLST command, the server-PI will send the first + (leading) line of the control response, the entry for the pathname + given, or the current directory if no pathname was provided, and the + terminating line. Normally exactly one entry would be returned, more + entries are permitted only when required to represent a file that is + to have multiple "Type" facts returned. + + Note that for MLST the fact set is preceded by a space. That is + provided to guarantee that the fact set cannot be accidentally + interpreted as the terminating line of the control response, but is + required even when that would not be possible. Exactly one space + exists between the set of facts and the pathname. Where no facts are + present, there will be exactly two leading spaces before the + pathname. No spaces are permitted in the facts, any other spaces in + the response are to be treated as being a part of the pathname. + + If the command was an MLSD command, the server will open a data + connection as indicated in section 3.2 of RFC959 [3]. If that fails, + the server will return an error-response. If all is OK, the server + will return the initial-response, send the appropriate data-response + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 30] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + over the new data connection, close that connection, and then send + the final-response over the control connection. The grammar above + defines the format for the data-response, which defines the format of + the data returned over the data connection established. + + The data connection opened for a MLSD response shall be a connection + as if the "TYPE L 8", "MODE S", and "STRU F" commands had been given, + whatever FTP transfer type, mode and structure had actually been set, + and without causing those settings to be altered for future commands. + That is, this transfer type shall be set for the duration of the data + connection established for this command only. While the content of + the data sent can be viewed as a series of lines, implementations + should note that there is no maximum line length defined. + Implementations should be prepared to deal with arbitrarily long + lines. + + The facts part of the specification would contain a series of "file + facts" about the file or directory named on the same line. Typical + information to be presented would include file size, last + modification time, creation time, a unique identifier, and a + file/directory flag. + + The complete format for a successful reply to the MLSD command would + be: + + facts SP pathname CRLF + facts SP pathname CRLF + facts SP pathname CRLF + ... + + Note that the format is intended for machine processing, not human + viewing, and as such the format is very rigid. Implementations MUST + NOT vary the format by, for example, inserting extra spaces for + readability, replacing spaces by tabs, including header or title + lines, or inserting blank lines, or in any other way alter this + format. Exactly one space is always required after the set of facts + (which may be empty). More spaces may be present on a line if, and + only if, the file name presented contains significant spaces. The + set of facts must not contain any spaces anywhere inside it. Facts + should be provided in each output line only if they both provide + relevant information about the file named on the same line, and they + are in the set requested by the user-PI. There is no requirement + that the same set of facts be provided for each file, or that the + facts presented occur in the same order for each file. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 31] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.3. Filename encoding + + An FTP implementation supporting the MLSx commands must be 8-bit + clean. This is necessary in order to transmit UTF-8 encoded + filenames. This specification recommends the use of UTF-8 encoded + filenames. FTP implementations SHOULD use UTF-8 whenever possible to + encourage the maximum interoperability. + + Filenames are not restricted to UTF-8, however treatment of arbitrary + character encodings is not specified by this standard. Applications + are encouraged to treat non-UTF-8 encodings of filenames as octet + sequences. + + Note that this encoding is unrelated to that of the contents of the + file, even if the file contains character data. + + Further information about filename encoding for FTP may be found in + "Internationalization of the File Transfer Protocol" [7]. + +8.3.1. Notes about the Filename + + The filename returned in the MLST response should be the same name as + was specified in the MLST command, or, where TVFS is supported, a + fully qualified TVFS path naming the same file. Where no argument + was given to the MLST command, the server-PI may either include an + empty filename in the response, or it may supply a name that refers + to the current directory, if such a name is available. Where TVFS is + supported, a fully qualified path name of the current directory + SHOULD be returned. + + Filenames returned in the output from an MLSD command SHOULD be + unqualified names within the directory named, or the current + directory if no argument was given. That is, the directory named in + the MLSD command SHOULD NOT appear as a component of the filenames + returned. + + If the server-FTP process is able, and the "type" fact is being + returned, it MAY return in the MLSD response, an entry whose type is + "cdir", which names the directory from which the contents of the + listing were obtained. Where TVFS is supported, the name MAY be the + fully qualified path name of the directory, or MAY be any other path + name which is valid to refer to that directory from the current + working directory of the server-FTP. Where more than one name + exists, multiple of these entries may be returned. In a sense, the + "cdir" entry can be viewed as a heading for the MLSD output. + However, it is not required to be the first entry returned, and may + occur anywhere within the listing. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 32] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + When TVFS is supported, a user-PI can refer to any file or directory + in the listing by combining a type "cdir" name, with the appropriate + name from the directory listing using the procedure defined in + section 7.2. + + Alternatively, whether TVFS is supported or not, the user-PI can + issue a CWD command ([3]) giving a name of type "cdir" from the + listing returned, and from that point reference the files returned in + the MLSD response from which the cdir was obtained by using the + filename components of the listing. + +8.4. Format of Facts + + The "facts" for a file in a reply to a MLSx command consist of + information about that file. The facts are a series of keyword=value + pairs each followed by semi-colon (";") characters. An individual + fact may not contain a semi-colon in its name or value. The complete + series of facts may not contain the space character. See the + definition or "RCHAR" in section 2.1 for a list of the characters + that can occur in a fact value. Not all are applicable to all facts. + + A sample of a typical series of facts would be: (spread over two + lines for presentation here only) + + size=4161;lang=en-US;modify=19970214165800;create=19961001124534; + type=file;x.myfact=foo,bar; + +8.5. Standard Facts + + This document defines a standard set of facts as follows: + + size -- Size in octets + modify -- Last modification time + create -- Creation time + type -- Entry type + unique -- Unique id of file/directory + perm -- File permissions, whether read, write, execute is + allowed for the login id. + lang -- Language of the filename per IANA[12] registry. + media-type -- MIME media-type of file contents per IANA registry. + charset -- Character set per IANA registry (if not UTF-8) + + Fact names are case-insensitive. Size, size, SIZE, and SiZe are the + same fact. + + Further operating system specific keywords could be specified by + using the IANA operating system name as a prefix (examples only): + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 33] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + OS/2.ea -- OS/2 extended attributes + MACOS.rf -- MacIntosh resource forks + UNIX.mode -- Unix file modes (permissions) + + Implementations may define keywords for experimental, or private use. + All such keywords MUST begin with the two character sequence "x.". + As type names are case independent, "x." and "X." are equivalent. + For example: + + x.ver -- Version information + x.desc -- File description + x.type -- File type + +8.5.1. The type Fact + + The type fact needs a special description. Part of the problem with + current practices is deciding when a file is a directory. If it is a + directory, is it the current directory, a regular directory, or a + parent directory? The MLST specification makes this unambiguous + using the type fact. The type fact given specifies information about + the object listed on the same line of the MLST response. + + Five values are possible for the type fact: + + file -- a file entry + cdir -- the listed directory + pdir -- a parent directory + dir -- a directory or sub-directory + OS.name=type -- an OS or file system dependent file type + + The syntax is defined to be: + + type-fact = type-label "=" type-val + type-label = "Type" + type-val = "File" / "cdir" / "pdir" / "dir" / + os-type + +8.5.1.1. type=file + + The presence of the type=file fact indicates the listed entry is a + file containing non-system data. That is, it may be transferred from + one system to another of quite different characteristics, and perhaps + still be meaningful. + +8.5.1.2. type=cdir + + The type=cdir fact indicates the listed entry contains a pathname of + the directory whose contents are listed. An entry of this type will + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 34] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + only be returned as a part of the result of an MLSD command when the + type fact is included, and provides a name for the listed directory, + and facts about that directory. In a sense, it can be viewed as + representing the title of the listing, in a machine friendly format. + It may appear at any point of the listing, it is not restricted to + appearing at the start, though frequently may do so, and may occur + multiple times. It MUST NOT be included if the type fact is not + included, or there would be no way for the user-PI to distinguish the + name of the directory from an entry in the directory. + + Where TVFS is supported by the server-FTP, this name may be used to + construct path names with which to refer to the files and directories + returned in the same MLSD output (see section 7.2). These path names + are only expected to work when the server-PI's position in the NVFS + file tree is the same as its position when the MLSD command was + issued, unless a fully qualified path name results. + + Where TVFS is not supported, the only defined semantics associated + with a "type=cdir" entry are that, provided the current working + directory of the server-PI has not been changed, a pathname of type + "cdir" may be used as an argument to a CWD command, which will cause + the current directory of the server-PI to change so that the + directory which was listed in its current working directory. + +8.5.1.3. type=dir + + If present, the type=dir entry gives the name of a directory. Such + an entry typically cannot be transferred from one system to another + using RETR, etc, but should (permissions permitting) be able to be + the object of an MLSD command. + +8.5.1.4. type=pdir + + If present, which will occur only in the response to a MLSD command + when the type fact is included, the type=pdir entry represents a + pathname of the parent directory of the listed directory. As well as + having the properties of a type=dir, a CWD command that uses the + pathname from this entry should change the user to a parent directory + of the listed directory. If the listed directory is the current + directory, a CDUP command may also have the effect of changing to the + named directory. User-FTP processes should note not all responses + will include this information, and that some systems may provide + multiple type=pdir responses. + + Where TVFS is supported, a "type=pdir" name may be a relative path + name, or a fully qualified path name. A relative path name will be + relative to the directory being listed, not to the current directory + of the server-PI at the time. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 35] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + For the purposes of this type value, a "parent directory" is any + directory in which there is an entry of type=dir which refers to the + directory in which the type=pdir entity was found. Thus it is not + required that all entities with type=pdir refer to the same + directory. The "unique" fact (if supported) can be used to determine + whether there is a relationship between the type=pdir entries or not. + +8.5.1.5. System defined types + + Files types that are specific to a specific operating system, or file + system, can be encoded using the "OS." type names. The format is: + + os-type = "OS." os-name "=" os-type + os-name = + os-type = token + + The "os-name" indicates the specific system type which supports the + particular localtype. OS specific types are registered by the IANA + using the procedures specified in section 11. The "os-type" provides + the system dependent information as to the type of the file listed. + The os-name and os-type strings in an os-type are case independent. + "OS.unix=block" and "OS.Unix=BLOCK" represent the same type (or + would, if such a type were registered.) + + Note: Where the underlying system supports a file type which is + essentially an indirect pointer to another file, the NVFS + representation of that type should normally be to represent the file + which the reference indicates. That is, the underlying basic file + will appear more than once in the NVFS, each time with the "unique" + fact (see immediately following section) containing the same value, + indicating that the same file is represented by all such names. + User-PIs transferring the file need then transfer it only once, and + then insert their own form of indirect reference to construct + alternate names where desired, or perhaps even copy the local file if + that is the only way to provide two names with the same content. A + file which would be a reference to another file, if only the other + file actually existed, may be represented in any OS dependent manner + appropriate, or not represented at all. + +8.5.1.6. Multiple types + + Where a file is such that it may validly, and sensibly, treated by + the server-PI as being of more than one of the above types, then + multiple entries should be returned, each with its own "Type" fact of + the appropriate type, and each containing the same pathname. This + may occur, for example, with a structured file, which may contain + sub-files, and where the server-PI permits the structured file to be + treated as a unit, or treated as a directory allowing the sub-files + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 36] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + within it to be referenced. + +8.5.2. The unique Fact + + The unique fact is used to present a unique identifier for a file or + directory in the NVFS accessed via a server-FTP process. The value + of this fact should be the same for any number of pathnames that + refer to the same underlying file. The fact should have different + values for names which reference distinct files. The mapping between + files, and unique fact tokens should be maintained, and remain + consistent, for at least the lifetime of the control connection from + user-PI to server-PI. + + unique-fact = "Unique" "=" token + + This fact would be expected to be used by Server-FTPs whose host + system allows things such as symbolic links so that the same file may + be represented in more than one directory on the server. The only + conclusion that should be drawn is that if two different names each + have the same value for the unique fact, they refer to the same + underlying object. The value of the unique fact (the token) should + be considered an opaque string for comparison purposes, and is a case + dependent value. The tokens "A" and "a" do not represent the same + underlying object. + +8.5.3. The modify Fact + + The modify fact is used to determine the last time the content of the + file (or directory) indicated was modified. Any change of substance + to the file should cause this value to alter. That is, if a change + is made to a file such that the results of a RETR command would + differ, then the value of the modify fact should alter. User-PIs + should not assume that a different modify fact value indicates that + the file contents are necessarily different than when last retrieved. + Some systems may alter the value of the modify fact for other + reasons, though this is discouraged wherever possible. Also a file + may alter, and then be returned to its previous content, which would + often be indicated as two incremental alterations to the value of the + modify fact. + + For directories, this value should alter whenever a change occurs to + the directory such that different filenames would (or might) be + included in MLSD output of that directory. + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 37] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + modify-fact = "Modify" "=" time-val + +8.5.4. The create Fact + + The create fact indicates when a file, or directory, was first + created. Exactly what "creation" is for this purpose is not + specified here, and may vary from server to server. About all that + can be said about the value returned is that it can never indicate a + later time than the modify fact. + + create-fact = "Create" "=" time-val + + Implementation Note: Implementors of this fact on UNIX(TM) systems + should note that the unix "stat" "st_ctime" field does not give + creation time, and that unix file systems do not record creation + time at all. Unix (and POSIX) implementations will normally not + include this fact. + +8.5.5. The perm Fact + + The perm fact is used to indicate access rights the current FTP user + has over the object listed. Its value is always an unordered + sequence of alphabetic characters. + + perm-fact = "Perm" "=" *pvals + pvals = "a" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f" / + "l" / "m" / "p" / "r" / "w" + + There are ten permission indicators currently defined. Many are + meaningful only when used with a particular type of object. The + indicators are case independent, "d" and "D" are the same indicator. + + The "a" permission applies to objects of type=file, and indicates + that the APPE (append) command may be applied to the file named. + + The "c" permission applies to objects of type=dir (and type=pdir, + type=cdir). It indicates that files may be created in the directory + named. That is, that a STOU command is likely to succeed, and that + STOR and APPE commands might succeed if the file named did not + previously exist, but is to be created in the directory object that + has the "c" permission. It also indicates that the RNTO command is + likely to succeed for names in the directory. + + The "d" permission applies to all types. It indicates that the + object named may be deleted, that is, that the RMD command may be + applied to it if it is a directory, and otherwise that the DELE + command may be applied to it. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 38] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The "e" permission applies to the directory types. When set on an + object of type=dir, type=cdir, or type=pdir it indicates that a CWD + command naming the object should succeed, and the user should be able + to enter the directory named. For type=pdir it also indicates that + the CDUP command may succeed (if this particular pathname is the one + to which a CDUP would apply.) + + The "f" permission for objects indicates that the object named may be + renamed - that is, may be the object of an RNFR command. + + The "l" permission applies to the directory file types, and indicates + that the listing commands, LIST, NLST, and MLSD may be applied to the + directory in question. + + The "m" permission applies to directory types, and indicates that the + MKD command may be used to create a new directory within the + directory under consideration. + + The "p" permission applies to directory types, and indicates that + objects in the directory may be deleted, or (stretching naming a + little) that the directory may be purged. Note: it does not indicate + that the RMD command may be used to remove the directory named + itself, the "d" permission indicator indicates that. + + The "r" permission applies to type=file objects, and for some + systems, perhaps to other types of objects, and indicates that the + RETR command may be applied to that object. + + The "w" permission applies to type=file objects, and for some + systems, perhaps to other types of objects, and indicates that the + STOR command may be applied to the object named. + + Note: That a permission indicator is set can never imply that the + appropriate command is guaranteed to work - just that it might. + Other system specific limitations, such as limitations on + available space for storing files, may cause an operation to + fail, where the permission flags may have indicated that it was + likely to succeed. The permissions are a guide only. + + Implementation note: The permissions are described here as they apply + to FTP commands. They may not map easily into particular + permissions available on the server's operating system. Servers + are expected to synthesize these permission bits from the + permission information available from operating system. For + example, to correctly determine whether the "D" permission bit + should be set on a directory for a server running on the + UNIX(TM) operating system, the server should check that the + directory named is empty, and that the user has write permission + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 39] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + on both the directory under consideration, and its parent + directory. + + Some systems may have more specific permissions than those + listed here, such systems should map those to the flags defined + as best they are able. Other systems may have only more broad + access controls. They will generally have just a few possible + permutations of permission flags, however they should attempt to + correctly represent what is permitted. + +8.5.6. The lang Fact + + The lang fact describes the natural language of the filename for use + in display purposes. Values used here should be taken from the + language registry of the IANA. See [13] for the syntax, and + procedures, related to language tags. + + lang-fact = "Lang" "=" token + + Server-FTP implementations MUST NOT guess language values. Language + values must be determined in an unambiguous way such as file system + tagging of language or by user configuration. Note that the lang + fact provides no information at all about the content of a file, only + about the encoding of its name. + +8.5.7. The size Fact + + The size fact applies to non-directory file types and should always + reflect the approximate size of the file. This should be as accurate + as the server can make it, without going to extraordinary lengths, + such as reading the entire file. The size is expressed in units of + octets of data in the file. + + Given limitations in some systems, Client-FTP implementations must + understand this size may not be precise and may change between the + time of a MLST and RETR operation. + + Clients that need highly accurate size information for some + particular reason should use the SIZE command as defined in section + 4. The most common need for this accuracy is likely to be in + conjunction with the REST command described in section 5. The size + fact, on the other hand, should be used for purposes such as + indicating to a human user the approximate size of the file to be + transferred, and perhaps to give an idea of expected transfer + completion time. + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 40] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + size-fact = "Size" "=" 1*DIGIT + +8.5.8. The media-type Fact + + The media-type fact represents the IANA media type of the file named, + and applies only to non-directory types. The list of values used + must follow the guidelines set by the IANA registry. + + media-type = "Media-Type" "=" + + Server-FTP implementations MUST NOT guess media type values. Media + type values must be determined in an unambiguous way such as file + system tagging of media-type or by user configuration. This fact + gives information about the content of the file named. Both the + primary media type, and any appropriate subtype should be given, + separated by a slash "/" as is traditional. + +8.5.9. The charset Fact + + The charset fact provides the IANA character set name, or alias, for + the encoded pathnames in a MLSx response. The default character set + is UTF-8 unless specified otherwise. FTP implementations SHOULD use + UTF-8 if possible to encourage maximum interoperability. The value + of this fact applies to the pathname only, and provides no + information about the contents of the file. + + charset-type = "Charset" "=" token + +8.5.10. Required facts + + Servers are not required to support any particular set of the + available facts. However, servers SHOULD, if conceivably possible, + support at least the type, perm, size, unique, and modify facts. + +8.6. System Dependent and Local Facts + + By using an system dependent fact, or a local fact, a server-PI may + communicate to the user-PI information about the file named which is + peculiar to the underlying file system. + +8.6.1. System Dependent Facts + + System dependent fact names are labeled by prefixing a label + identifying the specific information returned by the name of the + appropriate operating system from the IANA maintained list of + operating system names. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 41] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The value of an OS dependent fact may be whatever is appropriate to + convey the information available. It must be encoded as a "token" as + defined in section 2.1 however. + + In order to allow reliable interoperation between users of system + dependent facts, the IANA will maintain a registry of system + dependent fact names, their syntax, and the interpretation to be + given to their values. Registrations of system dependent facts are + to be accomplished according to the procedures of section 11. + +8.6.2. Local Facts + + Implementations may also make available other facts of their own + choosing. As the method of interpretation of such information will + generally not be widely understood, server-PIs should be aware that + clients will typically ignore any local facts provided. As there is + no registration of locally defined facts, it is entirely possible + that different servers will use the same local fact name to provide + vastly different information. Hence user-PIs should be hesitant + about making any use of any information in a locally defined fact + without some other specific assurance that the particular fact is one + that they do comprehend. + + Local fact names all begin with the sequence "X.". The rest of the + name is a "token" (see section 2.1). The value of a local fact can + be anything at all, provided it can be encoded as a "token". + +8.7. MLSx Examples + + The following examples are all taken from dialogues between existing + FTP clients and servers. Because of this, not all possible + variations of possible response formats are shown in the examples. + This should not be taken as limiting the options of other server + implementors. Where the examples show OS dependent information, that + is to be treated as being purely for the purposes of demonstration of + some possible OS specific information that could be defined. As at + the time of the writing of this document, no OS specific facts or + file types have been defined, the examples shown here should not be + treated as in any way to be preferred over other possible similar + definitions. Consult the IANA registries to determine what types and + facts have been defined. + + In the examples shown, only relevant commands and responses have been + included. This is not to imply that other commands (including + authentication, directory modification, PORT or PASV commands, or + similar) would not be present in an actual connection, or were not, + in fact, actually used in the examples before editing. Note also + that the formats shown are those that are transmitted between client + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 42] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + and server, not formats which would normally ever be reported to the + user of the client. + + In the examples, lines that begin "C> " were sent over the control + connection from the client to the server, lines that begin "S> " were + sent over the control connection from the server to the client, and + lines that begin "D> " were sent from the server to the client over a + data connection created just to send those lines and closed + immediately after. No examples here show data transferred over a + data connection from the client to the server. In all cases, the + prefixes shown above, including the one space, have been added for + the purposes of this document, and are not a part of the data + exchanged between client and server. + +8.7.1. Simple MLST + + C> PWD + S> 257 "/tmp" is current directory. + C> MLst cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> 250- Listing cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> Type=file;Size=1024990;Perm=r; /tmp/cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> 250 End + + The client first asked to be told the current directory of the + server. This was purely for the purposes of clarity of this example. + The client then requested facts about a specific file. The server + returned the "250-" first control-response line, followed by a single + line of facts about the file, followed by the terminating "250 " + line. The text on the control-response line and the terminating line + can be anything the server decides to send. Notice that the fact + line is indented by a single space. Notice also that there are no + spaces in the set of facts returned, until the single space before + the filename. The filename returned on the fact line is a fully + qualified pathname of the file listed. The facts returned show that + the line refers to a file, that file contains approximately 1024990 + bytes, though more or less than that may be transferred if the file + is retrieved, and a different number may be required to store the + file at the client's file store, and the connected user has + permission to retrieve the file but not to do anything else + particularly interesting. + +8.7.2. MLST of a directory + + C> PWD + S> 257 "/" is current directory. + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Type=dir;Modify=19981107085215;Perm=el; /tmp + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 43] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + S> 250 End + + Again the PWD is just for the purposes of demonstration for the + example. The MLST fact line this time shows that the file listed is + a directory, that it was last modified at 08:52:15 on the 7th of + November, 1998 UTC, and that the user has permission to enter the + directory, and to list its contents, but not to modify it in any way. + Again, the fully qualified path name of the directory listed is + given. + +8.7.3. MLSD of a directory + + C> MLSD tmp + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD tmp + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19981107085215;Perm=el; tmp + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19981107085215;Perm=el; /tmp + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990112030508;Perm=el; .. + D> Type=file;Size=25730;Modify=19940728095854;Perm=; capmux.tar.z + D> Type=file;Size=1830;Modify=19940916055648;Perm=r; hatch.c + D> Type=file;Size=25624;Modify=19951003165342;Perm=r; MacIP-02.txt + D> Type=file;Size=2154;Modify=19950501105033;Perm=r; uar.netbsd.patch + D> Type=file;Size=54757;Modify=19951105101754;Perm=r; iptnnladev.1.0.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=226546;Modify=19970515023901;Perm=r; melbcs.tif + D> Type=file;Size=12927;Modify=19961025135602;Perm=r; tardis.1.6.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=17867;Modify=19961025135602;Perm=r; timelord.1.4.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=224907;Modify=19980615100045;Perm=r; uar.1.2.3.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=1024990;Modify=19980130010322;Perm=r; cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> 226 MLSD completed + + In this example notice that there is no leading space on the fact + lines returned over the data connection. Also notice that two lines + of "type=cdir" have been given. These show two alternate names for + the directory listed, one a fully qualified pathname, and the other a + local name relative to the servers current directory when the MLSD + was performed. Note that all other filenames in the output are + relative to the directory listed, though the server could, if it + chose, give a fully qualified path name for the "type=pdir" line. + This server has chosen not to. The other files listed present a + fairly boring set of files that are present in the listed directory. + Note that there is no particular order in which they are listed. + They are not sorted by filename, by size, or by modify time. Note + also that the "perm" fact has an empty value for the file + "capmux.tar.z" indicating that the connected user has no permissions + at all for that file. This server has chosen to present the "cdir" + and "pdir" lines before the lines showing the content of the + directory, it is not required to do so. The "size" fact does not + provide any meaningful information for a directory, so is not + included in the fact lines for the directory types shown. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 44] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.7.4. A more complex example + + C> MLst test + S> 250- Listing test + S> Type=dir;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4 test + S> 250 End + C> MLSD test + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD test + D> Type=cdir;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4; test + D> Type=pdir;Perm=e;Unique=keVO1+d?3; .. + D> Type=OS.unix=slink:/foobar;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+4G4; foobar + D> Type=OS.unix=chr-13/29;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+5G4; device + D> Type=OS.unix=blk-11/108;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+6G4; block + D> Type=file;Perm=awr;Unique=keVO1+8G4; writable + D> Type=dir;Perm=cpmel;Unique=keVO1+7G4; promiscuous + D> Type=dir;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+1t2; no-exec + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+EG4; two words + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+IH4; leading space + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file1 + D> Type=dir;Perm=cpmel;Unique=keVO1+7G4; incoming + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file2 + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file3 + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file4 + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD test/incoming + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD test/incoming + D> Type=cdir;Perm=cpmel;Unique=keVO1+7G4; test/incoming + D> Type=pdir;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4; .. + D> Type=file;Perm=awdrf;Unique=keVO1+EH4; bar + D> Type=file;Perm=awdrf;Unique=keVO1+LH4; + D> Type=file;Perm=rf;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file5 + D> Type=file;Perm=rf;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file6 + D> Type=dir;Perm=cpmdelf;Unique=keVO1+!s2; empty + S> 226 MLSD completed + + For the purposes of this example the fact set requested has been + modified to delete the "size" and "modify" facts, and add the + "unique" fact. First, facts about a filename have been obtained via + MLST. Note that no fully qualified path name was given this time. + That was because the server was unable to determine that information. + Then having determined that the filename represents a directory, that + directory has been listed. That listing also shows no fully + qualified path name, for the same reason, thus has but a single + "type=cdir" line. This directory (which was created especially for + the purpose) contains several interesting files. There are some with + OS dependent file types, several sub-directories, and several + ordinary files. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 45] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + Not much can be said here about the OS dependent file types, as none + of the information shown there should be treated as any more than + possibilities. It can be seen that the OS type of the server is + "unix" though, which is one of the OS types in the IANA registry of + Operating System names. + + Of the three directories listed, "no-exec" has no permission granted + to this user to access at all. From the "Unique" fact values, it can + be determined that "promiscuous" and "incoming" in fact represent the + same directory. Its permissions show that the connected user has + permission to do essentially anything other than to delete the + directory. That directory was later listed. It happens that the + directory can not be deleted because it is not empty. + + Of the normal files listed, two contain spaces in their names. The + file called " leading space" actually contains two spaces in its + name, one before the "l" and one between the "g" and the "s". The + two spaces that separate the facts from the visible part of the path + name make that clear. The file "writable" has the "a" and "w" + permission bits set, and consequently the connected user should be + able to STOR or APPE to that file. + + The other four file names, "file1", "file2", "file3", and "file4" all + represent the same underlying file, as can be seen from the values of + the "unique" facts of each. It happens that "file1" and "file2" are + Unix "hard" links, and that "file3" and "file4" are "soft" or + "symbolic" links to the first two. None of that information is + available via standard MLST facts, it is sufficient for the purposes + of FTP to note that all represent the same file, and that the same + data would be fetched no matter which of them was retrieved, and that + all would be simultaneously modified were data stored in any. + + Finally, the sub-directory "incoming" is listed. Since "promiscuous" + is the same directory there would be no point listing it as well. In + that directory, the files "file5" and "file6" represent still more + names for the "file1" file we have seen before. Notice the entry + between that for "bar" and "file5". Though it is not possible to + easily represent it in this document, that shows a file with a name + comprising exactly three spaces (" "). A client will have no + difficulty determining that name from the output presented to it + however. The directory "empty" is, as its name implies, empty, + though that is not shown here. It can, however, be deleted, as can + file "bar" and the file whose name is three spaces. All the files + that reside in this directory can be renamed. This is a consequence + of the UNIX semantics of the directory that contains them being + modifiable. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 46] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.7.5. More accurate time information + + C> MLst file1 + S> 250- Listing file1 + S> Type=file;Modify=19990929003355.237; file1 + S> 250 End + + In this example, the server-FTP is indicating that "file1" was last + modified 237 milliseconds after 00:33:55 UTC on the 29th of + September, 1999. + +8.7.6. A different server + + C> MLST + S> 250-Begin + S> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABCAAA; / + S> 250 End. + C> MLSD . + S> 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for MLS. + D> type=cdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABCAAA; / + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABEAAA; bin + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABGAAA; etc + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAAB8AwA; halflife + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABoAAA; incoming + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABIAAA; lib + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABWAEA; linux + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABKAEA; ncftpd + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABGAEA; outbox + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABuAAA; quake2 + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABQAEA; winstuff + S> 226 Listing completed. + C> MLSD linux + S> 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for MLS. + D> type=cdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABWAEA; /linux + D> type=pdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABCAAA; / + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABeAEA; firewall + D> type=file;size=12;unique=AQkAAAAAAAACWAEA; helo_world + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABYAEA; kernel + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABmAEA; scripts + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABkAEA; security + S> 226 Listing completed. + C> MLSD linux/kernel + S> 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for MLS. + D> type=cdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABYAEA; /linux/kernel + D> type=pdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABWAEA; /linux + D> type=file;size=6704;unique=AQkAAAAAAAADYAEA; k.config + D> type=file;size=7269221;unique=AQkAAAAAAAACYAEA; linux-2.0.36.tar.gz + D> type=file;size=12514594;unique=AQkAAAAAAAAEYAEA; linux-2.1.130.tar.gz + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 47] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + S> 226 Listing completed. + + Note that this server returns its "unique" fact value in quite a + different format. It also returns fully qualified path names for the + "pdir" entry. + +8.7.7. Some IANA files + + C> MLSD . + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD . + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990219183438; /iana/assignments + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990112030453; .. + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990219073522; media-types + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033515; character-set-info + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033529; languages + D> Type=file;Size=44242;Modify=19990217230400; character-sets + D> Type=file;Size=1947;Modify=19990209215600; operating-system-names + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD media-types + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD media-types + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990219073522; media-types + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990219073522; /iana/assignments/media-types + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990219183438; .. + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033045; text + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990219183442; image + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033216; multipart + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033254; video + D> Type=file;Size=30249;Modify=19990218032700; media-types + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD character-set-info + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD character-set-info + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033515; character-set-info + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033515; /iana/assignments/character-set-info + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990219183438; .. + D> Type=file;Size=1234;Modify=19980903020400; windows-1251 + D> Type=file;Size=4557;Modify=19980922001400; tis-620 + D> Type=file;Size=801;Modify=19970324130000; ibm775 + D> Type=file;Size=552;Modify=19970320130000; ibm866 + D> Type=file;Size=922;Modify=19960505140000; windows-1258 + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD languages + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD languages + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033529; languages + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033529; /iana/assignments/languages + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990219183438; .. + D> Type=file;Size=2391;Modify=19980309130000; default + D> Type=file;Size=943;Modify=19980309130000; tags + D> Type=file;Size=870;Modify=19971026130000; navajo + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 48] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + D> Type=file;Size=699;Modify=19950911140000; no-bok + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> PWD + S> 257 "/iana/assignments" is current directory. + + This example shows some of the IANA maintained files that are + relevant for this specification in MLSD format. Note that these + listings have been edited by deleting many entries, the actual + listings are much longer. + +8.7.8. A stress test of case (in)dependence + + The following example is intended to make clear some cases where case + dependent strings are permitted in the MLSx commands, and where case + independent strings are required. + + C> MlsD . + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD . + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990929011228;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4; .. + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+Bd8; FILE2 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+aG8; file3 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+ag8; FILE3 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bD8; file1 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bD8; file2 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+Ag8; File3 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bD8; File1 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+Bd8; File2 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bd8; FILE1 + S> 226 MLSD completed + + Note first that the "MLSD" command, shown here as "MlsD" is case + independent. Clients may issue this command in any case, or + combination of cases, they desire. This is the case for all FTP + commands. + + Next, notice the labels of the facts. These are also case + independent strings, Server-FTP is permitted to return them in any + case they desire. User-FTP must be prepared to deal with any case, + though it may do this by mapping the labels to a common case if + desired. + + Then, notice that there are nine objects of "type" file returned. In + a case independent NVFS these would represent three different file + names, "file1", "file2", and "file3". With a case dependent NVFS all + nine represent different file names. Either is possible, server-FTPs + may implement a case dependent or a case independent NVFS. User-FTPs + must allow for case dependent selection of files to manipulate on the + server. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 49] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + Lastly, notice that the value of the "unique" fact is case dependent. + In the example shown, "file1", "File1", and "file2" all have the same + "unique" fact value "keVO1+bD8", and thus all represent the same + underlying file. On the other hand, "FILE1" has a different "unique" + fact value ("keVO1+bd8") and hence represents a different file. + Similarly, "FILE2" and "File2" are two names for the same underlying + file, whereas "file3", "File3" and "FILE3" all represent different + underlying files. + + That the approximate sizes ("size" fact) and last modification times + ("modify" fact) are the same in all cases might be no more than a + coincidence. + + It is not suggested that the operators of server-FTPs create NVFS + which stress the protocols to this extent, however both user and + server implementations must be prepared to deal with such extreme + examples. + +8.8. FEAT response for MLSx + + When responding to the FEAT command, a server-FTP process that + supports MLST, and MLSD, plus internationalization of pathnames, MUST + indicate that this support exists. It does this by including a MLST + feature line. As well as indicating the basic support, the MLST + feature line indicates which MLST facts are available from the + server, and which of those will be returned if no subsequent "OPTS + MLST" command is sent. + + mlst-feat = SP "MLST" [SP factlist] CRLF + factlist = 1*( factname ["*"] ";" ) + + The initial space shown in the mlst-feat response is that required by + the FEAT command, two spaces are not permitted. If no factlist is + given, then the server-FTP process is indicating that it supports + MLST, but implements no facts. Only pathnames can be returned. This + would be a minimal MLST implementation, and useless for most + practical purposes. Where the factlist is present, the factnames + included indicate the facts supported by the server. Where the + optional asterisk appears after a factname, that fact will be + included in MLST format responses, until an "OPTS MLST" is given to + alter the list of facts returned. After that, subsequent FEAT + commands will return the asterisk to show the facts selected by the + most recent "OPTS MLST". + + Note that there is no distinct FEAT output for MLSD. The presence of + the MLST feature indicates that both MLST and MLSD are supported. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 50] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.8.1. Examples + + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> REST STREAM + S> MDTM + S> SIZE + S> TVFS + S> UTF8 + S> MLST Type*;Size*;Modify*;Perm*;Unique*;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + + Aside from some features irrelevant here, this server indicates that + it supports MLST including several, but not all, standard facts, all + of which it will send by default. It also supports two OS dependent + facts, and one locally defined fact. The latter three must be + requested expressly by the client for this server to supply them. + + C> Feat + S> 211-Extensions supported: + S> CLNT + S> MDTM + S> MLST type*;size*;modify*;UNIX.mode*;UNIX.owner;UNIX.group;unique; + S> PASV + S> REST STREAM + S> SIZE + S> TVFS + S> Compliance Level: 19981201 (IETF mlst-05) + S> 211 End. + + Again, in addition to some irrelevant features here, this server + indicates that it supports MLST, four of the standard facts, one of + which ("unique") is not enabled by default, and several OS dependent + facts, one of which is provided by the server by default. This + server actually supported more OS dependent facts. Others were + deleted for the purposes of this document to comply with document + formatting restrictions. + +8.9. OPTS parameters for MLST + + For the MLSx commands, the Client-FTP may specify a list of facts it + wishes to be returned in all subsequent MLSx commands until another + OPTS MLST command is sent. The format is specified by: + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 51] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + mlst-opts = "OPTS" SP "MLST" + [ SP 1*( factname ";" ) ] + + By sending the "OPTS MLST" command, the client requests the server to + include only the facts listed as arguments to the command in + subsequent output from MLSx commands. Facts not included in the + "OPTS MLST" command MUST NOT be returned by the server. Facts that + are included should be returned for each entry returned from the MLSx + command where they meaningfully apply. Facts requested that are not + supported, or which are inappropriate to the file or directory being + listed should simply be omitted from the MLSx output. This is not an + error. Note that where no factname arguments are present, the client + is requesting that only the file names be returned. In this case, + and in any other case where no facts are included in the result, the + space that separates the fact names and their values from the file + name is still required. That is, the first character of the output + line will be a space, (or two characters will be spaces when the line + is returned over the control connection,) and the file name will + start immediately thereafter. + + Clients should note that generating values for some facts can be + possible, but very expensive, for some servers. It is generally + acceptable to retrieve any of the facts that the server offers as its + default set before any "OPTS MLST" command has been given, however + clients should use particular caution before requesting any facts not + in that set. That is, while other facts may be available from the + server, clients should refrain from requesting such facts unless + there is a particular operational requirement for that particular + information, which ought be more significant than perhaps simply + improving the information displayed to an end user. + + Note, there is no "OPTS MLSD" command, the fact names set with the + "OPTS MLST" command apply to both MLST and MLSD commands. + + Servers are not required to accept "OPTS MLST" commands before + authentication of the user-PI, but may choose to permit them. + +8.9.1. OPTS MLST Response + + The "response-message" from [6] to a successful OPTS MLST command has + the following syntax. + + mlst-opt-resp = "MLST OPTS" [ SP 1*( factname ";" ) ] + + This defines the "response-message" as used in the "opts-good" + message in RFC2389 [6]. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 52] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The facts named in the response are those which the server will now + include in MLST (and MLSD) response, after the processing of the + "OPTS MLST" command. Any facts from the request not supported by the + server will be omitted from this response message. If no facts will + be included, the list of facts will be empty. Note that the list of + facts returned will be the same as those marked by a trailing + asterisk ("*") in a subsequent FEAT command response. There is no + requirement that the order of the facts returned be the same as that + in which they were requested, or that in which they will be listed in + a FEAT command response, or that in which facts are returned in MLST + responses. The fixed string "MLST OPTS" in the response may be + returned in any case, or mixture of cases. + +8.9.2. Examples + + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size;Modify*;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> OptS Mlst Type;UNIX.mode;Perm; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Type;Perm;UNIX.mode; + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size;Modify;Perm*;Unique;UNIX.mode*;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> opts MLst lang;type;charset;create; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Type; + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> OPTS mlst size;frogs; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Size; + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type;Size*;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> opts MLst unique type; + S> 501 Invalid MLST options + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type;Size*;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + + For the purposes of this example, features other than MLST have been + deleted from the output to avoid clutter. The example shows the + initial default feature output for MLST. The facts requested are + then changed by the client. The first change shows facts that are + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 53] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + available from the server being selected. Subsequent FEAT output + shows the altered features as being returned. The client then + attempts to select some standard features which the server does not + support. This is not an error, however the server simply ignores the + requests for unsupported features, as the FEAT output that follows + shows. Then, the client attempts to request a non-standard, and + unsupported, feature. The server ignores that, and selects only the + supported features requested. Lastly, the client sends a request + containing a syntax error (spaces cannot appear in the factlist.) The + server-FTP sends an error response and completely ignores the + request, leaving the fact set selected as it had been previously. + + Note that in all cases, except the error response, the response lists + the facts that have been selected. + + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size*;Modify*;Perm*;Unique*;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> Opts MLST + S> 201 MLST OPTS + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type;Size;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OPTS mlst unique;size; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Size;Unique; + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OPTS mlst unique;type;modify; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Type;Modify;Unique; + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Type=dir;Modify=19990930152225;Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OPTS mlst fish;cakes; + S> 201 MLST OPTS + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OptS Mlst Modify;Unique; + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 54] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + S> 201 MLST OPTS Modify;Unique; + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Modify=19990930152225;Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + C> opts MLst fish cakes; + S> 501 Invalid MLST options + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Modify=19990930152225;Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + + This example shows the effect of changing the facts requested upon + subsequent MLST commands. Notice that a syntax error leaves the set + of selected facts unchanged. Also notice exactly two spaces + preceding the pathname when no facts were selected, either + deliberately, or because none of the facts requested were available. + +9. Impact On Other FTP Commands + + Along with the introduction of MLST, traditional FTP commands must be + extended to allow for the use of more than US-ASCII or EBCDIC + character sets. In general, the support of MLST requires support for + arbitrary character sets wherever filenames and directory names are + allowed. This applies equally to both arguments given to the + following commands and to the replies from them, as appropriate. + + CWD + RETR + STOR + STOU + APPE + RNFR + RNTO + DELE + RMD + MKD + PWD + STAT + + The arguments to all of these commands should be processed the same + way that MLST commands and responses are processed with respect to + handling embedded spaces, CRs and NULs. See section 2.2. + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 55] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +10. Character sets and Internationalization + + FTP commands are protocol elements, and are always expressed in + ASCII. FTP responses are composed of the numeric code, which is a + protocol element, and a message, which is often expected to convey + information to the user. It is not expected that users normally + interact directly with the protocol elements, rather the user FTP- + process constructs the commands, and interprets the results, in the + manner best suited for the particular user. Explanatory text in + responses generally has no particular meaning to the protocol. The + numeric codes provide all necessary information. Server-PIs are free + to provide the text in any language that can be adequately + represented in ASCII, or where an alternative language and + representation has been negotiated (see [7]) in that language and + representation. + + Pathnames are expected to be encoded in UTF-8 allowing essentially + any character to be represented in a pathname. Meaningful pathnames + are defined by the server NVFS. + + No restrictions at all are placed upon the contents of files + transferred using the FTP protocols. Unless the "media-type" fact is + provided in a MLSx response nor is any advice given here which would + allow determining the content type. That information is assumed to + be obtained via other means. + +11. IANA Considerations + + This specification makes use of some lists of values currently + maintained by the IANA, and creates two new lists for the IANA to + maintain. It does not add any values to any existing registries. + + The existing IANA registries used by this specification are modified + using mechanisms specified elsewhere. + +11.1. The OS specific fact registry + + A registry of OS specific fact names shall be maintained by the IANA. + The OS names for the OS portion of the fact name must be taken from + the IANA's list of registered OS names. To add a fact name to this + OS specific registry of OS specific facts, an applicant must send to + the IANA a request, in which is specified the OS name, the OS + specific fact name, a definition of the syntax of the fact value, + which must conform to the syntax of a token as given in this + document, and a specification of the semantics to be associated with + the particular fact and its values. Upon receipt of such an + application, and if the combination of OS name and OS specific fact + name has not been previously defined, the IANA will add the + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 56] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + specification to the registry. + + Any examples of OS specific facts found in this document are to be + treated as examples of possible OS specific facts, and do not form a + part of the IANA's registry merely because of being included in this + document. + +11.2. The OS specific filetype registry + + A registry of OS specific file types shall be maintained by the IANA. + The OS names for the OS portion of the fact name must be taken from + the IANA's list of registered OS names. To add a file type to this + OS specific registry of OS specific file types, an applicant must + send to the IANA a request, in which is specified the OS name, the OS + specific file type, a definition of the syntax of the fact value, + which must conform to the syntax of a token as given in this + document, and a specification of the semantics to be associated with + the particular fact and its values. Upon receipt of such an + application, and if the combination of OS name and OS specific file + type has not been previously defined, the IANA will add the + specification to the registry. + + Any examples of OS specific file types found in this document are to + be treated as potential OS specific file types only, and do not form + a part of the IANA's registry merely because of being included in + this document. + +12. Security Considerations + + This memo does not directly concern security. It is not believed + that any of the mechanisms documented here impact in any particular + way upon the security of FTP. + + Implementing the SIZE command, and perhaps some of the facts of the + MDLx commands, may impose a considerable load on the server, which + could lead to denial of service attacks. Servers have, however, + implemented this for many years, without significant reported + difficulties. + + With the introduction of virtual hosts to FTP, and the possible + accompanying multiple authentication environments, server + implementors will need to take some care to ensure that integrity is + maintained. + + The FEAT and OPTS commands may be issued before the FTP + authentication has occurred [6]. This allows unauthenticated clients + to determine which of the features defined here are supported, and to + negotiate the fact list for MLSx output. No actual MLSx commands may + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 57] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + be issued however, and no problems with permitting the selection of + the format prior to authentication are foreseen. + + A general discussion of issues related to the security of FTP can be + found in [14]. + +13. References + + [1] Coded Character Set--7-bit American Standard Code for Information + Interchange, ANSI X3.4-1986. + + [2] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode and ISO + 10646", RFC 2044, October 1996. + + [3] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)", + STD 9, RFC 959, October 1985 + + [4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + [5] Crocker, D., Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997 + + [6] Hethmon, P., Elz, R., "Feature negotiation mechanism for the + File Transfer Protocol", RFC 2389, August 1998 + + [7] Curtin, W., "Internationalization of the File Transfer Protocol", + RFC 2640, July 1999 + + [8] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "Telnet protocol Specification" + STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983 + + [9] Braden, R,. "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application + and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989 + + [10] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities" + STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987 + + [11] ISO/IEC 10646-1:1993 "Universal multiple-octet coded character set + (UCS) -- Part 1: Architecture and basic multilingual plane", + International Standard -- Information Technology, 1993 + + [12] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. http://www.iana.org + Email: iana@iana.org. + + [13] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of Languages" + RFC 1766, March 1995 + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 58] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + [14] Allman, M., Ostermann, S., "FTP Security Considerations" + RFC 2577, May 1999 + +Acknowledgments + + This document is a product of the FTPEXT working group of the IETF. + + The following people are among those who have contributed to this + document: + + Alex Belits + D. J. Bernstein + Dave Cridland + Martin J. Duerst + Mike Gleason + Mark Harris + Alun Jones + James Matthews + Luke Mewburn + Jan Mikkelsen + Keith Moore + Buz Owen + Mark Symons + Stephen Tihor + and the entire FTPEXT working group of the IETF. + + Apologies are offered to any inadvertently omitted. + + Bernhard Rosenkraenzer suggested the HOST command, and initially + described it. + + The description of the modifications to the REST command and the MDTM + and SIZE commands comes from a set of modifications suggested for + RFC959 by Rick Adams in 1989. A draft containing just those + commands, edited by David Borman, has been merged with this document. + + Mike Gleason provided access to the FTP server used in some of the + examples. + + All of the examples in this document are taken from actual + client/server exchanges, though some have been edited for brevity, or + to meet document formatting requirements. + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 59] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +Copyright + + This document is in the public domain. Any and all copyright + protection that might apply in any jurisdiction is expressly + disclaimed. + +Editors' Addresses + + Robert Elz + University of Melbourne + Department of Computer Science + Parkville, Vic 3052 + Australia + + Email: kre@munnari.OZ.AU + + + Paul Hethmon + Hethmon Brothers + 2305 Chukar Road + Knoxville, TN 37923 USA + + Phone: +1 423 690 8990 + Email: phethmon@hethmon.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 60] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1bee6fa49 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2690 @@ + + + + + + + + + +INTERNET DRAFT K. Raeburn +Kerberos Working Group MIT +Document: draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-03.txt February 24, 2003 + expires August 24, 2003 + + Encryption and Checksum Specifications + for Kerberos 5 + +Abstract + + This document describes a framework for defining encryption and + checksum mechanisms for use with the Kerberos protocol [Kerb], + defining an abstraction layer between the Kerberos protocol and + related protocols, and the actual mechanisms themselves. Several + mechanisms are also defined in this document. Some are taken from + RFC 1510, modified in form to fit this new framework, and + occasionally modified in content when the old specification was + incorrect. New mechanisms are presented here as well. This document + does NOT indicate which mechanisms may be considered "required to + implement". + + Comments should be sent to the editor, or to the IETF Kerberos + working group (ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov). + +Status + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [RFC2026]. Internet-Drafts + are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), + its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, + replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is + inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite + them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.html. + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 1] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Table of Contents + + +Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 +Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 +Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 +Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 +1. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 +2. Encryption algorithm profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 +3. Checksum algorithm profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 +4. Simplified profile for CBC ciphers with key derivation . . . . . 10 +4.1. A key derivation function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 +4.2. Simplified profile parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 +4.3. Cryptosystem profile based on simplified profile . . . . . . . 14 +4.4. Checksum profiles based on simplified profile . . . . . . . . . 16 +5. Profiles for Kerberos encryption and checksum algorithms . . . . 16 +5.1. Unkeyed checksums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 +5.2. DES-based encryption and checksum types . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 +5.3. Triple-DES based encryption and checksum types . . . . . . . . 28 +6. Use of Kerberos encryption outside this specification . . . . . . 30 +7. Assigned Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 +8. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 +9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 +10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 +11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 +12. Editor's address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 +13. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 +A. Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 +A.1. n-fold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 +A.2. mit_des_string_to_key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 +A.3. DES3 DR and DK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 +A.4. DES3string_to_key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 +A.5. Modified CRC-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 +B. Significant Changes from RFC 1510 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 +Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 +Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 +Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 2] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +Introduction + + The Kerberos protocols are designed to encrypt messages of arbitrary + sizes, using block encryption ciphers, or less commonly, stream + encryption ciphers. Encryption is used to prove the identities of + the network entities participating in message exchanges. However, + nothing in the Kerberos protocol requires any specific encryption + algorithm be used, as long as certain operations are available in the + algorithm that is used. + + The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms + currently defined for Kerberos, as well as a framework for defining + future mechanisms. The encoding, chaining, padding and other + requirements for each are described. Test vectors for several + functions are given in appendix A. + +1. Concepts + + Both encryption and checksum mechanisms are defined in terms of + profiles, detailed in later sections. Each specifies a collection of + operations and attributes that must be defined for a mechanism. A + Kerberos encryption or checksum mechanism specification is not + complete if it does not define all of these operations and + attributes. + + An encryption mechanism must provide for confidentiality and + integrity of the original plaintext. (Integrity checking may be + achieved by incorporating a checksum, if the encryption mode does not + provide an integrity check itself.) It must also provide non- + malleability [Bellare98, Dolev91]. Use of a random confounder + prepended to the plaintext is recommended. It should not be possible + to determine if two ciphertexts correspond to the same plaintext, + without knowledge of the key. + + A checksum mechanism [1] must provide proof of the integrity of the + associated message, and must preserve the confidentiality of the + message in case it is not sent in the clear. It should be infeasible + to find two plaintexts which have the same checksum. It is NOT + required that an eavesdropper be unable to determine if two checksums + are for the same message; it is assumed that the messages themselves + will be visible to any such eavesdropper. + + Due to advances in cryptography, it is considered unwise by some + cryptographers to use the same key for multiple purposes. Since keys + are used in performing a number of different functions in Kerberos, + it is desirable to use different keys for each of these purposes, + even though we start with a single long-term or session key. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 3] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + We do this by enumerating the different uses of keys within Kerberos, + and making the "usage number" an input to the encryption or checksum + mechanisms; this enumeration is outside the scope of this document. + Later sections of this document define simplified profile templates + for encryption and checksum mechanisms that use a key derivation + function applied to a CBC mode (or similar) cipher and a checksum or + hash algorithm. + + We distinguish the "base key" specified by other documents from the + "specific key" to be used for a particular instance of encryption or + checksum operations. It is expected but not required that the + specific key will be one or more separate keys derived from the + original protocol key and the key usage number. The specific key + should not be explicitly referenced outside of this document. The + typical language used in other documents should be something like, + "encrypt this octet string using this key and this usage number"; + generation of the specific key and cipher state (described in the + next section) are implicit. The creation of a new cipher-state + object, or the re-use of one from a previous encryption operation, + may also be explicit. + + New protocols defined in terms of the Kerberos encryption and + checksum types should use their own key usage values. Key usages are + unsigned 32 bit integers; zero is not permitted. + + All data is assumed to be in the form of strings of octets or 8-bit + bytes. Environments with other byte sizes will have to emulate this + behavior in order to get correct results. + + Each algorithm is assigned an encryption type (or "etype") or + checksum type number, for algorithm identification within the + Kerberos protocol. The full list of current type number assignments + is given in section 7. + +2. Encryption algorithm profile + + An encryption mechanism profile must define the following attributes + and operations. The operations must be defined as functions in the + mathematical sense: no additional or implicit inputs (such as + Kerberos principal names or message sequence numbers) are permitted. + + protocol key format + This describes what octet string values represent valid keys. For + encryption mechanisms that don't have perfectly dense key spaces, + this will describe the representation used for encoding keys. It + need not describe specific values that are not valid or desirable + for use; such values should be avoid by all key generation + routines. + + + +Raeburn [Page 4] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + specific key structure + This is not a protocol format at all, but a description of the + keying material derived from the chosen key and used to encrypt or + decrypt data or compute or verify a checksum. It may, for + example, be a single key, a set of keys, or a combination of the + original key with additional data. The authors recommend using + one or more keys derived from the original key via one-way + functions. + + required checksum mechanism + This indicates a checksum mechanism that must be available when + this encryption mechanism is used. Since Kerberos has no built in + mechanism for negotiating checksum mechanisms, once an encryption + mechanism has been decided upon, the corresponding checksum + mechanism can simply be used. + + key-generation seed length, K + This is the length of the random bitstring needed to generate a + key with the encryption scheme's random-to-key function (described + below). This must be a fixed value so that various techniques for + producing a random bitstring of a given length may be used with + key generation functions. + + key generation functions + Keys must be generated in a number of cases, from different types + of inputs. All function specifications must indicate how to + generate keys in the proper wire format, and must avoid generation + of keys that significantly compromise the confidentiality of + encrypted data, if the cryptosystem has such. Entropy from each + source should be preserved as much as possible. Many of the + inputs, while unknown, may be at least partly predictable (e.g., a + password string is likely to be entirely in the ASCII subset and + of fairly short length in many environments; a semi-random string + may include timestamps); the benefit of such predictability to an + attacker must be minimized. + + string-to-key (UTF-8 string, UTF-8 string, opaque)->(protocol-key) + This function generates a key from two UTF-8 strings and an + opaque octet string. One of the strings is normally the + principal's pass phrase, but is in general merely a secret + string. The other string is a "salt" string intended to + produce different keys from the same password for different + users or realms. While the strings provided will use UTF-8 + encoding, no specific version of Unicode should be assumed; all + valid UTF-8 strings should be allowed. + + The third argument, the octet string, may be used to pass + mechanism-specific parameters in to this function. Since doing + + + +Raeburn [Page 5] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + so implies knowledge of the specific encryption system, it is + intended that generating non-default parameter values be an + uncommon operation, and that normal Kerberos applications be + able to treat this parameter block as an opaque object supplied + by the KDC or defaulted to some mechanism-specific constant + value. + + This should be a one-way function, so that compromising a + user's key in one realm does not compromise the user's key in + another realm, even if the same password (but a different salt) + is used. + + random-to-key (bitstring[K])->(protocol-key) + This function generates a key from a random bit string of a + specific size. It may be assumed that all the bits of the + input string are equally random, even though the entropy + present in the random source may be limited. + + key-derivation (protocol-key, integer)->(specific-key) + In this function, the integer input is the key usage value as + described above; the usage values must be assumed to be known + to an attacker. The specific-key output value was described in + section 1. + + string-to-key parameter format + This describes the format of the block of data that can be passed + to the string-to-key function above to configure additional + parameters for that function. Along with the mechanism of + encoding parameter values, bounds on the allowed parameters should + also be described to avoid allowing a spoofed KDC to compromise + the user's password. It may be desirable to construct the + encoding such that values weakening the resulting key unacceptably + cannot be encoded, if practical. + + Tighter bounds might be permitted by local security policy, or to + avoid excess resource consumption; if so, recommended defaults for + those bounds should be given in the specification. The + description should also outline possible weaknesses that may be + caused by not applying bounds checks or other validation to a + parameter string received from the network. + + As mentioned above, this should be considered opaque to most + normal applications. + + default string-to-key parameters (octet string) + This default value for the "params" argument to the string-to-key + function is to be used when the application protocol (Kerberos or + otherwise) does not explicitly set the parameter value. As + + + +Raeburn [Page 6] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + indicated above, this parameter block should be treated as an + opaque object in most cases. + + cipher state + This describes any information that can be carried over from one + encryption or decryption operation to the next, for use in + conjunction with a given specific key. For example, a block + cipher used in CBC mode may put an initial vector of one block in + the cipher state. Other encryption modes may track nonces or + other data. + + This state must be non-empty, and must influence encryption so as + to require that messages be decrypted in the same order they were + encrypted, if the cipher state is carried over from one encryption + to the next. Distinguishing out-of-order or missing messages from + corrupted messages is not required; if desired, this can be done + at a higher level by including sequence numbers and not "chaining" + the cipher state between encryption operations. + + The cipher state may not be reused in multiple encryption or + decryption operations; these operations all generate a new cipher + state that may be used for following operations using the same key + and operation. + + The contents of the cipher state must be treated as opaque outside + of encryption system specifications. + + initial cipher state (specific-key, direction)->(state) + This describes the generation of the initial value for the cipher + state if it is not being carried over from a previous encryption + or decryption operation. + + This describes any initial state setup needed before encrypting + arbitrary amounts of data with a given specific key; the specific + key and the direction of operations to be performed (encrypt + versus decrypt) must be the only input needed for this + initialization. + + This state should be treated as opaque in any uses outside of an + encryption algorithm definition. + + IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: [Kerb1510] was vague on whether and to what + degree an application protocol could exercise control over the + initial vector used in DES CBC operations. Some existing + implementations permit the setting of the initial vector. This + new specification does not permit application control of the + cipher state (beyond "initialize" and "carry over from previous + encryption"), since the form and content of the initial cipher + + + +Raeburn [Page 7] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + state can vary between encryption systems, and may not always be a + single block of random data. + + New Kerberos application protocols should not assume that they can + control the initial vector, or that one even exists. However, a + general-purpose implementation may wish to provide the capability, + in case applications explicitly setting it are encountered. + + encrypt (specific-key, state, octet string)->(state, octet string) + This function takes the specific key, cipher state, and a non- + empty plaintext string as input, and generates ciphertext and a + new cipher state as outputs. If the basic encryption algorithm + itself does not provide for integrity protection (as DES in CBC + mode does not do), then some form of MAC or checksum must be + included that can be verified by the receiver. Some random factor + such as a confounder should be included so that an observer cannot + know if two messages contain the same plaintext, even if the + cipher state and specific keys are the same. The exact length of + the plaintext need not be encoded, but if it is not and if padding + is required, the padding must be added at the end of the string so + that the decrypted version may be parsed from the beginning. + + The specification of the encryption function must not only + indicate the precise contents of the output octet string, but also + the output cipher state. The application protocol may carry + forward the output cipher state from one encryption with a given + specific key to another; the effect of this "chaining" must be + defined. [2] + + Assuming correctly-produced values for the specific key and cipher + state, no input octet string may result in an error indication. + + decrypt (specific-key, state, octet string)->(state, octet string) + This function takes the specific key, cipher state, and ciphertext + as inputs, and verifies the integrity of the supplied ciphertext. + If the ciphertext's integrity is intact, this function produces + the plaintext and a new cipher state as outputs; otherwise, an + error indication must be returned, and the data discarded. + + The result of the decryption may be longer than the original + plaintext, for example if the encryption mode adds padding to + reach a multiple of a block size. If this is the case, any extra + octets must be after the decoded plaintext. An application + protocol which needs to know the exact length of the message must + encode a length or recognizable "end of message" marker within the + plaintext. [3] + + As with the encryption function, a correct specification for this + + + +Raeburn [Page 8] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + function must indicate not only the contents of the output octet + string, but also the resulting cipher state. + + pseudo-random (protocol-key, octet-string)->(octet-string) + This pseudo-random function should generate an octet string of + some size that independent of the octet string input. The PRF + output string should be suitable for use in key generation, even + if the octet string input is public. It should not reveal the + input key, even if the output is made public. + + These operations and attributes are all that should be required to + support Kerberos and various proposed preauthentication schemes. + + A document defining a new encryption type should also describe known + weaknesses or attacks, so that its security may be fairly assessed, + and should include test vectors or other validation procedures for + the operations defined. Specific references to information readily + available elsewhere are sufficient. + +3. Checksum algorithm profile + + A checksum mechanism profile must define the following attributes and + operations: + + associated encryption algorithm(s) + This indicates the types of encryption keys this checksum + mechanism can be used with. + + A keyed checksum mechanism may have more than one associated + encryption algorithm if they share the same wire key format, + string-to-key function, and key derivation function. (This + combination means that, for example, a checksum type, key usage + value and password are adequate to get the specific key used to + compute a checksum.) + + An unkeyed checksum mechanism can be used in conjunction with any + encryption type, since the key is ignored, but its use must be + limited to cases where the checksum itself is protected, to avoid + trivial attacks. + + get_mic function + This function generates a MIC token for a given specific key (see + section 2), and message (represented as an octet string), that may + be used to verify the integrity of the associated message. This + function is not required to return the same deterministic result + on every use; it need only generate a token that the verify_mic + routine can check. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 9] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + The output of this function will also dictate the size of the + checksum. + + verify_mic function + Given a specific key, message, and MIC token, this function + ascertains whether the message integrity has been compromised. + For a deterministic get_mic routine, the corresponding verify_mic + may simply generate another checksum and compare them. + + The get_mic and verify_mic operations must be able to handle inputs + of arbitrary length; if any padding is needed, the padding scheme + must be specified as part of these functions. + + These operations and attributes are all that should be required to + support Kerberos and various proposed preauthentication schemes. + + As with encryption mechanism definition documents, documents defining + new checksum mechanisms should indicate validation processes and + known weaknesses. + +4. Simplified profile for CBC ciphers with key derivation + + The profile outlines in sections 2 and 3 describes a large number of + operations that must be defined for encryption and checksum + algorithms to be used with Kerberos. We describe here a simpler + profile from which both encryption and checksum mechanism definitions + can be generated, filling in uses of key derivation in appropriate + places, providing integrity protection, and defining multiple + operations for the cryptosystem profile based on a smaller set of + operations given in the simplified profile. Not all of the existing + cryptosystems for Kerberos fit into this simplified profile, but we + recommend that future cryptosystems use it or something based on it. + [4] + + Not all of the operations in the complete profiles are defined + through this mechanism; several must still be defined for each new + algorithm pair. + +4.1. A key derivation function + + Rather than define some scheme by which a "protocol key" is composed + of a large number of encryption keys, we use keys derived from a base + key to perform cryptographic operations. The base key must be used + only for generating the derived keys, and this derivation must be + non-invertible and entropy-preserving. Given these restrictions, + compromise of one derived key does not compromise the other subkeys. + Attack of the base key is limited, since it is only used for + derivation, and is not exposed to any user data. + + + +Raeburn [Page 10] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Since the derived key has as much entropy as the base keys (if the + cryptosystem is good), password-derived keys have the full benefit of + all the entropy in the password. + + To generate a derived key from a base key, we generate a pseudorandom + octet string, using an algorithm DR described below, and generate a + key from that octet string using a function dependent on the + encryption algorithm; the input length needed for that function, + which is also dependent on the encryption algorithm, dictates the + length of the string to be generated by the DR algorithm (the value + "k" below). These procedures are based on the key derivation in + [Blumenthal96]. + + Derived Key = DK(Base Key, Well-Known Constant) + + DK(Key, Constant) = random-to-key(DR(Key, Constant)) + + DR(Key, Constant) = k-truncate(E(Key, Constant, + initial-cipher-state)) + + Here DR is the random-octet generation function described below, and + DK is the key-derivation function produced from it. In this + construction, E(Key, Plaintext, CipherState) is a cipher, Constant is + a well-known constant determined by the specific usage of this + function, and k-truncate truncates its argument by taking the first k + bits. Here, k is the key generation seed length needed for the + encryption system. + + The output of the DR function is a string of bits; the actual key is + produced by applying the cryptosystem's random-to-key operation on + this bitstring. + + If the Constant is smaller than the cipher block size of E, then it + must be expanded with n-fold() so it can be encrypted. If the output + of E is shorter than k bits it is fed back into the encryption as + many times as necessary. The construct is as follows (where | + indicates concatentation): + + K1 = E(Key, n-fold(Constant), initial-cipher-state) + K2 = E(Key, K1, initial-cipher-state) + K3 = E(Key, K2, initial-cipher-state) + K4 = ... + + DR(Key, Constant) = k-truncate(K1 | K2 | K3 | K4 ...) + + n-fold is an algorithm which takes m input bits and ``stretches'' + them to form n output bits with equal contribution from each input + bit to the output, as described in [Blumenthal96]: + + + +Raeburn [Page 11] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + We first define a primitive called n-folding, which takes a + variable-length input block and produces a fixed-length output + sequence. The intent is to give each input bit approximately + equal weight in determining the value of each output bit. Note + that whenever we need to treat a string of octets as a number, the + assumed representation is Big-Endian -- Most Significant Byte + first. + + To n-fold a number X, replicate the input value to a length that + is the least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before + each repetition, the input is rotated to the right by 13 bit + positions. The successive n-bit chunks are added together using + 1's-complement addition (that is, with end-around carry) to yield + a n-bit result.... + + + Test vectors for n-fold are supplied in Appendix A. [5] + + In this section, n-fold is always used to produce c bits of output, + where c is the cipher block size of E. + + The size of the Constant must not be larger than c, because reducing + the length of the Constant by n-folding can cause collisions. + + If the size of the Constant is smaller than c, then the Constant must + be n-folded to length c. This string is used as input to E. If the + block size of E is less than the random-to-key input size, then the + output from E is taken as input to a second invocation of E. This + process is repeated until the number of bits accumulated is greater + than or equal to the random-to-key input size. When enough bits have + been computed, the first k are taken as the random data used to + create the key with the algorithm-dependent random-to-key function. + + Since the derived key is the result of one or more encryptions in the + base key, deriving the base key from the derived key is equivalent to + determining the key from a very small number of plaintext/ciphertext + pairs. Thus, this construction is as strong as the cryptosystem + itself. + +4.2. Simplified profile parameters + + These are the operations and attributes that must be defined: + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 12] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + protocol key format + string-to-key function + default string-to-key parameters + key-generation seed length, k + random-to-key function + As above for the normal encryption mechanism profile. + + unkeyed hash algorithm, H + This should be a collision-resistant hash algorithm with fixed- + size output, suitable for use in an HMAC [HMAC]. It must support + inputs of arbitrary length. Its output must be at least the + message block size (below). + + HMAC output size, h + This indicates the size of the leading substring output by the + HMAC function that should be used in transmitted messages. It + should be at least half the output size of the hash function H, + and at least 80 bits; it need not match the output size. + + message block size, m + This is the size of the smallest units the cipher can handle in + the mode in which it is being used. Messages will be padded to a + multiple of this size. If a block cipher is used in a mode that + can handle messages that are not multiples of the cipher block + size, such as CBC mode with cipher text stealing (CTS, see [RC5]), + this value would be one octet. For traditional CBC mode with + padding, it will be the underlying cipher's block size. + + This value must be a multiple of 8 bits (one octet). + + encryption/decryption functions, E and D + These are basic encryption and decryption functions for messages + of sizes that are multiples of the message block size. No + integrity checking or confounder should be included here. These + functions take as input the IV or similar data, a protocol-format + key, and a octet string, returning a new IV and octet string. + + The encryption function is not required to use CBC mode, but is + assumed to be using something with similar properties. In + particular, prepending a cipher-block-size confounder to the + plaintext should alter the entire ciphertext (comparable to + choosing and including a random initial vector for CBC mode). + + The result of encrypting one cipher block (of size c, above) must + be deterministic, for the random octet generation function DR in + the previous section to work. For best security, it should also + be no larger than c. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 13] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + cipher block size, c + This is the block size of the block cipher underlying the + encryption and decryption functions indicated above, used for key + derivation and for the size of the message confounder and initial + vector. (If a block cipher is not in use, some comparable + parameter should be determined.) It must be at least 5 octets. + + This is not actually an independent parameter; rather, it is a + property of the functions E and D. It is listed here to clarify + the distinction between it and the message block size, m. + + While there are still a number of properties to specify, they are + fewer and simpler than in the full profile. + +4.3. Cryptosystem profile based on simplified profile + + The above key derivation function is used to produce three + intermediate keys. One is used for computing checksums of + unencrypted data. The other two are used for encrypting and + checksumming plaintext to be sent encrypted. + + The ciphertext output is the concatenation of the output of the basic + encryption function E and a (possibly truncated) HMAC using the + specified hash function H, both applied to the plaintext with a + random confounder prefix and sufficient padding to bring it to a + multiple of the message block size. When the HMAC is computed, the + key is used in the protocol key form. + + Decryption is performed by removing the (partial) HMAC, decrypting + the remainder, and verifying the HMAC. The cipher state is an + initial vector, initialized to zero. + + The substring notation "[1..h]" in the following table should be read + as using 1-based indexing; leading substrings are used. + + + cryptosystem from simplified profile +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +protocol key format As given. + +specific key structure Three protocol-format keys: { Kc, Ke, Ki }. + +key-generation seed As given. +length + +required checksum As defined below in section 4.4. +mechanism + + + + +Raeburn [Page 14] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + cryptosystem from simplified profile +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +cipher state initial vector (usually of length c) + +initial cipher state all bits zero + +encryption function conf = random string of length c + pad = shortest string to bring confounder + and plaintext to a length that's a + multiple of m + C1 = E(Ke, conf | plaintext | pad, + oldstate.ivec) + H1 = HMAC(Ki, conf | plaintext | pad) + ciphertext = C1 | H1[1..h] + newstate.ivec = last c of C1 + +decryption function (C1,H1) = ciphertext + P1 = D(Ke, C1, oldstate.ivec) + if (H1 != HMAC(Ki, P1)[1..h]) + report error + newstate.ivec = last c of C1 + +default string-to-key As given. +params + +pseudo-random function tmp1 = H(octet-string) + tmp2 = truncate tmp1 to multiple of m + PRF = E(protocol-key, tmp2, initial-cipher-state) + +key generation functions: + +string-to-key function As given. + +random-to-key function As given. + +key-derivation function The "well-known constant" used for the DK + function is the key usage number, expressed as + four octets in big-endian order, followed by one + octet indicated below. + + Kc = DK(base-key, usage | 0x99); + Ke = DK(base-key, usage | 0xAA); + Ki = DK(base-key, usage | 0x55); + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 15] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +4.4. Checksum profiles based on simplified profile + + When an encryption system is defined using the simplified profile + given in section 4.2, a checksum algorithm may be defined for it as + follows: + + + checksum mechanism from simplified profile + -------------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem as defined above + + get_mic HMAC(Kc, message)[1..h] + + verify_mic get_mic and compare + + The HMAC function and key Kc are as described in section 4.3. + +5. Profiles for Kerberos encryption and checksum algorithms + + These profiles describe the encryption and checksum systems defined + for Kerberos. The astute reader will notice that some of them do not + fulfull all of the requirements outlined in previous sections. These + systems are defined for backward compatibility; newer implementations + should (whenever possible) attempt to make use of encryption systems + which satisfy all of the profile requirements. + + The full list of current encryption and checksum type number + assignments, including values currently reserved but not defined in + this document, is given in section 7. + +5.1. Unkeyed checksums + + These checksum types use no encryption keys, and thus can be used in + combination with any encryption type, but may only be used with + caution, in limited circumstances where the lack of a key does not + provide a window for an attack, preferably as part of an encrypted + message. [6] Keyed checksum algorithms are recommended. + +5.1.1. The RSA MD5 Checksum + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 + algorithm [MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 16] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to be collision-proof. + + rsa-md5 + ---------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem any + + get_mic rsa-md5(msg) + + verify_mic get_mic and compare + + The rsa-md5 checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of + seven (7). + +5.1.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 + algorithm [MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) + checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to be collision-proof. + + + rsa-md4 + ---------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem any + + get_mic md4(msg) + + verify_mic get_mic and compare + + + The rsa-md4 checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of + two (2). + +5.1.3. CRC-32 Checksum + + This CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic + redundancy check as described in ISO 3309 [CRC], modified as + described below. The resulting checksum is four (4) octets in + length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof; thus, the + use of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a + probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be + able to generate an alternative message that satisfies the checksum. + + The CRC-32 checksum used in the des-cbc-crc encryption mode is + identical to the 32-bit FCS described in ISO 3309 with two + exceptions: the sum with the all-ones polynomial times x**k is + omitted, and the final remainder is not ones-complemented. ISO 3309 + describes the FCS in terms of bits, while this document describes the + + + +Raeburn [Page 17] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Kerberos protocol in terms of octets. To disambiguate the ISO 3309 + definition for the purpose of computing the CRC-32 in the des-cbc-crc + encryption mode, the ordering of bits in each octet shall be assumed + to be LSB-first. Given this assumed ordering of bits within an + octet, the mapping of bits to polynomial coefficients shall be + identical to that specified in ISO 3309. + + Test values for this modified CRC function are included in appendix + A.5. + + + crc32 + ---------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem any + + get_mic crc32(msg) + + verify_mic get_mic and compare + + + The crc32 checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of + one (1). + +5.2. DES-based encryption and checksum types + + These encryption systems encrypt information under the Data + Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode + [DESM80]. A checksum is computed as described below and placed in + the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to + be encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) + must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The values + of the padding bytes are unspecified. + + Plaintext and DES ciphertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which + are concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. + The first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the + octet's MSB used as the DES input block's MSB, etc.), the second + octet the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least + significant bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an + additional input in the form of an initialization vector; this vector + is specified for each encryption system, below. + + The DES specifications [DESI81] identify four 'weak' and twelve + 'semi-weak' keys; those keys shall not be used for encrypting + messages for use in Kerberos. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 18] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + A DES key is 8 octets of data. This consists of 56 bits of actual + key data, and 8 parity bits, one per octet. The key is encoded as a + series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the + key are also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption + key is (B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) + where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 + are the parity bits, the first octet of the key would be + B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the most significant bit). See the + [DESM80] introduction for reference. + + Encryption data format + + The format for the data to be encrypted includes a one-block + confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary + padding, as described in the following diagram. The msg-seq field + contains the part of the protocol message which is to be encrypted. + + +-----------+----------+---------+-----+ + |confounder | checksum | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+---------+-----+ + + One generates a random confounder of one block, placing it in + 'confounder'; zeroes out the 'checksum' field (of length appropriate + to exactly hold the checksum to be computed); calculates the + appropriate checksum over the whole sequence, placing the result in + 'checksum'; adds the necessary padding; then encrypts using the + specified encryption type and the appropriate key. + + String or random-data to key transformation + + To generate a DES key from two UTF-8 text strings (password and + salt), the two strings are concatenated, password first, and the + result is then padded with zero-valued octets to a multiple of 8 + octets. + + The top bit of each octet (always zero if the password is plain + ASCII, as was assumed when the original specification was written) is + discarded, and a bitstring is formed of the remaining seven bits of + each octet. This bitstring is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed + with itself to produce a 56-bit string. An eight-octet key is formed + from this string, each octet using seven bits from the bit string, + leaving the least significant bit unassigned. The key is then + "corrected" by correcting the parity on the key, and if the key + matches a 'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES + specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with the constant + 0x00000000000000F0. This key is then used to generate a DES CBC + checksum on the initial string with the salt appended. The result of + the CBC checksum is then "corrected" as described above to form the + + + +Raeburn [Page 19] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + result which is returned as the key. + + For purposes of the string-to-key function, the DES CBC checksum is + calculated by CBC encrypting a string using the key as IV and using + the final 8 byte block as the checksum. + + Pseudocode follows: + + removeMSBits(8byteblock) { + /* Treats a 64 bit block as 8 octets and remove the MSB in + each octect (in big endian mode) and concatenates the + result. E.g., input octet string: + 01110000 01100001 11110011 01110011 11110111 01101111 + 11110010 01100100 + results in output bit string: + 1110000 1100001 1110011 1110011 1110111 1101111 + 1110010 1100100 */ + } + + reverse(56bitblock) { + /* Treats a 56-bit block as a binary string and reverse it. + E.g., input string: + 1000001 1010100 1001000 1000101 1001110 1000001 + 0101110 1001101 + results in output string: + 1011001 0111010 1000001 0111001 1010001 0001001 + 0010101 1000001 */ + } + + add_parity_bits(56bitblock) { + /* Copies a 56-bit block into a 64-bit block, left shift + content in each octet and add DES parity bit. + E.g., input string: + 1100000 0001111 0011100 0110100 1000101 1100100 + 0110110 0010111 + results in output string: + 11000001 00011111 00111000 01101000 10001010 11001000 + 01101101 00101111 */ + } + + key_correction(key) { + fixparity(key); + if (is_weak_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 20] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + mit_des_string_to_key(string,salt) { + odd = 1; + s = string | salt; + tempstring = 0; /* 56-bit string */ + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for (8byteblock in s) { + 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock); + if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); + odd = ! odd; + tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring; + } + tempkey = key_correction(add_parity_bits(tempstring)); + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + return(key); + } + + des_string_to_key(string,salt,params) { + if (length(params) == 0) + type = 0; + else if (length(params) == 1) + type = params[0]; + else + error("invalid params"); + if (type == 0) + mit_des_string_to_key(string,salt); + else + error("invalid params"); + } + + One common extension is to support the "AFS string-to-key" algorithm, + which is not defined here, if the type value above is one (1). + + For generation of a key from a random bit-string, we start with a + 56-bit string, and as with the string-to-key operation above, insert + parity bits, and if the result is a weak or semi-weak key, modify it + by exclusive-OR with the constart 0x00000000000000F0: + + des_random_to_key(bitstring) { + return key_correction(add_parity_bits(bitstring)); + } + +5.2.1. DES with MD5 + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under DES in CBC + mode with an all-zero initial vector, with an MD5 checksum (described + in [MD5-92]) computed and placed in the checksum field. + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 21] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + The encryption system parameters for des-cbc-md5 are: + + des-cbc-md5 + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + protocol key format 8 bytes, parity in low bit of each + + specific key structure copy of original key + + required checksum rsa-md5-des + mechanism + + key-generation seed 8 bytes + length + + cipher state 8 bytes (CBC initial vector) + + initial cipher state all-zero + + encryption function des-cbc(confounder | checksum | msg | pad, + ivec=oldstate) + where + checksum = md5(confounder | 0000... + | msg | pad) + + newstate = last block of des-cbc output + + decryption function decrypt encrypted text and verify checksum + + newstate = last block of ciphertext + + default string-to-key empty string + params + + pseudo-random function des-cbc(md5(input-string), ivec=0) + + key generation functions: + + string-to-key des_string_to_key + + random-to-key des_random_to_key + + key-derivation identity + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption type is assigned the etype value three + (3). + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 22] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +5.2.2. DES with MD4 + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode also encrypts information under DES + in CBC mode, with an all-zero initial vector. An MD4 checksum + (described in [MD4-92]) is computed and placed in the checksum field. + + des-cbc-md4 + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + protocol key format 8 bytes, parity in low bit of each + + specific key structure copy of original key + + required checksum rsa-md4-des + mechanism + + key-generation seed 8 bytes + length + + cipher state 8 bytes (CBC initial vector) + + initial cipher state all-zero + + encryption function des-cbc(confounder | checksum | msg | pad, + ivec=oldstate) + where + checksum = md4(confounder | 0000... + | msg | pad) + + newstate = last block of des-cbc output + + decryption function decrypt encrypted text and verify checksum + + newstate = last block of ciphertext + + default string-to-key empty string + params + + pseudo-random function des-cbc(md5(input-string), ivec=0) + + key generation functions: + + string-to-key des_string_to_key + + random-to-key copy input, then fix parity bits + + key-derivation identity + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 23] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Note that des-cbc-md4 uses md5, not md4, in the PRF definition. + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption algorithm is assigned the etype value two + (2). + +5.2.3. DES with CRC + + The des-cbc-crc encryption type uses DES in CBC mode with the key + used as the initialization vector, with a 4-octet CRC-based checksum + computed as described in section 5.1.3. Note that this is not a + standard CRC-32 checksum, but a slightly modified one. + + + des-cbc-crc + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + protocol key format 8 bytes, parity in low bit of each + + specific key structure copy of original key + + required checksum rsa-md5-des + mechanism + + key-generation seed 8 bytes + length + + cipher state 8 bytes (CBC initial vector) + + initial cipher state copy of original key + + encryption function des-cbc(confounder | checksum | msg | pad, + ivec=oldstate) + where + checksum = crc(confounder | 00000000 + | msg | pad) + + newstate = last block of des-cbc output + + decryption function decrypt encrypted text and verify checksum + + newstate = last block of ciphertext + + default string-to-key empty string + params + + pseudo-random function des-cbc(md5(input-string), ivec=0) + + key generation functions: + + + + +Raeburn [Page 24] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + des-cbc-crc + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + + string-to-key des_string_to_key + + random-to-key copy input, then fix parity bits + + key-derivation identity + + The des-cbc-crc encryption algorithm is assigned the etype value one + (1). + +5.2.4. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD5 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the + checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the hexadecimal constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The + initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 + octets long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak + keys'; those keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums + for use in Kerberos. + + + rsa-md5-des + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc + + get_mic des-cbc(key XOR 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0, + conf | rsa-md5(conf | msg)) + + verify_mic decrypt and verify rsa-md5 checksum + + + The rsa-md5-des checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number + of eight (8). + +5.2.5. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD4 checksum algorithm [MD4-92], and encrypting the confounder and + the checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a + + + +Raeburn [Page 25] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. [7] The initialization + vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long. + This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and "semi-weak + keys"; those keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums + for use in Kerberos. + + rsa-md4-des + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc + + get_mic des-cbc(key XOR 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0, + conf | rsa-md4(conf | msg), + ivec=0) + + verify_mic decrypt and verify rsa-md4 checksum + + The rsa-md4-des checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number + of three (3). + +5.2.6. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof + checksum by applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting + the results using DES in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode using a DES + key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is + 16 octets long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for + encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no longer recommended. + + + rsa-md4-des-k + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc + + get_mic des-cbc(key, md4(msg), ivec=key) + + verify_mic decrypt, compute checksum and compare + + + The rsa-md4-des-k checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type + number of six (6). + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 26] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +5.2.7. DES CBC checksum + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder + to the plaintext, padding with zero-valued octets if necessary to + bring the length to a multiple of 8 octets, performing a DES CBC-mode + encryption on the result using the key and an initialization vector + of zero, taking the last block of the ciphertext, prepending the same + confounder and encrypting the pair using DES in cipher-block-chaining + (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the variant is computed + by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The + initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 + bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This checksum + is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + + + des-mac + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + associated des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc + cryptosystem + + get_mic des-cbc(key XOR 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0, + conf | des-mac(key, conf | msg | pad, ivec=0), + ivec=0) + + verify_mic decrypt, compute DES MAC using confounder, compare + + + The des-mac checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of + four (4). + +5.2.8. DES CBC checksum alternative + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode + encryption of the plaintext, with zero-valued padding bytes if + necessary to bring the length to a multiple of 8 octets, and using + the last block of the ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed + with an encryption key which is also used as the initialization + vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This + checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that this + checksum type is the old method for encoding the DESMAC checksum and + it is no longer recommended. + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 27] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + des-mac-k + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc + + get_mic des-mac(key, msg | pad, ivec=key) + + verify_mic compute MAC and compare + + + The des-mac-k checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number + of five (5). + +5.3. Triple-DES based encryption and checksum types + + This encryption and checksum type pair is based on the Triple DES + cryptosystem in Outer-CBC mode, and the HMAC-SHA1 message + authentication algorithm. + + A Triple DES key is the concatenation of three DES keys as described + above for des-cbc-md5. A Triple DES key is generated from random + data by creating three DES keys from separate sequences of random + data. + + Encrypted data using this type must be generated as described in + section 4.3. If the length of the input data is not a multiple of + the block size, zero-valued octets must be used to pad the plaintext + to the next eight-octet boundary. The confounder must be eight + random octets (one block). + + The simplified profile for Triple DES, with key derivation as defined + in section 4, is as follows: + + des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd, hmac-sha1-des3-kd + ------------------------------------------------ + protocol key format 24 bytes, parity in low + bit of each + + key-generation seed 21 bytes + length + + hash function SHA-1 + + HMAC output size 160 bits + + message block size 8 bytes + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 28] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd, hmac-sha1-des3-kd + ------------------------------------------------ + default string-to-key empty string + params + + encryption and triple-DES encrypt and + decryption functions decrypt, in outer-CBC + mode (cipher block size + 8 octets) + + key generation functions: + + random-to-key DES3random-to-key (see + below) + + string-to-key DES3string-to-key (see + below) + + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd encryption type is assigned the value + sixteen (16). The hmac-sha1-des3-kd checksum algorithm is assigned a + checksum type number of twelve (12). + +5.3.1. Triple DES Key Production (random-to-key, string-to-key) + + The 168 bits of random key data are converted to a protocol key value + as follows. First, the 168 bits are divided into three groups of 56 + bits, which are expanded individually into 64 bits as follows: + + DES3random-to-key: + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p + 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p + 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p + 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p + 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p + 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p + 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p + 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p + + The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output + of the three expansions are concatenated to form the protocol key + value. + + The string-to-key function is used to transform UTF-8 passwords into + DES3 keys. The DES3 string-to-key function relies on the "N-fold" + algorithm and DK function, described in section 4. + + The n-fold algorithm is applied to the password string concatenated + with a salt value. For 3-key triple DES, the operation will involve + + + +Raeburn [Page 29] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + a 168-fold of the input password string, to generate an intermediate + key, from which the user's long-term key will be derived with the DK + function. The DES3 string-to-key function is shown here in + pseudocode: + + DES3string-to-key(passwordString, salt, params) + if (params != emptyString) + error("invalid params"); + s = passwordString + salt + tmpKey = random-to-key(168-fold(s)) + key = DK (tmpKey, KerberosConstant) + + No weak-key checking is performed. The KerberosConstant value is the + byte string {0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values + correspond to the ASCII encoding for the string "kerberos". + +6. Use of Kerberos encryption outside this specification + + Several Kerberos-based application protocols and preauthentication + systems have been designed and deployed that perform encryption and + message integrity checks in various ways. While in some cases there + may be good reason for specifying these protocols in terms of + specific encryption or checksum algorithms, we anticipate that in + many cases this will not be true, and more generic approaches + independent of particular algorithms will be desirable. Rather than + having each protocol designer reinvent schemes for protecting data, + using multiple keys, etc, we have attempted to present in this + section a general framework that should be sufficient not only for + the Kerberos protocol itself but also for many preauthentication + systems and application protocols, while trying to avoid some of the + assumptions that can work their way into such protocol designs. + + Some problematic assumptions we've seen (and sometimes made) include: + that a random bitstring is always valid as a key (not true for DES + keys with parity); that the basic block encryption chaining mode + provides no integrity checking, or can easily be separated from such + checking (not true for many modes in development that do both + simultaneously); that a checksum for a message always results in the + same value (not true if a confounder is incorporated); that an + initial vector is used (may not be true if a block cipher in CBC mode + is not in use). + + Such assumptions, while they may hold for any given set of encryption + and checksum algorithms, may not be true of the next algorithms to be + defined, leaving the application protocol unable to make use of those + algorithms without updates to its specification. + + The Kerberos protocol uses only the attributes and operations + + + +Raeburn [Page 30] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + described in sections 2 and 3. Preauthentication systems and + application protocols making use of Kerberos are encouraged to use + them as well. The specific key and string-to-key parameters should + generally be treated as opaque. While the string-to-key parameters + are manipulated as an octet string, the representation for the + specific key structure is implementation-defined; it may not even be + a single object. + + While we don't recommend it, some application protocols will + undoubtedly continue to use the key data directly, even if only in + some of the currently existing protocol specifications. An + implementation intended to support general Kerberos applications may + therefore need to make the key data available, as well as the + attributes and operations described in sections 2 and 3. [8] + +7. Assigned Numbers + + The following encryption type numbers are already assigned or + reserved for use in Kerberos and related protocols. + + + encryption type etype section or comment + ----------------------------------------------------------------- + des-cbc-crc 1 5.2.3 + des-cbc-md4 2 5.2.2 + des-cbc-md5 3 5.2.1 + [reserved] 4 + des3-cbc-md5 5 + [reserved] 6 + des3-cbc-sha1 7 + dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 (pkinit) + md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 (pkinit) + sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 (pkinit) + rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 (pkinit) + rsaEncryption-EnvOID 13 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v1.5) + rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID 14 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v2.0) + des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 (pkinit) + des3-cbc-sha1-kd 16 5.3 + aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 17 [KRB5-AES] + aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 18 [KRB5-AES] + rc4-hmac 23 (Microsoft) + rc4-hmac-exp 24 (Microsoft) + subkey-keymaterial 65 (opaque; PacketCable) + + + (The "des3-cbc-sha1" assignment is a deprecated version using no key + derivation. It should not be confused with des3-cbc-sha1-kd.) + + + + +Raeburn [Page 31] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Several numbers have been reserved for use in encryption systems not + defined here. Encryption type numbers have unfortunately been + overloaded on occasion in Kerberos-related protocols, so some of the + reserved numbers do not and will not correspond to encryption systems + fitting the profile presented here. + + The following checksum type numbers are assigned or reserved. As + with encryption type numbers, some overloading of checksum numbers + has occurred. + + + Checksum type sumtype checksum section or + value size reference + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + CRC32 1 4 5.1.3 + rsa-md4 2 16 5.1.2 + rsa-md4-des 3 24 5.2.5 + des-mac 4 16 5.2.7 + des-mac-k 5 8 5.2.8 + rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 5.2.6 + rsa-md5 7 16 5.1.1 + rsa-md5-des 8 24 5.2.4 + rsa-md5-des3 9 24 ?? + sha1 (unkeyed) 10 20 ?? + hmac-sha1-des3-kd 12 20 5.3 + hmac-sha1-des3 13 20 ?? + sha1 (unkeyed) 14 20 ?? + hmac-sha1-96-aes128 15 20 [KRB5-AES] + hmac-sha1-96-aes256 16 20 [KRB5-AES] + [reserved] 0x8003 ? [GSS-KRB5] + + + Encryption and checksum type numbers are signed 32-bit values. Zero + is invalid, and negative numbers are reserved for local use. All + standardized values must be positive. + +8. Implementation Notes + + The "interface" described here is the minimal information that must + be defined to make a cryptosystem useful within Kerberos in an + interoperable fashion. Despite the functional notation used in some + places, it is not an attempt to define an API for cryptographic + functionality within Kerberos. Actual implementations providing + clean APIs will probably find it useful to make additional + information available, which should be possible to derive from a + specification written to the framework given here. For example, an + application designer may wish to determine the largest number of + bytes that can be encrypted without overflowing a certain size output + + + +Raeburn [Page 32] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + buffer, or conversely, the maximum number of bytes that might be + obtained by decrypting a ciphertext message of a given size. (In + fact, an implementation of the GSS-API Kerberos mechanism [GSS-KRB5] + will require some of these.) + + The presence of a mechanism in this document should not be taken as + an indication that it must be implemented for compliance with any + specification; required mechanisms will be specified elsewhere. + Indeed, some of the mechanisms described here for backwards + compatibility are now considered rather weak for protecting critical + data. + +9. Security Considerations + + Recent years have brought advancements in the ability to perform + large-scale attacks against DES, to such a degree that it is not + considered a strong encryption mechanism any longer; triple-DES is + generally preferred in its place, despite the poorer performance. + See [ESP-DES] for a summary of some of the potential attacks, and + [EFF-DES] for a detailed discussion of the implementation of + particular attack. However, most Kerberos implementations still have + DES as their primary interoperable encryption type. + + DES has four 'weak' keys and twelve 'semi-weak' keys, and the use of + single-DES here avoids them. However, DES also has 48 'possibly-weak' + keys [Schneier96] (note that the tables in many editions of the + reference contains errors) which are not avoided. + + DES weak keys are keys with the property that E1(E1(P)) = P (where E1 + denotes encryption of a single block with key 1). DES semi-weak keys + or "dual" keys are pairs of keys with the property that E1(P) = + D2(P), and thus E2(E1(P)) = P. Because of the use of CBC mode and + leading random confounder, however, these properties are unlikely to + present a security problem. + + The use of triple-DES in Kerberos makes no effort to avoid these + keys. The nature of the weak keys is such that it is extremely + unlikely that they will weaken the triple-DES encryption -- only + slightly more likely than having the middle of the three sub-keys + match one of the other two, which effectively converts the encryption + to single-DES, which is another case we make no effort to avoid. + + The true CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof; an attacker could + use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid + message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision- + proof checksums is of course recommended for environments where such + attacks represent a significant threat. The "simplifications" (read: + bugs) introduced when CRC-32 was implemented for Kerberos cause + + + +Raeburn [Page 33] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + leading zeros to effectively be ignored, so messages differing only + in leading zero bits will have the same checksum. + + [HMAC] and [IPSEC-HMAC] discuss weaknesses of the HMAC algorithm. + Unlike [IPSEC-HMAC], the triple-DES specification here does not use + the suggested truncation of the HMAC output. As pointed out in + [IPSEC-HMAC], SHA-1 was not developed to be used as a keyed hash + function, which is a criterion of HMAC. [HMAC-TEST] contains test + vectors for HMAC-SHA-1. + + The mit_des_string_to_key function was originally constructed with + the assumption that all input would be ASCII; it ignores the top bit + of each input byte. Folding with XOR is also not an especially good + mixing mechanism in terms of preserving randomness. + + The n-fold function used in the string-to-key operation for des3-cbc- + hmac-sha1-kd was designed to cause each bit of input to contribute + equally to the output; it was not designed to maximize or equally + distribute randomness in the input, and there are conceivable cases + of partially structured input where randomness may be lost. This + should only be an issue for highly structured passwords, however. + + [RFC1851] discusses the relative strength of triple-DES encryption. + The relative slow speed of triple-DES encryption may also be an issue + for some applications. + + This document, like the Kerberos protocol, completely ignores the + notion of limiting the amount of data a key may be used with to a + quantity based on the robustness of the algorithm or size of the key. + It is assumed that any defined algorithms and key sizes will be + strong enough to support very large amounts of data, or they will be + deprecated once significant attacks are known. + + This document also places no bounds on the amount of data that can be + handled in various operations. In order to avoid denial of service + attacks, implementations will probably want to restrict message sizes + at some higher level. + +10. IANA Considerations + + None at present. The management of encryption and checksum type + number assignments may be transferred to IANA at some future time. + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 34] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +11. Acknowledgments + + This document is an extension of the encryption specification + included in [Kerb1510] by B. Clifford Neuman and John Kohl, and much + of the text of the background, concepts, and DES specifications are + drawn directly from that document. + + The abstract framework presented in this document was put together by + Jeff Altman, Sam Hartman, Jeff Hutzelman, Cliff Neuman, Ken Raeburn, + and Tom Yu, and the details were refined several times based on + comments from John Brezak and others. + + Marc Horowitz wrote the original specification of triple-DES and key + derivation in a pair of Internet Drafts (under the names draft- + horowitz-key-derivation and draft-horowitz-kerb-key-derivation) which + were later folded into a draft revision of [Kerb1510], from which + this document was later split off. + + Tom Yu provided the text describing the modifications to the standard + CRC algorithm as Kerberos implementations actually use it. + + Miroslav Jurisic provided information for one of the UTF-8 test cases + for the string-to-key functions. + + Marcus Watts noticed some errors in earlier drafts, and pointed out + that the simplified profile could easily be modified to support + cipher text stealing modes. + + Simon Josefsson contributed some clarifications to the DES "CBC + checksum", string-to-key and weak key descriptions, and some test + vectors. + + Simon Josefsson, Louis LeVay and others also caught some errors in + earlier drafts. + +12. Editor's address + + Kenneth Raeburn + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + raeburn@mit.edu + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 35] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +13. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +A. Test vectors + + This section provides test vectors for various functions defined or + described in this document. For convenience, most inputs are ASCII + strings, though some UTF-8 samples are be provided for string-to-key + functions. Keys and other binary data are specified as hexadecimal + strings. + +A.1. n-fold + + The n-fold function is defined in section 4.1. As noted there, the + sample vector in the original paper defining the algorithm appears to + be incorrect. Here are some test cases provided by Marc Horowitz and + Simon Josefsson: + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 36] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + 64-fold("012345") = + 64-fold(303132333435) = be072631276b1955 + + 56-fold("password") = + 56-fold(70617373776f7264) = 78a07b6caf85fa + + 64-fold("Rough Consensus, and Running Code") = + 64-fold(526f75676820436f6e73656e7375732c20616e642052756e + 6e696e6720436f6465) = bb6ed30870b7f0e0 + + 168-fold("password") = + 168-fold(70617373776f7264) = + 59e4a8ca7c0385c3c37b3f6d2000247cb6e6bd5b3e + + 192-fold("MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY" + 192-fold(4d41535341434856534554545320494e5354495456544520 + 4f4620544543484e4f4c4f4759) = + db3b0d8f0b061e603282b308a50841229ad798fab9540c1b + + 168-fold("Q") = + 168-fold(51) = + 518a54a2 15a8452a 518a54a2 15a8452a + 518a54a2 15 + + 168-fold("ba") = + 168-fold(6261) = + fb25d531 ae897449 9f52fd92 ea9857c4 + ba24cf29 7e + + Here are some additional values corresponding to folded values of the + string "kerberos"; the 64-bit form is used in the des3 string-to-key + (section 5.3.1). + + 64-fold("kerberos") = + 6b657262 65726f73 + 128-fold("kerberos") = + 6b657262 65726f73 7b9b5b2b 93132b93 + 168-fold("kerberos") = + 8372c236 344e5f15 50cd0747 e15d62ca + 7a5a3bce a4 + 256-fold("kerberos") = + 6b657262 65726f73 7b9b5b2b 93132b93 + 5c9bdcda d95c9899 c4cae4de e6d6cae4 + + Note that the initial octets exactly match the input string when the + output length is a multiple of the input length. + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 37] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +A.2. mit_des_string_to_key + + The function mit_des_string_to_key is defined in section 5.2. We + present here several test values, with some of the intermediate + results. The fourth test demonstrates the use of UTF-8 with three + characters. The last two tests are specifically constructed so as to + trigger the weak-key fixups for the intermediate key produced by fan- + folding; we have no test cases that cause such fixups for the final + key. + + + UTF-8 encodings used in test vector: + eszett C3 9F s-caron C5 A1 c-acute C4 87 + g-clef F0 9D 84 9E + + + Test vector: + + + salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 415448454e412e4d49542e4544557261656275726e + password: "password" 70617373776f7264 + fan-fold result: c01e38688ac86c2e + intermediate key: c11f38688ac86d2f + DES key: cbc22fae235298e3 + + + + salt: "WHITEHOUSE.GOVdanny" 5748495445484f5553452e474f5664616e6e79 + password: "potatoe" 706f7461746f65 + fan-fold result: a028944ee63c0416 + intermediate key: a129944fe63d0416 + DES key: df3d32a74fd92a01 + + + + salt: "EXAMPLE.COMpianist" 4558414D504C452E434F4D7069616E697374 + password: g-clef f09d849e + fan-fold result: 3c4a262c18fab090 + intermediate key: 3d4a262c19fbb091 + DES key: 4ffb26bab0cd9413 + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 38] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUJuri" + s-caron + "i" + c-acute + 415448454e412e4d49542e4544554a757269c5a169c487 + password: eszett c39f + fan-fold result: b8f6c40e305afc9e + intermediate key: b9f7c40e315bfd9e + DES key: 62c81a5232b5e69d + + + + salt: "AAAAAAAA" 4141414141414141 + password: "11119999" 3131313139393939 + fan-fold result: e0e0e0e0f0f0f0f0 + intermediate key: e0e0e0e0f1f1f101 + DES key: 984054d0f1a73e31 + + + + salt: "FFFFAAAA" 4646464641414141 + password: "NNNN6666" 4e4e4e4e36363636 + fan-fold result: 1e1e1e1e0e0e0e0e + intermediate key: 1f1f1f1f0e0e0efe + DES key: c4bf6b25adf7a4f8 + + + This trace provided by Simon Josefsson shows the intermediate + processing stages of one of the test inputs: + + string_to_key (des-cbc-md5, string, salt) + ;; string: + ;; `password' (length 8 bytes) + ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 + ;; salt: + ;; `ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn' (length 21 bytes) + ;; 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61 + ;; 65 62 75 72 6e + des_string_to_key (string, salt) + ;; String: + ;; `password' (length 8 bytes) + ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 + ;; Salt: + ;; `ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn' (length 21 bytes) + ;; 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61 + ;; 65 62 75 72 6e + odd = 1; + s = string | salt; + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 39] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + tempstring = 0; /* 56-bit string */ + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + ;; s = pad(string|salt): + ;; `passwordATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn\x00\x00\x00' + ;; (length 32 bytes) + ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d + ;; 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61 65 62 75 72 6e 00 00 00 + for (8byteblock in s) { + ;; loop iteration 0 + ;; 8byteblock: + ;; `password' (length 8 bytes) + ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 + ;; 01110000 01100001 01110011 01110011 01110111 01101111 + ;; 01110010 01100100 + 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock); + ;; 56bitstring: + ;; 1110000 1100001 1110011 1110011 1110111 1101111 + ;; 1110010 1100100 + if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=1 + odd = ! odd + tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring; + ;; tempstring + ;; 1110000 1100001 1110011 1110011 1110111 1101111 + ;; 1110010 1100100 + + for (8byteblock in s) { + ;; loop iteration 1 + ;; 8byteblock: + ;; `ATHENA.M' (length 8 bytes) + ;; 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d + ;; 01000001 01010100 01001000 01000101 01001110 01000001 + ;; 00101110 01001101 + 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock); + ;; 56bitstring: + ;; 1000001 1010100 1001000 1000101 1001110 1000001 + ;; 0101110 1001101 + if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=0 + reverse(56bitstring) + ;; 56bitstring after reverse + ;; 1011001 0111010 1000001 0111001 1010001 0001001 + ;; 0010101 1000001 + odd = ! odd + tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring; + ;; tempstring + ;; 0101001 1011011 0110010 1001010 0100110 1100110 + ;; 1100111 0100101 + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 40] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + for (8byteblock in s) { + ;; loop iteration 2 + ;; 8byteblock: + ;; `IT.EDUra' (length 8 bytes) + ;; 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61 + ;; 01001001 01010100 00101110 01000101 01000100 01010101 + ;; 01110010 01100001 + 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock); + ;; 56bitstring: + ;; 1001001 1010100 0101110 1000101 1000100 1010101 + ;; 1110010 1100001 + if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=1 + odd = ! odd + tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring; + ;; tempstring + ;; 1100000 0001111 0011100 0001111 1100010 0110011 + ;; 0010101 1000100 + + for (8byteblock in s) { + ;; loop iteration 3 + ;; 8byteblock: + ;; `eburn\x00\x00\x00' (length 8 bytes) + ;; 65 62 75 72 6e 00 00 00 + ;; 01100101 01100010 01110101 01110010 01101110 00000000 + ;; 00000000 00000000 + 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock); + ;; 56bitstring: + ;; 1100101 1100010 1110101 1110010 1101110 0000000 + ;; 0000000 0000000 + if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=0 + reverse(56bitstring) + ;; 56bitstring after reverse + ;; 0000000 0000000 0000000 0111011 0100111 1010111 + ;; 0100011 1010011 + odd = ! odd + tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring; + ;; tempstring + ;; 1100000 0001111 0011100 0110100 1000101 1100100 + ;; 0110110 0010111 + + for (8byteblock in s) { + } + ;; for loop terminated + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 41] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + tempkey = key_correction(add_parity_bits(tempstring)); + ;; tempkey + ;; `\xc1\x1f8h\x8a\xc8m\x2f' (length 8 bytes) + ;; c1 1f 38 68 8a c8 6d 2f + ;; 11000001 00011111 00111000 01101000 10001010 11001000 + ;; 01101101 00101111 + + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + ;; key + ;; `\xcb\xc2\x2f\xae\x23R\x98\xe3' (length 8 bytes) + ;; cb c2 2f ae 23 52 98 e3 + ;; 11001011 11000010 00101111 10101110 00100011 01010010 + ;; 10011000 11100011 + + ;; string_to_key key: + ;; `\xcb\xc2\x2f\xae\x23R\x98\xe3' (length 8 bytes) + ;; cb c2 2f ae 23 52 98 e3 + + +A.3. DES3 DR and DK + + These tests show the derived-random and derived-key values for the + des3-hmac-sha1-kd encryption scheme, using the DR and DK functions + defined in section 5.3.1. The input keys were randomly generated; + the usage values are from this specification. + + + key: dce06b1f64c857a11c3db57c51899b2cc1791008ce973b92 + usage: 0000000155 + DR: 935079d14490a75c3093c4a6e8c3b049c71e6ee705 + DK: 925179d04591a79b5d3192c4a7e9c289b049c71f6ee604cd + + key: 5e13d31c70ef765746578531cb51c15bf11ca82c97cee9f2 + usage: 00000001aa + DR: 9f58e5a047d894101c469845d67ae3c5249ed812f2 + DK: 9e58e5a146d9942a101c469845d67a20e3c4259ed913f207 + + key: 98e6fd8a04a4b6859b75a176540b9752bad3ecd610a252bc + usage: 0000000155 + DR: 12fff90c773f956d13fc2ca0d0840349dbd39908eb + DK: 13fef80d763e94ec6d13fd2ca1d085070249dad39808eabf + + key: 622aec25a2fe2cad7094680b7c64940280084c1a7cec92b5 + usage: 00000001aa + DR: f8debf05b097e7dc0603686aca35d91fd9a5516a70 + DK: f8dfbf04b097e6d9dc0702686bcb3489d91fd9a4516b703e + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 42] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + key: d3f8298ccb166438dcb9b93ee5a7629286a491f838f802fb + usage: 6b65726265726f73 ("kerberos") + DR: 2270db565d2a3d64cfbfdc5305d4f778a6de42d9da + DK: 2370da575d2a3da864cebfdc5204d56df779a7df43d9da43 + + key: c1081649ada74362e6a1459d01dfd30d67c2234c940704da + usage: 0000000155 + DR: 348056ec98fcc517171d2b4d7a9493af482d999175 + DK: 348057ec98fdc48016161c2a4c7a943e92ae492c989175f7 + + key: 5d154af238f46713155719d55e2f1f790dd661f279a7917c + usage: 00000001aa + DR: a8818bc367dadacbe9a6c84627fb60c294b01215e5 + DK: a8808ac267dada3dcbe9a7c84626fbc761c294b01315e5c1 + + key: 798562e049852f57dc8c343ba17f2ca1d97394efc8adc443 + usage: 0000000155 + DR: c813f88b3be2b2f75424ce9175fbc8483b88c8713a + DK: c813f88a3be3b334f75425ce9175fbe3c8493b89c8703b49 + + key: 26dce334b545292f2feab9a8701a89a4b99eb9942cecd016 + usage: 00000001aa + DR: f58efc6f83f93e55e695fd252cf8fe59f7d5ba37ec + DK: f48ffd6e83f83e7354e694fd252cf83bfe58f7d5ba37ec5d + + +A.4. DES3string_to_key + + These are the keys generated for some of the above input strings for + triple-DES with key derivation as defined in section 5.3.1. + + salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + passwd: "password" + key: 850bb51358548cd05e86768c313e3bfef7511937dcf72c3e + + salt: "WHITEHOUSE.GOVdanny" + passwd: "potatoe" + key: dfcd233dd0a43204ea6dc437fb15e061b02979c1f74f377a + + salt: "EXAMPLE.COMbuckaroo" + passwd: "penny" + key: 6d2fcdf2d6fbbc3ddcadb5da5710a23489b0d3b69d5d9d4a + + salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUJuri" + s-caron + "i" + c-acute + passwd: eszett + key: 16d5a40e1ce3bacb61b9dce00470324c831973a7b952feb0 + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 43] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + salt: "EXAMPLE.COMpianist" + passwd: g-clef + key: 85763726585dbc1cce6ec43e1f751f07f1c4cbb098f40b19 + +A.5. Modified CRC-32 + + Below are modified-CRC32 values for various ASCII and octet strings. + Only the printable ASCII characters are checksummed, no C-style + trailing zero-valued octet. The 32-bit modified CRC and the sequence + of output bytes as used in Kerberos are shown. (The octet values are + separated here to emphasize that they are octet values and not 32-bit + numbers, which will be the most convenient form for manipulation in + some implementations. The bit and byte order used internally for + such a number is irrelevant; the octet sequence generated is what is + important.) + + + mod-crc-32("foo") = 33 bc 32 73 + mod-crc-32("test0123456789") = d6 88 3e b8 + mod-crc-32("MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY") = f7 80 41 e3 + mod-crc-32(8000) = 4b 98 83 3b + mod-crc-32(0008) = 32 88 db 0e + mod-crc-32(0080) = 20 83 b8 ed + mod-crc-32(80) = 20 83 b8 ed + mod-crc-32(80000000) = 3b b6 59 ed + mod-crc-32(00000001) = 96 30 07 77 + + +B. Significant Changes from RFC 1510 + + The encryption and checksum mechanism profiles are new. The old + specification defined a few operations for various mechanisms, but + didn't outline what should be required of new mechanisms in terms of + abstract properties, nor how to ensure that a mechanism specification + is complete enough for interoperability between implementations. The + new profiles do differ from the old specification in a few ways: + + Some message definitions in [Kerb1510] could be read as permitting + the initial vector to be specified by the application; the text + was too vague. It is specifically not permitted in this + specification. Some encryption algorithms may not use + initialization vectors, so relying on chosen, secret + initialization vectors for security is unwise. Also, the + prepended confounder in the existing algorithms is roughly + equivalent to a per-message initialization vector that is revealed + in encrypted form. However, carrying state across from one + encryption to another is explicitly permitted through the opaque + "cipher state" object. + + + +Raeburn [Page 44] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + The use of key derivation is new. + + Several new methods are introduced, including generation of a key + in wire-protocol format from random input data. + + The means for influencing the string-to-key algorithm are laid out + more clearly. + + Triple-DES support is new. + + The pseudo-random function is new. + + The des-cbc-crc, DES string-to-key and CRC descriptions have been + updated to align them with existing implementations. + + [Kerb1510] had no indication what character set or encoding might be + used for pass phrases and salts. + + In [Kerb1510], key types, encryption algorithms and checksum + algorithms were only loosely associated, and the association was not + well described. In this specification, key types and encryption + algorithms have a one-to-one correspondence, and associations between + encryption and checksum algorithms are described so that checksums + can be computed given negotiated keys, without requiring further + negotiation for checksum types. + +Notes + + [1] While Message Authentication Code (MAC) or Message Integrity + Check (MIC) would be more appropriate terms for many of the + uses in this document, we continue to use the term "checksum" + for historical reasons. + + [2] Extending CBC mode across messages would be one obvious + example of this chaining. Another might be the use of + counter mode, with a counter randomly initialized and + attached to the ciphertext; a second message could continue + incrementing the counter when chaining the cipher state, thus + avoiding having to transmit another counter value. However, + this chaining is only useful for uninterrupted, ordered + sequences of messages. + + [3] In the case of Kerberos, the encrypted objects will generally + be ASN.1 DER encodings, which contain indications of their + length in the first few octets. + + [4] As of the time of this writing, some new modes of operation + have been proposed, some of which may permit encryption and + + + +Raeburn [Page 45] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + integrity protection simultaneously. After some of these + proposals have been subjected to adequate analysis, we may + wish to formulate a new simplified profile based on one of + them. + + [5] It should be noted that the sample vector in Appendix B.2 of + the original paper appears to be incorrect. Two independent + implementations from the specification (one in C by Marc + Horowitz, and another in Scheme by Bill Sommerfeld) agree on + a value different from that in [Blumenthal96]. + + [6] For example, in MIT's implementation of [Kerb1510], the rsa- + md5 unkeyed checksum of application data may be included in + an authenticator encrypted in a service's key; since rsa-md5 + is believed to be collision-proof, even if the application + data is exposed to an attacker, it cannot be modified without + causing the checksum verification to fail. + + [7] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a + particular function, separating the functions of generating a + checksum from other encryption performed using the session + key. The constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was chosen because it + maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded the + use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar + purpose in the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy + Enhanced Mail standard. + + [8] Perhaps one of the more common reasons for directly + performing encryption is direct control over the negotiation + and to select a "sufficiently strong" encryption algorithm + (whatever that means in the context of a given application). + While Kerberos directly provides no facility for negotiating + encryption types between the application client and server, + there are other means for accomplishing similar goals. For + example, requesting only "strong" session key types from the + KDC, and assuming that the type actually returned by the KDC + will be understood and supported by the application server. + +Normative References + + [Bellare98] + Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., and P. Rogaway, + "Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption + Schemes". Extended abstract published in Advances in Cryptology- + Crypto 98 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. + 1462, H. Krawcyzk ed., Springer-Verlag, 1998. + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 46] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + [Blumenthal96] + Blumenthal, U., and S. Bellovin, "A Better Key Schedule for DES- + Like Ciphers", Proceedings of PRAGOCRYPT '96, 1996. + [CRC] + International Organization for Standardization, "ISO Information + Processing Systems - Data Communication - High-Level Data Link + Control Procedure - Frame Structure," IS 3309, 3rd Edition, + October 1984. + [DES77] + National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Data + Encryption Standard," Federal Information Processing Standards + Publication 46, Washington, DC, 1977. + [DESI81] + National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, + "Guidelines for implementing and using NBS Data Encryption + Standard," Federal Information Processing Standards Publication + 74, Washington, DC, 1981. + [DESM80] + National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "DES + Modes of Operation," Federal Information Processing Standards + Publication 81, Springfield, VA, December 1980. + [Dolev91] + Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M., "Non-malleable cryptography", + Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing, + ACM, 1991. + [HMAC] + Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing + for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997. + [KRB5-AES] + Raeburn, K., "AES Encyrption for Kerberos 5", RFC XXXX, Xxxxxxxx + 2003. + [MD4-92] + Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC 1320, MIT + Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992. + [MD5-92] + Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC 1321, MIT + Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992. + [RFC2026] + Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revisions 3," RFC + 2026, October 1996. + [SG92] + Stubblebine, S., and V. D. Gligor, "On Message Integrity in + Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on + Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1992. + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 47] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +Informative References + + [EFF-DES] + Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Cracking DES: Secrets of + Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design", O'Reilly + & Associates, Inc., May 1998. + [ESP-DES] + Madson, C., and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm + With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998. + [GSS-KRB5] + Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism," RFC 1964, + June 1996. + [HMAC-TEST] + Cheng, P., and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1", + RFC 2202, September 1997. + [IPSEC-HMAC] + Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and + AH", RFC 2404, November 1998. + [Kerb] + Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. + Raeburn, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", + draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-00.txt, February 22, + 2002. Work in progress. + [Kerb1510] + Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + [RC5] + Baldwin, R, and R. Rivest, "The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC-Pad, and + RC5-CTS Algorithms", RFC 2040, October 1996. + [Schneier96] + Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition", John Wiley & + Sons, New York, NY, 1996. ISBN 0-471-12845-7. + +Notes to RFC Editor + + Before publication of this document as an RFC, the following changes + are needed: + + Change the reference "[KRB5-AES]" in Normative References to indicate + the AES draft (draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-XX) that should be + advancing to RFC at the same time. The RFC number and publication + date are needed. + + If draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications advances to RFC at the + same time as this document, change the information for [Kerb] in the + Informative References section as well. + + Delete this section. + + + +Raeburn [Page 48] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..005ea86b0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7975 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + USC-ISI + Tom Yu + Sam Hartman + Ken Raeburn + MIT + March 2, 2003 + Expires 2 September, 2003 + + The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as draft- + ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt, and expires 2 September + 2003. Please send comments to: ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov + +ABSTRACT + + This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of + the Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the + protocol and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer + explanation than was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended + to provide a detailed description of the protocol, suitable for + implementation, together with descriptions of the appropriate use of + protocol messages and fields within those messages. + + + +March 2003 [Page 1] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + This document contains a subset of the changes considered and + discussed in the Kerberos working group and is intended as an interim + description of Kerberos. Additional changes to the Kerberos protocol + have been proposed and will appear in a subsequent extensions + document. + + This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, + system administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers + describing Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting + version 4 [SNS88], are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + + This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the + Kerberos network authentication system is based. It also specifies + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol. + + The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design + decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a + paper available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the + Kerberos portion of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols + have been a proposed standard and are being considered for + advancement for draft standard through the IETF standard process. + Comments are encouraged on the presentation, but only minor + refinements to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit + within current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + + Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of + Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos- + request@MIT.EDU. This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as + the group comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, + including documents and code availability, may be sent to info- + kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + + The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's + trusted third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on + modifications suggested by Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original + design and implementation of Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the + work of two former Project Athena staff members, Steve Miller of + Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman (now at the + Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern + California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project + Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other + members of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on + Kerberos. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 2] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has + evolved from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for + features not available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the + Kerberos protocol was led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much + input from the community. The development of the MIT reference + implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl and Theodore Ts'o, with + help and contributed code from many others. Since RFC1510 was issued, + extensions and revisions to the protocol have been proposed by many + individuals. Some of these proposals are reflected in this document. + Where such changes involved significant effort, the document cites + the contribution of the proposer. + + Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos + are publicly available and commercial implementations have been + developed and are widely used. Details on the differences between + Kerberos Versions 4 and 5 can be found in [KNT94]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +March 2003 [Page 3] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + TTaabbllee ooff CCoonntteennttss + + +1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 +1.1. Cross-realm operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 +1.2. Choosing a principal with which to communicate . . . . . . . . 10 +1.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 +1.4. Extending Kerberos Without Breaking Interoperability . . . . . 11 +1.4.1. Compatibility with RFC 1510 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 +1.4.2. Sending Extensible Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 +1.5. Environmental assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 +1.6. Glossary of terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 +2. Ticket flag uses and requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 +2.1. Initial, pre-authenticated, and hardware authenticated + tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 +2.2. Invalid tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 +2.3. Renewable tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 +2.4. Postdated tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 +2.6. Forwardable tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 +2.7. Transited Policy Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 +2.8. OK as Delegate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 +2.9. Other KDC options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 +2.9.1. Renewable-OK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 +2.9.2. ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 +2.9.3. Passwordless Hardware Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 +3. Message Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . 29 +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 +3.2.6. Using the encryption key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange . . . . . . . . . . 34 +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + + + +March 2003 [Page 4] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 +3.7. User to User Authentication Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 +4. Encryption and Checksum Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 +5. Message Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 +5.1. Specific Compatibility Notes on ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 +5.1.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 +5.1.2. Optional Integer Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 +5.1.3. Empty SEQUENCE OF Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 +5.1.4. Unrecognized Tag Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 +5.1.5. Tag Numbers Greater Than 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 +5.2. Basic Kerberos Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 +5.2.1. KerberosString . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 +5.2.2. Realm and PrincipalName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 +5.2.3. KerberosTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 +5.2.4. Constrained Integer types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 +5.2.5. HostAddress and HostAddresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 +5.2.6. AuthorizationData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 +5.2.6.1. IF-RELEVANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 +5.2.6.2. KDCIssued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 +5.2.6.3. AND-OR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 +5.2.6.4. MANDATORY-FOR-KDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 +5.2.7. PA-DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 +5.2.7.1. PA-TGS-REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 +5.2.7.2. Encrypted Timestamp Pre-authentication . . . . . . . . . . 60 +5.2.7.3. PA-PW-SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 +5.2.7.4. PA-ETYPE-INFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 +5.2.7.5. PA-ETYPE-INFO2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 +5.2.8. KerberosFlags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 +5.2.9. Cryptosystem-related Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 +5.3. Tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges . . . . . . . . . . 73 +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 84 +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 +5.5.3. Error message reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 + + + +March 2003 [Page 5] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 +5.9. Error message specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 +5.10. Application Tag Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 +6. Naming Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 +6.1. Realm Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 +6.2. Principal Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 +6.2.1. Name of server principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 +7. Constants and other defined values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 +7.1. Host address types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 +7.2. KDC messaging - IP Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 +7.2.1. UDP/IP transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 +7.2.2. TCP/IP transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 +7.2.3. KDC Discovery on IP Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 +7.2.3.1. DNS vs. Kerberos - Case Sensitivity of Realm Names . . . . 103 +7.2.3.2. Specifying KDC Location information with DNS SRV + records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 +7.2.3.3. KDC Discovery for Domain Style Realm Names on IP + Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 +7.3. Name of the TGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 +7.4. OID arc for KerberosV5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 +7.5. Protocol constants and associated values . . . . . . . . . . . 104 +7.5.1. Key usage numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 +7.5.2. PreAuthentication Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 +7.5.3. Address Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 +7.5.4. Authorization Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 +7.5.5. Transited Encoding Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 +7.5.6. Protocol Version Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 +7.5.7. Kerberos Message Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 +7.5.8. Name Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 +7.5.9. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 +8. Interoperability requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 +8.1. Specification 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 +8.2. Recommended KDC values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 +9. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 +10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 +11. Author's Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 +12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 +13. REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 +A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 +B. Changes since RFC-1510 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 +END NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 + + + + + + + +March 2003 [Page 6] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +1. Introduction + + Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, + (e.g. a workstation user or a network server) on an open + (unprotected) network. This is accomplished without relying on + assertions by the host operating system, without basing trust on host + addresses, without requiring physical security of all the hosts on + the network, and under the assumption that packets traveling along + the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. Kerberos + performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted third- + party authentication service by using conventional (shared secret key + [2]) cryptography. Kerberos extensions (outside the scope of this + document) can provide for the use of public key cryptography during + certain phases of the authentication protocol [@RFCE: if PKINIT + advances concurrently include reference to the RFC here]. Such + extensions support Kerberos authentication for users registered with + public key certification authorities and provide certain benefits of + public key cryptography in situations where they are needed. + + The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A + client sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting + "credentials" for a given server. The AS responds with these + credentials, encrypted in the client's key. The credentials consist + of a "ticket" for the server and a temporary encryption key (often + called a "session key"). The client transmits the ticket (which + contains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, all + encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session key (now + shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the client, + and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also be + used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to + exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further + communication. + + Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more + authentication servers running on physically secure hosts. The + authentication servers maintain a database of principals (i.e., users + and servers) and their secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption + and implement the Kerberos protocol. In order to add authentication + to its transactions, a typical network application adds one or two + calls to the Kerberos library directly or through the Generic + Security Services Application Programming Interface, GSSAPI, + described in separate document [ref to GSSAPI RFC]. These calls + result in the transmission of the necessary messages to achieve + authentication. + + The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or + exchanges). There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a + Kerberos server for credentials. In the first approach, the client + + + +March 2003 [Page 7] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + sends a cleartext request for a ticket for the desired server to the + AS. The reply is sent encrypted in the client's secret key. Usually + this request is for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) which can later be + used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). In the second method, + the client sends a request to the TGS. The client uses the TGT to + authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it were + contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos + authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the + TGT. Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS + as separate servers, they are implemented in practice as different + protocol entry points within a single Kerberos server. + + Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the + principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages + exchanged between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The + application is free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + + To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the + client transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the + ticket is sent "in the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this + encryption doesn't thwart replay) and might be intercepted and reused + by an attacker, additional information is sent to prove that the + message originated with the principal to whom the ticket was issued. + This information (called the authenticator) is encrypted in the + session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp proves that the + message was recently generated and is not a replay. Encrypting the + authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated by a + party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting + principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over + the network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + + The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also + be guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and + contained in the credentials). This approach provides detection of + both replay attacks and message stream modification attacks. It is + accomplished by generating and transmitting a collision-proof + checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest function) of the client's + message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and integrity of the + messages exchanged between principals can be secured by encrypting + the data to be passed using the session key contained in the ticket + or the sub-session key found in the authenticator. + + The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access + to the Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the + database must be modified, such as when adding new principals or + changing a principal's key. This is done using a protocol between a + client and a third Kerberos server, the Kerberos Administration + Server (KADM). There is also a protocol for maintaining multiple + + + +March 2003 [Page 8] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these protocols are + described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-realm operation + + The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational + boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a + server in another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server + establishes its own "realm". The name of the realm in which a client + is registered is part of the client's name, and can be used by the + end-service to decide whether to honor a request. + + By establishing "inter-realm" keys, the administrators of two realms + can allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its + identity to servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm + keys (a separate key may be used for each direction) registers the + ticket-granting service of each realm as a principal in the other + realm. A client is then able to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for + the remote realm's ticket-granting service from its local realm. When + that ticket-granting ticket is used, the remote ticket-granting + service uses the inter-realm key (which usually differs from its own + normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, and is thus + certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets issued by + the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the end-service + that the client was authenticated from another realm. + + A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms + share an inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm + key with an intermediate realm that communicates with the remote + realm. An authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms + that are transited in communicating from one realm to another. + + Realms may be organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with + its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key + is not directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization + allows an authentication path to be easily constructed. If a + hierarchical organization is not used, it may be necessary to consult + a database in order to construct an authentication path between + realms. + + Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may + be bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate + authentication paths (these might be established to make + communication between two realms more efficient). It is important for + the end-service to know which realms were transited when deciding how + much faith to place in the authentication process. To facilitate this + decision, a field in each ticket contains the names of the realms + that were involved in authenticating the client. + + + +March 2003 [Page 9] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or + rejecting authentication and SHOULD check the transited field. The + application server may choose to rely on the KDC for the application + server's realm to check the transited field. The application server's + KDC will set the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDCs + for intermediate realms may also check the transited field as they + issue ticket-granting tickets for other realms, but they are + encouraged not to do so. A client may request that the KDCs not check + the transited field by setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDCs + are encouraged but not required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Choosing a principal with which to communicate + + The Kerberos protocol provides the means for verifying (subject to + the assumptions in 1.5) that the entity with which one communicates + is the same entity that was registered with the KDC using the claimed + identity (principal name). It is still necessary to determine whether + that identity corresponds to the entity with which one intends to + communicate. + + When appropriate data has been exchanged in advance, this + determination may be performed syntactically by the application based + on the application protocol specification, information provided by + the user, and configuration files. For example, the server principal + name (including realm) for a telnet server might be derived from the + user specified host name (from the telnet command line), the "host/" + prefix specified in the application protocol specification, and a + mapping to a Kerberos realm derived syntactically from the domain + part of the specified hostname and information from the local + Kerberos realms database. + + One can also rely on trusted third parties to make this + determination, but only when the data obtained from the third party + is suitably integrity protected while resident on the third party + server and when transmitted. Thus, for example, one should not rely + on an unprotected domain name system record to map a host alias to + the primary name of a server, accepting the primary name as the party + one intends to contact, since an attacker can modify the mapping and + impersonate the party with which one intended to communicate. + + Implementations of Kerberos and protocols based on Kerberos MUST NOT + use insecure DNS queries to canonicalize the hostname components of + the service principal names. In an environment without secure name + service, application authors MAY append a statically configured + domain name to unqualified hostnames before passing the name to the + security mechanisms, but should do no more than that. Secure name + service facilities, if available, might be trusted for hostname + canonicalization, but such canonicalization by the client SHOULD NOT + + + +March 2003 [Page 10] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + be required by an KDC implementation. + + Implementation note: Many current implementations do some degree of + canonicalization of the provided service name, often using DNS even + though it creates security problems. However there is no consistency + among implementations about whether the service name is case folded + to lower case or whether reverse resolution is used. To maximize + interoperability and security, applications SHOULD provide security + mechanisms with names which result from folding the user-entered name + to lower case, without performing any other modifications or + canonicalization. + +1.3. Authorization + + As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying + the identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually + useful primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, + determining whether a client may use a service, which objects the + client is allowed to access, and the type of access allowed for each. + Kerberos does not, by itself, provide authorization. Possession of a + client ticket for a service provides only for authentication of the + client to that service, and in the absence of a separate + authorization procedure, it should not be considered by an + application as authorizing the use of that service. + + Such separate authorization methods MAY be implemented as application + specific access control functions and may utilize files on the + application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials + such as those based on proxies [Neu93], or on other authorization + services. Separately authenticated authorization credentials MAY be + embedded in a ticket's authorization data when encapsulated by the + KDC-issued authorization data element. + + Applications should not accept the mere issuance of a service ticket + by the Kerberos server (even by a modified Kerberos server) as + granting authority to use the service, since such applications may + become vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an + environment if they interoperate with other KDCs or where other + options for application authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) + are provided. + +1.4. Extending Kerberos Without Breaking Interoperability + + As the deployed base of Kerberos implementations grows, extending + Kerberos becomes more important. Unfortunately some extensions to the + existing Kerberos protocol create interoperability issues because of + uncertainty regarding the treatment of certain extensibility options + by some implementations. This section includes guidelines that will + + + +March 2003 [Page 11] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + enable future implementations to maintain interoperability. + + Kerberos provides a general mechanism for protocol extensibility. + Some protocol messages contain typed holes -- sub-messages that + contain an octet-string along with an integer that defines how to + interpret the octet-string. The integer types are registered + centrally, but can be used both for vendor extensions and for + extensions standardized through the IETF. + +1.4.1. Compatibility with RFC 1510 + + It is important to note that existing Kerberos message formats can + not be readily extended by adding fields to the ASN.1 types. Sending + additional fields often results in the entire message being discarded + without an error indication. Future versions of this specification + will provide guidelines to ensure that ASN.1 fields can be added + without creating an interoperability problem. + + In the meantime, all new or modified implementations of Kerberos that + receive an unknown message extension SHOULD preserve the encoding of + the extension but otherwise ignore the presence of the extension. + Recipients MUST NOT decline a request simply because an extension is + present. + + There is one exception to this rule. If an unknown authorization data + element type is received by a server other than the ticket granting + service either in an AP-REQ or in a ticket contained in an AP-REQ, + then authentication MUST fail. One of the primary uses of + authorization data is to restrict the use of the ticket. If the + service cannot determine whether the restriction applies to that + service then a security weakness may result if the ticket can be used + for that service. Authorization elements that are optional SHOULD be + enclosed in the AD-IF-RELEVANT element. + + The ticket granting service MUST ignore but propagate to derivative + tickets any unknown authorization data types, unless those data types + are embedded in a MANDATORY-FOR-KDC element, in which case the + request will be rejected. This behavior is appropriate because + requiring that the ticket granting service understand unknown + authorization data types would require that KDC software be upgraded + to understand new application-level restrictions before applications + used these restrictions, decreasing the utility of authorization data + as a mechanism for restricting the use of tickets. No security + problem is created because services to which the tickets are issued + will verify the authorization data. + + Implementation note: Many RFC 1510 implementations ignore unknown + authorization data elements. Depending on these implementations to + + + +March 2003 [Page 12] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + honor authorization data restrictions may create a security weakness. + +1.4.2. Sending Extensible Messages + + Care must be taken to ensure that old implementations can understand + messages sent to them even if they do not understand an extension + that is used. Unless the sender knows an extension is supported, the + extension cannot change the semantics of the core message or + previously defined extensions. + + For example, an extension including key information necessary to + decrypt the encrypted part of a KDC-REP could only be used in + situations where the recipient was known to support the extension. + Thus when designing such extensions it is important to provide a way + for the recipient to notify the sender of support for the extension. + For example in the case of an extension that changes the KDC-REP + reply key, the client could indicate support for the extension by + including a padata element in the AS-REQ sequence. The KDC should + only use the extension if this padata element is present in the AS- + REQ. Even if policy requires the use of the extension, it is better + to return an error indicating that the extension is required than to + use the extension when the recipient may not support it; debugging + why implementations do not interoperate is easier when errors are + returned. + +1.5. Environmental assumptions + + Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can + properly function: + + * "Denial of service" attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There + are places in the protocols where an intruder can prevent an + application from participating in the proper authentication steps. + Detection and solution of such attacks (some of which can appear + to be not-uncommon "normal" failure modes for the system) is + usually best left to the human administrators and users. + + * Principals MUST keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder + somehow steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as + that principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate + principal. + + * "Password guessing" attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a dictionary, + messages obtained which are encrypted under a key derived from the + user's password. + + + +March 2003 [Page 13] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + * Each host on the network MUST have a clock which is "loosely + synchronized" to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization + is used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers + when they do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be + configured on a per-server basis, but is typically on the order of + 5 minutes. If the clocks are synchronized over the network, the + clock synchronization protocol MUST itself be secured from network + attackers. + + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists + (ACLs) to grant permissions to particular principals. If a stale + ACL entry remains for a deleted principal and the principal + identifier is reused, the new principal will inherit rights + specified in the stale ACL entry. By not re-using principal + identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is removed. + +1.6. Glossary of terms + + Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + + Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. + + Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented + to a server as part of the authentication process. + + Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. + + Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been + recently generated using the session key known only by the client + and server. + + Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, + which objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of + access allowed for each. + + Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is + restricted by the contents of the authorization data field, but + which lists no network addresses, together with the session key + necessary to use the ticket. + + + +March 2003 [Page 14] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms + plaintext into ciphertext. + + Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. + Note that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some + other server (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file + server). + + Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use + that ticket in an authentication exchange. + + Encryption Type (etype) + When associated with encrypted data, an encryption type identifies + the algorithm used to encrypt the data and is used to select the + appropriate algorithm for decrypting the data. Encryption type + tags are communicated in other messages to enumerate algorithms + that are desired, supported, preferred, or allowed to be used for + encryption of data between parties. This preference is combined + with local information and policy to select an algorithm to be + used. + + KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets + and temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the + host on which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is + sometimes referred to as the Authentication Server (or service). + The ticket-granting ticket portion is sometimes referred to as the + ticket-granting server (or service). + + Kerberos + The name given to the Project Athena's authentication service, the + protocol used by that service, or the code used to implement the + authentication service. The name is adopted from the three-headed + dog which guards Hades. + + Key Version Number (kvno) + A tag associated with encrypted data identifies which key was used + for encryption when a long lived key associated with a principal + changes over time. It is used during the transition to a new key + so that the party decrypting a message can tell whether the data + was encrypted using the old or the new key. + + Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + + + +March 2003 [Page 15] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. + + Principal + A named client or server entity that participates in a network + communication, with one name that is considered canonical. + + Principal identifier + The canonical name used to uniquely identify each different + principal. + + Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that + the fields cannot be individually replaced without either + knowledge of the encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. + + Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the + case of a human user's principal, the secret key MAY be derived + from a password. + + Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network + clients. The server is sometimes referred to as the Application + Server. + + Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more + than one server (for example, remote file service). + + Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a + lifetime limited to the duration of a single login "session". + + Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected + and exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a + lifetime limited to the duration of a single association. + + Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and + other information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It + only serves to authenticate a client when presented along with a + fresh Authenticator. + + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + + + +March 2003 [Page 16] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to + indicate attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a + client when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on + and off by a Kerberos server as required. The following sections + explain what the various flags mean and give examples of reasons to + use them. With the exception of the INVALID flag clients MUST ignore + ticket flags that are not recognized. KDCs MUST ignore KDC options + that are not recognized. Some implementations of RFC 1510 are known + to reject unknown KDC options, so clients may need to resend a + request without KDC new options absent if the request was rejected + when sent with option added since RFC 1510. Since new KDCs will + ignore unknown options, clients MUST confirm that the ticket returned + by the KDC meets their needs. + + Note that it is not, in general, possible to determine whether an + option was not honored because it was not understood or because it + was rejected either through configuration or policy. When adding a + new option to the Kerberos protocol, designers should consider + whether the distinction is important for their option. In cases where + it is, a mechanism for the KDC to return an indication that the + option was understood but rejected needs to be provided in the + specification of the option. Often in such cases, the mechanism needs + to be broad enough to permit an error or reason to be returned. + +2.1. Initial, pre-authenticated, and hardware authenticated tickets + + The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS + protocol, rather than issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. + Application servers that want to require the demonstrated knowledge + of a client's secret key (e.g. a password-changing program) can + insist that this flag be set in any tickets they accept, and thus be + assured that the client's key was recently presented to the + application client. + + The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide additional information + about the initial authentication, regardless of whether the current + ticket was issued directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) + or issued on the basis of a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the + INITIAL flag is clear, but the PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are + carried forward from the ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + + The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application + servers MUST reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated + ticket will be issued in this form. Invalid tickets MUST be validated + by the KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request + with the VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only validate + + + +March 2003 [Page 17] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + tickets after their starttime has passed. The validation is required + so that postdated tickets which have been stolen before their + starttime can be rendered permanently invalid (through a hot-list + mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + + Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long + periods of time. However, this can expose their credentials to + potential theft for equally long periods, and those stolen + credentials would be valid until the expiration time of the + ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and obtaining new ones + periodically would require the client to have long-term access to its + secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be used to + mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two + "expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the + ticket expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an + individual expiration time. An application client must periodically + (i.e. before it expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with + the RENEW option set in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new + ticket with a new session key and a later expiration time. All other + fields of the ticket are left unmodified by the renewal process. When + the latest permissible expiration time arrives, the ticket expires + permanently. At each renewal, the KDC MAY consult a hot-list to + determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last + renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the + usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can + usually be ignored by application servers. However, some particularly + careful application servers MAY disallow renewable tickets. + + If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC + will not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, + but a client MAY request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in + the KRB_AS_REQ message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in + the ticket contains the time after which the ticket may not be + renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + + Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much + later, e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid + at the time the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to + hold valid tickets in a batch queue, since they will be on-line + longer and more prone to theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to + obtain these tickets from the KDC at job submission time, but to + + + +March 2003 [Page 18] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + leave them "dormant" until they are activated and validated by a + further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported in the + interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief + would be foiled. + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + This flag MUST be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a + postdated ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by + default; it MAY be requested by a client by setting the ALLOW- + POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow + a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting ticket; postdated + ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting the + postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) of + a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-granting + ticket at the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is + also set, in which case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) + of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC MAY limit how far in the + future a ticket may be postdated. + + The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The + application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see + when the original authentication occurred. Some services MAY choose + to reject postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a + certain period after the original authentication. When the KDC issues + a POSTDATED ticket, it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the + application client MUST present the ticket to the KDC to be validated + before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + + At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to + perform an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take + on the identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A + principal can allow a service to take on the principal's identity for + a particular purpose by granting it a proxy. + + The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags + is used to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though + conceptually also a proxy, users wishing to delegate their identity + in a form usable for all purpose MUST use the ticket forwarding + mechanism described in the next section to forward a ticket-granting + ticket. + + The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + When set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to + issue a new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a + + + +March 2003 [Page 19] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + different network address based on this ticket. This flag is set if + requested by the client on initial authentication. By default, the + client will request that it be set when requesting a ticket-granting + ticket, and reset when requesting any other ticket. + + This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a + remote request on its behalf (e.g. a print service client can give + the print server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular + file server in order to satisfy a print request). + + In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos + tickets are usually valid from only those network addresses + specifically included in the ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the + client MUST specify the new network address from which the proxy is + to be used, or indicate that the proxy is to be issued for use from + any address. + + The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy + ticket. Application servers MAY check this flag and at their option + they MAY require additional authentication from the agent presenting + the proxy in order to provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + + Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service + granted is complete use of the client's identity. An example where it + might be used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants + authentication to work from that system as if the login were local. + + The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + The FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the + PROXIABLE flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued + with different network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but + users MAY request that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in + the AS request when they request their initial ticket-granting + ticket. + + This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the + user to enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then + authentication forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can + still be achieved if the user engages in the AS exchange specifying + the requested network addresses and supplies a password. + + The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket + with the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by + specifying the FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses + for the new ticket. It is also set in all tickets issued based on + + + +March 2003 [Page 20] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + tickets with the FORWARDED flag set. Application servers may choose + to process FORWARDED tickets differently than non-FORWARDED tickets. + + If addressless tickets are forwarded from one system to another, + clients SHOULD still use this option to obtain a new TGT in order to + have different session keys on the different systems. + +2.7. Transited Policy Checking + + In Kerberos, the application server is ultimately responsible for + accepting or rejecting authentication and SHOULD check that only + suitably trusted KDCs are relied upon to authenticate a principal. + The transited field in the ticket identifies which realms (and thus + which KDCs) were involved in the authentication process and an + application server would normally check this field. If any of these + are untrusted to authenticate the indicated client principal + (probably determined by a realm-based policy), the authentication + attempt MUST be rejected. The presence of trusted KDCs in this list + does not provide any guarantee; an untrusted KDC may have fabricated + the list. + + While the end server ultimately decides whether authentication is + valid, the KDC for the end server's realm MAY apply a realm specific + policy for validating the transited field and accepting credentials + for cross-realm authentication. When the KDC applies such checks and + accepts such cross-realm authentication it will set the TRANSITED- + POLICY-CHECKED flag in the service tickets it issues based on the + cross-realm TGT. A client MAY request that the KDCs not check the + transited field by setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDCs are + encouraged but not required to honor this flag. + + Application servers MUST either do the transited-realm checks + themselves, or reject cross-realm tickets without TRANSITED-POLICY- + CHECKED set. + +2.8. OK as Delegate + + For some applications a client may need to delegate authority to a + server to act on its behalf in contacting other services. This + requires that the client forward credentials to an intermediate + server. The ability for a client to obtain a service ticket to a + server conveys no information to the client about whether the server + should be trusted to accept delegated credentials. The OK-AS- + DELEGATE provides a way for a KDC to communicate local realm policy + to a client regarding whether an intermediate server is trusted to + accept such credentials. + + The OK-AS-DELEGATE flag from the copy of the ticket flags in the + + + +March 2003 [Page 21] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + encrypted part of the KDC reply indicates to the client that the + server (not the client) specified in the ticket has been determined + by policy of the realm to be a suitable recipient of delegation. A + client can use the presence of this flag to help it make a decision + whether to delegate credentials (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket-granting ticket) to this server. Ignore the value of this + flag. When setting this flag, an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on which the service will run, + as well as whether the service requires the use of delegated + credentials. + +2.9. Other KDC options + + There are three additional options which MAY be set in a client's + request of the KDC. + +2.9.1. Renewable-OK + + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a + renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise + be provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, + then the KDC MAY issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to + the requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field MAY still be + adjusted by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the + individual principal or server. + +2.9.2. ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + + In its basic form the Kerberos protocol supports authentication in a + client-server + setting and is not well suited to authentication in a peer-to-peer + environment because the long term key of the user does not remain on + the workstation after initial login. Authentication of such peers may + be supported by Kerberos in its user-to-user variant. The ENC-TKT-IN- + SKEY option supports user-to-user authentication by allowing the KDC + to issue a service ticket encrypted using the session key from + another ticket-granting ticket issued to another user. The ENC-TKT- + IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. It + indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be + encrypted in the session key from the additional second ticket- + granting ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for + specific details. + +2.9.3. Passwordless Hardware Authentication + + The OPT-HARDWARE-AUTH option indicates that the client wishes to use + some form of hardware authentication instead of or in addition to the + client's password or other long-lived encryption key. OPT-HARDWARE- + + + +March 2003 [Page 22] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + AUTH is honored only by the authentication service. If supported and + allowed by policy, the KDC will return an errorcode + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED and include the required METHOD-DATA to + perform such authentication. + +3. Message Exchanges + + The following sections describe the interactions between network + clients and servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the + Kerberos Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it + wishes to obtain authentication credentials for a given server but + currently holds no credentials. In its basic form, the client's + secret key is used for encryption and decryption. This exchange is + typically used at the initiation of a login session to obtain + credentials for a Ticket-Granting Server which will subsequently be + used to obtain credentials for other servers (see section 3.3) + without requiring further use of the client's secret key. This + exchange is also used to request credentials for services which must + not be mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather + require a principal's secret key, such as the password-changing + service[5]. This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of + the identity of the user[6]. + + The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to + Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these + messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + + In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and + the identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials, + other information about the credentials it is requesting, and a + randomly generated nonce which can be used to detect replays, and to + associate replies with the matching requests. This nonce MUST be + generated randomly by the client and remembered for checking against + the nonce in the expected reply. The response, KRB_AS_REP, contains a + ticket for the client to present to the server, and a session key + that will be shared by the client and the server. The session key + and additional information are encrypted in the client's secret key. + + + +March 2003 [Page 23] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + The encrypted part of the KRB_AS_REP message also contains the nonce + which MUST be matched with the nonce from the KRB_AS_REQ message. + + Without pre-authentication, the authentication server does not know + whether the client is actually the principal named in the request. It + simply sends a reply without knowing or caring whether they are the + same. This is acceptable because nobody but the principal whose + identity was given in the request will be able to use the reply. Its + critical information is encrypted in that principal's key. However, + an attacker can send a KRB_AS_REQ message to get known plaintext in + order to attack the principal's key. Especially if the key is based + on a password, this may create a security exposure. So, the initial + request supports an optional field that can be used to pass + additional information that might be needed for the initial exchange. + This field SHOULD be used for pre-authentication as described in + sections 3.1.1 and 5.2.7. + + Various errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response + (KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is + not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains information which can + be used to associate it with the message to which it replies. The + contents of the KRB_ERROR message are not integrity-protected. As + such, the client cannot detect replays, fabrications or + modifications. A solution to this problem will be included in a + future version of the protocol. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + + The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. + Among these options are whether pre-authentication is to be + performed; whether the requested ticket is to be renewable, + proxiable, or forwardable; whether it should be postdated or allow + postdating of derivative tickets; and whether a renewable ticket will + be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the requested ticket + expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable ticket (due to + configuration constraints). + + The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + + If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in + the creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The + format for the ticket is described in section 5.3. The contents of + the ticket are determined as follows. + + Because Kerberos can run over unreliable transports such as UDP, the + KDC MUST be prepared to retransmit responses in case they are lost. + + + +March 2003 [Page 24] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + If a KDC receives a request identical to one it has recently + successfully processed, the KDC MUST respond with a KRB_AS_REP + message rather than a replay error. In order to reduce ciphertext + given to a potential attacker, KDCs MAY send the same response + generated when the request was first handled. KDCs MUST obey this + replay behavior even if the actual transport in use is reliable. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + + The authentication server looks up the client and server principals + named in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective + keys. If the requested client principal named in the request is not + known because it doesn't exist in the KDC's principal database, then + an error message with a KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN is returned. + + If required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the + pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If pre-authentication is + required, but was not present in the request, an error message with + the code KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned and a METHOD-DATA + object will be stored in the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message to + specify which pre-authentication mechanisms are acceptable. Usually + this will include PA-ETYPE-INFO and/or PA-ETYPE-INFO2 elements as + described below. If the server cannot accommodate any encryption type + requested by the client, an error message with code + KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP is returned. Otherwise the KDC generates a + 'random' session key[7]. + + When responding to an AS request, if there are multiple encryption + keys registered for a client in the Kerberos database, then the etype + field from the AS request is used by the KDC to select the encryption + method to be used to protect the encrypted part of the KRB_AS_REP + message which is sent to the client. If there is more than one + supported strong encryption type in the etype list, the KDC SHOULD + use the first valid strong etype for which an encryption key is + available. + + When the user's key is generated from a password or pass phrase, the + string-to-key function for the particular encryption key type is + used, as specified in [@KCRYPTO]. The salt value and additional + parameters for the string-to-key function have default values + (specified by section 4 and by the encryption mechanism + specification, respectively) that may be overridden by pre- + authentication data (PA-PW-SALT, PA-AFS3-SALT, PA-ETYPE-INFO, PA- + ETYPE-INFO2, etc). Since the KDC is presumed to store a copy of the + resulting key only, these values should not be changed for password- + based keys except when changing the principal's key. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 25] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + When the AS server is to include pre-authentication data in a KRB- + ERROR or in an AS-REP, it MUST use PA-ETYPE-INFO2, not PA-ETYPE-INFO, + if the etype field of the client's AS-REQ lists at least one "newer" + encryption type. Otherwise (when the etype field of the client's AS- + REQ does not list any "newer" encryption types) it MUST send both, + PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and PA-ETYPE-INFO (both with an entry for each + enctype). A "newer" enctype is any enctype first officially + specified concurrently with or subsequent to the issue of this RFC. + The enctypes DES, 3DES or RC4 and any defined in [RFC1510] are not + newer enctypes. + + It is not possible to reliably generate a user's key given a pass + phrase without contacting the KDC, since it will not be known whether + alternate salt or parameter values are required. + + The KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key + from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the + appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with + information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable + encryption methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue + tickets with a weak session key encryption type. + + If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, + or is within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the + POSTDATE option has not been specified, then the start time of the + ticket is set to the authentication server's current time. If it + indicates a time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but + the POSTDATED option has not been specified then the error + KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise the requested start + time is checked against the policy of the local realm (the + administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of + postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set + as requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The + postdated ticket MUST be validated before use by presenting it to the + KDC after the start time has been reached. + + The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the earlier of the + requested endtime and a time determined by local policy, possibly + determined using realm or principal specific factors. For example, + the expiration time MAY be set to the earliest of the following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ + message. + + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the client principal from the authentication + server's database. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 26] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the server principal. + + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the + policy of the local realm. + + If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined + above) is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error + message with code KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested + expiration time for the ticket exceeds what was determined as above, + and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' + flag is set in the new ticket, and the renew-till value is set as if + the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested (the field and option names are + described fully in section 5.4.1). + + If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK + option has been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the + renew-till field MAY be set to the earliest of: + + * Its requested value. + + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two + maximum renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' + database entries. + + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable + lifetime set by the policy of the local realm. + + The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set + if they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm + allows: FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. + If the new ticket is postdated (the start time is in the future), its + INVALID flag will also be set. + + If all of the above succeed, the server will encrypt the ciphertext + part of the ticket using the encryption key extracted from the server + principal's record in the Kerberos database using the encryption type + associated with the server principal's key (this choice is NOT + affected by the etype field in the request). It then formats a + KRB_AS_REP message (see section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the + request into the caddr of the response, placing any required pre- + authentication data into the padata of the response, and encrypts the + ciphertext part in the client's key using an acceptable encryption + method requested in the etype field of the request, or in some key + specified by pre-authentication mechanisms being used. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + + + + +March 2003 [Page 27] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by + returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error- + code and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message + contents and details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + + If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies + that the cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the + reply match what it requested. If any padata fields are present, they + may be used to derive the proper secret key to decrypt the message. + The client decrypts the encrypted part of the response using its + secret key, verifies that the nonce in the encrypted part matches the + nonce it supplied in its request (to detect replays). It also + verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match those in the + request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host address + field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, start + and expiration times, and other information for later use. The last- + req field (and the deprecated key-expiration field) from the + encrypted part of the response MAY be checked to notify the user of + impending key expiration. This enables the client program to suggest + remedial action, such as a password change. + + Upon validation of the KRB_AS_REP message (by checking the returned + nonce against that sent in the KRB_AS_REQ message) the client knows + that the current time on the KDC is that read from the authtime field + of the encrypted part of the reply. The client can optionally use + this value for clock synchronization in subsequent messages by + recording with the ticket the difference (offset) between the + authtime value and the local clock. This offset can then be used by + the same user to adjust the time read from the system clock when + generating messages [DGT96]. + + This technique MUST be used when adjusting for clock skew instead of + directly changing the system clock because the KDC reply is only + authenticated to the user whose secret key was used, but not to the + system or workstation. If the clock were adjusted, an attacker + colluding with a user logging into a workstation could agree on a + password, resulting in a KDC reply that would be correctly validated + even though it did not originate from a KDC trusted by the + workstation. + + Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient for the + host to verify the identity of the user; the user and an attacker + could cooperate to generate a KRB_AS_REP format message which + decrypts properly but is not from the proper KDC. If the host wishes + to verify the identity of the user, it MUST require the user to + present application credentials which can be verified using a + + + +March 2003 [Page 28] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can be + verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + + If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it + as an error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are + necessary to recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 + [optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network + applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. + The client MUST have already acquired credentials for the server + using the AS or TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + + The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which SHOULD be + part of the first message in an authenticated transaction. It + contains a ticket, an authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping + information (see section 5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by + itself is insufficient to authenticate a client, since tickets are + passed across the network in cleartext[8], so the authenticator is + used to prevent invalid replay of tickets by proving to the server + that the client knows the session key of the ticket and thus is + entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message is referred to + elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + + When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it + obtains (either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the + TGS exchange) a ticket and session key for the desired service. The + client MAY re-use any tickets it holds until they expire. To use a + ticket the client constructs a new Authenticator from the system + time, its name, and optionally an application specific checksum, an + initial sequence number to be used in KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, + and/or a session subkey to be used in negotiations for a session key + unique to this particular session. Authenticators MAY NOT be re-used + and will be rejected if replayed to a server[9]. If a sequence number + is to be included, it SHOULD be randomly chosen so that even after + + + +March 2003 [Page 29] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + many messages have been exchanged it is not likely to collide with + other sequence numbers in use. + + The client MAY indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the + use of a session-key based ticket (for user to user authentication - + see section 3.7) by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the ap-options + field of the message. + + The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with + the ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the + end server along with any additional application-specific + information. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + + Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks + MUST be loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. + Several errors are possible. If an error occurs, the server is + expected to reply to the client with a KRB_ERROR message. This + message MAY be encapsulated in the application protocol if its 'raw' + form is not acceptable to the protocol. The format of error messages + is described in section 5.9.1. + + The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. + If the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket + in the KRB_AP_REQ is not one the server can use (e.g., it indicates + an old key, and the server no longer possesses a copy of the old + key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE-SESSION- + KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it indicates to the server + that user-to-user authentication is in use, and that the ticket is + encrypted in the session key from the server's ticket-granting ticket + rather than in the server's secret key. See section 3.7 for a more + complete description of the affect of user to user authentication on + all messages in the Kerberos protocol. + + Since it is possible for the server to be registered in multiple + realms, with different keys in each, the srealm field in the + unencrypted portion of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to + specify which secret key the server should use to decrypt that + ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server + doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + + The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key + specified by the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a + modification of the ticket (each encryption system MUST provide + safeguards to detect modified ciphertext; see section 6), the + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned (chances are good that + + + +March 2003 [Page 30] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + + The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from + the decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, + the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of + the client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in + the authenticator. If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH + error is returned; this normally is caused by a client error or + attempted attack. The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then + searched for an address matching the operating-system reported + address of the client. If no match is found or the server insists on + ticket addresses but none are present in the ticket, the + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. If the local (server) time and + the client time in the authenticator differ by more than the + allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is + returned. + + Unless the application server provides its own suitable means to + protect against replay (for example, a challenge-response sequence + initiated by the server after authentication, or use of a server- + generated encryption subkey), the server MUST utilize a replay cache + to remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock + skew. Careful analysis of the application protocol and implementation + is recommended before eliminating this cache. The replay cache will + store at least the server name, along with the client name, time and + microsecond fields from the recently-seen authenticators and if a + matching tuple is found, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned + [10]. If a server loses track of authenticators presented within the + allowable clock skew, it MUST reject all requests until the clock + skew interval has passed, providing assurance that any lost or + replayed authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew + and can no longer be successfully replayed [11]. + + Implementation note: If a client generates multiple requests to the + KDC with the same timestamp, including the microsecond field, all but + the first of the requests received will be rejected as replays. This + might happen, for example, if the resolution of the client's clock is + too coarse. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the timestamps are + not reused, possibly by incrementing the microseconds field in the + time stamp when the clock returns the same time for multiple + requests. + + If multiple servers (for example, different services on one machine, + or a single service implemented on multiple machines) share a service + principal (a practice we do not recommend in general, but acknowledge + will be used in some cases), they should also share this replay + cache, or the application protocol should be designed so as to + eliminate the need for it. Note that this applies to all of the + + + +March 2003 [Page 31] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + services, if any of the application protocols does not have replay + protection built in; an authenticator used with such a service could + later be replayed to a different service with the same service + principal but no replay protection, if the former doesn't record the + authenticator information in the common replay cache. + + If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the server + saves it for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV + messages. If a subkey is present, the server either saves it for + later use or uses it to help generate its own choice for a subkey to + be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + + The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus + the start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the + current time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID + flag is set in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. + Otherwise, if the current time is later than end time by more than + the allowable clock skew, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is + returned. + + If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured + that the client possesses the credentials of the principal named in + the ticket and thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. + + Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named + principal; it does not imply authorization to use the named service. + Applications MUST make a separate authorization decisions based upon + the authenticated name of the user, the requested operation, local + access control information such as that contained in a .k5login or + .k5users file, and possibly a separate distributed authorization + service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + + Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication + information and its initial request in the same message, and the + server need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if + mutual authentication (not only authenticating the client to the + server, but also the server to the client) is being performed, the + KRB_AP_REQ message will have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options + field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is required in response. As with the + error message, this message MAY be encapsulated in the application + protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable to the application's + protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in the reply MUST + be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided in the + authenticator) [12]. If a sequence number is to be included, it + SHOULD be randomly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A + subkey MAY be included if the server desires to negotiate a different + + + +March 2003 [Page 32] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key + extracted from the ticket. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + + If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key + from the credentials obtained for the server [13] to decrypt the + message, and verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match + those in the Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then + the client is assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number + and subkey (if present) are retained for later use. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + + After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and + server share an encryption key which can be used by the application. + In some cases, the use of this session key will be implicit in the + protocol; in others the method of use must be chosen from several + alternatives. The 'true session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, + KRB_SAFE, or other application-specific uses MAY be chosen by the + application based on the session key from the ticket and subkeys in + the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator [14]. To mitigate the + effect of failures in random number generation on the client it is + strongly encouraged that any key derived by an application for + subsequent use include the full key entropy derived from the KDC + generated session key carried in the ticket. We leave the protocol + negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or + checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol + does not constrain the implementation options, but an example of how + this might be done follows. + + One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used + for subsequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to + propose a key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server + can then choose a key using the proposed key from the client as + input, returning the new subkey in the subkey field of the + application reply. This key could then be used for subsequent + communication. + + To make this example more concrete, if the communication patterns of + an application dictates the use of encryption modes of operation + incompatible with the encryption system used for the authenticator, + then a key compatible with the required encryption system may be + generated by either the client, the server, or collaboratively by + both and exchanged using the subkey field. This generation might + involve the use of a random number as a pre-key, initially generated + by either party, which could then be encrypted using the session key + from the ticket, and the result exchanged and used for subsequent + + + +March 2003 [Page 33] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + encryption. By encrypting the pre-key with the session key from the + ticket, randomness from the KDC generated key is assured of being + present in the negotiated key. Application developers must be careful + however, to use a means of introducing this entropy that does not + allow an attacker to learn the session key from the ticket if it + learns the key generated and used for subsequent communication. The + reader should note that this is only an example, and that an analysis + of the particular cryptosystem to be used, must be made before + deciding how to generate values for the subkey fields, and the key to + be used for subsequent communication. + + With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers + should take care not to send sensitive information to each other + without proper assurances. In particular, applications that require + privacy or integrity SHOULD use the KRB_AP_REP response from the + server to client to assure both client and server of their peer's + identity. If an application protocol requires privacy of its + messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section 3.5). The KRB_SAFE + message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting + Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain + authentication credentials for a given server (which might be + registered in a remote realm), when it wishes to renew or validate an + existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the + first case, the client must already have acquired a ticket for the + Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the ticket-granting + ticket is usually obtained when a client initially authenticates to + the system, such as when a user logs in). The message format for the + TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. The + primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS + exchange does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or + sub-session key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for all + application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so + once a renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, the client must + use a separate exchange to obtain valid tickets. + + The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) + from the client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply + + + +March 2003 [Page 34] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + (KRB_TGS_REP or KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes + information authenticating the client plus a request for credentials. + The authentication information consists of the authentication header + (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the client's previously obtained ticket- + granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. In the ticket-granting + ticket and proxy cases, the request MAY include one or more of: a + list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization data + to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application + server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). + The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, + encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting ticket or + renewable ticket, or if present, in the sub-session key from the + Authenticator (part of the authentication header). The KRB_ERROR + message contains an error code and text explaining what went wrong. + The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message + contains information which can be used to detect replays, and to + associate it with the message to which it replies. The KRB_ERROR + message also contains information which can be used to associate it + with the message to which it replies. The same comments about + integrity protection of KRB_ERROR messages mentioned in section 3.1 + apply to the TGS exchange. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client + MUST determine in which realm the application server is believed to + be registered [15]. If the client knows the service principal name + and realm and it does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket + for the appropriate realm, then one must be obtained. This is first + attempted by requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the destination + realm from a Kerberos server for which the client possesses a ticket- + granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ message recursively). The + Kerberos server MAY return a TGT for the desired realm in which case + one can proceed. Alternatively, the Kerberos server MAY return a TGT + for a realm which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further along the + standard hierarchical path between the client's realm and the + requested realm server's realm). It should be noted in this case that + misconfiguration of the Kerberos servers may cause loops in the + resulting authentication path, which the client should be careful to + detect and avoid. + + If the Kerberos server returns a TGT for a 'closer' realm other than + the desired realm, the client MAY use local policy configuration to + verify that the authentication path used is an acceptable one. + Alternatively, a client MAY choose its own authentication path, + rather than relying on the Kerberos server to select one. In either + case, any policy or configuration information used to choose or + validate authentication paths, whether by the Kerberos server or + + + +March 2003 [Page 35] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + client, MUST be obtained from a trusted source. + + When a client obtains a ticket-granting ticket that is 'closer' to + the destination realm, the client MAY cache this ticket and reuse it + in future KRB-TGS exchanges with services in the 'closer' realm. + However, if the client were to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for + the 'closer' realm by starting at the initial KDC rather than as part + of obtaining another ticket, then a shorter path to the 'closer' + realm might be used. This shorter path may be desirable because fewer + intermediate KDCs would know the session key of the ticket involved. + For this reason, clients SHOULD evaluate whether they trust the + realms transited in obtaining the 'closer' ticket when making a + decision to use the ticket in future. + + Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate + realm, it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and + contacts one. The list might be obtained through a configuration file + or network service or it MAY be generated from the name of the realm; + as long as the secret keys exchanged by realms are kept secret, only + denial of service results from using a false Kerberos server. + + (This paragraph changed) As in the AS exchange, the client MAY + specify a number of options in the KRB_TGS_REQ message. One of these + options is the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option used for user-to-user + authentication. An overview of user to user authentication can be + found in section 3.7. When generating the KRB_TGS_REQ message, this + option indicates that the client is including a ticket-granting + ticket obtained from the application server in the additional tickets + field of the request and that the KDC SHOULD encrypt the ticket for + the application server using the session key from this additional + ticket, instead of using a server key from the principal database. + + The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing an + authentication header as an element of the padata field, and + including the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along + with several optional fields: the enc-authorizatfion-data field for + application server use and additional tickets required by some + options. + + In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub- + session key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be + encrypted [16]. If the sub-session key is not specified, the session + key from the ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc- + authorization-data is present, it MUST be encrypted in the sub- + session key, if present, from the authenticator portion of the + authentication header, or if not present, using the session key from + the ticket-granting ticket. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 36] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the + destination realm. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the + KRB_AS_REQ message, but there are many additional checks to be + performed. First, the Kerberos server MUST determine which server the + accompanying ticket is for and it MUST select the appropriate key to + decrypt it. For a normal KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the + ticket granting service, and the TGS's key will be used. If the TGT + was issued by another realm, then the appropriate inter-realm key + MUST be used. If the accompanying ticket is not a ticket-granting + ticket for the current realm, but is for an application server in the + current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are specified in + the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is the + server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt + the ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server + for which it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata + field, the KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + + Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied + checksum in the Authenticator MUST be verified against the contents + of the request, and the message rejected if the checksums do not + match (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum + is not keyed or not collision-proof (with an error code of + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the checksum type is not supported, the + KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. If the authorization-data + are present, they are decrypted using the sub-session key from the + Authenticator. + + If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + + As discussed in section 3.1.2, the KDC MUST send a valid KRB_TGS_REP + message if it receives a KRB_TGS_REQ message identical to one it has + recently processed. However, if the authenticator is a replay, but + the rest of the request is not identical, then the KDC SHOULD return + KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + + The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP + (KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The + detailed specification is in section 5.4.2. + + The response will include a ticket for the requested server or for a + ticket granting server of an intermediate KDC to be contacted to + + + +March 2003 [Page 37] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + obtain the requested ticket. The Kerberos database is queried to + retrieve the record for the appropriate server (including the key + with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request is for a + ticket-granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared + with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the + realm 'closest' to the requested realm with which it does share a + key, and use that realm instead. If the requested server cannot be + found in the TGS database, then a TGT for another trusted realm MAY + be returned instead of a ticket for the service. This TGT is a + referral mechanism to cause the client to retry the request to the + realm of the TGT. These are the only cases where the response for + the KDC will be for a different server than that requested by the + client. + + By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list + of transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the + expiration time, and the authorization data of the newly-issued + ticket will be copied from the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or + renewable ticket. If the transited field needs to be updated, but the + transited type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is + returned. + + If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new + ticket is set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime + from the TGT, and (c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of + the maximum life for the application server and the maximum life for + the local realm (the maximum life for the requesting principal was + already applied when the TGT was issued). If the new ticket is to be + a renewal, then the endtime above is replaced by the minimum of (a) + the value of the renew_till field of the ticket and (b) the starttime + for the new ticket plus the life (endtime-starttime) of the old + ticket. + + If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket + will contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will + only be honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY + option is similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses + specified by the client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE + flag in the TGT is set. The PROXY option will not be honored on + requests for additional ticket-granting tickets. + + If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, + or is within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the + POSTDATE option has not been specified, then the start time of the + ticket is set to the authentication server's current time. If it + indicates a time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but + the POSTDATED option has not been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag + is not set in the TGT, then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is + + + +March 2003 [Page 38] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting ticket has the MAY- + POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be postdated and + the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the local + realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, + and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket MUST be validated + before use by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been + reached. However, in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew- + till time of a newly-issued postdated ticket extend beyond the renew- + till time of the ticket-granting ticket. + + If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional + ticket has been included in the request, it indicates that the client + is using user- to-user authentication to prove its identity to a + server that does not have access to a persistent key. Section 3.7 + describes the affect of this option on the entire Kerberos protocol. + When generating the KRB_TGS_REP message, this option in the + KRB_TGS_REQ message tells the KDC to decrypt the additional ticket + using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was + issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of + the requested server is missing from the request, the name of the + client in the additional ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of + the requested server will be compared to the name of the client in + the additional ticket and if different, the request will be rejected. + If the request succeeds, the session key from the additional ticket + will be used to encrypt the new ticket that is issued instead of + using the key of the server for which the new ticket will be used. + + If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC + as part of the authentication header is not that of the ticket- + granting server itself, the server is registered in the realm of the + KDC, and the RENEW option is requested, then the KDC will verify that + the RENEWABLE flag is set in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not + set in the ticket, and that the renew_till time is still in the + future. If the VALIDATE option is requested, the KDC will check that + the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is set. If the PROXY + option is requested, then the KDC will check that the PROXIABLE flag + is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the ticket passes the + hotlist check described in the next section, the KDC will issue the + appropriate new ticket. + + The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is + encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, + or the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not + encrypted using the client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's + key's expiration date and the key version number fields are left out + since these values are stored along with the client's database + record, and that record is not needed to satisfy a request based on a + ticket-granting ticket. + + + +March 2003 [Page 39] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + + Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the + presented ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets + which have been canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by + storing a range of issue timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a + presented ticket had an authtime in that range, it would be rejected. + In this way, a stolen ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket + cannot be used to gain additional tickets (renewals or otherwise) + once the theft has been reported to the KDC for the realm in which + the server resides. Any normal ticket obtained before it was reported + stolen will still be valid (because they require no interaction with + the KDC), but only until their normal expiration time. If TGT's have + been issued for cross-realm authentication, use of the cross-realm + TGT will not be affected unless the hot-list is propagated to the + KDCs for the realms for which such cross-realm tickets were issued. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + + If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC + as part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting + service, but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look + up the inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to + decrypt the ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor + the request, subject to the constraints outlined above in the section + describing the AS exchange. The realm part of the client's identity + will be taken from the ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm + that issued the ticket-granting ticket, if it is not the realm of the + client principal, will be added to the transited field of the ticket + to be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field + from the ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set + of realm names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing + and writing out its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a + rearrangement of the existing encoding). + + Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its + own realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the + previous realm. This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from + intentionally leaving out its own name (it could, however, omit other + realms' names). + + The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to + be included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the + ticket and both are known to have taken part in authenticating the + principal. Since the endpoints are not included, both local and + single-hop inter-realm authentication result in a transited field + that is empty. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 40] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it + might potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, + its contents are encoded. The initially supported encoding is + optimized for the normal case of inter-realm communication: a + hierarchical arrangement of realms using either domain or X.500 style + realm names. This encoding (called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now + described. + + Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", + "\", trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, + and if they are part of a realm name, they MUST be quoted in the + transited field by preceding them with a "\". + + A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to + the previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, + MIT.EDU, ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + + Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, + that they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + + A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to + the previous realm. For the purpose of appending, the realm + preceding the first listed realm is considered to be the null realm + (""). If a realm name beginning with a "/" is to stand by itself, + then it SHOULD be preceded by a space (" "). For example, we can + encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, /COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + + Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, + they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + + A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all + realms between the previous realm and the next realm have been + traversed. For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the + client's realm is considered to precede those in the transited field, + and the server's realm is considered to follow them. Thus, "," means + that all realms along the path between the client and the server have + been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that all realms from the client's + realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been traversed, + and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an X.500 + style has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in + + + +March 2003 [Page 41] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + one hierarchy shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm + in another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + + When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in + the same manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The + primary difference is that the ciphertext part of the response must + be decrypted using the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if it + was specified in the request, or the session key from the ticket- + granting ticket, rather than the client's secret key. The server name + returned in the reply is the true principal name of the service. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + + The KRB_SAFE message MAY be used by clients requiring the ability to + detect modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by + including a keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some + control information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key + (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if + no negotiation has occurred). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects + its data and the appropriate control information and computes a + checksum over them. The checksum algorithm should be the keyed + checksum mandated to be implemented along with the crypto system used + for the sub-session or session key. The checksum is generated using + the sub-session key if present, and the session key. Some + implementations use a different checksum algorithm for the KRB_SAFE + messages but doing so in a interoperable manner is not always + possible. + + Implementations SHOULD accept any checksum algorithm they implement + that both have adequate security and that have keys compatible with + the sub-session or session key. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof + checksums are not suitable for this use. + + The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a + timestamp and a sequence number. The designer of an application using + the KRB_SAFE message MUST choose at least one of the two mechanisms. + This choice SHOULD be based on the needs of the application protocol. + + Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received + by one's peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the + session key, so maintaining the next sequence number should not + present an additional problem. + + + +March 2003 [Page 42] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages + without them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the + appropriate replay detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the + appropriate mechanism for multi-cast protocols where all of one's + peers share a common sub-session key, but some messages will be sent + to a subset of one's peers. + + After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the + information and checksum to the recipient in the message format + specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + + When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as + follows. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by + the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version + and type fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. + A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE + error. The application verifies that the checksum used is a + collision-proof keyed checksum that uses keys compatible with the + sub-session or session key as appropriate (or with the application + key derived from the session or sub-session keys), and if it is not, + a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The sender's address + MUST be included in the control information; the recipient verifies + that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches + the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is + specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the + recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the + message. To work with network address translation, senders MAY use + the directional address type specified in section 8.1 for the sender + address and not include recipient addresses. A failed match for + either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp + and usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp + and usec are expected and not present, or they are present but not + current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, + along with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the + Authenticator match any recently-seen (sent or received) such tuples, + the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence + number is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, + the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp + and usec or a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error + is generated. Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and + control information, and if it doesn't match the received checksum, a + KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the + + + +March 2003 [Page 43] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + message was generated by its peer and was not modified in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + + The KRB_PRIV message MAY be used by clients requiring confidentiality + and the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It + achieves this by encrypting the messages and adding control + information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects + its data and the appropriate control information (specified in + section 5.7.1) and encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the + last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation + has occurred). As part of the control information, the client MUST + choose to use either a timestamp or a sequence number (or both); see + the discussion in section 3.4.1 for guidelines on which to use. After + the user data and control information are encrypted, the client + transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' information to the + recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + + When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as + follows. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by + the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version + and type fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. + A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE + error. The application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the + resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been + modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. + + The sender's address MUST be included in the control information; the + recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's + address matches the sender's address in the message. If a recipient + address is specified or the recipient requires an address then one of + the recipient's addresses MUST also appear as the recipient's address + in the message. Where a sender's or receiver's address might not + otherwise match the address in a message because of network address + translation, an application MAY be written to use addresses of the + directional address type in place of the actual network address. + + A failed match for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. + To work with network address translation, implementations MAY use the + directional address type defined in section 7.1 for the sender + + + +March 2003 [Page 44] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + address and include no recipient address. Then the timestamp and usec + and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec + are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, + the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along + with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the + Authenticator match any recently-seen such tuples, the + KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number + is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the + KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and + usec or a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is + generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was + generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without + intruders able to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + + The KRB_CRED message MAY be used by clients requiring the ability to + send Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this + by sending the tickets together with encrypted data containing the + session keys and other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using + the KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote + host. It then constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or + tickets so obtained, placing the session key needed to use each + ticket in the key field of the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of + the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. + + Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the + KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo + sequence in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current + time and, if specifically required by the application (and + communicated from the recipient to the sender by application specific + means) the nonce, s-address, and r-address fields, are placed in the + encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message which is then encrypted under + an encryption key previously exchanged in the KRB_AP exchange + (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if + no negotiation has occurred). + + Implementation note: When constructing a KRB_CRED message for + inclusion in a GSSAPI initial context token, the MIT implementation + of Kerberos will not encrypt the KRB_CRED message if the session key + is a DES or triple DES key. For interoperability with MIT, the + Microsoft implementation will not encrypt the KRB_CRED in a GSSAPI + + + +March 2003 [Page 45] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + token if it is using a DES session key. Starting at version 1.2.5, + MIT Kerberos can receive and decode either encrypted or unencrypted + KRB_CRED tokens in the GSSAPI exchange. The Heimdal implementation of + Kerberos can also accept either encrypted or unencrypted KRB_CRED + messages. Since the KRB_CRED message in a GSSAPI token is encrypted + in the authenticator, the MIT behavior does not present a security + problem, although it is a violation of the Kerberos specification. + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + + When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If + any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the + application. The message is verified by checking that the protocol + version and type fields match the current version and KRB_CRED, + respectively. A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then decrypts the + ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption shows + the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is + generated. + + If present or required, the recipient MAY verify that the operating + system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's address + in the message, and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as + the recipient's address in the message. The address check does not + provide any added security, since the address if present has already + been checked in the KRB_AP_REQ message and there is not any benefit + to be gained by an attacker in reflecting a KRB_CRED message back to + its originator. Thus, the recipient MAY ignore the address even if + present in order to work better in NAT environments. A failed match + for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Recipients MAY + skip the address check as the KRB_CRED message cannot generally be + reflected back to the originator. The timestamp and usec fields (and + the nonce field if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and + usec are not present, or they are present but not current, the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new + tickets in its credentials cache together with the session key and + other information in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the + encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. + +3.7. User to User Authentication Exchanges + + User to User authentication provides a method to perform + authentication when the verifier does not have a access to long term + service key. This might be the case when running a server (for + example a window server) as a user on a workstation. In such cases, + the server may have access to the ticket-granting ticket obtained + + + +March 2003 [Page 46] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + when the user logged in to the workstation, but because the server is + running as an unprivileged user it might not have access to system + keys. Similar situations may arise when running peer-to-peer + applications. + + Summary + Message direction Message type Sections + 0. Message from application server Not Specified + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 3.3 + 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 3.3 + 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + 3. Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 3.2 + 5.5.1 + + To address this problem, the Kerberos protocol allows the client to + request that the ticket issued by the KDC be encrypted using a + session key from a ticket-granting ticket issued to the party that + will verify the authentication. This ticket-granting ticket must be + obtained from the verifier by means of an exchange external to the + Kerberos protocol, usually as part of the application protocol. This + message is shown in the summary above as message 0. Note that because + the ticket-granting ticket is encrypted in the KDC's secret key, it + can not be used for authentication without posession of the + corresponding secret key. Furthermore, because the verifier does not + reveal the corresponding secret key, providing a copy of the + verifier's ticket-granting ticket does not allow impersonation of the + verifier. + + Message 0 in the table above represents an application specific + negotation between the client and server, at the end of which both + have determined that they will use user to user authentication and + the client has obtained the server's TGT. + + Next, the client includes the server's TGT as an additional ticket in + its KRB_TGS_REQ request to the KDC (message 1 in the table above) and + specifyies the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option in its request. + + If validated according to the instructions in 3.3.3, the application + ticket returned to the client (message 2 in the table above) will be + encrypted using the session key from the additional ticket and the + client will note this when it uses or stores the application ticket. + + When contacting the server using a ticket obtained for user to user + authentication (message 3 in the table above), the client MUST + specify the USE-SESSION-KEY flag in the ap-options field. This tells + the application server to use the session key associated with its + ticket-granting ticket to decrypt the server ticket provided in the + application request. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 47] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +4. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + + The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to + encrypt messages of arbitrary sizes, using stream or block encryption + ciphers. Encryption is used to prove the identities of the network + entities participating in message exchanges. The Key Distribution + Center for each realm is trusted by all principals registered in that + realm to store a secret key in confidence. Proof of knowledge of this + secret key is used to verify the authenticity of a principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a + shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to + ticket requests; the ability to obtain the secret key or session key + implies the knowledge of the appropriate keys and the identity of the + KDC. The ability of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and + present a Ticket and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with + the session key from the KDC response) to a service verifies the + identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the service to + extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge + thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + + [@KCRYPTO] defines a framework for defining encryption and checksum + mechanisms for use with Kerberos. It also defines several such + mechanisms, and more may be added in future updates to that document. + + The string-to-key operation provided by [@KCRYPTO] is used to produce + a long-term key for a principal (generally for a user). The default + salt string, if none is provided via pre-authentication data, is the + concatenation of the principal's realm and name components, in order, + with no separators. Unless otherwise indicated, the default string- + to-key opaque parameter set as defined in [@KCRYPTO] is used. + + Encrypted data, keys and checksums are transmitted using the + EncryptedData, EncryptionKey and Checksum data objects defined in + section 5.2.9. The encryption, decryption, and checksum operations + described in this document use the corresponding encryption, + decryption, and get_mic operations described in [@KCRYPTO], with + implicit "specific key" generation using the "key usage" values + specified in the description of each EncryptedData or Checksum object + to vary the key for each operation. Note that in some cases, the + value to be used is dependent on the method of choosing the key or + the context of the message. + + Key usages are unsigned 32 bit integers; zero is not permitted. The + key usage values for encrypting or checksumming Kerberos messages are + indicated in section 5 along with the message definitions. Key usage + values 512-1023 are reserved for uses internal to a Kerberos + implementation. (For example, seeding a pseudo-random number + + + +March 2003 [Page 48] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + generator with a value produced by encrypting something with a + session key and a key usage value not used for any other purpose.) + Key usage values between 1024 and 2047 (inclusive) are reserved for + application use; applications SHOULD use even values for encryption + and odd values for checksums within this range. Key usage values are + also summarized in a table in section 7.5.1. + + There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of + the RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would + not know about key usages. In order that these specifications + continue to be meaningful until they are updated, if not key usage + values are specified then key usages 1024 and 1025 must be used to + derive keys for encryption and checksums, respectively (this does not + apply to protocols that do their own encryption independent of this + framework, directly using the key resulting from the Kerberos + authentication exchange.) New protocols defined in terms of the + Kerberos encryption and checksum types SHOULD use their own key usage + values. + + Unless otherwise indicated, no cipher state chaining is done from one + encryption operation to another. + + Implementation note: While not recommended, some application + protocols will continue to use the key data directly, even if only in + currently existing protocol specifications. An implementation + intended to support general Kerberos applications may therefore need + to make key data available, as well as the attributes and operations + described in [@KCRYPTO]. One of the more common reasons for directly + performing encryption is direct control over negotiation and + selection of a "sufficiently strong" encryption algorithm (in the + context of a given application). While Kerberos does not directly + provide a facility for negotiating encryption types between the + application client and server, there are approaches for using + Kerberos to facilitate this negotiation - for example, a client may + request only "sufficiently strong" session key types from the KDC and + expect that any type returned by the KDC will be understood and + supported by the application server. + +5. Message Specifications + + NOTE: The ASN.1 collected here should be identical to the contents of + Appendix A. In case of conflict, the contents of Appendix A shall + take precedence. + + The Kerberos protocol is defined here in terms of Abstract Syntax + Notation One (ASN.1) [X680], which provides a syntax for specifying + both the abstract layout of protocol messages as well as their + encodings. Implementors not utilizing an existing ASN.1 compiler or + + + +March 2003 [Page 49] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + support library are cautioned to thoroughly understand the actual + ASN.1 specification to ensure correct implementation behavior, as + there is more complexity in the notation than is immediately obvious, + and some tutorials and guides to ASN.1 are misleading or erroneous. + + Note that in several places, there have been changes here from RFC + 1510 that change the abstract types. This is in part to address + widespread assumptions that various implementors have made, in some + cases resulting in unintentional violations of the ASN.1 standard. + These are clearly flagged where they occur. The differences between + the abstract types in RFC 1510 and abstract types in this document + can cause incompatible encodings to be emitted when certain encoding + rules, e.g. the Packed Encoding Rules (PER), are used. This + theoretical incompatibility should not be relevant for Kerberos, + since Kerberos explicitly specifies the use of the Distinguished + Encoding Rules (DER). It might be an issue for protocols wishing to + use Kerberos types with other encoding rules. (This practice is not + recommended.) With very few exceptions (most notably the usages of + BIT STRING), the encodings resulting from using the DER remain + identical between the types defined in RFC 1510 and the types defined + in this document. + + The type definitions in this section assume an ASN.1 module + definition of the following form: + + KerberosV5Spec2 { + iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) krb5spec2(2) + } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN + + -- rest of definitions here + + END + + This specifies that the tagging context for the module will be + explicit and non-automatic. + + Note that in some other publications [RFC1510] [RFC1964], the "dod" + portion of the object identifier is erroneously specified as having + the value "5". In the case of RFC 1964, use of the "correct" OID + value would result in a change in the wire protocol; therefore, it + remains unchanged for now. + + Note that elsewhere in this document, nomenclature for various + message types is inconsistent, but seems to largely follow C language + conventions, including use of underscore (_) characters and all-caps + spelling of names intended to be numeric constants. Also, in some + places, identifiers (especially ones refering to constants) are + + + +March 2003 [Page 50] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + written in all-caps in order to distinguish them from surrounding + explanatory text. + + The ASN.1 notation does not permit underscores in identifiers, so in + actual ASN.1 definitions, underscores are replaced with hyphens (-). + Additionally, structure member names and defined values in ASN.1 MUST + begin with a lowercase letter, while type names MUST begin with an + uppercase letter. + +5.1. Specific Compatibility Notes on ASN.1 + + For compatibility purposes, implementors should heed the following + specific notes regarding the use of ASN.1 in Kerberos. These notes do + not describe deviations from standard usage of ASN.1. The purpose of + these notes is to instead describe some historical quirks and non- + compliance of various implementations, as well as historical + ambiguities, which, while being valid ASN.1, can lead to confusion + during implementation. + +5.1.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules + + The encoding of Kerberos protocol messages shall obey the + Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) of ASN.1 as described in [X690]. + Some implementations (believed to be primarly ones derived from DCE + 1.1 and earlier) are known to use the more general Basic Encoding + Rules (BER); in particular, these implementations send indefinite + encodings of lengths. Implementations MAY accept such encodings in + the interests of backwards compatibility, though implementors are + warned that decoding fully-general BER is fraught with peril. + +5.1.2. Optional Integer Fields + + Some implementations do not internally distinguish between an omitted + optional integer value and a transmitted value of zero. The places in + the protocol where this is relevant include various microseconds + fields, nonces, and sequence numbers. Implementations SHOULD treat + omitted optional integer values as having been transmitted with a + value of zero, if the application is expecting this. + +5.1.3. Empty SEQUENCE OF Types + + There are places in the protocol where a message contains a SEQUENCE + OF type as an optional member. This can result in an encoding that + contains an empty SEQUENCE OF encoding. The Kerberos protocol does + not semantically distinguish between an absent optional SEQUENCE OF + type and a present optional but empty SEQUENCE OF type. + Implementations SHOULD NOT send empty SEQUENCE OF encodings that are + marked OPTIONAL, but SHOULD accept them as being equivalent to an + + + +March 2003 [Page 51] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + omitted OPTIONAL type. In the ASN.1 syntax describing Kerberos + messages, instances of these problematic optional SEQUENCE OF types + are indicated with a comment. + +5.1.4. Unrecognized Tag Numbers + + Future revisions to this protocol may include new message types with + different APPLICATION class tag numbers. Such revisions should + protect older implementations by only sending the message types to + parties that are known to understand them, e.g. by means of a flag + bit set by the receiver in a preceding request. In the interest of + robust error handling, implementations SHOULD gracefully handle + receiving a message with an unrecognized tag anyway, and return an + error message if appropriate. + +5.1.5. Tag Numbers Greater Than 30 + + A naive implementation of a DER ASN.1 decoder may experience problems + with ASN.1 tag numbers greater than 30, due to such tag numbers being + encoded using more than one byte. Future revisions of this protocol + may utilize tag numbers greater than 30, and implementations SHOULD + be prepared to gracefully return an error, if appropriate, if they do + not recognize the tag. + +5.2. Basic Kerberos Types + + This section defines a number of basic types that are potentially + used in multiple Kerberos protocol messages. + +5.2.1. KerberosString + + The original specification of the Kerberos protocol in RFC 1510 uses + GeneralString in numerous places for human-readable string data. + Historical implementations of Kerberos cannot utilize the full power + of GeneralString. This ASN.1 type requires the use of designation + and invocation escape sequences as specified in ISO-2022/ECMA-35 + [ISO-2022/ECMA-35] to switch character sets, and the default + character set that is designated as G0 is the ISO-646/ECMA-6 + [ISO-646,ECMA-6] International Reference Version (IRV) (aka U.S. + ASCII), which mostly works. + + ISO-2022/ECMA-35 defines four character-set code elements (G0..G3) + and two Control-function code elements (C0..C1). DER prohibits the + designation of character sets as any but the G0 and C0 sets. + Unfortunately, this seems to have the side effect of prohibiting the + use of ISO-8859 (ISO Latin) [ISO-8859] character-sets or any other + character-sets that utilize a 96-character set, since it is + prohibited by ISO-2022/ECMA-35 to designate them as the G0 code + + + +March 2003 [Page 52] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + element. This side effect is being investigated in the ASN.1 + standards community. + + In practice, many implementations treat GeneralStrings as if they + were 8-bit strings of whichever character set the implementation + defaults to, without regard for correct usage of character-set + designation escape sequences. The default character set is often + determined by the current user's operating system dependent locale. + At least one major implementation places unescaped UTF-8 encoded + Unicode characters in the GeneralString. This failure to adhere to + the GeneralString specifications results in interoperability issues + when conflicting character encodings are utilized by the Kerberos + clients, services, and KDC. + + This unfortunate situation is the result of improper documentation of + the restrictions of the ASN.1 GeneralString type in prior Kerberos + specifications. + + The new (post-RFC 1510) type KerberosString, defined below, is a + GeneralString that is constrained to only contain characters in + IA5String + + KerberosString ::= GeneralString (IA5String) + + US-ASCII control characters should in general not be used in + KerberosString, except for cases such as newlines in lengthy error + messages. Control characters SHOULD NOT be used in principal names or + realm names. + + For compatibility, implementations MAY choose to accept GeneralString + values that contain characters other than those permitted by + IA5String, but they should be aware that character set designation + codes will likely be absent, and that the encoding should probably be + treated as locale-specific in almost every way. Implementations MAY + also choose to emit GeneralString values that are beyond those + permitted by IA5String, but should be aware that doing so is + extraordinarily risky from an interoperability perspective. + + Some existing implementations use GeneralString to encode unescaped + locale-specific characters. This is a violation of the ASN.1 + standard. Most of these implementations encode US-ASCII in the left- + hand half, so as long the implementation transmits only US-ASCII, the + ASN.1 standard is not violated in this regard. As soon as such an + implementation encodes unescaped locale-specific characters with the + high bit set, it violates the ASN.1 standard. + + Other implementations have been known to use GeneralString to contain + a UTF-8 encoding. This also violates the ASN.1 standard, since UTF-8 + + + +March 2003 [Page 53] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + is a different encoding, not a 94 or 96 character "G" set as defined + by ISO 2022. It is believed that these implementations do not even + use the ISO 2022 escape sequence to change the character encoding. + Even if implementations were to announce the change of encoding by + using that escape sequence, the ASN.1 standard prohibits the use of + any escape sequences other than those used to designate/invoke "G" or + "C" sets allowed by GeneralString. + + Future revisions to this protocol will almost certainly allow for a + more interoperable representation of principal names, probably + including UTF8String. + + Note that applying a new constraint to a previously unconstrained + type constitutes creation of a new ASN.1 type. In this particular + case, the change does not result in a changed encoding under DER. + +5.2.2. Realm and PrincipalName + + Realm ::= KerberosString + + PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type [0] Int32, + name-string [1] SEQUENCE OF KerberosString + } + + Kerberos realm names are encoded as KerberosStrings. Realms shall not + contain a character with the code 0 (the US-ASCII NUL). Most realms + will usually consist of several components separated by periods (.), + in the style of Internet Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in + the style of X.500 names. Acceptable forms for realm names are + specified in section 6.1.. A PrincipalName is a typed sequence of + components consisting of the following sub-fields: + + name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 6.2. The name-type + SHOULD be treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names + can be the same (i.e. at least one of the components, or the + realm, must be different). + + name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a KerberosString. Taken together, a + PrincipalName and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most + PrincipalNames will have only a few components (typically one or + two). + +5.2.3. KerberosTime + + + +March 2003 [Page 54] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- with no fractional seconds + + The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. A + KerberosTime value shall not include any fractional portions of the + seconds. As required by the DER, it further shall not include any + separators, and it shall specify the UTC time zone (Z). Example: The + only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm on 6 + November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +5.2.4. Constrained Integer types + + Some integer members of types SHOULD be constrained to values + representable in 32 bits, for compatibility with reasonable + implementation limits. + + Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647) + -- signed values representable in 32 bits + + UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) + -- unsigned 32 bit values + + Microseconds ::= INTEGER (0..999999) + -- microseconds + + While this results in changes to the abstract types from the RFC 1510 + version, the encoding in DER should be unaltered. Historical + implementations were typically limited to 32-bit integer values + anyway, and assigned numbers SHOULD fall in the space of integer + values representable in 32 bits in order to promote interoperability + anyway. + + There are several integer fields in messages that are constrained to + fixed values. + + pvno + also TKT-VNO or AUTHENTICATOR-VNO, this recurring field is always + the constant integer 5. There is no easy way to make this field + into a useful protocol version number, so its value is fixed. + + msg-type + this integer field is usually identical to the application tag + number of the containing message type. + +5.2.5. HostAddress and HostAddresses + + HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type [0] Int32, + address [1] OCTET STRING + + + +March 2003 [Page 55] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + } + + -- NOTE: HostAddresses is always used as an OPTIONAL field and + -- should not be empty. + HostAddresses -- NOTE: subtly different from rfc1510, + -- but has a value mapping and encodes the same + ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + + The host address encodings consists of two fields: + + addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 7.5.3. + + address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +5.2.6. AuthorizationData + + -- NOTE: AuthorizationData is always used as an OPTIONAL field and + -- should not be empty. + AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type [0] Int32, + ad-data [1] OCTET STRING + } + + ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according + to the value of the corresponding ad-type field. + + ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All + negative values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values + are reserved for registered use. + + Each sequence of type and data is referred to as an authorization + element. Elements MAY be application specific, however, there is a + common set of recursive elements that should be understood by all + implementations. These elements contain other elements embedded + within them, and the interpretation of the encapsulating element + determines which of the embedded elements must be interpreted, and + which may be ignored. + + These common authorization data elements are recursively defined, + meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of + authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the + encapsulating element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating + element, the encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be + + + +March 2003 [Page 56] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + interpreted as issued directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in + a separate plaintext part of the ticket. The types of the + encapsulating elements are specified as part of the Kerberos + specification because the behavior based on these values should be + understood across implementations whereas other elements need only be + understood by the applications which they affect. + + Authorization data elements are considered critical if present in a + ticket or authenticator. Unless encapsulated in a known authorization + data element amending the criticality of the elements it contains, if + an unknown authorization data element type is received by a server + either in an AP-REQ or in a ticket contained in an AP-REQ, then + authentication MUST fail. Authorization data is intended to restrict + the use of a ticket. If the service cannot determine whether the + restriction applies to that service then a security weakness may + result if the ticket can be used for that service. Authorization + elements that are optional can be enclosed in AD-IF-RELEVANT element. + + In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the + element will be specified as the least significant part of the + subsection number, and the value of the ad-data will be as shown in + the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection heading. + + contents of ad-data ad-type + + DER encoding of AD-IF-RELEVANT 1 + + DER encoding of AD-KDCIssued 4 + + DER encoding of AD-AND-OR 5 + + DER encoding of AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC 8 + +5.2.6.1. IF-RELEVANT + + AD-IF-RELEVANT ::= AuthorizationData + + AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended + for interpretation only by application servers that understand the + particular ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that + do not understand the type of an element embedded within the if- + relevant element MAY ignore the uninterpretable element. This element + promotes interoperability across implementations which may have local + extensions for authorization. The ad-type for AD-IF-RELEVANT is (1). + +5.2.6.2. KDCIssued + + AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE { + + + +March 2003 [Page 57] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + ad-checksum [0] Checksum, + i-realm [1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements [3] AuthorizationData + } + + ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the + ticket itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same + encryption algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) using the key + used to protect the ticket, and a key usage value of 19. + + i-realm, i-sname + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC + itself. This field would be used when the KDC can verify the + authenticity of elements signed by the issuing principal and it + allows this KDC to notify the application server of the validity + of those elements. + + elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + + The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for + Kerberos principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege + attributes and other mechanisms for positive authorization, + amplifying the privileges of the principal beyond what can be done + using a credentials without such an a-data element. + + This can not be provided without this element because the definition + of the authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will + by the bearer of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets + and elements may also be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in + the authenticator. + + For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are + signed by the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the + server's key (the same key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key + derived from that key). Elements encapsulated with in the KDC-issued + element will be ignored by the application server if this "signature" + is not present. Further, elements encapsulated within this element + from a ticket-granting ticket MAY be interpreted by the KDC, and used + as a basis according to policy for including new signed elements + within derivative tickets, but they will not be copied to a + derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a + derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the + signature will not be correct for the application ticket elements, + and the field will be ignored by the application server. + + + +March 2003 [Page 58] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + This element and the elements it encapulates MAY be safely ignored by + applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement + this element. + + The ad-type for AD-KDC-ISSUED is (4). + +5.2.6.3. AND-OR + + AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE { + condition-count [0] INTEGER, + elements [1] AuthorizationData + } + + + When restrictive AD elements are encapsulated within the and-or + element, the and-or element is considered satisfied if and only if at + least the number of encapsulated elements specified in condition- + count are satisifed. Therefore, this element MAY be used to + implement an "or" operation by setting the condition-count field to + 1, and it MAY specify an "and" operation by setting the condition + count to the number of embedded elements. Application servers that do + not implement this element MUST reject tickets that contain + authorization data elements of this type. + + The ad-type for AD-AND-OR is (5). + +5.2.6.4. MANDATORY-FOR-KDC + + AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData + + AD elements encapsulated within the mandatory-for-kdc element are to + be interpreted by the KDC. KDCs that do not understand the type of an + element embedded within the mandatory-for-kdc element MUST reject the + request. + + The ad-type for AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC is (8). + +5.2.7. PA-DATA + + Historically, PA-DATA have been known as "pre-authentication data", + meaning that they were used to augment the initial authentication + with the KDC. Since that time, they have also been used as a typed + hole with which to extend protocol exchanges with the KDC. + + PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0] + padata-type [1] Int32, + padata-value [2] OCTET STRING -- might be encoded AP-REQ + + + +March 2003 [Page 59] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + } + + padata-type + indicates the way that the padata-value element is to be + interpreted. Negative values of padata-type are reserved for + unregistered use; non-negative values are used for a registered + interpretation of the element type. + + padata-value + Usually contains the DER encoding of another type; the padata-type + field identifies which type is encoded here. + + padata-type name contents of padata-value + + 1 pa-tgs-req DER encoding of AP-REQ + + 2 pa-enc-timestamp DER encoding of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + + 3 pa-pw-salt salt (not ASN.1 encoded) + + 11 pa-etype-info DER encoding of ETYPE-INFO + + 19 pa-etype-info2 DER encoding of ETYPE-INFO2 + + This field MAY also contain information needed by certain + extensions to the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used + to initially verify the identity of a client before any response + is returned. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the + KDC or the client select the key needed for generating or + decrypting the response. This form of the padata is useful for + supporting the use of certain token cards with Kerberos. The + details of such extensions are specified in separate documents. + See [Pat92] for additional uses of this field. + +5.2.7.1. PA-TGS-REQ + + In the case of requests for additional tickets (KRB_TGS_REQ), padata- + value will contain an encoded AP-REQ. The checksum in the + authenticator (which MUST be collision-proof) is to be computed over + the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. + +5.2.7.2. Encrypted Timestamp Pre-authentication + + There are pre-authentication types that may be used to pre- + authenticate a client by means of an encrypted timestamp. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 60] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp [0] KerberosTime -- client's time --, + pausec [1] Microseconds OPTIONAL + } + + Patimestamp contains the client's time, and pausec contains the + microseconds, which MAY be omitted if a client will not generate more + than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) consists + of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC encoding, encrypted using the client's secret + key and a key usage value of 1. + + This pre-authentication type was not present in RFC 1510, but many + implementations support it. + +5.2.7.3. PA-PW-SALT + + The padata-value for this pre-authentication type contains the salt + for the string-to-key to be used by the client to obtain the key for + decrypting the encrypted part of an AS-REP message. Unfortunately, + for historical reasons, the character set to be used is unspecified + and probably locale-specific. + + This pre-authentication type was not present in RFC 1510, but many + implementations support it. It is necessary in any case where the + salt for the string-to-key algorithm is not the default. + + In the trivial example, a zero-length salt string is very commonplace + for realms that have converted their principal databases from + Kerberos 4. + + A KDC SHOULD NOT send PA-PW-SALT when issuing a KRB-ERROR message + that requests additional pre-authentication. Implementation note: + some KDC implementations issue an erroneous PA-PW-SALT when issuing a + KRB-ERROR message that requests additional pre-authentication. + Therefore, clients SHOULD ignore a PA-PW-SALT accompanying a KRB- + ERROR message that requests additional pre-authentication. + +5.2.7.4. PA-ETYPE-INFO + + The ETYPE-INFO pre-authentication type is sent by the KDC in a KRB- + ERROR indicating a requirement for additional pre-authentication. It + is usually used to notify a client of which key to use for the + encryption of an encrypted timestamp for the purposes of sending a + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication value. It MAY also be sent in an + AS-REP to provide information to the client about which key salt to + use for the string-to-key to be used by the client to obtain the key + + + +March 2003 [Page 61] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + for decrypting the encrypted part the AS-REP. + + ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE { + etype [0] Int32, + salt [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + + The salt, like that of PA-PW-SALT, is also completely unspecified + with respect to character set and is probably locale-specific. + + If ETYPE-INFO is sent in an AS-REP, there shall be exactly one ETYPE- + INFO-ENTRY, and its etype shall match that of the enc-part in the AS- + REP. + + This pre-authentication type was not present in RFC 1510, but many + implementations that support encrypted timestamps for pre- + authentication need to support ETYPE-INFO as well. + +5.2.7.5. PA-ETYPE-INFO2 + + The ETYPE-INFO2 pre-authentication type is sent by the KDC in a KRB- + ERROR indicating a requirement for additional pre-authentication. It + is usually used to notify a client of which key to use for the + encryption of an encrypted timestamp for the purposes of sending a + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication value. It MAY also be sent in an + AS-REP to provide information to the client about which key salt to + use for the string-to-key to be used by the client to obtain the key + for decrypting the encrypted part the AS-REP. + + ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE { + etype [0] Int32, + salt [1] KerberosString OPTIONAL, + s2kparams [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + + The type of the salt is KerberosString, but existing installations + might have locale-specific characters stored in salt strings, and + implementors MAY choose to handle them. + + The interpretation of s2kparams is specified in the cryptosystem + description associated with the etype. Each cryptosystem has a + default interpretation of s2kparams that will hold if that element is + omitted from the encoding of ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 62] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + If ETYPE-INFO2 is sent in an AS-REP, there shall be exactly one + ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY, and its etype shall match that of the enc-part in + the AS-REP. + + The preferred ordering of pre-authentication data that modify client + key selection is: ETYPE-INFO2, followed by ETYPE-INFO, followed by + PW-SALT. A KDC shall send all of these pre-authentication data that + it supports, in the preferred ordering, when issuing an AS-REP or + when issuing a KRB-ERROR requesting additional pre-authentication. + + The ETYPE-INFO2 pre-authentication type was not present in RFC 1510. + +5.2.8. KerberosFlags + + For several message types, a specific constrained bit string type, + KerberosFlags, is used. + + KerberosFlags ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (32..MAX)) -- minimum number of bits + -- shall be sent, but no fewer than 32 + + Compatibility note: the following paragraphs describe a change from + the RFC1510 description of bit strings that would result in + incompatility in the case of an implementation that strictly + conformed to ASN.1 DER and RFC1510. + + ASN.1 bit strings have multiple uses. The simplest use of a bit + string is to contain a vector of bits, with no particular meaning + attached to individual bits. This vector of bits is not necessarily a + multiple of eight bits long. The use in Kerberos of a bit string as + a compact boolean vector wherein each element has a distinct meaning + poses some problems. The natural notation for a compact boolean + vector is the ASN.1 "NamedBit" notation, and the DER require that + encodings of a bit string using "NamedBit" notation exclude any + trailing zero bits. This truncation is easy to neglect, especially + given C language implementations that naturally choose to store + boolean vectors as 32 bit integers. + + For example, if the notation for KDCOptions were to include the + "NamedBit" notation, as in RFC 1510, and a KDCOptions value to be + encoded had only the "forwardable" (bit number one) bit set, the DER + encoding MUST include only two bits: the first reserved bit + ("reserved", bit number zero, value zero) and the one-valued bit (bit + number one) for "forwardable". + + Most existing implementations of Kerberos unconditionally send 32 + bits on the wire when encoding bit strings used as boolean vectors. + This behavior violates the ASN.1 syntax used for flag values in RFC + 1510, but occurs on such a widely installed base that the protocol + + + +March 2003 [Page 63] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + description is being modified to accomodate it. + + Consequently, this document removes the "NamedBit" notations for + individual bits, relegating them to comments. The size constraint on + the KerberosFlags type requires that at least 32 bits be encoded at + all times, though a lenient implementation MAY choose to accept fewer + than 32 bits and to treat the missing bits as set to zero. + + Currently, no uses of KerberosFlags specify more than 32 bits worth + of flags, although future revisions of this document may do so. When + more than 32 bits are to be transmitted in a KerberosFlags value, + future revisions to this document will likely specify that the + smallest number of bits needed to encode the highest-numbered one- + valued bit should be sent. This is somewhat similar to the DER + encoding of a bit string that is declared with the "NamedBit" + notation. + +5.2.9. Cryptosystem-related Types + + Many Kerberos protocol messages contain an EncryptedData as a + container for arbitrary encrypted data, which is often the encrypted + encoding of another data type. Fields within EncryptedData assist the + recipient in selecting a key with which to decrypt the enclosed data. + + EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype [0] Int32 -- EncryptionType --, + kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + } + + etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to + encipher the cipher. + + kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data + is encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long + lasting keys, such as principals' secret keys. + + cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET + STRING. (Note that the encryption mechanisms defined in + [@KCRYPTO] MUST incorporate integrity protection as well, so no + additional checksum is required.) + + The EncryptionKey type is the means by which cryptographic keys used + for encryption are transfered. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 64] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype [0] Int32 -- actually encryption type --, + keyvalue [1] OCTET STRING + } + + keytype + This field specifies the encryption type of the encryption key + that follows in the keyvalue field. While its name is "keytype", + it actually specifies an encryption type. Previously, multiple + cryptosystems that performed encryption differently but were + capable of using keys with the same characteristics were permitted + to share an assigned number to designate the type of key; this + usage is now deprecated. + + keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + + Messages containing cleartext data to be authenticated will usually + do so by using a member of type Checksum. Most instances of Checksum + use a keyed hash, though exceptions will be noted. + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype [0] Int32, + checksum [1] OCTET STRING + } + + cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the + accompanying checksum. + + checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet + string. + + See section 4 for a brief description of the use of encryption and + checksums in Kerberos. + +5.3. Tickets + + This section describes the format and encryption parameters for + tickets and authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is + included in a protocol message it is treated as an opaque object. A + ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A + Ticket contains the following information: + + Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno [0] INTEGER (5), + realm [1] Realm, + + + +March 2003 [Page 65] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + sname [2] PrincipalName, + enc-part [3] EncryptedData -- EncTicketPart + } + + -- Encrypted part of ticket + EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags [0] TicketFlags, + key [1] EncryptionKey, + crealm [2] Realm, + cname [3] PrincipalName, + transited [4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime [5] KerberosTime, + starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime [7] KerberosTime, + renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data [10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + -- encoded Transited field + TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type [0] Int32 -- must be registered --, + contents [1] OCTET STRING + } + + TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- the following are new since 1510 + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + + tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. + This document describes version number 5. + + realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also + + + +March 2003 [Page 66] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + serves to identify the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. Since a Kerberos server can only issue tickets for + servers within its realm, the two will always be identical. + + sname + This field specifies all components of the name part of the + server's identity, including those parts that identify a specific + instance of a service. + + enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart + sequence. It is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos and the + end server (the server's secret key), using a key usage value of + 2. + + flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or + requested when the ticket was issued. The meanings of the flags + are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 reserved Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + 1 forwardable flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new + ticket-granting ticket with a + different network address based on the + presented ticket. + + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or + 2 forwarded was issued based on authentication + involving a forwarded ticket-granting + ticket. + + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical + 3 proxiable to that of the FORWARDABLE flag, + except that the PROXIABLE flag tells + the ticket-granting server that only + non-ticket-granting tickets may be + + + +March 2003 [Page 67] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + issued with different network + addresses. + + 4 proxy When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + 5 may-postdate ignored by end servers. This flag + tells the ticket-granting server that + a post-dated ticket MAY be issued + based on this ticket-granting ticket. + + This flag indicates that this ticket + has been postdated. The end-service + 6 postdated can check the authtime field to see + when the original authentication + occurred. + + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by + 7 invalid the KDC before use. Application + servers must reject tickets which have + this flag set. + + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can + usually be ignored by end servers + 8 renewable (some particularly careful servers MAY + disallow renewable tickets). A + renewable ticket can be used to obtain + a replacement ticket that expires at a + later date. + + This flag indicates that this ticket + 9 initial was issued using the AS protocol, and + not issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + This flag indicates that during + initial authentication, the client was + authenticated by the KDC before a + 10 pre-authent ticket was issued. The strength of the + pre-authentication method is not + indicated, but is acceptable to the + KDC. + + This flag indicates that the protocol + + + +March 2003 [Page 68] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected + 11 hw-authent to be possessed solely by the named + client. The hardware authentication + method is selected by the KDC and the + strength of the method is not + indicated. + + This flag indicates that the KDC for + the realm has checked the transited + field against a realm defined policy + for trusted certifiers. If this flag + is reset (0), then the application + server must check the transited field + itself, and if unable to do so it must + reject the authentication. If the flag + 12 transited- is set (1) then the application server + policy-checked MAY skip its own validation of the + transited field, relying on the + validation performed by the KDC. At + its option the application server MAY + still apply its own validation based + on a separate policy for acceptance. + + This flag is new since RFC 1510. + + This flag indicates that the server + (not the client) specified in the + ticket has been determined by policy + of the realm to be a suitable + recipient of delegation. A client can + use the presence of this flag to help + it make a decision whether to delegate + credentials (either grant a proxy or a + forwarded ticket-granting ticket) to + 13 ok-as-delegate this server. The client is free to + ignore the value of this flag. When + setting this flag, an administrator + should consider the Security and + placement of the server on which the + service will run, as well as whether + the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + This flag is new since RFC 1510. + + 14-31 reserved Reserved for future use. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 69] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used + to pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server + and the client. + + crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. + + cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal + identifier. + + transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part + in authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does + not specify the order in which the realms were transited. See + section 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the + traversed realms. When the names of CA's are to be embedded in + the transited field (as specified for some extensions to the + protocol), the X.500 names of the CA's SHOULD be mapped into items + in the transited field using the mapping defined by RFC2253. + + authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the + named principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket + on which this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to + provide additional information to the end service, and to provide + the necessary information for implementation of a `hot list' + service at the KDC. An end service that is particularly paranoid + could refuse to accept tickets for which the initial + authentication occurred "too far" in the past. This field is also + returned as part of the response from the KDC. When returned as + part of the response to initial authentication (KRB_AS_REP), this + is the current time on the Kerberos server. It is NOT recommended + that this time value be used to adjust the workstation's clock + since the workstation cannot reliably determine that such a + KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + + + starttime + + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket + is valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of + the ticket. If the starttime field is absent from the ticket, then + the authtime field SHOULD be used in its place to determine the + life of the ticket. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 70] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be + honored (its expiration time). Note that individual services MAY + place their own limits on the life of a ticket and MAY reject + tickets which have not yet expired. As such, this is really an + upper bound on the expiration time for the ticket. + + renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag + set in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may + be included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute + expiration time for the ticket, including all renewals. + + caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if + present) host addresses. These are the addresses from which the + ticket can be used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be + used from any location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the + end server to accept addressless tickets is a policy decision and + is left to the Kerberos and end-service administrators; they MAY + refuse to issue or accept such tickets. Because of the wide + deployment of network address translation, it is recommended that + policy allow the issue and acceptance of such tickets. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for + an attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is + not sent over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be + stolen simply by listening to the network; an attacker has to gain + access to the session key (perhaps through operating system + security breaches or a careless user's unattended session) to make + use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it + could be, an attacker who has compromised the client's workstation + could use the credentials from there. Including the network + addresses only makes it more difficult, not impossible, for an + attacker to walk off with stolen credentials and then use them + from a "safe" location. + + authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data + from the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the + application service. If no authorization data is included, this + field will be left out. Experience has shown that the name of this + field is confusing, and that a better name for this field would be + restrictions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to change the name + of this field at this time. + + + +March 2003 [Page 71] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the + basis of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any + principal in posession of credentials to add entries to the + authorization data field since these entries further restrict what + can be done with the ticket. Such additions can be made by + specifying the additional entries when a new ticket is obtained + during the TGS exchange, or they MAY be added during chained + delegation using the authorization data field of the + authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, except when an entry is separately authenticated by + encapsulation in the KDC-issued element, it is not allowable for + the presence of an entry in the authorization data field of a + ticket to amplify the privileges one would obtain from using a + ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the + field will contain the names of service specific objects, and the + rights to those objects. The format for this field is described in + section 5.2.6. Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format + of the contents of the sub-fields, it does carry type information + (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to + issue a proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a + client wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to + be passed to the print server. By specifying the name of the file + in the authorization_data field, the file server knows that the + print server can only use the client's rights when accessing the + particular file to be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In + this case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized + entity), may obtain a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is + issued in the name of a privilege server), and this entity adds + restrictions on its own authority and delegates the restricted + authority through a proxy to the client. The client would then + present this authorization credential to the application server + separately from the authentication exchange. Alternatively, such + authorization credentials MAY be embedded in the ticket + authenticating the authorized entity, when the authorization is + separately authenticated using the KDC-issued authorization data + element (see 5.2.6.2). + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a + proxy and leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket + + + +March 2003 [Page 72] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + and session key can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for + some suggested uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + + This section specifies the format of the messages used in the + exchange between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of + possible error messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + + The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no application tag number of its own. + Instead, it is incorporated into one of KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ, + which each have an application tag, depending on whether the request + is for an initial ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the + message is sent from the client to the KDC to request credentials for + a service. + + The message fields are: + + AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ + + TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + + KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0] + pvno [1] INTEGER (5) , + msg-type [2] INTEGER (10 -- AS -- | 12 -- TGS --), + padata [3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL + -- NOTE: not empty --, + req-body [4] KDC-REQ-BODY + } + + KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options [0] KDCOptions, + cname [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL + -- Used only in AS-REQ --, + realm [2] Realm + -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ --, + sname [3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till [5] KerberosTime, + rtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce [7] UInt32, + + + +March 2003 [Page 73] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + etype [8] SEQUENCE OF Int32 -- EncryptionType + -- in preference order --, + addresses [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data [10] EncryptedData -- AuthorizationData --, + additional-tickets [11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL + -- NOTE: not empty + } + + KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + -- unused10(10), + -- opt-hardware-auth(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- 15 is reserved for canonicalize + -- unused15(15), + -- 26 was unused in 1510 + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + + The fields in this message are: + + pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. + + msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will + almost always be the same as the application identifier associated + with a message. It is included to make the identifier more readily + accessible to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type + will be KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. + + padata + Contains pre-authentication data. Requests for additional tickets + + + +March 2003 [Page 74] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + (KRB_TGS_REQ) MUST contain a padata of PA-TGS-REQ. + + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials + can be issued or decrypted. + + req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. + + kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to + the KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the + tickets as well as other information that is to modify the + behavior of the KDC. Where appropriate, the name of an option may + be the same as the flag that is set by that option. Although in + most case, the bit in the options field will be the same as that + in the flags field, this is not guaranteed, so it is not + acceptable to simply copy the options field to the flags field. + There are various checks that must be made before honoring an + option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options + are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options + and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is + specified in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail + above in section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bits Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of + this field. + + The FORWARDABLE option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is to + have its forwardable flag set. It + 1 FORWARDABLE may only be set on the initial + request, or in a subsequent request + if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based is also + forwardable. + + The FORWARDED option is only + specified in a request to the + ticket-granting server and will only + be honored if the ticket-granting + + + +March 2003 [Page 75] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + ticket in the request has its + 2 FORWARDED FORWARDABLE bit set. This option + indicates that this is a request for + forwarding. The address(es) of the + host from which the resulting ticket + is to be valid are included in the + addresses field of the request. + + The PROXIABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have + its proxiable flag set. It may only + 3 PROXIABLE be set on the initial request, or in + a subsequent request if the + ticket-granting ticket on which it + is based is also proxiable. + + The PROXY option indicates that this + is a request for a proxy. This + option will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the + 4 PROXY request has its PROXIABLE bit set. + The address(es) of the host from + which the resulting ticket is to be + valid are included in the addresses + field of the request. + + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is to + have its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE may only be set on the initial + request, or in a subsequent request + if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based also has its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + The POSTDATED option indicates that + this is a request for a postdated + ticket. This option will only be + honored if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based has its + 6 POSTDATED MAY-POSTDATE flag set. The resulting + ticket will also have its INVALID + flag set, and that flag may be reset + by a subsequent request to the KDC + after the starttime in the ticket + has been reached. + + 7 RESERVED This option is presently unused. + + + +March 2003 [Page 76] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + The RENEWABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have + its RENEWABLE flag set. It may only + be set on the initial request, or + when the ticket-granting ticket on + 8 RENEWABLE which the request is based is also + renewable. If this option is + requested, then the rtime field in + the request contains the desired + absolute expiration time for the + ticket. + + 9 RESERVED Reserved for PK-Cross + + 10 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + 11 RESERVED Reserved for opt-hardware-auth. + + 12-25 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a + ticket-granting-ticket against the + policy of the local realm before it + will issue derivative tickets based + on the ticket-granting ticket. If + this flag is set in the request, + checking of the transited field is + disabled. Tickets issued without the + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK performance of this check will be + noted by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be + checked locally. KDCs are + encouraged but not required to honor + the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + This flag is new since RFC 1510 + + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates + that a renewable ticket will be + acceptable if a ticket with the + requested life cannot otherwise be + provided. If a ticket with the + requested life cannot be provided, + 27 RENEWABLE-OK then a renewable ticket may be + issued with a renew-till equal to + + + +March 2003 [Page 77] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + the requested endtime. The value + of the renew-till field may still be + limited by local limits, or limits + selected by the individual principal + or server. + + This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option indicates + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY that the ticket for the end server + is to be encrypted in the session + key from the additional + ticket-granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The RENEW + option indicates that the present + request is for a renewal. The ticket + provided is encrypted in the secret + key for the server on which it is + 30 RENEW valid. This option will only be + honored if the ticket to be renewed + has its RENEWABLE flag set and if + the time in its renew-till field has + not passed. The ticket to be renewed + is passed in the padata field as + part of the authentication header. + + This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The + VALIDATE option indicates that the + request is to validate a postdated + ticket. It will only be honored if + the ticket presented is postdated, + presently has its INVALID flag set, + 31 VALIDATE and would be otherwise usable at + this time. A ticket cannot be + validated before its starttime. The + ticket presented for validation is + encrypted in the key of the server + for which it is valid and is passed + in the padata field as part of the + authentication header. + cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in + section 5.3. The sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + + + +March 2003 [Page 78] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + option is specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken + from the name of the client in the ticket passed as additional- + tickets. + + enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present + in the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization- + data encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the + Authenticator, or alternatively from the session key in the + ticket-granting ticket (both the Authenticator and ticket-granting + ticket come from the padata field in the KRB_TGS_REQ). The key + usage value used when encrypting is 5 if a sub-session key is + used, or 4 if the session key is used. + + realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. + + from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It + specifies the desired start time for the requested ticket. If this + field is omitted then the KDC SHOULD use the current time instead. + + till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in + a ticket request. It is not optional, but if the requested endtime + is "19700101000000Z", the requested ticket is to have the maximum + endtime permitted according to KDC policy. Implementation note: + This special timestamp corresponds to a UNIX time_t value of zero + on most systems. + + rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to + the KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. + + nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It is intended + to hold a random number generated by the client. If the same + number is included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it + provides evidence that the response is fresh and has not been + replayed by an attacker. Nonces MUST NEVER be reused. + + etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used + in the response. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 79] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the + addresses for the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this + field will contain other addresses. The contents of this field are + usually copied by the KDC into the caddr field of the resulting + ticket. + + additional-tickets + Additional tickets MAY be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be + used in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. When + the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is used for user-to-user + authentication, this addional ticket MAY be a TGT issued by the + local realm or an inter-realm TGT issued for the current KDC's + realm by a remote KDC. If more than one option which requires + additional tickets has been specified, then the additional tickets + are used in the order specified by the ordering of the options + bits (see kdc-options, above). + + The application tag number will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) + depending on whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or + for an additional ticket (TGS-REQ). + + The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional- + tickets) are only included if necessary to perform the operation + specified in the kdc-options field. + + It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number + appears twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ + message contains these fields as does the authentication header + (KRB_AP_REQ) that is passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + + The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for + either an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There + is no message type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext + part of the reply depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the + ciphertext is encrypted in the client's secret key, and the client's + key version number is included in the key version number for the + encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in the + sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if absent, the session key + from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. In that case, + + + +March 2003 [Page 80] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + no version number will be present in the EncryptedData sequence. + + The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + + AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP + + TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + + KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (11 -- AS -- | 13 -- TGS --), + padata [2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL + -- NOTE: not empty --, + crealm [3] Realm, + cname [4] PrincipalName, + ticket [5] Ticket, + enc-part [6] EncryptedData + -- EncASRepPart or EncTGSRepPart, + -- as appropriate + } + + EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart + + EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + + EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key [0] EncryptionKey, + last-req [1] LastReq, + nonce [2] UInt32, + key-expiration [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags [4] TicketFlags, + authtime [5] KerberosTime, + starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime [7] KerberosTime, + renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm [9] Realm, + sname [10] PrincipalName, + caddr [11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type [0] Int32, + lr-value [1] KerberosTime + } + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + either KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. + + + +March 2003 [Page 81] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible + use for this field is to encode an alternate "salt" string to be + used with a string-to-key algorithm. This ability is useful to + ease transitions if a realm name needs to change (e.g. when a + company is acquired); in such a case all existing password-derived + entries in the KDC database would be flagged as needing a special + salt string until the next password change. + + crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in + section 5.3. + + ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3. + + enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related + information that forms the encrypted part of a message. The + description of the encrypted part of the message follows each + appearance of this field. + + The key usage value for encrypting this field is 3 in an AS-REP + message, using the client's long-term key or another key selected + via pre-authentication mechanisms. In a TGS-REP message, the key + usage value is 8 if the TGS session key is used, or 9 if a TGS + authenticator subkey is used. + + Compatibility note: Some implementations unconditionally send an + encrypted EncTGSRepPart (application tag number 26) in this field + regardless of whether the reply is a AS-REP or a TGS-REP. In the + interests of compatibility, implementors MAY relax the check on + the tag number of the decrypted ENC-PART. + + key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3. + + last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the + last request by a principal. Depending on what information is + available, this might be the last time that a request for a + ticket-granting ticket was made, or the last time that a request + based on a ticket-granting ticket was successful. It also might + cover all servers for a realm, or just the particular server. Some + implementations MAY display this information to the user to aid in + discovering unauthorized use of one's identity. It is similar in + spirit to the last login time displayed when logging into + timesharing systems. + + + +March 2003 [Page 82] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information + pertains only to the responding server. Non-negative values + pertain to all servers for the realm. + + If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no information is + conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute value of the + lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is the + time of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of last initial request. If + it is three (3), then the lr-value subfield is the time of + issue for the newest ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four + (4), then the lr-value subfield is the time of the last + renewal. If it is five (5), then the lr-value subfield is the + time of last request (of any type). If it is (6), then the lr- + value subfield is the time when the password will expire. If + it is (7), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the + account will expire. + + lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. The time MUST + be interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying + lr-type subfield. + + nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. + The expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. If present, it SHOULD be set to the earliest of the + user's key expiration and account expiration. The use of this + field is deprecated and the last-req field SHOULD be used to + convey this information instead. This field will usually be left + out of the TGS reply since the response to the TGS request is + encrypted in a session key and no client information need be + retrieved from the KDC database. It is up to the application + client (usually the login program) to take appropriate action + (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time is imminent. + + flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted + portion of the attached ticket (see section 5.3), provided so the + client MAY verify they match the intended request and to assist in + proper ticket caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the + caddr field will only be filled in if the request was for a proxy + + + +March 2003 [Page 83] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + or forwarded ticket, or if the user is substituting a subset of + the addresses from the ticket-granting ticket. If the client- + requested addresses are not present or not used, then the + addresses contained in the ticket will be the same as those + included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + + This section specifies the format of the messages used for the + authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + + The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, + the message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options + in use, and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ + message is often referred to as the 'authentication header'. + + AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (14), + ap-options [2] APOptions, + ticket [3] Ticket, + authenticator [4] EncryptedData -- Authenticator + } + + APOptions ::= KerberosFlags + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. + + ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and + affects the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where + the selected options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and + the unselected options and reserved fields being reset (0). The + encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of + the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 reserved Reserved for future expansion of this field. + + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates that the + + + +March 2003 [Page 84] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + ticket the client is presenting to a server + 1 use-session-key is encrypted in the session key from the + server's ticket-granting ticket. When this + option is not specified, the ticket is + encrypted in the server's secret key. + + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the server + 2 mutual-required that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond with + a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 reserved Reserved for future use. + + ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. + + authenticator + This contains the encrypted authenticator, which includes the + client's choice of a subkey. + + The encrypted authenticator is included in the AP-REQ; it certifies + to a server that the sender has recent knowledge of the encryption + key in the accompanying ticket, to help the server detect replays. It + also assists in the selection of a "true session key" to use with the + particular session. The DER encoding of the following is encrypted + in the ticket's session key, with a key usage value of 11 in normal + application exchanges, or 7 when used as the PA-TGS-REQ PA-DATA field + of a TGS-REQ exchange (see section 5.4.1): + + -- Unencrypted authenticator + Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno [0] INTEGER (5), + crealm [1] Realm, + cname [2] PrincipalName, + cksum [3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec [4] Microseconds, + ctime [5] KerberosTime, + subkey [6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number [7] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + authorization-data [8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. + + crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in + + + +March 2003 [Page 85] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + section 5.3. + + cksum + This field contains a checksum of the application data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ, computed using a key usage value of 10 + in normal application exchanges, or 6 when used in the TGS-REQ PA- + TGS-REQ AP-DATA field. + + cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's + timestamp. Its value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. + It often appears along with ctime. The two fields are used + together to specify a reasonably accurate timestamp. + + ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. + + subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key + which is to be used to protect this specific application session. + Unless an application specifies otherwise, if this field is left + out the session key from the ticket will be used. + + seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be + used by the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers + are used to detect replays (It may also be used by application + specific messages). When included in the authenticator this field + specifies the initial sequence number for messages from the client + to the server. When included in the AP-REP message, the initial + sequence number is that for messages from the server to the + client. When used in KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages, it is + incremented by one after each message is sent. Sequence numbers + fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and wrap to zero following + the value 2^32 - 1. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of + replays they SHOULD be non-repeating, even across connection + boundaries. The initial sequence number SHOULD be random and + uniformly distributed across the full space of possible sequence + numbers, so that it cannot be guessed by an attacker and so that + it and the successive sequence numbers do not repeat other + sequences. + + Implmentation note: historically, some implementations transmit + signed twos-complement numbers for sequence numbers. In the + interests of compatibility, implementations MAY accept the + equivalent negative number where a positive number greater than + + + +March 2003 [Page 86] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + 2^31 - 1 is expected. + + Implementation note: as noted before, some implementations omit + the optional sequence number when its value would be zero. + Implementations MAY accept an omitted sequence number when + expecting a value of zero, and SHOULD NOT transmit an + Authenticator with a initial sequence number of zero. + + authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3. + It is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions + are to be placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in + the ticket itself. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + + The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, + the message type, and an encrypted time-stamp. The message is sent in + response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual + authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + + AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (15), + enc-part [2] EncryptedData -- EncAPRepPart + } + + EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime [0] KerberosTime, + cusec [1] Microseconds, + subkey [2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL + } + + The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of + the ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application- + arranged negotiation to choose a per association session key. + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. + + enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. It is computed + with a key usage value of 12. + + ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. + + + +March 2003 [Page 87] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's + timestamp. + + subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to + protect this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for + specifics on how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the + sub-session key from the authenticator, or if also left out, the + session key from the ticket will be used. + + seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + + If an error occurs while processing the application request, the + KRB_ERROR message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the + format of the error message. The cname and crealm fields MAY be left + out if the server cannot determine their appropriate values from the + corresponding KRB_AP_REQ message. If the authenticator was + decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields will contain the values from + it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by + either side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper- + proof message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has + previously been exchanged (for example, by using the + KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + + The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof + checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, + or the session key if no negotiation has occurred. The message fields + are: + + KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (20), + safe-body [2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum [3] Checksum + } + + KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + + + +March 2003 [Page 88] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + user-data [0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + s-address [4] HostAddress, + r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. + + safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. + + cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data, computed + with a key usage value of 15. + + The checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE + sequence. First, the cksum is set to a type zero, zero-length + value and the checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB- + SAFE sequence, then the checksum is set to the result of that + computation, and finally the KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again. + This method, while different than the one specified in RFC 1510, + corresponds to existing practice. + + user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and + contain the application specific data that is being passed from + the sender to the recipient. + + timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its + contents are the current time as known by the sender of the + message. By checking the timestamp, the recipient of the message + is able to make sure that it was recently generated, and is not a + replay. + + usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It + contains the microsecond part of the timestamp. + + seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + + s-address + Sender's address. + + + +March 2003 [Page 89] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the + message. It MAY be omitted if not required by the application + protocol. + + r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It MAY be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast + protocols), but the recipient MAY arbitrarily reject such + messages. This field, along with s-address, can be used to help + detect messages which have been incorrectly or maliciously + delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by + either side (client or server) of an application to securely and + privately send a message to its peer. It presumes that a session key + has previously been exchanged (for example, by using the + KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + + The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. + The message fields are: + + KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (21), + -- NOTE: there is no [2] tag + enc-part [3] EncryptedData -- EncKrbPrivPart + } + + EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE { + user-data [0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + s-address [4] HostAddress -- sender's addr --, + r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr + } + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. + + enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence + encrypted under the session key, with a key usage value of 13. + + + +March 2003 [Page 90] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of the KRB- + PRIV message. + + user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. + + seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to + send Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is + presented here to encourage a common mechanism to be used by + applications when forwarding tickets or providing proxies to + subordinate servers. It presumes that a session key has already been + exchanged perhaps by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + + The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and + information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from + each. The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under + an encryption key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the + KRB_CRED message. The message fields are: + + KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (22), + tickets [2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part [3] EncryptedData -- EncKrbCredPart + } + + EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info [0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + timestamp [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + s-address [4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key [0] EncryptionKey, + prealm [1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags [3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + + + +March 2003 [Page 91] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + starttime [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + renew-till [7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm [8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname [9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr [10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. + + tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use + by the intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB- + CRED message. + + enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence + encrypted under the session key shared between the sender and the + intended recipient, with a key usage value of 14. This encrypted + encoding is used for the enc-part field of the KRB-CRED message. + + Implementation note: implementations of certain applications, most + notably certain implementations of the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism, + do not separately encrypt the contents of the EncKrbCredPart of + the KRB-CRED message when sending it. In the case of those GSS- + API mechanisms, this is not a security vulnerability, as the + entire KRB-CRED message is itself embedded in an encrypted + message. + + nonce + If practical, an application MAY require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that + the message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A + nonce MUST NEVER be reused; it SHOULD be generated randomly by the + recipient of the message and provided to the sender of the message + in an application specific manner. + + timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was + generated. The time is used to provide assurance that the message + is fresh. + + s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + + + +March 2003 [Page 92] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. + + key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB- + CRED message and is used to pass the session key from the sender + to the intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in + section 5.2.9. + + The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated + with the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it + is assumed that the recipient of the credentials already knows their + value. + + prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. + + flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and + caddr + These fields contain the values of the corresponding fields from + the ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields + are identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + + This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The + fields included in the message are intended to return as much + information as possible about an error. It is not expected that all + the information required by the fields will be available for all + types of errors. If the appropriate information is not available when + the message is composed, the corresponding field will be left out of + the message. + + Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not integrity protected, it + is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such a + message. In particular, this means that the client SHOULD NOT use any + fields in this message for security-critical purposes, such as + setting a system clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The + message can be useful, however, for advising a user on the reason for + some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + + The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (30), + + + +March 2003 [Page 93] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + ctime [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + stime [4] KerberosTime, + susec [5] Microseconds, + error-code [6] Int32, + crealm [7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname [8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm [9] Realm -- service realm --, + sname [10] PrincipalName -- service name --, + e-text [11] KerberosString OPTIONAL, + e-data [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. +A msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. + + ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. + + stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. + + susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's + timestamp. Its value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along + with stime. The two fields are used in conjunction to specify a + reasonably accurate timestamp. + + error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the + server when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field + see the list of error codes in section 7.5.9. Implementations are + encouraged to provide for national language support in the display + of error messages. + + crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3. + + e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include + a principal name which was unknown). + + + + +March 2003 [Page 94] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If the + errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields, each + corresponding to an acceptable pre-authentication method and + optionally containing data for the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA + + For error codes defined in this document other than + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, the format and contents of the e-data field + are implementation-defined. Similarly, for future error codes, the + format and contents of the e-data field are implementation-defined + unless specified. Whether defined by the implementation or in a + future document, the e-data field MAY take the form of TYPED-DATA: + + TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { + data-type [0] INTEGER, + data-value [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + +5.10. Application Tag Numbers + + The following table lists the application class tag numbers used by + various data types defined in this section. + + Tag Number(s) Type Name Comments + + 0 unused + + 1 Ticket PDU + + 2 Authenticator non-PDU + + 3 EncTicketPart non-PDU + + 4-9 unused + + 10 AS-REQ PDU + + 11 AS-REP PDU + + 12 TGS-REQ PDU + + 13 TGS-REP PDU + + 14 AP-REQ PDU + + + +March 2003 [Page 95] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + 15 AP-REP PDU + + 16 RESERVED16 TGT-REQ (for user-to-user) + + 17 RESERVED17 TGT-REP (for user-to-user) + + 18-19 unused + + 20 KRB-SAFE PDU + + 21 KRB-PRIV PDU + + 22 KRB-CRED PDU + + 23-24 unused + + 25 EncASRepPart non-PDU + + 26 EncTGSRepPart non-PDU + + 27 EncApRepPart non-PDU + + 28 EncKrbPrivPart non-PDU + + 29 EncKrbCredPart non-PDU + + 30 KRB-ERROR PDU + + The ASN.1 types marked as "PDU" (Protocol Data Unit) in the above are + the only ASN.1 types intended as top-level types of the Kerberos + protcol, and are the only types that may be used as elements in + another protocol that makes use of Kerberos. + +6. Naming Constraints + +6.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a + realm can technically select any name it chooses, interoperability + across realm boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to + be assigned, and what information they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm MUST conform to the + conventions itself, and it MUST require that any realms with which + inter-realm keys are shared also conform to the conventions and + require the same from its neighbors. + + Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only + + + +March 2003 [Page 96] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + in the case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently + three styles of realm names: domain, X500, and other. Examples of + each style follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU + X500: C=US/O=OSF + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions + + Domain syle realm names MUST look like domain names: they consist of + components separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons + (:) nor slashes (/). Though domain names themselves are case + insensitive, in order for realms to match, the case must match as + well. When establishing a new realm name based on an internet domain + name it is recommended by convention that the characters be converted + to upper case. + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) + before the equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string + representations of the names with components separated by slashes. + Leading and trailing slashes will not be included. Note that the + slash separator is consistent with Kerberos implementations based on + RFC1510, but it is different from the separator recommended in + RFC2253. + + Names that fall into the other category MUST begin with a prefix that + contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix MUST be followed + by a colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be + assigned before they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the + first three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It + is unlikely that names will be assigned to this category unless there + is a very strong argument for not using the 'other' category. + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the + various name styles. The following additional constraints apply to + the assignment of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the + name of a realm for the domain or X.500 formats must either be used + by the organization owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet + domain name or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are + registered, authority to use a realm name MAY be derived from the + authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no domain + name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can + authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is + assigned is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to + its children in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the + + + +March 2003 [Page 97] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + parent assigns a realm name without also registering it in the domain + name or X.500 hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make + sure that there will not in the future exist a name identical to the + realm name of the child unless it is assigned to the same entity as + the realm name. + +6.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure + that all agree on what information is implied by a principal name. + The name-type field that is part of the principal name indicates the + kind of information implied by the name. The name-type SHOULD be + treated only as a hint to interpreting the meaning of a name. It is + not significant when checking for equivalence. Principal names that + differ only in the name-type identify the same principal. The name + type does not partition the name space. Ignoring the name type, no + two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the components, or + the realm, MUST be different). The following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + + name types + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + NT-SMTP-NAME 7 Name in form of SMTP email name (e.g. user@foo.com) + NT-ENTERPRISE 10 Enterprise name - may be mapped to principal name + + When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a + particular time the name type PRINCIPAL SHOULD be used. The principal + name type SHOULD be used for users, and it might also be used for a + unique server. If the name is a unique machine generated ID that is + guaranteed never to be reassigned then the name type of UID SHOULD be + used (note that it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any + type since stale entries might remain in access control lists). + + If the first component of a name identifies a service and the + remaining components identify an instance of the service in a server + specified manner, then the name type of SRV-INST SHOULD be used. An + example of this name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting service + whose name has a first component of krbtgt and a second component + identifying the realm for which the ticket is valid. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 98] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + If the first component of a name identifies a service and there is a + single component following the service name identifying the instance + as the host on which the server is running, then the name type SRV- + HST SHOULD be used. This type is typically used for Internet services + such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate + components of the host name appear as successive components following + the name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST SHOULD be used. + This type might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names + where the slash (/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + + A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL SHOULD be used when a name from an + X.509 certificate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of + the X.509 name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding + rules specified in RFC 2253. + + A name type of SMTP allows a name to be of a form that resembles a + SMTP email name. This name, including an "@" and a domain name, is + used as the one component of the principal name. + + A name type of UNKNOWN SHOULD be used when the form of the name is + not known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match + principals authenticated with names of any type. A principal + authenticated with a name of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match + other names of type UNKNOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved + for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 7.5.8 for the + form of such names. + +6.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be + composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server + is registered, and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the + host name is an Internet domain name or a multi-component name of + type NT-SRV-XHST if the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 + that allows slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or + multi-component name will identify the service and the latter + components will identify the host. Where the name of the host is not + case sensitive (for example, with Internet domain names) the name of + the host MUST be lower case. If specified by the application protocol + for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands which run + with system privileges, the first component MAY be the string 'host' + instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official + name and one or more aliases and the official name can be reliably + determined, the official name of the host SHOULD be used when + constructing the name of the server principal. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 99] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +7. Constants and other defined values + +7.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned + type fields and interpretations. + + Internet (IPv4) Addresses + + Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded + in MSB order. The IPv4 loopback address SHOULD NOT appear in a + Kerberos packet. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + + Internet (IPv6) Addresses + + IPv6 addresses [RFC2373] are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, + encoded in MSB order. The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four + (24). The following addresses MUST NOT appear in any Kerberos + packet: + + * the Unspecified Address + * the Loopback Address + * Link-Local addresses + + IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of + type 2. + + DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB + order. The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + + Netbios addresses + + Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 + to 15 alphanumeric characters and padded with the US-ASCII SPC + character (code 32). The 16th octet MUST be the US-ASCII NUL + character (code 0). The type of Netbios addresses is twenty (20). + + Directional Addresses + + In many environments, including the sender address in KRB_SAFE and + KRB_PRIV messages is undesirable because the addresses may be + changed in transport by network address translators. However, if + these addresses are removed, the messages may be subject to a + reflection attack in which a message is reflected back to its + originator. The directional address type provides a way to avoid + + + +March 2003 [Page 100] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + transport addresses and reflection attacks. Directional addresses + are encoded as four byte unsigned integers in network byte order. + If the message is originated by the party sending the original + KRB_AP_REQ message, then an address of 0 SHOULD be used. If the + message is originated by the party to whom that KRB_AP_REQ was + sent, then the address 1 SHOULD be used. Applications involving + multiple parties can specify the use of other addresses. + + Directional addresses MUST only be used for the sender address + field in the KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages. They MUST NOT be used + as a ticket address or in a KRB_AP_REQ message. This address type + SHOULD only be used in situations where the sending party knows + that the receiving party supports the address type. This generally + means that directional addresses may only be used when the + application protocol requires their support. Directional addresses + are type (3). + +7.2. KDC messaging - IP Transports + + Kerberos defines two IP transport mechanisms for communication + between clients and servers: UDP/IP and TCP/IP. + +7.2.1. UDP/IP transport + + Kerberos servers (KDCs) supporting IP transports MUST accept UDP + requests and SHOULD listen for such requests on port 88 (decimal) + unless specifically configured to listen on an alternative UDP port. + Alternate ports MAY be used when running multiple KDCs for multiple + realms on the same host. + + Kerberos clients supporting IP transports SHOULD support the sending + of UDP requests. Clients SHOULD use KDC discovery [7.2.3] to identify + the IP address and port to which they will send their request. + + When contacting a KDC for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP/IP + transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an + encoding of the request to the KDC. The KDC will respond with a reply + datagram containing only an encoding of the reply message (either a + KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at the sender's IP + address. The response to a request made through UDP/IP transport MUST + also use UDP/IP transport. If the response can not be handled using + UDP (for example because it is too large), the KDC MUST return + KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG, forcing the client to retry the request + using the TCP transport. + +7.2.2. TCP/IP transport + + Kerberos servers (KDCs) supporting IP transports MUST accept TCP + + + +March 2003 [Page 101] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + requests and SHOULD listen for such requests on port 88 (decimal) + unless specifically configured to listen on an alternate TCP port. + Alternate ports MAY be used when running multiple KDCs for multiple + realms on the same host. + + Clients MUST support the sending of TCP requests, but MAY choose to + intially try a request using the UDP transport. Clients SHOULD use + KDC discovery [7.2.3] to identify the IP address and port to which + they will send their request. + + Implementation note: Some extensions to the Kerberos protocol will + not succeed if any client or KDC not supporting the TCP transport is + involved. Implementations of RFC 1510 were not required to support + TCP/IP transports. + + When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP stream, + the response (KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message) MUST be returned to + the client on the same TCP stream that was established for the + request. The KDC MAY close the TCP stream after sending a response, + but MAY leave the stream open for a reasonable period of time if it + expects a followup. Care must be taken in managing TCP/IP connections + on the KDC to prevent denial of service attacks based on the number + of open TCP/IP connections. + + The client MUST be prepared to have the stream closed by the KDC at + anytime after the receipt of a response. A stream closure SHOULD NOT + be treated as a fatal error. Instead, if multiple exchanges are + required (e.g., certain forms of pre-authentication) the client may + need to establish a new connection when it is ready to send + subsequent messages. A client MAY close the stream after receiving a + response, and SHOULD close the stream if it does not expect to send + followup messages. + + A client MAY send multiple requests before receiving responses, + though it must be prepared to handle the connection being closed + after the first response. + + Each request (KRB_KDC_REQ) and response (KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR) + sent over the TCP stream is preceded by the length of the request as + 4 octets in network byte order. The high bit of the length is + reserved for future expansion and MUST currently be set to zero. + + If multiple requests are sent over a single TCP connection, and the + KDC sends multiple responses, the KDC is not required to send the + responses in the order of the corresponding requests. This may permit + some implementations to send each response as soon as it is ready + even if earlier requests are still being processed (for example, + waiting for a response from an external device or database). + + + +March 2003 [Page 102] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + +7.2.3. KDC Discovery on IP Networks + + Kerberos client implementations MUST provide a means for the client + to determine the location of the Kerberos Key Distribution Centers + (KDCs). Traditionally, Kerberos implementations have stored such + configuration information in a file on each client machine. + Experience has shown this method of storing configuration information + presents problems with out-of-date information and scaling problems, + especially when using cross-realm authentication. This section + describes a method for using the Domain Name System [RFC 1035] for + storing KDC location information. + +7.2.3.1. DNS vs. Kerberos - Case Sensitivity of Realm Names + + In Kerberos, realm names are case sensitive. While it is strongly + encouraged that all realm names be all upper case this recommendation + has not been adopted by all sites. Some sites use all lower case + names and other use mixed case. DNS on the other hand is case + insensitive for queries. Since "MYREALM", "myrealm", and "MyRealm" + are all different it is necessary that only one of the possible + combinations of upper and lower case characters be used. This + restriction may be lifted in the future as the DNS naming scheme is + expanded to support non-US-ASCII names. + +7.2.3.2. Specifying KDC Location information with DNS SRV records + + KDC location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kerberos is always "_kerberos". + + The Proto can be one of "_udp", "_tcp". If these SRV records are to + be used, both "_udp" and "_tcp" records MUST be specified for all KDC + deployments. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + + As per RFC 2052 the Port number used for "_udp" and "_tcp" SRV + records SHOULD be the value assigned to "kerberos" by the Internet + Assigned Number Authority: 88 (decimal) unless the KDC is configured + to listen on an alternate TCP port. + + Implementation note: Many existing client implementations do not + + + +March 2003 [Page 103] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + support KDC Discovery and are configured to send requests to the IANA + assigned port (88 decimal), so it is strongly recommended that KDCs + be configured to listen on that port. + +7.2.3.3. KDC Discovery for Domain Style Realm Names on IP Networks + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm EXAMPLE.COM. It has two + Kerberos servers, kdc1.example.com and kdc2.example.com. Queries + should be directed to kdc1.example.com first as per the specified + priority. Weights are not used in these sample records. + + _kerberos._udp.EXAMPLE.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.example.com. + _kerberos._udp.EXAMPLE.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.example.com. + _kerberos._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.example.com. + _kerberos._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.example.com. + +7.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be + composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS + ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part + "krbtgt" and the second part the name of the realm which will accept + the ticket-granting ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A ticket-granting + ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets + from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +7.4. OID arc for KerberosV5 + + This OID MAY be used to identify Kerberos protocol messages + encapsulated in other protocols. It also designates the OID arc for + KerberosV5-related OIDs assigned by future IETF action. + Implementation note:: RFC 1510 had an incorrect value (5) for "dod" + in its OID. + + id-krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) kerberosV5(2) + } + + Assignment of OIDs beneath the id-krb5 arc must be obtained by + contacting krb5-oid-registrar@mit.edu. + +7.5. Protocol constants and associated values + + + + +March 2003 [Page 104] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + The following tables list constants used in the protocol and define + their meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section + that limit the values of constants for which values are defined here. + This allows implementations to make assumptions about the maximum + values that will be received for these constants. Implementation + receiving values outside the range specified in the "specification" + section MAY reject the request, but they MUST recover cleanly. + +7.5.1. Key usage numbers + + The encryption and checksum specifications in [@KCRYPTO] require as + input a "key usage number", to alter the encryption key used in any + specific message, to make certain types of cryptographic attack more + difficult. These are the key usage values assigned in this document: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted + with the client key (section 5.2.7.2) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes TGS session + key or application session key), encrypted with the + service key (section 5.3) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes TGS session key or + application session key), encrypted with the client key + (section 5.4.2) + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with + the TGS session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with + the TGS authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, + keyed with the TGS session key (sections 5.5.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator + (includes TGS authenticator subkey), encrypted with the + TGS session key (section 5.5.1) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session + key), encrypted with the TGS session key (section + 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session + key), encrypted with the TGS authenticator subkey + (section 5.4.2) + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application + session key (section 5.5.1) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the application + session key (section 5.5.1) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session + subkey), encrypted with the application session key + (section 5.5.2) + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by + the application (section 5.7.1) + + + +March 2003 [Page 105] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by + the application (section 5.8.1) + 15. KRB-SAFE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 19. AD-KDC-ISSUED checksum (ad-checksum in 5.2.6.4) + 22-24. Reserved for use in GSSAPI mechanisms derived from RFC + 1964. (raeburn/MIT) + 16-18,20-21,25-511. Reserved for future use in Kerberos and related + protocols. + 512-1023. Reserved for uses internal to a Kerberos + implementation. + 1024. Encryption for application use in protocols that + do not specify key usage values + 1025. Checksums for application use in protocols that + do not specify key usage values + 1026-2047. Reserved for application use. + + +7.5.2. PreAuthentication Data Types + + padata and data types padata-type value comment + + PA-TGS-REQ 1 + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 + PA-PW-SALT 3 + [reserved] 4 + PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 (deprecated) + PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 + PA-SESAME 7 + PA-OSF-DCE 8 + PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 + PA-AFS3-SALT 10 + PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 + PA-SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) + PA-SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) + PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) + PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) + PA-ETYPE-INFO2 19 (replaces pa-etype-info) + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + PA-SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp) + PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 (embedded in typed data) + TD-PADATA 22 (embeds padata) + PA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO 23 (sam/otp) + PA-ALT-PRINC 24 (crawdad@fnal.gov) + PA-SAM-CHALLENGE2 30 (kenh@pobox.com) + PA-SAM-RESPONSE2 31 (kenh@pobox.com) + PA-EXTRA-TGT 41 Reserved extra TGT + TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS + + + +March 2003 [Page 106] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 PrincipalName + TD-KRB-REALM 103 Realm + TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 from PKINIT + TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 from PKINIT + TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR 106 application specific + TD-REQ-NONCE 107 INTEGER + TD-REQ-SEQ 108 INTEGER + PA-PAC-REQUEST 128 (jbrezak@exchange.microsoft.com) + +7.5.3. Address Types + + Address type value + + IPv4 2 + Directional 3 + ChaosNet 5 + XNS 6 + ISO 7 + DECNET Phase IV 12 + AppleTalk DDP 16 + NetBios 20 + IPv6 24 + +7.5.4. Authorization Data Types + + authorization data type ad-type value + AD-IF-RELEVANT 1 + AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 + AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 + AD-KDC-ISSUED 4 + AD-AND-OR 5 + AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 + AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 + AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC 8 + reserved values 9-63 + OSF-DCE 64 + SESAME 65 + AD-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID 66 (hemsath@us.ibm.com) + AD-WIN2K-PAC 128 (jbrezak@exchange.microsoft.com) + +7.5.5. Transited Encoding Types + + transited encoding type tr-type value + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 + reserved values all others + +7.5.6. Protocol Version Number + + + + +March 2003 [Page 107] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Label Value Meaning or MIT code + + pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +7.5.7. Kerberos Message Types + + message types + + KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication + KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request + KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT + KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request + KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server + KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL + KRB_RESERVED16 16 Reserved for user-to-user krb_tgt_request + KRB_RESERVED17 17 Reserved for user-to-user krb_tgt_reply + KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message + KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message + KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials + KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +7.5.8. Name Types + + name types + + KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users + KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components + KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID + KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + KRB_NT_SMTP_NAME 7 Name in form of SMTP email name (e.g. user@foo.com) + KRB_NT_ENTERPRISE 10 Enterprise name - may be mapped to principal name + +7.5.9. Error Codes + + error codes + + KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error + KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired + KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired + KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number + not supported + KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key + KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key + KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database + KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database + + + +March 2003 [Page 108] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database + KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key + KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time + KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request + KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option + KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type + KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type + KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type + KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked + KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked + KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later + KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later + KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired + - change password to reset + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired + KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match + KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only + KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path + KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE 29 A service is not available + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed + KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired + KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid + KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay + KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us + KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address + KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type + KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified + KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order + KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available + KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available + KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed + KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction + KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required + KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message + KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path + KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP + KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) + KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation + KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 Reserved for PKINIT + + + +March 2003 [Page 109] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 Reserved for PKINIT + KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT 67 No TGT available to validate USER-TO-USER + KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM 68 USER-TO-USER TGT issued different KDC + KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED 69 Ticket must be for USER-TO-USER + KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 Reserved for PKINIT + KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 Reserved for PKINIT + +8. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. + Among these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative + encoding schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for + pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, + options for mutual authentication, user to user authentication, + support for proxies, forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, + the format of realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to + define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all + implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as + technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered + that one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not + secure, it will be replaced. + +8.1. Specification 2 + + This section defines the second specification of these options. + Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to + support Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.2). Specification 1 + (deprecated) may be found in RFC1510. + + Transport + + TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport MUST be supported by clients and KDCs + claiming conformance to specification 2. + + Encryption and checksum methods + + The following encryption and checksum mechanisms MUST be + supported. + + + + +March 2003 [Page 110] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Encryption: AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 + Checksums: HMAC-SHA1-96-AES256 + + Implementations SHOULD support other mechanisms as well, but the + additional mechanisms may only be used when communicating with + principals known to also support them. The mechanisms that SHOULD + be supported are: + + Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5, DES3-CBC-SHA1-KD + Checksums: DES-MD5, HMAC-SHA1-DES3-KD + + Implementations MAY support other mechanisms as well, but the + additional mechanisms may only be used when communicating with + principals known to also support them. + + Implementation note: earlier implementations of Kerberos generate + messages using the CRC-32, RSA-MD5 checksum methods. For + interoperability with these earlier releases implementors MAY + consider supporting these checksum methods but should carefully + analyze the security impplications to limit the situations within + which these methods are accepted. + + Realm Names + + All implementations MUST understand hierarchical realms in both + the Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket-granting + ticket for an unknown realm is requested, the KDC MUST be able to + determine the names of the intermediate realms between the KDCs + realm and the requested realm. + + Transited field encoding + + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) MUST be + supported. Alternative encodings MAY be supported, but they may + be used only when that encoding is supported by ALL intermediate + realms. + + Pre-authentication methods + + The TGS-REQ method MUST be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not + used on the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method MUST be + supported by clients but whether it is enabled by default MAY be + determined on a realm by realm basis. If not used in the initial + request and the error KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned + specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an acceptable method, the client + SHOULD retry the initial request using the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre- + authentication method. Servers need not support the PA-ENC- + TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server SHOULD ignore + + + +March 2003 [Page 111] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request. + + The ETYPE-INFO2 method MUST be supported; this method is used to + communicate the set of supported encryption types, and + corresponding salt and string to key paramters. The ETYPE-INFO + method SHOULD be supported for interoperability with older + implementation. + + Mutual authentication + + Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) MUST be + supported. + + Ticket addresses and flags + + All KDCs MUST pass through tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. + if a TGT contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative + tickets). Implementations SHOULD default to requesting + addressless tickets as this significantly increases + interoperability with network address translation. In some cases + realms or application servers MAY require that tickets have an + address. + + Implementations SHOULD accept directional address type for the + KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV message and SHOULD include directional + addresses in these messages when other address types are not + available. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets MUST be supported. Individual realms + and application servers can set their own policy on when such + tickets will be accepted. + + All implementations MUST recognize renewable and postdated + tickets, but need not actually implement them. If these options + are not supported, the starttime and endtime in the ticket shall + specify a ticket's entire useful life. When a postdated ticket is + decoded by a server, all implementations shall make the presence + of the postdated flag visible to the calling server. + + User-to-user authentication + + Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + KDC option) MUST be provided by implementations, but individual + realms MAY decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on + a per-principal or realm-wide basis. + + Authorization data + + + + +March 2003 [Page 112] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Implementations MUST pass all authorization data subfields from + ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed + to suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that + registered subfield type (it is never incorrect to pass on a + subfield, and no registered subfield types presently specify + suppression at the KDC). + + Implementations MUST make the contents of any authorization data + subfields available to the server when a ticket is used. + Implementations are not required to allow clients to specify the + contents of the authorization data fields. + + Constant ranges + + All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values + unless further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit + is provided to allow implementations to make assumptions about the + maximum values that will be received for these constants. + Implementation receiving values outside this range MAY reject the + request, but they MUST recover cleanly. + +8.2. Recommended KDC values + + Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC configuration. + + minimum lifetime 5 minutes + maximum renewable lifetime 1 week + maximum ticket lifetime 1 day + acceptable clock skew 5 minutes + empty addresses Allowed. + proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +9. IANA considerations + + Section 7 of this document specifies protocol constants and other + defined values required for the interoperability of multiple + implementations. Until otherwise specified in a subsequent RFC, + allocations of additional protocol constants and other defined values + required for extensions to the Kerberos protocol will be administered + by the Kerberos Working Group. + +10. Security Considerations + + As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying + the identity of principals on a network. Kerberos does not, by + itself, provide authorization. Applications should not accept the + issuance of a service ticket by the Kerberos server as granting + authority to use the service, since such applications may become + + + +March 2003 [Page 113] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an + environment if they inter-operate with other KDCs or where other + options for application authentication are provided. + + Denial of service attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in the protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Because + authentication is a required step for the use of many services, + successful denial of service attacks on a Kerberos server might + result in the denial of other network services that rely on Kerberos + for authentication. Kerberos is vulnerable to many kinds of denial of + service attacks: denial of service attacks on the network which would + prevent clients from contacting the KDC; denial of service attacks on + the domain name system which could prevent a client from finding the + IP address of the Kerberos server; and denial of service attack by + overloading the Kerberos KDC itself with repeated requests. + + Interoperability conflicts caused by incompatible character-set usage + (see 5.2.1) can result in denial of service for clients that utilize + character-sets in Kerberos strings other than those stored in the KDC + database. + + Authentication servers maintain a database of principals (i.e., users + and servers) and their secret keys. The security of the + authentication server machines is critical. The breach of security of + an authentication server will compromise the security of all servers + that rely upon the compromised KDC, and will compromise the + authentication of any principals registered in the realm of the + compromised KDC. + + Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + + Password guessing attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an off-line dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a dictionary, + messages obtained which are encrypted under a key derived from the + user's password. + + Unless pre-authentication options are required by the policy of a + realm, the KDC will not know whether a request for authentication + succeeds. An attacker can request a reply with credentials for any + principal. These credentials will likely not be of much use to the + attacker unless it knows the client's secret key, but the + availability of the response encrypted in the client's secret key + provides the attacker with ciphertext that may be used to mount brute + + + +March 2003 [Page 114] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + force or dictionary attacks to decrypt the credentials, by guessing + the user's password. For this reason it is strongly encouraged that + Kerberos realms require the use of pre-authentication. Even with pre- + authentication, attackers may try brute force or dictionary attacks + against credentials that are observed by eavesdropping on the + network. + + Because a client can request a ticket for any server principal and + can attempt a brute force or dictionary attack against the server + principal's key using that ticket, it is strongly encouraged that + keys be randomly generated (rather than generated from passwords) for + any principals that are usable as the target principal for a + KRB_TGS_REQ or KRB_AS_REQ messages. + + Each host on the network must have a clock which is loosely + synchronized to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + + Principal identifiers must not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) + to grant permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry + remains for a deleted principal and the principal identifier is + reused, the new principal will inherit rights specified in the stale + ACL entry. By not reusing principal identifiers, the danger of + inadvertent access is removed. + + Proper decryption of an KRB_AS_REP message from the KDC is not + sufficient for the host to verify the identity of the user; the user + and an attacker could cooperate to generate a KRB_AS_REP format + message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper KDC. To + authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials + obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to + obtain credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be + verified by a local server through successful completion of the + Client/Server exchange. + + Kerberos credentials contain clear-text information identifying the + principals to which they apply. If privacy of this information is + needed, this exchange should itself be encapsulated in a protocol + providing for confidentiality on the exchange of these credentials. + + Applications must take care to protect communications subsequent to + authentication either by using the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages as + appropriate, or by applying their own confidentiality or integrity + + + +March 2003 [Page 115] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + mechanisms on such communications. Completion of the KRB_AP_REQ and + KRB_AP_REP exchange without subsequent use of confidentiality and + integrity mechanisms provides only for authentication of the parties + to the communication and not confidentiality and integrity of the + subsequent communication. Application applying confidentiality and + protections mechanisms other than KRB_PRIV and KRB_SAFE must make + sure that the authentication step is appropriately linked with the + protected communication channel that is established by the + application. + + Unless the application server provides its own suitable means to + protect against replay (for example, a challenge-response sequence + initiated by the server after authentication, or use of a server- + generated encryption subkey), the server must utilize a replay cache + to remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock + skew. All services sharing a key need to use the same replay cache. + If separate replay caches are used, then and authenticator used with + one such service could later be replayed to a different service with + the same service principal. + + If a server loses track of authenticators presented within the + allowable clock skew, it must reject all requests until the clock + skew interval has passed, providing assurance that any lost or + replayed authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew + and can no longer be successfully replayed. + + Implementations of Kerberos should not use untrusted directory + servers to determine the realm of a host. To allow such would allow + the compromise of the directory server to enable an attacker to + direct the client to accept authentication with the wrong principal + (i.e. one with a similar name, but in a realm with which the + legitimate host was not registered). + + Implementations of Kerberos must not use DNS to canonicalize the host + components of service principal names. To allow such canonicalization + would allow a compromise of the DNS to result in a client obtaining + credentials and correctly authenticating to the wrong principal. + Though the client will know who it is communicating with, it will not + be the principal with which it intended to communicate. + + If the Kerberos server returns a TGT for a 'closer' realm other than + the desired realm, the client may use local policy configuration to + verify that the authentication path used is an acceptable one. + Alternatively, a client may choose its own authentication path, + rather than relying on the Kerberos server to select one. In either + case, any policy or configuration information used to choose or + validate authentication paths, whether by the Kerberos server or + client, must be obtained from a trusted source. + + + +March 2003 [Page 116] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + The Kerberos protocol in its basic form does not provide perfect + forward secrecy for communications. If traffic has been recorded by + an eavesdropper, then messages encrypted using the KRB_PRIV message, + or messages encrypted using application specific encryption under + keys exchanged using Kerberos can be decrypted if any of the user's, + application server's, or KDC's key is subsequently discovered. This + is because the session key use to encrypt such messages is + transmitted over the network encrypted in the key of the application + server, and also encrypted under the session key from the user's + ticket-granting ticket when returned to the user in the KRB_TGS_REP + message. The session key from the ticket-granting ticket was sent to + the user in the KRB_AS_REP message encrypted in the user's secret + key, and embedded in the ticket-granting ticket, which was encrypted + in the key of the KDC. Application requiring perfect forward secrecy + must exchange keys through mechanisms that provide such assurance, + but may use Kerberos for authentication of the encrypted channel + established through such other means. + +11. Author's Addresses + + + Clifford Neuman + Information Sciences Institute + University of Southern California + 4676 Admiralty Way + Marina del Rey, CA 90292, USA + Email: bcn@isi.edu + + Tom Yu + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139, USA + Email: tlyu@mit.edu + + Sam Hartman + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139, USA + Email: hartmans@mit.edu + + Kenneth Raeburn + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139, USA + Email: raeburn@MIT.EDU + + +12. Acknowledgements + + + +March 2003 [Page 117] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + This document is a revision to RFC1510 which was co-authored with + John Kohl. The specification of the Kerberos protocol described in + this document is the result of many years of effort. Over this + period many individuals have contributed to the definition of the + protocol and to the writing of the specification. Unfortunately it is + not possible to list all contributors as authors of this document, + though there are many not listed who are authors in spirit, because + they contributed text for parts of some sections, because they + contributed to the design of parts of the protocol, or because they + contributed significantly to the discussion of the protocol in the + IETF common authentication technology (CAT) and Kerberos working + groups. + + Among those contributing to the development and specification of + Kerberos were Jeffrey Altman, John Brezak, Marc Colan, Johan + Danielsson, Don Davis, Doug Engert, Dan Geer, Paul Hill, John Kohl, + Marc Horowitz, Matt Hur, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Paul Leach, John Linn, + Ari Medvinsky, Sasha Medvinsky, Steve Miller, Jon Rochlis, Jerome + Saltzer, Jeffrey Schiller, Jennifer Steiner, Ralph Swick, Mike Swift, + Jonathan Trostle, Theodore Ts'o, Brian Tung, Jacques Vidrine, Assar + Westerlund, and Nicolas Williams. Many other members of MIT Project + Athena, the MIT networking group, and the Kerberos and CAT working + groups of the IETF contributed but are not listed. + +13. REFERENCES + + [@KRYPTO] + RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-krb-wg- + crypto. + + [@AES] + RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-raeburn0krb- + rijndael-krb. + + [DGT96] + Don Davis, Daniel Geer, and Theodore Ts'0, "Kerberos With Clocks + Adrift: History, Protocols, and Implementation", USENIX Computing + Systems 9:1 (Januart 1996). + + [DS81] + Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time-stamps in Key + Distribution Protocols," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), + pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + + [ISO-646/ECMA-6] + 7-bit Coded Character Set + + [ISO-2022/ECMA-35] + + + +March 2003 [Page 118] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Character Code Structure and Extension Techniques + + [ISO-4873/ECMA-43] + 8-bit Coded Character Set Structure and Rules + + [KNT94] + + John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "The + Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication System". In Distributed + Open Systems, pages 78-94. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1994. + + [MNSS87] + S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. Saltzer, + Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and Authorization System, + M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Massachusetts (December 21, + 1987). + + [Neu93] + B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, + 1993). + + [NS78] + Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using Encryption for + Authentication in Large Networks of Computers," Communications of + the ACM, Vol. 21(12), pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + + [NT94] + B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authentication + Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. + 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + + [Pat92]. + J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password Guessing + Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request for Comments 26 + (December 1992). + + [RFC1035] + P.V. Mockapetris, RFC1035: "Domain Names - Implementations and + Specification," November 1, 1987, Obsoletes - RFC973, RFC882, + RFC883. Updated by RFC1101, RFC1183, RFC1348, RFCRFC1876, RFC1982, + RFC1995, RFC1996, RFC2065, RFC2136, RFC2137, RFC2181, RFC2308, + RFC2535, RFC2845, and RFC3425. Status: Standard. + + [RFC1510] + J. Kohl and B. C. Neuman, RFC1510: "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (v5)," September 1993, Status: Proposed + + + +March 2003 [Page 119] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + Standard. + + [RFC2026] + S. Bradner, RFC2026: "The Internet Standard Process - Revision + 3," October 1996, Obsoletes - RFC 1602, Status: Best Current + Practice. + + [RFC2052] + A. Gulbrandsen and P. Vixie, RFC2052: "A DNS RR for Specifying the + Location of Services (DNS SRV)," October 1996, Obseleted by + RFC2782, Status: Experimental + + [RFC2253] + M. Wahl, S. Killie, and T. Howes, RFC2253: "Lightweight Directory + Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation or Distinguished + Names," December 1997, Obsoletes - RFC1779, Updated by RFC3377, + Status: Proposed Standard. + + [RFC2273] + D. Levi, P. Meyer, and B. Stewart, RFC2273: "SNMPv3 Applications," + January 1998, Obsoletes - RFC2263, Obsoleted by RFC2573, Status: + Proposed Standard. + + [RFC2373] + R. Hinden, S. Deering, RFC2373: "IP Version 6 Addressing + Architecture," July 1998, Status: Proposed Standard. + + [SNS88] + J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Kerberos: An + Authentication Service for Open Network Systems," pp. 191-202 in + Usenix Conference Proceedings, Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + + [X680] + Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic + Notation, ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (1997) | ISO/IEC + International Standard 8824-1:1998. + + [X690] + ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), + Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules + (DER), ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (1997)| ISO/IEC International + Standard 8825-1:1998. + +A. ASN.1 module + + KerberosV5Spec2 { + iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) krb5spec2(2) + + + +March 2003 [Page 120] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN + + -- OID arc for KerberosV5 + -- + -- This OID may be used to identify Kerberos protocol messages + -- encapsulated in other protocols. + -- + -- This OID also designates the OID arc for KerberosV5-related OIDs. + -- + -- NOTE: RFC 1510 had an incorrect value (5) for "dod" in its OID. + id-krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) kerberosV5(2) + } + + Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647) + -- signed values representable in 32 bits + + UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) + -- unsigned 32 bit values + + Microseconds ::= INTEGER (0..999999) + -- microseconds + + KerberosString ::= GeneralString (IA5String) + + Realm ::= KerberosString + + PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type [0] Int32, + name-string [1] SEQUENCE OF KerberosString + } + + KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- with no fractional seconds + + HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type [0] Int32, + address [1] OCTET STRING + } + + -- NOTE: HostAddresses is always used as an OPTIONAL field and + -- should not be empty. + HostAddresses -- NOTE: subtly different from rfc1510, + -- but has a value mapping and encodes the same + ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + + -- NOTE: AuthorizationData is always used as an OPTIONAL field and + -- should not be empty. + + + +March 2003 [Page 121] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type [0] Int32, + ad-data [1] OCTET STRING + } + + PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0] + padata-type [1] Int32, + padata-value [2] OCTET STRING -- might be encoded AP-REQ + } + + KerberosFlags ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (32..MAX)) -- minimum number of bits + -- shall be sent, but no fewer than 32 + + EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype [0] Int32 -- EncryptionType --, + kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + } + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype [0] Int32 -- actually encryption type --, + keyvalue [1] OCTET STRING + } + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype [0] Int32, + checksum [1] OCTET STRING + } + + Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno [0] INTEGER (5), + realm [1] Realm, + sname [2] PrincipalName, + enc-part [3] EncryptedData -- EncTicketPart + } + + -- Encrypted part of ticket + EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags [0] TicketFlags, + key [1] EncryptionKey, + crealm [2] Realm, + cname [3] PrincipalName, + transited [4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime [5] KerberosTime, + starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime [7] KerberosTime, + renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + + + +March 2003 [Page 122] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + caddr [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data [10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + -- encoded Transited field + TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type [0] Int32 -- must be registered --, + contents [1] OCTET STRING + } + + TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- the following are new since 1510 + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + + AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ + + TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + + KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0] + pvno [1] INTEGER (5) , + msg-type [2] INTEGER (10 -- AS -- | 12 -- TGS --), + padata [3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL + -- NOTE: not empty --, + req-body [4] KDC-REQ-BODY + } + + KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options [0] KDCOptions, + cname [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL + -- Used only in AS-REQ --, + realm [2] Realm + -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ --, + sname [3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + + + +March 2003 [Page 123] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + from [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till [5] KerberosTime, + rtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce [7] UInt32, + etype [8] SEQUENCE OF Int32 -- EncryptionType + -- in preference order --, + addresses [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data [10] EncryptedData -- AuthorizationData --, + additional-tickets [11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL + -- NOTE: not empty + } + + KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + -- unused10(10), + -- opt-hardware-auth(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- 15 is reserved for canonicalize + -- unused15(15), + -- 26 was unused in 1510 + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + + AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP + + TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + + KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (11 -- AS -- | 13 -- TGS --), + padata [2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL + -- NOTE: not empty --, + crealm [3] Realm, + cname [4] PrincipalName, + + + +March 2003 [Page 124] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + ticket [5] Ticket, + enc-part [6] EncryptedData + -- EncASRepPart or EncTGSRepPart, + -- as appropriate + } + + EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart + + EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + + EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key [0] EncryptionKey, + last-req [1] LastReq, + nonce [2] UInt32, + key-expiration [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags [4] TicketFlags, + authtime [5] KerberosTime, + starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime [7] KerberosTime, + renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm [9] Realm, + sname [10] PrincipalName, + caddr [11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type [0] Int32, + lr-value [1] KerberosTime + } + + AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (14), + ap-options [2] APOptions, + ticket [3] Ticket, + authenticator [4] EncryptedData -- Authenticator + } + + APOptions ::= KerberosFlags + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + + -- Unencrypted authenticator + Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno [0] INTEGER (5), + crealm [1] Realm, + cname [2] PrincipalName, + + + +March 2003 [Page 125] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + cksum [3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec [4] Microseconds, + ctime [5] KerberosTime, + subkey [6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number [7] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + authorization-data [8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (15), + enc-part [2] EncryptedData -- EncAPRepPart + } + + EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime [0] KerberosTime, + cusec [1] Microseconds, + subkey [2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL + } + + KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (20), + safe-body [2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum [3] Checksum + } + + KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data [0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + s-address [4] HostAddress, + r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (21), + -- NOTE: there is no [2] tag + enc-part [3] EncryptedData -- EncKrbPrivPart + } + + EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE { + user-data [0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + + + +March 2003 [Page 126] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + s-address [4] HostAddress -- sender's addr --, + r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr + } + + KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (22), + tickets [2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part [3] EncryptedData -- EncKrbCredPart + } + + EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info [0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL, + timestamp [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + s-address [4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key [0] EncryptionKey, + prealm [1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags [3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + renew-till [7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm [8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname [9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr [10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER (5), + msg-type [1] INTEGER (30), + ctime [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL, + stime [4] KerberosTime, + susec [5] Microseconds, + error-code [6] Int32, + crealm [7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname [8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm [9] Realm -- service realm --, + sname [10] PrincipalName -- service name --, + e-text [11] KerberosString OPTIONAL, + + + +March 2003 [Page 127] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + e-data [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA + + TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { + data-type [0] INTEGER, + data-value [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + -- preauth stuff follows + + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp [0] KerberosTime -- client's time --, + pausec [1] Microseconds OPTIONAL + } + + ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE { + etype [0] Int32, + salt [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + + ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE { + etype [0] Int32, + salt [1] KerberosString OPTIONAL, + s2kparams [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + + AD-IF-RELEVANT ::= AuthorizationData + + AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum [0] Checksum, + i-realm [1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements [3] AuthorizationData + } + + AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE { + condition-count [0] INTEGER, + elements [1] AuthorizationData + } + + + + +March 2003 [Page 128] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData + + END + +B. Changes since RFC-1510 + + This document replaces RFC-1510 and clarifies specification of items + that were not completely specified. Where changes to recommended + implementation choices were made, or where new options were added, + those changes are described within the document and listed in this + section. More significantly, "Specification 2" in section 8 changes + the required encryption and checksum methods to bring them in line + with the best current practices and to deprecate methods that are no + longer considered sufficiently strong. + + Discussion was added to section 1 regarding the ability to rely on + the KDC to check the transited field, and on the inclusion of a flag + in a ticket indicating that this check has occurred. This is a new + capability not present in RFC1510. Pre-existing implementations may + ignore or not set this flag without negative security implications. + + The definition of the secret key says that in the case of a user the + key may be derived from a password. In 1510, it said that the key was + derived from the password. This change was made to accommodate + situations where the user key might be stored on a smart-card, or + otherwise obtained independent of a password. + + The introduction mentions the use of public key cryptography for + initial authentication in Kerberos by reference. RFC1510 did not + include such a reference. + + Section 1.2 was added to explain that while Kerberos provides + authentication of a named principal, it is still the responsibility + of the application to ensure that the authenticated name is the + entity with which the application wishes to communicate. + + Discussion of extensibility has been added to the introduction. + + Discussion of how extensibility affects ticket flags and KDC options + was added to the introduction of section 2. No changes were made to + existing options and flags specified in RFC1510, though some of the + sections in the specification were renumbered, and text was revised + to make the description and intent of existing options clearer, + especially with respect to the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option (now section + 2.9.2) which is used for user-to-user authentication. The new option + and ticket flag transited policy checking (section 2.7) was added. + + A warning regarding generation of session keys for application use + + + +March 2003 [Page 129] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + was added to section 3, urging the inclusion of key entropy from the + KDC generated session key in the ticket. An example regarding use of + the sub-session key was added to section 3.2.6. Descriptions of the + pa-etype-info, pa-etype-info2, and pa-pw-salt pre-authentication data + items were added. The recommendation for use of pre-authentication + was changed from "may" to "should" and a note was added regarding + known plaintext attacks. + + In RFC 1510, section 4 described the database in the KDC. This + discussion was not necessary for interoperability and unnecessarily + constrained implementation. The old section 4 was removed. + + The current section 4 was formerly section 6 on encryption and + checksum specifications. The major part of this section was brought + up to date to support new encryption methods, and move to a separate + document. Those few remaining aspects of the encryption and checksum + specification specific to Kerberos are now specified in section 4. + + Significant changes were made to the layout of section 5 to clarify + the correct behavior for optional fields. Many of these changes were + made necessary because of improper ASN.1 description in the original + Kerberos specification which left the correct behavior + underspecified. Additionally, the wording in this section was + tightened wherever possible to ensure that implementations conforming + to this specification will be extensible with the addition of new + fields in future specifications. + + Text was added describing time_t=0 issues in the ASN.1. Text was also + added, clarifying issues with implementations treating omitted + optional integers as zero. Text was added clarifying behavior for + optional SEQUENCE or SEQUENCE OF that may be empty. Discussion was + added regarding sequence numbers and behavior of some + implementations, including "zero" behavior and negative numbers. A + compatibility note was added regarding the unconditional sending of + EncTGSRepPart regardless of the enclosing reply type. Minor changes + were made to the description of the HostAddresses type. Integer types + were constrained. KerberosString was defined as a (significantly) + constrained GeneralString. KerberosFlags was defined to reflect + existing implementation behavior that departs from the definition in + RFC 1510. The transited-policy-checked(12) and the ok-as-delegate(13) + ticket flags were added. The disable-transited-check(26) KDC option + was added. + + Descriptions of commonly implemented PA-DATA were added to section 5. + The description of KRB-SAFE has been updated to note the existing + implementation behavior of double-encoding. + + There were two definitions of METHOD-DATA in RFC 1510. The second + + + +March 2003 [Page 130] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + one, intended for use with KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD was removed leaving the + SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA definition. + + Section 7, naming constraints, from RFC1510 was moved to section 6. + + Words were added describing the convention that domain based realm + names for newly created realms should be specified as upper case. + This recommendation does not make lower case realm names illegal. + Words were added highlighting that the slash separated components in + the X500 style of realm names is consistent with existing RFC1510 + based implementations, but that it conflicts with the general + recommendation of X.500 name representation specified in RFC2253. + + Section 8, network transport, constants and defined values, from + RFC1510 was moved to section 7. Since RFC1510, the definition of the + TCP transport for Kerberos messages was added, and the encryption and + checksum number assignments have been moved into a separate document. + + "Specification 2" in section 8 of the current document changes the + required encryption and checksum methods to bring them in line with + the best current practices and to deprecate methods that are no + longer considered sufficiently strong. + + Two new sections, on IANA considerations and security considerations + were added. + + The pseudo-code has been removed from the appendix. The pseudo-code + was sometimes misinterpreted to limit implementation choices and in + RFC 1510, it was not always consistent with the words in the + specification. Effort was made to clear up any ambiguities in the + specification, rather than to rely on the pseudo-code. + + An appendix was added containing the complete ASN.1 module drawn from + the discussion in section 5 of the current document. + + An appendix was added defining those authorization data elements that + must be understood by all Kerberos implementations. + +END NOTES + + [TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the + Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of + these trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + + [1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions + only upon the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless + an application subsequently provides integrity protection for the + data stream, the identity verification applies only to the initiation + + + +March 2003 [Page 131] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + of the connection, and does not guarantee that subsequent messages on + the connection originate from the same principal. + + [2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the + literature. In our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, + thus a shared DES key is a secret key. Something is only private when + no one but its owner knows it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one + has a public and a private key. + + [3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange + registration of a separately-named principal in a remote realm, and + engage in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for + even small numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more + automatic methods as described here are necessary. + + [4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tickets with no + network addresses specified. + + [5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the + requester can provide the old password (the user's current secret + key). Otherwise, it would be possible for someone to walk up to an + unattended session and change another user's password. + + [6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the + credentials obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS + exchange to obtain credentials for a local server. Those credentials + must then be verified by a local server through successful completion + of the Client/Server exchange. + + [7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible + to guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session + keys. This can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator + if it is based on cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to + use a truly random number generator, such as one based on + measurements of random physical phenomena. + + [8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so + cleartext here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from + one message and replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + + [9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable + transports difficult to code correctly. If the transport might + deliver duplicated messages, either a new authenticator must be + generated for each retry, or the application server must match + requests and replies and replay the first reply in response to a + detected duplicate. + + [10] Note also that the rejection here is restricted to + + + +March 2003 [Page 132] + + + + + +Neuman, et al. draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-03.txt DRAFT + + + authenticators from the same principal to the same server. Other + client principals communicating with the same server principal should + not be have their authenticators rejected if the time and microsecond + fields happen to match some other client's authenticator. + + [11] If this is not done, an attacker could subvert the + authentication by recording the ticket and authenticator sent over + the network to a server and replaying them following an event that + caused the server to lose track of recently seen authenticators. + + [12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply + was the client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version + 5 because version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is + not possible to create the reply by judicious message surgery (even + in encrypted form) without knowledge of the appropriate encryption + keys. + + [13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session + key is not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + + [14] Implementations of the protocol may provide routines to choose + subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a + negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + + [15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known + beforehand (since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it + might be stored in a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a + configuration file. If the realm to be used is obtained from a + nameserver, there is a danger of being spoofed if the nameservice + providing the realm name is not authenticated. This might result in + the use of a realm which has been compromised, and would result in an + attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of the + application server to the client. + + [16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to + ensure the randomness of the selected sub-session key. One approach + would be to generate a random number and XOR it with the session key + from the ticket-granting ticket. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +March 2003 [Page 133] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5845995f2d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,725 @@ + + +Kerberos Working Group M. Swift +Internet Draft University of WA +Document: draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-00.txt J. Brezak +Category: Standards Track Microsoft + J. Trostle + Cisco Systems + K. Raeburn + MIT + February 2001 + + + Generating KDC Referrals to locate Kerberos realms + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of + six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The draft documents a new method for a Kerberos Key Distribution + Center (KDC) to respond to client requests for kerberos tickets when + the client does not have detailed configuration information on the + realms of users or services. The KDC will handle requests for + principals in other realms by returning either a referral error or a + cross-realm TGT to another realm on the referral path. The clients + will use this referral information to reach the realm of the target + principal and then receive the ticket. + +2. Conventions used in this document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. Introduction + + + + +Swift Category - Standards Track 1 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + Current implementations of the Kerberos AS and TGS protocols, as + defined in RFC 1510 [3], use principal names constructed from a + known user or service name and realm. A service name is typically + constructed from a name of the service and the DNS host name of the + computer that is providing the service. Many existing deployments of + Kerberos use a single Kerberos realm where all users and services + would be using the same realm. However in an environment where there + are multiple trusted Kerberos realms, the client needs to be able to + determine what realm a particular user or service is in before + making an AS or TGS request. Traditionally this requires client + configuration to make this possible. + + When having to deal with multiple trusted realms, users are forced + to know what realm they are in before they can obtain a ticket + granting ticket (TGT) with an AS request. However, in many cases the + user would like to use a more familiar name that is not directly + related to the realm of their Kerberos principal name. A good + example of this is an RFC-822 style email name. This document + describes a mechanism that would allow a user to specify a user + principal name that is an alias for the user's Kerberos principal + name. In practice this would be the name that the user specifies to + obtain a TGT from a Kerberos KDC. The user principal name no longer + has a direct relationship with the Kerberos principal or realm. Thus + the administrator is able to move the user's principal to other + realms without the user having to know that it happened. + + Once a user has a TGT, they would like to be able to access services + in any trusted Kerberos realm. To do this requires that the client + be able to determine what realm the target service's host is in + before making the TGS request. Current implementations of Kerberos + typically have a table that maps DNS host names to corresponding + Kerberos realms. In order for this to work on the client, each + application canonicalizes the host name of the service by doing a + DNS lookup followed by a reverse lookup using the returned IP + address. The returned primary host name is then used in the + construction of the principal name for the target service. In order + for the correct realm to be added for the target host, the mapping + table [domain_to_realm] is consulted for the realm corresponding to + the DNS host name. The corresponding realm is then used to complete + the target service principal name. + + This traditional mechanism requires that each client have very + detailed configuration information about the hosts that are + providing services and their corresponding realms. Having client + side configuration information can be very costly from an + administration point of view - especially if there are many realms + and computers in the environment. + + Current implementations of Kerberos also have difficulty with + services on hosts that can have multiple host names (multi-homed + hosts). Traditionally, each host name would need to have a distinct + principal and a corresponding key. An extreme example of this would + be a Web server with multiple host names for each domain that it is + +Swift Category - Standards Track 2 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + supporting. Principal aliases allow multi-homed hosts to have a + single Kerberos principal (with a single key) that can have + identities for each distinct host name. This mechanism allows the + Kerberos client to request a service ticket for the distinct + hostname and allows the KDC to return a ticket for the single + principal that the host is using. This canonical principal name + allows the host to only have to manage a single key for all of the + identities that it supports. In addition, the client only needs to + know the realm of the canonical service name, not all of the + identities. + + This draft proposes a solution for these problems and simplifies + administration by minimizing the configuration information needed on + each computer using Kerberos. Specifically it describes a mechanism + to allow the KDC to handle Canonicalization of names, provide for + principal aliases for users and services and provide a mechanism for + the KDC to determine the trusted realm authentication path by being + able to generate referrals to other realms in order to locate + principals. + + To rectify these problems, this draft introduces three new kinds of + KDC referrals: + + 1. AS ticket referrals, in which the client doesn't know which realm + contains a user account. + 2. TGS ticket referrals, in which the client doesn't know which + realm contains a server account. + 3. Cross realm shortcut referrals, in which the KDC chooses the next + path on a referral chain + +4. Realm Organization Model + + This draft assumes that the world of principals is arranged on + multiple levels: the realm, the enterprise, and the world. A KDC may + issue tickets for any principal in its realm or cross-realm tickets + for realms with which it has a direct trust relationship. The KDC + also has access to a trusted name service that can resolve any name + from within its enterprise into a realm. This trusted name service + removes the need to use an untrusted DNS lookup for name resolution. + + For example, consider the following configuration, where lines + indicate trust relationships: + + MS.COM + / \ + / \ + OFFICE.MS.COM NT.MS.COM + + In this configuration, all users in the MS.COM enterprise could have + a principal name such as alice@MS.COM, with the same realm portion. + In addition, servers at MS.COM should be able to have DNS host names + from any DNS domain independent of what Kerberos realm their + principal resides in. + +Swift Category - Standards Track 3 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + +5. Principal Names + +5.1 Service Principal Names + + The standard Kerberos model in RFC 1510 [3] gives each Kerberos + principal a single name. However, if a service is reachable by + several addresses, it is useful for a principal to have multiple + names. Consider a service running on a multi-homed machine. Rather + than requiring a separate principal and password for each name it + exports, a single account with multiple names could be used. + + Multiple names are also useful for services in that clients need not + perform DNS lookups to resolve a host name into a full DNS address. + Instead, the service may have a name for each of its supported host + names, including its IP address. Nonetheless, it is still convenient + for the service to not have to be aware of all these names. Thus a + new name may be added to DNS for a service by updating DNS and the + KDC database without having to notify the service. In addition, it + implies that these aliases are globally unique: they do not include + a specifier dictating what realm contains the principal. Thus, an + alias for a server is of the form "class/instance/name" and may be + transmitted as any name type. + +5.2 Client Principal Names + + Similarly, a client account may also have multiple principal names. + More useful, though, is a globally unique name that allows + unification of email and security principal names. For example, all + users at MS may have a client principal name of the form + "joe@MS.COM" even though the principals are contained in multiple + realms. This global name is again an alias for the true client + principal name, which is indicates what realm contains the + principal. Thus, accounts "alice" in the realm ntdev.MS.COM and + "bob" in office.MS.COM may logon as "alice@MS.COM" and "bob@MS.COM". + This requires a new client principal name type, as the AS-REQ + message only contains a single realm field, and the realm portion of + this name doesn't correspond to any Kerberos realm. Thus, the entire + name "alice@MS.COM" is transmitted in the client name field of the + AS-REQ message, with a name type of KRB-NT-ENTERPRISE-PRINCIPAL. + + KRB-NT-ENTERPRISE-PRINCIPAL 10 + +5.3 Name Canonicalization + + In order to support name aliases, the Kerberos client must + explicitly request the name-canonicalization KDC option (bit 15) in + the ticket flags for the TGS-REQ. This flag indicates to the KDC + that the client is prepared to receive a reply with a different + client or server principal name than the request. Thus, the + KDCOptions types is redefined as: + + KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + +Swift Category - Standards Track 4 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + name-canonicalize(15), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) + } + +6. Client Referrals + + The simplest form of ticket referral is for a user requesting a + ticket using an AS-REQ. In this case, the client machine will send + the AS request to a convenient trusted realm, either the realm of + the client machine or the realm of the client name. In the case of + the name Alice@MS.COM, the client may optimistically choose to send + the request to MS.COM. + + The client will send the string "alice@MS.COM" in the client + principal name field using the KRB-NT-ENTERPRISE-PRINCIPAL name type + with the crealm set to MS.COM. The KDC will try to lookup the name + in its local account database. If the account is present in the + crealm of the request, it MUST return a KDC reply structure with the + appropriate ticket. If the account is not present in the crealm + specified in the request and the name-canonicalize flag in the + KDCoptions is set, the KDC will try to lookup the entire name, + Alice@MS.COM, using a name service. If this lookup is unsuccessful, + it MUST return the error KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN. If the lookup + is successful, it MUST return an error KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM (0x44) + and in the error message the cname and crealm field MUST contain the + client name and the true realm of the client. If the KDC contains + the account locally, it MUST return a normal ticket. The client name + and realm portions of the ticket and KDC reply message MUST be the + client's true name in the realm, not the globally unique name. + + If the client receives a KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error, it will issue a + new AS request with the same client principal name used to generate + the first referral to the realm specified by the crealm field of the + kerberos error message from the first request. This request MUST + produce a valid AS response with a ticket for the canonical user + name. The ticket MUST also include the ticket extension containing + the TE-REFERRAL-DATA with the referred-names set to the name from + + +Swift Category - Standards Track 5 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + the AS request. Any other error or referral will terminate the + request and result in a failed AS request. + +7. Server Referrals + + The server referral mechanism is a bit more complex than the client + referral mechanism. The primary problem is that the KDC must return + a referral ticket rather than an error message, so it will include + in the TGS response information about what realm contains the + service. This is done by returning information about the server name + in the pre-auth data field of the KDC reply. + + If the KDC resolves the server principal name into a principal in + its realm, it may return a normal ticket. If the name-canonicalize + flag in the KDCoptions is not set, then the KDC MUST only look up + the name as a normal principal name. Otherwise, it MUST search all + aliases as well. The server principal name in both the ticket and + the KDC reply MUST be the true server principal name instead of one + of the aliases. This frees the application server from needing to + know about all its aliases. + + If the name-canonicalize flag in the KDCoptions is set and the KDC + doesn't find the principal locally, the KDC can return a cross-realm + ticket granting ticket to the next hop on the trust path towards a + realm that may be able to resolve the principal name. + + If the KDC can determine the service principal's realm, it can + return the server realm as ticket extension data. The ticket + extension MUST be encrypted using the session key from the ticket, + and the same etype as is used to protect the TGS reply body. + + The data itself is an ASN.1 encoded structure containing the + server's realm, and if known, canonical principal name and alias + names. The first name in the sequence is the canonical principal + name. + + TE-REFERRAL-INFO 20 + + TE-REFERRAL-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + referred-server-realm[0] KERB-REALM + referred-names[1] SEQUENCE OF + PrincipalNames OPTIONAL + } + + + The client can use this information to request a chain of cross- + realm ticket granting tickets until it reaches the realm of the + server, and can then expect to receive a valid service ticket. + + In order to facilitate cross-realm interoperability, a client SHOULD + NOT send short names in TGS requests to the KDC. A short name is + defined as a Kerberos name that includes a DNS name that is not + fully qualified. The client MAY use forward DNS lookups to obtain + +Swift Category - Standards Track 6 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + the long name that corresponds to the user entered short name (the + short name will be a prefix of the corresponding long name). + + The client may use the referred-names field to tell if it already + has a ticket to the server in its ticket cache. + + The client can use this information to request a chain of cross- + realm ticket granting tickets until it reaches the realm of the + server, and can then expect to receive a valid service ticket. + However an implementation should limit the number of referrals that + it processes to avoid infinite referral loops. A suggested limit is + 5 referrals before giving up. + +8. Cross Realm Routing + + The current Kerberos protocol requires the client to explicitly + request a cross-realm TGT for each pair of realms on a referral + chain. As a result, the client machines need to be aware of the + trust hierarchy and of any short-cut trusts (those that aren't + parent-child trusts). This requires more configurations on the + client. Instead, the client should be able to request a TGT to the + target realm from each realm on the route. The KDC will determine + the best path for the client and return a cross-realm TGT. The + client has to be aware that a request for a cross-realm TGT may + return a TGT for a realm different from the one requested. + +9. Security Considerations + + The original Kerberos specification stated that the server principal + name in the KDC reply was the same as the server name in the + request. These protocol changes break that assumption, so the client + may be vulnerable to a denial of service attack by an attacker that + replays replies from previous requests. It can verify that the + request was one of its own by checking the client-address field or + authtime field, though, so the damage is limited and detectable. + + For the AS exchange case, it is important that the logon mechanism + not trust a name that has not been used to authenticate the user. + For example, the name that the user enters as part of a logon + exchange may not be the name that the user authenticates as, given + that the KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error may have been returned. The + relevant Kerberos naming information for logon (if any), is the + client name and client realm in the service ticket targeted at the + workstation that was obtained using the user's initial TGT. + + How the client name and client realm is mapped into a local account + for logon is a local matter, but the client logon mechanism MUST use + additional information such as the client realm and/or authorization + attributes from the service ticket presented to the workstation by + the user, when mapping the logon credentials to a local account on + the workstation. + +10. Discussion + +Swift Category - Standards Track 7 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + + This section contains issues and suggestions that need to be + incorporated into this draft. From Ken Raeburn [raeburn@mit.edu]: + + 1) No means to do name canonicalization if you're not + authenticating. Is it okay to require credentials in order to do + canonicalization? If so, how about this: Send a TGS_REQ for the + service name you have. If you get back a TGS_REP for a service, + great; pull out the name and throw out the credentials. If you + get back a TGS_REP for a TGT service, ask again in the specified + realm. If you get back a KRB_ERROR because policy prohibits you + from authenticating to that service, we can add to the + specification that the {realm,sname} in the KRB_ERROR must be the + canonical name, and the checksum must be used. As long as the + checksum is present, it's still a secure exchange with the KDC. + + If we have to be able to do name canonicalization without any + sort of credentials, either client-side (tickets) or server-side + (tickets automatically acquired via service key), I think we just + lose. But maybe GSSAPI should be changed if that's the case. + + 2) Can't refer to another realm and specify a different service name + to give to that realm's KDC. The local KDC can tell you a + different service name or a different realm name, but not both. + This comes up in the "gnuftp.raeburn.org CNAME ftp.gnu.org" type + of case I've mentioned. + + Except ... the KDC-REP structure includes padata and ticket + extensions fields that are extensible. We could add a required + value to one of them -- perhaps only in the case where you return + a TGT when not asked -- that contains signed information about + the principal name to ask for in the other realm. (It would have + to be required, otherwise a man-in-the-middle could make it go + away.) Signing would be done using the session key for the TGS. + + 3) Secure canonicalization of service name in AS_REQ. If the + response is an AS_REP, we need a way to tell that the altered + server name wasn't a result of a MITM attack on the AS_REQ + message. Again, the KDC-REP extensible fields could have a new + required value added when name canonicalization happens, + indicating what the original principal name (in the AS_REQ + message) was, and signed using the same key as protects the + AS_REP. If it doesn't match what the client requested, the + messages were altered in transit. + + 4) Client name needs referral to another realm, and server name + needs canonicalization of some sort. The above fixes wouldn't + work for this case, and I'm not even sure which KDC should be + doing the canonicalization anyways. + + + The other-principal-name datum would probably look something like: + + +Swift Category - Standards Track 8 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + PrincipalAndNonce ::= SEQUENCE { + name[0] PrincipalName, + nonce[1] INTEGER -- copied from KDC_REQ + } + SignedPrincipal ::= SEQUENCE { + name-and-nonce[0] PrincipalAndNonce, + cksum[1] Checksum + } + {PA,TE}-ORIGINAL-SERVER-PRINCIPAL ::= SignedPrincipal + {PA,TE}-REMOTE-SERVER-PRINCIPAL ::= SignedPrincipal + + with the checksum computed over the encoding of the 'name-and-nonce' + field, and appropriate PA- or TE- numbers assigned. I don't have a + strong opinion on whether it'd be a pa-data or ticket extension; + conceptually it seems like an abuse of either, but, well, I think + I'd rather abuse them than leave the facility both in and + inadequate. + + The nonce is needed because multiple exchanges may be made with the + same key, and these extension fields aren't packed in with the other + encrypted data in the same response, so a MITM could pick apart + multiple messages and mix-and-match components. (In a TGS_REQ + exchange, a subsession key would help, but it's not required.) + + The extension field would be required to prevent a MITM from + discarding the field from a response; a flag bit in a protected part + of the message (probably in 'flags' in EncKDCRepPart) could also let + us know of a cases where the information can be omitted, namely, + when no name change is done. Perhaps the bit should be set to + indicate that a name change *was* done, and clear if it wasn't, + making the no-change case more directly compatible with RFC1510. + +11. References + + + 1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + 2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + 3 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 + + +12. Author's Addresses + + Michael Swift + University of Washington + Seattle, Washington + Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu + + John Brezak + +Swift Category - Standards Track 9 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: jbrezak@Microsoft.com + + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134 + Email: jtrostle@cisco.com + + Kenneth Raeburn + Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 + Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 + Email: raeburn@mit.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Standards Track 10 + + + + + + + + + KDC Referrals February 2001 + + + Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph + are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Standards Track 11 + + + + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-krb-dns-locate-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-krb-dns-locate-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6dec9d1e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-krb-dns-locate-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ + + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Ken Hornstein + NRL +February 28, 2001 Jeffrey Altman +Expires: August 28, 2001 Columbia University + + + + Distributing Kerberos KDC and Realm Information with DNS + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as , and expires on August 28, 2001. + Please send comments to the authors. + +Abstract + + Neither the Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] nor the Kerberos V4 proto- + col [RFC????] describe any mechanism for clients to learn critical + configuration information necessary for proper operation of the pro- + tocol. Such information includes the location of Kerberos key dis- + tribution centers or a mapping between DNS domains and Kerberos + realms. + + Current Kerberos implementations generally store such configuration + information in a file on each client machine. Experience has shown + this method of storing configuration information presents problems + with out-of-date information and scaling problems, especially when + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 1] + +RFC DRAFT February 28, 2001 + + + using cross-realm authentication. + + This memo describes a method for using the Domain Name System + [RFC1035] for storing such configuration information. Specifically, + methods for storing KDC location and hostname/domain name to realm + mapping information are discussed. + +DNS vs. Kerberos - Case Sensitivity of Realm Names + + In Kerberos, realm names are case sensitive. While it is strongly + encouraged that all realm names be all upper case this recommendation + has not been adopted by all sites. Some sites use all lower case + names and other use mixed case. DNS on the other hand is case insen- + sitive for queries but is case preserving for responses to TXT + queries. Since "MYREALM", "myrealm", and "MyRealm" are all different + it is necessary that only one of the possible combinations of upper + and lower case characters be used. This restriction may be lifted in + the future as the DNS naming scheme is expanded to support non-ASCII + names. + +Overview - KDC location information + + KDC location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kerberos is always "_kerberos". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_udp" record MUST be included. If the Kerberos implementa- + tion supports TCP transport, a "_tcp" record SHOULD be included. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, and Target have the standard mean- + ing as defined in RFC 2052. + + As per RFC 2052 the Port number should be the value assigned to "ker- + beros" by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (88). + +Example - KDC location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has two Ker- + beros servers, kdc1.asdf.com and kdc2.asdf.com. Queries should be + directed to kdc1.asdf.com first as per the specified priority. + Weights are not used in these records. + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 2] + +RFC DRAFT February 28, 2001 + + + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.asdf.com. + +Overview - Kerberos password changing server location information + + Kerberos password changing server [KERB-CHG] location is to be stored + using the DNS SRV RR [RFC 2052]. The format of this RR is as fol- + lows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for the password server is always "_kpasswd". + + The Proto MUST be "_udp". + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, and Target have the standard mean- + ing as defined in RFC 2052. + + As per RFC 2052 the Port number should be the value assigned to + "kpasswd" by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (464). + +Overview - Kerberos admin server location information + + Kerberos admin location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV + RR [RFC 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for the admin server is always "_kerberos-adm". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_tcp" record MUST be included. If the Kerberos admin imple- + mentation supports UDP transport, a "_udp" record SHOULD be included. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, and Target have the standard mean- + ing as defined in RFC 2052. + + As per RFC 2052 the Port number should be the value assigned to + "kerberos-adm" by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (749). + + Note that there is no formal definition of a Kerberos admin protocol, + so the use of this record is optional and implementation-dependent. + + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 3] + +RFC DRAFT February 28, 2001 + + +Example - Kerberos administrative server location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has one + administrative server, kdc1.asdf.com. + + _kerberos-adm._tcp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 749 kdc1.asdf.com. + +Overview - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + Information on the mapping of DNS hostnames and domain names to Ker- + beros realms is stored using DNS TXT records [RFC 1035]. These + records have the following format. + + Service.Name TTL Class TXT Realm + + The Service field is always "_kerberos", and prefixes all entries of + this type. + + The Name is a DNS hostname or domain name. This is explained in + greater detail below. + + TTL, Class, and TXT have the standard DNS meaning as defined in RFC + 1035. + + The Realm is the data for the TXT RR, and consists simply of the Ker- + beros realm that corresponds to the Name specified. + + When a Kerberos client wishes to utilize a host-specific service, it + will perform a DNS TXT query, using the hostname in the Name field of + the DNS query. If the record is not found, the first label of the + name is stripped and the query is retried. + + Compliant implementations MUST query the full hostname and the most + specific domain name (the hostname with the first label removed). + Compliant implementations SHOULD try stripping all subsequent labels + until a match is found or the Name field is empty. + +Example - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + For the previously mentioned ASDF.COM realm and domain, some sample + records might be as follows: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT "ASDF.COM" + _kerberos.mrkserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "MARKETING.ASDF.COM" + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "SALES.ASDF.COM" + + Let us suppose that in this case, a Kerberos client wishes to use a + Kerberized service on the host foo.asdf.com. It would first query: + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 4] + +RFC DRAFT February 28, 2001 + + + _kerberos.foo.asdf.com. IN TXT + + Finding no match, it would then query: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT + + And find an answer of ASDF.COM. This would be the realm that + foo.asdf.com resides in. + + If another Kerberos client wishes to use a Kerberized service on the + host salesserver.asdf.com, it would query: + + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com IN TXT + + And find an answer of SALES.ASDF.COM. + +Security considerations + + As DNS is deployed today, it is an unsecure service. Thus the infor- + mation returned by it cannot be trusted. + + Current practice for REALM to KDC mapping is to use hostnames to + indicate KDC hosts (stored in some implementation-dependent location, + but generally a local config file). These hostnames are vulnerable + to the standard set of DNS attacks (denial of service, spoofed + entries, etc). The design of the Kerberos protocol limits attacks of + this sort to denial of service. However, the use of SRV records does + not change this attack in any way. They have the same vulnerabili- + ties that already exist in the common practice of using hostnames for + KDC locations. + + Current practice for HOSTNAME to REALM mapping is to provide a local + configuration of mappings of hostname or domain name to realm which + are then mapped to KDCs. But this again is vulnerable to spoofing + via CNAME records that point to hosts in other domains. This has the + same effect as when a TXT record is spoofed. In a realm with no + cross-realm trusts this is a DoS attack. However, when cross-realm + trusts are used it is possible to redirect a client to use a comprom- + ised realm. + + This is not an exploit of the Kerberos protocol but of the Kerberos + trust model. The same can be done to any application that must + resolve the hostname in order to determine which domain a non-FQDN + belongs to. + + Implementations SHOULD provide a way of specifying this information + locally without the use of DNS. However, to make this feature + worthwhile a lack of any configuration information on a client should + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 5] + +RFC DRAFT February 28, 2001 + + + be interpretted as permission to use DNS. + +Expiration + + This Internet-Draft expires on August 28, 2001. + +References + + + [RFC1510] + The Kerberos Network Authentication System; Kohl, Newman; Sep- + tember 1993. + + [RFC1035] + Domain Names - Implementation and Specification; Mockapetris; + November 1987 + + [RFC2782] + A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV); Gul- + brandsen, Vixie; Feburary 2000 + + [KERB-CHG] + Kerberos Change Password Protocol; Horowitz; + ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg- + password-02.txt + +Authors' Addresses + + Ken Hornstein + US Naval Research Laboratory + Bldg A-49, Room 2 + 4555 Overlook Avenue + Washington DC 20375 USA + + Phone: +1 (202) 404-4765 + EMail: kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil + + Jeffrey Altman + The Kermit Project + Columbia University + 612 West 115th Street #716 + New York NY 10025-7799 USA + + Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344 + EMail: jaltman@columbia.edu + + + + + + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 6] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-cat-gssapi-krb5-3des-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-cat-gssapi-krb5-3des-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24325fdbda --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-cat-gssapi-krb5-3des-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +CAT Working Group K. Raeburn +Internet-draft MIT +Category: July 14, 2000 +Updates: RFC 1964 +Document: draft-raeburn-cat-gssapi-krb5-3des-00.txt + + Triple-DES Support for the Kerberos 5 GSSAPI Mechanism + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [RFC2026]. Internet-Drafts + are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups + may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a + maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by + other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use + Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The MIT Kerberos 5 release version 1.2 includes support for + triple-DES with key derivation [KrbRev]. Recent work by the EFF + [EFF] has demonstrated the vulnerability of single-DES mechanisms + to brute-force attacks by sufficiently motivated and well-funded + parties. + + The GSSAPI Kerberos 5 mechanism definition [GSSAPI-KRB5] + specifically enumerates encryption and checksum types, + independently of how such schemes may be used in Kerberos. In the + long run, a new Kerberos-based mechanism, which does not require + separately enumerating for the GSSAPI mechanism each of the + encryption types defined by Kerberos, appears to be a better + approach. Efforts to produce such a specification are under way. + + In the interest of providing increased security in the interim, + however, MIT is proposing adding support for triple-DES to the + existing mechanism, as described here. + +2. Conventions Used in this Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. + +3. New Algorithm Identifiers + + One new sealing algorithm is defined, for use in WRAP tokens: + + 02 00 - DES3-KD + + This algorithm uses triple-DES with key derivation, with a usage + value KG_USAGE_SEAL. Padding is still to 8-byte multiples, and the + IV for encrypting application data is zero. + + One new signing algorithm is defined, for use in MIC, Wrap, and + Delete tokens: + + 04 00 - HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD + + This algorithm generates an HMAC using SHA-1 and a derived DES3 key + with usage KG_USAGE_SIGN, as (ought to be described) in [KrbRev]. + + [XXX: The current [KrbRev] description refers to expired I-Ds from + Marc Horowitz. The text in [KrbRev] may be inadequate to produce + an interoperable implementation.] + + The checksum size for this algorithm is 20 octets. See section 5.3 + below for the use of checksum lengths of other than eight bytes. + +4. Key Derivation + + For purposes of key derivation, we add three new usage values to the + list defined in [KrbRev]; one for signing messages, one for + sealing messages, and one for encrypting sequence numbers: + + #define KG_USAGE_SEAL 22 + #define KG_USAGE_SIGN 23 + #define KG_USAGE_SEQ 24 + +5. Adjustments to Previous Definitions + +5.1. Quality of Protection + + The GSSAPI specification [GSSAPI] says that a zero QOP value + indicates the "default". The original specification for the + Kerberos 5 mechanism says that a zero QOP value (or a QOP value + with the appropriate bits clear) means DES encryption. + + Rather than continue to force the use of plain DES when the + application doesn't use mechanism-specific QOP values, the better + choice appears to be to redefine the DES QOP value as some non-zero + value, and define a triple-DES value as well. Then a zero value + continues to imply the default, which would be triple-DES + protection when given a triple-DES session key. + + Our values are: + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_HMAC_SHA1 0x0004 + /* SHA-1 checksum encrypted with key derivation */ + + GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES 0x0100 + /* plain DES encryption */ + GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES3_KD 0x0200 + /* triple-DES with key derivation */ + + Rather than open the question of whether to specify means for + deriving a key of one type given a key of another type, and the + security implications of whether to generate a long key from a + shorter one, our implementation will simply return an error if the + QOP value specified does not correspond to the session key type. + + [Implementation note: MIT's code does not implement QoP, and + returns an error for any non-zero QoP value.] + +5.2. MIC Sequence Number Encryption + + The sequence numbers are encrypted in the context key (as defined + in [GSSAPI-KRB5] -- this will be either the Kerberos session key or + asubkey provided by the context initiator), using whatever + encryption system is designated by the type of that context key. + The IV is formed from the first N bytes of the SGN_CKSUM field, + where N is the number of bytes needed for the IV. (With all + algorithms described here and in [GSSAPI-KRB5], the checksum is at + least as large as the IV.) + +5.3. Message Layout + + Both MIC and Wrap tokens, as defined in [GSSAPI-KRB5], contain an + checksum field SGN_CKSUM. In [GSSAPI-KRB5], this field was + specified as being 8 bytes long. We now change this size to be + "defined by the checksum algorithm", and retroactively amend the + descriptions of all the checksum algorithms described in + [GSSAPI-KRB5] to explicitly specify 8-byte output. Application + data continues to immediately follow the checksum field in the Wrap + token. + + The revised message descriptions are thus: + + MIC: + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Integrity algorithm indicator. + 4..7 Filler Contains ff ff ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Sequence number field. + 16..s+15 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of "to-be-signed data", + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + + Wrap: + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by GSS_Wrap() contain + the hex value 02 01 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Checksum algorithm indicator. + 4..5 SEAL_ALG Sealing algorithm indicator. + 6..7 Filler Contains ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Encrypted sequence number field. + 16..s+15 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of plaintext padded data, + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + s+16..last Data encrypted or plaintext padded data + + Where "s" indicates the size of the checksum. + + As indicated above in section 2, we define the HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD + checksum algorithm to produce a 20-byte output, so encrypted data + begins at byte 36. + +6. Backwards Compatibility Considerations + + The context initiator SHOULD request of the KDC credentials using + session-key cryptosystem types supported by that implementation; if + the only types returned by the KDC are not supported by the + mechanism implementation, it MUST indicate a failure. This may + seem obvious, but early implementations of both Kerberos and the + GSSAPI Kerberos mechanism supported only DES keys, so the + cryptosystem compatibility question was easy to overlook. + + Under the current mechanism, no negotiation of algorithm types + occurs, so server-side (acceptor) implementations cannot request + that clients not use algorithm types not understood by the server. + However, administration of the server's Kerberos data has to be + done in communication with the KDC, and it is from the KDC that the + client will request credentials. The KDC could therefore be tasked + with limiting session keys for a given service to types actually + supported by the Kerberos and GSSAPI software on the server. + + This does have a drawback for cases where a service principal name + is used both for GSSAPI-based and non-GSSAPI-based communication, + if the GSSAPI implementation does not understand triple-DES but the + Kerberos implementation does. It means that triple-DES session + keys cannot be issued for that service principal, which keeps the + protection of non-GSSAPI services weaker than necessary. However, + in the most recent MIT releases thus far, while triple-DES support + has been present, it has required additional work to enable, so it + is not likely to be in use for many services. + + It would also be possible to have clients attempt to get single-DES + session keys before trying to get triple-DES session keys, and have + the KDC refuse to issue the single-DES keys only for the most + critical of services, for which single-DES protection is considered + inadequate. However, that would eliminate the possibility of + connecting with the more secure cryptosystem to any service that + can be accessed with the weaker cryptosystem. + + We have chosen to go with the former approach, putting the burden + on the KDC administration and gaining the best protection possible + for GSSAPI services, possibly at the cost of protection of + non-GSSAPI Kerberos services running earlier versions of the + software. + +6. Security Considerations + + Various tradeoffs arise regarding the mixing of new and old + software, or GSSAPI-based and non-GSSAPI Kerberos authentication. + They are discussed in section 5. + +7. References + + [EFF] Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Cracking DES: Secrets of + Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design", O'Reilly & + Associates, Inc., May, 1998. + + [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January, 2000. + + [GSSAPI-KRB5] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", + RFC 1964, June, 1996. + + [KrbRev] Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-05.txt, March 10, 2000. + + [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision + 3", RFC 2026, October, 1996. + +8. Author's Address + + Kenneth Raeburn + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + +9. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph + are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-gssapi-krb5-3des-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-gssapi-krb5-3des-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..64ca1ac498 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-gssapi-krb5-3des-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ + + + + + + +Kerberos Working Group K. Raeburn +Category: Informational MIT +Document: draft-raeburn-krb-gssapi-krb5-3des-01.txt November 24, 2000 + + + Triple-DES Support for the Kerberos 5 GSSAPI Mechanism + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, + replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is + inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite + them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The GSSAPI Kerberos 5 mechanism definition [GSSAPI-KRB5] specifically + enumerates encryption and checksum types, independently of how such + schemes may be used in Kerberos. In the long run, a new Kerberos- + based mechanism, which does not require separately enumerating for + the GSSAPI mechanism each of the various encryption types defined by + Kerberos, is probably a better approach. Various people have + expressed interest in designing one, but the work has not yet been + completed. + + The MIT Kerberos 5 release version 1.2 includes support for triple- + DES with key derivation [KrbRev]. Recent work by the EFF [EFF] has + demonstrated the vulnerability of single-DES mechanisms to brute- + force attacks by sufficiently motivated and well-funded parties. So, + in the interest of providing increased security in the near term, MIT + is adding support for triple-DES to the existing mechanism + implementation we ship, as an interim measure. + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 1] + +INTERNET DRAFT Triple-DES for GSSAPI Kerberos November 2000 + + +2. New Algorithm Identifiers + + One new sealing algorithm is defined, for use in Wrap tokens. + + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | name octet values | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | DES3-KD 02 00 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + This algorithm uses triple-DES with key derivation, with a usage + value KG_USAGE_SEAL. (Unlike the EncryptedData definition in + [KrbRev], no integrity protection is needed, so this is "raw" triple- + DES, with no checksum attached to the encrypted data.) Padding is + still to 8-byte multiples, and the IV for encrypting application data + is zero. + + One new signing algorithm is defined, for use in MIC, Wrap, and + Delete tokens. + + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | name octet values | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD 04 00 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + This algorithm generates an HMAC using SHA-1 and a derived DES3 key + with usage KG_USAGE_SIGN, as described in [KrbRev]. + + [N.B.: The current [KrbRev] description refers to expired I-Ds from + Marc Horowitz. The text in [KrbRev] may be inadequate to produce an + interoperable implementation.] + + The checksum size for this algorithm is 20 octets. See section 4.3 + below for the use of checksum lengths of other than eight bytes. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 2] + +INTERNET DRAFT Triple-DES for GSSAPI Kerberos November 2000 + + +3. Key Derivation + + For purposes of key derivation, we add three new usage values to the + list defined in [KrbRev]; one for signing messages, one for sealing + messages, and one for encrypting sequence numbers: + + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | name value | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | KG_USAGE_SEAL 22 | + | KG_USAGE_SIGN 23 | + | KG_USAGE_SEQ 24 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +4. Adjustments to Previous Definitions + +4.1. Quality of Protection + + The GSSAPI specification [GSSAPI] says that a zero QOP value + indicates the "default". The original specification for the Kerberos + 5 mechanism says that a zero QOP value (or a QOP value with the + appropriate bits clear) means DES encryption. + + Rather than forcing the use of plain DES when the application doesn't + use mechanism-specific QOP values, we redefine the explicit DES QOP + value as a non-zero value, and define a triple-DES value as well. + Then a zero value continues to imply the default, which would be + triple-DES protection when given a triple-DES session key. + + Our values are: + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | name value meaning | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_HMAC_SHA1 0x0004 SHA-1 HMAC, using | + | key derivation | + | | + | GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES 0x0100 plain DES encryption | + | | + | GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES3_KD 0x0200 triple-DES with key | + | derivation | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Rather than attempt to specify a generic mechanism for deriving a key + of one type given a key of another type, and evaluate the security + implications of using a short key to generate a longer key to satisfy + the requested quality of protection, our implementation will simply + + + +Raeburn [Page 3] + +INTERNET DRAFT Triple-DES for GSSAPI Kerberos November 2000 + + + return an error if the nonzero QOP value specified does not + correspond to the session key type. + +4.2. MIC Sequence Number Encryption + + The sequence numbers are encrypted in the context key (as defined in + [GSSAPI-KRB5] -- this will be either the Kerberos session key or + asubkey provided by the context initiator), using whatever encryption + system is designated by the type of that context key. The IV is + formed from the first N bytes of the SGN_CKSUM field, where N is the + number of bytes needed for the IV. (With all algorithms described + here and in [GSSAPI-KRB5], the checksum is at least as large as the + IV.) + +4.3. Message Layout + + Both MIC and Wrap tokens, as defined in [GSSAPI-KRB5], contain an + checksum field SGN_CKSUM. In [GSSAPI-KRB5], this field was specified + as being 8 bytes long. We now change this size to be "defined by the + checksum algorithm", and retroactively amend the descriptions of all + the checksum algorithms described in [GSSAPI-KRB5] to explicitly + specify 8-byte output. Application data continues to immediately + follow the checksum field in the Wrap token. + + The revised message descriptions are thus: + + MIC token: + + Byte # Name Description + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Integrity algorithm indicator. + 4..7 Filler Contains ff ff ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Sequence number field. + 16..s+15 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of "to-be-signed + data", calculated according to + algorithm specified in SGN_ALG + field. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 4] + +INTERNET DRAFT Triple-DES for GSSAPI Kerberos November 2000 + + + Wrap token: + + Byte # Name Description + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. Tokens + emitted by GSS_Wrap() contain the + hex value 02 01 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Checksum algorithm indicator. + 4..5 SEAL_ALG Sealing algorithm indicator. + 6..7 Filler Contains ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Encrypted sequence number field. + 16..s+15 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of plaintext padded data, + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + s+16..last Data encrypted or plaintext padded data + + + Where "s" indicates the size of the checksum. + + As indicated above in section 2, we define the HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD + checksum algorithm to produce a 20-byte output, so encrypted data + begins at byte 36. + +5. Backwards Compatibility Considerations + + The context initiator should request of the KDC credentials using + session-key cryptosystem types supported by that implementation; if + the only types returned by the KDC are not supported by the mechanism + implementation, it should indicate a failure. This may seem obvious, + but early implementations of both Kerberos and the GSSAPI Kerberos + mechanism supported only DES keys, so the cryptosystem compatibility + question was easy to overlook. + + Under the current mechanism, no negotiation of algorithm types + occurs, so server-side (acceptor) implementations cannot request that + clients not use algorithm types not understood by the server. + However, administration of the server's Kerberos data (e.g., the + service key) has to be done in communication with the KDC, and it is + from the KDC that the client will request credentials. The KDC could + therefore be tasked with limiting session keys for a given service to + types actually supported by the Kerberos and GSSAPI software on the + server. + + This does have a drawback for cases where a service principal name is + used both for GSSAPI-based and non-GSSAPI-based communication (most + notably the "host" service key), if the GSSAPI implementation does + not understand triple-DES but the Kerberos implementation does. It + means that triple-DES session keys cannot be issued for that service + + + +Raeburn [Page 5] + +INTERNET DRAFT Triple-DES for GSSAPI Kerberos November 2000 + + + principal, which keeps the protection of non-GSSAPI services weaker + than necessary. + + It would also be possible to have clients attempt to get single-DES + session keys before trying to get triple-DES session keys, and have + the KDC refuse to issue the single-DES keys only for the most + critical of services, for which single-DES protection is considered + inadequate. However, that would eliminate the possibility of + connecting with the more secure cryptosystem to any service that can + be accessed with the weaker cryptosystem. + + For MIT's 1.2 release, we chose to go with the former approach, + putting the burden on the KDC administration and gaining the best + protection possible for GSSAPI services, possibly at the cost of + weaker protection of non-GSSAPI Kerberos services running earlier + versions of the software. + +6. Security Considerations + + Various tradeoffs arise regarding the mixing of new and old software, + or GSSAPI-based and non-GSSAPI Kerberos authentication. They are + discussed in section 5. + +7. References + + [EFF] Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Cracking DES: Secrets of + Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design", O'Reilly & + Associates, Inc., May, 1998. + + [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January, 2000. + + [GSSAPI-KRB5] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", + RFC 1964, June, 1996. + + [KrbRev] Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos- + revisions-06.txt, July 4, 2000. + +8. Author's Address + + Kenneth Raeburn Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 + Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 + +9. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 6] + +INTERNET DRAFT Triple-DES for GSSAPI Kerberos November 2000 + + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +10. Document Change History + +>From -00 to -01: + + Converted master to GNU troff and tbl, rewriting tables in the + process. + + Specify informational category only. Modify some text to emphasize + that this document intends to describe MIT's extensions. + + Point out that while EncryptedData for 3des-kd includes a checksum, + DES3-KD GSS encryption does not. + + Shorten backwards-compatibility descriptions a little. + + Submit to Kerberos working group rather than CAT. + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 7] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b9989f871 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ + + + + + + + + + +Kerberos Working Group K. Raeburn +Document: draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02.txt MIT + November 1, 2002 + expires May 1, 2003 + + AES Encryption for Kerberos 5 + +Abstract + + Recently the US National Institute of Standards and Technology chose + a new Advanced Encryption Standard [AES], which is significantly + faster and (it is believed) more secure than the old DES algorithm. + This document is a specification for the addition of this algorithm + to the Kerberos cryptosystem suite [KCRYPTO]. + + Comments should be sent to the author, or to the IETF Kerberos + working group (ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov). + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [RFC2026]. Internet-Drafts + are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), + its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, + replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is + inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite + them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Introduction + + This document defines encryption key and checksum types for Kerberos + 5 using the AES algorithm recently chosen by NIST. These new types + support 128-bit block encryption, and key sizes of 128 or 256 bits. + + Using the "simplified profile" of [KCRYPTO], we can define a pair of + encryption and checksum schemes. AES is used with cipher text + stealing to avoid message expansion, and SHA-1 [SHA1] is the + + + +Raeburn [Page 1] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + associated checksum function. + +2. Conventions Used in this Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. + +3. Protocol Key Representation + + The profile in [KCRYPTO] treats keys and random octet strings as + conceptually different. But since the AES key space is dense, we can + use any bit string as a key. We use the byte representation for the + key described in [AES], where the first bit of the bit string is the + high bit of the first byte of the byte string (octet string) + representation. + +4. Key Generation From Pass Phrases or Random Data + + Given the above format for keys, we can generate keys from the + appropriate amounts of random data (128 or 256 bits) by simply + copying the input string. + + To generate an encryption key from a pass phrase and salt string, we + use the PBKDF2 function from PKCS #5 v2.0 ([PKCS5]), with parameters + indicated below, to generate an intermediate key (of the same length + as the desired final key), which is then passed into the DK function + with the 8-octet ASCII string "kerberos" as is done for des3-cbc- + hmac-sha1-kd in [KCRYPTO]. (In [KCRYPTO] terms, the PBKDF2 function + produces a "random octet string", hence the application of the + random-to-key function even though it's effectively a simple identity + operation.) The resulting key is the user's long-term key for use + with the encryption algorithm in question. + + tkey = random2key(PBKDF2(passphrase, salt, iter_count, keylength)) + key = DK(tkey, "kerberos") + + The pseudorandom function used by PBKDF2 will be a SHA-1 HMAC of the + passphrase and salt, as described in Appendix B.1 to PKCS#5. + + The number of iterations is specified by the string-to-key parameters + supplied. The parameter string is four octets indicating an unsigned + number in big-endian order. This is the number of iterations to be + performed. If the value is 00 00 00 00, the number of iterations to + be performed is 4294967296 (2**32). (Thus the minimum expressable + iteration count is 1.) + + For environments where slower hardware is the norm, implementations + + + +Raeburn [Page 2] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + may wish to limit the number of iterations to prevent a spoofed + response from consuming lots of client-side CPU time; it is + recommended that this bound be no less than 50000. Even for + environments with fast hardware, 4 billion iterations is likely to + take a fairly long time; much larger bounds might still be enforced, + and it might be wise for implementations to permit interruption of + this operation by the user if the environment allows for it. + + If the string-to-key parameters are not supplied, the default value + to be used is 00 00 b0 00 (decimal 45056, indicating 45056 + iterations, which takes slightly under 1 second on a 300MHz Pentium + II in tests run by the author). + + Sample test vectors are given in the appendix. + +5. Cipher Text Stealing + + Cipher block chaining is used to encrypt messages. Unlike previous + Kerberos cryptosystems, we use cipher text stealing to handle the + possibly partial final block of the message. + + Cipher text stealing is described on pages 195-196 of [AC], and + section 8 of [RC5]; it has the advantage that no message expansion is + done during encryption of messages of arbitrary sizes as is typically + done in CBC mode with padding. + + Cipher text stealing, as defined in [RC5], assumes that more than one + block of plain text is available. Since a one-block confounder is + added in the simplified profile of [KCRYPTO], and [KCRYPTO] requires + that the message to be encrypted cannot be empty, the minimum length + to be encrypted is one block plus one byte. Thus we do not need to + do anything special to meet this constraint. + + For consistency, cipher text stealing is always used for the last two + blocks of the data to be encrypted, as in [RC5]. If the data length + is a multiple of the block size, this is equivalent to plain CBC mode + with the last two cipher text blocks swapped. + + A test vector is given in the appendix. + +6. Kerberos Algorithm Profile Parameters + + This is a summary of the parameters to be used with the simplified + algorithm profile described in [KCRYPTO]: + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 3] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | protocol key format 128- or 256-bit string | + | | + | string-to-key function PBKDF2+DK with variable | + | iteration count (see | + | above) | + | | + | default string-to-key parameters 00 09 | + | | + | key-generation seed length key size | + | | + | random-to-key function identity function | + | | + | hash function, H SHA-1 | + | | + | HMAC output size, h 12 octets (96 bits) | + | | + | confounder size, c 16 octets | + | | + | message block size, m 1 octet | + | | + | encryption/decryption functions, AES in CBC-CTS mode with | + | E and D zero ivec | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Using this profile with each key size gives us two each of encryption + and checksum algorithm definitions. + +7. Assigned Numbers + + The following encryption type numbers are assigned: + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | encryption types | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | type name etype value key size | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 17 128 | + | aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 18 256 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + The following checksum type numbers are assigned: + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 4] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | checksum types | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | type name sumtype value length | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | hmac-sha1-96-aes128 10 96 | + | hmac-sha1-96-aes256 11 96 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + These checksum types will be used with the corresponding encryption + types defined above. + +8. Recommendations + + Both new cryptosystems are RECOMMENDED. They should be more secure + than DES cryptosystems, and much faster than triple-DES. + +9. Security Considerations + + This new algorithm has not been around long enough to receive the + decades of intense analysis that DES has received. It is possible + that some weakness exists that has not been found by the + cryptographers analyzing these algorithms before and during the AES + selection process. + + The use of the HMAC function has drawbacks for certain pass phrase + lengths. For example, a pass phrase longer than the hash function + block size (64 bytes, for SHA-1) is hashed to a smaller size (20 + bytes) before applying the main HMAC algorithm. However, entropy is + generally sparse in pass phrases, especially in long ones, so this + may not be a problem in the rare cases of users with long pass + phrases. + + Also, generating a 256-bit key from a pass phrase of any length may + be deceptive, since the effective entropy in pass-phrase-derived key + cannot be nearly that large. + + The iteration count in PBKDF2 appears to be useful primarily as a + constant multiplier for the amount of work required for an attacker + using brute-force methods. Unfortunately, it also multiplies, by the + same amount, the work needed by a legitimate user with a valid + password. Thus the work factor imposed on an attacker (who may have + many powerful workstations at his disposal) must be balanced against + the work factor imposed on the legitimate user (who may have a PDA or + cell phone); the available computing power on either side increases + as time goes on, as well. A better way to deal with the brute-force + attack is through preauthentication mechanisms that provide better + protection of, the user's long-term key. Use of such mechanisms is + + + +Raeburn [Page 5] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + out of scope for this document. + + Any benefit against other attacks specific to the HMAC or SHA-1 + algorithms is probably achieved with a fairly small number of + iterations. + + Cipher text stealing mode, since it requires no additional padding, + will reveal the exact length of each message being encrypted, rather + than merely bounding it to a small range of possible lengths as in + CBC mode. Such obfuscation should not be relied upon at higher + levels in any case; if the length must be obscured from an outside + observer, it should be done by intentionally varying the length of + the message to be encrypted. + + The author is not a cryptographer. Caveat emptor. + +10. IANA Considerations + + None. + +11. Acknowledgements + + Thanks to John Brezak, Gerardo Diaz Cuellar and Marcus Watts for + feedback on earlier versions of this document. + +12. Normative References + + [AC] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography", second edition, John Wiley + and Sons, New York, 1996. + + [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department + of Commerce, "Advanced Encryption Standard", Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 197, Washington, DC, November 2001. + + [KCRYPTO] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for + Kerberos 5", draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-01.txt, May, 2002. Work in + progress. + + [PKCS5] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography + Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000. + + [RC5] Baldwin, R, and R. Rivest, "The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC-Pad, and + RC5-CTS Algorithms", RFC 2040, October 1996. + + [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision + 3", RFC 2026, October 1996. + + [SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. + + + +Raeburn [Page 6] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 180-1, Washington, DC, April 1995. + +13. Informative References + + [PECMS] Gutmann, P., "Password-based Encryption for CMS", RFC 3211, + December 2001. + +14. Author's Address + + Kenneth Raeburn + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + raeburn@mit.edu + +15. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +A. Sample test vectors + + Sample values for the string-to-key function are included below. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 7] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + Iteration count = 1 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + cd ed b5 28 1b b2 f8 01 56 5a 11 22 b2 56 35 15 + 128-bit AES key: + 42 26 3c 6e 89 f4 fc 28 b8 df 68 ee 09 79 9f 15 + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + cd ed b5 28 1b b2 f8 01 56 5a 11 22 b2 56 35 15 + 0a d1 f7 a0 4b b9 f3 a3 33 ec c0 e2 e1 f7 08 37 + 256-bit AES key: + fe 69 7b 52 bc 0d 3c e1 44 32 ba 03 6a 92 e6 5b + bb 52 28 09 90 a2 fa 27 88 39 98 d7 2a f3 01 61 + + Iteration count = 2 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt="ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 01 db ee 7f 4a 9e 24 3e 98 8b 62 c7 3c da 93 5d + 128-bit AES key: + c6 51 bf 29 e2 30 0a c2 7f a4 69 d6 93 bd da 13 + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 01 db ee 7f 4a 9e 24 3e 98 8b 62 c7 3c da 93 5d + a0 53 78 b9 32 44 ec 8f 48 a9 9e 61 ad 79 9d 86 + 256-bit AES key: + a2 e1 6d 16 b3 60 69 c1 35 d5 e9 d2 e2 5f 89 61 + 02 68 56 18 b9 59 14 b4 67 c6 76 22 22 58 24 ff + + Iteration count = 1200 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 5c 08 eb 61 fd f7 1e 4e 4e c3 cf 6b a1 f5 51 2b + 128-bit AES key: + 4c 01 cd 46 d6 32 d0 1e 6d be 23 0a 01 ed 64 2a + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 5c 08 eb 61 fd f7 1e 4e 4e c3 cf 6b a1 f5 51 2b + a7 e5 2d db c5 e5 14 2f 70 8a 31 e2 e6 2b 1e 13 + 256-bit AES key: + 55 a6 ac 74 0a d1 7b 48 46 94 10 51 e1 e8 b0 a7 + 54 8d 93 b0 ab 30 a8 bc 3f f1 62 80 38 2b 8c 2a + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 8] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + Iteration count = 5 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt=0x1234567878563412 + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + d1 da a7 86 15 f2 87 e6 a1 c8 b1 20 d7 06 2a 49 + 128-bit AES key: + e9 b2 3d 52 27 37 47 dd 5c 35 cb 55 be 61 9d 8e + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + d1 da a7 86 15 f2 87 e6 a1 c8 b1 20 d7 06 2a 49 + 3f 98 d2 03 e6 be 49 a6 ad f4 fa 57 4b 6e 64 ee + 256-bit AES key: + 97 a4 e7 86 be 20 d8 1a 38 2d 5e bc 96 d5 90 9c + ab cd ad c8 7c a4 8f 57 45 04 15 9f 16 c3 6e 31 + (This test is based on values given in [PECMS].) + + Iteration count = 1200 + Pass phrase = (64 characters) + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + Salt="pass phrase equals block size" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 13 9c 30 c0 96 6b c3 2b a5 5f db f2 12 53 0a c9 + 128-bit AES key: + 59 d1 bb 78 9a 82 8b 1a a5 4e f9 c2 88 3f 69 ed + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 13 9c 30 c0 96 6b c3 2b a5 5f db f2 12 53 0a c9 + c5 ec 59 f1 a4 52 f5 cc 9a d9 40 fe a0 59 8e d1 + 256-bit AES key: + 89 ad ee 36 08 db 8b c7 1f 1b fb fe 45 94 86 b0 + 56 18 b7 0c ba e2 20 92 53 4e 56 c5 53 ba 4b 34 + + Iteration count = 1200 + Pass phrase = (65 characters) + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + Salt = "pass phrase exceeds block size" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 9c ca d6 d4 68 77 0c d5 1b 10 e6 a6 87 21 be 61 + 128-bit AES key: + cb 80 05 dc 5f 90 17 9a 7f 02 10 4c 00 18 75 1d + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 9c ca d6 d4 68 77 0c d5 1b 10 e6 a6 87 21 be 61 + 1a 8b 4d 28 26 01 db 3b 36 be 92 46 91 5e c8 2a + 256-bit AES key: + d7 8c 5c 9c b8 72 a8 c9 da d4 69 7f 0b b5 b2 d2 + 14 96 c8 2b eb 2c ae da 21 12 fc ee a0 57 40 1b + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 9] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + Iteration count = 50 + Pass phrase = g-clef (0xf09d849e) + Salt = "EXAMPLE.COMpianist" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 6b 9c f2 6d 45 45 5a 43 a5 b8 bb 27 6a 40 3b 39 + 128-bit AES key: + f1 49 c1 f2 e1 54 a7 34 52 d4 3e 7f e6 2a 56 e5 + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 6b 9c f2 6d 45 45 5a 43 a5 b8 bb 27 6a 40 3b 39 + e7 fe 37 a0 c4 1e 02 c2 81 ff 30 69 e1 e9 4f 52 + 256-bit AES key: + 4b 6d 98 39 f8 44 06 df 1f 09 cc 16 6d b4 b8 3c + 57 18 48 b7 84 a3 d6 bd c3 46 58 9a 3e 39 3f 9e + + Some test vectors for CBC with cipher text stealing, using an initial + vector of all-zero. + + AES 128-bit key: + 63 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 20 74 65 72 69 79 61 6b 69 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 + Output: + c6 35 35 68 f2 bf 8c b4 d8 a5 80 36 2d a7 ff 7f + 97 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 + Output: + fc 00 78 3e 0e fd b2 c1 d4 45 d4 c8 ef f7 ed 22 + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + Output: + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 a8 + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 10] + +INTERNET DRAFT November 2002 + + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 2c 20 70 6c 65 61 73 65 2c + Output: + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + b3 ff fd 94 0c 16 a1 8c 1b 55 49 d2 f8 38 02 9e + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 2c 20 70 6c 65 61 73 65 2c 20 + Output: + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + 9d ad 8b bb 96 c4 cd c0 3b c1 03 e1 a1 94 bb d8 + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 a8 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 2c 20 70 6c 65 61 73 65 2c 20 + 61 6e 64 20 77 6f 6e 74 6f 6e 20 73 6f 75 70 2e + Output: + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 a8 + 48 07 ef e8 36 ee 89 a5 26 73 0d bc 2f 7b c8 40 + 9d ad 8b bb 96 c4 cd c0 3b c1 03 e1 a1 94 bb d8 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 11] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..70395f2ba8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,674 @@ + + + + + + + + + +Kerberos Working Group K. Raeburn +Document: draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-03.txt MIT + February 24, 2003 + expires August 24, 2003 + + AES Encryption for Kerberos 5 + +Abstract + + Recently the US National Institute of Standards and Technology chose + a new Advanced Encryption Standard [AES], which is significantly + faster and (it is believed) more secure than the old DES algorithm. + This document is a specification for the addition of this algorithm + to the Kerberos cryptosystem suite [KCRYPTO]. + + Comments should be sent to the author, or to the IETF Kerberos + working group (ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov). + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [RFC2026]. Internet-Drafts + are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), + its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, + replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is + inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite + them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Introduction + + This document defines encryption key and checksum types for Kerberos + 5 using the AES algorithm recently chosen by NIST. These new types + support 128-bit block encryption, and key sizes of 128 or 256 bits. + + Using the "simplified profile" of [KCRYPTO], we can define a pair of + encryption and checksum schemes. AES is used with cipher text + stealing to avoid message expansion, and SHA-1 [SHA1] is the + + + +Raeburn [Page 1] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + associated checksum function. + +2. Conventions Used in this Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. + +3. Protocol Key Representation + + The profile in [KCRYPTO] treats keys and random octet strings as + conceptually different. But since the AES key space is dense, we can + use any bit string of appropriate length as a key. We use the byte + representation for the key described in [AES], where the first bit of + the bit string is the high bit of the first byte of the byte string + (octet string) representation. + +4. Key Generation From Pass Phrases or Random Data + + Given the above format for keys, we can generate keys from the + appropriate amounts of random data (128 or 256 bits) by simply + copying the input string. + + To generate an encryption key from a pass phrase and salt string, we + use the PBKDF2 function from PKCS #5 v2.0 ([PKCS5]), with parameters + indicated below, to generate an intermediate key (of the same length + as the desired final key), which is then passed into the DK function + with the 8-octet ASCII string "kerberos" as is done for des3-cbc- + hmac-sha1-kd in [KCRYPTO]. (In [KCRYPTO] terms, the PBKDF2 function + produces a "random octet string", hence the application of the + random-to-key function even though it's effectively a simple identity + operation.) The resulting key is the user's long-term key for use + with the encryption algorithm in question. + + tkey = random2key(PBKDF2(passphrase, salt, iter_count, keylength)) + key = DK(tkey, "kerberos") + + The pseudorandom function used by PBKDF2 will be a SHA-1 HMAC of the + passphrase and salt, as described in Appendix B.1 to PKCS#5. + + The number of iterations is specified by the string-to-key parameters + supplied. The parameter string is four octets indicating an unsigned + number in big-endian order. This is the number of iterations to be + performed. If the value is 00 00 00 00, the number of iterations to + be performed is 4294967296 (2**32). (Thus the minimum expressable + iteration count is 1.) + + For environments where slower hardware is the norm, implementations + + + +Raeburn [Page 2] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + may wish to limit the number of iterations to prevent a spoofed + response from consuming lots of client-side CPU time; it is + recommended that this bound be no less than 50000. Even for + environments with fast hardware, 4 billion iterations is likely to + take a fairly long time; much larger bounds might still be enforced, + and it might be wise for implementations to permit interruption of + this operation by the user if the environment allows for it. + + If the string-to-key parameters are not supplied, the default value + to be used is 00 00 b0 00 (decimal 45056, indicating 45056 + iterations, which takes slightly under 1 second on a 300MHz Pentium + II in tests run by the author). + + Sample test vectors are given in the appendix. + +5. Cipher Text Stealing + + Cipher block chaining is used to encrypt messages. Unlike previous + Kerberos cryptosystems, we use cipher text stealing to handle the + possibly partial final block of the message. + + Cipher text stealing is described on pages 195-196 of [AC], and + section 8 of [RC5]; it has the advantage that no message expansion is + done during encryption of messages of arbitrary sizes as is typically + done in CBC mode with padding. + + Cipher text stealing, as defined in [RC5], assumes that more than one + block of plain text is available. If exactly one block is to be + encrypted, that block is simply encrypted with AES (also known as ECB + mode). Input of less than one block is padded at the end to one + block; the values of the padding bits are unspecified. + (Implementations may use all-zero padding, but protocols should not + rely on the result being deterministic. Implementations may use + random padding, but protocols should not rely on the result not being + deterministic. Note that in most cases, the Kerberos encryption + profile will add a random confounder independent of this padding.) + + For consistency, cipher text stealing is always used for the last two + blocks of the data to be encrypted, as in [RC5]. If the data length + is a multiple of the block size, this is equivalent to plain CBC mode + with the last two cipher text blocks swapped. + + A test vector is given in the appendix. + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 3] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + +6. Kerberos Algorithm Profile Parameters + + This is a summary of the parameters to be used with the simplified + algorithm profile described in [KCRYPTO]: + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | protocol key format 128- or 256-bit string | + | | + | string-to-key function PBKDF2+DK with variable | + | iteration count (see | + | above) | + | | + | default string-to-key parameters 00 00 b0 00 | + | | + | key-generation seed length key size | + | | + | random-to-key function identity function | + | | + | hash function, H SHA-1 | + | | + | HMAC output size, h 12 octets (96 bits) | + | | + | message block size, m 1 octet | + | | + | encryption/decryption functions, AES in CBC-CTS mode with | + | E and D zero ivec (cipher block | + | size 16 octets) | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + Using this profile with each key size gives us two each of encryption + and checksum algorithm definitions. + +7. Assigned Numbers + + The following encryption type numbers are assigned: + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | encryption types | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | type name etype value key size | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 17 128 | + | aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 18 256 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + The following checksum type numbers are assigned: + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 4] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | checksum types | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | type name sumtype value length | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | hmac-sha1-96-aes128 15 96 | + | hmac-sha1-96-aes256 16 96 | + +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + These checksum types will be used with the corresponding encryption + types defined above. + +8. Security Considerations + + This new algorithm has not been around long enough to receive the + decades of intense analysis that DES has received. It is possible + that some weakness exists that has not been found by the + cryptographers analyzing these algorithms before and during the AES + selection process. + + The use of the HMAC function has drawbacks for certain pass phrase + lengths. For example, a pass phrase longer than the hash function + block size (64 bytes, for SHA-1) is hashed to a smaller size (20 + bytes) before applying the main HMAC algorithm. However, entropy is + generally sparse in pass phrases, especially in long ones, so this + may not be a problem in the rare cases of users with long pass + phrases. + + Also, generating a 256-bit key from a pass phrase of any length may + be deceptive, since the effective entropy in pass-phrase-derived key + cannot be nearly that large. + + The iteration count in PBKDF2 appears to be useful primarily as a + constant multiplier for the amount of work required for an attacker + using brute-force methods. Unfortunately, it also multiplies, by the + same amount, the work needed by a legitimate user with a valid + password. Thus the work factor imposed on an attacker (who may have + many powerful workstations at his disposal) must be balanced against + the work factor imposed on the legitimate user (who may have a PDA or + cell phone); the available computing power on either side increases + as time goes on, as well. A better way to deal with the brute-force + attack is through preauthentication mechanisms that provide better + protection of, the user's long-term key. Use of such mechanisms is + out of scope for this document. + + If the PBKDF2 iteration count can be spoofed by an intruder on the + network, and the limit on the accepted iteration count is very high, + the intruder may be able to introduce a form of denial of service + + + +Raeburn [Page 5] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + attack against the client by sending a very high iteration count, + causing the client to spend a great deal of CPU time computing an + incorrect key. + + Any benefit against other attacks specific to the HMAC or SHA-1 + algorithms is probably achieved with a fairly small number of + iterations. + + Cipher text stealing mode, since it requires no additional padding in + most cases, will reveal the exact length of each message being + encrypted, rather than merely bounding it to a small range of + possible lengths as in CBC mode. Such obfuscation should not be + relied upon at higher levels in any case; if the length must be + obscured from an outside observer, it should be done by intentionally + varying the length of the message to be encrypted. + + The author is not a cryptographer. Caveat emptor. + +9. IANA Considerations + + None. + +10. Acknowledgements + + Thanks to John Brezak, Gerardo Diaz Cuellar and Marcus Watts for + feedback on earlier versions of this document. + +11. Normative References + + [AC] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography", second edition, John Wiley + and Sons, New York, 1996. + + [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department + of Commerce, "Advanced Encryption Standard", Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 197, Washington, DC, November 2001. + + [KCRYPTO] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for + Kerberos 5", draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-01.txt, May, 2002. Work in + progress. + + [PKCS5] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography + Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000. + + [RC5] Baldwin, R, and R. Rivest, "The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC-Pad, and + RC5-CTS Algorithms", RFC 2040, October 1996. + + [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision + 3", RFC 2026, October 1996. + + + +Raeburn [Page 6] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + [SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. + Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 180-1, Washington, DC, April 1995. + +12. Informative References + + [PECMS] Gutmann, P., "Password-based Encryption for CMS", RFC 3211, + December 2001. + +13. Author's Address + + Kenneth Raeburn + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + raeburn@mit.edu + +14. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +A. Sample test vectors + + Sample values for the string-to-key function are included below. + + + +Raeburn [Page 7] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Iteration count = 1 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + cd ed b5 28 1b b2 f8 01 56 5a 11 22 b2 56 35 15 + 128-bit AES key: + 42 26 3c 6e 89 f4 fc 28 b8 df 68 ee 09 79 9f 15 + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + cd ed b5 28 1b b2 f8 01 56 5a 11 22 b2 56 35 15 + 0a d1 f7 a0 4b b9 f3 a3 33 ec c0 e2 e1 f7 08 37 + 256-bit AES key: + fe 69 7b 52 bc 0d 3c e1 44 32 ba 03 6a 92 e6 5b + bb 52 28 09 90 a2 fa 27 88 39 98 d7 2a f3 01 61 + + Iteration count = 2 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt="ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 01 db ee 7f 4a 9e 24 3e 98 8b 62 c7 3c da 93 5d + 128-bit AES key: + c6 51 bf 29 e2 30 0a c2 7f a4 69 d6 93 bd da 13 + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 01 db ee 7f 4a 9e 24 3e 98 8b 62 c7 3c da 93 5d + a0 53 78 b9 32 44 ec 8f 48 a9 9e 61 ad 79 9d 86 + 256-bit AES key: + a2 e1 6d 16 b3 60 69 c1 35 d5 e9 d2 e2 5f 89 61 + 02 68 56 18 b9 59 14 b4 67 c6 76 22 22 58 24 ff + + Iteration count = 1200 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 5c 08 eb 61 fd f7 1e 4e 4e c3 cf 6b a1 f5 51 2b + 128-bit AES key: + 4c 01 cd 46 d6 32 d0 1e 6d be 23 0a 01 ed 64 2a + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 5c 08 eb 61 fd f7 1e 4e 4e c3 cf 6b a1 f5 51 2b + a7 e5 2d db c5 e5 14 2f 70 8a 31 e2 e6 2b 1e 13 + 256-bit AES key: + 55 a6 ac 74 0a d1 7b 48 46 94 10 51 e1 e8 b0 a7 + 54 8d 93 b0 ab 30 a8 bc 3f f1 62 80 38 2b 8c 2a + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 8] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Iteration count = 5 + Pass phrase = "password" + Salt=0x1234567878563412 + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + d1 da a7 86 15 f2 87 e6 a1 c8 b1 20 d7 06 2a 49 + 128-bit AES key: + e9 b2 3d 52 27 37 47 dd 5c 35 cb 55 be 61 9d 8e + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + d1 da a7 86 15 f2 87 e6 a1 c8 b1 20 d7 06 2a 49 + 3f 98 d2 03 e6 be 49 a6 ad f4 fa 57 4b 6e 64 ee + 256-bit AES key: + 97 a4 e7 86 be 20 d8 1a 38 2d 5e bc 96 d5 90 9c + ab cd ad c8 7c a4 8f 57 45 04 15 9f 16 c3 6e 31 + (This test is based on values given in [PECMS].) + + Iteration count = 1200 + Pass phrase = (64 characters) + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + Salt="pass phrase equals block size" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 13 9c 30 c0 96 6b c3 2b a5 5f db f2 12 53 0a c9 + 128-bit AES key: + 59 d1 bb 78 9a 82 8b 1a a5 4e f9 c2 88 3f 69 ed + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 13 9c 30 c0 96 6b c3 2b a5 5f db f2 12 53 0a c9 + c5 ec 59 f1 a4 52 f5 cc 9a d9 40 fe a0 59 8e d1 + 256-bit AES key: + 89 ad ee 36 08 db 8b c7 1f 1b fb fe 45 94 86 b0 + 56 18 b7 0c ba e2 20 92 53 4e 56 c5 53 ba 4b 34 + + Iteration count = 1200 + Pass phrase = (65 characters) + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + Salt = "pass phrase exceeds block size" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 9c ca d6 d4 68 77 0c d5 1b 10 e6 a6 87 21 be 61 + 128-bit AES key: + cb 80 05 dc 5f 90 17 9a 7f 02 10 4c 00 18 75 1d + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 9c ca d6 d4 68 77 0c d5 1b 10 e6 a6 87 21 be 61 + 1a 8b 4d 28 26 01 db 3b 36 be 92 46 91 5e c8 2a + 256-bit AES key: + d7 8c 5c 9c b8 72 a8 c9 da d4 69 7f 0b b5 b2 d2 + 14 96 c8 2b eb 2c ae da 21 12 fc ee a0 57 40 1b + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 9] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Iteration count = 50 + Pass phrase = g-clef (0xf09d849e) + Salt = "EXAMPLE.COMpianist" + 128-bit PBKDF2 output: + 6b 9c f2 6d 45 45 5a 43 a5 b8 bb 27 6a 40 3b 39 + 128-bit AES key: + f1 49 c1 f2 e1 54 a7 34 52 d4 3e 7f e6 2a 56 e5 + 256-bit PBKDF2 output: + 6b 9c f2 6d 45 45 5a 43 a5 b8 bb 27 6a 40 3b 39 + e7 fe 37 a0 c4 1e 02 c2 81 ff 30 69 e1 e9 4f 52 + 256-bit AES key: + 4b 6d 98 39 f8 44 06 df 1f 09 cc 16 6d b4 b8 3c + 57 18 48 b7 84 a3 d6 bd c3 46 58 9a 3e 39 3f 9e + + Some test vectors for CBC with cipher text stealing, using an initial + vector of all-zero. + + AES 128-bit key: + 63 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 20 74 65 72 69 79 61 6b 69 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 + Output: + c6 35 35 68 f2 bf 8c b4 d8 a5 80 36 2d a7 ff 7f + 97 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 + Output: + fc 00 78 3e 0e fd b2 c1 d4 45 d4 c8 ef f7 ed 22 + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + Output: + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 a8 + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + + + + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 10] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 2c 20 70 6c 65 61 73 65 2c + Output: + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + b3 ff fd 94 0c 16 a1 8c 1b 55 49 d2 f8 38 02 9e + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 2c 20 70 6c 65 61 73 65 2c 20 + Output: + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + 9d ad 8b bb 96 c4 cd c0 3b c1 03 e1 a1 94 bb d8 + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 a8 + + Input: + 49 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 6c 69 6b 65 20 74 68 65 + 20 47 65 6e 65 72 61 6c 20 47 61 75 27 73 20 43 + 68 69 63 6b 65 6e 2c 20 70 6c 65 61 73 65 2c 20 + 61 6e 64 20 77 6f 6e 74 6f 6e 20 73 6f 75 70 2e + Output: + 97 68 72 68 d6 ec cc c0 c0 7b 25 e2 5e cf e5 84 + 39 31 25 23 a7 86 62 d5 be 7f cb cc 98 eb f5 a8 + 48 07 ef e8 36 ee 89 a5 26 73 0d bc 2f 7b c8 40 + 9d ad 8b bb 96 c4 cd c0 3b c1 03 e1 a1 94 bb d8 + +Document History (delete before RFC publication) + + Major changes from -02 to -03: + + Describe encryption of data of one block or less. + + Fix default string-to-key parameters in table to agree with text. + + Remove Recommendations section; the Kerberos RFC will cover + recommendations and requirements. + + Restore change history, added notes to RFC editor saying to remove + it, and update the [KCRYPTO] entry in Normative References. + + Delete confounder size, since it's gone from the simplified profile + in crypto-03. + + Change checksum numbers, since Assar Westerlund says 10 is in use. + + + + +Raeburn [Page 11] + +INTERNET DRAFT February 2003 + + + Add Security Consideration about denial of service caused by very + high spoofed iteration count. + + Major changes from -01 to -02: + + Add test vectors. + + Drop 192/384-bit variants. Prevailing opinion seems to be that + 128-bit keys are good for speed, and 256-bit for paranoia, and no one + cares about the intermediate sizes. + + Update for new string-to-key params per new Kerberos crypto draft and + discussions during the IETF conferences at Salt Lake City, December, + 2001, and Minneapolis, March, 2002. + + Drop Serpent and Twofish; Rijndael is the only one people care about. + Use "AES" in preference to "Rijndael". + + Use cipher text stealing mode intead of plain CBC, and add -cts to + the algorithm names. + + Drop SHA-2, stick with SHA-1. New test cases to exercise boundary + conditions in HMAC used in string-to-key. + + Split References into Normative/Informative. + + Major changes from -00: + + Define different types based on key/hash sizes, with hash size always + twice key size. Use simplified profile of revised section 6 of + RFC1510bis. Drop "-kd" from the names. + + Use PKCS#5 instead of simple hash. Changed string-to-key vector to + use some "Appendix Z" cases also submitted for kerberos-revisions. + +Notes to RFC Editor + + Assuming this document goes through Last Call along with the Kerberos + crypto framework draft, the reference entry for [KCRYPTO] will list + the draft name, not the RFC number. This should be replaced with the + RFC info. + + The "Document History" section should be deleted, as should this one. + + + + + + + + +Raeburn [Page 12] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..321c5ba099 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,929 @@ + + +DHC Working Group S. Medvinsky +Internet Draft Motorola +Document: +Category: Standards Track P.Lalwaney +Expires: January 2001 Nokia + + July 2000 + + + Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of + six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as , and expires January 2001. Please + send comments to the authors. + + + +1. Abstract + + The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [1] includes an + option that allows authentication of all DHCP messages, as specified + in [2]. This document specifies a DHCP authentication mode based on + Kerberos V tickets. This provides mutual authentication between a + DHCP client and server, as well as authentication of all DHCP + messages. + + This document specifies Kerberos message exchanges between an + uninitialized client and the KDC (Key Distribution Center) using an + IAKERB proxy [7] so that the Kerberos key management phase is + decoupled from, and precedes the address allocation and network + configuration phase that uses the DHCP authentication option. In + order to make use of the IAKERB proxy, this document specifies a + transport mechanism that works with an uninitialized client (i.e. a + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + client without an assigned IP address). In addition, the document + specifies the format of the Kerberos authenticator to be used with + the DHCP authentication option. + +2. Conventions used in this document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119. + +3. Introduction + + 3.1 Terminology + + o "DHCP client" + + A DHCP client is an Internet host using DHCP to obtain configuration + parameters such as a network address. + + o "DHCP server" + + A DHCP server is an Internet host that returns configuration + parameters to DHCP clients. + + O "Ticket" + + A Kerberos term for a record that helps a client authenticate itself + to a server; it contains the client's identity, a session key, a + timestamp, and other information, all sealed using the server's + secret key. It only serves to authenticate a client when presented + along with a fresh Authenticator. + + o "Key Distribution Center" + + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host + on which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and Ticket- + Granting Ticket (TGT) requests. The initial ticket portion is + sometimes referred to as the Authentication Server (or service. The + Ticket-Granting Ticket portion is sometimes referred to as the + Ticket-Granting Server (or service). + + o "Realm" + + A Kerberos administrative domain that represents a group of + principals registered at a KDC. A single KDC may be responsible for + one or more realms. A fully qualified principal name includes a + realm name along with a principal name unique within that realm. + +3.2 Protocol Overview + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -2- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + DHCP as defined in [1] defines the protocol exchanges for a client + to obtain its IP address and network configuration information from + a DHCP Server. Kerberos V5 as described in [6] defines the protocol + and message exchanges to mutually authenticate two parties. It is + our goal to provide authentication support for DHCP using Kerberos. + This implies that the Kerberos key management exchange has to take + place before a client gets its IP address from the DHCP Server. + Kerberos assumes that the client has a network address and can + contact the Key Distribution Center to obtain its credentials for + authenticated communication with an application server. + + In this specification we utilize the key exchange using an IAKERB + proxy described in [7]. This does not require any changes to either + the IAKERB or the Kerberos V5 specification. This document also + specifies a particular transport that allows an uninitialized client + to contact an IAKERB proxy. + + The Kerberos ticket returned from the key management exchange + discussed in Section 5 of this document is passed to the DHCP Server + inside the DHCP authentication option with the new Kerberos + authenticator type. This is described in Section 6 of this draft. + + +3.3 Related Work + + A prior Internet Draft [3] outlined the use of Kerberos-based + authentication for DHCP. The proposal tightly coupled the Kerberos + client state machines and the DHCP client state machines. As a + result, the Kerberos key management messages were carried in DHCP + messages, along with the Kerberos authenticators. In addition, the + first DHCP message exchange (request, offer) is not authenticated. + + We propose a protocol exchange where Kerberos key management is + decoupled from and precedes authenticated DHCP exchanges. This + implies that the Kerberos ticket returned in the initial key + management exchange could be used to authenticate servers assigning + addresses by non-DHCP address assignment mechanisms like RSIP [4] + and for service specific parameter provisioning mechanisms using SLP + [5]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -3- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + +4. System Architecture + + + Client + -------- -------- + | | 5.Authenticated DHCP | | + | DHCP |<------------------------>| DHCP | + | client | | server | + | | | | + | | | | + |Kerberos| | | + | Client | | | + -------- -------- + ^ + | + | + | + | ------- + ------------------------------>| | + Kerberos Key Mgmt | Proxy | + messages: | | + 1. AS Request / 2.AS Reply ------- + 3. TGS Request / 4.TGS Reply ^ + | Kerberos + | Key Mgmt messages + v (1, 2, 3, 4) + -------- + | | + | KDC | + | | + -------- + + Figure 1: System blocks and message interactions between them + + + In this architecture, the DHCP client obtains a Kerberos ticket from + the Key Distribution Center (KDC) using standard Kerberos messages, + as specified in [6]. The client, however, contacts the KDC via a + proxy server, according to the IAKERB mechanism, described in [7]. + The are several reasons why a client has to go through this proxy in + order to contact the KDC: + + a)The client may not know the host address of the KDC and may be + sending its first request message as a broadcast on a local + network. The KDC may not be located on the local network, and + even if it were - it will be unable to communicate with a client + without an IP address. This document describes a specific + mechanism that may be used by a client to communicate with the + Kerberos proxy. + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -4- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + b)The client may not know its Kerberos realm name. The proxy is + able to fill in the missing client realm name in an AS Request + message, as specified in IAKERB. Note that in the case that + PKINIT pre-authenticator is used [8], the realm name in the AS + Request may be the KDC realm name and not the clientÆs realm name. + + c) The client does not know the realm name of the DHCP server. + + According to IAKERB, when the client sends a TGS Request with a + missing server realm name, the proxy will return to the client an + error message containing the missing realm name. + + Note that in this case the proxy could return the client a wrong + realm name and the client could be fooled into obtaining a ticket + for the wrong DHCP server (on the same local network). However, + the wrong DHCP server must still be a registered principal in a + KDC database. In some circumstances this may be an acceptable + compromise. Also, see the security considerations section. + + IAKERB describes the proxy as part of an application server - the + DHCP server in this case. However, in this document we are not + requiring the proxy to be integrated with the DHCP server. The + same IAKERB mechanisms apply in the more general case, where the + proxy is an independent application. This proxy, however, MUST be + reachable by a client via a local network broadcast. + + After a client has obtained a Kerberos ticket for the DHCP server, + it will use it as part of an authentication option in the DHCP + messages. The only extension to the DHCP protocol is the addition + of a new authenticator type based on Kerberos tickets. + +4.1 Cross-Realm Authentication + + Figure 1 shows a client communicating with a single KDC via a proxy. + However, the DHCP clientÆs realm may be different from the DHCP + serverÆs realm. In that case, the client may need to first contact + the KDC in its local realm to obtain a cross-realm TGT. Then, the + client would use the cross-realm TGT to contact the KDC in the DHCP + serverÆs realm, as specified in [6]. + + In the following example a client doesnÆt know its realm or the DHCP + serverÆs realm, which happens to be different from the clientÆs + realm. Here are the steps in obtaining the ticket for the DHCP + server (based on [6] and [7]): + + 1) The client sends AS Request with NULL realm to the proxy. + 2) The proxy fills in the realm and forwards the AS Request to + the KDC in the clientÆs realm. + 3) The KDC issues a TGT and sends back an AS Reply to the + proxy. + 4) The proxy forwards AS Reply to the client. + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -5- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + 5) The client sends TGS Request for a principal name "dhcpsrvr" + with NULL realm to the proxy. + 6) The proxy returns KRB_AP_ERR_REALM_REQUIRED error with the + DHCP serverÆs realm to the client. + 7) The client sends another TGS Request for a cross-realm TGT + to the proxy. + 8) The proxy forwards the TGS Request to the KDC in the + clientÆs realm. + 9) The KDC issues a cross-realm TGT and sends back a TGS Reply + to the proxy. + 10) The proxy forwards TGS Reply to the client. + 11) The client sends a TGS Request to the proxy for a principal + "dhcpsrvr" with the realm name filled in, using a cross-realm + TGT. + 12) The proxy forwards TGS Request to the KDC in the DHCP + server's realm. + 13) The KDC issues a ticket for the DHCP server and sends TGS + Reply back to the proxy. + 14) The proxy forwards TGS Reply to the client. + + In a most general case, the client may need to contact any number of + KDCs in different realms before it can get a ticket for the DHCP + server. In each case, the client would contact a KDC via the proxy + server, as specified in Section 5 of this document. + +4.2 Public Key Authentication + + This specification also allows clients to perform public key + authentication to the KDC, based on the PKINIT specification [8]. + In this case, the size of an AS Request and AS Reply messages is + likely to exceed the size of typical link MTU's. + + Here is an example, where PKINIT is used by a DHCP client that is + not a registered principal in the KDC principal database: + + 1) The client sends AS Request with a PKINIT Request pre- + authenticator to the proxy. This includes the clientÆs + signature and X.509 certificate. The KDC realm field is + left as NULL. + 2) The proxy fills in the realm and forwards the AS Request to + the KDC in the filled in realm. This is the realm of the + DHCP server. Here, the clientÆs realm is the name of a + Certification Authority - not the same as the KDC realm. + 3) The KDC issues a TGT and sends back an AS Reply with a + PKINIT Reply pre-authenticator to the proxy. + 4) The proxy forwards the AS Reply to the client. + 5) The client sends TGS Request for a principal name "dhcpsrvr" + with the realm found in the TGT to the proxy. + 6) The proxy forwards TGS Request to the KDC in the DHCP + serverÆs realm. + 7) The KDC issues a ticket for the DHCP server and sends TGS + Reply back to the proxy. + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -6- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + 8) The proxy forwards TGS Reply to the client. + + + 5. Key Management Exchange that Precedes Network Address Allocation + + An uninitialized host (e.g. on power-on and reset) does not have a + network address. It does have a link layer address or hardware + address. At this time, the client may not have any information on + its realm or the realm of the address allocation server (DHCP + Server). + + In the Kerberos key management exchange, a client gets its ticket + granting ticket (TGT) by contacting the Authentication Server in the + KDC using the AS_Request / Reply messages (shown as messages 1 and 2 + in Figure 1). The client then contacts the Ticket Granting Server in + the KDC to get the DHCP server ticket (to be used for mutual + authentication with the DHCP server) using the TGS_REQ / TGS_REP + messages (shown as messages 3 and 4 in the above figure). It is + also possible for the client to obtain a DHCP server ticket directly + with the AS Request / Reply exchange, without the use of the TGT. + + In the use of Kerberos for DHCP authentication, the client (a) does + not have an IP/network address (b) does not know he KDCÆs IP address + (c) the KDC may not be on the local network and (d) the client may + not know the DHCP ServerÆs IP address and realm. We therefore + require a Kerberos proxy on the local network to accept broadcast + Kerberos request messages (AS_REQ and TGS_REQ) from uninitialized + clients and relay them to the appropriate KDC. + + The uninitialized client formulates a broadcast AS_REQ or TGS_REQ as + follows: + + The request payload contains the client hardware address in + addresses field with a negative value for the address type. Kerberos + v5 [6] allows for the usage of negative address types for "local" + use. Note that IAKERB [7] discourages the use of the addresses field + as network addresses may not be known or may change in situation + where proxies are used. In this draft we incorporate the negative + values permitted in the Kerberos transport in the address type field + of both the AS_REQ and TGS_REQ messages. The negative value SHOULD + be the negative number of the hardware address type "htype" value + (from assigned numbers RFC) used in RFC 2131. The address field of + the message contains the clients hardware address. + + The request payload is UDP encapsulated and addressed to port 88 on + the server/proxy. The UDP source port is selected by the client. The + source and destination network addresses are the all-zeroÆs address + and the broadcast address, respectively. For IPv4, the source IP + address is set to 0.0.0.0 and the destination IP address is set to + 255.255.255.255. The data link layer header source address + corresponds to the link layer/hardware address of the client. The + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -7- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + destination link layer address is the broadcast address at the link + layer (e.g. for Ethernet the address is ffffffff). + + In the case where AS_REQ message contains a PKINIT pre-authenticator + for public key-based client authentication (based on [8]), the + message will probably not fit into a single UDP packet given typical + link MTU's. + + It is assumed that the proxy server on a network is configured with + a list of KDCÆs, their realms and their IP addresses. The proxy + server will act as a client to the KDC and forward standard Kerberos + messages to/from the KDC using unicast UDP or TCP transport + mechanisms, according to [6]. + + Upon receiving a broadcast request from a client, the proxy MUST + record the clientÆs hardware address that appears as the source + address on the frame as well as in the addresses field of the + request message. Based on the realm of the KDC specified in the + request, the proxy determines the KDC to which this message is + relayed as a unicast message from the proxy to the KDC. In the case + that the client left the KDC realm name as NULL, it is up to the + proxy to first determine the correct realm name and fill it in the + request (according to [7]). + + On receiving a request, the KDC formulates a response (AS_REP or + TGS_REP). It includes the clientÆs addresses field in the encrypted + part of the ticket (according to [6]). This response is unicast to + the proxy. + + Upon receiving the reply, the proxy MUST first determine the + previously saved hardware address of the client. The proxy + broadcasts the reply on its local network. This is a network layer + broadcast. At the link level, it uses the hardware address obtained + from the addresses field of the request. + + The client on receiving the response (link layer destination address + as its hardware address, network layer address is the broadcast + address) must verify that the hardware address in the ticket + corresponds to its link layer address. + + Upon receiving a TGS_REP (or an AS_REP with the application server + ticket) from the proxy, the client will have enough information to + securely communicate with the application server (the DHCP Server in + this case), as specified in the following section. + + + + + + + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -8- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + 6. Authenticated Message Exchange Between the DHCP Client and the + DHCP Server + + The ticket returned in the TGS response is used by the DHCP client + in the construction of the Kerberos authenticator. The Kerberos + ticket serves two purposes: to establish a shared session key with + the DHCP server, and is also included as part of a Kerberos + authenticator in the DHCP request. + + If the size of the authenticator is greater than 255 bytes, the DHCP + authentication option is repeated multiple times. When the values + of all the authentication options are concatenated together, they + will make up the complete authenticator. + + Once the session key is established, the Kerberos structure + containing the ticket (AP REQ) can be omitted from the authenticator + for subsequent messages sent by both the DHCP client and the DHCP + server. + + The Kerberos authenticator for a DHCP request message is specified + below: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Code | Length | Protocol | Algorithm | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | | + + Replay Detection (64 bits) + + | | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | | + + Authentication token (n octets) ... + + | | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + The format of this authenticator is in accordance with [2]. The code + for the authentication option is TBD, and the length field contains + the length of the remainder of the option, starting with the + protocol field. + + The value of the protocol field for this authenticator MUST be set + to 2. + + The algorithm field MUST take one of the following values: + 1 - HMAC-MD5 + 2 - HMAC-SHA-1 + + Replay protection field is a monotonically increasing counter field. + When the Kerberos AP REQ structure is present in the authenticator + the counter may be set to any value. The AP REQ contains its own + replay protection mechanism in the form of a timestamp. + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -9- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + + Once the session key has been established and the AP REQ is not + included in the authenticator, this field MUST be monotonically + increasing in the messages sent by the client. + + Kerberos authenticator token consists of type-length-value + attributes: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Type | Reserved | Payload Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | attribute value... + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + The following attributes are included in the Kerberos authenticator + token: + + Type Attribute Name Value + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + 0 Message Integrity Code Depends on the value of the + algorithm field. Its length is + 16 bytes for HMAC-MD5 [9, 10] + and 20 bytes for HMAC-SHA-1 + [11, 10]. The HMAC key must be + derived from Kerberos session + key found in the Kerberos + ticket according to the key + derivation rules in [6]: + + HMAC Key = DK(sess key, + key usage | 0x99) + + Here, DK is defined in [12] and + the key usage value for DHCP is + TBD. + + The HMAC is calculated over the + entire DHCP message. The + Message Integrity Code + attribute MUST be set to all 0s + for the computation of the + HMAC. Because a DHCP relay + agent may alter the values of + the 'giaddr' and 'hops' fields + in the DHCP message, the + contents of those two fields + MUST also be set to zero for + the computation of the HMAC. + Rules specified in Section 3 of + [2] for the exclusion and + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -10- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + processing of the relay agent + information are applicable here + too. + + This field MUST always be + present in the Kerberos + authenticator. + + 1 AP_REQ ASN.1 encoding of a Kerberos + AP_REQ message, as specified + in [6]. This MUST be included + by the client when establishing + a new session key. In all + other cases, this attribute + MUST be omitted. + + AP_REQ contains the Kerberos ticket for the DHCP server and also + contains information needed by the DHCP server to authenticate the + client. After verifying the AP_REQ and decrypting the Kerberos + ticket, the DHCP server is able to extract a session key which it + now shares with the DHCP client. + + The Kerberos authenticator token contains its own replay protection + mechanism inside the AP_REQ structure. The AP_REQ contains a + timestamp that must be within an agreed upon time window at the DHCP + server. However, this does not require the DHCP clients to maintain + an accurate clock between reboots. Kerberos allows clients to + synchronize their clock with the KDC with the help of Kerberos + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error message, as specified in [6]. + + The DHCP server MUST save both the session key and its associated + expiration time found in the Kerberos ticket. Up until the + expiration time, the server must accept client requests with the + Kerberos authenticator that does not include the AP REQ, using the + saved session key in calculating HMAC values. + + The Kerberos authenticator inside all DHCP server responses MUST NOT + contain the AP REQ and MUST use the saved Kerberos session key in + calculating HMAC values. + + When the session key expires, it is the client's responsibility to + obtain a new ticket from the KDC and to include an AP REQ inside the + Kerberos authenticator for the next DHCP request message. + + + + + + + + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -11- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + +7. Detailed message flows for Kerberos and DHCP message Exchanges + + The following flow depicts the Kerberos exchange in which a AS REQ + message is used to directly request the DHCP Server ticket. There + are no changes to transport mechanisms below when the additional + phase of using TGS requests/responses with TGTÆs is used. + + Client IAKERB Proxy KDC + + KB-client-------- AS_REQ ------> + + AS REQ Address type = - (htype) + AS REQ Address= hw address + + src UDP port = senders port + destination UDP port = 88 + + src IP = 0.0.0.0 + destination IP = 255.255.255.255 + + src link layer address = + clientÆs HW/link address [e.g Ethernet address] + + destination link layer address = + link broadcast address [e.g. ffffffff for Ethernet] + + + ---------------------------> + (unicast to UDP port 88) + + + + <-------------------------- + (unicast AS REP) + Encrypted portion of ticket + Includes clients HW address + + + <---------------AS_REP ----------- + + + Ticket includes clientÆs hardware address + + src UDP port = 88 + destination UDP port = copied from src port in AS_REQ + + src IP = ProxyÆs IP address + destination IP = 255.255.255.255 + + src link layer address = ProxyÆs HW/link address + destination link layer address = + ClientÆs link layer address from AS_REQ + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -12- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + + + + The client uses the ticket received from the KDC in the DHCP +Authentication option as described in Section 6. + + + Client + DHCP-client DHCP Server + + ------DHCPDISCOVER ----> + (Auth Protocol = 2, includes Kerberos + authenticator with AP REQ ) + ----------------------------------- + | HMAC | AP REQ | + ---------------------------------- + | Ticket| Client Authent | + -------------------------- + + 1. Server decrypts ticket + (inside AP REQ) with service + key + 2. Server decrypts client + authenticator (inside AP REQ) + and checks content and + checksum to validate the + client. + 3. Recompute HMAC with session + key and compare. + + + <-------DHCPOFFER---------- + (Auth Protocol = 2, no AP REQ ) + + + + ---------DHCPREQUEST-------> + (Auth Protocol = 2, no AP REQ) + + + <--------DHCPACK------------- + (Auth Protocol = 2, no AP REQ ) + + + + +8. Security Considerations + + DHCP clients that do not know the DHCP serverÆs realm name will get + it from the proxy, as specified in IAKERB [7]. Since the proxy is + not authenticated, a DHCP client can be fooled into obtaining a + ticket for the wrong DHCP server in the wrong realm. + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -13- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + + This could happen when the client leaves out the server realm name + in a TGS Request message to the proxy. It is also possible, + however, for a client to directly request a DHCP server ticket with + an AS Request message. In those cases, the same situation occurs + when the client leaves out the realm name in an AS Request. + + This wrong DHCP server is still registered as a valid principal in a + database of a KDC that can be trusted by the client. In some + circumstances a client may assume that a DHCP server that is a + Kerberos principal registered with a trusted KDC will not attempt to + deliberately misconfigure a client. + + This specification provides a tradeoff between: + + 1) The DHCP clients knowing DHCP serverÆs realm ahead of time, + which provides for full 2-way authentication at the cost of + an additional configuration parameter. + 2) The DHCP clients not requiring any additional configuration + information, besides a password or a key (and a public key + certificate if PKINIT is used). This is at the cost of not + being able to fully authenticate the identity of the DHCP + server. + + + +9. References + + + [1]Droms, R., Arbaugh, W., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", + RFC 2131, Bucknell University, March 1997. + + [2]Droms, R., Arbaugh, W., "Authentication for DHCP Messages", + draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-13.txt, June 2000. + + [3]Hornstein, K., Lemon, T., "DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V", + draft-hornstein-dhc-kerbauth-02.txt, February 2000. + + [4]Borella, M., Grabelsky, D., Lo, J., Tuniguchi, K., "Realm + Specific IP: Protocol Specification ", draft-ietf-nat-rsip- + protocol-06.txt, March 2000. + + [5]Guttman, E., Perkins, C., Veizades, J., Day, M., "Service + Location Protocol, Version 2", RFC 2608, June 1999. + + [6]Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- + 05.txt, March 2000. + + + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -14- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 + + + + [7]Swift, M., Trostle, J., "Initial Authentication and Pass Through + Authentication Using Kerberos V5 and the GSS-API (IAKERB)", + draft-ietf-cat-iakerb-03.txt, September 1999. + + [8]Tung, B., C. Neuman, M. Hur, A. Medvinsky, S. Medvinsky, J. Wray, + J. Trostle, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication + in Kerberos", draft-ietf-cat-pk-init-11.txt, March 2000. + + [9]Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April + 1992. + + [10]Krawczyk H., M. Bellare and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication," RFC 2104, February 1997. + + [11]NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", April 1995. + + [12]Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, Integrity, and + Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, August 1998. + + [13]Bradner, S. "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", RFC + 2026. + + + + 10. Author's Addresses + + Sasha Medvinsky + Motorola + 6450 Sequence Drive + San Diego, CA 92121 + Email: smedvinsky@gi.com + + Poornima Lalwaney + Nokia + 12278 Scripps Summit Drive + San Diego, CA 92131 + Email: poornima.lalwaney@nokia.com + + +11. Expiration + + This memo is filed as , and + expires January 1, 2001. + + + +12. Intellectual Property Notices + + + + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -15- + +Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients March 2000 + + + This section contains two notices as required by [13] for + standards track documents. Per [13], section 10.4(A): + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it + has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the + IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and + standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of + claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances + of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made + to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such + proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification + can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. + + Per [13] section 10.4(D): + + The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights + claimed in regard to some or all of the specification contained in + this document. For more information consult the online list of + claimed rights. + + 13. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph + are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and + will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or + assigns. This document and the information contained herein is + provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE + INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR + IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF + THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + +S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -16- + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-swift-win2k-krb-referrals-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-swift-win2k-krb-referrals-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85d745684b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-swift-win2k-krb-referrals-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +This Internet-Draft has expired and is no longer available. + +Unrevised documents placed in the Internet-Drafts directories have a +maximum life of six months. After that time, they must be updated, or +they will be deleted. This document was deleted on July 17, 2000. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-swift-win2k-krb-user2user-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-swift-win2k-krb-user2user-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85d745684b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-swift-win2k-krb-user2user-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +This Internet-Draft has expired and is no longer available. + +Unrevised documents placed in the Internet-Drafts directories have a +maximum life of six months. After that time, they must be updated, or +they will be deleted. This document was deleted on July 17, 2000. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68c170b499 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1140 @@ + + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying M. Thomas + Cisco Systems + K. McCloghrie + Cisco Systems + July 13, 2000 + + + + + + + Kerberized USM Keying + + draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt + + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +Abstract + + The KerbUSM MIB provides a means of leveraging a trusted third party + authentication and authorization mechanism using Kerberos for SNMP V3 + USM users and their associated VACM views. The MIB encodes the normal + Kerberos AP-REQ and AP-REP means of both authenticating and creating + a shared secret between the SNMP V3 Manager and Agent. + +The SNMP Management Framework + + The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major + components: An overall architecture, described in RFC 2571 + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 1] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + [RFC2571]. Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events + for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure + of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in STD + 16, RFC 1155 [RFC1155], STD 16, RFC 1212 [RFC1212] and RFC 1215 + [RFC1215]. The second version, called SMIv2, is described in STD 58, + RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580 + [RFC2580]. Message protocols for transferring management + information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is + called SNMPv1 and described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [RFC1157]. A second + version of the SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet + standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 + [RFC1901] and RFC 1906 [RFC1906]. The third version of the message + protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [RFC1906], RFC + 2572 [RFC2572] and RFC 2574 [RFC2574]. Protocol operations for + accessing management information. The first set of protocol + operations and associated PDU formats is described in STD 15, RFC + 1157 [RFC1157]. A second set of protocol operations and associated + PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [RFC1905]. A set of fundamental + applications described in RFC 2573 [RFC2573] and the view-based + access control mechanism described in RFC 2575 [RFC2575]. + + A more detailed introduction to the current SNMP Management Framework + can be found in RFC 2570 [RFC2570]. + + Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed + the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are + defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI. + + This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A + MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate + translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically + equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no + translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable + information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in + SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine + readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the + MIB. + + +Introduction + + The User based Security Model of SNMP V3 (USM) [2] provides a means + of associating different users with different access privileges of + the various MIB's that an agent supports. In conjunction with the + View based Access Control Model of SNMP V3 (VACM) [3], SNMP V3 + provides a means of providing resistance from various threats both + from outside attacks such as spoofing, and inside attacks such as an + user having, say, SET access to MIB variable for which they are not + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 2] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + authorized. + + SNMP V3, unfortunately, does not specify a means of doing key + distribution between the managers and the agents. For small numbers + of agents and managers, the O(n*m) manual keying is a cumbersome, but + possibly tractable problem. For a large number of agents with + distribution of managers, the key distribution quickly goes from + cumbersome to unmanageable. Also: there is always the lingering + concern of the security precautions taken for keys on either local + management stations, or even directories. + + Kerberos [1] provides a means of centralizing key management into an + authentication and authorization server known as a Key Distribution + Center (KDC). At a minimum, Kerberos changes the key distribution + problem from a O(n*m) problem to a O(n) problem since keys are shared + between the KDC and the Kerberos principals rather directly between + each host pair. Kerberos also provides a means to use public key + based authentication which can be used to further scale down the + number of pre-shared secrets required. Furthermore, a KDC is intended + and explicitly expected to be a standalone server which is managed + with a much higher level of security concern than a management + station or even a central directory which may host many services and + thus be exposed to many more possible vectors of attack. + + The MIB defined in this memo describes a means of using the desirable + properties of Kerberos within the context of SNMP V3. Kerberos + defines a standardized means of communicating with the KDC as well as + a standard format of Kerberos tickets which Kerberos principals + exchange in order to authenticate to one another. The actual means of + exchanging tickets, however, is left as application specific. This + MIB defines the SNMP MIB designed to transport Kerberos tickets and + by doing so set up SNMP V3 USM keys for authentication and privacy. + + It should be noted that using Kerberos does introduce reliance on a + key network element, the KDC. This flies in the face of one of SNMP's + dictums of working when the network is misbehaving. While this is a + valid concern, the risk of reliance on the KDC can be significantly + diminished with a few common sense actions. Since Kerberos tickets + can have long life times (days, weeks) a manager of key network + elements can and should maintain Kerberos tickets well ahead ticket + expiration so that likelihood of not being able to rekey a session + while the network is misbehaving is minimized. For non-critical, but + high fanout elements such as user CPE, etc, requiring a pre-fetched + ticket may not be practical, which puts the KDC into the critical + path. However, if all KDC's are unreachable, the non-critical network + elements are probably the least of the worries. + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 3] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + +Operation + + The normal Kerberos application ticket exchange is accomplished by a + client first fetching a service ticket from a KDC for the service + principal and then sending an AP-REQ to a server to authenticate + itself to the server. The server then sends a AP-REP to finish the + exchange. This MIB maps Kerberos' concept of client and server into + the SNMP V3 concept of Manager and Agent by designating that the + Kerberos Client is the SNMP V3 Agent. Although it could be argued + that an Agent is really a server, in practice there may be many, many + agents and relatively few managers. Also: Kerberos clients may make + use of public key authentication as defined in [4], and it is very + advantageous to take advantage of that capability for Agents rather + than Managers. + + The MIB is intended to be stateless and map USM users to Kerberos + principals. This mapping is explicitly done by putting a Kerberos + principal name into the usmUserSecurityName in the usmUser MIB and + instatiating the krbUsmMibEntry for the usmUserEntry. MIB variables + are accessed with INFORM's or TRAP PDU's and SET's to perform a + normal Kerberos AP-REQ/AP-REP exchange transaction which causes the + keys for a USM user to be derived and installed. The basic structure + of the MIB is a table which augements usmUserEntry's with a Kerberos + principal name as well as the transaction varbinds. In the normal + case, multiple varbinds should be sent in a single PDU which prevents + various race conditions, as well as increasing efficiency. + + It should be noted that this MIB is silent on the subject of how the + Agent and Manager find the KDC. In practice, this may be either + statically provisioned or use either DNS SRV records (RFC 2782) or + Service Location (RFC 2608). This MIB is does not provide for a means + of doing cipher suite negotiation either. It is expected that the + choices for ciphers in the USM MIB will reflect site specific choices + for ciphers. This matches well with the general philosophy of + centralized keying. + +Keying Transactions + + The following shows an error free transaction: + + Note: optional steps or parameters are shown like [ ] + + + + + + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 4] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + + Agent Manager KDC + +-- --+ + | 1) <------------------------------- | + | SET (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibNonce = xxxx; | + | [ krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibTgt = | + | TGT[usmUserSecurityName] ]); | + | | + | 2) -------------------------------> | + | Response | + +-- (optional) --+ + + 3) ---------------------------------------------------------------> + TGS-REQ (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibMgrPrinName + [, krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibTgt]); + + 4) <-------------------------------------------------------------- + Tick[usmUserSecurityName] = TGS-REP (); + + 5) ------------------------------> + INFORM (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibApReq = + AP_REQ[Tick[usmUserSecurityName]]; + [ krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibNonce = xxxx]); + + 6) <------------------------------ + SET (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibApRep = AP_REP[]); + + + 7) ------------------------------> + Response + + + The above flow translates to: + + + 1) This step is used when the Manager does not currently have a ses- + sion with the Agent but wishes to start one. The Manager MAY + place a ticket granting ticket into the krbUsmMibMgrTgt varbind + in the same PDU as the krbUsmMibNonce if it does not share a + secret with the KDC (as would be the case if the Manager used + PKinit to do initial authentication with the KDC). + + + 2) This step acknowledges the SET. There are no MIB specific errors + which can happen here. + + + 3) If the Agent is not already in possession of a service ticket for + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 5] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + the Manager in its ticket cache, it MUST request a service ticket + from the Agent's KDC for the service principal given by + krbUsmMibMgrPrinName in the row that the krbUsmMibNonce was SET + in, optionally adding a krbUsmMibMgrTgt. If the TGT is speci- + fied, the Manager's TGT must be placed in the additional-tickets + field with the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option set in the TGS-REQ to + obtain a service ticket (see section 3.3.3 of [1]). + + Note: a Kerberos TGS-REQ is but one way to obtain a service + ticket. An Agent may use any normal Kerberos means to + obtain the service ticket. This flow has also elided ini- + tial authentication (ie, AS-REQ) and any cross realm con- + siderations, though those may be necessary prerequisites + to obtaining the service ticket. + + 4) If step 3 was performed, this step receives the ticket or an + error from the KDC. + + + 5) This step sends a krbUsmMibApReq to the Manager via an INFORM or + TRAP PDU. If the message is the result of a request by the + Manager, krbUsmMibNonce received from the Manager MUST be sent in + the same PDU. If the Manager did not initiate the transaction, + the Agent MUST NOT send a krbUsmMibNonce varbind. The Agent also + MUST check krbUsmMibUnsolicitedNotify is not false, otherwise it + MUST abort the transaction. All krbUsmMibApReq's MUST contain a + sequence nonce so that the resulting krbUsmMibApRep can provide a + proof of the freshness of the message to prevent replay attacks. + + If the Agent encounters an error either generated by the KDC or + internally, the Agent MUST send an INFORM or TRAP PDU indicating + the error in the form of a KRB-ERROR placed in krbUsmMibApReq + with the same rules applied to krbUsmMibNonce and krbUsmMibUnsol- + icitedNotify above. If the Agent suspects that it is being + attacked by a purported Manager which is generating many failed + TGS-REQ's to the KDC, it SHOULD meter its TGS-REQ transactions + for that Manager to the KDC using an exponential backoff mechan- + ism truncated at 10 seconds. + + + + 6) Upon recepit of an INFORM or TRAP PDU with a krbUsmMibApReq, a + Manager may accept the AP-REQ. If it is accompanied with a + krbUsmMibNonce it MUST correlate it with any outstanding transac- + tions using its stored nonce for the transaction. If it does not + correlate with a current nonce, the request MUST be rejected as + it may be a replay. + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 6] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + If the Manager chooses to reject an unsolicited keying request, + it SHOULD send a WrongValue Error to the Agent with the krbUsmMi- + bApReq as the subject of the WrongValue. If an Agent receives a + WrongValue Error from a Manager it MUST cease retransmission of + the INFORM or TRAP PDU's so as to mitigate event avalanches by + Agents. There is a possible denial of service attack here, but it + must be weighed against the larger problem of network congestion, + flapping, etc. Therefore, if the Agent finds that it cannot can- + cel an unsolicited Notify (ie, it must be reliable), it MUST use + a truncated exponential backoff mechanism with the maximum trun- + cation interval set to 10 minutes. + + Otherwise, the Manager MUST send a SET PDU to the Agent which + contains a krbUsmMibApRep. + + + 7) If the Agent detects an error (including detecting replays) in + the final AP-REP, it MUST send a WrongValue error with a pointer + to the krbUsmMibApRep varbind to indicate its inability to estab- + lish the security association. Otherwise, receipt of the positive + acknowledgement from the final SET indicates to the Manager that + the proper keys have been installed on the Agent in the USM MIB. + +Unsolicited Agent Keying Requests + + An Agent may find that it needs to set up a security association for + a USM user in order to notify a Manager of some event. When the Agent + engine receives a request for a notify, it SHOULD check to see if + keying material has been established for the user and that the keying + material is valid. If the keying material is not valid and the USM + user has been tagged as being a Kerberos principal in a realm, the + Agent SHOULD first try to instantiate a security association by + obtaining a service ticket for the USM User and follow steps 3-7 of + the flow above. This insures that the USM User will have proper key- + ing material and providing a mechanism to allow for casual security + associations to be built up and torn down. This is especially useful + for Agents which may not normally need to be under constant Manager + supervision, such as the case with high fan out user residential CPE + and other SNMP managed "appliances". In all cases, the Agent MUST NOT + send an unsolicited Notify if krbUsmUnsolicitedNotify is set to + false. + + How the Agent obtains the Manager's address, how it determines + whether a Manager, realm, and whether it can be keyed using this MIB + is outside of the scope of this memo. + + Note: Although the MIB allows for a Manager to set up a session + using User-User mode of Kerberos by sending a TGT along with + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 7] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + the nonce, this, is limited to Manager initiated sessions + only since there is no easy way to store the Manager's ticket + in the MIB since it is publicly writable and as such would be + subject to denial of service attacks. Another method might be + to have the Agent send a krbUsmMibNonce to the Manager which + would tell it to instigate a session. Overall, it seems like + a marginal feature to allow a PKinit authenticated user be + the target of unsolicited informs and it would complicate the + transactions. For this reason, this scenario has been omitted + in favor of simplicity. + +Retransmissions + + Since this MIB defines not only variables, but transactions, discus- + sion of the retransmission state machine is in order. There are two + similar but different state machines for the Manager Solicited and + Agent Unsolicited transactions. There is one timer Timeout which + SHOULD take into consideration round trip considerations and MUST + implement a truncated exponential backoff mechanism. In addition, in + the case where an Agent makes an unsolicited Agent keying request, + the Agent SHOULD perform an initial random backoff if the keying + request to the Manager may result in a restart avalanche. A suitable + method is described in section 4.3.4 of [5]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 8] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + +Manager Solicited Retransmission State Machine + + Timeout + +---+ + | | + | V + +-----------+ Set-Ack (2) +----------+ + | |------------>| | + | Set-Nonce | | Ap-Req | + | (1) |<------------| (5) | + +-----------+ Timeout +----------+ + ^ | + | | Set-Ap-Rep + | +----------+ | (6) + +------| |<------+ + Timeout | Estab-wt | + | (7) | + +----------+ + | + | Set-Ap-Rep-Ack (7) + V + +----------+ + | | + | Estab | + | | + + +----------+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 9] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + +Agent Unsolicited Retransmission State Machine + + Timeout + +---+ + | | + | V + +----------+ + | | + +----> | Ap-Req |-------+ + | | (5) | | + | +----------+ | + | | + | | Set-Ap-Rep + | +----------+ | (6) + +------| |<------+ + Timeout | Estab-wt | + | (7) | + +----------+ + | + | Set-Ap-Rep-Ack (7) + V + +----------+ + | | + | Estab | + | | + +----------+ + +Session Duration and Failures + + The KerbUsmMib uses the ticket lifetime to determine the life of the + USM session. The Agent MUST keep track of whether the ticket which + instigated the session is valid whenever it forms PDU's for that par- + ticular user. If a session expires, or if it wasn't valid to begin + with (from the Agent's perspective), the Agent MUST reject the PDU by + sending a XXX Error [mat: help me here Keith... what does USM say + about this?]. + + Kerberos also inherently implies adding state to the Agent and + Manager since they share not only a key, but a lifetime associated + with that key. This is in some sense soft state because failure of an + Agent will cause it to reject PDU's for Managers with whom it does + not share a secret. The Manager can use the Error PDU's as an indica- + tion that it needs to reauthenticate with the Agent, taking care not + to loop. The Manager is even easier: when it reboots, it can either + check its credential cache to reconstruct state or cause the Agent to + reauthenticate to the Manager with its service ticket by initiating a + authentication transaction with the manager. + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 10] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + +Manager Collisions + + Managers may freely set up keys for different USM users using this + MIB without problem since they access different rows in the krbUsm- + PrinTable. However, multiple Managers trying to set up keys for the + same USM user is possible but discouraged. The requirement for the + Manager is that they MUST share the same service key with the KDC so + that they can all decrypt the same service ticket. There are two race + conditions, however, which are not well handled: + + + +1) At the end of a ticket lifetime, one manager may request the agent + to refresh its service ticket causing a new session key to be + installed for the USM user leaving the other managers with stale + keys. The workaround here is that the Agent will reject the stale + manager's PDU's which should inform them to do their own rekeying + operations. + + +2) If multiple managers try to access the same row at the same time, + the Agent SHOULD try to keep the transactions separate based on the + nonce values. The Managers or the Agents SHOULD NOT break the + krbUsmMibNonce and any other additional varbinds into separate PDU's + as this may result in a meta stable state. Given normal MTU sizes, + this should not be an issue in practice, and this should at worst + devolve into the case above. + + In all cases, the krbUsmMibNonce MUST be the last value to be + transmitted, though its position within a PDU is unimportant. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 11] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + + KrbUSM MIB + + KRB-USM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN + IMPORTS + MODULE-IDENTITY, + OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-IDENTITY, + snmpModules, Counter32, Unsigned32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI + TruthValue, DisplayString FROM SNMPv2-TC + usmUserEntry FROM SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB + + + + krbUsmMib MODULE-IDENTITY + LAST-UPDATED "00071300Z" + ORGANIZATION "IETF SNMP V3 Working Group" + CONTACT-INFO + "Michael Thomas + Cisco Systems + 375 E Tasman Drive + San Jose, Ca 95134 + Phone: +1 408-525-5386 + Fax: +1 801-382-5284 + email: mat@cisco.com" + DESCRIPTION + "This MIB contains the MIB variables to + exchange Kerberos credentials and a session + key to be used to authenticate and set up + USM keys" + + ::= { snmpModules nnn } -- not sure what needs to be here. + krbUsmMibObjects OBJECT INDENTIFIER ::= { krbUsmMib 1 } + + krbUsmMibAuthInAttemps + SYNTAX Counter32 + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "Counter of the number of Kerberos + authorization attempts as defined by + receipt of a PDU from a Manager with a + krbUsmMibNonce set in the principal table." + ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 1 } + + krbUsmMibAuthOutAttemps + SYNTAX Counter32 + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 12] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + DESCRIPTION + "Counter of the number of unsolicited Kerberos + authorization attempts as defined by + an Agent sending an INFORM or TRAP PDU with a + krbUsmMibApRep but without krbUsmApMibNonce + varbind." + ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 2 } + krbUsmMibAuthInFail + SYNTAX Counter32 + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "Counter of the number of Kerberos + authorization failures as defined by + a Manager setting the krbUsmMibNonce + in the principal table which results + in some sort of failure to install keys + in the requested USM user entry." + ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 3 } + + krbUsmMibAuthOutFail + SYNTAX Counter32 + MAX-ACCESS read-only + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "Counter of the number of unsolicited Kerberos + authorization failures as defined by + an Agent sending an INFORM or TRAP PDU with a + krbUsmMibApRep but without a krbUsmMibNonce + varbind which does not result in keys being + installed for that USM user entry." + ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 4 } + + krbUsmMibPrinTable OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF krbUsmMibEntry + MAX-ACCESS not-accessible + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "Table which maps Kerberos principals with USM + users as well as the per user variables to key + up sessions" + ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 5 } + + krbUsmMibPrinEntry OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX KrbUsmMibPrinEntry + MAX-ACCESS not-accessible + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 13] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + "an entry into the krbMibPrinTable which is a + parallel table to UsmUserEntry table" + AUGMENTS { usmUserEntry } + ::= { krbUsmMibPrinTable 1 } + + KrbUsmMibPrinEntry SEQUENCE + { + krbUsmMibApReq OCTET STRING, + krbUsmMibApRep OCTET STRING, + krbUsmMibNonce OCTET STRING, + krbUsmMibMgrTGT OCTET STRING, + krbUsmMibUnsolicitedNotify TruthValue, + } + + + krbUsmMibApReq OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX OCTET STRING + MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "This variable contains a DER encoded Kerberos + AP-REQ or KRB-ERROR for the USM user which is + to be keyed. This is sent from the Agent to + the Manager in an INFORM or TRAP request. + KRB-ERROR MUST only be sent to the Manager + if it is in response to a keying request from + the Manager. + " + ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 1 } + + krbUsmMibApRep OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX OCTET STRING + MAX-ACCESS read-write + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "This variable contains the DER encoded response + to an AP-REQ. This variable is SET by the + Manager to acknowledge receipt of an AP-REQ. If + krbUsmMibApRep contains a Kerberos AP-REP, the + Agent must derive keys from the session key + of the Kerberos ticket in the AP-REQ and place + them in the USM database in a manner specified + by [RFC2574]. If the Manager detects an error, + it will instead place a KRB-ERROR in this + variable to inform the Agent of the error. + + This variable is in effect a write-only variable. + attempts to read this variable will result in a + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 14] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + null octet string being returned" + ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 2 } + + krbUsmMibNonce OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX OCTET STRING + MAX-ACCESS read-write + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "SET'ing a krbUsmMibnonce allows a Manager to + determine whether an INFORM or TRAP from an + Agent is an outstanding keying request, or + unsolicited from the Agent. The Manager + initiates keying for a particular USM user + by writing a nonce into the row for which + desires to establish a security association. + The nonce is an ASCII string of the form + ``host:port?nonce'' where: + + host: is either an FQDN, or valid ipv4 or ipv6 + numerical notation of the Manager which + desires to initiate keying + port: is the destination port at which that the + Manager may be contacted + nonce: is a number generated by the Manager to + correlate the transaction + + The same nonce MUST be sent to the Manager in a + subsequent INFORM or TRAP with a krbUsmApReq. + The Agent MUST use the host address and port + supplied in the nonce as the destination of a + subsequent INFORM or TRAP. Unsolicited keying + requests MUST NOT contain a nonce, and should + instead use the destination stored Notifies of + this type. + + Nonces MUST be highly collision resistant either + using a time based method or a suitable random + number generator. Managers MUST never create + nonces which are 0. + + This variable is in effect a write-only variable. + Attempts to read this variable will result in a + nonce of value 0 being returned" + + + ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 3 } + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 15] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + krbUsmMibMgrTgt OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX OCTET STRING + MAX-ACCESS read-write + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "If the Manager does not possess a symmetric + key with the KDC as would be the case with + a Manager using PKinit for authentication, + the Manager MUST SET its DER encoded ticket + granting ticket into KrbUsmMgrTgt along + with krbUsmMibNonce. + + The agent will then attach the Manager's TGT + into the additional tickets field of the + TGS-REQ message to the KDC to get a User-User + service ticket. + + This variable is in effect a write-only variable. + Attempts to read this variable will result in a + null octet string being returned" + ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 4 } + + + krbUsmMibUnsolicitedNotify OBJECT-TYPE + SYNTAX TruthValue + MAX-ACCESS read-write + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "If this variable is false, the Agent MUST NOT + send unsolicited INFORM or TRAP PDU's to the + Manager. + + Attempts to SET this variable by the no-auth + no-priv user MUST be rejected." + ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 5 } + + -- + -- Conformance section... nothing optional. + + krbUsmMibCompliences MODULE-COMPLIANCE + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP + engines whichimplement the KRB-USM-MIB + " + MODULE -- this module + MANDATORY-GROUPS { krbUsmMib } + ::= { krbUsmMibCompliances 1 } + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 16] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + END + + +Key Derivation + + The session key provides the basis for the keying material for the + USM user specified in the AP-REQ. The actual keys for use for the + authentication and privacy are produced using the cryptographic hash- + ing function used to protect the ticket itself. The keying material + is derived using this function, F(key, salt), using successive + interations of F over the salt string "SNMPV3RULZ%d", where %d is a + monotonic counter starting at zero. The bits are taken directly from + the successive interations to produce two keys of appropriate size + (as specified in the USM user row) for the authentication transform + first, and the privacy transform second. If the authentication + transform is null, the first bits of the derived key are used for the + privacy transform. + +Security Considerations + + Various elements of this MIB must be readable and writable as the + no-auth, no-priv user. Unless specifically necessary for the key + negotiation, elements of this MIB SHOULD be protected by VACM views + which limit access. In particular, there is no reason anything in + this MIB should be visible to a no-auth, no-priv user with the excep- + tion of KrbUsmMibApReq, KrbUsmMibApRep, KrbUsmMibNonce, and + KrbUsmMibMgrTgt, and then only with the restrictions placed on them + in the MIB. As such, probing attacks are still possible, but should + not be profitable: all of the writable variables with interesting + information in them are defined in such a way as to be write only. + + There are some interesting denial of service attacks which are possi- + ble by attackers spoofing managers and putting load on the KDC to + generate unnecessary tickets. For large numbers or agents this could + be problematic. This can probably be mitigated by the KDC prioritiz- + ing TGS-REQ's though. + + +References + +[1] The CAT Working Group, J. Kohl, C.Neuman, "The Kerberos + Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September + 1993 + +[2] The SNMPV3 Working Group, U. Blumenthal, B. Wijnen, "The + User-based Security Model of SNMP V3", RFC 2574, April 1999 + +[3] The SNMPV3 Working Group, B. Wijnen, R. Presuhn, + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 17] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + + K.McCloghrie, "The View-based Access Control Model of SNMP + V3", RFC 2575, April 1999 + +[4] The CAT Working Group, Tung, et al, "Public Key Cryptography + for Initial Authentication in Kerberos", draft-ietf-cat-pk- + init-11, November 1999 + +[5] Arango, et al, "Media Gateway Control Protocl (MGCP)", RFC + 2705, October 1999 + + +[RFC2571] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, An Architecture + for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks, RFC 2571, April + 1999. + +[RFC1155] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, Structure and Identification of + Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets, STD 16, + RFC 1155, May 1990. + +[RFC1212] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, Concise MIB Definitions, STD + 16, RFC 1212, March 1991. + +[RFC1215] M. Rose, A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the + SNMP, RFC 1215, March 1991. + +[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., + Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Structure of Management Infor- + mation Version 2 (SMIv2), STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999. + +[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., + Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Textual Conventions for SMIv2, + STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. + +[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., + Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Conformance Statements for + SMIv2, STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. + +[RFC1157] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, Simple + Network Management Protocol, STD 15, RFC 1157, May 1990. + +[RFC1901] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, + Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2, RFC 1901, January + 1996. + +[RFC1906] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Tran- + sport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Manage- + ment Protocol (SNMPv2), RFC 1906, January 1996. + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 18] + + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 + + +[RFC2572] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, Message + Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management + Protocol (SNMP), RFC 2572, April 1999. + +[RFC2574] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, User-based Security Model + (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Proto- + col (SNMPv3), RFC 2574, April 1999. + +[RFC1905] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Pro- + tocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Manage- + ment Protocol (SNMPv2), RFC 1905, January 1996. + +[RFC2573] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, SNMPv3 Applications, + RFC 2573, April 1999. + +[RFC2575] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, View-based + Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Manage- + ment Protocol (SNMP), RFC 2575, April 1999. + +[RFC2570] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart, Introduc- + tion to Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Manage- + ment Framework, RFC 2570, April 1999. + +Author's Address + + Michael Thomas + Cisco Systems + 375 E Tasman Rd + San Jose, Ca, 95134, USA + Tel: +1 408-525-5386 + email: mat@cisco.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 19] + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-trostle-win2k-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-trostle-win2k-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b89108a53b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-trostle-win2k-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ + +CAT Working Group Mike Swift +draft-trostle-win2k-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-00.txt Microsoft +February 2000 Jonathan Trostle +Category: Informational Cisco Systems + John Brezak + Microsoft + + Extending Change Password for Setting Kerberos Passwords + + +0. Status Of This Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- + Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Comments and suggestions on this document are encouraged. Comments + on this document should be sent to the CAT working group discussion + list: + ietf-cat-wg@stanford.edu + +1. Abstract + + The Kerberos [1] change password protocol [2], does not allow for + an administrator to set a password for a new user. This functionality + is useful in some environments, and this proposal extends [2] to + allow password setting. The changes are: adding new fields to the + request message to indicate the principal which is having its + password set, not requiring the initial flag in the service ticket, + using a new protocol version number, and adding three new result + codes. + +2. The Protocol + + The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 and TCP port 464 as + well. The protocol consists of a single request message followed by + a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be fully + contained in a single UDP packet. + + For TCP transport, there is a 4 octet header in network byte order + precedes the message and specifies the length of the message. This + + requirement is consistent with the TCP transport header in 1510bis. + +Request Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REQ length | AP_REQ data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + All 16 bit fields are in big-endian order. + + message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message + including this field. + + protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0xff80 (big-endian + integer). + + AP-REQ length: length of AP-REQ data, in bytes. If the length is zero, + then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV + message. + + AP-REQ data: (see [1]) The AP-REQ message must be for the service + principal kadmin/changepw@REALM, where REALM is the REALM of the user + who wishes to change/set his password. The ticket in the AP-REQ must + must include a subkey in the Authenticator. To enable setting of + passwords, it is not required that the initial flag be set in the + Kerberos service ticket. + + KRB-PRIV message (see [1]) This KRB-PRIV message must be generated + using the subkey from the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The user-data component of the message consists of the following ASN.1 + structure encoded as an OCTET STRING: + + ChangePasswdData ::= SEQUENCE { + newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING, + targname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + targrealm[3] Realm OPTIONAL + } + + The server must verify the AP-REQ message, check whether the client + principal in the ticket is authorized to set/change the password + (either for that principal, or for the principal in the targname + field if present), and decrypt the new password. The server also + checks whether the initial flag is required for this request, + replying with status 0x0007 if it is not set and should be. An + authorization failure is cause to respond with status 0x0005. For + forward compatibility, the server should be prepared to ignore fields + after targrealm in the structure that it does not understand. + + The newpasswd field contains the cleartext password, and the server + should apply any local policy checks including password policy checks. + The server then generates the appropriate keytypes from the password + + and stores them in the KDC database. If all goes well, status 0x0000 + is returned to the client in the reply message (see below). + +Reply Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REP length | AP-REP data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + + All 16 bit fields are in big-endian order. + + message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message + including this field. + + protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian + integer). (The reply message has the same format as in [2]). + + AP-REP length: length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the length is zero, + then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV + message. + + AP-REP data: the AP-REP is the response to the AP-REQ in the request + packet. + + KRB-PRIV from [2]: This KRB-PRIV message must be generated using the + subkey in the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The server will respond with a KRB-PRIV message unless it cannot + decode the client AP-REQ or KRB-PRIV message, in which case it will + respond with a KRB-ERROR message. NOTE: Unlike change password version + 1, the KRB-ERROR message will be sent back without any encapsulation. + + The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data component + of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following data. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | result code | result string / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + result code (16 bits) (result codes 0-4 are from [2]): + The result code must have one of the following values (big- + endian integer): + KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS 0 request succeeds (This value is not + allowed in a KRB-ERROR message) + KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED 1 request fails due to being malformed + KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR 2 request fails due to "hard" error in + processing the request (for example, + there is a resource or other problem + causing the request to fail) + + KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR 3 request fails due to an error in + authentication processing + KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR 4 request fails due to a "soft" error + in processing the request + KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED 5 requestor not authorized + KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION 6 protocol version unsupported + KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED 7 initial flag required + 0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason. + Although only a few non-zero result codes are specified here, + the client should accept any non-zero result code as indicating + failure. + result string - from [2]: + This field should contain information which the server thinks + might be useful to the user, such as feedback about policy + failures. The string must be encoded in UTF-8. It may be + omitted if the server does not wish to include it. If it is + present, the client should display the string to the user. + This field is analogous to the string which follows the numeric + code in SMTP, FTP, and similar protocols. + +3. References + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments 1510. + + [2] M. Horowitz. Kerberos Change Password Protocol. + ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/ + draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt + +4. Expiration Date + + This draft expires in August 2000. + +5. Authors' Addresses + + Jonathan Trostle + Cisco Systems + 170 W. Tasman Dr. + San Jose, CA 95134 + Email: jtrostle@cisco.com + + Mike Swift + 1 Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + mikesw@microsoft.com + + John Brezak + 1 Microsoft Way + Redmond, WA 98052 + jbrezak@microsoft.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-tso-telnet-krb5-04.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-tso-telnet-krb5-04.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9611e395b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/draft-tso-telnet-krb5-04.txt @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +Network Working Group T. Ts'o, Editor +Internet-Draft Massachusetts Institute of Technology +draft-tso-telnet-krb5-04.txt April 2000 + + Telnet Authentication: Kerberos Version 5 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference mate- + rial or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. + +0. Abstract + + This document describes how Kerberos Version 5 [1] is used with the + telnet protocol. It describes an telnet authentication sub-option + to be used with the telnet authentication option [2]. This mecha- + nism can also used to provide keying material to provide data confi- + dentiality services in conjuction with the telnet encryption option + [3]. + +1. Command Names and Codes + + Authentication Types + + KERBEROS_V5 2 + + Sub-option Commands + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft Kerberos Version 5 for Telnet April 2000 + + AUTH 0 + REJECT 1 + ACCEPT 2 + RESPONSE 3 + FORWARD 4 + FORWARD_ACCEPT 5 + FORWARD_REJECT 6 + +2. Command Meanings + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS AUTH IAC SE + + This is used to pass the Kerberos V5 [1] KRB_AP_REQ message to the + remote side of the connection. The first octet of the value is KERBEROS_V5, to indicate that Version 5 + of Kerberos is being used. The Kerberos V5 authenticator in the + KRB_AP_REQ message must contain a Kerberos V5 checksum of the + two-byte authentication type pair. This checksum must be verified + by the server to assure that the authentication type pair was cor- + rectly negotiated. The Kerberos V5 authenticator must also in- + clude the optional subkey field, which shall be filled in with a + randomly chosen key. This key shall be used for encryption pur- + poses if encryption is negotiated, and shall be used as the nego- + tiated session key (i.e., used as keyid 0) for the purposes of the + telnet encryption option; if the subkey is not filled in, then the + ticket session key will be used instead. + + If data confidentiality services is desired the ENCRYPT_US- + ING_TELOPT flag must be set in the authentication-type-pair as + specified in [2]. + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY ACCEPT IAC SE + + This command indicates that the authentication was successful. + + If the AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL bit is set in the second octet of the au- + thentication-type-pair, the RESPONSE command must be sent before + the ACCEPT command is sent. + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY REJECT IAC SE + + This command indicates that the authentication was not successful, + and if there is any more data in the sub-option, it is an ASCII + text message of the reason for the rejection. + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY RESPONSE + IAC SE + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft Kerberos Version 5 for Telnet April 2000 + + This command is used to perform mutual authentication. It is only + used when the AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL bit is set in the second octet of + the authentication-type-pair. After an AUTH command is verified, + a RESPONSE command is sent which contains a Kerberos V5 KRB_AP_REP + message to perform the mutual authentication. + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION FORWARD IAC SE + + This command is used to forward kerberos credentials for use by + the remote session. The credentials are passed as a Kerberos V5 + KRB_CRED message which includes, among other things, the forwarded + Kerberos ticket and a session key associated with the ticket. Part + of the KRB_CRED message is encrypted in the key previously ex- + changed for the telnet session by the AUTH suboption. + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION FORWARD_ACCEPT IAC + SE + + This command indicates that the credential forwarding was success- + ful. + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION FORWARD_REJECT IAC SE + + This command indicates that the credential forwarding was not suc- + cessful, and if there is any more data in the sub-option, it is an + ASCII text message of the reason for the rejection. + +3. Implementation Rules + + If the second octet of the authentication-type-pair has the AUTH_WHO + bit set to AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER, then the client sends the initial + AUTH command, and the server responds with either ACCEPT or REJECT. + In addition, if the AUTH_HOW bit is set to AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, the serv- + er will send a RESPONSE before it sends the ACCEPT. + + If the second octet of the authentication-type-pair has the AUTH_WHO + bit set to AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT, then the server sends the initial + AUTH command, and the client responds with either ACCEPT or REJECT. + In addition, if the AUTH_HOW bit is set to AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, the + client will send a RESPONSE before it sends the ACCEPT. + + The Kerberos principal used by the server will generally be of the + form "host/@realm". That is, the first component of the + Kerberos principal is "host"; the second component is the fully qual- + ified lower-case hostname of the server; and the realm is the Ker- + beros realm to which the server belongs. + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft Kerberos Version 5 for Telnet April 2000 + + Any Telnet IAC characters that occur in the KRB_AP_REQ or KRB_AP_REP + messages, the KRB_CRED structure, or the optional rejection text + string must be doubled as specified in [4]. Otherwise the following + byte might be mis-interpreted as a Telnet command. + +4. Examples + + User "joe" may wish to log in as user "pete" on machine "foo". If + "pete" has set things up on "foo" to allow "joe" access to his ac- + count, then the client would send IAC SB AUTHENTICATION NAME "pete" + IAC SE IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KERBEROS_V5 AUTH + IAC SE + + The server would then authenticate the user as "joe" from the + KRB_AP_REQ_MESSAGE, and if the KRB_AP_REQ_MESSAGE was accepted by + Kerberos, and if "pete" has allowed "joe" to use his account, the + server would then continue the authentication sequence by sending a + RESPONSE (to do mutual authentication, if it was requested) followed + by the ACCEPT. + + If forwarding has been requested, the client then sends IAC SB AU- + THENTICATION IS KERBEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL FORWARD IAC SE. If the server succeeds in + reading the forwarded credentials, the server sends FORWARD_ACCEPT + else, a FORWARD_REJECT is sent back. + + Client Server + IAC DO AUTHENTICATION + IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION + + [ The server is now free to request authentication information. + ] + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND + KERBEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL + KERBEROS_V5 CLIENT|ONE_WAY IAC + SE + + [ The server has requested mutual Version 5 Kerberos + authentication. If mutual authentication is not supported, + then the server is willing to do one-way authentication. + + The client will now respond with the name of the user that it + wants to log in as, and the Kerberos ticket. ] + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION NAME + "pete" IAC SE + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS + KERBEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL AUTH + IAC SE + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft Kerberos Version 5 for Telnet April 2000 + + [ Since mutual authentication is desired, the server sends across + a RESPONSE to prove that it really is the right server. ] + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY + KERBEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL + RESPONSE + IAC SE + + [ The server responds with an ACCEPT command to state that the + authentication was successful. ] + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KER- + BEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL ACCEPT + IAC SE + + [ If so requested, the client now sends the FORWARD command to + forward credentials to the remote site. ] + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KER- + BEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL + FORWARD IAC + SE + + [ The server responds with a FORWARD_ACCEPT command to state that + the credential forwarding was successful. ] + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft Kerberos Version 5 for Telnet April 2000 + + IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KER- + BEROS_V5 CLIENT|MUTUAL FOR- + WARD_ACCEPT IAC SE + +5. Security Considerations + + The selection of the random session key in the Kerberos V5 authenti- + cator is critical, since this key will be used for encrypting the + telnet data stream if encryption is enabled. It is strongly advised + that the random key selection be done using cryptographic techniques + that involve the Kerberos ticket's session key. For example, using + the current time, encrypting it with the ticket session key, and then + correcting for key parity is a strong way to generate a subsession + key, since the ticket session key is assumed to be never disclosed to + an attacker. + + Care should be taken before forwarding a user's Kerberos credentials + to the remote server. If the remote server is not trustworthy, this + could result in the user's credentials being compromised. Hence, the + user interface should not forward credentials by default; it would be + far safer to either require the user to explicitly request creden- + tials forwarding for each connection, or to have a trusted list of + hosts for which credentials forwarding is enabled, but to not enable + credentials forwarding by default for all machines. + +6. IANA Considerations + + The authentication type KERBEROS_V5 and its associated suboption values + are registered with IANA. Any suboption values used to extend + the protocol as described in this document must be registered + with IANA before use. IANA is instructed not to issue new suboption + values without submission of documentation of their use. + +7. Acknowledgments + + This document was originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research, + Inc. Theodore Ts'o of MIT revised it to reflect the latest implemen- + tation experience. Cliff Neuman and Prasad Upasani of USC's Informa- + tion Sciences Institute developed the credential forwarding support. + + In addition, the contributions of the Telnet Working Group are also + gratefully acknowledged. + +8. References + + [1] Kohl, J. and B. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Sys- + tem (V5)", RFC 1510, USC/Information Sciences Institute, Septem- + ber 1993. + + [2] Internet Engineering Task Force, "Telnet Authentication", draft- + tso-telnet-auth-enc-04.txt, T. Ts'o, Editor, VA Linux Systems, + April 2000. + + [3] Internet Engineering Task Force, "Telnet Data Encryption Option", + draft-tso-telnet-encryption-04.txt, T. Ts'o, Editor, VA Linux + Systems, April 2000. + + [4] Postel, J.B. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Option Specifications", RFC + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft Kerberos Version 5 for Telnet April 2000 + + 855, STD 8, USC/Information Sciences Institute, May 1983. + +Editor's Address + + Theodore Ts'o + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + MIT Room E40-343 + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: (617) 253-8091 + EMail: tytso@mit.edu + + Expires Sept 2000 [Page 7] + + + Jeffrey Altman * Sr.Software Designer * Kermit-95 for Win32 and OS/2 + The Kermit Project * Columbia University + 612 West 115th St #716 * New York, NY * 10025 + http://www.kermit-project.org/k95.html * kermit-support@kermit-project.org + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rc4-hmac.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rc4-hmac.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..202d44e863 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rc4-hmac.txt @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +CAT working group M. Swift +Internet Draft J. Brezak +Document: draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt Microsoft +Category: Informational June 2000 + + + The Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption type + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be + updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It + is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to + cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new + encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an + MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using + the existing DES based encryption types. + + The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing + Windows NT environments, provide strong crypto (128-bit key + lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government + export restriction requirements) encryption. + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos contains new encryption + and checksum types for two reasons: for export reasons early in the + development process, 56 bit DES encryption could not be exported, + and because upon upgrade from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000, + accounts will not have the appropriate DES keying material to do the + standard DES encryption. Furthermore, 3DES is not available for + export, and there was a desire to use a single flavor of encryption + in the product for both US and international products. + + As a result, there are two new encryption types and one new checksum + type introduced in Windows 2000. + + +2. Conventions used in this document + + + +Swift Category - Informational 1 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. Key Generation + + On upgrade from existing Windows NT domains, the user accounts would + not have a DES based key available to enable the use of DES base + encryption types specified in RFC 1510. The key used for RC4-HMAC is + the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash) for + compatibility reasons. Once the account password is changed, the DES + based keys are created and maintained. Once the DES keys are + available DES based encryption types can be used with Kerberos. + + The RC4-HMAC String to key function is defined as follow: + + String2Key(password) + + K = MD4(UNICODE(password)) + + The RC4-HMAC keys are generated by using the Windows UNICODE version + of the password. Each Windows UNICODE character is encoded in + little-endian format of 2 octets each. Then performing an MD4 [6] + hash operation on just the UNICODE characters of the password (not + including the terminating zero octets). + + For an account with a password of "foo", this String2Key("foo") will + return: + + 0xac, 0x8e, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x83, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xbe, + 0xea, 0x5d, 0x43, 0xbd, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x00, 0xcc + +4. Basic Operations + + The MD5 HMAC function is defined in [3]. It is used in this + encryption type for checksum operations. Refer to [3] for details on + its operation. In this document this function is referred to as + HMAC(Key, Data) returning the checksum using the specified key on + the data. + + The basic MD5 hash operation is used in this encryption type and + defined in [7]. In this document this function is referred to as + MD5(Data) returning the checksum of the data. + + RC4 is a stream cipher licensed by RSA Data Security [RSADSI]. A + compatible cipher is described in [8]. In this document the function + is referred to as RC4(Key, Data) returning the encrypted data using + the specified key on the data. + + These encryption types use key derivation as defined in [9] (RFC- + 1510BIS) in Section titled "Key Derivation". With each message, the + message type (T) is used as a component of the keying material. This + summarizes the different key derivation values used in the various + +Swift Category - Informational 2 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + operations. Note that these differ from the key derivations used in + other Kerberos encryption types. + + T = 1 for TS-ENC-TS in the AS-Request + T = 8 for the AS-Reply + T = 7 for the Authenticator in the TGS-Request + T = 8 for the TGS-Reply + T = 2 for the Server Ticket in the AP-Request + T = 11 for the Authenticator in the AP-Request + T = 12 for the Server returned AP-Reply + T = 15 in the generation of checksum for the MIC token + T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the MIC token + T = 13 in the generation of checksum for the WRAP token + T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the WRAP token + T = 0 in the generation of encrypted data for the WRAPPED token + + All strings in this document are ASCII unless otherwise specified. + The lengths of ASCII encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + The concat(a,b,c,...) function will return the logical concatenation + (left to right) of the values of the arguments. + + The nonce(n) function returns a pseudo-random number of "n" octets. + +5. Checksum Types + + There is one checksum type used in this encryption type. The + Kerberos constant for this type is: + #define KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5 (-138) + + The function is defined as follows: + + K - is the Key + T - the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer + + CHKSUM(K, T, data) + + Ksign = HMAC(K, "signaturekey") //includes zero octet at end + tmp = MD5(concat(T, data)) + CHKSUM = HMAC(Ksign, tmp) + + +6. Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types used in these encryption types. The + Kerberos constants for these types are: + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC 23 + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP 24 + + The basic encryption function is defined as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + +Swift Category - Informational 3 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + + BYTE L40[14] = "fortybits"; + BYTE SK = "signaturekey"; + + ENCRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, data, data_len, edata, edata_len) + { + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 10 + 4, K1); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1); + } + memcpy (K2, K1, 16); + if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9); + add_8_random_bytes(data, data_len, conf_plus_data); + HMAC (K2, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, checksum); + HMAC (K1, checksum, 16, K3); + RC4(K3, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, edata + 16); + memcpy (edata, checksum, 16); + edata_len = 16 + 8 + data_len; + } + + DECRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, edata, edata_len, data, data_len) + { + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K1); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1); + } + memcpy (K2, K1, 16); + if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC (K1, edata, 16, K3); // checksum is at edata + RC4(K3, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, edata + 16); + data_len = edata_len - 16 - 8; + memcpy (data, edata + 16 + 8, data_len); + + // verify generated and received checksums + HMAC (K2, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, checksum); + if (memcmp(edata, checksum, 16) != 0) + printf("CHECKSUM ERROR !!!!!!\n"); + } + + The header field on the encrypted data in KDC messages is: + + typedef struct _RC4_MDx_HEADER { + UCHAR Checksum[16]; + UCHAR Confounder[8]; + } RC4_MDx_HEADER, *PRC4_MDx_HEADER; + + The KDC message is encrypted using the ENCRYPT function not + including the Checksum in the RC4_MDx_HEADER. + + +Swift Category - Informational 4 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +7. Key Strength Negotiation + + A Kerberos client and server can negotiate over key length if they + are using mutual authentication. If the client is unable to perform + full strength encryption, it may propose a key in the "subkey" field + of the authenticator, using a weaker encryption type. The server + must then either return the same key or suggest its own key in the + subkey field of the AP reply message. The key used to encrypt data + is derived from the key returned by the server. If the client is + able to perform strong encryption but the server is not, it may + propose a subkey in the AP reply without first being sent a subkey + in the authenticator. + +8. GSSAPI Kerberos V5 Mechanism Type + +8.1 Mechanism Specific Changes + + The GSSAPI per-message tokens also require new checksum and + encryption types. The GSS-API per-message tokens must be changed to + support these new encryption types (See [5] Section 1.2.2). The + sealing algorithm identifier (SEAL_ALG) for an RC4 based encryption + is: + Byte 4..5 SEAL_ALG 0x10 0x00 - RC4 + + The signing algorithm identifier (SGN_ALG) for MD5 HMAC is: + Byte 2..3 SGN ALG 0x11 0x00 - HMAC + + The only support quality of protection is: + #define GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0x0 + + In addition, when using an RC4 based encryption type, the sequence + number is sent in big-endian rather than little-endian order. + + The Windows 2000 implementation also defines new GSSAPI flags in the + initial token passed when initializing a security context. These + flags are passed in the checksum field of the authenticator (See [5] + Section 1.1.1). + + GSS_C_DCE_STYLE - This flag was added for use with Microsoft’s + implementation of DCE RPC, which initially expected three legs of + authentication. Setting this flag causes an extra AP reply to be + sent from the client back to the server after receiving the server’s + AP reply. In addition, the context negotiation tokens do not have + GSSAPI framing - they are raw AP message and do not include object + identifiers. + #define GSS_C_DCE_STYLE 0x1000 + + + +Swift Category - Informational 5 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG - This flag allows the client to indicate to the + server that it should only allow the server application to identify + the client by name and ID, but not to impersonate the client. + #define GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG 0x2000 + + GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG - Setting this flag indicates that the + client wants to be informed of extended error information. In + particular, Windows 2000 status codes may be returned in the data + field of a Kerberos error message. This allows the client to + understand a server failure more precisely. In addition, the server + may return errors to the client that are normally handled at the + application layer in the server, in order to let the client try to + recover. After receiving an error message, the client may attempt to + resubmit an AP request. + #define GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG 0x4000 + + These flags are only used if a client is aware of these conventions + when using the SSPI on the Windows platform, they are not generally + used by default. + + When NetBIOS addresses are used in the GSSAPI, they are identified + by the GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS value. This value is defined as: + #define GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS 0x14 + NetBios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to th 15 characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16 + octet of 0x0. + +8.2 GSSAPI Checksum Type + + The GSSAPI checksum type and algorithm is defined in Section 5. Only + the first 8 octets of the checksum are used. The resulting checksum + is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field (See [5] Section 1.2) for + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(conf_flag=FALSE). + + MIC (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, MIC_hdr, msg, msg_len, + MIC_seq, MIC_checksum) + { + HMAC (K, SK, 13, K4); + T = 15; + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 00, &T, 4); + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 04, MIC_hdr, 8); + // 0101 1100 FFFFFFFF + memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 12, msg, msg_len); + MD5 (T_hdr_msg, 4 + 8 + msg_len, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg); + HMAC (K4, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg, CHKSUM); + memcpy (MIC_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 bytes + + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K5); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K5); + +Swift Category - Informational 6 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + } + if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K5+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC(K5, MIT_checksum, 8, K6); + copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction); + //0x12345678 + copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction + + 4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF + RC4(K6, seq_plus_direction, 8, MIC_seq); + } + +8.3 GSSAPI Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types for GSSAPI message tokens, one that + is 128 bits in strength, and one that is 56 bits in strength as + defined in Section 6. + + All padding is rounded up to 1 byte. One byte is needed to say that + there is 1 byte of padding. The DES based mechanism type uses 8 byte + padding. See [5] Section 1.2.2.3. + + The encryption mechanism used for GSS wrap based messages is as + follow: + + + WRAP (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, WRAP_hdr, msg, msg_len, + WRAP_seq, WRAP_checksum, edata, edata_len) + { + HMAC (K, SK, 13, K7); + T = 13; + PAD = 1; + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 00, &T, 4); + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 04, WRAP_hdr, 8); // 0101 1100 + FFFFFFFF + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12, msg, msg_len); + memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12 + msg_len, &PAD, 1); + MD5 (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, + 4 + 8 + 8 + msg_len + 1, + MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad); + HMAC (K7, MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, CHKSUM); + memcpy (WRAP_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 + bytes + + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T; + HMAC (K, L40, 14, K8); + }else{ + HMAC (K, &T, 4, K8); + } + if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K8+7, 0xAB, 9); + HMAC(K8, WRAP_checksum, 8, K9); + copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction); + //0x12345678 + +Swift Category - Informational 7 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction + + 4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF + RC4(K9, seq_plus_direction, 8, WRAP_seq); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) K10 [i] ^= 0xF0; // XOR each byte + of key with 0xF0 + T = 0; + if (fRC4_EXP){ + *(DWORD *)(L40+10) = T; + HMAC(K10, L40, 14, K11); + memset(K11+7, 0xAB, 9); + }else{ + HMAC(K10, &T, 4, K11); + } + HMAC(K11, seq_num, 4, K12); + RC4(K12, T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 4 + 8, 8 + msg_len + 1, + edata); /* skip T & hdr */ + edata_len = 8 + msg_len + 1; // conf + msg_len + pad + } + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +9. Security Considerations + + Care must be taken in implementing this encryption type because it + uses a stream cipher. If a different IV isn’t used in each direction + when using a session key, the encryption is weak. By using the + sequence number as an IV, this is avoided. + +10. Acknowledgements + + We would like to thank Salil Dangi for the valuable input in + refining the descriptions of the functions and review input. + +11. References + + 1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + 2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + 3 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.,"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997 + + 4 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 + + + +Swift Category - Informational 8 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000 + + + + 5 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC-1964, + June 1996 + + 6 R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320, April + 1992 + + 7 R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1321, April + 1992 + + 8 Thayer, R. and K. Kaukonen, "A Stream Cipher Encryption + Algorithm", Work in Progress. + + 9 RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under license + from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information, contact: + + RSA Data Security, Inc. + 100 Marine Parkway + Redwood City, CA 94065-1031 + + 10 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- + 04.txt, June 25, 1999 + + +12. Author's Addresses + + Mike Swift + Dept. of Computer Science + Sieg Hall + University of Washington + Seattle, WA 98105 + Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu + + John Brezak + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 9 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + +13. Full Copyright Statement + + "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and + furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or + otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be + prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in + part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above + copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such + copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may + not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright + notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet + organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing + Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights + defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or + as required to translate it into languages other than English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will + not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or + assigns. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 10 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..132b855e05 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2747 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 1508 Geer Zolot Associates + September 1993 + + + Generic Security Service Application Program Interface + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status + of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) + definition provides security services to callers in a generic + fashion, supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms and + technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of + applications to different environments. This specification defines + GSS-API services and primitives at a level independent of underlying + mechanism and programming language environment, and is to be + complemented by other, related specifications: + + documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular + language environments + + documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to + be implemented in order to realize GSS-API services atop + particular security mechanisms + +Table of Contents + + 1. GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts ....................... 2 + 1.1. GSS-API Constructs ....................................... 5 + 1.1.1. Credentials ........................................... 5 + 1.1.2. Tokens ................................................ 6 + 1.1.3. Security Contexts ..................................... 7 + 1.1.4. Mechanism Types ....................................... 8 + 1.1.5. Naming ................................................ 9 + 1.1.6. Channel Bindings ...................................... 10 + 1.2. GSS-API Features and Issues ............................. 11 + 1.2.1. Status Reporting ...................................... 11 + 1.2.2. Per-Message Security Service Availability ............. 12 + 1.2.3. Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing ........... 13 + 1.2.4. Quality of Protection ................................. 15 + + + +Linn [Page 1] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + 2. Interface Descriptions ..................................... 15 + 2.1. Credential management calls ............................. 17 + 2.1.1. GSS_Acquire_cred call ................................. 17 + 2.1.2. GSS_Release_cred call ................................. 19 + 2.1.3. GSS_Inquire_cred call ................................. 20 + 2.2. Context-level calls ..................................... 21 + 2.2.1. GSS_Init_sec_context call ............................. 21 + 2.2.2. GSS_Accept_sec_context call ........................... 26 + 2.2.3. GSS_Delete_sec_context call ........................... 29 + 2.2.4. GSS_Process_context_token call ........................ 30 + 2.2.5. GSS_Context_time call ................................. 31 + 2.3. Per-message calls ....................................... 32 + 2.3.1. GSS_Sign call ......................................... 32 + 2.3.2. GSS_Verify call ....................................... 33 + 2.3.3. GSS_Seal call ......................................... 35 + 2.3.4. GSS_Unseal call ....................................... 36 + 2.4. Support calls ........................................... 37 + 2.4.1. GSS_Display_status call ............................... 37 + 2.4.2. GSS_Indicate_mechs call ............................... 38 + 2.4.3. GSS_Compare_name call ................................. 38 + 2.4.4. GSS_Display_name call ................................. 39 + 2.4.5. GSS_Import_name call .................................. 40 + 2.4.6. GSS_Release_name call ................................. 41 + 2.4.7. GSS_Release_buffer call ............................... 41 + 2.4.8. GSS_Release_oid_set call .............................. 42 + 3. Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios ....................... 42 + 3.1. Kerberos V5, single-TGT ................................. 43 + 3.2. Kerberos V5, double-TGT ................................. 43 + 3.3. X.509 Authentication Framework .......................... 44 + 4. Related Activities ......................................... 45 + 5. Acknowledgments ............................................ 46 + 6. Security Considerations .................................... 46 + 7. Author's Address ........................................... 46 + Appendix A .................................................... 47 + Appendix B .................................................... 48 + Appendix C .................................................... 49 + +1. GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts + + The operational paradigm in which GSS-API operates is as follows. A + typical GSS-API caller is itself a communications protocol, calling + on GSS-API in order to protect its communications with + authentication, integrity, and/or confidentiality security services. + A GSS-API caller accepts tokens provided to it by its local GSS-API + implementation and transfers the tokens to a peer on a remote system; + that peer passes the received tokens to its local GSS-API + implementation for processing. The security services available + through GSS-API in this fashion are implementable (and have been + + + +Linn [Page 2] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + implemented) over a range of underlying mechanisms based on secret- + key and public-key cryptographic technologies. + + The GSS-API separates the operations of initializing a security + context between peers, achieving peer entity authentication (This + security service definition, and other definitions used in this + document, corresponds to that provided in International Standard ISO + 7498-2-1988(E), Security Architecture.) (GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls), from the operations of providing + per-message data origin authentication and data integrity protection + (GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify() calls) for messages subsequently + transferred in conjunction with that context. Per-message GSS_Seal() + and GSS_Unseal() calls provide the data origin authentication and + data integrity services which GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify() offer, and + also support selection of confidentiality services as a caller + option. Additional calls provide supportive functions to the GSS- + API's users. + + The following paragraphs provide an example illustrating the + dataflows involved in use of the GSS-API by a client and server in a + mechanism-independent fashion, establishing a security context and + transferring a protected message. The example assumes that credential + acquisition has already been completed. The example assumes that the + underlying authentication technology is capable of authenticating a + client to a server using elements carried within a single token, and + of authenticating the server to the client (mutual authentication) + with a single returned token; this assumption holds for presently- + documented CAT mechanisms but is not necessarily true for other + cryptographic technologies and associated protocols. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context() to establish a security + context to the server identified by targ_name, and elects to set the + mutual_req_flag so that mutual authentication is performed in the + course of context establishment. GSS_Init_sec_context() returns an + output_token to be passed to the server, and indicates + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status pending completion of the mutual + authentication sequence. Had mutual_req_flag not been set, the + initial call to GSS_Init_sec_context() would have returned + GSS_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_token to the server. + + The server passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context indicates + GSS_COMPLETE status, provides the client's authenticated identity in + the src_name result, and provides an output_token to be passed to the + client. The server sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + a successor call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), which processes data + + + +Linn [Page 3] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + included in the token in order to achieve mutual authentication from + the client's viewpoint. This call to GSS_Init_sec_context() returns + GSS_COMPLETE status, indicating successful mutual authentication and + the completion of context establishment for this example. + + The client generates a data message and passes it to GSS_Seal(). + GSS_Seal() performs data origin authentication, data integrity, and + (optionally) confidentiality processing on the message and + encapsulates the result into output_message, indicating GSS_COMPLETE + status. The client sends the output_message to the server. + + The server passes the received message to GSS_Unseal(). GSS_Unseal + inverts the encapsulation performed by GSS_Seal(), deciphers the + message if the optional confidentiality feature was applied, and + validates the data origin authentication and data integrity checking + quantities. GSS_Unseal() indicates successful validation by + returning GSS_COMPLETE status along with the resultant + output_message. + + For purposes of this example, we assume that the server knows by + out-of-band means that this context will have no further use after + one protected message is transferred from client to server. Given + this premise, the server now calls GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush + context-level information. GSS_Delete_sec_context() returns a + context_token for the server to pass to the client. + + The client passes the returned context_token to + GSS_Process_context_token(), which returns GSS_COMPLETE status after + deleting context-level information at the client system. + + The GSS-API design assumes and addresses several basic goals, + including: + + Mechanism independence: The GSS-API defines an interface to + cryptographically implemented strong authentication and other + security services at a generic level which is independent of + particular underlying mechanisms. For example, GSS-API-provided + services can be implemented by secret-key technologies (e.g., + Kerberos) or public-key approaches (e.g., X.509). + + Protocol environment independence: The GSS-API is independent of + the communications protocol suites with which it is employed, + permitting use in a broad range of protocol environments. In + appropriate environments, an intermediate implementation "veneer" + which is oriented to a particular communication protocol (e.g., + Remote Procedure Call (RPC)) may be interposed between + applications which call that protocol and the GSS-API, thereby + invoking GSS-API facilities in conjunction with that protocol's + + + +Linn [Page 4] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + communications invocations. + + Protocol association independence: The GSS-API's security context + construct is independent of communications protocol association + constructs. This characteristic allows a single GSS-API + implementation to be utilized by a variety of invoking protocol + modules on behalf of those modules' calling applications. GSS-API + services can also be invoked directly by applications, wholly + independent of protocol associations. + + Suitability to a range of implementation placements: GSS-API + clients are not constrained to reside within any Trusted Computing + Base (TCB) perimeter defined on a system where the GSS-API is + implemented; security services are specified in a manner suitable + to both intra-TCB and extra-TCB callers. + +1.1. GSS-API Constructs + + This section describes the basic elements comprising the GSS-API. + +1.1.1. Credentials + + Credentials structures provide the prerequisites enabling peers to + establish security contexts with each other. A caller may designate + that its default credential be used for context establishment calls + without presenting an explicit handle to that credential. + Alternately, those GSS-API callers which need to make explicit + selection of particular credentials structures may make references to + those credentials through GSS-API-provided credential handles + ("cred_handles"). + + A single credential structure may be used for initiation of outbound + contexts and acceptance of inbound contexts. Callers needing to + operate in only one of these modes may designate this fact when + credentials are acquired for use, allowing underlying mechanisms to + optimize their processing and storage requirements. The credential + elements defined by a particular mechanism may contain multiple + cryptographic keys, e.g., to enable authentication and message + encryption to be performed with different algorithms. + + A single credential structure may accommodate credential information + associated with multiple underlying mechanisms (mech_types); a + credential structure's contents will vary depending on the set of + mech_types supported by a particular GSS-API implementation. + Commonly, a single mech_type will be used for all security contexts + established by a particular initiator to a particular target; the + primary motivation for supporting credential sets representing + multiple mech_types is to allow initiators on systems which are + + + +Linn [Page 5] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + equipped to handle multiple types to initiate contexts to targets on + other systems which can accommodate only a subset of the set + supported at the initiator's system. + + It is the responsibility of underlying system-specific mechanisms and + OS functions below the GSS-API to ensure that the ability to acquire + and use credentials associated with a given identity is constrained + to appropriate processes within a system. This responsibility should + be taken seriously by implementors, as the ability for an entity to + utilize a principal's credentials is equivalent to the entity's + ability to successfully assert that principal's identity. + + Once a set of GSS-API credentials is established, the transferability + of that credentials set to other processes or analogous constructs + within a system is a local matter, not defined by the GSS-API. An + example local policy would be one in which any credentials received + as a result of login to a given user account, or of delegation of + rights to that account, are accessible by, or transferable to, + processes running under that account. + + The credential establishment process (particularly when performed on + behalf of users rather than server processes) is likely to require + access to passwords or other quantities which should be protected + locally and exposed for the shortest time possible. As a result, it + will often be appropriate for preliminary credential establishment to + be performed through local means at user login time, with the + result(s) cached for subsequent reference. These preliminary + credentials would be set aside (in a system-specific fashion) for + subsequent use, either: + + to be accessed by an invocation of the GSS-API GSS_Acquire_cred() + call, returning an explicit handle to reference that credential + + as the default credentials installed on behalf of a process + +1.1.2. Tokens + + Tokens are data elements transferred between GSS-API callers, and are + divided into two classes. Context-level tokens are exchanged in order + to establish and manage a security context between peers. Per-message + tokens are exchanged in conjunction with an established context to + provide protective security services for corresponding data messages. + The internal contents of both classes of tokens are specific to the + particular underlying mechanism used to support the GSS-API; Appendix + B of this document provides a uniform recommendation for designers of + GSS-API support mechanisms, encapsulating mechanism-specific + information along with a globally-interpretable mechanism identifier. + + + + +Linn [Page 6] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Tokens are opaque from the viewpoint of GSS-API callers. They are + generated within the GSS-API implementation at an end system, + provided to a GSS-API caller to be transferred to the peer GSS-API + caller at a remote end system, and processed by the GSS-API + implementation at that remote end system. Tokens may be output by + GSS-API primitives (and are to be transferred to GSS-API peers) + independent of the status indications which those primitives + indicate. Token transfer may take place in an in-band manner, + integrated into the same protocol stream used by the GSS-API callers + for other data transfers, or in an out-of-band manner across a + logically separate channel. + + Development of GSS-API support primitives based on a particular + underlying cryptographic technique and protocol does not necessarily + imply that GSS-API callers invoking that GSS-API mechanism type will + be able to interoperate with peers invoking the same technique and + protocol outside the GSS-API paradigm. For example, the format of + GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a particular mechanism, + and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into callers' + protocols, may not be the same as those used by non-GSS-API callers + of the same underlying technique. + +1.1.3. Security Contexts + + Security contexts are established between peers, using credentials + established locally in conjunction with each peer or received by + peers via delegation. Multiple contexts may exist simultaneously + between a pair of peers, using the same or different sets of + credentials. Coexistence of multiple contexts using different + credentials allows graceful rollover when credentials expire. + Distinction among multiple contexts based on the same credentials + serves applications by distinguishing different message streams in a + security sense. + + The GSS-API is independent of underlying protocols and addressing + structure, and depends on its callers to transport GSS-API-provided + data elements. As a result of these factors, it is a caller + responsibility to parse communicated messages, separating GSS-API- + related data elements from caller-provided data. The GSS-API is + independent of connection vs. connectionless orientation of the + underlying communications service. + + No correlation between security context and communications protocol + association is dictated. (The optional channel binding facility, + discussed in Section 1.1.6 of this document, represents an + intentional exception to this rule, supporting additional protection + features within GSS-API supporting mechanisms.) This separation + allows the GSS-API to be used in a wide range of communications + + + +Linn [Page 7] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + environments, and also simplifies the calling sequences of the + individual calls. In many cases (depending on underlying security + protocol, associated mechanism, and availability of cached + information), the state information required for context setup can be + sent concurrently with initial signed user data, without interposing + additional message exchanges. + +1.1.4. Mechanism Types + + In order to successfully establish a security context with a target + peer, it is necessary to identify an appropriate underlying mechanism + type (mech_type) which both initiator and target peers support. The + definition of a mechanism embodies not only the use of a particular + cryptographic technology (or a hybrid or choice among alternative + cryptographic technologies), but also definition of the syntax and + semantics of data element exchanges which that mechanism will employ + in order to support security services. + + It is recommended that callers initiating contexts specify the + "default" mech_type value, allowing system-specific functions within + or invoked by the GSS-API implementation to select the appropriate + mech_type, but callers may direct that a particular mech_type be + employed when necessary. + + The means for identifying a shared mech_type to establish a security + context with a peer will vary in different environments and + circumstances; examples include (but are not limited to): + + use of a fixed mech_type, defined by configuration, within an + environment + + syntactic convention on a target-specific basis, through + examination of a target's name + + lookup of a target's name in a naming service or other database in + order to identify mech_types supported by that target + + explicit negotiation between GSS-API callers in advance of + security context setup + + When transferred between GSS-API peers, mech_type specifiers (per + Appendix B, represented as Object Identifiers (OIDs)) serve to + qualify the interpretation of associated tokens. (The structure and + encoding of Object Identifiers is defined in ISO/IEC 8824, + "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)" and in + ISO/IEC 8825, "Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract + Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)".) Use of hierarchically structured OIDs + serves to preclude ambiguous interpretation of mech_type specifiers. + + + +Linn [Page 8] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + The OID representing the DASS MechType, for example, is + 1.3.12.2.1011.7.5. + +1.1.5. Naming + + The GSS-API avoids prescription of naming structures, treating the + names transferred across the interface in order to initiate and + accept security contexts as opaque octet string quantities. This + approach supports the GSS-API's goal of implementability atop a range + of underlying security mechanisms, recognizing the fact that + different mechanisms process and authenticate names which are + presented in different forms. Generalized services offering + translation functions among arbitrary sets of naming environments are + outside the scope of the GSS-API; availability and use of local + conversion functions to translate among the naming formats supported + within a given end system is anticipated. + + Two distinct classes of name representations are used in conjunction + with different GSS-API parameters: + + a printable form (denoted by OCTET STRING), for acceptance from + and presentation to users; printable name forms are accompanied by + OID tags identifying the namespace to which they correspond + + an internal form (denoted by INTERNAL NAME), opaque to callers and + defined by individual GSS-API implementations; GSS-API + implementations supporting multiple namespace types are + responsible for maintaining internal tags to disambiguate the + interpretation of particular names + + Tagging of printable names allows GSS-API callers and underlying + GSS-API mechanisms to disambiguate name types and to determine + whether an associated name's type is one which they are capable of + processing, avoiding aliasing problems which could result from + misinterpreting a name of one type as a name of another type. + + In addition to providing means for names to be tagged with types, + this specification defines primitives to support a level of naming + environment independence for certain calling applications. To provide + basic services oriented towards the requirements of callers which + need not themselves interpret the internal syntax and semantics of + names, GSS-API calls for name comparison (GSS_Compare_name()), + human-readable display (GSS_Display_name()), input conversion + (GSS_Import_name()), and internal name deallocation + (GSS_Release_name()) functions are defined. (It is anticipated that + these proposed GSS-API calls will be implemented in many end systems + based on system-specific name manipulation primitives already extant + within those end systems; inclusion within the GSS-API is intended to + + + +Linn [Page 9] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + offer GSS-API callers a portable means to perform specific + operations, supportive of authorization and audit requirements, on + authenticated names.) + + GSS_Import_name() implementations can, where appropriate, support + more than one printable syntax corresponding to a given namespace + (e.g., alternative printable representations for X.500 Distinguished + Names), allowing flexibility for their callers to select among + alternative representations. GSS_Display_name() implementations + output a printable syntax selected as appropriate to their + operational environments; this selection is a local matter. Callers + desiring portability across alternative printable syntaxes should + refrain from implementing comparisons based on printable name forms + and should instead use the GSS_Compare_name() call to determine + whether or not one internal-format name matches another. + +1.1.6. Channel Bindings + + The GSS-API accommodates the concept of caller-provided channel + binding ("chan_binding") information, used by GSS-API callers to bind + the establishment of a security context to relevant characteristics + (e.g., addresses, transformed representations of encryption keys) of + the underlying communications channel and of protection mechanisms + applied to that communications channel. Verification by one peer of + chan_binding information provided by the other peer to a context + serves to protect against various active attacks. The caller + initiating a security context must determine the chan_binding values + before making the GSS_Init_sec_context() call, and consistent values + must be provided by both peers to a context. Callers should not + assume that underlying mechanisms provide confidentiality protection + for channel binding information. + + Use or non-use of the GSS-API channel binding facility is a caller + option, and GSS-API supporting mechanisms can support operation in an + environment where NULL channel bindings are presented. When non-NULL + channel bindings are used, certain mechanisms will offer enhanced + security value by interpreting the bindings' content (rather than + simply representing those bindings, or signatures computed on them, + within tokens) and will therefore depend on presentation of specific + data in a defined format. To this end, agreements among mechanism + implementors are defining conventional interpretations for the + contents of channel binding arguments, including address specifiers + (with content dependent on communications protocol environment) for + context initiators and acceptors. (These conventions are being + incorporated into related documents.) In order for GSS-API callers to + be portable across multiple mechanisms and achieve the full security + functionality available from each mechanism, it is strongly + recommended that GSS-API callers provide channel bindings consistent + + + +Linn [Page 10] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + with these conventions and those of the networking environment in + which they operate. + +1.2. GSS-API Features and Issues + + This section describes aspects of GSS-API operations, of the security + services which the GSS-API provides, and provides commentary on + design issues. + +1.2.1. Status Reporting + + Each GSS-API call provides two status return values. Major_status + values provide a mechanism-independent indication of call status + (e.g., GSS_COMPLETE, GSS_FAILURE, GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED), sufficient to + drive normal control flow within the caller in a generic fashion. + Table 1 summarizes the defined major_status return codes in tabular + fashion. + + Table 1: GSS-API Major Status Codes + + FATAL ERROR CODES + + GSS_BAD_BINDINGS channel binding mismatch + GSS_BAD_MECH unsupported mechanism requested + GSS_BAD_NAME invalid name provided + GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE name of unsupported type provided + GSS_BAD_STATUS invalid input status selector + GSS_BAD_SIG token had invalid signature + GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED specified security context expired + GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED expired credentials detected + GSS_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL defective credential detected + GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN defective token detected + GSS_FAILURE failure, unspecified at GSS-API + level + GSS_NO_CONTEXT no valid security context specified + GSS_NO_CRED no valid credentials provided + + INFORMATORY STATUS CODES + + GSS_COMPLETE normal completion + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED continuation call to routine + required + GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN duplicate per-message token + detected + GSS_OLD_TOKEN timed-out per-message token + detected + GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN out-of-order per-message token + detected + + + +Linn [Page 11] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Minor_status provides more detailed status information which may + include status codes specific to the underlying security mechanism. + Minor_status values are not specified in this document. + + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status returns, and optional message + outputs, are provided in GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls so that different mechanisms' + employment of different numbers of messages within their + authentication sequences need not be reflected in separate code paths + within calling applications. Instead, such cases are accomodated with + sequences of continuation calls to GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The same mechanism is used to encapsulate + mutual authentication within the GSS-API's context initiation calls. + + For mech_types which require interactions with third-party servers in + order to establish a security context, GSS-API context establishment + calls may block pending completion of such third-party interactions. + On the other hand, no GSS-API calls pend on serialized interactions + with GSS-API peer entities. As a result, local GSS-API status + returns cannot reflect unpredictable or asynchronous exceptions + occurring at remote peers, and reflection of such status information + is a caller responsibility outside the GSS-API. + +1.2.2. Per-Message Security Service Availability + + When a context is established, two flags are returned to indicate the + set of per-message protection security services which will be + available on the context: + + the integ_avail flag indicates whether per-message integrity and + data origin authentication services are available + + the conf_avail flag indicates whether per-message confidentiality + services are available, and will never be returned TRUE unless the + integ_avail flag is also returned TRUE + + GSS-API callers desiring per-message security services should + check the values of these flags at context establishment time, and + must be aware that a returned FALSE value for integ_avail means + that invocation of GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal() primitives on the + associated context will apply no cryptographic protection to user + data messages. + + The GSS-API per-message protection service primitives, as the + category name implies, are oriented to operation at the granularity + of protocol data units. They perform cryptographic operations on the + data units, transfer cryptographic control information in tokens, + and, in the case of GSS_Seal(), encapsulate the protected data unit. + + + +Linn [Page 12] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + As such, these primitives are not oriented to efficient data + protection for stream-paradigm protocols (e.g., Telnet) if + cryptography must be applied on an octet-by-octet basis. + +1.2.3. Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing + + Certain underlying mech_types are expected to offer support for + replay detection and/or sequencing of messages transferred on the + contexts they support. These optionally-selectable protection + features are distinct from replay detection and sequencing features + applied to the context establishment operation itself; the presence + or absence of context-level replay or sequencing features is wholly a + function of the underlying mech_type's capabilities, and is not + selected or omitted as a caller option. + + The caller initiating a context provides flags (replay_det_req_flag + and sequence_req_flag) to specify whether the use of per-message + replay detection and sequencing features is desired on the context + being established. The GSS-API implementation at the initiator system + can determine whether these features are supported (and whether they + are optionally selectable) as a function of mech_type, without need + for bilateral negotiation with the target. When enabled, these + features provide recipients with indicators as a result of GSS-API + processing of incoming messages, identifying whether those messages + were detected as duplicates or out-of-sequence. Detection of such + events does not prevent a suspect message from being provided to a + recipient; the appropriate course of action on a suspect message is a + matter of caller policy. + + The semantics of the replay detection and sequencing services applied + to received messages, as visible across the interface which the GSS- + API provides to its clients, are as follows: + + When replay_det_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window. + + 2. GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the + received message was correct, but that the message was recognized + as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. + + 3. GSS_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + message was correct, but that the message is too old to be checked + for duplication. + + + +Linn [Page 13] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + When sequence_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window. + + 2. GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the + received message was correct, but that the message was recognized + as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. + + 3. GSS_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + message was correct, but that the token is too old to be checked + for duplication. + + 4. GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + message was correct, but that it is earlier in a sequenced stream + than a message already processed on the context. [Note: + Mechanisms can be architected to provide a stricter form of + sequencing service, delivering particular messages to recipients + only after all predecessor messages in an ordered stream have been + delivered. This type of support is incompatible with the GSS-API + paradigm in which recipients receive all messages, whether in + order or not, and provide them (one at a time, without intra-GSS- + API message buffering) to GSS-API routines for validation. GSS- + API facilities provide supportive functions, aiding clients to + achieve strict message stream integrity in an efficient manner in + conjunction with sequencing provisions in communications + protocols, but the GSS-API does not offer this level of message + stream integrity service by itself.] + + As the message stream integrity features (especially sequencing) may + interfere with certain applications' intended communications + paradigms, and since support for such features is likely to be + resource intensive, it is highly recommended that mech_types + supporting these features allow them to be activated selectively on + initiator request when a context is established. A context initiator + and target are provided with corresponding indicators + (replay_det_state and sequence_state), signifying whether these + features are active on a given context. + + An example mech_type supporting per-message replay detection could + (when replay_det_state is TRUE) implement the feature as follows: The + underlying mechanism would insert timestamps in data elements output + by GSS_Sign() and GSS_Seal(), and would maintain (within a time- + limited window) a cache (qualified by originator-recipient pair) + identifying received data elements processed by GSS_Verify() and + + + +Linn [Page 14] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + GSS_Unseal(). When this feature is active, exception status returns + (GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_ OLD_TOKEN) will be provided when + GSS_Verify() or GSS_Unseal() is presented with a message which is + either a detected duplicate of a prior message or which is too old to + validate against a cache of recently received messages. + +1.2.4. Quality of Protection + + Some mech_types will provide their users with fine granularity + control over the means used to provide per-message protection, + allowing callers to trade off security processing overhead + dynamically against the protection requirements of particular + messages. A per-message quality-of-protection parameter (analogous to + quality-of-service, or QOS) selects among different QOP options + supported by that mechanism. On context establishment for a multi-QOP + mech_type, context-level data provides the prerequisite data for a + range of protection qualities. + + It is expected that the majority of callers will not wish to exert + explicit mechanism-specific QOP control and will therefore request + selection of a default QOP. Definitions of, and choices among, non- + default QOP values are mechanism-specific, and no ordered sequences + of QOP values can be assumed equivalent across different mechanisms. + Meaningful use of non-default QOP values demands that callers be + familiar with the QOP definitions of an underlying mechanism or + mechanisms, and is therefore a non-portable construct. + +2. Interface Descriptions + + This section describes the GSS-API's service interface, dividing the + set of calls offered into four groups. Credential management calls + are related to the acquisition and release of credentials by + principals. Context-level calls are related to the management of + security contexts between principals. Per-message calls are related + to the protection of individual messages on established security + contexts. Support calls provide ancillary functions useful to GSS-API + callers. Table 2 groups and summarizes the calls in tabular fashion. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 15] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Table 2: GSS-API Calls + + CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT + + GSS_Acquire_cred acquire credentials for use + GSS_Release_cred release credentials after use + GSS_Inquire_cred display information about + credentials + + CONTEXT-LEVEL CALLS + + GSS_Init_sec_context initiate outbound security context + GSS_Accept_sec_context accept inbound security context + GSS_Delete_sec_context flush context when no longer needed + GSS_Process_context_token process received control token on + context + GSS_Context_time indicate validity time remaining on + context + + PER-MESSAGE CALLS + + GSS_Sign apply signature, receive as token + separate from message + GSS_Verify validate signature token along with + message + GSS_Seal sign, optionally encrypt, + encapsulate + GSS_Unseal decapsulate, decrypt if needed, + validate signature + + SUPPORT CALLS + + GSS_Display_status translate status codes to printable + form + GSS_Indicate_mechs indicate mech_types supported on + local system + GSS_Compare_name compare two names for equality + GSS_Display_name translate name to printable form + GSS_Import_name convert printable name to + normalized form + GSS_Release_name free storage of normalized-form + name + GSS_Release_buffer free storage of printable name + GSS_Release_oid_set free storage of OID set object + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 16] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +2.1. Credential management calls + + These GSS-API calls provide functions related to the management of + credentials. Their characterization with regard to whether or not + they may block pending exchanges with other network entities (e.g., + directories or authentication servers) depends in part on OS-specific + (extra-GSS-API) issues, so is not specified in this document. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call is defined within the GSS-API in support + of application portability, with a particular orientation towards + support of portable server applications. It is recognized that (for + certain systems and mechanisms) credentials for interactive users may + be managed differently from credentials for server processes; in such + environments, it is the GSS-API implementation's responsibility to + distinguish these cases and the procedures for making this + distinction are a local matter. The GSS_Release_cred() call provides + a means for callers to indicate to the GSS-API that use of a + credentials structure is no longer required. The GSS_Inquire_cred() + call allows callers to determine information about a credentials + structure. + +2.1.1. GSS_Acquire_cred call + + Inputs: + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME, -NULL requests locally-determined + default + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,-empty set requests + system-selected default + + o cred_usage INTEGER-0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle OCTET STRING, + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + + +Linn [Page 17] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that requested credentials were + successfully established, for the duration indicated in + lifetime_rec, suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, for + the set of mech_types indicated in actual_mechs, and that those + credentials can be referenced for subsequent use with the handle + returned in output_cred_handle. + + o GSS_BAD_MECH indicates that a mech_type unsupported by the GSS-API + implementation type was requested, causing the credential + establishment operation to fail. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name is + uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the supporting GSS-API + implementation, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that credential establishment failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack of + authorization to establish and use credentials associated with the + identity named in the input desired_name argument. + + GSS_Acquire_cred() is used to acquire credentials so that a + principal can (as a function of the input cred_usage parameter) + initiate and/or accept security contexts under the identity + represented by the desired_name input argument. On successful + completion, the returned output_cred_handle result provides a handle + for subsequent references to the acquired credentials. Typically, + single-user client processes using only default credentials for + context establishment purposes will have no need to invoke this call. + + A caller may provide the value NULL for desired_name, signifying a + request for credentials corresponding to a default principal + identity. The procedures used by GSS-API implementations to select + the appropriate principal identity in response to this form of + request are local matters. It is possible that multiple pre- + established credentials may exist for the same principal identity + (for example, as a result of multiple user login sessions) when + GSS_Acquire_cred() is called; the means used in such cases to select + a specific credential are local matters. The input lifetime_req + argument to GSS_Acquire_cred() may provide useful information for + local GSS-API implementations to employ in making this disambiguation + + + +Linn [Page 18] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + in a manner which will best satisfy a caller's intent. + + The lifetime_rec result indicates the length of time for which the + acquired credentials will be valid, as an offset from the present. A + mechanism may return a reserved value indicating INDEFINITE if no + constraints on credential lifetime are imposed. A caller of + GSS_Acquire_cred() can request a length of time for which acquired + credentials are to be valid (lifetime_req argument), beginning at the + present, or can request credentials with a default validity interval. + (Requests for postdated credentials are not supported within the + GSS-API.) Certain mechanisms and implementations may bind in + credential validity period specifiers at a point preliminary to + invocation of the GSS_Acquire_cred() call (e.g., in conjunction with + user login procedures). As a result, callers requesting non-default + values for lifetime_req must recognize that such requests cannot + always be honored and must be prepared to accommodate the use of + returned credentials with different lifetimes as indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + The caller of GSS_Acquire_cred() can explicitly specify a set of + mech_types which are to be accommodated in the returned credentials + (desired_mechs argument), or can request credentials for a system- + defined default set of mech_types. Selection of the system-specified + default set is recommended in the interests of application + portability. The actual_mechs return value may be interrogated by the + caller to determine the set of mechanisms with which the returned + credentials may be used. + +2.1.2. GSS_Release_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle OCTET STRING-NULL specifies default credentials + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle were released for purposes of subsequent access + by the caller. The effect on other processes which may be + authorized shared access to such credentials is a local matter. + + + + + +Linn [Page 19] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no release operation was performed, + either because the input cred_handle was invalid or because the + caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for a caller to explicitly request that credentials + be released when their use is no longer required. Note that system- + specific credential management functions are also likely to exist, + for example to assure that credentials shared among processes are + properly deleted when all affected processes terminate, even if no + explicit release requests are issued by those processes. Given the + fact that multiple callers are not precluded from gaining authorized + access to the same credentials, invocation of GSS_Release_cred() + cannot be assumed to delete a particular set of credentials on a + system-wide basis. + +2.1.3. GSS_Inquire_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle OCTET STRING -NULL specifies default credentials + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, and that the output + cred_name, lifetime_rec, and cred_usage values represent, + respectively, the credentials' associated principal name, + remaining lifetime, suitable usage modes, and supported + mechanism types. + + + +Linn [Page 20] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks + authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred() call is defined primarily for the use of + those callers which make use of default credentials rather than + acquiring credentials explicitly with GSS_Acquire_cred(). It enables + callers to determine a credential structure's associated principal + name, remaining validity period, usability for security context + initiation and/or acceptance, and supported mechanisms. + +2.2. Context-level calls + + This group of calls is devoted to the establishment and management of + security contexts between peers. A context's initiator calls + GSS_Init_sec_context(), resulting in generation of a token which the + caller passes to the target. At the target, that token is passed to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Depending on the underlying mech_type and + specified options, additional token exchanges may be performed in the + course of context establishment; such exchanges are accommodated by + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns from GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Either party to an established context may + invoke GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush context information when a + context is no longer required. GSS_Process_context_token() is used + to process received tokens carrying context-level control + information. GSS_Context_time() allows a caller to determine the + length of time for which an established context will remain valid. + +2.2.1. GSS_Init_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o claimant_cred_handle OCTET STRING, -NULL specifies "use + default" + + o input_context_handle INTEGER, -0 specifies "none assigned + yet" + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -NULL parameter specifies "use + default" + + o deleg_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + + +Linn [Page 21] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o mutual_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default lifetime + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING-NULL or token received from target + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_handle INTEGER, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -actual mechanism always + indicated, never NULL + + o output_token OCTET STRING, -NULL or token to pass to context + target + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which an authentication server or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context initiator in order to generate an + output_token suitable for presentation to a specified target. + + Return major_status codes: + + + + +Linn [Page 22] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that context-level information was + successfully initialized, and that the returned output_token will + provide sufficient information for the target to perform per- + message processing on the newly-established context. + + o GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the target, and that a reply + must be received and passed as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), before per-message + processing can be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed, preventing further processing from being + performed based on that token. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + claimant_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token contains an + incorrect signature, so context setup cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the referenced + credentials are valid for context acceptor use only, or because + the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced + credentials. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input claimant_cred_handle argument are no longer + valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller- + provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the input_token + was detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing + context establishment. (This result will be returned by + GSS_Init_sec_context only for contexts where mutual_state is + TRUE.) + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided; this major status will be + returned only for successor calls following GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status returns. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided targ_name is of a + type uninterpretable or unsupported by the supporting GSS-API + implementation, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + + +Linn [Page 23] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided targ_name is inconsistent + in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier information, so + context establishment cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be accomplished + for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that no + interface-defined recovery action is available. + + This routine is used by a context initiator, and ordinarily emits one + (or, for the case of a multi-step exchange, more than one) + output_token suitable for use by the target within the selected + mech_type's protocol. Using information in the credentials structure + referenced by claimant_cred_handle, GSS_Init_sec_context() + initializes the data structures required to establish a security + context with target targ_name. The claimant_cred_handle must + correspond to the same valid credentials structure on the initial + call to GSS_Init_sec_context() and on any successor calls resulting + from GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; different protocol sequences + modeled by the GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED mechanism will require access to + credentials at different points in the context establishment + sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Init_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. That call returns an output_context_handle for future + references to this context. When continuation attempts to + GSS_Init_sec_context() are needed to perform context establishment, + the previously-returned non-zero handle value is entered into the + input_context_handle argument and will be echoed in the returned + output_context_handle argument. On such continuation attempts (and + only on continuation attempts) the input_token value is used, to + provide the token returned from the context's target. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The input_token argument contains a message received from the target, + and is significant only on a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() which + follows a previous return indicating GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + It is the caller's responsibility to establish a communications path + to the target, and to transmit any returned output_token (independent + of the accompanying returned major_status value) to the target over + that path. The output_token can, however, be transmitted along with + + + +Linn [Page 24] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + the first application-provided input message to be processed by + GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal() in conjunction with a successfully- + established context. + + The initiator may request various context-level functions through + input flags: the deleg_req_flag requests delegation of access rights, + the mutual_req_flag requests mutual authentication, the + replay_det_req_flag requests that replay detection features be + applied to messages transferred on the established context, and the + sequence_req_flag requests that sequencing be enforced. (See Section + 1.2.3 for more information on replay detection and sequencing + features.) + + Not all of the optionally-requestable features will be available in + all underlying mech_types; the corresponding return state values + (deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, sequence_state) + indicate, as a function of mech_type processing capabilities and + initiator-provided input flags, the set of features which will be + active on the context. These state indicators' values are undefined + unless the routine's major_status indicates COMPLETE. Failure to + provide the precise set of features requested by the caller does not + cause context establishment to fail; it is the caller's prerogative + to delete the context if the feature set provided is unsuitable for + the caller's use. The returned mech_type value indicates the + specific mechanism employed on the context, and will never indicate + the value for "default". + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Seal() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal()) on + the established context. + + The lifetime_req input specifies a desired upper bound for the + lifetime of the context to be established, with a value of 0 used to + request a default lifetime. The lifetime_rec return value indicates + the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as + an offset from the present; depending on mechanism capabilities, + credential lifetimes, and local policy, it may not correspond to the + value requested in lifetime_req. If no constraints on context + lifetime are imposed, this may be indicated by returning a reserved + value representing INDEFINITE lifetime_req. The values of conf_avail, + integ_avail, and lifetime_rec are undefined unless the routine's + major_status indicates COMPLETE. + + If the mutual_state is TRUE, this fact will be reflected within the + + + +Linn [Page 25] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + output_token. A call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() at the target in + conjunction with such a context will return a token, to be processed + by a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), in order to achieve + mutual authentication. + +2.2.2. GSS_Accept_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o acceptor_cred_handle OCTET STRING,-NULL specifies "use + default" + + o input_context_handle INTEGER, -0 specifies "not yet assigned" + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o output_context_handle INTEGER, + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER, - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o delegated_cred_handle OCTET STRING, + + o output_token OCTET STRING -NULL or token to pass to context + + + +Linn [Page 26] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + initiator + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which a directory service or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context acceptor in order to validate a + received input_token. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that context-level data structures were + successfully initialized, and that per-message processing can now + be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the initiator, and that a + response must be received and passed as the input_token argument + to a continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), before per- + message processing can be performed in conjunction with this + context. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed, preventing further processing from being + performed based on that token. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + acceptor_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token contains an + incorrect signature, so context setup cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token was recognized + as a duplicate of an input_token already processed. No new context + is established. + + o GSS_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token is too old to be + checked for duplication against previously-processed input_tokens. + No new context is established. + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the referenced + credentials are valid for context initiator use only, or because + the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced + credentials. + + + + +Linn [Page 27] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input acceptor_cred_handle argument are no longer + valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller- + provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the input_token + was detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing + context establishment. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided; this major status will be + returned only for successor calls following GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status returns. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be accomplished + for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that no + interface-defined recovery action is available. + + The GSS_Accept_sec_context() routine is used by a context target. + Using information in the credentials structure referenced by the + input acceptor_cred_handle, it verifies the incoming input_token and + (following the successful completion of a context establishment + sequence) returns the authenticated src_name and the mech_type used. + The acceptor_cred_handle must correspond to the same valid + credentials structure on the initial call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() + and on any successor calls resulting from GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status + returns; different protocol sequences modeled by the + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED mechanism will require access to credentials at + different points in the context establishment sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Accept_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. That call returns an output_context_handle for future + references to this context; when continuation attempts to + GSS_Accept_sec_context() are needed to perform context + establishment, that handle value will be entered into the + input_context_handle argument. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The returned state results (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, and sequence_state) reflect the same context state + values as returned to GSS_Init_sec_context()'s caller at the + initiator system. + + + +Linn [Page 28] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Seal() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal()) on + the established context. + + The lifetime_rec return value indicates the length of time for which + the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the present. + The values of deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, + sequence_state, conf_avail, integ_avail, and lifetime_rec are + undefined unless the accompanying major_status indicates COMPLETE. + + The delegated_cred_handle result is significant only when deleg_state + is TRUE, and provides a means for the target to reference the + delegated credentials. The output_token result, when non-NULL, + provides a context-level token to be returned to the context + initiator to continue a multi-step context establishment sequence. As + noted with GSS_Init_sec_context(), any returned token should be + transferred to the context's peer (in this case, the context + initiator), independent of the value of the accompanying returned + major_status. + + Note: A target must be able to distinguish a context-level + input_token, which is passed to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), from the + per-message data elements passed to GSS_Verify() or GSS_Unseal(). + These data elements may arrive in a single application message, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() must be performed before per-message + processing can be performed successfully. + +2.2.3. GSS_Delete_sec_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle INTEGER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + + + + +Linn [Page 29] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the context was recognized, that + relevant context-specific information was flushed, and that the + returned output_context_token is ready for transfer to the + context's peer. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provide, so no deletion was performed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Delete_sec_context() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call may block pending network interactions for mech_types in + which active notification must be made to a central server when a + security context is to be deleted. + + This call can be made by either peer in a security context, to flush + context-specific information and to return an output_context_token + which can be passed to the context's peer informing it that the + peer's corresponding context information can also be flushed. (Once a + context is established, the peers involved are expected to retain + cached credential and context-related information until the + information's expiration time is reached or until a + GSS_Delete_sec_context() call is made.) Attempts to perform per- + message processing on a deleted context will result in error returns. + +2.2.4. GSS_Process_context_token call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o input_context_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the input_context_token was + successfully processed in conjunction with the context referenced + by context_handle. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the received context_token failed, preventing further processing + + + +Linn [Page 30] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Process_context_token() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to process context_tokens received from a peer once + a context has been established, with corresponding impact on + context-level state information. One use for this facility is + processing of the context_tokens generated by + GSS_Delete_sec_context(); GSS_Process_context_token() will not block + pending network interactions for that purpose. Another use is to + process tokens indicating remote-peer context establishment failures + after the point where the local GSS-API implementation has already + indicated GSS_COMPLETE status. + +2.2.5. GSS_Context_time call + + Input: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid, and + will remain valid for the amount of time indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that data items related to the + referenced context have expired. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + + +Linn [Page 31] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to determine the amount of time for which a + currently established context will remain valid. + +2.3. Per-message calls + + This group of calls is used to perform per-message protection + processing on an established security context. None of these calls + block pending network interactions. These calls may be invoked by a + context's initiator or by the context's target. The four members of + this group should be considered as two pairs; the output from + GSS_Sign() is properly input to GSS_Verify(), and the output from + GSS_Seal() is properly input to GSS_Unseal(). + + GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify() support data origin authentication and + data integrity services. When GSS_Sign() is invoked on an input + message, it yields a per-message token containing data items which + allow underlying mechanisms to provide the specified security + services. The original message, along with the generated per-message + token, is passed to the remote peer; these two data elements are + processed by GSS_Verify(), which validates the message in + conjunction with the separate token. + + GSS_Seal() and GSS_Unseal() support caller-requested confidentiality + in addition to the data origin authentication and data integrity + services offered by GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify(). GSS_Seal() outputs + a single data element, encapsulating optionally enciphered user data + as well as associated token data items. The data element output from + GSS_Seal() is passed to the remote peer and processed by + GSS_Unseal() at that system. GSS_Unseal() combines decipherment (as + required) with validation of data items related to authentication and + integrity. + +2.3.1. GSS_Sign call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn [Page 32] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a signature, suitable for an + established security context, was successfully applied and that + the message and corresponding per_msg_token are ready for + transmission. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified + at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, apply a + signature to the input message (along with timestamps and/or other + data included in support of mech_type-specific mechanisms) and return + the result in per_msg_token. The qop_req parameter allows quality- + of-protection control. The caller passes the message and the + per_msg_token to the target. + + The GSS_Sign() function completes before the message and + per_msg_token is sent to the peer; successful application of + GSS_Sign() does not guarantee that a corresponding GSS_Verify() has + been (or can necessarily be) performed successfully when the message + arrives at the destination. + +2.3.2. GSS_Verify call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o message OCTET STRING, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + + + +Linn [Page 33] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Outputs: + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the message was successfully verified. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the received per_msg_token failed, preventing further processing + from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that the received per_msg_token contains an + incorrect signature for the message. + + o GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_OLD_TOKEN, and GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN values + appear in conjunction with the optional per-message replay + detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are + described in that section. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Verify() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, verify that + the input per_msg_token contains an appropriate signature for the + input message, and apply any active replay detection or sequencing + features. Return an indication of the quality-of-protection applied + to the processed message in the qop_state result. + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 34] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +2.3.3. GSS_Seal call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the output_message is ready for transmission. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Seal() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Performs the data origin authentication and data integrity functions + of GSS_Sign(). If the input conf_req_flag is TRUE, requests that + confidentiality be applied to the input_message. Confidentiality may + not be supported in all mech_types or by all implementations; the + returned conf_state flag indicates whether confidentiality was + provided for the input_message. The qop_req parameter allows + quality-of-protection control. + + + +Linn [Page 35] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + In all cases, the GSS_Seal() call yields a single output_message + data element containing (optionally enciphered) user data as well as + control information. + +2.3.4. GSS_Unseal call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the resulting output_message is available. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the per_msg_token extracted from the input_message failed, + preventing further processing from being performed. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that an incorrect signature was detected for + the message. + + o GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_OLD_TOKEN, and GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN values + appear in conjunction with the optional per-message replay + detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are + described in that section. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + + + +Linn [Page 36] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Unseal() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Processes a data element generated (and optionally enciphered) by + GSS_Seal(), provided as input_message. The returned conf_state value + indicates whether confidentiality was applied to the input_message. + If conf_state is TRUE, GSS_Unseal() deciphers the input_message. + Returns an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the + processed message in the qop_state result. GSS_Seal() performs the + data integrity and data origin authentication checking functions of + GSS_Verify() on the plaintext data. Plaintext data is returned in + output_message. + +2.4. Support calls + + This group of calls provides support functions useful to GSS-API + callers, independent of the state of established contexts. Their + characterization with regard to blocking or non-blocking status in + terms of network interactions is unspecified. + +2.4.1. GSS_Display_status call + + Inputs: + + o status_value INTEGER,-GSS-API major_status or minor_status + return value + + o status_type INTEGER,-1 if major_status, 2 if minor_status + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER-mech_type to be used for minor_ + status translation + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o status_string_set SET OF OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable status + representation (possibly representing more than one status event + + + +Linn [Page 37] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + encoded within the status_value) is available in the returned + status_string_set. + + o GSS_BAD_MECH indicates that translation in accordance with an + unsupported mech_type was requested, so translation could not be + performed. + + o GSS_BAD_STATUS indicates that the input status_value was invalid, + or that the input status_type carried a value other than 1 or 2, + so translation could not be performed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for callers to translate GSS-API-returned major and + minor status codes into printable string representations. + +2.4.2. GSS_Indicate_mechs call + + Input: + + o (none) + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a set of available mechanisms has + been returned in mech_set. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of mechanism types available on + the local system. This call is intended for support of specialized + callers who need to request non-default mech_type sets from + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and should not be needed by other callers. + +2.4.3. GSS_Compare_name call + + Inputs: + + + + +Linn [Page 38] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o name1 INTERNAL NAME, + + o name2 INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_equal BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that name1 and name2 were comparable, and + that the name_equal result indicates whether name1 and name2 were + equal or unequal. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that one or both of name1 and name2 + contained internal type specifiers uninterpretable by the + supporting GSS-API implementation, or that the two names' types + are different and incomparable, so the equality comparison could + not be completed. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that one or both of the input names was + ill-formed in terms of its internal type specifier, so the + equality comparison could not be completed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to compare two internal name representations for + equality. + +2.4.4. GSS_Display_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_string OCTET STRING, + + + + +Linn [Page 39] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable name representation + is available in the returned name_string. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided name was of a type + uninterpretable by the supporting GSS-API implementation, so no + printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the contents of the provided name were + inconsistent with the internally-indicated name type, so no + printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to translate an internal name representation into a + printable form with associated namespace type descriptor. The syntax + of the printable form is a local matter. + +2.4.5. GSS_Import_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name_string OCTET STRING, + + o input_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a valid name representation is output + in output_name and described by the type value in + output_name_type. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input_name_type is unsupported + by the GSS-API implementation, so the import operation could not + be completed. + + + + +Linn [Page 40] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided input_name_string is + ill-formed in terms of the input_name_type, so the import + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to provide a printable name representation, designate + the type of namespace in conjunction with which it should be parsed, + and convert that printable representation to an internal form + suitable for input to other GSS-API routines. The syntax of the + input_name is a local matter. + +2.4.6. GSS_Release_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the input + name was successfully released. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name argument did not + contain a valid name. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an internal + name representation. + +2.4.7. GSS_Release_buffer call + + Inputs: + + o buffer OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn [Page 41] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the input + buffer was successfully released. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an OCTET STRING + buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. + +2.4.8. GSS_Release_oid_set call + + Inputs: + + o buffer SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the input + object identifier set was successfully released. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an object + identifier set object allocated by another GSS-API call. + +3. Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios + + This section provides illustrative overviews of the use of various + candidate mechanism types to support the GSS-API. These discussions + are intended primarily for readers familiar with specific security + technologies, demonstrating how GSS-API functions can be used and + implemented by candidate underlying mechanisms. They should not be + regarded as constrictive to implementations or as defining the only + means through which GSS-API functions can be realized with a + particular underlying technology, and do not demonstrate all GSS-API + features with each technology. + + + + +Linn [Page 42] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +3.1. Kerberos V5, single-TGT + + OS-specific login functions yield a TGT to the local realm Kerberos + server; TGT is placed in a credentials structure for the client. + Client calls GSS_Acquire_cred() to acquire a cred_handle in order to + reference the credentials for use in establishing security contexts. + + Client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(). If the requested service is + located in a different realm, GSS_Init_sec_context() gets the + necessary TGT/key pairs needed to traverse the path from local to + target realm; these data are placed in the owner's TGT cache. After + any needed remote realm resolution, GSS_Init_sec_context() yields a + service ticket to the requested service with a corresponding session + key; these data are stored in conjunction with the context. GSS-API + code sends KRB_TGS_REQ request(s) and receives KRB_TGS_REP + response(s) (in the successful case) or KRB_ERROR. + + Assuming success, GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted + KRB_AP_REQ message, and returns it in output_token. The client sends + the output_token to the service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which verifies the authenticator, provides + the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns an + output_context_handle. + + Both parties now hold the session key associated with the service + ticket, and can use this key in subsequent GSS_Sign(), GSS_Verify(), + GSS_Seal(), and GSS_Unseal() operations. + +3.2. Kerberos V5, double-TGT + + TGT acquisition as above. + + Note: To avoid unnecessary frequent invocations of error paths when + implementing the GSS-API atop Kerberos V5, it seems appropriate to + represent "single-TGT K-V5" and "double-TGT K-V5" with separate + mech_types, and this discussion makes that assumption. + + Based on the (specified or defaulted) mech_type, + GSS_Init_sec_context() determines that the double-TGT protocol + should be employed for the specified target. GSS_Init_sec_context() + returns GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, and its returned + output_token contains a request to the service for the service's TGT. + (If a service TGT with suitably long remaining lifetime already + exists in a cache, it may be usable, obviating the need for this + step.) The client passes the output_token to the service. Note: this + scenario illustrates a different use for the GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + + + +Linn [Page 43] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + status return facility than for support of mutual authentication; + note that both uses can coexist as successive operations within a + single context establishment operation. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which recognizes it as a request for TGT. + (Note that current Kerberos V5 defines no intra-protocol mechanism to + represent such a request.) GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status and provides the service's TGT in + its output_token. The service sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation of GSS_Init_sec_context(). GSS_Init_sec_context() caches + the received service TGT and uses it as part of a service ticket + request to the Kerberos authentication server, storing the returned + service ticket and session key in conjunction with the context. + GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted authenticator, + and returns it in output_token along with GSS_COMPLETE return + major_status. The client sends the output_token to the service. + + Service passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + GSS_Accept_sec_context() verifies the authenticator, provides the + service with the client's authenticated name, and returns + major_status GSS_COMPLETE. + + GSS_Sign(), GSS_Verify(), GSS_Seal(), and GSS_Unseal() as above. + +3.3. X.509 Authentication Framework + + This example illustrates use of the GSS-API in conjunction with + public-key mechanisms, consistent with the X.509 Directory + Authentication Framework. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call establishes a credentials structure, + making the client's private key accessible for use on behalf of the + client. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(), which interrogates the + Directory to acquire (and validate) a chain of public-key + certificates, thereby collecting the public key of the service. The + certificate validation operation determines that suitable signatures + were applied by trusted authorities and that those certificates have + not expired. GSS_Init_sec_context() generates a secret key for use + in per-message protection operations on the context, and enciphers + that secret key under the service's public key. + + The enciphered secret key, along with an authenticator quantity + + + +Linn [Page 44] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + signed with the client's private key, is included in the output_token + from GSS_Init_sec_context(). The output_token also carries a + certification path, consisting of a certificate chain leading from + the service to the client; a variant approach would defer this path + resolution to be performed by the service instead of being asserted + by the client. The client application sends the output_token to the + service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context() validates the + certification path, and as a result determines a certified binding + between the client's distinguished name and the client's public key. + Given that public key, GSS_Accept_sec_context() can process the + input_token's authenticator quantity and verify that the client's + private key was used to sign the input_token. At this point, the + client is authenticated to the service. The service uses its private + key to decipher the enciphered secret key provided to it for per- + message protection operations on the context. + + The client calls GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal() on a data message, which + causes per-message authentication, integrity, and (optional) + confidentiality facilities to be applied to that message. The service + uses the context's shared secret key to perform corresponding + GSS_Verify() and GSS_Unseal() calls. + +4. Related Activities + + In order to implement the GSS-API atop existing, emerging, and future + security mechanisms: + + object identifiers must be assigned to candidate GSS-API + mechanisms and the name types which they support + + concrete data element formats must be defined for candidate + mechanisms + + Calling applications must implement formatting conventions which will + enable them to distinguish GSS-API tokens from other data carried in + their application protocols. + + Concrete language bindings are required for the programming + environments in which the GSS-API is to be employed; such bindings + for the C language are available in an associated RFC. + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 45] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +5. Acknowledgments + + This proposal is the result of a collaborative effort. + Acknowledgments are due to the many members of the IETF Security Area + Advisory Group (SAAG) and the Common Authentication Technology (CAT) + Working Group for their contributions at meetings and by electronic + mail. Acknowledgments are also due to Kannan Alagappan, Doug Barlow, + Bill Brown, Cliff Kahn, Charlie Kaufman, Butler Lampson, Richard + Pitkin, Joe Tardo, and John Wray of Digital Equipment Corporation, + and John Carr, John Kohl, Jon Rochlis, Jeff Schiller, and Ted T'so of + MIT and Project Athena. Joe Pato and Bill Sommerfeld of HP/Apollo, + Walt Tuvell of OSF, and Bill Griffith and Mike Merritt of AT&T, + provided inputs which helped to focus and clarify directions. + Precursor work by Richard Pitkin, presented to meetings of the + Trusted Systems Interoperability Group (TSIG), helped to demonstrate + the value of a generic, mechanism-independent security service API. + +6. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +7. Author's Address + + John Linn + Geer Zolot Associates + One Main St. + Cambridge, MA 02142 USA + + Phone: +1 617.374.3700 + Email: Linn@gza.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 46] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +APPENDIX A + +PACS AND AUTHORIZATION SERVICES + + Consideration has been given to modifying the GSS-API service + interface to recognize and manipulate Privilege Attribute + Certificates (PACs) as in ECMA 138, carrying authorization data as a + side effect of establishing a security context, but no such + modifications have been incorporated at this time. This appendix + provides rationale for this decision and discusses compatibility + alternatives between PACs and the GSS-API which do not require that + PACs be made visible to GSS-API callers. + + Existing candidate mechanism types such as Kerberos and X.509 do not + incorporate PAC manipulation features, and exclusion of such + mechanisms from the set of candidates equipped to fully support the + GSS-API seems inappropriate. Inclusion (and GSS-API visibility) of a + feature supported by only a limited number of mechanisms could + encourage the development of ostensibly portable applications which + would in fact have only limited portability. + + The status quo, in which PACs are not visible across the GSS-API + interface, does not preclude implementations in which PACs are + carried transparently, within the tokens defined and used for certain + mech_types, and stored within peers' credentials and context-level + data structures. While invisible to API callers, such PACs could be + used by operating system or other local functions as inputs in the + course of mediating access requests made by callers. This course of + action allows dynamic selection of PAC contents, if such selection is + administratively-directed rather than caller-directed. + + In a distributed computing environment, authentication must span + different systems; the need for such authentication provides + motivation for GSS-API definition and usage. Heterogeneous systems in + a network can intercommunicate, with globally authenticated names + comprising the common bond between locally defined access control + policies. Access control policies to which authentication provides + inputs are often local, or specific to particular operating systems + or environments. If the GSS-API made particular authorization models + visible across its service interface, its scope of application would + become less general. The current GSS-API paradigm is consistent with + the precedent set by Kerberos, neither defining the interpretation of + authorization-related data nor enforcing access controls based on + such data. + + The GSS-API is a general interface, whose callers may reside inside + or outside any defined TCB or NTCB boundaries. Given this + characteristic, it appears more realistic to provide facilities which + + + +Linn [Page 47] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + provide "value-added" security services to its callers than to offer + facilities which enforce restrictions on those callers. Authorization + decisions must often be mediated below the GSS-API level in a local + manner against (or in spite of) applications, and cannot be + selectively invoked or omitted at those applications' discretion. + Given that the GSS-API's placement prevents it from providing a + comprehensive solution to the authorization issue, the value of a + partial contribution specific to particular authorization models is + debatable. + +APPENDIX B + +MECHANISM-INDEPENDENT TOKEN FORMAT + + This appendix specifies a mechanism-independent level of + encapsulating representation for the initial token of a GSS-API + context establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the + mechanism type to be used on that context. Use of this format (with + ASN.1-encoded data elements represented in BER, constrained in the + interests of parsing simplicity to the Distinguished Encoding Rule + (DER) BER subset defined in X.509, clause 8.7) is recommended to the + designers of GSS-API implementations based on various mechanisms, so + that tokens can be interpreted unambiguously at GSS-API peers. There + is no requirement that the mechanism-specific innerContextToken, + innerMsgToken, and sealedUserData data elements be encoded in ASN.1 + BER. + + -- optional top-level token definitions to + -- frame different mechanisms + + GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::= + + BEGIN + + MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- data structure definitions + + -- callers must be able to distinguish among + -- InitialContextToken, SubsequentContextToken, + -- PerMsgToken, and SealedMessage data elements + -- based on the usage in which they occur + + InitialContextToken ::= + -- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within + -- mechanism-specific token + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType, + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + + + +Linn [Page 48] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + -- contents mechanism-specific + } + + SubsequentContextToken ::= innerContextToken ANY + -- interpretation based on predecessor InitialContextToken + + PerMsgToken ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Sign and processed by GSS_Verify + innerMsgToken ANY + + SealedMessage ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Seal and processed by GSS_Unseal + -- includes internal, mechanism-defined indicator + -- of whether or not encrypted + sealedUserData ANY + + END + +APPENDIX C + +MECHANISM DESIGN CONSTRAINTS + + The following constraints on GSS-API mechanism designs are adopted in + response to observed caller protocol requirements, and adherence + thereto is anticipated in subsequent descriptions of GSS-API + mechanisms to be documented in standards-track Internet + specifications. + + Use of the approach defined in Appendix B of this specification, + applying a mechanism type tag to the InitialContextToken, is + required. + + It is strongly recommended that mechanisms offering per-message + protection services also offer at least one of the replay detection + and sequencing services, as mechanisms offering neither of the latter + will fail to satisfy recognized requirements of certain candidate + caller protocols. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 49] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f36cd80e6d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2691 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Wray +Request for Comments: 1509 Digital Equipment Corporation + September 1993 + + + Generic Security Service API : C-bindings + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status + of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This document specifies C language bindings for the Generic Security + Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), which is described + at a language-independent conceptual level in other documents. + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface (GSS- + API) provides security services to its callers, and is intended for + implementation atop alternative underlying cryptographic mechanisms. + Typically, GSS-API callers will be application protocols into which + security enhancements are integrated through invocation of services + provided by the GSS-API. The GSS-API allows a caller application to + authenticate a principal identity associated with a peer application, + to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security services such as + confidentiality and integrity on a per-message basis. + +1. INTRODUCTION + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface [1] + provides security services to calling applications. It allows a + communicating application to authenticate the user associated with + another application, to delegate rights to another application, and + to apply security services such as confidentiality and integrity on a + per-message basis. + + There are four stages to using the GSSAPI: + + (a) The application acquires a set of credentials with which it may + prove its identity to other processes. The application's + credentials vouch for its global identity, which may or may not + be related to the local username under which it is running. + + + + + +Wray [Page 1] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + (b) A pair of communicating applications establish a joint security + context using their credentials. The security context is a + pair of GSSAPI data structures that contain shared state + information, which is required in order that per-message + security services may be provided. As part of the + establishment of a security context, the context initiator is + authenticated to the responder, and may require that the + responder is authenticated in turn. The initiator may + optionally give the responder the right to initiate further + security contexts. This transfer of rights is termed + delegation, and is achieved by creating a set of credentials, + similar to those used by the originating application, but which + may be used by the responder. To establish and maintain the + shared information that makes up the security context, certain + GSSAPI calls will return a token data structure, which is a + cryptographically protected opaque data type. The caller of + such a GSSAPI routine is responsible for transferring the token + to the peer application, which should then pass it to a + corresponding GSSAPI routine which will decode it and extract + the information. + + (c) Per-message services are invoked to apply either: + + (i) integrity and data origin authentication, or + + (ii) confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication + to application data, which are treated by GSSAPI as + arbitrary octet-strings. The application transmitting a + message that it wishes to protect will call the appropriate + GSSAPI routine (sign or seal) to apply protection, specifying + the appropriate security context, and send the result to the + receiving application. The receiver will pass the received + data to the corresponding decoding routine (verify or unseal) + to remove the protection and validate the data. + + (d) At the completion of a communications session (which may extend + across several connections), the peer applications call GSSAPI + routines to delete the security context. Multiple contexts may + also be used (either successively or simultaneously) within a + single communications association. + +2. GSSAPI Routines + + This section lists the functions performed by each of the GSSAPI + routines and discusses their major parameters, describing how they + are to be passed to the routines. The routines are listed in figure + 4-1. + + + + +Wray [Page 2] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Figure 4-1 GSSAPI Routines + + + Routine Function + + gss_acquire_cred Assume a global identity + + gss_release_cred Discard credentials + + gss_init_sec_context Initiate a security context + with a peer application + + gss_accept_sec_context Accept a security context + initiated by a peer + application + + gss_process_context_token Process a token on a security + context from a peer + application + + gss_delete_sec_context Discard a security context + + gss_context_time Determine for how long a + context will remain valid + + gss_sign Sign a message; integrity + service + + gss_verify Check signature on a message + + gss_seal Sign (optionally encrypt) a + message; confidentiality + service + + gss_unseal Verify (optionally decrypt) + message + + gss_display_status Convert an API status code + to text + + gss_indicate_mechs Determine underlying + authentication mechanism + + gss_compare_name Compare two internal-form + names + + gss_display_name Convert opaque name to text + + + + +Wray [Page 3] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + gss_import_name Convert a textual name to + internal-form + + gss_release_name Discard an internal-form + name + + gss_release_buffer Discard a buffer + + gss_release_oid_set Discard a set of object + identifiers + + gss_inquire_cred Determine information about + a credential + + Individual GSSAPI implementations may augment these routines by + providing additional mechanism-specific routines if required + functionality is not available from the generic forms. Applications + are encouraged to use the generic routines wherever possible on + portability grounds. + +2.1. Data Types and Calling Conventions + + The following conventions are used by the GSSAPI: + +2.1.1. Structured data types + + Wherever these GSSAPI C-bindings describe structured data, only + fields that must be provided by all GSSAPI implementation are + documented. Individual implementations may provide additional + fields, either for internal use within GSSAPI routines, or for use by + non-portable applications. + +2.1.2. Integer types + + GSSAPI defines the following integer data type: + + OM_uint32 32-bit unsigned integer + + Where guaranteed minimum bit-count is important, this portable data + type is used by the GSSAPI routine definitions. Individual GSSAPI + implementations will include appropriate typedef definitions to map + this type onto a built-in data type. + +2.1.3. String and similar data + + Many of the GSSAPI routines take arguments and return values that + describe contiguous multiple-byte data. All such data is passed + between the GSSAPI and the caller using the gss_buffer_t data type. + + + +Wray [Page 4] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + This data type is a pointer to a buffer descriptor, which consists of + a length field that contains the total number of bytes in the datum, + and a value field which contains a pointer to the actual datum: + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + Storage for data passed to the application by a GSSAPI routine using + the gss_buffer_t conventions is allocated by the GSSAPI routine. The + application may free this storage by invoking the gss_release_buffer + routine. Allocation of the gss_buffer_desc object is always the + responsibility of the application; Unused gss_buffer_desc objects + may be initialized to the value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER. + +2.1.3.1. Opaque data types + + Certain multiple-word data items are considered opaque data types at + the GSSAPI, because their internal structure has no significance + either to the GSSAPI or to the caller. Examples of such opaque data + types are the input_token parameter to gss_init_sec_context (which is + opaque to the caller), and the input_message parameter to gss_seal + (which is opaque to the GSSAPI). Opaque data is passed between the + GSSAPI and the application using the gss_buffer_t datatype. + +2.1.3.2. Character strings + + Certain multiple-word data items may be regarded as simple ISO + Latin-1 character strings. An example of this is the + input_name_buffer parameter to gss_import_name. Some GSSAPI routines + also return character strings. Character strings are passed between + the application and the GSSAPI using the gss_buffer_t datatype, + defined earlier. + +2.1.4. Object Identifiers + + Certain GSSAPI procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID, or + Object identifier. This is a type containing ISO-defined tree- + structured values, and is used by the GSSAPI caller to select an + underlying security mechanism. A value of type gss_OID has the + following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + + + +Wray [Page 5] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + The elements field of this structure points to the first byte of an + octet string containing the ASN.1 BER encoding of the value of the + gss_OID. The length field contains the number of bytes in this + value. For example, the gss_OID value corresponding to {iso(1) + identified- oganization(3) icd-ecma(12) member-company(2) dec(1011) + cryptoAlgorithms(7) SPX(5)} meaning SPX (Digital's X.509 + authentication mechanism) has a length field of 7 and an elements + field pointing to seven octets containing the following octal values: + 53,14,2,207,163,7,5. GSSAPI implementations should provide constant + gss_OID values to allow callers to request any supported mechanism, + although applications are encouraged on portability grounds to accept + the default mechanism. gss_OID values should also be provided to + allow applications to specify particular name types (see section + 2.1.10). Applications should treat gss_OID_desc values returned by + GSSAPI routines as read-only. In particular, the application should + not attempt to deallocate them. The gss_OID_desc datatype is + equivalent to the X/Open OM_object_identifier datatype [2]. + +2.1.5. Object Identifier Sets + + Certain GSSAPI procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID_set. + This type represents one or more object identifiers (section 2.1.4). + A gss_OID_set object has the following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + int count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + The count field contains the number of OIDs within the set. The + elements field is a pointer to an array of gss_OID_desc objects, each + of which describes a single OID. gss_OID_set values are used to name + the available mechanisms supported by the GSSAPI, to request the use + of specific mechanisms, and to indicate which mechanisms a given + credential supports. Storage associated with gss_OID_set values + returned to the application by the GSSAPI may be deallocated by the + gss_release_oid_set routine. + +2.1.6. Credentials + + A credential handle is a caller-opaque atomic datum that identifies a + GSSAPI credential data structure. It is represented by the caller- + opaque type gss_cred_id_t, which may be implemented as either an + arithmetic or a pointer type. Credentials describe a principal, and + they give their holder the ability to act as that principal. The + GSSAPI does not make the actual credentials available to + applications; instead the credential handle is used to identify a + particular credential, held internally by GSSAPI or underlying + + + +Wray [Page 6] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + mechanism. Thus the credential handle contains no security-relavent + information, and requires no special protection by the application. + Depending on the implementation, a given credential handle may refer + to different credentials when presented to the GSSAPI by different + callers. Individual GSSAPI implementations should define both the + scope of a credential handle and the scope of a credential itself + (which must be at least as wide as that of a handle). Possibilities + for credential handle scope include the process that acquired the + handle, the acquiring process and its children, or all processes + sharing some local identification information (e.g., UID). If no + handles exist by which a given credential may be reached, the GSSAPI + may delete the credential. + + Certain routines allow credential handle parameters to be omitted to + indicate the use of a default credential. The mechanism by which a + default credential is established and its scope should be defined by + the individual GSSAPI implementation. + +2.1.7. Contexts + + The gss_ctx_id_t data type contains a caller-opaque atomic value that + identifies one end of a GSSAPI security context. It may be + implemented as either an arithmetic or a pointer type. Depending on + the implementation, a given gss_ctx_id_t value may refer to different + GSSAPI security contexts when presented to the GSSAPI by different + callers. The security context holds state information about each end + of a peer communication, including cryptographic state information. + Individual GSSAPI implementations should define the scope of a + context. Since no way is provided by which a new gss_ctx_id_t value + may be obtained for an existing context, the scope of a context + should be the same as the scope of a gss_ctx_id_t. + +2.1.8. Authentication tokens + + A token is a caller-opaque type that GSSAPI uses to maintain + synchronization between the context data structures at each end of a + GSSAPI security context. The token is a cryptographically protected + bit-string, generated by the underlying mechanism at one end of a + GSSAPI security context for use by the peer mechanism at the other + end. Encapsulation (if required) and transfer of the token are the + responsibility of the peer applications. A token is passed between + the GSSAPI and the application using the gss_buffer_t conventions. + +2.1.9. Status values + + One or more status codes are returned by each GSSAPI routine. Two + distinct sorts of status codes are returned. These are termed GSS + status codes and Mechanism status codes. + + + +Wray [Page 7] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +2.1.9.1. GSS status codes + + GSSAPI routines return GSS status codes as their OM_uint32 function + value. These codes indicate errors that are independent of the + underlying mechanism used to provide the security service. The + errors that can be indicated via a GSS status code are either generic + API routine errors (errors that are defined in the GSSAPI + specification) or calling errors (errors that are specific to these + bindings). + + A GSS status code can indicate a single fatal generic API error from + the routine and a single calling error. In addition, supplementary + status information may be indicated via the setting of bits in the + supplementary info field of a GSS status code. + + These errors are encoded into the 32-bit GSS status code as follows: + + MSB LSB + |------------------------------------------------------------| + | Calling Error | Routine Error | Supplementary Info | + |------------------------------------------------------------| + Bit 31 24 23 16 15 0 + + Hence if a GSSAPI routine returns a GSS status code whose upper 16 + bits contain a non-zero value, the call failed. If the calling error + field is non-zero, the invoking application's call of the routine was + erroneous. Calling errors are defined in table 5-1. If the routine + error field is non-zero, the routine failed for one of the routine- + specific reasons listed below in table 5-2. Whether or not the upper + 16 bits indicate a failure or a success, the routine may indicate + additional information by setting bits in the supplementary info + field of the status code. The meaning of individual bits is listed + below in table 5-3. + + Table 5-1 Calling Errors + + Name Value in Meaning + Field + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ 1 A required input + parameter could + not be read. + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE 2 A required output + parameter could + not be written. + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE 3 A parameter was + malformed + + + + + +Wray [Page 8] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Table 5-2 Routine Errors + + Name Value in Meaning + Field + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH 1 An unsupported mechanism was + requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME 2 An invalid name was supplied + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 3 A supplied name was of an + unsupported type + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS 4 Incorrect channel bindings + were supplied + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 5 An invalid status code was + supplied + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG 6 A token had an invalid + signature + GSS_S_NO_CRED 7 No credentials were supplied + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 8 No context has been + established + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 9 A token was invalid + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 10 A credential was invalid + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 11 The referenced credentials + have expired + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 12 The context has expired + GSS_S_FAILURE 13 Miscellaneous failure + (see text) + + Table 5-3 Supplementary Status Bits + + Name Bit Number Meaning + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED 0 (LSB) The routine must be called + again to complete its + function. + See routine documentation for + detailed description. + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN 1 The token was a duplicate of + an earlier token + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 2 The token's validity period + has expired + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 3 A later token has already been + processed + + The routine documentation also uses the name GSS_S_COMPLETE, which is + a zero value, to indicate an absence of any API errors or + supplementary information bits. + + + + + +Wray [Page 9] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + All GSS_S_xxx symbols equate to complete OM_uint32 status codes, + rather than to bitfield values. For example, the actual value of the + symbol GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (value 3 in the routine error field) is 3 + << 16. + + The macros GSS_CALLING_ERROR(), GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR() and + GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO() are provided, each of which takes a GSS + status code and removes all but the relevant field. For example, the + value obtained by applying GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR to a status code removes + the calling errors and supplementary info fields, leaving only the + routine errors field. The values delivered by these macros may be + directly compared with a GSS_S_xxx symbol of the appropriate type. + The macro GSS_ERROR() is also provided, which when applied to a GSS + status code returns a non-zero value if the status code indicated a + calling or routine error, and a zero value otherwise. + + A GSSAPI implementation may choose to signal calling errors in a + platform-specific manner instead of, or in addition to the routine + value; routine errors and supplementary info should be returned via + routine status values only. + +2.1.9.2. Mechanism-specific status codes + + GSSAPI routines return a minor_status parameter, which is used to + indicate specialized errors from the underlying security mechanism. + This parameter may contain a single mechanism-specific error, + indicated by a OM_uint32 value. + + The minor_status parameter will always be set by a GSSAPI routine, + even if it returns a calling error or one of the generic API errors + indicated above as fatal, although other output parameters may remain + unset in such cases. However, output parameters that are expected to + return pointers to storage allocated by a routine must always set set + by the routine, even in the event of an error, although in such cases + the GSSAPI routine may elect to set the returned parameter value to + NULL to indicate that no storage was actually allocated. Any length + field associated with such pointers (as in a gss_buffer_desc + structure) should also be set to zero in such cases. + + The GSS status code GSS_S_FAILURE is used to indicate that the + underlying mechanism detected an error for which no specific GSS + status code is defined. The mechanism status code will provide more + details about the error. + +2.1.10. Names + + A name is used to identify a person or entity. GSSAPI authenticates + the relationship between a name and the entity claiming the name. + + + +Wray [Page 10] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Two distinct representations are defined for names: + + (a) A printable form, for presentation to a user + + (b) An internal form, for presentation at the API + + The syntax of a printable name is defined by the GSSAPI + implementation, and may be dependent on local system configuration, + or on individual user preference. The internal form provides a + canonical representation of the name that is independent of + configuration. + + A given GSSAPI implementation may support names drawn from multiple + namespaces. In such an implementation, the internal form of the name + must include fields that identify the namespace from which the name + is drawn. The namespace from which a printable name is drawn is + specified by an accompanying object identifier. + + Routines (gss_import_name and gss_display_name) are provided to + convert names between their printable representations and the + gss_name_t type. gss_import_name may support multiple syntaxes for + each supported namespace, allowing users the freedom to choose a + preferred name representation. gss_display_name should use an + implementation-chosen preferred syntax for each supported name-type. + + Comparison of internal-form names is accomplished via the + gss_compare_names routine. This removes the need for the application + program to understand the syntaxes of the various printable names + that a given GSSAPI implementation may support. + + Storage is allocated by routines that return gss_name_t values. A + procedure, gss_release_name, is provided to free storage associated + with a name. + +2.1.11. Channel Bindings + + GSSAPI supports the use of user-specified tags to identify a given + context to the peer application. These tags are used to identify the + particular communications channel that carries the context. Channel + bindings are communicated to the GSSAPI using the following + structure: + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 11] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + The initiator_addrtype and acceptor_addrtype fields denote the type + of addresses contained in the initiator_address and acceptor_address + buffers. The address type should be one of the following: + + GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC Unspecified address type + GSS_C_AF_LOCAL Host-local address type + GSS_C_AF_INET DARPA Internet address type + GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK ARPAnet IMP address type (eg IP) + GSS_C_AF_PUP pup protocols (eg BSP) address type + GSS_C_AF_CHAOS MIT CHAOS protocol address type + GSS_C_AF_NS XEROX NS address type + GSS_C_AF_NBS nbs address type + GSS_C_AF_ECMA ECMA address type + GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT datakit protocols address type + GSS_C_AF_CCITT CCITT protocols (eg X.25) + GSS_C_AF_SNA IBM SNA address type + GSS_C_AF_DECnet DECnet address type + GSS_C_AF_DLI Direct data link interface address type + GSS_C_AF_LAT LAT address type + GSS_C_AF_HYLINK NSC Hyperchannel address type + GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK AppleTalk address type + GSS_C_AF_BSC BISYNC 2780/3780 address type + GSS_C_AF_DSS Distributed system services address type + GSS_C_AF_OSI OSI TP4 address type + GSS_C_AF_X25 X25 + GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR No address specified + + Note that these name address families rather than specific addressing + formats. For address families that contain several alternative + address forms, the initiator_address and acceptor_address fields must + contain sufficient information to determine which address form is + used. When not otherwise specified, addresses should be specified in + network byte-order. + + Conceptually, the GSSAPI concatenates the initiator_addrtype, + initiator_address, acceptor_addrtype, acceptor_address and + application_data to form an octet string. The mechanism signs this + octet string, and binds the signature to the context establishment + token emitted by gss_init_sec_context. The same bindings are + presented by the context acceptor to gss_accept_sec_context, and a + + + +Wray [Page 12] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + signature is calculated in the same way. The calculated signature is + compared with that found in the token, and if the signatures differ, + gss_accept_sec_context will return a GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS error, and + the context will not be established. Some mechanisms may include the + actual channel binding data in the token (rather than just a + signature); applications should therefore not use confidential data + as channel-binding components. Individual mechanisms may impose + additional constraints on addresses and address types that may appear + in channel bindings. For example, a mechanism may verify that the + initiator_address field of the channel bindings presented to + gss_init_sec_context contains the correct network address of the host + system. + +2.1.12. Optional parameters + + Various parameters are described as optional. This means that they + follow a convention whereby a default value may be requested. The + following conventions are used for omitted parameters. These + conventions apply only to those parameters that are explicitly + documented as optional. + +2.1.12.1. gss_buffer_t types + + Specify GSS_C_NO_BUFFER as a value. For an input parameter this + signifies that default behavior is requested, while for an output + parameter it indicates that the information that would be returned + via the parameter is not required by the application. + +2.1.12.2. Integer types (input) + + Individual parameter documentation lists values to be used to + indicate default actions. + +2.1.12.3. Integer types (output) + + Specify NULL as the value for the pointer. + +2.1.12.4. Pointer types + + Specify NULL as the value. + +2.1.12.5. Object IDs + + Specify GSS_C_NULL_OID as the value. + +2.1.12.6. Object ID Sets + + Specify GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET as the value. + + + +Wray [Page 13] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +2.1.12.7. Credentials + + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to use the default credential handle. + +2.1.12.8. Channel Bindings + + Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS to indicate that channel bindings + are not to be used. + +3. GSSAPI routine descriptions + +2.1. gss_acquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + int cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_int32 * time_rec) + Purpose: + + Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing + credential by name. GSSAPI implementations must impose a local + access-control policy on callers of this routine to prevent + unauthorized callers from acquiring credentials to which they are not + entitled. This routine is not intended to provide a "login to the + network" function, as such a function would result in the creation of + new credentials rather than merely acquiring a handle to existing + credentials. Such functions, if required, should be defined in + implementation-specific extensions to the API. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may chooses to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g., by gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call + of gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of + gss_acquire_cred must return valid credential data, and may therefore + incur the overhead of a deferred credential acquisition. + + Parameters: + + desired_name gss_name_t, read + Name of principal whose credential + should be acquired + + + +Wray [Page 14] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + time_req integer, read + number of seconds that credentials + should remain valid + + desired_mechs Set of Object IDs, read + set of underlying security mechanisms that + may be used. GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET may be used + to obtain an implementation-specific default. + + cred_usage integer, read + GSS_C_BOTH - Credentials may be used + either to initiate or accept + security contexts. + GSS_C_INITIATE - Credentials will only be + used to initiate security + contexts. + GSS_C_ACCEPT - Credentials will only be used to + accept security contexts. + + output_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify + The returned credential handle. + + actual_mechs Set of Object IDs, modify, optional + The set of mechanisms for which the + credential is valid. Specify NULL + if not required. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid. If the + implementation does not support expiration of + credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will + be returned. Specify NULL if not required + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Unavailable mechanism requested + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE Type contained within desired_name parameter is + not supported + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME Value supplied for desired_name parameter is + + + +Wray [Page 15] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + ill-formed. + + GSS_S_FAILURE Unspecified failure. The minor_status parameter + contains more detailed information + +3.2. gss_release_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Informs GSSAPI that the specified credential handle is no longer + required by the process. When all processes have released a + credential, it will be deleted. + + Parameters: + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + buffer containing opaque credential + handle. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is supplied, + the default credential will be released + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED Credentials could not be accessed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 16] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +3.3. gss_init_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_name_t target_name, + gss_OID mech_type, + int req_flags, + int time_req, + gss_channel_bindings_t + input_chan_bindings, + gss_buffer_t input_token + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + int * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec ) + + Purpose: + + Initiates the establishment of a security context between the + application and a remote peer. Initially, the input_token parameter + should be specified as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER. The routine may return a + output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, + where the peer application will present it to gss_accept_sec_context. + If no token need be sent, gss_init_sec_context will indicate this by + setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To + complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + required from the peer application; if so, gss_init_sec_context will + return a status indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED in which case it + should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer + application, passing the token to gss_init_sec_context via the + input_token parameters. + + The values returned via the ret_flags and time_rec parameters are not + defined unless the routine returns GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + Parameters: + + claimant_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + handle for credentials claimed. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to use default + credentials. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned by first call in continuation calls. + + + +Wray [Page 17] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + target_name gss_name_t, read + Name of target + + mech_type OID, read, optional + Object ID of desired mechanism. Supply + GSS_C_NULL_OID to obtain an implementation + specific default + + req_flags bit-mask, read + Contains four independent flags, each of + which requests that the context support a + specific service option. Symbolic + names are provided for each flag, and the + symbolic names corresponding to the required + flags should be logically-ORed + together to form the bit-mask value. The + flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegate credentials to remote peer + False - Don't delegate + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Request that remote peer + authenticate itself + False - Authenticate self to remote peer + only + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - Enable replay detection for signed + or sealed messages + False - Don't attempt to detect + replayed messages + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - Enable detection of out-of-sequence + signed or sealed messages + False - Don't attempt to detect + out-of-sequence messages + + time_req integer, read + Desired number of seconds for which context + should remain valid. Supply 0 to request a + default validity period. + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. + + + + +Wray [Page 18] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + input_token buffer, opaque, read, optional (see text) + Token received from peer application. + Supply GSS_C_NO_BUFFER on initial call. + + actual_mech_type OID, modify + actual mechanism used. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be sent to peer application. If + the length field of the returned buffer is + zero, no token need be sent to the peer + application. + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify + Contains six independent flags, each of which + indicates that the context supports a specific + service option. Symbolic names are provided + for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags should be + logically-ANDed with the ret_flags value to test + whether a given option is supported by the + context. The flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Credentials were delegated to + the remote peer + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer has been asked to + authenticated itself + False - Remote peer has not been asked to + authenticate itself + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of signed or sealed messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence signed or sealed + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling seal routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + seal) available. seal will provide + message encapsulation, data-origin + + + +Wray [Page 19] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + authentication and integrity + services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_sign or gss_seal + routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + + time_rec integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. If the implementation does + not support credential expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer + application is required to complete thecontext, and + that gss_init_sec_context must be called again with + that token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for context + initiation, or the credential handle did not + reference any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel + bindings to those specified via the + input_chan_bindings parameter + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid signature, or a + signature that could not be verified + + + +Wray [Page 20] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error + during context establishment + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of + a token already processed. This is a fatal error + during context establishment. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did not + refer to a valid context + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The provided target_name parameter contained an + invalid or unsupported type of name + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided target_name parameter was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information + +3.4. gss_accept_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer + gss_channel_bindings_t + input_chan_bindings, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_OID * mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + int * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application + and a remote peer to be established. The routine may return a + output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, + where the peer application will present it to gss_init_sec_context. + If no token need be sent, gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this + by setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To + complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + required from the peer application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context + will return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in which case it + should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer + application, passing the token to gss_accept_sec_context via the + input_token parameters. + + + + +Wray [Page 21] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + The values returned via the src_name, ret_flags, time_rec, and + delegated_cred_handle parameters are not defined unless the routine + returns GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + Parameters: + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned in subsequent calls. + + verifier_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + Credential handle claimed by context + acceptor. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to use default + credentials. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is + specified, but the caller has no default + credentials established, an + implementation-defined default credential + may be used. + + input_token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token obtained from remote application + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. + + src_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + Authenticated name of context initiator. + After use, this name should be deallocated by + passing it to gss_release_name. If not required, + specify NULL. + + mech_type Object ID, modify + Security mechanism used. The returned + OID value will be a pointer into static + storage, and should be treated as read-only + by the caller. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + Token to be passed to peer application. If the + length field of the returned token buffer is 0, + then no token need be passed to the peer + application. + + + + +Wray [Page 22] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify + Contains six independent flags, each of + which indicates that the context supports a + specific service option. Symbolic names are + provided for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags + should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags + value to test whether a given option is + supported by the context. The flags are: + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegated credentials are available + via the delegated_cred_handle + parameter + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer asked for mutual + authentication + False - Remote peer did not ask for mutual + authentication + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of signed or sealed messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence signed or sealed + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling seal routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + seal) available. seal will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked + by calling either gss_sign or + gss_seal routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + + time_rec integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. Specify NULL if not required. + + + + +Wray [Page 23] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + delegated_cred_handle + gss_cred_id_t, modify + credential handle for credentials received from + context initiator. Only valid if deleg_flag in + ret_flags is true. + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer + application is required to complete the context, + and that gss_accept_sec_context must be called + again with that token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the input_token failed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for + context acceptance, or the credential handle + did not reference any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have + expired. + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel + bindings to those specified via the + input_chan_bindings parameter. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did + not refer to a valid context. + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid signature. + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal + error during context establishment. + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a + duplicate of a token already processed. This + is a fatal error during context establishment. + + + +Wray [Page 24] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.5. gss_process_context_token + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer) + + Purpose: + + Provides a way to pass a token to the security service. Usually, + tokens are associated either with context establishment (when they + would be passed to gss_init_sec_context or gss_accept_sec_context) or + with per-message security service (when they would be passed to + gss_verify or gss_unseal). Occasionally, tokens may be received at + other times, and gss_process_context_token allows such tokens to be + passed to the underlying security service for processing. At + present, such additional tokens may only be generated by + gss_delete_sec_context. GSSAPI implementation may use this service + to implement deletion of the security context. + + Parameters: + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + context handle of context on which token is to + be processed + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + pointer to first byte of token to process + + minor_status integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the token failed + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle did not refer to a valid + context + + + + +Wray [Page 25] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +3.6. gss_delete_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token) + + Purpose: + + Delete a security context. gss_delete_sec_context will delete the + local data structures associated with the specified security context, + and generate an output_token, which when passed to the peer + gss_process_context_token will instruct it to do likewise. No + further security services may be obtained using the context specified + by context_handle. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle identifying context to delete. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be sent to remote application to + instruct it to also delete the context + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure, see minor_status for more information + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT No valid context was supplied + +3.7. gss_context_time + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 * time_rec) + Purpose: + + Determines the number of seconds for which the specified context will + remain valid. + + + +Wray [Page 26] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context to be interrogated. + + time_rec integer, modify + Number of seconds that the context will remain + valid. If the context has already expired, + zero will be returned. + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + +3.8. gss_sign + + OM_uint32 gss_sign ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t msg_token) + Purpose: + + Generates a cryptographic signature for the supplied message, and + places the signature in a token for transfer to the peer application. + The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several cryptographic + algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + + + +Wray [Page 27] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + will be sent + + qop_req integer, read, optional + Specifies requested quality of protection. + Callers are encouraged, on portability grounds, + to accept the default quality of protection + offered by the chosen mechanism, which may be + requested by specifying GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT for + this parameter. If an unsupported protection + strength is requested, gss_sign will return a + major_status of GSS_S_FAILURE. + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be signed + + msg_token buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive token + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.9. gss_verify + + OM_uint32 gss_verify ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + int * qop_state) + Purpose: + + Verifies that a cryptographic signature, contained in the token + parameter, fits the supplied message. The qop_state parameter allows + a message recipient to determine the strength of protection that was + applied to the message. + + + +Wray [Page 28] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be verified + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token associated with message + + qop_state integer, modify + quality of protection gained from signature + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The signature was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but it had already + been processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but it is too old + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but has been + verified out of sequence; an earlier token has + been signed or sealed by the remote + application, but not yet been processed + locally. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + + + + +Wray [Page 29] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.10. gss_seal + + OM_uint32 gss_seal ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + int qop_req + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer) + + Purpose: + + Cryptographically signs and optionally encrypts the specified + input_message. The output_message contains both the signature and + the message. The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several + cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + will be sent + + conf_req_flag boolean, read + True - Both confidentiality and integrity + services are requested + False - Only integrity service is requested + + qop_req integer, read, optional + Specifies required quality of protection. A + mechanism-specific default may be requested by + setting qop_req to GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT. If an + unsupported protection strength is requested, + gss_seal will return a major_status of + GSS_S_FAILURE. + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be sealed + + + + +Wray [Page 30] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + conf_state boolean, modify + True - Confidentiality, data origin + authentication and integrity services + have been applied + False - Integrity and data origin services only + has been applied. + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive sealed message + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.11. gss_unseal + + OM_uint32 gss_unseal ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + int * qop_state) + + Purpose: + + Converts a previously sealed message back to a usable form, verifying + the embedded signature. The conf_state parameter indicates whether + the message was encrypted; the qop_state parameter indicates the + strength of protection that was used to provide the confidentiality + and integrity services. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + + +Wray [Page 31] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + sealed message + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive unsealed message + + conf_state boolean, modify + True - Confidentiality and integrity protection + were used + False - Inteegrity service only was used + + qop_state integer, modify + quality of protection gained from signature + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The signature was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a + correct signature for the message, but it had + already been processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but it is too old + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but has been + verified out of sequence; an earlier token has + been signed or sealed by the remote + application, but not yet been processed + locally. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + + + + +Wray [Page 32] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.12. gss_display_status + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + int status_value, + int status_type, + gss_OID mech_type, + int * message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSSAPI + status code, for display to the user or for logging purposes. Since + some status values may indicate multiple errors, applications may + need to call gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating + a single text string. The message_context parameter is used to + indicate which error message should be extracted from a given + status_value; message_context should be initialized to 0, and + gss_display_status will return a non-zero value if there are further + messages to extract. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + status_value integer, read + Status value to be converted + + status_type integer, read + GSS_C_GSS_CODE - status_value is a GSS status + code + GSS_C_MECH_CODE - status_value is a mechanism + status code + + mech_type Object ID, read, optional + Underlying mechanism (used to interpret a + minor status value) Supply GSS_C_NULL_OID to + obtain the system default. + + message_context integer, read/modify + Should be initialized to zero by caller + + + +Wray [Page 33] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + on first call. If further messages are + contained in the status_value parameter, + message_context will be non-zero on return, + and this value should be passed back to + subsequent calls, along with the same + status_value, status_type and mech_type + parameters. + + status_string buffer, character string, modify + textual interpretation of the status_value + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Indicates that translation in accordance with + an unsupported mechanism type was requested + + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS The status value was not recognized, or the + status type was neither GSS_C_GSS_CODE nor + GSS_C_MECH_CODE. + + +3.13. gss_indicate_mechs + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * mech_set) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to determine which underlying security + mechanisms are available. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + mech_set set of Object IDs, modify + set of implementation-supported mechanisms. + The returned gss_OID_set value will be a + pointer into static storage, and should be + treated as read-only by the caller. + + + + + +Wray [Page 34] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +3.14. gss_compare_name + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t name1, + gss_name_t name2, + int * name_equal) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to compare two internal-form names to determine + whether they refer to the same entity. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + name1 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name2 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name_equal boolean, modify + True - names refer to same entity + False - names refer to different entities + (strictly, the names are not known to + refer to the same identity). + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The type contained within either name1 or + name2 was unrecognized, or the names were of + incomparable types. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME One or both of name1 or name2 was ill-formed + + + + + +Wray [Page 35] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +3.15. gss_display_name + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID * output_name_type) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque + internal-form name for display purposes. The syntax of a printable + name is defined by the GSSAPI implementation. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + input_name gss_name_t, read + name to be displayed + + output_name_buffer buffer, character-string, modify + buffer to receive textual name string + + output_name_type Object ID, modify + The type of the returned name. The returned + gss_OID will be a pointer into static storage, + and should be treated as read-only by the caller + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The type of input_name was not recognized + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME input_name was ill-formed + +3.16. gss_import_name + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t * output_name) + + + + +Wray [Page 36] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Purpose: + + Convert a printable name to internal form. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name_buffer buffer, character-string, read + buffer containing printable name to convert + + input_name_type Object ID, read, optional + Object Id specifying type of printable + name. Applications may specify either + GSS_C_NULL_OID to use a local system-specific + printable syntax, or an OID registered by the + GSSAPI implementation to name a particular + namespace. + + output_name gss_name_t, modify + returned name in internal form + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The input_name_type was unrecognized + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The input_name parameter could not be + interpreted as a name of the specified type + +3.17. gss_release_name + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t * name) + + Purpose: + + Free GSSAPI-allocated storage associated with an internal form name. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + + +Wray [Page 37] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + name gss_name_t, modify + The name to be deleted + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The name parameter did not contain a valid name + +3.18. gss_release_buffer + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer) + + Purpose: + + Free storage associated with a buffer format name. The storage must + have been allocated by a GSSAPI routine. In addition to freeing the + associated storage, the routine will zero the length field in the + buffer parameter. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + buffer buffer, modify + The storage associated with the buffer will be + deleted. The gss_buffer_desc object will not + be freed, but its length field will be zeroed. + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +3.19. gss_release_oid_set + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * set) + + Purpose: + + + + +Wray [Page 38] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Free storage associated with a gss_OID_set object. The storage must + have been allocated by a GSSAPI routine. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + set Set of Object IDs, modify + The storage associated with the gss_OID_set + will be deleted. + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +3.20. gss_inquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime, + int * cred_usage, + gss_OID_set * mechanisms ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains information about a credential. The caller must already have + obtained a handle that refers to the credential. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the target credential. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to inquire about + the default credential. + + name gss_name_t, modify + The name whose identity the credential asserts. + Specify NULL if not required. + + lifetime Integer, modify + + + +Wray [Page 39] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain valid. If the credential has + expired, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support + credential expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + cred_usage Integer, modify + How the credential may be used. One of the + following: + GSS_C_INITIATE + GSS_C_ACCEPT + GSS_C_BOTH + Specify NULL if not required. + + mechanisms gss_OID_set, modify + Set of mechanisms supported by the credential. + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The referenced credentials could not be + accessed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL The referenced credentials were + invalid. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. + If the lifetime parameter was not passed as + NULL, it will be set to 0. + + + #ifndef GSSAPI_H_ + #define GSSAPI_H_ + + /* + * First, define the platform-dependent types. + */ + typedef OM_uint32; + typedef gss_ctx_id_t; + typedef gss_cred_id_t; + typedef gss_name_t; + + + + +Wray [Page 40] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + /* + * Note that a platform supporting the xom.h X/Open header file + * may make use of that header for the definitions of OM_uint32 + * and the structure to which gss_OID_desc equates. + */ + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + int count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + + /* + * Six independent flags each of which indicates that a context + * supports a specific service option. + */ + #define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 1 + #define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 2 + #define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 4 + #define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 8 + #define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 16 + #define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 32 + + + /* + * Credential usage options + */ + #define GSS_C_BOTH 0 + #define GSS_C_INITIATE 1 + #define GSS_C_ACCEPT 2 + + + +Wray [Page 41] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + /* + * Status code types for gss_display_status + */ + #define GSS_C_GSS_CODE 1 + #define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2 + + /* + * The constant definitions for channel-bindings address families + */ + #define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC 0; + #define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL 1; + #define GSS_C_AF_INET 2; + #define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK 3; + #define GSS_C_AF_PUP 4; + #define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS 5; + #define GSS_C_AF_NS 6; + #define GSS_C_AF_NBS 7; + #define GSS_C_AF_ECMA 8; + #define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT 9; + #define GSS_C_AF_CCITT 10; + #define GSS_C_AF_SNA 11; + #define GSS_C_AF_DECnet 12; + #define GSS_C_AF_DLI 13; + #define GSS_C_AF_LAT 14; + #define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK 15; + #define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK 16; + #define GSS_C_AF_BSC 17; + #define GSS_C_AF_DSS 18; + #define GSS_C_AF_OSI 19; + #define GSS_C_AF_X25 21; + + #define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR 255; + + #define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID ((gss_OID) 0) + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL} + + /* + * Define the default Quality of Protection for per-message + * services. Note that an implementation that offers multiple + * levels of QOP may either reserve a value (for example zero, + * as assumed here) to mean "default protection", or alternatively + * may simply equate GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT to a specific explicit QOP + * value. + + + +Wray [Page 42] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + */ + #define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0 + + /* + * Expiration time of 2^32-1 seconds means infinite lifetime for a + * credential or security context + */ + #define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful + + + /* Major status codes */ + + #define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0 + + /* + * Some "helper" definitions to make the status code macros obvious. + */ + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24 + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16 + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0 + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul + + /* + * The macros that test status codes for error conditions + */ + #define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK << GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ERROR(x) \ + ((GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) != 0) || (GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) != 0)) + + + /* + * Now the actual status code definitions + */ + + /* + * Calling errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ \ + (1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE \ + (2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + + + +Wray [Page 43] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + #define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE \ + (3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Routine errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_BAD_MECH (1ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAME (2ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (3ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS (4ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS (5ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_SIG (6ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NO_CRED (7ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT (8ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN (9ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED (11ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (12ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_FAILURE (13ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Supplementary info bits: + */ + #define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0)) + #define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1)) + #define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2)) + #define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3)) + + + /* + * Finally, function prototypes for the GSSAPI routines. + */ + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t, /* desired_name */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + gss_OID_set, /* desired_mechs */ + int, /* cred_usage */ + gss_cred_id_t*, /* output_cred_handle */ + gss_OID_set*, /* actual_mechs */ + OM_uint32* /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred, + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t* /* cred_handle */ + ); + + + +Wray [Page 44] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t, /* claimant_cred_handle */ + gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ + gss_name_t, /* target_name */ + gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + int, /* req_flags */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_token */ + gss_OID*, /* actual_mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + int*, /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32* /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ + gss_cred_id_t, /* verifier_cred_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_token_buffer */ + gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + gss_name_t*, /* src_name */ + gss_OID*, /* mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + int*, /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32*, /* time_rec */ + gss_cred_id_t* /* delegated_cred_handle */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* token_buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_token */ + ); + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 45] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + OM_uint32* /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t /* message_token */ + ); + + OM_uitn32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* token_buffer */ + int* /* qop_state */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + int*, /* conf_state */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_message_buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_message_buffer */ + int*, /* conf_state */ + int* /* qop_state */ + ); + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 46] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + OM_uint32, /* status_value */ + int, /* status_type */ + gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + int*, /* message_context */ + gss_buffer_t /* status_string */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set* /* mech_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t, /* name1 */ + gss_name_t, /* name2 */ + int* /* name_equal */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name, + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_name_buffer */ + gss_OID* /* output_name_type */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_name_buffer */ + gss_OID, /* input_name_type */ + gss_name_t* /* output_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t* /* input_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_buffer_t /* buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set* /* set */ + + + +Wray [Page 47] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t, /* cred_handle */ + gss_name_t *, /* name */ + OM_uint32 *, /* lifetime */ + int *, /* cred_usage */ + gss_OID_set * /* mechanisms */ + ); + + + + #endif /* GSSAPI_H_ */ + +References + + [1] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface", RFC 1508, Geer Zolot Associate, September 1993. + + [2] "OSI Object Management API Specification, Version 2.0 t", X.400 + API Association & X/Open Company Limited, August 24, 1990. + Specification of datatypes and routines for manipulating + information objects. + +Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +Author's Address + + John Wray + Digital Equipment Corporation + 550 King Street, LKG2-2/AA6 + Littleton, MA 01460 + USA + + Phone: +1-508-486-5210 + EMail: Wray@tuxedo.enet.dec.com + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 48] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc810cc506 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6275 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Kohl +Request for Comments: 1510 Digital Equipment Corporation + C. Neuman + ISI + September 1993 + + + The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status + of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This document gives an overview and specification of Version 5 of the + protocol for the Kerberos network authentication system. Version 4, + described elsewhere [1,2], is presently in production use at MIT's + Project Athena, and at other Internet sites. + +Overview + + Project Athena, Athena, Athena MUSE, Discuss, Hesiod, Kerberos, + Moira, and Zephyr are trademarks of the Massachusetts Institute of + Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these trademarks may be made + without prior written permission of MIT. + + This RFC describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos + network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 + of the Kerberos protocol. + + The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design + decisions are treated cursorily; for Version 4 they are fully + described in the Kerberos portion of the Athena Technical Plan [1]. + The protocols are under review, and are not being submitted for + consideration as an Internet standard at this time. Comments are + encouraged. Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for + discussion of Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to + kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. This mailing list is gatewayed onto the + Usenet as the group comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further + information, including documents and code availability, may be sent + to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 1] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +Background + + The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's + trusted third-party authentication protocol [3] and on modifications + suggested by Denning and Sacco [4]. The original design and + implementation of Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two + former Project Athena staff members, Steve Miller of Digital + Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman (now at the Information + Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California), along + with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project Athena, and + Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members of + Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos. + Version 4 is publicly available, and has seen wide use across the + Internet. + + Version 5 (described in this document) has evolved from Version 4 + based on new requirements and desires for features not available in + Version 4. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 + and 5 can be found in [5]. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................... 5 + 1.1. Cross-Realm Operation ............................ 7 + 1.2. Environmental assumptions ........................ 8 + 1.3. Glossary of terms ................................ 9 + 2. Ticket flag uses and requests ...................... 12 + 2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets ............ 12 + 2.2. Invalid tickets .................................. 12 + 2.3. Renewable tickets ................................ 12 + 2.4. Postdated tickets ................................ 13 + 2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets ...................... 14 + 2.6. Forwardable tickets .............................. 15 + 2.7. Other KDC options ................................ 15 + 3. Message Exchanges .................................. 16 + 3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange .............. 16 + 3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message ............... 17 + 3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message .................. 17 + 3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message ............... 17 + 3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message ................ 19 + 3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message .................. 19 + 3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message ................... 20 + 3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange ........ 20 + 3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message ......................... 20 + 3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message ............. 20 + 3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message .................. 21 + 3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message ............. 23 + 3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message .................. 23 + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 2] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + 3.2.6. Using the encryption key ....................... 24 + 3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange ....... 24 + 3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message .............. 25 + 3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message ................. 26 + 3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message .............. 27 + 3.3.3.1. Encoding the transited field ................. 29 + 3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message ................. 31 + 3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange ............................ 31 + 3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message ............... 31 + 3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message .................... 32 + 3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange ............................ 33 + 3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message ............... 33 + 3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message .................... 33 + 3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange ............................ 34 + 3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message ............... 34 + 3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message .................... 34 + 4. The Kerberos Database .............................. 35 + 4.1. Database contents ................................ 35 + 4.2. Additional fields ................................ 36 + 4.3. Frequently Changing Fields ....................... 37 + 4.4. Site Constants ................................... 37 + 5. Message Specifications ............................. 38 + 5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation ...... 38 + 5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions ........................... 38 + 5.3. Tickets and Authenticators ....................... 42 + 5.3.1. Tickets ........................................ 42 + 5.3.2. Authenticators ................................. 47 + 5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges ...... 49 + 5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition ......................... 49 + 5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition ......................... 56 + 5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications ........ 58 + 5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition .......................... 58 + 5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition .......................... 60 + 5.5.3. Error message reply ............................ 61 + 5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification ................... 61 + 5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition ............................ 61 + 5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification ................... 62 + 5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition ............................ 62 + 5.8. KRB_CRED message specification ................... 63 + 5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition ............................ 63 + 5.9. Error message specification ...................... 65 + 5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition ........................... 66 + 6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications ............. 67 + 6.1. Encryption Specifications ........................ 68 + 6.2. Encryption Keys .................................. 71 + 6.3. Encryption Systems ............................... 71 + 6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) .............. 71 + 6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (descbc-crc)71 + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 3] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + 6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (descbc-md4) 72 + 6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (descbc-md5) 72 + 6.4. Checksums ........................................ 74 + 6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) .................... 74 + 6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) ................. 75 + 6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + (rsa-md4-des) ......................................... 75 + 6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) ................. 76 + 6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + (rsa-md5-des) ......................................... 76 + 6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + 6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) ........................... 77 + 6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative + (des-mac-k) ........................................... 77 + 7. Naming Constraints ................................. 78 + 7.1. Realm Names ...................................... 77 + 7.2. Principal Names .................................. 79 + 7.2.1. Name of server principals ...................... 80 + 8. Constants and other defined values ................. 80 + 8.1. Host address types ............................... 80 + 8.2. KDC messages ..................................... 81 + 8.2.1. IP transport ................................... 81 + 8.2.2. OSI transport .................................. 82 + 8.2.3. Name of the TGS ................................ 82 + 8.3. Protocol constants and associated values ......... 82 + 9. Interoperability requirements ...................... 86 + 9.1. Specification 1 .................................. 86 + 9.2. Recommended KDC values ........................... 88 + 10. Acknowledgments ................................... 88 + 11. References ........................................ 89 + 12. Security Considerations ........................... 90 + 13. Authors' Addresses ................................ 90 + A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing ................ 91 + A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation ............................ 91 + A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation 92 + A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification .......................... 95 + A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks ......... 96 + A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation ........................... 97 + A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation 98 + A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification ......................... 104 + A.8. Authenticator generation ......................... 104 + A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation ............................ 105 + A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification ......................... 105 + A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation ........................... 106 + A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification ......................... 107 + A.13. KRB_SAFE generation ............................. 107 + A.14. KRB_SAFE verification ........................... 108 + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 4] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks ............. 108 + A.16. KRB_PRIV generation ............................. 109 + A.17. KRB_PRIV verification ........................... 110 + A.18. KRB_CRED generation ............................. 110 + A.19. KRB_CRED verification ........................... 111 + A.20. KRB_ERROR generation ............................ 112 + +1. Introduction + + Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, + (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open + (unprotected) network. This is accomplished without relying on + authentication by the host operating system, without basing trust on + host addresses, without requiring physical security of all the hosts + on the network, and under the assumption that packets traveling along + the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will. (Note, + however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon the + initiation of a stream-based network connection, and assume the + absence of any "hijackers" who might subvert such a connection. Such + use implicitly trusts the host addresses involved.) Kerberos + performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted third- + party authentication service by using conventional cryptography, + i.e., shared secret key. (shared secret key - Secret and private are + often used interchangeably in the literature. In our usage, it takes + two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key is a secret + key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows it. + Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private + key.) + + The authentication process proceeds as follows: A client sends a + request to the authentication server (AS) requesting "credentials" + for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, + encrypted in the client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a + "ticket" for the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often + called a "session key"). The client transmits the ticket (which + contains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, all + encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session key (now + shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the client, + and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also + be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or + to exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further + communication. + + The implementation consists of one or more authentication servers + running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers + maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their + secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the + Kerberos protocol. In order to add authentication to its + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 5] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + transactions, a typical network application adds one or two calls to + the Kerberos library, which results in the transmission of the + necessary messages to achieve authentication. + + The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or + exchanges). There are two methods by which a client can ask a + Kerberos server for credentials. In the first approach, the client + sends a cleartext request for a ticket for the desired server to the + AS. The reply is sent encrypted in the client's secret key. Usually + this request is for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) which can later be + used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). In the second method, + the client sends a request to the TGS. The client sends the TGT to + the TGS in the same manner as if it were contacting any other + application server which requires Kerberos credentials. The reply is + encrypted in the session key from the TGT. + + Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the + principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages + exchanged between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The + application is free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + + To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the + client transmits the ticket to the server. Since the ticket is sent + "in the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption + doesn't thwart replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an + attacker, additional information is sent to prove that the message + was originated by the principal to whom the ticket was issued. This + information (called the authenticator) is encrypted in the session + key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp proves that the message + was recently generated and is not a replay. Encrypting the + authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated by a + party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting + principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over + the network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + + The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also + be guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and + contained in the credentials). This approach provides detection of + both replay attacks and message stream modification attacks. It is + accomplished by generating and transmitting a collision-proof + checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest function) of the client's + message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and integrity of the + messages exchanged between principals can be secured by encrypting + the data to be passed using the session key passed in the ticket, and + contained in the credentials. + + The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access + to the Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 6] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + database must be modified, such as when adding new principals or + changing a principal's key. This is done using a protocol between a + client and a third Kerberos server, the Kerberos Administration + Server (KADM). The administration protocol is not described in this + document. There is also a protocol for maintaining multiple copies of + the Kerberos database, but this can be considered an implementation + detail and may vary to support different database technologies. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + + The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational + boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a + server in another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos + server establishes its own "realm". The name of the realm in which a + client is registered is part of the client's name, and can be used by + the end-service to decide whether to honor a request. + + By establishing "inter-realm" keys, the administrators of two realms + can allow a client authenticated in the local realm to use its + authentication remotely (Of course, with appropriate permission the + client could arrange registration of a separately-named principal in + a remote realm, and engage in normal exchanges with that realm's + services. However, for even small numbers of clients this becomes + cumbersome, and more automatic methods as described here are + necessary). The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key may be + used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of + each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able + to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket- + granting service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting + ticket is used, the remote ticket-granting service uses the inter- + realm key (which usually differs from its own normal TGS key) to + decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, and is thus certain that it was + issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets issued by the remote ticket- + granting service will indicate to the end-service that the client was + authenticated from another realm. + + A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms + share an inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm + key with an intermediate realm that communicates with the remote + realm. An authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms + that are transited in communicating from one realm to another. + + Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a + key with its parent and a different key with each child. If an + inter-realm key is not directly shared by two realms, the + hierarchical organization allows an authentication path to be easily + constructed. If a hierarchical organization is not used, it may be + necessary to consult some database in order to construct an + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 7] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authentication path between realms. + + Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may + be bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate + authentication paths (these might be established to make + communication between two realms more efficient). It is important + for the end-service to know which realms were transited when deciding + how much faith to place in the authentication process. To facilitate + this decision, a field in each ticket contains the names of the + realms that were involved in authenticating the client. + +1.2. Environmental assumptions + + Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can + properly function: + + + "Denial of service" attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There + are places in these protocols where an intruder intruder can + prevent an application from participating in the proper + authentication steps. Detection and solution of such attacks + (some of which can appear to be not-uncommon "normal" failure + modes for the system) is usually best left to the human + administrators and users. + + + Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder + somehow steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade + as that principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate + principal. + + + "Password guessing" attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a + user chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a + dictionary, messages obtained which are encrypted under a key + derived from the user's password. + + + Each host on the network must have a clock which is "loosely + synchronized" to the time of the other hosts; this + synchronization is used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of + application servers when they do replay detection. The degree + of "looseness" can be configured on a per-server basis. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock + synchronization protocol must itself be secured from network + attackers. + + + Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists + (ACLs) to grant permissions to particular principals. If a + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 8] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + stale ACL entry remains for a deleted principal and the + principal identifier is reused, the new principal will inherit + rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not re-using + principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + +1.3. Glossary of terms + + Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + + + Authentication Verifying the claimed identity of a + principal. + + + Authentication header A record containing a Ticket and an + Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication + process. + + + Authentication path A sequence of intermediate realms transited + in the authentication process when + communicating from one realm to another. + + Authenticator A record containing information that can + be shown to have been recently generated + using the session key known only by the + client and server. + + + Authorization The process of determining whether a + client may use a service, which objects + the client is allowed to access, and the + type of access allowed for each. + + + Capability A token that grants the bearer permission + to access an object or service. In + Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose + use is restricted by the contents of the + authorization data field, but which + lists no network addresses, together + with the session key necessary to use + the ticket. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 9] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Ciphertext The output of an encryption function. + Encryption transforms plaintext into + ciphertext. + + + Client A process that makes use of a network + service on behalf of a user. Note that + in some cases a Server may itself be a + client of some other server (e.g., a + print server may be a client of a file + server). + + + Credentials A ticket plus the secret session key + necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. + + + KDC Key Distribution Center, a network service + that supplies tickets and temporary + session keys; or an instance of that + service or the host on which it runs. + The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The + initial ticket portion is sometimes + referred to as the Authentication Server + (or service). The ticket-granting + ticket portion is sometimes referred to + as the ticket-granting server (or service). + + Kerberos Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding + Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the + protocol used by that service, or the + code used to implement the authentication + service. + + + Plaintext The input to an encryption function or + the output of a decryption function. + Decryption transforms ciphertext into + plaintext. + + + Principal A uniquely named client or server + instance that participates in a network + communication. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 10] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Principal identifier The name used to uniquely identify each + different principal. + + + Seal To encipher a record containing several + fields in such a way that the fields + cannot be individually replaced without + either knowledge of the encryption key + or leaving evidence of tampering. + + + Secret key An encryption key shared by a principal + and the KDC, distributed outside the + bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. + In the case of a human user's + principal, the secret key is derived + from a password. + + + Server A particular Principal which provides a + resource to network clients. + + + Service A resource provided to network clients; + often provided by more than one server + (for example, remote file service). + + + Session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, with a lifetime limited + to the duration of a single login "session". + + + Sub-session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, selected and exchanged + by the principals using the session key, + and with a lifetime limited to the duration + of a single association. + + + Ticket A record that helps a client authenticate + itself to a server; it contains the + client's identity, a session key, a + timestamp, and other information, all + sealed using the server's secret key. + It only serves to authenticate a client + when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 11] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + + Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to + indicate various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be + requested by a client when the ticket is obtained; some are + automatically turned on and off by a Kerberos server as required. + The following sections explain what the various flags mean, and gives + examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + + The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS + protocol and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. + Application servers that want to require the knowledge of a client's + secret key (e.g., a passwordchanging program) can insist that this + flag be set in any tickets they accept, and thus be assured that the + client's key was recently presented to the application client. + + The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information + about the initial authentication, regardless of whether the current + ticket was issued directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) + or issued on the basis of a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the + INITIAL flag is clear, but the PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are + carried forward from the ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + + The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application + servers must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated + ticket will usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be + validated by the KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a + TGS request with the VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only + validate tickets after their starttime has passed. The validation is + required so that postdated tickets which have been stolen before + their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid (through a hot- + list mechanism). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + + Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long + periods of time. However, this can expose their credentials to + potential theft for equally long periods, and those stolen + credentials would be valid until the expiration time of the + ticket(s). Simply using shortlived tickets and obtaining new ones + periodically would require the client to have long-term access to its + secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be used to + mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two + "expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 12] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + ticket expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an + individual expiration time. An application client must periodically + (i.e., before it expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with + the RENEW option set in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new + ticket with a new session key and a later expiration time. All other + fields of the ticket are left unmodified by the renewal process. + When the latest permissible expiration time arrives, the ticket + expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a hot-list + to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last + renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the + usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can + usually be ignored by application servers. However, some + particularly careful application servers may wish to disallow + renewable tickets. + + If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC + will not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, + but a client may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option + in the KRB_AS_REQ message. If it is set, then the renew-till field + in the ticket contains the time after which the ticket may not be + renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + + Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much + later, e.g., a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid + at the time the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to + hold valid tickets in a batch queue, since they will be on-line + longer and more prone to theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to + obtain these tickets from the KDC at job submission time, but to + leave them "dormant" until they are activated and validated by a + further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported in the + interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief + would be foiled. + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + This flag must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a + postdated ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by + default; it may be requested by a client by setting the ALLOW- + POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow + a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting ticket; postdated + ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting the + postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) + of a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket- + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 13] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + granting ticket at the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE + option is also set, in which case it can be the full life (endtime- + starttime) of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how far + in the future a ticket may be postdated. + + The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The + application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see + when the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose + to reject postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a + certain period after the original authentication. When the KDC issues + a POSTDATED ticket, it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the + application client must present the ticket to the KDC to be validated + before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + + At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to + perform an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take + on the identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A + principal can allow a service to take on the principal's identity for + a particular purpose by granting it a proxy. + + The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + When set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to + issue a new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a + different network address based on this ticket. This flag is set by + default. + + This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a + remote request on its behalf, e.g., a print service client can give + the print server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular + file server in order to satisfy a print request. + + In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos + tickets are usually valid from only those network addresses + specifically included in the ticket (It is permissible to request or + issue tickets with no network addresses specified, but we do not + recommend it). For this reason, a client wishing to grant a proxy + must request a new ticket valid for the network address of the + service to be granted the proxy. + + The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a + proxy ticket. Application servers may check this flag and require + additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in + order to provide an audit trail. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 14] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + + Authentication forwarding is an instance of the proxy case where the + service is granted complete use of the client's identity. An example + where it might be used is when a user logs in to a remote system and + wants authentication to work from that system as if the login were + local. + + The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + The FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the + PROXIABLE flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued + with different network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but + users may request that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in + the AS request when they request their initial ticket-granting + ticket. + + This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the + user to enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then + authentication forwarding is not permitted, but the same end result + can still be achieved if the user engages in the AS exchange with the + requested network addresses and supplies a password. + + The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket + with the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests it be set by specifying + the FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new + ticket. It is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with + the FORWARDED flag set. Application servers may wish to process + FORWARDED tickets differently than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + + There are two additional options which may be set in a client's + request of the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the + client will accept a renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested + life cannot otherwise be provided. If a ticket with the requested + life cannot be provided, then the KDC may issue a renewable ticket + with a renew-till equal to the the requested endtime. The value of + the renew-till field may still be adjusted by site-determined limits + or limits imposed by the individual principal or server. + + The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting + service. It indicates that the to-be-issued ticket for the end + server is to be encrypted in the session key from the additional + ticket-granting ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 + for specific details. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 15] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +3. Message Exchanges + + The following sections describe the interactions between network + clients and servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the + Kerberos Authentication Server is usually initiated by a client when + it wishes to obtain authentication credentials for a given server but + currently holds no credentials. The client's secret key is used for + encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the + initiation of a login session, to obtain credentials for a Ticket- + Granting Server, which will subsequently be used to obtain + credentials for other servers (see section 3.3) without requiring + further use of the client's secret key. This exchange is also used + to request credentials for services which must not be mediated + through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a principal's + secret key, such as the password-changing service. (The password- + changing request must not be honored unless the requester can provide + the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it + would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended session and + change another user's password.) This exchange does not by itself + provide any assurance of the the identity of the user. (To + authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials + obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to + obtain credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then + be verified by the local server through successful completion of the + Client/Server exchange.) + + The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to + Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these + messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + + In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and + the identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. + The response, KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present + to the server, and a session key that will be shared by the client + and the server. The session key and additional information are + encrypted in the client's secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message + contains information which can be used to detect replays, and to + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 16] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + associate it with the message to which it replies. Various errors + can occur; these are indicated by an error response (KRB_ERROR) + instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not + encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can + be used to associate it with the message to which it replies. The + lack of encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to + detect replays or fabrications of such messages. + + In the normal case the authentication server does not know whether + the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply + sends a reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. + This is acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity + was given in the request will be able to use the reply. Its critical + information is encrypted in that principal's key. The initial + request supports an optional field that can be used to pass + additional information that might be needed for the initial exchange. + This field may be used for preauthentication if desired, but the + mechanism is not currently specified. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + + The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. + Among these options are whether preauthentication is to be performed; + whether the requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or + forwardable; whether it should be postdated or allow postdating of + derivative tickets; and whether a renewable ticket will be accepted + in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the requested ticket expiration + date cannot be satisfied by a nonrenewable ticket (due to + configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 for + pseudocode. + + The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + + If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in + the creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. + The format for the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The + contents of the ticket are determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + + The authentication server looks up the client and server principals + named in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective + keys. If required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if + the pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate + the requested encryption type, an error message with code + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 17] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP is returned. Otherwise it generates a "random" + session key ("Random" means that, among other things, it should be + impossible to guess the next session key based on knowledge of past + session keys. This can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number + generator if it is based on cryptographic principles. It would be + more desirable to use a truly random number generator, such as one + based on measurements of random physical phenomena.). + + If the requested start time is absent or indicates a time in the + past, then the start time of the ticket is set to the authentication + server's current time. If it indicates a time in the future, but the + POSTDATED option has not been specified, then the error + KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise the requested start + time is checked against the policy of the local realm (the + administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of + postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set + as requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The + postdated ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the + KDC after the start time has been reached. + + The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the + following: + + +The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ + message. + + +The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the client principal (the authentication + server's database includes a maximum ticket lifetime field + in each principal's record; see section 4). + + +The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the server principal. + + +The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + + If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined + above) is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error + message with code KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested + expiration time for the ticket exceeds what was determined as above, + and if the "RENEWABLE-OK" option was requested, then the "RENEWABLE" + flag is set in the new ticket, and the renew-till value is set as if + the "RENEWABLE" option were requested (the field and option names are + described fully in section 5.4.1). If the RENEWABLE option has been + requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has been set and a renewable + ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field is set to the + minimum of: + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 18] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + +Its requested value. + + +The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two + maximum renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' + database entries. + + +The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable + lifetime set by the policy of the local realm. + + The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set + if they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm + allows: FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. + If the new ticket is postdated (the start time is in the future), its + INVALID flag will also be set. + + If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message + (see section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the + caddr of the response, placing any required pre-authentication data + into the padata of the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in + the client's key using the requested encryption method, and sends it + to the client. See section A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + + Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by + returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the + error-code and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error + message contents and details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + + If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies + that the cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the + reply match what it requested. If any padata fields are present, + they may be used to derive the proper secret key to decrypt the + message. The client decrypts the encrypted part of the response + using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the encrypted part + matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect replays). It + also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match those + in the request, and that the host address field is also correct. It + then stores the ticket, session key, start and expiration times, and + other information for later use. The key-expiration field from the + encrypted part of the response may be checked to notify the user of + impending key expiration (the client program could then suggest + remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 for + pseudocode. + + Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 19] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + verify the identity of the user; the user and an attacker could + cooperate to generate a KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts + properly but is not from the proper KDC. If the host wishes to + verify the identity of the user, it must require the user to present + application credentials which can be verified using a securely-stored + secret key. If those credentials can be verified, then the identity + of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + + If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it + as an error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are + necessary to recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 + [optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network + applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. + The client must have already acquired credentials for the server + using the AS or TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + + The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be + part of the first message in an authenticated transaction. It + contains a ticket, an authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping + information (see section 5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by + itself is insufficient to authenticate a client, since tickets are + passed across the network in cleartext(Tickets contain both an + encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext here refers to the + entire unit, which can be copied from one message and replayed in + another without any cryptographic skill.), so the authenticator is + used to prevent invalid replay of tickets by proving to the server + that the client knows the session key of the ticket and thus is + entitled to use it. The KRB_AP_REQ message is referred to elsewhere + as the "authentication header." + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + + When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it + obtains (either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 20] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + TGS exchange) a ticket and session key for the desired service. The + client may re-use any tickets it holds until they expire. The client + then constructs a new Authenticator from the the system time, its + name, and optionally an application specific checksum, an initial + sequence number to be used in KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a + session subkey to be used in negotiations for a session key unique to + this particular session. Authenticators may not be re-used and will + be rejected if replayed to a server (Note that this can make + applications based on unreliable transports difficult to code + correctly, if the transport might deliver duplicated messages. In + such cases, a new authenticator must be generated for each retry.). + If a sequence number is to be included, it should be randomly chosen + so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is not likely + to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + + The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the + use of a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) + in the ap-options field of the message. + + The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with + the ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the + end server along with any additional application-specific + information. See section A.9 for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + + Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks + must be loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. + Several errors are possible. If an error occurs, the server is + expected to reply to the client with a KRB_ERROR message. This + message may be encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" + form is not acceptable to the protocol. The format of error messages + is described in section 5.9.1. + + The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. + If the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket + in the KRB_AP_REQ is not one the server can use (e.g., it indicates + an old key, and the server no longer possesses a copy of the old + key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE- + SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it indicates to the + server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from the + server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key (This is + used for user-to-user authentication as described in [6]). Since it + is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms, with + different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion + of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key + the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 21] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + error code is returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to + decipher the ticket. + + The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key + specified by the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a + modification of the ticket (each encryption system must provide + safeguards to detect modified ciphertext; see section 6), the + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned (chances are good that + different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + + The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from + the decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, + the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm + of the client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in + the authenticator. If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH + error is returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong + session key was used to encrypt the authenticator). The addresses in + the ticket (if any) are then searched for an address matching the + operating-system reported address of the client. If no match is + found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are present + in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + + If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator + differ by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. If the server name, along with + the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator + match any recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is + returned (Note that the rejection here is restricted to + authenticators from the same principal to the same server. Other + client principals communicating with the same server principal should + not be have their authenticators rejected if the time and microsecond + fields happen to match some other client's authenticator.). The + server must remember any authenticator presented within the allowable + clock skew, so that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a + server loses track of any authenticator presented within the + allowable clock skew, it must reject all requests until the clock + skew interval has passed. This assures that any lost or re-played + authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew and can no + longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an attacker + could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator sent over the + network to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as the + disabled host, and replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the + authentication.). If a sequence number is provided in the + authenticator, the server saves it for later use in processing + KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is present, the + server either saves it for later use or uses it to help generate its + own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 22] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus + the start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than + the current time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the + INVALID flag is set in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is + returned. Otherwise, if the current time is later than end time by + more than the allowable clock skew, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error + is returned. + + If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured + that the client possesses the credentials of the principal named in + the ticket and thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. + See section A.10 for pseudocode. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + + Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication + information and its initial request in the same message, and the + server need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if + mutual authentication (not only authenticating the client to the + server, but also the server to the client) is being performed, the + KRB_AP_REQ message will have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options + field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is required in response. As with the + error message, this message may be encapsulated in the application + protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable to the application's + protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in the reply must + be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided in the + authenticator). [Note: In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the + timestamp in the reply was the client's timestamp plus one. This is + not necessary in version 5 because version 5 messages are formatted + in such a way that it is not possible to create the reply by + judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) without knowledge + of the appropriate encryption keys.] If a sequence number is to be + included, it should be randomly chosen as described above for the + authenticator. A subkey may be included if the server desires to + negotiate a different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in + the session key extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 for + pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + + If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key + from the credentials obtained for the server (Note that for + encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key is not used, + even if present in the Authenticator.) to decrypt the message, and + verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the + Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client + is assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey + (if present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 23] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + + After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and + server share an encryption key which can be used by the application. + The "true session key" to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other + application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on + the subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator + (Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to + choose subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to + orchestrate a negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP + message.). In some cases, the use of this session key will be + implicit in the protocol; in others the method of use must be chosen + from a several alternatives. We leave the protocol negotiations of + how to use the key (e.g., selecting an encryption or checksum type) + to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not + constrain the implementation options. + + With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers + should take care not to send sensitive information to each other + without proper assurances. In particular, applications that require + privacy or integrity should use the KRB_AP_REP or KRB_ERROR responses + from the server to client to assure both client and server of their + peer's identity. If an application protocol requires privacy of its + messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section 3.5). The KRB_SAFE + message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting + Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain + authentication credentials for a given server (which might be + registered in a remote realm), when it wishes to renew or validate an + existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the + first case, the client must already have acquired a ticket for the + Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the ticket-granting + ticket is usually obtained when a client initially authenticates to + the system, such as when a user logs in). The message format for the + TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. The + primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 24] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + exchange does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or + sub-session key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for + all application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the TGS, + so once a renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, the client + must use a separate exchange to obtain valid tickets. + + The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) + from the client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply + (KRB_TGS_REP or KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes + information authenticating the client plus a request for credentials. + The authentication information consists of the authentication header + (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the client's previously obtained ticket- + granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. In the ticket-granting + ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one or more of: a + list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization data + to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application + server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). + The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, + encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting ticket or + renewable ticket, or if present, in the subsession key from the + Authenticator (part of the authentication header). The KRB_ERROR + message contains an error code and text explaining what went wrong. + The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message + contains information which can be used to detect replays, and to + associate it with the message to which it replies. The KRB_ERROR + message also contains information which can be used to associate it + with the message to which it replies, but the lack of encryption in + the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays or + fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client + must determine in which realm the application server is registered + [Note: This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known + beforehand (since the realm is part of the principal identifier), or + it might be stored in a nameserver. Presently, however, this + information is obtained from a configuration file. If the realm to + be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of being + spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not + authenticated. This might result in the use of a realm which has + been compromised, and would result in an attacker's ability to + compromise the authentication of the application server to the + client.]. If the client does not already possess a ticket-granting + ticket for the appropriate realm, then one must be obtained. This is + first attempted by requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the + destination realm from the local Kerberos server (using the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 25] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + KRB_TGS_REQ message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a + TGT for the desired realm in which case one can proceed. + Alternatively, the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm which + is "closer" to the desired realm (further along the standard + hierarchical path), in which case this step must be repeated with a + Kerberos server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. If + neither are returned, then the request must be retried with a + Kerberos server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request + will itself require a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm + which must be obtained by recursively applying these directions. + + Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate + realm, it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and + contacts one. The list might be obtained through a configuration file + or network service; as long as the secret keys exchanged by realms + are kept secret, only denial of service results from a false Kerberos + server. + + As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in + the KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ + message, providing an authentication header as an element of the + padata field, and including the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ + message along with several optional fields: the enc-authorization- + data field for application server use and additional tickets required + by some options. + + In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub- + session key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be + encrypted (If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be + taken to ensure the randomness of the selected subsession key. One + approach would be to generate a random number and XOR it with the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket.). If the sub-session key + is not specified, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket + will be used. If the enc-authorization-data is present, it must be + encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from the authenticator + portion of the authentication header, or if not present in the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + + Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the + destination realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the + KRB_AS_REQ message, but there are many additional checks to be + performed. First, the Kerberos server must determine which server + the accompanying ticket is for and it must select the appropriate key + to decrypt it. For a normal KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 26] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + ticket granting service, and the TGS's key will be used. If the TGT + was issued by another realm, then the appropriate inter-realm key + must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not a ticket granting + ticket for the current realm, but is for an application server in the + current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are specified in + the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is the + server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt + the ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server + for which it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata + field, the KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + + Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied + checksum in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents + of the request, and the message rejected if the checksums do not + match (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum + is not keyed or not collision-proof (with an error code of + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the checksum type is not supported, the + KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. If the authorization-data + are present, they are decrypted using the sub-session key from the + Authenticator. + + If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + + The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP + (KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The + detailed specification is in section 5.4.2. + + The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The + Kerberos database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested + server (including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). + If the request is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, + and if no key is shared with the requested realm, then the Kerberos + server will select the realm "closest" to the requested realm with + which it does share a key, and use that realm instead. This is the + only case where the response from the KDC will be for a different + server than that requested by the client. + + By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list + of transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the + expiration time, and the authorization data of the newly-issued + ticket will be copied from the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or + renewable ticket. If the transited field needs to be updated, but + the transited type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error + is returned. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 27] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new + ticket is set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime + from the TGT, and (c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of + the maximum life for the application server and the maximum life for + the local realm (the maximum life for the requesting principal was + already applied when the TGT was issued). If the new ticket is to be + a renewal, then the endtime above is replaced by the minimum of (a) + the value of the renew_till field of the ticket and (b) the starttime + for the new ticket plus the life (endtimestarttime) of the old + ticket. + + If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket + will contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will + only be honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY + option is similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses + specified by the client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE + flag in the TGT is set. The PROXY option will not be honored on + requests for additional ticket-granting tickets. + + If the requested start time is absent or indicates a time in the + past, then the start time of the ticket is set to the authentication + server's current time. If it indicates a time in the future, but the + POSTDATED option has not been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is + not set in the TGT, then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is + returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting ticket has the + MAYPOSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be postdated and + the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the local + realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, + and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated + before use by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been + reached. However, in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew- + till time of a newly-issued postdated ticket extend beyond the + renew-till time of the ticket-granting ticket. + + If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional + ticket has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the + additional ticket using the key for the server to which the + additional ticket was issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting + ticket. If the name of the requested server is missing from the + request, the name of the client in the additional ticket will be + used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be compared to + the name of the client in the additional ticket and if different, the + request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the session key + from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new ticket + that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the + new ticket will be used (This allows easy implementation of user-to- + user authentication [6], which uses ticket-granting ticket session + keys in lieu of secret server keys in situations where such secret + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 28] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + keys could be easily compromised.). + + If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC + as part of the authentication header is not that of the ticket- + granting server itself, and the server is registered in the realm of + the KDC, If the RENEW option is requested, then the KDC will verify + that the RENEWABLE flag is set in the ticket and that the renew_till + time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, + the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag + is set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check + that the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, + the KDC will issue the appropriate new ticket. + + Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the + presented ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets + which have been canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by + storing a range of issue dates for "suspect tickets"; if a presented + ticket had an authtime in that range, it would be rejected. In this + way, a stolen ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket cannot be + used to gain additional tickets (renewals or otherwise) once the + theft has been reported. Any normal ticket obtained before it was + reported stolen will still be valid (because they require no + interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration + time. + + The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is + encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, + or the session key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not + encrypted using the client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's + key's expiration date and the key version number fields are left out + since these values are stored along with the client's database + record, and that record is not needed to satisfy a request based on a + ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.1. Encoding the transited field + + If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC + as part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting + service, but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look + up the inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to + decrypt the ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor + the request, subject to the constraints outlined above in the section + describing the AS exchange. The realm part of the client's identity + will be taken from the ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm + that issued the ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited + field of the ticket to be issued. This is accomplished by reading + the transited field from the ticket-granting ticket (which is treated + as an unordered set of realm names), adding the new realm to the set, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 29] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + then constructing and writing out its encoded (shorthand) form (this + may involve a rearrangement of the existing encoding). + + Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its + own realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the + previous realm. This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from + intentionally leaving out its own name (it could, however, omit other + realms' names). + + The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to + be included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the + ticket and both are known to have taken part in authenticating the + principal. Since the endpoints are not included, both local and + single-hop inter-realm authentication result in a transited field + that is empty. + + Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, + it might potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this + field, its contents are encoded. The initially supported encoding is + optimized for the normal case of inter-realm communication: a + hierarchical arrangement of realms using either domain or X.500 style + realm names. This encoding (called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now + described. + + Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", + "\", trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, + and if they are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the + transited field by preceding them with a "\". + + A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to + the previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, + MIT.EDU, ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + + Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were endpoints, + that they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + + A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to + the previous realm (For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding + the first listed realm is considered to be the null realm ("")). If + it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded by a space (" + "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, /COM/HP, + /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 30] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, + they they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + + A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all + realms between the previous realm and the next realm have been + traversed (For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the + client's realm is considered to precede those in the transited field, + and the server's realm is considered to follow them.). Thus, "," + means that all realms along the path between the client and the + server have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms + from the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have + been traversed, and that everything from /COM down to the server's + realm in an X.500 style has also been traversed. This could occur if + the EDU realm in one hierarchy shares an inter-realm key directly + with the /COM realm in another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + + When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in + the same manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The + primary difference is that the ciphertext part of the response must + be decrypted using the session key from the ticket-granting ticket + rather than the client's secret key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + + The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to + detect modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by + including a keyed collisionproof checksum of the user data and some + control information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key + (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if + no negotiation has occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects + its data and the appropriate control information and computes a + checksum over them. The checksum algorithm should be some sort of + keyed one-way hash function (such as the RSA-MD5-DES checksum + algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC), generated + using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. Different + algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the + message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable + for this use. + + The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 31] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + timestamp and a sequence number. The designer of an application + using the KRB_SAFE message must choose at least one of the two + mechanisms. This choice should be based on the needs of the + application protocol. + + Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received + by one's peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain + the session key, so maintaining the next sequence number should not + present an additional problem. + + If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages + without them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the + appropriate replay detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the + appropriate mechanism for multi-cast protocols where all of one's + peers share a common sub-session key, but some messages will be sent + to a subset of one's peers. + + After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the + information and checksum to the recipient in the message format + specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + + When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as + follows. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by + the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version + and type fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. + A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE + error. The application verifies that the checksum used is a + collisionproof keyed checksum, and if it is not, a + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The recipient verifies + that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches + the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is + specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the + recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the + message. A failed match for either case generates a + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the + sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are + expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with + the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator + match any recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is + generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a + sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER + error is generated. If neither a timestamp and usec or a sequence + number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 32] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and control + information, and if it doesn't match the received checksum, a + KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the + message was generated by its peer and was not modified in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + + The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality + and the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It + achieves this by encrypting the messages and adding control + information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects + its data and the appropriate control information (specified in + section 5.7.1) and encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the + last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation + has occured). As part of the control information, the client must + choose to use either a timestamp or a sequence number (or both); see + the discussion in section 3.4.1 for guidelines on which to use. + After the user data and control information are encrypted, the client + transmits the ciphertext and some "envelope" information to the + recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + + When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as + follows. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by + the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version + and type fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. + A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE + error. The application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes + the resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been + modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. The + recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's + address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if a + recipient address is specified or the recipient requires an address) + that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's + address in the message. A failed match for either case generates a + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the + sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are + expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 33] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator + match any recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is + generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a + sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER + error is generated. If neither a timestamp and usec or a sequence + number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was + generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without + intruders able to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + + The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to + send Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this + by sending the tickets together with encrypted data containing the + session keys and other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using + the KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote + host. It then constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or + tickets so obtained, placing the session key needed to use each + ticket in the key field of the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of + the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED message. + + Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the + KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo + sequence in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current + time and, if specifically required by the application the nonce, s- + address, and raddress fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the + KRB_CRED message which is then encrypted under an encryption key + previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP exchange (usually the last key + negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has + occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + + When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If + any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the + application. The message is verified by checking that the protocol + version and type fields match the current version and KRB_CRED, + respectively. A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then decrypts the + ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption shows + the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is + generated. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 34] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating + system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's address + in the message, and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as + the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either + case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec + fields (and the nonce field if required) are checked next. If the + timestamp and usec are not present, or they are present but not + current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new + tickets in its ticket cache together with the session key and other + information in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the + encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + + The Kerberos server must have access to a database containing the + principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be + authenticated (The implementation of the Kerberos server need not + combine the database and the server on the same machine; it is + feasible to store the principal database in, say, a network name + service, as long as the entries stored therein are protected from + disclosure to and modification by unauthorized parties. However, we + recommend against such strategies, as they can make system management + and threat analysis quite complex.). + +4.1. Database contents + + A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + + Field Value + + name Principal's identifier + key Principal's secret key + p_kvno Principal's key version + max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets + max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable + Tickets + + The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key + field contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret + key. (The key can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos + "master key" to protect it in case the database is compromised but + the master key is not. In that case, an extra field must be added to + indicate the master key version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is + the key version number of the principal's secret key. The max_life + field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime - starttime) + for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 35] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable + Ticket issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description + of how these lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a + given Ticket.) + + A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the + database representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between + principal records with identifiers which differ only in the realm + name. + + When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine + (i.e., not the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key + should be retained by the server until all tickets that had been + issued using that key have expired. Because of this, it is possible + for several keys to be active for a single principal. Ciphertext + encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged with the version of + the key that was used for encryption, to help the recipient find the + proper key for decryption. + + When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the + principal will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. + The keys and key version numbers will differ between the records (the + rest of the fields may or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos + issues a ticket, or responds to a request for initial authentication, + the most recent key (known by the Kerberos server) will be used for + encryption. This is the key with the highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + + Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its + database: + + Field Value + + K_kvno Kerberos' key version + expiration Expiration date for entry + attributes Bit field of attributes + mod_date Timestamp of last modification + mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + + The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key + under which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + + After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an + error to any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the + principal. (A database may want to maintain two expiration dates: + one for the principal, and one for the principal's current key. This + allows password aging to work independently of the principal's + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 36] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + expiration date. However, due to the limited space in the responses, + the KDC must combine the key expiration and principal expiration date + into a single value called "key_exp", which is used as a hint to the + user to take administrative action.) + + The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations + involving the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction + with user registration procedures, for site-specific policy + implementations (Project Athena currently uses it for their user + registration process controlled by the system-wide database service, + Moira [7]), or to identify the "string to key" conversion algorithm + used for a principal's key. (See the discussion of the padata field + in section 5.4.2 for details on why this can be useful.) Other bits + are used to indicate that certain ticket options should not be + allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key (one bit each): + Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing forwardable + tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, + disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable + tickets, and disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the + server. + + The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the + entry, and the mod_name field contains the name of the principal + which last modified the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + + Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a + request was made by a particular principal. Information that might + be maintained includes the time of the last request, the time of the + last request for a ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use + of a ticket-granting ticket, or other times. This information can + then be returned to the user in the last-req field (see section 5.2). + + Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the + latest expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using + each key. This field would be used to indicate how long old keys + must remain valid to allow the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + + The KDC implementation should have the following configurable + constants or options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce + policy decisions: + + + The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant + should reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 37] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + KDC, encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client + and target server, and it should allow for a minimum "useful" + lifetime. + + + The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + + + The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + + + Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be + issued if the request specifies some authorization_data). + + + Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets + are to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + + The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of + protocol messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are + presented in the first subsection. The remaining subsections specify + the protocol objects (tickets and authenticators) and messages. + Specification of encryption and checksum techniques, and the fields + related to them, appear in section 6. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + + All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding + Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 + specification, section 8.7 [8]. + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + + The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this + section. Note that since the underscore character (_) is not + permitted in ASN.1 names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the + purposes of ASN.1 names. + + Realm ::= GeneralString + PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString + } + + Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not + contain a character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms + will usually consist of several components separated by periods (.), + in the style of Internet Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 38] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + the style of X.500 names. Acceptable forms for realm names are + specified in section 7. A PrincipalName is a typed sequence of + components consisting of the following sub-fields: + + name-type This field specifies the type of name that follows. + Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two + names can be the same (i.e., at least one of the + components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. + + name-string This field encodes a sequence of components that + form a name, each component encoded as a General + String. Taken together, a PrincipalName and a Realm + form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames + will have only a few components (typically one or two). + + KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + + The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An + encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include + any fractional portions of the seconds. It further shall not include + any separators. Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 + minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + + HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + } + + HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + } + + + The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + + addr-type This field specifies the type of address that + follows. Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 8.1. + + + address This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + + The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 39] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + address; HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many + addresses. + + AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING + } + + + ad-data This field contains authorization data to be + interpreted according to the value of the + corresponding ad-type field. + + ad-type This field specifies the format for the ad-data + subfield. All negative values are reserved for + local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + } + + + TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11) + } + + KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 40] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) + } + + + LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime + } + + lr-type This field indicates how the following lr-value + field is to be interpreted. Negative values indicate + that the information pertains only to the + responding server. Non-negative values pertain to + all servers for the realm. + + If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no information + is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the + absolute value of the lr-type field is one (1), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of last + initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of last initial + request. If it is three (3), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of the last + renewal. If it is five (5), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last request (of any + type). + + lr-value This field contains the time of the last request. + The time must be interpreted according to the contents + of the accompanying lr-type subfield. + + See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, + EncryptedData, EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 41] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + + This section describes the format and encryption parameters for + tickets and authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is + included in a protocol message it is treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + + A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. + A Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + + The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by + Kerberos and the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 + for the format of the ciphertext. + + tkt-vno This field specifies the version number for the ticket + format. This document describes version number 5. + + realm This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It + also serves to identify the realm part of the server's + principal identifier. Since a Kerberos server can only + issue tickets for servers within its realm, the two will + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 42] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + always be identical. + + sname This field specifies the name part of the server's + identity. + + enc-part This field holds the encrypted encoding of the + EncTicketPart sequence. + + flags This field indicates which of various options were used or + requested when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, + where the selected options are indicated by the bit being + set (1), and the unselected options and reserved fields + being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most significant bit. The + encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The + flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, + this flag tells the ticket-granting + server that it is OK to issue a new + ticket- granting ticket with a + different network address based on + the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED When set, this flag indicates that + the ticket has either been forwarded + or was issued based on authentication + involving a forwarded ticket-granting + ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical + to that of the FORWARDABLE flag, + except that the PROXIABLE flag tells + the ticket-granting server that only + non- ticket-granting tickets may be + issued with different network + addresses. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 43] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + 4 PROXY When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally + only interpreted by the TGS, and can + be ignored by end servers. This flag + tells the ticket-granting server that + a post- dated ticket may be issued + based on this ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED This flag indicates that this ticket + has been postdated. The end-service + can check the authtime field to see + when the original authentication + occurred. + + 7 INVALID This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by + the KDC before use. Application + servers must reject tickets which + have this flag set. + + 8 RENEWABLE The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can + usually be ignored by end servers + (some particularly careful servers + may wish to disallow renewable + tickets). A renewable ticket can be + used to obtain a replacement ticket + that expires at a later date. + + 9 INITIAL This flag indicates that this ticket + was issued using the AS protocol, and + not issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT This flag indicates that during + initial authentication, the client + was authenticated by the KDC before a + ticket was issued. The strength of + the preauthentication method is not + indicated, but is acceptable to the + KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected + to be possessed solely by the named + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 44] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + client. The hardware authentication + method is selected by the KDC and the + strength of the method is not + indicated. + + 12-31 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + key This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is + used to pass the session key from Kerberos to the + application server and the client. The field's encoding is + described in section 6.2. + + crealm This field contains the name of the realm in which the + client is registered and in which initial authentication + took place. + + cname This field contains the name part of the client's principal + identifier. + + transited This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took + part in authenticating the user to whom this ticket was + issued. It does not specify the order in which the realms + were transited. See section 3.3.3.1 for details on how + this field encodes the traversed realms. + + authtime This field indicates the time of initial authentication for + the named principal. It is the time of issue for the + original ticket on which this ticket is based. It is + included in the ticket to provide additional information to + the end service, and to provide the necessary information + for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An + end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to + accept tickets for which the initial authentication + occurred "too far" in the past. + + This field is also returned as part of the response from + the KDC. When returned as part of the response to initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on + the Kerberos server (It is NOT recommended that this time + value be used to adjust the workstation's clock since the + workstation cannot reliably determine that such a + KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely + manner.). + + starttime This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the + ticket is valid. Together with endtime, this field + specifies the life of the ticket. If it is absent from + the ticket, its value should be treated as that of the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 45] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authtime field. + + endtime This field contains the time after which the ticket will + not be honored (its expiration time). Note that individual + services may place their own limits on the life of a ticket + and may reject tickets which have not yet expired. As + such, this is really an upper bound on the expiration time + for the ticket. + + renew-till This field is only present in tickets that have the + RENEWABLE flag set in the flags field. It indicates the + maximum endtime that may be included in a renewal. It can + be thought of as the absolute expiration time for the + ticket, including all renewals. + + caddr This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more + (if present) host addresses. These are the addresses from + which the ticket can be used. If there are no addresses, + the ticket can be used from any location. The decision + by the KDC to issue or by the end server to accept zero- + address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to + issue or accept such tickets. The suggested and default + policy, however, is that such tickets will only be issued + or accepted when additional information that can be used to + restrict the use of the ticket is included in the + authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it + harder for an attacker to use stolen credentials. Because + the session key is not sent over the network in cleartext, + credentials can't be stolen simply by listening to the + network; an attacker has to gain access to the session key + (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a + careless user's unattended session) to make use of stolen + tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which + a connection is received cannot be reliably determined. + Even if it could be, an attacker who has compromised the + client's workstation could use the credentials from there. + Including the network addresses only makes it more + difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off with + stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" + location. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 46] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authorization-data The authorization-data field is used to pass + authorization data from the principal on whose behalf a + ticket was issued to the application service. If no + authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. The data in this field are specific to the end + service. It is expected that the field will contain the + names of service specific objects, and the rights to those + objects. The format for this field is described in section + 5.2. Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of + the contents of the subfields, it does carry type + information (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able + to issue a proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For + example, a client wishing to print a file can obtain a file + server proxy to be passed to the print server. By + specifying the name of the file in the authorization_data + field, the file server knows that the print server can only + use the client's rights when accessing the particular file + to be printed. + + It is interesting to note that if one specifies the + authorization-data field of a proxy and leaves the host + addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key can + be treated as a capability. See [9] for some suggested + uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have + to be included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + + An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to + certify the client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, + to help the server detect replays, and to help choose a "true session + key" to use with the particular session. The encoding is encrypted + in the ticket's session key shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 47] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + authenticator-vno This field specifies the version number for the + format of the authenticator. This document specifies + version 5. + + crealm and cname These fields are the same as those described for the + ticket in section 5.3.1. + + cksum This field contains a checksum of the the application data + that accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. + + cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the client's + timestamp. Its value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to + 999999. It often appears along with ctime. The two fields + are used together to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. + + ctime This field contains the current time on the client's host. + + subkey This field contains the client's choice for an encryption + key which is to be used to protect this specific + application session. Unless an application specifies + otherwise, if this field is left out the session key from + the ticket will be used. + + seq-number This optional field includes the initial sequence number + to be used by the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when + sequence numbers are used to detect replays (It may also be + used by application specific messages). When included in + the authenticator this field specifies the initial sequence + number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number + is that for messages from the server to the client. When + used in KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by + one after each message is sent. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of + replays they should be non-repeating, even across + connection boundaries. The initial sequence number should + be random and uniformly distributed across the full space + of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot be guessed + by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 48] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authorization-data This field is the same as described for the ticket + in section 5.3.1. It is optional and will only appear when + additional restrictions are to be placed on the use of a + ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + + This section specifies the format of the messages used in exchange + between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible + error messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + + The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is + one of KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is + for an initial ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the + message is sent from the client to the Authentication Server to + request credentials for a service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 49] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + + The fields in this message are: + + pvno This field is included in each message, and specifies the + protocol version number. This document specifies protocol + version 5. + + msg-type This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It + will almost always be the same as the application + identifier associated with a message. It is included to + make the identifier more readily accessible to the + application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. + + padata The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a of + authentication information which may be needed before + credentials can be issued or decrypted. In the case of + requests for additional tickets (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field + will include an element with padata-type of PA-TGS-REQ and + data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket + and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator + (which must be collisionproof) is to be computed over the + KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In most requests for initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies (KDC-REP), the + padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain + extensions to the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might + be used to initially verify the identity of a client before + any response is returned. This is accomplished with a + padata field with padata-type equal to PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and + padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 50] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec + containing the microseconds which may be omitted if a + client will not generate more than one request per second. + The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC + sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to + help the KDC or the client select the key needed for + generating or decrypting the response. This form of the + padata is useful for supporting the use of certain + "smartcards" with Kerberos. The details of such extensions + are beyond the scope of this specification. See [10] for + additional uses of this field. + + padata-type The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the + way that the padata-value element is to be interpreted. + Negative values of padata-type are reserved for + unregistered use; non-negative values are used for a + registered interpretation of the element type. + + req-body This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the + remaining fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over + the request, it is calculated over an encoding of the KDC- + REQ-BODY sequence which is enclosed within the req-body + field. + + kdc-options This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ + requests to the KDC and indicates the flags that the client + wants set on the tickets as well as other information that + is to modify the behavior of the KDC. Where appropriate, + the name of an option may be the same as the flag that is + set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, + this is not guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply + copy the options field to the flags field. There are + various checks that must be made before honoring an option + anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + unselected options and reserved fields being reset (0). + The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The + options are described in more detail above in section 2. + The meanings of the options are: + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 51] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a + subsequent request if the ticket- + granting ticket on which it is based + is also forwardable. + + 2 FORWARDED The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a + request for forwarding. The + address(es) of the host from which the + resulting ticket is to be valid are + included in the addresses field of the + request. + + + 3 PROXIABLE The PROXIABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + proxiable flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or in a + subsequent request if the ticket- + granting ticket on which it is based + is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY The PROXY option indicates that this + is a request for a proxy. This option + will only be honored if the ticket- + granting ticket in the request has its + PROXIABLE bit set. The address(es) of + the host from which the resulting + ticket is to be valid are included in + the addresses field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is to + have its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It + may only be set on the initial + request, or in a subsequent request if + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 52] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + the ticket-granting ticket on which it + is based also has its MAY-POSTDATE + flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED The POSTDATED option indicates that + this is a request for a postdated + ticket. This option will only be + honored if the ticket-granting ticket + on which it is based has its MAY- + POSTDATE flag set. The resulting + ticket will also have its INVALID flag + set, and that flag may be reset by a + subsequent request to the KDC after + the starttime in the ticket has been + reached. + + 7 UNUSED This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE The RENEWABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or when + the ticket-granting ticket on which + the request is based is also + renewable. If this option is + requested, then the rtime field in the + request contains the desired absolute + expiration time for the ticket. + + 9-26 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that + a renewable ticket will be acceptable + if a ticket with the requested life + cannot otherwise be provided. If a + ticket with the requested life cannot + be provided, then a renewable ticket + may be issued with a renew-till equal + to the the requested endtime. The + value of the renew-till field may + still be limited by local limits, or + limits selected by the individual + principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The ENC- + TKT-IN-SKEY option indicates that the + ticket for the end server is to be + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 53] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + encrypted in the session key from the + additional ticket-granting ticket + provided. + + 29 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The RENEW + option indicates that the present + request is for a renewal. The ticket + provided is encrypted in the secret + key for the server on which it is + valid. This option will only be + honored if the ticket to be renewed + has its RENEWABLE flag set and if the + time in its renew till field has not + passed. The ticket to be renewed is + passed in the padata field as part of + the authentication header. + + 31 VALIDATE This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The VALIDATE + option indicates that the request is + to validate a postdated ticket. It + will only be honored if the ticket + presented is postdated, presently has + its INVALID flag set, and would be + otherwise usable at this time. A + ticket cannot be validated before its + starttime. The ticket presented for + validation is encrypted in the key of + the server for which it is valid and + is passed in the padata field as part + of the authentication header. + + cname and sname These fields are the same as those described for the + ticket in section 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is specified. If absent, the name + of the server is taken from the name of the client in the + ticket passed as additional-tickets. + + enc-authorization-data The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it + can only be present in the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of + the desired authorization-data encrypted under the sub- + session key if present in the Authenticator, or + alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting + ticket, both from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 54] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + realm This field specifies the realm part of the server's + principal identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the + realm part of the client's principal identifier. + + from This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ + ticket requests when the requested ticket is to be + postdated. It specifies the desired start time for the + requested ticket. + + till This field contains the expiration date requested by the + client in a ticket request. + + rtime This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a + client to the KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. + + nonce This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it + intended to hold a random number generated by the client. + If the same number is included in the encrypted response + from the KDC, it provides evidence that the response is + fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. Nonces + must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be gen erated + randomly, but if the correct time is known, it may suffice + (Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one + must make sure that the workstation time is monotonically + increasing. If the time is ever reset backwards, there is + a small, but finite, probability that a nonce will be + reused.). + + etype This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be + used in the response. + + addresses This field is included in the initial request for tickets, + and optionally included in requests for additional tickets + from the ticket-granting server. It specifies the + addresses from which the requested ticket is to be valid. + Normally it includes the addresses for the client's host. + If a proxy is requested, this field will contain other + addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied + by the KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. + + additional-tickets Additional tickets may be optionally included in a + request to the ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN- + SKEY option has been specified, then the session key from + the additional ticket will be used in place of the server's + key to encrypt the new ticket. If more than one option + which requires additional tickets has been specified, then + the additional tickets are used in the order specified by + the ordering of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 55] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending + on whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an + additional ticket (TGS-REQ). + + The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional- + tickets) are only included if necessary to perform the operation + specified in the kdc-options field. + + It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number + appears twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ + message contains these fields as does the authentication header + (KRB_AP_REQ) that is passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + + The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for + either an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There + is no message type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext + part of the reply depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the + ciphertext is encrypted in the client's secret key, and the client's + key version number is included in the key version number for the + encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in the + sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if absent, the session key + from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. In that case, + no version number will be present in the EncryptedData sequence. + + The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + + AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP + TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + + KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData + } + + EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[25]] EncKDCRepPart + EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + + EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 56] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + NOTE: In EncASRepPart, the application code in the encrypted + part of a message provides an additional check that + the message was decrypted properly. + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is either KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. + + padata This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One + possible use for this field is to encode an alternate + "mix-in" string to be used with a string-to-key algorithm + (such as is described in section 6.3.2). This ability is + useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to change + (e.g., when a company is acquired); in such a case all + existing password-derived entries in the KDC database would + be flagged as needing a special mix-in string until the + next password change. + + crealm, cname, srealm and sname These fields are the same as those + described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. + + ticket The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. + + enc-part This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related + information that forms the encrypted part of a message. + The description of the encrypted part of the message + follows each appearance of this field. The encrypted part + is encoded as described in section 6.1. + + key This field is the same as described for the ticket in + section 5.3.1. + + last-req This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) + of the last request by a principal. Depending on what + information is available, this might be the last time that + a request for a ticket-granting ticket was made, or the + last time that a request based on a ticket-granting ticket + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 57] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + was successful. It also might cover all servers for a + realm, or just the particular server. Some implementations + may display this information to the user to aid in + discovering unauthorized use of one's identity. It is + similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when + logging into timesharing systems. + + nonce This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + key-expiration The key-expiration field is part of the response from + the KDC and specifies the time that the client's secret key + is due to expire. The expiration might be the result of + password aging or an account expiration. This field will + usually be left out of the TGS reply since the response to + the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no client + information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is + up to the application client (usually the login program) to + take appropriate action (such as notifying the user) if the + expira tion time is imminent. + + flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr These + fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted + portion of the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), + provided so the client may verify they match the intended + request and to assist in proper ticket caching. If the + message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will only + be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded + ticket, or if the user is substituting a subset of the + addresses from the ticket granting ticket. If the client- + requested addresses are not present or not used, then the + addresses contained in the ticket will be the same as those + included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + + This section specifies the format of the messages used for the + authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + + The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, + the message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options + in use, and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ + message is often referred to as the "authentication header". + + AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 58] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData + } + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + } + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REQ. + + ap-options This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) + and affects the way the request is processed. It is a + bit-field, where the selected options are indicated by the + bit being set (1), and the unselected options and reserved + fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is + specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of + this field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEYThe USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is + presenting to a server is encrypted in + the session key from the server's + ticket-granting ticket. When this + option is not specified, the ticket is + encrypted in the server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIREDThe MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must + respond with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + ticket This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the + server. + + authenticator This contains the authenticator, which includes the + client's choice of a subkey. Its encoding is described in + section 5.3.2. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 59] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + + The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, + the message type, and an encrypted timestamp. The message is sent in + in response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual + authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + + AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData + } + + EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + NOTE: in EncAPRepPart, the application code in the encrypted part of + a message provides an additional check that the message was decrypted + properly. + + The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of + the ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an + application-arranged negotiation to choose a per association session + key. + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REP. + + enc-part This field is described above in section 5.4.2. + + ctime This field contains the current time on the client's host. + + cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the client's + timestamp. + + subkey This field contains an encryption key which is to be used + to protect this specific application session. See section + 3.2.6 for specifics on how this field is used to negotiate + a key. Unless an application specifies otherwise, if this + field is left out, the sub-session key from the + authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from + the ticket will be used. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 60] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +5.5.3. Error message reply + + If an error occurs while processing the application request, the + KRB_ERROR message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for + the format of the error message. The cname and crealm fields may be + left out if the server cannot determine their appropriate values from + the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ message. If the authenticator was + decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields will contain the values from + it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by + either side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper- + proof message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has + previously been exchanged (for example, by using the + KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + + The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof + checksum keyed with the session key. The message fields are: + + KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum + } + + KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_SAFE. + + safe-body This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE + message. It is to be encoded separately and then have the + checksum computed over it, for use in the cksum field. + + cksum This field contains the checksum of the application data. + Checksum details are described in section 6.4. The + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 61] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE-BODY + sequence. + + user-data This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages + and contain the application specific data that is being + passed from the sender to the recipient. + + timestamp This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. + Its contents are the current time as known by the sender of + the message. By checking the timestamp, the recipient of + the message is able to make sure that it was recently + generated, and is not a replay. + + usec This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. + It contains the microsecond part of the timestamp. + + seq-number This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + + s-address This field specifies the address in use by the sender of + the message. + + r-address This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of + the message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as + broadcast protocols), but the recipient may arbitrarily + reject such messages. This field along with s-address can + be used to help detect messages which have been incorrectly + or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by + either side (client or server) of an application to securely and + privately send a message to its peer. It presumes that a session key + has previously been exchanged (for example, by using the + KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + + The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. + The message fields are: + + KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData + } + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 62] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + -- recip's addr + } + + NOTE: In EncKrbPrivPart, the application code in the encrypted part + of a message provides an additional check that the message was + decrypted properly. + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_PRIV. + + enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence + encrypted under the session key (If supported by the + encryption method in use, an initialization vector may be + passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve + proper cipher chaining. The initialization vector might + come from the last block of the ciphertext from the + previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the application's + choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. + If left out, the default initialization vector for the + encryption algorithm will be used.). This encrypted + encoding is used for the enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV + message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. + + user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address These fields are + described above in section 5.6.1. + + seq-number This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to + send Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is + presented here to encourage a common mechanism to be used by + applications when forwarding tickets or providing proxies to + subordinate servers. It presumes that a session key has already been + exchanged perhaps by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + + The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and + information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 63] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + each. The information needed to use the tickets is encryped under an + encryption key previously exchanged. The message fields are: + + KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData + } + + EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_CRED. + + tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically + for use by the intended recipient. Successive tickets are + paired with the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the + enc-part of the KRB-CRED message. + + enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence + encrypted under the session key shared between the sender + and the intended recipient. This encrypted encoding is + used for the enc-part field of the KRB-CRED message. See + section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 64] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + nonce If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a + nonce generated by the recipient of the message. If the + same value is included as the nonce in the message, it + provides evidence that the message is fresh and has not + been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must never be re- + used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the mes sage in + an application specific manner. + + timestamp and usec These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED + message was generated. The time is used to provide + assurance that the message is fresh. + + s-address and r-address These fields are described above in section + 5.6.1. They are used optionally to provide additional + assurance of the integrity of the KRB-CRED message. + + key This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the + KRB-CRED message and is used to pass the session key from + the sender to the intended recipient. The field's encoding + is described in section 6.2. + + The following fields are optional. If present, they can be + associated with the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left + out, then it is assumed that the recipient of the credentials already + knows their value. + + prealm and pname The name and realm of the delegated principal + identity. + + flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, + and caddr These fields contain the values of the + corresponding fields from the ticket found in the ticket + field. Descriptions of the fields are identical to the + descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + + This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The + fields included in the message are intended to return as much + information as possible about an error. It is not expected that all + the information required by the fields will be available for all + types of errors. If the appropriate information is not available + when the message is composed, the corresponding field will be left + out of the message. + + Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected by any + encryption, it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 65] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + modify such a message. In particular, this means that the client + should not use any fields in this message for security-critical + purposes, such as setting a system clock or generating a fresh + authenticator. The message can be useful, however, for advising a + user on the reason for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + + The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_ERROR. + + ctime This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + cusec This field is described above in section 5.5.2. + + stime This field contains the current time on the server. It is + of type KerberosTime. + + susec This field contains the microsecond part of the server's + timestamp. Its value ranges from 0 to 999. It appears + along with stime. The two fields are used in conjunction to + specify a reasonably accurate timestamp. + + error-code This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or + the server when a request fails. To interpret the value of + this field see the list of error codes in section 8. + Implementations are encouraged to provide for national + language support in the display of error messages. + + crealm, cname, srealm and sname These fields are described above in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 66] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + section 5.3.1. + + e-text This field contains additional text to help explain the + error code associated with the failed request (for example, + it might include a principal name which was unknown). + + e-data This field contains additional data about the error for use + by the application to help it recover from or handle the + error. If the errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then + the e-data field will contain an encoding of a sequence of + padata fields, each corresponding to an acceptable pre- + authentication method and optionally containing data for + the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate method; method-data + will contain any required additional information. + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + + The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use + stream encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly + available block encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption + Standard [11], in conjunction with block chaining and checksum + methods [12]. Encryption is used to prove the identities of the + network entities participating in message exchanges. The Key + Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by all principals + registered in that realm to store a secret key in confidence. Proof + of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the authenticity of + a principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a + shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to + ticket requests; the ability to obtain the secret key or session key + implies the knowledge of the appropriate keys and the identity of the + KDC. The ability of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and + present a Ticket and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with + the session key from the KDC response) to a service verifies the + identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the service to + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 67] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge + thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + + The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is + secure from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of + fields in the encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize + the effects of poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose + good keys. If keys are derived from user-typed passwords, those + passwords need to be well chosen to make brute force attacks more + difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy targets for intruders. + + The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms + currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding + requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is + often desirable to place random information (often referred to as a + confounder) at the start of the message. The requirements for a + confounder are specified with each encryption mechanism. + + Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the + the security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these + chaining methods often don't provide an integrity check upon + decryption. Such systems (such as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented + with a checksum of the plaintext which can be verified at decryption + and used to detect any tampering or damage. Such checksums should be + good at detecting burst errors in the input. If any damage is + detected, the decryption routine is expected to return an error + indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each encryption type is + expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. The + specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum + requirements. + + Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an + algorithm for converting the password to a key of the appropriate + type is included. It is desirable for the string to key function to + be one-way, and for the mapping to be different in different realms. + This is important because users who are registered in more than one + realm will often use the same password in each, and it is desirable + that an attacker compromising the Kerberos server in one realm not + obtain or derive the user's key in another. + + For a discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate + encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the the + reader is referred to [13]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + + The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The + enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 68] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + section 5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional + key version number, and the ciphertext. + + EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + } + + etype This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used + to encipher the cipher. Detailed specifications for + selected encryption types appear later in this section. + + kvno This field contains the version number of the key under + which data is encrypted. It is only present in messages + encrypted under long lasting keys, such as principals' + secret keys. + + cipher This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an + OCTET STRING. + + The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption + algorithm to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific + inputs. Encryption mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must + take sufficient measures to guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, + and we recommend they also take measures to protect against + precomputed dictionary attacks. If the encryption algorithm is not + itself capable of doing so, the protections can often be enhanced by + adding a checksum and a confounder. + + The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a + confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary + padding. The msg-seq field contains the part of the protocol message + described in section 5 which is to be encrypted. The confounder, + checksum, and padding are all untagged and untyped, and their length + is exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate item. The type and + length is implicit and specified by the particular encryption type + being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted is + described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 69] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + + In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the + notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is + not a valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from + the confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the + message starts with random data, but the tag and its length are + fixed. For other fields, the length and tag would be redundant if + they were included because they are specified by the encryption type. + + One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing + it in confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate + checksum over confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in + check; adds the necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified + encryption type and the appropriate key. + + Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm + that specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an + octet boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format (The ordering + of the fields in the CipherText is important. Additionally, messages + encoded in this format must include a length as part of the msg-seq + field. This allows the recipient to verify that the message has not + been truncated. Without a length, an attacker could use a chosen + plaintext attack to generate a message which could be truncated, + while leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the msg-seq is an + encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length is + part of that encoding.). Those fields which are not specified will be + omitted. + + In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular + encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the + specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is + needed as part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum + is to be used, a new encryption type must be defined. + + Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and + the data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher- + block-chaining mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, + the description for each encryption type must specify the source of + such additional information. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 70] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +6.2. Encryption Keys + + The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + + keytype This field specifies the type of encryption key that + follows in the keyvalue field. It will almost always + correspond to the encryption algorithm used to generate the + EncryptedData, though more than one algorithm may use the + same type of key (the mapping is many to one). This might + happen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a + different chaining mechanism. + + keyvalue This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet + string. + + All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for + local use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially + assigned type fields and interpretations. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + + If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the + NULL encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no + checksum, confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the + plaintext. The NULL Key is used by the null encryption system and is + zero octets in length, with keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + + The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [11] using the cipher block chaining mode [12]. + A CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [14]) is applied to the + confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum + field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be + encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) + must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details + of the encryption of this data are identical to those for the des- + cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collisionproof, an + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 71] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + attacker could use a probabilistic chosenplaintext attack to generate + a valid message even if a confounder is used [13]. The use of + collision-proof checksums is recommended for environments where such + attacks represent a significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the + checksum for ticket or authenticator is no longer mandated as an + interoperability requirement for Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 + (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [11] using the cipher block chaining mode [12]. + An MD4 checksum (described in [15]) is applied to the confounder and + message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks + are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the + concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to + an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the encryption + of this data are identical to those for the descbc-md5 encryption + mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [11] using the cipher block chaining mode [12]. + An MD5 checksum (described in [16]) is applied to the confounder and + message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks + are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the + concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to + an 8 byte boundary before encryption. + + Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as 8-octet blocks which are + concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The + first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's + MSbit used as the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet + the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least + significant bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an + additional input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless + otherwise specified, zero should be used as the initialization + vector. Kerberos' use of DES requires an 8-octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semiweak" keys; + those keys shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in + Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way that keys are derived for + the encryption of checksums, keys shall not be used that yield "weak" + or "semi-weak" keys when eXclusive-ORed with the constant + F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 72] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists + of 56 bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is + encoded as a series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits + within the key are also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the + encryption key is: + (B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where + B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the + parity bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 + (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for + reference.] + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), the text string + normally must have the realm and each component of the principal's + name appended(In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different + "mix-in" string for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of + padata in section 5.4.2.), then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 byte + boundary. This string is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with + itself to form an 8 byte DES key. The parity is corrected on the + key, and it is used to generate a DES CBC checksum on the initial + string (with the realm and name appended). Next, parity is corrected + on the CBC checksum. If the result matches a "weak" or "semiweak" + key as described in the DES specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with + the constant 00000000000000F0. Finally, the result is returned as + the key. Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + odd = 1; + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + fixparity(tempkey); + key = DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 73] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +6.4. Checksums + + The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + + cksumtype This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the + accompanying checksum. + + checksum This field contains the checksum itself, encoded + as an octet string. + + Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in + this section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for + local use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially + assigned type fields and interpretations. + + Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: + whether they are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is + infeasible to find two plaintexts which generate the same checksum + value for a collision-proof checksum. A key is required to perturb + or initialize the algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent + message-stream modification by an active attacker, unkeyed checksums + should only be used when the checksum and message will be + subsequently encrypted (e.g., the checksums defined as part of the + encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). Collision- + proof checksums can be made tamper-proof as well if the checksum + value is encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the + composition of the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be + considered a separate checksum algorithm (e.g., RSA-MD5 encrypted + using DES is a new checksum algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most + keyed checksums, as well as for the encrypted forms of collisionproof + checksums, Kerberos prepends a confounder before the checksum is + calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic + redundancy check as described in ISO 3309 [14]. The resulting + checksum is four (4) octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed + nor collision-proof. The use of this checksum is not recommended. + An attacker using a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack as + described in [13] might be able to generate an alternative message + that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof checksums is + recommended for environments where such attacks represent a + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 74] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 + algorithm [15]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) + checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4des) + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collisionproof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD4 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the + checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 (A variant of the key is + used to limit the use of a key to a particular function, separating + the functions of generating a checksum from other encryption + performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was + chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES + precluded the use of the complement. The same constant is used for + similar purpose in the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy + Enhanced Mail standard.). The initialization vector should be zero. + The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are + redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys"; those keys shall + not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + | des-cbc(confounder + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 75] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 + algorithm [16]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) + checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5des) + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collisionproof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD5 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the + checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization + vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 + octets of which are redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and + believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys"; those keys shall + not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + | des-cbc(confounder + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder + to the plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result + using the key and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last + block of the ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and + encrypting the pair using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode + using a a variant of the key, where the variant is computed by + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 76] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The + initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 + bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This checksum + is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + | des-cbc(confounder + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + + +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) + } + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semiweak" keys; + those keys shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use + in Kerberos, nor shall a key be used whose veriant is "weak" or + "semi-weak". + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative + (rsa-md4-des-k) + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof + checksum by applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting + the results using DES in cipherblock-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES + key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is + 16 octets long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for + encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (desmac-k) + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode + encryption of the plaintext, and using the last block of the + ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed with an encryption key + and an initialization vector; any uses which do not specify an + additional initialization vector will use the key as both key and + initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) + long. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 77] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DESMAC checksum + and it is no longer recommended. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys"; those keys shall + not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a + realm can technically select any name it chooses, interoperability + across realm boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to + be assigned, and what information they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the + conventions itself, and it must require that any realms with which + inter-realm keys are shared also conform to the conventions and + require the same from its neighbors. + + There are presently four styles of realm names: domain, X500, other, + and reserved. Examples of each style follow: + + domain: host.subdomain.domain (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + + Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components + separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor + slashes (/). + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) + before the equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string + representations of the names with components separated by slashes. + Leading and trailing slashes will not be included. + + Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that + contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed + by a colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be + assigned before they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the + first three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It + is unlikely that names will be assigned to this category unless there + is a very strong argument for not using the "other" category. + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 78] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + various name styles. The following additional constraints apply to + the assignment of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the + name of a realm for the domain or X.500 formats must either be used + by the organization owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet + domain name or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are + registered, authority to use a realm name may be derived from the + authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no domain + name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can + authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is + assigned is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to + its children in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the + parent assigns a realm name without also registering it in the domain + name or X.500 hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make + sure that there will not in the future exists a name identical to the + realm name of the child unless it is assigned to the same entity as + the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure + that all agree on what information is implied by a principal name. + The name-type field that is part of the principal name indicates the + kind of information implied by the name. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the + same (i.e., at least one of the components, or the realm, must be + different). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. The + following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in + DCE, or for users + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance + (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + + When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a + particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The + principal name type should be used for users, and it might also be + used for a unique server. If the name is a unique machine generated + ID that is guaranteed never to be reassigned then the name type of + UID should be used (note that it is generally a bad idea to reassign + names of any type since stale entries might remain in access control + lists). + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 79] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + If the first component of a name identifies a service and the + remaining components identify an instance of the service in a server + specified manner, then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An + example of this name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting ticket + which has a first component of krbtgt and a second component + identifying the realm for which the ticket is valid. + + If instance is a single component following the service name and the + instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the + name type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for + Internet services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the + separate components of the host name appear as successive components + following the name of the service, then the name type SRVXHST should + be used. This type might be used to identify servers on hosts with + X.500 names where the slash (/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + + A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is + not known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match + principals authenticated with names of any type. A principal + authenticated with a name of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match + other names of type UNKNOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of "krbtgt" are reserved + for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the + form of such names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be + composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server + is registered, and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the + host name is an Internet domain name or a multi-component name of + type NT-SRV-XHST if the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 + that allows slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or + multi-component name will identify the service and the latter + components will identify the host. Where the name of the host is not + case sensitive (for example, with Internet domain names) the name of + the host must be lower case. For services such as telnet and the + Berkeley R commands which run with system privileges, the first + component will be the string "host" instead of a service specific + identifier. + +8. Constants and other defined values + +8.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 80] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + type fields and interpretations. + + The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to + match the defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard + Distributions of Unix. They can be found in with + symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an abbreviation of the address + family name). + + + Internet addresses + + Internet addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of internet addresses is two (2). + + CHAOSnet addresses + + CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + + ISO addresses + + ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is + seven (7). + + Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + + XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of XNS addresses is six (6). + + AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + + AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16- + bit network number. The first octet of the address is the node + number; the remaining two octets encode the network number in MSB + order. The type of AppleTalk DDP addresses is sixteen (16). + + DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB + order. The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. IP transport + + When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request + using IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing + only an encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 81] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + address; the KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only + an encoding of the reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a + KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at the sender's IP address. + +8.2.2. OSI transport + + During authentication of an OSI client to and OSI server, the mutual + authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of + credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange + of private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages + may be treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication + mechanism will be: + + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(5),internet(1), + security(5), kerberosv5(2)} + + Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an + authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply + (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message (KRB_SAFE), a private message + (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message (KRB_CRED). The opaque data + contains an application code as specified in the ASN.1 description + for each message. The application code may be used by Kerberos to + determine the message type. + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be + composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS + ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRVINST, with the first part + "krbtgt" and the second part the name of the realm which will accept + the ticket-granting ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A ticket-granting + ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets + from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + + The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines + their meanings. + + + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 82] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +---------------+-----------+----------+----------------+--------------- +Encryption type|etype value|block size|minimum pad size|confounder size +---------------+-----------+----------+----------------+--------------- +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + +-------------------------------+-------------------+------------- +Checksum type |sumtype value |checksum size +-------------------------------+-------------------+------------- +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 + +-------------------------------+----------------- +padata type |padata-type value +-------------------------------+----------------- +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + +-------------------------------+------------- +authorization data type |ad-type value +-------------------------------+------------- +reserved values 0-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +-------------------------------+----------------- +alternate authentication type |method-type value +-------------------------------+----------------- +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +-------------------------------+------------- +transited encoding type |tr-type value +-------------------------------+------------- +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 83] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +--------------+-------+----------------------------------------- +Label |Value |Meaning or MIT code +--------------+-------+----------------------------------------- + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward + credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or + for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, + rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has + expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has + expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number + not supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old + master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old + master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in + database + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 84] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than + end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested + option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption + type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been + revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again + later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again + later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change + password to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information + was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authentication + required* +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field + failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not + available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method + required* +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 85] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + message +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this + implementation + + *This error carries additional information in the e-data field. The + contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section + 5.9.1. + +9. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. + Among these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative + encoding schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for + pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, + options for mutual authentication, user to user authentication, + support for proxies, forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, + the format of realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to + define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all + implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as + technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered + that one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not + secure, it will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 1 + + This section defines the first specification of these options. + Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to + support Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (5.1). + + Encryption and checksum methods + + The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. + Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the + additional mechanisms may only be used when communicating with + principals known to also support them: Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 + Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + + Realm Names + + All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the + Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket + for an unknown realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine + the names of the intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the + requested realm. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 86] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Transited field encoding + + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.1) must be + supported. Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be + used only when that encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + + Pre-authentication methods + + The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used + on the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported + by clients but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on + a realm by realm basis. If not used in the initial request and the + error KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENCTIMESTAMP + as an acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request + using the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not + support the PAENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server + should ignore the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in + a request. + + Mutual authentication + + Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + + Ticket addresses and flags + + All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e., if a + TGT contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), + but each realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and + each application server will set its own policy with respect to + accepting them. By default, servers should not accept them. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms + and application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets + will be accepted. + + All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, + but need not actually implement them. If these options are not + supported, the starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a + ticket's entire useful life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a + server, all implementations shall make the presence of the postdated + flag visible to the calling server. + + User-to-user authentication + + Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKTIN-SKEY KDC + option) must be provided by implementations, but individual realms + may decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on a per- + principal or realm-wide basis. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 87] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Authorization data + + Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from + ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to + suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered + subfield type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no + registered subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + + Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data + subfields available to the server when a ticket is used. + Implementations are not required to allow clients to specify the + contents of the authorization data fields. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + + Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, + based on the list of suggested configuration constants (see section + 4.4). + + minimum lifetime 5 minutes + + maximum renewable lifetime 1 week + + maximum ticket lifetime 1 day + + empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data + + proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +10. Acknowledgments + + Early versions of this document, describing version 4 of the + protocol, were written by Jennifer Steiner (formerly at Project + Athena); these drafts provided an excellent starting point for this + current version 5 specification. Many people in the Internet + community have contributed ideas and suggested protocol changes for + version 5. Notable contributions came from Ted Anderson, Steve + Bellovin and Michael Merritt [17], Daniel Bernstein, Mike Burrows, + Donald Davis, Ravi Ganesan, Morrie Gasser, Virgil Gligor, Bill + Griffeth, Mark Lillibridge, Mark Lomas, Steve Lunt, Piers McMahon, + Joe Pato, William Sommerfeld, Stuart Stubblebine, Ralph Swick, Ted + T'so, and Stanley Zanarotti. Many others commented and helped shape + this specification into its current form. + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 88] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +11. References + + [1] Miller, S., Neuman, C., Schiller, J., and J. Saltzer, "Section + E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and Authorization System", + M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 21, + 1987. + + [2] Steiner, J., Neuman, C., and J. Schiller, "Kerberos: An + Authentication Service for Open Network Systems", pp. 191-202 in + Usenix Conference Proceedings, Dallas, Texas, February, 1988. + + [3] Needham, R., and M. Schroeder, "Using Encryption for + Authentication in Large Networks of Computers", Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 21 (12), pp. 993-999, December 1978. + + [4] Denning, D., and G. Sacco, "Time stamps in Key Distribution + Protocols", Communications of the ACM, Vol. 24 (8), pp. 533-536, + August 1981. + + [5] Kohl, J., Neuman, C., and T. Ts'o, "The Evolution of the + Kerberos Authentication Service", in an IEEE Computer Society + Text soon to be published, June 1992. + + [6] Davis, D., and R. Swick, "Workstation Services and Kerberos + Authentication at Project Athena", Technical Memorandum TM-424, + MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, February 1990. + + [7] Levine, P., Gretzinger, M, Diaz, J., Sommerfeld, W., and K. + Raeburn, "Section E.1: Service Management System, M.I.T. + Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas sachusetts (1987). + + [8] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentication + Framework, December 1988. + + [9] Neuman, C., "Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems", Pittsburgh, PA, + May 1993. + + [10] Pato, J., "Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password Guessing + Attacks", Open Software Foundation DCE Request for Comments 26, + December 1992. + + [11] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Data + Encryption Standard", Federal Information Processing Standards + Publication 46, Washington, DC (1977). + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 89] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + [12] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "DES + Modes of Operation", Federal Information Processing Standards + Publication 81, Springfield, VA, December 1980. + + [13] Stubblebine S., and V. Gligor, "On Message Integrity in + Cryptographic Protocols", in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium + on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May + 1992. + + [14] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO Information + Processing Systems - Data Communication High-Level Data Link + Control Procedure - Frame Structure", IS 3309, October 1984, 3rd + Edition. + + [15] Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320, MIT + Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992. + + [16] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, MIT + Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992. + + [17] Bellovin S., and M. Merritt, "Limitations of the Kerberos + Authentication System", Computer Communications Review, Vol. + 20(5), pp. 119-132, October 1990. + +12. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +13. Authors' Addresses + + John Kohl + Digital Equipment Corporation + 110 Spit Brook Road, M/S ZKO3-3/U14 + Nashua, NH 03062 + + Phone: 603-881-2481 + EMail: jtkohl@zk3.dec.com + + + B. Clifford Neuman + USC/Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way #1001 + Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695 + + Phone: 310-822-1511 + EMail: bcn@isi.edu + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 90] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + + This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to + be constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", + "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 91] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable + skew) then error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 92] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.ALLOW-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when + omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 93] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 94] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) + then set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 95] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that */ + /* all that should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) + then destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 96] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + /* Note that make_application_request might have to */ + /* recursivly call this routine to get the appropriate */ + /* ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 97] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and + choosing the correct key for decryption. The name of the + server appears in the plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is + operating is determined by the instance from the + ticket-granting ticket. The realm in the ticket-granting + ticket is the realm under which the ticket granting ticket was + issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos server to + support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not + req.sname) then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 98] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(server)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(server); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 99] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 100] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket */ + /* would have been rejected in the initial authentication */ + /* stage, so there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till >= kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later */ + /* processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 101] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; + /* leave the renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data + into decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := + req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited + := compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 102] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), + second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, + server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 103] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := + decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := + decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 104] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator + using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 105] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket + using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent */ + /* details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 106] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) + using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 107] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 108] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and + packet.seq-number not present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 109] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 110] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 111] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + + + + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 112] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56d478c7ee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1683 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Eastlake, 3rd +Request for Comments: 1750 DEC +Category: Informational S. Crocker + Cybercash + J. Schiller + MIT + December 1994 + + + Randomness Recommendations for Security + +Status of this Memo + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo + does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of + this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + Security systems today are built on increasingly strong cryptographic + algorithms that foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security + of these systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for + passwords, cryptographic keys, and similar quantities. The use of + pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in + pseudo-security. The sophisticated attacker of these security + systems may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced + the secret quantities, searching the resulting small set of + possibilities, than to locate the quantities in the whole of the + number space. + + Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated + adversary is surprisingly difficult. This paper points out many + pitfalls in using traditional pseudo-random number generation + techniques for choosing such quantities. It recommends the use of + truly random hardware techniques and shows that the existing hardware + on many systems can be used for this purpose. It provides + suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hardware solution is not + available. And it gives examples of how large such quantities need + to be for some particular applications. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 1] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +Acknowledgements + + Comments on this document that have been incorporated were received + from (in alphabetic order) the following: + + David M. Balenson (TIS) + Don Coppersmith (IBM) + Don T. Davis (consultant) + Carl Ellison (Stratus) + Marc Horowitz (MIT) + Christian Huitema (INRIA) + Charlie Kaufman (IRIS) + Steve Kent (BBN) + Hal Murray (DEC) + Neil Haller (Bellcore) + Richard Pitkin (DEC) + Tim Redmond (TIS) + Doug Tygar (CMU) + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction........................................... 3 + 2. Requirements........................................... 4 + 3. Traditional Pseudo-Random Sequences.................... 5 + 4. Unpredictability....................................... 7 + 4.1 Problems with Clocks and Serial Numbers............... 7 + 4.2 Timing and Content of External Events................ 8 + 4.3 The Fallacy of Complex Manipulation.................. 8 + 4.4 The Fallacy of Selection from a Large Database....... 9 + 5. Hardware for Randomness............................... 10 + 5.1 Volume Required...................................... 10 + 5.2 Sensitivity to Skew.................................. 10 + 5.2.1 Using Stream Parity to De-Skew..................... 11 + 5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew............... 12 + 5.2.3 Using FFT to De-Skew............................... 13 + 5.2.4 Using Compression to De-Skew....................... 13 + 5.3 Existing Hardware Can Be Used For Randomness......... 14 + 5.3.1 Using Existing Sound/Video Input................... 14 + 5.3.2 Using Existing Disk Drives......................... 14 + 6. Recommended Non-Hardware Strategy..................... 14 + 6.1 Mixing Functions..................................... 15 + 6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function.......................... 15 + 6.1.2 Stronger Mixing Functions.......................... 16 + 6.1.3 Diff-Hellman as a Mixing Function.................. 17 + 6.1.4 Using a Mixing Function to Stretch Random Bits..... 17 + 6.1.5 Other Factors in Choosing a Mixing Function........ 18 + 6.2 Non-Hardware Sources of Randomness................... 19 + 6.3 Cryptographically Strong Sequences................... 19 + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 2] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + 6.3.1 Traditional Strong Sequences....................... 20 + 6.3.2 The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator.............. 21 + 7. Key Generation Standards.............................. 22 + 7.1 US DoD Recommendations for Password Generation....... 23 + 7.2 X9.17 Key Generation................................. 23 + 8. Examples of Randomness Required....................... 24 + 8.1 Password Generation................................. 24 + 8.2 A Very High Security Cryptographic Key............... 25 + 8.2.1 Effort per Key Trial............................... 25 + 8.2.2 Meet in the Middle Attacks......................... 26 + 8.2.3 Other Considerations............................... 26 + 9. Conclusion............................................ 27 + 10. Security Considerations.............................. 27 + References............................................... 28 + Authors' Addresses....................................... 30 + +1. Introduction + + Software cryptography is coming into wider use. Systems like + Kerberos, PEM, PGP, etc. are maturing and becoming a part of the + network landscape [PEM]. These systems provide substantial + protection against snooping and spoofing. However, there is a + potential flaw. At the heart of all cryptographic systems is the + generation of secret, unguessable (i.e., random) numbers. + + For the present, the lack of generally available facilities for + generating such unpredictable numbers is an open wound in the design + of cryptographic software. For the software developer who wants to + build a key or password generation procedure that runs on a wide + range of hardware, the only safe strategy so far has been to force + the local installation to supply a suitable routine to generate + random numbers. To say the least, this is an awkward, error-prone + and unpalatable solution. + + It is important to keep in mind that the requirement is for data that + an adversary has a very low probability of guessing or determining. + This will fail if pseudo-random data is used which only meets + traditional statistical tests for randomness or which is based on + limited range sources, such as clocks. Frequently such random + quantities are determinable by an adversary searching through an + embarrassingly small space of possibilities. + + This informational document suggests techniques for producing random + quantities that will be resistant to such attack. It recommends that + future systems include hardware random number generation or provide + access to existing hardware that can be used for this purpose. It + suggests methods for use if such hardware is not available. And it + gives some estimates of the number of random bits required for sample + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 3] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + applications. + +2. Requirements + + Probably the most commonly encountered randomness requirement today + is the user password. This is usually a simple character string. + Obviously, if a password can be guessed, it does not provide + security. (For re-usable passwords, it is desirable that users be + able to remember the password. This may make it advisable to use + pronounceable character strings or phrases composed on ordinary + words. But this only affects the format of the password information, + not the requirement that the password be very hard to guess.) + + Many other requirements come from the cryptographic arena. + Cryptographic techniques can be used to provide a variety of services + including confidentiality and authentication. Such services are + based on quantities, traditionally called "keys", that are unknown to + and unguessable by an adversary. + + In some cases, such as the use of symmetric encryption with the one + time pads [CRYPTO*] or the US Data Encryption Standard [DES], the + parties who wish to communicate confidentially and/or with + authentication must all know the same secret key. In other cases, + using what are called asymmetric or "public key" cryptographic + techniques, keys come in pairs. One key of the pair is private and + must be kept secret by one party, the other is public and can be + published to the world. It is computationally infeasible to + determine the private key from the public key [ASYMMETRIC, CRYPTO*]. + + The frequency and volume of the requirement for random quantities + differs greatly for different cryptographic systems. Using pure RSA + [CRYPTO*], random quantities are required when the key pair is + generated, but thereafter any number of messages can be signed + without any further need for randomness. The public key Digital + Signature Algorithm that has been proposed by the US National + Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) requires good random + numbers for each signature. And encrypting with a one time pad, in + principle the strongest possible encryption technique, requires a + volume of randomness equal to all the messages to be processed. + + In most of these cases, an adversary can try to determine the + "secret" key by trial and error. (This is possible as long as the + key is enough smaller than the message that the correct key can be + uniquely identified.) The probability of an adversary succeeding at + this must be made acceptably low, depending on the particular + application. The size of the space the adversary must search is + related to the amount of key "information" present in the information + theoretic sense [SHANNON]. This depends on the number of different + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 4] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + secret values possible and the probability of each value as follows: + + ----- + \ + Bits-of-info = \ - p * log ( p ) + / i 2 i + / + ----- + + where i varies from 1 to the number of possible secret values and p + sub i is the probability of the value numbered i. (Since p sub i is + less than one, the log will be negative so each term in the sum will + be non-negative.) + + If there are 2^n different values of equal probability, then n bits + of information are present and an adversary would, on the average, + have to try half of the values, or 2^(n-1) , before guessing the + secret quantity. If the probability of different values is unequal, + then there is less information present and fewer guesses will, on + average, be required by an adversary. In particular, any values that + the adversary can know are impossible, or are of low probability, can + be initially ignored by an adversary, who will search through the + more probable values first. + + For example, consider a cryptographic system that uses 56 bit keys. + If these 56 bit keys are derived by using a fixed pseudo-random + number generator that is seeded with an 8 bit seed, then an adversary + needs to search through only 256 keys (by running the pseudo-random + number generator with every possible seed), not the 2^56 keys that + may at first appear to be the case. Only 8 bits of "information" are + in these 56 bit keys. + +3. Traditional Pseudo-Random Sequences + + Most traditional sources of random numbers use deterministic sources + of "pseudo-random" numbers. These typically start with a "seed" + quantity and use numeric or logical operations to produce a sequence + of values. + + [KNUTH] has a classic exposition on pseudo-random numbers. + Applications he mentions are simulation of natural phenomena, + sampling, numerical analysis, testing computer programs, decision + making, and games. None of these have the same characteristics as + the sort of security uses we are talking about. Only in the last two + could there be an adversary trying to find the random quantity. + However, in these cases, the adversary normally has only a single + chance to use a guessed value. In guessing passwords or attempting + to break an encryption scheme, the adversary normally has many, + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 5] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + perhaps unlimited, chances at guessing the correct value and should + be assumed to be aided by a computer. + + For testing the "randomness" of numbers, Knuth suggests a variety of + measures including statistical and spectral. These tests check + things like autocorrelation between different parts of a "random" + sequence or distribution of its values. They could be met by a + constant stored random sequence, such as the "random" sequence + printed in the CRC Standard Mathematical Tables [CRC]. + + A typical pseudo-random number generation technique, known as a + linear congruence pseudo-random number generator, is modular + arithmetic where the N+1th value is calculated from the Nth value by + + V = ( V * a + b )(Mod c) + N+1 N + + The above technique has a strong relationship to linear shift + register pseudo-random number generators, which are well understood + cryptographically [SHIFT*]. In such generators bits are introduced + at one end of a shift register as the Exclusive Or (binary sum + without carry) of bits from selected fixed taps into the register. + + For example: + + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ + | B | <-- | B | <-- | B | <-- . . . . . . <-- | B | <-+ + | 0 | | 1 | | 2 | | n | | + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ | + | | | | + | | V +-----+ + | V +----------------> | | + V +-----------------------------> | XOR | + +---------------------------------------------------> | | + +-----+ + + + V = ( ( V * 2 ) + B .xor. B ... )(Mod 2^n) + N+1 N 0 2 + + The goodness of traditional pseudo-random number generator algorithms + is measured by statistical tests on such sequences. Carefully chosen + values of the initial V and a, b, and c or the placement of shift + register tap in the above simple processes can produce excellent + statistics. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 6] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + These sequences may be adequate in simulations (Monte Carlo + experiments) as long as the sequence is orthogonal to the structure + of the space being explored. Even there, subtle patterns may cause + problems. However, such sequences are clearly bad for use in + security applications. They are fully predictable if the initial + state is known. Depending on the form of the pseudo-random number + generator, the sequence may be determinable from observation of a + short portion of the sequence [CRYPTO*, STERN]. For example, with + the generators above, one can determine V(n+1) given knowledge of + V(n). In fact, it has been shown that with these techniques, even if + only one bit of the pseudo-random values is released, the seed can be + determined from short sequences. + + Not only have linear congruent generators been broken, but techniques + are now known for breaking all polynomial congruent generators + [KRAWCZYK]. + +4. Unpredictability + + Randomness in the traditional sense described in section 3 is NOT the + same as the unpredictability required for security use. + + For example, use of a widely available constant sequence, such as + that from the CRC tables, is very weak against an adversary. Once + they learn of or guess it, they can easily break all security, future + and past, based on the sequence [CRC]. Yet the statistical + properties of these tables are good. + + The following sections describe the limitations of some randomness + generation techniques and sources. + +4.1 Problems with Clocks and Serial Numbers + + Computer clocks, or similar operating system or hardware values, + provide significantly fewer real bits of unpredictability than might + appear from their specifications. + + Tests have been done on clocks on numerous systems and it was found + that their behavior can vary widely and in unexpected ways. One + version of an operating system running on one set of hardware may + actually provide, say, microsecond resolution in a clock while a + different configuration of the "same" system may always provide the + same lower bits and only count in the upper bits at much lower + resolution. This means that successive reads on the clock may + produce identical values even if enough time has passed that the + value "should" change based on the nominal clock resolution. There + are also cases where frequently reading a clock can produce + artificial sequential values because of extra code that checks for + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 7] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + the clock being unchanged between two reads and increases it by one! + Designing portable application code to generate unpredictable numbers + based on such system clocks is particularly challenging because the + system designer does not always know the properties of the system + clocks that the code will execute on. + + Use of a hardware serial number such as an Ethernet address may also + provide fewer bits of uniqueness than one would guess. Such + quantities are usually heavily structured and subfields may have only + a limited range of possible values or values easily guessable based + on approximate date of manufacture or other data. For example, it is + likely that most of the Ethernet cards installed on Digital Equipment + Corporation (DEC) hardware within DEC were manufactured by DEC + itself, which significantly limits the range of built in addresses. + + Problems such as those described above related to clocks and serial + numbers make code to produce unpredictable quantities difficult if + the code is to be ported across a variety of computer platforms and + systems. + +4.2 Timing and Content of External Events + + It is possible to measure the timing and content of mouse movement, + key strokes, and similar user events. This is a reasonable source of + unguessable data with some qualifications. On some machines, inputs + such as key strokes are buffered. Even though the user's inter- + keystroke timing may have sufficient variation and unpredictability, + there might not be an easy way to access that variation. Another + problem is that no standard method exists to sample timing details. + This makes it hard to build standard software intended for + distribution to a large range of machines based on this technique. + + The amount of mouse movement or the keys actually hit are usually + easier to access than timings but may yield less unpredictability as + the user may provide highly repetitive input. + + Other external events, such as network packet arrival times, can also + be used with care. In particular, the possibility of manipulation of + such times by an adversary must be considered. + +4.3 The Fallacy of Complex Manipulation + + One strategy which may give a misleading appearance of + unpredictability is to take a very complex algorithm (or an excellent + traditional pseudo-random number generator with good statistical + properties) and calculate a cryptographic key by starting with the + current value of a computer system clock as the seed. An adversary + who knew roughly when the generator was started would have a + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 8] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + relatively small number of seed values to test as they would know + likely values of the system clock. Large numbers of pseudo-random + bits could be generated but the search space an adversary would need + to check could be quite small. + + Thus very strong and/or complex manipulation of data will not help if + the adversary can learn what the manipulation is and there is not + enough unpredictability in the starting seed value. Even if they can + not learn what the manipulation is, they may be able to use the + limited number of results stemming from a limited number of seed + values to defeat security. + + Another serious strategy error is to assume that a very complex + pseudo-random number generation algorithm will produce strong random + numbers when there has been no theory behind or analysis of the + algorithm. There is a excellent example of this fallacy right near + the beginning of chapter 3 in [KNUTH] where the author describes a + complex algorithm. It was intended that the machine language program + corresponding to the algorithm would be so complicated that a person + trying to read the code without comments wouldn't know what the + program was doing. Unfortunately, actual use of this algorithm + showed that it almost immediately converged to a single repeated + value in one case and a small cycle of values in another case. + + Not only does complex manipulation not help you if you have a limited + range of seeds but blindly chosen complex manipulation can destroy + the randomness in a good seed! + +4.4 The Fallacy of Selection from a Large Database + + Another strategy that can give a misleading appearance of + unpredictability is selection of a quantity randomly from a database + and assume that its strength is related to the total number of bits + in the database. For example, typical USENET servers as of this date + process over 35 megabytes of information per day. Assume a random + quantity was selected by fetching 32 bytes of data from a random + starting point in this data. This does not yield 32*8 = 256 bits + worth of unguessability. Even after allowing that much of the data + is human language and probably has more like 2 or 3 bits of + information per byte, it doesn't yield 32*2.5 = 80 bits of + unguessability. For an adversary with access to the same 35 + megabytes the unguessability rests only on the starting point of the + selection. That is, at best, about 25 bits of unguessability in this + case. + + The same argument applies to selecting sequences from the data on a + CD ROM or Audio CD recording or any other large public database. If + the adversary has access to the same database, this "selection from a + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 9] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + large volume of data" step buys very little. However, if a selection + can be made from data to which the adversary has no access, such as + system buffers on an active multi-user system, it may be of some + help. + +5. Hardware for Randomness + + Is there any hope for strong portable randomness in the future? + There might be. All that's needed is a physical source of + unpredictable numbers. + + A thermal noise or radioactive decay source and a fast, free-running + oscillator would do the trick directly [GIFFORD]. This is a trivial + amount of hardware, and could easily be included as a standard part + of a computer system's architecture. Furthermore, any system with a + spinning disk or the like has an adequate source of randomness + [DAVIS]. All that's needed is the common perception among computer + vendors that this small additional hardware and the software to + access it is necessary and useful. + +5.1 Volume Required + + How much unpredictability is needed? Is it possible to quantify the + requirement in, say, number of random bits per second? + + The answer is not very much is needed. For DES, the key is 56 bits + and, as we show in an example in Section 8, even the highest security + system is unlikely to require a keying material of over 200 bits. If + a series of keys are needed, it can be generated from a strong random + seed using a cryptographically strong sequence as explained in + Section 6.3. A few hundred random bits generated once a day would be + enough using such techniques. Even if the random bits are generated + as slowly as one per second and it is not possible to overlap the + generation process, it should be tolerable in high security + applications to wait 200 seconds occasionally. + + These numbers are trivial to achieve. It could be done by a person + repeatedly tossing a coin. Almost any hardware process is likely to + be much faster. + +5.2 Sensitivity to Skew + + Is there any specific requirement on the shape of the distribution of + the random numbers? The good news is the distribution need not be + uniform. All that is needed is a conservative estimate of how non- + uniform it is to bound performance. Two simple techniques to de-skew + the bit stream are given below and stronger techniques are mentioned + in Section 6.1.2 below. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 10] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +5.2.1 Using Stream Parity to De-Skew + + Consider taking a sufficiently long string of bits and map the string + to "zero" or "one". The mapping will not yield a perfectly uniform + distribution, but it can be as close as desired. One mapping that + serves the purpose is to take the parity of the string. This has the + advantages that it is robust across all degrees of skew up to the + estimated maximum skew and is absolutely trivial to implement in + hardware. + + The following analysis gives the number of bits that must be sampled: + + Suppose the ratio of ones to zeros is 0.5 + e : 0.5 - e, where e is + between 0 and 0.5 and is a measure of the "eccentricity" of the + distribution. Consider the distribution of the parity function of N + bit samples. The probabilities that the parity will be one or zero + will be the sum of the odd or even terms in the binomial expansion of + (p + q)^N, where p = 0.5 + e, the probability of a one, and q = 0.5 - + e, the probability of a zero. + + These sums can be computed easily as + + N N + 1/2 * ( ( p + q ) + ( p - q ) ) + and + N N + 1/2 * ( ( p + q ) - ( p - q ) ). + + (Which one corresponds to the probability the parity will be 1 + depends on whether N is odd or even.) + + Since p + q = 1 and p - q = 2e, these expressions reduce to + + N + 1/2 * [1 + (2e) ] + and + N + 1/2 * [1 - (2e) ]. + + Neither of these will ever be exactly 0.5 unless e is zero, but we + can bring them arbitrarily close to 0.5. If we want the + probabilities to be within some delta d of 0.5, i.e. then + + N + ( 0.5 + ( 0.5 * (2e) ) ) < 0.5 + d. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 11] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Solving for N yields N > log(2d)/log(2e). (Note that 2e is less than + 1, so its log is negative. Division by a negative number reverses + the sense of an inequality.) + + The following table gives the length of the string which must be + sampled for various degrees of skew in order to come within 0.001 of + a 50/50 distribution. + + +---------+--------+-------+ + | Prob(1) | e | N | + +---------+--------+-------+ + | 0.5 | 0.00 | 1 | + | 0.6 | 0.10 | 4 | + | 0.7 | 0.20 | 7 | + | 0.8 | 0.30 | 13 | + | 0.9 | 0.40 | 28 | + | 0.95 | 0.45 | 59 | + | 0.99 | 0.49 | 308 | + +---------+--------+-------+ + + The last entry shows that even if the distribution is skewed 99% in + favor of ones, the parity of a string of 308 samples will be within + 0.001 of a 50/50 distribution. + +5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew + + Another technique, originally due to von Neumann [VON NEUMANN], is to + examine a bit stream as a sequence of non-overlapping pairs. You + could then discard any 00 or 11 pairs found, interpret 01 as a 0 and + 10 as a 1. Assume the probability of a 1 is 0.5+e and the + probability of a 0 is 0.5-e where e is the eccentricity of the source + and described in the previous section. Then the probability of each + pair is as follows: + + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + | pair | probability | + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + | 00 | (0.5 - e)^2 = 0.25 - e + e^2 | + | 01 | (0.5 - e)*(0.5 + e) = 0.25 - e^2 | + | 10 | (0.5 + e)*(0.5 - e) = 0.25 - e^2 | + | 11 | (0.5 + e)^2 = 0.25 + e + e^2 | + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + + This technique will completely eliminate any bias but at the expense + of taking an indeterminate number of input bits for any particular + desired number of output bits. The probability of any particular + pair being discarded is 0.5 + 2e^2 so the expected number of input + bits to produce X output bits is X/(0.25 - e^2). + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 12] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + This technique assumes that the bits are from a stream where each bit + has the same probability of being a 0 or 1 as any other bit in the + stream and that bits are not correlated, i.e., that the bits are + identical independent distributions. If alternate bits were from two + correlated sources, for example, the above analysis breaks down. + + The above technique also provides another illustration of how a + simple statistical analysis can mislead if one is not always on the + lookout for patterns that could be exploited by an adversary. If the + algorithm were mis-read slightly so that overlapping successive bits + pairs were used instead of non-overlapping pairs, the statistical + analysis given is the same; however, instead of provided an unbiased + uncorrelated series of random 1's and 0's, it instead produces a + totally predictable sequence of exactly alternating 1's and 0's. + +5.2.3 Using FFT to De-Skew + + When real world data consists of strongly biased or correlated bits, + it may still contain useful amounts of randomness. This randomness + can be extracted through use of the discrete Fourier transform or its + optimized variant, the FFT. + + Using the Fourier transform of the data, strong correlations can be + discarded. If adequate data is processed and remaining correlations + decay, spectral lines approaching statistical independence and + normally distributed randomness can be produced [BRILLINGER]. + +5.2.4 Using Compression to De-Skew + + Reversible compression techniques also provide a crude method of de- + skewing a skewed bit stream. This follows directly from the + definition of reversible compression and the formula in Section 2 + above for the amount of information in a sequence. Since the + compression is reversible, the same amount of information must be + present in the shorter output than was present in the longer input. + By the Shannon information equation, this is only possible if, on + average, the probabilities of the different shorter sequences are + more uniformly distributed than were the probabilities of the longer + sequences. Thus the shorter sequences are de-skewed relative to the + input. + + However, many compression techniques add a somewhat predicatable + preface to their output stream and may insert such a sequence again + periodically in their output or otherwise introduce subtle patterns + of their own. They should be considered only a rough technique + compared with those described above or in Section 6.1.2. At a + minimum, the beginning of the compressed sequence should be skipped + and only later bits used for applications requiring random bits. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 13] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +5.3 Existing Hardware Can Be Used For Randomness + + As described below, many computers come with hardware that can, with + care, be used to generate truly random quantities. + +5.3.1 Using Existing Sound/Video Input + + Increasingly computers are being built with inputs that digitize some + real world analog source, such as sound from a microphone or video + input from a camera. Under appropriate circumstances, such input can + provide reasonably high quality random bits. The "input" from a + sound digitizer with no source plugged in or a camera with the lens + cap on, if the system has enough gain to detect anything, is + essentially thermal noise. + + For example, on a SPARCstation, one can read from the /dev/audio + device with nothing plugged into the microphone jack. Such data is + essentially random noise although it should not be trusted without + some checking in case of hardware failure. It will, in any case, + need to be de-skewed as described elsewhere. + + Combining this with compression to de-skew one can, in UNIXese, + generate a huge amount of medium quality random data by doing + + cat /dev/audio | compress - >random-bits-file + +5.3.2 Using Existing Disk Drives + + Disk drives have small random fluctuations in their rotational speed + due to chaotic air turbulence [DAVIS]. By adding low level disk seek + time instrumentation to a system, a series of measurements can be + obtained that include this randomness. Such data is usually highly + correlated so that significant processing is needed, including FFT + (see section 5.2.3). Nevertheless experimentation has shown that, + with such processing, disk drives easily produce 100 bits a minute or + more of excellent random data. + + Partly offsetting this need for processing is the fact that disk + drive failure will normally be rapidly noticed. Thus, problems with + this method of random number generation due to hardware failure are + very unlikely. + +6. Recommended Non-Hardware Strategy + + What is the best overall strategy for meeting the requirement for + unguessable random numbers in the absence of a reliable hardware + source? It is to obtain random input from a large number of + uncorrelated sources and to mix them with a strong mixing function. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 14] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Such a function will preserve the randomness present in any of the + sources even if other quantities being combined are fixed or easily + guessable. This may be advisable even with a good hardware source as + hardware can also fail, though this should be weighed against any + increase in the chance of overall failure due to added software + complexity. + +6.1 Mixing Functions + + A strong mixing function is one which combines two or more inputs and + produces an output where each output bit is a different complex non- + linear function of all the input bits. On average, changing any + input bit will change about half the output bits. But because the + relationship is complex and non-linear, no particular output bit is + guaranteed to change when any particular input bit is changed. + + Consider the problem of converting a stream of bits that is skewed + towards 0 or 1 to a shorter stream which is more random, as discussed + in Section 5.2 above. This is simply another case where a strong + mixing function is desired, mixing the input bits to produce a + smaller number of output bits. The technique given in Section 5.2.1 + of using the parity of a number of bits is simply the result of + successively Exclusive Or'ing them which is examined as a trivial + mixing function immediately below. Use of stronger mixing functions + to extract more of the randomness in a stream of skewed bits is + examined in Section 6.1.2. + +6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function + + A trivial example for single bit inputs is the Exclusive Or function, + which is equivalent to addition without carry, as show in the table + below. This is a degenerate case in which the one output bit always + changes for a change in either input bit. But, despite its + simplicity, it will still provide a useful illustration. + + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + | input 1 | input 2 | output | + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 1 | 1 | + | 1 | 0 | 1 | + | 1 | 1 | 0 | + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + + If inputs 1 and 2 are uncorrelated and combined in this fashion then + the output will be an even better (less skewed) random bit than the + inputs. If we assume an "eccentricity" e as defined in Section 5.2 + above, then the output eccentricity relates to the input eccentricity + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 15] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + as follows: + + e = 2 * e * e + output input 1 input 2 + + Since e is never greater than 1/2, the eccentricity is always + improved except in the case where at least one input is a totally + skewed constant. This is illustrated in the following table where + the top and left side values are the two input eccentricities and the + entries are the output eccentricity: + + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | e | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | + | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.10 | + | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.20 | + | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.30 | + | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.40 | + | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + + However, keep in mind that the above calculations assume that the + inputs are not correlated. If the inputs were, say, the parity of + the number of minutes from midnight on two clocks accurate to a few + seconds, then each might appear random if sampled at random intervals + much longer than a minute. Yet if they were both sampled and + combined with xor, the result would be zero most of the time. + +6.1.2 Stronger Mixing Functions + + The US Government Data Encryption Standard [DES] is an example of a + strong mixing function for multiple bit quantities. It takes up to + 120 bits of input (64 bits of "data" and 56 bits of "key") and + produces 64 bits of output each of which is dependent on a complex + non-linear function of all input bits. Other strong encryption + functions with this characteristic can also be used by considering + them to mix all of their key and data input bits. + + Another good family of mixing functions are the "message digest" or + hashing functions such as The US Government Secure Hash Standard + [SHS] and the MD2, MD4, MD5 [MD2, MD4, MD5] series. These functions + all take an arbitrary amount of input and produce an output mixing + all the input bits. The MD* series produce 128 bits of output and SHS + produces 160 bits. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 16] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Although the message digest functions are designed for variable + amounts of input, DES and other encryption functions can also be used + to combine any number of inputs. If 64 bits of output is adequate, + the inputs can be packed into a 64 bit data quantity and successive + 56 bit keys, padding with zeros if needed, which are then used to + successively encrypt using DES in Electronic Codebook Mode [DES + MODES]. If more than 64 bits of output are needed, use more complex + mixing. For example, if inputs are packed into three quantities, A, + B, and C, use DES to encrypt A with B as a key and then with C as a + key to produce the 1st part of the output, then encrypt B with C and + then A for more output and, if necessary, encrypt C with A and then B + for yet more output. Still more output can be produced by reversing + the order of the keys given above to stretch things. The same can be + done with the hash functions by hashing various subsets of the input + data to produce multiple outputs. But keep in mind that it is + impossible to get more bits of "randomness" out than are put in. + + An example of using a strong mixing function would be to reconsider + the case of a string of 308 bits each of which is biased 99% towards + zero. The parity technique given in Section 5.2.1 above reduced this + to one bit with only a 1/1000 deviance from being equally likely a + zero or one. But, applying the equation for information given in + Section 2, this 308 bit sequence has 5 bits of information in it. + Thus hashing it with SHS or MD5 and taking the bottom 5 bits of the + result would yield 5 unbiased random bits as opposed to the single + bit given by calculating the parity of the string. + +6.1.3 Diffie-Hellman as a Mixing Function + + Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange is a technique that yields a + shared secret between two parties that can be made computationally + infeasible for a third party to determine even if they can observe + all the messages between the two communicating parties. This shared + secret is a mixture of initial quantities generated by each of them + [D-H]. If these initial quantities are random, then the shared + secret contains the combined randomness of them both, assuming they + are uncorrelated. + +6.1.4 Using a Mixing Function to Stretch Random Bits + + While it is not necessary for a mixing function to produce the same + or fewer bits than its inputs, mixing bits cannot "stretch" the + amount of random unpredictability present in the inputs. Thus four + inputs of 32 bits each where there is 12 bits worth of + unpredicatability (such as 4,096 equally probable values) in each + input cannot produce more than 48 bits worth of unpredictable output. + The output can be expanded to hundreds or thousands of bits by, for + example, mixing with successive integers, but the clever adversary's + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 17] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + search space is still 2^48 possibilities. Furthermore, mixing to + fewer bits than are input will tend to strengthen the randomness of + the output the way using Exclusive Or to produce one bit from two did + above. + + The last table in Section 6.1.1 shows that mixing a random bit with a + constant bit with Exclusive Or will produce a random bit. While this + is true, it does not provide a way to "stretch" one random bit into + more than one. If, for example, a random bit is mixed with a 0 and + then with a 1, this produces a two bit sequence but it will always be + either 01 or 10. Since there are only two possible values, there is + still only the one bit of original randomness. + +6.1.5 Other Factors in Choosing a Mixing Function + + For local use, DES has the advantages that it has been widely tested + for flaws, is widely documented, and is widely implemented with + hardware and software implementations available all over the world + including source code available by anonymous FTP. The SHS and MD* + family are younger algorithms which have been less tested but there + is no particular reason to believe they are flawed. Both MD5 and SHS + were derived from the earlier MD4 algorithm. They all have source + code available by anonymous FTP [SHS, MD2, MD4, MD5]. + + DES and SHS have been vouched for the the US National Security Agency + (NSA) on the basis of criteria that primarily remain secret. While + this is the cause of much speculation and doubt, investigation of DES + over the years has indicated that NSA involvement in modifications to + its design, which originated with IBM, was primarily to strengthen + it. No concealed or special weakness has been found in DES. It is + almost certain that the NSA modification to MD4 to produce the SHS + similarly strengthened the algorithm, possibly against threats not + yet known in the public cryptographic community. + + DES, SHS, MD4, and MD5 are royalty free for all purposes. MD2 has + been freely licensed only for non-profit use in connection with + Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM]. Between the MD* algorithms, some people + believe that, as with "Goldilocks and the Three Bears", MD2 is strong + but too slow, MD4 is fast but too weak, and MD5 is just right. + + Another advantage of the MD* or similar hashing algorithms over + encryption algorithms is that they are not subject to the same + regulations imposed by the US Government prohibiting the unlicensed + export or import of encryption/decryption software and hardware. The + same should be true of DES rigged to produce an irreversible hash + code but most DES packages are oriented to reversible encryption. + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 18] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +6.2 Non-Hardware Sources of Randomness + + The best source of input for mixing would be a hardware randomness + such as disk drive timing affected by air turbulence, audio input + with thermal noise, or radioactive decay. However, if that is not + available there are other possibilities. These include system + clocks, system or input/output buffers, user/system/hardware/network + serial numbers and/or addresses and timing, and user input. + Unfortunately, any of these sources can produce limited or + predicatable values under some circumstances. + + Some of the sources listed above would be quite strong on multi-user + systems where, in essence, each user of the system is a source of + randomness. However, on a small single user system, such as a + typical IBM PC or Apple Macintosh, it might be possible for an + adversary to assemble a similar configuration. This could give the + adversary inputs to the mixing process that were sufficiently + correlated to those used originally as to make exhaustive search + practical. + + The use of multiple random inputs with a strong mixing function is + recommended and can overcome weakness in any particular input. For + example, the timing and content of requested "random" user keystrokes + can yield hundreds of random bits but conservative assumptions need + to be made. For example, assuming a few bits of randomness if the + inter-keystroke interval is unique in the sequence up to that point + and a similar assumption if the key hit is unique but assuming that + no bits of randomness are present in the initial key value or if the + timing or key value duplicate previous values. The results of mixing + these timings and characters typed could be further combined with + clock values and other inputs. + + This strategy may make practical portable code to produce good random + numbers for security even if some of the inputs are very weak on some + of the target systems. However, it may still fail against a high + grade attack on small single user systems, especially if the + adversary has ever been able to observe the generation process in the + past. A hardware based random source is still preferable. + +6.3 Cryptographically Strong Sequences + + In cases where a series of random quantities must be generated, an + adversary may learn some values in the sequence. In general, they + should not be able to predict other values from the ones that they + know. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 19] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + The correct technique is to start with a strong random seed, take + cryptographically strong steps from that seed [CRYPTO2, CRYPTO3], and + do not reveal the complete state of the generator in the sequence + elements. If each value in the sequence can be calculated in a fixed + way from the previous value, then when any value is compromised, all + future values can be determined. This would be the case, for + example, if each value were a constant function of the previously + used values, even if the function were a very strong, non-invertible + message digest function. + + It should be noted that if your technique for generating a sequence + of key values is fast enough, it can trivially be used as the basis + for a confidentiality system. If two parties use the same sequence + generating technique and start with the same seed material, they will + generate identical sequences. These could, for example, be xor'ed at + one end with data being send, encrypting it, and xor'ed with this + data as received, decrypting it due to the reversible properties of + the xor operation. + +6.3.1 Traditional Strong Sequences + + A traditional way to achieve a strong sequence has been to have the + values be produced by hashing the quantities produced by + concatenating the seed with successive integers or the like and then + mask the values obtained so as to limit the amount of generator state + available to the adversary. + + It may also be possible to use an "encryption" algorithm with a + random key and seed value to encrypt and feedback some or all of the + output encrypted value into the value to be encrypted for the next + iteration. Appropriate feedback techniques will usually be + recommended with the encryption algorithm. An example is shown below + where shifting and masking are used to combine the cypher output + feedback. This type of feedback is recommended by the US Government + in connection with DES [DES MODES]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 20] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + +---------------+ + | V | + | | n | + +--+------------+ + | | +---------+ + | +---------> | | +-----+ + +--+ | Encrypt | <--- | Key | + | +-------- | | +-----+ + | | +---------+ + V V + +------------+--+ + | V | | + | n+1 | + +---------------+ + + Note that if a shift of one is used, this is the same as the shift + register technique described in Section 3 above but with the all + important difference that the feedback is determined by a complex + non-linear function of all bits rather than a simple linear or + polynomial combination of output from a few bit position taps. + + It has been shown by Donald W. Davies that this sort of shifted + partial output feedback significantly weakens an algorithm compared + will feeding all of the output bits back as input. In particular, + for DES, repeated encrypting a full 64 bit quantity will give an + expected repeat in about 2^63 iterations. Feeding back anything less + than 64 (and more than 0) bits will give an expected repeat in + between 2**31 and 2**32 iterations! + + To predict values of a sequence from others when the sequence was + generated by these techniques is equivalent to breaking the + cryptosystem or inverting the "non-invertible" hashing involved with + only partial information available. The less information revealed + each iteration, the harder it will be for an adversary to predict the + sequence. Thus it is best to use only one bit from each value. It + has been shown that in some cases this makes it impossible to break a + system even when the cryptographic system is invertible and can be + broken if all of each generated value was revealed. + +6.3.2 The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator + + Currently the generator which has the strongest public proof of + strength is called the Blum Blum Shub generator after its inventors + [BBS]. It is also very simple and is based on quadratic residues. + It's only disadvantage is that is is computationally intensive + compared with the traditional techniques give in 6.3.1 above. This + is not a serious draw back if it is used for moderately infrequent + purposes, such as generating session keys. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 21] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Simply choose two large prime numbers, say p and q, which both have + the property that you get a remainder of 3 if you divide them by 4. + Let n = p * q. Then you choose a random number x relatively prime to + n. The initial seed for the generator and the method for calculating + subsequent values are then + + 2 + s = ( x )(Mod n) + 0 + + 2 + s = ( s )(Mod n) + i+1 i + + You must be careful to use only a few bits from the bottom of each s. + It is always safe to use only the lowest order bit. If you use no + more than the + + log ( log ( s ) ) + 2 2 i + + low order bits, then predicting any additional bits from a sequence + generated in this manner is provable as hard as factoring n. As long + as the initial x is secret, you can even make n public if you want. + + An intersting characteristic of this generator is that you can + directly calculate any of the s values. In particular + + i + ( ( 2 )(Mod (( p - 1 ) * ( q - 1 )) ) ) + s = ( s )(Mod n) + i 0 + + This means that in applications where many keys are generated in this + fashion, it is not necessary to save them all. Each key can be + effectively indexed and recovered from that small index and the + initial s and n. + +7. Key Generation Standards + + Several public standards are now in place for the generation of keys. + Two of these are described below. Both use DES but any equally + strong or stronger mixing function could be substituted. + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 22] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +7.1 US DoD Recommendations for Password Generation + + The United States Department of Defense has specific recommendations + for password generation [DoD]. They suggest using the US Data + Encryption Standard [DES] in Output Feedback Mode [DES MODES] as + follows: + + use an initialization vector determined from + the system clock, + system ID, + user ID, and + date and time; + use a key determined from + system interrupt registers, + system status registers, and + system counters; and, + as plain text, use an external randomly generated 64 bit + quantity such as 8 characters typed in by a system + administrator. + + The password can then be calculated from the 64 bit "cipher text" + generated in 64-bit Output Feedback Mode. As many bits as are needed + can be taken from these 64 bits and expanded into a pronounceable + word, phrase, or other format if a human being needs to remember the + password. + +7.2 X9.17 Key Generation + + The American National Standards Institute has specified a method for + generating a sequence of keys as follows: + + s is the initial 64 bit seed + 0 + + g is the sequence of generated 64 bit key quantities + n + + k is a random key reserved for generating this key sequence + + t is the time at which a key is generated to as fine a resolution + as is available (up to 64 bits). + + DES ( K, Q ) is the DES encryption of quantity Q with key K + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 23] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + g = DES ( k, DES ( k, t ) .xor. s ) + n n + + s = DES ( k, DES ( k, t ) .xor. g ) + n+1 n + + If g sub n is to be used as a DES key, then every eighth bit should + be adjusted for parity for that use but the entire 64 bit unmodified + g should be used in calculating the next s. + +8. Examples of Randomness Required + + Below are two examples showing rough calculations of needed + randomness for security. The first is for moderate security + passwords while the second assumes a need for a very high security + cryptographic key. + +8.1 Password Generation + + Assume that user passwords change once a year and it is desired that + the probability that an adversary could guess the password for a + particular account be less than one in a thousand. Further assume + that sending a password to the system is the only way to try a + password. Then the crucial question is how often an adversary can + try possibilities. Assume that delays have been introduced into a + system so that, at most, an adversary can make one password try every + six seconds. That's 600 per hour or about 15,000 per day or about + 5,000,000 tries in a year. Assuming any sort of monitoring, it is + unlikely someone could actually try continuously for a year. In + fact, even if log files are only checked monthly, 500,000 tries is + more plausible before the attack is noticed and steps taken to change + passwords and make it harder to try more passwords. + + To have a one in a thousand chance of guessing the password in + 500,000 tries implies a universe of at least 500,000,000 passwords or + about 2^29. Thus 29 bits of randomness are needed. This can probably + be achieved using the US DoD recommended inputs for password + generation as it has 8 inputs which probably average over 5 bits of + randomness each (see section 7.1). Using a list of 1000 words, the + password could be expressed as a three word phrase (1,000,000,000 + possibilities) or, using case insensitive letters and digits, six + would suffice ((26+10)^6 = 2,176,782,336 possibilities). + + For a higher security password, the number of bits required goes up. + To decrease the probability by 1,000 requires increasing the universe + of passwords by the same factor which adds about 10 bits. Thus to + have only a one in a million chance of a password being guessed under + the above scenario would require 39 bits of randomness and a password + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 24] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + that was a four word phrase from a 1000 word list or eight + letters/digits. To go to a one in 10^9 chance, 49 bits of randomness + are needed implying a five word phrase or ten letter/digit password. + + In a real system, of course, there are also other factors. For + example, the larger and harder to remember passwords are, the more + likely users are to write them down resulting in an additional risk + of compromise. + +8.2 A Very High Security Cryptographic Key + + Assume that a very high security key is needed for symmetric + encryption / decryption between two parties. Assume an adversary can + observe communications and knows the algorithm being used. Within + the field of random possibilities, the adversary can try key values + in hopes of finding the one in use. Assume further that brute force + trial of keys is the best the adversary can do. + +8.2.1 Effort per Key Trial + + How much effort will it take to try each key? For very high security + applications it is best to assume a low value of effort. Even if it + would clearly take tens of thousands of computer cycles or more to + try a single key, there may be some pattern that enables huge blocks + of key values to be tested with much less effort per key. Thus it is + probably best to assume no more than a couple hundred cycles per key. + (There is no clear lower bound on this as computers operate in + parallel on a number of bits and a poor encryption algorithm could + allow many keys or even groups of keys to be tested in parallel. + However, we need to assume some value and can hope that a reasonably + strong algorithm has been chosen for our hypothetical high security + task.) + + If the adversary can command a highly parallel processor or a large + network of work stations, 2*10^10 cycles per second is probably a + minimum assumption for availability today. Looking forward just a + couple years, there should be at least an order of magnitude + improvement. Thus assuming 10^9 keys could be checked per second or + 3.6*10^11 per hour or 6*10^13 per week or 2.4*10^14 per month is + reasonable. This implies a need for a minimum of 51 bits of + randomness in keys to be sure they cannot be found in a month. Even + then it is possible that, a few years from now, a highly determined + and resourceful adversary could break the key in 2 weeks (on average + they need try only half the keys). + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 25] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +8.2.2 Meet in the Middle Attacks + + If chosen or known plain text and the resulting encrypted text are + available, a "meet in the middle" attack is possible if the structure + of the encryption algorithm allows it. (In a known plain text + attack, the adversary knows all or part of the messages being + encrypted, possibly some standard header or trailer fields. In a + chosen plain text attack, the adversary can force some chosen plain + text to be encrypted, possibly by "leaking" an exciting text that + would then be sent by the adversary over an encrypted channel.) + + An oversimplified explanation of the meet in the middle attack is as + follows: the adversary can half-encrypt the known or chosen plain + text with all possible first half-keys, sort the output, then half- + decrypt the encoded text with all the second half-keys. If a match + is found, the full key can be assembled from the halves and used to + decrypt other parts of the message or other messages. At its best, + this type of attack can halve the exponent of the work required by + the adversary while adding a large but roughly constant factor of + effort. To be assured of safety against this, a doubling of the + amount of randomness in the key to a minimum of 102 bits is required. + + The meet in the middle attack assumes that the cryptographic + algorithm can be decomposed in this way but we can not rule that out + without a deep knowledge of the algorithm. Even if a basic algorithm + is not subject to a meet in the middle attack, an attempt to produce + a stronger algorithm by applying the basic algorithm twice (or two + different algorithms sequentially) with different keys may gain less + added security than would be expected. Such a composite algorithm + would be subject to a meet in the middle attack. + + Enormous resources may be required to mount a meet in the middle + attack but they are probably within the range of the national + security services of a major nation. Essentially all nations spy on + other nations government traffic and several nations are believed to + spy on commercial traffic for economic advantage. + +8.2.3 Other Considerations + + Since we have not even considered the possibilities of special + purpose code breaking hardware or just how much of a safety margin we + want beyond our assumptions above, probably a good minimum for a very + high security cryptographic key is 128 bits of randomness which + implies a minimum key length of 128 bits. If the two parties agree + on a key by Diffie-Hellman exchange [D-H], then in principle only + half of this randomness would have to be supplied by each party. + However, there is probably some correlation between their random + inputs so it is probably best to assume that each party needs to + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 26] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + provide at least 96 bits worth of randomness for very high security + if Diffie-Hellman is used. + + This amount of randomness is beyond the limit of that in the inputs + recommended by the US DoD for password generation and could require + user typing timing, hardware random number generation, or other + sources. + + It should be noted that key length calculations such at those above + are controversial and depend on various assumptions about the + cryptographic algorithms in use. In some cases, a professional with + a deep knowledge of code breaking techniques and of the strength of + the algorithm in use could be satisfied with less than half of the + key size derived above. + +9. Conclusion + + Generation of unguessable "random" secret quantities for security use + is an essential but difficult task. + + We have shown that hardware techniques to produce such randomness + would be relatively simple. In particular, the volume and quality + would not need to be high and existing computer hardware, such as + disk drives, can be used. Computational techniques are available to + process low quality random quantities from multiple sources or a + larger quantity of such low quality input from one source and produce + a smaller quantity of higher quality, less predictable key material. + In the absence of hardware sources of randomness, a variety of user + and software sources can frequently be used instead with care; + however, most modern systems already have hardware, such as disk + drives or audio input, that could be used to produce high quality + randomness. + + Once a sufficient quantity of high quality seed key material (a few + hundred bits) is available, strong computational techniques are + available to produce cryptographically strong sequences of + unpredicatable quantities from this seed material. + +10. Security Considerations + + The entirety of this document concerns techniques and recommendations + for generating unguessable "random" quantities for use as passwords, + cryptographic keys, and similar security uses. + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 27] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +References + + [ASYMMETRIC] - Secure Communications and Asymmetric Cryptosystems, + edited by Gustavus J. Simmons, AAAS Selected Symposium 69, Westview + Press, Inc. + + [BBS] - A Simple Unpredictable Pseudo-Random Number Generator, SIAM + Journal on Computing, v. 15, n. 2, 1986, L. Blum, M. Blum, & M. Shub. + + [BRILLINGER] - Time Series: Data Analysis and Theory, Holden-Day, + 1981, David Brillinger. + + [CRC] - C.R.C. Standard Mathematical Tables, Chemical Rubber + Publishing Company. + + [CRYPTO1] - Cryptography: A Primer, A Wiley-Interscience Publication, + John Wiley & Sons, 1981, Alan G. Konheim. + + [CRYPTO2] - Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data Security, + A Wiley-Interscience Publication, John Wiley & Sons, 1982, Carl H. + Meyer & Stephen M. Matyas. + + [CRYPTO3] - Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source + Code in C, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, Bruce Schneier. + + [DAVIS] - Cryptographic Randomness from Air Turbulence in Disk + Drives, Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '94, Springer-Verlag Lecture + Notes in Computer Science #839, 1984, Don Davis, Ross Ihaka, and + Philip Fenstermacher. + + [DES] - Data Encryption Standard, United States of America, + Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and + Technology, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-1. + - Data Encryption Algorithm, American National Standards Institute, + ANSI X3.92-1981. + (See also FIPS 112, Password Usage, which includes FORTRAN code for + performing DES.) + + [DES MODES] - DES Modes of Operation, United States of America, + Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and + Technology, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 81. + - Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation, American National + Standards Institute, ANSI X3.106-1983. + + [D-H] - New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions on + Information Technology, November, 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin + E. Hellman. + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 28] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + [DoD] - Password Management Guideline, United States of America, + Department of Defense, Computer Security Center, CSC-STD-002-85. + (See also FIPS 112, Password Usage, which incorporates CSC-STD-002-85 + as one of its appendices.) + + [GIFFORD] - Natural Random Number, MIT/LCS/TM-371, September 1988, + David K. Gifford + + [KNUTH] - The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2: Seminumerical + Algorithms, Chapter 3: Random Numbers. Addison Wesley Publishing + Company, Second Edition 1982, Donald E. Knuth. + + [KRAWCZYK] - How to Predict Congruential Generators, Journal of + Algorithms, V. 13, N. 4, December 1992, H. Krawczyk + + [MD2] - The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1319, April 1992, B. + Kaliski + [MD4] - The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1320, April 1992, R. + Rivest + [MD5] - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1321, April 1992, R. + Rivest + + [PEM] - RFCs 1421 through 1424: + - RFC 1424, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + IV: Key Certification and Related Services, 02/10/1993, B. Kaliski + - RFC 1423, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers, 02/10/1993, D. Balenson + - RFC 1422, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + II: Certificate-Based Key Management, 02/10/1993, S. Kent + - RFC 1421, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: + Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, 02/10/1993, J. Linn + + [SHANNON] - The Mathematical Theory of Communication, University of + Illinois Press, 1963, Claude E. Shannon. (originally from: Bell + System Technical Journal, July and October 1948) + + [SHIFT1] - Shift Register Sequences, Aegean Park Press, Revised + Edition 1982, Solomon W. Golomb. + + [SHIFT2] - Cryptanalysis of Shift-Register Generated Stream Cypher + Systems, Aegean Park Press, 1984, Wayne G. Barker. + + [SHS] - Secure Hash Standard, United States of American, National + Institute of Science and Technology, Federal Information Processing + Standard (FIPS) 180, April 1993. + + [STERN] - Secret Linear Congruential Generators are not + Cryptograhically Secure, Proceedings of IEEE STOC, 1987, J. Stern. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 29] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + [VON NEUMANN] - Various techniques used in connection with random + digits, von Neumann's Collected Works, Vol. 5, Pergamon Press, 1963, + J. von Neumann. + +Authors' Addresses + + Donald E. Eastlake 3rd + Digital Equipment Corporation + 550 King Street, LKG2-1/BB3 + Littleton, MA 01460 + + Phone: +1 508 486 6577(w) +1 508 287 4877(h) + EMail: dee@lkg.dec.com + + + Stephen D. Crocker + CyberCash Inc. + 2086 Hunters Crest Way + Vienna, VA 22181 + + Phone: +1 703-620-1222(w) +1 703-391-2651 (fax) + EMail: crocker@cybercash.com + + + Jeffrey I. Schiller + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 253 0161(w) + EMail: jis@mit.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 30] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0556c9e83f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1011 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group R. Srinivasan +Request for Comments: 1831 Sun Microsystems +Category: Standards Track August 1995 + + + RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol Specification Version 2 + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +ABSTRACT + + This document describes the ONC Remote Procedure Call (ONC RPC + Version 2) protocol as it is currently deployed and accepted. "ONC" + stands for "Open Network Computing". + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + + 1. INTRODUCTION 2 + 2. TERMINOLOGY 2 + 3. THE RPC MODEL 2 + 4. TRANSPORTS AND SEMANTICS 4 + 5. BINDING AND RENDEZVOUS INDEPENDENCE 5 + 6. AUTHENTICATION 5 + 7. RPC PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 5 + 7.1 RPC Programs and Procedures 6 + 7.2 Authentication 7 + 7.3 Program Number Assignment 8 + 7.4 Other Uses of the RPC Protocol 8 + 7.4.1 Batching 8 + 7.4.2 Broadcast Remote Procedure Calls 8 + 8. THE RPC MESSAGE PROTOCOL 9 + 9. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 12 + 9.1 Null Authentication 13 + 10. RECORD MARKING STANDARD 13 + 11. THE RPC LANGUAGE 13 + 11.1 An Example Service Described in the RPC Language 13 + 11.2 The RPC Language Specification 14 + 11.3 Syntax Notes 15 + APPENDIX A: SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION 16 + REFERENCES 17 + Security Considerations 18 + Author's Address 18 + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +1. INTRODUCTION + + This document specifies version two of the message protocol used in + ONC Remote Procedure Call (RPC). The message protocol is specified + with the eXternal Data Representation (XDR) language [9]. This + document assumes that the reader is familiar with XDR. It does not + attempt to justify remote procedure calls systems or describe their + use. The paper by Birrell and Nelson [1] is recommended as an + excellent background for the remote procedure call concept. + +2. TERMINOLOGY + + This document discusses clients, calls, servers, replies, services, + programs, procedures, and versions. Each remote procedure call has + two sides: an active client side that makes the call to a server, + which sends back a reply. A network service is a collection of one + or more remote programs. A remote program implements one or more + remote procedures; the procedures, their parameters, and results are + documented in the specific program's protocol specification. A + server may support more than one version of a remote program in order + to be compatible with changing protocols. + + For example, a network file service may be composed of two programs. + One program may deal with high-level applications such as file system + access control and locking. The other may deal with low-level file + input and output and have procedures like "read" and "write". A + client of the network file service would call the procedures + associated with the two programs of the service on behalf of the + client. + + The terms client and server only apply to a particular transaction; a + particular hardware entity (host) or software entity (process or + program) could operate in both roles at different times. For + example, a program that supplies remote execution service could also + be a client of a network file service. + +3. THE RPC MODEL + + The ONC RPC protocol is based on the remote procedure call model, + which is similar to the local procedure call model. In the local + case, the caller places arguments to a procedure in some well- + specified location (such as a register window). It then transfers + control to the procedure, and eventually regains control. At that + point, the results of the procedure are extracted from the well- + specified location, and the caller continues execution. + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + The remote procedure call model is similar. One thread of control + logically winds through two processes: the caller's process, and a + server's process. The caller process first sends a call message to + the server process and waits (blocks) for a reply message. The call + message includes the procedure's parameters, and the reply message + includes the procedure's results. Once the reply message is + received, the results of the procedure are extracted, and caller's + execution is resumed. + + On the server side, a process is dormant awaiting the arrival of a + call message. When one arrives, the server process extracts the + procedure's parameters, computes the results, sends a reply message, + and then awaits the next call message. + + In this model, only one of the two processes is active at any given + time. However, this model is only given as an example. The ONC RPC + protocol makes no restrictions on the concurrency model implemented, + and others are possible. For example, an implementation may choose + to have RPC calls be asynchronous, so that the client may do useful + work while waiting for the reply from the server. Another + possibility is to have the server create a separate task to process + an incoming call, so that the original server can be free to receive + other requests. + + There are a few important ways in which remote procedure calls differ + from local procedure calls: + + 1. Error handling: failures of the remote server or network must + be handled when using remote procedure calls. + + 2. Global variables and side-effects: since the server does not + have access to the client's address space, hidden arguments cannot + be passed as global variables or returned as side effects. + + 3. Performance: remote procedures usually operate one or more + orders of magnitude slower than local procedure calls. + + 4. Authentication: since remote procedure calls can be transported + over unsecured networks, authentication may be necessary. + Authentication prevents one entity from masquerading as some other + entity. + + The conclusion is that even though there are tools to automatically + generate client and server libraries for a given service, protocols + must still be designed carefully. + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +4. TRANSPORTS AND SEMANTICS + + The RPC protocol can be implemented on several different transport + protocols. The RPC protocol does not care how a message is passed + from one process to another, but only with specification and + interpretation of messages. However, the application may wish to + obtain information about (and perhaps control over) the transport + layer through an interface not specified in this document. For + example, the transport protocol may impose a restriction on the + maximum size of RPC messages, or it may be stream-oriented like TCP + with no size limit. The client and server must agree on their + transport protocol choices. + + It is important to point out that RPC does not try to implement any + kind of reliability and that the application may need to be aware of + the type of transport protocol underneath RPC. If it knows it is + running on top of a reliable transport such as TCP [6], then most of + the work is already done for it. On the other hand, if it is running + on top of an unreliable transport such as UDP [7], it must implement + its own time-out, retransmission, and duplicate detection policies as + the RPC protocol does not provide these services. + + Because of transport independence, the RPC protocol does not attach + specific semantics to the remote procedures or their execution + requirements. Semantics can be inferred from (but should be + explicitly specified by) the underlying transport protocol. For + example, consider RPC running on top of an unreliable transport such + as UDP. If an application retransmits RPC call messages after time- + outs, and does not receive a reply, it cannot infer anything about + the number of times the procedure was executed. If it does receive a + reply, then it can infer that the procedure was executed at least + once. + + A server may wish to remember previously granted requests from a + client and not regrant them in order to insure some degree of + execute-at-most-once semantics. A server can do this by taking + advantage of the transaction ID that is packaged with every RPC + message. The main use of this transaction ID is by the client RPC + entity in matching replies to calls. However, a client application + may choose to reuse its previous transaction ID when retransmitting a + call. The server may choose to remember this ID after executing a + call and not execute calls with the same ID in order to achieve some + degree of execute-at-most-once semantics. The server is not allowed + to examine this ID in any other way except as a test for equality. + + On the other hand, if using a "reliable" transport such as TCP, the + application can infer from a reply message that the procedure was + executed exactly once, but if it receives no reply message, it cannot + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + assume that the remote procedure was not executed. Note that even if + a connection-oriented protocol like TCP is used, an application still + needs time-outs and reconnection to handle server crashes. + + There are other possibilities for transports besides datagram- or + connection-oriented protocols. For example, a request-reply protocol + such as VMTP [2] is perhaps a natural transport for RPC. ONC RPC + uses both TCP and UDP transport protocols. Section 10 (RECORD + MARKING STANDARD) describes the mechanism employed by ONC RPC to + utilize a connection-oriented, stream-oriented transport such as TCP. + +5. BINDING AND RENDEZVOUS INDEPENDENCE + + The act of binding a particular client to a particular service and + transport parameters is NOT part of this RPC protocol specification. + This important and necessary function is left up to some higher-level + software. + + Implementors could think of the RPC protocol as the jump-subroutine + instruction ("JSR") of a network; the loader (binder) makes JSR + useful, and the loader itself uses JSR to accomplish its task. + Likewise, the binding software makes RPC useful, possibly using RPC + to accomplish this task. + +6. AUTHENTICATION + + The RPC protocol provides the fields necessary for a client to + identify itself to a service, and vice-versa, in each call and reply + message. Security and access control mechanisms can be built on top + of this message authentication. Several different authentication + protocols can be supported. A field in the RPC header indicates + which protocol is being used. More information on specific + authentication protocols is in section 9: "Authentication Protocols". + +7. RPC PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS + + The RPC protocol must provide for the following: + + (1) Unique specification of a procedure to be called. + (2) Provisions for matching response messages to request messages. + (3) Provisions for authenticating the caller to service and + vice-versa. + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + Besides these requirements, features that detect the following are + worth supporting because of protocol roll-over errors, implementation + bugs, user error, and network administration: + + (1) RPC protocol mismatches. + (2) Remote program protocol version mismatches. + (3) Protocol errors (such as misspecification of a procedure's + parameters). + (4) Reasons why remote authentication failed. + (5) Any other reasons why the desired procedure was not called. + +7.1 RPC Programs and Procedures + + The RPC call message has three unsigned integer fields -- remote + program number, remote program version number, and remote procedure + number -- which uniquely identify the procedure to be called. + Program numbers are administered by a central authority + (rpc@sun.com). Once implementors have a program number, they can + implement their remote program; the first implementation would most + likely have the version number 1. Because most new protocols evolve, + a version field of the call message identifies which version of the + protocol the caller is using. Version numbers enable support of both + old and new protocols through the same server process. + + The procedure number identifies the procedure to be called. These + numbers are documented in the specific program's protocol + specification. For example, a file service's protocol specification + may state that its procedure number 5 is "read" and procedure number + 12 is "write". + + Just as remote program protocols may change over several versions, + the actual RPC message protocol could also change. Therefore, the + call message also has in it the RPC version number, which is always + equal to two for the version of RPC described here. + + The reply message to a request message has enough information to + distinguish the following error conditions: + + (1) The remote implementation of RPC does not support protocol + version 2. The lowest and highest supported RPC version numbers + are returned. + + (2) The remote program is not available on the remote system. + + (3) The remote program does not support the requested version + number. The lowest and highest supported remote program version + numbers are returned. + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + (4) The requested procedure number does not exist. (This is + usually a client side protocol or programming error.) + + (5) The parameters to the remote procedure appear to be garbage + from the server's point of view. (Again, this is usually caused + by a disagreement about the protocol between client and service.) + +7.2 Authentication + + Provisions for authentication of caller to service and vice-versa are + provided as a part of the RPC protocol. The call message has two + authentication fields, the credential and verifier. The reply + message has one authentication field, the response verifier. The RPC + protocol specification defines all three fields to be the following + opaque type (in the eXternal Data Representation (XDR) language [9]): + + enum auth_flavor { + AUTH_NONE = 0, + AUTH_SYS = 1, + AUTH_SHORT = 2 + /* and more to be defined */ + }; + + struct opaque_auth { + auth_flavor flavor; + opaque body<400>; + }; + + In other words, any "opaque_auth" structure is an "auth_flavor" + enumeration followed by up to 400 bytes which are opaque to + (uninterpreted by) the RPC protocol implementation. + + The interpretation and semantics of the data contained within the + authentication fields is specified by individual, independent + authentication protocol specifications. (Section 9 defines the + various authentication protocols.) + + If authentication parameters were rejected, the reply message + contains information stating why they were rejected. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +7.3 Program Number Assignment + + Program numbers are given out in groups of hexadecimal 20000000 + (decimal 536870912) according to the following chart: + + 0 - 1fffffff defined by rpc@sun.com + 20000000 - 3fffffff defined by user + 40000000 - 5fffffff transient + 60000000 - 7fffffff reserved + 80000000 - 9fffffff reserved + a0000000 - bfffffff reserved + c0000000 - dfffffff reserved + e0000000 - ffffffff reserved + + The first group is a range of numbers administered by rpc@sun.com and + should be identical for all sites. The second range is for + applications peculiar to a particular site. This range is intended + primarily for debugging new programs. When a site develops an + application that might be of general interest, that application + should be given an assigned number in the first range. Application + developers may apply for blocks of RPC program numbers in the first + range by sending electronic mail to "rpc@sun.com". The third group + is for applications that generate program numbers dynamically. The + final groups are reserved for future use, and should not be used. + +7.4 Other Uses of the RPC Protocol + + The intended use of this protocol is for calling remote procedures. + Normally, each call message is matched with a reply message. + However, the protocol itself is a message-passing protocol with which + other (non-procedure call) protocols can be implemented. + +7.4.1 Batching + + Batching is useful when a client wishes to send an arbitrarily large + sequence of call messages to a server. Batching typically uses + reliable byte stream protocols (like TCP) for its transport. In the + case of batching, the client never waits for a reply from the server, + and the server does not send replies to batch calls. A sequence of + batch calls is usually terminated by a legitimate remote procedure + call operation in order to flush the pipeline and get positive + acknowledgement. + +7.4.2 Broadcast Remote Procedure Calls + + In broadcast protocols, the client sends a broadcast call to the + network and waits for numerous replies. This requires the use of + packet-based protocols (like UDP) as its transport protocol. Servers + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + that support broadcast protocols usually respond only when the call + is successfully processed and are silent in the face of errors, but + this varies with the application. + + The principles of broadcast RPC also apply to multicasting - an RPC + request can be sent to a multicast address. + +8. THE RPC MESSAGE PROTOCOL + + This section defines the RPC message protocol in the XDR data + description language [9]. + + enum msg_type { + CALL = 0, + REPLY = 1 + }; + + A reply to a call message can take on two forms: The message was + either accepted or rejected. + + enum reply_stat { + MSG_ACCEPTED = 0, + MSG_DENIED = 1 + }; + + Given that a call message was accepted, the following is the status + of an attempt to call a remote procedure. + + enum accept_stat { + SUCCESS = 0, /* RPC executed successfully */ + PROG_UNAVAIL = 1, /* remote hasn't exported program */ + PROG_MISMATCH = 2, /* remote can't support version # */ + PROC_UNAVAIL = 3, /* program can't support procedure */ + GARBAGE_ARGS = 4, /* procedure can't decode params */ + SYSTEM_ERR = 5 /* errors like memory allocation failure */ + }; + + Reasons why a call message was rejected: + + enum reject_stat { + RPC_MISMATCH = 0, /* RPC version number != 2 */ + AUTH_ERROR = 1 /* remote can't authenticate caller */ + }; + + Why authentication failed: + + enum auth_stat { + AUTH_OK = 0, /* success */ + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + /* + * failed at remote end + */ + AUTH_BADCRED = 1, /* bad credential (seal broken) */ + AUTH_REJECTEDCRED = 2, /* client must begin new session */ + AUTH_BADVERF = 3, /* bad verifier (seal broken) */ + AUTH_REJECTEDVERF = 4, /* verifier expired or replayed */ + AUTH_TOOWEAK = 5, /* rejected for security reasons */ + /* + * failed locally + */ + AUTH_INVALIDRESP = 6, /* bogus response verifier */ + AUTH_FAILED = 7 /* reason unknown */ + }; + + The RPC message: + + All messages start with a transaction identifier, xid, followed by a + two-armed discriminated union. The union's discriminant is a + msg_type which switches to one of the two types of the message. The + xid of a REPLY message always matches that of the initiating CALL + message. NB: The xid field is only used for clients matching reply + messages with call messages or for servers detecting retransmissions; + the service side cannot treat this id as any type of sequence number. + + struct rpc_msg { + unsigned int xid; + union switch (msg_type mtype) { + case CALL: + call_body cbody; + case REPLY: + reply_body rbody; + } body; + }; + + Body of an RPC call: + + In version 2 of the RPC protocol specification, rpcvers must be equal + to 2. The fields prog, vers, and proc specify the remote program, + its version number, and the procedure within the remote program to be + called. After these fields are two authentication parameters: cred + (authentication credential) and verf (authentication verifier). The + two authentication parameters are followed by the parameters to the + remote procedure, which are specified by the specific program + protocol. + + The purpose of the authentication verifier is to validate the + authentication credential. Note that these two items are + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + historically separate, but are always used together as one logical + entity. + + struct call_body { + unsigned int rpcvers; /* must be equal to two (2) */ + unsigned int prog; + unsigned int vers; + unsigned int proc; + opaque_auth cred; + opaque_auth verf; + /* procedure specific parameters start here */ + }; + + Body of a reply to an RPC call: + + union reply_body switch (reply_stat stat) { + case MSG_ACCEPTED: + accepted_reply areply; + case MSG_DENIED: + rejected_reply rreply; + } reply; + + Reply to an RPC call that was accepted by the server: + + There could be an error even though the call was accepted. The first + field is an authentication verifier that the server generates in + order to validate itself to the client. It is followed by a union + whose discriminant is an enum accept_stat. The SUCCESS arm of the + union is protocol specific. The PROG_UNAVAIL, PROC_UNAVAIL, + GARBAGE_ARGS, and SYSTEM_ERR arms of the union are void. The + PROG_MISMATCH arm specifies the lowest and highest version numbers of + the remote program supported by the server. + + struct accepted_reply { + opaque_auth verf; + union switch (accept_stat stat) { + case SUCCESS: + opaque results[0]; + /* + * procedure-specific results start here + */ + case PROG_MISMATCH: + struct { + unsigned int low; + unsigned int high; + } mismatch_info; + default: + /* + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + * Void. Cases include PROG_UNAVAIL, PROC_UNAVAIL, + * GARBAGE_ARGS, and SYSTEM_ERR. + */ + void; + } reply_data; + }; + + Reply to an RPC call that was rejected by the server: + + The call can be rejected for two reasons: either the server is not + running a compatible version of the RPC protocol (RPC_MISMATCH), or + the server rejects the identity of the caller (AUTH_ERROR). In case + of an RPC version mismatch, the server returns the lowest and highest + supported RPC version numbers. In case of invalid authentication, + failure status is returned. + + union rejected_reply switch (reject_stat stat) { + case RPC_MISMATCH: + struct { + unsigned int low; + unsigned int high; + } mismatch_info; + case AUTH_ERROR: + auth_stat stat; + }; + +9. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS + + As previously stated, authentication parameters are opaque, but + open-ended to the rest of the RPC protocol. This section defines two + standard "flavors" of authentication. Implementors are free to + invent new authentication types, with the same rules of flavor number + assignment as there is for program number assignment. The "flavor" + of a credential or verifier refers to the value of the "flavor" field + in the opaque_auth structure. Flavor numbers, like RPC program + numbers, are also administered centrally, and developers may assign + new flavor numbers by applying through electronic mail to + "rpc@sun.com". Credentials and verifiers are represented as variable + length opaque data (the "body" field in the opaque_auth structure). + + In this document, two flavors of authentication are described. Of + these, Null authentication (described in the next subsection) is + mandatory - it must be available in all implementations. System + authentication is described in Appendix A. It is strongly + recommended that implementors include System authentication in their + implementations. Many applications use this style of authentication, + and availability of this flavor in an implementation will enhance + interoperability. + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +9.1 Null Authentication + + Often calls must be made where the client does not care about its + identity or the server does not care who the client is. In this + case, the flavor of the RPC message's credential, verifier, and reply + verifier is "AUTH_NONE". Opaque data associated with "AUTH_NONE" is + undefined. It is recommended that the length of the opaque data be + zero. + +10. RECORD MARKING STANDARD + + When RPC messages are passed on top of a byte stream transport + protocol (like TCP), it is necessary to delimit one message from + another in order to detect and possibly recover from protocol errors. + This is called record marking (RM). One RPC message fits into one RM + record. + + A record is composed of one or more record fragments. A record + fragment is a four-byte header followed by 0 to (2**31) - 1 bytes of + fragment data. The bytes encode an unsigned binary number; as with + XDR integers, the byte order is from highest to lowest. The number + encodes two values -- a boolean which indicates whether the fragment + is the last fragment of the record (bit value 1 implies the fragment + is the last fragment) and a 31-bit unsigned binary value which is the + length in bytes of the fragment's data. The boolean value is the + highest-order bit of the header; the length is the 31 low-order bits. + (Note that this record specification is NOT in XDR standard form!) + +11. THE RPC LANGUAGE + + Just as there was a need to describe the XDR data-types in a formal + language, there is also need to describe the procedures that operate + on these XDR data-types in a formal language as well. The RPC + Language is an extension to the XDR language, with the addition of + "program", "procedure", and "version" declarations. The following + example is used to describe the essence of the language. + +11.1 An Example Service Described in the RPC Language + + Here is an example of the specification of a simple ping program. + + program PING_PROG { + /* + * Latest and greatest version + */ + version PING_VERS_PINGBACK { + void + PINGPROC_NULL(void) = 0; + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + /* + * Ping the client, return the round-trip time + * (in microseconds). Returns -1 if the operation + * timed out. + */ + int + PINGPROC_PINGBACK(void) = 1; + } = 2; + + /* + * Original version + */ + version PING_VERS_ORIG { + void + PINGPROC_NULL(void) = 0; + } = 1; + } = 1; + + const PING_VERS = 2; /* latest version */ + + The first version described is PING_VERS_PINGBACK with two + procedures, PINGPROC_NULL and PINGPROC_PINGBACK. PINGPROC_NULL takes + no arguments and returns no results, but it is useful for computing + round-trip times from the client to the server and back again. By + convention, procedure 0 of any RPC protocol should have the same + semantics, and never require any kind of authentication. The second + procedure is used for the client to have the server do a reverse ping + operation back to the client, and it returns the amount of time (in + microseconds) that the operation used. The next version, + PING_VERS_ORIG, is the original version of the protocol and it does + not contain PINGPROC_PINGBACK procedure. It is useful for + compatibility with old client programs, and as this program matures + it may be dropped from the protocol entirely. + +11.2 The RPC Language Specification + + The RPC language is identical to the XDR language defined in RFC + 1014, except for the added definition of a "program-def" described + below. + + program-def: + "program" identifier "{" + version-def + version-def * + "}" "=" constant ";" + + version-def: + "version" identifier "{" + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + procedure-def + procedure-def * + "}" "=" constant ";" + + procedure-def: + type-specifier identifier "(" type-specifier + ("," type-specifier )* ")" "=" constant ";" + +11.3 Syntax Notes + + (1) The following keywords are added and cannot be used as + identifiers: "program" and "version"; + + (2) A version name cannot occur more than once within the scope of a + program definition. Nor can a version number occur more than once + within the scope of a program definition. + + (3) A procedure name cannot occur more than once within the scope of + a version definition. Nor can a procedure number occur more than once + within the scope of version definition. + + (4) Program identifiers are in the same name space as constant and + type identifiers. + + (5) Only unsigned constants can be assigned to programs, versions and + procedures. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +APPENDIX A: SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION + + The client may wish to identify itself, for example, as it is + identified on a UNIX(tm) system. The flavor of the client credential + is "AUTH_SYS". The opaque data constituting the credential encodes + the following structure: + + struct authsys_parms { + unsigned int stamp; + string machinename<255>; + unsigned int uid; + unsigned int gid; + unsigned int gids<16>; + }; + + The "stamp" is an arbitrary ID which the caller machine may generate. + The "machinename" is the name of the caller's machine (like + "krypton"). The "uid" is the caller's effective user ID. The "gid" + is the caller's effective group ID. The "gids" is a counted array of + groups which contain the caller as a member. The verifier + accompanying the credential should have "AUTH_NONE" flavor value + (defined above). Note this credential is only unique within a + particular domain of machine names, uids, and gids. + + The flavor value of the verifier received in the reply message from + the server may be "AUTH_NONE" or "AUTH_SHORT". In the case of + "AUTH_SHORT", the bytes of the reply verifier's string encode an + opaque structure. This new opaque structure may now be passed to the + server instead of the original "AUTH_SYS" flavor credential. The + server may keep a cache which maps shorthand opaque structures + (passed back by way of an "AUTH_SHORT" style reply verifier) to the + original credentials of the caller. The caller can save network + bandwidth and server cpu cycles by using the shorthand credential. + + The server may flush the shorthand opaque structure at any time. If + this happens, the remote procedure call message will be rejected due + to an authentication error. The reason for the failure will be + "AUTH_REJECTEDCRED". At this point, the client may wish to try the + original "AUTH_SYS" style of credential. + + It should be noted that use of this flavor of authentication does not + guarantee any security for the users or providers of a service, in + itself. The authentication provided by this scheme can be considered + legitimate only when applications using this scheme and the network + can be secured externally, and privileged transport addresses are + used for the communicating end-points (an example of this is the use + of privileged TCP/UDP ports in Unix systems - note that not all + systems enforce privileged transport address mechanisms). + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +REFERENCES + + [1] Birrell, A. D. & Nelson, B. J., "Implementing Remote Procedure + Calls", XEROX CSL-83-7, October 1983. + + [2] Cheriton, D., "VMTP: Versatile Message Transaction Protocol", + Preliminary Version 0.3, Stanford University, January 1987. + + [3] Diffie & Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE + Transactions on Information Theory IT-22, November 1976. + + [4] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol", RFC 1305, UDEL, + March 1992. + + [5] National Bureau of Standards, "Data Encryption Standard", + Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46, January + 1977. + + [6] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol - DARPA Internet + Program Protocol Specification", STD 7, RFC 793, USC/Information + Sciences Institute, September 1981. + + [7] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, August 1980. + + [8] Reynolds, J., and Postel, J., "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, + RFC 1700, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994. + + [9] Srinivasan, R., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard", + RFC 1832, Sun Microsystems, Inc., August 1995. + + [10] Miller, S., Neuman, C., Schiller, J., and J. Saltzer, "Section + E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and Authorization System", + M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 21, + 1987. + + [11] Steiner, J., Neuman, C., and J. Schiller, "Kerberos: An + Authentication Service for Open Network Systems", pp. 191-202 in + Usenix Conference Proceedings, Dallas, Texas, February 1988. + + [12] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, Digital Equipment Corporation, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, September 1993. + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +Security Considerations + + Security issues are not discussed in this memo. + +Author's Address + + Raj Srinivasan + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + ONC Technologies + 2550 Garcia Avenue + M/S MTV-5-40 + Mountain View, CA 94043 + USA + + Phone: 415-336-2478 + Fax: 415-336-6015 + EMail: raj@eng.sun.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 18] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2960b961d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1123 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 1964 OpenVision Technologies +Category: Standards Track June 1996 + + + The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +ABSTRACT + + This specification defines protocols, procedures, and conventions to + be employed by peers implementing the Generic Security Service + Application Program Interface (as specified in RFCs 1508 and 1509) + when using Kerberos Version 5 technology (as specified in RFC 1510). + +ACKNOWLEDGMENTS + + Much of the material in this memo is based on working documents + drafted by John Wray of Digital Equipment Corporation and on + discussions, implementation activities, and interoperability testing + involving Marc Horowitz, Ted Ts'o, and John Wray. Particular thanks + are due to each of these individuals for their contributions towards + development and availability of GSS-API support within the Kerberos + Version 5 code base. + +1. Token Formats + + This section discusses protocol-visible characteristics of the GSS- + API mechanism to be implemented atop Kerberos V5 security technology + per RFC-1508 and RFC-1510; it defines elements of protocol for + interoperability and is independent of language bindings per RFC- + 1509. + + Tokens transferred between GSS-API peers (for security context + management and per-message protection purposes) are defined. The + data elements exchanged between a GSS-API endpoint implementation and + the Kerberos KDC are not specific to GSS-API usage and are therefore + defined within RFC-1510 rather than within this specification. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + To support ongoing experimentation, testing, and evolution of the + specification, the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as defined in this + and any successor memos will be identified with the following Object + Identifier, as defined in RFC-1510, until the specification is + advanced to the level of Proposed Standard RFC: + + {iso(1), org(3), dod(5), internet(1), security(5), kerberosv5(2)} + + Upon advancement to the level of Proposed Standard RFC, the Kerberos + V5 GSS-API mechanism will be identified by an Object Identifier + having the value: + + {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) + gssapi(2) krb5(2)} + +1.1. Context Establishment Tokens + + Per RFC-1508, Appendix B, the initial context establishment token + will be enclosed within framing as follows: + + InitialContextToken ::= + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType + -- MechType is OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- representing "Kerberos V5" + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + -- contents mechanism-specific; + -- ASN.1 usage within innerContextToken + -- is not required + } + + The innerContextToken of the initial context token will consist of a + Kerberos V5 KRB_AP_REQ message, preceded by a two-byte token-id + (TOK_ID) field, which shall contain the value 01 00. + + The above GSS-API framing shall be applied to all tokens emitted by + the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, including KRB_AP_REP, KRB_ERROR, + context-deletion, and per-message tokens, not just to the initial + token in a context establishment sequence. While not required by + RFC-1508, this enables implementations to perform enhanced error- + checking. The innerContextToken field of context establishment tokens + for the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism will contain a Kerberos message + (KRB_AP_REQ, KRB_AP_REP or KRB_ERROR), preceded by a 2-byte TOK_ID + field containing 01 00 for KRB_AP_REQ messages, 02 00 for KRB_AP_REP + messages and 03 00 for KRB_ERROR messages. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +1.1.1. Initial Token + + Relevant KRB_AP_REQ syntax (from RFC-1510) is as follows: + + AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER, -- indicates Version 5 + msg-type [1] INTEGER, -- indicates KRB_AP_REQ + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData + } + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved (0), + use-session-key (1), + mutual-required (2) + } + + Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno [0] INTEGER, -- indicates Version 5 + realm [1] Realm, + sname [2] PrincipalName, + enc-part [3] EncryptedData + } + + -- Encrypted part of ticket + EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + -- Unencrypted authenticator + Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + For purposes of this specification, the authenticator shall include + the optional sequence number, and the checksum field shall be used to + convey channel binding, service flags, and optional delegation + information. The checksum will have a type of 0x8003 (a value being + registered within the Kerberos protocol specification), and a value + field of at least 24 bytes in length. The length of the value field + is extended beyond 24 bytes if and only if an optional facility to + carry a Kerberos-defined KRB_CRED message for delegation purposes is + supported by an implementation and active on a context. When + delegation is active, a TGT with its FORWARDABLE flag set will be + transferred within the KRB_CRED message. + + The checksum value field's format is as follows: + + Byte Name Description + 0..3 Lgth Number of bytes in Bnd field; + Currently contains hex 10 00 00 00 + (16, represented in little-endian form) + 4..19 Bnd MD5 hash of channel bindings, taken over all non-null + components of bindings, in order of declaration. + Integer fields within channel bindings are represented + in little-endian order for the purposes of the MD5 + calculation. + 20..23 Flags Bit vector of context-establishment flags, + with values consistent with RFC-1509, p. 41: + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG: 1 + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG: 2 + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG: 4 + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG: 8 + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG: 16 + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG: 32 + The resulting bit vector is encoded into bytes 20..23 + in little-endian form. + 24..25 DlgOpt The Delegation Option identifier (=1) [optional] + 26..27 Dlgth The length of the Deleg field. [optional] + 28..n Deleg A KRB_CRED message (n = Dlgth + 29) [optional] + + In computing the contents of the "Bnd" field, the following detailed + points apply: + + (1) Each integer field shall be formatted into four bytes, using + little-endian byte ordering, for purposes of MD5 hash + computation. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + (2) All input length fields within gss_buffer_desc elements of a + gss_channel_bindings_struct, even those which are zero-valued, + shall be included in the hash calculation; the value elements of + gss_buffer_desc elements shall be dereferenced, and the + resulting data shall be included within the hash computation, + only for the case of gss_buffer_desc elements having non-zero + length specifiers. + + (3) If the caller passes the value GSS_C_NO_BINDINGS instead of + a valid channel bindings structure, the Bnd field shall be set + to 16 zero-valued bytes. + + In the initial Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism token (KRB_AP_REQ token) + from initiator to target, the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, and GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG values shall each be set + as the logical AND of the initiator's corresponding request flag to + GSS_Init_sec_context() and a Boolean indicator of whether that + optional service is available to GSS_Init_sec_context()'s caller. + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG, for which no corresponding + context-level input indicator flags to GSS_Init_sec_context() exist, + shall each be set to indicate whether their respective per-message + protection services are available for use on the context being + established. + + When input source address channel binding values are provided by a + caller (i.e., unless the input argument is GSS_C_NO_BINDINGS or the + source address specifier value within the input structure is + GSS_C_NULL_ADDRTYPE), and the corresponding token received from the + context's peer bears address restrictions, it is recommended that an + implementation of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism should check that + the source address as provided by the caller matches that in the + received token, and should return the GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS major_status + value if a mismatch is detected. Note: discussion is ongoing about + the strength of recommendation to be made in this area, and on the + circumstances under which such a recommendation should be applicable; + implementors are therefore advised that changes on this matter may be + included in subsequent versions of this specification. + +1.1.2. Response Tokens + + A context establishment sequence based on the Kerberos V5 mechanism + will perform one-way authentication (without confirmation or any + return token from target to initiator in response to the initiator's + KRB_AP_REQ) if the mutual_req bit is not set in the application's + call to GSS_Init_sec_context(). Applications requiring confirmation + that their authentication was successful should request mutual + authentication, resulting in a "mutual-required" indication within + KRB_AP_REQ APoptions and the setting of the mutual_req bit in the + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + flags field of the authenticator checksum. In response to such a + request, the context target will reply to the initiator with a token + containing either a KRB_AP_REP or KRB_ERROR, completing the mutual + context establishment exchange. + + Relevant KRB_AP_REP syntax is as follows: + + AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER, -- represents Kerberos V5 + msg-type [1] INTEGER, -- represents KRB_AP_REP + enc-part [2] EncryptedData + } + + EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime [0] KerberosTime, + cusec [1] INTEGER, + subkey [2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + The optional seq-number element within the AP-REP's EncAPRepPart + shall be included. + + The syntax of KRB_ERROR is as follows: + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + Values to be transferred in the error-code field of a KRB-ERROR + message are defined in [RFC-1510], not in this specification. + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +1.2. Per-Message and Context Deletion Tokens + + Three classes of tokens are defined in this section: "MIC" tokens, + emitted by calls to GSS_GetMIC() (formerly GSS_Sign()) and consumed + by calls to GSS_VerifyMIC() (formerly GSS_Verify()), "Wrap" tokens, + emitted by calls to GSS_Wrap() (formerly GSS_Seal()) and consumed by + calls to GSS_Unwrap() (formerly GSS_Unseal()), and context deletion + tokens, emitted by calls to GSS_Delete_sec_context() and consumed by + calls to GSS_Process_context_token(). Note: References to GSS-API + per-message routines in the remainder of this specification will be + based on those routines' newer recommended names rather than those + names' predecessors. + + Several variants of cryptographic keys are used in generation and + processing of per-message tokens: + + (1) context key: uses Kerberos session key (or subkey, if + present in authenticator emitted by context initiator) directly + + (2) confidentiality key: forms variant of context key by + exclusive-OR with the hexadecimal constant f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0. + + (3) MD2.5 seed key: forms variant of context key by reversing + the bytes of the context key (i.e. if the original key is the + 8-byte sequence {aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, ff, gg, hh}, the seed key + will be {hh, gg, ff, ee, dd, cc, bb, aa}). + +1.2.1. Per-message Tokens - MIC + +Use of the GSS_GetMIC() call yields a token, separate from the user +data being protected, which can be used to verify the integrity of +that data as received. The token has the following format: + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by GSS_GetMIC() contain + the hex value 01 01 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Integrity algorithm indicator. + 00 00 - DES MAC MD5 + 01 00 - MD2.5 + 02 00 - DES MAC + 4..7 Filler Contains ff ff ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Sequence number field. + 16..23 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of "to-be-signed data", + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + GSS-API tokens must be encapsulated within the higher-level protocol + by the application; no embedded length field is necessary. + +1.2.1.1. Checksum + + Checksum calculation procedure (common to all algorithms): Checksums + are calculated over the data field, logically prepended by the first + 8 bytes of the plaintext packet header. The resulting value binds + the data to the packet type and signature algorithm identifier + fields. + + DES MAC MD5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by computing an MD5 + [RFC-1321] hash over the plaintext data, and then computing a DES-CBC + MAC on the 16-byte MD5 result. A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is + computed per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key and a zero IV. + The 8-byte result is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. + + MD2.5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by first DES-CBC encrypting a + 16-byte zero-block, using a zero IV and a key formed by reversing the + bytes of the context key (i.e. if the original key is the 8-byte + sequence {aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, ff, gg, hh}, the checksum key will be + {hh, gg, ff, ee, dd, cc, bb, aa}). The resulting 16-byte value is + logically prepended to the to-be-signed data. A standard MD5 + checksum is calculated over the combined data, and the first 8 bytes + of the result are stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. Note 1: we refer to + this algorithm informally as "MD2.5" to connote the fact that it uses + half of the 128 bits generated by MD5; use of only a subset of the + MD5 bits is intended to protect against the prospect that data could + be postfixed to an existing message with corresponding modifications + being made to the checksum. Note 2: This algorithm is fairly novel + and has received more limited evaluation than that to which other + integrity algorithms have been subjected. An initial, limited + evaluation indicates that it may be significantly weaker than DES MAC + MD5. + + DES-MAC algorithm: A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is computed on the + plaintext data per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key and a + zero IV. Padding procedures to accomodate plaintext data lengths + which may not be integral multiples of 8 bytes are defined in [FIPS- + PUB-113]. The result is an 8-byte value, which is stored in the + SGN_CKSUM field. Support for this algorithm may not be present in + all implementations. + +1.2.1.2. Sequence Number + + Sequence number field: The 8 byte plaintext sequence number field is + formed from the sender's four-byte sequence number as follows. If + the four bytes of the sender's sequence number are named s0, s1, s2 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + and s3 (from least to most significant), the plaintext sequence + number field is the 8 byte sequence: (s0, s1, s2, s3, di, di, di, + di), where 'di' is the direction-indicator (Hex 0 - sender is the + context initiator, Hex FF - sender is the context acceptor). The + field is then DES-CBC encrypted using the context key and an IV + formed from the first 8 bytes of the previously calculated SGN_CKSUM + field. After sending a GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() token, the sender's + sequence number is incremented by one. + + The receiver of the token will first verify the SGN_CKSUM field. If + valid, the sequence number field may be decrypted and compared to the + expected sequence number. The repetition of the (effectively 1-bit) + direction indicator within the sequence number field provides + redundancy so that the receiver may verify that the decryption + succeeded. + + Since the checksum computation is used as an IV to the sequence + number decryption, attempts to splice a checksum and sequence number + from different messages will be detected. The direction indicator + will detect packets that have been maliciously reflected. + + The sequence number provides a basis for detection of replayed + tokens. Replay detection can be performed using state information + retained on received sequence numbers, interpreted in conjunction + with the security context on which they arrive. + + Provision of per-message replay and out-of-sequence detection + services is optional for implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism. Further, it is recommended that implementations of the + Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism which offer these services should honor + a caller's request that the services be disabled on a context. + Specifically, if replay_det_req_flag is input FALSE, replay_det_state + should be returned FALSE and the GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN and + GSS_OLD_TOKEN stati should not be indicated as a result of duplicate + detection when tokens are processed; if sequence_req_flag is input + FALSE, sequence_state should be returned FALSE and + GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_OLD_TOKEN, and GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN stati should + not be indicated as a result of out-of-sequence detection when tokens + are processed. + +1.2.2. Per-message Tokens - Wrap + + Use of the GSS_Wrap() call yields a token which encapsulates the + input user data (optionally encrypted) along with associated + integrity check quantities. The token emitted by GSS_Wrap() consists + of an integrity header whose format is identical to that emitted by + GSS_GetMIC() (except that the TOK_ID field contains the value 02 01), + followed by a body portion that contains either the plaintext data + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + (if SEAL_ALG = ff ff) or encrypted data for any other supported value + of SEAL_ALG. Currently, only SEAL_ALG = 00 00 is supported, and + means that DES-CBC encryption is being used to protect the data. + + The GSS_Wrap() token has the following format: + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by GSS_Wrap() contain + the hex value 02 01 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Checksum algorithm indicator. + 00 00 - DES MAC MD5 + 01 00 - MD2.5 + 02 00 - DES MAC + 4..5 SEAL_ALG ff ff - none + 00 00 - DES + 6..7 Filler Contains ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Encrypted sequence number field. + 16..23 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of plaintext padded data, + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + 24..last Data encrypted or plaintext padded data + + GSS-API tokens must be encapsulated within the higher-level protocol + by the application; no embedded length field is necessary. + +1.2.2.1. Checksum + + Checksum calculation procedure (common to all algorithms): Checksums + are calculated over the plaintext padded data field, logically + prepended by the first 8 bytes of the plaintext packet header. The + resulting signature binds the data to the packet type, protocol + version, and signature algorithm identifier fields. + + DES MAC MD5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by computing an MD5 + hash over the plaintext padded data, and then computing a DES-CBC MAC + on the 16-byte MD5 result. A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is computed + per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key and a zero IV. The 8- + byte result is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. + + MD2.5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by first DES-CBC encrypting a + 16-byte zero-block, using a zero IV and a key formed by reversing the + bytes of the context key (i.e., if the original key is the 8-byte + sequence {aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, ff, gg, hh}, the checksum key will be + {hh, gg, ff, ee, dd, cc, bb, aa}). The resulting 16-byte value is + logically pre-pended to the "to-be-signed data". A standard MD5 + checksum is calculated over the combined data, and the first 8 bytes + of the result are stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + DES-MAC algorithm: A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is computed on the + plaintext padded data per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key + and a zero IV. The plaintext padded data is already assured to be an + integral multiple of 8 bytes; no additional padding is required or + applied in order to accomplish MAC calculation. The result is an 8- + byte value, which is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. Support for this + lgorithm may not be present in all implementations. + +1.2.2.2. Sequence Number + + Sequence number field: The 8 byte plaintext sequence number field is + formed from the sender's four-byte sequence number as follows. If + the four bytes of the sender's sequence number are named s0, s1, s2 + and s3 (from least to most significant), the plaintext sequence + number field is the 8 byte sequence: (s0, s1, s2, s3, di, di, di, + di), where 'di' is the direction-indicator (Hex 0 - sender is the + context initiator, Hex FF - sender is the context acceptor). + + The field is then DES-CBC encrypted using the context key and an IV + formed from the first 8 bytes of the SEAL_CKSUM field. + + After sending a GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() token, the sender's + sequence numbers are incremented by one. + +1.2.2.3. Padding + + Data padding: Before encryption and/or signature calculation, + plaintext data is padded to the next highest multiple of 8 bytes, by + appending between 1 and 8 bytes, the value of each such byte being + the total number of pad bytes. For example, given data of length 20 + bytes, four pad bytes will be appended, and each byte will contain + the hex value 04. An 8-byte random confounder is prepended to the + data, and signatures are calculated over the resulting padded + plaintext. + + After padding, the data is encrypted according to the algorithm + specified in the SEAL_ALG field. For SEAL_ALG=DES (the only non-null + algorithm currently supported), the data is encrypted using DES-CBC, + with an IV of zero. The key used is derived from the established + context key by XOR-ing the context key with the hexadecimal constant + f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0. + +1.2.3. Context deletion token + + The token emitted by GSS_Delete_sec_context() is based on the packet + format for tokens emitted by GSS_GetMIC(). The context-deletion + token has the following format: + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by + GSS_Delete_sec_context() contain + the hex value 01 02 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Integrity algorithm indicator. + 00 00 - DES MAC MD5 + 01 00 - MD2.5 + 02 00 - DES MAC + 4..7 Filler Contains ff ff ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Sequence number field. + 16..23 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of "to-be-signed data", + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + + SGN_ALG and SND_SEQ will be calculated as for tokens emitted by + GSS_GetMIC(). The SGN_CKSUM will be calculated as for tokens emitted + by GSS_GetMIC(), except that the user-data component of the "to-be- + signed" data will be a zero-length string. + +2. Name Types and Object Identifiers + + This section discusses the name types which may be passed as input to + the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism's GSS_Import_name() call, and their + associated identifier values. It defines interface elements in + support of portability, and assumes use of C language bindings per + RFC-1509. In addition to specifying OID values for name type + identifiers, symbolic names are included and recommended to GSS-API + implementors in the interests of convenience to callers. It is + understood that not all implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism need support all name types in this list, and that + additional name forms will likely be added to this list over time. + Further, the definitions of some or all name types may later migrate + to other, mechanism-independent, specifications. The occurrence of a + name type in this specification is specifically not intended to + suggest that the type may be supported only by an implementation of + the Kerberos V5 mechanism. In particular, the occurrence of the + string "_KRB5_" in the symbolic name strings constitutes a means to + unambiguously register the name strings, avoiding collision with + other documents; it is not meant to limit the name types' usage or + applicability. + + For purposes of clarification to GSS-API implementors, this section's + discussion of some name forms describes means through which those + forms can be supported with existing Kerberos technology. These + discussions are not intended to preclude alternative implementation + strategies for support of the name forms within Kerberos mechanisms + or mechanisms based on other technologies. To enhance application + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + portability, implementors of mechanisms are encouraged to support + name forms as defined in this section, even if their mechanisms are + independent of Kerberos V5. + +2.1. Mandatory Name Forms + + This section discusses name forms which are to be supported by all + conformant implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism. + +2.1.1. Kerberos Principal Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + krb5(2) krb5_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this type + is "GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME". + + This name type corresponds to the single-string representation of a + Kerberos name. (Within the MIT Kerberos V5 implementation, such + names are parseable with the krb5_parse_name() function.) The + elements included within this name representation are as follows, + proceeding from the beginning of the string: + + (1) One or more principal name components; if more than one + principal name component is included, the components are + separated by `/`. Arbitrary octets may be included within + principal name components, with the following constraints and + special considerations: + + (1a) Any occurrence of the characters `@` or `/` within a + name component must be immediately preceded by the `\` + quoting character, to prevent interpretation as a component + or realm separator. + + (1b) The ASCII newline, tab, backspace, and null characters + may occur directly within the component or may be + represented, respectively, by `\n`, `\t`, `\b`, or `\0`. + + (1c) If the `\` quoting character occurs outside the contexts + described in (1a) and (1b) above, the following character is + interpreted literally. As a special case, this allows the + doubled representation `\\` to represent a single occurrence + of the quoting character. + + (1d) An occurrence of the `\` quoting character as the last + character of a component is illegal. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + (2) Optionally, a `@` character, signifying that a realm name + immediately follows. If no realm name element is included, the + local realm name is assumed. The `/` , `:`, and null characters + may not occur within a realm name; the `@`, newline, tab, and + backspace characters may be included using the quoting + conventions described in (1a), (1b), and (1c) above. + +2.1.2. Host-Based Service Name Form + + This name form has been incorporated at the mechanism-independent + GSS-API level as of GSS-API, Version 2. This subsection retains the + Object Identifier and symbolic name assignments previously made at + the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism level, and adopts the definition as + promoted to the mechanism-independent level. + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) service_name(4)}. The previously recommended symbolic + name for this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_NAME". The + currently preferred symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE". + + This name type is used to represent services associated with host + computers. This name form is constructed using two elements, + "service" and "hostname", as follows: + + service@hostname + + When a reference to a name of this type is resolved, the "hostname" + is canonicalized by attempting a DNS lookup and using the fully- + qualified domain name which is returned, or by using the "hostname" + as provided if the DNS lookup fails. The canonicalization operation + also maps the host's name into lower-case characters. + + The "hostname" element may be omitted. If no "@" separator is + included, the entire name is interpreted as the service specifier, + with the "hostname" defaulted to the canonicalized name of the local + host. + + Values for the "service" element will be registered with the IANA. + +2.1.3. Exported Name Object Form for Kerberos V5 Mechanism + + Support for this name form is not required for GSS-V1 + implementations, but will be required for use in conjunction with the + GSS_Export_name() call planned for GSS-API Version 2. Use of this + name form will be signified by a "GSS-API Exported Name Object" OID + value which will be defined at the mechanism-independent level for + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + GSS-API Version 2. + + This name type represents a self-describing object, whose framing + structure will be defined at the mechanism-independent level for + GSS-API Version 2. When generated by the Kerberos V5 mechanism, the + Mechanism OID within the exportable name shall be that of the + Kerberos V5 mechanism. The name component within the exportable name + shall be a contiguous string with structure as defined for the + Kerberos Principal Name Form. + + In order to achieve a distinguished encoding for comparison purposes, + the following additional constraints are imposed on the export + operation: + + (1) all occurrences of the characters `@`, `/`, and `\` within + principal components or realm names shall be quoted with an + immediately-preceding `\`. + + (2) all occurrences of the null, backspace, tab, or newline + characters within principal components or realm names will be + represented, respectively, with `\0`, `\b`, `\t`, or `\n`. + + (3) the `\` quoting character shall not be emitted within an + exported name except to accomodate cases (1) and (2). + +2.2. Optional Name Forms + + This section discusses additional name forms which may optionally be + supported by implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism. + It is recognized that some of the name forms cited here are derived + from UNIX(tm) operating system platforms; some listed forms may be + irrelevant to non-UNIX platforms, and definition of additional forms + corresponding to such platforms may also be appropriate. It is also + recognized that OS-specific functions outside GSS-API are likely to + exist in order to perform translations among these forms, and that + GSS-API implementations supporting these forms may themselves be + layered atop such OS-specific functions. Inclusion of this support + within GSS-API implementations is intended as a convenience to + applications. + +2.2.1. User Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this + type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME". + + This name type is used to indicate a named user on a local system. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + Its interpretation is OS-specific. This name form is constructed as: + + username + + Assuming that users' principal names are the same as their local + operating system names, an implementation of GSS_Import_name() based + on Kerberos V5 technology can process names of this form by + postfixing an "@" sign and the name of the local realm. + +2.2.2. Machine UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". + + This name type is used to indicate a numeric user identifier + corresponding to a user on a local system. Its interpretation is + OS-specific. The gss_buffer_desc representing a name of this type + should contain a locally-significant uid_t, represented in host byte + order. The GSS_Import_name() operation resolves this uid into a + username, which is then treated as the User Name Form. + +2.2.3. String UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". + + This name type is used to indicate a string of digits representing + the numeric user identifier of a user on a local system. Its + interpretation is OS-specific. This name type is similar to the + Machine UID Form, except that the buffer contains a string + representing the uid_t. + +3. Credentials Management + + The Kerberos V5 protocol uses different credentials (in the GSSAPI + sense) for initiating and accepting security contexts. Normal + clients receive a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) and an associated + session key at "login" time; the pair of a TGT and its corresponding + session key forms a credential which is suitable for initiating + security contexts. A ticket-granting ticket, its session key, and + any other (ticket, key) pairs obtained through use of the ticket- + granting-ticket, are typically stored in a Kerberos V5 credentials + cache, sometimes known as a ticket file. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + The encryption key used by the Kerberos server to seal tickets for a + particular application service forms the credentials suitable for + accepting security contexts. These service keys are typically stored + in a Kerberos V5 key table, or srvtab file. In addition to their use + as accepting credentials, these service keys may also be used to + obtain initiating credentials for their service principal. + + The Kerberos V5 mechanism's credential handle may contain references + to either or both types of credentials. It is a local matter how the + Kerberos V5 mechanism implementation finds the appropriate Kerberos + V5 credentials cache or key table. + + However, when the Kerberos V5 mechanism attempts to obtain initiating + credentials for a service principal which are not available in a + credentials cache, and the key for that service principal is + available in a Kerberos V5 key table, the mechanism should use the + service key to obtain initiating credentials for that service. This + should be accomplished by requesting a ticket-granting-ticket from + the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC), and decrypting the KDC's + reply using the service key. + +4. Parameter Definitions + + This section defines parameter values used by the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism. It defines interface elements in support of portability, + and assumes use of C language bindings per RFC-1509. + +4.1. Minor Status Codes + + This section recommends common symbolic names for minor_status values + to be returned by the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism. Use of these + definitions will enable independent implementors to enhance + application portability across different implementations of the + mechanism defined in this specification. (In all cases, + implementations of GSS_Display_status() will enable callers to + convert minor_status indicators to text representations.) Each + implementation should make available, through include files or other + means, a facility to translate these symbolic names into the concrete + values which a particular GSS-API implementation uses to represent + the minor_status values specified in this section. + + It is recognized that this list may grow over time, and that the need + for additional minor_status codes specific to particular + implementations may arise. It is recommended, however, that + implementations should return a minor_status value as defined on a + mechanism-wide basis within this section when that code is accurately + representative of reportable status rather than using a separate, + implementation-defined code. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +4.1.1. Non-Kerberos-specific codes + + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_SERVICE_NAME + /* "No @ in SERVICE-NAME name string" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_STRING_UID + /* "STRING-UID-NAME contains nondigits" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_NOUSER + /* "UID does not resolve to username" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_VALIDATE_FAILED + /* "Validation error" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BUFFER_ALLOC + /* "Couldn't allocate gss_buffer_t data" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_MSG_CTX + /* "Message context invalid" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_WRONG_SIZE + /* "Buffer is the wrong size" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE + /* "Credential usage type is unknown" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_UNKNOWN_QOP + /* "Unknown quality of protection specified" */ + +4.1.2. Kerberos-specific-codes + + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH + /* "Principal in credential cache does not match desired name" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_KEYTAB_NOMATCH + /* "No principal in keytab matches desired name" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_TGT_MISSING + /* "Credential cache has no TGT" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_NO_SUBKEY + /* "Authenticator has no subkey" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED + /* "Context is already fully established" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_SIGN_TYPE + /* "Unknown signature type in token" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_LENGTH + /* "Invalid field length in token" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE + /* "Attempt to use incomplete security context" */ + +4.2. Quality of Protection Values + + This section defines Quality of Protection (QOP) values to be used + with the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as input to GSS_Wrap() and + GSS_GetMIC() routines in order to select among alternate integrity + and confidentiality algorithms. Additional QOP values may be added in + future versions of this specification. Non-overlapping bit positions + are and will be employed in order that both integrity and + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + confidentiality QOP may be selected within a single parameter, via + inclusive-OR of the specified integrity and confidentiality values. + +4.2.1. Integrity Algorithms + + The following Quality of Protection (QOP) values are currently + defined for the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, and are used to select + among alternate integrity checking algorithms. + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_MD5 (numeric value: 1) + /* Integrity using partial MD5 ("MD2.5") of plaintext */ + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DES_MD5 (numeric value: 2) + /* Integrity using DES MAC of MD5 of plaintext */ + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DES_MAC (numeric value: 3) + /* Integrity using DES MAC of plaintext */ + +4.2.2. Confidentiality Algorithms + + Only one confidentiality QOP value is currently defined for the + Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism: + + GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES (numeric value: 0) + /* Confidentiality with DES */ + + Note: confidentiality QOP should be indicated only by GSS-API calls + capable of providing confidentiality services. If non-zero + confidentiality QOP values are defined in future to represent + different algorithms, therefore, the bit positions containing those + values should be cleared before being returned by implementations of + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC(). + +4.3. Buffer Sizes + + All implementations of this specification shall be capable of + accepting buffers of at least 16 Kbytes as input to GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), and GSS_Wrap(), and shall be capable of accepting + the output_token generated by GSS_Wrap() for a 16 Kbyte input buffer + as input to GSS_Unwrap(). Support for larger buffer sizes is optional + but recommended. + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +5. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +6. References + + + [RFC-1321]: Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC + 1321, April 1992. + + [RFC-1508]: Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface", RFC 1508, September 1993. + + [RFC-1509]: Wray, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface: C-bindings", RFC 1509, September 1993. + + [RFC-1510]: Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + [FIPS-PUB-113]: National Bureau of Standards, Federal Information + Processing Standard 113, "Computer Data Authentication", May 1985. + +AUTHOR'S ADDRESS + + John Linn + OpenVision Technologies + One Main St. + Cambridge, MA 02142 USA + + Phone: +1 617.374.2245 + EMail: John.Linn@ov.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 20] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1dd1e4aebd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4763 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 2078 OpenVision Technologies +Category: Standards Track January 1997 +Obsoletes: 1508 + + + Generic Security Service Application Program Interface, Version 2 + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), + as defined in RFC-1508, provides security services to callers in a + generic fashion, supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms + and technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of + applications to different environments. This specification defines + GSS-API services and primitives at a level independent of underlying + mechanism and programming language environment, and is to be + complemented by other, related specifications: + + documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular + language environments + + documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to be + implemented in order to realize GSS-API services atop particular + security mechanisms + + This memo revises RFC-1508, making specific, incremental changes in + response to implementation experience and liaison requests. It is + intended, therefore, that this memo or a successor version thereto + will become the basis for subsequent progression of the GSS-API + specification on the standards track. + +Table of Contents + + 1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts.......................... 3 + 1.1: GSS-API Constructs.......................................... 6 + 1.1.1: Credentials.............................................. 6 + 1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts...................... 6 + 1.1.1.2: Credential Management................................... 7 + 1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution........................... 8 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 1.1.2: Tokens.................................................... 9 + 1.1.3: Security Contexts........................................ 10 + 1.1.4: Mechanism Types.......................................... 11 + 1.1.5: Naming................................................... 12 + 1.1.6: Channel Bindings......................................... 14 + 1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues................................ 15 + 1.2.1: Status Reporting......................................... 15 + 1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability................. 17 + 1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing............... 18 + 1.2.4: Quality of Protection.................................... 20 + 1.2.5: Anonymity Support......................................... 21 + 1.2.6: Initialization............................................ 22 + 1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment....... 22 + 1.2.8: Implementation Robustness................................. 23 + 2: Interface Descriptions....................................... 23 + 2.1: Credential management calls................................ 25 + 2.1.1: GSS_Acquire_cred call.................................... 26 + 2.1.2: GSS_Release_cred call.................................... 28 + 2.1.3: GSS_Inquire_cred call.................................... 29 + 2.1.4: GSS_Add_cred call........................................ 31 + 2.1.5: GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech call............................ 33 + 2.2: Context-level calls........................................ 34 + 2.2.1: GSS_Init_sec_context call................................ 34 + 2.2.2: GSS_Accept_sec_context call.............................. 40 + 2.2.3: GSS_Delete_sec_context call.............................. 44 + 2.2.4: GSS_Process_context_token call........................... 46 + 2.2.5: GSS_Context_time call.................................... 47 + 2.2.6: GSS_Inquire_context call................................. 47 + 2.2.7: GSS_Wrap_size_limit call................................. 49 + 2.2.8: GSS_Export_sec_context call.............................. 50 + 2.2.9: GSS_Import_sec_context call.............................. 52 + 2.3: Per-message calls.......................................... 53 + 2.3.1: GSS_GetMIC call.......................................... 54 + 2.3.2: GSS_VerifyMIC call....................................... 55 + 2.3.3: GSS_Wrap call............................................ 56 + 2.3.4: GSS_Unwrap call.......................................... 58 + 2.4: Support calls.............................................. 59 + 2.4.1: GSS_Display_status call.................................. 60 + 2.4.2: GSS_Indicate_mechs call.................................. 60 + 2.4.3: GSS_Compare_name call.................................... 61 + 2.4.4: GSS_Display_name call.................................... 62 + 2.4.5: GSS_Import_name call..................................... 63 + 2.4.6: GSS_Release_name call.................................... 64 + 2.4.7: GSS_Release_buffer call.................................. 65 + 2.4.8: GSS_Release_OID_set call................................. 65 + 2.4.9: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set call............................ 66 + 2.4.10: GSS_Add_OID_set_member call.............................. 67 + 2.4.11: GSS_Test_OID_set_member call............................. 67 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 2.4.12: GSS_Release_OID call..................................... 68 + 2.4.13: GSS_OID_to_str call...................................... 68 + 2.4.14: GSS_Str_to_OID call...................................... 69 + 2.4.15: GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech call.......................... 69 + 2.4.16: GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name call.......................... 70 + 2.4.17: GSS_Canonicalize_name call............................... 71 + 2.4.18: GSS_Export_name call..................................... 72 + 2.4.19: GSS_Duplicate_name call.................................. 73 + 3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage................... 73 + 3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format.......................... 74 + 3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format........... 77 + 4: Name Type Definitions......................................... 77 + 4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form................................ 77 + 4.2: User Name Form.............................................. 78 + 4.3: Machine UID Form............................................ 78 + 4.4: String UID Form............................................. 79 + 5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios......................... 79 + 5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT..................................... 79 + 5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT..................................... 80 + 5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework............................. 81 + 6: Security Considerations...................................... 82 + 7: Related Activities........................................... 82 + Appendix A: Mechanism Design Constraints......................... 83 + Appendix B: Compatibility with GSS-V1............................ 83 + +1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts + + GSS-API operates in the following paradigm. A typical GSS-API caller + is itself a communications protocol, calling on GSS-API in order to + protect its communications with authentication, integrity, and/or + confidentiality security services. A GSS-API caller accepts tokens + provided to it by its local GSS-API implementation and transfers the + tokens to a peer on a remote system; that peer passes the received + tokens to its local GSS-API implementation for processing. The + security services available through GSS-API in this fashion are + implementable (and have been implemented) over a range of underlying + mechanisms based on secret-key and public-key cryptographic + technologies. + + The GSS-API separates the operations of initializing a security + context between peers, achieving peer entity authentication (This + security service definition, and other definitions used in this + document, corresponds to that provided in International Standard ISO + 7498-2-1988(E), Security Architecture.) (GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls), from the operations of providing + per-message data origin authentication and data integrity protection + (GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() calls) for messages subsequently + transferred in conjunction with that context. When establishing a + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + security context, the GSS-API enables a context initiator to + optionally permit its credentials to be delegated, meaning that the + context acceptor may initiate further security contexts on behalf of + the initiating caller. Per-message GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap() calls + provide the data origin authentication and data integrity services + which GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() offer, and also support + selection of confidentiality services as a caller option. Additional + calls provide supportive functions to the GSS-API's users. + + The following paragraphs provide an example illustrating the + dataflows involved in use of the GSS-API by a client and server in a + mechanism-independent fashion, establishing a security context and + transferring a protected message. The example assumes that credential + acquisition has already been completed. The example assumes that the + underlying authentication technology is capable of authenticating a + client to a server using elements carried within a single token, and + of authenticating the server to the client (mutual authentication) + with a single returned token; this assumption holds for presently- + documented CAT mechanisms but is not necessarily true for other + cryptographic technologies and associated protocols. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context() to establish a security + context to the server identified by targ_name, and elects to set the + mutual_req_flag so that mutual authentication is performed in the + course of context establishment. GSS_Init_sec_context() returns an + output_token to be passed to the server, and indicates + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status pending completion of the mutual + authentication sequence. Had mutual_req_flag not been set, the + initial call to GSS_Init_sec_context() would have returned + GSS_S_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_token to the + server. + + The server passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE status, provides the client's authenticated identity + in the src_name result, and provides an output_token to be passed to + the client. The server sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + a successor call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), which processes data + included in the token in order to achieve mutual authentication from + the client's viewpoint. This call to GSS_Init_sec_context() returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE status, indicating successful mutual authentication + and the completion of context establishment for this example. + + The client generates a data message and passes it to GSS_Wrap(). + GSS_Wrap() performs data origin authentication, data integrity, and + (optionally) confidentiality processing on the message and + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + encapsulates the result into output_message, indicating + GSS_S_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_message to the + server. + + The server passes the received message to GSS_Unwrap(). GSS_Unwrap() + inverts the encapsulation performed by GSS_Wrap(), deciphers the + message if the optional confidentiality feature was applied, and + validates the data origin authentication and data integrity checking + quantities. GSS_Unwrap() indicates successful validation by + returning GSS_S_COMPLETE status along with the resultant + output_message. + + For purposes of this example, we assume that the server knows by + out-of-band means that this context will have no further use after + one protected message is transferred from client to server. Given + this premise, the server now calls GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush + context-level information. Optionally, the server-side application + may provide a token buffer to GSS_Delete_sec_context(), to receive a + context_token to be transferred to the client in order to request + that client-side context-level information be deleted. + + If a context_token is transferred, the client passes the + context_token to GSS_Process_context_token(), which returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE status after deleting context-level information at the + client system. + + The GSS-API design assumes and addresses several basic goals, + including: + + Mechanism independence: The GSS-API defines an interface to + cryptographically implemented strong authentication and other + security services at a generic level which is independent of + particular underlying mechanisms. For example, GSS-API-provided + services can be implemented by secret-key technologies (e.g., + Kerberos) or public-key approaches (e.g., X.509). + + Protocol environment independence: The GSS-API is independent of + the communications protocol suites with which it is employed, + permitting use in a broad range of protocol environments. In + appropriate environments, an intermediate implementation "veneer" + which is oriented to a particular communication protocol (e.g., + Remote Procedure Call (RPC)) may be interposed between + applications which call that protocol and the GSS-API, thereby + invoking GSS-API facilities in conjunction with that protocol's + communications invocations. + + Protocol association independence: The GSS-API's security context + construct is independent of communications protocol association + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + constructs. This characteristic allows a single GSS-API + implementation to be utilized by a variety of invoking protocol + modules on behalf of those modules' calling applications. GSS-API + services can also be invoked directly by applications, wholly + independent of protocol associations. + + Suitability to a range of implementation placements: GSS-API + clients are not constrained to reside within any Trusted Computing + Base (TCB) perimeter defined on a system where the GSS-API is + implemented; security services are specified in a manner suitable + to both intra-TCB and extra-TCB callers. + +1.1: GSS-API Constructs + + This section describes the basic elements comprising the GSS-API. + +1.1.1: Credentials + +1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts + + Credentials provide the prerequisites which permit GSS-API peers to + establish security contexts with each other. A caller may designate + that the credential elements which are to be applied for context + initiation or acceptance be selected by default. Alternately, those + GSS-API callers which need to make explicit selection of particular + credentials structures may make references to those credentials + through GSS-API-provided credential handles ("cred_handles"). In all + cases, callers' credential references are indirect, mediated by GSS- + API implementations and not requiring callers to access the selected + credential elements. + + A single credential structure may be used to initiate outbound + contexts and to accept inbound contexts. Callers needing to operate + in only one of these modes may designate this fact when credentials + are acquired for use, allowing underlying mechanisms to optimize + their processing and storage requirements. The credential elements + defined by a particular mechanism may contain multiple cryptographic + keys, e.g., to enable authentication and message encryption to be + performed with different algorithms. + + A GSS-API credential structure may contain multiple credential + elements, each containing mechanism-specific information for a + particular underlying mechanism (mech_type), but the set of elements + within a given credential structure represent a common entity. A + credential structure's contents will vary depending on the set of + mech_types supported by a particular GSS-API implementation. Each + credential element identifies the data needed by its mechanism in + order to establish contexts on behalf of a particular principal, and + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + may contain separate credential references for use in context + initiation and context acceptance. Multiple credential elements + within a given credential having overlapping combinations of + mechanism, usage mode, and validity period are not permitted. + + Commonly, a single mech_type will be used for all security contexts + established by a particular initiator to a particular target. A major + motivation for supporting credential sets representing multiple + mech_types is to allow initiators on systems which are equipped to + handle multiple types to initiate contexts to targets on other + systems which can accommodate only a subset of the set supported at + the initiator's system. + +1.1.1.2: Credential Management + + It is the responsibility of underlying system-specific mechanisms and + OS functions below the GSS-API to ensure that the ability to acquire + and use credentials associated with a given identity is constrained + to appropriate processes within a system. This responsibility should + be taken seriously by implementors, as the ability for an entity to + utilize a principal's credentials is equivalent to the entity's + ability to successfully assert that principal's identity. + + Once a set of GSS-API credentials is established, the transferability + of that credentials set to other processes or analogous constructs + within a system is a local matter, not defined by the GSS-API. An + example local policy would be one in which any credentials received + as a result of login to a given user account, or of delegation of + rights to that account, are accessible by, or transferable to, + processes running under that account. + + The credential establishment process (particularly when performed on + behalf of users rather than server processes) is likely to require + access to passwords or other quantities which should be protected + locally and exposed for the shortest time possible. As a result, it + will often be appropriate for preliminary credential establishment to + be performed through local means at user login time, with the + result(s) cached for subsequent reference. These preliminary + credentials would be set aside (in a system-specific fashion) for + subsequent use, either: + + to be accessed by an invocation of the GSS-API GSS_Acquire_cred() + call, returning an explicit handle to reference that credential + + to comprise default credential elements to be installed, and to be + used when default credential behavior is requested on behalf of a + process + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution + + The gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context routines allow + the value GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to be specified as their credential + handle parameter. This special credential-handle indicates a desire + by the application to act as a default principal. While individual + GSS-API implementations are free to determine such default behavior + as appropriate to the mechanism, the following default behavior by + these routines is recommended for portability: + + GSS_Init_sec_context: + + (i) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating + security contexts that the application is authorized to act on + behalf of, then that principal shall be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network- + identity, and if the application is authorized to act on behalf of + that identity for the purpose of initiating security contexts, + then the principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, + otherwise + + (iii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local + identity, and provides a means to map local identities into + network-identities, and if the application is authorized to act on + behalf of the network-identity image of the default local identity + for the purpose of initiating security contexts, then the + principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, otherwise + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity should be used. + + GSS_Accept_sec_context: + + (i) If there is only a single authorized principal identity + capable of accepting security contexts, then that principal shall + be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target + principal by examining the context-establishment token, and if the + accepting application is authorized to act as that principal for + the purpose of accepting security contexts, then that principal + identity shall be used, otherwise + + (iii) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any + principal, and mutual authentication was not requested, any + principal that the application is authorized to accept security + contexts under may be used, otherwise + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity shall be used. + + The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be + established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior + wherever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are + likely to be more portable across mechanisms and platforms than ones + that use GSS_Acquire_cred to request a specific identity. + +1.1.2: Tokens + + Tokens are data elements transferred between GSS-API callers, and are + divided into two classes. Context-level tokens are exchanged in order + to establish and manage a security context between peers. Per-message + tokens relate to an established context and are exchanged to provide + protective security services (i.e., data origin authentication, + integrity, and optional confidentiality) for corresponding data + messages. + + The first context-level token obtained from GSS_Init_sec_context() is + required to indicate at its very beginning a globally-interpretable + mechanism identifier, i.e., an Object Identifier (OID) of the + security mechanism. The remaining part of this token as well as the + whole content of all other tokens are specific to the particular + underlying mechanism used to support the GSS-API. Section 3 of this + document provides, for designers of GSS-API support mechanisms, the + description of the header of the first context-level token which is + then followed by mechanism-specific information. + + Tokens' contents are opaque from the viewpoint of GSS-API callers. + They are generated within the GSS-API implementation at an end + system, provided to a GSS-API caller to be transferred to the peer + GSS-API caller at a remote end system, and processed by the GSS-API + implementation at that remote end system. Tokens may be output by + GSS-API calls (and should be transferred to GSS-API peers) whether or + not the calls' status indicators indicate successful completion. + Token transfer may take place in an in-band manner, integrated into + the same protocol stream used by the GSS-API callers for other data + transfers, or in an out-of-band manner across a logically separate + channel. + + Different GSS-API tokens are used for different purposes (e.g., + context initiation, context acceptance, protected message data on an + established context), and it is the responsibility of a GSS-API + caller receiving tokens to distinguish their types, associate them + with corresponding security contexts, and pass them to appropriate + GSS-API processing routines. Depending on the caller protocol + environment, this distinction may be accomplished in several ways. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The following examples illustrate means through which tokens' types + may be distinguished: + + - implicit tagging based on state information (e.g., all tokens on + a new association are considered to be context establishment + tokens until context establishment is completed, at which point + all tokens are considered to be wrapped data objects for that + context), + + - explicit tagging at the caller protocol level, + + - a hybrid of these approaches. + + Commonly, the encapsulated data within a token includes internal + mechanism-specific tagging information, enabling mechanism-level + processing modules to distinguish tokens used within the mechanism + for different purposes. Such internal mechanism-level tagging is + recommended to mechanism designers, and enables mechanisms to + determine whether a caller has passed a particular token for + processing by an inappropriate GSS-API routine. + + Development of GSS-API support primitives based on a particular + underlying cryptographic technique and protocol (i.e., conformant to + a specific GSS-API mechanism definition) does not necessarily imply + that GSS-API callers using that GSS-API mechanism will be able to + interoperate with peers invoking the same technique and protocol + outside the GSS-API paradigm, or with peers implementing a different + GSS-API mechanism based on the same underlying technology. The + format of GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a particular + mechanism, and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into + callers' protocols, may not be interoperable with the tokens used by + non-GSS-API callers of the same underlying technique. + +1.1.3: Security Contexts + + Security contexts are established between peers, using credentials + established locally in conjunction with each peer or received by + peers via delegation. Multiple contexts may exist simultaneously + between a pair of peers, using the same or different sets of + credentials. Coexistence of multiple contexts using different + credentials allows graceful rollover when credentials expire. + Distinction among multiple contexts based on the same credentials + serves applications by distinguishing different message streams in a + security sense. + + The GSS-API is independent of underlying protocols and addressing + structure, and depends on its callers to transport GSS-API-provided + data elements. As a result of these factors, it is a caller + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + responsibility to parse communicated messages, separating GSS-API- + related data elements from caller-provided data. The GSS-API is + independent of connection vs. connectionless orientation of the + underlying communications service. + + No correlation between security context and communications protocol + association is dictated. (The optional channel binding facility, + discussed in Section 1.1.6 of this document, represents an + intentional exception to this rule, supporting additional protection + features within GSS-API supporting mechanisms.) This separation + allows the GSS-API to be used in a wide range of communications + environments, and also simplifies the calling sequences of the + individual calls. In many cases (depending on underlying security + protocol, associated mechanism, and availability of cached + information), the state information required for context setup can be + sent concurrently with initial signed user data, without interposing + additional message exchanges. + +1.1.4: Mechanism Types + + In order to successfully establish a security context with a target + peer, it is necessary to identify an appropriate underlying mechanism + type (mech_type) which both initiator and target peers support. The + definition of a mechanism embodies not only the use of a particular + cryptographic technology (or a hybrid or choice among alternative + cryptographic technologies), but also definition of the syntax and + semantics of data element exchanges which that mechanism will employ + in order to support security services. + + It is recommended that callers initiating contexts specify the + "default" mech_type value, allowing system-specific functions within + or invoked by the GSS-API implementation to select the appropriate + mech_type, but callers may direct that a particular mech_type be + employed when necessary. + + The means for identifying a shared mech_type to establish a security + context with a peer will vary in different environments and + circumstances; examples include (but are not limited to): + + use of a fixed mech_type, defined by configuration, within an + environment + + syntactic convention on a target-specific basis, through + examination of a target's name + + lookup of a target's name in a naming service or other database in + order to identify mech_types supported by that target + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + explicit negotiation between GSS-API callers in advance of + security context setup + + When transferred between GSS-API peers, mech_type specifiers (per + Section 3, represented as Object Identifiers (OIDs)) serve to qualify + the interpretation of associated tokens. (The structure and encoding + of Object Identifiers is defined in ISO/IEC 8824, "Specification of + Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)" and in ISO/IEC 8825, + "Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1)".) Use of hierarchically structured OIDs serves to + preclude ambiguous interpretation of mech_type specifiers. The OID + representing the DASS MechType, for example, is 1.3.12.2.1011.7.5, + and that of the Kerberos V5 mechanism, once advanced to the level of + Proposed Standard, will be 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2. + +1.1.5: Naming + + The GSS-API avoids prescribing naming structures, treating the names + which are transferred across the interface in order to initiate and + accept security contexts as opaque objects. This approach supports + the GSS-API's goal of implementability atop a range of underlying + security mechanisms, recognizing the fact that different mechanisms + process and authenticate names which are presented in different + forms. Generalized services offering translation functions among + arbitrary sets of naming environments are outside the scope of the + GSS-API; availability and use of local conversion functions to + translate among the naming formats supported within a given end + system is anticipated. + + Different classes of name representations are used in conjunction + with different GSS-API parameters: + + - Internal form (denoted in this document by INTERNAL NAME), + opaque to callers and defined by individual GSS-API + implementations. GSS-API implementations supporting multiple + namespace types must maintain internal tags to disambiguate the + interpretation of particular names. A Mechanism Name (MN) is a + special case of INTERNAL NAME, guaranteed to contain elements + corresponding to one and only one mechanism; calls which are + guaranteed to emit MNs or which require MNs as input are so + identified within this specification. + + - Contiguous string ("flat") form (denoted in this document by + OCTET STRING); accompanied by OID tags identifying the namespace + to which they correspond. Depending on tag value, flat names may + or may not be printable strings for direct acceptance from and + presentation to users. Tagging of flat names allows GSS-API + callers and underlying GSS-API mechanisms to disambiguate name + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + types and to determine whether an associated name's type is one + which they are capable of processing, avoiding aliasing problems + which could result from misinterpreting a name of one type as a + name of another type. + + - The GSS-API Exported Name Object, a special case of flat name + designated by a reserved OID value, carries a canonicalized form + of a name suitable for binary comparisons. + + In addition to providing means for names to be tagged with types, + this specification defines primitives to support a level of naming + environment independence for certain calling applications. To provide + basic services oriented towards the requirements of callers which + need not themselves interpret the internal syntax and semantics of + names, GSS-API calls for name comparison (GSS_Compare_name()), + human-readable display (GSS_Display_name()), input conversion + (GSS_Import_name()), internal name deallocation (GSS_Release_name()), + and internal name duplication (GSS_Duplicate_name()) functions are + defined. (It is anticipated that these proposed GSS-API calls will be + implemented in many end systems based on system-specific name + manipulation primitives already extant within those end systems; + inclusion within the GSS-API is intended to offer GSS-API callers a + portable means to perform specific operations, supportive of + authorization and audit requirements, on authenticated names.) + + GSS_Import_name() implementations can, where appropriate, support + more than one printable syntax corresponding to a given namespace + (e.g., alternative printable representations for X.500 Distinguished + Names), allowing flexibility for their callers to select among + alternative representations. GSS_Display_name() implementations + output a printable syntax selected as appropriate to their + operational environments; this selection is a local matter. Callers + desiring portability across alternative printable syntaxes should + refrain from implementing comparisons based on printable name forms + and should instead use the GSS_Compare_name() call to determine + whether or not one internal-format name matches another. + + The GSS_Canonicalize_name() and GSS_Export_name() calls enable + callers to acquire and process Exported Name Objects, canonicalized + and translated in accordance with the procedures of a particular + GSS-API mechanism. Exported Name Objects can, in turn, be input to + GSS_Import_name(), yielding equivalent MNs. These facilities are + designed specifically to enable efficient storage and comparison of + names (e.g., for use in access control lists). + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The following diagram illustrates the intended dataflow among name- + related GSS-API processing routines. + + GSS-API library defaults + | + | + V text, for + text --------------> internal_name (IN) -----------> display only + import_name() / display_name() + / + / + / + accept_sec_context() / + | / + | / + | / canonicalize_name() + | / + | / + | / + | / + | / + | | + V V <--------------------- + single mechanism import_name() exported name: flat + internal_name (MN) binary "blob" usable + ----------------------> for access control + export_name() + +1.1.6: Channel Bindings + + The GSS-API accommodates the concept of caller-provided channel + binding ("chan_binding") information. Channel bindings are used to + strengthen the quality with which peer entity authentication is + provided during context establishment, by limiting the scope within + which an intercepted context establishment token can be reused by an + attacker. Specifically, they enable GSS-API callers to bind the + establishment of a security context to relevant characteristics + (e.g., addresses, transformed representations of encryption keys) of + the underlying communications channel, of protection mechanisms + applied to that communications channel, and to application-specific + data. + + The caller initiating a security context must determine the + appropriate channel binding values to provide as input to the + GSS_Init_sec_context() call, and consistent values must be provided + to GSS_Accept_sec_context() by the context's target, in order for + both peers' GSS-API mechanisms to validate that received tokens + possess correct channel-related characteristics. Use or non-use of + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + the GSS-API channel binding facility is a caller option. GSS-API + mechanisms can operate in an environment where NULL channel bindings + are presented; mechanism implementors are encouraged, but not + required, to make use of caller-provided channel binding data within + their mechanisms. Callers should not assume that underlying + mechanisms provide confidentiality protection for channel binding + information. + + When non-NULL channel bindings are provided by callers, certain + mechanisms can offer enhanced security value by interpreting the + bindings' content (rather than simply representing those bindings, or + integrity check values computed on them, within tokens) and will + therefore depend on presentation of specific data in a defined + format. To this end, agreements among mechanism implementors are + defining conventional interpretations for the contents of channel + binding arguments, including address specifiers (with content + dependent on communications protocol environment) for context + initiators and acceptors. (These conventions are being incorporated + in GSS-API mechanism specifications and into the GSS-API C language + bindings specification.) In order for GSS-API callers to be portable + across multiple mechanisms and achieve the full security + functionality which each mechanism can provide, it is strongly + recommended that GSS-API callers provide channel bindings consistent + with these conventions and those of the networking environment in + which they operate. + +1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues + + This section describes aspects of GSS-API operations, of the security + services which the GSS-API provides, and provides commentary on + design issues. + +1.2.1: Status Reporting + + Each GSS-API call provides two status return values. Major_status + values provide a mechanism-independent indication of call status + (e.g., GSS_S_COMPLETE, GSS_S_FAILURE, GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), + sufficient to drive normal control flow within the caller in a + generic fashion. Table 1 summarizes the defined major_status return + codes in tabular fashion. + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +Table 1: GSS-API Major Status Codes + + FATAL ERROR CODES + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS channel binding mismatch + GSS_S_BAD_MECH unsupported mechanism requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME invalid name provided + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE name of unsupported type provided + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS invalid input status selector + GSS_S_BAD_SIG token had invalid integrity check + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED specified security context expired + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED expired credentials detected + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL defective credential detected + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN defective token detected + GSS_S_FAILURE failure, unspecified at GSS-API + level + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT no valid security context specified + GSS_S_NO_CRED no valid credentials provided + GSS_S_BAD_QOP unsupported QOP value + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED operation unauthorized + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE operation unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT duplicate credential element requested + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN name contains multi-mechanism elements + + INFORMATORY STATUS CODES + + GSS_S_COMPLETE normal completion + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED continuation call to routine + required + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN duplicate per-message token + detected + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN timed-out per-message token + detected + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN reordered (early) per-message token + detected + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN skipped predecessor token(s) + detected + + Minor_status provides more detailed status information which may + include status codes specific to the underlying security mechanism. + Minor_status values are not specified in this document. + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status returns, and optional message + outputs, are provided in GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls so that different mechanisms' + employment of different numbers of messages within their + authentication sequences need not be reflected in separate code paths + within calling applications. Instead, such cases are accommodated + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + with sequences of continuation calls to GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The same mechanism is used to encapsulate + mutual authentication within the GSS-API's context initiation calls. + + For mech_types which require interactions with third-party servers in + order to establish a security context, GSS-API context establishment + calls may block pending completion of such third-party interactions. + + On the other hand, no GSS-API calls pend on serialized interactions + with GSS-API peer entities. As a result, local GSS-API status + returns cannot reflect unpredictable or asynchronous exceptions + occurring at remote peers, and reflection of such status information + is a caller responsibility outside the GSS-API. + +1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability + + When a context is established, two flags are returned to indicate the + set of per-message protection security services which will be + available on the context: + + the integ_avail flag indicates whether per-message integrity and + data origin authentication services are available + + the conf_avail flag indicates whether per-message confidentiality + services are available, and will never be returned TRUE unless the + integ_avail flag is also returned TRUE + + GSS-API callers desiring per-message security services should + check the values of these flags at context establishment time, and + must be aware that a returned FALSE value for integ_avail means + that invocation of GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() primitives on the + associated context will apply no cryptographic protection to user + data messages. + + The GSS-API per-message integrity and data origin authentication + services provide assurance to a receiving caller that protection was + applied to a message by the caller's peer on the security context, + corresponding to the entity named at context initiation. The GSS-API + per-message confidentiality service provides assurance to a sending + caller that the message's content is protected from access by + entities other than the context's named peer. + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The GSS-API per-message protection service primitives, as the + category name implies, are oriented to operation at the granularity + of protocol data units. They perform cryptographic operations on the + data units, transfer cryptographic control information in tokens, + and, in the case of GSS_Wrap(), encapsulate the protected data unit. + As such, these primitives are not oriented to efficient data + protection for stream-paradigm protocols (e.g., Telnet) if + cryptography must be applied on an octet-by-octet basis. + +1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing + + Certain underlying mech_types offer support for replay detection + and/or sequencing of messages transferred on the contexts they + support. These optionally-selectable protection features are distinct + from replay detection and sequencing features applied to the context + establishment operation itself; the presence or absence of context- + level replay or sequencing features is wholly a function of the + underlying mech_type's capabilities, and is not selected or omitted + as a caller option. + + The caller initiating a context provides flags (replay_det_req_flag + and sequence_req_flag) to specify whether the use of per-message + replay detection and sequencing features is desired on the context + being established. The GSS-API implementation at the initiator system + can determine whether these features are supported (and whether they + are optionally selectable) as a function of mech_type, without need + for bilateral negotiation with the target. When enabled, these + features provide recipients with indicators as a result of GSS-API + processing of incoming messages, identifying whether those messages + were detected as duplicates or out-of-sequence. Detection of such + events does not prevent a suspect message from being provided to a + recipient; the appropriate course of action on a suspect message is a + matter of caller policy. + + The semantics of the replay detection and sequencing services applied + to received messages, as visible across the interface which the GSS- + API provides to its clients, are as follows: + + When replay_det_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 2. GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic + checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that the + message was recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed + message. + + 3. GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on + the received message was correct, but that the message is too old + to be checked for duplication. + + When sequence_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window, and that no predecessor sequenced + messages are missing relative to the last received message (if + any) processed on the context with a correct cryptographic + checkvalue. + + 2. GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value + on the received message was correct, but that the message was + recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. + + 3. GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value on the + received message was correct, but that the token is too old to be + checked for duplication. + + 4. GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue + on the received message was correct, but that it is earlier in a + sequenced stream than a message already processed on the context. + [Note: Mechanisms can be architected to provide a stricter form of + sequencing service, delivering particular messages to recipients + only after all predecessor messages in an ordered stream have been + delivered. This type of support is incompatible with the GSS-API + paradigm in which recipients receive all messages, whether in + order or not, and provide them (one at a time, without intra-GSS- + API message buffering) to GSS-API routines for validation. GSS- + API facilities provide supportive functions, aiding clients to + achieve strict message stream integrity in an efficient manner in + conjunction with sequencing provisions in communications + protocols, but the GSS-API does not offer this level of message + stream integrity service by itself.] + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 5. GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on + the received message was correct, but that one or more predecessor + sequenced messages have not been successfully processed relative + to the last received message (if any) processed on the context + with a correct cryptographic checkvalue. + + As the message stream integrity features (especially sequencing) may + interfere with certain applications' intended communications + paradigms, and since support for such features is likely to be + resource intensive, it is highly recommended that mech_types + supporting these features allow them to be activated selectively on + initiator request when a context is established. A context initiator + and target are provided with corresponding indicators + (replay_det_state and sequence_state), signifying whether these + features are active on a given context. + + An example mech_type supporting per-message replay detection could + (when replay_det_state is TRUE) implement the feature as follows: The + underlying mechanism would insert timestamps in data elements output + by GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(), and would maintain (within a time- + limited window) a cache (qualified by originator-recipient pair) + identifying received data elements processed by GSS_VerifyMIC() and + GSS_Unwrap(). When this feature is active, exception status returns + (GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN) will be provided when + GSS_VerifyMIC() or GSS_Unwrap() is presented with a message which is + either a detected duplicate of a prior message or which is too old to + validate against a cache of recently received messages. + +1.2.4: Quality of Protection + + Some mech_types provide their users with fine granularity control + over the means used to provide per-message protection, allowing + callers to trade off security processing overhead dynamically against + the protection requirements of particular messages. A per-message + quality-of-protection parameter (analogous to quality-of-service, or + QOS) selects among different QOP options supported by that mechanism. + On context establishment for a multi-QOP mech_type, context-level + data provides the prerequisite data for a range of protection + qualities. + + It is expected that the majority of callers will not wish to exert + explicit mechanism-specific QOP control and will therefore request + selection of a default QOP. Definitions of, and choices among, non- + default QOP values are mechanism-specific, and no ordered sequences + of QOP values can be assumed equivalent across different mechanisms. + Meaningful use of non-default QOP values demands that callers be + familiar with the QOP definitions of an underlying mechanism or + mechanisms, and is therefore a non-portable construct. The + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP major_status value is defined in order to indicate that + a provided QOP value is unsupported for a security context, most + likely because that value is unrecognized by the underlying + mechanism. + +1.2.5: Anonymity Support + + In certain situations or environments, an application may wish to + authenticate a peer and/or protect communications using GSS-API per- + message services without revealing its own identity. For example, + consider an application which provides read access to a research + database, and which permits queries by arbitrary requestors. A + client of such a service might wish to authenticate the service, to + establish trust in the information received from it, but might not + wish to disclose its identity to the service for privacy reasons. + + In ordinary GSS-API usage, a context initiator's identity is made + available to the context acceptor as part of the context + establishment process. To provide for anonymity support, a facility + (input anon_req_flag to GSS_Init_sec_context()) is provided through + which context initiators may request that their identity not be + provided to the context acceptor. Mechanisms are not required to + honor this request, but a caller will be informed (via returned + anon_state indicator from GSS_Init_sec_context()) whether or not the + request is honored. Note that authentication as the anonymous + principal does not necessarily imply that credentials are not + required in order to establish a context. + + The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to + identify anonymous names, and can be compared against in order to + determine, in a mechanism-independent fashion, whether a name refers + to an anonymous principal: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 3(gss-anonymous-name)} + + The recommended symbolic name corresponding to this definition is + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS. + + Four possible combinations of anon_state and mutual_state are + possible, with the following results: + + anon_state == FALSE, mutual_state == FALSE: initiator + authenticated to target. + + anon_state == FALSE, mutual_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated + to target, target authenticated to initiator. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == FALSE: initiator authenticated + as anonymous principal to target. + + anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated + as anonymous principal to target, target authenticated to + initiator. + +1.2.6: Initialization + + No initialization calls (i.e., calls which must be invoked prior to + invocation of other facilities in the interface) are defined in GSS- + API. As an implication of this fact, GSS-API implementations must + themselves be self-initializing. + +1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment + + A facility is defined in GSS-V2 to enable protection and buffering of + data messages for later transfer while a security context's + establishment is in GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status, to be used in cases + where the caller side already possesses the necessary session key to + enable this processing. Specifically, a new state Boolean, called + prot_ready_state, is added to the set of information returned by + GSS_Init_sec_context(), GSS_Accept_sec_context(), and + GSS_Inquire_context(). + + For context establishment calls, this state Boolean is valid and + interpretable when the associated major_status is either + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, or GSS_S_COMPLETE. Callers of GSS-API (both + initiators and acceptors) can assume that per-message protection (via + GSS_Wrap(), GSS_Unwrap(), GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC()) is + available and ready for use if either: prot_ready_state == TRUE, or + major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE, though mutual authentication (if + requested) cannot be guaranteed until GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + + This achieves full, transparent backward compatibility for GSS-API V1 + callers, who need not even know of the existence of prot_ready_state, + and who will get the expected behavior from GSS_S_COMPLETE, but who + will not be able to use per-message protection before GSS_S_COMPLETE + is returned. + + It is not a requirement that GSS-V2 mechanisms ever return TRUE + prot_ready_state before completion of context establishment (indeed, + some mechanisms will not evolve usable message protection keys, + especially at the context acceptor, before context establishment is + complete). It is expected but not required that GSS-V2 mechanisms + will return TRUE prot_ready_state upon completion of context + establishment if they support per-message protection at all (however + GSS-V2 applications should not assume that TRUE prot_ready_state will + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + always be returned together with the GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status, + since GSS-V2 implementations may continue to support GSS-V1 mechanism + code, which will never return TRUE prot_ready_state). + + When prot_ready_state is returned TRUE, mechanisms shall also set + those context service indicator flags (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, trans_state, + conf_avail, integ_avail) which represent facilities confirmed, at + that time, to be available on the context being established. In + situations where prot_ready_state is returned before GSS_S_COMPLETE, + it is possible that additional facilities may be confirmed and + subsequently indicated when GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + +1.2.8: Implementation Robustness + + This section recommends aspects of GSS-API implementation behavior in + the interests of overall robustness. + + If a token is presented for processing on a GSS-API security context + and that token is determined to be invalid for that context, the + context's state should not be disrupted for purposes of processing + subsequent valid tokens. + + Certain local conditions at a GSS-API implementation (e.g., + unavailability of memory) may preclude, temporarily or permanently, + the successful processing of tokens on a GSS-API security context, + typically generating GSS_S_FAILURE major_status returns along with + locally-significant minor_status. For robust operation under such + conditions, the following recommendations are made: + + Failing calls should free any memory they allocate, so that + callers may retry without causing further loss of resources. + + Failure of an individual call on an established context should not + preclude subsequent calls from succeeding on the same context. + + Whenever possible, it should be possible for + GSS_Delete_sec_context() calls to be successfully processed even + if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + resources to be released. + +2: Interface Descriptions + + This section describes the GSS-API's service interface, dividing the + set of calls offered into four groups. Credential management calls + are related to the acquisition and release of credentials by + principals. Context-level calls are related to the management of + security contexts between principals. Per-message calls are related + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + to the protection of individual messages on established security + contexts. Support calls provide ancillary functions useful to GSS-API + callers. Table 2 groups and summarizes the calls in tabular fashion. + +Table 2: GSS-API Calls + + CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT + + GSS_Acquire_cred acquire credentials for use + GSS_Release_cred release credentials after use + GSS_Inquire_cred display information about + credentials + GSS_Add_cred construct credentials incrementally + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech display per-mechanism credential + information + + CONTEXT-LEVEL CALLS + + GSS_Init_sec_context initiate outbound security context + GSS_Accept_sec_context accept inbound security context + GSS_Delete_sec_context flush context when no longer needed + GSS_Process_context_token process received control token on + context + GSS_Context_time indicate validity time remaining on + context + GSS_Inquire_context display information about context + GSS_Wrap_size_limit determine GSS_Wrap token size limit + GSS_Export_sec_context transfer context to other process + GSS_Import_sec_context import transferred context + + PER-MESSAGE CALLS + + GSS_GetMIC apply integrity check, receive as + token separate from message + GSS_VerifyMIC validate integrity check token + along with message + GSS_Wrap sign, optionally encrypt, + encapsulate + GSS_Unwrap decapsulate, decrypt if needed, + validate integrity check + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + SUPPORT CALLS + + GSS_Display_status translate status codes to printable + form + GSS_Indicate_mechs indicate mech_types supported on + local system + GSS_Compare_name compare two names for equality + GSS_Display_name translate name to printable form + GSS_Import_name convert printable name to + normalized form + GSS_Release_name free storage of normalized-form + name + GSS_Release_buffer free storage of printable name + GSS_Release_OID free storage of OID object + GSS_Release_OID_set free storage of OID set object + GSS_Create_empty_OID_set create empty OID set + GSS_Add_OID_set_member add member to OID set + GSS_Test_OID_set_member test if OID is member of OID set + GSS_OID_to_str display OID as string + GSS_Str_to_OID construct OID from string + GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech indicate name types supported by + mechanism + GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name indicates mechanisms supporting name + type + GSS_Canonicalize_name translate name to per-mechanism form + GSS_Export_name externalize per-mechanism name + GSS_Duplicate_name duplicate name object + +2.1: Credential management calls + + These GSS-API calls provide functions related to the management of + credentials. Their characterization with regard to whether or not + they may block pending exchanges with other network entities (e.g., + directories or authentication servers) depends in part on OS-specific + (extra-GSS-API) issues, so is not specified in this document. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call is defined within the GSS-API in support + of application portability, with a particular orientation towards + support of portable server applications. It is recognized that (for + certain systems and mechanisms) credentials for interactive users may + be managed differently from credentials for server processes; in such + environments, it is the GSS-API implementation's responsibility to + distinguish these cases and the procedures for making this + distinction are a local matter. The GSS_Release_cred() call provides + a means for callers to indicate to the GSS-API that use of a + credentials structure is no longer required. The GSS_Inquire_cred() + call allows callers to determine information about a credentials + structure. The GSS_Add_cred() call enables callers to append + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + elements to an existing credential structure, allowing iterative + construction of a multi-mechanism credential. The + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() call enables callers to extract per- + mechanism information describing a credentials structure. + +2.1.1: GSS_Acquire_cred call + + Inputs: + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME, -NULL requests locally-determined + default + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,-empty set requests + system-selected default + + o cred_usage INTEGER -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that requested credentials were + successfully established, for the duration indicated in + lifetime_rec, suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, + for the set of mech_types indicated in actual_mechs, and that + those credentials can be referenced for subsequent use with + the handle returned in output_cred_handle. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that a mech_type unsupported by the + GSS-API implementation type was requested, causing the + credential establishment operation to fail. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name is + uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable + underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so no credentials could be + established for the accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that credential establishment failed + for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack + of authorization to establish and use credentials associated + with the identity named in the input desired_name argument. + + GSS_Acquire_cred() is used to acquire credentials so that a + principal can (as a function of the input cred_usage parameter) + initiate and/or accept security contexts under the identity + represented by the desired_name input argument. On successful + completion, the returned output_cred_handle result provides a handle + for subsequent references to the acquired credentials. Typically, + single-user client processes requesting that default credential + behavior be applied for context establishment purposes will have no + need to invoke this call. + + A caller may provide the value NULL for desired_name, signifying a + request for credentials corresponding to a principal identity + selected by default for the caller. The procedures used by GSS-API + implementations to select the appropriate principal identity in + response to such a request are local matters. It is possible that + multiple pre-established credentials may exist for the same principal + identity (for example, as a result of multiple user login sessions) + when GSS_Acquire_cred() is called; the means used in such cases to + select a specific credential are local matters. The input + lifetime_req argument to GSS_Acquire_cred() may provide useful + information for local GSS-API implementations to employ in making + this disambiguation in a manner which will best satisfy a caller's + intent. + + The lifetime_rec result indicates the length of time for which the + acquired credentials will be valid, as an offset from the present. A + mechanism may return a reserved value indicating INDEFINITE if no + constraints on credential lifetime are imposed. A caller of + GSS_Acquire_cred() can request a length of time for which acquired + credentials are to be valid (lifetime_req argument), beginning at the + present, or can request credentials with a default validity interval. + (Requests for postdated credentials are not supported within the + GSS-API.) Certain mechanisms and implementations may bind in + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + credential validity period specifiers at a point preliminary to + invocation of the GSS_Acquire_cred() call (e.g., in conjunction with + user login procedures). As a result, callers requesting non-default + values for lifetime_req must recognize that such requests cannot + always be honored and must be prepared to accommodate the use of + returned credentials with different lifetimes as indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + The caller of GSS_Acquire_cred() can explicitly specify a set of + mech_types which are to be accommodated in the returned credentials + (desired_mechs argument), or can request credentials for a system- + defined default set of mech_types. Selection of the system-specified + default set is recommended in the interests of application + portability. The actual_mechs return value may be interrogated by the + caller to determine the set of mechanisms with which the returned + credentials may be used. + +2.1.2: GSS_Release_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE - NULL specifies that + the credential elements used when default credential behavior + is requested be released. + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle were released for purposes of subsequent + access by the caller. The effect on other processes which may + be authorized shared access to such credentials is a local + matter. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no release operation was + performed, either because the input cred_handle was invalid or + because the caller lacks authorization to access the + referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Provides a means for a caller to explicitly request that credentials + be released when their use is no longer required. Note that system- + specific credential management functions are also likely to exist, + for example to assure that credentials shared among processes are + properly deleted when all affected processes terminate, even if no + explicit release requests are issued by those processes. Given the + fact that multiple callers are not precluded from gaining authorized + access to the same credentials, invocation of GSS_Release_cred() + cannot be assumed to delete a particular set of credentials on a + system-wide basis. + +2.1.3: GSS_Inquire_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -NULL specifies that the + credential elements used when default credential behavior is + requested are to be queried + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, and that the output + cred_name, lifetime_rec, and cred_usage values represent, + respectively, the credentials' associated principal name, + remaining lifetime, suitable usage modes, and supported + mechanism types. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks + authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced + credentials are invalid. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced + credentials have expired. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred() call is defined primarily for the use of those + callers which request use of default credential behavior rather than + acquiring credentials explicitly with GSS_Acquire_cred(). It enables + callers to determine a credential structure's associated principal + name, remaining validity period, usability for security context + initiation and/or acceptance, and supported mechanisms. + + For a multi-mechanism credential, the returned "lifetime" specifier + indicates the shortest lifetime of any of the mechanisms' elements in + the credential (for either context initiation or acceptance + purposes). + + GSS_Inquire_cred() should indicate INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT for + "cred_usage" if both of the following conditions hold: + + (1) there exists in the credential an element which allows context + initiation using some mechanism + + (2) there exists in the credential an element which allows context + acceptance using some mechanism (allowably, but not necessarily, + one of the same mechanism(s) qualifying for (1)). + + If condition (1) holds but not condition (2), GSS_Inquire_cred() + should indicate INITIATE-ONLY for "cred_usage". If condition (2) + holds but not condition (1), GSS_Inquire_cred() should indicate + ACCEPT-ONLY for "cred_usage". + + Callers requiring finer disambiguation among available combinations + of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms should call the + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() routine, passing that routine one of the + mech OIDs returned by GSS_Inquire_cred(). + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.1.4: GSS_Add_cred call + + Inputs: + + o input_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE - handle to credential + structure created with prior GSS_Acquire_cred() or + GSS_Add_cred() call, or NULL to append elements to the set + which are applied for the caller when default credential + behavior is specified. + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME - NULL requests locally-determined + default + + o initiator_time_req INTEGER - in seconds; 0 requests default + + o acceptor_time_req INTEGER - in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mech OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + o cred_usage INTEGER - 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, - NULL to request that + credential elements be added "in place" to the credential + structure identified by input_cred_handle, non-NULL pointer + to request that a new credential structure and handle be created. + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o initiator_time_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o acceptor_time_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- full set of mechanisms + supported by resulting credential. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by + the input_cred_handle argument were valid, and that the + resulting credential from GSS_Add_cred() is valid for the + durations indicated in initiator_time_rec and acceptor_time_rec, + suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, and for the + mechanisms indicated in actual_mechs. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT indicates that the input desired_mech + specified a mechanism for which the referenced credential + already contained a credential element with overlapping + cred_usage and validity time specifiers. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the input desired_mech specified + a mechanism unsupported by the GSS-API implementation, causing + the GSS_Add_cred() operation to fail. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name + is uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable + underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the GSS_Add_cred() operation + could not be performed for that name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so the GSS_Add_cred() operation could not be + performed for that name. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that the input_cred_handle referenced + invalid or inaccessible credentials. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack of + authorization to establish or use credentials representing + the requested identity. + + GSS_Add_cred() enables callers to construct credentials iteratively + by adding credential elements in successive operations, corresponding + to different mechanisms. This offers particular value in multi- + mechanism environments, as the major_status and minor_status values + returned on each iteration are individually visible and can therefore + be interpreted unambiguously on a per-mechanism basis. + + The same input desired_name, or default reference, should be used on + all GSS_Acquire_cred() and GSS_Add_cred() calls corresponding to a + particular credential. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.1.5: GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech call + + Inputs: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- NULL specifies that the + credential elements used when default credential behavior is + requested are to be queried + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- specific mechanism for + which credentials are being queried + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN + + o lifetime_rec_initiate INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o lifetime_rec_accept INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, that the mechanism + indicated by the input mech_type was represented with elements + within those credentials, and that the output cred_name, + lifetime_rec_initiate, lifetime_rec_accept, and cred_usage values + represent, respectively, the credentials' associated principal + name, remaining lifetimes, and suitable usage modes. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks + authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced + credentials are invalid. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced + credentials have expired. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the referenced credentials do not + contain elements for the requested mechanism. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() call enables callers in multi- + mechanism environments to acquire specific data about available + combinations of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms within a + credential structure. The lifetime_rec_initiate result indicates the + available lifetime for context initiation purposes; the + lifetime_rec_accept result indicates the available lifetime for + context acceptance purposes. + +2.2: Context-level calls + + This group of calls is devoted to the establishment and management of + security contexts between peers. A context's initiator calls + GSS_Init_sec_context(), resulting in generation of a token which the + caller passes to the target. At the target, that token is passed to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Depending on the underlying mech_type and + specified options, additional token exchanges may be performed in the + course of context establishment; such exchanges are accommodated by + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns from GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + + Either party to an established context may invoke + GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush context information when a context + is no longer required. GSS_Process_context_token() is used to + process received tokens carrying context-level control information. + GSS_Context_time() allows a caller to determine the length of time + for which an established context will remain valid. + GSS_Inquire_context() returns status information describing context + characteristics. GSS_Wrap_size_limit() allows a caller to determine + the size of a token which will be generated by a GSS_Wrap() + operation. GSS_Export_sec_context() and GSS_Import_sec_context() + enable transfer of active contexts between processes on an end + system. + +2.2.1: GSS_Init_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o claimant_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -NULL specifies "use + default" + + o input_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -0 specifies "none assigned + yet" + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -NULL parameter specifies "use + default" + + o deleg_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o anon_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default lifetime + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING-NULL or token received from target + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -actual mechanism always + indicated, never NULL + + o output_token OCTET STRING, -NULL or token to pass to context + target + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which an authentication server or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context initiator in order to generate an + output_token suitable for presentation to a specified target. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that context-level information was + successfully initialized, and that the returned output_token + will provide sufficient information for the target to perform + per-message processing on the newly-established context. + + o GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the target, and that a + reply must be received and passed as the input_token argument + to a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), before + per-message processing can be performed in conjunction with + this context. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks + performed on the input_token failed, preventing further + processing from being performed based on that token. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + claimant_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token + contains an incorrect integrity check, so context setup cannot + be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, + either because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the + referenced credentials are valid for context acceptor use + only, or because the caller lacks authorization to access the + referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials + provided through the input claimant_cred_handle argument are no + longer valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the + caller-provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the + input_token was detected, signifying a security-relevant + event and preventing context establishment. (This result will + be returned by GSS_Init_sec_context only for contexts where + mutual_state is TRUE.) + + o GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the input_token is too old to + be checked for integrity. This is a fatal error during context + establishment. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the input token has a + correct integrity check, but is a duplicate of a token already + processed. This is a fatal error during context establishment. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided; this major status will + be returned only for successor calls following GSS_S_CONTINUE_ + NEEDED status returns. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided targ_name is + of a type uninterpretable or unsupported by the applicable + underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so context establishment + cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided targ_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so context establishment cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token + or of a caller request specifying a mechanism unsupported by + the local system or with the caller's active credentials + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be + accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and + that no interface-defined recovery action is available. + + This routine is used by a context initiator, and ordinarily emits one + (or, for the case of a multi-step exchange, more than one) + output_token suitable for use by the target within the selected + mech_type's protocol. Using information in the credentials structure + referenced by claimant_cred_handle, GSS_Init_sec_context() + initializes the data structures required to establish a security + context with target targ_name. The targ_name may be any valid + INTERNAL NAME; it need not be an MN. The claimant_cred_handle must + correspond to the same valid credentials structure on the initial + call to GSS_Init_sec_context() and on any successor calls resulting + from GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; different protocol + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + sequences modeled by the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED facility will require + access to credentials at different points in the context + establishment sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Init_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. If successful (i.e., if accompanied by major_status + GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and only if successful, the + initial GSS_Init_sec_context() call returns a non-zero + output_context_handle for use in future references to this context. + Once a non-zero output_context_handle has been returned, GSS-API + callers should call GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context- + related resources if errors occur in later phases of context + establishment, or when an established context is no longer required. + + When continuation attempts to GSS_Init_sec_context() are needed to + perform context establishment, the previously-returned non-zero + handle value is entered into the input_context_handle argument and + will be echoed in the returned output_context_handle argument. On + such continuation attempts (and only on continuation attempts) the + input_token value is used, to provide the token returned from the + context's target. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The input_token argument contains a message received from the target, + and is significant only on a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() which + follows a previous return indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + It is the caller's responsibility to establish a communications path + to the target, and to transmit any returned output_token (independent + of the accompanying returned major_status value) to the target over + that path. The output_token can, however, be transmitted along with + the first application-provided input message to be processed by + GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() in conjunction with a successfully- + established context. + + The initiator may request various context-level functions through + input flags: the deleg_req_flag requests delegation of access rights, + the mutual_req_flag requests mutual authentication, the + replay_det_req_flag requests that replay detection features be + applied to messages transferred on the established context, and the + sequence_req_flag requests that sequencing be enforced. (See Section + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 1.2.3 for more information on replay detection and sequencing + features.) The anon_req_flag requests that the initiator's identity + not be transferred within tokens to be sent to the acceptor. + + Not all of the optionally-requestable features will be available in + all underlying mech_types. The corresponding return state values + deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, and sequence_state + indicate, as a function of mech_type processing capabilities and + initiator-provided input flags, the set of features which will be + active on the context. The returned trans_state value indicates + whether the context is transferable to other processes through use of + GSS_Export_sec_context(). These state indicators' values are + undefined unless either the routine's major_status indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE, or TRUE prot_ready_state is returned along with + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status; for the latter case, it is + possible that additional features, not confirmed or indicated along + with TRUE prot_ready_state, will be confirmed and indicated when + GSS_S_COMPLETE is subsequently returned. + + The returned anon_state and prot_ready_state values are significant + for both GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status + returns from GSS_Init_sec_context(). When anon_state is returned + TRUE, this indicates that neither the current token nor its + predecessors delivers or has delivered the initiator's identity. + Callers wishing to perform context establishment only if anonymity + support is provided should transfer a returned token from + GSS_Init_sec_context() to the peer only if it is accompanied by a + TRUE anon_state indicator. When prot_ready_state is returned TRUE in + conjunction with GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, this indicates + that per-message protection operations may be applied on the context: + see Section 1.2.7 for further discussion of this facility. + + Failure to provide the precise set of features requested by the + caller does not cause context establishment to fail; it is the + caller's prerogative to delete the context if the feature set + provided is unsuitable for the caller's use. + + The returned mech_type value indicates the specific mechanism + employed on the context, is valid only along with major_status + GSS_S_COMPLETE, and will never indicate the value for "default". + Note that, for the case of certain mechanisms which themselves + perform negotiation, the returned mech_type result may indicate + selection of a mechanism identified by an OID different than that + passed in the input mech_type argument. + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + input to GSS_Wrap() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap()) on + the established context. These state indicators' values are undefined + unless either the routine's major_status indicates GSS_S_COMPLETE, or + TRUE prot_ready_state is returned along with GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + The lifetime_req input specifies a desired upper bound for the + lifetime of the context to be established, with a value of 0 used to + request a default lifetime. The lifetime_rec return value indicates + the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as + an offset from the present; depending on mechanism capabilities, + credential lifetimes, and local policy, it may not correspond to the + value requested in lifetime_req. If no constraints on context + lifetime are imposed, this may be indicated by returning a reserved + value representing INDEFINITE lifetime_req. The value of lifetime_rec + is undefined unless the routine's major_status indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + If the mutual_state is TRUE, this fact will be reflected within the + output_token. A call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() at the target in + conjunction with such a context will return a token, to be processed + by a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), in order to + achieve mutual authentication. + +2.2.2: GSS_Accept_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o acceptor_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- NULL specifies + "use default" + + o input_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -- 0 specifies + "not yet assigned" + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o output_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 for discussion + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER, - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o delegated_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, + + o output_token OCTET STRING -NULL or token to pass to context + initiator + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which a directory service or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context acceptor in order to validate a + received input_token. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that context-level data structures + were successfully initialized, and that per-message processing + can now be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the initiator, and that + a response must be received and passed as the input_token + argument to a continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), + before per-message processing can be performed in conjunction + with this context. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the input_token failed, preventing further processing from + being performed based on that token. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + acceptor_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token contains + an incorrect integrity check, so context setup cannot be + accomplished. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the + received input_token was correct, but that the input_token + was recognized as a duplicate of an input_token already + processed. No new context is established. + + o GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token is too old + to be checked for duplication against previously-processed + input_tokens. No new context is established. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the + referenced credentials are valid for context initiator use + only, or because the caller lacks authorization to access the + referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input acceptor_cred_handle argument are no + longer valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the + caller-provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the + input_token was detected, signifying a security-relevant + event and preventing context establishment. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided; this major status will + be returned only for successor calls following GSS_S_CONTINUE_ + NEEDED status returns. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token + specifying a mechanism unsupported by the local system or with + the caller's active credentials. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be + accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and + that no interface-defined recovery action is available. + + The GSS_Accept_sec_context() routine is used by a context target. + Using information in the credentials structure referenced by the + input acceptor_cred_handle, it verifies the incoming input_token and + (following the successful completion of a context establishment + sequence) returns the authenticated src_name and the mech_type used. + The returned src_name is guaranteed to be an MN, processed by the + mechanism under which the context was established. The + acceptor_cred_handle must correspond to the same valid credentials + structure on the initial call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() and on any + successor calls resulting from GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; + different protocol sequences modeled by the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + mechanism will require access to credentials at different points in + the context establishment sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Accept_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. If successful (i.e., if accompanied by major_status + GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and only if successful, the + initial GSS_Accept_sec_context() call returns a non-zero + output_context_handle for use in future references to this context. + Once a non-zero output_context_handle has been returned, GSS-API + callers should call GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context- + related resources if errors occur in later phases of context + establishment, or when an established context is no longer required. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The returned state results (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, trans_state, and + prot_ready_state) reflect the same information as described for + GSS_Init_sec_context(), and their values are significant under the + same return state conditions. + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Wrap() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap()) + on the established context. These values are significant under the + same return state conditions as described under + GSS_Init_sec_context(). + + The lifetime_rec return value is significant only in conjunction with + GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status, and indicates the length of time for + which the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the + present. + + The mech_type return value indicates the specific mechanism employed + on the context, is valid only along with major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE, + and will never indicate the value for "default". + + The delegated_cred_handle result is significant only when deleg_state + is TRUE, and provides a means for the target to reference the + delegated credentials. The output_token result, when non-NULL, + provides a context-level token to be returned to the context + initiator to continue a multi-step context establishment sequence. As + noted with GSS_Init_sec_context(), any returned token should be + transferred to the context's peer (in this case, the context + initiator), independent of the value of the accompanying returned + major_status. + + Note: A target must be able to distinguish a context-level + input_token, which is passed to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), from the + per-message data elements passed to GSS_VerifyMIC() or GSS_Unwrap(). + These data elements may arrive in a single application message, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() must be performed before per-message + processing can be performed successfully. + +2.2.3: GSS_Delete_sec_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o output_context_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the context was recognized, and that + relevant context-specific information was flushed. If the caller + provides a non-null buffer to receive an output_context_token, and + the mechanism returns a non-NULL token into that buffer, the + returned output_context_token is ready for transfer to the + context's peer. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided, so no deletion was + performed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Delete_sec_context() operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call may block pending network interactions for mech_types in + which active notification must be made to a central server when a + security context is to be deleted. + + This call can be made by either peer in a security context, to flush + context-specific information. If a non-null output_context_token + parameter is provided by the caller, an output_context_token may be + returned to the caller. If an output_context_token is provided to + the caller, it can be passed to the context's peer to inform the + peer's GSS-API implementation that the peer's corresponding context + information can also be flushed. (Once a context is established, the + peers involved are expected to retain cached credential and context- + related information until the information's expiration time is + reached or until a GSS_Delete_sec_context() call is made.) + + The facility for context_token usage to signal context deletion is + retained for compatibility with GSS-API Version 1. For current + usage, it is recommended that both peers to a context invoke + GSS_Delete_sec_context() independently, passing a null + output_context_token buffer to indicate that no context_token is + required. Implementations of GSS_Delete_sec_context() should delete + relevant locally-stored context information. + + Attempts to perform per-message processing on a deleted context will + result in error returns. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.2.4: GSS_Process_context_token call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o input_context_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_context_token was + successfully processed in conjunction with the context + referenced by context_handle. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks + performed on the received context_token failed, preventing + further processing from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Process_context_token() operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to process context_tokens received from a peer once + a context has been established, with corresponding impact on + context-level state information. One use for this facility is + processing of the context_tokens generated by + GSS_Delete_sec_context(); GSS_Process_context_token() will not block + pending network interactions for that purpose. Another use is to + process tokens indicating remote-peer context establishment failures + after the point where the local GSS-API implementation has already + indicated GSS_S_COMPLETE status. + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.2.5: GSS_Context_time call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid, + and will remain valid for the amount of time indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that data items related to the + referenced context have expired. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to determine the amount of time for which a + currently established context will remain valid. + +2.2.6: GSS_Inquire_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context initiator, + -- guaranteed to be MN + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context target, + -- guaranteed to be MN + + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- the mechanism supporting this + security context + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o locally_initiated BOOLEAN, -- TRUE if initiator, FALSE if acceptor + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid + and that src_name, targ_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, deleg_state, + mutual_state, replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, + trans_state, prot_ready_state, conf_avail, integ_avail, and + locally_initiated return values describe the corresponding + characteristics of the context. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context + has expired. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call is used to extract information describing characteristics + of a security context. + +2.2.7: GSS_Wrap_size_limit call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o qop INTEGER, + + o output_size INTEGER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o max_input_size INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates a successful token size determination: + an input message with a length in octets equal to the + returned max_input_size value will, when passed to GSS_Wrap() + for processing on the context identified by the context_handle + parameter and with the quality of protection specifier provided + in the qop parameter, yield an output token no larger than the + value of the provided output_size parameter. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context + has expired. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call is used to determine the largest input datum which may be + passed to GSS_Wrap() without yielding an output token larger than a + caller-specified value. + +2.2.8: GSS_Export_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o interprocess_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context has been + successfully exported to a representation in the interprocess_token, + and is no longer available for use by the caller. + + o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context export facility + is not available for use on the referenced context. (This status + should occur only for contexts for which the trans_state value is + FALSE.) Return values other than major_status and minor_status are + undefined. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context has + expired. Return values other than major_status and minor_status are + undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call generates an interprocess token for transfer to another + process within an end system, in order to transfer control of a + security context to that process. The recipient of the interprocess + token will call GSS_Import_sec_context() to accept the transfer. The + GSS_Export_sec_context() operation is defined for use only with + security contexts which are fully and successfully established (i.e., + those for which GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() + have returned GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status). + + To ensure portability, a caller of GSS_Export_sec_context() must not + assume that a context may continue to be used once it has been + exported; following export, the context referenced by the + context_handle cannot be assumed to remain valid. Further, portable + callers must not assume that a given interprocess token can be + imported by GSS_Import_sec_context() more than once, thereby creating + multiple instantiations of a single context. GSS-API implementations + may detect and reject attempted multiple imports, but are not + required to do so. + + The internal representation contained within the interprocess token + is an implementation-defined local matter. Interprocess tokens + cannot be assumed to be transferable across different GSS-API + implementations. + + It is recommended that GSS-API implementations adopt policies suited + to their operational environments in order to define the set of + processes eligible to import a context, but specific constraints in + this area are local matters. Candidate examples include transfers + between processes operating on behalf of the same user identity, or + processes comprising a common job. However, it may be impossible to + enforce such policies in some implementations. + + In support of the above goals, implementations may protect the + transferred context data by using cryptography to protect data within + the interprocess token, or by using interprocess tokens as a means to + reference local interprocess communication facilities (protected by + other means) rather than storing the context data directly within the + tokens. + + Transfer of an open context may, for certain mechanisms and + implementations, reveal data about the credential which was used to + establish the context. Callers should, therefore, be cautious about + the trustworthiness of processes to which they transfer contexts. + Although the GSS-API implementation may provide its own set of + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 51] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + protections over the exported context, the caller is responsible for + protecting the interprocess token from disclosure, and for taking + care that the context is transferred to an appropriate destination + process. + +2.2.9: GSS_Import_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o interprocess_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the context represented by the + input interprocess_token has been successfully transferred to + the caller, and is available for future use via the output + context_handle. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the context represented by + the input interprocess_token has expired. Return values other + than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that the context represented by the + input interprocess_token was invalid. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that the input interprocess_token + was defective. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context import facility + is not available for use on the referenced context. Return values + other than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that the context represented by + the input interprocess_token is unauthorized for transfer to the + caller. Return values other than major_status and minor_status + are undefined. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 52] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call processes an interprocess token generated by + GSS_Export_sec_context(), making the transferred context available + for use by the caller. After a successful GSS_Import_sec_context() + operation, the imported context is available for use by the importing + process. + + For further discussion of the security and authorization issues + regarding this call, please see the discussion in Section 2.2.8. + +2.3: Per-message calls + + This group of calls is used to perform per-message protection + processing on an established security context. None of these calls + block pending network interactions. These calls may be invoked by a + context's initiator or by the context's target. The four members of + this group should be considered as two pairs; the output from + GSS_GetMIC() is properly input to GSS_VerifyMIC(), and the output + from GSS_Wrap() is properly input to GSS_Unwrap(). + + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() support data origin authentication + and data integrity services. When GSS_GetMIC() is invoked on an + input message, it yields a per-message token containing data items + which allow underlying mechanisms to provide the specified security + services. The original message, along with the generated per-message + token, is passed to the remote peer; these two data elements are + processed by GSS_VerifyMIC(), which validates the message in + conjunction with the separate token. + + GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap() support caller-requested confidentiality + in addition to the data origin authentication and data integrity + services offered by GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC(). GSS_Wrap() + outputs a single data element, encapsulating optionally enciphered + user data as well as associated token data items. The data element + output from GSS_Wrap() is passed to the remote peer and processed by + GSS_Unwrap() at that system. GSS_Unwrap() combines decipherment (as + required) with validation of data items related to authentication and + integrity. + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 53] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.3.1: GSS_GetMIC call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Sign call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Sign are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that an integrity check, suitable for an + established security context, was successfully applied and + that the message and corresponding per_msg_token are ready + for transmission. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the requested operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 54] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, apply an + integrity check to the input message (along with timestamps and/or + other data included in support of mech_type-specific mechanisms) and + return the result in per_msg_token. The qop_req parameter, + interpretation of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows + quality-of-protection control. The caller passes the message and the + per_msg_token to the target. + + The GSS_GetMIC() function completes before the message and + per_msg_token is sent to the peer; successful application of + GSS_GetMIC() does not guarantee that a corresponding GSS_VerifyMIC() + has been (or can necessarily be) performed successfully when the + message arrives at the destination. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.2: GSS_VerifyMIC call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Verify call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Verify are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o message OCTET STRING, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was successfully + verified. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 55] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the received per_msg_token failed, preventing + further processing from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that the received per_msg_token contains + an incorrect integrity check for the message. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, + and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN values appear in conjunction with the + optional per-message replay detection features described + in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are described in that section. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_VerifyMIC() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, verify that + the input per_msg_token contains an appropriate integrity check for + the input message, and apply any active replay detection or + sequencing features. Return an indication of the quality-of- + protection applied to the processed message in the qop_state result. + Since the GSS_VerifyMIC() routine never provides a confidentiality + service, its implementations should not return non-zero values in the + confidentiality fields of the output qop_state. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.3: GSS_Wrap call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Seal call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Seal are deprecated. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 56] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the output_message is ready for + transmission. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Wrap() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Performs the data origin authentication and data integrity functions + of GSS_GetMIC(). If the input conf_req_flag is TRUE, requests that + confidentiality be applied to the input_message. Confidentiality may + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 57] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + not be supported in all mech_types or by all implementations; the + returned conf_state flag indicates whether confidentiality was + provided for the input_message. The qop_req parameter, interpretation + of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows quality-of-protection + control. + + In all cases, the GSS_Wrap() call yields a single output_message + data element containing (optionally enciphered) user data as well as + control information. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.4: GSS_Unwrap call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Unseal call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Unseal are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was + successfully processed and that the resulting output_message is + available. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the per_msg_token extracted from the input_message + failed, preventing further processing from being performed. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 58] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that an incorrect integrity check was + detected + for the message. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, + and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN values appear in conjunction with the + optional per-message replay detection features described + in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are described in that section. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Unwrap() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Processes a data element generated (and optionally enciphered) by + GSS_Wrap(), provided as input_message. The returned conf_state value + indicates whether confidentiality was applied to the input_message. + If conf_state is TRUE, GSS_Unwrap() deciphers the input_message. + Returns an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the + processed message in the qop_state result. GSS_Wrap() performs the + data integrity and data origin authentication checking functions of + GSS_VerifyMIC() on the plaintext data. Plaintext data is returned in + output_message. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.4: Support calls + + This group of calls provides support functions useful to GSS-API + callers, independent of the state of established contexts. Their + characterization with regard to blocking or non-blocking status in + terms of network interactions is unspecified. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 59] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.4.1: GSS_Display_status call + + Inputs: + + o status_value INTEGER,-GSS-API major_status or minor_status + return value + + o status_type INTEGER,-1 if major_status, 2 if minor_status + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER-mech_type to be used for minor_ + status translation + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o status_string_set SET OF OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable status + representation (possibly representing more than one status event + encoded within the status_value) is available in the returned + status_string_set. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that translation in accordance with an + unsupported mech_type was requested, so translation could not + be performed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_STATUS indicates that the input status_value was + invalid, or that the input status_type carried a value other + than 1 or 2, so translation could not be performed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for callers to translate GSS-API-returned major and + minor status codes into printable string representations. + +2.4.2: GSS_Indicate_mechs call + + Input: + + o (none) + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 60] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a set of available mechanisms has + been returned in mech_set. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of mechanism types available on + the local system. This call is intended for support of specialized + callers who need to request non-default mech_type sets from + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and should not be needed by other callers. + +2.4.3: GSS_Compare_name call + + Inputs: + + o name1 INTERNAL NAME, + + o name2 INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_equal BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that name1 and name2 were comparable, + and that the name_equal result indicates whether name1 and + name2 represent the same entity. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that one or both of name1 and + name2 contained internal type specifiers uninterpretable + by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), or that + the two names' types are different and incomparable, so that + the comparison operation could not be completed. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 61] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that one or both of the input names + was ill-formed in terms of its internal type specifier, so + the comparison operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the call's operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to compare two internal name representations to + determine whether they refer to the same entity. If either name + presented to GSS_Compare_name() denotes an anonymous principal, + GSS_Compare_name() shall indicate FALSE. It is not required that + either or both inputs name1 and name2 be MNs; for some + implementations and cases, GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE may be returned, + indicating name incomparability, for the case where neither input + name is an MN. + +2.4.4: GSS_Display_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_string OCTET STRING, + + o name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable name + representation is available in the returned name_string. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided name was of a + type uninterpretable by the applicable underlying GSS-API + mechanism(s), so no printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the contents of the provided name + were inconsistent with the internally-indicated name type, so + no printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 62] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Allows callers to translate an internal name representation into a + printable form with associated namespace type descriptor. The syntax + of the printable form is a local matter. + + If the input name represents an anonymous identity, a reserved value + (GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS) shall be returned for name_type. + +2.4.5: GSS_Import_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name_string OCTET STRING, + + o input_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid name representation is + output in output_name and described by the type value in + output_name_type. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input_name_type is unsupported + by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the import + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided input_name_string + is ill-formed in terms of the input_name_type, so the import + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to provide a name representation as a contiguous octet + string, designate the type of namespace in conjunction with which it + should be parsed, and convert that representation to an internal form + suitable for input to other GSS-API routines. The syntax of the + input_name_string is defined in conjunction with its associated name + type; depending on the input_name_type, the associated + input_name_string may or may not be a printable string. Note: The + input_name_type argument serves to describe and qualify the + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 63] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + interpretation of the associated input_name_string; it does not + specify the data type of the returned output_name. + + If a mechanism claims support for a particular name type, its + GSS_Import_name() operation shall be able to accept all possible + values conformant to the external name syntax as defined for that + name type. These imported values may correspond to: + + (1) locally registered entities (for which credentials may be + acquired), + + (2) non-local entities (for which local credentials cannot be + acquired, but which may be referenced as targets of initiated + security contexts or initiators of accepted security contexts), or + to + + (3) neither of the above. + + Determination of whether a particular name belongs to class (1), (2), + or (3) as described above is not guaranteed to be performed by the + GSS_Import_name() function. + + The internal name generated by a GSS_Import_name() operation may be a + single-mechanism MN, and is likely to be an MN within a single- + mechanism implementation, but portable callers must not depend on + this property (and must not, therefore, assume that the output from + GSS_Import_name() can be passed directly to GSS_Export_name() without + first being processed through GSS_Canonicalize_name()). + +2.4.6: GSS_Release_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input name was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name argument did not + contain a valid name. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 64] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an internal + name representation. This call's specific behavior depends on the + language and programming environment within which a GSS-API + implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable + bindings specifications; in particular, this call may be superfluous + within bindings where memory management is automatic. + +2.4.7: GSS_Release_buffer call + + Inputs: + + o buffer OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input buffer was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an OCTET STRING + buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's specific + behavior depends on the language and programming environment within + which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed + within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, this call + may be superfluous within bindings where memory management is + automatic. + +2.4.8: GSS_Release_OID_set call + + Inputs: + + o buffer SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 65] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input object identifier set was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an object + identifier set object allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's + specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment + within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore + detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, + this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management + is automatic. + +2.4.9: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set call + + Inputs: + + o (none) + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Creates an object identifier set containing no object identifiers, to + which members may be subsequently added using the + GSS_Add_OID_set_member() routine. These routines are intended to be + used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to + GSS_Acquire_cred(). + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 66] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.4.10: GSS_Add_OID_set_member call + + Inputs: + + o member_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o oid_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Adds an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine + is intended for use in conjunction with GSS_Create_empty_OID_set() + when constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to + GSS_Acquire_cred(). + +2.4.11: GSS_Test_OID_set_member call + + Inputs: + + o member OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o present BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 67] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Interrogates an Object Identifier set to determine whether a + specified Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to + be used with OID sets returned by GSS_Indicate_mechs(), + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and GSS_Inquire_cred(). + +2.4.12: GSS_Release_OID call + + Inputs: + + o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Allows the caller to release the storage associated with an OBJECT + IDENTIFIER buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's + specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment + within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore + detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, + this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management + is automatic. + +2.4.13: GSS_OID_to_str call + + Inputs: + + o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid_str OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 68] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + The function GSS_OID_to_str() returns a string representing the input + OID in numeric ASN.1 syntax format (curly-brace enclosed, space- + delimited, e.g., "{2 16 840 1 113687 1 2 1}"). The string is + releasable using GSS_Release_buffer(). If the input "oid" does not + represent a syntactically valid object identifier, GSS_S_FAILURE + status is returned and the returned oid_str result is NULL. + +2.4.14: GSS_Str_to_OID call + + Inputs: + + o oid_str OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + The function GSS_Str_to_OID() constructs and returns an OID from its + printable form; implementations should be able to accept the numeric + ASN.1 syntax form as described for GSS_OID_to_str(), and this form + should be used for portability, but implementations of this routine + may also accept other formats (e.g., "1.2.3.3"). The OID is suitable + for release using the function GSS_Release_OID(). If the input + oid_str cannot be translated into an OID, GSS_S_FAILURE status is + returned and the "oid" result is NULL. + +2.4.15: GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech call + + Input: + + o input_mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- mechanism type + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 69] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_type_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the output name_type_set contains + a list of name types which are supported by the locally available + mechanism identified by input_mech_type. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the mechanism identified by + input_mech_type was unsupported within the local implementation, + causing the query to fail. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of name types which are + supportable by a specific locally-available mechanism. + +2.4.16: GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_types SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a set of object identifiers, + corresponding to the set of mechanisms suitable for processing + the input_name, is available in mech_types. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input_name could not be + processed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the type of the input_name + is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 70] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This routine returns the mechanism set with which the input_name may + be processed. After use, the mech_types object should be freed by + the caller via the GSS_Release_OID_set() call. Note: it is + anticipated that implementations of GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name() will + commonly operate based on type information describing the + capabilities of available mechanisms; it is not guaranteed that all + identified mechanisms will necessarily be able to canonicalize (via + GSS_Canonicalize_name()) a particular name. + +2.4.17: GSS_Canonicalize_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- must be explicit mechanism, + not "default" specifier + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a mechanism-specific reduction of + the input_name, as processed by the mechanism identified by + mech_type, is available in output_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the identified mechanism is + unsupported. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name does not + contain an element with suitable type for processing by the + identified mechanism. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name contains an + element with suitable type for processing by the identified + mechanism, but that this element could not be processed + successfully. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 71] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This routine reduces a GSS-API internal name, which may in general + contain elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, to a + mechanism-specific Mechanism Name (MN) by applying the translations + corresponding to the mechanism identified by mech_type. + +2.4.18: GSS_Export_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, -- required to be MN + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a flat representation of the + input name is available in output_name. + + o GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN indicates that the input name contained + elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, so cannot + be exported into a single-mechanism flat form. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name was an MN, + but could not be processed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name was an MN, + but that its type is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine creates a flat name representation, suitable for + bytewise comparison or for input to GSS_Import_name() in conjunction + with the reserved GSS-API Exported Name Object OID, from a internal- + form Mechanism Name (MN) as emitted, e.g., by GSS_Canonicalize_name() + or GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + + The emitted GSS-API Exported Name Object is self-describing; no + associated parameter-level OID need be emitted by this call. This + flat representation consists of a mechanism-independent wrapper + layer, defined in Section 3.2 of this document, enclosing a + mechanism-defined name representation. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 72] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + In all cases, the flat name output by GSS_Export_name() to correspond + to a particular input MN must be invariant over time within a + particular installation. + + The GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN status code is provided to enable + implementations to reject input names which are not MNs. It is not, + however, required for purposes of conformance to this specification + that all non-MN input names must necessarily be rejected. + +2.4.19: GSS_Duplicate_name call + + Inputs: + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o dest_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that dest_name references an internal + name object containing the same name as passed to src_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name was invalid. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name's type + is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine takes input internal name src_name, and returns another + reference (dest_name) to that name which can be used even if src_name + is later freed. (Note: This may be implemented by copying or through + use of reference counts.) + +3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage + + Subsections of this section define, for interoperability and + portability purposes, certain data structures for use with GSS-V2. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 73] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format + + This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating + representation for the initial token of a GSS-API context + establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the mechanism + type to be used on that context and enabling tokens to be interpreted + unambiguously at GSS-API peers. Use of this format is required for + initial context establishment tokens of Internet standards-track + GSS-API mechanisms; use in non-initial tokens is optional. + + The encoding format for the token tag is derived from ASN.1 and DER + (per illustrative ASN.1 syntax included later within this + subsection), but its concrete representation is defined directly in + terms of octets rather than at the ASN.1 level in order to facilitate + interoperable implementation without use of general ASN.1 processing + code. The token tag consists of the following elements, in order: + + 1. 0x60 -- Tag for [APPLICATION 0] SEQUENCE; indicates that + constructed form, definite length encoding follows. + + 2. Token length octets, specifying length of subsequent data + (i.e., the summed lengths of elements 3-5 in this list, and of the + mechanism-defined token object following the tag). This element + comprises a variable number of octets: + + 2a. If the indicated value is less than 128, it shall be + represented in a single octet with bit 8 (high order) set to "0" + and the remaining bits representing the value. + + 2b. If the indicated value is 128 or more, it shall be represented + in two or more octets, with bit 8 of the first octet set to "1" + and the remaining bits of the first octet specifying the number of + additional octets. The subsequent octets carry the value, 8 bits + per octet, most significant digit first. The minimum number of + octets shall be used to encode the length (i.e., no octets + representing leading zeros shall be included within the length + encoding). + + 3. 0x06 -- Tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + 4. Object identifier length -- length (number of octets) of the + encoded object identifier contained in element 5, encoded per + rules as described in 2a. and 2b. above. + + 5. Object identifier octets -- variable number of octets, encoded + per ASN.1 BER rules: + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 74] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 5a. The first octet contains the sum of two values: (1) the top- + level object identifier component, multiplied by 40 (decimal), and + (2) the second-level object identifier component. This special + case is the only point within an object identifier encoding where + a single octet represents contents of more than one component. + + 5b. Subsequent octets, if required, encode successively-lower + components in the represented object identifier. A component's + encoding may span multiple octets, encoding 7 bits per octet (most + significant bits first) and with bit 8 set to "1" on all but the + final octet in the component's encoding. The minimum number of + octets shall be used to encode each component (i.e., no octets + representing leading zeros shall be included within a component's + encoding). + + (Note: In many implementations, elements 3-5 may be stored and + referenced as a contiguous string constant.) + + The token tag is immediately followed by a mechanism-defined token + object. Note that no independent size specifier intervenes following + the object identifier value to indicate the size of the mechanism- + defined token object. While ASN.1 usage within mechanism-defined + tokens is permitted, there is no requirement that the mechanism- + specific innerContextToken, innerMsgToken, and sealedUserData data + elements must employ ASN.1 BER/DER encoding conventions. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 75] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The following ASN.1 syntax is included for descriptive purposes only, + to illustrate structural relationships among token and tag objects. + For interoperability purposes, token and tag encoding shall be + performed using the concrete encoding procedures described earlier in + this subsection. + + GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::= + + BEGIN + + MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- data structure definitions + + -- callers must be able to distinguish among + -- InitialContextToken, SubsequentContextToken, + -- PerMsgToken, and SealedMessage data elements + -- based on the usage in which they occur + + InitialContextToken ::= + -- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within + -- mechanism-specific token + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType, + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + -- contents mechanism-specific + -- ASN.1 structure not required + } + + SubsequentContextToken ::= innerContextToken ANY + -- interpretation based on predecessor InitialContextToken + -- ASN.1 structure not required + + PerMsgToken ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_GetMIC and processed by GSS_VerifyMIC + -- ASN.1 structure not required + innerMsgToken ANY + + SealedMessage ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Wrap and processed by GSS_Unwrap + -- includes internal, mechanism-defined indicator + -- of whether or not encrypted + -- ASN.1 structure not required + sealedUserData ANY + + END + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 76] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format + + This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating + representation for names exported via the GSS_Export_name() call, + including an object identifier representing the exporting mechanism. + The format of names encapsulated via this representation shall be + defined within individual mechanism drafts. Name objects of this + type will be identified with the following Object Identifier: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 4(gss-api-exported-name)} + + No name type OID is included in this mechanism-independent level of + format definition, since (depending on individual mechanism + specifications) the enclosed name may be implicitly typed or may be + explicitly typed using a means other than OID encoding. + + Length Name Description + + 2 TOK_ID Token Identifier + For exported name objects, this + must be hex 04 01. + 2 MECH_OID_LEN Length of the Mechanism OID + MECH_OID_LEN MECH_OID Mechanism OID, in DER + 4 NAME_LEN Length of name + NAME_LEN NAME Exported name; format defined in + applicable mechanism draft. + +4: Name Type Definitions + + This section includes definitions for name types and associated + syntaxes which are defined in a mechanism-independent fashion at the + GSS-API level rather than being defined in individual mechanism + specifications. + +4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form + + The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to + identify this name form: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 2(gss-host-based-services)} + + The recommended symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE". + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 77] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This name type is used to represent services associated with host + computers. This name form is constructed using two elements, + "service" and "hostname", as follows: + + service@hostname + + When a reference to a name of this type is resolved, the "hostname" + is canonicalized by attempting a DNS lookup and using the fully- + qualified domain name which is returned, or by using the "hostname" + as provided if the DNS lookup fails. The canonicalization operation + also maps the host's name into lower-case characters. + + The "hostname" element may be omitted. If no "@" separator is + included, the entire name is interpreted as the service specifier, + with the "hostname" defaulted to the canonicalized name of the local + host. + + Values for the "service" element are registered with the IANA. + +4.2: User Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended mechanism-independent + symbolic name for this type is "GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME". (Note: the same + name form and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism, but the symbolic name recommended there begins with a + "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a named user on a local system. + Its interpretation is OS-specific. This name form is constructed as: + + username + +4.3: Machine UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended mechanism- + independent symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". (Note: the same name form and OID is + defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the symbolic + name recommended there begins with a "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a numeric user identifier + corresponding to a user on a local system. Its interpretation is + OS-specific. The gss_buffer_desc representing a name of this type + should contain a locally-significant uid_t, represented in host byte + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 78] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + order. The GSS_Import_name() operation resolves this uid into a + username, which is then treated as the User Name Form. + +4.4: String UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". (Note: the same name form + and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the + symbolic name recommended there begins with a "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a string of digits representing + the numeric user identifier of a user on a local system. Its + interpretation is OS-specific. This name type is similar to the + Machine UID Form, except that the buffer contains a string + representing the uid_t. + +5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios + + This section provides illustrative overviews of the use of various + candidate mechanism types to support the GSS-API. These discussions + are intended primarily for readers familiar with specific security + technologies, demonstrating how GSS-API functions can be used and + implemented by candidate underlying mechanisms. They should not be + regarded as constrictive to implementations or as defining the only + means through which GSS-API functions can be realized with a + particular underlying technology, and do not demonstrate all GSS-API + features with each technology. + +5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT + + OS-specific login functions yield a TGT to the local realm Kerberos + server; TGT is placed in a credentials structure for the client. + Client calls GSS_Acquire_cred() to acquire a cred_handle in order to + reference the credentials for use in establishing security contexts. + + Client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(). If the requested service is + located in a different realm, GSS_Init_sec_context() gets the + necessary TGT/key pairs needed to traverse the path from local to + target realm; these data are placed in the owner's TGT cache. After + any needed remote realm resolution, GSS_Init_sec_context() yields a + service ticket to the requested service with a corresponding session + key; these data are stored in conjunction with the context. GSS-API + code sends KRB_TGS_REQ request(s) and receives KRB_TGS_REP + response(s) (in the successful case) or KRB_ERROR. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 79] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Assuming success, GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted + KRB_AP_REQ message, and returns it in output_token. The client sends + the output_token to the service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which verifies the authenticator, provides + the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns an + output_context_handle. + + Both parties now hold the session key associated with the service + ticket, and can use this key in subsequent GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Wrap(), and GSS_Unwrap() operations. + +5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT + + TGT acquisition as above. + + Note: To avoid unnecessary frequent invocations of error paths when + implementing the GSS-API atop Kerberos V5, it seems appropriate to + represent "single-TGT K-V5" and "double-TGT K-V5" with separate + mech_types, and this discussion makes that assumption. + + Based on the (specified or defaulted) mech_type, + GSS_Init_sec_context() determines that the double-TGT protocol + should be employed for the specified target. GSS_Init_sec_context() + returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, and its returned + output_token contains a request to the service for the service's TGT. + (If a service TGT with suitably long remaining lifetime already + exists in a cache, it may be usable, obviating the need for this + step.) The client passes the output_token to the service. Note: this + scenario illustrates a different use for the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status return facility than for support of mutual authentication; + note that both uses can coexist as successive operations within a + single context establishment operation. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which recognizes it as a request for TGT. + (Note that current Kerberos V5 defines no intra-protocol mechanism to + represent such a request.) GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status and provides the service's TGT in + its output_token. The service sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation of GSS_Init_sec_context(). GSS_Init_sec_context() caches + the received service TGT and uses it as part of a service ticket + request to the Kerberos authentication server, storing the returned + service ticket and session key in conjunction with the context. + GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted authenticator, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 80] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + and returns it in output_token along with GSS_S_COMPLETE return + major_status. The client sends the output_token to the service. + + Service passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + GSS_Accept_sec_context() verifies the authenticator, provides the + service with the client's authenticated name, and returns + major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + GSS_GetMIC(), GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Wrap(), and GSS_Unwrap() as + above. + +5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework + + This example illustrates use of the GSS-API in conjunction with + public-key mechanisms, consistent with the X.509 Directory + Authentication Framework. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call establishes a credentials structure, + making the client's private key accessible for use on behalf of the + client. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(), which interrogates the + Directory to acquire (and validate) a chain of public-key + certificates, thereby collecting the public key of the service. The + certificate validation operation determines that suitable integrity + checks were applied by trusted authorities and that those + certificates have not expired. GSS_Init_sec_context() generates a + secret key for use in per-message protection operations on the + context, and enciphers that secret key under the service's public + key. + + The enciphered secret key, along with an authenticator quantity + signed with the client's private key, is included in the output_token + from GSS_Init_sec_context(). The output_token also carries a + certification path, consisting of a certificate chain leading from + the service to the client; a variant approach would defer this path + resolution to be performed by the service instead of being asserted + by the client. The client application sends the output_token to the + service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context() validates the + certification path, and as a result determines a certified binding + between the client's distinguished name and the client's public key. + Given that public key, GSS_Accept_sec_context() can process the + input_token's authenticator quantity and verify that the client's + private key was used to sign the input_token. At this point, the + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 81] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + client is authenticated to the service. The service uses its private + key to decipher the enciphered secret key provided to it for per- + message protection operations on the context. + + The client calls GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() on a data message, which + causes per-message authentication, integrity, and (optional) + confidentiality facilities to be applied to that message. The service + uses the context's shared secret key to perform corresponding + GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap() calls. + +6: Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +7: Related Activities + + In order to implement the GSS-API atop existing, emerging, and future + security mechanisms: + + object identifiers must be assigned to candidate GSS-API + mechanisms and the name types which they support + + concrete data element formats and processing procedures must be + defined for candidate mechanisms + + Calling applications must implement formatting conventions which will + enable them to distinguish GSS-API tokens from other data carried in + their application protocols. + + Concrete language bindings are required for the programming + environments in which the GSS-API is to be employed, as RFC-1509 + defines for the C programming language and GSS-V1. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 82] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +APPENDIX A + +MECHANISM DESIGN CONSTRAINTS + + The following constraints on GSS-API mechanism designs are adopted in + response to observed caller protocol requirements, and adherence + thereto is anticipated in subsequent descriptions of GSS-API + mechanisms to be documented in standards-track Internet + specifications. + + It is strongly recommended that mechanisms offering per-message + protection services also offer at least one of the replay detection + and sequencing services, as mechanisms offering neither of the latter + will fail to satisfy recognized requirements of certain candidate + caller protocols. + +APPENDIX B + + COMPATIBILITY WITH GSS-V1 + + It is the intent of this document to define an interface and + procedures which preserve compatibility between GSS-V1 (RFC-1508) + callers and GSS- V2 providers. All calls defined in GSS-V1 are + preserved, and it has been a goal that GSS-V1 callers should be able + to operate atop GSS-V2 provider implementations. Certain detailed + changes, summarized in this section, have been made in order to + resolve omissions identified in GSS-V1. + + The following GSS-V1 constructs, while supported within GSS-V2, are + deprecated: + + Names for per-message processing routines: GSS_Seal() deprecated + in favor of GSS_Wrap(); GSS_Sign() deprecated in favor of + GSS_GetMIC(); GSS_Unseal() deprecated in favor of GSS_Unwrap(); + GSS_Verify() deprecated in favor of GSS_VerifyMIC(). + + GSS_Delete_sec_context() facility for context_token usage, + allowing mechanisms to signal context deletion, is retained for + compatibility with GSS-V1. For current usage, it is recommended + that both peers to a context invoke GSS_Delete_sec_context() + independently, passing a null output_context_token buffer to + indicate that no context_token is required. Implementations of + GSS_Delete_sec_context() should delete relevant locally-stored + context information. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 83] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This GSS-V2 specification adds the following calls which are not + present in GSS-V1: + + Credential management calls: GSS_Add_cred(), + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech(). + + Context-level calls: GSS_Inquire_context(), GSS_Wrap_size_limit(), + GSS_Export_sec_context(), GSS_Import_sec_context(). + + Per-message calls: No new calls. Existing calls have been renamed. + + Support calls: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set(), + GSS_Add_OID_set_member(), GSS_Test_OID_set_member(), + GSS_Release_OID(), GSS_OID_to_str(), GSS_Str_to_OID(), + GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech(), GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name(), + GSS_Canonicalize_name(), GSS_Export_name(), GSS_Duplicate_name(). + + This GSS-V2 specification introduces three new facilities applicable + to security contexts, indicated using the following context state + values which are not present in GSS-V1: + + anon_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context's initiator is + anonymous from the viewpoint of the target; Section 1.2.5 of this + specification provides a summary description of the GSS-V2 + anonymity support facility, support and use of which is optional. + + prot_ready_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context may be used + for per-message protection before final completion of context + establishment; Section 1.2.7 of this specification provides a + summary description of the GSS-V2 facility enabling mechanisms to + selectively permit per-message protection during context + establishment, support and use of which is optional. + + trans_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context is transferable to + another process using the GSS-V2 GSS_Export_sec_context() facility. + + These state values are represented (at the C bindings level) in + positions within a bit vector which are unused in GSS-V1, and may be + safely ignored by GSS-V1 callers. + + Relative to GSS-V1, GSS-V2 provides additional guidance to GSS-API + implementors in the following areas: implementation robustness, + credential management, behavior in multi-mechanism configurations, + naming support, and inclusion of optional sequencing services. The + token tagging facility as defined in GSS-V2, Section 3.1, is now + described directly in terms of octets to facilitate interoperable + implementation without general ASN.1 processing code; the + corresponding ASN.1 syntax, included for descriptive purposes, is + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 84] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + unchanged from that in GSS-V1. For use in conjunction with added + naming support facilities, a new Exported Name Object construct is + added. Additional name types are introduced in Section 4. + + This GSS-V2 specification adds the following major_status values + which are not defined in GSS-V1: + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP unsupported QOP value + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED operation unauthorized + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE operation unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT duplicate credential element requested + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN name contains multi-mechanism elements + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN skipped predecessor token(s) + detected + + Of these added status codes, only two values are defined to be + returnable by calls existing in GSS-V1: GSS_S_BAD_QOP (returnable by + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap()), and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN (returnable by + GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap()). + + Additionally, GSS-V2 descriptions of certain calls present in GSS-V1 + have been updated to allow return of additional major_status values + from the set as defined in GSS-V1: GSS_Inquire_cred() has + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL and GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED defined as + returnable, GSS_Init_sec_context() has GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, and GSS_S_BAD_MECH defined as returnable, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() has GSS_S_BAD_MECH defined as returnable. + +Author's Address + + John Linn + OpenVision Technologies + One Main St. + Cambridge, MA 02142 USA + + Phone: +1 617.374.2245 + EMail: John.Linn@ov.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 85] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f6a8a0d0f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1291 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Eisler +Request for Comments: 2203 A. Chiu +Category: Standards Track L. Ling + September 1997 + + + RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This memo describes an ONC/RPC security flavor that allows RPC + protocols to access the Generic Security Services Application + Programming Interface (referred to henceforth as GSS-API). + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 2. The ONC RPC Message Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 3. Flavor Number Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 4. New auth_stat Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 5. Elements of the RPCSEC_GSS Security Protocol . . . . . . . . . 3 + 5.1. Version Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.2. Context Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.2.1. Mechanism and QOP Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.2.2. Context Creation Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 5.2.3. Context Creation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 5.2.3.1. Context Creation Response - Successful Acceptance . . . 8 + 5.2.3.1.1. Client Processing of Successful Context Creation + Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 5.2.3.2. Context Creation Response - Unsuccessful Cases . . . . . 9 + 5.3. RPC Data Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.3.1. RPC Request Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.3.2. RPC Request Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.2.1. RPC Request Data - No Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.2.2. RPC Request Data - With Data Integrity . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.2.3. RPC Request Data - With Data Privacy . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.3. Server Processing of RPC Data Requests . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.3.1. Context Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.3.2. Server Reply - Request Accepted . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.3.3.3. Server Reply - Request Denied . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + 5.3.3.4. Mapping of GSS-API Errors to Server Responses . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.1. GSS_GetMIC() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.2. GSS_VerifyMIC() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.3. GSS_Unwrap() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.4. GSS_Wrap() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.4. Context Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 6. Set of GSS-API Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.1. Privacy of Call Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2. Sequence Number Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2.1. Sequence Numbers Above the Window . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2.2. Sequence Numbers Within or Below the Window . . . . . . 18 + 7.3. Message Stealing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + Appendix A. GSS-API Major Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + +1. Introduction + + This document describes the protocol used by the RPCSEC_GSS security + flavor. Security flavors have been called authentication flavors for + historical reasons. This memo recognizes that there are two other + security services besides authentication, integrity, and privacy, and + so defines a new RPCSEC_GSS security flavor. + + The protocol is described using the XDR language [Srinivasan-xdr]. + The reader is assumed to be familiar with ONC RPC and the security + flavor mechanism [Srinivasan-rpc]. The reader is also assumed to be + familiar with the GSS-API framework [Linn]. The RPCSEC_GSS security + flavor uses GSS-API interfaces to provide security services that are + independent of the underlying security mechanism. + +2. The ONC RPC Message Protocol + + This memo refers to the following XDR types of the ONC RPC protocol, + which are described in the document entitled Remote Procedure Call + Protocol Specification Version 2 [Srinivasan-rpc]: + + msg_type + reply_stat + auth_flavor + accept_stat + reject_stat + auth_stat + opaque_auth + rpc_msg + call_body + reply_body + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + accepted_reply + rejected_reply + +3. Flavor Number Assignment + + The RPCSEC_GSS security flavor has been assigned the value of 6: + + enum auth_flavor { + ... + RPCSEC_GSS = 6 /* RPCSEC_GSS security flavor */ + }; + +4. New auth_stat Values + + RPCSEC_GSS requires the addition of two new values to the auth_stat + enumerated type definition: + + enum auth_stat { + ... + /* + * RPCSEC_GSS errors + */ + RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM = 13, + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM = 14 + }; + + The descriptions of these two new values are defined later in this + memo. + +5. Elements of the RPCSEC_GSS Security Protocol + + An RPC session based on the RPCSEC_GSS security flavor consists of + three phases: context creation, RPC data exchange, and context + destruction. In the following discussion, protocol elements for + these three phases are described. + + The following description of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol uses some of the + definitions within XDR language description of the RPC protocol. + + Context creation and destruction use control messages that are not + dispatched to service procedures registered by an RPC server. The + program and version numbers used in these control messages are the + same as the RPC service's program and version numbers. The procedure + number used is NULLPROC (zero). A field in the credential + information (the gss_proc field which is defined in the + rpc_gss_cred_t structure below) specifies whether a message is to be + interpreted as a control message or a regular RPC message. If this + field is set to RPCSEC_GSS_DATA, no control action is implied; in + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + this case, it is a regular data message. If this field is set to any + other value, a control action is implied. This is described in the + following sections. + + Just as with normal RPC data exchange messages, the transaction + identifier (the xid field in struct rpc_msg), should be set to unique + values on each call for context creation and context destruction. + + The following definitions are used for describing the protocol. + + /* RPCSEC_GSS control procedures */ + + + enum rpc_gss_proc_t { + RPCSEC_GSS_DATA = 0, + RPCSEC_GSS_INIT = 1, + RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT = 2, + RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY = 3 + }; + + /* RPCSEC_GSS services */ + + enum rpc_gss_service_t { + /* Note: the enumerated value for 0 is reserved. */ + rpc_gss_svc_none = 1, + rpc_gss_svc_integrity = 2, + rpc_gss_svc_privacy = 3 + }; + + /* Credential */ + + /* + * Note: version 0 is reserved for possible future + * definition of a version negotiation protocol + * + */ + #define RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 1 + + struct rpc_gss_cred_t { + union switch (unsigned int version) { /* version of + RPCSEC_GSS */ + case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1: + struct { + rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc; /* control procedure */ + unsigned int seq_num; /* sequence number */ + rpc_gss_service_t service; /* service used */ + opaque handle<>; /* context handle */ + } rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t; + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + } + }; + + /* Maximum sequence number value */ + + #define MAXSEQ 0x80000000 + +5.1. Version Selection + + This document defines just one protocol version (RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1). + The client should assume that the server supports RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 + and issue a Context Creation message (as described in the section + RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1, the RPC response will have a reply_stat of + MSG_DENIED, a rejection status of AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of + AUTH_REJECTED_CRED. + +5.2. Context Creation + + Before RPC data is exchanged on a session using the RPCSEC_GSS + flavor, a context must be set up between the client and the server. + Context creation may involve zero or more RPC exchanges. The number + of exchanges depends on the security mechanism. + +5.2.1. Mechanism and QOP Selection + + There is no facility in the RPCSEC_GSS protocol to negotiate GSS-API + mechanism identifiers or QOP values. At minimum, it is expected that + implementations of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol provide a means to: + + * specify mechanism identifiers, QOP values, and RPCSEC_GSS + service values on the client side, and to + + * enforce mechanism identifiers, QOP values, and RPCSEC_GSS + service values on a per-request basis on the server side. + + It is necessary that above capabilities exist so that applications + have the means to conform the required set of required set of + tuples (See the section entitled Set of + GSS-API Mechanisms). An application may negotiate selection within its protocol or via an out of band + protocol. Hence it may be necessary for RPCSEC_GSS implementations to + provide programming interfaces for the specification and enforcement + of . + + Additionally, implementations may depend on negotiation schemes + constructed as pseudo-mechanisms under the GSS-API. Because such + schemes are below the GSS-API layer, the RPCSEC_GSS protocol, as + specified in this document, can make use of them. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.2.2. Context Creation Requests + + The first RPC request from the client to the server initiates context + creation. Within the RPC message protocol's call_body structure, + rpcvers is set to 2. prog and vers are always those for the service + being accessed. The proc is always set to NULLPROC (zero). + + Within the RPC message protocol's cred structure, flavor is set to + RPCSEC_GSS (6). The opaque data of the cred structure (the body + field) constituting the credential encodes the rpc_gss_cred_t + structure defined previously. + + The values of the fields contained in the rpc_gss_cred_t structure + are set as follows. The version field is set to the version of the + RPCSEC_GSS protocol the client wants to use. The remainder of this + memo documents version RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 of RPCSEC_GSS, and so the + version field would be set to RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1. The gss_proc field + must be set to RPCSEC_GSS_INIT for the first creation request. In + subsequent creation requests, the gss_proc field must be set to + RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT. In a creation request, the seq_num and + service fields are undefined and both must be ignored by the server. + In the first creation request, the handle field is NULL (opaque data + of zero length). In subsequent creation requests, handle must be + equal to the value returned by the server. The handle field serves + as the identifier for the context, and will not change for the + duration of the context, including responses to + RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT. + + The verifier field in the RPC message header is also described by the + opaque_auth structure. All creation requests have the NULL verifier + (AUTH_NONE flavor with zero length opaque data). + + Following the verifier are the call data (procedure specific + parameters). Note that the proc field of the call_body structure is + set to NULLPROC, and thus normally there would be zero octets + following the verifier. However, since there is no RPC data exchange + during a context creation, it is safe to transfer information + following the verifier. It is necessary to "overload" the call data + in this way, rather than pack the GSS-API token into the RPC header, + because RPC Version 2 restricts the amount of data that can be sent + in the header. The opaque body of the credential and verifier fields + can be each at most 400 octets long, and GSS tokens can be longer + than 800 octets. + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + The call data for a context creation request is described by the + following structure for all creation requests: + + struct rpc_gss_init_arg { + opaque gss_token<>; + }; + + Here, gss_token is the token returned by the call to GSS-API's + GSS_Init_sec_context() routine, opaquely encoded. The value of this + field will likely be different in each creation request, if there is + more than one creation request. If no token is returned by the call + to GSS_Init_sec_context(), the context must have been created + (assuming no errors), and there will not be any more creation + requests. + + When GSS_Init_sec_context() is called, the parameters + replay_det_req_flag and sequence_req_flag must be turned off. The + reasons for this are: + + * ONC RPC can be used over unreliable transports and provides no + layer to reliably re-assemble messages. Thus it is possible for + gaps in message sequencing to occur, as well as out of order + messages. + + * RPC servers can be multi-threaded, and thus the order in which + GSS-API messages are signed or wrapped can be different from the + order in which the messages are verified or unwrapped, even if + the requests are sent on reliable transports. + + * To maximize convenience of implementation, the order in which an + ONC RPC entity will verify the header and verify/unwrap the body + of an RPC call or reply is left unspecified. + + The RPCSEC_GSS protocol provides for protection from replay attack, + yet tolerates out-of-order delivery or processing of messages and + tolerates dropped requests. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.2.3. Context Creation Responses + +5.2.3.1. Context Creation Response - Successful Acceptance + + The response to a successful creation request has an MSG_ACCEPTED + response with a status of SUCCESS. The results field encodes a + response with the following structure: + + struct rpc_gss_init_res { + opaque handle<>; + unsigned int gss_major; + unsigned int gss_minor; + unsigned int seq_window; + opaque gss_token<>; + }; + + Here, handle is non-NULL opaque data that serves as the context + identifier. The client must use this value in all subsequent requests + whether control messages or otherwise). The gss_major and gss_minor + fields contain the results of the call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() + executed by the server. The values for the gss_major field are + defined in Appendix A of this document. The values for the gss_minor + field are GSS-API mechanism specific and are defined in the + mechanism's specification. If gss_major is not one of GSS_S_COMPLETE + or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context setup has failed; in this case + handle and gss_token must be set to NULL by the server. The value of + gss_minor is dependent on the value of gss_major and the security + mechanism used. The gss_token field contains any token returned by + the GSS_Accept_sec_context() call executed by the server. A token + may be returned for both successful values of gss_major. If the + value is GSS_S_COMPLETE, it indicates that the server is not + expecting any more tokens, and the RPC Data Exchange phase must begin + on the subsequent request from the client. If the value is + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the server is expecting another token. Hence + the client must send at least one more creation request (with + gss_proc set to RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT in the request's credential) + carrying the required token. + + In a successful response, the seq_window field is set to the sequence + window length supported by the server for this context. This window + specifies the maximum number of client requests that may be + outstanding for this context. The server will accept "seq_window" + requests at a time, and these may be out of order. The client may + use this number to determine the number of threads that can + simultaneously send requests on this context. + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + If gss_major is GSS_S_COMPLETE, the verifier's (the verf element in + the response) flavor field is set to RPCSEC_GSS, and the body field + set to the checksum of the seq_window (in network order). The QOP + used for this checksum is 0 (zero), which is the default QOP. For + all other values of gss_major, a NULL verifier (AUTH_NONE flavor with + zero-length opaque data) is used. + +5.2.3.1.1. Client Processing of Successful Context Creation Responses + + If the value of gss_major in the response is GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, + then the client, per the GSS-API specification, must invoke + GSS_Init_sec_context() using the token returned in gss_token in the + context creation response. The client must then generate a context + creation request, with gss_proc set to RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT. + + If the value of gss_major in the response is GSS_S_COMPLETE, and if + the client's previous invocation of GSS_Init_sec_context() returned a + gss_major value of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, then the client, per the + GSS-API specification, must invoke GSS_Init_sec_context() using the + token returned in gss_token in the context creation response. If + GSS_Init_sec_context() returns GSS_S_COMPLETE, the context is + successfully set up, and the RPC data exchange phase must begin on + the subsequent request from the client. + +5.2.3.2. Context Creation Response - Unsuccessful Cases + + An MSG_ACCEPTED reply (to a creation request) with an acceptance + status of other than SUCCESS has a NULL verifier (flavor set to + AUTH_NONE, and zero length opaque data in the body field), and is + formulated as usual for different status values. + + An MSG_DENIED reply (to a creation request) is also formulated as + usual. Note that MSG_DENIED could be returned because the server's + RPC implementation does not recognize the RPCSEC_GSS security flavor. + RFC 1831 does not specify the appropriate reply status in this + instance, but common implementation practice appears to be to return + a rejection status of AUTH_ERROR with an auth_stat of + AUTH_REJECTEDCRED. Even though two new values (RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM + and RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM) have been defined for the auth_stat type, + neither of these two can be returned in responses to context creation + requests. The auth_stat new values can be used for responses to + normal (data) requests. This is described later. + + MSG_DENIED might also be returned if the RPCSEC_GSS version number in + the credential is not supported on the server. In that case, the + server returns a rejection status of AUTH_ERROR, with an auth_stat of + + AUTH_REJECTED_CRED. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.3. RPC Data Exchange + + The data exchange phase is entered after a context has been + successfully set up. The format of the data exchanged depends on the + security service used for the request. Although clients can change + the security service and QOP used on a per-request basis, this may + not be acceptable to all RPC services; some RPC services may "lock" + the data exchange phase into using the QOP and service used on the + first data exchange message. For all three modes of service (no data + integrity, data integrity, data privacy), the RPC request header has + the same format. + +5.3.1. RPC Request Header + + The credential has the opaque_auth structure described earlier. The + flavor field is set to RPCSEC_GSS. The credential body is created by + XDR encoding the rpc_gss_cred_t structure listed earlier into an + octet stream, and then opaquely encoding this octet stream as the + body field. + + Values of the fields contained in the rpc_gss_cred_t structure are + set as follows. The version field is set to same version value that + was used to create the context, which within the scope of this memo + will always be RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1. The gss_proc field is set to + RPCSEC_GSS_DATA. The service field is set to indicate the desired + service (one of rpc_gss_svc_none, rpc_gss_svc_integrity, or + rpc_gss_svc_privacy). The handle field is set to the context handle + value received from the RPC server during context creation. The + seq_num field can start at any value below MAXSEQ, and must be + incremented (by one or more) for successive requests. Use of + sequence numbers is described in detail when server processing of the + request is discussed. + + The verifier has the opaque_auth structure described earlier. The + flavor field is set to RPCSEC_GSS. The body field is set as follows. + The checksum of the RPC header (up to and including the credential) + is computed using the GSS_GetMIC() call with the desired QOP. This + returns the checksum as an opaque octet stream and its length. This + is encoded into the body field. Note that the QOP is not explicitly + specified anywhere in the request. It is implicit in the checksum or + encrypted data. The same QOP value as is used for the header + checksum must also be used for the data (for checksumming or + encrypting), unless the service used for the request is + rpc_gss_svc_none. + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.3.2. RPC Request Data + +5.3.2.1. RPC Request Data - No Data Integrity + + If the service specified is rpc_gss_svc_none, the data (procedure + arguments) are not integrity or privacy protected. They are sent in + exactly the same way as they would be if the AUTH_NONE flavor were + used (following the verifier). Note, however, that since the RPC + header is integrity protected, the sender will still be authenticated + in this case. + +5.3.2.2. RPC Request Data - With Data Integrity + + When data integrity is used, the request data is represented as + follows: + + struct rpc_gss_integ_data { + opaque databody_integ<>; + opaque checksum<>; + }; + + The databody_integ field is created as follows. A structure + consisting of a sequence number followed by the procedure arguments + is constructed. This is shown below as the type rpc_gss_data_t: + + struct rpc_gss_data_t { + unsigned int seq_num; + proc_req_arg_t arg; + }; + + Here, seq_num must have the same value as in the credential. The + type proc_req_arg_t is the procedure specific XDR type describing the + procedure arguments (and so is not specified here). The octet stream + corresponding to the XDR encoded rpc_gss_data_t structure and its + length are placed in the databody_integ field. Note that because the + XDR type of databody_integ is opaque, the XDR encoding of + databody_integ will include an initial four octet length field, + followed by the XDR encoded octet stream of rpc_gss_data_t. + + The checksum field represents the checksum of the XDR encoded octet + stream corresponding to the XDR encoded rpc_gss_data_t structure + (note, this is not the checksum of the databody_integ field). This + is obtained using the GSS_GetMIC() call, with the same QOP as was + used to compute the header checksum (in the verifier). The + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + GSS_GetMIC() call returns the checksum as an opaque octet stream and + its length. The checksum field of struct rpc_gss_integ_data has an + XDR type of opaque. Thus the checksum length from GSS_GetMIC() is + encoded as a four octet length field, followed by the checksum, + padded to a multiple of four octets. + +5.3.2.3. RPC Request Data - With Data Privacy + + When data privacy is used, the request data is represented as + follows: + + struct rpc_gss_priv_data { + opaque databody_priv<> + }; + + The databody_priv field is created as follows. The rpc_gss_data_t + structure described earlier is constructed again in the same way as + for the case of data integrity. Next, the GSS_Wrap() call is invoked + to encrypt the octet stream corresponding to the rpc_gss_data_t + structure, using the same value for QOP (argument qop_req to + GSS_Wrap()) as was used for the header checksum (in the verifier) and + conf_req_flag (an argument to GSS_Wrap()) of TRUE. The GSS_Wrap() + call returns an opaque octet stream (representing the encrypted + rpc_gss_data_t structure) and its length, and this is encoded as the + databody_priv field. Since databody_priv has an XDR type of opaque, + the length returned by GSS_Wrap() is encoded as the four octet + length, followed by the encrypted octet stream (padded to a multiple + of four octets). + +5.3.3. Server Processing of RPC Data Requests + +5.3.3.1. Context Management + + When a request is received by the server, the following are verified + to be acceptable: + + * the version number in the credential + + * the service specified in the credential + + * the context handle specified in the credential + + * the header checksum in the verifier (via GSS_VerifyMIC()) + + * the sequence number (seq_num) specified in the credential (more + on this follows) + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + The gss_proc field in the credential must be set to RPCSEC_GSS_DATA + for data requests (otherwise, the message will be interpreted as a + control message). + + The server maintains a window of "seq_window" sequence numbers, + starting with the last sequence number seen and extending backwards. + If a sequence number higher than the last number seen is received + (AND if GSS_VerifyMIC() on the header checksum from the verifier + returns GSS_S_COMPLETE), the window is moved forward to the new + sequence number. If the last sequence number seen is N, the server + is prepared to receive requests with sequence numbers in the range N + through (N - seq_window + 1), both inclusive. If the sequence number + received falls below this range, it is silently discarded. If the + sequence number is within this range, and the server has not seen it, + the request is accepted, and the server turns on a bit to "remember" + that this sequence number has been seen. If the server determines + that it has already seen a sequence number within the window, the + request is silently discarded. The server should select a seq_window + value based on the number requests it expects to process + simultaneously. For example, in a threaded implementation seq_window + might be equal to the number of server threads. There are no known + security issues with selecting a large window. The primary issue is + how much space the server is willing to allocate to keep track of + requests received within the window. + + The reason for discarding requests silently is that the server is + unable to determine if the duplicate or out of range request was due + to a sequencing problem in the client, network, or the operating + system, or due to some quirk in routing, or a replay attack by an + intruder. Discarding the request allows the client to recover after + timing out, if indeed the duplication was unintentional or well + intended. Note that a consequence of the silent discard is that + clients may increment the seq_num by more than one. The effect of + this is that the window will move forward more quickly. It is not + believed that there is any benefit to doing this. + + Note that the sequence number algorithm requires that the client + increment the sequence number even if it is retrying a request with + the same RPC transaction identifier. It is not infrequent for + clients to get into a situation where they send two or more attempts + and a slow server sends the reply for the first attempt. With + RPCSEC_GSS, each request and reply will have a unique sequence + number. If the client wishes to improve turn around time on the RPC + call, it can cache the RPCSEC_GSS sequence number of each request it + sends. Then when it receives a response with a matching RPC + transaction identifier, it can compute the checksum of each sequence + number in the cache to try to match the checksum in the reply's + verifier. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + The data is decoded according to the service specified in the + credential. In the case of integrity or privacy, the server ensures + that the QOP value is acceptable, and that it is the same as that + used for the header checksum in the verifier. Also, in the case of + integrity or privacy, the server will reject the message (with a + reply status of MSG_ACCEPTED, and an acceptance status of + GARBAGE_ARGS) if the sequence number embedded in the request body is + different from the sequence number in the credential. + +5.3.3.2. Server Reply - Request Accepted + + An MSG_ACCEPTED reply to a request in the data exchange phase will + have the verifier's (the verf element in the response) flavor field + set to RPCSEC_GSS, and the body field set to the checksum (the output + of GSS_GetMIC()) of the sequence number (in network order) of the + corresponding request. The QOP used is the same as the QOP used for + the corresponding request. + + If the status of the reply is not SUCCESS, the rest of the message is + formatted as usual. + + If the status of the message is SUCCESS, the format of the rest of + the message depends on the service specified in the corresponding + request message. Basically, what follows the verifier in this case + are the procedure results, formatted in different ways depending on + the requested service. + + If no data integrity was requested, the procedure results are + formatted as for the AUTH_NONE security flavor. + + If data integrity was requested, the results are encoded in exactly + the same way as the procedure arguments were in the corresponding + request. See the section 'RPC Request Data - With Data Integrity.' + The only difference is that the structure representing the + procedure's result - proc_res_arg_t - must be substituted in place of + the request argument structure proc_req_arg_t. The QOP used for the + checksum must be the same as that used for constructing the reply + verifier. + + If data privacy was requested, the results are encoded in exactly the + same way as the procedure arguments were in the corresponding + request. See the section 'RPC Request Data - With Data Privacy.' The + QOP used for encryption must be the same as that used for + constructing the reply verifier. + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.3.3.3. Server Reply - Request Denied + + An MSG_DENIED reply (to a data request) is formulated as usual. Two + new values (RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM and RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM) have + been defined for the auth_stat type. When the reason for denial of + the request is a reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR, one of the two new + auth_stat values could be returned in addition to the existing + values. These two new values have special significance from the + existing reasons for denial of a request. + + The server maintains a list of contexts for the clients that are + currently in session with it. Normally, a context is destroyed when + the client ends the session corresponding to it. However, due to + resource constraints, the server may destroy a context prematurely + (on an LRU basis, or if the server machine is rebooted, for example). + In this case, when a client request comes in, there may not be a + context corresponding to its handle. The server rejects the request, + with the reason RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM in this case. Upon receiving + this error, the client must refresh the context - that is, + reestablish it after destroying the old one - and try the request + again. This error is also returned if the context handle matches + that of a different context that was allocated after the client's + context was destroyed (this will be detected by a failure in + verifying the header checksum). + + If the GSS_VerifyMIC() call on the header checksum (contained in the + verifier) fails to return GSS_S_COMPLETE, the server rejects the + request and returns an auth_stat of RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM. + + When the client's sequence number exceeds the maximum the server will + allow, the server will reject the request with the reason + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM. Also, if security credentials become stale + while in use (due to ticket expiry in the case of the Kerberos V5 + mechanism, for example), the failures which result cause the + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM reason to be returned. In these cases also, + the client must refresh the context, and retry the request. + + For other errors, retrying will not rectify the problem and the + client must not refresh the context until the problem causing the + client request to be denied is rectified. + + If the version field in the credential does not match the version of + RPCSEC_GSS that was used when the context was created, the + AUTH_BADCRED value is returned. + + If there is a problem with the credential, such a bad length, illegal + control procedure, or an illegal service, the appropriate auth_stat + status is AUTH_BADCRED. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + Other errors can be returned as appropriate. + +5.3.3.4. Mapping of GSS-API Errors to Server Responses + + During the data exchange phase, the server may invoke GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Unwrap(), and GSS_Wrap(). If any of these + routines fail to return GSS_S_COMPLETE, then various unsuccessful + responses can be returned. The are described as follows for each of + the aforementioned four interfaces. + +5.3.3.4.1. GSS_GetMIC() Failure + + When GSS_GetMIC() is called to generate the verifier in the response, + a failure results in an RPC response with a reply status of + MSG_DENIED, reject status of AUTH_ERROR and an auth status of + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM. + + When GSS_GetMIC() is called to sign the call results (service is + rpc_gss_svc_integrity), a failure results in no RPC response being + sent. Since ONC RPC server applications will typically control when a + response is sent, the failure indication will be returned to the + server application and it can take appropriate action (such as + logging the error). + +5.3.3.4.2. GSS_VerifyMIC() Failure + + When GSS_VerifyMIC() is called to verify the verifier in request, a + failure results in an RPC response with a reply status of MSG_DENIED, + reject status of AUTH_ERROR and an auth status of + RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM. + + When GSS_VerifyMIC() is called to verify the call arguments (service + is rpc_gss_svc_integrity), a failure results in an RPC response with + a reply status of MSG_ACCEPTED, and an acceptance status of + GARBAGE_ARGS. + +5.3.3.4.3. GSS_Unwrap() Failure + + When GSS_Unwrap() is called to decrypt the call arguments (service is + rpc_gss_svc_privacy), a failure results in an RPC response with a + reply status of MSG_ACCEPTED, and an acceptance status of + GARBAGE_ARGS. + +5.3.3.4.4. GSS_Wrap() Failure + + When GSS_Wrap() is called to encrypt the call results (service is + rpc_gss_svc_privacy), a failure results in no RPC response being + sent. Since ONC RPC server applications will typically control when a + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + response is sent, the failure indication will be returned to the + application and it can take appropriate action (such as logging the + error). + +5.4. Context Destruction + + When the client is done using the session, it must send a control + message informing the server that it no longer requires the context. + This message is formulated just like a data request packet, with the + following differences: the credential has gss_proc set to + RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY, the procedure specified in the header is + NULLPROC, and there are no procedure arguments. The sequence number + in the request must be valid, and the header checksum in the verifier + must be valid, for the server to accept the message. The server + sends a response as it would to a data request. The client and + server must then destroy the context for the session. + + If the request to destroy the context fails for some reason, the + client need not take any special action. The server must be prepared + to deal with situations where clients never inform the server that + they no longer are in session and so don't need the server to + maintain a context. An LRU mechanism or an aging mechanism should be + employed by the server to clean up in such cases. + +6. Set of GSS-API Mechanisms + + RPCSEC_GSS is effectively a "pass-through" to the GSS-API layer, and + as such it is inappropriate for the RPCSEC_GSS specification to + enumerate a minimum set of required security mechanisms and/or + quality of protections. + + If an application protocol specification references RPCSEC_GSS, the + protocol specification must list a mandatory set of { mechanism, QOP, + service } triples, such that an implementation cannot claim + conformance to the protocol specification unless it implements the + set of triples. Within each triple, mechanism is a GSS-API security + mechanism, QOP is a valid quality-of-protection within the mechanism, + and service is either rpc_gss_svc_integrity or rpc_gss_svc_privacy. + + For example, a network filing protocol built on RPC that depends on + RPCSEC_GSS for security, might require that Kerberos V5 with the + default QOP using the rpc_gss_svc_integrity service be supported by + implementations conforming to the network filing protocol + specification. + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +7. Security Considerations + +7.1. Privacy of Call Header + + The reader will note that for the privacy option, only the call + arguments and results are encrypted. Information about the + application in the form of RPC program number, program version + number, and program procedure number is transmitted in the clear. + Encrypting these fields in the RPC call header would have changed the + size and format of the call header. This would have required revising + the RPC protocol which was beyond the scope of this proposal. Storing + the encrypted numbers in the credential would have obviated a + protocol change, but would have introduced more overloading of fields + and would have made implementations of RPC more complex. Even if the + fields were encrypted somehow, in most cases an attacker can + determine the program number and version number by examining the + destination address of the request and querying the rpcbind service + on the destination host [Srinivasan-bind]. In any case, even by not + encrypting the three numbers, RPCSEC_GSS still improves the state of + security over what existing RPC services have had available + previously. Implementors of new RPC services that are concerned about + this risk may opt to design in a "sub-procedure" field that is + included in the service specific call arguments. + +7.2. Sequence Number Attacks + +7.2.1. Sequence Numbers Above the Window + + An attacker cannot coax the server into raising the sequence number + beyond the range the legitimate client is aware of (and thus engineer + a denial of server attack) without constructing an RPC request that + will pass the header checksum. If the cost of verifying the header + checksum is sufficiently large (depending on the speed of the + processor doing the checksum and the cost of checksum algorithm), it + is possible to envision a denial of service attack (vandalism, in the + form of wasting processing resources) whereby the attacker sends + requests that are above the window. The simplest method might be for + the attacker to monitor the network traffic and then choose a + sequence number that is far above the current sequence number. Then + the attacker can send bogus requests using the above window sequence + number. + +7.2.2. Sequence Numbers Within or Below the Window + + If the attacker sends requests that are within or below the window, + then even if the header checksum is successfully verified, the server + will silently discard the requests because the server assumes it has + already processed the request. In this case, a server can optimize by + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + skipping the header checksum verification if the sequence number is + below the window, or if it is within the window, not attempt the + checksum verification if the sequence number has already been seen. + +7.3. Message Stealing Attacks + + This proposal does not address attacks where an attacker can block or + steal messages without being detected by the server. To implement + such protection would be tantamount to assuming a state in the RPC + service. RPCSEC_GSS does not worsen this situation. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +Appendix A. GSS-API Major Status Codes + + The GSS-API definition [Linn] does not include numerical values for + the various GSS-API major status codes. It is expected that this will + be addressed in future RFC. Until then, this appendix defines the + values for each GSS-API major status code listed in the GSS-API + definition. If in the future, the GSS-API definition defines values + for the codes that are different than what follows, then implementors + of RPCSEC_GSS will be obliged to map them into the values defined + below. If in the future, the GSS-API definition defines additional + status codes not defined below, then the RPCSEC_GSS definition will + subsume those additional values. + + Here are the definitions of each GSS_S_* major status that the + implementor of RPCSEC_GSS can expect in the gss_major major field of + rpc_gss_init_res. These definitions are not in RPC description + language form. The numbers are in base 16 (hexadecimal): + + GSS_S_COMPLETE 0x00000000 + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED 0x00000001 + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN 0x00000002 + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 0x00000004 + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 0x00000008 + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN 0x00000010 + GSS_S_BAD_MECH 0x00010000 + GSS_S_BAD_NAME 0x00020000 + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 0x00030000 + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS 0x00040000 + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 0x00050000 + GSS_S_BAD_MIC 0x00060000 + GSS_S_BAD_SIG 0x00060000 + GSS_S_NO_CRED 0x00070000 + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 0x00080000 + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 0x00090000 + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 0x000a0000 + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 0x000b0000 + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 0x000c0000 + GSS_S_FAILURE 0x000d0000 + GSS_S_BAD_QOP 0x000e0000 + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED 0x000f0000 + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE 0x00100000 + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT 0x00110000 + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN 0x00120000 + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ 0x01000000 + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE 0x02000000 + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE 0x03000000 + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + Note that the GSS-API major status is split into three fields as + follows: + + Most Significant Bit Least Significant Bit + |------------------------------------------------------------| + | Calling Error | Routine Error | Supplementary Info | + |------------------------------------------------------------| + Bit 31 24 23 16 15 0 + + Up to one status in the Calling Error field can be logically ORed + with up to one status in the Routine Error field which in turn can be + logically ORed with zero or more statuses in the Supplementary Info + field. If the resulting major status has a non-zero Calling Error + and/or a non-zero Routine Error, then the applicable GSS-API + operation has failed. For purposes of RPCSEC_GSS, this means that + the GSS_Accept_sec_context() call executed by the server has failed. + + If the major status is equal GSS_S_COMPLETE, then this indicates the + absence of any Errors or Supplementary Info. + + The meanings of most of the GSS_S_* status are defined in the GSS-API + definition, which the exceptions of: + + GSS_S_BAD_MIC This code has the same meaning as GSS_S_BAD_SIG. + + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ + A required input parameter could not be read. + + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE + A required input parameter could not be written. + + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE + A parameter was malformed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +Acknowledgements + + Much of the protocol was based on the AUTH_GSSAPI security flavor + developed by Open Vision Technologies [Jaspan]. In particular, we + acknowledge Barry Jaspan, Marc Horowitz, John Linn, and Ellen + McDermott. + + Raj Srinivasan designed RPCSEC_GSS [Eisler] with input from Mike + Eisler. Raj, Roland Schemers, Lin Ling, and Alex Chiu contributed to + Sun Microsystems' implementation of RPCSEC_GSS. + + Brent Callaghan, Marc Horowitz, Barry Jaspan, John Linn, Hilarie + Orman, Martin Rex, Ted Ts'o, and John Wroclawski analyzed the + specification and gave valuable feedback. + + Steve Nahm and Kathy Slattery reviewed various drafts of this + specification. + + Much of content of Appendix A was excerpted from John Wray's Work in + Progress on GSS-API Version 2 C-bindings. + +References + + [Eisler] Eisler, M., Schemers, R., and Srinivasan, R. + (1996). "Security Mechanism Independence in ONC + RPC," Proceedings of the Sixth Annual USENIX + Security Symposium, pp. 51-65. + + [Jaspan] Jaspan, B. (1995). "GSS-API Security for ONC + RPC," `95 Proceedings of The Internet Society + Symposium on Network and Distributed System + Security, pp. 144- 151. + + [Linn] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application + Program Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January + 1997. + + [Srinivasan-bind] Srinivasan, R., "Binding Protocols for + ONC RPC Version 2", RFC 1833, August 1995. + + [Srinivasan-rpc] Srinivasan, R., "RPC: Remote Procedure Call + Protocol Specification Version 2", RFC 1831, + August 1995. + + [Srinivasan-xdr] Srinivasan, R., "XDR: External Data + Representation Standard", RFC 1832, August 1995. + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Michael Eisler + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + M/S UCOS03 + 2550 Garcia Avenue + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: +1 (719) 599-9026 + EMail: mre@eng.sun.com + + + Alex Chiu + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + M/S UMPK17-203 + 2550 Garcia Avenue + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: +1 (415) 786-6465 + EMail: hacker@eng.sun.com + + + Lin Ling + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + M/S UMPK17-201 + 2550 Garcia Avenue + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: +1 (415) 786-5084 + EMail: lling@eng.sun.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 23] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1fbfcbfa09 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1515 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz +Request for Comments: 2228 Cygnus Solutions +Updates: 959 S. Lunt +Category: Standards Track Bellcore + October 1997 + + FTP Security Extensions + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This document defines extensions to the FTP specification STD 9, RFC + 959, "FILE TRANSFER PROTOCOL (FTP)" (October 1985). These extensions + provide strong authentication, integrity, and confidentiality on both + the control and data channels with the introduction of new optional + commands, replies, and file transfer encodings. + + The following new optional commands are introduced in this + specification: + + AUTH (Authentication/Security Mechanism), + ADAT (Authentication/Security Data), + PROT (Data Channel Protection Level), + PBSZ (Protection Buffer Size), + CCC (Clear Command Channel), + MIC (Integrity Protected Command), + CONF (Confidentiality Protected Command), and + ENC (Privacy Protected Command). + + A new class of reply types (6yz) is also introduced for protected + replies. + + None of the above commands are required to be implemented, but + interdependencies exist. These dependencies are documented with the + commands. + + Note that this specification is compatible with STD 9, RFC 959. + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +1. Introduction + + The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in STD 9, RFC 959 + and in place on the Internet uses usernames and passwords passed in + cleartext to authenticate clients to servers (via the USER and PASS + commands). Except for services such as "anonymous" FTP archives, + this represents a security risk whereby passwords can be stolen + through monitoring of local and wide-area networks. This either aids + potential attackers through password exposure and/or limits + accessibility of files by FTP servers who cannot or will not accept + the inherent security risks. + + Aside from the problem of authenticating users in a secure manner, + there is also the problem of authenticating servers, protecting + sensitive data and/or verifying its integrity. An attacker may be + able to access valuable or sensitive data merely by monitoring a + network, or through active means may be able to delete or modify the + data being transferred so as to corrupt its integrity. An active + attacker may also initiate spurious file transfers to and from a site + of the attacker's choice, and may invoke other commands on the + server. FTP does not currently have any provision for the encryption + or verification of the authenticity of commands, replies, or + transferred data. Note that these security services have value even + to anonymous file access. + + Current practice for sending files securely is generally either: + + 1. via FTP of files pre-encrypted under keys which are manually + distributed, + + 2. via electronic mail containing an encoding of a file encrypted + under keys which are manually distributed, + + 3. via a PEM message, or + + 4. via the rcp command enhanced to use Kerberos. + + None of these means could be considered even a de facto standard, and + none are truly interactive. A need exists to securely transfer files + using FTP in a secure manner which is supported within the FTP + protocol in a consistent manner and which takes advantage of existing + security infrastructure and technology. Extensions are necessary to + the FTP specification if these security services are to be introduced + into the protocol in an interoperable way. + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + Although the FTP control connection follows the Telnet protocol, and + Telnet has defined an authentication and encryption option [TELNET- + SEC], [RFC-1123] explicitly forbids the use of Telnet option + negotiation over the control connection (other than Synch and IP). + + Also, the Telnet authentication and encryption option does not + provide for integrity protection only (without confidentiality), and + does not address the protection of the data channel. + +2. FTP Security Overview + + At the highest level, the FTP security extensions seek to provide an + abstract mechanism for authenticating and/or authorizing connections, + and integrity and/or confidentiality protecting commands, replies, + and data transfers. + + In the context of FTP security, authentication is the establishment + of a client's identity and/or a server's identity in a secure way, + usually using cryptographic techniques. The basic FTP protocol does + not have a concept of authentication. + + Authorization is the process of validating a user for login. The + basic authorization process involves the USER, PASS, and ACCT + commands. With the FTP security extensions, authentication + established using a security mechanism may also be used to make the + authorization decision. + + Without the security extensions, authentication of the client, as + this term is usually understood, never happens. FTP authorization is + accomplished with a password, passed on the network in the clear as + the argument to the PASS command. The possessor of this password is + assumed to be authorized to transfer files as the user named in the + USER command, but the identity of the client is never securely + established. + + An FTP security interaction begins with a client telling the server + what security mechanism it wants to use with the AUTH command. The + server will either accept this mechanism, reject this mechanism, or, + in the case of a server which does not implement the security + extensions, reject the command completely. The client may try + multiple security mechanisms until it requests one which the server + accepts. This allows a rudimentary form of negotiation to take + place. (If more complex negotiation is desired, this may be + implemented as a security mechanism.) The server's reply will + indicate if the client must respond with additional data for the + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + security mechanism to interpret. If none is needed, this will + usually mean that the mechanism is one where the password (specified + by the PASS command) is to be interpreted differently, such as with a + token or one-time password system. + + If the server requires additional security information, then the + client and server will enter into a security data exchange. The + client will send an ADAT command containing the first block of + security data. The server's reply will indicate if the data exchange + is complete, if there was an error, or if more data is needed. The + server's reply can optionally contain security data for the client to + interpret. If more data is needed, the client will send another ADAT + command containing the next block of data, and await the server's + reply. This exchange can continue as many times as necessary. Once + this exchange completes, the client and server have established a + security association. This security association may include + authentication (client, server, or mutual) and keying information for + integrity and/or confidentiality, depending on the mechanism in use. + + The term "security data" here is carefully chosen. The purpose of + the security data exchange is to establish a security association, + which might not actually include any authentication at all, between + the client and the server as described above. For instance, a + Diffie-Hellman exchange establishes a secret key, but no + authentication takes place. If an FTP server has an RSA key pair but + the client does not, then the client can authenticate the server, but + the server cannot authenticate the client. + + Once a security association is established, authentication which is a + part of this association may be used instead of or in addition to the + standard username/password exchange for authorizing a user to connect + to the server. A username specified by the USER command is always + required to specify the identity to be used on the server. + + In order to prevent an attacker from inserting or deleting commands + on the control stream, if the security association supports + integrity, then the server and client must use integrity protection + on the control stream, unless it first transmits a CCC command to + turn off this requirement. Integrity protection is performed with + the MIC and ENC commands, and the 63z reply codes. The CCC command + and its reply must be transmitted with integrity protection. + Commands and replies may be transmitted without integrity (that is, + in the clear or with confidentiality only) only if no security + association is established, the negotiated security association does + not support integrity, or the CCC command has succeeded. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + Once the client and server have negotiated with the PBSZ command an + acceptable buffer size for encapsulating protected data over the data + channel, the security mechanism may also be used to protect data + channel transfers. + + Policy is not specified by this document. In particular, client and + server implementations may choose to implement restrictions on what + operations can be performed depending on the security association + which exists. For example, a server may require that a client + authorize via a security mechanism rather than using a password, + require that the client provide a one-time password from a token, + require at least integrity protection on the command channel, or + require that certain files only be transmitted encrypted. An + anonymous ftp client might refuse to do file transfers without + integrity protection in order to insure the validity of files + downloaded. + + No particular set of functionality is required, except as + dependencies described in the next section. This means that none of + authentication, integrity, or confidentiality are required of an + implementation, although a mechanism which does none of these is not + of much use. For example, it is acceptable for a mechanism to + implement only integrity protection, one-way authentication and/or + encryption, encryption without any authentication or integrity + protection, or any other subset of functionality if policy or + technical considerations make this desirable. Of course, one peer + might require as a matter of policy stronger protection than the + other is able to provide, preventing perfect interoperability. + +3. New FTP Commands + + The following commands are optional, but dependent on each other. + They are extensions to the FTP Access Control Commands. + + The reply codes documented here are generally described as + recommended, rather than required. The intent is that reply codes + describing the full range of success and failure modes exist, but + that servers be allowed to limit information presented to the client. + For example, a server might implement a particular security + mechanism, but have a policy restriction against using it. The + server should respond with a 534 reply code in this case, but may + respond with a 504 reply code if it does not wish to divulge that the + disallowed mechanism is supported. If the server does choose to use + a different reply code than the recommended one, it should try to use + a reply code which only differs in the last digit. In all cases, the + server must use a reply code which is documented as returnable from + the command received, and this reply code must begin with the same + digit as the recommended reply code for the situation. + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + AUTHENTICATION/SECURITY MECHANISM (AUTH) + + The argument field is a Telnet string identifying a supported + mechanism. This string is case-insensitive. Values must be + registered with the IANA, except that values beginning with "X-" + are reserved for local use. + + If the server does not recognize the AUTH command, it must respond + with reply code 500. This is intended to encompass the large + deployed base of non-security-aware ftp servers, which will + respond with reply code 500 to any unrecognized command. If the + server does recognize the AUTH command but does not implement the + security extensions, it should respond with reply code 502. + + If the server does not understand the named security mechanism, it + should respond with reply code 504. + + If the server is not willing to accept the named security + mechanism, it should respond with reply code 534. + + If the server is not able to accept the named security mechanism, + such as if a required resource is unavailable, it should respond + with reply code 431. + + If the server is willing to accept the named security mechanism, + but requires security data, it must respond with reply code 334. + + If the server is willing to accept the named security mechanism, + and does not require any security data, it must respond with reply + code 234. + + If the server is responding with a 334 reply code, it may include + security data as described in the next section. + + Some servers will allow the AUTH command to be reissued in order + to establish new authentication. The AUTH command, if accepted, + removes any state associated with prior FTP Security commands. + The server must also require that the user reauthorize (that is, + reissue some or all of the USER, PASS, and ACCT commands) in this + case (see section 4 for an explanation of "authorize" in this + context). + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + AUTHENTICATION/SECURITY DATA (ADAT) + + The argument field is a Telnet string representing base 64 encoded + security data (see Section 9, "Base 64 Encoding"). If a reply + code indicating success is returned, the server may also use a + string of the form "ADAT=base64data" as the text part of the reply + if it wishes to convey security data back to the client. + + The data in both cases is specific to the security mechanism + specified by the previous AUTH command. The ADAT command, and the + associated replies, allow the client and server to conduct an + arbitrary security protocol. The security data exchange must + include enough information for both peers to be aware of which + optional features are available. For example, if the client does + not support data encryption, the server must be made aware of + this, so it will know not to send encrypted command channel + replies. It is strongly recommended that the security mechanism + provide sequencing on the command channel, to insure that commands + are not deleted, reordered, or replayed. + + The ADAT command must be preceded by a successful AUTH command, + and cannot be issued once a security data exchange completes + (successfully or unsuccessfully), unless it is preceded by an AUTH + command to reset the security state. + + If the server has not yet received an AUTH command, or if a prior + security data exchange completed, but the security state has not + been reset with an AUTH command, it should respond with reply code + 503. + + If the server cannot base 64 decode the argument, it should + respond with reply code 501. + + If the server rejects the security data (if a checksum fails, for + instance), it should respond with reply code 535. + + If the server accepts the security data, and requires additional + data, it should respond with reply code 335. + + If the server accepts the security data, but does not require any + additional data (i.e., the security data exchange has completed + successfully), it must respond with reply code 235. + + If the server is responding with a 235 or 335 reply code, then it + may include security data in the text part of the reply as + specified above. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + If the ADAT command returns an error, the security data exchange + will fail, and the client must reset its internal security state. + If the client becomes unsynchronized with the server (for example, + the server sends a 234 reply code to an AUTH command, but the + client has more data to transmit), then the client must reset the + server's security state. + + PROTECTION BUFFER SIZE (PBSZ) + + The argument is a decimal integer representing the maximum size, + in bytes, of the encoded data blocks to be sent or received during + file transfer. This number shall be no greater than can be + represented in a 32-bit unsigned integer. + + This command allows the FTP client and server to negotiate a + maximum protected buffer size for the connection. There is no + default size; the client must issue a PBSZ command before it can + issue the first PROT command. + + The PBSZ command must be preceded by a successful security data + exchange. + + If the server cannot parse the argument, or if it will not fit in + 32 bits, it should respond with a 501 reply code. + + If the server has not completed a security data exchange with the + client, it should respond with a 503 reply code. + + Otherwise, the server must reply with a 200 reply code. If the + size provided by the client is too large for the server, it must + use a string of the form "PBSZ=number" in the text part of the + reply to indicate a smaller buffer size. The client and the + server must use the smaller of the two buffer sizes if both buffer + sizes are specified. + + DATA CHANNEL PROTECTION LEVEL (PROT) + + The argument is a single Telnet character code specifying the data + channel protection level. + + This command indicates to the server what type of data channel + protection the client and server will be using. The following + codes are assigned: + + C - Clear + S - Safe + E - Confidential + P - Private + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + The default protection level if no other level is specified is + Clear. The Clear protection level indicates that the data channel + will carry the raw data of the file transfer, with no security + applied. The Safe protection level indicates that the data will + be integrity protected. The Confidential protection level + indicates that the data will be confidentiality protected. The + Private protection level indicates that the data will be integrity + and confidentiality protected. + + It is reasonable for a security mechanism not to provide all data + channel protection levels. It is also reasonable for a mechanism + to provide more protection at a level than is required (for + instance, a mechanism might provide Confidential protection, but + include integrity-protection in that encoding, due to API or other + considerations). + + The PROT command must be preceded by a successful protection + buffer size negotiation. + + If the server does not understand the specified protection level, + it should respond with reply code 504. + + If the current security mechanism does not support the specified + protection level, the server should respond with reply code 536. + + If the server has not completed a protection buffer size + negotiation with the client, it should respond with a 503 reply + code. + + The PROT command will be rejected and the server should reply 503 + if no previous PBSZ command was issued. + + If the server is not willing to accept the specified protection + level, it should respond with reply code 534. + + If the server is not able to accept the specified protection + level, such as if a required resource is unavailable, it should + respond with reply code 431. + + Otherwise, the server must reply with a 200 reply code to indicate + that the specified protection level is accepted. + + CLEAR COMMAND CHANNEL (CCC) + + This command does not take an argument. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + It is desirable in some environments to use a security mechanism + to authenticate and/or authorize the client and server, but not to + perform any integrity checking on the subsequent commands. This + might be used in an environment where IP security is in place, + insuring that the hosts are authenticated and that TCP streams + cannot be tampered, but where user authentication is desired. + + If unprotected commands are allowed on any connection, then an + attacker could insert a command on the control stream, and the + server would have no way to know that it was invalid. In order to + prevent such attacks, once a security data exchange completes + successfully, if the security mechanism supports integrity, then + integrity (via the MIC or ENC command, and 631 or 632 reply) must + be used, until the CCC command is issued to enable non-integrity + protected control channel messages. The CCC command itself must + be integrity protected. + + Once the CCC command completes successfully, if a command is not + protected, then the reply to that command must also not be + protected. This is to support interoperability with clients which + do not support protection once the CCC command has been issued. + + This command must be preceded by a successful security data + exchange. + + If the command is not integrity-protected, the server must respond + with a 533 reply code. + + If the server is not willing to turn off the integrity + requirement, it should respond with a 534 reply code. + + Otherwise, the server must reply with a 200 reply code to indicate + that unprotected commands and replies may now be used on the + command channel. + + INTEGRITY PROTECTED COMMAND (MIC) and + CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTED COMMAND (CONF) and + PRIVACY PROTECTED COMMAND (ENC) + + The argument field of MIC is a Telnet string consisting of a base + 64 encoded "safe" message produced by a security mechanism + specific message integrity procedure. The argument field of CONF + is a Telnet string consisting of a base 64 encoded "confidential" + message produced by a security mechanism specific confidentiality + procedure. The argument field of ENC is a Telnet string + consisting of a base 64 encoded "private" message produced by a + security mechanism specific message integrity and confidentiality + procedure. + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + The server will decode and/or verify the encoded message. + + This command must be preceded by a successful security data + exchange. + + A server may require that the first command after a successful + security data exchange be CCC, and not implement the protection + commands at all. In this case, the server should respond with a + 502 reply code. + + If the server cannot base 64 decode the argument, it should + respond with a 501 reply code. + + If the server has not completed a security data exchange with the + client, it should respond with a 503 reply code. + + If the server has completed a security data exchange with the + client using a mechanism which supports integrity, and requires a + CCC command due to policy or implementation limitations, it should + respond with a 503 reply code. + + If the server rejects the command because it is not supported by + the current security mechanism, the server should respond with + reply code 537. + + If the server rejects the command (if a checksum fails, for + instance), it should respond with reply code 535. + + If the server is not willing to accept the command (if privacy is + required by policy, for instance, or if a CONF command is received + before a CCC command), it should respond with reply code 533. + + Otherwise, the command will be interpreted as an FTP command. An + end-of-line code need not be included, but if one is included, it + must be a Telnet end-of-line code, not a local end-of-line code. + + The server may require that, under some or all circumstances, all + commands be protected. In this case, it should make a 533 reply + to commands other than MIC, CONF, and ENC. + +4. Login Authorization + + The security data exchange may, among other things, establish the + identity of the client in a secure way to the server. This identity + may be used as one input to the login authorization process. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + In response to the FTP login commands (AUTH, PASS, ACCT), the server + may choose to change the sequence of commands and replies specified + by RFC 959 as follows. There are also some new replies available. + + If the server is willing to allow the user named by the USER command + to log in based on the identity established by the security data + exchange, it should respond with reply code 232. + + If the security mechanism requires a challenge/response password, it + should respond to the USER command with reply code 336. The text + part of the reply should contain the challenge. The client must + display the challenge to the user before prompting for the password + in this case. This is particularly relevant to more sophisticated + clients or graphical user interfaces which provide dialog boxes or + other modal input. These clients should be careful not to prompt for + the password before the username has been sent to the server, in case + the user needs the challenge in the 336 reply to construct a valid + password. + +5. New FTP Replies + + The new reply codes are divided into two classes. The first class is + new replies made necessary by the new FTP Security commands. The + second class is a new reply type to indicate protected replies. + + 5.1. New individual reply codes + + 232 User logged in, authorized by security data exchange. + 234 Security data exchange complete. + 235 [ADAT=base64data] + ; This reply indicates that the security data exchange + ; completed successfully. The square brackets are not + ; to be included in the reply, but indicate that + ; security data in the reply is optional. + + 334 [ADAT=base64data] + ; This reply indicates that the requested security mechanism + ; is ok, and includes security data to be used by the client + ; to construct the next command. The square brackets are not + ; to be included in the reply, but indicate that + ; security data in the reply is optional. + 335 [ADAT=base64data] + ; This reply indicates that the security data is + ; acceptable, and more is required to complete the + ; security data exchange. The square brackets + ; are not to be included in the reply, but indicate + ; that security data in the reply is optional. + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + 336 Username okay, need password. Challenge is "...." + ; The exact representation of the challenge should be chosen + ; by the mechanism to be sensible to the human user of the + ; system. + + 431 Need some unavailable resource to process security. + + 533 Command protection level denied for policy reasons. + 534 Request denied for policy reasons. + 535 Failed security check (hash, sequence, etc). + 536 Requested PROT level not supported by mechanism. + 537 Command protection level not supported by security mechanism. + + 5.2. Protected replies. + + One new reply type is introduced: + + 6yz Protected reply + + There are three reply codes of this type. The first, reply + code 631 indicates an integrity protected reply. The + second, reply code 632, indicates a confidentiality and + integrity protected reply. the third, reply code 633, + indicates a confidentiality protected reply. + + The text part of a 631 reply is a Telnet string consisting + of a base 64 encoded "safe" message produced by a security + mechanism specific message integrity procedure. The text + part of a 632 reply is a Telnet string consisting of a base + 64 encoded "private" message produced by a security + mechanism specific message confidentiality and integrity + procedure. The text part of a 633 reply is a Telnet string + consisting of a base 64 encoded "confidential" message + produced by a security mechanism specific message + confidentiality procedure. + + The client will decode and verify the encoded reply. How + failures decoding or verifying replies are handled is + implementation-specific. An end-of-line code need not be + included, but if one is included, it must be a Telnet end- + of-line code, not a local end-of-line code. + + A protected reply may only be sent if a security data + exchange has succeeded. + + The 63z reply may be a multiline reply. In this case, the + plaintext reply must be broken up into a number of + fragments. Each fragment must be protected, then base 64 + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + encoded in order into a separate line of the multiline + reply. There need not be any correspondence between the + line breaks in the plaintext reply and the encoded reply. + Telnet end-of-line codes must appear in the plaintext of the + encoded reply, except for the final end-of-line code, which + is optional. + + The multiline reply must be formatted more strictly than the + continuation specification in RFC 959. In particular, each + line before the last must be formed by the reply code, + followed immediately by a hyphen, followed by a base 64 + encoded fragment of the reply. + + For example, if the plaintext reply is + + 123-First line + Second line + 234 A line beginning with numbers + 123 The last line + + then the resulting protected reply could be any of the + following (the first example has a line break only to fit + within the margins): + + 631 base64(protect("123-First line\r\nSecond line\r\n 234 A line + 631-base64(protect("123-First line\r\n")) + 631-base64(protect("Second line\r\n")) + 631-base64(protect(" 234 A line beginning with numbers\r\n")) + 631 base64(protect("123 The last line")) + + 631-base64(protect("123-First line\r\nSecond line\r\n 234 A line b")) + 631 base64(protect("eginning with numbers\r\n123 The last line\r\n")) + +6. Data Channel Encapsulation + + When data transfers are protected between the client and server (in + either direction), certain transformations and encapsulations must be + performed so that the recipient can properly decode the transmitted + file. + + The sender must apply all protection services after transformations + associated with the representation type, file structure, and transfer + mode have been performed. The data sent over the data channel is, + for the purposes of protection, to be treated as a byte stream. + + When performing a data transfer in an authenticated manner, the + authentication checks are performed on individual blocks of the file, + rather than on the file as a whole. Consequently, it is possible for + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + insertion attacks to insert blocks into the data stream (i.e., + replays) that authenticate correctly, but result in a corrupted file + being undetected by the receiver. To guard against such attacks, the + specific security mechanism employed should include mechanisms to + protect against such attacks. Many GSS-API mechanisms usable with + the specification in Appendix I, and the Kerberos mechanism in + Appendix II do so. + + The sender must take the input byte stream, and break it up into + blocks such that each block, when encoded using a security mechanism + specific procedure, will be no larger than the buffer size negotiated + by the client with the PBSZ command. Each block must be encoded, + then transmitted with the length of the encoded block prepended as a + four byte unsigned integer, most significant byte first. + + When the end of the file is reached, the sender must encode a block + of zero bytes, and send this final block to the recipient before + closing the data connection. + + The recipient will read the four byte length, read a block of data + that many bytes long, then decode and verify this block with a + security mechanism specific procedure. This must be repeated until a + block encoding a buffer of zero bytes is received. This indicates + the end of the encoded byte stream. + + Any transformations associated with the representation type, file + structure, and transfer mode are to be performed by the recipient on + the byte stream resulting from the above process. + + When using block transfer mode, the sender's (cleartext) buffer size + is independent of the block size. + + The server will reply 534 to a STOR, STOU, RETR, LIST, NLST, or APPE + command if the current protection level is not at the level dictated + by the server's security requirements for the particular file + transfer. + + If any data protection services fail at any time during data transfer + at the server end (including an attempt to send a buffer size greater + than the negotiated maximum), the server will send a 535 reply to the + data transfer command (either STOR, STOU, RETR, LIST, NLST, or APPE). + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +7. Potential policy considerations + + While there are no restrictions on client and server policy, there + are a few recommendations which an implementation should implement. + + - Once a security data exchange takes place, a server should require + all commands be protected (with integrity and/or confidentiality), + and it should protect all replies. Replies should use the same + level of protection as the command which produced them. This + includes replies which indicate failure of the MIC, CONF, and ENC + commands. In particular, it is not meaningful to require that + AUTH and ADAT be protected; it is meaningful and useful to require + that PROT and PBSZ be protected. In particular, the use of CCC is + not recommended, but is defined in the interest of + interoperability between implementations which might desire such + functionality. + + - A client should encrypt the PASS command whenever possible. It is + reasonable for the server to refuse to accept a non-encrypted PASS + command if the server knows encryption is available. + + - Although no security commands are required to be implemented, it + is recommended that an implementation provide all commands which + can be implemented, given the mechanisms supported and the policy + considerations of the site (export controls, for instance). + +8. Declarative specifications + + These sections are modelled after sections 5.3 and 5.4 of RFC 959, + which describe the same information, except for the standard FTP + commands and replies. + + 8.1. FTP Security commands and arguments + + AUTH + ADAT + PROT + PBSZ + MIC + CONF + ENC + + ::= + ::= + ; must be formatted as described in section 9 + ::= C | S | E | P + ::= any decimal integer from 1 to (2^32)-1 + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + 8.2. Command-Reply sequences + + Security Association Setup + AUTH + 234 + 334 + 502, 504, 534, 431 + 500, 501, 421 + ADAT + 235 + 335 + 503, 501, 535 + 500, 501, 421 + Data protection negotiation commands + PBSZ + 200 + 503 + 500, 501, 421, 530 + PROT + 200 + 504, 536, 503, 534, 431 + 500, 501, 421, 530 + Command channel protection commands + MIC + 535, 533 + 500, 501, 421 + CONF + 535, 533 + 500, 501, 421 + ENC + 535, 533 + 500, 501, 421 + Security-Enhanced login commands (only new replies listed) + USER + 232 + 336 + Data channel commands (only new replies listed) + STOR + 534, 535 + STOU + 534, 535 + RETR + 534, 535 + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + LIST + 534, 535 + NLST + 534, 535 + APPE + 534, 535 + + In addition to these reply codes, any security command can return + 500, 501, 502, 533, or 421. Any ftp command can return a reply + code encapsulated in a 631, 632, or 633 reply once a security data + exchange has completed successfully. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +9. State Diagrams + + This section includes a state diagram which demonstrates the flow of + authentication and authorization in a security enhanced FTP + implementation. The rectangular blocks show states where the client + must issue a command, and the diamond blocks show states where the + server must issue a response. + + + ,------------------, USER + __\| Unauthenticated |_________\ + | /| (new connection) | /| + | `------------------' | + | | | + | | AUTH | + | V | + | / \ | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 234 | + |<--------< >------------->. | + | \ / | | + | \_/ | | + | | | | + | | 334 | | + | V | | + | ,--------------------, | | + | | Need Security Data |<--. | | + | `--------------------' | | | + | | | | | + | | ADAT | | | + | V | | | + | / \ | | | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 335 | | | + `<--------< >-----------' | | + \ / | | + \_/ | | + | | | + | 235 | | + V | | + ,---------------. | | + ,--->| Authenticated |<--------' | After the client and server + | `---------------' | have completed authenti- + | | | cation, command must be + | | USER | integrity-protected if + | | | integrity is available. The + | |<-------------------' CCC command may be issued to + | V relax this restriction. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + | / \ + | 4yz,5yz / \ 2yz + |<--------< >------------->. + | \ / | + | \_/ | + | | | + | | 3yz | + | V | + | ,---------------. | + | | Need Password | | + | `---------------' | + | | | + | | PASS | + | V | + | / \ | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 2yz | + |<--------< >------------->| + | \ / | + | \_/ | + | | | + | | 3yz | + | V | + | ,--------------. | + | | Need Account | | + | `--------------' | + | | | + | | ACCT | + | V | + | / \ | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 2yz | + `<--------< >------------->| + \ / | + \_/ | + | | + | 3yz | + V | + ,-------------. | + | Authorized |/________| + | (Logged in) |\ + `-------------' + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +10. Base 64 Encoding + + Base 64 encoding is the same as the Printable Encoding described in + Section 4.3.2.4 of [RFC-1421], except that line breaks must not be + included. This encoding is defined as follows. + + Proceeding from left to right, the bit string resulting from the + mechanism specific protection routine is encoded into characters + which are universally representable at all sites, though not + necessarily with the same bit patterns (e.g., although the character + "E" is represented in an ASCII-based system as hexadecimal 45 and as + hexadecimal C5 in an EBCDIC-based system, the local significance of + the two representations is equivalent). + + A 64-character subset of International Alphabet IA5 is used, enabling + 6 bits to be represented per printable character. (The proposed + subset of characters is represented identically in IA5 and ASCII.) + The character "=" signifies a special processing function used for + padding within the printable encoding procedure. + + The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output + strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right + across a 24-bit input group output from the security mechanism + specific message protection procedure, each 6-bit group is used as an + index into an array of 64 printable characters, namely "[A-Z][a- + z][0-9]+/". The character referenced by the index is placed in the + output string. These characters are selected so as to be universally + representable, and the set excludes characters with particular + significance to Telnet (e.g., "", "", IAC). + + Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available + in an input group at the end of a message. A full encoding quantum + is always completed at the end of a message. When fewer than 24 + input bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on + the right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Output + character positions which are not required to represent actual input + data are set to the character "=". Since all canonically encoded + output is an integral number of octets, only the following cases can + arise: (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral + multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be + an integral multiple of 4 characters with no "=" padding, (2) the + final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits; here, the final + unit of encoded output will be two characters followed by two "=" + padding characters, or (3) the final quantum of encoding input is + exactly 16 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be three + characters followed by one "=" padding character. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + Implementors must keep in mind that the base 64 encodings in ADAT, + MIC, CONF, and ENC commands, and in 63z replies may be arbitrarily + long. Thus, the entire line must be read before it can be processed. + Several successive reads on the control channel may be necessary. It + is not appropriate to for a server to reject a command containing a + base 64 encoding simply because it is too long (assuming that the + decoding is otherwise well formed in the context in which it was + sent). + + Case must not be ignored when reading commands and replies containing + base 64 encodings. + +11. Security Considerations + + This entire document deals with security considerations related to + the File Transfer Protocol. + + Third party file transfers cannot be secured using these extensions, + since a security context cannot be established between two servers + using these facilities (no control connection exists between servers + over which to pass ADAT tokens). Further work in this area is + deferred. + +12. Acknowledgements + + I would like to thank the members of the CAT WG, as well as all + participants in discussions on the "cat-ietf@mit.edu" mailing list, + for their contributions to this document. I would especially like to + thank Sam Sjogren, John Linn, Ted Ts'o, Jordan Brown, Michael Kogut, + Derrick Brashear, John Gardiner Myers, Denis Pinkas, and Karri Balk + for their contributions to this work. Of course, without Steve Lunt, + the author of the first six revisions of this document, it would not + exist at all. + +13. References + + [TELNET-SEC] Borman, D., "Telnet Authentication and Encryption + Option", Work in Progress. + + [RFC-1123] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- + Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989. + + [RFC-1421] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic + Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures", + RFC 1421, February 1993. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +14. Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + EMail: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +Appendix I: Specification under the GSSAPI + + In order to maximise the utility of new security mechanisms, it is + desirable that new mechanisms be implemented as GSSAPI mechanisms + rather than as FTP security mechanisms. This will enable existing + ftp implementations to support the new mechanisms more easily, since + little or no code will need to be changed. In addition, the + mechanism will be usable by other protocols, such as IMAP, which are + built on top of the GSSAPI, with no additional specification or + implementation work needed by the mechanism designers. + + The security mechanism name (for the AUTH command) associated with + all mechanisms employing the GSSAPI is GSSAPI. If the server + supports a security mechanism employing the GSSAPI, it must respond + with a 334 reply code indicating that an ADAT command is expected + next. + + The client must begin the authentication exchange by calling + GSS_Init_Sec_Context, passing in 0 for input_context_handle + (initially), and a targ_name equal to output_name from + GSS_Import_Name called with input_name_type of Host-Based Service and + input_name_string of "ftp@hostname" where "hostname" is the fully + qualified host name of the server with all letters in lower case. + (Failing this, the client may try again using input_name_string of + "host@hostname".) The output_token must then be base 64 encoded and + sent to the server as the argument to an ADAT command. If + GSS_Init_Sec_Context returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, then the client + must expect a token to be returned in the reply to the ADAT command. + This token must subsequently be passed to another call to + GSS_Init_Sec_Context. In this case, if GSS_Init_Sec_Context returns + no output_token, then the reply code from the server for the previous + ADAT command must have been 235. If GSS_Init_Sec_Context returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE, then no further tokens are expected from the server, + and the client must consider the server authenticated. + + The server must base 64 decode the argument to the ADAT command and + pass the resultant token to GSS_Accept_Sec_Context as input_token, + setting acceptor_cred_handle to NULL (for "use default credentials"), + and 0 for input_context_handle (initially). If an output_token is + returned, it must be base 64 encoded and returned to the client by + including "ADAT=base64string" in the text of the reply. If + GSS_Accept_Sec_Context returns GSS_S_COMPLETE, the reply code must be + 235, and the server must consider the client authenticated. If + GSS_Accept_Sec_Context returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the reply code + must be 335. Otherwise, the reply code should be 535, and the text + of the reply should contain a descriptive error message. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + The chan_bindings input to GSS_Init_Sec_Context and + GSS_Accept_Sec_Context should use the client internet address and + server internet address as the initiator and acceptor addresses, + respectively. The address type for both should be GSS_C_AF_INET. No + application data should be specified. + + Since GSSAPI supports anonymous peers to security contexts, it is + possible that the client's authentication of the server does not + actually establish an identity. + + The procedure associated with MIC commands, 631 replies, and Safe + file transfers is: + + GSS_Wrap for the sender, with conf_flag == FALSE + + GSS_Unwrap for the receiver + + The procedure associated with ENC commands, 632 replies, and Private + file transfers is: + + GSS_Wrap for the sender, with conf_flag == TRUE + GSS_Unwrap for the receiver + + CONF commands and 633 replies are not supported. + + Both the client and server should inspect the value of conf_avail to + determine whether the peer supports confidentiality services. + + When the security state is reset (when AUTH is received a second + time, or when REIN is received), this should be done by calling the + GSS_Delete_sec_context function. + +Appendix II: Specification under Kerberos version 4 + + The security mechanism name (for the AUTH command) associated with + Kerberos Version 4 is KERBEROS_V4. If the server supports + KERBEROS_V4, it must respond with a 334 reply code indicating that an + ADAT command is expected next. + + The client must retrieve a ticket for the Kerberos principal + "ftp.hostname@realm" by calling krb_mk_req(3) with a principal name + of "ftp", an instance equal to the first part of the canonical host + name of the server with all letters in lower case (as returned by + krb_get_phost(3)), the server's realm name (as returned by + krb_realmofhost(3)), and an arbitrary checksum. The ticket must then + be base 64 encoded and sent as the argument to an ADAT command. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + If the "ftp" principal name is not a registered principal in the + Kerberos database, then the client may fall back on the "rcmd" + principal name (same instance and realm). However, servers must + accept only one or the other of these principal names, and must not + be willing to accept either. Generally, if the server has a key for + the "ftp" principal in its srvtab, then that principal only must be + used, otherwise the "rcmd" principal only must be used. + + The server must base 64 decode the argument to the ADAT command and + pass the result to krb_rd_req(3). The server must add one to the + checksum from the authenticator, convert the result to network byte + order (most significant byte first), and sign it using + krb_mk_safe(3), and base 64 encode the result. Upon success, the + server must reply to the client with a 235 code and include + "ADAT=base64string" in the text of the reply. Upon failure, the + server should reply 535. + + Upon receipt of the 235 reply from the server, the client must parse + the text of the reply for the base 64 encoded data, decode it, + convert it from network byte order, and pass the result to + krb_rd_safe(3). The client must consider the server authenticated if + the resultant checksum is equal to one plus the value previously + sent. + + The procedure associated with MIC commands, 631 replies, and Safe + file transfers is: + + krb_mk_safe(3) for the sender + krb_rd_safe(3) for the receiver + + The procedure associated with ENC commands, 632 replies, and Private + file transfers is: + + krb_mk_priv(3) for the sender + krb_rd_priv(3) for the receiver + + CONF commands and 633 replies are not supported. + + Note that this specification for KERBEROS_V4 contains no provision + for negotiating alternate means for integrity and confidentiality + routines. Note also that the ADAT exchange does not convey whether + the peer supports confidentiality services. + + In order to stay within the allowed PBSZ, implementors must take note + that a cleartext buffer will grow by 31 bytes when processed by + krb_mk_safe(3) and will grow by 26 bytes when processed by + krb_mk_priv(3). + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published + andand distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 27] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2743.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2743.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e5da571abb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2743.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5659 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 2743 RSA Laboratories +Obsoletes: 2078 January 2000 +Category: Standards Track + + + Generic Security Service Application Program Interface + Version 2, Update 1 + + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), + Version 2, as defined in [RFC-2078], provides security services to + callers in a generic fashion, supportable with a range of underlying + mechanisms and technologies and hence allowing source-level + portability of applications to different environments. This + specification defines GSS-API services and primitives at a level + independent of underlying mechanism and programming language + environment, and is to be complemented by other, related + specifications: + + documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular + language environments + + documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to be + implemented in order to realize GSS-API services atop particular + security mechanisms + + This memo obsoletes [RFC-2078], making specific, incremental changes + in response to implementation experience and liaison requests. It is + intended, therefore, that this memo or a successor version thereto + will become the basis for subsequent progression of the GSS-API + specification on the standards track. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + + 1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.1: GSS-API Constructs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 1.1.1: Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 1.1.1.2: Credential Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 1.1.2: Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 1.1.3: Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 1.1.4: Mechanism Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 1.1.5: Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 1.1.6: Channel Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 1.2.1: Status Reporting and Optional Service Support . . . . 17 + 1.2.1.1: Status Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 1.2.1.2: Optional Service Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability . . . . . . . 20 + 1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing . . . . . . 21 + 1.2.4: Quality of Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 1.2.5: Anonymity Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 1.2.6: Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment . . 26 + 1.2.8: Implementation Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 1.2.9: Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 1.2.10: Interprocess Context Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 2: Interface Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 2.1: Credential management calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 2.1.1: GSS_Acquire_cred call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 2.1.2: GSS_Release_cred call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 2.1.3: GSS_Inquire_cred call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 2.1.4: GSS_Add_cred call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 2.1.5: GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech call . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + 2.2: Context-level calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 2.2.1: GSS_Init_sec_context call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 2.2.2: GSS_Accept_sec_context call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 2.2.3: GSS_Delete_sec_context call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 2.2.4: GSS_Process_context_token call . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 2.2.5: GSS_Context_time call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 + 2.2.6: GSS_Inquire_context call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + 2.2.7: GSS_Wrap_size_limit call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 + 2.2.8: GSS_Export_sec_context call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 + 2.2.9: GSS_Import_sec_context call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 + 2.3: Per-message calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + 2.3.1: GSS_GetMIC call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 + 2.3.2: GSS_VerifyMIC call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 + 2.3.3: GSS_Wrap call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 + 2.3.4: GSS_Unwrap call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + 2.4: Support calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 + 2.4.1: GSS_Display_status call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 + 2.4.2: GSS_Indicate_mechs call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + 2.4.3: GSS_Compare_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 + 2.4.4: GSS_Display_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 + 2.4.5: GSS_Import_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 + 2.4.6: GSS_Release_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 + 2.4.7: GSS_Release_buffer call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 + 2.4.8: GSS_Release_OID_set call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 + 2.4.9: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set call . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + 2.4.10: GSS_Add_OID_set_member call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 + 2.4.11: GSS_Test_OID_set_member call . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 + 2.4.12: GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech call . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 + 2.4.13: GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 + 2.4.14: GSS_Canonicalize_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 + 2.4.15: GSS_Export_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 + 2.4.16: GSS_Duplicate_name call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 + 3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage . . . . . . . . 81 + 3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 + 3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format . . . . 84 + 4: Name Type Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 + 4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 + 4.2: User Name Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 + 4.3: Machine UID Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 + 4.4: String UID Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 + 4.5: Anonymous Nametype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 + 4.6: GSS_C_NO_OID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 + 4.7: Exported Name Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 + 4.8: GSS_C_NO_NAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 + 5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . 88 + 5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 + 5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 + 5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 + 6: Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 + 7: Related Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 + 8: Referenced Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 + Appendix A: Mechanism Design Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . 94 + Appendix B: Compatibility with GSS-V1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 + Appendix C: Changes Relative to RFC-2078 . . . . . . . . . . . 96 + Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100 + Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts + + GSS-API operates in the following paradigm. A typical GSS-API caller + is itself a communications protocol, calling on GSS-API in order to + protect its communications with authentication, integrity, and/or + confidentiality security services. A GSS-API caller accepts tokens + provided to it by its local GSS-API implementation and transfers the + tokens to a peer on a remote system; that peer passes the received + tokens to its local GSS-API implementation for processing. The + security services available through GSS-API in this fashion are + implementable (and have been implemented) over a range of underlying + mechanisms based on secret-key and public-key cryptographic + technologies. + + The GSS-API separates the operations of initializing a security + context between peers, achieving peer entity authentication + (GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls), from the + operations of providing per-message data origin authentication and + data integrity protection (GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() calls) + for messages subsequently transferred in conjunction with that + context. (The definition for the peer entity authentication service, + and other definitions used in this document, corresponds to that + provided in [ISO-7498-2].) When establishing a security context, the + GSS-API enables a context initiator to optionally permit its + credentials to be delegated, meaning that the context acceptor may + initiate further security contexts on behalf of the initiating + caller. Per-message GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap() calls provide the + data origin authentication and data integrity services which + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() offer, and also support selection of + confidentiality services as a caller option. Additional calls provide + supportive functions to the GSS-API's users. + + The following paragraphs provide an example illustrating the + dataflows involved in use of the GSS-API by a client and server in a + mechanism-independent fashion, establishing a security context and + transferring a protected message. The example assumes that credential + acquisition has already been completed. The example also assumes + that the underlying authentication technology is capable of + authenticating a client to a server using elements carried within a + single token, and of authenticating the server to the client (mutual + authentication) with a single returned token; this assumption holds + for some presently-documented CAT mechanisms but is not necessarily + true for other cryptographic technologies and associated protocols. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context() to establish a security + context to the server identified by targ_name, and elects to set the + mutual_req_flag so that mutual authentication is performed in the + course of context establishment. GSS_Init_sec_context() returns an + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + output_token to be passed to the server, and indicates + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status pending completion of the mutual + authentication sequence. Had mutual_req_flag not been set, the + initial call to GSS_Init_sec_context() would have returned + GSS_S_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_token to the + server. + + The server passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE status, provides the client's authenticated identity + in the src_name result, and provides an output_token to be passed to + the client. The server sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + a successor call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), which processes data + included in the token in order to achieve mutual authentication from + the client's viewpoint. This call to GSS_Init_sec_context() returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE status, indicating successful mutual authentication + and the completion of context establishment for this example. + + The client generates a data message and passes it to GSS_Wrap(). + GSS_Wrap() performs data origin authentication, data integrity, and + (optionally) confidentiality processing on the message and + encapsulates the result into output_message, indicating + GSS_S_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_message to the + server. + + The server passes the received message to GSS_Unwrap(). GSS_Unwrap() + inverts the encapsulation performed by GSS_Wrap(), deciphers the + message if the optional confidentiality feature was applied, and + validates the data origin authentication and data integrity checking + quantities. GSS_Unwrap() indicates successful validation by returning + GSS_S_COMPLETE status along with the resultant output_message. + + For purposes of this example, we assume that the server knows by + out-of-band means that this context will have no further use after + one protected message is transferred from client to server. Given + this premise, the server now calls GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush + context-level information. Optionally, the server-side application + may provide a token buffer to GSS_Delete_sec_context(), to receive a + context_token to be transferred to the client in order to request + that client-side context-level information be deleted. + + If a context_token is transferred, the client passes the + context_token to GSS_Process_context_token(), which returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE status after deleting context-level information at the + client system. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + The GSS-API design assumes and addresses several basic goals, + including: + + Mechanism independence: The GSS-API defines an interface to + cryptographically implemented strong authentication and other + security services at a generic level which is independent of + particular underlying mechanisms. For example, GSS-API-provided + services have been implemented using secret-key technologies + (e.g., Kerberos, per [RFC-1964]) and with public-key approaches + (e.g., SPKM, per [RFC-2025]). + + Protocol environment independence: The GSS-API is independent of + the communications protocol suites with which it is employed, + permitting use in a broad range of protocol environments. In + appropriate environments, an intermediate implementation "veneer" + which is oriented to a particular communication protocol may be + interposed between applications which call that protocol and the + GSS-API (e.g., as defined in [RFC-2203] for Open Network Computing + Remote Procedure Call (RPC)), thereby invoking GSS-API facilities + in conjunction with that protocol's communications invocations. + + Protocol association independence: The GSS-API's security context + construct is independent of communications protocol association + constructs. This characteristic allows a single GSS-API + implementation to be utilized by a variety of invoking protocol + modules on behalf of those modules' calling applications. GSS-API + services can also be invoked directly by applications, wholly + independent of protocol associations. + + Suitability to a range of implementation placements: GSS-API + clients are not constrained to reside within any Trusted Computing + Base (TCB) perimeter defined on a system where the GSS-API is + implemented; security services are specified in a manner suitable + to both intra-TCB and extra-TCB callers. + +1.1: GSS-API Constructs + + This section describes the basic elements comprising the GSS-API. + +1.1.1: Credentials + +1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts + + Credentials provide the prerequisites which permit GSS-API peers to + establish security contexts with each other. A caller may designate + that the credential elements which are to be applied for context + initiation or acceptance be selected by default. Alternately, those + GSS-API callers which need to make explicit selection of particular + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + credentials structures may make references to those credentials + through GSS-API-provided credential handles ("cred_handles"). In all + cases, callers' credential references are indirect, mediated by GSS- + API implementations and not requiring callers to access the selected + credential elements. + + A single credential structure may be used to initiate outbound + contexts and to accept inbound contexts. Callers needing to operate + in only one of these modes may designate this fact when credentials + are acquired for use, allowing underlying mechanisms to optimize + their processing and storage requirements. The credential elements + defined by a particular mechanism may contain multiple cryptographic + keys, e.g., to enable authentication and message encryption to be + performed with different algorithms. + + A GSS-API credential structure may contain multiple credential + elements, each containing mechanism-specific information for a + particular underlying mechanism (mech_type), but the set of elements + within a given credential structure represent a common entity. A + credential structure's contents will vary depending on the set of + mech_types supported by a particular GSS-API implementation. Each + credential element identifies the data needed by its mechanism in + order to establish contexts on behalf of a particular principal, and + may contain separate credential references for use in context + initiation and context acceptance. Multiple credential elements + within a given credential having overlapping combinations of + mechanism, usage mode, and validity period are not permitted. + + Commonly, a single mech_type will be used for all security contexts + established by a particular initiator to a particular target. A major + motivation for supporting credential sets representing multiple + mech_types is to allow initiators on systems which are equipped to + handle multiple types to initiate contexts to targets on other + systems which can accommodate only a subset of the set supported at + the initiator's system. + +1.1.1.2: Credential Management + + It is the responsibility of underlying system-specific mechanisms and + OS functions below the GSS-API to ensure that the ability to acquire + and use credentials associated with a given identity is constrained + to appropriate processes within a system. This responsibility should + be taken seriously by implementors, as the ability for an entity to + utilize a principal's credentials is equivalent to the entity's + ability to successfully assert that principal's identity. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Once a set of GSS-API credentials is established, the transferability + of that credentials set to other processes or analogous constructs + within a system is a local matter, not defined by the GSS-API. An + example local policy would be one in which any credentials received + as a result of login to a given user account, or of delegation of + rights to that account, are accessible by, or transferable to, + processes running under that account. + + The credential establishment process (particularly when performed on + behalf of users rather than server processes) is likely to require + access to passwords or other quantities which should be protected + locally and exposed for the shortest time possible. As a result, it + will often be appropriate for preliminary credential establishment to + be performed through local means at user login time, with the + result(s) cached for subsequent reference. These preliminary + credentials would be set aside (in a system-specific fashion) for + subsequent use, either: + + to be accessed by an invocation of the GSS-API GSS_Acquire_cred() + call, returning an explicit handle to reference that credential + + to comprise default credential elements to be installed, and to be + used when default credential behavior is requested on behalf of a + process + +1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution + + The GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() routines + allow the value GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to be specified as their + credential handle parameter. This special credential handle + indicates a desire by the application to act as a default principal. + In support of application portability, support for the default + resolution behavior described below for initiator credentials + (GSS_Init_sec_context() usage) is mandated; support for the default + resolution behavior described below for acceptor credentials + (GSS_Accept_sec_context() usage) is recommended. If default + credential resolution fails, GSS_S_NO_CRED status is to be returned. + + GSS_Init_sec_context: + + (i) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating + security contexts that the application is authorized to act on + behalf of, then that principal shall be used, otherwise + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + (ii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network- + identity, and if the application is authorized to act on behalf + of that identity for the purpose of initiating security + contexts, then the principal corresponding to that identity + shall be used, otherwise + + (iii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local + identity, and provides a means to map local identities into + network-identities, and if the application is authorized to act + on behalf of the network-identity image of the default local + identity for the purpose of initiating security contexts, then + the principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, + otherwise + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity should be used. + + GSS_Accept_sec_context: + + (i) If there is only a single authorized principal identity + capable of accepting security contexts, then that principal + shall be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target + principal by examining the context-establishment token, and if + the accepting application is authorized to act as that + principal for the purpose of accepting security contexts, then + that principal identity shall be used, otherwise + + (iii) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any + principal, and mutual authentication was not requested, any + principal that the application is authorized to accept security + contexts under may be used, otherwise + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity shall be used. + + The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be + established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior + wherever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are + likely to be more portable across mechanisms and platforms than those + that use GSS_Acquire_cred() to request a specific identity. + +1.1.2: Tokens + + Tokens are data elements transferred between GSS-API callers, and are + divided into two classes. Context-level tokens are exchanged in order + to establish and manage a security context between peers. Per-message + tokens relate to an established context and are exchanged to provide + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + protective security services (i.e., data origin authentication, + integrity, and optional confidentiality) for corresponding data + messages. + + The first context-level token obtained from GSS_Init_sec_context() is + required to indicate at its very beginning a globally-interpretable + mechanism identifier, i.e., an Object Identifier (OID) of the + security mechanism. The remaining part of this token as well as the + whole content of all other tokens are specific to the particular + underlying mechanism used to support the GSS-API. Section 3.1 of this + document provides, for designers of GSS-API mechanisms, the + description of the header of the first context-level token which is + then followed by mechanism-specific information. + + Tokens' contents are opaque from the viewpoint of GSS-API callers. + They are generated within the GSS-API implementation at an end + system, provided to a GSS-API caller to be transferred to the peer + GSS-API caller at a remote end system, and processed by the GSS-API + implementation at that remote end system. + + Context-level tokens may be output by GSS-API calls (and should be + transferred to GSS-API peers) whether or not the calls' status + indicators indicate successful completion. Per-message tokens, in + contrast, are to be returned only upon successful completion of per- + message calls. Zero-length tokens are never returned by GSS routines + for transfer to a peer. Token transfer may take place in an in-band + manner, integrated into the same protocol stream used by the GSS-API + callers for other data transfers, or in an out-of-band manner across + a logically separate channel. + + Different GSS-API tokens are used for different purposes (e.g., + context initiation, context acceptance, protected message data on an + established context), and it is the responsibility of a GSS-API + caller receiving tokens to distinguish their types, associate them + with corresponding security contexts, and pass them to appropriate + GSS-API processing routines. Depending on the caller protocol + environment, this distinction may be accomplished in several ways. + + The following examples illustrate means through which tokens' types + may be distinguished: + + - implicit tagging based on state information (e.g., all tokens on + a new association are considered to be context establishment + tokens until context establishment is completed, at which point + all tokens are considered to be wrapped data objects for that + context), + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + - explicit tagging at the caller protocol level, + + - a hybrid of these approaches. + + Commonly, the encapsulated data within a token includes internal + mechanism-specific tagging information, enabling mechanism-level + processing modules to distinguish tokens used within the mechanism + for different purposes. Such internal mechanism-level tagging is + recommended to mechanism designers, and enables mechanisms to + determine whether a caller has passed a particular token for + processing by an inappropriate GSS-API routine. + + Development of GSS-API mechanisms based on a particular underlying + cryptographic technique and protocol (i.e., conformant to a specific + GSS-API mechanism definition) does not necessarily imply that GSS-API + callers using that GSS-API mechanism will be able to interoperate + with peers invoking the same technique and protocol outside the GSS- + API paradigm, or with peers implementing a different GSS-API + mechanism based on the same underlying technology. The format of + GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a particular mechanism, + and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into callers' + protocols, may not be interoperable with the tokens used by non-GSS- + API callers of the same underlying technique. + +1.1.3: Security Contexts + + Security contexts are established between peers, using credentials + established locally in conjunction with each peer or received by + peers via delegation. Multiple contexts may exist simultaneously + between a pair of peers, using the same or different sets of + credentials. Coexistence of multiple contexts using different + credentials allows graceful rollover when credentials expire. + Distinction among multiple contexts based on the same credentials + serves applications by distinguishing different message streams in a + security sense. + + The GSS-API is independent of underlying protocols and addressing + structure, and depends on its callers to transport GSS-API-provided + data elements. As a result of these factors, it is a caller + responsibility to parse communicated messages, separating GSS-API- + related data elements from caller-provided data. The GSS-API is + independent of connection vs. connectionless orientation of the + underlying communications service. + + No correlation between security context and communications protocol + association is dictated. (The optional channel binding facility, + discussed in Section 1.1.6 of this document, represents an + intentional exception to this rule, supporting additional protection + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + features within GSS-API supporting mechanisms.) This separation + allows the GSS-API to be used in a wide range of communications + environments, and also simplifies the calling sequences of the + individual calls. In many cases (depending on underlying security + protocol, associated mechanism, and availability of cached + information), the state information required for context setup can be + sent concurrently with initial signed user data, without interposing + additional message exchanges. Messages may be protected and + transferred in both directions on an established GSS-API security + context concurrently; protection of messages in one direction does + not interfere with protection of messages in the reverse direction. + + GSS-API implementations are expected to retain inquirable context + data on a context until the context is released by a caller, even + after the context has expired, although underlying cryptographic data + elements may be deleted after expiration in order to limit their + exposure. + +1.1.4: Mechanism Types + + In order to successfully establish a security context with a target + peer, it is necessary to identify an appropriate underlying mechanism + type (mech_type) which both initiator and target peers support. The + definition of a mechanism embodies not only the use of a particular + cryptographic technology (or a hybrid or choice among alternative + cryptographic technologies), but also definition of the syntax and + semantics of data element exchanges which that mechanism will employ + in order to support security services. + + It is recommended that callers initiating contexts specify the + "default" mech_type value, allowing system-specific functions within + or invoked by the GSS-API implementation to select the appropriate + mech_type, but callers may direct that a particular mech_type be + employed when necessary. + + For GSS-API purposes, the phrase "negotiating mechanism" refers to a + mechanism which itself performs negotiation in order to select a + concrete mechanism which is shared between peers and is then used for + context establishment. Only those mechanisms which are defined in + their specifications as negotiating mechanisms are to yield selected + mechanisms with different identifier values than the value which is + input by a GSS-API caller, except for the case of a caller requesting + the "default" mech_type. + + The means for identifying a shared mech_type to establish a security + context with a peer will vary in different environments and + circumstances; examples include (but are not limited to): + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + use of a fixed mech_type, defined by configuration, within an + environment + + syntactic convention on a target-specific basis, through + examination of a target's name lookup of a target's name in a + naming service or other database in order to identify mech_types + supported by that target + + explicit negotiation between GSS-API callers in advance of + security context setup + + use of a negotiating mechanism + + When transferred between GSS-API peers, mech_type specifiers (per + Section 3 of this document, represented as Object Identifiers (OIDs)) + serve to qualify the interpretation of associated tokens. (The + structure and encoding of Object Identifiers is defined in [ISOIEC- + 8824] and [ISOIEC-8825].) Use of hierarchically structured OIDs + serves to preclude ambiguous interpretation of mech_type specifiers. + The OID representing the DASS ([RFC-1507]) MechType, for example, is + 1.3.12.2.1011.7.5, and that of the Kerberos V5 mechanism ([RFC- + 1964]), having been advanced to the level of Proposed Standard, is + 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2. + +1.1.5: Naming + + The GSS-API avoids prescribing naming structures, treating the names + which are transferred across the interface in order to initiate and + accept security contexts as opaque objects. This approach supports + the GSS-API's goal of implementability atop a range of underlying + security mechanisms, recognizing the fact that different mechanisms + process and authenticate names which are presented in different + forms. Generalized services offering translation functions among + arbitrary sets of naming environments are outside the scope of the + GSS-API; availability and use of local conversion functions to + translate among the naming formats supported within a given end + system is anticipated. + + Different classes of name representations are used in conjunction + with different GSS-API parameters: + + - Internal form (denoted in this document by INTERNAL NAME), + opaque to callers and defined by individual GSS-API + implementations. GSS-API implementations supporting multiple + namespace types must maintain internal tags to disambiguate the + interpretation of particular names. A Mechanism Name (MN) is a + special case of INTERNAL NAME, guaranteed to contain elements + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + corresponding to one and only one mechanism; calls which are + guaranteed to emit MNs or which require MNs as input are so + identified within this specification. + + - Contiguous string ("flat") form (denoted in this document by + OCTET STRING); accompanied by OID tags identifying the namespace + to which they correspond. Depending on tag value, flat names may + or may not be printable strings for direct acceptance from and + presentation to users. Tagging of flat names allows GSS-API + callers and underlying GSS-API mechanisms to disambiguate name + types and to determine whether an associated name's type is one + which they are capable of processing, avoiding aliasing problems + which could result from misinterpreting a name of one type as a + name of another type. + + - The GSS-API Exported Name Object, a special case of flat name + designated by a reserved OID value, carries a canonicalized form + of a name suitable for binary comparisons. + + In addition to providing means for names to be tagged with types, + this specification defines primitives to support a level of naming + environment independence for certain calling applications. To provide + basic services oriented towards the requirements of callers which + need not themselves interpret the internal syntax and semantics of + names, GSS-API calls for name comparison (GSS_Compare_name()), + human-readable display (GSS_Display_name()), input conversion + (GSS_Import_name()), internal name deallocation (GSS_Release_name()), + and internal name duplication (GSS_Duplicate_name()) functions are + defined. (It is anticipated that these proposed GSS-API calls will be + implemented in many end systems based on system-specific name + manipulation primitives already extant within those end systems; + inclusion within the GSS-API is intended to offer GSS-API callers a + portable means to perform specific operations, supportive of + authorization and audit requirements, on authenticated names.) + + GSS_Import_name() implementations can, where appropriate, support + more than one printable syntax corresponding to a given namespace + (e.g., alternative printable representations for X.500 Distinguished + Names), allowing flexibility for their callers to select among + alternative representations. GSS_Display_name() implementations + output a printable syntax selected as appropriate to their + operational environments; this selection is a local matter. Callers + desiring portability across alternative printable syntaxes should + refrain from implementing comparisons based on printable name forms + and should instead use the GSS_Compare_name() call to determine + whether or not one internal-format name matches another. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + When used in large access control lists, the overhead of invoking + GSS_Import_name() and GSS_Compare_name() on each name from the ACL + may be prohibitive. As an alternative way of supporting this case, + GSS-API defines a special form of the contiguous string name which + may be compared directly (e.g., with memcmp()). Contiguous names + suitable for comparison are generated by the GSS_Export_name() + routine, which requires an MN as input. Exported names may be re- + imported by the GSS_Import_name() routine, and the resulting internal + name will also be an MN. The symbolic constant GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME + identifies the "export name" type. Structurally, an exported name + object consists of a header containing an OID identifying the + mechanism that authenticated the name, and a trailer containing the + name itself, where the syntax of the trailer is defined by the + individual mechanism specification. The precise format of an + exported name is defined in Section 3.2 of this specification. + + Note that the results obtained by using GSS_Compare_name() will in + general be different from those obtained by invoking + GSS_Canonicalize_name() and GSS_Export_name(), and then comparing the + exported names. The first series of operations determines whether + two (unauthenticated) names identify the same principal; the second + whether a particular mechanism would authenticate them as the same + principal. These two operations will in general give the same + results only for MNs. + + The following diagram illustrates the intended dataflow among name- + related GSS-API processing routines. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS-API library defaults + | + | + V text, for + text --------------> internal_name (IN) -----------> display only + import_name() / display_name() + / + / + / + accept_sec_context() / + | / + | / + | / canonicalize_name() + | / + | / + | / + | / + | / + | | + V V <--------------------- + single mechanism import_name() exported name: flat + internal_name (MN) binary "blob" usable + ----------------------> for access control + export_name() + +1.1.6: Channel Bindings + + The GSS-API accommodates the concept of caller-provided channel + binding ("chan_binding") information. Channel bindings are used to + strengthen the quality with which peer entity authentication is + provided during context establishment, by limiting the scope within + which an intercepted context establishment token can be reused by an + attacker. Specifically, they enable GSS-API callers to bind the + establishment of a security context to relevant characteristics + (e.g., addresses, transformed representations of encryption keys) of + the underlying communications channel, of protection mechanisms + applied to that communications channel, and to application-specific + data. + + The caller initiating a security context must determine the + appropriate channel binding values to provide as input to the + GSS_Init_sec_context() call, and consistent values must be provided + to GSS_Accept_sec_context() by the context's target, in order for + both peers' GSS-API mechanisms to validate that received tokens + possess correct channel-related characteristics. Use or non-use of + the GSS-API channel binding facility is a caller option. GSS-API + mechanisms can operate in an environment where NULL channel bindings + are presented; mechanism implementors are encouraged, but not + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + required, to make use of caller-provided channel binding data within + their mechanisms. Callers should not assume that underlying + mechanisms provide confidentiality protection for channel binding + information. + + When non-NULL channel bindings are provided by callers, certain + mechanisms can offer enhanced security value by interpreting the + bindings' content (rather than simply representing those bindings, or + integrity check values computed on them, within tokens) and will + therefore depend on presentation of specific data in a defined + format. To this end, agreements among mechanism implementors are + defining conventional interpretations for the contents of channel + binding arguments, including address specifiers (with content + dependent on communications protocol environment) for context + initiators and acceptors. (These conventions are being incorporated + in GSS-API mechanism specifications and into the GSS-API C language + bindings specification.) In order for GSS-API callers to be portable + across multiple mechanisms and achieve the full security + functionality which each mechanism can provide, it is strongly + recommended that GSS-API callers provide channel bindings consistent + with these conventions and those of the networking environment in + which they operate. + +1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues + + This section describes aspects of GSS-API operations, of the security + services which the GSS-API provides, and provides commentary on + design issues. + +1.2.1: Status Reporting and Optional Service Support + +1.2.1.1: Status Reporting + + Each GSS-API call provides two status return values. Major_status + values provide a mechanism-independent indication of call status + (e.g., GSS_S_COMPLETE, GSS_S_FAILURE, GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), + sufficient to drive normal control flow within the caller in a + generic fashion. Table 1 summarizes the defined major_status return + codes in tabular fashion. + + Sequencing-related informatory major_status codes + (GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, and + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN) can be indicated in conjunction with either + GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_FAILURE status for GSS-API per-message calls. + For context establishment calls, these sequencing-related codes will + be indicated only in conjunction with GSS_S_FAILURE status (never in + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + conjunction with GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and, + therefore, always correspond to fatal failures if encountered during + the context establishment phase. + + Table 1: GSS-API Major Status Codes + + FATAL ERROR CODES + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS channel binding mismatch + GSS_S_BAD_MECH unsupported mechanism requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME invalid name provided + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE name of unsupported type provided + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS invalid input status selector + GSS_S_BAD_SIG token had invalid integrity check + GSS_S_BAD_MIC preferred alias for GSS_S_BAD_SIG + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED specified security context expired + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED expired credentials detected + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL defective credential detected + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN defective token detected + GSS_S_FAILURE failure, unspecified at GSS-API + level + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT no valid security context specified + GSS_S_NO_CRED no valid credentials provided + GSS_S_BAD_QOP unsupported QOP value + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED operation unauthorized + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE operation unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT duplicate credential element requested + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN name contains multi-mechanism elements + + INFORMATORY STATUS CODES + + GSS_S_COMPLETE normal completion + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED continuation call to routine + required + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN duplicate per-message token + detected + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN timed-out per-message token + detected + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN reordered (early) per-message token + detected + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN skipped predecessor token(s) + detected + + Minor_status provides more detailed status information which may + include status codes specific to the underlying security mechanism. + Minor_status values are not specified in this document. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status returns, and optional message + outputs, are provided in GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls so that different mechanisms' + employment of different numbers of messages within their + authentication sequences need not be reflected in separate code paths + within calling applications. Instead, such cases are accommodated + with sequences of continuation calls to GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The same facility is used to encapsulate + mutual authentication within the GSS-API's context initiation calls. + + For mech_types which require interactions with third-party servers in + order to establish a security context, GSS-API context establishment + calls may block pending completion of such third-party interactions. + On the other hand, no GSS-API calls pend on serialized interactions + with GSS-API peer entities. As a result, local GSS-API status + returns cannot reflect unpredictable or asynchronous exceptions + occurring at remote peers, and reflection of such status information + is a caller responsibility outside the GSS-API. + +1.2.1.2: Optional Service Support + + A context initiator may request various optional services at context + establishment time. Each of these services is requested by setting a + flag in the req_flags input parameter to GSS_Init_sec_context(). + + The optional services currently defined are: + + - Delegation - The (usually temporary) transfer of rights from + initiator to acceptor, enabling the acceptor to authenticate + itself as an agent of the initiator. + + - Mutual Authentication - In addition to the initiator + authenticating its identity to the context acceptor, the context + acceptor should also authenticate itself to the initiator. + + - Replay detection - In addition to providing message integrity + services, GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap() should include message + numbering information to enable GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap() + to detect if a message has been duplicated. + + - Out-of-sequence detection - In addition to providing message + integrity services, GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap() should include + message sequencing information to enable GSS_VerifyMIC() and + GSS_Unwrap() to detect if a message has been received out of + sequence. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + - Anonymous authentication - The establishment of the security + context should not reveal the initiator's identity to the context + acceptor. + + - Available per-message confidentiality - requests that per- + message confidentiality services be available on the context. + + - Available per-message integrity - requests that per-message + integrity services be available on the context. + + Any currently undefined bits within such flag arguments should be + ignored by GSS-API implementations when presented by an application, + and should be set to zero when returned to the application by the + GSS-API implementation. + + Some mechanisms may not support all optional services, and some + mechanisms may only support some services in conjunction with others. + Both GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() inform the + applications which services will be available from the context when + the establishment phase is complete, via the ret_flags output + parameter. In general, if the security mechanism is capable of + providing a requested service, it should do so, even if additional + services must be enabled in order to provide the requested service. + If the mechanism is incapable of providing a requested service, it + should proceed without the service, leaving the application to abort + the context establishment process if it considers the requested + service to be mandatory. + + Some mechanisms may specify that support for some services is + optional, and that implementors of the mechanism need not provide it. + This is most commonly true of the confidentiality service, often + because of legal restrictions on the use of data-encryption, but may + apply to any of the services. Such mechanisms are required to send + at least one token from acceptor to initiator during context + establishment when the initiator indicates a desire to use such a + service, so that the initiating GSS-API can correctly indicate + whether the service is supported by the acceptor's GSS-API. + +1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability + + When a context is established, two flags are returned to indicate the + set of per-message protection security services which will be + available on the context: + + the integ_avail flag indicates whether per-message integrity and + data origin authentication services are available + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + the conf_avail flag indicates whether per-message confidentiality + services are available, and will never be returned TRUE unless the + integ_avail flag is also returned TRUE + + GSS-API callers desiring per-message security services should check + the values of these flags at context establishment time, and must be + aware that a returned FALSE value for integ_avail means that + invocation of GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() primitives on the associated + context will apply no cryptographic protection to user data messages. + + The GSS-API per-message integrity and data origin authentication + services provide assurance to a receiving caller that protection was + applied to a message by the caller's peer on the security context, + corresponding to the entity named at context initiation. The GSS-API + per-message confidentiality service provides assurance to a sending + caller that the message's content is protected from access by + entities other than the context's named peer. + + The GSS-API per-message protection service primitives, as the + category name implies, are oriented to operation at the granularity + of protocol data units. They perform cryptographic operations on the + data units, transfer cryptographic control information in tokens, + and, in the case of GSS_Wrap(), encapsulate the protected data unit. + As such, these primitives are not oriented to efficient data + protection for stream-paradigm protocols (e.g., Telnet) if + cryptography must be applied on an octet-by-octet basis. + +1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing + + Certain underlying mech_types offer support for replay detection + and/or sequencing of messages transferred on the contexts they + support. These optionally-selectable protection features are distinct + from replay detection and sequencing features applied to the context + establishment operation itself; the presence or absence of context- + level replay or sequencing features is wholly a function of the + underlying mech_type's capabilities, and is not selected or omitted + as a caller option. + + The caller initiating a context provides flags (replay_det_req_flag + and sequence_req_flag) to specify whether the use of per-message + replay detection and sequencing features is desired on the context + being established. The GSS-API implementation at the initiator system + can determine whether these features are supported (and whether they + are optionally selectable) as a function of the selected mechanism, + without need for bilateral negotiation with the target. When enabled, + these features provide recipients with indicators as a result of + GSS-API processing of incoming messages, identifying whether those + messages were detected as duplicates or out-of-sequence. Detection of + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + such events does not prevent a suspect message from being provided to + a recipient; the appropriate course of action on a suspect message is + a matter of caller policy. + + The semantics of the replay detection and sequencing services applied + to received messages, as visible across the interface which the GSS- + API provides to its clients, are as follows: + + When replay_det_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_S_COMPLETE, without concurrent indication of + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN or GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, indicates that the + message was within the window (of time or sequence space) allowing + replay events to be detected, and that the message was not a + replay of a previously-processed message within that window. + + 2. GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic + checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that the + message was recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed + message. In addition to identifying duplicated tokens originated + by a context's peer, this status may also be used to identify + reflected copies of locally-generated tokens; it is recommended + that mechanism designers include within their protocols facilities + to detect and report such tokens. + + 3. GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on + the received message was correct, but that the message is too old + to be checked for duplication. + + When sequence_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_S_COMPLETE, without concurrent indication of + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, or + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN, indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window, and that no predecessor sequenced + messages are missing relative to the last received message (if + any) processed on the context with a correct cryptographic + checkvalue. + + 2. GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value + on the received message was correct, but that the message was + recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. In + addition to identifying duplicated tokens originated by a + context's peer, this status may also be used to identify reflected + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + copies of locally-generated tokens; it is recommended that + mechanism designers include within their protocols facilities to + detect and report such tokens. + + 3. GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value on the + received message was correct, but that the token is too old to be + checked for duplication. + + 4. GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue + on the received message was correct, but that it is earlier in a + sequenced stream than a message already processed on the context. + [Note: Mechanisms can be architected to provide a stricter form of + sequencing service, delivering particular messages to recipients + only after all predecessor messages in an ordered stream have been + delivered. This type of support is incompatible with the GSS-API + paradigm in which recipients receive all messages, whether in + order or not, and provide them (one at a time, without intra-GSS- + API message buffering) to GSS-API routines for validation. GSS- + API facilities provide supportive functions, aiding clients to + achieve strict message stream integrity in an efficient manner in + conjunction with sequencing provisions in communications + protocols, but the GSS-API does not offer this level of message + stream integrity service by itself.] + + 5. GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on + the received message was correct, but that one or more predecessor + sequenced messages have not been successfully processed relative + to the last received message (if any) processed on the context + with a correct cryptographic checkvalue. + + As the message stream integrity features (especially sequencing) may + interfere with certain applications' intended communications + paradigms, and since support for such features is likely to be + resource intensive, it is highly recommended that mech_types + supporting these features allow them to be activated selectively on + initiator request when a context is established. A context initiator + and target are provided with corresponding indicators + (replay_det_state and sequence_state), signifying whether these + features are active on a given context. + + An example mech_type supporting per-message replay detection could + (when replay_det_state is TRUE) implement the feature as follows: The + underlying mechanism would insert timestamps in data elements output + by GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(), and would maintain (within a time- + limited window) a cache (qualified by originator-recipient pair) + identifying received data elements processed by GSS_VerifyMIC() and + GSS_Unwrap(). When this feature is active, exception status returns + (GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN) will be provided when + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_VerifyMIC() or GSS_Unwrap() is presented with a message which is + either a detected duplicate of a prior message or which is too old to + validate against a cache of recently received messages. + +1.2.4: Quality of Protection + + Some mech_types provide their users with fine granularity control + over the means used to provide per-message protection, allowing + callers to trade off security processing overhead dynamically against + the protection requirements of particular messages. A per-message + quality-of-protection parameter (analogous to quality-of-service, or + QOS) selects among different QOP options supported by that mechanism. + On context establishment for a multi-QOP mech_type, context-level + data provides the prerequisite data for a range of protection + qualities. + + It is expected that the majority of callers will not wish to exert + explicit mechanism-specific QOP control and will therefore request + selection of a default QOP. Definitions of, and choices among, non- + default QOP values are mechanism-specific, and no ordered sequences + of QOP values can be assumed equivalent across different mechanisms. + Meaningful use of non-default QOP values demands that callers be + familiar with the QOP definitions of an underlying mechanism or + mechanisms, and is therefore a non-portable construct. The + GSS_S_BAD_QOP major_status value is defined in order to indicate that + a provided QOP value is unsupported for a security context, most + likely because that value is unrecognized by the underlying + mechanism. + + In the interests of interoperability, mechanisms which allow optional + support of particular QOP values shall satisfy one of the following + conditions. Either: + + (i) All implementations of the mechanism are required to be + capable of processing messages protected using any QOP value, + regardless of whether they can apply protection corresponding to + that QOP, or + + (ii) The set of mutually-supported receiver QOP values must be + determined during context establishment, and messages may be + protected by either peer using only QOP values from this + mutually-supported set. + + NOTE: (i) is just a special-case of (ii), where implementations are + required to support all QOP values on receipt. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +1.2.5: Anonymity Support + + In certain situations or environments, an application may wish to + authenticate a peer and/or protect communications using GSS-API per- + message services without revealing its own identity. For example, + consider an application which provides read access to a research + database, and which permits queries by arbitrary requestors. A + client of such a service might wish to authenticate the service, to + establish trust in the information received from it, but might not + wish to disclose its identity to the service for privacy reasons. + + In ordinary GSS-API usage, a context initiator's identity is made + available to the context acceptor as part of the context + establishment process. To provide for anonymity support, a facility + (input anon_req_flag to GSS_Init_sec_context()) is provided through + which context initiators may request that their identity not be + provided to the context acceptor. Mechanisms are not required to + honor this request, but a caller will be informed (via returned + anon_state indicator from GSS_Init_sec_context()) whether or not the + request is honored. Note that authentication as the anonymous + principal does not necessarily imply that credentials are not + required in order to establish a context. + + Section 4.5 of this document defines the Object Identifier value used + to identify an anonymous principal. + + Four possible combinations of anon_state and mutual_state are + possible, with the following results: + + anon_state == FALSE, mutual_state == FALSE: initiator + authenticated to target. + + anon_state == FALSE, mutual_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated + to target, target authenticated to initiator. + + anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == FALSE: initiator authenticated + as anonymous principal to target. + + anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated + as anonymous principal to target, target authenticated to + initiator. + +1.2.6: Initialization + + No initialization calls (i.e., calls which must be invoked prior to + invocation of other facilities in the interface) are defined in GSS- + API. As an implication of this fact, GSS-API implementations must + themselves be self-initializing. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment + + A facility is defined in GSS-V2 to enable protection and buffering of + data messages for later transfer while a security context's + establishment is in GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status, to be used in cases + where the caller side already possesses the necessary session key to + enable this processing. Specifically, a new state Boolean, called + prot_ready_state, is added to the set of information returned by + GSS_Init_sec_context(), GSS_Accept_sec_context(), and + GSS_Inquire_context(). + + For context establishment calls, this state Boolean is valid and + interpretable when the associated major_status is either + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, or GSS_S_COMPLETE. Callers of GSS-API (both + initiators and acceptors) can assume that per-message protection (via + GSS_Wrap(), GSS_Unwrap(), GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC()) is + available and ready for use if either: prot_ready_state == TRUE, or + major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE, though mutual authentication (if + requested) cannot be guaranteed until GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + Callers making use of per-message protection services in advance of + GSS_S_COMPLETE status should be aware of the possibility that a + subsequent context establishment step may fail, and that certain + context data (e.g., mech_type) as returned for subsequent calls may + change. + + This approach achieves full, transparent backward compatibility for + GSS-API V1 callers, who need not even know of the existence of + prot_ready_state, and who will get the expected behavior from + GSS_S_COMPLETE, but who will not be able to use per-message + protection before GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + + It is not a requirement that GSS-V2 mechanisms ever return TRUE + prot_ready_state before completion of context establishment (indeed, + some mechanisms will not evolve usable message protection keys, + especially at the context acceptor, before context establishment is + complete). It is expected but not required that GSS-V2 mechanisms + will return TRUE prot_ready_state upon completion of context + establishment if they support per-message protection at all (however + GSS-V2 applications should not assume that TRUE prot_ready_state will + always be returned together with the GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status, + since GSS-V2 implementations may continue to support GSS-V1 mechanism + code, which will never return TRUE prot_ready_state). + + When prot_ready_state is returned TRUE, mechanisms shall also set + those context service indicator flags (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, trans_state, + conf_avail, integ_avail) which represent facilities confirmed, at + that time, to be available on the context being established. In + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + situations where prot_ready_state is returned before GSS_S_COMPLETE, + it is possible that additional facilities may be confirmed and + subsequently indicated when GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + +1.2.8: Implementation Robustness + + This section recommends aspects of GSS-API implementation behavior in + the interests of overall robustness. + + Invocation of GSS-API calls is to incur no undocumented side effects + visible at the GSS-API level. + + If a token is presented for processing on a GSS-API security context + and that token generates a fatal error in processing or is otherwise + determined to be invalid for that context, the context's state should + not be disrupted for purposes of processing subsequent valid tokens. + + Certain local conditions at a GSS-API implementation (e.g., + unavailability of memory) may preclude, temporarily or permanently, + the successful processing of tokens on a GSS-API security context, + typically generating GSS_S_FAILURE major_status returns along with + locally-significant minor_status. For robust operation under such + conditions, the following recommendations are made: + + Failing calls should free any memory they allocate, so that + callers may retry without causing further loss of resources. + + Failure of an individual call on an established context should not + preclude subsequent calls from succeeding on the same context. + + Whenever possible, it should be possible for + GSS_Delete_sec_context() calls to be successfully processed even + if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + resources to be released. + + A failure of GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() due to an attempt to use an + unsupported QOP will not interfere with context validity, nor shall + such a failure impact the ability of the application to subsequently + invoke GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() using a supported QOP. Any state + information concerning sequencing of outgoing messages shall be + unchanged by an unsuccessful call of GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap(). + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +1.2.9: Delegation + + The GSS-API allows delegation to be controlled by the initiating + application via a Boolean parameter to GSS_Init_sec_context(), the + routine that establishes a security context. Some mechanisms do not + support delegation, and for such mechanisms attempts by an + application to enable delegation are ignored. + + The acceptor of a security context for which the initiator enabled + delegation will receive (via the delegated_cred_handle parameter of + GSS_Accept_sec_context()) a credential handle that contains the + delegated identity, and this credential handle may be used to + initiate subsequent GSS-API security contexts as an agent or delegate + of the initiator. If the original initiator's identity is "A" and + the delegate's identity is "B", then, depending on the underlying + mechanism, the identity embodied by the delegated credential may be + either "A" or "B acting for A". + + For many mechanisms that support delegation, a simple Boolean does + not provide enough control. Examples of additional aspects of + delegation control that a mechanism might provide to an application + are duration of delegation, network addresses from which delegation + is valid, and constraints on the tasks that may be performed by a + delegate. Such controls are presently outside the scope of the GSS- + API. GSS-API implementations supporting mechanisms offering + additional controls should provide extension routines that allow + these controls to be exercised (perhaps by modifying the initiator's + GSS-API credential prior to its use in establishing a context). + However, the simple delegation control provided by GSS-API should + always be able to over-ride other mechanism-specific delegation + controls; if the application instructs GSS_Init_sec_context() that + delegation is not desired, then the implementation must not permit + delegation to occur. This is an exception to the general rule that a + mechanism may enable services even if they are not requested; + delegation may only be provided at the explicit request of the + application. + +1.2.10: Interprocess Context Transfer + + GSS-API V2 provides routines (GSS_Export_sec_context() and + GSS_Import_sec_context()) which allow a security context to be + transferred between processes on a single machine. The most common + use for such a feature is a client-server design where the server is + implemented as a single process that accepts incoming security + contexts, which then launches child processes to deal with the data + on these contexts. In such a design, the child processes must have + access to the security context data structure created within the + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + parent by its call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() so that they can use + per-message protection services and delete the security context when + the communication session ends. + + Since the security context data structure is expected to contain + sequencing information, it is impractical in general to share a + context between processes. Thus GSS-API provides a call + (GSS_Export_sec_context()) that the process which currently owns the + context can call to declare that it has no intention to use the + context subsequently, and to create an inter-process token containing + information needed by the adopting process to successfully import the + context. After successful completion of this call, the original + security context is made inaccessible to the calling process by GSS- + API, and any context handles referring to this context are no longer + valid. The originating process transfers the inter-process token to + the adopting process, which passes it to GSS_Import_sec_context(), + and a fresh context handle is created such that it is functionally + identical to the original context. + + The inter-process token may contain sensitive data from the original + security context (including cryptographic keys). Applications using + inter-process tokens to transfer security contexts must take + appropriate steps to protect these tokens in transit. + Implementations are not required to support the inter-process + transfer of security contexts. The ability to transfer a security + context is indicated when the context is created, by + GSS_Init_sec_context() or GSS_Accept_sec_context() indicating a TRUE + trans_state return value. + +2: Interface Descriptions + + This section describes the GSS-API's service interface, dividing the + set of calls offered into four groups. Credential management calls + are related to the acquisition and release of credentials by + principals. Context-level calls are related to the management of + security contexts between principals. Per-message calls are related + to the protection of individual messages on established security + contexts. Support calls provide ancillary functions useful to GSS-API + callers. Table 2 groups and summarizes the calls in tabular fashion. + + Table 2: GSS-API Calls + + CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT + + GSS_Acquire_cred acquire credentials for use + GSS_Release_cred release credentials after use + GSS_Inquire_cred display information about + credentials + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_Add_cred construct credentials incrementally + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech display per-mechanism credential + information + + CONTEXT-LEVEL CALLS + + GSS_Init_sec_context initiate outbound security context + GSS_Accept_sec_context accept inbound security context + GSS_Delete_sec_context flush context when no longer needed + GSS_Process_context_token process received control token on + context + GSS_Context_time indicate validity time remaining on + context + GSS_Inquire_context display information about context + GSS_Wrap_size_limit determine GSS_Wrap token size limit + GSS_Export_sec_context transfer context to other process + GSS_Import_sec_context import transferred context + + PER-MESSAGE CALLS + + GSS_GetMIC apply integrity check, receive as + token separate from message + GSS_VerifyMIC validate integrity check token + along with message + GSS_Wrap sign, optionally encrypt, + encapsulate + GSS_Unwrap decapsulate, decrypt if needed, + validate integrity check + + SUPPORT CALLS + + GSS_Display_status translate status codes to printable + form + GSS_Indicate_mechs indicate mech_types supported on + local system + GSS_Compare_name compare two names for equality + GSS_Display_name translate name to printable form + GSS_Import_name convert printable name to + normalized form + GSS_Release_name free storage of normalized-form + name + GSS_Release_buffer free storage of general GSS-allocated + object + GSS_Release_OID_set free storage of OID set object + GSS_Create_empty_OID_set create empty OID set + GSS_Add_OID_set_member add member to OID set + GSS_Test_OID_set_member test if OID is member of OID set + GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech indicate name types supported by + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + mechanism + GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name indicates mechanisms supporting name + type + GSS_Canonicalize_name translate name to per-mechanism form + GSS_Export_name externalize per-mechanism name + GSS_Duplicate_name duplicate name object + +2.1: Credential management calls + + These GSS-API calls provide functions related to the management of + credentials. Their characterization with regard to whether or not + they may block pending exchanges with other network entities (e.g., + directories or authentication servers) depends in part on OS-specific + (extra-GSS-API) issues, so is not specified in this document. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call is defined within the GSS-API in support + of application portability, with a particular orientation towards + support of portable server applications. It is recognized that (for + certain systems and mechanisms) credentials for interactive users may + be managed differently from credentials for server processes; in such + environments, it is the GSS-API implementation's responsibility to + distinguish these cases and the procedures for making this + distinction are a local matter. The GSS_Release_cred() call provides + a means for callers to indicate to the GSS-API that use of a + credentials structure is no longer required. The GSS_Inquire_cred() + call allows callers to determine information about a credentials + structure. The GSS_Add_cred() call enables callers to append + elements to an existing credential structure, allowing iterative + construction of a multi-mechanism credential. The + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() call enables callers to extract per- + mechanism information describing a credentials structure. + +2.1.1: GSS_Acquire_cred call + + Inputs: + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME, -- NULL requests locally-determined + -- default + + o lifetime_req INTEGER, -- in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- NULL requests + -- system-selected default + + o cred_usage INTEGER -- 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + -- 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- if returned non-NULL, + -- caller must release with GSS_Release_cred() + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- if returned non-NULL, + -- caller must release with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that requested credentials were + successfully established, for the duration indicated in lifetime_rec, + suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, for the set of + mech_types indicated in actual_mechs, and that those credentials can + be referenced for subsequent use with the handle returned in + output_cred_handle. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that a mech_type unsupported by the GSS- + API implementation type was requested, causing the credential + establishment operation to fail. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name is + uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable underlying + GSS-API mechanism(s), so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that underlying credential + elements corresponding to the requested desired_name have expired, so + requested credentials could not be established. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no credential elements corresponding + to the requested desired_name and usage could be accessed, so + requested credentials could not be established. In particular, this + status should be returned upon temporary user-fixable conditions + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + preventing successful credential establishment and upon lack of + authorization to establish and use credentials associated with the + identity named in the input desired_name argument. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that credential establishment failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + GSS_Acquire_cred() is used to acquire credentials so that a principal + can (as a function of the input cred_usage parameter) initiate and/or + accept security contexts under the identity represented by the + desired_name input argument. On successful completion, the returned + output_cred_handle result provides a handle for subsequent references + to the acquired credentials. Typically, single-user client processes + requesting that default credential behavior be applied for context + establishment purposes will have no need to invoke this call. + + A caller may provide the value NULL (GSS_C_NO_NAME) for desired_name, + which will be interpreted as a request for a credential handle that + will invoke default behavior when passed to GSS_Init_sec_context(), + if cred_usage is GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH, or + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), if cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or + GSS_C_BOTH. It is possible that multiple pre-established credentials + may exist for the same principal identity (for example, as a result + of multiple user login sessions) when GSS_Acquire_cred() is called; + the means used in such cases to select a specific credential are + local matters. The input lifetime_req argument to GSS_Acquire_cred() + may provide useful information for local GSS-API implementations to + employ in making this disambiguation in a manner which will best + satisfy a caller's intent. + + This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, + since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways + of obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login + process. Some implementations may therefore not support the + acquisition of GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via + GSS_Acquire_cred() for any name other than GSS_C_NO_NAME, or a name + resulting from applying GSS_Inquire_context() to an active context, + or a name resulting from applying GSS_Inquire_cred() against a + credential handle corresponding to default behavior. It is important + to recognize that the explicit name which is yielded by resolving a + default reference may change over time, e.g., as a result of local + credential element management operations outside GSS-API; once + resolved, however, the value of such an explicit name will remain + constant. + + The lifetime_rec result indicates the length of time for which the + acquired credentials will be valid, as an offset from the present. A + mechanism may return a reserved value indicating INDEFINITE if no + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + constraints on credential lifetime are imposed. A caller of + GSS_Acquire_cred() can request a length of time for which acquired + credentials are to be valid (lifetime_req argument), beginning at the + present, or can request credentials with a default validity interval. + (Requests for postdated credentials are not supported within the + GSS-API.) Certain mechanisms and implementations may bind in + credential validity period specifiers at a point preliminary to + invocation of the GSS_Acquire_cred() call (e.g., in conjunction with + user login procedures). As a result, callers requesting non-default + values for lifetime_req must recognize that such requests cannot + always be honored and must be prepared to accommodate the use of + returned credentials with different lifetimes as indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + The caller of GSS_Acquire_cred() can explicitly specify a set of + mech_types which are to be accommodated in the returned credentials + (desired_mechs argument), or can request credentials for a system- + defined default set of mech_types. Selection of the system-specified + default set is recommended in the interests of application + portability. The actual_mechs return value may be interrogated by the + caller to determine the set of mechanisms with which the returned + credentials may be used. + +2.1.2: GSS_Release_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- if GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL + -- is specified, the call will complete successfully, but + -- will have no effect; no credential elements will be + -- released. + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle were released for purposes of subsequent access by + the caller. The effect on other processes which may be authorized + shared access to such credentials is a local matter. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no release operation was performed, + either because the input cred_handle was invalid or because the + caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for a caller to explicitly request that credentials + be released when their use is no longer required. Note that system- + specific credential management functions are also likely to exist, + for example to assure that credentials shared among processes are + properly deleted when all affected processes terminate, even if no + explicit release requests are issued by those processes. Given the + fact that multiple callers are not precluded from gaining authorized + access to the same credentials, invocation of GSS_Release_cred() + cannot be assumed to delete a particular set of credentials on a + system-wide basis. + +2.1.3: GSS_Inquire_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- if GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL + -- is specified, default initiator credentials are queried + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, -- caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_name() + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -- 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + -- 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, and that the output cred_name, + lifetime_rec, and cred_usage values represent, respectively, the + credentials' associated principal name, remaining lifetime, suitable + usage modes, and supported mechanism types. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks authorization to + access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced + credentials are invalid. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced + credentials have expired. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred() call is defined primarily for the use of those + callers which request use of default credential behavior rather than + acquiring credentials explicitly with GSS_Acquire_cred(). It enables + callers to determine a credential structure's associated principal + name, remaining validity period, usability for security context + initiation and/or acceptance, and supported mechanisms. + + For a multi-mechanism credential, the returned "lifetime" specifier + indicates the shortest lifetime of any of the mechanisms' elements in + the credential (for either context initiation or acceptance + purposes). + + GSS_Inquire_cred() should indicate INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT for + "cred_usage" if both of the following conditions hold: + + (1) there exists in the credential an element which allows context + initiation using some mechanism + + (2) there exists in the credential an element which allows context + acceptance using some mechanism (allowably, but not necessarily, + one of the same mechanism(s) qualifying for (1)). + + If condition (1) holds but not condition (2), GSS_Inquire_cred() + should indicate INITIATE-ONLY for "cred_usage". If condition (2) + holds but not condition (1), GSS_Inquire_cred() should indicate + ACCEPT-ONLY for "cred_usage". + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Callers requiring finer disambiguation among available combinations + of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms should call the + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() routine, passing that routine one of the + mech OIDs returned by GSS_Inquire_cred(). + +2.1.4: GSS_Add_cred call + + Inputs: + + o input_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- handle to credential + -- structure created with prior GSS_Acquire_cred() or + -- GSS_Add_cred() call; see text for definition of behavior + -- when GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL provided. + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME + + o initiator_time_req INTEGER -- in seconds; 0 requests default + + o acceptor_time_req INTEGER -- in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mech OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + o cred_usage INTEGER -- 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + -- 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- NULL to request that + -- credential elements be added "in place" to the credential + -- structure identified by input_cred_handle, + -- non-NULL pointer to request that + -- a new credential structure and handle be created. + -- if credential handle returned, caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_cred() + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- if returned, caller must + -- release with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + o initiator_time_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + o acceptor_time_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -- 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + -- 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- full set of mechanisms + -- supported by resulting credential. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input_cred_handle argument were valid, and that the resulting + credential from GSS_Add_cred() is valid for the durations indicated + in initiator_time_rec and acceptor_time_rec, suitable for the usage + requested in cred_usage, and for the mechanisms indicated in + actual_mechs. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT indicates that the input desired_mech + specified a mechanism for which the referenced credential already + contained a credential element with overlapping cred_usage and + validity time specifiers. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the input desired_mech specified a + mechanism unsupported by the GSS-API implementation, causing the + GSS_Add_cred() operation to fail. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name is + uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable underlying + GSS-API mechanism(s), so the GSS_Add_cred() operation could not be + performed for that name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so the GSS_Add_cred() operation could not be performed + for that name. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that the input_cred_handle referenced + invalid or inaccessible credentials. In particular, this status + should be returned upon temporary user-fixable conditions preventing + successful credential establishment or upon lack of authorization to + establish or use credentials representing the requested identity. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that referenced credential + elements have expired, so the GSS_Add_cred() operation could not be + performed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_Add_cred() enables callers to construct credentials iteratively + by adding credential elements in successive operations, corresponding + to different mechanisms. This offers particular value in multi- + mechanism environments, as the major_status and minor_status values + returned on each iteration are individually visible and can therefore + be interpreted unambiguously on a per-mechanism basis. A credential + element is identified by the name of the principal to which it + refers. GSS-API implementations must impose a local access control + policy on callers of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers + from acquiring credential elements to which they are not entitled. + This routine is not intended to provide a "login to the network" + function, as such a function would involve the creation of new + mechanism-specific authentication data, rather than merely acquiring + a GSS-API handle to existing data. Such functions, if required, + should be defined in implementation-specific extension routines. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may choose to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g. by GSS_Init_sec_context() or + GSS_Accept_sec_context()). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call + of GSS_Inquire_cred() immediately following the call of + GSS_Acquire_cred() must return valid credential data, and may + therefore incur the overhead of a deferred credential acquisition. + + If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as input_cred_handle, a non-NULL + output_cred_handle must be supplied. For the case of + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL as input_cred_handle, GSS_Add_cred() will create + the credential referenced by its output_cred_handle based on default + behavior. That is, the call will have the same effect as if the + caller had previously called GSS_Acquire_cred(), specifying the same + usage and passing GSS_C_NO_NAME as the desired_name parameter + (thereby obtaining an explicit credential handle corresponding to + default behavior), had passed that credential handle to + GSS_Add_cred(), and had finally called GSS_Release_cred() on the + credential handle received from GSS_Acquire_cred(). + + This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, + since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways + of obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login + process. Some implementations may therefore not support the + acquisition of GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via + GSS_Acquire_cred() for any name other than GSS_C_NO_NAME, or a name + resulting from applying GSS_Inquire_context() to an active context, + or a name resulting from applying GSS_Inquire_cred() against a + credential handle corresponding to default behavior. It is important + to recognize that the explicit name which is yielded by resolving a + default reference may change over time, e.g., as a result of local + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + credential element management operations outside GSS-API; once + resolved, however, the value of such an explicit name will remain + constant. + + A caller may provide the value NULL (GSS_C_NO_NAME) for desired_name, + which will be interpreted as a request for a credential handle that + will invoke default behavior when passed to GSS_Init_sec_context(), + if cred_usage is GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH, or + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), if cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or + GSS_C_BOTH. + + The same input desired_name, or default reference, should be used on + all GSS_Acquire_cred() and GSS_Add_cred() calls corresponding to a + particular credential. + +2.1.5: GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech call + + Inputs: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- if GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL + -- specified, default initiator credentials are queried + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- specific mechanism for + -- which credentials are being queried + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN; caller must + -- release with GSS_Release_name() + + o lifetime_rec_initiate INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + o lifetime_rec_accept INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -- 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + -- 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, that the mechanism indicated + by the input mech_type was represented with elements within those + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + credentials, and that the output cred_name, lifetime_rec_initiate, + lifetime_rec_accept, and cred_usage values represent, respectively, + the credentials' associated principal name, remaining lifetimes, and + suitable usage modes. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks authorization to + access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced + credentials are invalid. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced + credentials have expired. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the referenced credentials do not + contain elements for the requested mechanism. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() call enables callers in multi- + mechanism environments to acquire specific data about available + combinations of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms within a + credential structure. The lifetime_rec_initiate result indicates the + available lifetime for context initiation purposes; the + lifetime_rec_accept result indicates the available lifetime for + context acceptance purposes. + +2.2: Context-level calls + + This group of calls is devoted to the establishment and management of + security contexts between peers. A context's initiator calls + GSS_Init_sec_context(), resulting in generation of a token which the + caller passes to the target. At the target, that token is passed to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Depending on the underlying mech_type and + specified options, additional token exchanges may be performed in the + course of context establishment; such exchanges are accommodated by + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns from GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + + Either party to an established context may invoke + GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush context information when a context + is no longer required. GSS_Process_context_token() is used to process + received tokens carrying context-level control information. + GSS_Context_time() allows a caller to determine the length of time + for which an established context will remain valid. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_Inquire_context() returns status information describing context + characteristics. GSS_Wrap_size_limit() allows a caller to determine + the size of a token which will be generated by a GSS_Wrap() + operation. GSS_Export_sec_context() and GSS_Import_sec_context() + enable transfer of active contexts between processes on an end + system. + +2.2.1: GSS_Init_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o claimant_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- NULL specifies "use + -- default" + + o input_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -- 0 + -- (GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) specifies "none assigned yet" + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- NULL parameter specifies "use + -- default" + + o deleg_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o anon_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o integ_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_req INTEGER, -- 0 specifies default lifetime + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING -- NULL or token received from target + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o output_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -- once returned non-NULL, + -- caller must release with GSS_Delete_sec_context() + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- actual mechanism always + -- indicated, never NULL; caller should treat as read-only + -- and should not attempt to release + + o output_token OCTET STRING, -- NULL or token to pass to context + -- target; caller must release with GSS_Release_buffer() + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which an authentication server or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context initiator in order to generate an + output_token suitable for presentation to a specified target. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that context-level information was + successfully initialized, and that the returned output_token will + provide sufficient information for the target to perform per-message + processing on the newly-established context. + + o GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the target, and that a reply + must be received and passed as the input_token argument + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + to a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), before per-message + processing can be performed in conjunction with this context (unless + the prot_ready_state value is concurrently returned TRUE). + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the input_token failed, preventing further processing from being + performed based on that token. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + claimant_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from being + performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG (GSS_S_BAD_MIC) indicates that the received + input_token contains an incorrect integrity check, so context setup + cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the referenced + credentials are valid for context acceptor use only, because the + caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials, or + because the resolution of default credentials failed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input claimant_cred_handle argument are no longer valid, + so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller- + provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the input_token was + detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing context + establishment. (This result will be returned by + GSS_Init_sec_context() only for contexts where mutual_state is TRUE.) + + o GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the input_token is too old to be + checked for integrity. This is a fatal error during context + establishment. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the input token has a correct + integrity check, but is a duplicate of a token already processed. + This is a fatal error during context establishment. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided; this major status will be + returned only for successor calls following GSS_S_CONTINUE_ NEEDED + status returns. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided targ_name is of a + type uninterpretable or unsupported by the applicable underlying + GSS-API mechanism(s), so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided targ_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so context establishment cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token + or of a caller request specifying a mechanism unsupported by the + local system or with the caller's active credentials + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be + accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that + no interface-defined recovery action is available. + + This routine is used by a context initiator, and ordinarily emits an + output_token suitable for use by the target within the selected + mech_type's protocol. For the case of a multi-step exchange, this + output_token will be one in a series, each generated by a successive + call. Using information in the credentials structure referenced by + claimant_cred_handle, GSS_Init_sec_context() initializes the data + structures required to establish a security context with target + targ_name. + + The targ_name may be any valid INTERNAL NAME; it need not be an MN. + In addition to support for other name types, it is recommended (newly + as of GSS-V2, Update 1) that mechanisms be able to accept + GSS_C_NO_NAME as an input type for targ_name. While recommended, + such support is not required, and it is recognized that not all + mechanisms can construct tokens without explicitly naming the context + target, even when mutual authentication of the target is not + obtained. Callers wishing to make use of this facility and concerned + with portability should be aware that support for GSS_C_NO_NAME as + input targ_name type is unlikely to be provided within mechanism + definitions specified prior to GSS-V2, Update 1. + + The claimant_cred_handle must correspond to the same valid + credentials structure on the initial call to GSS_Init_sec_context() + and on any successor calls resulting from GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status returns; different protocol sequences modeled by the + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED facility will require access to credentials at + different points in the context establishment sequence. + + The caller-provided input_context_handle argument is to be 0 + (GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), specifying "not yet assigned", on the first + GSS_Init_sec_context() call relating to a given context. If + successful (i.e., if accompanied by major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE or + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and only if successful, the initial + GSS_Init_sec_context() call returns a non-zero output_context_handle + for use in future references to this context. Once a non-zero + output_context_handle has been returned, GSS-API callers should call + GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context-related resources if + errors occur in later phases of context establishment, or when an + established context is no longer required. If GSS_Init_sec_context() + is passed the handle of a context which is already fully established, + GSS_S_FAILURE status is returned. + + When continuation attempts to GSS_Init_sec_context() are needed to + perform context establishment, the previously-returned non-zero + handle value is entered into the input_context_handle argument and + will be echoed in the returned output_context_handle argument. On + such continuation attempts (and only on continuation attempts) the + input_token value is used, to provide the token returned from the + context's target. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The input_token argument contains a message received from the target, + and is significant only on a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() which + follows a previous return indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + It is the caller's responsibility to establish a communications path + to the target, and to transmit any returned output_token (independent + of the accompanying returned major_status value) to the target over + that path. The output_token can, however, be transmitted along with + the first application-provided input message to be processed by + GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() in conjunction with a successfully- + established context. (Note: when the GSS-V2 prot_ready_state + indicator is returned TRUE, it can be possible to transfer a + protected message before context establishment is complete: see also + Section 1.2.7) + + The initiator may request various context-level functions through + input flags: the deleg_req_flag requests delegation of access rights, + the mutual_req_flag requests mutual authentication, the + replay_det_req_flag requests that replay detection features be + applied to messages transferred on the established context, and the + sequence_req_flag requests that sequencing be enforced. (See Section + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + 1.2.3 for more information on replay detection and sequencing + features.) The anon_req_flag requests that the initiator's identity + not be transferred within tokens to be sent to the acceptor. + + The conf_req_flag and integ_req_flag provide informatory inputs to + the GSS-API implementation as to whether, respectively, per-message + confidentiality and per-message integrity services will be required + on the context. This information is important as an input to + negotiating mechanisms. It is important to recognize, however, that + the inclusion of these flags (which are newly defined for GSS-V2) + introduces a backward incompatibility with callers implemented to + GSS-V1, where the flags were not defined. Since no GSS-V1 callers + would set these flags, even if per-message services are desired, + GSS-V2 mechanism implementations which enable such services + selectively based on the flags' values may fail to provide them to + contexts established for GSS-V1 callers. It may be appropriate under + certain circumstances, therefore, for such mechanism implementations + to infer these service request flags to be set if a caller is known + to be implemented to GSS-V1. + + Not all of the optionally-requestable features will be available in + all underlying mech_types. The corresponding return state values + deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, and sequence_state + indicate, as a function of mech_type processing capabilities and + initiator-provided input flags, the set of features which will be + active on the context. The returned trans_state value indicates + whether the context is transferable to other processes through use of + GSS_Export_sec_context(). These state indicators' values are + undefined unless either the routine's major_status indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE, or TRUE prot_ready_state is returned along with + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status; for the latter case, it is + possible that additional features, not confirmed or indicated along + with TRUE prot_ready_state, will be confirmed and indicated when + GSS_S_COMPLETE is subsequently returned. + + The returned anon_state and prot_ready_state values are significant + for both GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status + returns from GSS_Init_sec_context(). When anon_state is returned + TRUE, this indicates that neither the current token nor its + predecessors delivers or has delivered the initiator's identity. + Callers wishing to perform context establishment only if anonymity + support is provided should transfer a returned token from + GSS_Init_sec_context() to the peer only if it is accompanied by a + TRUE anon_state indicator. When prot_ready_state is returned TRUE in + conjunction with GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, this indicates + that per-message protection operations may be applied on the context: + see Section 1.2.7 for further discussion of this facility. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Failure to provide the precise set of features requested by the + caller does not cause context establishment to fail; it is the + caller's prerogative to delete the context if the feature set + provided is unsuitable for the caller's use. + + The returned mech_type value indicates the specific mechanism + employed on the context; it will never indicate the value for + "default". A valid mech_type result must be returned along with a + GSS_S_COMPLETE status return; GSS-API implementations may (but are + not required to) also return mech_type along with predecessor calls + indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status or (if a mechanism is + determinable) in conjunction with fatal error cases. For the case of + mechanisms which themselves perform negotiation, the returned + mech_type result may indicate selection of a mechanism identified by + an OID different than that passed in the input mech_type argument, + and the returned value may change between successive calls returning + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED and the final call returning GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Wrap() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap()) on + the established context. These state indicators' values are undefined + unless either the routine's major_status indicates GSS_S_COMPLETE, or + TRUE prot_ready_state is returned along with GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + The lifetime_req input specifies a desired upper bound for the + lifetime of the context to be established, with a value of 0 used to + request a default lifetime. The lifetime_rec return value indicates + the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as + an offset from the present; depending on mechanism capabilities, + credential lifetimes, and local policy, it may not correspond to the + value requested in lifetime_req. If no constraints on context + lifetime are imposed, this may be indicated by returning a reserved + value representing INDEFINITE lifetime_req. The value of lifetime_rec + is undefined unless the routine's major_status indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + If the mutual_state is TRUE, this fact will be reflected within the + output_token. A call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() at the target in + conjunction with such a context will return a token, to be processed + by a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), in order to achieve + mutual authentication. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +2.2.2: GSS_Accept_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o acceptor_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- NULL specifies + -- "use default" + + o input_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -- 0 + -- (GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) specifies "not yet assigned" + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN + -- once returned, caller must release with GSS_Release_name() + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- caller should treat as + -- read-only; does not need to be released + + o output_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -- once returned + -- non-NULL in context establishment sequence, caller + -- must release with GSS_Delete_sec_context() + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 for discussion + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER, -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + o delegated_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- if returned non-NULL, + -- caller must release with GSS_Release_cred() + + o output_token OCTET STRING -- NULL or token to pass to context + -- initiator; if returned non-NULL, caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_buffer() + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which a directory service or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context acceptor in order to validate a + received input_token. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that context-level data structures were + successfully initialized, and that per-message processing can now be + performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the initiator, and that a + response must be received and passed as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), before per-message + processing can be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the input_token failed, preventing further processing from being + performed based on that token. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + acceptor_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from being + performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG (GSS_S_BAD_MIC) indicates that the received + input_token contains an incorrect integrity check, so context setup + cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the + received input_token was correct, but that the input_token was + recognized as a duplicate of an input_token already processed. No new + context is established. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token is too old to be + checked for duplication against previously-processed input_tokens. No + new context is established. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the referenced + credentials are valid for context initiator use only, because the + caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials, or + because the procedure for default credential resolution failed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input acceptor_cred_handle argument are no longer valid, + so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller- + provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the input_token was + detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing context + establishment. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided; this major status will be + returned only for successor calls following GSS_S_CONTINUE_ NEEDED + status returns. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token + specifying a mechanism unsupported by the local system or with the + caller's active credentials. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be + accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that + no interface-defined recovery action is available. + + The GSS_Accept_sec_context() routine is used by a context target. + Using information in the credentials structure referenced by the + input acceptor_cred_handle, it verifies the incoming input_token and + (following the successful completion of a context establishment + sequence) returns the authenticated src_name and the mech_type used. + The returned src_name is guaranteed to be an MN, processed by the + mechanism under which the context was established. The + acceptor_cred_handle must correspond to the same valid credentials + structure on the initial call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() and on any + successor calls resulting from GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; + different protocol sequences modeled by the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + mechanism will require access to credentials at different points in + the context establishment sequence. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 51] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + The caller-provided input_context_handle argument is to be 0 + (GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), specifying "not yet assigned", on the first + GSS_Accept_sec_context() call relating to a given context. If + successful (i.e., if accompanied by major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE or + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and only if successful, the initial + GSS_Accept_sec_context() call returns a non-zero + output_context_handle for use in future references to this context. + Once a non-zero output_context_handle has been returned, GSS-API + callers should call GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context- + related resources if errors occur in later phases of context + establishment, or when an established context is no longer required. + If GSS_Accept_sec_context() is passed the handle of a context which + is already fully established, GSS_S_FAILURE status is returned. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The returned state results (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, trans_state, and + prot_ready_state) reflect the same information as described for + GSS_Init_sec_context(), and their values are significant under the + same return state conditions. + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Wrap() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap()) + on the established context. These values are significant under the + same return state conditions as described under + GSS_Init_sec_context(). + + The lifetime_rec return value is significant only in conjunction with + GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status, and indicates the length of time for + which the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the + present. + + The returned mech_type value indicates the specific mechanism + employed on the context; it will never indicate the value for + "default". A valid mech_type result must be returned whenever + GSS_S_COMPLETE status is indicated; GSS-API implementations may (but + are not required to) also return mech_type along with predecessor + calls indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status or (if a mechanism is + determinable) in conjunction with fatal error cases. For the case of + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 52] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + mechanisms which themselves perform negotiation, the returned + mech_type result may indicate selection of a mechanism identified by + an OID different than that passed in the input mech_type argument, + and the returned value may change between successive calls returning + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED and the final call returning GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + The delegated_cred_handle result is significant only when deleg_state + is TRUE, and provides a means for the target to reference the + delegated credentials. The output_token result, when non-NULL, + provides a context-level token to be returned to the context + initiator to continue a multi-step context establishment sequence. As + noted with GSS_Init_sec_context(), any returned token should be + transferred to the context's peer (in this case, the context + initiator), independent of the value of the accompanying returned + major_status. + + Note: A target must be able to distinguish a context-level + input_token, which is passed to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), from the + per-message data elements passed to GSS_VerifyMIC() or GSS_Unwrap(). + These data elements may arrive in a single application message, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() must be performed before per-message + processing can be performed successfully. + +2.2.3: GSS_Delete_sec_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the context was recognized, and that + relevant context-specific information was flushed. If the caller + provides a non-null buffer to receive an output_context_token, and + the mechanism returns a non-NULL token into that buffer, the returned + output_context_token is ready for transfer to the context's peer. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided, so no deletion was performed. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 53] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that + the GSS_Delete_sec_context() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call can be made by either peer in a security context, to flush + context-specific information. Once a non-zero output_context_handle + has been returned by context establishment calls, GSS-API callers + should call GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context-related + resources if errors occur in later phases of context establishment, + or when an established context is no longer required. This call may + block pending network interactions for mech_types in which active + notification must be made to a central server when a security context + is to be deleted. + + If a non-null output_context_token parameter is provided by the + caller, an output_context_token may be returned to the caller. If an + output_context_token is provided to the caller, it can be passed to + the context's peer to inform the peer's GSS-API implementation that + the peer's corresponding context information can also be flushed. + (Once a context is established, the peers involved are expected to + retain cached credential and context-related information until the + information's expiration time is reached or until a + GSS_Delete_sec_context() call is made.) + + The facility for context_token usage to signal context deletion is + retained for compatibility with GSS-API Version 1. For current + usage, it is recommended that both peers to a context invoke + GSS_Delete_sec_context() independently, passing a null + output_context_token buffer to indicate that no context_token is + required. Implementations of GSS_Delete_sec_context() should delete + relevant locally-stored context information. + + Attempts to perform per-message processing on a deleted context will + result in error returns. + +2.2.4: GSS_Process_context_token call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o input_context_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 54] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_context_token was + successfully processed in conjunction with the context referenced by + context_handle. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the received context_token failed, preventing further processing + from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that + the GSS_Process_context_token() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to process context_tokens received from a peer once + a context has been established, with corresponding impact on + context-level state information. One use for this facility is + processing of the context_tokens generated by + GSS_Delete_sec_context(); GSS_Process_context_token() will not block + pending network interactions for that purpose. Another use is to + process tokens indicating remote-peer context establishment failures + after the point where the local GSS-API implementation has already + indicated GSS_S_COMPLETE status. + +2.2.5: GSS_Context_time call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid, and + will remain valid for the amount of time indicated in lifetime_rec. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 55] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that data items related to the + referenced context have expired. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to determine the amount of time for which a + currently established context will remain valid. + +2.2.6: GSS_Inquire_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context initiator, + -- guaranteed to be MN; + -- caller must release with GSS_Release_name() if returned + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context target, + -- guaranteed to be MN; + -- caller must release with GSS_Release_name() if returned + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + -- INDEFINITE or EXPIRED + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- the mechanism supporting this + -- security context; caller should treat as read-only and not + -- attempt to release + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 56] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o locally_initiated BOOLEAN, -- TRUE if initiator, FALSE if acceptor + + o open BOOLEAN, -- TRUE if context fully established, FALSE + -- if partly established (in CONTINUE_NEEDED state) + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid and + that deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, sequence_state, + anon_state, trans_state, prot_ready_state, conf_avail, integ_avail, + locally_initiated, and open return values describe the corresponding + characteristics of the context. If open is TRUE, lifetime_rec is + also returned: if open is TRUE and the context peer's name is known, + src_name and targ_name are valid in addition to the values listed + above. The mech_type value must be returned for contexts where open + is TRUE and may be returned for contexts where open is FALSE. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call is used to extract information describing characteristics + of a security context. Note that GSS-API implementations are + expected to retain inquirable context data on a context until the + context is released by a caller, even after the context has expired, + although underlying cryptographic data elements may be deleted after + expiration in order to limit their exposure. + +2.2.7: GSS_Wrap_size_limit call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 57] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o qop INTEGER, + + o output_size INTEGER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o max_input_size INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates a successful token size determination: + an input message with a length in octets equal to the returned + max_input_size value will, when passed to GSS_Wrap() for processing + on the context identified by the context_handle parameter with the + confidentiality request state as provided in conf_req_flag and with + the quality of protection specifier provided in the qop parameter, + yield an output token no larger than the value of the provided + output_size parameter. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context has + expired. Return values other than major_status and minor_status are + undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call is used to determine the largest input datum which may be + passed to GSS_Wrap() without yielding an output token larger than a + caller-specified value. + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 58] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +2.2.8: GSS_Export_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o interprocess_token OCTET STRING -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_buffer() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context has been + successfully exported to a representation in the interprocess_token, + and is no longer available for use by the caller. + + o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context export facility is + not available for use on the referenced context. (This status should + occur only for contexts for which the trans_state value is FALSE.) + Return values other than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context has + expired. Return values other than major_status and minor_status are + undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call generates an interprocess token for transfer to another + process within an end system, in order to transfer control of a + security context to that process. The recipient of the interprocess + token will call GSS_Import_sec_context() to accept the transfer. The + GSS_Export_sec_context() operation is defined for use only with + security contexts which are fully and successfully established (i.e., + those for which GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() + have returned GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status). + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 59] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + A successful GSS_Export_sec_context() operation deactivates the + security context for the calling process; for this case, the GSS-API + implementation shall deallocate all process-wide resources associated + with the security context and shall set the context_handle to + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. In the event of an error that makes it impossible + to complete export of the security context, the GSS-API + implementation must not return an interprocess token and should + strive to leave the security context referenced by the context_handle + untouched. If this is impossible, it is permissible for the + implementation to delete the security context, provided that it also + sets the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. + + Portable callers must not assume that a given interprocess token can + be imported by GSS_Import_sec_context() more than once, thereby + creating multiple instantiations of a single context. GSS-API + implementations may detect and reject attempted multiple imports, but + are not required to do so. + + The internal representation contained within the interprocess token + is an implementation-defined local matter. Interprocess tokens + cannot be assumed to be transferable across different GSS-API + implementations. + + It is recommended that GSS-API implementations adopt policies suited + to their operational environments in order to define the set of + processes eligible to import a context, but specific constraints in + this area are local matters. Candidate examples include transfers + between processes operating on behalf of the same user identity, or + processes comprising a common job. However, it may be impossible to + enforce such policies in some implementations. + + In support of the above goals, implementations may protect the + transferred context data by using cryptography to protect data within + the interprocess token, or by using interprocess tokens as a means to + reference local interprocess communication facilities (protected by + other means) rather than storing the context data directly within the + tokens. + + Transfer of an open context may, for certain mechanisms and + implementations, reveal data about the credential which was used to + establish the context. Callers should, therefore, be cautious about + the trustworthiness of processes to which they transfer contexts. + Although the GSS-API implementation may provide its own set of + protections over the exported context, the caller is responsible for + protecting the interprocess token from disclosure, and for taking + care that the context is transferred to an appropriate destination + process. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 60] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +2.2.9: GSS_Import_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o interprocess_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE -- if successfully returned, + -- caller must release with GSS_Delete_sec_context() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the context represented by the input + interprocess_token has been successfully transferred to the caller, + and is available for future use via the output context_handle. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that the context represented by the + input interprocess_token was invalid. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that the input interprocess_token + was defective. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context import facility is + not available for use on the referenced context. Return values other + than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that the context represented by the + input interprocess_token is unauthorized for transfer to the caller. + Return values other than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call processes an interprocess token generated by + GSS_Export_sec_context(), making the transferred context available + for use by the caller. After a successful GSS_Import_sec_context() + operation, the imported context is available for use by the importing + process. In particular, the imported context is usable for all per- + message operations and may be deleted or exported by its importer. + The inability to receive delegated credentials through + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 61] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + gss_import_sec_context() precludes establishment of new contexts + based on information delegated to the importer's end system within + the context which is being imported, unless those delegated + credentials are obtained through separate routines (e.g., XGSS-API + calls) outside the GSS-V2 definition. + + For further discussion of the security and authorization issues + regarding this call, please see the discussion in Section 2.2.8. + +2.3: Per-message calls + + This group of calls is used to perform per-message protection + processing on an established security context. None of these calls + block pending network interactions. These calls may be invoked by a + context's initiator or by the context's target. The four members of + this group should be considered as two pairs; the output from + GSS_GetMIC() is properly input to GSS_VerifyMIC(), and the output + from GSS_Wrap() is properly input to GSS_Unwrap(). + + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() support data origin authentication + and data integrity services. When GSS_GetMIC() is invoked on an input + message, it yields a per-message token containing data items which + allow underlying mechanisms to provide the specified security + services. The original message, along with the generated per-message + token, is passed to the remote peer; these two data elements are + processed by GSS_VerifyMIC(), which validates the message in + conjunction with the separate token. + + GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap() support caller-requested confidentiality + in addition to the data origin authentication and data integrity + services offered by GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC(). GSS_Wrap() + outputs a single data element, encapsulating optionally enciphered + user data as well as associated token data items. The data element + output from GSS_Wrap() is passed to the remote peer and processed by + GSS_Unwrap() at that system. GSS_Unwrap() combines decipherment (as + required) with validation of data items related to authentication and + integrity. + + Although zero-length tokens are never returned by GSS calls for + transfer to a context's peer, a zero-length object may be passed by a + caller into GSS_Wrap(), in which case the corresponding peer calling + GSS_Unwrap() on the transferred token will receive a zero-length + object as output from GSS_Unwrap(). Similarly, GSS_GetMIC() can be + called on an empty object, yielding a MIC which GSS_VerifyMIC() will + successfully verify against the active security context in + conjunction with a zero-length object. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 62] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +2.3.1: GSS_GetMIC call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Sign call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Sign are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o qop_req INTEGER, -- 0 specifies default QOP + + o message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_buffer() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that an integrity check, suitable for an + established security context, was successfully applied and that the + message and corresponding per_msg_token are ready for transmission. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items + have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no context was recognized for the + input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that + the requested operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, apply an + integrity check to the input message (along with timestamps and/or + other data included in support of mech_type-specific mechanisms) and + (if GSS_S_COMPLETE status is indicated) return the result in + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 63] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + per_msg_token. The qop_req parameter, interpretation of which is + discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows quality-of-protection control. The + caller passes the message and the per_msg_token to the target. + + The GSS_GetMIC() function completes before the message and + per_msg_token is sent to the peer; successful application of + GSS_GetMIC() does not guarantee that a corresponding GSS_VerifyMIC() + has been (or can necessarily be) performed successfully when the + message arrives at the destination. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.2: GSS_VerifyMIC call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Verify call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Verify are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o message OCTET STRING, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was successfully + verified. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the received per_msg_token failed, preventing further processing + from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG (GSS_S_BAD_MIC) indicates that the received + per_msg_token contains an incorrect integrity check for the message. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 64] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, and + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN values appear in conjunction with the optional per- + message replay detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their + semantics are described in that section. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items + have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no context was recognized for the + input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that + the GSS_VerifyMIC() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, verify that + the input per_msg_token contains an appropriate integrity check for + the input message, and apply any active replay detection or + sequencing features. Returns an indication of the quality-of- + protection applied to the processed message in the qop_state result. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.3: GSS_Wrap call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Seal call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Seal are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o qop_req INTEGER, -- 0 specifies default QOP + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 65] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o output_message OCTET STRING -- caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_buffer() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the output_message is ready for transmission. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items + have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no context was recognized for the + input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that + the GSS_Wrap() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Performs the data origin authentication and data integrity functions + of GSS_GetMIC(). If the input conf_req_flag is TRUE, requests that + confidentiality be applied to the input_message. Confidentiality may + not be supported in all mech_types or by all implementations; the + returned conf_state flag indicates whether confidentiality was + provided for the input_message. The qop_req parameter, interpretation + of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows quality-of-protection + control. + + When GSS_S_COMPLETE status is returned, the GSS_Wrap() call yields a + single output_message data element containing (optionally enciphered) + user data as well as control information. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.4: GSS_Unwrap call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Unseal call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Unseal are deprecated. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 66] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_message OCTET STRING -- caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_buffer() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the resulting output_message is available. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the per_msg_token extracted from the input_message failed, + preventing further processing from being performed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG (GSS_S_BAD_MIC) indicates that an incorrect + integrity check was detected for the message. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, and + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN values appear in conjunction with the optional per- + message replay detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their + semantics are described in that section. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items + have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no context was recognized for the + input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that + the GSS_Unwrap() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 67] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Processes a data element generated (and optionally enciphered) by + GSS_Wrap(), provided as input_message. The returned conf_state value + indicates whether confidentiality was applied to the input_message. + If conf_state is TRUE, GSS_Unwrap() has deciphered the input_message. + Returns an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the + processed message in the qop_state result. GSS_Unwrap() performs the + data integrity and data origin authentication checking functions of + GSS_VerifyMIC() on the plaintext data. Plaintext data is returned in + output_message. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.4: Support calls + + This group of calls provides support functions useful to GSS-API + callers, independent of the state of established contexts. Their + characterization with regard to blocking or non-blocking status in + terms of network interactions is unspecified. + +2.4.1: GSS_Display_status call + + Inputs: + + o status_value INTEGER, -- GSS-API major_status or minor_status + -- return value + + o status_type INTEGER, -- 1 if major_status, 2 if minor_status + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- mech_type to be used for + -- minor_status translation + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o status_string_set SET OF OCTET STRING -- required calls for + -- release by caller are specific to language bindings + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable status + representation (possibly representing more than one status event + encoded within the status_value) is available in the returned + status_string_set. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 68] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that translation in accordance with an + unsupported mech_type was requested, so translation could not be + performed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_STATUS indicates that the input status_value was + invalid, or that the input status_type carried a value other than 1 + or 2, so translation could not be performed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for callers to translate GSS-API-returned major and + minor status codes into printable string representations. Note: some + language bindings may employ an iterative approach in order to emit + successive status components; this approach is acceptable but not + required for conformance with the current specification. + + Although not contemplated in [RFC-2078], it has been observed that + some existing GSS-API implementations return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status when iterating through successive messages returned from + GSS_Display_status(). This behavior is deprecated; + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED should be returned only by + GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context(). For maximal + portability, however, it is recommended that defensive callers be + able to accept and ignore GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status if indicated + by GSS_Display_status() or any other call other than + GSS_Init_sec_context() or GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + +2.4.2: GSS_Indicate_mechs call + + Input: + + o (none) + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a set of available mechanisms has + been returned in mech_set. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 69] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of mechanism types available on + the local system. This call is intended for support of specialized + callers who need to request non-default mech_type sets from GSS-API + calls which accept input mechanism type specifiers. + +2.4.3: GSS_Compare_name call + + Inputs: + + o name1 INTERNAL NAME, + + o name2 INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_equal BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that name1 and name2 were comparable, and + that the name_equal result indicates whether name1 and name2 + represent the same entity. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the two input names' types are + different and incomparable, so that the comparison operation could + not be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that one or both of the input names was + ill-formed in terms of its internal type specifier, so the comparison + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the call's operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to compare two internal name representations to + determine whether they refer to the same entity. If either name + presented to GSS_Compare_name() denotes an anonymous principal, + GSS_Compare_name() shall indicate FALSE. It is not required that + either or both inputs name1 and name2 be MNs; for some + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 70] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + implementations and cases, GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE may be returned, + indicating name incomparability, for the case where neither input + name is an MN. + +2.4.4: GSS_Display_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_string OCTET STRING, -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_buffer() + + o name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- caller should treat + -- as read-only; does not need to be released + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable name + representation is available in the returned name_string. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the contents of the provided name + were inconsistent with the internally-indicated name type, so no + printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to translate an internal name representation into a + printable form with associated namespace type descriptor. The syntax + of the printable form is a local matter. + + If the input name represents an anonymous identity, a reserved value + (GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS) shall be returned for name_type. + + The GSS_C_NO_OID name type is to be returned only when the + corresponding internal name was created through import with + GSS_C_NO_OID. It is acceptable for mechanisms to normalize names + imported with GSS_C_NO_OID into other supported types and, therefore, + to display them with types other than GSS_C_NO_OID. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 71] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +2.4.5: GSS_Import_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name_string OCTET STRING, + + o input_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME -- caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_name() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid name representation is + output in output_name and described by the type value in + output_name_type. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input_name_type is + unsupported by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the + import operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided input_name_string is + ill-formed in terms of the input_name_type, so the import operation + could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the input presented for import was + an exported name object and that its enclosed mechanism type was not + recognized or was unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to provide a name representation as a contiguous octet + string, designate the type of namespace in conjunction with which it + should be parsed, and convert that representation to an internal form + suitable for input to other GSS-API routines. The syntax of the + input_name_string is defined in conjunction with its associated name + type; depending on the input_name_type, the associated + input_name_string may or may not be a printable string. If the + input_name_type's value is GSS_C_NO_OID, a mechanism-specific default + printable syntax (which shall be specified in the corresponding GSS- + V2 mechanism specification) is assumed for the input_name_string; + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 72] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + other input_name_type values as registered by GSS-API implementations + can be used to indicate specific non-default name syntaxes. Note: The + input_name_type argument serves to describe and qualify the + interpretation of the associated input_name_string; it does not + specify the data type of the returned output_name. + + If a mechanism claims support for a particular name type, its + GSS_Import_name() operation shall be able to accept all possible + values conformant to the external name syntax as defined for that + name type. These imported values may correspond to: + + (1) locally registered entities (for which credentials may be + acquired), + + (2) non-local entities (for which local credentials cannot be + acquired, but which may be referenced as targets of initiated + security contexts or initiators of accepted security contexts), or + to + + (3) neither of the above. + + Determination of whether a particular name belongs to class (1), (2), + or (3) as described above is not guaranteed to be performed by the + GSS_Import_name() function. + + The internal name generated by a GSS_Import_name() operation may be a + single-mechanism MN, and is likely to be an MN within a single- + mechanism implementation, but portable callers must not depend on + this property (and must not, therefore, assume that the output from + GSS_Import_name() can be passed directly to GSS_Export_name() without + first being processed through GSS_Canonicalize_name()). + +2.4.6: GSS_Release_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input name was successfully released. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 73] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name argument did not + contain a valid name. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an internal + name representation. This call's specific behavior depends on the + language and programming environment within which a GSS-API + implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable + bindings specifications; in particular, implementation and invocation + of this call may be superfluous (and may be omitted) within bindings + where memory management is automatic. + +2.4.7: GSS_Release_buffer call + + Inputs: + + o buffer OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input buffer was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an OCTET STRING + buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's specific + behavior depends on the language and programming environment within + which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed + within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, + implementation and invocation of this call may be superfluous (and + may be omitted) within bindings where memory management is automatic. + +2.4.8: GSS_Release_OID_set call + + Inputs: + + o buffer SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 74] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input object identifier set was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an object + identifier set object allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's + specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment + within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore + detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, + implementation and invocation of this call may be superfluous (and + may be omitted) within bindings where memory management is automatic. + +2.4.9: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set call + + Inputs: + + o (none) + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Creates an object identifier set containing no object identifiers, to + which members may be subsequently added using the + GSS_Add_OID_set_member() routine. These routines are intended to be + used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to + GSS_Acquire_cred(). + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 75] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +2.4.10: GSS_Add_OID_set_member call + + Inputs: + + o member_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o oid_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Adds an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine + is intended for use in conjunction with GSS_Create_empty_OID_set() + when constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to + GSS_Acquire_cred(). + +2.4.11: GSS_Test_OID_set_member call + + Inputs: + + o member OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o present BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 76] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Interrogates an Object Identifier set to determine whether a + specified Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to + be used with OID sets returned by GSS_Indicate_mechs(), + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and GSS_Inquire_cred(). + +2.4.12: GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech call + + Input: + + o input_mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- mechanism type + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_type_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the output name_type_set contains a + list of name types which are supported by the locally available + mechanism identified by input_mech_type. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the mechanism identified by + input_mech_type was unsupported within the local implementation, + causing the query to fail. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of name types which are + supportable by a specific locally-available mechanism. + +2.4.13: GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 77] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o mech_types SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_oid_set() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a set of object identifiers, + corresponding to the set of mechanisms suitable for processing the + input_name, is available in mech_types. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input_name was ill-formed and + could not be processed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input_name parameter + contained an invalid name type or a name type unsupported by the + GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine returns the mechanism set with which the input_name may + be processed. + + Each mechanism returned will recognize at least one element within + the name. It is permissible for this routine to be implemented within + a mechanism-independent GSS-API layer, using the type information + contained within the presented name, and based on registration + information provided by individual mechanism implementations. This + means that the returned mech_types result may indicate that a + particular mechanism will understand a particular name when in fact + it would refuse to accept that name as input to + GSS_Canonicalize_name(), GSS_Init_sec_context(), GSS_Acquire_cred(), + or GSS_Add_cred(), due to some property of the particular name rather + than a property of the name type. Thus, this routine should be used + only as a pre-filter for a call to a subsequent mechanism-specific + routine. + +2.4.14: GSS_Canonicalize_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- must be explicit mechanism, + -- not "default" specifier or identifier of negotiating mechanism + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 78] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME -- caller must release with + -- GSS_Release_name() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a mechanism-specific reduction of + the input_name, as processed by the mechanism identified by + mech_type, is available in output_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the identified mechanism is + unsupported for this operation; this may correspond either to a + mechanism wholly unsupported by the local GSS-API implementation or + to a negotiating mechanism with which the canonicalization operation + cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name does not contain + an element with suitable type for processing by the identified + mechanism. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name contains an element + with suitable type for processing by the identified mechanism, but + that this element could not be processed successfully. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine reduces a GSS-API internal name input_name, which may in + general contain elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, to a + mechanism-specific Mechanism Name (MN) output_name by applying the + translations corresponding to the mechanism identified by mech_type. + The contents of input_name are unaffected by the + GSS_Canonicalize_name() operation. References to output_name will + remain valid until output_name is released, independent of whether or + not input_name is subsequently released. + +2.4.15: GSS_Export_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, -- required to be MN + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 79] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + o output_name OCTET STRING -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_buffer() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a flat representation of the input + name is available in output_name. + + o GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN indicates that the input name contained elements + corresponding to multiple mechanisms, so cannot be exported into a + single-mechanism flat form. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name was an MN, but could + not be processed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name was an MN, but + that its type is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine creates a flat name representation, suitable for + bytewise comparison or for input to GSS_Import_name() in conjunction + with the reserved GSS-API Exported Name Object OID, from a internal- + form Mechanism Name (MN) as emitted, e.g., by GSS_Canonicalize_name() + or GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + + The emitted GSS-API Exported Name Object is self-describing; no + associated parameter-level OID need be emitted by this call. This + flat representation consists of a mechanism-independent wrapper + layer, defined in Section 3.2 of this document, enclosing a + mechanism-defined name representation. + + In all cases, the flat name output by GSS_Export_name() to correspond + to a particular input MN must be invariant over time within a + particular installation. + + The GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN status code is provided to enable + implementations to reject input names which are not MNs. It is not, + however, required for purposes of conformance to this specification + that all non-MN input names must necessarily be rejected. + +2.4.16: GSS_Duplicate_name call + + Inputs: + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 80] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o dest_name INTERNAL NAME -- caller must release + -- with GSS_Release_name() + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that dest_name references an internal + name object containing the same name as passed to src_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name was invalid. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine takes input internal name src_name, and returns another + reference (dest_name) to that name which can be used even if src_name + is later freed. (Note: This may be implemented by copying or through + use of reference counts.) + +3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage + + Subsections of this section define, for interoperability and + portability purposes, certain data structures for use with GSS-V2. + +3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format + + This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating + representation for the initial token of a GSS-API context + establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the mechanism + type to be used on that context and enabling tokens to be interpreted + unambiguously at GSS-API peers. Use of this format is required for + initial context establishment tokens of Internet standards-track + GSS-API mechanisms; use in non-initial tokens is optional. + + The encoding format for the token tag is derived from ASN.1 and DER + (per illustrative ASN.1 syntax included later within this + subsection), but its concrete representation is defined directly in + terms of octets rather than at the ASN.1 level in order to facilitate + interoperable implementation without use of general ASN.1 processing + code. The token tag consists of the following elements, in order: + + 1. 0x60 -- Tag for [APPLICATION 0] SEQUENCE; indicates that + -- constructed form, definite length encoding follows. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 81] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + 2. Token length octets, specifying length of subsequent data + (i.e., the summed lengths of elements 3-5 in this list, and of the + mechanism-defined token object following the tag). This element + comprises a variable number of octets: + + 2a. If the indicated value is less than 128, it shall be + represented in a single octet with bit 8 (high order) set to + "0" and the remaining bits representing the value. + + 2b. If the indicated value is 128 or more, it shall be + represented in two or more octets, with bit 8 of the first + octet set to "1" and the remaining bits of the first octet + specifying the number of additional octets. The subsequent + octets carry the value, 8 bits per octet, most significant + digit first. The minimum number of octets shall be used to + encode the length (i.e., no octets representing leading zeros + shall be included within the length encoding). + + 3. 0x06 -- Tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + 4. Object identifier length -- length (number of octets) of + -- the encoded object identifier contained in element 5, + -- encoded per rules as described in 2a. and 2b. above. + + 5. Object identifier octets -- variable number of octets, + -- encoded per ASN.1 BER rules: + + 5a. The first octet contains the sum of two values: (1) the + top-level object identifier component, multiplied by 40 + (decimal), and (2) the second-level object identifier + component. This special case is the only point within an + object identifier encoding where a single octet represents + contents of more than one component. + + 5b. Subsequent octets, if required, encode successively-lower + components in the represented object identifier. A component's + encoding may span multiple octets, encoding 7 bits per octet + (most significant bits first) and with bit 8 set to "1" on all + but the final octet in the component's encoding. The minimum + number of octets shall be used to encode each component (i.e., + no octets representing leading zeros shall be included within a + component's encoding). + + (Note: In many implementations, elements 3-5 may be stored and + referenced as a contiguous string constant.) + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 82] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + The token tag is immediately followed by a mechanism-defined token + object. Note that no independent size specifier intervenes following + the object identifier value to indicate the size of the mechanism- + defined token object. While ASN.1 usage within mechanism-defined + tokens is permitted, there is no requirement that the mechanism- + specific innerContextToken, innerMsgToken, and sealedUserData data + elements must employ ASN.1 BER/DER encoding conventions. + + The following ASN.1 syntax is included for descriptive purposes only, + to illustrate structural relationships among token and tag objects. + For interoperability purposes, token and tag encoding shall be + performed using the concrete encoding procedures described earlier in + this subsection. + + GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::= + + BEGIN + + MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- data structure definitions + -- callers must be able to distinguish among + -- InitialContextToken, SubsequentContextToken, + -- PerMsgToken, and SealedMessage data elements + -- based on the usage in which they occur + + InitialContextToken ::= + -- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within + -- mechanism-specific token + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType, + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + -- contents mechanism-specific + -- ASN.1 structure not required + } + + SubsequentContextToken ::= innerContextToken ANY + -- interpretation based on predecessor InitialContextToken + -- ASN.1 structure not required + + PerMsgToken ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_GetMIC and processed by GSS_VerifyMIC + -- ASN.1 structure not required + innerMsgToken ANY + + SealedMessage ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Wrap and processed by GSS_Unwrap + -- includes internal, mechanism-defined indicator + -- of whether or not encrypted + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 83] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + -- ASN.1 structure not required + sealedUserData ANY + + END + +3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format + + This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating + representation for names exported via the GSS_Export_name() call, + including an object identifier representing the exporting mechanism. + The format of names encapsulated via this representation shall be + defined within individual mechanism drafts. The Object Identifier + value to indicate names of this type is defined in Section 4.7 of + this document. + + No name type OID is included in this mechanism-independent level of + format definition, since (depending on individual mechanism + specifications) the enclosed name may be implicitly typed or may be + explicitly typed using a means other than OID encoding. + + The bytes within MECH_OID_LEN and NAME_LEN elements are represented + most significant byte first (equivalently, in IP network byte order). + + Length Name Description + + 2 TOK_ID Token Identifier + For exported name objects, this + must be hex 04 01. + 2 MECH_OID_LEN Length of the Mechanism OID + MECH_OID_LEN MECH_OID Mechanism OID, in DER + 4 NAME_LEN Length of name + NAME_LEN NAME Exported name; format defined in + applicable mechanism draft. + + A concrete example of the contents of an exported name object, + derived from the Kerberos Version 5 mechanism, is as follows: + + 04 01 00 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 hx xx xx xl pp qq ... zz + + 04 01 mandatory token identifier + + 00 0B 2-byte length of the immediately following DER-encoded + ASN.1 value of type OID, most significant octet first + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 84] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 DER-encoded ASN.1 value + of type OID; Kerberos V5 + mechanism OID indicates + Kerberos V5 exported name + + in Detail: 06 Identifier octet (6=OID) + 09 Length octet(s) + 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 Content octet(s) + + hx xx xx xl 4-byte length of the immediately following exported + name blob, most significant octet first + + pp qq ... zz exported name blob of specified length, + bits and bytes specified in the + (Kerberos 5) GSS-API v2 mechanism spec + +4: Name Type Definitions + + This section includes definitions for name types and associated + syntaxes which are defined in a mechanism-independent fashion at the + GSS-API level rather than being defined in individual mechanism + specifications. + +4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier: + + {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) + "gssapi(2) generic(1) service_name(4)}. + + The recommended symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE". + + For reasons of compatibility with existing implementations, it is + recommended that this OID be used rather than the alternate value as + included in [RFC-2078]: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 2(gss-host-based-services)} + + While it is not recommended that this alternate value be emitted on + output by GSS implementations, it is recommended that it be accepted + on input as equivalent to the recommended value. + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 85] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + This name type is used to represent services associated with host + computers. Support for this name form is recommended to mechanism + designers in the interests of portability, but is not mandated by + this specification. This name form is constructed using two elements, + "service" and "hostname", as follows: + + service@hostname + + When a reference to a name of this type is resolved, the "hostname" + may (as an example implementation strategy) be canonicalized by + attempting a DNS lookup and using the fully-qualified domain name + which is returned, or by using the "hostname" as provided if the DNS + lookup fails. The canonicalization operation also maps the host's + name into lower-case characters. + + The "hostname" element may be omitted. If no "@" separator is + included, the entire name is interpreted as the service specifier, + with the "hostname" defaulted to the canonicalized name of the local + host. + + Documents specifying means for GSS integration into a particular + protocol should state either: + + (a) that a specific IANA-registered name associated with that + protocol shall be used for the "service" element (this admits, if + needed, the possibility that a single name can be registered and + shared among a related set of protocols), or + + (b) that the generic name "host" shall be used for the "service" + element, or + + (c) that, for that protocol, fallback in specified order (a, then + b) or (b, then a) shall be applied. + + IANA registration of specific names per (a) should be handled in + accordance with the "Specification Required" assignment policy, + defined by BCP 26, RFC 2434 as follows: "Values and their meaning + must be documented in an RFC or other available reference, in + sufficient detail so that interoperability between independent + implementations is possible." + +4.2: User Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended mechanism-independent + symbolic name for this type is "GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME". (Note: the same + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 86] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + name form and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism, but the symbolic name recommended there begins with a + "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a named user on a local system. + Its syntax and interpretation may be OS-specific. This name form is + constructed as: + + username + +4.3: Machine UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended mechanism- + independent symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". (Note: the same name form and OID is + defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the symbolic + name recommended there begins with a "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a numeric user identifier + corresponding to a user on a local system. Its interpretation is + OS-specific. The gss_buffer_desc representing a name of this type + should contain a locally-significant user ID, represented in host + byte order. The GSS_Import_name() operation resolves this uid into a + username, which is then treated as the User Name Form. + +4.4: String UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". (Note: the same name form + and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the + symbolic name recommended there begins with a "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a string of digits representing + the numeric user identifier of a user on a local system. Its + interpretation is OS-specific. This name type is similar to the + Machine UID Form, except that the buffer contains a string + representing the user ID. + +4.5: Anonymous Nametype + + The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to + identify anonymous names, and can be compared against in order to + determine, in a mechanism-independent fashion, whether a name refers + to an anonymous principal: + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 87] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 3(gss-anonymous-name)} + + The recommended symbolic name corresponding to this definition is + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS. + +4.6: GSS_C_NO_OID + + The recommended symbolic name GSS_C_NO_OID corresponds to a null + input value instead of an actual object identifier. Where specified, + it indicates interpretation of an associated name based on a + mechanism-specific default printable syntax. + +4.7: Exported Name Object + + Name objects of the Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object type, + as defined in Section 3.2 of this document, will be identified with + the following Object Identifier: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 4(gss-api-exported-name)} + + The recommended symbolic name corresponding to this definition is + GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME. + +4.8: GSS_C_NO_NAME + + The recommended symbolic name GSS_C_NO_NAME indicates that no name is + being passed within a particular value of a parameter used for the + purpose of transferring names. Note: GSS_C_NO_NAME is not an actual + name type, and is not represented by an OID; its acceptability in + lieu of an actual name is confined to specific calls + (GSS_Acquire_cred(), GSS_Add_cred(), and GSS_Init_sec_context()) with + usages as identified within this specification. + +5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios + + This section provides illustrative overviews of the use of various + candidate mechanism types to support the GSS-API. These discussions + are intended primarily for readers familiar with specific security + technologies, demonstrating how GSS-API functions can be used and + implemented by candidate underlying mechanisms. They should not be + regarded as constrictive to implementations or as defining the only + means through which GSS-API functions can be realized with a + particular underlying technology, and do not demonstrate all GSS-API + features with each technology. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 88] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT + + OS-specific login functions yield a TGT to the local realm Kerberos + server; TGT is placed in a credentials structure for the client. + Client calls GSS_Acquire_cred() to acquire a cred_handle in order to + reference the credentials for use in establishing security contexts. + + Client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(). If the requested service is + located in a different realm, GSS_Init_sec_context() gets the + necessary TGT/key pairs needed to traverse the path from local to + target realm; these data are placed in the owner's TGT cache. After + any needed remote realm resolution, GSS_Init_sec_context() yields a + service ticket to the requested service with a corresponding session + key; these data are stored in conjunction with the context. GSS-API + code sends KRB_TGS_REQ request(s) and receives KRB_TGS_REP + response(s) (in the successful case) or KRB_ERROR. + + Assuming success, GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted + KRB_AP_REQ message, and returns it in output_token. The client sends + the output_token to the service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which verifies the authenticator, provides + the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns an + output_context_handle. + + Both parties now hold the session key associated with the service + ticket, and can use this key in subsequent GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Wrap(), and GSS_Unwrap() operations. + +5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT + + TGT acquisition as above. + + Note: To avoid unnecessary frequent invocations of error paths when + implementing the GSS-API atop Kerberos V5, it seems appropriate to + represent "single-TGT K-V5" and "double-TGT K-V5" with separate + mech_types, and this discussion makes that assumption. + + Based on the (specified or defaulted) mech_type, + GSS_Init_sec_context() determines that the double-TGT protocol + should be employed for the specified target. GSS_Init_sec_context() + returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, and its returned + output_token contains a request to the service for the service's TGT. + (If a service TGT with suitably long remaining lifetime already + exists in a cache, it may be usable, obviating the need for this + step.) The client passes the output_token to the service. Note: this + scenario illustrates a different use for the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 89] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + status return facility than for support of mutual authentication; + note that both uses can coexist as successive operations within a + single context establishment operation. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which recognizes it as a request for TGT. + (Note that current Kerberos V5 defines no intra-protocol mechanism to + represent such a request.) GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status and provides the service's TGT in + its output_token. The service sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation of GSS_Init_sec_context(). GSS_Init_sec_context() caches + the received service TGT and uses it as part of a service ticket + request to the Kerberos authentication server, storing the returned + service ticket and session key in conjunction with the context. + GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted authenticator, and + returns it in output_token along with GSS_S_COMPLETE return + major_status. The client sends the output_token to the service. + + Service passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + GSS_Accept_sec_context() verifies the authenticator, provides the + service with the client's authenticated name, and returns + major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + GSS_GetMIC(), GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Wrap(), and GSS_Unwrap() as + above. + +5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework + + This example illustrates use of the GSS-API in conjunction with + public-key mechanisms, consistent with the X.509 Directory + Authentication Framework. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call establishes a credentials structure, + making the client's private key accessible for use on behalf of the + client. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(), which interrogates the + Directory to acquire (and validate) a chain of public-key + certificates, thereby collecting the public key of the service. The + certificate validation operation determines that suitable integrity + checks were applied by trusted authorities and that those + certificates have not expired. GSS_Init_sec_context() generates a + secret key for use in per-message protection operations on the + context, and enciphers that secret key under the service's public + key. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 90] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + The enciphered secret key, along with an authenticator quantity + signed with the client's private key, is included in the output_token + from GSS_Init_sec_context(). The output_token also carries a + certification path, consisting of a certificate chain leading from + the service to the client; a variant approach would defer this path + resolution to be performed by the service instead of being asserted + by the client. The client application sends the output_token to the + service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context() validates the + certification path, and as a result determines a certified binding + between the client's distinguished name and the client's public key. + Given that public key, GSS_Accept_sec_context() can process the + input_token's authenticator quantity and verify that the client's + private key was used to sign the input_token. At this point, the + client is authenticated to the service. The service uses its private + key to decipher the enciphered secret key provided to it for per- + message protection operations on the context. + + The client calls GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() on a data message, which + causes per-message authentication, integrity, and (optional) + confidentiality facilities to be applied to that message. The service + uses the context's shared secret key to perform corresponding + GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap() calls. + +6: Security Considerations + + This document specifies a service interface for security facilities + and services; as such, security considerations are considered + throughout the specification. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to + summarize certain specific points relevant to GSS-API implementors + and calling applications. Usage of the GSS-API interface does not in + itself provide security services or assurance; instead, these + attributes are dependent on the underlying mechanism(s) which support + a GSS-API implementation. Callers must be attentive to the requests + made to GSS-API calls and to the status indicators returned by GSS- + API, as these specify the security service characteristics which + GSS-API will provide. When the interprocess context transfer + facility is used, appropriate local controls should be applied to + constrain access to interprocess tokens and to the sensitive data + which they contain. + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 91] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +7: Related Activities + + In order to implement the GSS-API atop existing, emerging, and future + security mechanisms: + + object identifiers must be assigned to candidate GSS-API + mechanisms and the name types which they support + + concrete data element formats and processing procedures must be + defined for candidate mechanisms + + Calling applications must implement formatting conventions which will + enable them to distinguish GSS-API tokens from other data carried in + their application protocols. + + Concrete language bindings are required for the programming + environments in which the GSS-API is to be employed, as [RFC-1509] + defines for the C programming language and GSS-V1. C Language + bindings for GSS-V2 are defined in [RFC-2744]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 92] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +8: Referenced Documents + + [ISO-7498-2] International Standard ISO 7498-2-1988(E), Security + Architecture. + + [ISOIEC-8824] ISO/IEC 8824, "Specification of Abstract Syntax + Notation One (ASN.1)". + + [ISOIEC-8825] ISO/IEC 8825, "Specification of Basic Encoding Rules + for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)".) + + [RFC-1507]: Kaufman, C., "DASS: Distributed Authentication Security + Service", RFC 1507, September 1993. + + [RFC-1508]: Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface", RFC 1508, September 1993. + + [RFC-1509]: Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API: C-bindings", + RFC 1509, September 1993. + + [RFC-1964]: Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", + RFC 1964, June 1996. + + [RFC-2025]: Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism + (SPKM)", RFC 2025, October 1996. + + [RFC-2078]: Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January 1997. + + [RFC-2203]: Eisler, M., Chiu, A. and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol + Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997. + + [RFC-2744]: Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 : + C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 93] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +APPENDIX A + +MECHANISM DESIGN CONSTRAINTS + + The following constraints on GSS-API mechanism designs are adopted in + response to observed caller protocol requirements, and adherence + thereto is anticipated in subsequent descriptions of GSS-API + mechanisms to be documented in standards-track Internet + specifications. + + It is strongly recommended that mechanisms offering per-message + protection services also offer at least one of the replay detection + and sequencing services, as mechanisms offering neither of the latter + will fail to satisfy recognized requirements of certain candidate + caller protocols. + +APPENDIX B + +COMPATIBILITY WITH GSS-V1 + + It is the intent of this document to define an interface and + procedures which preserve compatibility between GSS-V1 [RFC-1508] + callers and GSS-V2 providers. All calls defined in GSS-V1 are + preserved, and it has been a goal that GSS-V1 callers should be able + to operate atop GSS-V2 provider implementations. Certain detailed + changes, summarized in this section, have been made in order to + resolve omissions identified in GSS-V1. + + The following GSS-V1 constructs, while supported within GSS-V2, are + deprecated: + + Names for per-message processing routines: GSS_Seal() deprecated + in favor of GSS_Wrap(); GSS_Sign() deprecated in favor of + GSS_GetMIC(); GSS_Unseal() deprecated in favor of GSS_Unwrap(); + GSS_Verify() deprecated in favor of GSS_VerifyMIC(). + + GSS_Delete_sec_context() facility for context_token usage, + allowing mechanisms to signal context deletion, is retained for + compatibility with GSS-V1. For current usage, it is recommended + that both peers to a context invoke GSS_Delete_sec_context() + independently, passing a null output_context_token buffer to + indicate that no context_token is required. Implementations of + GSS_Delete_sec_context() should delete relevant locally-stored + context information. + + This GSS-V2 specification adds the following calls which are not + present in GSS-V1: + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 94] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Credential management calls: GSS_Add_cred(), + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech(). + + Context-level calls: GSS_Inquire_context(), GSS_Wrap_size_limit(), + GSS_Export_sec_context(), GSS_Import_sec_context(). + + Per-message calls: No new calls. Existing calls have been + renamed. + + Support calls: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set(), + GSS_Add_OID_set_member(), GSS_Test_OID_set_member(), + GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech(), GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name(), + GSS_Canonicalize_name(), GSS_Export_name(), GSS_Duplicate_name(). + + This GSS-V2 specification introduces three new facilities applicable + to security contexts, indicated using the following context state + values which are not present in GSS-V1: + + anon_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context's initiator is + anonymous from the viewpoint of the target; Section 1.2.5 of this + specification provides a summary description of the GSS-V2 + anonymity support facility, support and use of which is optional. + + prot_ready_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context may be used + for per-message protection before final completion of context + establishment; Section 1.2.7 of this specification provides a + summary description of the GSS-V2 facility enabling mechanisms to + selectively permit per-message protection during context + establishment, support and use of which is optional. + + trans_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context is transferable + to another process using the GSS-V2 GSS_Export_sec_context() + facility. + + These state values are represented (at the C bindings level) in + positions within a bit vector which are unused in GSS-V1, and may be + safely ignored by GSS-V1 callers. + + New conf_req_flag and integ_req_flag inputs are defined for + GSS_Init_sec_context(), primarily to provide information to + negotiating mechanisms. This introduces a compatibility issue with + GSS-V1 callers, discussed in section 2.2.1 of this specification. + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 95] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Relative to GSS-V1, GSS-V2 provides additional guidance to GSS-API + implementors in the following areas: implementation robustness, + credential management, behavior in multi-mechanism configurations, + naming support, and inclusion of optional sequencing services. The + token tagging facility as defined in GSS-V2, Section 3.1, is now + described directly in terms of octets to facilitate interoperable + implementation without general ASN.1 processing code; the + corresponding ASN.1 syntax, included for descriptive purposes, is + unchanged from that in GSS-V1. For use in conjunction with added + naming support facilities, a new Exported Name Object construct is + added. Additional name types are introduced in Section 4. + + This GSS-V2 specification adds the following major_status values + which are not defined in GSS-V1: + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP unsupported QOP value + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED operation unauthorized + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE operation unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT duplicate credential element + requested + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN name contains multi-mechanism + elements + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN skipped predecessor token(s) + detected + + Of these added status codes, only two values are defined to be + returnable by calls existing in GSS-V1: GSS_S_BAD_QOP (returnable by + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap()), and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN (returnable by + GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap()). + + Additionally, GSS-V2 descriptions of certain calls present in GSS-V1 + have been updated to allow return of additional major_status values + from the set as defined in GSS-V1: GSS_Inquire_cred() has + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL and GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED defined as + returnable, GSS_Init_sec_context() has GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, and GSS_S_BAD_MECH defined as returnable, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() has GSS_S_BAD_MECH defined as returnable. + +APPENDIX C + +CHANGES RELATIVE TO RFC-2078 + + This document incorporates a number of changes relative to RFC-2078, + made primarily in response to implementation experience, for purposes + of alignment with the GSS-V2 C language bindings document, and to add + informative clarification. This section summarizes technical changes + incorporated. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 96] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + General: + + Clarified usage of object release routines, and incorporated + statement that some may be omitted within certain operating + environments. + + Removed GSS_Release_OID, GSS_OID_to_str(), and GSS_Str_to_OID() + routines. + + Clarified circumstances under which zero-length tokens may validly + exist as inputs and outputs to/from GSS-API calls. + + Added GSS_S_BAD_MIC status code as alias for GSS_S_BAD_SIG. + + For GSS_Display_status(), deferred to language bindings the choice + of whether to return multiple status values in parallel or via + iteration, and added commentary deprecating return of + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. + + Adapted and incorporated clarifying material on optional service + support, delegation, and interprocess context transfer from C + bindings document. + + Added and updated references to related documents, and to current + status of cited Kerberos mechanism OID. + + Added general statement about GSS-API calls having no side effects + visible at the GSS-API level. + + Context-related (including per-message protection issues): + + Clarified GSS_Delete_sec_context() usage for partially-established + contexts. + + Added clarification on GSS_Export_sec_context() and + GSS_Import_sec_context() behavior and context usage following an + export-import sequence. + + Added informatory conf_req_flag, integ_req_flag inputs to + GSS_Init_sec_context(). (Note: this facility introduces a + backward incompatibility with GSS-V1 callers, discussed in Section + 2.2.1; this implication was recognized and accepted in working + group discussion.) + + Stated that GSS_S_FAILURE is to be returned if + GSS_Init_sec_context() or GSS_Accept_sec_context() is passed the + handle of a context which is already fully established. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 97] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Re GSS_Inquire_sec_context(), stated that src_name and targ_name + are not returned until GSS_S_COMPLETE status is reached; removed + use of GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED status code (replacing with EXPIRED + lifetime return value); stated requirement to retain inquirable + data until context released by caller; added result value + indicating whether or not context is fully open. + + Added discussion of interoperability conditions for mechanisms + permitting optional support of QOPs. Removed reference to + structured QOP elements in GSS_Verify_MIC(). + + Added discussion of use of GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN status to + indicate reflected per-message tokens. + + Clarified use of informational sequencing codes from per-message + protection calls in conjunction with GSS_S_COMPLETE and + GSS_S_FAILURE major_status returns, adjusting status code + descriptions accordingly. + + Added specific statements about impact of GSS_GetMIC() and + GSS_Wrap() failures on context state information, and generalized + existing statements about impact of processing failures on + received per-message tokens. + + For GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context(), permitted + returned mech_type to be valid before GSS_S_COMPLETE, recognizing + that the value may change on successive continuation calls in the + negotiated mechanism case. + + Deleted GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED status from + GSS_Import_sec_context(). + + Added conf_req_flag input to GSS_Wrap_size_limit(). + + Stated requirement for mechanisms' support of per-message + protection services to be usable concurrently in both directions + on a context. + + Credential-related: + + For GSS_Acquire_cred() and GSS_Add_cred(), aligned with C bindings + statement of likely non-support for INITIATE or BOTH credentials + if input name is neither empty nor a name resulting from applying + GSS_Inquire_cred() against the default credential. Further, + stated that an explicit name returned by GSS_Inquire_context() + should also be accepted. Added commentary about potentially + time-variant results of default resolution and attendant + implications. Aligned with C bindings re behavior when + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 98] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + GSS_C_NO_NAME provided for desired_name. In GSS_Acquire_cred(), + stated that NULL, rather than empty OID set, should be used for + desired_mechs in order to request default mechanism set. + + Added GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED as returnable major_status for + GSS_Acquire_cred(), GSS_Add_cred(), also specifying GSS_S_NO_CRED + as appropriate return for temporary, user-fixable credential + unavailability. GSS_Acquire_cred() and GSS_Add_cred() are also to + return GSS_S_NO_CRED if an authorization failure is encountered + upon credential acquisition. + + Removed GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED status return from per-message + protection, GSS_Context_time(), and GSS_Inquire_context() calls. + + For GSS_Add_cred(), aligned with C bindings' description of + behavior when addition of elements to the default credential is + requested. + + Upgraded recommended default credential resolution algorithm to + status of requirement for initiator credentials. + + For GSS_Release_cred(), GSS_Inquire_cred(), and + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech(), clarified behavior for input + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL. + + Name-related: + + Aligned GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name() description with C bindings. + + Removed GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE status return from + GSS_Duplicate_name(), GSS_Display_name(); constrained its + applicability for GSS_Compare_name(). + + Aligned with C bindings statement re GSS_Import_name() behavior + with GSS_C_NO_OID input name type, and stated that GSS-V2 + mechanism specifications are to define processing procedures + applicable to their mechanisms. Also clarified GSS_C_NO_OID usage + with GSS_Display_name(). + + Downgraded reference to name canonicalization via DNS lookup to an + example. + + For GSS_Canonicalize_name(), stated that neither negotiated + mechanisms nor the default mechanism are supported input + mech_types for this operation, and specified GSS_S_BAD_MECH status + to be returned in this case. Clarified that the + GSS_Canonicalize_name() operation is non-destructive to its input + name. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 99] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + + Clarified semantics of GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME name type. + + Added descriptions of additional name types. Also added + discussion of GSS_C_NO_NAME and its constrained usage with + specific GSS calls. + + Adapted and incorporated C bindings discussion about name + comparisons with exported name objects. + + Added recommendation to mechanism designers for support of host- + based service name type, deferring any requirement statement to + individual mechanism specifications. Added discussion of host- + based service's service name element and proposed approach for + IANA registration policy therefor. + + Clarified byte ordering within exported name object. Stated that + GSS_S_BAD_MECH is to be returned if, in the course of attempted + import of an exported name object, the name object's enclosed + mechanism type is unrecognized or unsupported. + + Stated that mechanisms may optionally accept GSS_C_NO_NAME as an + input target name to GSS_Init_sec_context(), with comment that + such support is unlikely within mechanisms predating GSS-V2, + Update 1. + +AUTHOR'S ADDRESS + + John Linn + RSA Laboratories + 20 Crosby Drive + Bedford, MA 01730 USA + + Phone: +1 781.687.7817 + EMail: jlinn@rsasecurity.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 100] + +RFC 2743 GSS-API January 2000 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Acknowledgement + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 101] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2744.txt b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2744.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f0c61946f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/standardisation/rfc2744.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5659 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Wray +Request for Comments: 2744 Iris Associates +Obsoletes: 1509 January 2000 +Category: Standards Track + + + Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This document specifies C language bindings for Version 2, Update 1 + of the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS- + API), which is described at a language-independent conceptual level + in RFC-2743 [GSSAPI]. It obsoletes RFC-1509, making specific + incremental changes in response to implementation experience and + liaison requests. It is intended, therefore, that this memo or a + successor version thereof will become the basis for subsequent + progression of the GSS-API specification on the standards track. + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface + provides security services to its callers, and is intended for + implementation atop a variety of underlying cryptographic mechanisms. + Typically, GSS-API callers will be application protocols into which + security enhancements are integrated through invocation of services + provided by the GSS-API. The GSS-API allows a caller application to + authenticate a principal identity associated with a peer application, + to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security services such as + confidentiality and integrity on a per-message basis. + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +1. Introduction + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface + [GSSAPI] provides security services to calling applications. It + allows a communicating application to authenticate the user + associated with another application, to delegate rights to another + application, and to apply security services such as confidentiality + and integrity on a per-message basis. + + There are four stages to using the GSS-API: + + a) The application acquires a set of credentials with which it may + prove its identity to other processes. The application's + credentials vouch for its global identity, which may or may not be + related to any local username under which it may be running. + + b) A pair of communicating applications establish a joint security + context using their credentials. The security context is a pair + of GSS-API data structures that contain shared state information, + which is required in order that per-message security services may + be provided. Examples of state that might be shared between + applications as part of a security context are cryptographic keys, + and message sequence numbers. As part of the establishment of a + security context, the context initiator is authenticated to the + responder, and may require that the responder is authenticated in + turn. The initiator may optionally give the responder the right + to initiate further security contexts, acting as an agent or + delegate of the initiator. This transfer of rights is termed + delegation, and is achieved by creating a set of credentials, + similar to those used by the initiating application, but which may + be used by the responder. + + To establish and maintain the shared information that makes up the + security context, certain GSS-API calls will return a token data + structure, which is an opaque data type that may contain + cryptographically protected data. The caller of such a GSS-API + routine is responsible for transferring the token to the peer + application, encapsulated if necessary in an application- + application protocol. On receipt of such a token, the peer + application should pass it to a corresponding GSS-API routine + which will decode the token and extract the information, updating + the security context state information accordingly. + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + c) Per-message services are invoked to apply either: + + integrity and data origin authentication, or confidentiality, + integrity and data origin authentication to application data, + which are treated by GSS-API as arbitrary octet-strings. An + application transmitting a message that it wishes to protect will + call the appropriate GSS-API routine (gss_get_mic or gss_wrap) to + apply protection, specifying the appropriate security context, and + send the resulting token to the receiving application. The + receiver will pass the received token (and, in the case of data + protected by gss_get_mic, the accompanying message-data) to the + corresponding decoding routine (gss_verify_mic or gss_unwrap) to + remove the protection and validate the data. + + d) At the completion of a communications session (which may extend + across several transport connections), each application calls a + GSS-API routine to delete the security context. Multiple contexts + may also be used (either successively or simultaneously) within a + single communications association, at the option of the + applications. + +2. GSS-API Routines + + This section lists the routines that make up the GSS-API, and + offers a brief description of the purpose of each routine. + Detailed descriptions of each routine are listed in alphabetical + order in section 5. + + Table 2-1 GSS-API Credential-management Routines + + Routine Section Function + ------- ------- -------- + gss_acquire_cred 5.2 Assume a global identity; Obtain + a GSS-API credential handle for + pre-existing credentials. + gss_add_cred 5.3 Construct credentials + incrementally + gss_inquire_cred 5.21 Obtain information about a + credential + gss_inquire_cred_by_mech 5.22 Obtain per-mechanism information + about a credential. + gss_release_cred 5.27 Discard a credential handle. + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Table 2-2 GSS-API Context-Level Routines + + Routine Section Function + ------- ------- -------- + gss_init_sec_context 5.19 Initiate a security context with + a peer application + gss_accept_sec_context 5.1 Accept a security context + initiated by a + peer application + gss_delete_sec_context 5.9 Discard a security context + gss_process_context_token 5.25 Process a token on a security + context from a peer application + gss_context_time 5.7 Determine for how long a context + will remain valid + gss_inquire_context 5.20 Obtain information about a + security context + gss_wrap_size_limit 5.34 Determine token-size limit for + gss_wrap on a context + gss_export_sec_context 5.14 Transfer a security context to + another process + gss_import_sec_context 5.17 Import a transferred context + + + Table 2-3 GSS-API Per-message Routines + + Routine Section Function + ------- ------- -------- + gss_get_mic 5.15 Calculate a cryptographic message + integrity code (MIC) for a + message; integrity service + gss_verify_mic 5.32 Check a MIC against a message; + verify integrity of a received + message + gss_wrap 5.33 Attach a MIC to a message, and + optionally encrypt the message + content; + confidentiality service + gss_unwrap 5.31 Verify a message with attached + MIC, and decrypt message content + if necessary. + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Table 2-4 GSS-API Name manipulation Routines + + Routine Section Function + ------- ------- -------- + gss_import_name 5.16 Convert a contiguous string name + to internal-form + gss_display_name 5.10 Convert internal-form name to + text + gss_compare_name 5.6 Compare two internal-form names + + gss_release_name 5.28 Discard an internal-form name + gss_inquire_names_for_mech 5.24 List the name-types supported by + the specified mechanism + gss_inquire_mechs_for_name 5.23 List mechanisms that support the + specified name-type + gss_canonicalize_name 5.5 Convert an internal name to an MN + gss_export_name 5.13 Convert an MN to export form + gss_duplicate_name 5.12 Create a copy of an internal name + + + Table 2-5 GSS-API Miscellaneous Routines + + Routine Section Function + ------- ------- -------- + gss_add_oid_set_member 5.4 Add an object identifier to + a set + gss_display_status 5.11 Convert a GSS-API status code + to text + gss_indicate_mechs 5.18 Determine available underlying + authentication mechanisms + gss_release_buffer 5.26 Discard a buffer + gss_release_oid_set 5.29 Discard a set of object + identifiers + gss_create_empty_oid_set 5.8 Create a set containing no + object identifiers + gss_test_oid_set_member 5.30 Determines whether an object + identifier is a member of a set. + + Individual GSS-API implementations may augment these routines by + providing additional mechanism-specific routines if required + functionality is not available from the generic forms. Applications + are encouraged to use the generic routines wherever possible on + portability grounds. + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +3. Data Types and Calling Conventions + + The following conventions are used by the GSS-API C-language + bindings: + +3.1. Integer types + + GSS-API uses the following integer data type: + + OM_uint32 32-bit unsigned integer + + Where guaranteed minimum bit-count is important, this portable data + type is used by the GSS-API routine definitions. Individual GSS-API + implementations will include appropriate typedef definitions to map + this type onto a built-in data type. If the platform supports the + X/Open xom.h header file, the OM_uint32 definition contained therein + should be used; the GSS-API header file in Appendix A contains logic + that will detect the prior inclusion of xom.h, and will not attempt + to re-declare OM_uint32. If the X/Open header file is not available + on the platform, the GSS-API implementation should use the smallest + natural unsigned integer type that provides at least 32 bits of + precision. + +3.2. String and similar data + + Many of the GSS-API routines take arguments and return values that + describe contiguous octet-strings. All such data is passed between + the GSS-API and the caller using the gss_buffer_t data type. This + data type is a pointer to a buffer descriptor, which consists of a + length field that contains the total number of bytes in the datum, + and a value field which contains a pointer to the actual datum: + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + Storage for data returned to the application by a GSS-API routine + using the gss_buffer_t conventions is allocated by the GSS-API + routine. The application may free this storage by invoking the + gss_release_buffer routine. Allocation of the gss_buffer_desc object + is always the responsibility of the application; unused + gss_buffer_desc objects may be initialized to the value + GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER. + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +3.2.1. Opaque data types + + Certain multiple-word data items are considered opaque data types at + the GSS-API, because their internal structure has no significance + either to the GSS-API or to the caller. Examples of such opaque data + types are the input_token parameter to gss_init_sec_context (which is + opaque to the caller), and the input_message parameter to gss_wrap + (which is opaque to the GSS-API). Opaque data is passed between the + GSS-API and the application using the gss_buffer_t datatype. + +3.2.2. Character strings + + Certain multiple-word data items may be regarded as simple ISO + Latin-1 character strings. Examples are the printable strings passed + to gss_import_name via the input_name_buffer parameter. Some GSS-API + routines also return character strings. All such character strings + are passed between the application and the GSS-API implementation + using the gss_buffer_t datatype, which is a pointer to a + gss_buffer_desc object. + + When a gss_buffer_desc object describes a printable string, the + length field of the gss_buffer_desc should only count printable + characters within the string. In particular, a trailing NUL + character should NOT be included in the length count, nor should + either the GSS-API implementation or the application assume the + presence of an uncounted trailing NUL. + +3.3. Object Identifiers + + Certain GSS-API procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID, or + Object identifier. This is a type containing ISO-defined tree- + structured values, and is used by the GSS-API caller to select an + underlying security mechanism and to specify namespaces. A value of + type gss_OID has the following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + The elements field of this structure points to the first byte of an + octet string containing the ASN.1 BER encoding of the value portion + of the normal BER TLV encoding of the gss_OID. The length field + contains the number of bytes in this value. For example, the gss_OID + value corresponding to {iso(1) identified-organization(3) icd- + ecma(12) member-company(2) dec(1011) cryptoAlgorithms(7) DASS(5)}, + meaning the DASS X.509 authentication mechanism, has a length field + of 7 and an elements field pointing to seven octets containing the + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + following octal values: 53,14,2,207,163,7,5. GSS-API implementations + should provide constant gss_OID values to allow applications to + request any supported mechanism, although applications are encouraged + on portability grounds to accept the default mechanism. gss_OID + values should also be provided to allow applications to specify + particular name types (see section 3.10). Applications should treat + gss_OID_desc values returned by GSS-API routines as read-only. In + particular, the application should not attempt to deallocate them + with free(). The gss_OID_desc datatype is equivalent to the X/Open + OM_object_identifier datatype[XOM]. + +3.4. Object Identifier Sets + + Certain GSS-API procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID_set. + This type represents one or more object identifiers (section 2.3). A + gss_OID_set object has the following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + size_t count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + The count field contains the number of OIDs within the set. The + elements field is a pointer to an array of gss_OID_desc objects, each + of which describes a single OID. gss_OID_set values are used to name + the available mechanisms supported by the GSS-API, to request the use + of specific mechanisms, and to indicate which mechanisms a given + credential supports. + + All OID sets returned to the application by GSS-API are dynamic + objects (the gss_OID_set_desc, the "elements" array of the set, and + the "elements" array of each member OID are all dynamically + allocated), and this storage must be deallocated by the application + using the gss_release_oid_set() routine. + +3.5. Credentials + + A credential handle is a caller-opaque atomic datum that identifies a + GSS-API credential data structure. It is represented by the caller- + opaque type gss_cred_id_t, which should be implemented as a pointer + or arithmetic type. If a pointer implementation is chosen, care must + be taken to ensure that two gss_cred_id_t values may be compared with + the == operator. + + GSS-API credentials can contain mechanism-specific principal + authentication data for multiple mechanisms. A GSS-API credential is + composed of a set of credential-elements, each of which is applicable + to a single mechanism. A credential may contain at most one + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + credential-element for each supported mechanism. A credential-element + identifies the data needed by a single mechanism to authenticate a + single principal, and conceptually contains two credential-references + that describe the actual mechanism-specific authentication data, one + to be used by GSS-API for initiating contexts, and one to be used + for accepting contexts. For mechanisms that do not distinguish + between acceptor and initiator credentials, both references would + point to the same underlying mechanism-specific authentication data. + + Credentials describe a set of mechanism-specific principals, and give + their holder the ability to act as any of those principals. All + principal identities asserted by a single GSS-API credential should + belong to the same entity, although enforcement of this property is + an implementation-specific matter. The GSS-API does not make the + actual credentials available to applications; instead a credential + handle is used to identify a particular credential, held internally + by GSS-API. The combination of GSS-API credential handle and + mechanism identifies the principal whose identity will be asserted by + the credential when used with that mechanism. + + The gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context routines allow + the value GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to be specified as their credential + handle parameter. This special credential-handle indicates a desire + by the application to act as a default principal. While individual + GSS-API implementations are free to determine such default behavior + as appropriate to the mechanism, the following default behavior by + these routines is recommended for portability: + + gss_init_sec_context + + 1) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating + security contexts for the chosen mechanism that the application + is authorized to act on behalf of, then that principal shall be + used, otherwise + + 2) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network- + identity for the chosen mechanism, and if the application is + authorized to act on behalf of that identity for the purpose of + initiating security contexts, then the principal corresponding + to that identity shall be used, otherwise + + 3) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local + identity, and provides a means to map local identities into + network-identities for the chosen mechanism, and if the + application is authorized to act on behalf of the network- + identity image of the default local identity for the purpose of + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + initiating security contexts using the chosen mechanism, then + the principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, + otherwise + + 4) A user-configurable default identity should be used. + + gss_accept_sec_context + + 1) If there is only a single authorized principal identity capable + of accepting security contexts for the chosen mechanism, then + that principal shall be used, otherwise + + 2) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target + principal by examining the context-establishment token, and if + the accepting application is authorized to act as that + principal for the purpose of accepting security contexts using + the chosen mechanism, then that principal identity shall be + used, otherwise + + 3) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any principal, + and if mutual authentication was not requested, any principal + that the application is authorized to accept security contexts + under using the chosen mechanism may be used, otherwise + + 4)A user-configurable default identity shall be used. + + The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be + established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior + wherever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are + likely to be more portable across mechanisms and platforms than ones + that use gss_acquire_cred to request a specific identity. + +3.6. Contexts + + The gss_ctx_id_t data type contains a caller-opaque atomic value that + identifies one end of a GSS-API security context. It should be + implemented as a pointer or arithmetic type. If a pointer type is + chosen, care should be taken to ensure that two gss_ctx_id_t values + may be compared with the == operator. + + The security context holds state information about each end of a peer + communication, including cryptographic state information. + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +3.7. Authentication tokens + + A token is a caller-opaque type that GSS-API uses to maintain + synchronization between the context data structures at each end of a + GSS-API security context. The token is a cryptographically protected + octet-string, generated by the underlying mechanism at one end of a + GSS-API security context for use by the peer mechanism at the other + end. Encapsulation (if required) and transfer of the token are the + responsibility of the peer applications. A token is passed between + the GSS-API and the application using the gss_buffer_t conventions. + +3.8. Interprocess tokens + + Certain GSS-API routines are intended to transfer data between + processes in multi-process programs. These routines use a caller- + opaque octet-string, generated by the GSS-API in one process for use + by the GSS-API in another process. The calling application is + responsible for transferring such tokens between processes in an OS- + specific manner. Note that, while GSS-API implementors are + encouraged to avoid placing sensitive information within interprocess + tokens, or to cryptographically protect them, many implementations + will be unable to avoid placing key material or other sensitive data + within them. It is the application's responsibility to ensure that + interprocess tokens are protected in transit, and transferred only to + processes that are trustworthy. An interprocess token is passed + between the GSS-API and the application using the gss_buffer_t + conventions. + +3.9. Status values + + Every GSS-API routine returns two distinct values to report status + information to the caller: GSS status codes and Mechanism status + codes. + +3.9.1. GSS status codes + + GSS-API routines return GSS status codes as their OM_uint32 function + value. These codes indicate errors that are independent of the + underlying mechanism(s) used to provide the security service. The + errors that can be indicated via a GSS status code are either generic + API routine errors (errors that are defined in the GSS-API + specification) or calling errors (errors that are specific to these + language bindings). + + A GSS status code can indicate a single fatal generic API error from + the routine and a single calling error. In addition, supplementary + status information may be indicated via the setting of bits in the + supplementary info field of a GSS status code. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + These errors are encoded into the 32-bit GSS status code as follows: + + MSB LSB + |------------------------------------------------------------| + | Calling Error | Routine Error | Supplementary Info | + |------------------------------------------------------------| + Bit 31 24 23 16 15 0 + + Hence if a GSS-API routine returns a GSS status code whose upper 16 + bits contain a non-zero value, the call failed. If the calling error + field is non-zero, the invoking application's call of the routine was + erroneous. Calling errors are defined in table 5-1. If the routine + error field is non-zero, the routine failed for one of the routine- + specific reasons listed below in table 5-2. Whether or not the upper + 16 bits indicate a failure or a success, the routine may indicate + additional information by setting bits in the supplementary info + field of the status code. The meaning of individual bits is listed + below in table 5-3. + + Table 3-1 Calling Errors + + Name Value in field Meaning + ---- -------------- ------- + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ 1 A required input parameter + could not be read + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE 2 A required output parameter + could not be written. + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE 3 A parameter was malformed + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Table 3-2 Routine Errors + + Name Value in field Meaning + ---- -------------- ------- + GSS_S_BAD_MECH 1 An unsupported mechanism + was requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME 2 An invalid name was + supplied + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 3 A supplied name was of an + unsupported type + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS 4 Incorrect channel bindings + were supplied + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 5 An invalid status code was + supplied + GSS_S_BAD_MIC GSS_S_BAD_SIG 6 A token had an invalid MIC + GSS_S_NO_CRED 7 No credentials were + supplied, or the + credentials were + unavailable or + inaccessible. + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 8 No context has been + established + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 9 A token was invalid + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 10 A credential was invalid + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 11 The referenced credentials + have expired + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 12 The context has expired + GSS_S_FAILURE 13 Miscellaneous failure (see + text) + GSS_S_BAD_QOP 14 The quality-of-protection + requested could not be + provided + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED 15 The operation is forbidden + by local security policy + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE 16 The operation or option is + unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT 17 The requested credential + element already exists + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN 18 The provided name was not a + mechanism name + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Table 3-3 Supplementary Status Bits + + Name Bit Number Meaning + ---- ---------- ------- + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED 0 (LSB) Returned only by + gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context. The + routine must be called again + to complete its function. + See routine documentation for + detailed description + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN 1 The token was a duplicate of + an earlier token + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 2 The token's validity period + has expired + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 3 A later token has already been + processed + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN 4 An expected per-message token + was not received + + The routine documentation also uses the name GSS_S_COMPLETE, which is + a zero value, to indicate an absence of any API errors or + supplementary information bits. + + All GSS_S_xxx symbols equate to complete OM_uint32 status codes, + rather than to bitfield values. For example, the actual value of the + symbol GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (value 3 in the routine error field) is + 3<<16. The macros GSS_CALLING_ERROR(), GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR() and + GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO() are provided, each of which takes a GSS + status code and removes all but the relevant field. For example, the + value obtained by applying GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR to a status code removes + the calling errors and supplementary info fields, leaving only the + routine errors field. The values delivered by these macros may be + directly compared with a GSS_S_xxx symbol of the appropriate type. + The macro GSS_ERROR() is also provided, which when applied to a GSS + status code returns a non-zero value if the status code indicated a + calling or routine error, and a zero value otherwise. All macros + defined by GSS-API evaluate their argument(s) exactly once. + + A GSS-API implementation may choose to signal calling errors in a + platform-specific manner instead of, or in addition to the routine + value; routine errors and supplementary info should be returned via + major status values only. + + The GSS major status code GSS_S_FAILURE is used to indicate that the + underlying mechanism detected an error for which no specific GSS + status code is defined. The mechanism-specific status code will + provide more details about the error. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +3.9.2. Mechanism-specific status codes + + GSS-API routines return a minor_status parameter, which is used to + indicate specialized errors from the underlying security mechanism. + This parameter may contain a single mechanism-specific error, + indicated by a OM_uint32 value. + + The minor_status parameter will always be set by a GSS-API routine, + even if it returns a calling error or one of the generic API errors + indicated above as fatal, although most other output parameters may + remain unset in such cases. However, output parameters that are + expected to return pointers to storage allocated by a routine must + always be set by the routine, even in the event of an error, although + in such cases the GSS-API routine may elect to set the returned + parameter value to NULL to indicate that no storage was actually + allocated. Any length field associated with such pointers (as in a + gss_buffer_desc structure) should also be set to zero in such cases. + +3.10. Names + + A name is used to identify a person or entity. GSS-API authenticates + the relationship between a name and the entity claiming the name. + + Since different authentication mechanisms may employ different + namespaces for identifying their principals, GSSAPI's naming support + is necessarily complex in multi-mechanism environments (or even in + some single-mechanism environments where the underlying mechanism + supports multiple namespaces). + + Two distinct representations are defined for names: + + An internal form. This is the GSS-API "native" format for names, + represented by the implementation-specific gss_name_t type. It is + opaque to GSS-API callers. A single gss_name_t object may contain + multiple names from different namespaces, but all names should + refer to the same entity. An example of such an internal name + would be the name returned from a call to the gss_inquire_cred + routine, when applied to a credential containing credential + elements for multiple authentication mechanisms employing + different namespaces. This gss_name_t object will contain a + distinct name for the entity for each authentication mechanism. + + For GSS-API implementations supporting multiple namespaces, + objects of type gss_name_t must contain sufficient information to + determine the namespace to which each primitive name belongs. + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Mechanism-specific contiguous octet-string forms. A format + capable of containing a single name (from a single namespace). + Contiguous string names are always accompanied by an object + identifier specifying the namespace to which the name belongs, and + their format is dependent on the authentication mechanism that + employs the name. Many, but not all, contiguous string names will + be printable, and may therefore be used by GSS-API applications + for communication with their users. + + Routines (gss_import_name and gss_display_name) are provided to + convert names between contiguous string representations and the + internal gss_name_t type. gss_import_name may support multiple + syntaxes for each supported namespace, allowing users the freedom to + choose a preferred name representation. gss_display_name should use + an implementation-chosen printable syntax for each supported name- + type. + + If an application calls gss_display_name(), passing the internal name + resulting from a call to gss_import_name(), there is no guarantee the + the resulting contiguous string name will be the same as the original + imported string name. Nor do name-space identifiers necessarily + survive unchanged after a journey through the internal name-form. An + example of this might be a mechanism that authenticates X.500 names, + but provides an algorithmic mapping of Internet DNS names into X.500. + That mechanism's implementation of gss_import_name() might, when + presented with a DNS name, generate an internal name that contained + both the original DNS name and the equivalent X.500 name. + Alternatively, it might only store the X.500 name. In the latter + case, gss_display_name() would most likely generate a printable X.500 + name, rather than the original DNS name. + + The process of authentication delivers to the context acceptor an + internal name. Since this name has been authenticated by a single + mechanism, it contains only a single name (even if the internal name + presented by the context initiator to gss_init_sec_context had + multiple components). Such names are termed internal mechanism + names, or "MN"s and the names emitted by gss_accept_sec_context() are + always of this type. Since some applications may require MNs without + wanting to incur the overhead of an authentication operation, a + second function, gss_canonicalize_name(), is provided to convert a + general internal name into an MN. + + Comparison of internal-form names may be accomplished via the + gss_compare_name() routine, which returns true if the two names being + compared refer to the same entity. This removes the need for the + application program to understand the syntaxes of the various + printable names that a given GSS-API implementation may support. + Since GSS-API assumes that all primitive names contained within a + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + given internal name refer to the same entity, gss_compare_name() can + return true if the two names have at least one primitive name in + common. If the implementation embodies knowledge of equivalence + relationships between names taken from different namespaces, this + knowledge may also allow successful comparison of internal names + containing no overlapping primitive elements. + + When used in large access control lists, the overhead of invoking + gss_import_name() and gss_compare_name() on each name from the ACL + may be prohibitive. As an alternative way of supporting this case, + GSS-API defines a special form of the contiguous string name which + may be compared directly (e.g. with memcmp()). Contiguous names + suitable for comparison are generated by the gss_export_name() + routine, which requires an MN as input. Exported names may be re- + imported by the gss_import_name() routine, and the resulting internal + name will also be an MN. The gss_OID constant GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME + indentifies the "export name" type, and the value of this constant is + given in Appendix A. Structurally, an exported name object consists + of a header containing an OID identifying the mechanism that + authenticated the name, and a trailer containing the name itself, + where the syntax of the trailer is defined by the individual + mechanism specification. The precise format of an export name is + defined in the language-independent GSS-API specification [GSSAPI]. + + Note that the results obtained by using gss_compare_name() will in + general be different from those obtained by invoking + gss_canonicalize_name() and gss_export_name(), and then comparing the + exported names. The first series of operation determines whether two + (unauthenticated) names identify the same principal; the second + whether a particular mechanism would authenticate them as the same + principal. These two operations will in general give the same + results only for MNs. + + The gss_name_t datatype should be implemented as a pointer type. To + allow the compiler to aid the application programmer by performing + type-checking, the use of (void *) is discouraged. A pointer to an + implementation-defined type is the preferred choice. + + Storage is allocated by routines that return gss_name_t values. A + procedure, gss_release_name, is provided to free storage associated + with an internal-form name. + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +3.11. Channel Bindings + + GSS-API supports the use of user-specified tags to identify a given + context to the peer application. These tags are intended to be used + to identify the particular communications channel that carries the + context. Channel bindings are communicated to the GSS-API using the + following structure: + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + The initiator_addrtype and acceptor_addrtype fields denote the type + of addresses contained in the initiator_address and acceptor_address + buffers. The address type should be one of the following: + + GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC Unspecified address type + GSS_C_AF_LOCAL Host-local address type + GSS_C_AF_INET Internet address type (e.g. IP) + GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK ARPAnet IMP address type + GSS_C_AF_PUP pup protocols (eg BSP) address type + GSS_C_AF_CHAOS MIT CHAOS protocol address type + GSS_C_AF_NS XEROX NS address type + GSS_C_AF_NBS nbs address type + GSS_C_AF_ECMA ECMA address type + GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT datakit protocols address type + GSS_C_AF_CCITT CCITT protocols + GSS_C_AF_SNA IBM SNA address type + GSS_C_AF_DECnet DECnet address type + GSS_C_AF_DLI Direct data link interface address type + GSS_C_AF_LAT LAT address type + GSS_C_AF_HYLINK NSC Hyperchannel address type + GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK AppleTalk address type + GSS_C_AF_BSC BISYNC 2780/3780 address type + GSS_C_AF_DSS Distributed system services address type + GSS_C_AF_OSI OSI TP4 address type + GSS_C_AF_X25 X.25 + GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR No address specified + + Note that these symbols name address families rather than specific + addressing formats. For address families that contain several + alternative address forms, the initiator_address and acceptor_address + fields must contain sufficient information to determine which address + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + form is used. When not otherwise specified, addresses should be + specified in network byte-order (that is, native byte-ordering for + the address family). + + Conceptually, the GSS-API concatenates the initiator_addrtype, + initiator_address, acceptor_addrtype, acceptor_address and + application_data to form an octet string. The mechanism calculates a + MIC over this octet string, and binds the MIC to the context + establishment token emitted by gss_init_sec_context. The same + bindings are presented by the context acceptor to + gss_accept_sec_context, and a MIC is calculated in the same way. The + calculated MIC is compared with that found in the token, and if the + MICs differ, gss_accept_sec_context will return a GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS + error, and the context will not be established. Some mechanisms may + include the actual channel binding data in the token (rather than + just a MIC); applications should therefore not use confidential data + as channel-binding components. + + Individual mechanisms may impose additional constraints on addresses + and address types that may appear in channel bindings. For example, + a mechanism may verify that the initiator_address field of the + channel bindings presented to gss_init_sec_context contains the + correct network address of the host system. Portable applications + should therefore ensure that they either provide correct information + for the address fields, or omit addressing information, specifying + GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR as the address-types. + +3.12. Optional parameters + + Various parameters are described as optional. This means that they + follow a convention whereby a default value may be requested. The + following conventions are used for omitted parameters. These + conventions apply only to those parameters that are explicitly + documented as optional. + +3.12.1. gss_buffer_t types + + Specify GSS_C_NO_BUFFER as a value. For an input parameter this + signifies that default behavior is requested, while for an output + parameter it indicates that the information that would be returned + via the parameter is not required by the application. + +3.12.2. Integer types (input) + + Individual parameter documentation lists values to be used to + indicate default actions. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +3.12.3. Integer types (output) + + Specify NULL as the value for the pointer. + +3.12.4. Pointer types + + Specify NULL as the value. + +3.12.5. Object IDs + + Specify GSS_C_NO_OID as the value. + +3.12.6. Object ID Sets + + Specify GSS_C_NO_OID_SET as the value. + +3.12.7. Channel Bindings + + Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS to indicate that channel bindings + are not to be used. + +4. Additional Controls + + This section discusses the optional services that a context initiator + may request of the GSS-API at context establishment. Each of these + services is requested by setting a flag in the req_flags input + parameter to gss_init_sec_context. + + The optional services currently defined are: + + Delegation - The (usually temporary) transfer of rights from + initiator to acceptor, enabling the acceptor to authenticate + itself as an agent of the initiator. + + Mutual Authentication - In addition to the initiator authenticating + its identity to the context acceptor, the context acceptor should + also authenticate itself to the initiator. + + Replay detection - In addition to providing message integrity + services, gss_get_mic and gss_wrap should include message + numbering information to enable gss_verify_mic and gss_unwrap to + detect if a message has been duplicated. + + Out-of-sequence detection - In addition to providing message + integrity services, gss_get_mic and gss_wrap should include + message sequencing information to enable gss_verify_mic and + gss_unwrap to detect if a message has been received out of + sequence. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Anonymous authentication - The establishment of the security context + should not reveal the initiator's identity to the context + acceptor. + + Any currently undefined bits within such flag arguments should be + ignored by GSS-API implementations when presented by an application, + and should be set to zero when returned to the application by the + GSS-API implementation. + + Some mechanisms may not support all optional services, and some + mechanisms may only support some services in conjunction with others. + Both gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context inform the + applications which services will be available from the context when + the establishment phase is complete, via the ret_flags output + parameter. In general, if the security mechanism is capable of + providing a requested service, it should do so, even if additional + services must be enabled in order to provide the requested service. + If the mechanism is incapable of providing a requested service, it + should proceed without the service, leaving the application to abort + the context establishment process if it considers the requested + service to be mandatory. + + Some mechanisms may specify that support for some services is + optional, and that implementors of the mechanism need not provide it. + This is most commonly true of the confidentiality service, often + because of legal restrictions on the use of data-encryption, but may + apply to any of the services. Such mechanisms are required to send + at least one token from acceptor to initiator during context + establishment when the initiator indicates a desire to use such a + service, so that the initiating GSS-API can correctly indicate + whether the service is supported by the acceptor's GSS-API. + +4.1. Delegation + + The GSS-API allows delegation to be controlled by the initiating + application via a boolean parameter to gss_init_sec_context(), the + routine that establishes a security context. Some mechanisms do not + support delegation, and for such mechanisms attempts by an + application to enable delegation are ignored. + + The acceptor of a security context for which the initiator enabled + delegation will receive (via the delegated_cred_handle parameter of + gss_accept_sec_context) a credential handle that contains the + delegated identity, and this credential handle may be used to + initiate subsequent GSS-API security contexts as an agent or delegate + of the initiator. If the original initiator's identity is "A" and + the delegate's identity is "B", then, depending on the underlying + mechanism, the identity embodied by the delegated credential may be + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + either "A" or "B acting for A". + + For many mechanisms that support delegation, a simple boolean does + not provide enough control. Examples of additional aspects of + delegation control that a mechanism might provide to an application + are duration of delegation, network addresses from which delegation + is valid, and constraints on the tasks that may be performed by a + delegate. Such controls are presently outside the scope of the GSS- + API. GSS-API implementations supporting mechanisms offering + additional controls should provide extension routines that allow + these controls to be exercised (perhaps by modifying the initiator's + GSS-API credential prior to its use in establishing a context). + However, the simple delegation control provided by GSS-API should + always be able to over-ride other mechanism-specific delegation + controls - If the application instructs gss_init_sec_context() that + delegation is not desired, then the implementation must not permit + delegation to occur. This is an exception to the general rule that a + mechanism may enable services even if they are not requested - + delegation may only be provided at the explicit request of the + application. + +4.2. Mutual authentication + + Usually, a context acceptor will require that a context initiator + authenticate itself so that the acceptor may make an access-control + decision prior to performing a service for the initiator. In some + cases, the initiator may also request that the acceptor authenticate + itself. GSS-API allows the initiating application to request this + mutual authentication service by setting a flag when calling + gss_init_sec_context. + + The initiating application is informed as to whether or not the + context acceptor has authenticated itself. Note that some mechanisms + may not support mutual authentication, and other mechanisms may + always perform mutual authentication, whether or not the initiating + application requests it. In particular, mutual authentication my be + required by some mechanisms in order to support replay or out-of- + sequence message detection, and for such mechanisms a request for + either of these services will automatically enable mutual + authentication. + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +4.3. Replay and out-of-sequence detection + + The GSS-API may provide detection of mis-ordered message once a + security context has been established. Protection may be applied to + messages by either application, by calling either gss_get_mic or + gss_wrap, and verified by the peer application by calling + gss_verify_mic or gss_unwrap. + + gss_get_mic calculates a cryptographic MIC over an application + message, and returns that MIC in a token. The application should + pass both the token and the message to the peer application, which + presents them to gss_verify_mic. + + gss_wrap calculates a cryptographic MIC of an application message, + and places both the MIC and the message inside a single token. The + Application should pass the token to the peer application, which + presents it to gss_unwrap to extract the message and verify the MIC. + + Either pair of routines may be capable of detecting out-of-sequence + message delivery, or duplication of messages. Details of such mis- + ordered messages are indicated through supplementary status bits in + the major status code returned by gss_verify_mic or gss_unwrap. The + relevant supplementary bits are: + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN - The token is a duplicate of one that has + already been received and processed. Only + contexts that claim to provide replay detection + may set this bit. + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN - The token is too old to determine whether or + not it is a duplicate. Contexts supporting + out-of-sequence detection but not replay + detection should always set this bit if + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN is set; contexts that support + replay detection should only set this bit if the + token is so old that it cannot be checked for + duplication. + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN - A later token has already been processed. + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN - An earlier token has not yet been received. + + A mechanism need not maintain a list of all tokens that have been + processed in order to support these status codes. A typical + mechanism might retain information about only the most recent "N" + tokens processed, allowing it to distinguish duplicates and missing + tokens within the most recent "N" messages; the receipt of a token + older than the most recent "N" would result in a GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN + status. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +4.4. Anonymous Authentication + + In certain situations, an application may wish to initiate the + authentication process to authenticate a peer, without revealing its + own identity. As an example, consider an application providing + access to a database containing medical information, and offering + unrestricted access to the service. A client of such a service might + wish to authenticate the service (in order to establish trust in any + information retrieved from it), but might not wish the service to be + able to obtain the client's identity (perhaps due to privacy concerns + about the specific inquiries, or perhaps simply to avoid being placed + on mailing-lists). + + In normal use of the GSS-API, the initiator's identity is made + available to the acceptor as a result of the context establishment + process. However, context initiators may request that their identity + not be revealed to the context acceptor. Many mechanisms do not + support anonymous authentication, and for such mechanisms the request + will not be honored. An authentication token will be still be + generated, but the application is always informed if a requested + service is unavailable, and has the option to abort context + establishment if anonymity is valued above the other security + services that would require a context to be established. + + In addition to informing the application that a context is + established anonymously (via the ret_flags outputs from + gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context), the optional + src_name output from gss_accept_sec_context and gss_inquire_context + will, for such contexts, return a reserved internal-form name, + defined by the implementation. + + When presented to gss_display_name, this reserved internal-form name + will result in a printable name that is syntactically distinguishable + from any valid principal name supported by the implementation, + associated with a name-type object identifier with the value + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS, whose value us given in Appendix A. The + printable form of an anonymous name should be chosen such that it + implies anonymity, since this name may appear in, for example, audit + logs. For example, the string "" might be a good choice, + if no valid printable names supported by the implementation can begin + with "<" and end with ">". + +4.5. Confidentiality + + If a context supports the confidentiality service, gss_wrap may be + used to encrypt application messages. Messages are selectively + encrypted, under the control of the conf_req_flag input parameter to + gss_wrap. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +4.6. Inter-process context transfer + + GSS-API V2 provides routines (gss_export_sec_context and + gss_import_sec_context) which allow a security context to be + transferred between processes on a single machine. The most common + use for such a feature is a client-server design where the server is + implemented as a single process that accepts incoming security + contexts, which then launches child processes to deal with the data + on these contexts. In such a design, the child processes must have + access to the security context data structure created within the + parent by its call to gss_accept_sec_context so that they can use + per-message protection services and delete the security context when + the communication session ends. + + Since the security context data structure is expected to contain + sequencing information, it is impractical in general to share a + context between processes. Thus GSS-API provides a call + (gss_export_sec_context) that the process which currently owns the + context can call to declare that it has no intention to use the + context subsequently, and to create an inter-process token containing + information needed by the adopting process to successfully import the + context. After successful completion of gss_export_sec_context, the + original security context is made inaccessible to the calling process + by GSS-API, and any context handles referring to this context are no + longer valid. The originating process transfers the inter-process + token to the adopting process, which passes it to + gss_import_sec_context, and a fresh gss_ctx_id_t is created such that + it is functionally identical to the original context. + + The inter-process token may contain sensitive data from the original + security context (including cryptographic keys). Applications using + inter-process tokens to transfer security contexts must take + appropriate steps to protect these tokens in transit. + + Implementations are not required to support the inter-process + transfer of security contexts. The ability to transfer a security + context is indicated when the context is created, by + gss_init_sec_context or gss_accept_sec_context setting the + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bit in their ret_flags parameter. + +4.7. The use of incomplete contexts + + Some mechanisms may allow the per-message services to be used before + the context establishment process is complete. For example, a + mechanism may include sufficient information in its initial context- + level token for the context acceptor to immediately decode messages + protected with gss_wrap or gss_get_mic. For such a mechanism, the + initiating application need not wait until subsequent context-level + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + tokens have been sent and received before invoking the per-message + protection services. + + The ability of a context to provide per-message services in advance + of complete context establishment is indicated by the setting of the + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG bit in the ret_flags parameter from + gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context. Applications wishing + to use per-message protection services on partially-established + contexts should check this flag before attempting to invoke gss_wrap + or gss_get_mic. + +5. GSS-API Routine Descriptions + + In addition to the explicit major status codes documented here, the + code GSS_S_FAILURE may be returned by any routine, indicating an + implementation-specific or mechanism-specific error condition, + further details of which are reported via the minor_status parameter. + +5.1. gss_accept_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, + const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_name_t *src_name, + gss_OID *mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 *ret_flags, + OM_uint32 *time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application + and a remote peer to be established. The routine may return a + output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, + where the peer application will present it to gss_init_sec_context. + If no token need be sent, gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this + by setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To + complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + required from the peer application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context + will return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in which case it + should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer + application, passing the token to gss_accept_sec_context via the + input_token parameters. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length + and return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or + waited for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke + gss_accept_sec_context within a loop: + + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + + do { + receive_token_from_peer(input_token); + maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + cred_hdl, + input_token, + input_bindings, + &client_name, + &mech_type, + output_token, + &ret_flags, + &time_rec, + &deleg_cred); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + report_error(maj_stat, min_stat); + }; + if (output_token->length != 0) { + send_token_to_peer(output_token); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token); + }; + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + }; + } while (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the + following restrictions apply to the output parameters: + + The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined Unless the + accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be + applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value + returned via the mech_type parameter may be undefined until the + routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG,GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG,GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned + via the ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the + implementation expects would be valid if context establishment were + to succeed. + + The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits + within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time + gss_accept_sec_context returns, whether or not the context is fully + established. + + Although this requires that GSS-API implementations set the + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags returned to a caller + (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code), applications + should not rely on this behavior as the flag was not defined in + Version 1 of the GSS-API. Instead, applications should be prepared to + use per-message services after a successful context establishment, + according to the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values. + + All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to zero. + While the routine returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the values returned + via the ret_flags argument indicate the services that the + implementation expects to be available from the established context. + + If the initial call of gss_accept_sec_context() fails, the + implementation should not create a context object, and should leave + the value of the context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to + indicate this. In the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the + implementation is permitted to delete the "half-built" security + context (in which case it should set the context_handle parameter to + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), but the preferred behavior is to leave the + security context (and the context_handle parameter) untouched for the + application to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context). + + During context establishment, the informational status bits + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and + GSS-API mechanisms should always return them in association with a + routine error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This requirement for pairing did not + exist in version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that + wish to run over version 1 implementations must special-case these + codes. + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify context handle for new + context. Supply GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first + call; use value returned in subsequent calls. + Once gss_accept_sec_context() has returned a + value via this parameter, resources have been + assigned to the corresponding context, and must + be freed by the application after use with a + call to gss_delete_sec_context(). + + + acceptor_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read Credential handle claimed + by context acceptor. Specify + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to accept the context as a + default principal. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is + specified, but no default acceptor principal is + defined, GSS_S_NO_CRED will be returned. + + input_token_buffer buffer, opaque, read token obtained from remote + application. + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read, optional Application- + specified bindings. Allows application to + securely bind channel identification information + to the security context. If channel bindings + are not used, specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS. + + src_name gss_name_t, modify, optional Authenticated name + of context initiator. After use, this name + should be deallocated by passing it to + gss_release_name(). If not required, specify + NULL. + + mech_type Object ID, modify, optional Security mechanism + used. The returned OID value will be a pointer + into static storage, and should be treated as + read-only by the caller (in particular, it does + not need to be freed). If not required, specify + NULL. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify Token to be passed to + peer application. If the length field of the + returned token buffer is 0, then no token need + be passed to the peer application. If a non- + zero length field is returned, the associated + storage must be freed after use by the + application with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify, optional Contains various + independent flags, each of which indicates that + the context supports a specific service option. + If not needed, specify NULL. Symbolic names are + provided for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags should be + logically-ANDed with the ret_flags value to test + whether a given option is supported by the + context. The flags are: + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegated credentials are available + via the delegated_cred_handle + parameter + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer asked for mutual + authentication + False - Remote peer did not ask for mutual + authentication + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of protected messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence protected + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling the gss_wrap + routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_get_mic or + gss_wrap routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - The initiator does not wish to + be authenticated; the src_name + parameter (if requested) contains + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + an anonymous internal name. + False - The initiator has been + authenticated normally. + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG + True - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + if the accompanying major status + return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE + or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. + False - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + only if the accompanying major status + return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE. + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG + True - The resultant security context may + be transferred to other processes via + a call to gss_export_sec_context(). + False - The security context is not + transferable. + All other bits should be set to zero. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context will + remain valid. Specify NULL if not required. + + delegated_cred_handle + gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional credential + handle for credentials received from context + initiator. Only valid if deleg_flag in + ret_flags is true, in which case an explicit + credential handle (i.e. not GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + will be returned; if deleg_flag is false, + gss_accept_context() will set this parameter to + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL. If a credential handle is + returned, the associated resources must be + released by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_cred(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer + application is required to complete the + context, and that gss_accept_sec_context must + be called again with that token. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for context + acceptance, or the credential handle did not + reference any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel + bindings to those specified via the + input_chan_bindings parameter. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did not + refer to a valid context. + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid MIC. + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error + during context establishment. + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of + a token already processed. This is a fatal + error during context establishment. + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The received token specified a mechanism that is + not supported by the implementation or the + provided credential. + +5.2. gss_acquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t *output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 *time_rec) + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing + credential by name. GSS-API implementations must impose a local + access-control policy on callers of this routine to prevent + unauthorized callers from acquiring credentials to which they are not + entitled. This routine is not intended to provide a "login to the + network" function, as such a function would involve the creation of + new credentials rather than merely acquiring a handle to existing + credentials. Such functions, if required, should be defined in + implementation-specific extensions to the API. + + If desired_name is GSS_C_NO_NAME, the call is interpreted as a + request for a credential handle that will invoke default behavior + when passed to gss_init_sec_context() (if cred_usage is + GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH) or gss_accept_sec_context() (if + cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or GSS_C_BOTH). + + Mechanisms should honor the desired_mechs parameter, and return a + credential that is suitable to use only with the requested + mechanisms. An exception to this is the case where one underlying + credential element can be shared by multiple mechanisms; in this case + it is permissible for an implementation to indicate all mechanisms + with which the credential element may be used. If desired_mechs is + an empty set, behavior is undefined. + + This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, + since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways + of obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login + process. Some implementations may therefore not support the + acquisition of GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via + gss_acquire_cred for any name other than GSS_C_NO_NAME, or a name + produced by applying either gss_inquire_cred to a valid credential, + or gss_inquire_context to an active context. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may choose to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g. by gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call + of gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of + gss_acquire_cred must return valid credential data, and may therefore + incur the overhead of a deferred credential acquisition. + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + desired_name gss_name_t, read + Name of principal whose credential + should be acquired + + time_req Integer, read, optional + number of seconds that credentials + should remain valid. Specify GSS_C_INDEFINITE + to request that the credentials have the maximum + permitted lifetime. + + desired_mechs Set of Object IDs, read, optional + set of underlying security mechanisms that + may be used. GSS_C_NO_OID_SET may be used + to obtain an implementation-specific default. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, read + GSS_C_BOTH - Credentials may be used + either to initiate or accept + security contexts. + GSS_C_INITIATE - Credentials will only be + used to initiate security contexts. + GSS_C_ACCEPT - Credentials will only be used to + accept security contexts. + + output_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify + The returned credential handle. Resources + associated with this credential handle must + be released by the application after use + with a call to gss_release_cred(). + + actual_mechs Set of Object IDs, modify, optional + The set of mechanisms for which the + credential is valid. Storage associated + with the returned OID-set must be released by + the application after use with a call to + gss_release_oid_set(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid. If the + implementation does not support expiration of + credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will + be returned. Specify NULL if not required + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Unavailable mechanism requested + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE Type contained within desired_name parameter + is not supported + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME Value supplied for desired_name parameter is ill + formed. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The credentials could not be acquired + Because they have expired. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED No credentials were found for the specified name. + +5.3. gss_add_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + const gss_OID desired_mech, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + OM_uint32 initiator_time_req, + OM_uint32 acceptor_time_req, + gss_cred_id_t *output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 *initiator_time_rec, + OM_uint32 *acceptor_time_rec) + + Purpose: + + Adds a credential-element to a credential. The credential-element is + identified by the name of the principal to which it refers. GSS-API + implementations must impose a local access-control policy on callers + of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from acquiring + credential-elements to which they are not entitled. This routine is + not intended to provide a "login to the network" function, as such a + function would involve the creation of new mechanism-specific + authentication data, rather than merely acquiring a GSS-API handle to + existing data. Such functions, if required, should be defined in + implementation-specific extensions to the API. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + If desired_name is GSS_C_NO_NAME, the call is interpreted as a + request to add a credential element that will invoke default behavior + when passed to gss_init_sec_context() (if cred_usage is + GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH) or gss_accept_sec_context() (if + cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or GSS_C_BOTH). + + This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, + since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways + of obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login + process. Some implementations may therefore not support the + acquisition of GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via + gss_acquire_cred for any name other than GSS_C_NO_NAME, or a name + produced by applying either gss_inquire_cred to a valid credential, + or gss_inquire_context to an active context. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may choose to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g. by gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call + of gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of gss_add_cred + must return valid credential data, and may therefore incur the + overhead of a deferred credential acquisition. + + This routine can be used to either compose a new credential + containing all credential-elements of the original in addition to the + newly-acquire credential-element, or to add the new credential- + element to an existing credential. If NULL is specified for the + output_cred_handle parameter argument, the new credential-element + will be added to the credential identified by input_cred_handle; if a + valid pointer is specified for the output_cred_handle parameter, a + new credential handle will be created. + + If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as the input_cred_handle, + gss_add_cred will compose a credential (and set the + output_cred_handle parameter accordingly) based on default behavior. + That is, the call will have the same effect as if the application had + first made a call to gss_acquire_cred(), specifying the same usage + and passing GSS_C_NO_NAME as the desired_name parameter to obtain an + explicit credential handle embodying default behavior, passed this + credential handle to gss_add_cred(), and finally called + gss_release_cred() on the first credential handle. + + If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as the input_cred_handle + parameter, a non-NULL output_cred_handle must be supplied. + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + input_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + The credential to which a credential-element + will be added. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is + specified, the routine will compose the new + credential based on default behavior (see + description above). Note that, while the + credential-handle is not modified by + gss_add_cred(), the underlying credential + will be modified if output_credential_handle + is NULL. + + desired_name gss_name_t, read. + Name of principal whose credential + should be acquired. + + desired_mech Object ID, read + Underlying security mechanism with which the + credential may be used. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, read + GSS_C_BOTH - Credential may be used + either to initiate or accept + security contexts. + GSS_C_INITIATE - Credential will only be + used to initiate security + contexts. + GSS_C_ACCEPT - Credential will only be used to + accept security contexts. + + initiator_time_req Integer, read, optional + number of seconds that the credential + should remain valid for initiating security + contexts. This argument is ignored if the + composed credentials are of type GSS_C_ACCEPT. + Specify GSS_C_INDEFINITE to request that the + credentials have the maximum permitted + initiator lifetime. + + acceptor_time_req Integer, read, optional + number of seconds that the credential + should remain valid for accepting security + contexts. This argument is ignored if the + composed credentials are of type GSS_C_INITIATE. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Specify GSS_C_INDEFINITE to request that the + credentials have the maximum permitted initiator + lifetime. + + output_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + The returned credential handle, containing + the new credential-element and all the + credential-elements from input_cred_handle. + If a valid pointer to a gss_cred_id_t is + supplied for this parameter, gss_add_cred + creates a new credential handle containing all + credential-elements from the input_cred_handle + and the newly acquired credential-element; if + NULL is specified for this parameter, the newly + acquired credential-element will be added + to the credential identified by input_cred_handle. + + The resources associated with any credential + handle returned via this parameter must be + released by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_cred(). + + actual_mechs Set of Object IDs, modify, optional + The complete set of mechanisms for which + the new credential is valid. Storage for + the returned OID-set must be freed by the + application after use with a call to + gss_release_oid_set(). Specify NULL if + not required. + + initiator_time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid for + initiating contexts using the specified + mechanism. If the implementation or mechanism + does not support expiration of credentials, the + value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required + + acceptor_time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid for + accepting security contexts using the specified + mechanism. If the implementation or mechanism + does not support expiration of credentials, the + value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Unavailable mechanism requested + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE Type contained within desired_name parameter + is not supported + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME Value supplied for desired_name parameter is + ill-formed. + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT The credential already contains an element + for the requested mechanism with overlapping + usage and validity period. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The required credentials could not be + added because they have expired. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED No credentials were found for the specified name. + +5.4. gss_add_oid_set_member + + OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_OID member_oid, + gss_OID_set *oid_set) + + Purpose: + + Add an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine + is intended for use in conjunction with gss_create_empty_oid_set when + constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to gss_acquire_cred. + The oid_set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was created by + GSS-API (e.g. a set returned by gss_create_empty_oid_set()). GSS-API + creates a copy of the member_oid and inserts this copy into the set, + expanding the storage allocated to the OID-set's elements array if + necessary. The routine may add the new member OID anywhere within + the elements array, and implementations should verify that the new + member_oid is not already contained within the elements array; if the + member_oid is already present, the oid_set should remain unchanged. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + member_oid Object ID, read + The object identifier to copied into + the set. + + oid_set Set of Object ID, modify + The set in which the object identifier + should be inserted. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +5.5. gss_canonicalize_name + + OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t *output_name) + + Purpose: + + Generate a canonical mechanism name (MN) from an arbitrary internal + name. The mechanism name is the name that would be returned to a + context acceptor on successful authentication of a context where the + initiator used the input_name in a successful call to + gss_acquire_cred, specifying an OID set containing as its + only member, followed by a call to gss_init_sec_context, specifying + as the authentication mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name gss_name_t, read + The name for which a canonical form is + desired + + mech_type Object ID, read + The authentication mechanism for which the + canonical form of the name is desired. The + desired mechanism must be specified explicitly; + no default is provided. + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + output_name gss_name_t, modify + The resultant canonical name. Storage + associated with this name must be freed by + the application after use with a call to + gss_release_name(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion. + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The identified mechanism is not supported. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The provided internal name contains no elements + that could be processed by the specified + mechanism. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided internal name was ill-formed. + +5.6. gss_compare_name + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t name1, + const gss_name_t name2, + int *name_equal) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to compare two internal-form names to determine + whether they refer to the same entity. + + If either name presented to gss_compare_name denotes an anonymous + principal, the routines should indicate that the two names do not + refer to the same identity. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + name1 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name2 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + name_equal boolean, modify + non-zero - names refer to same entity + zero - names refer to different entities + (strictly, the names are not known + to refer to the same identity). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The two names were of incomparable types. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME One or both of name1 or name2 was ill-formed. + +5.7. gss_context_time + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 *time_rec) + + Purpose: + + Determines the number of seconds for which the specified context will + remain valid. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context to be interrogated. + + time_rec Integer, modify + Number of seconds that the context will remain + valid. If the context has already expired, + zero will be returned. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify + a valid context + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.8. gss_create_empty_oid_set + + OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_OID_set *oid_set) + + Purpose: + + Create an object-identifier set containing no object identifiers, to + which members may be subsequently added using the + gss_add_oid_set_member() routine. These routines are intended to be + used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to + gss_acquire_cred. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + oid_set Set of Object IDs, modify + The empty object identifier set. + The routine will allocate the + gss_OID_set_desc object, which the + application must free after use with + a call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +5.9. gss_delete_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token) + + Purpose: + + Delete a security context. gss_delete_sec_context will delete the + local data structures associated with the specified security context, + and may generate an output_token, which when passed to the peer + gss_process_context_token will instruct it to do likewise. If no + token is required by the mechanism, the GSS-API should set the length + field of the output_token (if provided) to zero. No further security + services may be obtained using the context specified by + context_handle. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + In addition to deleting established security contexts, + gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + gss_init_sec_context()/gss_accept_sec_context() calls. + + The output_token parameter is retained for compatibility with version + 1 of the GSS-API. It is recommended that both peer applications + invoke gss_delete_sec_context passing the value GSS_C_NO_BUFFER for + the output_token parameter, indicating that no token is required, and + that gss_delete_sec_context should simply delete local context data + structures. If the application does pass a valid buffer to + gss_delete_sec_context, mechanisms are encouraged to return a zero- + length token, indicating that no peer action is necessary, and that + no token should be transferred by the application. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle identifying context to delete. + After deleting the context, the GSS-API will set + this context handle to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify, optional + token to be sent to remote application to + instruct it to also delete the context. It + is recommended that applications specify + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER for this parameter, requesting + local deletion only. If a buffer parameter is + provided by the application, the mechanism may + return a token in it; mechanisms that implement + only local deletion should set the length field of + this token to zero to indicate to the application + that no token is to be sent to the peer. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT No valid context was supplied + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.10.gss_display_name + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID *output_name_type) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque + internal-form name for display purposes. The syntax of a printable + name is defined by the GSS-API implementation. + + If input_name denotes an anonymous principal, the implementation + should return the gss_OID value GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS as the + output_name_type, and a textual name that is syntactically distinct + from all valid supported printable names in output_name_buffer. + + If input_name was created by a call to gss_import_name, specifying + GSS_C_NO_OID as the name-type, implementations that employ lazy + conversion between name types may return GSS_C_NO_OID via the + output_name_type parameter. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + input_name gss_name_t, read + name to be displayed + + output_name_buffer buffer, character-string, modify + buffer to receive textual name string. + The application must free storage associated + with this name after use with a call to + gss_release_buffer(). + + output_name_type Object ID, modify, optional + The type of the returned name. The returned + gss_OID will be a pointer into static storage, + and should be treated as read-only by the caller + (in particular, the application should not attempt + to free it). Specify NULL if not required. + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME input_name was ill-formed + +5.11.gss_display_status + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + OM_uint32 status_value, + int status_type, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 *message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSS-API + status code, for display to the user or for logging purposes. Since + some status values may indicate multiple conditions, applications may + need to call gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating + a single text string. The message_context parameter is used by + gss_display_status to store state information about which error + messages have already been extracted from a given status_value; + message_context must be initialized to 0 by the application prior to + the first call, and gss_display_status will return a non-zero value + in this parameter if there are further messages to extract. + + The message_context parameter contains all state information required + by gss_display_status in order to extract further messages from the + status_value; even when a non-zero value is returned in this + parameter, the application is not required to call gss_display_status + again unless subsequent messages are desired. The following code + extracts all messages from a given status code and prints them to + stderr: + + OM_uint32 message_context; + OM_uint32 status_code; + OM_uint32 maj_status; + OM_uint32 min_status; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + + ... + + message_context = 0; + + do { + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + maj_status = gss_display_status ( + &min_status, + status_code, + GSS_C_GSS_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &message_context, + &status_string) + + fprintf(stderr, + "%.*s\n", + (int)status_string.length, + + (char *)status_string.value); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &status_string); + + } while (message_context != 0); + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + status_value Integer, read + Status value to be converted + + status_type Integer, read + GSS_C_GSS_CODE - status_value is a GSS status + code + + GSS_C_MECH_CODE - status_value is a mechanism + status code + + mech_type Object ID, read, optional + Underlying mechanism (used to interpret a + minor status value) Supply GSS_C_NO_OID to + obtain the system default. + + message_context Integer, read/modify + Should be initialized to zero by the + application prior to the first call. + On return from gss_display_status(), + a non-zero status_value parameter indicates + that additional messages may be extracted + from the status code via subsequent calls + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + to gss_display_status(), passing the same + status_value, status_type, mech_type, and + message_context parameters. + + status_string buffer, character string, modify + textual interpretation of the status_value. + Storage associated with this parameter must + be freed by the application after use with + a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Indicates that translation in accordance with + an unsupported mechanism type was requested + + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS The status value was not recognized, or the + status type was neither GSS_C_GSS_CODE nor + GSS_C_MECH_CODE. + +5.12. gss_duplicate_name + + OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t src_name, + gss_name_t *dest_name) + + Purpose: + + Create an exact duplicate of the existing internal name src_name. + The new dest_name will be independent of src_name (i.e. src_name and + dest_name must both be released, and the release of one shall not + affect the validity of the other). + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + src_name gss_name_t, read + internal name to be duplicated. + + dest_name gss_name_t, modify + The resultant copy of . + Storage associated with this name must + be freed by the application after use + with a call to gss_release_name(). + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The src_name parameter was ill-formed. + +5.13. gss_export_name + + OM_uint32 gss_export_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t exported_name) + + Purpose: + + To produce a canonical contiguous string representation of a + mechanism name (MN), suitable for direct comparison (e.g. with + memcmp) for use in authorization functions (e.g. matching entries in + an access-control list). The parameter must specify a + valid MN (i.e. an internal name generated by gss_accept_sec_context + or by gss_canonicalize_name). + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name gss_name_t, read + The MN to be exported + + exported_name gss_buffer_t, octet-string, modify + The canonical contiguous string form of + . Storage associated with + this string must freed by the application + after use with gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN The provided internal name was not a mechanism + name. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided internal name was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The internal name was of a type not supported + by the GSS-API implementation. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.14. gss_export_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, + gss_buffer_t interprocess_token) + + Purpose: + + Provided to support the sharing of work between multiple processes. + This routine will typically be used by the context-acceptor, in an + application where a single process receives incoming connection + requests and accepts security contexts over them, then passes the + established context to one or more other processes for message + exchange. gss_export_sec_context() deactivates the security context + for the calling process and creates an interprocess token which, when + passed to gss_import_sec_context in another process, will re-activate + the context in the second process. Only a single instantiation of a + given context may be active at any one time; a subsequent attempt by + a context exporter to access the exported security context will fail. + + The implementation may constrain the set of processes by which the + interprocess token may be imported, either as a function of local + security policy, or as a result of implementation decisions. For + example, some implementations may constrain contexts to be passed + only between processes that run under the same account, or which are + part of the same process group. + + The interprocess token may contain security-sensitive information + (for example cryptographic keys). While mechanisms are encouraged to + either avoid placing such sensitive information within interprocess + tokens, or to encrypt the token before returning it to the + application, in a typical object-library GSS-API implementation this + may not be possible. Thus the application must take care to protect + the interprocess token, and ensure that any process to which the + token is transferred is trustworthy. + + If creation of the interprocess token is successful, the + implementation shall deallocate all process-wide resources associated + with the security context, and set the context_handle to + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. In the event of an error that makes it impossible + to complete the export of the security context, the implementation + must not return an interprocess token, and should strive to leave the + security context referenced by the context_handle parameter + untouched. If this is impossible, it is permissible for the + implementation to delete the security context, providing it also sets + the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle identifying the context to + transfer. + + interprocess_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be transferred to target process. + Storage associated with this token must be + freed by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context was invalid + + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE The operation is not supported. + +5.15. gss_get_mic + + OM_uint32 gss_get_mic ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t msg_token) + + Purpose: + + Generates a cryptographic MIC for the supplied message, and places + the MIC in a token for transfer to the peer application. The qop_req + parameter allows a choice between several cryptographic algorithms, + if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted + by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must + support derivation of MICs from zero-length messages. + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 51] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + will be sent + + qop_req gss_qop_t, read, optional + Specifies requested quality of protection. + Callers are encouraged, on portability grounds, + to accept the default quality of protection + offered by the chosen mechanism, which may be + requested by specifying GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT for + this parameter. If an unsupported protection + strength is requested, gss_get_mic will return a + major_status of GSS_S_BAD_QOP. + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be protected + + msg_token buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive token. The application must + free storage associated with this buffer after + use with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify + a valid context + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP The specified QOP is not supported by the + mechanism. + +5.16. gss_import_name + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + const gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t *output_name) + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 52] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Purpose: + + Convert a contiguous string name to internal form. In general, the + internal name returned (via the parameter) will not be + an MN; the exception to this is if the indicates + that the contiguous string provided via the + parameter is of type GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, in which case the returned + internal name will be an MN for the mechanism that exported the name. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name_buffer buffer, octet-string, read + buffer containing contiguous string name to convert + + input_name_type Object ID, read, optional + Object ID specifying type of printable + name. Applications may specify either + GSS_C_NO_OID to use a mechanism-specific + default printable syntax, or an OID recognized + by the GSS-API implementation to name a + specific namespace. + + output_name gss_name_t, modify + returned name in internal form. Storage + associated with this name must be freed + by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_name(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The input_name_type was unrecognized + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The input_name parameter could not be interpreted + as a name of the specified type + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The input name-type was GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, + but the mechanism contained within the + input-name is not supported + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 53] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.17. gss_import_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_import_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle) + + Purpose: + + Allows a process to import a security context established by another + process. A given interprocess token may be imported only once. See + gss_export_sec_context. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + interprocess_token buffer, opaque, modify + token received from exporting process + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle of newly reactivated context. + Resources associated with this context handle + must be released by the application after use + with a call to gss_delete_sec_context(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The token did not contain a valid context + reference. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token was invalid. + + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE The operation is unavailable. + + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED Local policy prevents the import of this context + by the current process. + +5.18. gss_indicate_mechs + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_OID_set *mech_set) + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 54] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to determine which underlying security + mechanisms are available. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + mech_set set of Object IDs, modify + set of implementation-supported mechanisms. + The returned gss_OID_set value will be a + dynamically-allocated OID set, that should + be released by the caller after use with a + call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +5.19. gss_init_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,\ + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token + gss_OID *actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 *ret_flags, + OM_uint32 *time_rec ) + + Purpose: + + Initiates the establishment of a security context between the + application and a remote peer. Initially, the input_token parameter + should be specified either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a + gss_buffer_desc object whose length field contains the value zero. + The routine may return a output_token which should be transferred to + the peer application, where the peer application will present it to + gss_accept_sec_context. If no token need be sent, + gss_init_sec_context will indicate this by setting the length field + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 55] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + of the output_token argument to zero. To complete the context + establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer + application; if so, gss_init_sec_context will return a status + containing the supplementary information bit GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. + In this case, gss_init_sec_context should be called again when the + reply token is received from the peer application, passing the reply + token to gss_init_sec_context via the input_token parameters. + + Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length + and return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or + waited for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke + gss_init_sec_context within a loop: + + int context_established = 0; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + ... + input_token->length = 0; + + while (!context_established) { + maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + cred_hdl, + &context_hdl, + target_name, + desired_mech, + desired_services, + desired_time, + input_bindings, + input_token, + &actual_mech, + output_token, + &actual_services, + &actual_time); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + report_error(maj_stat, min_stat); + }; + + if (output_token->length != 0) { + send_token_to_peer(output_token); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token) + }; + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + }; + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 56] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + receive_token_from_peer(input_token); + } else { + context_established = 1; + }; + }; + + Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the + following restrictions apply to the output parameters: + + The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined Unless + the accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be + applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value + returned via the actual_mech_type parameter is undefined until the + routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_CONF_FLAG, + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the + ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the + implementation expects would be valid if context establishment + were to succeed. In particular, if the application has requested + a service such as delegation or anonymous authentication via the + req_flags argument, and such a service is unavailable from the + underlying mechanism, gss_init_sec_context should generate a token + that will not provide the service, and indicate via the ret_flags + argument that the service will not be supported. The application + may choose to abort the context establishment by calling + gss_delete_sec_context (if it cannot continue in the absence of + the service), or it may choose to transmit the token and continue + context establishment (if the service was merely desired but not + mandatory). + + The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits + within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time + gss_init_sec_context returns, whether or not the context is fully + established. + + GSS-API implementations that support per-message protection are + encouraged to set the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags + returned to a caller (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE + status code). However, applications should not rely on this + behavior as the flag was not defined in Version 1 of the GSS-API. + Instead, applications should determine what per-message services + are available after a successful context establishment according + to the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 57] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to + zero. + + If the initial call of gss_init_sec_context() fails, the + implementation should not create a context object, and should leave + the value of the context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to + indicate this. In the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the + implementation is permitted to delete the "half-built" security + context (in which case it should set the context_handle parameter to + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), but the preferred behavior is to leave the + security context untouched for the application to delete (using + gss_delete_sec_context). + + During context establishment, the informational status bits + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and + GSS-API mechanisms should always return them in association with a + routine error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This requirement for pairing did not + exist in version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that + wish to run over version 1 implementations must special-case these + codes. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + initiator_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + handle for credentials claimed. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to act as a default + initiator principal. If no default + initiator is defined, the function will + return GSS_S_NO_CRED. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned by first call in continuation calls. + Resources associated with this context-handle + must be released by the application after use + with a call to gss_delete_sec_context(). + + target_name gss_name_t, read + Name of target + + mech_type OID, read, optional + Object ID of desired mechanism. Supply + GSS_C_NO_OID to obtain an implementation + specific default + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 58] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + req_flags bit-mask, read + Contains various independent flags, each of + which requests that the context support a + specific service option. Symbolic + names are provided for each flag, and the + symbolic names corresponding to the required + flags should be logically-ORed + together to form the bit-mask value. The + flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegate credentials to remote peer + False - Don't delegate + + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Request that remote peer + authenticate itself + False - Authenticate self to remote peer + only + + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - Enable replay detection for + messages protected with gss_wrap + or gss_get_mic + False - Don't attempt to detect + replayed messages + + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - Enable detection of out-of-sequence + protected messages + False - Don't attempt to detect + out-of-sequence messages + + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Request that confidentiality service + be made available (via gss_wrap) + False - No per-message confidentiality service + is required. + + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Request that integrity service be + made available (via gss_wrap or + gss_get_mic) + False - No per-message integrity service + is required. + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 59] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - Do not reveal the initiator's + identity to the acceptor. + False - Authenticate normally. + + time_req Integer, read, optional + Desired number of seconds for which context + should remain valid. Supply 0 to request a + default validity period. + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read, optional + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS + if channel bindings are not used. + + input_token buffer, opaque, read, optional (see text) + Token received from peer application. + Supply GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or a pointer to + a buffer containing the value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER + on initial call. + + actual_mech_type OID, modify, optional + Actual mechanism used. The OID returned via + this parameter will be a pointer to static + storage that should be treated as read-only; + In particular the application should not attempt + to free it. Specify NULL if not required. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be sent to peer application. If + the length field of the returned buffer is + zero, no token need be sent to the peer + application. Storage associated with this + buffer must be freed by the application + after use with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify, optional + Contains various independent flags, each of which + indicates that the context supports a specific + service option. Specify NULL if not + required. Symbolic names are provided + for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags should be + logically-ANDed with the ret_flags value to test + whether a given option is supported by the + context. The flags are: + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 60] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Credentials were delegated to + the remote peer + False - No credentials were delegated + + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - The remote peer has authenticated + itself. + False - Remote peer has not authenticated + itself. + + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of protected messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence protected + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will + not be detected + + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling gss_wrap routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap + routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - The initiator's identity has not been + revealed, and will not be revealed if + any emitted token is passed to the + acceptor. + False - The initiator's identity has been or + will be authenticated normally. + + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 61] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + True - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available for + use if the accompanying major status + return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. + False - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + only if the accompanying major status + return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG + True - The resultant security context may + be transferred to other processes via + a call to gss_export_sec_context(). + False - The security context is not + transferable. + + All other bits should be set to zero. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. If the implementation does + not support context expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer + application is required to complete the + context, and that gss_init_sec_context + must be called again with that token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed + on the input_token failed + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for + context initiation, or the credential handle + did not reference any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 62] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel + bindings to those specified via the + input_chan_bindings parameter + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid MIC, or a MIC + that could not be verified + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal + error during context establishment + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate + of a token already processed. This is a + fatal error during context establishment. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did + not refer to a valid context + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The provided target_name parameter contained an + invalid or unsupported type of name + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided target_name parameter was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The specified mechanism is not supported by the + provided credential, or is unrecognized by the + implementation. + +5.20. gss_inquire_context + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_name_t *src_name, + gss_name_t *targ_name, + OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec, + gss_OID *mech_type, + OM_uint32 *ctx_flags, + int *locally_initiated, + int *open ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains information about a security context. The caller must + already have obtained a handle that refers to the context, although + the context need not be fully established. + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 63] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the security context. + + src_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name of the context initiator. + If the context was established using anonymous + authentication, and if the application invoking + gss_inquire_context is the context acceptor, + an anonymous name will be returned. Storage + associated with this name must be freed by the + application after use with a call to + gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + targ_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name of the context acceptor. + Storage associated with this name must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_name(). If the context acceptor + did not authenticate itself, and if the initiator + did not specify a target name in its call to + gss_init_sec_context(), the value GSS_C_NO_NAME + will be returned. Specify NULL if not required. + + lifetime_rec Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. If the context has + expired, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support + context expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + mech_type gss_OID, modify, optional + The security mechanism providing the + context. The returned OID will be a + pointer to static storage that should + be treated as read-only by the application; + in particular the application should not + attempt to free it. Specify NULL if not + required. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 64] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + ctx_flags bit-mask, modify, optional + Contains various independent flags, each of + which indicates that the context supports + (or is expected to support, if ctx_open is + false) a specific service option. If not + needed, specify NULL. Symbolic names are + provided for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags + should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags + value to test whether a given option is + supported by the context. The flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Credentials were delegated from + the initiator to the acceptor. + False - No credentials were delegated + + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - The acceptor was authenticated + to the initiator + False - The acceptor did not authenticate + itself. + + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of protected messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence protected + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be invoked + by calling gss_wrap routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap + routines. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 65] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - The initiator's identity will not + be revealed to the acceptor. + The src_name parameter (if + requested) contains an anonymous + internal name. + False - The initiator has been + authenticated normally. + + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG + True - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + for use. + False - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + only if the context is fully + established (i.e. if the open parameter + is non-zero). + + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG + True - The resultant security context may + be transferred to other processes via + a call to gss_export_sec_context(). + False - The security context is not + transferable. + + locally_initiated Boolean, modify + Non-zero if the invoking application is the + context initiator. + Specify NULL if not required. + + open Boolean, modify + Non-zero if the context is fully established; + Zero if a context-establishment token + is expected from the peer application. + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The referenced context could not be accessed. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 66] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.21. gss_inquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t *name, + OM_uint32 *lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage, + gss_OID_set *mechanisms ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains information about a credential. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the target credential. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to inquire about + the default initiator principal. + + name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name whose identity the credential asserts. + Storage associated with this name should be freed + by the application after use with a call to + gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not required. + + lifetime Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain valid. If the credential has + expired, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support + credential expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, modify, optional + How the credential may be used. One of the + following: + GSS_C_INITIATE + GSS_C_ACCEPT + GSS_C_BOTH + Specify NULL if not required. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 67] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + mechanisms gss_OID_set, modify, optional + Set of mechanisms supported by the credential. + Storage associated with this OID set must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_oid_set(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The referenced credentials could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL The referenced credentials were invalid. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. + If the lifetime parameter was not passed as NULL, + it will be set to 0. + +5.22. gss_inquire_cred_by_mech + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t *name, + OM_uint32 *initiator_lifetime, + OM_uint32 *acceptor_lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains per-mechanism information about a credential. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the target credential. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to inquire about + the default initiator principal. + + mech_type gss_OID, read + The mechanism for which information should be + returned. + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 68] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name whose identity the credential asserts. + Storage associated with this name must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + initiator_lifetime Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain capable of initiating security contexts + under the specified mechanism. If the credential + can no longer be used to initiate contexts, or if + the credential usage for this mechanism is + GSS_C_ACCEPT, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support expiration + of initiator credentials, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify NULL + if not required. + + acceptor_lifetime Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain capable of accepting security contexts + under the specified mechanism. If the credential + can no longer be used to accept contexts, or if + the credential usage for this mechanism is + GSS_C_INITIATE, this parameter will be set to zero. + + If the implementation does not support expiration + of acceptor credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE + will be returned. Specify NULL if not required. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, modify, optional + How the credential may be used with the specified + mechanism. One of the following: + GSS_C_INITIATE + GSS_C_ACCEPT + GSS_C_BOTH + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The referenced credentials could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL The referenced credentials were invalid. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 69] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. + If the lifetime parameter was not passed as NULL, + it will be set to 0. + +5.23. gss_inquire_mechs_for_name + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_OID_set *mech_types ) + + Purpose: + + Returns the set of mechanisms supported by the GSS-API implementation + that may be able to process the specified name. + + Each mechanism returned will recognize at least one element within + the name. It is permissible for this routine to be implemented + within a mechanism-independent GSS-API layer, using the type + information contained within the presented name, and based on + registration information provided by individual mechanism + implementations. This means that the returned mech_types set may + indicate that a particular mechanism will understand the name when in + fact it would refuse to accept the name as input to + gss_canonicalize_name, gss_init_sec_context, gss_acquire_cred or + gss_add_cred (due to some property of the specific name, as opposed + to the name type). Thus this routine should be used only as a pre- + filter for a call to a subsequent mechanism-specific routine. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + input_name gss_name_t, read + The name to which the inquiry relates. + + mech_types gss_OID_set, modify + Set of mechanisms that may support the + specified name. The returned OID set + must be freed by the caller after use + with a call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The input_name parameter was ill-formed. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 70] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The input_name parameter contained an invalid or + unsupported type of name + +5.24. gss_inquire_names_for_mech + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_OID mechanism, + gss_OID_set *name_types) + + Purpose: + + Returns the set of nametypes supported by the specified mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + mechanism gss_OID, read + The mechanism to be interrogated. + + name_types gss_OID_set, modify + Set of name-types supported by the specified + mechanism. The returned OID set must be + freed by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +5.25. gss_process_context_token + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer) + + Purpose: + + Provides a way to pass an asynchronous token to the security service. + Most context-level tokens are emitted and processed synchronously by + gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context, and the application + is informed as to whether further tokens are expected by the + GSS_C_CONTINUE_NEEDED major status bit. Occasionally, a mechanism + may need to emit a context-level token at a point when the peer + entity is not expecting a token. For example, the initiator's final + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 71] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + call to gss_init_sec_context may emit a token and return a status of + GSS_S_COMPLETE, but the acceptor's call to gss_accept_sec_context may + fail. The acceptor's mechanism may wish to send a token containing + an error indication to the initiator, but the initiator is not + expecting a token at this point, believing that the context is fully + established. Gss_process_context_token provides a way to pass such a + token to the mechanism at any time. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + context handle of context on which token is to + be processed + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token to process + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed + on the token failed + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle did not refer to a valid context + +5.26. gss_release_buffer + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer) + + Purpose: + + Free storage associated with a buffer. The storage must have been + allocated by a GSS-API routine. In addition to freeing the + associated storage, the routine will zero the length field in the + descriptor to which the buffer parameter refers, and implementations + are encouraged to additionally set the pointer field in the + descriptor to NULL. Any buffer object returned by a GSS-API routine + may be passed to gss_release_buffer (even if there is no storage + associated with the buffer). + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 72] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + buffer buffer, modify + The storage associated with the buffer will be + deleted. The gss_buffer_desc object will not + be freed, but its length field will be zeroed. + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +5.27. gss_release_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Informs GSS-API that the specified credential handle is no longer + required by the application, and frees associated resources. + Implementations are encouraged to set the cred_handle to + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL on successful completion of this call. + + Parameters: + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + Opaque handle identifying credential + to be released. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL + is supplied, the routine will complete + successfully, but will do nothing. + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED Credentials could not be accessed. + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 73] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.28. gss_release_name + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_name_t *name) + + Purpose: + + Free GSSAPI-allocated storage associated with an internal-form name. + Implementations are encouraged to set the name to GSS_C_NO_NAME on + successful completion of this call. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + name gss_name_t, modify + The name to be deleted + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The name parameter did not contain a valid name + +5.29. gss_release_oid_set + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_OID_set *set) + + Purpose: + + Free storage associated with a GSSAPI-generated gss_OID_set object. + The set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was returned from a + GSS-API routine. gss_release_oid_set() will free the storage + associated with each individual member OID, the OID set's elements + array, and the gss_OID_set_desc. + + Implementations are encouraged to set the gss_OID_set parameter to + GSS_C_NO_OID_SET on successful completion of this routine. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 74] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + set Set of Object IDs, modify + The storage associated with the gss_OID_set + will be deleted. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +5.30. gss_test_oid_set_member + + OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_OID member, + const gss_OID_set set, + int *present) + + Purpose: + + Interrogate an Object Identifier set to determine whether a specified + Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to be used + with OID sets returned by gss_indicate_mechs(), gss_acquire_cred(), + and gss_inquire_cred(), but will also work with user-generated sets. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + member Object ID, read + The object identifier whose presence + is to be tested. + + set Set of Object ID, read + The Object Identifier set. + + present Boolean, modify + non-zero if the specified OID is a member + of the set, zero if not. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 75] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.31. gss_unwrap + + OM_uint32 gss_unwrap ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_qop_t *qop_state) + + Purpose: + + Converts a message previously protected by gss_wrap back to a usable + form, verifying the embedded MIC. The conf_state parameter indicates + whether the message was encrypted; the qop_state parameter indicates + the strength of protection that was used to provide the + confidentiality and integrity services. + + Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted + by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must + support the wrapping and unwrapping of zero-length messages. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + protected message + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + Buffer to receive unwrapped message. + Storage associated with this buffer must + be freed by the application after use use + with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + conf_state boolean, modify, optional + Non-zero - Confidentiality and integrity + protection were used + Zero - Integrity service only was used + Specify NULL if not required + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 76] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + qop_state gss_qop_t, modify, optional + Quality of protection provided. + Specify NULL if not required + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The MIC was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + MIC for the message, but it had already been + processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but it is too old to check for + duplication. + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but has been verified out of + sequence; a later token has already been + received. + + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but has been verified out of + sequence; an earlier expected token has not yet + been received. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify + a valid context + +5.32. gss_verify_mic + + OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t *qop_state) + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 77] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Purpose: + + Verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, + fits the supplied message. The qop_state parameter allows a message + recipient to determine the strength of protection that was applied to + the message. + + Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted + by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must + support the calculation and verification of MICs over zero-length + messages. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + Message to be verified + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + Token associated with message + + qop_state gss_qop_t, modify, optional + quality of protection gained from MIC + Specify NULL if not required + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The MIC was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + MIC for the message, but it had already been + processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but it is too old to check for + duplication. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 78] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but has been verified out of + sequence; a later token has already been received. + + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but has been verified out of + sequence; an earlier expected token has not yet + been received. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + +5.33. gss_wrap + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer ) + + Purpose: + + Attaches a cryptographic MIC and optionally encrypts the specified + input_message. The output_message contains both the MIC and the + message. The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several + cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted + by gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations must + support the wrapping of zero-length messages. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context on which the message + will be sent + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 79] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + conf_req_flag boolean, read + Non-zero - Both confidentiality and integrity + services are requested + Zero - Only integrity service is requested + + qop_req gss_qop_t, read, optional + Specifies required quality of protection. A + mechanism-specific default may be requested by + setting qop_req to GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT. If an + unsupported protection strength is requested, + gss_wrap will return a major_status of + GSS_S_BAD_QOP. + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + Message to be protected + + conf_state boolean, modify, optional + Non-zero - Confidentiality, data origin + authentication and integrity + services have been applied + Zero - Integrity and data origin services only + has been applied. + Specify NULL if not required + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + Buffer to receive protected message. + Storage associated with this message must + be freed by the application after use with + a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP The specified QOP is not supported by the + mechanism. + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 80] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +5.34. gss_wrap_size_limit + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 *max_input_size) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to determine the maximum message size that, if + presented to gss_wrap with the same conf_req_flag and qop_req + parameters, will result in an output token containing no more than + req_output_size bytes. + + This call is intended for use by applications that communicate over + protocols that impose a maximum message size. It enables the + application to fragment messages prior to applying protection. + + GSS-API implementations are recommended but not required to detect + invalid QOP values when gss_wrap_size_limit() is called. This routine + guarantees only a maximum message size, not the availability of + specific QOP values for message protection. + + Successful completion of this call does not guarantee that gss_wrap + will be able to protect a message of length max_input_size bytes, + since this ability may depend on the availability of system resources + at the time that gss_wrap is called. However, if the implementation + itself imposes an upper limit on the length of messages that may be + processed by gss_wrap, the implementation should not return a value + via max_input_bytes that is greater than this length. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the security over + which the messages will be sent. + + conf_req_flag Boolean, read + Indicates whether gss_wrap will be asked + to apply confidentiality protection in + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 81] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + addition to integrity protection. See + the routine description for gss_wrap + for more details. + + qop_req gss_qop_t, read + Indicates the level of protection that + gss_wrap will be asked to provide. See + the routine description for gss_wrap for + more details. + + req_output_size Integer, read + The desired maximum size for tokens emitted + by gss_wrap. + + max_input_size Integer, modify + The maximum input message size that may + be presented to gss_wrap in order to + guarantee that the emitted token shall + be no larger than req_output_size bytes. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The referenced context could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has expired. + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP The specified QOP is not supported by the + mechanism. + +6. Security Considerations + + This document specifies a service interface for security facilities + and services; as such, security considerations appear throughout the + specification. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to summarize certain + specific points relevant to GSS-API implementors and calling + applications. Usage of the GSS-API interface does not in itself + provide security services or assurance; instead, these attributes are + dependent on the underlying mechanism(s) which support a GSS-API + implementation. Callers must be attentive to the requests made to + GSS-API calls and to the status indicators returned by GSS-API, as + these specify the security service characteristics which GSS-API will + provide. When the interprocess context transfer facility is used, + appropriate local controls should be applied to constrain access to + interprocess tokens and to the sensitive data which they contain. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 82] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + Appendix A. GSS-API C header file gssapi.h + + C-language GSS-API implementations should include a copy of the + following header-file. + + #ifndef GSSAPI_H_ + #define GSSAPI_H_ + + + + /* + * First, include stddef.h to get size_t defined. + */ + #include + + /* + * If the platform supports the xom.h header file, it should be + * included here. + */ + #include + + + /* + * Now define the three implementation-dependent types. + */ + typedef gss_ctx_id_t; + typedef gss_cred_id_t; + typedef gss_name_t; + + /* + * The following type must be defined as the smallest natural + * unsigned integer supported by the platform that has at least + * 32 bits of precision. + */ + typedef gss_uint32; + + + #ifdef OM_STRING + /* + * We have included the xom.h header file. Verify that OM_uint32 + * is defined correctly. + */ + + #if sizeof(gss_uint32) != sizeof(OM_uint32) + #error Incompatible definition of OM_uint32 from xom.h + #endif + + typedef OM_object_identifier gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 83] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + #else + + /* + * We can't use X/Open definitions, so roll our own. + */ + + typedef gss_uint32 OM_uint32; + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + #endif + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + size_t count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + /* + * For now, define a QOP-type as an OM_uint32 + */ + typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t; + + typedef int gss_cred_usage_t; + + /* + * Flag bits for context-level services. + */ + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 84] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + #define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 1 + #define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 2 + #define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 4 + #define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 8 + #define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 16 + #define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 32 + #define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG 64 + #define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG 128 + #define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG 256 + + /* + * Credential usage options + */ + #define GSS_C_BOTH 0 + #define GSS_C_INITIATE 1 + #define GSS_C_ACCEPT 2 + + /* + * Status code types for gss_display_status + */ + #define GSS_C_GSS_CODE 1 + #define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2 + + /* + * The constant definitions for channel-bindings address families + */ + #define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC 0 + #define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL 1 + #define GSS_C_AF_INET 2 + #define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK 3 + #define GSS_C_AF_PUP 4 + #define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS 5 + #define GSS_C_AF_NS 6 + #define GSS_C_AF_NBS 7 + #define GSS_C_AF_ECMA 8 + #define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT 9 + #define GSS_C_AF_CCITT 10 + #define GSS_C_AF_SNA 11 + #define GSS_C_AF_DECnet 12 + #define GSS_C_AF_DLI 13 + #define GSS_C_AF_LAT 14 + #define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK 15 + #define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK 16 + #define GSS_C_AF_BSC 17 + #define GSS_C_AF_DSS 18 + #define GSS_C_AF_OSI 19 + #define GSS_C_AF_X25 21 + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 85] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + #define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR 255 + + /* + * Various Null values + */ + #define GSS_C_NO_NAME ((gss_name_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_OID ((gss_OID) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL} + + /* + * Some alternate names for a couple of the above + * values. These are defined for V1 compatibility. + */ + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID GSS_C_NO_OID + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET GSS_C_NO_OID_SET + + /* + * Define the default Quality of Protection for per-message + * services. Note that an implementation that offers multiple + * levels of QOP may define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT to be either zero + * (as done here) to mean "default protection", or to a specific + * explicit QOP value. However, a value of 0 should always be + * interpreted by a GSS-API implementation as a request for the + * default protection level. + */ + #define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0 + + /* + * Expiration time of 2^32-1 seconds means infinite lifetime for a + * credential or security context + */ + #define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user_name(1)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 86] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + * nametypes(6) gss-host-based-services(2)). The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. This is a deprecated OID value, and + * implementations wishing to support hostbased-service names + * should instead use the GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE OID, + * defined below, to identify such names; + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X should be accepted a synonym + * for GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE when presented as an input + * parameter, but should not be emitted by GSS-API + * implementations + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X; + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 87] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x04"}, corresponding to an + * object-identifier value of {iso(1) member-body(2) + * Unites States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) service_name(4)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE should be initialized + * to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 3(gss-anonymous-name)}. The constant + * and GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS; + + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 4(gss-api-exported-name)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME; + + + /* Major status codes */ + + #define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0 + + /* + * Some "helper" definitions to make the status code macros obvious. + */ + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24 + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16 + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 88] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0 + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul + + /* + * The macros that test status codes for error conditions. + * Note that the GSS_ERROR() macro has changed slightly from + * the V1 GSS-API so that it now evaluates its argument + * only once. + */ + #define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK << GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ERROR(x) \ + (x & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | \ + (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))) + + /* + * Now the actual status code definitions + */ + + /* + * Calling errors: + + */ + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ \ + (1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE \ + (2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE \ + (3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Routine errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_BAD_MECH (1ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAME (2ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (3ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS (4ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS (5ul << + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 89] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_SIG (6ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_MIC GSS_S_BAD_SIG + #define GSS_S_NO_CRED (7ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT (8ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN (9ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED (11ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (12ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_FAILURE (13ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_QOP (14ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED (15ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE (16ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT (17ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN (18ul << + GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Supplementary info bits: + */ + #define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED \ + (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0)) + #define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN \ + (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1)) + #define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN \ + (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2)) + #define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN \ + (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3)) + #define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN \ + (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4)) + + /* + * Finally, function prototypes for the GSS-API routines. + */ + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 90] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* desired_name */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + const gss_OID_set, /* desired_mechs */ + gss_cred_usage_t, /* cred_usage */ + gss_cred_id_t , /* output_cred_handle */ + gss_OID_set , /* actual_mechs */ + OM_uint32 * /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t * /* cred_handle */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* initiator_cred_handle */ + gss_ctx_id_t , /* context_handle */ + const gss_name_t, /* target_name */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + OM_uint32, /* req_flags */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + const gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_token */ + gss_OID , /* actual_mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + OM_uint32 , /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32 * /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t , /* context_handle */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* acceptor_cred_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_token_buffer */ + const gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + gss_name_t , /* src_name */ + gss_OID , /* mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + OM_uint32 , /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32 , /* time_rec */ + gss_cred_id_t * /* delegated_cred_handle */ + ); + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 91] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t /* token_buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t , /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_token */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + OM_uint32 * /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_get_mic + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_qop_t, /* qop_req */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t /* message_token */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* token_buffer */ + gss_qop_t * /* qop_state */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + gss_qop_t, /* qop_req */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + int , /* conf_state */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_message_buffer */ + ); + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 92] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + OM_uint32 gss_unwrap + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_message_buffer */ + int , /* conf_state */ + gss_qop_t * /* qop_state */ + ); + + + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + OM_uint32, /* status_value */ + int, /* status_type */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + OM_uint32 , /* message_context */ + gss_buffer_t /* status_string */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set * /* mech_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* name1 */ + const gss_name_t, /* name2 */ + int * /* name_equal */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_name_buffer */ + gss_OID * /* output_name_type */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_name_buffer */ + const gss_OID, /* input_name_type */ + gss_name_t * /* output_name */ + ); + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 93] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + OM_uint32 gss_export_name + (OM_uint32, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_buffer_t /* exported_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t * /* input_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_buffer_t /* buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set * /* set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* cred_handle */ + gss_name_t , /* name */ + OM_uint32 , /* lifetime */ + gss_cred_usage_t , /* cred_usage */ + gss_OID_set * /* mechanisms */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_name_t , /* src_name */ + gss_name_t , /* targ_name */ + OM_uint32 , /* lifetime_rec */ + gss_OID , /* mech_type */ + OM_uint32 , /* ctx_flags */ + int , /* locally_initiated */ + int * /* open */ + ); + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 94] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + gss_qop_t, /* qop_req */ + OM_uint32, /* req_output_size */ + OM_uint32 * /* max_input_size */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* input_cred_handle */ + const gss_name_t, /* desired_name */ + const gss_OID, /* desired_mech */ + gss_cred_usage_t, /* cred_usage */ + OM_uint32, /* initiator_time_req */ + OM_uint32, /* acceptor_time_req */ + gss_cred_id_t , /* output_cred_handle */ + gss_OID_set , /* actual_mechs */ + OM_uint32 , /* initiator_time_rec */ + OM_uint32 * /* acceptor_time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* cred_handle */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + gss_name_t , /* name */ + OM_uint32 , /* initiator_lifetime */ + OM_uint32 , /* acceptor_lifetime */ + gss_cred_usage_t * /* cred_usage */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t , /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* interprocess_token */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* interprocess_token */ + gss_ctx_id_t * /* context_handle */ + ); + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 95] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set * /* oid_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_OID, /* member_oid */ + gss_OID_set * /* oid_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_OID, /* member */ + const gss_OID_set, /* set */ + int * /* present */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_OID, /* mechanism */ + gss_OID_set * /* name_types */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_OID_set * /* mech_types */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + gss_name_t * /* output_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* src_name */ + gss_name_t * /* dest_name */ + ); + + /* + * The following routines are obsolete variants of gss_get_mic, + * gss_verify_mic, gss_wrap and gss_unwrap. They should be + * provided by GSS-API V2 implementations for backwards + * compatibility with V1 applications. Distinct entrypoints + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 96] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + * (as opposed to #defines) should be provided, both to allow + * GSS-API V1 applications to link against GSS-API V2 + implementations, + * and to retain the slight parameter type differences between the + * obsolete versions of these routines and their current forms. + */ + + OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t /* message_token */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* token_buffer */ + int * /* qop_state */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + int , /* conf_state */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_message_buffer */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32 , /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_message_buffer */ + int , /* conf_state */ + int * /* qop_state */ + ); + + #endif /* GSSAPI_H_ */ + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 97] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +Appendix B. Additional constraints for application binary portability + + The purpose of this C-bindings document is to encourage source-level + portability of applications across GSS-API implementations on + different platforms and atop different mechanisms. Additional goals + that have not been explicitly addressed by this document are link- + time and run-time portability. + + Link-time portability provides the ability to compile an application + against one implementation of GSS-API, and then link it against a + different implementation on the same platform. It is a stricter + requirement than source-level portability. + + Run-time portability differs from link-time portability only on those + platforms that implement dynamically loadable GSS-API + implementations, but do not offer load-time symbol resolution. On + such platforms, run-time portability is a stricter requirement than + link-time portability, and will typically include the precise + placement of the various GSS-API routines within library entrypoint + vectors. + + Individual platforms will impose their own rules that must be + followed to achieve link-time (and run-time, if different) + portability. In order to ensure either form of binary portability, + an ABI specification must be written for GSS-API implementations on + that platform. However, it is recognized that there are some issues + that are likely to be common to all such ABI specifications. This + appendix is intended to be a repository for such common issues, and + contains some suggestions that individual ABI specifications may + choose to reference. Since machine architectures vary greatly, it may + not be possible or desirable to follow these suggestions on all + platforms. + +B.1. Pointers + + While ANSI-C provides a single pointer type for each declared type, + plus a single (void *) type, some platforms (notably those using + segmented memory architectures) augment this with various modified + pointer types (e.g. far pointers, near pointers). These language + bindings assume ANSI-C, and thus do not address such non-standard + implementations. GSS-API implementations for such platforms must + choose an appropriate memory model, and should use it consistently + throughout. For example, if a memory model is chosen that requires + the use of far pointers when passing routine parameters, then far + pointers should also be used within the structures defined by GSS- + API. + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 98] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +B.2. Internal structure alignment + + GSS-API defines several data-structures containing differently-sized + fields. An ABI specification should include a detailed description + of how the fields of such structures are aligned, and if there is any + internal padding in these data structures. The use of compiler + defaults for the platform is recommended. + +B.3. Handle types + + The C bindings specify that the gss_cred_id_t and gss_ctx_id_t types + should be implemented as either pointer or arithmetic types, and that + if pointer types are used, care should be taken to ensure that two + handles may be compared with the == operator. Note that ANSI-C does + not guarantee that two pointer values may be compared with the == + operator unless either the two pointers point to members of a single + array, or at least one of the pointers contains a NULL value. + + For binary portability, additional constraints are required. The + following is an attempt at defining platform-independent constraints. + + The size of the handle type must be the same as sizeof(void *), using + the appropriate memory model. + + The == operator for the chosen type must be a simple bit-wise + comparison. That is, for two in-memory handle objects h1 and h2, the + boolean value of the expression + + (h1 == h2) + + should always be the same as the boolean value of the expression + + (memcmp(&h1, &h2, sizeof(h1)) == 0) + + The actual use of the type (void *) for handle types is discouraged, + not for binary portability reasons, but since it effectively disables + much of the compile-time type-checking that the compiler can + otherwise perform, and is therefore not "programmer-friendly". If a + pointer implementation is desired, and if the platform's + implementation of pointers permits, the handles should be implemented + as pointers to distinct implementation-defined types. + +B.4. The gss_name_t type + + The gss_name_t type, representing the internal name object, should be + implemented as a pointer type. The use of the (void *) type is + discouraged as it does not allow the compiler to perform strong + type-checking. However, the pointer type chosen should be of the + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 99] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + + same size as the (void *) type. Provided this rule is obeyed, ABI + specifications need not further constrain the implementation of + gss_name_t objects. + +B.5. The int and size_t types + + Some platforms may support differently sized implementations of the + "int" and "size_t" types, perhaps chosen through compiler switches, + and perhaps dependent on memory model. An ABI specification for such + a platform should include required implementations for these types. + It is recommended that the default implementation (for the chosen + memory model, if appropriate) is chosen. + +B.6. Procedure-calling conventions + + Some platforms support a variety of different binary conventions for + calling procedures. Such conventions cover things like the format of + the stack frame, the order in which the routine parameters are pushed + onto the stack, whether or not a parameter count is pushed onto the + stack, whether some argument(s) or return values are to be passed in + registers, and whether the called routine or the caller is + responsible for removing the stack frame on return. For such + platforms, an ABI specification should specify which calling + convention is to be used for GSS-API implementations. + +References + + [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000. + + [XOM] OSI Object Management API Specification, Version 2.0 t", + X.400 API Association & X/Open Company Limited, August + 24, 1990 Specification of datatypes and routines for + manipulating information objects. + +Author's Address + + John Wray + Iris Associates + 5 Technology Park Drive, + Westford, MA 01886 + USA + + Phone: +1-978-392-6689 + EMail: John_Wray@Iris.com + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 100] + +RFC 2744 GSS-API V2: C-bindings January 2000 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Acknowledgement + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray Standards Track [Page 101] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/whatis.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/whatis.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eff52d779c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/whatis.texi @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +@c $Id: whatis.texi,v 1.5 2001/01/28 22:11:23 assar Exp $ + +@node What is Kerberos?, Building and Installing, Introduction, Top +@chapter What is Kerberos? + +@quotation +@flushleft + Now this Cerberus had three heads of dogs, + the tail of a dragon, and on his back the + heads of all sorts of snakes. + --- Pseudo-Apollodorus Library 2.5.12 +@end flushleft +@end quotation + +Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services on a network. +It is built upon the assumption that the network is ``unsafe''. For +example, data sent over the network can be eavesdropped and altered, and +addresses can also be faked. Therefore they cannot be used for +authentication purposes. +@cindex authentication + +Kerberos is a trusted third-party service. That means that there is a +third party (the kerberos server) that is trusted by all the entities on +the network (users and services, usually called @dfn{principals}). All +principals share a secret password (or key) with the kerberos server and +this enables principals to verify that the messages from the kerberos +server are authentic. Thus trusting the kerberos server, users and +services can authenticate each other. + +@section Basic mechanism + +@ifinfo +@macro sub{arg} +<\arg\> +@end macro +@end ifinfo + +@tex +@def@xsub#1{$_{#1}$} +@global@let@sub=@xsub +@end tex + +@ifhtml +@macro sub{arg} +<\arg\> +@end macro +@end ifhtml + +@quotation +@strong{Note:} This discussion is about Kerberos version 4, but version +5 works similarly. +@end quotation + +In Kerberos, principals use @dfn{tickets} to prove that they are who +they claim to be. In the following example, @var{A} is the initiator of +the authentication exchange, usually a user, and @var{B} is the service +that @var{A} wishes to use. + +To obtain a ticket for a specific service, @var{A} sends a ticket +request to the kerberos server. The request contains @var{A}'s and +@var{B}'s names (along with some other fields). The kerberos server +checks that both @var{A} and @var{B} are valid principals. + +Having verified the validity of the principals, it creates a packet +containing @var{A}'s and @var{B}'s names, @var{A}'s network address +(@var{A@sub{addr}}), the current time (@var{t@sub{issue}}), the lifetime +of the ticket (@var{life}), and a secret @dfn{session key} +@cindex session key +(@var{K@sub{AB}}). This packet is encrypted with @var{B}'s secret key +(@var{K@sub{B}}). The actual ticket (@var{T@sub{AB}}) looks like this: +(@{@var{A}, @var{B}, @var{A@sub{addr}}, @var{t@sub{issue}}, @var{life}, +@var{K@sub{AB}}@}@var{K@sub{B}}). + +The reply to @var{A} consists of the ticket (@var{T@sub{AB}}), @var{B}'s +name, the current time, the lifetime of the ticket, and the session key, all +encrypted in @var{A}'s secret key (@{@var{B}, @var{t@sub{issue}}, +@var{life}, @var{K@sub{AB}}, @var{T@sub{AB}}@}@var{K@sub{A}}). @var{A} +decrypts the reply and retains it for later use. + +@sp 1 + +Before sending a message to @var{B}, @var{A} creates an authenticator +consisting of @var{A}'s name, @var{A}'s address, the current time, and a +``checksum'' chosen by @var{A}, all encrypted with the secret session +key (@{@var{A}, @var{A@sub{addr}}, @var{t@sub{current}}, +@var{checksum}@}@var{K@sub{AB}}). This is sent together with the ticket +received from the kerberos server to @var{B}. Upon reception, @var{B} +decrypts the ticket using @var{B}'s secret key. Since the ticket +contains the session key that the authenticator was encrypted with, +@var{B} can now also decrypt the authenticator. To verify that @var{A} +really is @var{A}, @var{B} now has to compare the contents of the ticket +with that of the authenticator. If everything matches, @var{B} now +considers @var{A} as properly authenticated. + +@c (here we should have some more explanations) + +@section Different attacks + +@subheading Impersonating A + +An impostor, @var{C} could steal the authenticator and the ticket as it +is transmitted across the network, and use them to impersonate +@var{A}. The address in the ticket and the authenticator was added to +make it more difficult to perform this attack. To succeed @var{C} will +have to either use the same machine as @var{A} or fake the source +addresses of the packets. By including the time stamp in the +authenticator, @var{C} does not have much time in which to mount the +attack. + +@subheading Impersonating B + +@var{C} can hijack @var{B}'s network address, and when @var{A} sends +her credentials, @var{C} just pretend to verify them. @var{C} can't +be sure that she is talking to @var{A}. + +@section Defense strategies + +It would be possible to add a @dfn{replay cache} +@cindex replay cache +to the server side. The idea is to save the authenticators sent during +the last few minutes, so that @var{B} can detect when someone is trying +to retransmit an already used message. This is somewhat impractical +(mostly regarding efficiency), and is not part of Kerberos 4; MIT +Kerberos 5 contains it. + +To authenticate @var{B}, @var{A} might request that @var{B} sends +something back that proves that @var{B} has access to the session +key. An example of this is the checksum that @var{A} sent as part of the +authenticator. One typical procedure is to add one to the checksum, +encrypt it with the session key and send it back to @var{A}. This is +called @dfn{mutual authentication}. + +The session key can also be used to add cryptographic checksums to the +messages sent between @var{A} and @var{B} (known as @dfn{message +integrity}). Encryption can also be added (@dfn{message +confidentiality}). This is probably the best approach in all cases. +@cindex integrity +@cindex confidentiality + +@section Further reading + +The original paper on Kerberos from 1988 is @cite{Kerberos: An +Authentication Service for Open Network Systems}, by Jennifer Steiner, +Clifford Neuman and Jeffrey I. Schiller. + +A less technical description can be found in @cite{Designing an +Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes} by Bill Bryant, also +from 1988. + +These documents can be found on our web-page at +@url{http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/}. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/win2k.texi b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/win2k.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2db4da1e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/doc/win2k.texi @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +@c $Id: win2k.texi,v 1.15 2001/07/19 16:44:41 assar Exp $ + +@node Windows 2000 compatability, Programming with Kerberos, Kerberos 4 issues, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Windows 2000 compatability + +Windows 2000 (formerly known as Windows NT 5) from Microsoft implements +Kerberos 5. Their implementation, however, has some quirks, +peculiarities, and bugs. This chapter is a short summary of the things +that we have found out while trying to test Heimdal against Windows +2000. Another big problem with the Kerberos implementation in Windows +2000 is that the available documentation is more focused on getting +things to work rather than how they work and not that useful in figuring +out how things really work. + +This information should apply to Heimdal @value{VERSION} and Windows +2000 Professional. It's of course subject all the time and mostly consists of +our not so inspired guesses. Hopefully it's still somewhat useful. + +@menu +* Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC:: +* Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC:: +* Create account mappings:: +* Encryption types:: +* Authorization data:: +* Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC:: +* Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000:: +@end menu + +@node Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC, Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC, Windows 2000 compatability, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, precious, up +@section Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC + +You need the command line program called @code{ksetup.exe} which is available +in the file @code{SUPPORT/TOOLS/SUPPORT.CAB} on the Windows 2000 Professional +CD-ROM. This program is used to configure the Kerberos settings on a +Workstation. + +@code{Ksetup} store the domain information under the registry key: +@code{HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\Kerberos\Domains}. + +Use the kadmin program in Heimdal to create a host principal in the +Kerberos realm. + +@example +unix% kadmin +kadmin> ank -pw password host/datan.my.domain +@end example + +You must configure the Workstation as a member of a workgroup, as opposed +to a member in an NT domain, and specify the KDC server of the realm +as follows: +@example +C:> ksetup /setdomain MY.REALM +C:> ksetup /addkdc MY.REALM kdc.my.domain +@end example + +Set the machine password, i.e. create the local keytab: +@example +C:> ksetup /setmachpassword password +@end example + +The workstation must now be rebooted. + +A mapping between local NT users and Kerberos principals must be specified, +you have two choices: + +@example +C:> ksetup /mapuser user@@MY.REALM nt_user +@end example + +This will map a user to a specific principal, this allows you to have +other usernames in the realm than in your NT user database. (Don't ask +me why on earth you would want that...) + +You can also say: +@example +C:> ksetup /mapuser * * +@end example +The Windows machine will now map any user to the corresponding principal, +for example @samp{nisse} to the principal @samp{nisse@@MY.REALM}. +(This is most likely what you want.) + +@node Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC, Create account mappings, Configuring Windows 2000 to use a Heimdal KDC, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, precious, up +@section Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC + +See also the Step-by-Step guide from Microsoft, referenced below. + +Install Windows 2000, and create a new controller (Active Directory +Server) for the domain. + +By default the trust will be non-transitive. This means that only users +directly from the trusted domain may authenticate. This can be changed +to transitive by using the @code{netdom.exe} tool. + +You need to tell Windows 2000 on what hosts to find the KDCs for the +non-Windows realm with @code{ksetup}, see @xref{Configuring Windows 2000 +to use a Heimdal KDC}. + +This need to be done on all computers that want enable cross-realm +login with @code{Mapped Names}. + +Then you need to add the inter-realm keys on the Windows kdc. Start the +Domain Tree Management tool. (Found in Programs, Administrative tools, +Active Directory Domains and Trusts). + +Right click on Properties of your domain, select the Trust tab. Press +Add on the appropriate trust windows and enter domain name and +password. When prompted if this is a non-Windows Kerberos realm, press +OK. + +Do not forget to add trusts in both directions. + +You also need to add the inter-realm keys to the Heimdal KDC. There are +some tweaks that you need to do to @file{krb5.conf} beforehand. + +@example +[libdefaults] + default_etypes = des-cbc-crc + default_etypes_des = des-cbc-crc +@end example + +since otherwise checksum types that are not understood by Windows 2000 +will be generated (@xref{Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC}.). + +Another issue is salting. Since Windows 2000 does not seem to +understand Kerberos 4 salted hashes you might need to turn off anything +similar to the following if you have it, at least while adding the +principals that are going to share keys with Windows 2000. + +@example + [kadmin]default_keys = v5 v4 +@end example + +You must also set: + +Once that is also done, you can add the required inter-realm keys: + +@example +kadmin add krbtgt/NT.REALM.EXAMPLE.COM@@EXAMPLE.COM +kadmin add krbtgt/REALM.EXAMPLE.COM@@NT.EXAMPLE.COM +@end example + +Use the same passwords for both keys. + +Do not forget to reboot before trying the new realm-trust (after running +@code{ksetup}). It looks like it might work, but packets are never sent to the +non-Windows KDC. + +@node Create account mappings, Encryption types, Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 and a Heimdal KDC, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, precious, up +@section Create account mappings + +Start the @code{Active Directory Users and Computers} tool. Select the +View menu, that is in the left corner just below the real menu (or press +Alt-V), and select Advanced Features. Right click on the user that you +are going to do a name mapping for and choose Name mapping. + +Click on the Kerberos Names tab and add a new principal from the +non-Windows domain. + +@node Encryption types, Authorization data, Create account mappings, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@section Encryption types + +Windows 2000 supports both the standard DES encryptions (des-cbc-crc and +des-cbc-md5) and its own proprietary encryption that is based on MD4 and +rc4 that is documented in and is supposed to be described in +@file{draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt}. New users will get both +MD4 and DES keys. Users that are converted from a NT4 database, will +only have MD4 passwords and will need a password change to get a DES +key. + +Heimdal implements both of these encryption types, but since DES is the +standard and the hmac-code is somewhat newer, it is likely to work better. + +@node Authorization data, Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC, Encryption types, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@section Authorization data + +The Windows 2000 KDC also adds extra authorization data in tickets. +It is at this point unclear what triggers it to do this. The format of +this data is only available under a ``secret'' license from Microsoft, +which prohibits you implementing it. + +A simple way of getting hold of the data to be able to understand it +better is described here. + +@enumerate +@item Find the client example on using the SSPI in the SDK documentation. +@item Change ``AuthSamp'' in the source code to lowercase. +@item Build the program. +@item Add the ``authsamp'' principal with a known password to the +database. Make sure it has a DES key. +@item Run @kbd{ktutil add} to add the key for that principal to a +keytab. +@item Run @kbd{appl/test/nt_gss_server -p 2000 -s authsamp +--dump-auth=file} where file is an appropriate file. +@item It should authenticate and dump for you the authorization data in +the file. +@item The tool @kbd{lib/asn1/asn1_print} is somewhat useful for +analyzing the data. +@end enumerate + +@node Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC, Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000, Authorization data, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@section Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC + +There are some issues with salts and Windows 2000. Using an empty salt, +which is the only one that Kerberos 4 supported and is therefore known +as a Kerberos 4 compatible salt does not work, as far as we can tell +from out experiments and users reports. Therefore, you have to make +sure you keep around keys with all the different types of salts that are +required. + +Microsoft seems also to have forgotten to implement the checksum +algorithms @samp{rsa-md4-des} and @samp{rsa-md5-des}. This can make Name +mapping (@pxref{Create account mappings}) fail if a @code{des-cbc-md5} key +is used. To make the KDC return only @code{des-cbc-crc} you must delete +the @code{des-cbc-md5} key from the kdc using the @code{kadmin +del_enctype} command. + +@example +kadmin del_enctype lha des-cbc-md5 +@end example + +You should also add the following entries to the @file{krb5.conf} file: + +@example +[libdefaults] + default_etypes = des-cbc-crc + default_etypes_des = des-cbc-crc +@end example + +These configuration options will make sure that no checksums of the +unsupported types are generated. + +@node Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000, , Quirks of Windows 2000 KDC, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@section Useful links when reading about the Windows 2000 + +See also our paper presented at the 2001 usenix Annual Technical +Conference, available in the proceedings or at +@url{http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/usenix01/freenix01/westerlund.html}. + +There are lots of text about Kerberos on Microsoft's web site, here is a +short list of the interesting documents that we have managed to find. + +@itemize @bullet + +@item Step-by-Step Guide to Kerberos 5 (krb5 1.0) Interoperability - +@url{http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/library/planning/security/kerbsteps.asp} +Kerberos GSS-API (in Windows-ize SSPI), Windows as a client in a +non-Windows KDC realm, adding unix clients to a Windows 2000 KDC, and +adding cross-realm trust (@xref{Inter-Realm keys (trust) between Windows 2000 +and a Heimdal KDC}.). + +@item Windows 2000 Kerberos Authentication - +@url{http://www.microsoft.com/TechNet/win2000/win2ksrv/technote/kerberos.asp} +White paper that describes how Kerberos is used in Windows 2000. + +@item Overview of kerberos - +@url{http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q248/7/58.ASP} +Links to useful other links. + +@item Klist for windows - +@url{http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/periodic/period00/security0500.htm} +Describes where to get a klist for Windows 2000. + +@item Event logging for kerberos - +@url{http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q262/1/77.ASP}. +Basicly it say that you can add a registry key +@code{HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters\LogLevel} +with value DWORD equal to 1, and then you'll get logging in the Event +Logger. + +@item Access to the active directory through LDAP +@url{http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/techart/kerberossamp.htm} + +@end itemize + +Other useful programs include these: + +@itemize @bullet +@item pwdump2 +@url{http://www.webspan.net/~tas/pwdump2/} +@end itemize diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/etc/services.append b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/etc/services.append new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ee650d974 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/etc/services.append @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# +# $Id: services.append,v 1.6 2001/08/08 15:48:37 assar Exp $ +# +# Kerberos services +# +kerberos 88/udp kerberos-sec # Kerberos v5 UDP +kerberos 88/tcp kerberos-sec # Kerberos v5 TCP +kpasswd 464/udp # password changing +kpasswd 464/tcp # password changing +klogin 543/tcp # Kerberos authenticated rlogin +kshell 544/tcp krcmd # and remote shell +ekshell 545/tcp # Kerberos encrypted remote shell -kfall +ekshell2 2106/tcp # What U of Colorado @ Boulder uses? +kerberos-adm 749/udp # v5 kadmin +kerberos-adm 749/tcp # v5 kadmin +kerberos-iv 750/udp kdc # Kerberos authentication--udp +kerberos-iv 750/tcp kdc # Kerberos authentication--tcp +kerberos_master 751/udp # v4 kadmin +kerberos_master 751/tcp # v4 kadmin +krb_prop 754/tcp hprop # Kerberos slave propagation +kpop 1109/tcp # Pop with Kerberos +eklogin 2105/tcp # Kerberos encrypted rlogin +rkinit 2108/tcp # Kerberos remote kinit +kf 2110/tcp # forward credentials +kx 2111/tcp # X over kerberos +kip 2112/tcp # IP over kerberos +kauth 2120/tcp # Remote kauth +iprop 2121/tcp # incremental propagation +krb524 4444/udp # MIT 5->4 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c283cd2a49 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.33 2002/09/10 19:59:25 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = kadm5 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = bits make_crypto +CHECK_LOCAL = + +INCLUDES += -DHOST=\"$(CANONICAL_HOST)\" + +include_HEADERS = krb5-types.h +noinst_HEADERS = crypto-headers.h + +krb5-types.h: bits$(EXEEXT) + ./bits$(EXEEXT) krb5-types.h + +crypto-headers.h: make_crypto$(EXEEXT) + ./make_crypto$(EXEEXT) crypto-headers.h + +CLEANFILES = \ + asn1.h \ + asn1_err.h \ + base64.h \ + com_err.h \ + com_right.h \ + crypto-headers.h\ + der.h \ + des.h \ + editline.h \ + err.h \ + getarg.h \ + glob.h \ + gssapi.h \ + hdb.h \ + hdb_asn1.h \ + hdb_err.h \ + heim_err.h \ + kafs.h \ + krb5-protos.h \ + krb5-private.h \ + krb5-types.h \ + krb5.h \ + krb5_err.h \ + md4.h \ + md5.h \ + rc4.h \ + otp.h \ + parse_time.h \ + parse_units.h \ + resolve.h \ + roken-common.h \ + roken.h \ + sha.h \ + sl.h \ + xdbm.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b18f68078 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,919 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.33 2002/09/10 19:59:25 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + +SOURCES = bits.c make_crypto.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(include_HEADERS) $(noinst_HEADERS) \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(srcdir)/config.h.in $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +noinst_PROGRAMS = bits$(EXEEXT) make_crypto$(EXEEXT) +subdir = 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(Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: bits.c,v 1.22 2002/08/28 16:08:44 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define BITSIZE(TYPE) \ +{ \ + int b = 0; TYPE x = 1, zero = 0; const char *pre = "u"; \ + char tmp[128], tmp2[128]; \ + while(x){ x <<= 1; b++; if(x < zero) pre=""; } \ + if(b >= len){ \ + int tabs; \ + sprintf(tmp, "%sint%d_t" , pre, len); \ + sprintf(tmp2, "typedef %s %s;", #TYPE, tmp); \ + tabs = 5 - strlen(tmp2) / 8; \ + fprintf(f, "%s", tmp2); \ + while(tabs-- > 0) fprintf(f, "\t"); \ + fprintf(f, "/* %2d bits */\n", b); \ + return; \ + } \ +} + +#ifndef HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +static void +try_signed(FILE *f, int len) __attribute__ ((unused)); + +static void +try_unsigned(FILE *f, int len) __attribute__ ((unused)); + +static int +print_bt(FILE *f, int flag) __attribute__ ((unused)); + +static void +try_signed(FILE *f, int len) +{ + BITSIZE(signed char); + BITSIZE(short); + BITSIZE(int); + BITSIZE(long); +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + BITSIZE(long long); +#endif + fprintf(f, "/* There is no %d bit type */\n", len); +} + +static void +try_unsigned(FILE *f, int len) +{ + BITSIZE(unsigned char); + BITSIZE(unsigned short); + BITSIZE(unsigned int); + BITSIZE(unsigned long); +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + BITSIZE(unsigned long long); +#endif + fprintf(f, "/* There is no %d bit type */\n", len); +} + +static int +print_bt(FILE *f, int flag) +{ + if(flag == 0){ + fprintf(f, "/* For compatibility with various type definitions */\n"); + fprintf(f, "#ifndef __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__\n"); + fprintf(f, "#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__\n"); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } + return 1; +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *f; + int flag; + char *fn, *hb; + + if(argc < 2){ + fn = "bits.h"; + hb = "__BITS_H__"; + f = stdout; + } else { + char *p; + fn = argv[1]; + hb = malloc(strlen(fn) + 5); + sprintf(hb, "__%s__", fn); + for(p = hb; *p; p++){ + if(!isalnum((unsigned char)*p)) + *p = '_'; + } + f = fopen(argv[1], "w"); + } + fprintf(f, "/* %s -- this file was generated for %s by\n", fn, HOST); + fprintf(f, " %*s %s */\n\n", (int)strlen(fn), "", + "$Id: bits.c,v 1.22 2002/08/28 16:08:44 joda Exp $"); + fprintf(f, "#ifndef %s\n", hb); + fprintf(f, "#define %s\n", hb); + fprintf(f, "\n"); +#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SOCKLEN_T + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif + fprintf(f, "\n"); + + flag = 0; +#ifndef HAVE_INT8_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 8); +#endif /* HAVE_INT8_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_INT16_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 16); +#endif /* HAVE_INT16_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_INT32_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 32); +#endif /* HAVE_INT32_T */ +#if 0 +#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 64); +#endif /* HAVE_INT64_T */ +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UINT8_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 8); +#endif /* HAVE_UINT8_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_UINT16_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 16); +#endif /* HAVE_UINT16_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_UINT32_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 32); +#endif /* HAVE_UINT32_T */ +#if 0 +#ifndef HAVE_UINT64_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 64); +#endif /* HAVE_UINT64_T */ +#endif + +#define X(S) fprintf(f, "typedef uint" #S "_t u_int" #S "_t;\n") +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT8_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + X(8); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT8_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT16_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + X(16); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT16_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT32_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + X(32); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT32_T */ +#if 0 +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + X(64); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT64_T */ +#endif + + if(flag){ + fprintf(f, "\n"); + fprintf(f, "#endif /* __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ */\n\n"); + } +#ifdef KRB5 + fprintf(f, "\n"); +#if defined(HAVE_SOCKLEN_T) + fprintf(f, "typedef socklen_t krb5_socklen_t;\n"); +#else + fprintf(f, "typedef int krb5_socklen_t;\n"); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SSIZE_T) +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif + fprintf(f, "typedef ssize_t krb5_ssize_t;\n"); +#else + fprintf(f, "typedef int krb5_ssize_t;\n"); +#endif + fprintf(f, "\n"); +#endif /* KRB5 */ + fprintf(f, "#endif /* %s */\n", hb); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/config.h.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/config.h.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..147b3cef6b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/config.h.in @@ -0,0 +1,1427 @@ +/* include/config.h.in. Generated from configure.in by autoheader. */ + +#ifndef RCSID +#define RCSID(msg) \ +static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "@(#)" msg } +#endif + +/* Maximum values on all known systems */ +#define MaxHostNameLen (64+4) +#define MaxPathLen (1024+4) + + + +/* Define if you want authentication support in telnet. */ +#undef AUTHENTICATION + +/* path to bin */ +#undef BINDIR + +/* Define if realloc(NULL) doesn't work. */ +#undef BROKEN_REALLOC + +/* Define if you want support for DCE/DFS PAG's. */ +#undef DCE + +/* Define if you want to use DES encryption in telnet. */ +#undef DES_ENCRYPTION + +/* Define this to enable diagnostics in telnet. */ +#undef DIAGNOSTICS + +/* Define if you want encryption support in telnet. */ +#undef ENCRYPTION + +/* define if sys/param.h defines the endiness */ +#undef ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H + +/* Define this if you want support for broken ENV_{VAR,VAL} telnets. */ +#undef ENV_HACK + +/* define if prototype of gethostbyaddr is compatible with struct hostent + *gethostbyaddr(const void *, size_t, int) */ +#undef GETHOSTBYADDR_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if prototype of gethostbyname is compatible with struct hostent + *gethostbyname(const char *) */ +#undef GETHOSTBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if prototype of getservbyname is compatible with struct servent + *getservbyname(const char *, const char *) */ +#undef GETSERVBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if prototype of getsockname is compatible with int getsockname(int, + struct sockaddr*, socklen_t*) */ +#undef GETSOCKNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* Define if you have the `altzone' variable. */ +#undef HAVE_ALTZONE + +/* define if your system declares altzone */ +#undef HAVE_ALTZONE_DECLARATION + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_FTP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `asnprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ASNPRINTF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `atexit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ATEXIT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BSDSETJMP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bswap16' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BSWAP16 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bswap32' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BSWAP32 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CAPABILITY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_set_proc' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CAP_SET_PROC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `cgetent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CGETENT + +/* Define if you have the function `chown'. */ +#undef HAVE_CHOWN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CONFIG_H + +/* Define if you have the function `copyhostent'. */ +#undef HAVE_COPYHOSTENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CURSES_H + +/* Define if you have the function `daemon'. */ +#undef HAVE_DAEMON + +/* define if you have a berkeley db1/2 library */ +#undef HAVE_DB1 + +/* define if you have a berkeley db3/4 library */ +#undef HAVE_DB3 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DB3_DB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DB4_DB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dbm_firstkey' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DBM_FIRSTKEY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DBM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dbopen' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DBOPEN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DB_185_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `db_create' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DB_CREATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DB_H + +/* define if you have ndbm compat in db */ +#undef HAVE_DB_NDBM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DLFCN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DLOPEN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dn_expand' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DN_EXPAND + +/* Define if you have the function `ecalloc'. */ +#undef HAVE_ECALLOC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `el_init' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EL_INIT + +/* Define if you have the function `emalloc'. */ +#undef HAVE_EMALLOC + +/* define if your system declares environ */ +#undef HAVE_ENVIRON_DECLARATION + +/* Define if you have the function `erealloc'. */ +#undef HAVE_EREALLOC + +/* Define if you have the function `err'. */ +#undef HAVE_ERR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ERRNO_H + +/* Define if you have the function `errx'. */ +#undef HAVE_ERRX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ERR_H + +/* Define if you have the function `estrdup'. */ +#undef HAVE_ESTRDUP + +/* Define if you have the function `fchown'. */ +#undef HAVE_FCHOWN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `fcntl' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FCNTL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H + +/* Define if you have the function `flock'. */ +#undef HAVE_FLOCK + +/* Define if you have the function `fnmatch'. */ +#undef HAVE_FNMATCH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FNMATCH_H + +/* Define if el_init takes four arguments. */ +#undef HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_EL_INIT + +/* define if krb_put_int takes four arguments. */ +#undef HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO + +/* Define if you have the function `freehostent'. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEHOSTENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GDBM_NDBM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getconfattr' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETCONFATTR + +/* Define if you have the function `getcwd'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETCWD + +/* Define if you have the function `getdtablesize'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETDTABLESIZE + +/* Define if you have the function `getegid'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETEGID + +/* Define if you have the function `geteuid'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETEUID + +/* Define if you have the function `getgid'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `gethostbyname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `gethostbyname2' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME2 + +/* Define if you have the function `gethostname'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETHOSTNAME + +/* Define if you have the function `getifaddrs'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETIFADDRS + +/* Define if you have the function `getipnodebyaddr'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYADDR + +/* Define if you have the function `getipnodebyname'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlogin' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETLOGIN + +/* Define if you have a working getmsg. */ +#undef HAVE_GETMSG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO + +/* Define if you have the function `getopt'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETOPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpagesize' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getprogname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPROGNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwnam_r' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPWNAM_R + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getsockopt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETSOCKOPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getspnam' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETSPNAM + +/* Define if you have the function `gettimeofday'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getudbnam' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUDBNAM + +/* Define if you have the function `getuid'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUID + +/* Define if you have the function `getusershell'. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL + +/* define if you have a glob() that groks GLOB_BRACE, GLOB_NOCHECK, + GLOB_QUOTE, GLOB_TILDE, and GLOB_LIMIT */ +#undef HAVE_GLOB + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `grantpt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GRANTPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GRP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `hstrerror' function. */ +#undef HAVE_HSTRERROR + +/* Define if you have the `h_errlist' variable. */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRLIST + +/* define if your system declares h_errlist */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRLIST_DECLARATION + +/* Define if you have the `h_errno' variable. */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRNO + +/* define if your system declares h_errno */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRNO_DECLARATION + +/* Define if you have the `h_nerr' variable. */ +#undef HAVE_H_NERR + +/* define if your system declares h_nerr */ +#undef HAVE_H_NERR_DECLARATION + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_IFADDRS_H + +/* Define if you have the in6addr_loopback variable */ +#undef HAVE_IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK + +/* define */ +#undef HAVE_INET_ATON + +/* define */ +#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP + +/* define */ +#undef HAVE_INET_PTON + +/* Define if you have the function `initgroups'. */ +#undef HAVE_INITGROUPS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `initstate' function. */ +#undef HAVE_INITSTATE + +/* Define if you have the function `innetgr'. */ +#undef HAVE_INNETGR + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `int16_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_INT16_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `int32_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_INT32_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `int64_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_INT64_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `int8_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_INT8_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_IO_H + +/* Define if you have IPv6. */ +#undef HAVE_IPV6 + +/* Define if you have the function `iruserok'. */ +#undef HAVE_IRUSEROK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `issetugid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ISSETUGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb_disable_debug' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_DISABLE_DEBUG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb_enable_debug' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_ENABLE_DEBUG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb_get_kdc_time_diff' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_GET_KDC_TIME_DIFF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb_get_our_ip_for_realm' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_GET_OUR_IP_FOR_REALM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb_kdctimeofday' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_KDCTIMEOFDAY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `loadquery' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOADQUERY + +/* Define if you have the function `localtime_r'. */ +#undef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGOUT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */ +#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG + +/* Define if you have the function `lstat'. */ +#undef HAVE_LSTAT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H + +/* Define if you have the function `memmove'. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H + +/* Define if you have the function `mkstemp'. */ +#undef HAVE_MKSTEMP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `mktime' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MKTIME + +/* Define to 1 if you have a working `mmap' system call. */ +#undef HAVE_MMAP + +/* define if you have a ndbm library */ +#undef HAVE_NDBM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NDBM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETDB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_VAR_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H + +/* Define if you want to use Netinfo instead of krb5.conf. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINFO_NI_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NET_IF_H + +/* Define if NDBM really is DB (creates files *.db) */ +#undef HAVE_NEW_DB + +/* define if you have hash functions like md4_finito() */ +#undef HAVE_OLD_HASH_NAMES + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `on_exit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ON_EXIT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */ +#undef HAVE_OPENPTY + +/* define to use openssl's libcrypto */ +#undef HAVE_OPENSSL + +/* define if your system declares optarg */ +#undef HAVE_OPTARG_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares opterr */ +#undef HAVE_OPTERR_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares optind */ +#undef HAVE_OPTIND_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares optopt */ +#undef HAVE_OPTOPT_DECLARATION + +/* Define to enable basic OSF C2 support. */ +#undef HAVE_OSFC2 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PATHS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pidfile' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PIDFILE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PTHREAD_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `ptsname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PTSNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PTY_H + +/* Define if you have the function `putenv'. */ +#undef HAVE_PUTENV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PWD_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `rand' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RAND + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `random' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RANDOM + +/* Define if you have the function `rcmd'. */ +#undef HAVE_RCMD + +/* Define if you have a readline compatible library. */ +#undef HAVE_READLINE + +/* Define if you have the function `readv'. */ +#undef HAVE_READV + +/* Define if you have the function `recvmsg'. */ +#undef HAVE_RECVMSG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_RESOLV_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `res_nsearch' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RES_NSEARCH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `res_search' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RES_SEARCH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `revoke' function. */ +#undef HAVE_REVOKE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SAC_H + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sa_family_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MODULES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `select' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SELECT + +/* Define if you have the function `sendmsg'. */ +#undef HAVE_SENDMSG + +/* Define if you have the function `setegid'. */ +#undef HAVE_SETEGID + +/* Define if you have the function `setenv'. */ +#undef HAVE_SETENV + +/* Define if you have the function `seteuid'. */ +#undef HAVE_SETEUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setitimer' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETITIMER + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlim' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLIM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPCRED + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpgid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setprogname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPROGNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETREGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRESGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRESUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETREUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETSID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsockopt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETSOCKOPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setstate' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETSTATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETUTENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sgi_getcapabilitybyname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SGI_GETCAPABILITYBYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SGTTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SIAD_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SIGACTION + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + +/* define if you have a working snprintf */ +#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SOCKET + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `socklen_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_SOCKLEN_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `ssize_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STANDARDS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STDINT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H + +/* Define if you have the function `strcasecmp'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRCASECMP + +/* Define if you have the function `strdup'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRDUP + +/* Define if you have the function `strerror'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRERROR + +/* Define if you have the function `strftime'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRFTIME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STRING_H + +/* Define if you have the function `strlcat'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLCAT + +/* Define if you have the function `strlcpy'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLCPY + +/* Define if you have the function `strlwr'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLWR + +/* Define if you have the function `strncasecmp'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNCASECMP + +/* Define if you have the function `strndup'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNDUP + +/* Define if you have the function `strnlen'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNLEN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STROPTS_H + +/* Define if you have the function `strptime'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRPTIME + +/* Define if you have the function `strsep'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSEP + +/* Define if you have the function `strsep_copy'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSEP_COPY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strstr' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSTR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsvis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSVIS + +/* Define if you have the function `strtok_r'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRTOK_R + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct addrinfo'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct ifaddrs'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IFADDRS + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct iovec'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IOVEC + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct msghdr'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_MSGHDR + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct sockaddr'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR + +/* Define if struct sockaddr has field sa_len. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct sockaddr_storage'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE + +/* define if you have struct spwd */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD + +/* Define if struct tm has field tm_gmtoff. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_GMTOFF + +/* Define if struct tm has field tm_zone. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_ZONE + +/* Define if struct utmpx has field ut_exit. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_EXIT + +/* Define if struct utmpx has field ut_syslen. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_addr. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_host. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_id. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_pid. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_type. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_user. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER + +/* define if struct winsize is declared in sys/termios.h */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strunvis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUNVIS + +/* Define if you have the function `strupr'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUPR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strvis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRVIS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strvisx' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRVISX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `svis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SVIS + +/* Define if you have the function `swab'. */ +#undef HAVE_SWAB + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSCONF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysctl' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSCTL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `syslog' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSLOG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSLOG_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_BSWAP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CATEGORY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_IOCCOM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PROC_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTYIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTYVAR_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STR_TTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TERMIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMEB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERMCAP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERMIOS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERMIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `tgetent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TGETENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `timegm' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TIMEGM + +/* Define if you have the `timezone' variable. */ +#undef HAVE_TIMEZONE + +/* define if your system declares timezone */ +#undef HAVE_TIMEZONE_DECLARATION + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TIME_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `ttyname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TTYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `ttyslot' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TTYSLOT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UDB_H + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uint16_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_UINT16_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uint32_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_UINT32_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uint64_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_UINT64_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uint8_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_UINT8_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `umask' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UMASK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `uname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `unlockpt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNLOCKPT + +/* Define if you have the function `unsetenv'. */ +#undef HAVE_UNSETENV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `unvis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNVIS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_USERCONF_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTIL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMP_H + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `u_int16_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT16_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `u_int32_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT32_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `u_int64_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `u_int8_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT8_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasnprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_VASNPRINTF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF + +/* Define if you have the function `verr'. */ +#undef HAVE_VERR + +/* Define if you have the function `verrx'. */ +#undef HAVE_VERRX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */ +#undef HAVE_VHANGUP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `vis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_VIS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_VIS_H + +/* define if you have a working vsnprintf */ +#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF + +/* Define if you have the function `vsyslog'. */ +#undef HAVE_VSYSLOG + +/* Define if you have the function `vwarn'. */ +#undef HAVE_VWARN + +/* Define if you have the function `vwarnx'. */ +#undef HAVE_VWARNX + +/* Define if you have the function `warn'. */ +#undef HAVE_WARN + +/* Define if you have the function `warnx'. */ +#undef HAVE_WARNX + +/* Define if you have the function `writev'. */ +#undef HAVE_WRITEV + +/* define if struct winsize has ws_xpixel */ +#undef HAVE_WS_XPIXEL + +/* define if struct winsize has ws_ypixel */ +#undef HAVE_WS_YPIXEL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `XauFileName' function. */ +#undef HAVE_XAUFILENAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `XauReadAuth' function. */ +#undef HAVE_XAUREADAUTH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `XauWriteAuth' function. */ +#undef HAVE_XAUWRITEAUTH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `yp_get_default_domain' function. */ +#undef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */ +#undef HAVE__GETPTY + +/* Define if you have the `_res' variable. */ +#undef HAVE__RES + +/* define if your system declares _res */ +#undef HAVE__RES_DECLARATION + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `_scrsize' function. */ +#undef HAVE__SCRSIZE + +/* define if your compiler has __attribute__ */ +#undef HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ + +/* Define if you have the `__progname' variable. */ +#undef HAVE___PROGNAME + +/* define if your system declares __progname */ +#undef HAVE___PROGNAME_DECLARATION + +/* Define if you have the hesiod package. */ +#undef HESIOD + +/* Define if you are running IRIX 4. */ +#undef IRIX4 + +/* Define if you have the krb4 package. */ +#undef KRB4 + +/* Enable Kerberos 5 support in applications. */ +#undef KRB5 + +/* Define if krb_mk_req takes const char * */ +#undef KRB_MK_REQ_CONST + +/* This is the krb4 sendauth version. */ +#undef KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS + +/* Define to zero if your krb.h doesn't */ +#undef KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE + +/* Define to one if your krb.h doesn't */ +#undef KRB_VERIFY_SECURE + +/* Define to two if your krb.h doesn't */ +#undef KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL + +/* path to lib */ +#undef LIBDIR + +/* path to libexec */ +#undef LIBEXECDIR + +/* path to localstate */ +#undef LOCALSTATEDIR + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for asnprintf() */ +#undef NEED_ASNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for asprintf() */ +#undef NEED_ASPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for crypt() */ +#undef NEED_CRYPT_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for gethostname() */ +#undef NEED_GETHOSTNAME_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for getusershell() */ +#undef NEED_GETUSERSHELL_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for glob() */ +#undef NEED_GLOB_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for hstrerror() */ +#undef NEED_HSTRERROR_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for inet_aton() */ +#undef NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for mkstemp() */ +#undef NEED_MKSTEMP_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for setenv() */ +#undef NEED_SETENV_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for snprintf() */ +#undef NEED_SNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strndup() */ +#undef NEED_STRNDUP_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strsep() */ +#undef NEED_STRSEP_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strsvis() */ +#undef NEED_STRSVIS_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strtok_r() */ +#undef NEED_STRTOK_R_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strunvis() */ +#undef NEED_STRUNVIS_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strvisx() */ +#undef NEED_STRVISX_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strvis() */ +#undef NEED_STRVIS_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for svis() */ +#undef NEED_SVIS_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for unsetenv() */ +#undef NEED_UNSETENV_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for unvis() */ +#undef NEED_UNVIS_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vasnprintf() */ +#undef NEED_VASNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vasprintf() */ +#undef NEED_VASPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vis() */ +#undef NEED_VIS_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vsnprintf() */ +#undef NEED_VSNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* Define if you don't want to use mmap. */ +#undef NO_MMAP + +/* Define this to enable old environment option in telnet. */ +#undef OLD_ENVIRON + +/* Define if you have the openldap package. */ +#undef OPENLDAP + +/* define if prototype of openlog is compatible with void openlog(const char + *, int, int) */ +#undef OPENLOG_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* Define if you want OTP support in applications. */ +#undef OTP + +/* Name of package */ +#undef PACKAGE + +/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */ +#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT + +/* Define to the full name of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_NAME + +/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_STRING + +/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME + +/* Define to the version of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_VERSION + +/* Define if getlogin has POSIX flavour (and not BSD). */ +#undef POSIX_GETLOGIN + +/* Define if getpwnam_r has POSIX flavour. */ +#undef POSIX_GETPWNAM_R + +/* Define if you have the readline package. */ +#undef READLINE + +/* Define as the return type of signal handlers (`int' or `void'). */ +#undef RETSIGTYPE + +/* path to sbin */ +#undef SBINDIR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */ +#undef STDC_HEADERS + +/* Define if you have streams ptys. */ +#undef STREAMSPTY + +/* path to sysconf */ +#undef SYSCONFDIR + +/* Define to what version of SunOS you are running. */ +#undef SunOS + +/* Define to 1 if you can safely include both and . */ +#undef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME + +/* Define to 1 if your declares `struct tm'. */ +#undef TM_IN_SYS_TIME + +/* Version number of package */ +#undef VERSION + +/* Define if signal handlers return void. */ +#undef VOID_RETSIGTYPE + +/* define if target is big endian */ +#undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN + +/* Define to 1 if the X Window System is missing or not being used. */ +#undef X_DISPLAY_MISSING + +/* Define to 1 if `lex' declares `yytext' as a `char *' by default, not a + `char[]'. */ +#undef YYTEXT_POINTER + +/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */ +#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS + +/* Define to enable extensions on glibc-based systems such as Linux. */ +#undef _GNU_SOURCE + +/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */ +#undef _LARGE_FILES + +/* Define to empty if `const' does not conform to ANSI C. */ +#undef const + +/* Define to `int' if doesn't define. */ +#undef gid_t + +/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler + calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +#undef inline +#endif + +/* Define this to what the type mode_t should be. */ +#undef mode_t + +/* Define to `long' if does not define. */ +#undef off_t + +/* Define to `int' if does not define. */ +#undef pid_t + +/* Define this to what the type sig_atomic_t should be. */ +#undef sig_atomic_t + +/* Define to `unsigned' if does not define. */ +#undef size_t + +/* Define to `int' if doesn't define. */ +#undef uid_t + +#if defined(HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT) || !defined(KRB4) +#define KRB_PUT_INT(F, T, L, S) krb_put_int((F), (T), (L), (S)) +#else +#define KRB_PUT_INT(F, T, L, S) krb_put_int((F), (T), (S)) +#endif + + + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) && !defined(AUTHENTICATION) +#define AUTHENTICATION 1 +#endif + +/* Set this to the default system lead string for telnetd + * can contain %-escapes: %s=sysname, %m=machine, %r=os-release + * %v=os-version, %t=tty, %h=hostname, %d=date and time + */ +#undef USE_IM + +/* Used with login -p */ +#undef LOGIN_ARGS + +/* set this to a sensible login */ +#ifndef LOGIN_PATH +#define LOGIN_PATH BINDIR "/login" +#endif + + +#ifdef ROKEN_RENAME +#include "roken_rename.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_KRB_KDCTIMEOFDAY +#define krb_kdctimeofday(X) gettimeofday((X), NULL) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_KRB_GET_KDC_TIME_DIFF +#define krb_get_kdc_time_diff() (0) +#endif + +#ifdef VOID_RETSIGTYPE +#define SIGRETURN(x) return +#else +#define SIGRETURN(x) return (RETSIGTYPE)(x) +#endif + +#ifdef BROKEN_REALLOC +#define realloc(X, Y) isoc_realloc((X), (Y)) +#define isoc_realloc(X, Y) ((X) ? realloc((X), (Y)) : malloc(Y)) +#endif + + +#if ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H +# include +# include +# if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN +# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 +# endif +#endif + + +#if _AIX +#define _ALL_SOURCE +/* XXX this is gross, but kills about a gazillion warnings */ +struct ether_addr; +struct sockaddr; +struct sockaddr_dl; +struct sockaddr_in; +#endif + + +/* IRIX 4 braindamage */ +#if IRIX == 4 && !defined(__STDC__) +#define __STDC__ 0 +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/kadm5/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/kadm5/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0647b8474 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/kadm5/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +CLEANFILES = admin.h kadm5_err.h private.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/kadm5/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/kadm5/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..10c34e1414 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/kadm5/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,638 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +subdir = include/kadm5 +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 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mode 100644 index 0000000000..2215f3fe25 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/include/make_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: make_crypto.c,v 1.4.2.1 2003/05/05 20:10:27 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *p; + FILE *f; + if(argc != 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: make_crypto file\n"); + exit(1); + } + f = fopen(argv[1], "w"); + if(f == NULL) { + perror(argv[1]); + exit(1); + } + for(p = argv[1]; *p; p++) + if(!isalnum((int)*p)) + *p = '_'; + fprintf(f, "#ifndef __%s__\n", argv[1]); + fprintf(f, "#define __%s__\n", argv[1]); +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + fputs("#define OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY\n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); +#if ENABLE_AES + fputs("#include \n", f); +#endif +#else + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); + fputs("#include \n", f); +#ifdef HAVE_OLD_HASH_NAMES + fputs("\n", f); + fputs(" typedef struct md4 MD4_CTX;\n", f); + fputs("#define MD4_Init md4_init\n", f); + fputs("#define MD4_Update md4_update\n", f); + fputs("#define MD4_Final(D, C) md4_finito((C), (D))\n", f); + fputs("\n", f); + fputs(" typedef struct md5 MD5_CTX;\n", f); + fputs("#define MD5_Init md5_init\n", f); + fputs("#define MD5_Update md5_update\n", f); + fputs("#define MD5_Final(D, C) md5_finito((C), (D))\n", f); + fputs("\n", f); + fputs(" typedef struct sha SHA_CTX;\n", f); + fputs("#define SHA1_Init sha_init\n", f); + fputs("#define SHA1_Update sha_update\n", f); + fputs("#define SHA1_Final(D, C) sha_finito((C), (D))\n", f); +#endif +#endif + fprintf(f, "#endif /* __%s__ */\n", argv[1]); + fclose(f); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/install-sh b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/install-sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..77bc38144f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/install-sh @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# install - install a program, script, or datafile + +scriptversion=2004-02-15.20 + +# This originates from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh), which was +# later released in X11R6 (xc/config/util/install.sh) with the +# following copyright and license. +# +# Copyright (C) 1994 X Consortium +# +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: +# +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +# AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNEC- +# TION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. +# +# Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not +# be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other deal- +# ings in this Software without prior written authorization from the X Consor- +# tium. +# +# +# FSF changes to this file are in the public domain. +# +# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent +# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it +# when there is no Makefile. +# +# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written +# from scratch. It can only install one file at a time, a restriction +# shared with many OS's install programs. + +# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script + +# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. +doit="${DOITPROG-}" + +# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars. + +mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}" +cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}" +chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}" +chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}" +chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}" +stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}" +rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}" +mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}" + +transformbasename= +transform_arg= +instcmd="$mvprog" +chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755" +chowncmd= +chgrpcmd= +stripcmd= +rmcmd="$rmprog -f" +mvcmd="$mvprog" +src= +dst= +dir_arg= + +usage="Usage: $0 [OPTION]... SRCFILE DSTFILE + or: $0 [OPTION]... SRCFILES... DIRECTORY + or: $0 -d DIRECTORIES... + +In the first form, install SRCFILE to DSTFILE, removing SRCFILE by default. +In the second, create the directory path DIR. + +Options: +-b=TRANSFORMBASENAME +-c copy source (using $cpprog) instead of moving (using $mvprog). +-d create directories instead of installing files. +-g GROUP $chgrp installed files to GROUP. +-m MODE $chmod installed files to MODE. +-o USER $chown installed files to USER. +-s strip installed files (using $stripprog). +-t=TRANSFORM +--help display this help and exit. +--version display version info and exit. + +Environment variables override the default commands: + CHGRPPROG CHMODPROG CHOWNPROG CPPROG MKDIRPROG MVPROG RMPROG STRIPPROG +" + +while test -n "$1"; do + case $1 in + -b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'` + shift + continue;; + + -c) instcmd=$cpprog + shift + continue;; + + -d) dir_arg=true + shift + continue;; + + -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + --help) echo "$usage"; exit 0;; + + -m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -s) stripcmd=$stripprog + shift + continue;; + + -t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'` + shift + continue;; + + --version) echo "$0 $scriptversion"; exit 0;; + + *) # When -d is used, all remaining arguments are directories to create. + test -n "$dir_arg" && break + # Otherwise, the last argument is the destination. Remove it from $@. + for arg + do + if test -n "$dstarg"; then + # $@ is not empty: it contains at least $arg. + set fnord "$@" "$dstarg" + shift # fnord + fi + shift # arg + dstarg=$arg + done + break;; + esac +done + +if test -z "$1"; then + if test -z "$dir_arg"; then + echo "$0: no input file specified." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + # It's OK to call `install-sh -d' without argument. + # This can happen when creating conditional directories. + exit 0 +fi + +for src +do + # Protect names starting with `-'. + case $src in + -*) src=./$src ;; + esac + + if test -n "$dir_arg"; then + dst=$src + src= + + if test -d "$dst"; then + instcmd=: + chmodcmd= + else + instcmd=$mkdirprog + fi + else + # Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command + # might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad + # if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'. + if test ! -f "$src" && test ! -d "$src"; then + echo "$0: $src does not exist." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -z "$dstarg"; then + echo "$0: no destination specified." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + + dst=$dstarg + # Protect names starting with `-'. + case $dst in + -*) dst=./$dst ;; + esac + + # If destination is a directory, append the input filename; won't work + # if double slashes aren't ignored. + if test -d "$dst"; then + dst=$dst/`basename "$src"` + fi + fi + + # This sed command emulates the dirname command. + dstdir=`echo "$dst" | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'` + + # Make sure that the destination directory exists. + + # Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case. + if test ! -d "$dstdir"; then + defaultIFS=' + ' + IFS="${IFS-$defaultIFS}" + + oIFS=$IFS + # Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason. + IFS='%' + set - `echo "$dstdir" | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'` + IFS=$oIFS + + pathcomp= + + while test $# -ne 0 ; do + pathcomp=$pathcomp$1 + shift + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + $mkdirprog "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + # mkdir can fail with a `File exist' error in case several + # install-sh are creating the directory concurrently. This + # is OK. + test ! -d "$pathcomp" && { (exit ${lasterr-1}); exit; } + fi + pathcomp=$pathcomp/ + done + fi + + if test -n "$dir_arg"; then + $doit $instcmd "$dst" \ + && { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dst"; } \ + && { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dst"; } \ + && { test -z "$stripcmd" || $doit $stripcmd "$dst"; } \ + && { test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd "$dst"; } + + else + # If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now. + if test -z "$transformarg"; then + dstfile=`basename "$dst"` + else + dstfile=`basename "$dst" $transformbasename \ + | sed $transformarg`$transformbasename + fi + + # don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename. + test -z "$dstfile" && dstfile=`basename "$dst"` + + # Make a couple of temp file names in the proper directory. + dsttmp=$dstdir/_inst.$$_ + rmtmp=$dstdir/_rm.$$_ + + # Trap to clean up those temp files at exit. + trap 'status=$?; rm -f "$dsttmp" "$rmtmp" && exit $status' 0 + trap '(exit $?); exit' 1 2 13 15 + + # Move or copy the file name to the temp name + $doit $instcmd "$src" "$dsttmp" && + + # and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits. + # + # If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to + # ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore + # errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command. + # + { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dsttmp"; } \ + && { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dsttmp"; } \ + && { test -z "$stripcmd" || $doit $stripcmd "$dsttmp"; } \ + && { test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd "$dsttmp"; } && + + # Now remove or move aside any old file at destination location. We + # try this two ways since rm can't unlink itself on some systems and + # the destination file might be busy for other reasons. In this case, + # the final cleanup might fail but the new file should still install + # successfully. + { + if test -f "$dstdir/$dstfile"; then + $doit $rmcmd -f "$dstdir/$dstfile" 2>/dev/null \ + || $doit $mvcmd -f "$dstdir/$dstfile" "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null \ + || { + echo "$0: cannot unlink or rename $dstdir/$dstfile" >&2 + (exit 1); exit + } + else + : + fi + } && + + # Now rename the file to the real destination. + $doit $mvcmd "$dsttmp" "$dstdir/$dstfile" + fi || { (exit 1); exit; } +done + +# The final little trick to "correctly" pass the exit status to the exit trap. +{ + (exit 0); exit +} + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion=" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H" +# time-stamp-end: "$" +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8bfbeed7fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,635 @@ +2004-04-29 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * version4.c: 1.30: (handle_v4): make sure length is longer then + 2, Pointed out by Evgeny Demidov + + * kadmind.c: 1.31: make kerberos4 support default turned off + +2003-04-14 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * util.c: cast argument to tolower to unsigned char, from + Christian Biere via NetBSD + +2003-04-06 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kadmind.8: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + +2003-03-31 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kadmin.8: initialises -> initializes, from Perry E. Metzger" + + + * kadmin.c: principal, not pricipal. From Thomas Klausner + + +2003-02-04 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kadmind.8: spelling, from jmc + + * kadmin.8: spelling, from jmc + +2003-01-29 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * server.c (kadmind_dispatch): kadm_chpass: require the password + to pass the password quality check in case the user changes the + user's own password kadm_chpass_with_key: disallow the user to + change it own password to a key, since that password might violate + the password quality check. + +2002-10-23 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (decode_packet): check the length of the version + string and that rlen has a reasonable value + +2002-10-21 Johan Danielsson + + * version4.c: check size of rlen + +2002-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * server.c: constify match_appl_version() + + * version4.c: change some lingering krb_err_base + +2002-09-09 Jacques Vidrine + + * server.c (kadmind_dispatch): while decoding arguments for + kadm_chpass_with_key, sanity check the number of keys given. + Potential problem pointed out by + Sebastian Krahmer . + +2002-09-04 Johan Danielsson + + * load.c (parse_generation): return if there is no generation + (spotted by Daniel Kouril) + +2002-06-07 Jacques Vidrine + + * ank.c: do not attempt to free uninitialized pointer when + kadm5_randkey_principal fails. + +2002-06-07 Johan Danielsson + + * util.c: remove unused variable; reported by Hans Insulander + +2002-03-05 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmind.8: clarify some acl wording, and add an example file + +2002-02-11 Johan Danielsson + + * ext.c: no need to use the "modify" keytab anymore + +2001-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * add-random-users.c: allocate several buffers for the list of + words, instead of one strdup per word (running under efence does + not work very well otherwise) + +2001-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * add-random-users.c: allow specifying the number of users to + create + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: rename variable name to avoid error from current + automake + +2001-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin_locl.h: include libutil.h if it exists + +2001-08-10 Johan Danielsson + + * util.c: do something to handle C-c in prompts + + * load.c: remove unused etypes code, and add parsing of the + generation field + + * ank.c: add a --use-defaults option to just use default values + without questions + + * kadmin.c: add "del" alias for delete + + * cpw.c: call this operation "passwd" in usage + + * kadmin_locl.h: prototype for set_defaults + + * util.c (edit_entry): move setting of default values to a + separate function, set_defaults + +2001-08-01 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin.c: print help message on bad options + +2001-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * add-random-users.c (main): handle --version + +2001-07-30 Johan Danielsson + + * load.c: increase line buffer to 8k + +2001-06-12 Assar Westerlund + + * ext.c (ext_keytab): use the default modify keytab per default + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * kadm_conn.c (start_server): fix krb5_eai_to_heim_errno call + +2001-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin.c (main): some error cleaning required + +2001-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmind.c: new krb5_config_parse_file + * kadmin.c: new krb5_config_parse_file + * kadm_conn.c: update to new krb5_sockaddr2address + +2001-05-07 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin_locl.h (foreach_principal): update prototype + * get.c (getit): new foreach_principal + * ext.c (ext_keytab): new foreach_principal + * del.c (del_entry): new foreach_principal + * cpw.c (cpw_entry): new foreach_principal + * util.c (foreach_principal): add `funcname' and try printing the + error string + +2001-05-04 Johan Danielsson + + * rename.c: fix argument number test + +2001-04-19 Johan Danielsson + + * del_enctype.c: fix argument count check after getarg change; + spotted by mark@MCS.VUW.AC.NZ + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmind.c (main): use a `struct sockaddr_storage' to be able to + store all types of addresses + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin.c: add --keytab / _K, from Leif Johansson + + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * kadm_conn.c (spawn_child): close the newly created socket in the + packet, it's not used. from + * version4.c (decode_packet): check success of + krb5_425_conv_principal. from + +2001-01-12 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (parse_attributes): make empty string mean no attributes, + specifying the empty string at the command line should give you no + attributes, but just pressing return at the prompt gives you + default attributes + (edit_entry): only pick up values from the default principal if they + aren't set in the principal being edited + +2001-01-04 Assar Westerlund + + * load.c (doit): print an error and bail out if storing an entry + in the database fails. The most likely reason for it failing is + out-of-space. + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmind.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + * kadmin.c (main): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + * add-random-users.c (add_user): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + + * kadm_conn.c (spawn_child): use a struct sockaddr_storage + +2000-12-15 Johan Danielsson + + * get.c: avoid asprintf'ing NULL strings + +2000-12-14 Johan Danielsson + + * load.c: fix option parsing + +2000-11-16 Assar Westerlund + + * kadm_conn.c (wait_for_connection): check for fd's being too + large to select on + +2000-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * get.c: don't try to print modifier name if it isn't set (from + Jacques A. Vidrine" ) + +2000-09-19 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (kadmind_loop): send in keytab to v4 handling function + * version4.c: allow the specification of what keytab to use + + * get.c (print_entry_long): actually print the actual saltvalue + used if it's not the default + +2000-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin.c: add option parsing, and add `privs' as an alias for + `privileges' + + * init.c: complain if there's no realm name specified + + * rename.c: add option parsing + + * load.c: add option parsing + + * get.c: make `get' and `list' aliases to each other, but with + different defaults + + * del_enctype.c: add option parsing + + * del.c: add option parsing + + * ank.c: calling the command `add' make more sense from an english + pov + + * Makefile.am: add kadmin manpage + + * kadmin.8: short manpage + + * kadmin.c: `quit' should be a alias for `exit', not `help' + +2000-08-27 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (handle_v5): do not try to perform stupid stunts when + printing errors + +2000-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (str2time_t): add alias for `now'. + +2000-08-18 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (handle_v5): accept any kadmin/admin@* principal as the + server + * kadmind.c: remove extra prototype of kadmind_loop + * kadmin_locl.h (kadmind_loop): add prototype + + * init.c (usage): print init-usage and not add-dito + +2000-08-07 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmind.c: use roken_getsockname + +2000-08-07 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmind.c, kadm_conn.c: use socklen_t instead of int where + appropriate. From + +2000-08-04 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: link with pidfile library + + * kadmind.c: write a pid file, and setup password quality + functions + + * kadmin_locl.h: util.h + +2000-07-27 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (decode_packet): be totally consistent with the + prototype of des_cbc_cksum + * kadmind.c: use sa_size instead of sa_len, some systems define + this to emulate anonymous unions + * kadm_conn.c: use sa_size instead of sa_len, some systems define + this to emulate anonymous unions + +2000-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin.c (commands): add quit + * load.c (doit): truncate the log since there's no way of knowing + what changes are going to be added + +2000-07-23 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (str2time_t): be more careful with strptime that might + zero out the `struct tm' + +2000-07-22 Johan Danielsson + + * kadm_conn.c: make the parent process wait for children and + terminate after receiving a signal, also terminate on SIGINT + +2000-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c: map both princ_expire_time and pw_expiration to v4 + principal expiration + +2000-07-22 Johan Danielsson + + * version4.c (handle_v4): check for termination + + * server.c (v5_loop): check for termination + + * kadm_conn.c (wait_term): if we're doing something, set just set + a flag otherwise exit rightaway + + * server.c: use krb5_read_priv_message; (v5_loop): check for EOF + +2000-07-21 Assar Westerlund + + * kadm_conn.c: remove sys/select.h. make signal handlers + type-correct and static + + * kadmin_locl.h: add limits.h and sys/select.h + +2000-07-20 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (init): also create `kadmin/hprop' + * kadmind.c: ports is a string argument + * kadm_conn.c (start_server): fix printf format + + * kadmin_locl.h: add + * kadm_conn.c: remove sys/select.h. make signal handlers + type-correct and static + + * kadmin_locl.h: add limits.h and sys/select.h + +2000-07-17 Johan Danielsson + + * kadm_conn.c: put all processes in a new process group + + * server.c (v5_loop): use krb5_{read,write}_priv_message + +2000-07-11 Johan Danielsson + + * version4.c: change log strings to match the v5 counterparts + + * mod.c: allow setting kvno + + * kadmind.c: if stdin is not a socket create and listen to sockets + + * kadm_conn.c: socket creation functions + + * util.c (deltat2str): treat 0 and INT_MAX as never + +2000-07-08 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (INCLUDES): add ../lib/krb5 + * kadmin_locl.h: add krb5_locl.h (since we just use some stuff + from there) + +2000-06-07 Assar Westerlund + + * add-random-users.c: new testing program that adds a number of + randomly generated users + +2000-04-12 Assar Westerlund + + * cpw.c (do_cpw_entry): call set_password if no argument is given, + it will prompt for the password. + * kadmin.c: make help only print the commands that are actually + available. + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * del_enctype.c (del_enctype): set ignore correctly + +2000-04-02 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin.c (main): make parse errors a fatal error + * init.c (init): create changepw/kerberos with disallow-tgt and + pwchange attributes + +2000-03-23 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (hex2n, parse_des_key): add + * server.c (kadmind_dispatch): add kadm_chpass_with_key + * cpw.c: add --key + * ank.c: add --key + +2000-02-16 Assar Westerlund + + * load.c (doit): check return value from parse_hdbflags2int + correctly + +2000-01-25 Assar Westerlund + + * load.c: checking all parsing for errors and all memory + allocations also + +2000-01-02 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c: check initial flag in ticket and allow users to change + their own password if it's set + * ext.c (do_ext_keytab): set timestamp + +1999-12-14 Assar Westerlund + + * del_enctype.c (usage): don't use arg_printusage + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * del_enctype.c (del_enctype): try not to leak memory + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_mod): use kadm5_s_modify_principal (no + _with_key) + + * kadmin.c: add `del_enctype' + + * del_enctype.c (del_enctype): new function for deleting enctypes + from a principal + + * Makefile.am (kadmin_SOURCES): add del_enctype.c + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * server.c: cope with old clients + + * kadmin_locl.h: remove version string + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (kadmin_LDADD): add LIB_dlopen + +1999-10-01 Assar Westerlund + + * ank.c (add_one_principal): `password' can cactually be NULL in + the overwrite code, check for it. + +1999-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * mod.c (mod_entry): print the correct principal name in error + messages. From Love + +1999-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (init): also create `changepw/kerberos' + + * version4.c: only create you loose packets when we fail decoding + and not when an operation is not performed for some reason + (decode_packet): read the service key from the hdb + (dispatch, decode_packet): return proper error messages + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): add password quality functions + +1999-08-27 Johan Danielsson + + * server.c (handle_v5): give more informative message if + KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND + +1999-08-26 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmind.c: use HDB keytabs + +1999-08-25 Assar Westerlund + + * cpw.c (set_password): use correct variable. From Love + + + * server.c (v5_loop): use correct error code + + * ank.c (add_one_principal): initialize `default_ent' + +1999-08-21 Assar Westerlund + + * random_password.c: new file, stolen from krb4 + + * kadmin_locl.h: add prototype for random_password + + * cpw.c: add support for --random-password + + * ank.c: add support for --random-password + + * Makefile.am (kadmin_SOURCES): add random_password.c + +1999-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (edit_timet): break when we manage to parse the time not + the inverse. + + * mod.c: add parsing of lots of options. From Love + + + * ank.c: add setting of expiration and password expiration + + * kadmin_locl.h: update util.c prototypes + + * util.c: move-around. clean-up, rename, make consistent (and + some other weird stuff). based on patches from Love + + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): initialize password + (handle_v4): remove unused variable `ret' + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (handle_v4): more error checking and more correct + error messages + + * server.c (v5_loop, kadmind_loop): more error checking and more + correct error messages + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (str2timeval, edit_time): functions for parsing and + editing times. Based on patches from Love . + (edit_entry): call new functions + + * mod.c (mod_entry): allow modifying expiration times + + * kadmin_locl.h (str2timeval): add prototype + + * ank.c (add_one_principal): allow setting expiration times + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (v5_loop): handle data allocation with krb5_data_alloc + and check return value + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): read the key in the strange order + it's sent + + * util.c (edit_entry): look at default + (edit_time): always set mask even if value == 0 + + * kadmin_locl.h (edit_entry): update + + * ank.c: make ank use the values of the default principal for + prompting + + * version4.c (values_to_ent): convert key data correctly + +1999-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (create_random_entry): more correct setting of mask + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (handle_v5): read sendauth version correctly. + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (error_code): try to handle really old krb4 + distributions + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (init): initialize realm_max_life and realm_max_rlife + +1999-05-07 Assar Westerlund + + * ank.c (add_new_key): initialize more variables + +1999-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): always allow a user to change her + password + (kadm_ser_*): make logging work + clean-up and restructure + + * kadmin_locl.h (set_entry): add prototype + + * kadmin.c (usage): update usage string + + * init.c (init): new arguments realm-max-ticket-life and + realm-max-renewable-life + + * util.c (edit_time, edit_attributes): don't do anything if it's + already set + (set_entry): new function + + * ank.c (add_new_key): new options for setting max-ticket-life, + max-renewable-life, and attributes + + * server.c (v5_loop): remove unused variable + + * kadmin_locl.h: add prototypes + + * version4.c: re-insert krb_err.h and other miss + + * server.c (kadmind_loop): break-up and restructure + + * version4.c: add ACL checks more error code checks restructure + +1999-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * load.c: check for (un-)encrypted keys + + * dump.c: use hdb_print_entry + + * version4.c: version 4 support + + * Makefile.am: link with krb4 + + * kadmin_locl.h: include + + * server.c: move from lib/kadm5, and add basic support for krb4 + kadmin protocol + + * kadmind.c: move recvauth to kadmind_loop() diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3e9e4066fb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.34 2001/08/28 08:31:26 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) -I$(srcdir)/../lib/krb5 + +sbin_PROGRAMS = kadmin + +libexec_PROGRAMS = kadmind + +man_MANS = kadmin.8 kadmind.8 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = add_random_users + +kadmin_SOURCES = \ + ank.c \ + cpw.c \ + del.c \ + del_enctype.c \ + dump.c \ + ext.c \ + get.c \ + init.c \ + kadmin.c \ + load.c \ + mod.c \ + rename.c \ + util.c \ + random_password.c \ + kadmin_locl.h + +if KRB4 +KRB4LIB = $(LIB_krb4) +version4_c = version4.c +endif + +kadmind_SOURCES = \ + kadmind.c \ + server.c \ + kadmin_locl.h \ + $(version4_c) \ + kadm_conn.c + +EXTRA_kadmind_SOURCES = version4.c + +add_random_users_SOURCES = add-random-users.c + +LDADD_common = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +kadmind_LDADD = $(KRB4LIB) $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(LDADD_common) \ + $(LIB_pidfile) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) + +kadmin_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la \ + $(LIB_readline) \ + $(LDADD_common) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) + +add_random_users_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(LDADD_common) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19d7215852 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,936 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.34 2001/08/28 08:31:26 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(add_random_users_SOURCES) $(kadmin_SOURCES) $(kadmind_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_kadmind_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + 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+install-suid-programs: + @foo='$(bin_SUIDS)'; \ + for file in $$foo; do \ + x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + echo "*"; \ + echo "* Failed to install $$x setuid root"; \ + echo "*"; \ + fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(nodist_include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/add-random-users.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/add-random-users.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ebd114945d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/add-random-users.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add-random-users.c,v 1.6 2001/09/20 09:17:33 assar Exp $"); + +#define WORDS_FILENAME "/usr/share/dict/words" + +#define NUSERS 1000 + +#define WORDBUF_SIZE 65535 + +static unsigned +read_words (const char *filename, char ***ret_w) +{ + unsigned n, alloc; + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + char **w = NULL; + char *wbuf = NULL, *wptr = NULL, *wend = NULL; + + f = fopen (filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + err (1, "cannot open %s", filename); + alloc = n = 0; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + size_t len; + + if (buf[strlen (buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen (buf) - 1] = '\0'; + if (n >= alloc) { + alloc = max(alloc + 16, alloc * 2); + w = erealloc (w, alloc * sizeof(char **)); + } + len = strlen(buf); + if (wptr + len + 1 >= wend) { + wptr = wbuf = emalloc (WORDBUF_SIZE); + wend = wbuf + WORDBUF_SIZE; + } + memmove (wptr, buf, len + 1); + w[n++] = wptr; + wptr += len + 1; + } + *ret_w = w; + return n; +} + +static void +add_user (krb5_context context, void *kadm_handle, + unsigned nwords, char **words) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + char name[64]; + int r1, r2; + krb5_error_code ret; + int mask; + + r1 = rand(); + r2 = rand(); + + snprintf (name, sizeof(name), "%s%d", words[r1 % nwords], r2 % 1000); + + mask = KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name, &princ.principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + + ret = kadm5_create_principal (kadm_handle, &princ, mask, name); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_create_principal"); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + printf ("%s\n", name); +} + +static void +add_users (const char *filename, unsigned n) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + void *kadm_handle; + krb5_context context; + unsigned nwords; + char **words; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password"); + + nwords = read_words (filename, &words); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + add_user (context, kadm_handle, nwords, words); + kadm5_destroy(kadm_handle); + krb5_free_context(context); +} + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[filename [n]]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int n = NUSERS; + const char *filename = WORDS_FILENAME; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + return 0; + } + srand (0); + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 0) { + if (argc > 1) + n = atoi(argv[1]); + filename = argv[0]; + } + + add_users (filename, n); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ank.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ank.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a166fb2377 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ank.c @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ank.c,v 1.25 2002/12/03 14:11:24 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * fetch the default principal corresponding to `princ' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_default (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal def_principal; + krb5_realm *realm = krb5_princ_realm(context->context, princ); + + ret = krb5_make_principal (context->context, &def_principal, + *realm, "default", NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_get_principal (context, def_principal, default_ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, def_principal); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add the principal `name' to the database. + * Prompt for all data not given by the input parameters. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +add_one_principal (const char *name, + int rand_key, + int rand_password, + int use_defaults, + char *password, + krb5_key_data *key_data, + const char *max_ticket_life, + const char *max_renewable_life, + const char *attributes, + const char *expiration, + const char *pw_expiration) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ, defrec; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec *default_ent = NULL; + krb5_principal princ_ent = NULL; + int mask = 0; + int default_mask = 0; + char pwbuf[1024]; + + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name, &princ_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + return ret; + } + princ.principal = princ_ent; + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + + ret = set_entry(context, &princ, &mask, + max_ticket_life, max_renewable_life, + expiration, pw_expiration, attributes); + if (ret) + goto out; + + default_ent = &defrec; + ret = get_default (kadm_handle, princ_ent, default_ent); + if (ret) { + default_ent = NULL; + default_mask = 0; + } else { + default_mask = KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_MAX_LIFE | KADM5_MAX_RLIFE | + KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME | KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION; + } + + if(use_defaults) + set_defaults(&princ, &mask, default_ent, default_mask); + else + if(edit_entry(&princ, &mask, default_ent, default_mask)) + goto out; + if(rand_key || key_data) { + princ.attributes |= KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + strlcpy (pwbuf, "hemlig", sizeof(pwbuf)); + password = pwbuf; + } else if (rand_password) { + random_password (pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf)); + password = pwbuf; + } else if(password == NULL) { + char *princ_name; + char *prompt; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ_ent, &princ_name); + asprintf (&prompt, "%s's Password: ", princ_name); + free (princ_name); + ret = des_read_pw_string (pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), prompt, 1); + free (prompt); + if (ret) + goto out; + password = pwbuf; + } + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask, password); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_create_principal"); + goto out; + } + if(rand_key) { + krb5_keyblock *new_keys; + int n_keys, i; + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, + &new_keys, &n_keys); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_randkey_principal"); + n_keys = 0; + } + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &new_keys[i]); + if (n_keys > 0) + free(new_keys); + kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + princ.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + princ.kvno = 1; + kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, + KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_KVNO); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + } else if (key_data) { + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key (kadm_handle, princ_ent, + 3, key_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key"); + } + kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + princ.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + } else if (rand_password) { + char *princ_name; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ_ent, &princ_name); + printf ("added %s with password `%s'\n", princ_name, password); + free (princ_name); + } +out: + if (princ_ent) + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + if(default_ent) + kadm5_free_principal_ent (context, default_ent); + if (password != NULL) + memset (password, 0, strlen(password)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * parse the string `key_string' into `key', returning 0 iff succesful. + */ + +/* + * the ank command + */ + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "random-key", 'r', arg_flag, NULL, "set random key" }, + { "random-password", 0, arg_flag, NULL, "set random password" }, + { "password", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "princial's password" }, + { "key", 0, arg_string, NULL, "DES-key in hex" }, + { "max-ticket-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, "max ticket lifetime", + "lifetime"}, + { "max-renewable-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "max renewable lifetime", "lifetime" }, + { "attributes", 0, arg_string, NULL, "principal attributes", + "attributes"}, + { "expiration-time",0, arg_string, NULL, "expiration time", + "time"}, + { "pw-expiration-time", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "password expiration time", "time"}, + { "use-defaults", 0, arg_flag, NULL, "use default values" } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "add", "principal..."); +} + +/* + * Parse arguments and add all the principals. + */ + +int +add_new_key(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *password = NULL; + char *key = NULL; + int random_key = 0; + int random_password = 0; + int optind = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *max_ticket_life = NULL; + char *max_renewable_life = NULL; + char *attributes = NULL; + char *expiration = NULL; + char *pw_expiration = NULL; + int use_defaults = 0; + int i; + int num; + krb5_key_data key_data[3]; + krb5_key_data *kdp = NULL; + + args[0].value = &random_key; + args[1].value = &random_password; + args[2].value = &password; + args[3].value = &key; + args[4].value = &max_ticket_life; + args[5].value = &max_renewable_life; + args[6].value = &attributes; + args[7].value = &expiration; + args[8].value = &pw_expiration; + args[9].value = &use_defaults; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + if(optind == argc) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + + num = 0; + if (random_key) + ++num; + if (random_password) + ++num; + if (password) + ++num; + if (key) + ++num; + + if (num > 1) { + printf ("give only one of " + "--random-key, --random-password, --password, --key\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (key) { + const char *error; + + if (parse_des_key (key, key_data, &error)) { + printf ("failed parsing key `%s': %s\n", key, error); + return 0; + } + kdp = key_data; + } + + for (i = optind; i < argc; ++i) { + ret = add_one_principal (argv[i], random_key, random_password, + use_defaults, + password, + kdp, + max_ticket_life, + max_renewable_life, + attributes, + expiration, + pw_expiration); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "adding %s", argv[i]); + break; + } + } + if (kdp) { + int16_t dummy = 3; + kadm5_free_key_data (kadm_handle, &dummy, key_data); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/cpw.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/cpw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..50c1cb27eb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/cpw.c @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: cpw.c,v 1.13 2001/08/10 08:05:35 joda Exp $"); + +struct cpw_entry_data { + int random_key; + int random_password; + char *password; + krb5_key_data *key_data; +}; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "random-key", 'r', arg_flag, NULL, "set random key" }, + { "random-password", 0, arg_flag, NULL, "set random password" }, + { "password", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "princial's password" }, + { "key", 0, arg_string, NULL, "DES key in hex" } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "passwd", "principal..."); +} + +static int +set_random_key (krb5_principal principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int num_keys; + + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, principal, &keys, &num_keys); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[i]); + free(keys); + return 0; +} + +static int +set_random_password (krb5_principal principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char pw[128]; + + random_password (pw, sizeof(pw)); + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, principal, pw); + if (ret == 0) { + char *princ_name; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &princ_name); + + printf ("%s's password set to `%s'\n", princ_name, pw); + free (princ_name); + } + memset (pw, 0, sizeof(pw)); + return ret; +} + +static int +set_password (krb5_principal principal, char *password) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char pwbuf[128]; + + if(password == NULL) { + char *princ_name; + char *prompt; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &princ_name); + asprintf(&prompt, "%s's Password: ", princ_name); + free (princ_name); + ret = des_read_pw_string(pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), prompt, 1); + free (prompt); + if(ret){ + return 0; /* XXX error code? */ + } + password = pwbuf; + } + if(ret == 0) + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, principal, password); + memset(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf)); + return ret; +} + +static int +set_key_data (krb5_principal principal, krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key (kadm_handle, principal, + 3, key_data); + return ret; +} + +static int +do_cpw_entry(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + struct cpw_entry_data *e = data; + + if (e->random_key) + return set_random_key (principal); + else if (e->random_password) + return set_random_password (principal); + else if (e->key_data) + return set_key_data (principal, e->key_data); + else + return set_password (principal, e->password); +} + +int +cpw_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + int optind = 0; + struct cpw_entry_data data; + int num; + char *key_string; + krb5_key_data key_data[3]; + + data.random_key = 0; + data.random_password = 0; + data.password = NULL; + data.key_data = NULL; + + key_string = NULL; + + args[0].value = &data.random_key; + args[1].value = &data.random_password; + args[2].value = &data.password; + args[3].value = &key_string; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + usage(); + return 0; + } + + num = 0; + if (data.random_key) + ++num; + if (data.random_password) + ++num; + if (data.password) + ++num; + if (key_string) + ++num; + + if (num > 1) { + printf ("give only one of " + "--random-key, --random-password, --password, --key\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (key_string) { + const char *error; + + if (parse_des_key (key_string, key_data, &error)) { + printf ("failed parsing key `%s': %s\n", key_string, error); + return 0; + } + data.key_data = key_data; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_cpw_entry, "cpw", &data); + + if (data.key_data) { + int16_t dummy; + kadm5_free_key_data (kadm_handle, &dummy, key_data); + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/del.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/del.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1697656de2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/del.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: del.c,v 1.6 2001/05/07 05:30:50 assar Exp $"); + +static int +do_del_entry(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + return kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handle, principal); +} + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "delete", "principal..."); +} + + +int +del_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + + args[0].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + if(optind == argc || help_flag) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + + for(i = 1; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_del_entry, "del", NULL); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/del_enctype.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/del_enctype.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..985cc84f37 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/del_enctype.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: del_enctype.c,v 1.7 2001/04/19 07:26:52 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * del_enctype principal enctypes... + */ + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "del_enctype", "principal enctypes..."); +} + + +int +del_enctype(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + krb5_principal princ_ent = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *princ_name; + int i, j, k; + krb5_key_data *new_key_data; + int n_etypes; + krb5_enctype *etypes; + + args[0].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + if(argc - optind < 2 || help_flag) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + + memset (&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + princ_name = argv[1]; + n_etypes = argc - 2; + etypes = malloc (n_etypes * sizeof(*etypes)); + if (etypes == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "out of memory"); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < n_etypes; ++i) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype (context, argv[i + 2], &etypes[i]); + if (ret) { + krb5_warnx (context, "bad enctype `%s'", argv[i + 2]); + goto out2; + } + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princ_name, &princ_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", princ_name); + goto out2; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + krb5_warnx (context, "no such principal: %s", princ_name); + goto out2; + } + + new_key_data = malloc(princ.n_key_data * sizeof(*new_key_data)); + if (new_key_data == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "out of memory"); + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < princ.n_key_data; ++i) { + krb5_key_data *key = &princ.key_data[i]; + int docopy = 1; + + for (k = 0; k < n_etypes; ++k) + if (etypes[k] == key->key_data_type[0]) { + docopy = 0; + break; + } + if (docopy) { + new_key_data[j++] = *key; + } else { + int16_t ignore = 1; + + kadm5_free_key_data (kadm_handle, &ignore, key); + } + } + + free (princ.key_data); + princ.n_key_data = j; + princ.key_data = new_key_data; + + ret = kadm5_modify_principal (kadm_handle, &princ, KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_modify_principal"); +out: + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); +out2: + free (etypes); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/dump.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/dump.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a57309c593 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/dump.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: dump.c,v 1.26 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +int +dump(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + FILE *f; + HDB *db = _kadm5_s_get_db(kadm_handle); + int decrypt = 0; + int optind = 0; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "decrypt", 'd', arg_flag, NULL, "decrypt keys" } + }; + args[0].value = &decrypt; + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), "kadmin dump", + "[dump-file]"); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + if(argc < 1) + f = stdout; + else + f = fopen(argv[0], "w"); + + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0600); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_open"); + if(f != stdout) + fclose(f); + return 0; + } + + hdb_foreach(context, db, decrypt ? HDB_F_DECRYPT : 0, hdb_print_entry, f); + + if(f != stdout) + fclose(f); + db->close(context, db); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ext.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ext.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c945fea4c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ext.c,v 1.8 2002/02/11 14:29:52 joda Exp $"); + +struct ext_keytab_data { + krb5_keytab keytab; +}; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, NULL, "keytab to use" }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ext", "principal..."); +} + +static int +do_ext_keytab(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + struct ext_keytab_data *e = data; + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, principal, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KVNO|KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < princ.n_key_data; i++){ + krb5_keytab_entry key; + krb5_key_data *k = &princ.key_data[i]; + key.principal = princ.principal; + key.vno = k->key_data_kvno; + key.keyblock.keytype = k->key_data_type[0]; + key.keyblock.keyvalue.length = k->key_data_length[0]; + key.keyblock.keyvalue.data = k->key_data_contents[0]; + key.timestamp = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, e->keytab, &key); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + } + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + return 0; +} + +int +ext_keytab(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + int optind = 0; + char *keytab = NULL; + struct ext_keytab_data data; + + args[0].value = &keytab; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + usage(); + return 0; + } + if (keytab == NULL) + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &data.keytab); + else + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab, &data.keytab); + + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve"); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) + foreach_principal(argv[i], do_ext_keytab, "ext", &data); + + krb5_kt_close(context, data.keytab); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/get.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/get.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30eea9dfcf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/get.c @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get.c,v 1.13 2001/05/07 05:31:43 assar Exp $"); + +struct get_entry_data { + void (*header)(void); + void (*format)(kadm5_principal_ent_t); +}; + +static void +print_entry_terse(kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + char *p; + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ->principal, &p); + printf(" %s\n", p); + free(p); +} + +static void +print_header_short(void) +{ + printf("%-20s ", "Principal"); + + printf("%-10s ", "Expires"); + + printf("%-10s ", "PW-exp"); + + printf("%-10s ", "PW-change"); + + printf("%-9s ", "Max life"); + + printf("%-9s ", "Max renew"); + + printf("\n"); +} + +static void +print_entry_short(kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + char buf[1024]; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short(context, princ->principal, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-20s ", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->princ_expire_time, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->pw_expiration, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->last_pwd_change, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-9s ", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_renewable_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-9s ", buf); + +#if 0 + time_t2str(princ->mod_date, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ->mod_name, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-24s", buf); +#endif + + printf("\n"); +} + +/* + * return 0 iff `salt' actually is the same as the current salt in `k' + */ + +static int +cmp_salt (const krb5_salt *salt, const krb5_key_data *k) +{ + if (salt->salttype != k->key_data_type[1]) + return 1; + if (salt->saltvalue.length != k->key_data_length[1]) + return 1; + return memcmp (salt->saltvalue.data, k->key_data_contents[1], + salt->saltvalue.length); +} + +static void +print_entry_long(kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + char buf[1024]; + int i; + krb5_salt def_salt; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ->principal, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Principal", buf); + time_t2str(princ->princ_expire_time, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Principal expires", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->pw_expiration, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Password expires", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->last_pwd_change, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last password change", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Max ticket life", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_renewable_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Max renewable life", buf); + printf("%24s: %d\n", "Kvno", princ->kvno); + printf("%24s: %d\n", "Mkvno", princ->mkvno); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Policy", princ->policy ? princ->policy : "none"); + time_t2str(princ->last_success, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last successful login", buf); + time_t2str(princ->last_failed, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last failed login", buf); + printf("%24s: %d\n", "Failed login count", princ->fail_auth_count); + time_t2str(princ->mod_date, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last modified", buf); + if(princ->mod_name != NULL) { + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ->mod_name, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Modifier", buf); + } + attributes2str (princ->attributes, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Attributes", buf); + + printf("%24s: ", "Keytypes(salttype[(salt-value)])"); + + krb5_get_pw_salt (context, princ->principal, &def_salt); + + for (i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; ++i) { + krb5_key_data *k = &princ->key_data[i]; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *e_string, *s_string, *salt; + + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string (context, + k->key_data_type[0], + &e_string); + if (ret) + asprintf (&e_string, "unknown(%d)", k->key_data_type[0]); + + ret = krb5_salttype_to_string (context, + k->key_data_type[0], + k->key_data_type[1], + &s_string); + if (ret) + asprintf (&s_string, "unknown(%d)", k->key_data_type[1]); + + if (cmp_salt(&def_salt, k) == 0) + salt = strdup(""); + else if(k->key_data_length[1] == 0) + salt = strdup("()"); + else + asprintf (&salt, "(%.*s)", k->key_data_length[1], + (char *)k->key_data_contents[1]); + + + printf ("%s%s(%s%s)", (i != 0) ? ", " : "", e_string, s_string, salt); + free (e_string); + free (s_string); + free (salt); + } + krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt); + printf("\n\n"); +} + +static int +do_get_entry(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct get_entry_data *e = data; + + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, principal, + &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK|KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if(ret) + return ret; + else { + if(e->header) { + (*e->header)(); + e->header = NULL; /* XXX only once */ + } + (e->format)(&princ); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + } + return 0; +} + +static int +getit(const char *name, int terse_flag, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct get_entry_data data; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "long", 'l', arg_flag, NULL, "long format" }, + { "short", 's', arg_flag, NULL, "short format" }, + { "terse", 't', arg_flag, NULL, "terse format" }, + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int long_flag = -1; + int short_flag = -1; + + args[0].value = &long_flag; + args[1].value = &short_flag; + args[2].value = &terse_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + goto usage; + if(optind == argc) + goto usage; + + if(long_flag == -1 && (short_flag == 1 || terse_flag == 1)) + long_flag = 0; + if(short_flag == -1 && (long_flag == 1 || terse_flag == 1)) + short_flag = 0; + if(terse_flag == -1 && (long_flag == 1 || short_flag == 1)) + terse_flag = 0; + if(long_flag == 0 && short_flag == 0 && terse_flag == 0) + short_flag = 1; + + if(long_flag) { + data.format = print_entry_long; + data.header = NULL; + } else if(short_flag){ + data.format = print_entry_short; + data.header = print_header_short; + } else if(terse_flag) { + data.format = print_entry_terse; + data.header = NULL; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_get_entry, "get", &data); + return 0; +usage: + arg_printusage (args, num_args, name, "principal..."); + return 0; +} + +int +get_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + return getit("get", 0, argc, argv); +} + +int +list_princs(int argc, char **argv) +{ + return getit("list", 1, argc, argv); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/init.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..587458b17f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: init.c,v 1.29 2002/12/03 14:08:17 joda Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +create_random_entry(krb5_principal princ, + unsigned max_life, + unsigned max_rlife, + u_int32_t attributes) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + int mask = 0; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int n_keys, i; + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + ent.principal = princ; + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + if (max_life) { + ent.max_life = max_life; + mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; + } + if (max_rlife) { + ent.max_renewable_life = max_rlife; + mask |= KADM5_MAX_RLIFE; + } + ent.attributes |= attributes | KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask, "hemlig"); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ, &keys, &n_keys); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[i]); + free(keys); + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ, &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + if(ret) + return ret; + ent.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + ent.kvno = 1; + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, + KADM5_ATTRIBUTES|KADM5_KVNO); + kadm5_free_principal_ent (kadm_handle, &ent); + if(ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm-max-ticket-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "realm max ticket lifetime" }, + { "realm-max-renewable-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "realm max renewable lifetime" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "init", "realm..."); +} + +int +init(int argc, char **argv) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + int i; + char *realm_max_life = NULL; + char *realm_max_rlife = NULL; + int help_flag = 0; + HDB *db; + int optind = 0; + krb5_deltat max_life, max_rlife; + + args[0].value = &realm_max_life; + args[1].value = &realm_max_rlife; + args[2].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind) || help_flag) { + usage(); + return 0; + } + + if(argc - optind < 1) { + usage(); + return 0; + } + + if (realm_max_life) { + if (str2deltat (realm_max_life, &max_life) != 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", realm_max_life); + return 0; + } + } + if (realm_max_rlife) { + if (str2deltat (realm_max_rlife, &max_rlife) != 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", realm_max_rlife); + return 0; + } + } + + db = _kadm5_s_get_db(kadm_handle); + + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_open"); + return 0; + } + db->close(context, db); + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + krb5_principal princ; + const char *realm = argv[i]; + + /* Create `krbtgt/REALM' */ + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, realm, NULL); + if(ret) + return 0; + if (realm_max_life == NULL) { + max_life = 0; + if(edit_deltat ("Realm max ticket life", &max_life, NULL, 0)) { + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return 0; + } + } + if (realm_max_rlife == NULL) { + max_rlife = 0; + if(edit_deltat("Realm max renewable ticket life", &max_rlife, + NULL, 0)) { + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return 0; + } + } + create_random_entry(princ, max_life, max_rlife, 0); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `kadmin/changepw' */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "kadmin", "changepw", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 5*60, 5*60, + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED| + KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE| + KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `kadmin/admin' */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "kadmin", "admin", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 60*60, 60*60, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `changepw/kerberos' (for v4 compat) */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "changepw", "kerberos", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 60*60, 60*60, + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED| + KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE); + + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `kadmin/hprop' for database propagation */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "kadmin", "hprop", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 60*60, 60*60, + KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `default' */ + { + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + int mask = 0; + + memset (&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + krb5_make_principal(context, &ent.principal, realm, + "default", NULL); + mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; + ent.max_life = 24 * 60 * 60; + mask |= KADM5_MAX_RLIFE; + ent.max_renewable_life = 7 * ent.max_life; + ent.attributes = KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask, ""); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_create_principal"); + + krb5_free_principal(context, ent.principal); + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadm_conn.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadm_conn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae44c43095 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadm_conn.c @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: kadm_conn.c,v 1.14 2002/10/21 13:21:24 joda Exp $"); + +struct kadm_port { + char *port; + unsigned short def_port; + struct kadm_port *next; +} *kadm_ports; + +static void +add_kadm_port(krb5_context context, const char *service, unsigned int port) +{ + struct kadm_port *p; + p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "failed to allocate %lu bytes\n", + (unsigned long)sizeof(*p)); + return; + } + + p->port = strdup(service); + p->def_port = port; + + p->next = kadm_ports; + kadm_ports = p; +} + +extern int do_kerberos4; + +static void +add_standard_ports (krb5_context context) +{ + add_kadm_port(context, "kerberos-adm", 749); +#ifdef KRB4 + if(do_kerberos4) + add_kadm_port(context, "kerberos-master", 751); +#endif +} + +/* + * parse the set of space-delimited ports in `str' and add them. + * "+" => all the standard ones + * otherwise it's port|service[/protocol] + */ + +void +parse_ports(krb5_context context, const char *str) +{ + char p[128]; + + while(strsep_copy(&str, " \t", p, sizeof(p)) != -1) { + if(strcmp(p, "+") == 0) + add_standard_ports(context); + else + add_kadm_port(context, p, 0); + } +} + +static pid_t pgrp; +sig_atomic_t term_flag, doing_useful_work; + +static RETSIGTYPE +sigchld(int sig) +{ + int status; + waitpid(-1, &status, 0); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +terminate(int sig) +{ + if(getpid() == pgrp) { + /* parent */ + term_flag = 1; + signal(sig, SIG_IGN); + killpg(pgrp, sig); + } else { + /* child */ + if(doing_useful_work) + term_flag = 1; + else + exit(0); + } + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +static int +spawn_child(krb5_context context, int *socks, int num_socks, int this_sock) +{ + int e, i; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + socklen_t sa_size = sizeof(__ss); + int s; + pid_t pid; + krb5_address addr; + char buf[128]; + size_t buf_len; + + s = accept(socks[this_sock], sa, &sa_size); + if(s < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "accept"); + return 1; + } + e = krb5_sockaddr2address(context, sa, &addr); + if(e) + krb5_warn(context, e, "krb5_sockaddr2address"); + else { + e = krb5_print_address (&addr, buf, sizeof(buf), + &buf_len); + if(e) + krb5_warn(context, e, "krb5_print_address"); + else + krb5_warnx(context, "connection from %s", buf); + krb5_free_address(context, &addr); + } + + pid = fork(); + if(pid == 0) { + for(i = 0; i < num_socks; i++) + close(socks[i]); + dup2(s, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(s, STDOUT_FILENO); + if(s != STDIN_FILENO && s != STDOUT_FILENO) + close(s); + return 0; + } else { + close(s); + } + return 1; +} + +static int +wait_for_connection(krb5_context context, + int *socks, int num_socks) +{ + int i, e; + fd_set orig_read_set, read_set; + int max_fd = -1; + + FD_ZERO(&orig_read_set); + + for(i = 0; i < num_socks; i++) { + if (socks[i] >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(socks[i], &orig_read_set); + max_fd = max(max_fd, socks[i]); + } + + pgrp = getpid(); + + if(setpgid(0, pgrp) < 0) + err(1, "setpgid"); + + signal(SIGTERM, terminate); + signal(SIGINT, terminate); + signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld); + + while (term_flag == 0) { + read_set = orig_read_set; + e = select(max_fd + 1, &read_set, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if(e < 0) { + if(errno != EINTR) + krb5_warn(context, errno, "select"); + } else if(e == 0) + krb5_warnx(context, "select returned 0"); + else { + for(i = 0; i < num_socks; i++) { + if(FD_ISSET(socks[i], &read_set)) + if(spawn_child(context, socks, num_socks, i) == 0) + return 0; + } + } + } + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); + while(1) { + int status; + pid_t pid; + pid = waitpid(-1, &status, 0); + if(pid == -1 && errno == ECHILD) + break; + } + exit(0); +} + + +int +start_server(krb5_context context) +{ + int e; + struct kadm_port *p; + + int *socks = NULL, *tmp; + int num_socks = 0; + int i; + + for(p = kadm_ports; p; p = p->next) { + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *ap; + char portstr[32]; + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + e = getaddrinfo(NULL, p->port, &hints, &ai); + if(e) { + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", p->def_port); + e = getaddrinfo(NULL, portstr, &hints, &ai); + } + + if(e) { + krb5_warn(context, krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(e, errno), + "%s", portstr); + continue; + } + i = 0; + for(ap = ai; ap; ap = ap->ai_next) + i++; + tmp = realloc(socks, (num_socks + i) * sizeof(*socks)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "failed to reallocate %lu bytes", + (unsigned long)(num_socks + i) * sizeof(*socks)); + continue; + } + socks = tmp; + for(ap = ai; ap; ap = ap->ai_next) { + int one = 1; + int s = socket(ap->ai_family, ap->ai_socktype, ap->ai_protocol); + if(s < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "socket"); + continue; + } +#if defined(SO_REUSEADDR) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if(setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&one, + sizeof(one)) < 0) + krb5_warn(context, errno, "setsockopt"); +#endif + if (bind (s, ap->ai_addr, ap->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "bind"); + close(s); + continue; + } + if (listen (s, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "listen"); + close(s); + continue; + } + socks[num_socks++] = s; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + } + if(num_socks == 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "no sockets to listen to - exiting"); + return wait_for_connection(context, socks, num_socks); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf7ebe857b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.8 @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kadmin.8,v 1.10 2003/03/31 10:42:32 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 10, 2000 +.Dt KADMIN 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kadmin +.Nd Kerberos administration utility +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl p Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -principal= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl K Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl c Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl k Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl r Ar realm \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl a Ar host \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -admin-server= Ns Ar host +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl s Ar port number \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -server-port= Ns Ar port number +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl l | Fl -local +.Op Fl h | Fl -help +.Op Fl v | Fl -version +.Op Ar command +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program is used to make modifications to the Kerberos database, either remotely via the +.Xr kadmind 8 +daemon, or locally (with the +.Fl l +option). +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar string , +.Fl -principal= Ns Ar string +.Xc +principal to authenticate as +.It Xo +.Fl K Ar string , +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar string +.Xc +keytab for authentication principal +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar file , +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +location of config file +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar file , +.Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +location of master key file +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar realm , +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +realm to use +.It Xo +.Fl a Ar host , +.Fl -admin-server= Ns Ar host +.Xc +server to contact +.It Xo +.Fl s Ar port number , +.Fl -server-port= Ns Ar port number +.Xc +port to use +.It Xo +.Fl l , +.Fl -local +.Xc +local admin mode +.El +.Pp +If no +.Ar command +is given on the command line, +.Nm +will prompt for commands to process. Commands include: +.\" not using a list here, since groff apparently gets confused +.\" with nested Xo/Xc +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +.Nm add +.Op Fl r | Fl -random-key +.Op Fl -random-password +.Oo Fl p Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -password= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -key= Ns Ar string +.Op Fl -max-ticket-life= Ns Ar lifetime +.Op Fl -max-renewable-life= Ns Ar lifetime +.Op Fl -attributes= Ns Ar attributes +.Op Fl -expiration-time= Ns Ar time +.Op Fl -pw-expiration-time= Ns Ar time +.Ar principal... +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +creates a new principal +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm passwd +.Op Fl r | Fl -random-key +.Op Fl -random-password +.Oo Fl p Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -password= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -key= Ns Ar string +.Ar principal... +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +changes the password of an existing principal +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm delete +.Ar principal... +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +removes a principal +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm del_enctype +.Ar principal enctypes... +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +removes some enctypes from a principal. This can be useful the service +belonging to the principal is known to not handle certain enctypes +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm ext_keytab +.Oo Fl k Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Ar principal... +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +creates a keytab with the keys of the specified principals +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm get +.Op Fl l | Fl -long +.Op Fl s | Fl -short +.Op Fl t | Fl -terse +.Ar expression... +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +lists the principals that match the expressions (which are shell glob +like), long format gives more information, and terse just prints the +names +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm rename +.Ar from to +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +renames a principal +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm modify +.Oo Fl a Ar attributes \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -attributes= Ns Ar attributes +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -max-ticket-life= Ns Ar lifetime +.Op Fl -max-renewable-life= Ns Ar lifetime +.Op Fl -expiration-time= Ns Ar time +.Op Fl -pw-expiration-time= Ns Ar time +.Op Fl -kvno= Ns Ar number +.Ar principal +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +modifies certain attributes of a principal +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm privileges +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +lists the operations you are allowed to perform +.Ed +.Pp +.Ed +.Pp +When running in local mode, the following commands can also be used: +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +.Nm dump +.Op Fl d | Fl -decrypt +.Op Ar dump-file +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +writes the database in +.Dq human readable +form to the specified file, or standard out +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm init +.Op Fl -realm-max-ticket-life= Ns Ar string +.Op Fl -realm-max-renewable-life= Ns Ar string +.Ar realm +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +initializes the Kerberos database with entries for a new realm. It's +possible to have more than one realm served by one server +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm load +.Ar file +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +reads a previously dumped database, and re-creates that database from scratch +.Ed +.Pp +.Nm merge +.Ar file +.Pp +.Bd -ragged -offset indent +similar to +.Nm list +but just modifies the database with the entries in the dump file +.Ed +.Pp +.Ed +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kadmind 8 , +.Xr kdc 8 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9438587255 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.c @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: kadmin.c,v 1.42 2003/03/31 10:20:19 lha Exp $"); + +static char *config_file; +static char *keyfile; +static int local_flag; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *realm; +static char *admin_server; +static int server_port = 0; +static char *client_name; +static char *keytab; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, &client_name, + "principal to authenticate as" }, + { "keytab", 'K', arg_string, &keytab, + "keytab for authentication principal" }, + { + "config-file", 'c', arg_string, &config_file, + "location of config file", "file" + }, + { + "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, + "location of master key file", "file" + }, + { + "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { + "admin-server", 'a', arg_string, &admin_server, + "server to contact", "host" + }, + { + "server-port", 's', arg_integer, &server_port, + "port to use", "port number" + }, + { "local", 'l', arg_flag, &local_flag, "local admin mode" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static SL_cmd commands[] = { + /* commands that are only available with `-l' */ + { + "dump", dump, "dump [file]", + "Dumps the database in a human readable format to the\n" + "specified file, or the standard out." + }, + { + "load", load, "load file", + "Loads a previously dumped file." + }, + { + "merge", merge, "merge file" , + "Merges the contents of a dump file into the database." + }, + { + "init", init, "init realm...", + "Initializes the default principals for a realm.\n" + "Creates the database if necessary." + }, + /* common commands */ + { + "add", add_new_key, "add principal" , + "Adds a principal to the database." + }, + { "add_new_key"}, + { "ank"}, + { + "passwd", cpw_entry, "passwd expression..." , + "Changes the password of one or more principals\n" + "matching the expressions." + }, + { "change_password"}, + { "cpw"}, + { + "delete", del_entry, "delete expression...", + "Deletes all principals matching the expressions." + }, + { "del_entry" }, + { "del" }, + { + "del_enctype", del_enctype, "del_enctype principal enctype...", + "Delete all the mentioned enctypes for principal." + }, + { + "ext_keytab", ext_keytab, "ext_keytab expression...", + "Extracts the keys of all principals matching the expressions,\n" + "and stores them in a keytab." + }, + { + "get", get_entry, "get expression...", + "Shows information about principals matching the expressions." + }, + { "get_entry" }, + { + "rename", rename_entry, "rename source target", + "Renames `source' to `target'." + }, + { + "modify", mod_entry, "modify principal", + "Modifies some attributes of the specified principal." + }, + { + "privileges", get_privs, "privileges", + "Shows which kinds of operations you are allowed to perform." + }, + { "privs" }, + { + "list", list_princs, "list expression...", + "Lists principals in a terse format. The same as `get -t'." + }, + { "help", help, "help"}, + { "?"}, + { "exit", exit_kadmin, "exit"}, + { "quit" }, + { NULL} +}; + +krb5_context context; +void *kadm_handle; + +static SL_cmd *actual_cmds; + +int +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sl_help(actual_cmds, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +int +exit_kadmin (int argc, char **argv) +{ + return 1; +} + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "[command]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +get_privs(int argc, char **argv) +{ + u_int32_t privs; + char str[128]; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + + int help_flag = 0; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + + args[0].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "privileges", NULL); + return 0; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "privileges", NULL); + return 0; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handle, &privs); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_get_privs"); + else{ + ret =_kadm5_privs_to_string(privs, str, sizeof(str)); + printf("%s\n", str); + } + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_section *cf = NULL; + kadm5_config_params conf; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (config_file == NULL) + config_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.conf"; + + if(krb5_config_parse_file(context, config_file, &cf) == 0) { + const char *p = krb5_config_get_string (context, cf, + "kdc", "key-file", NULL); + if (p) + keyfile = strdup(p); + } + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm); /* XXX should be fixed + some other way */ + conf.realm = realm; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + } + + if (admin_server) { + conf.admin_server = admin_server; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER; + } + + if (server_port) { + conf.kadmind_port = htons(server_port); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT; + } + + if(local_flag){ + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + actual_cmds = commands; + } else if (keytab) { + ret = kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + actual_cmds = commands + 4; /* XXX */ + } else { + ret = kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + actual_cmds = commands + 4; /* XXX */ + } + + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password"); + + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); /* ignore signals for now, the sl command + parser will handle SIGINT its own way; + we should really take care of this in + each function, f.i `get' might be + interruptable, but not `create' */ + if (argc != 0) { + ret = sl_command (actual_cmds, argc, argv); + if(ret == -1) + krb5_warnx (context, "unrecognized command: %s", argv[0]); + } else + ret = sl_loop (actual_cmds, "kadmin> ") != 0; + + kadm5_destroy(kadm_handle); + krb5_config_file_free (context, cf); + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..449c3f4b80 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ + +KADMIN(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KADMIN(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkaaddmmiinn - Kerberos administration utility + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkaaddmmiinn [--pp _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----pprriinncciippaall==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [--KK _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----kkeeyyttaabb==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [--cc + _f_i_l_e | ----ccoonnffiigg--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e] [--kk _f_i_l_e | ----kkeeyy--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e] [--rr _r_e_a_l_m | + ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m] [--aa _h_o_s_t | ----aaddmmiinn--sseerrvveerr==_h_o_s_t] [--ss _p_o_r_t _n_u_m_b_e_r | + ----sseerrvveerr--ppoorrtt==_p_o_r_t _n_u_m_b_e_r] [--ll | ----llooccaall] [--hh | ----hheellpp] [--vv | ----vveerrssiioonn] + [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkaaddmmiinn program is used to make modifications to the Kerberos + database, either remotely via the kadmind(8) daemon, or locally (with the + --ll option). + + Supported options: + + --pp _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----pprriinncciippaall==_s_t_r_i_n_g + principal to authenticate as + + --KK _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----kkeeyyttaabb==_s_t_r_i_n_g + keytab for authentication principal + + --cc _f_i_l_e, ----ccoonnffiigg--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + location of config file + + --kk _f_i_l_e, ----kkeeyy--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + location of master key file + + --rr _r_e_a_l_m, ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m + realm to use + + --aa _h_o_s_t, ----aaddmmiinn--sseerrvveerr==_h_o_s_t + server to contact + + --ss _p_o_r_t _n_u_m_b_e_r, ----sseerrvveerr--ppoorrtt==_p_o_r_t _n_u_m_b_e_r + port to use + + --ll, ----llooccaall + local admin mode + + If no _c_o_m_m_a_n_d is given on the command line, kkaaddmmiinn will prompt for com- + mands to process. Commands include: + + aadddd [--rr | ----rraannddoomm--kkeeyy] [----rraannddoomm--ppaasssswwoorrdd] [--pp _s_t_r_i_n_g | + ----ppaasssswwoorrdd==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [----kkeeyy==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [----mmaaxx--ttiicckkeett--lliiffee==_l_i_f_e_t_i_m_e] + [----mmaaxx--rreenneewwaabbllee--lliiffee==_l_i_f_e_t_i_m_e] [----aattttrriibbuutteess==_a_t_t_r_i_b_u_t_e_s] + [----eexxppiirraattiioonn--ttiimmee==_t_i_m_e] [----ppww--eexxppiirraattiioonn--ttiimmee==_t_i_m_e] _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_._._. + + creates a new principal + + ppaasssswwdd [--rr | ----rraannddoomm--kkeeyy] [----rraannddoomm--ppaasssswwoorrdd] [--pp _s_t_r_i_n_g | + ----ppaasssswwoorrdd==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [----kkeeyy==_s_t_r_i_n_g] _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_._._. + + changes the password of an existing principal + + ddeelleettee _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_._._. + + removes a principal + + ddeell__eennccttyyppee _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _e_n_c_t_y_p_e_s_._._. + + + removes some enctypes from a principal. This can be useful + the service belonging to the principal is known to not handle + certain enctypes + + eexxtt__kkeeyyttaabb [--kk _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----kkeeyyttaabb==_s_t_r_i_n_g] _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_._._. + + creates a keytab with the keys of the specified principals + + ggeett [--ll | ----lloonngg] [--ss | ----sshhoorrtt] [--tt | ----tteerrssee] _e_x_p_r_e_s_s_i_o_n_._._. + + lists the principals that match the expressions (which are + shell glob like), long format gives more information, and + terse just prints the names + + rreennaammee _f_r_o_m _t_o + + renames a principal + + mmooddiiffyy [--aa _a_t_t_r_i_b_u_t_e_s | ----aattttrriibbuutteess==_a_t_t_r_i_b_u_t_e_s] + [----mmaaxx--ttiicckkeett--lliiffee==_l_i_f_e_t_i_m_e] [----mmaaxx--rreenneewwaabbllee--lliiffee==_l_i_f_e_t_i_m_e] + [----eexxppiirraattiioonn--ttiimmee==_t_i_m_e] [----ppww--eexxppiirraattiioonn--ttiimmee==_t_i_m_e] + [----kkvvnnoo==_n_u_m_b_e_r] _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l + + modifies certain attributes of a principal + + pprriivviilleeggeess + + lists the operations you are allowed to perform + + When running in local mode, the following commands can also be used: + + dduummpp [--dd | ----ddeeccrryypptt] [_d_u_m_p_-_f_i_l_e] + + writes the database in ``human readable'' form to the speci- + fied file, or standard out + + iinniitt [----rreeaallmm--mmaaxx--ttiicckkeett--lliiffee==_s_t_r_i_n_g] + [----rreeaallmm--mmaaxx--rreenneewwaabbllee--lliiffee==_s_t_r_i_n_g] _r_e_a_l_m + + initializes the Kerberos database with entries for a new + realm. It's possible to have more than one realm served by + one server + + llooaadd _f_i_l_e + + reads a previously dumped database, and re-creates that + database from scratch + + mmeerrggee _f_i_l_e + + similar to lliisstt but just modifies the database with the en- + tries in the dump file + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kadmind(8), kdc(8) + + HEIMDAL September 10, 2000 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59c1bd29a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: kadmin_locl.h,v 1.41 2002/09/10 20:04:45 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __ADMIN_LOCL_H__ +#define __ADMIN_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +extern krb5_context context; +extern void * kadm_handle; + +#define DECL(X) int X(int, char **) + +DECL(add_new_key); +DECL(cpw_entry); +DECL(del_entry); +DECL(del_enctype); +DECL(exit_kadmin); +DECL(ext_keytab); +DECL(get_entry); +DECL(get_privs); +DECL(help); +DECL(list_princs); +DECL(mod_entry); +DECL(rename_entry); +DECL(init); +DECL(dump); +DECL(load); +DECL(merge); + +#undef ALLOC +#define ALLOC(X) ((X) = malloc(sizeof(*(X)))) + +/* util.c */ + +void attributes2str(krb5_flags attributes, char *str, size_t len); +int str2attributes(const char *str, krb5_flags *flags); +int parse_attributes (const char *resp, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, int bit); +int edit_attributes (const char *prompt, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, + int bit); + +void time_t2str(time_t t, char *str, size_t len, int include_time); +int str2time_t (const char *str, time_t *time); +int parse_timet (const char *resp, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, int bit); +int edit_timet (const char *prompt, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, + int bit); + +void deltat2str(unsigned t, char *str, size_t len); +int str2deltat(const char *str, krb5_deltat *delta); +int parse_deltat (const char *resp, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit); +int edit_deltat (const char *prompt, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit); + +int edit_entry(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int *mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent, int default_mask); +void set_defaults(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int *mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent, int default_mask); +int set_entry(krb5_context context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int *mask, + const char *max_ticket_life, + const char *max_renewable_life, + const char *expiration, + const char *pw_expiration, + const char *attributes); +int +foreach_principal(const char *exp, + int (*func)(krb5_principal, void*), + const char *funcname, + void *data); + +int parse_des_key (const char *key_string, + krb5_key_data *key_data, const char **err); + +/* server.c */ + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context, krb5_keytab, int); + +/* version4.c */ + +void +handle_v4(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab, int len, int fd); + +/* random_password.c */ + +void +random_password(char *pw, size_t len); + +/* kadm_conn.c */ + +extern sig_atomic_t term_flag, doing_useful_work; + +void parse_ports(krb5_context, const char*); +int start_server(krb5_context); + +/* server.c */ + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context, krb5_keytab, int); + +#endif /* __ADMIN_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5663225913 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.8 @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2002 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kadmind.8,v 1.14 2003/04/06 17:47:57 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 5, 2002 +.Dt KADMIND 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kadmind +.Nd "server for administrative access to Kerberos database" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl c Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl k Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Oo Fl r Ar realm \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl d | Fl -debug +.Oo Fl p Ar port \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -ports= Ns Ar port +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -no-kerberos4 +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +listens for requests for changes to the Kerberos database and performs +these, subject to permissions. When starting, if stdin is a socket it +assumes that it has been started by +.Xr inetd 8 , +otherwise it behaves as a daemon, forking processes for each new +connection. The +.Fl -debug +option causes +.Nm +to accept exactly one connection, which is useful for debugging. +.Pp +If built with krb4 support, it implements both the Heimdal Kerberos 5 +administrative protocol and the Kerberos 4 protocol. Password changes +via the Kerberos 4 protocol are also performed by +.Nm kadmind , +but the +.Xr kpasswdd 8 +daemon is responsible for the Kerberos 5 password changing protocol +(used by +.Xr kpasswd 1 ) +. +.Pp +This daemon should only be run on the master server, and not on any +slaves. +.Pp +Principals are always allowed to change their own password and list +their own principal. Apart from that, doing any operation requires +permission explicitly added in the ACL file +.Pa /var/heimdal/kadmind.acl . +The format of this file is: +.Bd -ragged +.Va principal +.Va rights +.Op Va principal-pattern +.Ed +.Pp +Where rights is any (comma separated) combination of: +.Bl -bullet -compact +.It +change-password or cpw +.It +list +.It +delete +.It +modify +.It +add +.It +get +.It +all +.El +.Pp +And the optional +.Ar principal-pattern +restricts the rights to operations on principals that match the +glob-style pattern. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar file , +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +location of config file +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar file , +.Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +location of master key file +.It Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Xc +what keytab to use +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar realm , +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +realm to use +.It Xo +.Fl d , +.Fl -debug +.Xc +enable debugging +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port , +.Fl -ports= Ns Ar port +.Xc +ports to listen to. By default, if run as a daemon, it listens to ports +749, and 751 (if Kerberos 4 support is built and enabled), but you can +add any number of ports with this option. The port string is a +whitespace separated list of port specifications, with the special +string +.Dq + +representing the default set of ports. +.It Fl -no-kerberos4 +make +.Nm +ignore Kerberos 4 kadmin requests. +.El +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Sh FILES +.Pa /var/heimdal/kadmind.acl +.Sh EXAMPLES +This will cause +.Nm +to listen to port 4711 in addition to any +compiled in defaults: +.Pp +.D1 Nm Fl -ports Ns Li "=\*[q]+ 4711\*[q] &" +.Pp +This acl file will grant Joe all rights, and allow Mallory to view and +add host principals. +.Bd -literal -offset indent +joe/admin@EXAMPLE.COM all +mallory/admin@EXAMPLE.COM add,get host/*@EXAMPLE.COM +.Ed +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kpasswd 1 , +.Xr kadmin 8 , +.Xr kdc 8 , +.Xr kpasswdd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c52637b26 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.c @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kadmind.c,v 1.28.2.1 2004/04/29 12:30:32 lha Exp $"); + +static char *check_library = NULL; +static char *check_function = NULL; +static char *config_file; +static char *keyfile; +static char *keytab_str = "HDB:"; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int debug_flag; +static char *port_str; +char *realm; +#ifdef KRB4 +int do_kerberos4 = 0; +#endif + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { + "config-file", 'c', arg_string, &config_file, + "location of config file", "file" + }, + { + "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, + "location of master key file", "file" + }, + { + "keytab", 0, arg_string, &keytab_str, + "what keytab to use", "keytab" + }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN + { "check-library", 0, arg_string, &check_library, + "library to load password check function from", "library" }, + { "check-function", 0, arg_string, &check_function, + "password check function to load", "function" }, +#endif + { "debug", 'd', arg_flag, &debug_flag, + "enable debugging" + }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "kerberos4", 0, arg_flag, &do_kerberos4, + "don't respond to kerberos 4 requests" + }, +#endif + { "ports", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, + "ports to listen to", "port" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +krb5_context context; + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_section *cf; + int optind = 0; + int e; + krb5_log_facility *logf; + krb5_keytab keytab; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + ret = krb5_openlog(context, "kadmind", &logf); + ret = krb5_set_warn_dest(context, logf); + + while((e = getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind))) + warnx("error at argument `%s'", argv[optind]); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + if (config_file == NULL) + config_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.conf"; + + if(krb5_config_parse_file(context, config_file, &cf) == 0) { + const char *p = krb5_config_get_string (context, cf, + "kdc", "key-file", NULL); + if (p) + keyfile = strdup(p); + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve"); + + kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check (context, check_library, check_function); + + { + int fd = 0; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + socklen_t sa_size = sizeof(__ss); + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + int debug_port; + + if(debug_flag) { + if(port_str == NULL) + debug_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos-adm", + "tcp", 749); + else + debug_port = htons(atoi(port_str)); + mini_inetd(debug_port); + } else if(roken_getsockname(STDIN_FILENO, sa, &sa_size) < 0 && + errno == ENOTSOCK) { + parse_ports(context, port_str ? port_str : "+"); + pidfile(NULL); + start_server(context); + } + if(realm) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm); /* XXX */ + kadmind_loop(context, ac, keytab, fd); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9d61eb2ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/kadmind.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ + +KADMIND(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KADMIND(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkaaddmmiinndd - server for administrative access to Kerberos database + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkaaddmmiinndd [--cc _f_i_l_e | ----ccoonnffiigg--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e] [--kk _f_i_l_e | ----kkeeyy--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e] + [----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b] [--rr _r_e_a_l_m | ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m] [--dd | ----ddeebbuugg] [--pp _p_o_r_t | + ----ppoorrttss==_p_o_r_t] [----nnoo--kkeerrbbeerrooss44] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkaaddmmiinndd listens for requests for changes to the Kerberos database and + performs these, subject to permissions. When starting, if stdin is a + socket it assumes that it has been started by inetd(8), otherwise it be- + haves as a daemon, forking processes for each new connection. The ----ddeebbuugg + option causes kkaaddmmiinndd to accept exactly one connection, which is useful + for debugging. + + If built with krb4 support, it implements both the Heimdal Kerberos 5 ad- + ministrative protocol and the Kerberos 4 protocol. Password changes via + the Kerberos 4 protocol are also performed by kkaaddmmiinndd, but the kpass- + wdd(8) daemon is responsible for the Kerberos 5 password changing proto- + col (used by kpasswd(1)) + + This daemon should only be run on the master server, and not on any + slaves. + + Principals are always allowed to change their own password and list their + own principal. Apart from that, doing any operation requires permission + explicitly added in the ACL file _/_v_a_r_/_h_e_i_m_d_a_l_/_k_a_d_m_i_n_d_._a_c_l. The format of + this file is: + + _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _r_i_g_h_t_s [_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_-_p_a_t_t_e_r_n] + + Where rights is any (comma separated) combination of: + ++oo change-password or cpw + ++oo list + ++oo delete + ++oo modify + ++oo add + ++oo get + ++oo all + + And the optional _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_-_p_a_t_t_e_r_n restricts the rights to operations on + principals that match the glob-style pattern. + + Supported options: + + --cc _f_i_l_e, ----ccoonnffiigg--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + location of config file + + --kk _f_i_l_e, ----kkeeyy--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + location of master key file + + ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b + what keytab to use + + --rr _r_e_a_l_m, ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m + realm to use + + --dd, ----ddeebbuugg + enable debugging + + --pp _p_o_r_t, ----ppoorrttss==_p_o_r_t + ports to listen to. By default, if run as a daemon, it listens to + ports 749, and 751 (if Kerberos 4 support is built and enabled), + but you can add any number of ports with this option. The port + string is a whitespace separated list of port specifications, + with the special string ``+'' representing the default set of + ports. + + ----nnoo--kkeerrbbeerrooss44 + make kkaaddmmiinndd ignore Kerberos 4 kadmin requests. + +FFIILLEESS + _/_v_a_r_/_h_e_i_m_d_a_l_/_k_a_d_m_i_n_d_._a_c_l + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + This will cause kkaaddmmiinndd to listen to port 4711 in addition to any com- + piled in defaults: + + kkaaddmmiinndd----ppoorrttss="+ 4711" & + + This acl file will grant Joe all rights, and allow Mallory to view and + add host principals. + + joe/admin@EXAMPLE.COM all + mallory/admin@EXAMPLE.COM add,get host/*@EXAMPLE.COM + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kpasswd(1), kadmin(8), kdc(8), kpasswdd(8) + + HEIMDAL March 5, 2002 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/load.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/load.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3635023cbb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/load.c @@ -0,0 +1,540 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: load.c,v 1.44 2002/09/04 20:44:35 joda Exp $"); + +struct entry { + char *principal; + char *key; + char *max_life; + char *max_renew; + char *created; + char *modified; + char *valid_start; + char *valid_end; + char *pw_end; + char *flags; + char *generation; +}; + +static char * +skip_next(char *p) +{ + while(*p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + p++; + *p++ = 0; + while(*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + p++; + return p; +} + +/* + * Parse the time in `s', returning: + * -1 if error parsing + * 0 if none present + * 1 if parsed ok + */ + +static int +parse_time_string(time_t *t, const char *s) +{ + int year, month, date, hour, minute, second; + struct tm tm; + + if(strcmp(s, "-") == 0) + return 0; + if(sscanf(s, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", + &year, &month, &date, &hour, &minute, &second) != 6) + return -1; + tm.tm_year = year - 1900; + tm.tm_mon = month - 1; + tm.tm_mday = date; + tm.tm_hour = hour; + tm.tm_min = minute; + tm.tm_sec = second; + tm.tm_isdst = 0; + *t = timegm(&tm); + return 1; +} + +/* + * parse time, allocating space in *t if it's there + */ + +static int +parse_time_string_alloc (time_t **t, const char *s) +{ + time_t tmp; + int ret; + + *t = NULL; + ret = parse_time_string (&tmp, s); + if (ret == 1) { + *t = malloc (sizeof (**t)); + if (*t == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: out of memory"); + **t = tmp; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * see parse_time_string for calling convention + */ + +static int +parse_integer(unsigned *u, const char *s) +{ + if(strcmp(s, "-") == 0) + return 0; + if (sscanf(s, "%u", u) != 1) + return -1; + return 1; +} + +static int +parse_integer_alloc (int **u, const char *s) +{ + unsigned tmp; + int ret; + + *u = NULL; + ret = parse_integer (&tmp, s); + if (ret == 1) { + *u = malloc (sizeof (**u)); + if (*u == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: out of memory"); + **u = tmp; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse dumped keys in `str' and store them in `ent' + * return -1 if parsing failed + */ + +static int +parse_keys(hdb_entry *ent, char *str) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int tmp; + char *p; + int i; + + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if (sscanf(p, "%d", &tmp) != 1) + return 1; + ent->kvno = tmp; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + while(p){ + Key *key; + key = realloc(ent->keys.val, + (ent->keys.len + 1) * sizeof(*ent->keys.val)); + if(key == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "realloc: out of memory"); + ent->keys.val = key; + key = ent->keys.val + ent->keys.len; + ent->keys.len++; + memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); + if(sscanf(p, "%d", &tmp) == 1) { + key->mkvno = malloc(sizeof(*key->mkvno)); + *key->mkvno = tmp; + } else + key->mkvno = NULL; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if (sscanf(p, "%d", &tmp) != 1) + return 1; + key->key.keytype = tmp; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&key->key.keyvalue, (strlen(p) - 1) / 2 + 1); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_data_alloc"); + for(i = 0; i < strlen(p); i += 2) { + if(sscanf(p + i, "%02x", &tmp) != 1) + return 1; + ((u_char*)key->key.keyvalue.data)[i / 2] = tmp; + } + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if(strcmp(p, "-") != 0){ + unsigned type; + size_t p_len; + + if(sscanf(p, "%u/", &type) != 1) + return 1; + p = strchr(p, '/'); + if(p == NULL) + return 1; + p++; + p_len = strlen(p); + + key->salt = malloc(sizeof(*key->salt)); + if (key->salt == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: out of memory"); + key->salt->type = type; + + if (p_len) { + if(*p == '\"') { + ret = krb5_data_copy(&key->salt->salt, p + 1, p_len - 2); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_data_copy"); + } else { + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&key->salt->salt, + (p_len - 1) / 2 + 1); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_data_alloc"); + for(i = 0; i < p_len; i += 2){ + if (sscanf(p + i, "%02x", &tmp) != 1) + return 1; + ((u_char*)key->salt->salt.data)[i / 2] = tmp; + } + } + } else + krb5_data_zero (&key->salt->salt); + } + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * see parse_time_string for calling convention + */ + +static int +parse_event(Event *ev, char *s) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *p; + + if(strcmp(s, "-") == 0) + return 0; + memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev)); + p = strsep(&s, ":"); + if(parse_time_string(&ev->time, p) != 1) + return -1; + p = strsep(&s, ":"); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, p, &ev->principal); + if (ret) + return -1; + return 1; +} + +static int +parse_event_alloc (Event **ev, char *s) +{ + Event tmp; + int ret; + + *ev = NULL; + ret = parse_event (&tmp, s); + if (ret == 1) { + *ev = malloc (sizeof (**ev)); + if (*ev == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: out of memory"); + **ev = tmp; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +parse_hdbflags2int(HDBFlags *f, const char *s) +{ + int ret; + unsigned tmp; + + ret = parse_integer (&tmp, s); + if (ret == 1) + *f = int2HDBFlags (tmp); + return ret; +} + +static int +parse_generation(char *str, GENERATION **gen) +{ + char *p; + int v; + + if(strcmp(str, "-") == 0 || *str == '\0') { + *gen = NULL; + return 0; + } + *gen = calloc(1, sizeof(**gen)); + + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if(parse_time_string(&(*gen)->time, p) != 1) + return -1; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if(sscanf(p, "%d", &v) != 1) + return -1; + (*gen)->usec = v; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if(sscanf(p, "%d", &v) != 1) + return -1; + (*gen)->gen = v - 1; /* XXX gets bumped in _hdb_store */ + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Parse the dump file in `filename' and create the database (merging + * iff merge) + */ + +static int +doit(const char *filename, int merge) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + FILE *f; + char s[8192]; /* XXX should fix this properly */ + char *p; + int line; + int flags = O_RDWR; + struct entry e; + hdb_entry ent; + HDB *db = _kadm5_s_get_db(kadm_handle); + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(f == NULL){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "fopen(%s)", filename); + return 1; + } + ret = kadm5_log_truncate (kadm_handle); + if (ret) { + fclose (f); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_truncate"); + return 1; + } + + if(!merge) + flags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC; + ret = db->open(context, db, flags, 0600); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_open"); + fclose(f); + return 1; + } + line = 0; + ret = 0; + while(fgets(s, sizeof(s), f) != NULL) { + ret = 0; + line++; + e.principal = s; + for(p = s; *p; p++){ + if(*p == '\\') + p++; + else if(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) { + *p = 0; + break; + } + } + p = skip_next(p); + + e.key = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.created = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.modified = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.valid_start = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.valid_end = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.pw_end = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.max_life = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.max_renew = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.flags = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.generation = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, e.principal, &ent.principal); + if(ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d:%s (%s)\n", + filename, + line, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret), + e.principal); + continue; + } + + if (parse_keys(&ent, e.key)) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing keys (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.key); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + + if (parse_event(&ent.created_by, e.created) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing created event (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.created); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + if (parse_event_alloc (&ent.modified_by, e.modified) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing event (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.modified); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + if (parse_time_string_alloc (&ent.valid_start, e.valid_start) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing time (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.valid_start); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + if (parse_time_string_alloc (&ent.valid_end, e.valid_end) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing time (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.valid_end); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + if (parse_time_string_alloc (&ent.pw_end, e.pw_end) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing time (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.pw_end); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + + if (parse_integer_alloc (&ent.max_life, e.max_life) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing lifetime (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.max_life); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + + } + if (parse_integer_alloc (&ent.max_renew, e.max_renew) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing lifetime (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.max_renew); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + + if (parse_hdbflags2int (&ent.flags, e.flags) != 1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing flags (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.flags); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + + if(parse_generation(e.generation, &ent.generation) == -1) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:error parsing generation (%s)\n", + filename, line, e.generation); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + continue; + } + + ret = db->store(context, db, HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "db_store"); + break; + } + } + db->close(context, db); + fclose(f); + return ret != 0; +} + + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(const char *name) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, name, "file"); +} + + + +int +load(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + + args[0].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage ("load"); + return 0; + } + if(argc - optind != 1 || help_flag) { + usage ("load"); + return 0; + } + + doit(argv[optind], 0); + return 0; +} + +int +merge(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + + args[0].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage ("merge"); + return 0; + } + if(argc - optind != 1 || help_flag) { + usage ("merge"); + return 0; + } + + doit(argv[optind], 1); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/mod.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/mod.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e9cd08c7f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/mod.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mod.c,v 1.11 2002/12/03 14:12:30 joda Exp $"); + +static int parse_args (krb5_context context, kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int argc, char **argv, int *optind, char *name, + int *mask); + +static int +parse_args(krb5_context context, kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int argc, char **argv, int *optind, char *name, + int *mask) +{ + char *attr_str = NULL; + char *max_life_str = NULL; + char *max_rlife_str = NULL; + char *expiration_str = NULL; + char *pw_expiration_str = NULL; + int new_kvno = -1; + int ret, i; + + struct getargs args[] = { + {"attributes", 'a', arg_string, NULL, "Attributies", + "attributes"}, + {"max-ticket-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, "max ticket lifetime", + "lifetime"}, + {"max-renewable-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "max renewable lifetime", "lifetime" }, + {"expiration-time", 0, arg_string, + NULL, "Expiration time", "time"}, + {"pw-expiration-time", 0, arg_string, + NULL, "Password expiration time", "time"}, + {"kvno", 0, arg_integer, + NULL, "Key version number", "number"}, + }; + + i = 0; + args[i++].value = &attr_str; + args[i++].value = &max_life_str; + args[i++].value = &max_rlife_str; + args[i++].value = &expiration_str; + args[i++].value = &pw_expiration_str; + args[i++].value = &new_kvno; + + *optind = 0; /* XXX */ + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + argc, argv, optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + name ? name : "", + "principal"); + return -1; + } + + ret = set_entry(context, ent, mask, max_life_str, max_rlife_str, + expiration_str, pw_expiration_str, attr_str); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if(new_kvno != -1) { + ent->kvno = new_kvno; + *mask |= KADM5_KVNO; + } + return 0; +} + +int +mod_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + int mask = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ_ent = NULL; + int optind; + + memset (&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + + ret = parse_args (context, &princ, argc, argv, + &optind, "mod", &mask); + if (ret) + return 0; + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) { + printf ("Usage: mod [options] principal\n"); + return 0; + } + + krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &princ_ent); + + if (mask == 0) { + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | + KADM5_MAX_LIFE | KADM5_MAX_RLIFE | + KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME | + KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION); + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + if (ret) { + printf ("no such principal: %s\n", argv[0]); + return 0; + } + if(edit_entry(&princ, &mask, NULL, 0)) + goto out; + } else { + princ.principal = princ_ent; + } + + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_modify_principal"); + out: + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/random_password.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/random_password.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92fb2fcddb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/random_password.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: random_password.c,v 1.4 2001/02/15 04:20:53 assar Exp $"); + +/* This file defines some a function that generates a random password, + that can be used when creating a large amount of principals (such + as for a batch of students). Since this is a political matter, you + should think about how secure generated passwords has to be. + + Both methods defined here will give you at least 55 bits of + entropy. + */ + +/* If you want OTP-style passwords, define OTP_STYLE */ + +#ifdef OTP_STYLE +#include +#else +static void generate_password(char **pw, int num_classes, ...); +#endif + +void +random_password(char *pw, size_t len) +{ +#ifdef OTP_STYLE + { + OtpKey newkey; + + krb5_generate_random_block(&newkey, sizeof(newkey)); + otp_print_stddict (newkey, pw, len); + strlwr(pw); + } +#else + char *pass; + generate_password(&pass, 3, + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", 7, + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ", 2, + "@$%&*()-+=:,/<>1234567890", 1); + strlcpy(pw, pass, len); + memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass)); + free(pass); +#endif +} + +/* some helper functions */ + +#ifndef OTP_STYLE +/* return a random value in range 0-127 */ +static int +RND(unsigned char *key, int keylen, int *left) +{ + if(*left == 0){ + krb5_generate_random_block(key, keylen); + *left = keylen; + } + (*left)--; + return ((unsigned char*)key)[*left]; +} + +/* This a helper function that generates a random password with a + number of characters from a set of character classes. + + If there are n classes, and the size of each class is Pi, and the + number of characters from each class is Ni, the number of possible + passwords are (given that the character classes are disjoint): + + n n + ----- / ---- \ + | | Ni | \ | + | | Pi | \ Ni| ! + | | ---- * | / | + | | Ni! | /___ | + i=1 \ i=1 / + + Since it uses the RND function above, neither the size of each + class, nor the total length of the generated password should be + larger than 127 (without fixing RND). + + */ +static void +generate_password(char **pw, int num_classes, ...) +{ + struct { + const char *str; + int len; + int freq; + } *classes; + va_list ap; + int len, i; + unsigned char rbuf[8]; /* random buffer */ + int rleft = 0; + + classes = malloc(num_classes * sizeof(*classes)); + va_start(ap, num_classes); + len = 0; + for(i = 0; i < num_classes; i++){ + classes[i].str = va_arg(ap, const char*); + classes[i].len = strlen(classes[i].str); + classes[i].freq = va_arg(ap, int); + len += classes[i].freq; + } + va_end(ap); + *pw = malloc(len + 1); + if(*pw == NULL) + return; + for(i = 0; i < len; i++) { + int j; + int x = RND(rbuf, sizeof(rbuf), &rleft) % (len - i); + int t = 0; + for(j = 0; j < num_classes; j++) { + if(x < t + classes[j].freq) { + (*pw)[i] = classes[j].str[RND(rbuf, sizeof(rbuf), &rleft) + % classes[j].len]; + classes[j].freq--; + break; + } + t += classes[j].freq; + } + } + (*pw)[len] = '\0'; + memset(rbuf, 0, sizeof(rbuf)); + free(classes); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/rename.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/rename.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac5f4d699d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/rename.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename.c,v 1.4 2001/05/04 13:07:03 joda Exp $"); + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "rename", "from to"); +} + +int +rename_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ1, princ2; + + args[0].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + if(argc - optind != 2 || help_flag) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[1], &princ1); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name(%s)", argv[1]); + return 0; + } + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[2], &princ2); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ2); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name(%s)", argv[2]); + return 0; + } + ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handle, princ1, princ2); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "rename"); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ1); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ2); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/server.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..adaf6cfa70 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/server.c @@ -0,0 +1,577 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: server.c,v 1.38 2003/01/29 12:33:05 lha Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadmind_dispatch(void *kadm_handle, krb5_boolean initial, + krb5_data *in, krb5_data *out) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + int32_t cmd, mask, tmp; + kadm5_server_context *context = kadm_handle; + char client[128], name[128], name2[128]; + char *op = ""; + krb5_principal princ, princ2; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + char *password, *exp; + krb5_keyblock *new_keys; + int n_keys; + char **princs; + int n_princs; + krb5_storage *sp; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, context->caller, + client, sizeof(client)); + + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in); + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &cmd); + switch(cmd){ + case kadm_get:{ + op = "GET"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_GET, princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ, &ent, mask); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + } + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + break; + } + case kadm_delete:{ + op = "DELETE"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handle, princ); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_create:{ + op = "CREATE"; + ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context->context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context->context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, ent.principal, + name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_ADD, + ent.principal); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context->context, &ent); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, + mask, password); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_modify:{ + op = "MODIFY"; + ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, ent.principal, + name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY, + ent.principal); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_rename:{ + op = "RENAME"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ2); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ2, name2, sizeof(name2)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s -> %s", + client, op, name, name2); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, + KADM5_PRIV_ADD, + princ2) + || _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, + KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, + princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handle, princ, princ2); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ2); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_chpass:{ + op = "CHPASS"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + + /* + * The change is allowed if at least one of: + + * a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an + * initial ticket, but then, check with the password quality + * function. + * b) the user is on the CPW ACL. + */ + + if (initial + && krb5_principal_compare (context->context, context->caller, + princ)) + { + krb5_data pwd_data; + const char *pwd_reason; + + pwd_data.data = password; + pwd_data.length = strlen(password); + + pwd_reason = kadm5_check_password_quality (context->context, + princ, &pwd_data); + if (pwd_reason != NULL) + ret = KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT; + else + ret = 0; + } else + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, princ, password); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_chpass_with_key:{ + int i; + krb5_key_data *key_data; + int n_key_data; + + op = "CHPASS_WITH_KEY"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_key_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + /* n_key_data will be squeezed into an int16_t below. */ + if (n_key_data < 0 || n_key_data >= 1 << 16 || + n_key_data > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*key_data)) { + ret = ERANGE; + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + + key_data = malloc (n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data)); + if (key_data == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; ++i) { + ret = kadm5_ret_key_data (sp, &key_data[i]); + if (ret) { + int16_t dummy = i; + + kadm5_free_key_data (context, &dummy, key_data); + free (key_data); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + } + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + + /* + * The change is only allowed if the user is on the CPW ACL, + * this it to force password quality check on the user. + */ + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + if(ret) { + int16_t dummy = n_key_data; + + kadm5_free_key_data (context, &dummy, key_data); + free (key_data); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key(kadm_handle, princ, + n_key_data, key_data); + { + int16_t dummy = n_key_data; + kadm5_free_key_data (context, &dummy, key_data); + } + free (key_data); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_randkey:{ + op = "RANDKEY"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + /* + * The change is allowed if at least one of: + * a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an initial ticket + * b) the user is on the CPW ACL. + */ + + if (initial + && krb5_principal_compare (context->context, context->caller, + princ)) + ret = 0; + else + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ, + &new_keys, &n_keys); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + int i; + krb5_store_int32(sp, n_keys); + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++){ + krb5_store_keyblock(sp, new_keys[i]); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context->context, &new_keys[i]); + } + } + break; + } + case kadm_get_privs:{ + ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handle, &mask); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0) + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + break; + } + case kadm_get_princs:{ + op = "LIST"; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) + goto fail; + if(tmp){ + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &exp); + if(ret) + goto fail; + }else + exp = NULL; + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, exp ? exp : "*"); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_LIST, NULL); + if(ret){ + free(exp); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handle, exp, &princs, &n_princs); + free(exp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + int i; + krb5_store_int32(sp, n_princs); + for(i = 0; i < n_princs; i++) + krb5_store_string(sp, princs[i]); + kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handle, princs, &n_princs); + } + break; + } + default: + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: UNKNOWN OP %d", client, cmd); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, KADM5_FAILURE); + break; + } + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context->context, ret, "%s", op); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +} + +static void +v5_loop (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_boolean initial, + void *kadm_handle, + int fd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data in, out; + + for (;;) { + doing_useful_work = 0; + if(term_flag) + exit(0); + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, ac, &fd, &in); + if(ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) + exit(0); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + doing_useful_work = 1; + kadmind_dispatch(kadm_handle, initial, &in, &out); + krb5_data_free(&in); + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, ac, &fd, &out); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message"); + } +} + +static krb5_boolean +match_appl_version(const void *data, const char *appl_version) +{ + unsigned minor; + if(sscanf(appl_version, "KADM0.%u", &minor) != 1) + return 0; + *(unsigned*)data = minor; + return 1; +} + +static void +handle_v5(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int len, + int fd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_char version[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)]; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *server_name; + char *client; + void *kadm_handle; + ssize_t n; + krb5_boolean initial; + + unsigned kadm_version; + kadm5_config_params realm_params; + + if (len != sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "bad sendauth len %d", len); + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, version, len); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "reading sendauth version"); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF reading sendauth version"); + if(memcmp(version, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) != 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "bad sendauth version %.8s", version); + + ret = krb5_recvauth_match_version(context, &ac, &fd, + match_appl_version, &kadm_version, + NULL, KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + keytab, &ticket); + if(ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "krb5_recvauth: key not found"); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, ticket->server, &server_name); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + if (strncmp (server_name, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + strlen(KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE)) != 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "ticket for strange principal (%s)", + server_name); + + free (server_name); + + memset(&realm_params, 0, sizeof(realm_params)); + + if(kadm_version == 1) { + krb5_data params; + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, ac, &fd, ¶ms); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + _kadm5_unmarshal_params(context, ¶ms, &realm_params); + } + + initial = ticket->ticket.flags.initial; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ticket->client, &client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &realm_params, + 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if(ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + v5_loop (context, ac, initial, kadm_handle, fd); +} + +extern int do_kerberos4; + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int fd) +{ + unsigned char tmp[4]; + ssize_t n; + unsigned long len; + + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, tmp, 4); + if(n == 0) + exit(0); + if(n < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "read"); + _krb5_get_int(tmp, &len, 4); + if(len > 0xffff && (len & 0xffff) == ('K' << 8) + 'A') { + len >>= 16; +#ifdef KRB4 + if(do_kerberos4) + handle_v4(context, keytab, len, fd); + else + krb5_errx(context, 1, "version 4 kadmin is disabled"); +#else + krb5_errx(context, 1, "packet appears to be version 4"); +#endif + } else { + handle_v5(context, ac, keytab, len, fd); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/util.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b25bf2a60c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/util.c @@ -0,0 +1,641 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: util.c,v 1.39 2003/04/14 11:55:27 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * util.c - functions for parsing, unparsing, and editing different + * types of data used in kadmin. + */ + +static int +get_response(const char *prompt, const char *def, char *buf, size_t len); + +/* + * attributes + */ + +struct units kdb_attrs[] = { + { "new-princ", KRB5_KDB_NEW_PRINC }, + { "support-desmd5", KRB5_KDB_SUPPORT_DESMD5 }, + { "pwchange-service", KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE }, + { "disallow-svr", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR }, + { "requires-pw-change", KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE }, + { "requires-hw-auth", KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH }, + { "requires-pre-auth", KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH }, + { "disallow-all-tix", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX }, + { "disallow-dup-skey", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY }, + { "disallow-proxiable", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE }, + { "disallow-renewable", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE }, + { "disallow-tgt-based", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED }, + { "disallow-forwardable", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE }, + { "disallow-postdated", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED }, + { NULL } +}; + +/* + * convert the attributes in `attributes' into a printable string + * in `str, len' + */ + +void +attributes2str(krb5_flags attributes, char *str, size_t len) +{ + unparse_flags (attributes, kdb_attrs, str, len); +} + +/* + * convert the string in `str' into attributes in `flags' + * return 0 if parsed ok, else -1. + */ + +int +str2attributes(const char *str, krb5_flags *flags) +{ + int res; + + res = parse_flags (str, kdb_attrs, *flags); + if (res < 0) + return res; + else { + *flags = res; + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * try to parse the string `resp' into attributes in `attr', also + * setting the `bit' in `mask' if attributes are given and valid. + */ + +int +parse_attributes (const char *resp, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, int bit) +{ + krb5_flags tmp = *attr; + + if (str2attributes(resp, &tmp) == 0) { + *attr = tmp; + if (mask) + *mask |= bit; + return 0; + } else if(*resp == '?') { + print_flags_table (kdb_attrs, stderr); + } else { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to parse '%s'\n", resp); + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit the attributes in `attr', prompting with `prompt' + */ + +int +edit_attributes (const char *prompt, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, int bit) +{ + char buf[1024], resp[1024]; + + if (mask && (*mask & bit)) + return 0; + + attributes2str(*attr, buf, sizeof(buf)); + for (;;) { + if(get_response("Attributes", buf, resp, sizeof(resp)) != 0) + return 1; + if (resp[0] == '\0') + break; + if (parse_attributes (resp, attr, mask, bit) == 0) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * time_t + * the special value 0 means ``never'' + */ + +/* + * Convert the time `t' to a string representation in `str' (of max + * size `len'). If include_time also include time, otherwise just + * date. + */ + +void +time_t2str(time_t t, char *str, size_t len, int include_time) +{ + if(t) { + if(include_time) + strftime(str, len, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC", gmtime(&t)); + else + strftime(str, len, "%Y-%m-%d", gmtime(&t)); + } else + snprintf(str, len, "never"); +} + +/* + * Convert the time representation in `str' to a time in `time'. + * Return 0 if succesful, else -1. + */ + +int +str2time_t (const char *str, time_t *t) +{ + const char *p; + struct tm tm, tm2; + + memset (&tm, 0, sizeof (tm)); + + if(strcasecmp(str, "never") == 0) { + *t = 0; + return 0; + } + + if(strcasecmp(str, "now") == 0) { + *t = time(NULL); + return 0; + } + + p = strptime (str, "%Y-%m-%d", &tm); + + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + + /* Do it on the end of the day */ + tm2.tm_hour = 23; + tm2.tm_min = 59; + tm2.tm_sec = 59; + + if(strptime (p, "%H:%M:%S", &tm2) != NULL) { + tm.tm_hour = tm2.tm_hour; + tm.tm_min = tm2.tm_min; + tm.tm_sec = tm2.tm_sec; + } + + *t = tm2time (tm, 0); + return 0; +} + +/* + * try to parse the time in `resp' storing it in `value' + */ + +int +parse_timet (const char *resp, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + time_t tmp; + + if (str2time_t(resp, &tmp) == 0) { + *value = tmp; + if(mask) + *mask |= bit; + return 0; + } else if(*resp == '?') { + printf ("Print date on format YYYY-mm-dd [hh:mm:ss]\n"); + } else { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to parse time '%s'\n", resp); + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit the time in `value' + */ + +int +edit_timet (const char *prompt, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + char buf[1024], resp[1024]; + + if (mask && (*mask & bit)) + return 0; + + time_t2str (*value, buf, sizeof (buf), 0); + + for (;;) { + if(get_response(prompt, buf, resp, sizeof(resp)) != 0) + return 1; + if (parse_timet (resp, value, mask, bit) == 0) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * deltat + * the special value 0 means ``unlimited'' + */ + +/* + * convert the delta_t value in `t' into a printable form in `str, len' + */ + +void +deltat2str(unsigned t, char *str, size_t len) +{ + if(t == 0 || t == INT_MAX) + snprintf(str, len, "unlimited"); + else + unparse_time(t, str, len); +} + +/* + * parse the delta value in `str', storing result in `*delta' + * return 0 if ok, else -1 + */ + +int +str2deltat(const char *str, krb5_deltat *delta) +{ + int res; + + if(strcasecmp(str, "unlimited") == 0) { + *delta = 0; + return 0; + } + res = parse_time(str, "day"); + if (res < 0) + return res; + else { + *delta = res; + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * try to parse the string in `resp' into a deltad in `value' + * `mask' will get the bit `bit' set if a value was given. + */ + +int +parse_deltat (const char *resp, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + krb5_deltat tmp; + + if (str2deltat(resp, &tmp) == 0) { + *value = tmp; + if (mask) + *mask |= bit; + return 0; + } else if(*resp == '?') { + print_time_table (stderr); + } else { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to parse time '%s'\n", resp); + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit the deltat in `value' + */ + +int +edit_deltat (const char *prompt, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + char buf[1024], resp[1024]; + + if (mask && (*mask & bit)) + return 0; + + deltat2str(*value, buf, sizeof(buf)); + for (;;) { + if(get_response(prompt, buf, resp, sizeof(resp)) != 0) + return 1; + if (parse_deltat (resp, value, mask, bit) == 0) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit `ent' + */ + +void +set_defaults(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int *mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent, int default_mask) +{ + if (default_ent + && (default_mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) + && !(*mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE)) + ent->max_life = default_ent->max_life; + + if (default_ent + && (default_mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) + && !(*mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)) + ent->max_renewable_life = default_ent->max_renewable_life; + + if (default_ent + && (default_mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) + && !(*mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME)) + ent->princ_expire_time = default_ent->princ_expire_time; + + if (default_ent + && (default_mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) + && !(*mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)) + ent->pw_expiration = default_ent->pw_expiration; + + if (default_ent + && (default_mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) + && !(*mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES)) + ent->attributes = default_ent->attributes & ~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; +} + +int +edit_entry(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int *mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent, int default_mask) +{ + + set_defaults(ent, mask, default_ent, default_mask); + + if(edit_deltat ("Max ticket life", &ent->max_life, mask, + KADM5_MAX_LIFE) != 0) + return 1; + + if(edit_deltat ("Max renewable life", &ent->max_renewable_life, mask, + KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) != 0) + return 1; + + if(edit_timet ("Principal expiration time", &ent->princ_expire_time, mask, + KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) != 0) + return 1; + + if(edit_timet ("Password expiration time", &ent->pw_expiration, mask, + KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) != 0) + return 1; + + if(edit_attributes ("Attributes", &ent->attributes, mask, + KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) != 0) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse the arguments, set the fields in `ent' and the `mask' for the + * entries having been set. + * Return 1 on failure and 0 on success. + */ + +int +set_entry(krb5_context context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int *mask, + const char *max_ticket_life, + const char *max_renewable_life, + const char *expiration, + const char *pw_expiration, + const char *attributes) +{ + if (max_ticket_life != NULL) { + if (parse_deltat (max_ticket_life, &ent->max_life, + mask, KADM5_MAX_LIFE)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", max_ticket_life); + return 1; + } + } + if (max_renewable_life != NULL) { + if (parse_deltat (max_renewable_life, &ent->max_renewable_life, + mask, KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", max_renewable_life); + return 1; + } + } + + if (expiration) { + if (parse_timet (expiration, &ent->princ_expire_time, + mask, KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", expiration); + return 1; + } + } + if (pw_expiration) { + if (parse_timet (pw_expiration, &ent->pw_expiration, + mask, KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", pw_expiration); + return 1; + } + } + if (attributes != NULL) { + if (parse_attributes (attributes, &ent->attributes, + mask, KADM5_ATTRIBUTES)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", attributes); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Does `string' contain any globing characters? + */ + +static int +is_expression(const char *string) +{ + const char *p; + int quote = 0; + + for(p = string; *p; p++) { + if(quote) { + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\\') + quote++; + else if(strchr("[]*?", *p) != NULL) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* loop over all principals matching exp */ +int +foreach_principal(const char *exp, + int (*func)(krb5_principal, void*), + const char *funcname, + void *data) +{ + char **princs; + int num_princs; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ_ent; + int is_expr; + + /* if this isn't an expression, there is no point in wading + through the whole database looking for matches */ + is_expr = is_expression(exp); + if(is_expr) + ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handle, exp, &princs, &num_princs); + if(!is_expr || ret == KADM5_AUTH_LIST) { + /* we might be able to perform the requested opreration even + if we're not allowed to list principals */ + num_princs = 1; + princs = malloc(sizeof(*princs)); + if(princs == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + princs[0] = strdup(exp); + if(princs[0] == NULL){ + free(princs); + return ENOMEM; + } + } else if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_get_principals"); + return ret; + } + for(i = 0; i < num_princs; i++) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princs[i], &princ_ent); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name(%s)", princs[i]); + continue; + } + ret = (*func)(princ_ent, data); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s %s", funcname, princs[i]); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + } + kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handle, princs, &num_princs); + return 0; +} + +/* + * prompt with `prompt' and default value `def', and store the reply + * in `buf, len' + */ + +#include + +static jmp_buf jmpbuf; + +static void +interrupt(int sig) +{ + longjmp(jmpbuf, 1); +} + +static int +get_response(const char *prompt, const char *def, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + char *p; + void (*osig)(int); + + osig = signal(SIGINT, interrupt); + if(setjmp(jmpbuf)) { + signal(SIGINT, osig); + printf("\n"); + return 1; + } + + printf("%s [%s]:", prompt, def); + if(fgets(buf, len, stdin) == NULL) { + int save_errno = errno; + if(ferror(stdin)) + krb5_err(context, 1, save_errno, ""); + signal(SIGINT, osig); + return 1; + } + p = strchr(buf, '\n'); + if(p) + *p = '\0'; + if(strcmp(buf, "") == 0) + strlcpy(buf, def, len); + signal(SIGINT, osig); + return 0; +} + +/* + * return [0, 16) or -1 + */ + +static int +hex2n (char c) +{ + static char hexdigits[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + const char *p; + + p = strchr (hexdigits, tolower((unsigned char)c)); + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + else + return p - hexdigits; +} + +/* + * convert a key in a readable format into a keyblock. + * return 0 iff succesful, otherwise `err' should point to an error message + */ + +int +parse_des_key (const char *key_string, krb5_key_data *key_data, + const char **err) +{ + const char *p = key_string; + unsigned char bits[8]; + int i; + + if (strlen (key_string) != 16) { + *err = "bad length, should be 16 for DES key"; + return 1; + } + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + int d1, d2; + + d1 = hex2n(p[2 * i]); + d2 = hex2n(p[2 * i + 1]); + if (d1 < 0 || d2 < 0) { + *err = "non-hex character"; + return 1; + } + bits[i] = (d1 << 4) | d2; + } + for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) { + key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2; + key_data[i].key_data_kvno = 0; + /* key */ + key_data[i].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + key_data[i].key_data_length[0] = 8; + key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] = malloc(8); + memcpy (key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], bits, 8); + /* salt */ + key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PW_SALT; + key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0; + key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL; + } + key_data[0].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + key_data[1].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/version4.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/version4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ffa9c07f85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kadmin/version4.c @@ -0,0 +1,1016 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +#define Principal krb4_Principal +#define kadm_get krb4_kadm_get +#undef ALLOC +#include +#include +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: version4.c,v 1.29.2.1 2004/04/29 12:29:23 lha Exp $"); + +#define KADM_NO_OPCODE -1 +#define KADM_NO_ENCRYPT -2 + +/* + * make an error packet if we fail encrypting + */ + +static void +make_you_lose_packet(int code, krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_data_alloc(reply, KADM_VERSIZE + 4); + memcpy(reply->data, KADM_ULOSE, KADM_VERSIZE); + _krb5_put_int((char*)reply->data + KADM_VERSIZE, code, 4); +} + +static int +ret_fields(krb5_storage *sp, char *fields) +{ + return krb5_storage_read(sp, fields, FLDSZ); +} + +static int +store_fields(krb5_storage *sp, char *fields) +{ + return krb5_storage_write(sp, fields, FLDSZ); +} + +static void +ret_vals(krb5_storage *sp, Kadm_vals *vals) +{ + int field; + char *tmp_string; + + memset(vals, 0, sizeof(*vals)); + + ret_fields(sp, vals->fields); + + for(field = 31; field >= 0; field--) { + if(IS_FIELD(field, vals->fields)) { + switch(field) { + case KADM_NAME: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->name, tmp_string, sizeof(vals->name)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_INST: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->instance, tmp_string, + sizeof(vals->instance)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_EXPDATE: + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->exp_date); + break; + case KADM_ATTR: + krb5_ret_int16(sp, &vals->attributes); + break; + case KADM_MAXLIFE: + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &vals->max_life); + break; + case KADM_DESKEY: + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->key_high); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->key_low); + break; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + case KADM_MODDATE: + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->mod_date); + break; + case KADM_MODNAME: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->mod_name, tmp_string, + sizeof(vals->mod_name)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_MODINST: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->mod_instance, tmp_string, + sizeof(vals->mod_instance)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_KVNO: + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &vals->key_version); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + } +} + +static void +store_vals(krb5_storage *sp, Kadm_vals *vals) +{ + int field; + + store_fields(sp, vals->fields); + + for(field = 31; field >= 0; field--) { + if(IS_FIELD(field, vals->fields)) { + switch(field) { + case KADM_NAME: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->name); + break; + case KADM_INST: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->instance); + break; + case KADM_EXPDATE: + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->exp_date); + break; + case KADM_ATTR: + krb5_store_int16(sp, vals->attributes); + break; + case KADM_MAXLIFE: + krb5_store_int8(sp, vals->max_life); + break; + case KADM_DESKEY: + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->key_high); + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->key_low); + break; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + case KADM_MODDATE: + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->mod_date); + break; + case KADM_MODNAME: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->mod_name); + break; + case KADM_MODINST: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->mod_instance); + break; + case KADM_KVNO: + krb5_store_int8(sp, vals->key_version); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + } +} + +static int +flags_4_to_5(char *flags) +{ + int i; + int32_t mask = 0; + for(i = 31; i >= 0; i--) { + if(IS_FIELD(i, flags)) + switch(i) { + case KADM_NAME: + case KADM_INST: + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + case KADM_EXPDATE: + mask |= KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME; + case KADM_MAXLIFE: + mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + case KADM_KVNO: + mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA; + case KADM_MODDATE: + mask |= KADM5_MOD_TIME; + case KADM_MODNAME: + case KADM_MODINST: + mask |= KADM5_MOD_NAME; +#endif + } + } + return mask; +} + +static void +ent_to_values(krb5_context context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int32_t mask, + Kadm_vals *vals) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + time_t exp = 0; + + memset(vals, 0, sizeof(*vals)); + if(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) { + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, ent->principal, + vals->name, vals->instance, realm); + SET_FIELD(KADM_NAME, vals->fields); + SET_FIELD(KADM_INST, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if(ent->princ_expire_time != 0) + exp = ent->princ_expire_time; + } + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if(ent->pw_expiration != 0 && (exp == 0 || exp > ent->pw_expiration)) + exp = ent->pw_expiration; + } + if(exp) { + vals->exp_date = exp; + SET_FIELD(KADM_EXPDATE, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(ent->max_life == 0) + vals->max_life = 255; + else + vals->max_life = krb_time_to_life(0, ent->max_life); + SET_FIELD(KADM_MAXLIFE, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + if(ent->n_key_data > 0) { +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + vals->key_version = ent->key_data[0].key_data_kvno; + SET_FIELD(KADM_KVNO, vals->fields); +#endif + } + /* XXX the key itself? */ + } +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + vals->mod_date = ent->mod_date; + SET_FIELD(KADM_MODDATE, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + krb5_524_conv_principal(context, ent->mod_name, + vals->mod_name, vals->mod_instance, realm); + SET_FIELD(KADM_MODNAME, vals->fields); + SET_FIELD(KADM_MODINST, vals->fields); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * convert the kadm4 values in `vals' to `ent' (and `mask') + */ + +static krb5_error_code +values_to_ent(krb5_context context, + Kadm_vals *vals, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int32_t *mask) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + *mask = 0; + memset(ent, 0, sizeof(*ent)); + + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_NAME, vals->fields)) { + char *inst = NULL; + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_INST, vals->fields)) + inst = vals->instance; + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, + vals->name, + inst, + NULL, + &ent->principal); + if(ret) + return ret; + *mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + } + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_EXPDATE, vals->fields)) { + ent->princ_expire_time = vals->exp_date; + *mask |= KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME; + } + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MAXLIFE, vals->fields)) { + ent->max_life = krb_life_to_time(0, vals->max_life); + *mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; + } + + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_DESKEY, vals->fields)) { + int i; + ent->key_data = calloc(3, sizeof(*ent->key_data)); + if(ent->key_data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + u_int32_t key_low, key_high; + + ent->key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_KVNO, vals->fields)) + ent->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = vals->key_version; +#endif + ent->key_data[i].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + ent->key_data[i].key_data_length[0] = 8; + if((ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] = malloc(8)) == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + key_low = ntohl(vals->key_low); + key_high = ntohl(vals->key_high); + memcpy(ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], + &key_low, 4); + memcpy((char*)ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] + 4, + &key_high, 4); + ent->key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PW_SALT; + ent->key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0; + ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL; + } + ent->key_data[1].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ent->key_data[2].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + ent->n_key_data = 3; + *mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA; + } + +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MODDATE, vals->fields)) { + ent->mod_date = vals->mod_date; + *mask |= KADM5_MOD_TIME; + } + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MODNAME, vals->fields)) { + char *inst = NULL; + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MODINST, vals->fields)) + inst = vals->mod_instance; + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, + vals->mod_name, + inst, + NULL, + &ent->mod_name); + if(ret) + return ret; + *mask |= KADM5_MOD_NAME; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to translate a KADM5 error code into a v4 kadmin one. + */ + +static int +error_code(int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case 0: + return 0; + case KADM5_FAILURE : + case KADM5_AUTH_GET : + case KADM5_AUTH_ADD : + case KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY : + case KADM5_AUTH_DELETE : + case KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT : + return KADM_UNAUTH; + case KADM5_BAD_DB : + return KADM_UK_RERROR; + case KADM5_DUP : + return KADM_INUSE; + case KADM5_RPC_ERROR : + case KADM5_NO_SRV : + return KADM_NO_SERV; + case KADM5_NOT_INIT : + return KADM_NO_CONN; + case KADM5_UNK_PRINC : + return KADM_NOENTRY; + case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT : +#ifdef KADM_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT + return KADM_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT; +#else + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; +#endif + case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS : +#ifdef KADM_PASS_Q_CLASS + return KADM_PASS_Q_CLASS; +#else + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; +#endif + case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT : +#ifdef KADM_PASS_Q_DICT + return KADM_PASS_Q_DICT; +#else + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; +#endif + case KADM5_PASS_REUSE : + case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON : + case KADM5_BAD_PASSWORD : + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; + case KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL : + return KADM_IMMUTABLE; + case KADM5_POLICY_REF : + case KADM5_INIT : + case KADM5_BAD_HIST_KEY : + case KADM5_UNK_POLICY : + case KADM5_BAD_MASK : + case KADM5_BAD_CLASS : + case KADM5_BAD_LENGTH : + case KADM5_BAD_POLICY : + case KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL : + case KADM5_BAD_AUX_ATTR : + case KADM5_BAD_HISTORY : + case KADM5_BAD_MIN_PASS_LIFE : + case KADM5_BAD_SERVER_HANDLE : + case KADM5_BAD_STRUCT_VERSION : + case KADM5_OLD_STRUCT_VERSION : + case KADM5_NEW_STRUCT_VERSION : + case KADM5_BAD_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_OLD_LIB_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_OLD_SERVER_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_NEW_LIB_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_NEW_SERVER_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_SECURE_PRINC_MISSING : + case KADM5_NO_RENAME_SALT : + case KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS : + case KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS : + case KADM5_AUTH_LIST : + case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW : + case KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE : + case KADM5_MISSING_CONF_PARAMS : + case KADM5_BAD_SERVER_NAME : + default : + return KADM_UNAUTH; /* XXX */ + } +} + +/* + * server functions + */ + +static int +kadm_ser_cpw(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + char key[8]; + char *password = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: CHPASS %s", + principal_string, principal_string); + + ret = krb5_storage_read(message, key + 4, 4); + ret = krb5_storage_read(message, key, 4); + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(message, &password); + + if(password) { + krb5_data pwd_data; + const char *tmp; + + pwd_data.data = password; + pwd_data.length = strlen(password); + + tmp = kadm5_check_password_quality (context, principal, &pwd_data); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + krb5_store_stringz (reply, (char *)tmp); + ret = KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT; + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, principal, password); + } else { + krb5_key_data key_data[3]; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2; + key_data[i].key_data_kvno = 0; + /* key */ + key_data[i].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + key_data[i].key_data_length[0] = 8; + key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] = malloc(8); + memcpy(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], &key, 8); + /* salt */ + key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PW_SALT; + key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0; + key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL; + } + key_data[0].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + key_data[1].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ret = kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key(kadm_handle, + principal, 3, key_data); + } + + if(ret != 0) { + krb5_store_stringz(reply, (char*)krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto fail; + } + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat CHPASS"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_add(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + int32_t mask; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, out; + Kadm_vals values; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values); + + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: ADD %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_ADD, + ent.principal); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key(kadm_handle, &ent, mask); + if(ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + goto fail; + } + + mask = KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME | KADM5_MAX_LIFE | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_MOD_TIME | KADM5_MOD_NAME; + + kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal, &out, mask); + ent_to_values(context, &out, mask, &values); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &out); + store_vals(reply, &values); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat ADD"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_get(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + Kadm_vals values; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, out; + int32_t mask; + char flags[FLDSZ]; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values); + /* XXX BRAIN DAMAGE! these flags are not stored in the same order + as in the header */ + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[3]); + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[2]); + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[1]); + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[0]); + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: GET %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_GET, + ent.principal); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + mask = flags_4_to_5(flags); + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal, &out, mask); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ent_to_values(context, &out, mask, &values); + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &out); + + store_vals(reply, &values); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat GET"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_mod(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + Kadm_vals values1, values2; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, out; + int32_t mask; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values1); + /* why are the old values sent? is the mask the same in the old and + the new entry? */ + ret_vals(message, &values2); + + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values2, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: MOD %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY, + ent.principal); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_s_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask); + if(ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_s_modify_principal"); + goto fail; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal, &out, mask); + if(ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_s_modify_principal"); + goto fail; + } + + ent_to_values(context, &out, mask, &values1); + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &out); + + store_vals(reply, &values1); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat MOD"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_del(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + Kadm_vals values; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + int32_t mask; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values); + + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: DEL %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, + ent.principal); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal); + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat ADD"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +dispatch(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_data msg, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + int retval; + int8_t command; + krb5_storage *sp_in, *sp_out; + + sp_in = krb5_storage_from_data(&msg); + krb5_ret_int8(sp_in, &command); + + sp_out = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_storage_write(sp_out, KADM_VERSTR, KADM_VERSIZE); + krb5_store_int32(sp_out, 0); + + switch(command) { + case CHANGE_PW: + retval = kadm_ser_cpw(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case ADD_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_add(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case GET_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_get(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case MOD_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_mod(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case DEL_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_del(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + default: + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: unknown opcode: %d", + principal_string, command); + retval = KADM_NO_OPCODE; + break; + } + krb5_storage_free(sp_in); + if(retval) { + krb5_storage_seek(sp_out, KADM_VERSIZE, SEEK_SET); + krb5_store_int32(sp_out, retval); + } + krb5_storage_to_data(sp_out, reply); + krb5_storage_free(sp_out); + return retval; +} + +/* + * Decode a v4 kadmin packet in `message' and create a reply in `reply' + */ + +static void +decode_packet(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab keytab, + struct sockaddr_in *admin_addr, + struct sockaddr_in *client_addr, + krb5_data message, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + int ret; + KTEXT_ST authent; + AUTH_DAT ad; + MSG_DAT msg_dat; + off_t off = 0; + unsigned long rlen; + char sname[] = "changepw", sinst[] = "kerberos"; + unsigned long checksum; + des_key_schedule schedule; + char *msg = message.data; + void *kadm_handle; + krb5_principal client; + char *client_str; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + if(message.length < KADM_VERSIZE + 4 + || strncmp(msg, KADM_VERSTR, KADM_VERSIZE) != 0) { + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_BAD_VER, reply); + return; + } + + off = KADM_VERSIZE; + off += _krb5_get_int(msg + off, &rlen, 4); + memset(&authent, 0, sizeof(authent)); + authent.length = message.length - rlen - KADM_VERSIZE - 4; + + if(rlen > message.length - KADM_VERSIZE - 4 + || authent.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN) { + krb5_warnx(context, "received bad rlen (%lu)", (unsigned long)rlen); + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_LENGTH_ERROR, reply); + return; + } + + memcpy(authent.dat, (char*)msg + off, authent.length); + off += authent.length; + + { + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_keyblock *key; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &principal, NULL, + "changepw", "kerberos", NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_NOMEM, reply); + return; + } + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, keytab, principal, 0, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, &entry); + krb5_kt_close (context, keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_NO_AUTH, reply); + return; + } + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock,& key); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + if(ret) { + if(ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) + make_you_lose_packet(KADM_NO_AUTH, reply); + else + /* XXX */ + make_you_lose_packet(KADM_NO_AUTH, reply); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_read_service_key"); + return; + } + + if(key->keyvalue.length != 8) + krb5_abortx(context, "key has wrong length (%lu)", + (unsigned long)key->keyvalue.length); + krb_set_key(key->keyvalue.data, 0); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, key); + } + + ret = krb_rd_req(&authent, sname, sinst, + client_addr->sin_addr.s_addr, &ad, NULL); + + if(ret) { + make_you_lose_packet(ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb + ret, reply); + krb5_warnx(context, "krb_rd_req: %d", ret); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + &client); + if (ret) { + krb5_warnx (context, "krb5_425_conv_principal: %d", ret); + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_NOMEM, reply); + return; + } + + krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &client_str); + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_str, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_NOMEM, reply); + goto out; + } + + checksum = des_quad_cksum((void *)(msg + off), NULL, rlen, 0, &ad.session); + if(checksum != ad.checksum) { + krb5_warnx(context, "decode_packet: bad checksum"); + make_you_lose_packet (KADM_BAD_CHK, reply); + goto out; + } + des_set_key(&ad.session, schedule); + ret = krb_rd_priv(msg + off, rlen, schedule, &ad.session, + client_addr, admin_addr, &msg_dat); + if (ret) { + make_you_lose_packet (ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb + ret, reply); + krb5_warnx(context, "krb_rd_priv: %d", ret); + goto out; + } + + { + krb5_data d, r; + int retval; + + d.data = msg_dat.app_data; + d.length = msg_dat.app_length; + + retval = dispatch(context, kadm_handle, + client, client_str, d, &r); + krb5_data_alloc(reply, r.length + 26); + reply->length = krb_mk_priv(r.data, reply->data, r.length, + schedule, &ad.session, + admin_addr, client_addr); + if((ssize_t)reply->length < 0) { + make_you_lose_packet(KADM_NO_ENCRYPT, reply); + goto out; + } + } +out: + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + free(client_str); +} + +void +handle_v4(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int len, + int fd) +{ + int first = 1; + struct sockaddr_in admin_addr, client_addr; + socklen_t addr_len; + krb5_data message, reply; + ssize_t n; + + addr_len = sizeof(client_addr); + if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&admin_addr, &addr_len) < 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "getsockname"); + addr_len = sizeof(client_addr); + if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&client_addr, &addr_len) < 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "getpeername"); + + while(1) { + doing_useful_work = 0; + if(term_flag) + exit(0); + if(first) { + if (len < 2) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "received too short len (%d < 2)", len); + /* first time around, we have already read len, and two + bytes of the version string */ + krb5_data_alloc(&message, len); + memcpy(message.data, "KA", 2); + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, (char*)message.data + 2, + len - 2); + if (n == 0) + exit (0); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + first = 0; + } else { + char buf[2]; + unsigned long tmp; + ssize_t n; + + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, buf, sizeof(2)); + if (n == 0) + exit (0); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + _krb5_get_int(buf, &tmp, 2); + krb5_data_alloc(&message, tmp); + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, message.data, message.length); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + } + doing_useful_work = 1; + decode_packet(context, keytab, &admin_addr, &client_addr, + message, &reply); + krb5_data_free(&message); + { + char buf[2]; + + _krb5_put_int(buf, reply.length, sizeof(buf)); + n = krb5_net_write(context, &fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_write"); + n = krb5_net_write(context, &fd, reply.data, reply.length); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_write"); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + } + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/524.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/524.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..225594e6fc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/524.c @@ -0,0 +1,371 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: 524.c,v 1.29 2003/03/17 05:35:47 assar Exp $"); + +#ifndef KRB4 +#include +#endif + +/* + * fetch the server from `t', returning the name in malloced memory in + * `spn' and the entry itself in `server' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +fetch_server (const Ticket *t, + char **spn, + hdb_entry **server, + const char *from) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal sprinc; + + ret = principalname2krb5_principal(&sprinc, t->sname, t->realm); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "principalname2krb5_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sprinc, spn); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, sprinc); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_unparse_name: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + ret = db_fetch(sprinc, server); + krb5_free_principal(context, sprinc); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, + "Request to convert ticket from %s for unknown principal %s: %s", + from, *spn, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +log_524 (const EncTicketPart *et, + const char *from, + const char *spn) +{ + krb5_principal client; + char *cpn; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = principalname2krb5_principal(&client, et->cname, et->crealm); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "principalname2krb5_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &cpn); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_unparse_name: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return ret; + } + kdc_log(1, "524-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn); + free(cpn); + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +verify_flags (const EncTicketPart *et, + const char *spn) +{ + if(et->endtime < kdc_time){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket expired (%s)", spn); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED; + } + if(et->flags.invalid){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket not valid (%s)", spn); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * set the `et->caddr' to the most appropriate address to use, where + * `addr' is the address the request was received from. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +set_address (EncTicketPart *et, + struct sockaddr *addr, + const char *from) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_address *v4_addr; + + v4_addr = malloc (sizeof(*v4_addr)); + if (v4_addr == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address(context, addr, v4_addr); + if(ret) { + free (v4_addr); + kdc_log(0, "Failed to convert address (%s)", from); + return ret; + } + + if (et->caddr && !krb5_address_search (context, v4_addr, et->caddr)) { + kdc_log(0, "Incorrect network address (%s)", from); + krb5_free_address(context, v4_addr); + free (v4_addr); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + } + if(v4_addr->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_INET) { + /* we need to collapse the addresses in the ticket to a + single address; best guess is to use the address the + connection came from */ + + if (et->caddr != NULL) { + free_HostAddresses(et->caddr); + } else { + et->caddr = malloc (sizeof (*et->caddr)); + if (et->caddr == NULL) { + krb5_free_address(context, v4_addr); + free(v4_addr); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + et->caddr->val = v4_addr; + et->caddr->len = 1; + } else { + krb5_free_address(context, v4_addr); + free(v4_addr); + } + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +encrypt_v4_ticket(void *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_keyblock *skey, + EncryptedData *reply) +{ + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + buf, + len, + 0, + reply); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +encode_524_response(const char *spn, const EncTicketPart et, const Ticket *t, + hdb_entry *server, EncryptedData *ticket, int *kvno) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int use_2b; + size_t len; + + use_2b = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, "kdc", "use_2b", spn, NULL); + if(use_2b) { + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, + ticket->cipher.data, ticket->cipher.length, + &t->enc_part, &len, ret); + + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode v4 (2b) ticket (%s)", spn); + return ret; + } + + ticket->etype = 0; + ticket->kvno = NULL; + *kvno = 213; /* 2b's use this magic kvno */ + } else { + unsigned char buf[MAX_KTXT_LEN + 4 * 4]; + Key *skey; + + if (!enable_v4_cross_realm && strcmp (et.crealm, t->realm) != 0) { + kdc_log(0, "524 cross-realm %s -> %s disabled", et.crealm, + t->realm); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + ret = encode_v4_ticket(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + &et, &t->sname, &len); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode v4 ticket (%s)", spn); + return ret; + } + ret = get_des_key(server, TRUE, FALSE, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for server (%s)", spn); + return ret; + } + ret = encrypt_v4_ticket(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, + &skey->key, ticket); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encrypt v4 ticket (%s)", spn); + return ret; + } + *kvno = server->kvno; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * process a 5->4 request, based on `t', and received `from, addr', + * returning the reply in `reply' + */ + +krb5_error_code +do_524(const Ticket *t, krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_crypto crypto; + hdb_entry *server = NULL; + Key *skey; + krb5_data et_data; + EncTicketPart et; + EncryptedData ticket; + krb5_storage *sp; + char *spn = NULL; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KTXT_LEN + 4 * 4]; + size_t len; + int kvno; + + if(!enable_524) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Rejected ticket conversion request from %s", from); + goto out; + } + + ret = fetch_server (t, &spn, &server, from); + if (ret) { + goto out; + } + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, server, t->enc_part.etype, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "No suitable key found for server (%s) from %s", spn, from); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &skey->key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + &t->enc_part, + &et_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decrypt ticket from %s for %s", from, spn); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decode_EncTicketPart(context, et_data.data, et_data.length, + &et, &len); + krb5_data_free(&et_data); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decode ticket from %s for %s", from, spn); + goto out; + } + + ret = log_524 (&et, from, spn); + if (ret) { + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + goto out; + } + + ret = verify_flags (&et, spn); + if (ret) { + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + goto out; + } + + ret = set_address (&et, addr, from); + if (ret) { + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + goto out; + } + + ret = encode_524_response(spn, et, t, server, &ticket, &kvno); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + +out: + /* make reply */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + krb5_store_int32(sp, kvno); + krb5_store_data(sp, ticket.cipher); + /* Aargh! This is coded as a KTEXT_ST. */ + krb5_storage_seek(sp, MAX_KTXT_LEN - ticket.cipher.length, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32(sp, 0); /* mbz */ + free_EncryptedData(&ticket); + } + ret = krb5_storage_to_data(sp, reply); + reply->length = krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + if(spn) + free(spn); + if(server) + free_ent (server); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f41f46eb51 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.44 2003/01/14 05:47:06 lha Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) -I$(srcdir)/../lib/krb5 + +bin_PROGRAMS = string2key + +sbin_PROGRAMS = kstash + +libexec_PROGRAMS = hprop hpropd kdc + +man_MANS = kdc.8 kstash.8 hprop.8 hpropd.8 string2key.8 + +hprop_SOURCES = hprop.c mit_dump.c v4_dump.c hprop.h kadb.h +hpropd_SOURCES = hpropd.c hprop.h + +kstash_SOURCES = kstash.c headers.h + +string2key_SOURCES = string2key.c headers.h + +if KRB4 +krb4_sources = kaserver.c rx.h +else +krb4_sources = +endif + +kdc_SOURCES = \ + config.c \ + connect.c \ + kdc_locl.h \ + kerberos5.c \ + log.c \ + main.c \ + misc.c \ + 524.c \ + kerberos4.c \ + $(krb4_sources) + + +hprop_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_kdb) $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +hpropd_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_kdb) $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +kdc_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIB_pidfile) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e5f5ca528 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,973 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.44 2003/01/14 05:47:06 lha Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(hprop_SOURCES) $(hpropd_SOURCES) $(kdc_SOURCES) $(kstash_SOURCES) $(string2key_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +bin_PROGRAMS = string2key$(EXEEXT) +sbin_PROGRAMS = kstash$(EXEEXT) 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@foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/config.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/config.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ab826a1cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/config.c @@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: config.c,v 1.46.2.2 2003/10/27 11:06:52 joda Exp $"); + +static const char *config_file; /* location of kdc config file */ + +int require_preauth = -1; /* 1 == require preauth for all principals */ + +size_t max_request; /* maximal size of a request */ + +static char *max_request_str; /* `max_request' as a string */ + +time_t kdc_warn_pwexpire; /* time before expiration to print a warning */ + +struct dbinfo *databases; +HDB **db; +int num_db; + +const char *port_str; + +#ifdef HAVE_DAEMON +int detach_from_console = -1; +#define DETACH_IS_DEFAULT FALSE +#endif + +int enable_http = -1; +krb5_boolean encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep; /* bug compatibility */ + +krb5_boolean check_ticket_addresses; +krb5_boolean allow_null_ticket_addresses; +krb5_boolean allow_anonymous; +int trpolicy; +static const char *trpolicy_str; + +static struct getarg_strings addresses_str; /* addresses to listen on */ +krb5_addresses explicit_addresses; + +#ifdef KRB4 +char *v4_realm; +int enable_v4 = -1; +int enable_kaserver = -1; +#endif + +int enable_524 = -1; +int enable_v4_cross_realm = -1; + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { + "config-file", 'c', arg_string, &config_file, + "location of config file", "file" + }, + { + "require-preauth", 'p', arg_negative_flag, &require_preauth, + "don't require pa-data in as-reqs" + }, + { + "max-request", 0, arg_string, &max_request, + "max size for a kdc-request", "size" + }, +#if 0 + { + "database", 'd', arg_string, &databases, + "location of database", "database" + }, +#endif + { "enable-http", 'H', arg_flag, &enable_http, "turn on HTTP support" }, + { "524", 0, arg_negative_flag, &enable_524, + "don't respond to 524 requests" + }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { + "kaserver", 'K', arg_flag, &enable_kaserver, + "enable kaserver support" + }, + { "kerberos4", 0, arg_flag, &enable_v4, + "respond to kerberos 4 requests" + }, + { + "v4-realm", 'r', arg_string, &v4_realm, + "realm to serve v4-requests for" + }, +#endif + { "kerberos4-cross-realm", 0, arg_flag, + &enable_v4_cross_realm, + "respond to kerberos 4 requests from foreign realms" + }, + { "ports", 'P', arg_string, &port_str, + "ports to listen to", "portspec" + }, +#ifdef HAVE_DAEMON +#if DETACH_IS_DEFAULT + { + "detach", 'D', arg_negative_flag, &detach_from_console, + "don't detach from console" + }, +#else + { + "detach", 0 , arg_flag, &detach_from_console, + "detach from console" + }, +#endif +#endif + { "addresses", 0, arg_strings, &addresses_str, + "addresses to listen on", "list of addresses" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +get_dbinfo(void) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *top_binding = NULL; + const krb5_config_binding *db_binding; + const krb5_config_binding *default_binding = NULL; + struct dbinfo *di, **dt; + const char *default_dbname = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; + const char *default_mkey = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; + const char *p; + + databases = NULL; + dt = &databases; + while((db_binding = (const krb5_config_binding *) + krb5_config_get_next(context, NULL, &top_binding, + krb5_config_list, + "kdc", + "database", + NULL))) { + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "realm", NULL); + if(p == NULL) { + if(default_binding) { + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: more than one realm-less " + "database specification"); + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: using the first encountered"); + } else + default_binding = db_binding; + continue; + } + di = calloc(1, sizeof(*di)); + di->realm = strdup(p); + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "dbname", NULL); + if(p) + di->dbname = strdup(p); + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "mkey_file", NULL); + if(p) + di->mkey_file = strdup(p); + *dt = di; + dt = &di->next; + } + if(default_binding) { + di = calloc(1, sizeof(*di)); + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, default_binding, "dbname", NULL); + if(p) { + di->dbname = strdup(p); + default_dbname = p; + } + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, default_binding, "mkey_file", NULL); + if(p) { + di->mkey_file = strdup(p); + default_mkey = p; + } + *dt = di; + dt = &di->next; + } else if(databases == NULL) { + /* if there are none specified, use some default */ + di = calloc(1, sizeof(*di)); + di->dbname = strdup(default_dbname); + di->mkey_file = strdup(default_mkey); + *dt = di; + dt = &di->next; + } + for(di = databases; di; di = di->next) { + if(di->dbname == NULL) + di->dbname = strdup(default_dbname); + if(di->mkey_file == NULL) { + p = strrchr(di->dbname, '.'); + if(p == NULL || strchr(p, '/') != NULL) + /* final pathname component does not contain a . */ + asprintf(&di->mkey_file, "%s.mkey", di->dbname); + else + /* the filename is something.else, replace .else with + .mkey */ + asprintf(&di->mkey_file, "%.*s.mkey", + (int)(p - di->dbname), di->dbname); + } + } +} + +static void +add_one_address (const char *str, int first) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_addresses tmp; + + ret = krb5_parse_address (context, str, &tmp); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "parse_address `%s'", str); + if (first) + krb5_copy_addresses(context, &tmp, &explicit_addresses); + else + krb5_append_addresses(context, &explicit_addresses, &tmp); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &tmp); +} + +void +configure(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int e; + const char *p; + + while((e = getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind))) + warnx("error at argument `%s'", argv[optind]); + + if(help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage(1); + + { + krb5_error_code ret; + char **files; + char *tmp; + if(config_file == NULL) + config_file = _PATH_KDC_CONF; + asprintf(&tmp, "%s:%s", config_file, krb5_config_file); + if(tmp == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "out of memory"); + + krb5_config_file = tmp; + + ret = krb5_get_default_config_files(&files); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "reading configuration files"); + ret = krb5_set_config_files(context, files); + krb5_free_config_files(files); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "reading configuration files"); + } + + get_dbinfo(); + + if(max_request_str) + max_request = parse_bytes(max_request_str, NULL); + + if(max_request == 0){ + p = krb5_config_get_string (context, + NULL, + "kdc", + "max-request", + NULL); + if(p) + max_request = parse_bytes(p, NULL); + } + + if(require_preauth == -1) + require_preauth = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, "kdc", + "require-preauth", NULL); + + if(port_str == NULL){ + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "kdc", "ports", NULL); + if (p != NULL) + port_str = strdup(p); + } + + explicit_addresses.len = 0; + + if (addresses_str.num_strings) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < addresses_str.num_strings; ++i) + add_one_address (addresses_str.strings[i], i == 0); + free_getarg_strings (&addresses_str); + } else { + char **foo = krb5_config_get_strings (context, NULL, + "kdc", "addresses", NULL); + + if (foo != NULL) { + add_one_address (*foo++, TRUE); + while (*foo) + add_one_address (*foo++, FALSE); + } + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if(enable_v4 == -1) + enable_v4 = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, "kdc", + "enable-kerberos4", NULL); +#else +#define enable_v4 0 +#endif + if(enable_v4_cross_realm == -1) + enable_v4_cross_realm = + krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, + FALSE, "kdc", + "enable-kerberos4-cross-realm", + NULL); + if(enable_524 == -1) + enable_524 = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, enable_v4, + "kdc", "enable-524", NULL); + + if(enable_http == -1) + enable_http = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, "kdc", + "enable-http", NULL); + check_ticket_addresses = + krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, TRUE, "kdc", + "check-ticket-addresses", NULL); + allow_null_ticket_addresses = + krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, TRUE, "kdc", + "allow-null-ticket-addresses", NULL); + + allow_anonymous = + krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, "kdc", + "allow-anonymous", NULL); + trpolicy_str = + krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, "always-check", "kdc", + "transited-policy", NULL); + if(strcasecmp(trpolicy_str, "always-check") == 0) + trpolicy = TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK; + else if(strcasecmp(trpolicy_str, "allow-per-principal") == 0) + trpolicy = TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL; + else if(strcasecmp(trpolicy_str, "always-honour-request") == 0) + trpolicy = TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST; + else { + kdc_log(0, "unknown transited-policy: %s, reverting to always-check", + trpolicy_str); + trpolicy = TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK; + } + + krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, TRUE, "kdc", + "enforce-transited-policy", NULL); +#ifdef KRB4 + if(v4_realm == NULL){ + p = krb5_config_get_string (context, NULL, + "kdc", + "v4-realm", + NULL); + if(p != NULL) { + v4_realm = strdup(p); + if (v4_realm == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "out of memory"); + } + } + if (enable_kaserver == -1) + enable_kaserver = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, + "kdc", + "enable-kaserver", + NULL); +#endif + + encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, "kdc", + "encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep", + NULL); + + kdc_warn_pwexpire = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "kdc", + "kdc_warn_pwexpire", + NULL); + +#ifdef HAVE_DAEMON + if(detach_from_console == -1) + detach_from_console = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, + DETACH_IS_DEFAULT, + "kdc", + "detach", NULL); +#endif + kdc_openlog(); + if(max_request == 0) + max_request = 64 * 1024; + if(require_preauth == -1) + require_preauth = 1; + if (port_str == NULL) + port_str = "+"; +#ifdef KRB4 + if(v4_realm == NULL){ + v4_realm = malloc(40); /* REALM_SZ */ + if (v4_realm == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "out of memory"); + krb_get_lrealm(v4_realm, 1); + } +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/connect.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/connect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9e9e481235 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/connect.c @@ -0,0 +1,810 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: connect.c,v 1.90.2.2 2004/04/02 20:50:53 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * a tuple describing on what to listen + */ + +struct port_desc{ + int family; + int type; + int port; +}; + +/* the current ones */ + +static struct port_desc *ports; +static int num_ports; + +/* + * add `family, port, protocol' to the list with duplicate suppresion. + */ + +static void +add_port(int family, int port, const char *protocol) +{ + int type; + int i; + + if(strcmp(protocol, "udp") == 0) + type = SOCK_DGRAM; + else if(strcmp(protocol, "tcp") == 0) + type = SOCK_STREAM; + else + return; + for(i = 0; i < num_ports; i++){ + if(ports[i].type == type + && ports[i].port == port + && ports[i].family == family) + return; + } + ports = realloc(ports, (num_ports + 1) * sizeof(*ports)); + if (ports == NULL) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "realloc"); + ports[num_ports].family = family; + ports[num_ports].type = type; + ports[num_ports].port = port; + num_ports++; +} + +/* + * add a triple but with service -> port lookup + * (this prints warnings for stuff that does not exist) + */ + +static void +add_port_service(int family, const char *service, int port, + const char *protocol) +{ + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, service, protocol, port); + add_port (family, port, protocol); +} + +/* + * add the port with service -> port lookup or string -> number + * (no warning is printed) + */ + +static void +add_port_string (int family, const char *port_str, const char *protocol) +{ + struct servent *sp; + int port; + + sp = roken_getservbyname (port_str, protocol); + if (sp != NULL) { + port = sp->s_port; + } else { + char *end; + + port = htons(strtol(port_str, &end, 0)); + if (end == port_str) + return; + } + add_port (family, port, protocol); +} + +/* + * add the standard collection of ports for `family' + */ + +static void +add_standard_ports (int family) +{ + add_port_service(family, "kerberos", 88, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos", 88, "tcp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-sec", 88, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-sec", 88, "tcp"); + if(enable_http) + add_port_service(family, "http", 80, "tcp"); + if(enable_524) { + add_port_service(family, "krb524", 4444, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "krb524", 4444, "tcp"); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if(enable_v4) { + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-iv", 750, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-iv", 750, "tcp"); + } + if (enable_kaserver) + add_port_service(family, "afs3-kaserver", 7004, "udp"); +#endif +} + +/* + * parse the set of space-delimited ports in `str' and add them. + * "+" => all the standard ones + * otherwise it's port|service[/protocol] + */ + +static void +parse_ports(const char *str) +{ + char *pos = NULL; + char *p; + char *str_copy = strdup (str); + + p = strtok_r(str_copy, " \t", &pos); + while(p != NULL) { + if(strcmp(p, "+") == 0) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + add_standard_ports(AF_INET6); +#endif + add_standard_ports(AF_INET); + } else { + char *q = strchr(p, '/'); + if(q){ + *q++ = 0; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + add_port_string(AF_INET6, p, q); +#endif + add_port_string(AF_INET, p, q); + }else { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + add_port_string(AF_INET6, p, "udp"); + add_port_string(AF_INET6, p, "tcp"); +#endif + add_port_string(AF_INET, p, "udp"); + add_port_string(AF_INET, p, "tcp"); + } + } + + p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &pos); + } + free (str_copy); +} + +/* + * every socket we listen on + */ + +struct descr { + int s; + int type; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t size; + size_t len; + time_t timeout; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa; + socklen_t sock_len; + char addr_string[128]; +}; + +static void +init_descr(struct descr *d) +{ + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->sa = (struct sockaddr *)&d->__ss; + d->s = -1; +} + +/* + * re-initialize all `n' ->sa in `d'. + */ + +static void +reinit_descrs (struct descr *d, int n) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + d[i].sa = (struct sockaddr *)&d[i].__ss; +} + +/* + * Create the socket (family, type, port) in `d' + */ + +static void +init_socket(struct descr *d, krb5_address *a, int family, int type, int port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int sa_size = sizeof(__ss); + + init_descr (d); + + ret = krb5_addr2sockaddr (context, a, sa, &sa_size, port); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_addr2sockaddr"); + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; + return; + } + + if (sa->sa_family != family) + return; + + d->s = socket(family, type, 0); + if(d->s < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "socket(%d, %d, 0)", family, type); + d->s = -1; + return; + } +#if defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_REUSEADDR) + { + int one = 1; + setsockopt(d->s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&one, sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + d->type = type; + + if(bind(d->s, sa, sa_size) < 0){ + char a_str[256]; + size_t len; + + krb5_print_address (a, a_str, sizeof(a_str), &len); + krb5_warn(context, errno, "bind %s/%d", a_str, ntohs(port)); + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; + return; + } + if(type == SOCK_STREAM && listen(d->s, SOMAXCONN) < 0){ + char a_str[256]; + size_t len; + + krb5_print_address (a, a_str, sizeof(a_str), &len); + krb5_warn(context, errno, "listen %s/%d", a_str, ntohs(port)); + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; + return; + } +} + +/* + * Allocate descriptors for all the sockets that we should listen on + * and return the number of them. + */ + +static int +init_sockets(struct descr **desc) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i, j; + struct descr *d; + int num = 0; + krb5_addresses addresses; + + if (explicit_addresses.len) { + addresses = explicit_addresses; + } else { + ret = krb5_get_all_server_addrs (context, &addresses); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_all_server_addrs"); + } + parse_ports(port_str); + d = malloc(addresses.len * num_ports * sizeof(*d)); + if (d == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "malloc(%lu) failed", + (unsigned long)num_ports * sizeof(*d)); + + for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++){ + for (j = 0; j < addresses.len; ++j) { + init_socket(&d[num], &addresses.val[j], + ports[i].family, ports[i].type, ports[i].port); + if(d[num].s != -1){ + char a_str[80]; + size_t len; + + krb5_print_address (&addresses.val[j], a_str, + sizeof(a_str), &len); + + kdc_log(5, "listening on %s port %u/%s", + a_str, + ntohs(ports[i].port), + (ports[i].type == SOCK_STREAM) ? "tcp" : "udp"); + /* XXX */ + num++; + } + } + } + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addresses); + d = realloc(d, num * sizeof(*d)); + if (d == NULL && num != 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "realloc(%lu) failed", + (unsigned long)num * sizeof(*d)); + reinit_descrs (d, num); + *desc = d; + return num; +} + +/* + * handle the request in `buf, len', from `addr' (or `from' as a string), + * sending a reply in `reply'. + */ + +static int +process_request(unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_data *reply, + int *sendlength, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + KDC_REQ req; + Ticket ticket; + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t i; + + gettimeofday(&now, NULL); + if(decode_AS_REQ(buf, len, &req, &i) == 0){ + ret = as_rep(&req, reply, from, addr); + free_AS_REQ(&req); + return ret; + }else if(decode_TGS_REQ(buf, len, &req, &i) == 0){ + ret = tgs_rep(&req, reply, from, addr); + free_TGS_REQ(&req); + return ret; + }else if(decode_Ticket(buf, len, &ticket, &i) == 0){ + ret = do_524(&ticket, reply, from, addr); + free_Ticket(&ticket); + return ret; +#ifdef KRB4 + } else if(maybe_version4(buf, len)){ + *sendlength = 0; /* elbitapmoc sdrawkcab XXX */ + do_version4(buf, len, reply, from, (struct sockaddr_in*)addr); + return 0; + } else if (enable_kaserver) { + ret = do_kaserver (buf, len, reply, from, (struct sockaddr_in*)addr); + return ret; +#endif + } + + return -1; +} + +static void +addr_to_string(struct sockaddr *addr, size_t addr_len, char *str, size_t len) +{ + krb5_address a; + if(krb5_sockaddr2address(context, addr, &a) == 0) { + if(krb5_print_address(&a, str, len, &len) == 0) { + krb5_free_address(context, &a); + return; + } + krb5_free_address(context, &a); + } + snprintf(str, len, "", addr->sa_family); +} + +/* + * Handle the request in `buf, len' to socket `d' + */ + +static void +do_request(void *buf, size_t len, int sendlength, + struct descr *d) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data reply; + + reply.length = 0; + ret = process_request(buf, len, &reply, &sendlength, + d->addr_string, d->sa); + if(reply.length){ + kdc_log(5, "sending %lu bytes to %s", (unsigned long)reply.length, + d->addr_string); + if(sendlength){ + unsigned char len[4]; + len[0] = (reply.length >> 24) & 0xff; + len[1] = (reply.length >> 16) & 0xff; + len[2] = (reply.length >> 8) & 0xff; + len[3] = reply.length & 0xff; + if(sendto(d->s, len, sizeof(len), 0, d->sa, d->sock_len) < 0) { + kdc_log (0, "sendto(%s): %s", d->addr_string, strerror(errno)); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + return; + } + } + if(sendto(d->s, reply.data, reply.length, 0, d->sa, d->sock_len) < 0) { + kdc_log (0, "sendto(%s): %s", d->addr_string, strerror(errno)); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + return; + } + krb5_data_free(&reply); + } + if(ret) + kdc_log(0, "Failed processing %lu byte request from %s", + (unsigned long)len, d->addr_string); +} + +/* + * Handle incoming data to the UDP socket in `d' + */ + +static void +handle_udp(struct descr *d) +{ + unsigned char *buf; + int n; + + buf = malloc(max_request); + if(buf == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to allocate %lu bytes", (unsigned long)max_request); + return; + } + + d->sock_len = sizeof(d->__ss); + n = recvfrom(d->s, buf, max_request, 0, d->sa, &d->sock_len); + if(n < 0) + krb5_warn(context, errno, "recvfrom"); + else { + addr_to_string (d->sa, d->sock_len, + d->addr_string, sizeof(d->addr_string)); + do_request(buf, n, 0, d); + } + free (buf); +} + +static void +clear_descr(struct descr *d) +{ + if(d->buf) + memset(d->buf, 0, d->size); + d->len = 0; + if(d->s != -1) + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; +} + + +/* remove HTTP %-quoting from buf */ +static int +de_http(char *buf) +{ + char *p, *q; + for(p = q = buf; *p; p++, q++) { + if(*p == '%' && isxdigit(p[1]) && isxdigit(p[2])) { + unsigned int x; + if(sscanf(p + 1, "%2x", &x) != 1) + return -1; + *q = x; + p += 2; + } else + *q = *p; + } + *q = '\0'; + return 0; +} + +#define TCP_TIMEOUT 4 + +/* + * accept a new TCP connection on `d[parent]' and store it in `d[child]' + */ + +static void +add_new_tcp (struct descr *d, int parent, int child) +{ + int s; + + if (child == -1) + return; + + d[child].sock_len = sizeof(d[child].__ss); + s = accept(d[parent].s, d[child].sa, &d[child].sock_len); + if(s < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "accept"); + return; + } + + if (s >= FD_SETSIZE) { + krb5_warnx(context, "socket FD too large"); + close (s); + return; + } + + d[child].s = s; + d[child].timeout = time(NULL) + TCP_TIMEOUT; + d[child].type = SOCK_STREAM; + addr_to_string (d[child].sa, d[child].sock_len, + d[child].addr_string, sizeof(d[child].addr_string)); +} + +/* + * Grow `d' to handle at least `n'. + * Return != 0 if fails + */ + +static int +grow_descr (struct descr *d, size_t n) +{ + if (d->size - d->len < n) { + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t grow; + + grow = max(1024, d->len + n); + if (d->size + grow > max_request) { + kdc_log(0, "Request exceeds max request size (%lu bytes).", + (unsigned long)d->size + grow); + clear_descr(d); + return -1; + } + tmp = realloc (d->buf, d->size + grow); + if (tmp == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to re-allocate %lu bytes.", + (unsigned long)d->size + grow); + clear_descr(d); + return -1; + } + d->size += grow; + d->buf = tmp; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to handle the TCP data at `d->buf, d->len'. + * Return -1 if failed, 0 if succesful, and 1 if data is complete. + */ + +static int +handle_vanilla_tcp (struct descr *d) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t len; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(d->buf, d->len); + if (sp == NULL) { + kdc_log (0, "krb5_storage_from_mem failed"); + return -1; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &len); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(d->len - 4 >= len) { + memmove(d->buf, d->buf + 4, d->len - 4); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to handle the TCP/HTTP data at `d->buf, d->len'. + * Return -1 if failed, 0 if succesful, and 1 if data is complete. + */ + +static int +handle_http_tcp (struct descr *d) +{ + char *s, *p, *t; + void *data; + char *proto; + int len; + + s = (char *)d->buf; + + p = strstr(s, "\r\n"); + if (p == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", d->addr_string); + return -1; + } + *p = 0; + + p = NULL; + t = strtok_r(s, " \t", &p); + if (t == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", d->addr_string); + return -1; + } + t = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &p); + if(t == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", d->addr_string); + return -1; + } + data = malloc(strlen(t)); + if (data == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to allocate %lu bytes", + (unsigned long)strlen(t)); + return -1; + } + if(*t == '/') + t++; + if(de_http(t) != 0) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", d->addr_string); + kdc_log(5, "Request: %s", t); + free(data); + return -1; + } + proto = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &p); + if (proto == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", d->addr_string); + free(data); + return -1; + } + len = base64_decode(t, data); + if(len <= 0){ + const char *msg = + " 404 Not found\r\n" + "Server: Heimdal/" VERSION "\r\n" + "Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n" + "Pragma: no-cache\r\n" + "Content-type: text/html\r\n" + "Content-transfer-encoding: 8bit\r\n\r\n" + "404 Not found\r\n" + "

404 Not found

\r\n" + "That page doesn't exist, maybe you are looking for " + "Heimdal?\r\n"; + write(d->s, proto, strlen(proto)); + write(d->s, msg, strlen(msg)); + kdc_log(0, "HTTP request from %s is non KDC request", d->addr_string); + kdc_log(5, "Request: %s", t); + free(data); + return -1; + } + { + const char *msg = + " 200 OK\r\n" + "Server: Heimdal/" VERSION "\r\n" + "Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n" + "Pragma: no-cache\r\n" + "Content-type: application/octet-stream\r\n" + "Content-transfer-encoding: binary\r\n\r\n"; + write(d->s, proto, strlen(proto)); + write(d->s, msg, strlen(msg)); + } + memcpy(d->buf, data, len); + d->len = len; + free(data); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Handle incoming data to the TCP socket in `d[index]' + */ + +static void +handle_tcp(struct descr *d, int index, int min_free) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int n; + int ret = 0; + + if (d[index].timeout == 0) { + add_new_tcp (d, index, min_free); + return; + } + + n = recvfrom(d[index].s, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, NULL, NULL); + if(n < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "recvfrom"); + return; + } else if (n == 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "connection closed before end of data after %lu " + "bytes from %s", + (unsigned long)d[index].len, d[index].addr_string); + clear_descr (d + index); + return; + } + if (grow_descr (&d[index], n)) + return; + memcpy(d[index].buf + d[index].len, buf, n); + d[index].len += n; + if(d[index].len > 4 && d[index].buf[0] == 0) { + ret = handle_vanilla_tcp (&d[index]); + } else if(enable_http && + d[index].len >= 4 && + strncmp((char *)d[index].buf, "GET ", 4) == 0 && + strncmp((char *)d[index].buf + d[index].len - 4, + "\r\n\r\n", 4) == 0) { + ret = handle_http_tcp (&d[index]); + if (ret < 0) + clear_descr (d + index); + } else if (d[index].len > 4) { + kdc_log (0, "TCP data of strange type from %s", d[index].addr_string); + return; + } + if (ret < 0) + return; + else if (ret == 1) { + do_request(d[index].buf, d[index].len, 1, &d[index]); + clear_descr(d + index); + } +} + +void +loop(void) +{ + struct descr *d; + int ndescr; + + ndescr = init_sockets(&d); + if(ndescr <= 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No sockets!"); + while(exit_flag == 0){ + struct timeval tmout; + fd_set fds; + int min_free = -1; + int max_fd = 0; + int i; + + FD_ZERO(&fds); + for(i = 0; i < ndescr; i++) { + if(d[i].s >= 0){ + if(d[i].type == SOCK_STREAM && + d[i].timeout && d[i].timeout < time(NULL)) { + kdc_log(1, "TCP-connection from %s expired after %lu bytes", + d[i].addr_string, (unsigned long)d[i].len); + clear_descr(&d[i]); + continue; + } + if(max_fd < d[i].s) + max_fd = d[i].s; + if (max_fd >= FD_SETSIZE) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(d[i].s, &fds); + } else if(min_free < 0 || i < min_free) + min_free = i; + } + if(min_free == -1){ + struct descr *tmp; + tmp = realloc(d, (ndescr + 4) * sizeof(*d)); + if(tmp == NULL) + krb5_warnx(context, "No memory"); + else { + d = tmp; + reinit_descrs (d, ndescr); + memset(d + ndescr, 0, 4 * sizeof(*d)); + for(i = ndescr; i < ndescr + 4; i++) + init_descr (&d[i]); + min_free = ndescr; + ndescr += 4; + } + } + + tmout.tv_sec = TCP_TIMEOUT; + tmout.tv_usec = 0; + switch(select(max_fd + 1, &fds, 0, 0, &tmout)){ + case 0: + break; + case -1: + if (errno != EINTR) + krb5_warn(context, errno, "select"); + break; + default: + for(i = 0; i < ndescr; i++) + if(d[i].s >= 0 && FD_ISSET(d[i].s, &fds)) { + if(d[i].type == SOCK_DGRAM) + handle_udp(&d[i]); + else if(d[i].type == SOCK_STREAM) + handle_tcp(d, i, min_free); + } + } + } + free (d); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/headers.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/headers.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..91e4d50b7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/headers.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: headers.h,v 1.15 2002/09/10 20:04:46 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __HEADERS_H__ +#define __HEADERS_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include /* copy_octet_string */ + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#define Principal Principal4 +#include +#endif + +#undef ALLOC +#define ALLOC(X) ((X) = malloc(sizeof(*(X)))) +#undef ALLOC_SEQ +#define ALLOC_SEQ(X, N) do { (X)->len = (N); \ +(X)->val = calloc((X)->len, sizeof(*(X)->val)); } while(0) + +#endif /* __HEADERS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5e3879cf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.8 @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: hprop.8,v 1.18 2003/02/16 21:10:19 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd June 19, 2000 +.Dt HPROP 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm hprop +.Nd propagate the KDC database +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl m Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -master-key= Ns Pa file +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl d Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -database= Ns Pa file +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -source= Ns Ar heimdal|mit-dump|krb4-dump|krb4-db|kaserver +.Oo Fl r Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -v4-realm= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl c Ar cell \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -cell= Ns Ar cell +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl S | Fl -kaspecials +.Oo Fl k Ar keytab \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl R Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -v5-realm= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl D | Fl -decrypt +.Op Fl E | Fl -encrypt +.Op Fl n | Fl -stdout +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl h | Fl -help +.Op Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar port +.Ar ... +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +takes a principal database in a specified format and converts it into +a stream of Heimdal database records. This stream can either be +written to standard out, or (more commonly) be propagated to a +.Xr hpropd 8 +server running on a different machine. +.Pp +If propagating, it connects to all +.Ar hosts +specified on the command by opening a TCP connection to port 754 +(service hprop) and sends the database in encrypted form. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl m Ar file , +.Fl -master-key= Ns Pa file +.Xc +Where to find the master key to encrypt or decrypt keys with. +.It Xo +.Fl d Ar file , +.Fl -database= Ns Pa file +.Xc +The database to be propagated. +.It Xo +.Fl -source= Ns Ar heimdal|mit-dump|krb4-dump|krb4-db|kaserver +.Xc +Specifies the type of the source database. Alternatives include: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width krb4-dump -compact -offset indent +.It heimdal +a Heimdal database +.It mit-dump +a MIT Kerberos 5 dump file +.It krb4-db +a Kerberos 4 database +.It krb4-dump +a Kerberos 4 dump file +.It kaserver +an AFS kaserver database +.El +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar keytab , +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Xc +The keytab to use for fetching the key to be used for authenticating +to the propagation daemon(s). The key +.Pa kadmin/hprop +is used from this keytab. The default is to fetch the key from the +KDC database. +.It Xo +.Fl R Ar string , +.Fl -v5-realm= Ns Ar string +.Xc +Local realm override. +.It Xo +.Fl D , +.Fl -decrypt +.Xc +The encryption keys in the database can either be in clear, or +encrypted with a master key. This option transmits the database with +unencrypted keys. +.It Xo +.Fl E , +.Fl -encrypt +.Xc +This option transmits the database with encrypted keys. +.It Xo +.Fl n , +.Fl -stdout +.Xc +Dump the database on stdout, in a format that can be fed to hpropd. +.El +.Pp +The following options are only valid if +.Nm hprop +is compiled with support for Kerberos 4 (kaserver). +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar string , +.Fl -v4-realm= Ns Ar string +.Xc +v4 realm to use. +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar cell , +.Fl -cell= Ns Ar cell +.Xc +The AFS cell name, used if reading a kaserver database. +.It Xo +.Fl S , +.Fl -kaspecials +.Xc +Also dump the principals marked as special in the kaserver database. +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -v4-db +.Xc +Deprecated, identical to +.Sq --source=krb4-db . +.It Xo +.Fl K , +.Fl -ka-db +.Xc +Deprecated, identical to +.Sq --source=kaserver . +.El +.Sh EXAMPLES +The following will propagate a database to another machine (which +should run +.Xr hpropd 8): +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ hprop slave-1 slave-2 +.Ed +.Pp +Copy a Kerberos 4 database to a Kerberos 5 slave: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ hprop --source=krb4-db -E krb5-slave +.Ed +.Pp +Convert a Kerberos 4 dump-file for use with a Heimdal KDC: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ hprop -n --source=krb4-dump -d /var/kerberos/principal.dump --master-key=/.k | hpropd -n +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr hpropd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3bc066fe19 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.c @@ -0,0 +1,868 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hprop.c,v 1.70 2002/09/04 18:19:41 joda Exp $"); + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +static const char *ktname = HPROP_KEYTAB; +static const char *database; +static char *mkeyfile; +static int to_stdout; +static int verbose_flag; +static int encrypt_flag; +static int decrypt_flag; +static hdb_master_key mkey5; + +static char *source_type; + +static char *afs_cell; +static char *v4_realm; + +static int kaspecials_flag; +static int ka_use_null_salt; + +static char *local_realm=NULL; + +static int +open_socket(krb5_context context, const char *hostname, const char *port) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, port, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + warnx ("%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return s; + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return -1; +} + +krb5_error_code +v5_prop(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *appdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct prop_data *pd = appdata; + krb5_data data; + + if(encrypt_flag) { + ret = hdb_seal_keys_mkey(context, entry, mkey5); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_seal_keys_mkey"); + return ret; + } + } + if(decrypt_flag) { + ret = hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(context, entry, mkey5); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_unseal_keys_mkey"); + return ret; + } + } + + ret = hdb_entry2value(context, entry, &data); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_entry2value"); + return ret; + } + + if(to_stdout) + ret = krb5_write_message(context, &pd->sock, &data); + else + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, pd->auth_context, + &pd->sock, &data); + krb5_data_free(&data); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 + +static char realm_buf[REALM_SZ]; + +static int +kdb_prop(void *arg, Principal *p) +{ + int ret; + struct v4_principal pr; + + memset(&pr, 0, sizeof(pr)); + + if(p->attributes != 0) { + warnx("%s.%s has non-zero attributes - skipping", + p->name, p->instance); + return 0; + } + strlcpy(pr.name, p->name, sizeof(pr.name)); + strlcpy(pr.instance, p->instance, sizeof(pr.instance)); + + copy_to_key(&p->key_low, &p->key_high, pr.key); + pr.exp_date = p->exp_date; + pr.mod_date = p->mod_date; + strlcpy(pr.mod_name, p->mod_name, sizeof(pr.mod_name)); + strlcpy(pr.mod_instance, p->mod_instance, sizeof(pr.mod_instance)); + pr.max_life = p->max_life; + pr.mkvno = p->kdc_key_ver; + pr.kvno = p->key_version; + + ret = v4_prop(arg, &pr); + memset(&pr, 0, sizeof(pr)); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifndef KRB4 +static time_t +krb_life_to_time(time_t start, int life) +{ + static int lifetimes[] = { + 38400, 41055, 43894, 46929, 50174, 53643, 57352, 61318, + 65558, 70091, 74937, 80119, 85658, 91581, 97914, 104684, + 111922, 119661, 127935, 136781, 146239, 156350, 167161, 178720, + 191077, 204289, 218415, 233517, 249664, 266926, 285383, 305116, + 326213, 348769, 372885, 398668, 426234, 455705, 487215, 520904, + 556921, 595430, 636601, 680618, 727680, 777995, 831789, 889303, + 950794, 1016537, 1086825, 1161973, 1242318, 1328218, 1420057, 1518247, + 1623226, 1735464, 1855462, 1983758, 2120925, 2267576, 2424367, 2592000 + }; + +#if 0 + int i; + double q = exp((log(2592000.0) - log(38400.0)) / 63); + double x = 38400; + for(i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + lifetimes[i] = (int)x; + x *= q; + } +#endif + + if(life == 0xff) + return NEVERDATE; + if(life < 0x80) + return start + life * 5 * 60; + if(life > 0xbf) + life = 0xbf; + return start + lifetimes[life - 0x80]; +} +#endif /* !KRB4 */ + +int +v4_prop(void *arg, struct v4_principal *p) +{ + struct prop_data *pd = arg; + hdb_entry ent; + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, p->name, p->instance, v4_realm, + &ent.principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, + "krb5_425_conv_principal %s.%s@%s", + p->name, p->instance, v4_realm); + return 0; + } + + if(verbose_flag) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name_short(pd->context, ent.principal, &s); + krb5_warnx(pd->context, "%s.%s -> %s", p->name, p->instance, s); + free(s); + } + + ent.kvno = p->kvno; + ent.keys.len = 3; + ent.keys.val = malloc(ent.keys.len * sizeof(*ent.keys.val)); + if(p->mkvno != -1) { + ent.keys.val[0].mkvno = malloc (sizeof(*ent.keys.val[0].mkvno)); + *(ent.keys.val[0].mkvno) = p->mkvno; + } else + ent.keys.val[0].mkvno = NULL; + ent.keys.val[0].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[0].salt)); + ent.keys.val[0].salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + ent.keys.val[0].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + krb5_data_alloc(&ent.keys.val[0].key.keyvalue, sizeof(des_cblock)); + memcpy(ent.keys.val[0].key.keyvalue.data, p->key, 8); + + copy_Key(&ent.keys.val[0], &ent.keys.val[1]); + ent.keys.val[1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + copy_Key(&ent.keys.val[0], &ent.keys.val[2]); + ent.keys.val[2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + + { + int life = krb_life_to_time(0, p->max_life); + if(life == NEVERDATE){ + ent.max_life = NULL; + } else { + /* clean up lifetime a bit */ + if(life > 86400) + life = (life + 86399) / 86400 * 86400; + else if(life > 3600) + life = (life + 3599) / 3600 * 3600; + ALLOC(ent.max_life); + *ent.max_life = life; + } + } + + ALLOC(ent.valid_end); + *ent.valid_end = p->exp_date; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(pd->context, &ent.created_by.principal, + v4_realm, + "kadmin", + "hprop", + NULL); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + ent.created_by.time = time(NULL); + ALLOC(ent.modified_by); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, p->mod_name, p->mod_instance, + v4_realm, &ent.modified_by->principal); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, "%s.%s@%s", p->name, p->instance, v4_realm); + ent.modified_by->principal = NULL; + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + ent.modified_by->time = p->mod_date; + + ent.flags.forwardable = 1; + ent.flags.renewable = 1; + ent.flags.proxiable = 1; + ent.flags.postdate = 1; + ent.flags.client = 1; + ent.flags.server = 1; + + /* special case password changing service */ + if(strcmp(p->name, "changepw") == 0 && + strcmp(p->instance, "kerberos") == 0) { + ent.flags.forwardable = 0; + ent.flags.renewable = 0; + ent.flags.proxiable = 0; + ent.flags.postdate = 0; + ent.flags.initial = 1; + ent.flags.change_pw = 1; + } + + ret = v5_prop(pd->context, NULL, &ent, pd); + + if (strcmp (p->name, "krbtgt") == 0 + && strcmp (v4_realm, p->instance) != 0) { + krb5_free_principal (pd->context, ent.principal); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal (pd->context, p->name, + v4_realm, p->instance, + &ent.principal); + if (ret == 0) + ret = v5_prop (pd->context, NULL, &ent, pd); + } + + out: + hdb_free_entry(pd->context, &ent); + return ret; +} + +#include "kadb.h" + +/* read a `ka_entry' from `fd' at offset `pos' */ +static void +read_block(krb5_context context, int fd, int32_t pos, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; +#ifdef HAVE_PREAD + if((ret = pread(fd, buf, len, 64 + pos)) < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "pread(%u)", 64 + pos); +#else + if(lseek(fd, 64 + pos, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "lseek(%u)", 64 + pos); + ret = read(fd, buf, len); + if(ret < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "read(%lu)", (unsigned long)len); +#endif + if(ret != len) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "read(%lu) = %u", (unsigned long)len, ret); +} + +static int +ka_convert(struct prop_data *pd, int fd, struct ka_entry *ent) +{ + int32_t flags = ntohl(ent->flags); + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry hdb; + + if(!kaspecials_flag + && (flags & KAFNORMAL) == 0) /* remove special entries */ + return 0; + memset(&hdb, 0, sizeof(hdb)); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, ent->name, ent->instance, + v4_realm, &hdb.principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, + "krb5_425_conv_principal (%s.%s@%s)", + ent->name, ent->instance, v4_realm); + return 0; + } + hdb.kvno = ntohl(ent->kvno); + hdb.keys.len = 3; + hdb.keys.val = malloc(hdb.keys.len * sizeof(*hdb.keys.val)); + hdb.keys.val[0].mkvno = NULL; + hdb.keys.val[0].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*hdb.keys.val[0].salt)); + if (ka_use_null_salt) { + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->salt.data = NULL; + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->salt.length = 0; + } else { + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->type = hdb_afs3_salt; + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->salt.data = strdup(afs_cell); + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->salt.length = strlen(afs_cell); + } + + hdb.keys.val[0].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + krb5_data_copy(&hdb.keys.val[0].key.keyvalue, ent->key, sizeof(ent->key)); + copy_Key(&hdb.keys.val[0], &hdb.keys.val[1]); + hdb.keys.val[1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + copy_Key(&hdb.keys.val[0], &hdb.keys.val[2]); + hdb.keys.val[2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + + ALLOC(hdb.max_life); + *hdb.max_life = ntohl(ent->max_life); + + if(ntohl(ent->valid_end) != NEVERDATE && ntohl(ent->valid_end) != -1){ + ALLOC(hdb.valid_end); + *hdb.valid_end = ntohl(ent->valid_end); + } + + if (ntohl(ent->pw_change) != NEVERDATE && + ent->pw_expire != 255 && + ent->pw_expire != 0) { + ALLOC(hdb.pw_end); + *hdb.pw_end = ntohl(ent->pw_change) + + 24 * 60 * 60 * ent->pw_expire; + } + + ret = krb5_make_principal(pd->context, &hdb.created_by.principal, + v4_realm, + "kadmin", + "hprop", + NULL); + hdb.created_by.time = time(NULL); + + if(ent->mod_ptr){ + struct ka_entry mod; + ALLOC(hdb.modified_by); + read_block(pd->context, fd, ntohl(ent->mod_ptr), &mod, sizeof(mod)); + + krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, mod.name, mod.instance, v4_realm, + &hdb.modified_by->principal); + hdb.modified_by->time = ntohl(ent->mod_time); + memset(&mod, 0, sizeof(mod)); + } + + hdb.flags.forwardable = 1; + hdb.flags.renewable = 1; + hdb.flags.proxiable = 1; + hdb.flags.postdate = 1; + /* XXX - AFS 3.4a creates krbtgt.REALMOFCELL as NOTGS+NOSEAL */ + if (strcmp(ent->name, "krbtgt") == 0 && + (flags & (KAFNOTGS|KAFNOSEAL)) == (KAFNOTGS|KAFNOSEAL)) + flags &= ~(KAFNOTGS|KAFNOSEAL); + + hdb.flags.client = (flags & KAFNOTGS) == 0; + hdb.flags.server = (flags & KAFNOSEAL) == 0; + + ret = v5_prop(pd->context, NULL, &hdb, pd); + hdb_free_entry(pd->context, &hdb); + return ret; +} + +static int +ka_dump(struct prop_data *pd, const char *file) +{ + struct ka_header header; + int i; + int fd = open(file, O_RDONLY); + + if(fd < 0) + krb5_err(pd->context, 1, errno, "open(%s)", file); + read_block(pd->context, fd, 0, &header, sizeof(header)); + if(header.version1 != header.version2) + krb5_errx(pd->context, 1, "Version mismatch in header: %ld/%ld", + (long)ntohl(header.version1), (long)ntohl(header.version2)); + if(ntohl(header.version1) != 5) + krb5_errx(pd->context, 1, "Unknown database version %ld (expected 5)", + (long)ntohl(header.version1)); + for(i = 0; i < ntohl(header.hashsize); i++){ + int32_t pos = ntohl(header.hash[i]); + while(pos){ + struct ka_entry ent; + read_block(pd->context, fd, pos, &ent, sizeof(ent)); + ka_convert(pd, fd, &ent); + pos = ntohl(ent.next); + } + } + return 0; +} + + + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "master-key", 'm', arg_string, &mkeyfile, "v5 master key file", "file" }, + { "database", 'd', arg_string, &database, "database", "file" }, + { "source", 0, arg_string, &source_type, "type of database to read", + "heimdal" + "|mit-dump" + "|krb4-dump" +#ifdef KRB4 + "|krb4-db" +#endif + "|kaserver" + }, + + { "v4-realm", 'r', arg_string, &v4_realm, "v4 realm to use" }, + { "cell", 'c', arg_string, &afs_cell, "name of AFS cell" }, + { "kaspecials", 'S', arg_flag, &kaspecials_flag, "dump KASPECIAL keys"}, + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &ktname, "keytab to use for authentication", "keytab" }, + { "v5-realm", 'R', arg_string, &local_realm, "v5 realm to use" }, + { "decrypt", 'D', arg_flag, &decrypt_flag, "decrypt keys" }, + { "encrypt", 'E', arg_flag, &encrypt_flag, "encrypt keys" }, + { "stdout", 'n', arg_flag, &to_stdout, "dump to stdout" }, + { "verbose", 'v', arg_flag, &verbose_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "[host[:port]] ..."); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +get_creds(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *cache) +{ + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt init_opts; + krb5_preauthtype preauth = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; + krb5_creds creds; + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, ktname, &keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve"); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &client, NULL, + "kadmin", HPROP_NAME, NULL); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&init_opts); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(&init_opts, &preauth, 1); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(context, &creds, client, keytab, 0, NULL, &init_opts); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + + ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close"); + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, cache); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_gen_new"); + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, *cache, client); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, *cache, &creds); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); + + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &creds); +} + +enum hprop_source { + HPROP_HEIMDAL = 1, + HPROP_KRB4_DB, + HPROP_KRB4_DUMP, + HPROP_KASERVER, + HPROP_MIT_DUMP +}; + +#define IS_TYPE_V4(X) ((X) == HPROP_KRB4_DB || (X) == HPROP_KRB4_DUMP || (X) == HPROP_KASERVER) + +struct { + int type; + const char *name; +} types[] = { + { HPROP_HEIMDAL, "heimdal" }, + { HPROP_KRB4_DUMP, "krb4-dump" }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { HPROP_KRB4_DB, "krb4-db" }, +#endif + { HPROP_KASERVER, "kaserver" }, + { HPROP_MIT_DUMP, "mit-dump" } +}; + +static int +parse_source_type(const char *s) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(types) / sizeof(types[0]); i++) { + if(strstr(types[i].name, s) == types[i].name) + return types[i].type; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +iterate (krb5_context context, + const char *database, + HDB *db, + int type, + struct prop_data *pd) +{ + int ret; + + switch(type) { + case HPROP_KRB4_DUMP: + ret = v4_prop_dump(pd, database); + break; +#ifdef KRB4 + case HPROP_KRB4_DB: + ret = kerb_db_iterate ((k_iter_proc_t)kdb_prop, pd); + if(ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "kerb_db_iterate: %s", + krb_get_err_text(ret)); + break; +#endif /* KRB4 */ + case HPROP_KASERVER: + ret = ka_dump(pd, database); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "ka_dump"); + break; + case HPROP_MIT_DUMP: + ret = mit_prop_dump(pd, database); + if (ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "mit_prop_dump: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + break; + case HPROP_HEIMDAL: + ret = hdb_foreach(context, db, HDB_F_DECRYPT, v5_prop, pd); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_foreach"); + break; + } +} + +static int +dump_database (krb5_context context, int type, + const char *database, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct prop_data pd; + krb5_data data; + + pd.context = context; + pd.auth_context = NULL; + pd.sock = STDOUT_FILENO; + + iterate (context, database, db, type, &pd); + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = krb5_write_message (context, &pd.sock, &data); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_write_message"); + + return 0; +} + +static int +propagate_database (krb5_context context, int type, + const char *database, + HDB *db, krb5_ccache ccache, + int optind, int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_principal server; + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + int fd; + struct prop_data pd; + krb5_data data; + + char *port, portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + port = strchr(argv[i], ':'); + if(port == NULL) { + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", + ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "hprop", "tcp", + HPROP_PORT))); + port = portstr; + } else + *port++ = '\0'; + + fd = open_socket(context, argv[i], port); + if(fd < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "connect %s", argv[i]); + continue; + } + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, argv[i], + HPROP_NAME, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal(%s)", argv[i]); + close(fd); + continue; + } + + if (local_realm) { + krb5_realm my_realm; + krb5_get_default_realm(context,&my_realm); + + free (*krb5_princ_realm(context, server)); + krb5_princ_set_realm(context,server,&my_realm); + } + + auth_context = NULL; + ret = krb5_sendauth(context, + &auth_context, + &fd, + HPROP_VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY, + NULL, /* in_data */ + NULL, /* in_creds */ + ccache, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_sendauth"); + close(fd); + continue; + } + + pd.context = context; + pd.auth_context = auth_context; + pd.sock = fd; + + iterate (context, database, db, type, &pd); + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, auth_context, &fd, &data); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message"); + + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, auth_context, &fd, &data); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + else + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context); + close(fd); + } + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + HDB *db = NULL; + int optind = 0; + + int type = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + exit(1); + + if(local_realm) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, local_realm); + + if(v4_realm == NULL) { + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &v4_realm); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_default_realm"); + } + + if(afs_cell == NULL) { + afs_cell = strdup(v4_realm); + if(afs_cell == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "out of memory"); + strlwr(afs_cell); + } + + + if(encrypt_flag && decrypt_flag) + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "only one of `--encrypt' and `--decrypt' is meaningful"); + + if(source_type != NULL) { + if(type != 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "more than one database type specified"); + type = parse_source_type(source_type); + if(type == 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "unknown source type `%s'", source_type); + } else if(type == 0) + type = HPROP_HEIMDAL; + + if(!to_stdout) + get_creds(context, &ccache); + + if(decrypt_flag || encrypt_flag) { + ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, mkeyfile, &mkey5); + if(ret && ret != ENOENT) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_read_master_key"); + if(ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No master key file found"); + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (IS_TYPE_V4(type)) { + int e; + + if (v4_realm == NULL) { + e = krb_get_lrealm(realm_buf, 1); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "krb_get_lrealm: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); + v4_realm = realm_buf; + } + } +#endif + + switch(type) { +#ifdef KRB4 + case HPROP_KRB4_DB: + if (database == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "no database specified"); + break; +#endif + case HPROP_KASERVER: + if (database == NULL) + database = DEFAULT_DATABASE; + ka_use_null_salt = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, + "hprop", + "afs_uses_null_salt", + NULL); + + break; + case HPROP_KRB4_DUMP: + if (database == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "no dump file specified"); + + break; + case HPROP_MIT_DUMP: + if (database == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "no dump file specified"); + break; + case HPROP_HEIMDAL: + ret = hdb_create (context, &db, database); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create: %s", database); + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + break; + default: + krb5_errx(context, 1, "unknown dump type `%d'", type); + break; + } + + if (to_stdout) + dump_database (context, type, database, db); + else + propagate_database (context, type, database, + db, ccache, optind, argc, argv); + + if(ccache != NULL) + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + + if(db != NULL) + (*db->destroy)(context, db); + + krb5_free_context(context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c3f87e1d7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ + +HPROP(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual HPROP(8) + +NNAAMMEE + hhpprroopp - propagate the KDC database + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + hhpprroopp [--mm _f_i_l_e | ----mmaasstteerr--kkeeyy==_f_i_l_e] [--dd _f_i_l_e | ----ddaattaabbaassee==_f_i_l_e] + [----ssoouurrccee==_h_e_i_m_d_a_l_|_m_i_t_-_d_u_m_p_|_k_r_b_4_-_d_u_m_p_|_k_r_b_4_-_d_b_|_k_a_s_e_r_v_e_r] [--rr _s_t_r_i_n_g | + ----vv44--rreeaallmm==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [--cc _c_e_l_l | ----cceellll==_c_e_l_l] [--SS | ----kkaassppeecciiaallss] [--kk _k_e_y_t_a_b + | ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b] [--RR _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----vv55--rreeaallmm==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [--DD | ----ddeeccrryypptt] [--EE | + ----eennccrryypptt] [--nn | ----ssttddoouutt] [--vv | ----vveerrbboossee] [----vveerrssiioonn] [--hh | ----hheellpp] + [_h_o_s_t[:_p_o_r_t]] _._._. + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + hhpprroopp takes a principal database in a specified format and converts it + into a stream of Heimdal database records. This stream can either be + written to standard out, or (more commonly) be propagated to a hpropd(8) + server running on a different machine. + + If propagating, it connects to all _h_o_s_t_s specified on the command by + opening a TCP connection to port 754 (service hprop) and sends the + database in encrypted form. + + Supported options: + + --mm _f_i_l_e, ----mmaasstteerr--kkeeyy==_f_i_l_e + Where to find the master key to encrypt or decrypt keys with. + + --dd _f_i_l_e, ----ddaattaabbaassee==_f_i_l_e + The database to be propagated. + + ----ssoouurrccee==_h_e_i_m_d_a_l_|_m_i_t_-_d_u_m_p_|_k_r_b_4_-_d_u_m_p_|_k_r_b_4_-_d_b_|_k_a_s_e_r_v_e_r + Specifies the type of the source database. Alternatives include: + + heimdal a Heimdal database + mit-dump a MIT Kerberos 5 dump file + krb4-db a Kerberos 4 database + krb4-dump a Kerberos 4 dump file + kaserver an AFS kaserver database + + --kk _k_e_y_t_a_b, ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b + The keytab to use for fetching the key to be used for authenti- + cating to the propagation daemon(s). The key _k_a_d_m_i_n_/_h_p_r_o_p is used + from this keytab. The default is to fetch the key from the KDC + database. + + --RR _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----vv55--rreeaallmm==_s_t_r_i_n_g + Local realm override. + + --DD, ----ddeeccrryypptt + The encryption keys in the database can either be in clear, or + encrypted with a master key. This option transmits the database + with unencrypted keys. + + --EE, ----eennccrryypptt + This option transmits the database with encrypted keys. + + --nn, ----ssttddoouutt + Dump the database on stdout, in a format that can be fed to + hpropd. + + The following options are only valid if hhpprroopp is compiled with support + + + for Kerberos 4 (kaserver). + + --rr _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----vv44--rreeaallmm==_s_t_r_i_n_g + v4 realm to use. + + --cc _c_e_l_l, ----cceellll==_c_e_l_l + The AFS cell name, used if reading a kaserver database. + + --SS, ----kkaassppeecciiaallss + Also dump the principals marked as special in the kaserver + database. + + --44, ----vv44--ddbb + Deprecated, identical to `--source=krb4-db'. + + --KK, ----kkaa--ddbb + Deprecated, identical to `--source=kaserver'. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + The following will propagate a database to another machine (which should + run hpropd(8):) + + $ hprop slave-1 slave-2 + + Copy a Kerberos 4 database to a Kerberos 5 slave: + + $ hprop --source=krb4-db -E krb5-slave + + Convert a Kerberos 4 dump-file for use with a Heimdal KDC: + + $ hprop -n --source=krb4-dump -d /var/kerberos/principal.dump --master-key=/.k | hpropd -n + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + hpropd(8) + + HEIMDAL June 19, 2000 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0bcab88b4f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hprop.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: hprop.h,v 1.13 2001/01/26 15:54:19 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __HPROP_H__ +#define __HPROP_H__ + +#include "headers.h" + +struct prop_data{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + int sock; +}; + +#define HPROP_VERSION "hprop-0.0" +#define HPROP_NAME "hprop" +#define HPROP_KEYTAB "HDB:" +#define HPROP_PORT 754 + +#ifndef NEVERDATE +#define NEVERDATE ((1U << 31) - 1) +#endif + +krb5_error_code v5_prop(krb5_context, HDB*, hdb_entry*, void*); +int mit_prop_dump(void*, const char*); + +struct v4_principal { + char name[64]; + char instance[64]; + des_cblock key; + int kvno; + int mkvno; + time_t exp_date; + time_t mod_date; + char mod_name[64]; + char mod_instance[64]; + int max_life; +}; + +int v4_prop(void*, struct v4_principal*); +int v4_prop_dump(void *arg, const char*); + +#endif /* __HPROP_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7bb2debe16 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 2000 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: hpropd.8,v 1.11 2003/02/16 21:10:20 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 27, 1997 +.Dt HPROPD 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm hpropd +.Nd receive a propagated database +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl d Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -database= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl n | Fl -stdin +.Op Fl -print +.Op Fl i | Fl -no-inetd +.Oo Fl k Ar keytab \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -v4dump +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +receives a database sent by +.Nm hprop . +and writes it as a local database. +.Pp +By default, +.Nm +expects to be started from +.Nm inetd +if stdin is a socket and expects to receive the dumped database over +stdin otherwise. +If the database is sent over the network, it is authenticated and +encrypted. +Only connections from +.Nm kadmin Ns / Ns Nm hprop +are accepted. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl d Ar file , +.Fl -database= Ns Ar file +.Xc +database +.It Xo +.Fl n , +.Fl -stdin +.Xc +read from stdin +.It Xo +.Fl -print +.Xc +print dump to stdout +.It Xo +.Fl i , +.Fl -no-inetd +.Xc +not started from inetd +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar keytab , +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Xc +keytab to use for authentication +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -v4dump +.Xc +create v4 type DB +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr hprop 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d27ff25727 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.c @@ -0,0 +1,439 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hpropd.c,v 1.36 2003/04/16 15:46:32 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +static des_cblock mkey4; +static des_key_schedule msched4; + +static char * +time2str(time_t t) +{ + static char buf[128]; + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d%H%M", gmtime(&t)); + return buf; +} + +static int +dump_krb4(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, int fd) +{ + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char buf[1024]; + char *p; + int i; + int ret; + char *princ_name; + Event *modifier; + krb5_realm *realms; + int cmp; + + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, ent->principal, + name, instance, realm); + if (ret) { + krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &princ_name); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", princ_name); + free(princ_name); + return -1; + } + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &realms); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_get_default_realms"); + return -1; + } + + cmp = strcmp (realms[0], ent->principal->realm); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + if (cmp != 0) + return -1; + + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s ", name, + (strlen(instance) != 0) ? instance : "*"); + + if (ent->max_life) { + asprintf(&p, "%d", krb_time_to_life(0, *ent->max_life)); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + } else + strlcat(buf, "255", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + i = 0; + while (i < ent->keys.len && + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype != KEYTYPE_DES) + ++i; + + if (i == ent->keys.len) { + krb5_warnx(context, "No DES key for %s.%s", name, instance); + return -1; + } + + if (ent->keys.val[i].mkvno) + asprintf(&p, "%d ", *ent->keys.val[i].mkvno); + else + asprintf(&p, "%d ", 1); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + + asprintf(&p, "%d ", ent->kvno); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + + asprintf(&p, "%d ", 0); /* Attributes are always 0*/ + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + + { + u_int32_t *key = ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.data; + kdb_encrypt_key((des_cblock*)key, (des_cblock*)key, + &mkey4, msched4, DES_ENCRYPT); + asprintf(&p, "%x %x ", (int)htonl(*key), (int)htonl(*(key+1))); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + } + + if (ent->valid_end == NULL) + strlcat(buf, time2str(60*60*24*365*50), sizeof(buf)); /*no expiration*/ + else + strlcat(buf, time2str(*ent->valid_end), sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + if (ent->modified_by == NULL) + modifier = &ent->created_by; + else + modifier = ent->modified_by; + + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, modifier->principal, + name, instance, realm); + if (ret) { + krb5_unparse_name(context, modifier->principal, &princ_name); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", princ_name); + free(princ_name); + return -1; + } + asprintf(&p, "%s %s %s\n", time2str(modifier->time), + (strlen(name) != 0) ? name : "*", + (strlen(instance) != 0) ? instance : "*"); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + + ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (ret == -1) + krb5_warnx(context, "write"); + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +static int inetd_flag = -1; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int print_dump; +static const char *database = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; +static int from_stdin; +static char *local_realm; +#ifdef KRB4 +static int v4dump; +#endif +static char *ktname = NULL; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "database", 'd', arg_string, &database, "database", "file" }, + { "stdin", 'n', arg_flag, &from_stdin, "read from stdin" }, + { "print", 0, arg_flag, &print_dump, "print dump to stdout" }, + { "inetd", 'i', arg_negative_flag, &inetd_flag, + "Not started from inetd" }, + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &ktname, "keytab to use for authentication", "keytab" }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &local_realm, "realm to use" }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "v4dump", '4', arg_flag, &v4dump, "create v4 type DB" }, +#endif + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, NULL, NULL }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, NULL} +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + krb5_principal c1, c2; + krb5_authenticator authent; + krb5_keytab keytab; + int fd; + HDB *db; + int optind = 0; + char *tmp_db; + krb5_log_facility *fac; + int nprincs; +#ifdef KRB4 + int e; + int fd_out = -1; +#endif + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + exit(1); + + ret = krb5_openlog(context, "hpropd", &fac); + if(ret) + ; + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, fac); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump && database == HDB_DEFAULT_DB) + database = "/var/kerberos/524_dump"; +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + if(local_realm != NULL) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, local_realm); + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage(1); + + if(from_stdin) + fd = STDIN_FILENO; + else { + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss; + socklen_t sin_len = sizeof(ss); + char addr_name[256]; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *server; + + fd = STDIN_FILENO; + if (inetd_flag == -1) { + if (getpeername (fd, sa, &sin_len) < 0) + inetd_flag = 0; + else + inetd_flag = 1; + } + if (!inetd_flag) { + mini_inetd (krb5_getportbyname (context, "hprop", "tcp", + HPROP_PORT)); + } + sin_len = sizeof(ss); + if(getpeername(fd, sa, &sin_len) < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "getpeername"); + + if (inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, + socket_get_address (sa), + addr_name, + sizeof(addr_name)) == NULL) + strlcpy (addr_name, "unknown address", + sizeof(addr_name)); + + krb5_log(context, fac, 0, "Connection from %s", addr_name); + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + if (ktname != NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, ktname, &keytab); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve %s", ktname); + } else { + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default"); + } + + ret = krb5_recvauth(context, &ac, &fd, HPROP_VERSION, NULL, + 0, keytab, &ticket); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ticket->server, &server); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + if (strncmp(server, "hprop/", 5) != 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "ticket not for hprop (%s)", server); + + free(server); + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + + ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &authent); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator"); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &c1, NULL, "kadmin", "hprop", NULL); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + principalname2krb5_principal(&c2, authent->cname, authent->crealm); + if(!krb5_principal_compare(context, c1, c2)) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name(context, c2, &s); + krb5_errx(context, 1, "Unauthorized connection from %s", s); + } + krb5_free_principal(context, c1); + krb5_free_principal(context, c2); + + ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close"); + } + + if(!print_dump) { + asprintf(&tmp_db, "%s~", database); +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + fd_out = open(tmp_db, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if (fd_out == -1) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "%s", strerror(errno)); + } + else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = hdb_create(context, &db, tmp_db); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create(%s)", tmp_db); + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_open(%s)", tmp_db); + } + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + e = kdb_get_master_key(0, &mkey4, msched4); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "kdb_get_master_key: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + nprincs = 0; + while(1){ + krb5_data data; + hdb_entry entry; + + if(from_stdin) { + ret = krb5_read_message(context, &fd, &data); + if(ret != 0 && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_message"); + } else { + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, ac, &fd, &data); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + } + + if(ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF || data.length == 0) { + if(!from_stdin) { + data.data = NULL; + data.length = 0; + krb5_write_priv_message(context, ac, &fd, &data); + } + if(!print_dump) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + ret = rename(tmp_db, database); + if (ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "rename"); + ret = close(fd_out); + if (ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "close"); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = db->rename(context, db, database); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_rename"); + ret = db->close(context, db); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_close"); + } + } + break; + } + ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &entry); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_value2entry"); + if(print_dump) + hdb_print_entry(context, db, &entry, stdout); + else { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + ret = dump_krb4(context, &entry, fd_out); + if(!ret) nprincs++; + } + else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = db->store(context, db, 0, &entry); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_EXISTS) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name(context, entry.principal, &s); + krb5_warnx(context, "Entry exists: %s", s); + free(s); + } else if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_store"); + else + nprincs++; + } + } + hdb_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + if (!print_dump) + krb5_log(context, fac, 0, "Received %d principals", nprincs); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..07ce0aee0f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/hpropd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ + +HPROPD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual HPROPD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + hhpprrooppdd - receive a propagated database + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + hhpprrooppdd [--dd _f_i_l_e | ----ddaattaabbaassee==_f_i_l_e] [--nn | ----ssttddiinn] [----pprriinntt] [--ii | + ----nnoo--iinneettdd] [--kk _k_e_y_t_a_b | ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b] [--44 | ----vv44dduummpp] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + hhpprrooppdd receives a database sent by hhpprroopp. and writes it as a local + database. + + By default, hhpprrooppdd expects to be started from iinneettdd if stdin is a socket + and expects to receive the dumped database over stdin otherwise. If the + database is sent over the network, it is authenticated and encrypted. + Only connections from kkaaddmmiinn/hhpprroopp are accepted. + + Options supported: + + --dd _f_i_l_e, ----ddaattaabbaassee==_f_i_l_e + database + + --nn, ----ssttddiinn + read from stdin + + ----pprriinntt + print dump to stdout + + --ii, ----nnoo--iinneettdd + not started from inetd + + --kk _k_e_y_t_a_b, ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b + keytab to use for authentication + + --44, ----vv44dduummpp + create v4 type DB + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + hprop(8) + + HEIMDAL August 27, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kadb.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kadb.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c98ccc77a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kadb.h @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kadb.h,v 1.3 2000/03/03 12:36:26 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __kadb_h__ +#define __kadb_h__ + +#define HASHSIZE 8191 + +struct ka_header { + int32_t version1; /* file format version, should + match version2 */ + int32_t size; + int32_t free_ptr; + int32_t eof_ptr; + int32_t kvno_ptr; + int32_t stats[8]; + int32_t admin_accounts; + int32_t special_keys_version; + int32_t hashsize; /* allocated size of hash */ + int32_t hash[HASHSIZE]; + int32_t version2; +}; + +struct ka_entry { + int32_t flags; /* see below */ + int32_t next; /* next in hash list */ + int32_t valid_end; /* expiration date */ + int32_t mod_time; /* time last modified */ + int32_t mod_ptr; /* pointer to modifier */ + int32_t pw_change; /* last pw change */ + int32_t max_life; /* max ticket life */ + int32_t kvno; + int32_t foo2[2]; /* huh? */ + char name[64]; + char instance[64]; + char key[8]; + u_char pw_expire; /* # days before password expires */ + u_char spare; + u_char attempts; + u_char locktime; +}; + +#define KAFNORMAL (1<<0) +#define KAFADMIN (1<<2) /* an administrator */ +#define KAFNOTGS (1<<3) /* ! allow principal to get or use TGT */ +#define KAFNOSEAL (1<<5) /* ! allow principal as server in GetTicket */ +#define KAFNOCPW (1<<6) /* ! allow principal to change its own key */ +#define KAFSPECIAL (1<<8) /* set if special AuthServer principal */ + +#define DEFAULT_DATABASE "/usr/afs/db/kaserver.DB0" + +#endif /* __kadb_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kaserver.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kaserver.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..869447180b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kaserver.c @@ -0,0 +1,839 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kaserver.c,v 1.21.2.1 2003/10/06 21:02:35 lha Exp $"); + + +#include + +#define KA_AUTHENTICATION_SERVICE 731 +#define KA_TICKET_GRANTING_SERVICE 732 +#define KA_MAINTENANCE_SERVICE 733 + +#define AUTHENTICATE_OLD 1 +#define CHANGEPASSWORD 2 +#define GETTICKET_OLD 3 +#define SETPASSWORD 4 +#define SETFIELDS 5 +#define CREATEUSER 6 +#define DELETEUSER 7 +#define GETENTRY 8 +#define LISTENTRY 9 +#define GETSTATS 10 +#define DEBUG 11 +#define GETPASSWORD 12 +#define GETRANDOMKEY 13 +#define AUTHENTICATE 21 +#define AUTHENTICATE_V2 22 +#define GETTICKET 23 + +/* XXX - Where do we get these? */ + +#define RXGEN_OPCODE (-455) + +#define KADATABASEINCONSISTENT (180480L) +#define KAEXIST (180481L) +#define KAIO (180482L) +#define KACREATEFAIL (180483L) +#define KANOENT (180484L) +#define KAEMPTY (180485L) +#define KABADNAME (180486L) +#define KABADINDEX (180487L) +#define KANOAUTH (180488L) +#define KAANSWERTOOLONG (180489L) +#define KABADREQUEST (180490L) +#define KAOLDINTERFACE (180491L) +#define KABADARGUMENT (180492L) +#define KABADCMD (180493L) +#define KANOKEYS (180494L) +#define KAREADPW (180495L) +#define KABADKEY (180496L) +#define KAUBIKINIT (180497L) +#define KAUBIKCALL (180498L) +#define KABADPROTOCOL (180499L) +#define KANOCELLS (180500L) +#define KANOCELL (180501L) +#define KATOOMANYUBIKS (180502L) +#define KATOOMANYKEYS (180503L) +#define KABADTICKET (180504L) +#define KAUNKNOWNKEY (180505L) +#define KAKEYCACHEINVALID (180506L) +#define KABADSERVER (180507L) +#define KABADUSER (180508L) +#define KABADCPW (180509L) +#define KABADCREATE (180510L) +#define KANOTICKET (180511L) +#define KAASSOCUSER (180512L) +#define KANOTSPECIAL (180513L) +#define KACLOCKSKEW (180514L) +#define KANORECURSE (180515L) +#define KARXFAIL (180516L) +#define KANULLPASSWORD (180517L) +#define KAINTERNALERROR (180518L) +#define KAPWEXPIRED (180519L) +#define KAREUSED (180520L) +#define KATOOSOON (180521L) +#define KALOCKED (180522L) + +static void +decode_rx_header (krb5_storage *sp, + struct rx_header *h) +{ + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->epoch); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->connid); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->callid); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->seqno); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->serialno); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->type); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->flags); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->status); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->secindex); + krb5_ret_int16(sp, &h->reserved); + krb5_ret_int16(sp, &h->serviceid); +} + +static void +encode_rx_header (struct rx_header *h, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->epoch); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->connid); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->callid); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->seqno); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->serialno); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->type); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->flags); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->status); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->secindex); + krb5_store_int16(sp, h->reserved); + krb5_store_int16(sp, h->serviceid); +} + +static void +init_reply_header (struct rx_header *hdr, + struct rx_header *reply_hdr, + u_char type, + u_char flags) +{ + reply_hdr->epoch = hdr->epoch; + reply_hdr->connid = hdr->connid; + reply_hdr->callid = hdr->callid; + reply_hdr->seqno = 1; + reply_hdr->serialno = 1; + reply_hdr->type = type; + reply_hdr->flags = flags; + reply_hdr->status = 0; + reply_hdr->secindex = 0; + reply_hdr->reserved = 0; + reply_hdr->serviceid = hdr->serviceid; +} + +static void +make_error_reply (struct rx_header *hdr, + u_int32_t ret, + krb5_data *reply) + +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + struct rx_header reply_hdr; + + init_reply_header (hdr, &reply_hdr, HT_ABORT, HF_LAST); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + encode_rx_header (&reply_hdr, sp); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + krb5_storage_to_data (sp, reply); + krb5_storage_free (sp); +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_xdr_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int ret; + int size; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(size < 0) + return ERANGE; + data->length = size; + if (size) { + u_char foo[4]; + size_t pad = (4 - size % 4) % 4; + + data->data = malloc(size); + if (data->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = krb5_storage_read(sp, data->data, size); + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_CC_END; + if (pad) { + ret = krb5_storage_read(sp, foo, pad); + if (ret != pad) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_CC_END; + } + } else + data->data = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_store_xdr_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data) +{ + u_char zero[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0}; + int ret; + size_t pad; + + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, data.length); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, data.data, data.length); + if(ret != data.length){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_CC_END; + } + pad = (4 - data.length % 4) % 4; + if (pad) { + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, zero, pad); + if (ret != pad) { + if (ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_CC_END; + } + } + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +create_reply_ticket (struct rx_header *hdr, + Key *skey, + char *name, char *instance, char *realm, + struct sockaddr_in *addr, + int life, + int kvno, + int32_t max_seq_len, + const char *sname, const char *sinstance, + u_int32_t challenge, + const char *label, + des_cblock *key, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + KTEXT_ST ticket; + des_cblock session; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_data enc_data; + des_key_schedule schedule; + struct rx_header reply_hdr; + des_cblock zero; + size_t pad; + unsigned fyrtiosjuelva; + + /* create the ticket */ + + des_new_random_key(&session); + + krb_create_ticket (&ticket, 0, name, instance, realm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, + &session, life, kdc_time, + sname, sinstance, skey->key.keyvalue.data); + + /* create the encrypted part of the reply */ + sp = krb5_storage_emem (); + krb5_generate_random_block(&fyrtiosjuelva, sizeof(fyrtiosjuelva)); + fyrtiosjuelva &= 0xffffffff; + krb5_store_int32 (sp, fyrtiosjuelva); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, challenge); + krb5_storage_write (sp, session, 8); + memset (&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, kdc_time); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, kdc_time + krb_life_to_time (0, life)); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, kvno); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, ticket.length); + krb5_store_stringz (sp, name); + krb5_store_stringz (sp, instance); +#if 1 /* XXX - Why shouldn't the realm go here? */ + krb5_store_stringz (sp, ""); +#else + krb5_store_stringz (sp, realm); +#endif + krb5_store_stringz (sp, sname); + krb5_store_stringz (sp, sinstance); + krb5_storage_write (sp, ticket.dat, ticket.length); + krb5_storage_write (sp, label, strlen(label)); + + /* pad to DES block */ + memset (zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + pad = (8 - krb5_storage_seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) % 8) % 8; + krb5_storage_write (sp, zero, pad); + + krb5_storage_to_data (sp, &enc_data); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + + if (enc_data.length > max_seq_len) { + krb5_data_free (&enc_data); + make_error_reply (hdr, KAANSWERTOOLONG, reply); + return 0; + } + + /* encrypt it */ + des_set_key (key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt (enc_data.data, + enc_data.data, + enc_data.length, + schedule, + key, + DES_ENCRYPT); + memset (&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + /* create the reply packet */ + init_reply_header (hdr, &reply_hdr, HT_DATA, HF_LAST); + sp = krb5_storage_emem (); + encode_rx_header (&reply_hdr, sp); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, max_seq_len); + krb5_store_xdr_data (sp, enc_data); + krb5_data_free (&enc_data); + krb5_storage_to_data (sp, reply); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_auth_args (krb5_storage *sp, + char **name, + char **instance, + time_t *start_time, + time_t *end_time, + krb5_data *request, + int32_t *max_seq_len) +{ + krb5_data data; + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *name = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*name == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (*name, data.data, data.length); + (*name)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *instance = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*instance == NULL) { + free (*name); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*instance, data.data, data.length); + (*instance)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *start_time = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *end_time = tmp; + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, request); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, max_seq_len); + /* ignore the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static void +do_authenticate (struct rx_header *hdr, + krb5_storage *sp, + struct sockaddr_in *addr, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *name = NULL; + char *instance = NULL; + time_t start_time; + time_t end_time; + krb5_data request; + int32_t max_seq_len; + hdb_entry *client_entry = NULL; + hdb_entry *server_entry = NULL; + Key *ckey = NULL; + Key *skey = NULL; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + krb5_storage *reply_sp; + time_t max_life; + u_int8_t life; + int32_t chal; + char client_name[256]; + char server_name[256]; + + krb5_data_zero (&request); + + unparse_auth_args (sp, &name, &instance, &start_time, &end_time, + &request, &max_seq_len); + if (request.length < 8) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADREQUEST, reply); + goto out; + } + + snprintf (client_name, sizeof(client_name), "%s.%s@%s", + name, instance, v4_realm); + + ret = db_fetch4 (name, instance, v4_realm, &client_entry); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Client not found in database: %s: %s", + client_name, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + snprintf (server_name, sizeof(server_name), "%s.%s@%s", + "krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm); + + ret = db_fetch4 ("krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm, &server_entry); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s: %s", + server_name, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + ret = check_flags (client_entry, client_name, + server_entry, server_name, + TRUE); + if (ret) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KAPWEXPIRED, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(client_entry, FALSE, TRUE, &ckey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for client"); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(server_entry, TRUE, TRUE, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for server"); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* try to decode the `request' */ + memcpy (&key, ckey->key.keyvalue.data, sizeof(key)); + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt (request.data, + request.data, + request.length, + schedule, + &key, + DES_DECRYPT); + memset (&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + /* check for the magic label */ + if (memcmp ((char *)request.data + 4, "gTGS", 4) != 0) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADREQUEST, reply); + goto out; + } + + reply_sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (request.data, 4); + krb5_ret_int32 (reply_sp, &chal); + krb5_storage_free (reply_sp); + + if (abs(chal - kdc_time) > context->max_skew) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KACLOCKSKEW, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* life */ + max_life = end_time - kdc_time; + /* end_time - kdc_time can sometimes be non-positive due to slight + time skew between client and server. Let's make sure it is postive */ + if(max_life < 1) + max_life = 1; + if (client_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *client_entry->max_life); + if (server_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server_entry->max_life); + + life = krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, kdc_time + max_life); + + create_reply_ticket (hdr, skey, + name, instance, v4_realm, + addr, life, server_entry->kvno, + max_seq_len, + "krbtgt", v4_realm, + chal + 1, "tgsT", + &key, reply); + memset (&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + +out: + if (request.length) { + memset (request.data, 0, request.length); + krb5_data_free (&request); + } + if (name) + free (name); + if (instance) + free (instance); + if (client_entry) + free_ent (client_entry); + if (server_entry) + free_ent (server_entry); +} + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_getticket_args (krb5_storage *sp, + int *kvno, + char **auth_domain, + krb5_data *ticket, + char **name, + char **instance, + krb5_data *times, + int32_t *max_seq_len) +{ + krb5_data data; + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *kvno = tmp; + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *auth_domain = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*auth_domain == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (*auth_domain, data.data, data.length); + (*auth_domain)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, ticket); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *name = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*name == NULL) { + free (*auth_domain); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*name, data.data, data.length); + (*name)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *instance = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*instance == NULL) { + free (*auth_domain); + free (*name); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*instance, data.data, data.length); + (*instance)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, times); + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, max_seq_len); + /* ignore the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static void +do_getticket (struct rx_header *hdr, + krb5_storage *sp, + struct sockaddr_in *addr, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int kvno; + char *auth_domain = NULL; + krb5_data aticket; + char *name = NULL; + char *instance = NULL; + krb5_data times; + int32_t max_seq_len; + hdb_entry *server_entry = NULL; + hdb_entry *krbtgt_entry = NULL; + Key *kkey = NULL; + Key *skey = NULL; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock session; + time_t max_life; + int8_t life; + time_t start_time, end_time; + char pname[ANAME_SZ]; + char pinst[INST_SZ]; + char prealm[REALM_SZ]; + char server_name[256]; + + krb5_data_zero (&aticket); + krb5_data_zero (×); + + unparse_getticket_args (sp, &kvno, &auth_domain, &aticket, + &name, &instance, ×, &max_seq_len); + if (times.length < 8) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADREQUEST, reply); + goto out; + + } + + snprintf (server_name, sizeof(server_name), + "%s.%s@%s", name, instance, v4_realm); + + ret = db_fetch4 (name, instance, v4_realm, &server_entry); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s: %s", + server_name, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + ret = check_flags (NULL, NULL, + server_entry, server_name, + FALSE); + if (ret) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KAPWEXPIRED, reply); + goto out; + } + + ret = db_fetch4 ("krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm, &krbtgt_entry); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s.%s@%s: %s", + "krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(krbtgt_entry, TRUE, TRUE, &kkey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for krbtgt"); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(server_entry, TRUE, TRUE, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for server"); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* decrypt the incoming ticket */ + memcpy (&key, kkey->key.keyvalue.data, sizeof(key)); + + /* unpack the ticket */ + { + KTEXT_ST ticket; + u_char flags; + int life; + u_int32_t time_sec; + char sname[ANAME_SZ]; + char sinstance[SNAME_SZ]; + u_int32_t paddress; + + if (aticket.length > sizeof(ticket.dat)) { + kdc_log(0, "ticket too long (%u > %u)", + (unsigned)aticket.length, + (unsigned)sizeof(ticket.dat)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADTICKET, reply); + goto out; + } + + ticket.length = aticket.length; + memcpy (ticket.dat, aticket.data, ticket.length); + + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + decomp_ticket (&ticket, &flags, pname, pinst, prealm, + &paddress, session, &life, &time_sec, + sname, sinstance, + &key, schedule); + + if (strcmp (sname, "krbtgt") != 0 + || strcmp (sinstance, v4_realm) != 0) { + kdc_log(0, "no TGT: %s.%s for %s.%s@%s", + sname, sinstance, + pname, pinst, prealm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADTICKET, reply); + goto out; + } + + if (kdc_time > krb_life_to_time(time_sec, life)) { + kdc_log(0, "TGT expired: %s.%s@%s", + pname, pinst, prealm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADTICKET, reply); + goto out; + } + } + + /* decrypt the times */ + des_set_key (&session, schedule); + des_ecb_encrypt (times.data, + times.data, + schedule, + DES_DECRYPT); + memset (&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + /* and extract them */ + { + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (times.data, times.length); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + start_time = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + end_time = tmp; + krb5_storage_free (sp); + } + + /* life */ + max_life = end_time - kdc_time; + /* end_time - kdc_time can sometimes be non-positive due to slight + time skew between client and server. Let's make sure it is postive */ + if(max_life < 1) + max_life = 1; + if (krbtgt_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *krbtgt_entry->max_life); + if (server_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server_entry->max_life); + + life = krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, kdc_time + max_life); + + create_reply_ticket (hdr, skey, + pname, pinst, prealm, + addr, life, server_entry->kvno, + max_seq_len, + name, instance, + 0, "gtkt", + &session, reply); + memset (&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + +out: + if (aticket.length) { + memset (aticket.data, 0, aticket.length); + krb5_data_free (&aticket); + } + if (times.length) { + memset (times.data, 0, times.length); + krb5_data_free (×); + } + if (auth_domain) + free (auth_domain); + if (name) + free (name); + if (instance) + free (instance); + if (krbtgt_entry) + free_ent (krbtgt_entry); + if (server_entry) + free_ent (server_entry); +} + +krb5_error_code +do_kaserver(unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + struct rx_header hdr; + u_int32_t op; + krb5_storage *sp; + + if (len < RX_HEADER_SIZE) + return -1; + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (buf, len); + + decode_rx_header (sp, &hdr); + buf += RX_HEADER_SIZE; + len -= RX_HEADER_SIZE; + + switch (hdr.type) { + case HT_DATA : + break; + case HT_ACK : + case HT_BUSY : + case HT_ABORT : + case HT_ACKALL : + case HT_CHAL : + case HT_RESP : + case HT_DEBUG : + default: + /* drop */ + goto out; + } + + + if (hdr.serviceid != KA_AUTHENTICATION_SERVICE + && hdr.serviceid != KA_TICKET_GRANTING_SERVICE) { + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &op); + switch (op) { + case AUTHENTICATE : + do_authenticate (&hdr, sp, addr, reply); + break; + case GETTICKET : + do_getticket (&hdr, sp, addr, reply); + break; + case AUTHENTICATE_OLD : + case CHANGEPASSWORD : + case GETTICKET_OLD : + case SETPASSWORD : + case SETFIELDS : + case CREATEUSER : + case DELETEUSER : + case GETENTRY : + case LISTENTRY : + case GETSTATS : + case DEBUG : + case GETPASSWORD : + case GETRANDOMKEY : + case AUTHENTICATE_V2 : + default : + make_error_reply (&hdr, RXGEN_OPCODE, reply); + break; + } + +out: + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29cca73abd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc.8 @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kdc.8,v 1.23.2.1 2003/10/21 20:06:01 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd October 21, 2003 +.Dt KDC 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kdc +.Nd Kerberos 5 server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl c Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl p | Fl -no-require-preauth +.Op Fl -max-request= Ns Ar size +.Op Fl H | Fl -enable-http +.Op Fl -no-524 +.Op Fl -kerberos4 +.Op Fl -kerberos4-cross-realm +.Oo Fl r Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -v4-realm= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl K | Fl -kaserver +.Oo Fl P Ar portspec \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -ports= Ns Ar portspec +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -detach +.Op Fl -addresses= Ns Ar list of addresses +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +serves requests for tickets. +When it starts, it first checks the flags passed, any options that are +not specified with a command line flag are taken from a config file, +or from a default compiled-in value. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar file , +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +Specifies the location of the config file, the default is +.Pa /var/heimdal/kdc.conf . +This is the only value that can't be specified in the config file. +.It Xo +.Fl p , +.Fl -no-require-preauth +.Xc +Turn off the requirement for pre-autentication in the initial AS-REQ +for all principals. +The use of pre-authentication makes it more difficult to do offline +password attacks. +You might want to turn it off if you have clients +that don't support pre-authentication. +Since the version 4 protocol doesn't support any pre-authentication, +serving version 4 clients is just about the same as not requiring +pre-athentication. +The default is to require pre-authentication. +Adding the require-preauth per principal is a more flexible way of +handling this. +.It Xo +.Fl -max-request= Ns Ar size +.Xc +Gives an upper limit on the size of the requests that the kdc is +willing to handle. +.It Xo +.Fl H , +.Fl -enable-http +.Xc +Makes the kdc listen on port 80 and handle requests encapsulated in HTTP. +.It Xo +.Fl -no-524 +.Xc +don't respond to 524 requests +.It Xo +.Fl -kerberos4 +.Xc +respond to Kerberos 4 requests +.It Xo +.Fl -kerberos4-cross-realm +.Xc +respond to Kerberos 4 requests from foreign realms. +This is a known security hole and should not be enabled unless you +understand the consequences and are willing to live with them. +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar string , +.Fl -v4-realm= Ns Ar string +.Xc +What realm this server should act as when dealing with version 4 +requests. +The database can contain any number of realms, but since the version 4 +protocol doesn't contain a realm for the server, it must be explicitly +specified. +The default is whatever is returned by +.Fn krb_get_lrealm . +This option is only availabe if the KDC has been compiled with version +4 support. +.It Xo +.Fl K , +.Fl -kaserver +.Xc +Enable kaserver emulation (in case it's compiled in). +.It Xo +.Fl P Ar portspec , +.Fl -ports= Ns Ar portspec +.Xc +Specifies the set of ports the KDC should listen on. +It is given as a +white-space separated list of services or port numbers. +.It Fl -addresses= Ns Ar list of addresses +The list of addresses to listen for requests on. +By default, the kdc will listen on all the locally configured +addresses. +If only a subset is desired, or the automatic detection fails, this +option might be used. +.El +.Pp +All activities are logged to one or more destinations, see +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +and +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 . +The entity used for logging is +.Nm kdc . +.Sh CONFIGURATION FILE +The configuration file has the same syntax as +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +but will be read before +.Pa /etc/krb5.conf , +so it may override settings found there. +Options specific to the KDC only are found in the +.Dq [kdc] +section. +All the command-line options can preferably be added in the +configuration file. +The only difference is the pre-authentication flag, which has to be +specified as: +.Pp +.Dl require-preauth = no +.Pp +(in fact you can specify the option as +.Fl -require-preauth=no ) . +.Pp +And there are some configuration options which do not have +command-line equivalents: +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li check-ticket-addresses = Va boolean +Check the addresses in the ticket when processing TGS requests. +The default is FALSE. +.It Li allow-null-ticket-addresses = Va boolean +Permit tickets with no addresses. +This option is only relevant when check-ticket-addresses is TRUE. +.It Li allow-anonymous = Va boolean +Permit anonymous tickets with no addresses. +.It Li enforce-transited-policy = Va boolean +Always verify the transited policy, ignoring the +.Va disable-transited-check +flag if set in the KDC client request. +.It encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep = Va boolean +Encode AS-Rep as TGS-Rep to be bug-compatible with old DCE code. +The Heimdal clients allow both. +.It kdc_warn_pwexpire = Va time +How long before password/principal expiration the KDC should start +sending out warning messages. +.El +.Pp +The configuration file is only read when the +.Nm +is started. +If changes made to the configuration file are to take effect, the +.Nm +needs to be restarted. +.Pp +An example of a config file: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[kdc] + require-preauth = no + v4-realm = FOO.SE + key-file = /key-file +.Ed +.Sh BUGS +If the machine running the KDC has new addresses added to it, the KDC +will have to be restarted to listen to them. +The reason it doesn't just listen to wildcarded (like INADDR_ANY) +addresses, is that the replies has to come from the same address they +were sent to, and most OS:es doesn't pass this information to the +application. +If your normal mode of operation require that you add and remove +addresses, the best option is probably to listen to a wildcarded TCP +socket, and make sure your clients use TCP to connect. +For instance, this will listen to IPv4 TCP port 88 only: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +kdc --addresses=0.0.0.0 --ports="88/tcp" +.Ed +.Pp +There should be a way to specify protocol, port, and address triplets, +not just addresses and protocol, port tuples. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3405fb6f89 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ + +KDC(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KDC(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkddcc - Kerberos 5 server + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkddcc [--cc _f_i_l_e | ----ccoonnffiigg--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e] [--pp | ----nnoo--rreeqquuiirree--pprreeaauutthh] + [----mmaaxx--rreeqquueesstt==_s_i_z_e] [--HH | ----eennaabbllee--hhttttpp] [----nnoo--552244] [----kkeerrbbeerrooss44] + [----kkeerrbbeerrooss44--ccrroossss--rreeaallmm] [--rr _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----vv44--rreeaallmm==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [--KK | + ----kkaasseerrvveerr] [--PP _p_o_r_t_s_p_e_c | ----ppoorrttss==_p_o_r_t_s_p_e_c] [----ddeettaacchh] [----aaddddrreesssseess==_l_i_s_t + _o_f _a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkddcc serves requests for tickets. When it starts, it first checks the + flags passed, any options that are not specified with a command line flag + are taken from a config file, or from a default compiled-in value. + + Options supported: + + --cc _f_i_l_e, ----ccoonnffiigg--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + Specifies the location of the config file, the default is + _/_v_a_r_/_h_e_i_m_d_a_l_/_k_d_c_._c_o_n_f. This is the only value that can't be spec- + ified in the config file. + + --pp, ----nnoo--rreeqquuiirree--pprreeaauutthh + Turn off the requirement for pre-autentication in the initial AS- + REQ for all principals. The use of pre-authentication makes it + more difficult to do offline password attacks. You might want to + turn it off if you have clients that don't support pre-authenti- + cation. Since the version 4 protocol doesn't support any pre-au- + thentication, serving version 4 clients is just about the same as + not requiring pre-athentication. The default is to require pre- + authentication. Adding the require-preauth per principal is a + more flexible way of handling this. + + ----mmaaxx--rreeqquueesstt==_s_i_z_e + Gives an upper limit on the size of the requests that the kdc is + willing to handle. + + --HH, ----eennaabbllee--hhttttpp + Makes the kdc listen on port 80 and handle requests encapsulated + in HTTP. + + ----nnoo--552244 + don't respond to 524 requests + + ----kkeerrbbeerrooss44 + respond to Kerberos 4 requests + + ----kkeerrbbeerrooss44--ccrroossss--rreeaallmm + respond to Kerberos 4 requests from foreign realms. This is a + known security hole and should not be enabled unless you under- + stand the consequences and are willing to live with them. + + --rr _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----vv44--rreeaallmm==_s_t_r_i_n_g + What realm this server should act as when dealing with version 4 + requests. The database can contain any number of realms, but + since the version 4 protocol doesn't contain a realm for the + server, it must be explicitly specified. The default is whatever + is returned by kkrrbb__ggeett__llrreeaallmm(). This option is only availabe if + the KDC has been compiled with version 4 support. + + --KK, ----kkaasseerrvveerr + + Enable kaserver emulation (in case it's compiled in). + + --PP _p_o_r_t_s_p_e_c, ----ppoorrttss==_p_o_r_t_s_p_e_c + Specifies the set of ports the KDC should listen on. It is given + as a white-space separated list of services or port numbers. + + ----aaddddrreesssseess==_l_i_s_t _o_f _a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s + The list of addresses to listen for requests on. By default, the + kdc will listen on all the locally configured addresses. If only + a subset is desired, or the automatic detection fails, this op- + tion might be used. + + All activities are logged to one or more destinations, see krb5.conf(5), + and krb5_openlog(3). The entity used for logging is kkddcc. + +CCOONNFFIIGGUURRAATTIIOONN FFIILLEE + The configuration file has the same syntax as krb5.conf(5), but will be + read before _/_e_t_c_/_k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f, so it may override settings found there. Op- + tions specific to the KDC only are found in the ``[kdc]'' section. All + the command-line options can preferably be added in the configuration + file. The only difference is the pre-authentication flag, which has to + be specified as: + + require-preauth = no + + (in fact you can specify the option as ----rreeqquuiirree--pprreeaauutthh==nnoo). + + And there are some configuration options which do not have command-line + equivalents: + + check-ticket-addresses = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Check the addresses in the ticket when processing TGS re- + quests. The default is FALSE. + + allow-null-ticket-addresses = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Permit tickets with no addresses. This option is only rele- + vant when check-ticket-addresses is TRUE. + + allow-anonymous = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Permit anonymous tickets with no addresses. + + enforce-transited-policy = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Always verify the transited policy, ignoring the _d_i_s_a_b_l_e_- + _t_r_a_n_s_i_t_e_d_-_c_h_e_c_k flag if set in the KDC client request. + + encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Encode AS-Rep as TGS-Rep to be bug-compatible with old DCE + code. The Heimdal clients allow both. + + kdc_warn_pwexpire = _t_i_m_e + How long before password/principal expiration the KDC should + start sending out warning messages. + + The configuration file is only read when the kkddcc is started. If changes + made to the configuration file are to take effect, the kkddcc needs to be + restarted. + + An example of a config file: + + [kdc] + require-preauth = no + v4-realm = FOO.SE + key-file = /key-file + +BBUUGGSS + If the machine running the KDC has new addresses added to it, the KDC + will have to be restarted to listen to them. The reason it doesn't just + listen to wildcarded (like INADDR_ANY) addresses, is that the replies has + to come from the same address they were sent to, and most OS:es doesn't + pass this information to the application. If your normal mode of opera- + tion require that you add and remove addresses, the best option is proba- + bly to listen to a wildcarded TCP socket, and make sure your clients use + TCP to connect. For instance, this will listen to IPv4 TCP port 88 only: + + kdc --addresses=0.0.0.0 --ports="88/tcp" + + There should be a way to specify protocol, port, and address triplets, + not just addresses and protocol, port tuples. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kinit(1), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL October 21, 2003 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed69f54573 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kdc_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: kdc_locl.h,v 1.58.2.2 2003/10/27 11:07:16 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __KDC_LOCL_H__ +#define __KDC_LOCL_H__ + +#include "headers.h" + +extern krb5_context context; + +extern int require_preauth; +extern sig_atomic_t exit_flag; +extern size_t max_request; +extern time_t kdc_warn_pwexpire; +extern struct dbinfo { + char *realm; + char *dbname; + char *mkey_file; + struct dbinfo *next; +} *databases; +extern HDB **db; +extern int num_db; +extern const char *port_str; +extern krb5_addresses explicit_addresses; + +extern int enable_http; +extern krb5_boolean encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep; +extern krb5_boolean check_ticket_addresses; +extern krb5_boolean allow_null_ticket_addresses; +extern krb5_boolean allow_anonymous; +enum { TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK, + TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL, + TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST }; +extern int trpolicy; +extern int enable_524; +extern int enable_v4_cross_realm; + +#ifdef KRB4 +extern char *v4_realm; +extern int enable_v4; +extern krb5_boolean enable_kaserver; +#endif + +#define _PATH_KDC_CONF HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.conf" +#define DEFAULT_LOG_DEST "0-1/FILE:" HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.log" + +extern struct timeval now; +#define kdc_time (now.tv_sec) + +krb5_error_code as_rep (KDC_REQ*, krb5_data*, const char*, struct sockaddr*); +void configure (int, char**); +krb5_error_code db_fetch (krb5_principal, hdb_entry**); +void free_ent(hdb_entry *); +void kdc_log (int, const char*, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,3))); + +char* kdc_log_msg (int, const char*, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,3))); +char* kdc_log_msg_va (int, const char*, va_list) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2,0))); +void kdc_openlog (void); +void loop (void); +void set_master_key (EncryptionKey); +krb5_error_code tgs_rep (KDC_REQ*, krb5_data*, const char*, struct sockaddr *); +Key* unseal_key (Key*); +krb5_error_code check_flags(hdb_entry *client, const char *client_name, + hdb_entry *server, const char *server_name, + krb5_boolean is_as_req); + +krb5_error_code get_des_key(hdb_entry*, krb5_boolean, krb5_boolean, Key**); +krb5_error_code encode_v4_ticket (void*, size_t, const EncTicketPart*, + const PrincipalName*, size_t*); +krb5_error_code do_524 (const Ticket*, krb5_data*, const char*, struct sockaddr*); + +#ifdef KRB4 +krb5_error_code db_fetch4 (const char*, const char*, const char*, hdb_entry**); +krb5_error_code do_version4 (unsigned char*, size_t, krb5_data*, const char*, + struct sockaddr_in*); +int maybe_version4 (unsigned char*, int); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +krb5_error_code do_kaserver (unsigned char*, size_t, krb5_data*, const char*, + struct sockaddr_in*); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#define des_new_random_key des_random_key +#endif + +#endif /* __KDC_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kerberos4.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kerberos4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..050db5d8f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kerberos4.c @@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kerberos4.c,v 1.45.2.1 2004/03/30 10:29:27 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +#ifndef swap32 +static u_int32_t +swap32(u_int32_t x) +{ + return ((x << 24) & 0xff000000) | + ((x << 8) & 0xff0000) | + ((x >> 8) & 0xff00) | + ((x >> 24) & 0xff); +} +#endif /* swap32 */ + +int +maybe_version4(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + return len > 0 && *buf == 4; +} + +static void +make_err_reply(krb5_data *reply, int code, const char *msg) +{ + KTEXT_ST er; + + /* name, instance and realm are not checked in most (all?) + implementations; msg is also never used, but we send it anyway + (for debugging purposes) */ + + if(msg == NULL) + msg = krb_get_err_text(code); + cr_err_reply(&er, "", "", "", kdc_time, code, (char*)msg); + krb5_data_copy(reply, er.dat, er.length); +} + +static krb5_boolean +valid_princ(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *s; + hdb_entry *ent; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &s); + if (ret) + return FALSE; + ret = db_fetch(princ, &ent); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(7, "Lookup %s failed: %s", s, + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + free(s); + return FALSE; + } + kdc_log(7, "Lookup %s succeeded", s); + free(s); + free_ent(ent); + return TRUE; +} + +krb5_error_code +db_fetch4(const char *name, const char *instance, const char *realm, + hdb_entry **ent) +{ + krb5_principal p; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal_ext(context, name, instance, realm, + valid_princ, 0, &p); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = db_fetch(p, ent); + krb5_free_principal(context, p); + return ret; +} + +#define RCHECK(X, L) if(X){make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, "Packet too short"); goto L;} + +/* + * Process the v4 request in `buf, len' (received from `addr' + * (with string `from'). + * Return an error code and a reply in `reply'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +do_version4(unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry *client = NULL, *server = NULL; + Key *ckey, *skey; + int8_t pvno; + int8_t msg_type; + int lsb; + char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *realm = NULL; + char *sname = NULL, *sinst = NULL; + int32_t req_time; + time_t max_life, max_end, actual_end, issue_time; + u_int8_t life; + char client_name[256]; + char server_name[256]; + + if(!enable_v4) { + kdc_log(0, "Rejected version 4 request from %s", from); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_GEN_ERR, "function not enabled"); + return 0; + } + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, len); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &pvno), out); + if(pvno != 4){ + kdc_log(0, "Protocol version mismatch (krb4) (%d)", pvno); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_PKT_VER, NULL); + goto out; + } + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &msg_type), out); + lsb = msg_type & 1; + msg_type &= ~1; + switch(msg_type){ + case AUTH_MSG_KDC_REQUEST: + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &name), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &inst), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &realm), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int32(sp, &req_time), out1); + if(lsb) + req_time = swap32(req_time); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &life), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sname), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sinst), out1); + snprintf (client_name, sizeof(client_name), + "%s.%s@%s", name, inst, realm); + snprintf (server_name, sizeof(server_name), + "%s.%s@%s", sname, sinst, v4_realm); + + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ (krb4) %s from %s for %s", + client_name, from, server_name); + + ret = db_fetch4(name, inst, realm, &client); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Client not found in database: %s: %s", + client_name, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, NULL); + goto out1; + } + ret = db_fetch4(sname, sinst, v4_realm, &server); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s: %s", + server_name, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, NULL); + goto out1; + } + + ret = check_flags (client, client_name, + server, server_name, + TRUE); + if (ret) { + /* good error code? */ + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_NAME_EXP, NULL); + goto out1; + } + + /* + * There's no way to do pre-authentication in v4 and thus no + * good error code to return if preauthentication is required. + */ + + if (require_preauth + || client->flags.require_preauth + || server->flags.require_preauth) { + kdc_log(0, + "Pre-authentication required for v4-request: " + "%s for %s", + client_name, server_name); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_NULL_KEY, NULL); + goto out1; + } + + ret = get_des_key(client, FALSE, FALSE, &ckey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for client"); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "no suitable DES key for client"); + goto out1; + } + +#if 0 + /* this is not necessary with the new code in libkrb */ + /* find a properly salted key */ + while(ckey->salt == NULL || ckey->salt->salt.length != 0) + ret = hdb_next_keytype2key(context, client, KEYTYPE_DES, &ckey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "No version-4 salted key in database -- %s.%s@%s", + name, inst, realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "No version-4 salted key in database"); + goto out1; + } +#endif + + ret = get_des_key(server, TRUE, FALSE, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for server"); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "no suitable DES key for server"); + goto out1; + } + + max_life = krb_life_to_time(0, life); + if(client->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *client->max_life); + if(server->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server->max_life); + + life = krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, kdc_time + max_life); + + { + KTEXT_ST cipher, ticket; + KTEXT r; + des_cblock session; + + des_new_random_key(&session); + + krb_create_ticket(&ticket, 0, name, inst, v4_realm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, session, life, kdc_time, + sname, sinst, skey->key.keyvalue.data); + + create_ciph(&cipher, session, sname, sinst, v4_realm, + life, server->kvno % 256, &ticket, kdc_time, + ckey->key.keyvalue.data); + memset(&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + r = create_auth_reply(name, inst, realm, req_time, 0, + client->pw_end ? *client->pw_end : 0, + client->kvno % 256, &cipher); + krb5_data_copy(reply, r->dat, r->length); + memset(&cipher, 0, sizeof(cipher)); + memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket)); + } + out1: + break; + case AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST: { + int8_t kvno; + int8_t ticket_len; + int8_t req_len; + KTEXT_ST auth; + AUTH_DAT ad; + size_t pos; + krb5_principal tgt_princ = NULL; + hdb_entry *tgt = NULL; + Key *tkey; + + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &kvno), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &realm), out2); + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, "krbtgt", realm, v4_realm, + &tgt_princ); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Converting krbtgt principal (krb4): %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, + "Failed to convert v4 principal (krbtgt)"); + goto out2; + } + + ret = db_fetch(tgt_princ, &tgt); + if(ret){ + char *s; + s = kdc_log_msg(0, "Ticket-granting ticket not " + "found in database (krb4): krbtgt.%s@%s: %s", + realm, v4_realm, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, s); + free(s); + goto out2; + } + + if(tgt->kvno % 256 != kvno){ + kdc_log(0, "tgs-req (krb4) with old kvno %d (current %d) for " + "krbtgt.%s@%s", kvno, tgt->kvno % 256, realm, v4_realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_AUTH_EXP, + "old krbtgt kvno used"); + goto out2; + } + + ret = get_des_key(tgt, TRUE, FALSE, &tkey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for krbtgt (krb4)"); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "no suitable DES key for krbtgt"); + goto out2; + } + + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &ticket_len), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &req_len), out2); + + pos = krb5_storage_seek(sp, ticket_len + req_len, SEEK_CUR); + + memset(&auth, 0, sizeof(auth)); + memcpy(&auth.dat, buf, pos); + auth.length = pos; + krb_set_key(tkey->key.keyvalue.data, 0); + + krb_ignore_ip_address = !check_ticket_addresses; + + ret = krb_rd_req(&auth, "krbtgt", realm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, &ad, 0); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "krb_rd_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, ret, NULL); + goto out2; + } + + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int32(sp, &req_time), out2); + if(lsb) + req_time = swap32(req_time); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &life), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sname), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sinst), out2); + snprintf (server_name, sizeof(server_name), + "%s.%s@%s", + sname, sinst, v4_realm); + + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ (krb4) %s.%s@%s from %s for %s", + ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, from, server_name); + + if(strcmp(ad.prealm, realm)){ + kdc_log(0, "Can't hop realms (krb4) %s -> %s", realm, ad.prealm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, + "Can't hop realms"); + goto out2; + } + + if (!enable_v4_cross_realm && strcmp(realm, v4_realm) != 0) { + kdc_log(0, "krb4 Cross-realm %s -> %s disabled", realm, v4_realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, + "Can't hop realms"); + goto out2; + } + + if(strcmp(sname, "changepw") == 0){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for changepw ticket (krb4)"); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, + "Can't authorize password change based on TGT"); + goto out2; + } + +#if 0 + ret = db_fetch4(ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, &client); + if(ret){ + char *s; + s = kdc_log_msg(0, "Client not found in database: (krb4) " + "%s.%s@%s: %s", + ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, s); + free(s); + goto out2; + } +#endif + + ret = db_fetch4(sname, sinst, v4_realm, &server); + if(ret){ + char *s; + s = kdc_log_msg(0, "Server not found in database (krb4): %s: %s", + server_name, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, s); + free(s); + goto out2; + } + + ret = check_flags (NULL, NULL, + server, server_name, + FALSE); + if (ret) { + /* good error code? */ + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_NAME_EXP, NULL); + goto out2; + } + + ret = get_des_key(server, TRUE, FALSE, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "no suitable DES key for server (krb4)"); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "no suitable DES key for server"); + goto out2; + } + + max_end = krb_life_to_time(ad.time_sec, ad.life); + max_end = min(max_end, krb_life_to_time(kdc_time, life)); + life = min(life, krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, max_end)); + + issue_time = kdc_time; + actual_end = krb_life_to_time(issue_time, life); + while (actual_end > max_end && life > 1) { + /* move them into the next earlier lifetime bracket */ + life--; + actual_end = krb_life_to_time(issue_time, life); + } + if (actual_end > max_end) { + /* if life <= 1 and it's still too long, backdate the ticket */ + issue_time -= actual_end - max_end; + } + + { + KTEXT_ST cipher, ticket; + KTEXT r; + des_cblock session; + des_new_random_key(&session); + + krb_create_ticket(&ticket, 0, ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, &session, life, + issue_time, + sname, sinst, skey->key.keyvalue.data); + + create_ciph(&cipher, session, sname, sinst, v4_realm, + life, server->kvno % 256, &ticket, + issue_time, &ad.session); + + memset(&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + memset(ad.session, 0, sizeof(ad.session)); + + r = create_auth_reply(ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + req_time, 0, 0, 0, &cipher); + krb5_data_copy(reply, r->dat, r->length); + memset(&cipher, 0, sizeof(cipher)); + memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket)); + } + out2: + if(tgt_princ) + krb5_free_principal(context, tgt_princ); + if(tgt) + free_ent(tgt); + break; + } + + case AUTH_MSG_ERR_REPLY: + break; + default: + kdc_log(0, "Unknown message type (krb4): %d from %s", + msg_type, from); + + make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, "Unknown message type"); + } +out: + if(name) + free(name); + if(inst) + free(inst); + if(realm) + free(realm); + if(sname) + free(sname); + if(sinst) + free(sinst); + if(client) + free_ent(client); + if(server) + free_ent(server); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +} + +#else /* KRB4 */ + +#include + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +krb5_error_code +encode_v4_ticket(void *buf, size_t len, const EncTicketPart *et, + const PrincipalName *service, size_t *size) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[40], inst[40], realm[40]; + char sname[40], sinst[40]; + + { + krb5_principal princ; + principalname2krb5_principal(&princ, + *service, + et->crealm); + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, + princ, + sname, + sinst, + realm); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + if(ret) + return ret; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&princ, + et->cname, + et->crealm); + + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, + princ, + name, + inst, + realm); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + } + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, 0); /* flags */ + krb5_store_stringz(sp, name); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, inst); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + { + unsigned char tmp[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + int i; + if(et->caddr){ + for(i = 0; i < et->caddr->len; i++) + if(et->caddr->val[i].addr_type == AF_INET && + et->caddr->val[i].address.length == 4){ + memcpy(tmp, et->caddr->val[i].address.data, 4); + break; + } + } + krb5_storage_write(sp, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + } + + if((et->key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 && + et->key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 && + et->key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) || + et->key.keyvalue.length != 8) + return -1; + krb5_storage_write(sp, et->key.keyvalue.data, 8); + + { + time_t start = et->starttime ? *et->starttime : et->authtime; + krb5_store_int8(sp, krb_time_to_life(start, et->endtime)); + krb5_store_int32(sp, start); + } + + krb5_store_stringz(sp, sname); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, sinst); + + { + krb5_data data; + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + *size = (data.length + 7) & ~7; /* pad to 8 bytes */ + if(*size > len) + return -1; + memset((unsigned char*)buf - *size + 1, 0, *size); + memcpy((unsigned char*)buf - *size + 1, data.data, data.length); + krb5_data_free(&data); + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +get_des_key(hdb_entry *principal, krb5_boolean is_server, + krb5_boolean prefer_afs_key, Key **ret_key) +{ + Key *v5_key = NULL, *v4_key = NULL, *afs_key = NULL, *server_key = NULL; + int i; + krb5_enctype etypes[] = { ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC }; + + for(i = 0; + i < sizeof(etypes)/sizeof(etypes[0]) + && (v5_key == NULL || v4_key == NULL || + afs_key == NULL || server_key == NULL); + ++i) { + Key *key = NULL; + while(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, principal, etypes[i], &key) == 0) { + if(key->salt == NULL) { + if(v5_key == NULL) + v5_key = key; + } else if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt && + key->salt->salt.length == 0) { + if(v4_key == NULL) + v4_key = key; + } else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt) { + if(afs_key == NULL) + afs_key = key; + } else if(server_key == NULL) + server_key = key; + } + } + + if(prefer_afs_key) { + if(afs_key) + *ret_key = afs_key; + else if(v4_key) + *ret_key = v4_key; + else if(v5_key) + *ret_key = v5_key; + else if(is_server && server_key) + *ret_key = server_key; + else + return KERB_ERR_NULL_KEY; + } else { + if(v4_key) + *ret_key = v4_key; + else if(afs_key) + *ret_key = afs_key; + else if(v5_key) + *ret_key = v5_key; + else if(is_server && server_key) + *ret_key = server_key; + else + return KERB_ERR_NULL_KEY; + } + + if((*ret_key)->key.keyvalue.length == 0) + return KERB_ERR_NULL_KEY; + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kerberos5.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kerberos5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2736fd284 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kerberos5.c @@ -0,0 +1,1915 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kerberos5.c,v 1.145.2.4 2004/08/13 19:28:26 lha Exp $"); + +#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1)) + +static void +fix_time(time_t **t) +{ + if(*t == NULL){ + ALLOC(*t); + **t = MAX_TIME; + } + if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */ +} + +static void +set_salt_padata (METHOD_DATA **m, Salt *salt) +{ + if (salt) { + ALLOC(*m); + (*m)->len = 1; + ALLOC((*m)->val); + (*m)->val->padata_type = salt->type; + copy_octet_string(&salt->salt, + &(*m)->val->padata_value); + } +} + +static PA_DATA* +find_padata(KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type) +{ + while(*start < req->padata->len){ + (*start)++; + if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == type) + return &req->padata->val[*start - 1]; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for + * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find + * one, but preferring one that has default salt + */ + +static krb5_error_code +find_etype(hdb_entry *princ, krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len, + Key **ret_key, krb5_enctype *ret_etype) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + + for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len ; i++) { + Key *key = NULL; + + while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, princ, etypes[i], &key) == 0) { + if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY; + continue; + } + *ret_key = key; + *ret_etype = etypes[i]; + ret = 0; + if (key->salt == NULL) + return ret; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +find_keys(hdb_entry *client, + hdb_entry *server, + Key **ckey, + krb5_enctype *cetype, + Key **skey, + krb5_enctype *setype, + krb5_enctype *etypes, + unsigned num_etypes) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(client){ + /* find client key */ + ret = find_etype(client, etypes, num_etypes, ckey, cetype); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Client has no support for etypes"); + return ret; + } + } + + if(server){ + /* find server key */ + ret = find_etype(server, etypes, num_etypes, skey, setype); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server has no support for etypes"); + return ret; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn) +{ + pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL; + pn->name_string.len = 1; + pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val)); + if (pn->name_string.val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous"); + if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) { + free(pn->name_string.val); + pn->name_string.val = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +encode_reply(KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek, + krb5_enctype etype, + int skvno, EncryptionKey *skey, + int ckvno, EncryptionKey *ckey, + const char **e_text, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + if(buf_size != len) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + *e_text = "KDC internal error"; + return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + buf, + len, + skvno, + &rep->ticket.enc_part); + free(buf); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + + if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep) + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret); + else + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + if(buf_size != len) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + *e_text = "KDC internal error"; + return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, ckey, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) { + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART, + buf, + len, + ckvno, + &rep->enc_part); + free(buf); + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret); + } else { + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION, + buf, + len, + ckvno, + &rep->enc_part); + free(buf); + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret); + } + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + if(buf_size != len) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + *e_text = "KDC internal error"; + return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + reply->data = buf; + reply->length = buf_size; + return 0; +} + +static int +realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md) +{ + PA_DATA *pa; + pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val)); + if(pa == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + md->val = pa; + md->len++; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +make_etype_info_entry(ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key) +{ + ent->etype = key->key.keytype; + if(key->salt){ + ALLOC(ent->salttype); +#if 0 + if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt) + *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */ + else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt) + *ent->salttype = 2; + else { + kdc_log(0, "unknown salt-type: %d", + key->salt->type); + return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if + we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you + *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming + that the cell is the same as the realm in lower + case) */ +#else + *ent->salttype = key->salt->type; +#endif + krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt, + &ent->salt); + } else { + /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate + * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some + * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type + * here. */ + + ent->salttype = NULL; + ent->salt = NULL; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_pa_etype_info(METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client, + ENCTYPE *etypes, unsigned int etypes_len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int i, j; + unsigned int n = 0; + ETYPE_INFO pa; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + + + pa.len = client->keys.len; + if(pa.len > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*pa.val)) + return ERANGE; + pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val)); + if(pa.val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + if (pa.val[i].etype == etypes[j]) + goto skip1; + for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) { + if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) + if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(&pa.val[n++], + &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) { + free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + return ret; + } + } + skip1:; + } + for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) { + for(j = 0; j < etypes_len; j++) { + if(client->keys.val[i].key.keytype == etypes[j]) + goto skip2; + } + if((ret = make_etype_info_entry(&pa.val[n++], + &client->keys.val[i])) != 0) { + free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + return ret; + } + skip2:; + } + + if(n != pa.len) { + char *name; + krb5_unparse_name(context, client->principal, &name); + kdc_log(0, "internal error in get_pa_etype_info(%s): %d != %d", + name, n, pa.len); + free(name); + pa.len = n; + } + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret); + free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = realloc_method_data(md); + if(ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO; + md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len; + md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf; + return 0; +} + +/* + * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0 + * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning + * and error code otherwise. + */ + +krb5_error_code +check_flags(hdb_entry *client, const char *client_name, + hdb_entry *server, const char *server_name, + krb5_boolean is_as_req) +{ + if(client != NULL) { + /* check client */ + if (client->flags.invalid) { + kdc_log(0, "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if(!client->flags.client){ + kdc_log(0, "Principal may not act as client -- %s", + client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Client not yet valid -- %s", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET; + } + + if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Client expired -- %s", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP; + } + + if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time + && !server->flags.change_pw) { + kdc_log(0, "Client's key has expired -- %s", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED; + } + } + + /* check server */ + + if (server != NULL) { + if (server->flags.invalid) { + kdc_log(0, "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if(!server->flags.server){ + kdc_log(0, "Principal may not act as server -- %s", + server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) { + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not yet valid -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET; + } + + if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Server expired -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP; + } + + if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Server's key has expired -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration + * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about + * these checks + */ + +static krb5_boolean +check_addresses(HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_address addr; + krb5_boolean result; + + if(check_ticket_addresses == 0) + return TRUE; + + if(addresses == NULL) + return allow_null_ticket_addresses; + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr); + if(ret) + return FALSE; + + result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses); + krb5_free_address (context, &addr); + return result; +} + +krb5_error_code +as_rep(KDC_REQ *req, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *from_addr) +{ + KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body; + AS_REP rep; + KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options; + hdb_entry *client = NULL, *server = NULL; + krb5_enctype cetype, setype; + EncTicketPart et; + EncKDCRepPart ek; + krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL; + char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + const char *e_text = NULL; + krb5_crypto crypto; + Key *ckey, *skey; + + memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + + if(b->sname == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + e_text = "No server in request"; + } else{ + principalname2krb5_principal (&server_princ, *(b->sname), b->realm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name); + } + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from); + goto out; + } + + if(b->cname == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + e_text = "No client in request"; + } else { + principalname2krb5_principal (&client_princ, *(b->cname), b->realm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name); + } + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from); + goto out; + } + + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s", client_name, from, server_name); + + ret = db_fetch(client_princ, &client); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + ret = db_fetch(server_princ, &server); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + ret = check_flags(client, client_name, server, server_name, TRUE); + if(ret) + goto out; + + memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et)); + memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek)); + + if(req->padata){ + int i = 0; + PA_DATA *pa; + int found_pa = 0; + kdc_log(5, "Looking for pa-data -- %s", client_name); + while((pa = find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){ + krb5_data ts_data; + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + time_t patime; + size_t len; + EncryptedData enc_data; + Key *pa_key; + + found_pa = 1; + + ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data, + pa->padata_value.length, + &enc_data, + &len); + if (ret) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log(5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s", + client_name); + goto out; + } + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, client, enc_data.etype, &pa_key); + if(ret){ + char *estr; + e_text = "No key matches pa-data"; + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr)) + estr = NULL; + if(estr == NULL) + kdc_log(5, "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s", + enc_data.etype, client_name); + else + kdc_log(5, "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s", + estr, client_name); + free(estr); + + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + continue; + } + + try_next_key: + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + continue; + } + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, + &enc_data, + &ts_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, client, + enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0) + goto try_next_key; + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA"; + kdc_log (5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s", + client_name); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + continue; + } + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data, + ts_data.length, + &p, + &len); + krb5_data_free(&ts_data); + if(ret){ + e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC"; + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log (5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s", + client_name); + continue; + } + patime = p.patimestamp; + free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); + if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + e_text = "Too large time skew"; + kdc_log(0, "Too large time skew -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + et.flags.pre_authent = 1; + kdc_log(2, "Pre-authentication succeded -- %s", client_name); + break; + } + if(found_pa == 0 && require_preauth) + goto use_pa; + /* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there + was some problem with it, other than too large skew */ + if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){ + kdc_log(0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name); + e_text = NULL; + goto out; + } + }else if (require_preauth + || client->flags.require_preauth + || server->flags.require_preauth) { + METHOD_DATA method_data; + PA_DATA *pa; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + krb5_data foo_data; + + use_pa: + method_data.len = 0; + method_data.val = NULL; + + ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data); + pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1]; + pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; + pa->padata_value.length = 0; + pa->padata_value.data = NULL; + + ret = get_pa_etype_info(&method_data, client, + b->etype.val, b->etype.len); /* XXX check ret */ + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret); + free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data); + foo_data.data = buf; + foo_data.length = len; + + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP", + &foo_data, + client_princ, + server_princ, + NULL, + NULL, + reply); + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "No PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP -- %s", client_name); + ret = 0; + goto out2; + } + + ret = find_keys(client, server, &ckey, &cetype, &skey, &setype, + b->etype.val, b->etype.len); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server/client has no support for etypes"); + goto out; + } + + { + char *cet; + char *set; + + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set); + if (ret == 0) { + kdc_log(5, "Using %s/%s", cet, set); + free(set); + } + free(cet); + } + if (ret != 0) + kdc_log(5, "Using e-types %d/%d", cetype, setype); + } + + { + char str[128]; + unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(f), KDCOptions_units, str, sizeof(str)); + if(*str) + kdc_log(2, "Requested flags: %s", str); + } + + + if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey + || (f.request_anonymous && !allow_anonymous)) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + kdc_log(0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + + rep.pvno = 5; + rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep; + copy_Realm(&b->realm, &rep.crealm); + if (f.request_anonymous) + make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname); + else + copy_PrincipalName(b->cname, &rep.cname); + rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; + copy_Realm(&b->realm, &rep.ticket.realm); + copy_PrincipalName(b->sname, &rep.ticket.sname); + + et.flags.initial = 1; + if(client->flags.forwardable && server->flags.forwardable) + et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable; + else if (f.forwardable) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + if(client->flags.proxiable && server->flags.proxiable) + et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable; + else if (f.proxiable) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + if(client->flags.postdate && server->flags.postdate) + et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate; + else if (f.allow_postdate){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + + /* check for valid set of addresses */ + if(!check_addresses(b->addresses, from_addr)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + kdc_log(0, "Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + + krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, setype, &et.key); + copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname); + copy_Realm(&b->realm, &et.crealm); + + { + time_t start; + time_t t; + + start = et.authtime = kdc_time; + + if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){ + ALLOC(et.starttime); + start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from; + et.flags.invalid = 1; + et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */ + } + fix_time(&b->till); + t = *b->till; + + /* be careful not overflowing */ + + if(client->max_life) + t = start + min(t - start, *client->max_life); + if(server->max_life) + t = start + min(t - start, *server->max_life); +#if 0 + t = min(t, start + realm->max_life); +#endif + et.endtime = t; + if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){ + f.renewable = 1; + if(b->rtime == NULL){ + ALLOC(b->rtime); + *b->rtime = 0; + } + if(*b->rtime < *b->till) + *b->rtime = *b->till; + } + if(f.renewable && b->rtime){ + t = *b->rtime; + if(t == 0) + t = MAX_TIME; + if(client->max_renew) + t = start + min(t - start, *client->max_renew); + if(server->max_renew) + t = start + min(t - start, *server->max_renew); +#if 0 + t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew); +#endif + ALLOC(et.renew_till); + *et.renew_till = t; + et.flags.renewable = 1; + } + } + + if (f.request_anonymous) + et.flags.anonymous = 1; + + if(b->addresses){ + ALLOC(et.caddr); + copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr); + } + + et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; + krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents); + + copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key); + + /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded + * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus + * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length. + * + * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req + * + * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that, + * otherwise just a dummy lr. + */ + ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val)); + ek.last_req.len = 0; + if (client->pw_end + && (kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0 + || kdc_time + kdc_warn_pwexpire <= *client->pw_end)) { + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->pw_end; + ++ek.last_req.len; + } + if (client->valid_end) { + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->valid_end; + ++ek.last_req.len; + } + if (ek.last_req.len == 0) { + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0; + ++ek.last_req.len; + } + ek.nonce = b->nonce; + if (client->valid_end || client->pw_end) { + ALLOC(ek.key_expiration); + if (client->valid_end) { + if (client->pw_end) + *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->valid_end, *client->pw_end); + else + *ek.key_expiration = *client->valid_end; + } else + *ek.key_expiration = *client->pw_end; + } else + ek.key_expiration = NULL; + ek.flags = et.flags; + ek.authtime = et.authtime; + if (et.starttime) { + ALLOC(ek.starttime); + *ek.starttime = *et.starttime; + } + ek.endtime = et.endtime; + if (et.renew_till) { + ALLOC(ek.renew_till); + *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till; + } + copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm); + copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname); + if(et.caddr){ + ALLOC(ek.caddr); + copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr); + } + + set_salt_padata (&rep.padata, ckey->salt); + ret = encode_reply(&rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->kvno, &skey->key, + client->kvno, &ckey->key, &e_text, reply); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek); + out: + free_AS_REP(&rep); + if(ret){ + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + e_text, + NULL, + client_princ, + server_princ, + NULL, + NULL, + reply); + ret = 0; + } + out2: + if (client_princ) + krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ); + free(client_name); + if (server_princ) + krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ); + free(server_name); + if(client) + free_ent(client); + if(server) + free_ent(server); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +check_tgs_flags(KDC_REQ_BODY *b, EncTicketPart *tgt, EncTicketPart *et) +{ + KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options; + + if(f.validate){ + if(!tgt->flags.invalid || tgt->starttime == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request to validate ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + if(*tgt->starttime > kdc_time){ + kdc_log(0, "Early request to validate ticket"); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV; + } + /* XXX tkt = tgt */ + et->flags.invalid = 0; + }else if(tgt->flags.invalid){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket-granting ticket has INVALID flag set"); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID; + } + + if(f.forwardable){ + if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for forwardable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.forwardable = 1; + } + if(f.forwarded){ + if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to forward non-forwardable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.forwarded = 1; + et->caddr = b->addresses; + } + if(tgt->flags.forwarded) + et->flags.forwarded = 1; + + if(f.proxiable){ + if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for proxiable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.proxiable = 1; + } + if(f.proxy){ + if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to proxy non-proxiable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.proxy = 1; + et->caddr = b->addresses; + } + if(tgt->flags.proxy) + et->flags.proxy = 1; + + if(f.allow_postdate){ + if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for post-datable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.may_postdate = 1; + } + if(f.postdated){ + if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for postdated ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + if(b->from) + *et->starttime = *b->from; + et->flags.postdated = 1; + et->flags.invalid = 1; + }else if(b->from && *b->from > kdc_time + context->max_skew){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket cannot be postdated"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE; + } + + if(f.renewable){ + if(!tgt->flags.renewable){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for renewable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.renewable = 1; + ALLOC(et->renew_till); + fix_time(&b->rtime); + *et->renew_till = *b->rtime; + } + if(f.renew){ + time_t old_life; + if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to renew non-renewable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + old_life = tgt->endtime; + if(tgt->starttime) + old_life -= *tgt->starttime; + else + old_life -= tgt->authtime; + et->endtime = *et->starttime + old_life; + if (et->renew_till != NULL) + et->endtime = min(*et->renew_till, et->endtime); + } + + /* checks for excess flags */ + if(f.request_anonymous && !allow_anonymous){ + kdc_log(0, "Request for anonymous ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fix_transited_encoding(krb5_boolean check_policy, + TransitedEncoding *tr, + EncTicketPart *et, + const char *client_realm, + const char *server_realm, + const char *tgt_realm) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char **realms, **tmp; + int num_realms; + int i; + + if(tr->tr_type != DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) { + kdc_log(0, "Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context, + tr->contents, + &realms, + &num_realms, + client_realm, + server_realm); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "Decoding transited encoding"); + return ret; + } + if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) { + /* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */ + if (num_realms < 0 || num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) { + ret = ERANGE; + goto free_realms; + } + tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms)); + if(tmp == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + goto free_realms; + } + realms = tmp; + realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm); + if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + goto free_realms; + } + num_realms++; + } + if(num_realms == 0) { + if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm)) + kdc_log(0, "cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm); + } else { + size_t l = 0; + char *rs; + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) + l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2; + rs = malloc(l); + if(rs != NULL) { + *rs = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) { + if(i > 0) + strlcat(rs, ", ", l); + strlcat(rs, realms[i], l); + } + kdc_log(0, "cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]", client_realm, server_realm, rs); + free(rs); + } + } + if(check_policy) { + ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm, + server_realm, + realms, num_realms, NULL); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s", + client_realm, server_realm); + goto free_realms; + } + et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1; + } + et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; + ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding"); + free_realms: + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) + free(realms[i]); + free(realms); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +tgs_make_reply(KDC_REQ_BODY *b, + EncTicketPart *tgt, + EncTicketPart *adtkt, + AuthorizationData *auth_data, + hdb_entry *server, + hdb_entry *client, + krb5_principal client_principal, + hdb_entry *krbtgt, + krb5_enctype cetype, + const char **e_text, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + KDC_REP rep; + EncKDCRepPart ek; + EncTicketPart et; + KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_enctype etype; + Key *skey; + EncryptionKey *ekey; + + if(adtkt) { + int i; + krb5_keytype kt; + ekey = &adtkt->key; + for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_enctype_to_keytype(context, b->etype.val[i], &kt); + if(ret) + continue; + if(adtkt->key.keytype == kt) + break; + } + if(i == b->etype.len) + return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + etype = b->etype.val[i]; + }else{ + ret = find_keys(NULL, server, NULL, NULL, &skey, &etype, + b->etype.val, b->etype.len); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server has no support for etypes"); + return ret; + } + ekey = &skey->key; + } + + memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et)); + memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek)); + + rep.pvno = 5; + rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep; + + et.authtime = tgt->authtime; + fix_time(&b->till); + et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till); + ALLOC(et.starttime); + *et.starttime = kdc_time; + + ret = check_tgs_flags(b, tgt, &et); + if(ret) + goto out; + + /* We should check the transited encoding if: + 1) the request doesn't ask not to be checked + 2) globally enforcing a check + 3) principal requires checking + 4) we allow non-check per-principal, but principal isn't marked as allowing this + 5) we don't globally allow this + */ + +#define GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK (trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK) +#define GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL (trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL) +#define GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK (trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST) +/* these will consult the database in future release */ +#define PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0 +#define PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0 + + ret = fix_transited_encoding(!f.disable_transited_check || + GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK || + PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server) || + !((GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL && + PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server)) || + GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK), + &tgt->transited, &et, + *krb5_princ_realm(context, client_principal), + *krb5_princ_realm(context, server->principal), + *krb5_princ_realm(context, krbtgt->principal)); + if(ret) + goto out; + + copy_Realm(krb5_princ_realm(context, server->principal), + &rep.ticket.realm); + krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server->principal); + copy_Realm(&tgt->crealm, &rep.crealm); + if (f.request_anonymous) + make_anonymous_principalname (&tgt->cname); + else + copy_PrincipalName(&tgt->cname, &rep.cname); + rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; + + ek.caddr = et.caddr; + if(et.caddr == NULL) + et.caddr = tgt->caddr; + + { + time_t life; + life = et.endtime - *et.starttime; + if(client && client->max_life) + life = min(life, *client->max_life); + if(server->max_life) + life = min(life, *server->max_life); + et.endtime = *et.starttime + life; + } + if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable && + et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till){ + et.flags.renewable = 1; + ALLOC(et.renew_till); + *et.renew_till = *b->till; + } + if(et.renew_till){ + time_t renew; + renew = *et.renew_till - et.authtime; + if(client && client->max_renew) + renew = min(renew, *client->max_renew); + if(server->max_renew) + renew = min(renew, *server->max_renew); + *et.renew_till = et.authtime + renew; + } + + if(et.renew_till){ + *et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till); + *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till); + et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till); + } + + *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime); + + if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID; + goto out; + } + if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){ + free(et.renew_till); + et.renew_till = NULL; + et.flags.renewable = 0; + } + + et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent; + et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent; + et.flags.anonymous = tgt->flags.anonymous; + + /* XXX Check enc-authorization-data */ + et.authorization_data = auth_data; + + krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &et.key); + et.crealm = tgt->crealm; + et.cname = tgt->cname; + + ek.key = et.key; + /* MIT must have at least one last_req */ + ek.last_req.len = 1; + ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val)); + ek.nonce = b->nonce; + ek.flags = et.flags; + ek.authtime = et.authtime; + ek.starttime = et.starttime; + ek.endtime = et.endtime; + ek.renew_till = et.renew_till; + ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm; + ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname; + + /* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following + encryption should come from. What we have is a session + key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes + *for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible + etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look + at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt + session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say) + CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the + etype list, even if we don't want a session key with + DES3? */ + ret = encode_reply(&rep, &et, &ek, etype, adtkt ? 0 : server->kvno, ekey, + 0, &tgt->key, e_text, reply); + out: + free_TGS_REP(&rep); + free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited); + if(et.starttime) + free(et.starttime); + if(et.renew_till) + free(et.renew_till); + free_LastReq(&ek.last_req); + memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length); + free_EncryptionKey(&et.key); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +tgs_check_authenticator(krb5_auth_context ac, + KDC_REQ_BODY *b, + const char **e_text, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_authenticator auth; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth); + if(auth->cksum == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "No authenticator in request"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; + goto out; + } + /* + * according to RFC1510 it doesn't need to be keyed, + * but according to the latest draft it needs to. + */ + if ( +#if 0 +!krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype) + || +#endif + !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)) { + kdc_log(0, "Bad checksum type in authenticator: %d", + auth->cksum->cksumtype); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; + goto out; + } + + /* XXX should not re-encode this */ + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KDC_REQ_BODY, buf, buf_size, b, &len, ret); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode KDC-REQ-BODY: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + if(buf_size != len) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + *e_text = "KDC internal error"; + ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, + buf, + len, + auth->cksum); + free(buf); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to verify checksum: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } +out: + free_Authenticator(auth); + free(auth); + return ret; +} + +/* + * return the realm of a krbtgt-ticket or NULL + */ + +static Realm +get_krbtgt_realm(const PrincipalName *p) +{ + if(p->name_string.len == 2 + && strcmp(p->name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) == 0) + return p->name_string.val[1]; + else + return NULL; +} + +static Realm +find_rpath(Realm crealm, Realm srealm) +{ + const char *new_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context, + NULL, + "capaths", + crealm, + srealm, + NULL); + return (Realm)new_realm; +} + + +static krb5_boolean +need_referral(krb5_principal server, krb5_realm **realms) +{ + if(server->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_SRV_INST || + server->name.name_string.len != 2) + return FALSE; + + return krb5_get_host_realm_int(context, server->name.name_string.val[1], + FALSE, realms) == 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +tgs_rep2(KDC_REQ_BODY *b, + PA_DATA *tgs_req, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + const struct sockaddr *from_addr, + time_t **csec, + int **cusec) +{ + krb5_ap_req ap_req; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; + krb5_flags ap_req_options; + krb5_flags verify_ap_req_flags; + const char *e_text = NULL; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + hdb_entry *krbtgt = NULL; + EncTicketPart *tgt; + Key *tkey; + krb5_enctype cetype; + krb5_principal cp = NULL; + krb5_principal sp = NULL; + AuthorizationData *auth_data = NULL; + + *csec = NULL; + *cusec = NULL; + + memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req)); + ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, &tgs_req->padata_value, &ap_req); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decode AP-REQ: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + + if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&ap_req.ticket.sname)){ + /* XXX check for ticket.sname == req.sname */ + kdc_log(0, "PA-DATA is not a ticket-granting ticket"); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + + principalname2krb5_principal(&princ, + ap_req.ticket.sname, + ap_req.ticket.realm); + + ret = db_fetch(princ, &krbtgt); + + if(ret) { + char *p; + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + kdc_log(0, "Ticket-granting ticket not found in database: %s: %s", + p, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + free(p); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US; + goto out2; + } + + if(ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno && + *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno != krbtgt->kvno){ + char *p; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, princ, &p); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + kdc_log(0, "Ticket kvno = %d, DB kvno = %d (%s)", + *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno, + krbtgt->kvno, + p); + free (p); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER; + goto out2; + } + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, krbtgt, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &tkey); + if(ret){ + char *str; + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &str); + kdc_log(0, "No server key found for %s", str); + free(str); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER; + goto out2; + } + + if (b->kdc_options.validate) + verify_ap_req_flags = KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID; + else + verify_ap_req_flags = 0; + + ret = krb5_verify_ap_req2(context, + &ac, + &ap_req, + princ, + &tkey->key, + verify_ap_req_flags, + &ap_req_options, + &ticket, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH); + + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to verify AP-REQ: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + + { + krb5_authenticator auth; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth); + if (ret == 0) { + *csec = malloc(sizeof(**csec)); + if (*csec == NULL) { + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth); + kdc_log(0, "malloc failed"); + goto out2; + } + **csec = auth->ctime; + *cusec = malloc(sizeof(**cusec)); + if (*cusec == NULL) { + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth); + kdc_log(0, "malloc failed"); + goto out2; + } + **csec = auth->cusec; + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth); + } + } + + cetype = ap_req.authenticator.etype; + + tgt = &ticket->ticket; + + ret = tgs_check_authenticator(ac, b, &e_text, &tgt->key); + + if (b->enc_authorization_data) { + krb5_keyblock *subkey; + krb5_data ad; + ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, + ac, + &subkey); + if(ret){ + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + kdc_log(0, "Failed to get remote subkey: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + if(subkey == NULL){ + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &subkey); + if(ret) { + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + kdc_log(0, "Failed to get session key: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + } + if(subkey == NULL){ + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + kdc_log(0, "Failed to get key for enc-authorization-data"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, subkey, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + kdc_log(0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY, + b->enc_authorization_data, + &ad); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decrypt enc-authorization-data"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + krb5_free_keyblock(context, subkey); + ALLOC(auth_data); + ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad.data, ad.length, auth_data, NULL); + if(ret){ + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + free(auth_data); + auth_data = NULL; + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decode authorization data"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + } + + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to verify authenticator: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + + { + PrincipalName *s; + Realm r; + char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL; + hdb_entry *server = NULL, *client = NULL; + int loop = 0; + EncTicketPart adtkt; + char opt_str[128]; + + s = b->sname; + r = b->realm; + if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){ + Ticket *t; + hdb_entry *uu; + krb5_principal p; + Key *tkey; + + if(b->additional_tickets == NULL || + b->additional_tickets->len == 0){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */ + kdc_log(0, "No second ticket present in request"); + goto out; + } + t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0]; + if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){ + kdc_log(0, "Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket"); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + goto out2; + } + principalname2krb5_principal(&p, t->sname, t->realm); + ret = db_fetch(p, &uu); + krb5_free_principal(context, p); + if(ret){ + if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, uu, t->enc_part.etype, &tkey); + if(ret){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &tkey->key, &adtkt, 0); + + if(ret) + goto out; + s = &adtkt.cname; + r = adtkt.crealm; + } + + principalname2krb5_principal(&sp, *s, r); + krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn); + principalname2krb5_principal(&cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn); + unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), KDCOptions_units, + opt_str, sizeof(opt_str)); + if(*opt_str) + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]", + cpn, from, spn, opt_str); + else + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn); + server_lookup: + ret = db_fetch(sp, &server); + + if(ret){ + Realm req_rlm, new_rlm; + krb5_realm *realms; + + if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) { + if(loop++ < 2) { + new_rlm = find_rpath(tgt->crealm, req_rlm); + if(new_rlm) { + kdc_log(5, "krbtgt for realm %s not found, trying %s", + req_rlm, new_rlm); + krb5_free_principal(context, sp); + free(spn); + krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, new_rlm, NULL); + krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn); + goto server_lookup; + } + } + } else if(need_referral(sp, &realms)) { + if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) { + kdc_log(5, "returning a referral to realm %s for " + "server %s that was not found", + realms[0], spn); + krb5_free_principal(context, sp); + free(spn); + krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME, + realms[0], NULL); + krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn); + krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms); + goto server_lookup; + } + krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms); + } + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + ret = db_fetch(cp, &client); + if(ret) + kdc_log(1, "Client not found in database: %s: %s", + cpn, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); +#if 0 + /* XXX check client only if same realm as krbtgt-instance */ + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Client not found in database: %s: %s", + cpn, krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } +#endif + + if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, sp), + krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, krbtgt->principal, 1)) != 0) { + char *tpn; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->principal, &tpn); + kdc_log(0, "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s", (ret == 0) ? tpn : ""); + if(ret == 0) + free(tpn); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US; + goto out; + + } + + ret = check_flags(client, cpn, server, spn, FALSE); + if(ret) + goto out; + + if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) && + !krb5_principal_compare(context, + krbtgt->principal, + server->principal)){ + kdc_log(0, "Inconsistent request."); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH; + goto out; + } + + /* check for valid set of addresses */ + if(!check_addresses(tgt->caddr, from_addr)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + kdc_log(0, "Request from wrong address"); + goto out; + } + + ret = tgs_make_reply(b, + tgt, + b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey ? &adtkt : NULL, + auth_data, + server, + client, + cp, + krbtgt, + cetype, + &e_text, + reply); + + out: + free(spn); + free(cpn); + + if(server) + free_ent(server); + if(client) + free_ent(client); + } +out2: + if(ret) { + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + e_text, + NULL, + cp, + sp, + NULL, + NULL, + reply); + free(*csec); + free(*cusec); + *csec = NULL; + *cusec = NULL; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, cp); + krb5_free_principal(context, sp); + if (ticket) { + krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket); + free(ticket); + } + free_AP_REQ(&ap_req); + if(auth_data){ + free_AuthorizationData(auth_data); + free(auth_data); + } + + if(krbtgt) + free_ent(krbtgt); + + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +tgs_rep(KDC_REQ *req, + krb5_data *data, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *from_addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i = 0; + PA_DATA *tgs_req = NULL; + time_t *csec = NULL; + int *cusec = NULL; + + if(req->padata == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; /* XXX ??? */ + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-DATA", from); + goto out; + } + + tgs_req = find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ); + + if(tgs_req == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP; + + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-TGS-REQ", from); + goto out; + } + ret = tgs_rep2(&req->req_body, tgs_req, data, from, from_addr, + &csec, &cusec); +out: + if(ret && data->data == NULL){ + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + csec, + cusec, + data); + } + free(csec); + free(cusec); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3bd46c63ac --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.8 @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +.\" $Id: kstash.8,v 1.7 2002/08/20 16:37:14 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 1, 2000 +.Dt KSTASH 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kstash +.Nd "store the KDC master password in a file" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl e Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -enctype= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl k Ar file \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -convert-file +.Op Fl -master-key-fd= Ns Ar fd +.Op Fl h | Fl -help +.Op Fl -version +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +reads the Kerberos master key and stores it in a file that will be +used by the KDC. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl e Ar string , +.Fl -enctype= Ns Ar string +.Xc +the encryption type to use, defaults to DES3-CBC-SHA1 +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar file , +.Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Xc +the name of the master key file +.It Xo +.Fl -convert-file +.Xc +don't ask for a new master key, just read an old master key file, and +write it back in the new keyfile format +.It Xo +.Fl -master-key-fd= Ns Ar fd +.Xc +filedescriptor to read passphrase from, if not specified the +passphrase will be read from the terminal +.El +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kdc 8 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc0621a6f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "headers.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kstash.c,v 1.15 2002/04/18 09:47:25 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +const char *keyfile = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; +int convert_flag; +int help_flag; +int version_flag; + +int master_key_fd = -1; + +const char *enctype_str = "des3-cbc-sha1"; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, &enctype_str, "encryption type" }, + { "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, "master key file", "file" }, + { "convert-file", 0, arg_flag, &convert_flag, + "just convert keyfile to new format" }, + { "master-key-fd", 0, arg_integer, &master_key_fd, + "filedescriptor to read passphrase from", "fd" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char buf[1024]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + krb5_enctype enctype; + + hdb_master_key mkey; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, enctype_str, &enctype); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_string_to_enctype"); + + ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, keyfile, &mkey); + if(ret && ret != ENOENT) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "reading master key from %s", keyfile); + + if (convert_flag) { + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "reading master key from %s", keyfile); + } else { + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_salt salt; + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + /* XXX better value? */ + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + if(master_key_fd != -1) { + ssize_t n; + n = read(master_key_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if(n <= 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "failed to read passphrase"); + buf[n] = '\0'; + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + } else { + if(des_read_pw_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "Master key: ", 1)) + exit(1); + } + krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, enctype, buf, salt, &key); + ret = hdb_add_master_key(context, &key, &mkey); + + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + + } + + { + char *new, *old; + asprintf(&old, "%s.old", keyfile); + asprintf(&new, "%s.new", keyfile); + if(unlink(new) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + ret = errno; + goto out; + } + krb5_warnx(context, "writing key to `%s'", keyfile); + ret = hdb_write_master_key(context, new, mkey); + if(ret) + unlink(new); + else { + unlink(old); + if(link(keyfile, old) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + ret = errno; + unlink(new); + } else if(rename(new, keyfile) < 0) { + ret = errno; + } + } + out: + free(old); + free(new); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, errno, "writing master key file"); + } + + hdb_free_master_key(context, mkey); + + exit(ret != 0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3cd2e9906 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/kstash.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ + +KSTASH(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KSTASH(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkssttaasshh - store the KDC master password in a file + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkssttaasshh [--ee _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----eennccttyyppee==_s_t_r_i_n_g] [--kk _f_i_l_e | ----kkeeyy--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e] + [----ccoonnvveerrtt--ffiillee] [----mmaasstteerr--kkeeyy--ffdd==_f_d] [--hh | ----hheellpp] [----vveerrssiioonn] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkssttaasshh reads the Kerberos master key and stores it in a file that will be + used by the KDC. + + Supported options: + + --ee _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----eennccttyyppee==_s_t_r_i_n_g + the encryption type to use, defaults to DES3-CBC-SHA1 + + --kk _f_i_l_e, ----kkeeyy--ffiillee==_f_i_l_e + the name of the master key file + + ----ccoonnvveerrtt--ffiillee + don't ask for a new master key, just read an old master key file, + and write it back in the new keyfile format + + ----mmaasstteerr--kkeeyy--ffdd==_f_d + filedescriptor to read passphrase from, if not specified the + passphrase will be read from the terminal + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kdc(8) + + HEIMDAL September 1, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa430aa7ce --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: log.c,v 1.14 2002/08/19 12:17:49 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_log_facility *logf; + +void +kdc_openlog(void) +{ + char **s = NULL, **p; + krb5_initlog(context, "kdc", &logf); + s = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "kdc", "logging", NULL); + if(s == NULL) + s = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "logging", "kdc", NULL); + if(s){ + for(p = s; *p; p++) + krb5_addlog_dest(context, logf, *p); + krb5_config_free_strings(s); + }else + krb5_addlog_dest(context, logf, DEFAULT_LOG_DEST); + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, logf); +} + +char* +kdc_log_msg_va(int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *msg; + krb5_vlog_msg(context, logf, &msg, level, fmt, ap); + return msg; +} + +char* +kdc_log_msg(int level, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *s; + va_start(ap, fmt); + s = kdc_log_msg_va(level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return s; +} + +void +kdc_log(int level, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *s; + va_start(ap, fmt); + s = kdc_log_msg_va(level, fmt, ap); + if(s) free(s); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/main.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..32ae20f5c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.27 2002/08/28 21:27:16 joda Exp $"); + +sig_atomic_t exit_flag = 0; +krb5_context context; + +#ifdef HAVE_DAEMON +extern int detach_from_console; +#endif + +static RETSIGTYPE +sigterm(int sig) +{ + exit_flag = 1; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + setprogname(argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + configure(argc, argv); + + if(databases == NULL) { + db = malloc(sizeof(*db)); + num_db = 1; + ret = hdb_create(context, &db[0], NULL); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create %s", HDB_DEFAULT_DB); + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile(context, db[0], NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + } else { + struct dbinfo *d; + int i; + /* count databases */ + for(d = databases, i = 0; d; d = d->next, i++); + db = malloc(i * sizeof(*db)); + for(d = databases, num_db = 0; d; d = d->next, num_db++) { + ret = hdb_create(context, &db[num_db], d->dbname); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create %s", d->dbname); + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile(context, db[num_db], d->mkey_file); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + } + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + { + struct sigaction sa; + + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = sigterm; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + + sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); + sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL); + } +#else + signal(SIGINT, sigterm); + signal(SIGTERM, sigterm); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_DAEMON + if (detach_from_console) + daemon(0, 0); +#endif + pidfile(NULL); + loop(); + krb5_free_context(context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/misc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aebdc6895b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: misc.c,v 1.22 2001/01/30 03:54:21 assar Exp $"); + +struct timeval now; + +krb5_error_code +db_fetch(krb5_principal principal, hdb_entry **h) +{ + hdb_entry *ent; + krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + int i; + + ent = malloc (sizeof (*ent)); + if (ent == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ent->principal = principal; + + for(i = 0; i < num_db; i++) { + ret = db[i]->open(context, db[i], O_RDONLY, 0); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to open database: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + continue; + } + ret = db[i]->fetch(context, db[i], HDB_F_DECRYPT, ent); + db[i]->close(context, db[i]); + if(ret == 0) { + *h = ent; + return 0; + } + } + free(ent); + return ret; +} + +void +free_ent(hdb_entry *ent) +{ + hdb_free_entry (context, ent); + free (ent); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/mit_dump.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/mit_dump.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..336d265791 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/mit_dump.c @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mit_dump.c,v 1.3 2000/08/09 09:57:37 joda Exp $"); + +/* +can have any number of princ stanzas. +format is as follows (only \n indicates newlines) +princ\t%d\t (%d is KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH, always 38) +%d\t (strlen of principal e.g. shadow/foo@ANDREW.CMU.EDU) +%d\t (number of tl_data) +%d\t (number of key data, e.g. how many keys for this user) +%d\t (extra data length) +%s\t (principal name) +%d\t (attributes) +%d\t (max lifetime, seconds) +%d\t (max renewable life, seconds) +%d\t (expiration, seconds since epoch or 2145830400 for never) +%d\t (password expiration, seconds, 0 for never) +%d\t (last successful auth, seconds since epoch) +%d\t (last failed auth, per above) +%d\t (failed auth count) +foreach tl_data 0 to number of tl_data - 1 as above + %d\t%d\t (data type, data length) + foreach tl_data 0 to length-1 + %02x (tl data contents[element n]) + except if tl_data length is 0 + %d (always -1) + \t +foreach key 0 to number of keys - 1 as above + %d\t%d\t (key data version, kvno) + foreach version 0 to key data version - 1 (a key or a salt) + %d\t%d\t(data type for this key, data length for this key) + foreach key data length 0 to length-1 + %02x (key data contents[element n]) + except if key_data length is 0 + %d (always -1) + \t +foreach extra data length 0 to length - 1 + %02x (extra data part) +unless no extra data + %d (always -1) +;\n + +*/ + +static int +hex_to_octet_string(const char *ptr, krb5_data *data) +{ + int i; + unsigned int v; + for(i = 0; i < data->length; i++) { + if(sscanf(ptr + 2 * i, "%02x", &v) != 1) + return -1; + ((unsigned char*)data->data)[i] = v; + } + return 2 * i; +} + +static char * +nexttoken(char **p) +{ + char *q; + do { + q = strsep(p, " \t"); + } while(q && *q == '\0'); + return q; +} + +static size_t +getdata(char **p, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + int v; + char *q = nexttoken(p); + i = 0; + while(*q && i < len) { + if(sscanf(q, "%02x", &v) != 1) + break; + buf[i++] = v; + q += 2; + } + return i; +} + +static int +getint(char **p) +{ + int val; + char *q = nexttoken(p); + sscanf(q, "%d", &val); + return val; +} + +#include + +static void +attr_to_flags(unsigned attr, HDBFlags *flags) +{ + flags->postdate = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED); + flags->forwardable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE); + flags->initial = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED); + flags->renewable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE); + flags->proxiable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE); + /* DUP_SKEY */ + flags->invalid = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + flags->require_preauth = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + /* HW_AUTH */ + flags->server = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR); + flags->change_pw = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE); + flags->client = 1; /* XXX */ +} + +#define KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL 0 +#define KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4 1 +#define KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NOREALM 2 +#define KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_ONLYREALM 3 +#define KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_SPECIAL 4 +#define KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_AFS3 5 + +static krb5_error_code +fix_salt(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, int key_num) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + Salt *salt = ent->keys.val[key_num].salt; + /* fix salt type */ + switch((int)salt->type) { + case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL: + salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + break; + case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4: + krb5_data_free(&salt->salt); + salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + break; + case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NOREALM: + { + size_t len; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *p; + + len = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ent->principal->name.name_string.len; ++i) + len += strlen(ent->principal->name.name_string.val[i]); + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&salt->salt, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + p = salt->salt.data; + for (i = 0; i < ent->principal->name.name_string.len; ++i) { + memcpy (p, + ent->principal->name.name_string.val[i], + strlen(ent->principal->name.name_string.val[i])); + p += strlen(ent->principal->name.name_string.val[i]); + } + + salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + break; + } + case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_ONLYREALM: + krb5_data_free(&salt->salt); + ret = krb5_data_copy(&salt->salt, + ent->principal->realm, + strlen(ent->principal->realm)); + if(ret) + return ret; + salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + break; + case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_SPECIAL: + salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + break; + case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_AFS3: + krb5_data_free(&salt->salt); + ret = krb5_data_copy(&salt->salt, + ent->principal->realm, + strlen(ent->principal->realm)); + if(ret) + return ret; + salt->type = KRB5_PADATA_AFS3_SALT; + break; + default: + abort(); + } + return 0; +} + +int +mit_prop_dump(void *arg, const char *file) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char buf [1024]; + FILE *f; + int lineno = 0; + struct hdb_entry ent; + + struct prop_data *pd = arg; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return errno; + + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + char *p = buf, *q; + + int i; + + int num_tl_data; + int num_key_data; + int extra_data_length; + int attributes; + + int tmp; + + lineno++; + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + + q = nexttoken(&p); + if(strcmp(q, "kdb5_util") == 0) { + int major; + q = nexttoken(&p); /* load_dump */ + if(strcmp(q, "load_dump")) + errx(1, "line %d: unknown version", lineno); + q = nexttoken(&p); /* load_dump */ + if(strcmp(q, "version")) + errx(1, "line %d: unknown version", lineno); + q = nexttoken(&p); /* x.0 */ + if(sscanf(q, "%d", &major) != 1) + errx(1, "line %d: unknown version", lineno); + if(major != 4) + errx(1, "unknown dump file format, got %d, expected 4", major); + continue; + } else if(strcmp(q, "princ") != 0) { + warnx("line %d: not a principal", lineno); + continue; + } + tmp = getint(&p); + if(tmp != 38) { + warnx("line %d: bad base length %d != 38", lineno, tmp); + continue; + } + q = nexttoken(&p); /* length of principal */ + num_tl_data = getint(&p); /* number of tl-data */ + num_key_data = getint(&p); /* number of key-data */ + extra_data_length = getint(&p); /* length of extra data */ + q = nexttoken(&p); /* principal name */ + krb5_parse_name(pd->context, q, &ent.principal); + attributes = getint(&p); /* attributes */ + attr_to_flags(attributes, &ent.flags); + tmp = getint(&p); /* max life */ + if(tmp != 0) { + ALLOC(ent.max_life); + *ent.max_life = tmp; + } + tmp = getint(&p); /* max renewable life */ + if(tmp != 0) { + ALLOC(ent.max_renew); + *ent.max_renew = tmp; + } + tmp = getint(&p); /* expiration */ + if(tmp != 0 && tmp != 2145830400) { + ALLOC(ent.valid_end); + *ent.valid_end = tmp; + } + tmp = getint(&p); /* pw expiration */ + if(tmp != 0) { + ALLOC(ent.pw_end); + *ent.pw_end = tmp; + } + q = nexttoken(&p); /* last auth */ + q = nexttoken(&p); /* last failed auth */ + q = nexttoken(&p); /* fail auth count */ + for(i = 0; i < num_tl_data; i++) { + unsigned long val; + int tl_type, tl_length; + unsigned char *buf; + krb5_principal princ; + + tl_type = getint(&p); /* data type */ + tl_length = getint(&p); /* data length */ + +#define KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE 1 +#define KRB5_TL_MOD_PRINC 2 + switch(tl_type) { + case KRB5_TL_MOD_PRINC: + buf = malloc(tl_length); + getdata(&p, buf, tl_length); /* data itself */ + val = buf[0] | (buf[1] << 8) | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24); + ret = krb5_parse_name(pd->context, buf + 4, &princ); + free(buf); + ALLOC(ent.modified_by); + ent.modified_by->time = val; + ent.modified_by->principal = princ; + break; + default: + nexttoken(&p); + break; + } + } + ALLOC_SEQ(&ent.keys, num_key_data); + for(i = 0; i < num_key_data; i++) { + int key_versions; + key_versions = getint(&p); /* key data version */ + ent.kvno = getint(&p); /* XXX kvno */ + + ALLOC(ent.keys.val[i].mkvno); + *ent.keys.val[i].mkvno = 0; + + /* key version 0 -- actual key */ + ent.keys.val[i].key.keytype = getint(&p); /* key type */ + tmp = getint(&p); /* key length */ + /* the first two bytes of the key is the key length -- + skip it */ + krb5_data_alloc(&ent.keys.val[i].key.keyvalue, tmp - 2); + q = nexttoken(&p); /* key itself */ + hex_to_octet_string(q + 4, &ent.keys.val[i].key.keyvalue); + + if(key_versions > 1) { + /* key version 1 -- optional salt */ + ALLOC(ent.keys.val[i].salt); + ent.keys.val[i].salt->type = getint(&p); /* salt type */ + tmp = getint(&p); /* salt length */ + if(tmp > 0) { + krb5_data_alloc(&ent.keys.val[i].salt->salt, tmp - 2); + q = nexttoken(&p); /* salt itself */ + hex_to_octet_string(q + 4, &ent.keys.val[i].salt->salt); + } else { + ent.keys.val[i].salt->salt.length = 0; + ent.keys.val[i].salt->salt.data = NULL; + tmp = getint(&p); /* -1, if no data. */ + } + fix_salt(pd->context, &ent, i); + } + } + q = nexttoken(&p); /* extra data */ + v5_prop(pd->context, NULL, &ent, arg); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/rx.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/rx.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab8ec80523 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/rx.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: rx.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __RX_H__ +#define __RX_H__ + +/* header of a RPC packet */ + +enum rx_header_type { + HT_DATA = 1, + HT_ACK = 2, + HT_BUSY = 3, + HT_ABORT = 4, + HT_ACKALL = 5, + HT_CHAL = 6, + HT_RESP = 7, + HT_DEBUG = 8 +}; + +/* For flags in header */ + +enum rx_header_flag { + HF_CLIENT_INITIATED = 1, + HF_REQ_ACK = 2, + HF_LAST = 4, + HF_MORE = 8 +}; + +struct rx_header { + u_int32_t epoch; + u_int32_t connid; /* And channel ID */ + u_int32_t callid; + u_int32_t seqno; + u_int32_t serialno; + u_char type; + u_char flags; + u_char status; + u_char secindex; + u_int16_t reserved; /* ??? verifier? */ + u_int16_t serviceid; +/* This should be the other way around according to everything but */ +/* tcpdump */ +}; + +#define RX_HEADER_SIZE 28 + +#endif /* __RX_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc9d63b5f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.8 @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: string2key.8,v 1.6 2003/02/16 21:10:21 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 4, 2000 +.Dt STRING2KEY 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm string2key +.Nd map a password into a key +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 5 | Fl -version5 +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -version4 +.Op Fl a | Fl -afs +.Oo Fl c Ar cell \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -cell= Ns Ar cell +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl w Ar password \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -password= Ns Ar password +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl p Ar principal \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -principal= Ns Ar principal +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl k Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytype= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Ar password +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +performs the string-to-key function. +This is useful when you want to handle the raw key instead of the password. +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 5 , +.Fl -version5 +.Xc +Output Kerberos v5 string-to-key +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -version4 +.Xc +Output Kerberos v4 string-to-key +.It Xo +.Fl a , +.Fl -afs +.Xc +Output AFS string-to-key +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar cell , +.Fl -cell= Ns Ar cell +.Xc +AFS cell to use +.It Xo +.Fl w Ar password , +.Fl -password= Ns Ar password +.Xc +Password to use +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar principal , +.Fl -principal= Ns Ar principal +.Xc +Kerberos v5 principal to use +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar string , +.Fl -keytype= Ns Ar string +.Xc +Keytype +.It Xo +.Fl -version +.Xc +print version +.It Xo +.Fl -help +.Xc +.El diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a38442be9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.c @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "headers.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: string2key.c,v 1.20 2003/03/25 12:28:52 joda Exp $"); + +int version5; +int version4; +int afs; +char *principal; +char *cell; +char *password; +const char *keytype_str = "des3-cbc-sha1"; +int version; +int help; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version5", '5', arg_flag, &version5, "Output Kerberos v5 string-to-key" }, + { "version4", '4', arg_flag, &version4, "Output Kerberos v4 string-to-key" }, + { "afs", 'a', arg_flag, &afs, "Output AFS string-to-key" }, + { "cell", 'c', arg_string, &cell, "AFS cell to use", "cell" }, + { "password", 'w', arg_string, &password, "Password to use", "password" }, + { "principal",'p', arg_string, &principal, "Kerberos v5 principal to use", "principal" }, + { "keytype", 'k', arg_string, &keytype_str, "Keytype" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version, "print version" }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help, NULL } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int status) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "password"); + exit(status); +} + +static void +tokey(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_salt salt, + const char *label) +{ + int i; + krb5_keyblock key; + char *e; + krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, enctype, password, salt, &key); + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enctype, &e); + printf(label, e); + printf(": "); + for(i = 0; i < key.keyvalue.length; i++) + printf("%02x", ((unsigned char*)key.keyvalue.data)[i]); + printf("\n"); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_salt salt; + int optind; + char buf[1024]; + krb5_enctype etype; + krb5_error_code ret; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help) + usage(0); + + if(version){ + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage(1); + + if(!version5 && !version4 && !afs) + version5 = 1; + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, keytype_str, &etype); + if(ret) { + krb5_keytype keytype; + int *etypes; + unsigned num; + ret = krb5_string_to_keytype(context, keytype_str, &keytype); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", keytype_str); + ret = krb5_keytype_to_enctypes(context, keytype, &num, &etypes); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", keytype_str); + if(num == 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "there are no encryption types for that keytype"); + etype = etypes[0]; + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, etype, &keytype_str); + if(num > 1 && version5) + krb5_warnx(context, "ambiguous keytype, using %s", keytype_str); + } + + if((etype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC && + etype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 && + etype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) && + (afs || version4)) { + if(!version5) { + etype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + } else { + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "DES is the only valid keytype for AFS and Kerberos 4"); + } + } + + if(version5 && principal == NULL){ + printf("Kerberos v5 principal: "); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + principal = estrdup(buf); + } + if(afs && cell == NULL){ + printf("AFS cell: "); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + cell = estrdup(buf); + } + if(argv[0]) + password = argv[0]; + if(password == NULL){ + if(des_read_pw_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "Password: ", 0)) + return 1; + password = buf; + } + + if(version5){ + krb5_parse_name(context, principal, &princ); + krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ, &salt); + tokey(context, etype, password, salt, "Kerberos 5 (%s)"); + krb5_free_salt(context, salt); + } + if(version4){ + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + tokey(context, ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, password, salt, "Kerberos 4"); + } + if(afs){ + salt.salttype = KRB5_AFS3_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.length = strlen(cell); + salt.saltvalue.data = cell; + tokey(context, ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, password, salt, "AFS"); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d70e150b50 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/string2key.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ + +STRING2KEY(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual STRING2KEY(8) + +NNAAMMEE + ssttrriinngg22kkeeyy - map a password into a key + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + ssttrriinngg22kkeeyy [--55 | ----vveerrssiioonn55] [--44 | ----vveerrssiioonn44] [--aa | ----aaffss] [--cc _c_e_l_l | + ----cceellll==_c_e_l_l] [--ww _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d | ----ppaasssswwoorrdd==_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d] [--pp _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l | + ----pprriinncciippaall==_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [--kk _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----kkeeyyttyyppee==_s_t_r_i_n_g] _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + ssttrriinngg22kkeeyy performs the string-to-key function. This is useful when you + want to handle the raw key instead of the password. Supported options: + + --55, ----vveerrssiioonn55 + Output Kerberos v5 string-to-key + + --44, ----vveerrssiioonn44 + Output Kerberos v4 string-to-key + + --aa, ----aaffss + Output AFS string-to-key + + --cc _c_e_l_l, ----cceellll==_c_e_l_l + AFS cell to use + + --ww _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d, ----ppaasssswwoorrdd==_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d + Password to use + + --pp _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, ----pprriinncciippaall==_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l + Kerberos v5 principal to use + + --kk _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----kkeeyyttyyppee==_s_t_r_i_n_g + Keytype + + ----vveerrssiioonn + print version + + ----hheellpp + + HEIMDAL March 4, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/v4_dump.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/v4_dump.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ddf8222bce --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kdc/v4_dump.c @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: v4_dump.c,v 1.4.8.1 2003/04/28 12:24:54 lha Exp $"); + +static time_t +time_parse(const char *cp) +{ + char wbuf[5]; + struct tm tp; + int local; + + memset(&tp, 0, sizeof(tp)); /* clear out the struct */ + + /* new format is YYYYMMDDHHMM UTC, + old format is YYMMDDHHMM local time */ + if (strlen(cp) > 10) { /* new format */ + strlcpy(wbuf, cp, sizeof(wbuf)); + tp.tm_year = atoi(wbuf) - 1900; + cp += 4; + local = 0; + } else { + wbuf[0] = *cp++; + wbuf[1] = *cp++; + wbuf[2] = '\0'; + tp.tm_year = atoi(wbuf); + if(tp.tm_year < 38) + tp.tm_year += 100; + local = 1; + } + + wbuf[0] = *cp++; + wbuf[1] = *cp++; + wbuf[2] = 0; + tp.tm_mon = atoi(wbuf) - 1; + + wbuf[0] = *cp++; + wbuf[1] = *cp++; + tp.tm_mday = atoi(wbuf); + + wbuf[0] = *cp++; + wbuf[1] = *cp++; + tp.tm_hour = atoi(wbuf); + + wbuf[0] = *cp++; + wbuf[1] = *cp++; + tp.tm_min = atoi(wbuf); + + return(tm2time(tp, local)); +} + +/* convert a version 4 dump file */ +int +v4_prop_dump(void *arg, const char *file) +{ + char buf [1024]; + FILE *f; + int lineno = 0; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return errno; + + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + int ret; + unsigned long key[2]; /* yes, long */ + char exp_date[64], mod_date[64]; + struct v4_principal pr; + int attributes; + + memset(&pr, 0, sizeof(pr)); + errno = 0; + lineno++; + ret = sscanf(buf, "%63s %63s %d %d %d %d %lx %lx %63s %63s %63s %63s", + pr.name, pr.instance, + &pr.max_life, &pr.mkvno, &pr.kvno, + &attributes, + &key[0], &key[1], + exp_date, mod_date, + pr.mod_name, pr.mod_instance); + if(ret != 12){ + warnx("Line %d malformed (ignored)", lineno); + continue; + } + if(attributes != 0) { + warnx("Line %d (%s.%s) has non-zero attributes - skipping", + lineno, pr.name, pr.instance); + continue; + } + pr.key[0] = (key[0] >> 24) & 0xff; + pr.key[1] = (key[0] >> 16) & 0xff; + pr.key[2] = (key[0] >> 8) & 0xff; + pr.key[3] = (key[0] >> 0) & 0xff; + pr.key[4] = (key[1] >> 24) & 0xff; + pr.key[5] = (key[1] >> 16) & 0xff; + pr.key[6] = (key[1] >> 8) & 0xff; + pr.key[7] = (key[1] >> 0) & 0xff; + pr.exp_date = time_parse(exp_date); + pr.mod_date = time_parse(mod_date); + if (pr.instance[0] == '*') + pr.instance[0] = '\0'; + if (pr.mod_name[0] == '*') + pr.mod_name[0] = '\0'; + if (pr.mod_instance[0] == '*') + pr.mod_instance[0] = '\0'; + v4_prop(arg, &pr); + memset(&pr, 0, sizeof(pr)); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e287a9c37 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 2001/08/28 08:31:29 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_des) + +man_MANS = kpasswd.1 kpasswdd.8 + +bin_PROGRAMS = kpasswd + +kpasswd_SOURCES = kpasswd.c kpasswd_locl.h + +libexec_PROGRAMS = kpasswdd + +noinst_PROGRAMS = kpasswd-generator + +kpasswdd_SOURCES = kpasswdd.c kpasswd_locl.h + +kpasswdd_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + $(LDADD) \ + $(LIB_pidfile) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) \ + $(DBLIB) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f29cde7f41 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,932 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 2001/08/28 08:31:29 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(kpasswd_SOURCES) kpasswd-generator.c 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"$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..202dcfc877 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd-generator.c @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kpasswd_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kpasswd-generator.c,v 1.5 2001/07/31 02:44:42 assar Exp $"); + +static unsigned +read_words (const char *filename, char ***ret_w) +{ + unsigned n, alloc; + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + char **w = NULL; + + f = fopen (filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + err (1, "cannot open %s", filename); + alloc = n = 0; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + if (buf[strlen (buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen (buf) - 1] = '\0'; + if (n >= alloc) { + alloc += 16; + w = erealloc (w, alloc * sizeof(char **)); + } + w[n++] = estrdup (buf); + } + *ret_w = w; + return n; +} + +static int +nop_prompter (krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *name, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void +generate_requests (const char *filename, unsigned nreq) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + char **words; + unsigned nwords; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + nwords = read_words (filename, &words); + + for (i = 0; i < nreq; ++i) { + char *name = words[rand() % nwords]; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_principal principal; + int result_code; + krb5_data result_code_string, result_string; + char *old_pwd, *new_pwd; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&opt, 300); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable (&opt, FALSE); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (&opt, FALSE); + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, name, &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", name); + + asprintf (&old_pwd, "%s", name); + asprintf (&new_pwd, "%s2", name); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + old_pwd, + nop_prompter, + NULL, + 0, + "kadmin/changepw", + &opt); + if( ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY + || ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) { + char *tmp; + + tmp = new_pwd; + new_pwd = old_pwd; + old_pwd = tmp; + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + old_pwd, + nop_prompter, + NULL, + 0, + "kadmin/changepw", + &opt); + } + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds_password"); + + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + + ret = krb5_change_password (context, &cred, new_pwd, + &result_code, + &result_code_string, + &result_string); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_change_password"); + + free (old_pwd); + free (new_pwd); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + } +} + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "file [number]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int nreq; + char *end; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + return 0; + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 2) + usage (1); + srand (0); + nreq = strtol (argv[1], &end, 0); + if (argv[1] == end || *end != '\0') + usage (1); + generate_requests (argv[0], nreq); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c2e26c143 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kpasswd.1,v 1.5 2003/02/16 21:10:22 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 27, 1997 +.Dt KPASSWD 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kpasswd +.Nd Kerberos 5 password changing program +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Ar principal +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is the client for changing passwords. +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +If the password quality check fails or some other error occurs, an +explanation is printed. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kpasswdd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..02f9557925 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kpasswd_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kpasswd.c,v 1.24 2001/09/27 01:29:40 assar Exp $"); + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret, struct getargs *a, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage (a, num_args, NULL, "[principal]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal principal; + int optind = 0; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_creds cred; + int result_code; + krb5_data result_code_string, result_string; + char pwbuf[BUFSIZ]; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, + args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), usage); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version (NULL); + exit(0); + } + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&opt, 300); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable (&opt, FALSE); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (&opt, FALSE); + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage (1, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(argv[0]) { + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, argv[0], &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + } else + principal = NULL; + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + NULL, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + "kadmin/changepw", + &opt); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + break; + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR : + return 1; + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY : + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED : + krb5_errx(context, 1, "Password incorrect"); + break; + default: + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + } + + krb5_data_zero (&result_code_string); + krb5_data_zero (&result_string); + + if(des_read_pw_string (pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), "New password: ", 1) != 0) + return 1; + + ret = krb5_change_password (context, &cred, pwbuf, + &result_code, + &result_code_string, + &result_string); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_change_password"); + + printf ("%s%s%.*s\n", krb5_passwd_result_to_string(context, + result_code), + result_string.length > 0 ? " : " : "", + (int)result_string.length, + (char *)result_string.data); + + krb5_data_free (&result_code_string); + krb5_data_free (&result_string); + + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + krb5_free_context (context); + return result_code; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b307e117eb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ + +KPASSWD(1) UNIX Reference Manual KPASSWD(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkppaasssswwdd - Kerberos 5 password changing program + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkppaasssswwdd [_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkppaasssswwdd is the client for changing passwords. + +DDIIAAGGNNOOSSTTIICCSS + If the password quality check fails or some other error occurs, an expla- + nation is printed. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kpasswdd(8) + + HEIMDAL August 27, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c254f6f20f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kpasswd_locl.h,v 1.13 2002/09/10 20:03:48 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KPASSWD_LOCL_H__ +#define __KPASSWD_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "crypto-headers.h" /* for des_read_pw_string */ + +#endif /* __KPASSWD_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..899b3a35c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +.\" $Id: kpasswdd.8,v 1.8 2003/02/04 21:48:01 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 19, 1999 +.Dt KPASSWDD 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kpasswdd +.Nd Kerberos 5 password changing server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl -check-library= Ns Ar library +.Op Fl -check-function= Ns Ar function +.Oo Fl k Ar kspec \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar kspec +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl r Ar realm \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl p Ar string \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -port= Ns Ar string +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +serves request for password changes. It listens on UDP port 464 +(service kpasswd) and processes requests when they arrive. It changes +the database directly and should thus only run on the master KDC. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl -check-library= Ns Ar library +.Xc +If your system has support for dynamic loading of shared libraries, +you can use an external function to check password quality. This +option specifies which library to load. +.It Xo +.Fl -check-function= Ns Ar function +.Xc +This is the function to call in the loaded library. The function +should look like this: +.Pp +.Ft const char * +.Fn passwd_check "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" "krb5_data *password" +.Pp +.Fa context +is an initialized context; +.Fa principal +is the one who tries to change passwords, and +.Fa password +is the new password. Note that the password (in +.Fa password->data ) +is not zero terminated. +.It Xo +.Fl k Ar kspec , +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar kspec +.Xc +Keytab to get authentication key from +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar realm , +.Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Xc +Default realm +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar string , +.Fl -port= Ns Ar string +.Xc +Port to listen on (default service kpasswd - 464). +.El +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +If an error occurs, the error message is returned to the user and/or +logged to syslog. +.Sh BUGS +The default password quality checks are too basic. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kpasswd 1 , +.Xr kdc 8 +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh SEE ALSO +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b3373296f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c @@ -0,0 +1,612 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kpasswd_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kpasswdd.c,v 1.54 2002/12/02 14:31:52 joda Exp $"); + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_log_facility *log_facility; + +static sig_atomic_t exit_flag = 0; + +static void +send_reply (int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + krb5_data *ap_rep, + krb5_data *rest) +{ + struct msghdr msghdr; + struct iovec iov[3]; + u_int16_t len, ap_rep_len; + u_char header[6]; + u_char *p; + + if (ap_rep) + ap_rep_len = ap_rep->length; + else + ap_rep_len = 0; + + len = 6 + ap_rep_len + rest->length; + p = header; + *p++ = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = (ap_rep_len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (ap_rep_len >> 0) & 0xFF; + + memset (&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + msghdr.msg_name = (void *)sa; + msghdr.msg_namelen = sa_size; + msghdr.msg_iov = iov; + msghdr.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov)/sizeof(*iov); +#if 0 + msghdr.msg_control = NULL; + msghdr.msg_controllen = 0; +#endif + + iov[0].iov_base = (char *)header; + iov[0].iov_len = 6; + if (ap_rep_len) { + iov[1].iov_base = ap_rep->data; + iov[1].iov_len = ap_rep->length; + } else { + iov[1].iov_base = NULL; + iov[1].iov_len = 0; + } + iov[2].iov_base = rest->data; + iov[2].iov_len = rest->length; + + if (sendmsg (s, &msghdr, 0) < 0) + krb5_warn (context, errno, "sendmsg"); +} + +static int +make_result (krb5_data *data, + u_int16_t result_code, + const char *expl) +{ + krb5_data_zero (data); + + data->length = asprintf ((char **)&data->data, + "%c%c%s", + (result_code >> 8) & 0xFF, + result_code & 0xFF, + expl); + + if (data->data == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "Out of memory generating error reply"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +reply_error (krb5_principal server, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + krb5_error_code error_code, + u_int16_t result_code, + const char *expl) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data error_data; + krb5_data e_data; + + if (make_result(&e_data, result_code, expl)) + return; + + ret = krb5_mk_error (context, + error_code, + NULL, + &e_data, + NULL, + server, + NULL, + NULL, + &error_data); + krb5_data_free (&e_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "Could not even generate error reply"); + return; + } + send_reply (s, sa, sa_size, NULL, &error_data); + krb5_data_free (&error_data); +} + +static void +reply_priv (krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + u_int16_t result_code, + const char *expl) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + krb5_data ap_rep_data; + krb5_data e_data; + + ret = krb5_mk_rep (context, + auth_context, + &ap_rep_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "Could not even generate error reply"); + return; + } + + if (make_result(&e_data, result_code, expl)) + return; + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &e_data, + &krb_priv_data, + NULL); + krb5_data_free (&e_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "Could not even generate error reply"); + return; + } + send_reply (s, sa, sa_size, &ap_rep_data, &krb_priv_data); + krb5_data_free (&ap_rep_data); + krb5_data_free (&krb_priv_data); +} + +/* + * Change the password for `principal', sending the reply back on `s' + * (`sa', `sa_size') to `pwd_data'. + */ + +static void +change (krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_principal principal, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + krb5_data *pwd_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *client; + const char *pwd_reason; + kadm5_config_params conf; + void *kadm5_handle; + char *tmp; + + memset (&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + + krb5_unparse_name (context, principal, &client); + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm5_handle); + if (ret) { + free (client); + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + return; + } + + krb5_warnx (context, "Changing password for %s", client); + free (client); + + pwd_reason = kadm5_check_password_quality (context, principal, pwd_data); + if (pwd_reason != NULL ) { + krb5_warnx (context, "%s", pwd_reason); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 4, pwd_reason); + kadm5_destroy (kadm5_handle); + return; + } + + tmp = malloc (pwd_data->length + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + goto out; + } + memcpy (tmp, pwd_data->data, pwd_data->length); + tmp[pwd_data->length] = '\0'; + + ret = kadm5_s_chpass_principal_cond (kadm5_handle, principal, tmp); + memset (tmp, 0, pwd_data->length); + free (tmp); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_s_chpass_principal_cond"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + goto out; + } + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 0, "Password changed"); +out: + kadm5_destroy (kadm5_handle); +} + +static int +verify (krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket, + krb5_data *out_data, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + u_char *msg, + size_t len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int16_t pkt_len, pkt_ver, ap_req_len; + krb5_data ap_req_data; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + + pkt_len = (msg[0] << 8) | (msg[1]); + pkt_ver = (msg[2] << 8) | (msg[3]); + ap_req_len = (msg[4] << 8) | (msg[5]); + if (pkt_len != len) { + krb5_warnx (context, "Strange len: %ld != %ld", + (long)pkt_len, (long)len); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, 0, 1, "Bad request"); + return 1; + } + if (pkt_ver != 0x0001) { + krb5_warnx (context, "Bad version (%d)", pkt_ver); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, 0, 1, "Wrong program version"); + return 1; + } + + ap_req_data.data = msg + 6; + ap_req_data.length = ap_req_len; + + ret = krb5_rd_req (context, + auth_context, + &ap_req_data, + server, + keytab, + NULL, + ticket); + if (ret) { + if(ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { + char *name; + krb5_unparse_name(context, server, &name); + krb5_warnx (context, "krb5_rd_req: %s (%s)", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret), name); + free(name); + } else + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_rd_req"); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, ret, 3, "Authentication failed"); + return 1; + } + + if (!(*ticket)->ticket.flags.initial) { + krb5_warnx (context, "initial flag not set"); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, ret, 1, + "Bad request"); + goto out; + } + krb_priv_data.data = msg + 6 + ap_req_len; + krb_priv_data.length = len - 6 - ap_req_len; + + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, + *auth_context, + &krb_priv_data, + out_data, + NULL); + + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_rd_priv"); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, ret, 3, "Bad request"); + goto out; + } + return 0; +out: + krb5_free_ticket (context, *ticket); + return 1; +} + +static void +process (krb5_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int s, + krb5_address *this_addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + u_char *msg, + int len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_data out_data; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + krb5_address other_addr; + + krb5_data_zero (&out_data); + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + return; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setflags (context, auth_context, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE); + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, sa, &other_addr); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_sockaddr2address"); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + this_addr, + &other_addr); + krb5_free_address (context, &other_addr); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + goto out; + } + + if (verify (&auth_context, server, keytab, &ticket, &out_data, + s, sa, sa_size, msg, len) == 0) { + change (auth_context, + ticket->client, + s, + sa, sa_size, + &out_data); + memset (out_data.data, 0, out_data.length); + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + free (ticket); + } + +out: + krb5_data_free (&out_data); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); +} + +static int +doit (krb5_keytab keytab, int port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal server; + int *sockets; + int maxfd; + char *realm; + krb5_addresses addrs; + unsigned n, i; + fd_set real_fdset; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + + ret = krb5_get_default_realm (context, &realm); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_default_realm"); + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &server, + strlen(realm), + realm, + "kadmin", + "changepw", + NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_build_principal"); + + free (realm); + + ret = krb5_get_all_server_addrs (context, &addrs); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_all_server_addrs"); + + n = addrs.len; + + sockets = malloc (n * sizeof(*sockets)); + if (sockets == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "out of memory"); + maxfd = -1; + FD_ZERO(&real_fdset); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + int sa_size = sizeof(__ss); + + krb5_addr2sockaddr (context, &addrs.val[i], sa, &sa_size, port); + + sockets[i] = socket (sa->sa_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (sockets[i] < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket"); + if (bind (sockets[i], sa, sa_size) < 0) { + char str[128]; + size_t len; + int save_errno = errno; + + ret = krb5_print_address (&addrs.val[i], str, sizeof(str), &len); + if (ret) + strlcpy(str, "unknown address", sizeof(str)); + krb5_warn (context, save_errno, "bind(%s)", str); + continue; + } + maxfd = max (maxfd, sockets[i]); + if (maxfd >= FD_SETSIZE) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(sockets[i], &real_fdset); + } + if (maxfd == -1) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "No sockets!"); + + while(exit_flag == 0) { + int ret; + fd_set fdset = real_fdset; + + ret = select (maxfd + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "select"); + } + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i], &fdset)) { + u_char buf[BUFSIZ]; + socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(__ss); + + ret = recvfrom (sockets[i], buf, sizeof(buf), 0, + sa, &addrlen); + if (ret < 0) { + if(errno == EINTR) + break; + else + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "recvfrom"); + } + + process (server, keytab, sockets[i], + &addrs.val[i], + sa, addrlen, + buf, ret); + } + } + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addrs); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + krb5_free_context (context); + return 0; +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +sigterm(int sig) +{ + exit_flag = 1; +} + +const char *check_library = NULL; +const char *check_function = NULL; +char *keytab_str = "HDB:"; +char *realm_str; +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +char *port_str; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN + { "check-library", 0, arg_string, &check_library, + "library to load password check function from", "library" }, + { "check-function", 0, arg_string, &check_function, + "password check function to load", "function" }, +#endif + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &keytab_str, + "keytab to get authentication key from", "kspec" }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm_str, "default realm", "realm" }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_error_code ret; + int port; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(realm_str) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm_str); + + krb5_openlog (context, "kpasswdd", &log_facility); + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, log_facility); + + if (port_str != NULL) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "udp"); + + if (s != NULL) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } else + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kpasswd", "udp", KPASSWD_PORT); + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", keytab_str); + + kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check (context, check_library, check_function); + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + { + struct sigaction sa; + + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = sigterm; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + + sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); + sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL); + } +#else + signal(SIGINT, sigterm); + signal(SIGTERM, sigterm); +#endif + + pidfile(NULL); + + return doit (keytab, port); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55d12a2b30 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kpasswd/kpasswdd.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ + +KPASSWDD(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KPASSWDD(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkppaasssswwdddd - Kerberos 5 password changing server + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkppaasssswwdddd [----cchheecckk--lliibbrraarryy==_l_i_b_r_a_r_y] [----cchheecckk--ffuunnccttiioonn==_f_u_n_c_t_i_o_n] [--kk _k_s_p_e_c + | ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_s_p_e_c] [--rr _r_e_a_l_m | ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m] [--pp _s_t_r_i_n_g | ----ppoorrtt==_s_t_r_i_n_g] + [----vveerrssiioonn] [----hheellpp] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkppaasssswwdddd serves request for password changes. It listens on UDP port 464 + (service kpasswd) and processes requests when they arrive. It changes the + database directly and should thus only run on the master KDC. + + Supported options: + + ----cchheecckk--lliibbrraarryy==_l_i_b_r_a_r_y + If your system has support for dynamic loading of shared li- + braries, you can use an external function to check password qual- + ity. This option specifies which library to load. + + ----cchheecckk--ffuunnccttiioonn==_f_u_n_c_t_i_o_n + This is the function to call in the loaded library. The function + should look like this: + + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _* ppaasssswwdd__cchheecckk(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l + _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d) + + _c_o_n_t_e_x_t is an initialized context; _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l is the one who tries + to change passwords, and _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d is the new password. Note that + the password (in _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d_-_>_d_a_t_a) is not zero terminated. + + --kk _k_s_p_e_c, ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_s_p_e_c + Keytab to get authentication key from + + --rr _r_e_a_l_m, ----rreeaallmm==_r_e_a_l_m + Default realm + + --pp _s_t_r_i_n_g, ----ppoorrtt==_s_t_r_i_n_g + Port to listen on (default service kpasswd - 464). + +DDIIAAGGNNOOSSTTIICCSS + If an error occurs, the error message is returned to the user and/or + logged to syslog. + +BBUUGGSS + The default password quality checks are too basic. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kpasswd(1), kdc(8) + + HEIMDAL April 19, 1999 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/krb5.conf b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/krb5.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c9f4c44a5e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/krb5.conf @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +[libdefaults] + default_realm = MY.REALM + clockskew = 300 + v4_instance_resolve = false + v4_name_convert = { + host = { + rcmd = host + ftp = ftp + } + plain = { + something = something-else + } + } + +[realms] + MY.REALM = { + kdc = MY.COMPUTER + } + OTHER.REALM = { + v4_instance_convert = { + kerberos = kerberos + computer = computer.some.other.domain + } + } +[domain_realm] + .my.domain = MY.REALM diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e33b948671 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.31 2003/03/18 13:15:27 lha Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) -I$(srcdir)/../lib/krb5 + +man_MANS = kinit.1 klist.1 kdestroy.1 kgetcred.1 + +bin_PROGRAMS = kinit klist kdestroy kgetcred + +noinst_PROGRAMS = kverify kdecode_ticket generate-requests + +kinit_LDADD = \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) + +kdestroy_LDADD = $(kinit_LDADD) + +klist_LDADD = $(kinit_LDADD) + +LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) + +# make sure install-exec-hook doesn't have any commands in Makefile.am.common +install-exec-hook: + (cd $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) && rm -f kauth && $(LN_S) kinit kauth) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01e24a6677 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,893 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.31 2003/03/18 13:15:27 lha Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = generate-requests.c kdecode_ticket.c kdestroy.c kgetcred.c kinit.c klist.c kverify.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : 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Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: generate-requests.c,v 1.4 2001/08/24 01:07:22 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +null_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + return ENOTTY; +} + +static unsigned +read_words (const char *filename, char ***ret_w) +{ + unsigned n, alloc; + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + char **w = NULL; + + f = fopen (filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + err (1, "cannot open %s", filename); + alloc = n = 0; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + if (buf[strlen (buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen (buf) - 1] = '\0'; + if (n >= alloc) { + alloc += 16; + w = erealloc (w, alloc * sizeof(char **)); + } + w[n++] = estrdup (buf); + } + *ret_w = w; + return n; +} + +static void +generate_requests (const char *filename, unsigned nreq) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cred; + int i; + char **words; + unsigned nwords; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + nwords = read_words (filename, &words); + + for (i = 0; i < nreq; ++i) { + char *name = words[rand() % nwords]; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, name, &cred.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", name); + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, cred.client); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &cred.server, *client_realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + null_key_proc, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &cred, NULL); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + } +} + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "file number"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int nreq; + char *end; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 2) + usage (1); + srand (0); + nreq = strtol (argv[1], &end, 0); + if (argv[1] == end || *end != '\0') + usage (1); + generate_requests (argv[0], nreq); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kauth_options.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kauth_options.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c432d32ac1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kauth_options.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kauth_options.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +int do_afslog = 1; +int get_v4_tgt = 1; +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74ca5af88e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kdecode_ticket.c,v 1.5 2001/02/20 01:44:51 assar Exp $"); + +static char *etype_str; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static void +print_and_decode_tkt (krb5_context context, + krb5_data *ticket, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_enctype enctype) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_data dec_data; + size_t len; + EncTicketPart decr_part; + krb5_keyblock key; + Ticket tkt; + + ret = decode_Ticket (ticket->data, ticket->length, &tkt, &len); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "decode_Ticket"); + + ret = krb5_string_to_key (context, enctype, "foo", server, &key); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_string_to_key"); + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_crypto_init"); + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, crypto, KRB5_KU_TICKET, + &tkt.enc_part, &dec_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy (context, crypto); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData"); + ret = krb5_decode_EncTicketPart (context, dec_data.data, dec_data.length, + &decr_part, &len); + krb5_data_free (&dec_data); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_decode_EncTicketPart"); +} + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, &etype_str, + "encryption type to use", "enctype"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "service"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache cache; + krb5_creds in, *out; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_default"); + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + + if (etype_str) { + krb5_enctype enctype; + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, etype_str, &enctype); + if (ret) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "unrecognized enctype: %s", etype_str); + in.session.keytype = enctype; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &in.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &in.server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", argv[0]); + + in.times.endtime = 0; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, cache, &in, &out); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_credentials"); + + print_and_decode_tkt (context, &out->ticket, out->server, + out->session.keytype); + + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, out); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8910e9a0dc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.1 @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 1999, 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kdestroy.1,v 1.4 2003/02/16 21:10:23 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 27, 1997 +.Dt KDESTROY 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kdestroy +.Nd destroy the current ticket file +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl c Ar cachefile +.Op Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachefile +.Op Fl -no-unlog +.Op Fl -no-delete-v4 +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +remove the current set of tickets. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl c Ar cachefile +.It Fl cache= Ns Ar cachefile +The cache file to remove. +.It Fl -no-unlog +Do not remove AFS tokens. +.It Fl -no-delete-v4 +Do not remove v4 tickets. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr klist 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d232455c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kdestroy.c,v 1.14.2.1 2003/05/08 18:59:17 lha Exp $"); + +static const char *cache; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int unlog_flag = 1; +static int dest_tkt_flag = 1; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "cache", 'c', arg_string, &cache, "cache to destroy", "cache" }, + { "unlog", 0, arg_negative_flag, &unlog_flag, + "do not destroy tokens", NULL }, + { "delete-v4", 0, arg_negative_flag, &dest_tkt_flag, + "do not destroy v4 tickets", NULL }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, NULL, NULL }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, NULL} +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage (int status) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (status); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + int optind = 0; + int exit_val = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(cache == NULL) { + cache = krb5_cc_default_name(context); + if (cache == NULL) { + warnx ("krb5_cc_default_name: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + exit(1); + } + } + + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, + cache, + &ccache); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_destroy (context, ccache); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_cc_destroy: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + exit_val = 1; + } + } else { + warnx ("krb5_cc_resolve(%s): %s", cache, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + exit_val = 1; + } + + krb5_free_context (context); + +#if KRB4 + if(dest_tkt_flag && dest_tkt ()) + exit_val = 1; +#endif + if (unlog_flag && k_hasafs ()) { + if (k_unlog ()) + exit_val = 1; + } + + return exit_val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0949f9687b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kdestroy.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ + +KDESTROY(1) UNIX Reference Manual KDESTROY(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkddeessttrrooyy - destroy the current ticket file + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkddeessttrrooyy [--cc _c_a_c_h_e_f_i_l_e] [----ccaacchhee==_c_a_c_h_e_f_i_l_e] [----nnoo--uunnlloogg] [----nnoo--ddeelleettee--vv44] + [----vveerrssiioonn] [----hheellpp] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkddeessttrrooyy remove the current set of tickets. + + Supported options: + + --cc _c_a_c_h_e_f_i_l_e + + --ccaacchhee==_c_a_c_h_e_f_i_l_e + The cache file to remove. + + ----nnoo--uunnlloogg + Do not remove AFS tokens. + + ----nnoo--ddeelleettee--vv44 + Do not remove v4 tickets. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kinit(1), klist(1) + + HEIMDAL August 27, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f69e411167 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.1 @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999, 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kgetcred.1,v 1.6 2003/02/16 21:10:24 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 14, 1999 +.Dt KGETCRED 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kgetcred +.Nd "get a ticket for a particular service" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl e Ar enctype \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Ar service +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +obtains a ticket for a service. +Usually tickets for services are obtained automatically when needed +but sometimes for some odd reason you want to obtain a particular +ticket or of a special type. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl e Ar enctype , +.Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Xc +encryption type to use +.It Xo +.Fl -version +.Xc +.It Xo +.Fl -help +.Xc +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr klist 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..670745535d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kgetcred.c,v 1.5 2001/02/20 01:44:51 assar Exp $"); + +static char *etype_str; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, &etype_str, + "encryption type to use", "enctype"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "service"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache cache; + krb5_creds in, *out; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_default"); + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + + if (etype_str) { + krb5_enctype enctype; + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, etype_str, &enctype); + if (ret) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "unrecognized enctype: %s", etype_str); + in.session.keytype = enctype; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &in.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &in.server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", argv[0]); + + in.times.endtime = 0; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, cache, &in, &out); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_credentials"); + + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, out); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63a6c983a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kgetcred.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ + +KGETCRED(1) UNIX Reference Manual KGETCRED(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkggeettccrreedd - get a ticket for a particular service + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkggeettccrreedd [--ee _e_n_c_t_y_p_e | ----eennccttyyppee==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e] [----vveerrssiioonn] [----hheellpp] _s_e_r_v_i_c_e + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkggeettccrreedd obtains a ticket for a service. Usually tickets for services + are obtained automatically when needed but sometimes for some odd reason + you want to obtain a particular ticket or of a special type. + + Supported options: + + --ee _e_n_c_t_y_p_e, ----eennccttyyppee==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e + encryption type to use + + ----vveerrssiioonn + + ----hheellpp + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kinit(1), klist(1) + + HEIMDAL May 14, 1999 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..97ed2af62d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.1 @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1998 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kinit.1,v 1.23 2003/04/06 17:49:05 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 29, 1998 +.Dt KINIT 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kinit +.Nm kauth +.Nd acquire initial tickets +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm kinit +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -524init +.Op Fl 9 | Fl -524convert +.Op Fl -afslog +.Oo Fl c Ar cachename \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachename +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl f | Fl -forwardable +.Oo Fl t Ar keytabname \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytabname +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl l Ar time \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -lifetime= Ns Ar time +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl p | Fl -proxiable +.Op Fl R | Fl -renew +.Op Fl -renewable +.Oo Fl r Ar time \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -renewable-life= Ns Ar time +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl S Ar principal \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -server= Ns Ar principal +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl s Ar time \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -start-time= Ns Ar time +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl k | Fl -use-keytab +.Op Fl v | Fl -validate +.Oo Fl e Ar enctypes \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -enctypes= Ns Ar enctypes +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl a Ar addresses \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -extra-addresses= Ns Ar addresses +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl -fcache-version= Ns Ar integer +.Op Fl -no-addresses +.Op Fl -anonymous +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Op Ar principal Op Ar command +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is used to authenticate to the Kerberos server as +.Ar principal , +or if none is given, a system generated default (typically your login +name at the default realm), and acquire a ticket granting ticket that +can later be used to obtain tickets for other services. +.Pp +If you have compiled +.Nm kinit +with Kerberos 4 support and you have a +Kerberos 4 server, +.Nm +will detect this and get you Kerberos 4 tickets. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar cachename +.Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachename +.Xc +The credentials cache to put the acquired ticket in, if other than +default. +.It Xo +.Fl f , +.Fl -forwardable +.Xc +Get ticket that can be forwarded to another host. +.It Xo +.Fl t Ar keytabname , +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytabname +.Xc +Don't ask for a password, but instead get the key from the specified +keytab. +.It Xo +.Fl l Ar time , +.Fl -lifetime= Ns Ar time +.Xc +Specifies the lifetime of the ticket. The argument can either be in +seconds, or a more human readable string like +.Sq 1h . +.It Xo +.Fl p , +.Fl -proxiable +.Xc +Request tickets with the proxiable flag set. +.It Xo +.Fl R , +.Fl -renew +.Xc +Try to renew ticket. The ticket must have the +.Sq renewable +flag set, and must not be expired. +.It Fl -renewable +The same as +.Fl -renewable-life , +with an infinite time. +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar time , +.Fl -renewable-life= Ns Ar time +.Xc +The max renewable ticket life. +.It Xo +.Fl S Ar principal , +.Fl -server= Ns Ar principal +.Xc +Get a ticket for a service other than krbtgt/LOCAL.REALM. +.It Xo +.Fl s Ar time , +.Fl -start-time= Ns Ar time +.Xc +Obtain a ticket that starts to be valid +.Ar time +(which can really be a generic time specification, like +.Sq 1h ) +seconds into the future. +.It Xo +.Fl k , +.Fl -use-keytab +.Xc +The same as +.Fl -keytab , +but with the default keytab name (normally +.Ar FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab ) . +.It Xo +.Fl v , +.Fl -validate +.Xc +Try to validate an invalid ticket. +.It Xo +.Fl e , +.Fl -enctypes= Ns Ar enctypes +.Xc +Request tickets with this particular enctype. +.It Xo +.Fl -fcache-version= Ns Ar version +.Xc +Create a credentials cache of version +.Nm version . +.It Xo +.Fl a , +.Fl -extra-addresses= Ns Ar enctypes +.Xc +Adds a set of addresses that will, in addition to the systems local +addresses, be put in the ticket. This can be useful if all addresses a +client can use can't be automatically figured out. One such example is +if the client is behind a firewall. Also settable via +.Li libdefaults/extra_addresses +in +.Xr krb5.conf 5 . +.It Xo +.Fl -no-addresses +.Xc +Request a ticket with no addresses. +.It Xo +.Fl -anonymous +.Xc +Request an anonymous ticket (which means that the ticket will be +issued to an anonymous principal, typically +.Dq anonymous@REALM ) . +.El +.Pp +The following options are only available if +.Nm +has been compiled with support for Kerberos 4. +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -524init +.Xc +Try to convert the obtained Kerberos 5 krbtgt to a version 4 +compatible ticket. It will store this ticket in the default Kerberos 4 +ticket file. +.It Xo +.Fl 9 , +.Fl -524convert +.Xc +only convert ticket to version 4 +.It Fl -afslog +Gets AFS tickets, converts them to version 4 format, and stores them +in the kernel. Only useful if you have AFS. +.El +.Pp +The +.Ar forwardable , +.Ar proxiable , +.Ar ticket_life , +and +.Ar renewable_life +options can be set to a default value from the +.Dv appdefaults +section in krb5.conf, see +.Xr krb5_appdefault 3 . +.Pp +If a +.Ar command +is given, +.Nm kinit +will setup new credentials caches, and AFS PAG, and then run the given +command. When it finishes the credentials will be removed. +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev KRB5CCNAME +Specifies the default credentials cache. +.It Ev KRB5_CONFIG +The file name of +.Pa krb5.conf +, the default being +.Pa /etc/krb5.conf . +.It Ev KRBTKFILE +Specifies the Kerberos 4 ticket file to store version 4 tickets in. +.El +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kdestroy 1 , +.Xr klist 1 , +.Xr krb5_appdefault 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b8b24a38f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.c @@ -0,0 +1,711 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kinit.c,v 1.90.4.5 2004/06/21 08:17:06 lha Exp $"); + +int forwardable_flag = -1; +int proxiable_flag = -1; +int renewable_flag = -1; +int renew_flag = 0; +int validate_flag = 0; +int version_flag = 0; +int help_flag = 0; +int addrs_flag = 1; +struct getarg_strings extra_addresses; +int anonymous_flag = 0; +char *lifetime = NULL; +char *renew_life = NULL; +char *server = NULL; +char *cred_cache = NULL; +char *start_str = NULL; +struct getarg_strings etype_str; +int use_keytab = 0; +char *keytab_str = NULL; +int do_afslog = -1; +#ifdef KRB4 +int get_v4_tgt = -1; +int convert_524; +#endif +int fcache_version; + +static struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "524init", '4', arg_flag, &get_v4_tgt, + "obtain version 4 TGT" }, + + { "524convert", '9', arg_flag, &convert_524, + "only convert ticket to version 4" }, +#endif + { "afslog", 0 , arg_flag, &do_afslog, + "obtain afs tokens" }, + + { "cache", 'c', arg_string, &cred_cache, + "credentials cache", "cachename" }, + + { "forwardable", 'f', arg_flag, &forwardable_flag, + "get forwardable tickets"}, + + { "keytab", 't', arg_string, &keytab_str, + "keytab to use", "keytabname" }, + + { "lifetime", 'l', arg_string, &lifetime, + "lifetime of tickets", "time"}, + + { "proxiable", 'p', arg_flag, &proxiable_flag, + "get proxiable tickets" }, + + { "renew", 'R', arg_flag, &renew_flag, + "renew TGT" }, + + { "renewable", 0, arg_flag, &renewable_flag, + "get renewable tickets" }, + + { "renewable-life", 'r', arg_string, &renew_life, + "renewable lifetime of tickets", "time" }, + + { "server", 'S', arg_string, &server, + "server to get ticket for", "principal" }, + + { "start-time", 's', arg_string, &start_str, + "when ticket gets valid", "time" }, + + { "use-keytab", 'k', arg_flag, &use_keytab, + "get key from keytab" }, + + { "validate", 'v', arg_flag, &validate_flag, + "validate TGT" }, + + { "enctypes", 'e', arg_strings, &etype_str, + "encryption types to use", "enctypes" }, + + { "fcache-version", 0, arg_integer, &fcache_version, + "file cache version to create" }, + + { "addresses", 0, arg_negative_flag, &addrs_flag, + "request a ticket with no addresses" }, + + { "extra-addresses",'a', arg_strings, &extra_addresses, + "include these extra addresses", "addresses" }, + + { "anonymous", 0, arg_flag, &anonymous_flag, + "request an anonymous ticket" }, + + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[principal [command]]"); + exit (ret); +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +/* for when the KDC tells us it's a v4 one, we try to talk that */ + +static int +key_to_key(const char *user, + char *instance, + const char *realm, + const void *arg, + des_cblock *key) +{ + memcpy(key, arg, sizeof(des_cblock)); + return 0; +} + +static int +do_v4_fallback (krb5_context context, + const krb5_principal principal, + int lifetime, + int use_srvtab, const char *srvtab_str, + const char *passwd) +{ + int ret; + krb_principal princ; + des_cblock key; + krb5_error_code kret; + + if (lifetime == 0) + lifetime = DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE; + else + lifetime = krb_time_to_life (0, lifetime); + + kret = krb5_524_conv_principal (context, principal, + princ.name, + princ.instance, + princ.realm); + if (kret) { + krb5_warn (context, kret, "krb5_524_conv_principal"); + return 1; + } + + if (use_srvtab || srvtab_str) { + if (srvtab_str == NULL) + srvtab_str = KEYFILE; + + ret = read_service_key (princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + 0, srvtab_str, (char *)&key); + if (ret) { + warnx ("read_service_key %s: %s", srvtab_str, + krb_get_err_text (ret)); + return 1; + } + ret = krb_get_in_tkt (princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, princ.realm, + lifetime, key_to_key, NULL, key); + } else { + ret = krb_get_pw_in_tkt(princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, princ.realm, + lifetime, passwd); + } + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + if (ret) { + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + if (do_afslog && k_hasafs()) { + if ((ret = krb_afslog(NULL, NULL)) != 0 && ret != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) { + if(ret > 0) + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + else + warnx ("failed to store AFS token"); + } + } + return 0; +} + + +/* + * the special version of get_default_principal that takes v4 into account + */ + +static krb5_error_code +kinit_get_default_principal (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id; + krb_principal v4_princ; + int kret; + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &id); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, id, princ); + krb5_cc_close (context, id); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + } + + kret = krb_get_tf_fullname (tkt_string(), + v4_princ.name, + v4_princ.instance, + v4_princ.realm); + if (kret == KSUCCESS) { + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal (context, + v4_princ.name, + v4_princ.instance, + v4_princ.realm, + princ); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + } + return krb5_get_default_principal (context, princ); +} + +#else /* !KRB4 */ + +static krb5_error_code +kinit_get_default_principal (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + return krb5_get_default_principal (context, princ); +} + +#endif /* !KRB4 */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_server(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal client, + const char *server, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + krb5_realm *client_realm; + if(server) + return krb5_parse_name(context, server, princ); + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, client); + return krb5_make_principal(context, princ, *client_realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, NULL); +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static krb5_error_code +do_524init(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, const char *server) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_creds in_creds, *real_creds; + + if(creds != NULL) + real_creds = creds; + else { + krb5_principal client; + krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &client); + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + ret = get_server(context, client, server, &in_creds.server); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + return ret; + } + in_creds.client = client; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, ccache, &in_creds, &real_creds); + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(context, ccache, real_creds, &c); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "converting creds"); + else { + int tret = tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + if(tret) + krb5_warnx(context, "saving v4 creds: %s", krb_get_err_text(tret)); + } + + if(creds == NULL) + krb5_free_creds(context, real_creds); + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + + return ret; +} +#endif + +static int +renew_validate(krb5_context context, + int renew, + int validate, + krb5_ccache cache, + const char *server, + krb5_deltat life) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds in, *out; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &in.client); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + return ret; + } + ret = get_server(context, in.client, server, &in.server); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "get_server"); + goto out; + } + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.renewable = flags.b.renew = renew; + flags.b.validate = validate; + if (forwardable_flag != -1) + flags.b.forwardable = forwardable_flag; + if (proxiable_flag != -1) + flags.b.proxiable = proxiable_flag; + if (anonymous_flag != -1) + flags.b.request_anonymous = anonymous_flag; + if(life) + in.times.endtime = time(NULL) + life; + + ret = krb5_get_kdc_cred(context, + cache, + flags, + NULL, + NULL, + &in, + &out); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_get_kdc_cred"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, cache, in.client); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_creds (context, out); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, cache, out); + + if(ret == 0 && server == NULL) { +#ifdef KRB4 + /* only do this if it's a general renew-my-tgt request */ + if(get_v4_tgt) + do_524init(context, cache, out, NULL); +#endif + if(do_afslog && k_hasafs()) + krb5_afslog(context, cache, NULL, NULL); + } + + krb5_free_creds (context, out); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); + goto out; + } +out: + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &in); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_new_tickets(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_deltat ticket_life) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_addresses no_addrs; + krb5_creds cred; + char passwd[256]; + krb5_deltat start_time = 0; + krb5_deltat renew = 0; + + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(context, "kinit", + /* XXX */principal->realm, &opt); + + if(forwardable_flag != -1) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable (&opt, forwardable_flag); + if(proxiable_flag != -1) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (&opt, proxiable_flag); + if(anonymous_flag != -1) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous (&opt, anonymous_flag); + + if (!addrs_flag) { + no_addrs.len = 0; + no_addrs.val = NULL; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list (&opt, &no_addrs); + } + + if (renew_life == NULL && renewable_flag) + renew_life = "1 month"; + if(renew_life) { + renew = parse_time (renew_life, "s"); + if (renew < 0) + errx (1, "unparsable time: %s", renew_life); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life (&opt, renew); + } + + if(ticket_life != 0) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&opt, ticket_life); + + if(start_str) { + int tmp = parse_time (start_str, "s"); + if (tmp < 0) + errx (1, "unparsable time: %s", start_str); + + start_time = tmp; + } + + if(etype_str.num_strings) { + krb5_enctype *enctype = NULL; + int i; + enctype = malloc(etype_str.num_strings * sizeof(*enctype)); + if(enctype == NULL) + errx(1, "out of memory"); + for(i = 0; i < etype_str.num_strings; i++) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, + etype_str.strings[i], + &enctype[i]); + if(ret) + errx(1, "unrecognized enctype: %s", etype_str.strings[i]); + } + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(&opt, enctype, + etype_str.num_strings); + } + + if(use_keytab || keytab_str) { + krb5_keytab kt; + if(keytab_str) + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &kt); + else + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &kt); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "resolving keytab"); + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab (context, + &cred, + principal, + kt, + start_time, + server, + &opt); + krb5_kt_close(context, kt); + } else { + char *p, *prompt; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, principal, &p); + asprintf (&prompt, "%s's Password: ", p); + free (p); + + if (des_read_pw_string(passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, prompt, 0)){ + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + exit(1); + } + + free (prompt); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + passwd, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + start_time, + server, + &opt); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY || ret == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH) { + int exit_val; + + exit_val = do_v4_fallback (context, principal, ticket_life, + use_keytab, keytab_str, passwd); + get_v4_tgt = 0; + do_afslog = 0; + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + if (exit_val == 0 || ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY) + return exit_val; + } +#endif + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + + switch(ret){ + case 0: + break; + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR: /* don't print anything if it was just C-c:ed */ + exit(1); + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: + krb5_errx(context, 1, "Password incorrect"); + break; + default: + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + } + + if(ticket_life != 0) { + if(abs(cred.times.endtime - cred.times.starttime - ticket_life) > 30) { + char life[32]; + unparse_time(cred.times.endtime - cred.times.starttime, + life, sizeof(life)); + krb5_warnx(context, "NOTICE: ticket lifetime is %s", life); + } + } + if(renew != 0) { + if(abs(cred.times.renew_till - cred.times.starttime - renew) > 30) { + char life[32]; + unparse_time(cred.times.renew_till - cred.times.starttime, + life, sizeof(life)); + krb5_warnx(context, "NOTICE: ticket renewable lifetime is %s", + life); + } + } + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, ccache, cred.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, ccache, &cred); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); + + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + + return 0; +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal principal; + int optind = 0; + krb5_deltat ticket_life = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argv[0]) { + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, argv[0], &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + } else { + ret = kinit_get_default_principal (context, &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_default_principal"); + } + + if(fcache_version) + krb5_set_fcache_version(context, fcache_version); + + if(cred_cache) + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, cred_cache, &ccache); + else { + if(argc > 1) { + char s[1024]; + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "creating cred cache"); + snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "%s:%s", + krb5_cc_get_type(context, ccache), + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache)); + setenv("KRB5CCNAME", s, 1); +#ifdef KRB4 + { + int fd; + snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "%s_XXXXXX", TKT_ROOT); + if((fd = mkstemp(s)) >= 0) { + close(fd); + setenv("KRBTKFILE", s, 1); + } + } +#endif + } else + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + } + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "resolving credentials cache"); + + if (argc > 1 && k_hasafs ()) + k_setpag(); + + if (lifetime) { + int tmp = parse_time (lifetime, "s"); + if (tmp < 0) + errx (1, "unparsable time: %s", lifetime); + + ticket_life = tmp; + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if(get_v4_tgt == -1) + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, "kinit", + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal), + "krb4_get_tickets", TRUE, &get_v4_tgt); +#endif + if(do_afslog == -1) + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, "kinit", + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal), + "afslog", TRUE, &do_afslog); + + if(!addrs_flag && extra_addresses.num_strings > 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "specifying both extra addresses and " + "no addresses makes no sense"); + { + int i; + krb5_addresses addresses; + memset(&addresses, 0, sizeof(addresses)); + for(i = 0; i < extra_addresses.num_strings; i++) { + ret = krb5_parse_address(context, extra_addresses.strings[i], + &addresses); + if (ret == 0) { + krb5_add_extra_addresses(context, &addresses); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &addresses); + } + } + free_getarg_strings(&extra_addresses); + } + + + if(renew_flag || validate_flag) { + ret = renew_validate(context, renew_flag, validate_flag, + ccache, server, ticket_life); + exit(ret != 0); + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if(!convert_524) +#endif + get_new_tickets(context, principal, ccache, ticket_life); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if(get_v4_tgt) + do_524init(context, ccache, NULL, server); +#endif + if(do_afslog && k_hasafs()) + krb5_afslog(context, ccache, NULL, NULL); + if(argc > 1) { + ret = simple_execvp(argv[1], argv+1); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); +#ifdef KRB4 + dest_tkt(); +#endif + if(k_hasafs()) + k_unlog(); + } else { + krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + ret = 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + krb5_free_context (context); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..147cd3b943 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ + +KINIT(1) UNIX Reference Manual KINIT(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkiinniitt kkaauutthh - acquire initial tickets + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkiinniitt [--44 | ----552244iinniitt] [--99 | ----552244ccoonnvveerrtt] [----aaffsslloogg] [--cc _c_a_c_h_e_n_a_m_e | + ----ccaacchhee==_c_a_c_h_e_n_a_m_e] [--ff | ----ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee] [--tt _k_e_y_t_a_b_n_a_m_e | + ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b_n_a_m_e] [--ll _t_i_m_e | ----lliiffeettiimmee==_t_i_m_e] [--pp | ----pprrooxxiiaabbllee] + [--RR | ----rreenneeww] [----rreenneewwaabbllee] [--rr _t_i_m_e | ----rreenneewwaabbllee--lliiffee==_t_i_m_e] [--SS + _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l | ----sseerrvveerr==_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l] [--ss _t_i_m_e | ----ssttaarrtt--ttiimmee==_t_i_m_e] [--kk | + ----uussee--kkeeyyttaabb] [--vv | ----vvaalliiddaattee] [--ee _e_n_c_t_y_p_e_s | ----eennccttyyppeess==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e_s] + [--aa _a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s | ----eexxttrraa--aaddddrreesssseess==_a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s] + [----ffccaacchhee--vveerrssiioonn==_i_n_t_e_g_e_r] [----nnoo--aaddddrreesssseess] [----aannoonnyymmoouuss] + [----vveerrssiioonn] [----hheellpp] [_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d]] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkiinniitt is used to authenticate to the Kerberos server as _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, or if + none is given, a system generated default (typically your login name at + the default realm), and acquire a ticket granting ticket that can later + be used to obtain tickets for other services. + + If you have compiled kkiinniitt with Kerberos 4 support and you have a Ker- + beros 4 server, kkiinniitt will detect this and get you Kerberos 4 tickets. + + Supported options: + + --cc _c_a_c_h_e_n_a_m_e ----ccaacchhee==_c_a_c_h_e_n_a_m_e + The credentials cache to put the acquired ticket in, if other + than default. + + --ff, ----ffoorrwwaarrddaabbllee + Get ticket that can be forwarded to another host. + + --tt _k_e_y_t_a_b_n_a_m_e, ----kkeeyyttaabb==_k_e_y_t_a_b_n_a_m_e + Don't ask for a password, but instead get the key from the speci- + fied keytab. + + --ll _t_i_m_e, ----lliiffeettiimmee==_t_i_m_e + Specifies the lifetime of the ticket. The argument can either be + in seconds, or a more human readable string like `1h'. + + --pp, ----pprrooxxiiaabbllee + Request tickets with the proxiable flag set. + + --RR, ----rreenneeww + Try to renew ticket. The ticket must have the `renewable' flag + set, and must not be expired. + + ----rreenneewwaabbllee + The same as ----rreenneewwaabbllee--lliiffee, with an infinite time. + + --rr _t_i_m_e, ----rreenneewwaabbllee--lliiffee==_t_i_m_e + The max renewable ticket life. + + --SS _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, ----sseerrvveerr==_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l + Get a ticket for a service other than krbtgt/LOCAL.REALM. + + --ss _t_i_m_e, ----ssttaarrtt--ttiimmee==_t_i_m_e + Obtain a ticket that starts to be valid _t_i_m_e (which can really be + a generic time specification, like `1h') seconds into the future. + + --kk, ----uussee--kkeeyyttaabb + The same as ----kkeeyyttaabb, but with the default keytab name (normally + + _F_I_L_E_:_/_e_t_c_/_k_r_b_5_._k_e_y_t_a_b). + + --vv, ----vvaalliiddaattee + Try to validate an invalid ticket. + + --ee, ----eennccttyyppeess==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e_s + Request tickets with this particular enctype. + + ----ffccaacchhee--vveerrssiioonn==_v_e_r_s_i_o_n + Create a credentials cache of version vveerrssiioonn. + + --aa, ----eexxttrraa--aaddddrreesssseess==_e_n_c_t_y_p_e_s + Adds a set of addresses that will, in addition to the systems lo- + cal addresses, be put in the ticket. This can be useful if all + addresses a client can use can't be automatically figured out. + One such example is if the client is behind a firewall. Also set- + table via libdefaults/extra_addresses in krb5.conf(5). + + ----nnoo--aaddddrreesssseess + Request a ticket with no addresses. + + ----aannoonnyymmoouuss + Request an anonymous ticket (which means that the ticket will be + issued to an anonymous principal, typically ``anonymous@REALM''). + + The following options are only available if kkiinniitt has been compiled with + support for Kerberos 4. + + --44, ----552244iinniitt + Try to convert the obtained Kerberos 5 krbtgt to a version 4 com- + patible ticket. It will store this ticket in the default Kerberos + 4 ticket file. + + --99, ----552244ccoonnvveerrtt + only convert ticket to version 4 + + ----aaffsslloogg + Gets AFS tickets, converts them to version 4 format, and stores + them in the kernel. Only useful if you have AFS. + + The _f_o_r_w_a_r_d_a_b_l_e, _p_r_o_x_i_a_b_l_e, _t_i_c_k_e_t___l_i_f_e, and _r_e_n_e_w_a_b_l_e___l_i_f_e options can + be set to a default value from the appdefaults section in krb5.conf, see + krb5_appdefault(3). + + If a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d is given, kkiinniitt will setup new credentials caches, and AFS + PAG, and then run the given command. When it finishes the credentials + will be removed. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + KRB5CCNAME + Specifies the default credentials cache. + + KRB5_CONFIG + The file name of _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f , the default being _/_e_t_c_/_k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f. + + KRBTKFILE + Specifies the Kerberos 4 ticket file to store version 4 tickets + in. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kdestroy(1), klist(1), krb5_appdefault(3), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL May 29, 1998 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit_options.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit_options.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a7dcd9875 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kinit_options.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kinit_options.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +int do_afslog = 0; +int get_v4_tgt = 0; +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a144365993 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.1 @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: klist.1,v 1.12 2003/02/16 21:10:26 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 8, 2000 +.Dt KLIST 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm klist +.Nd list Kerberos credentials +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl c Ar cache \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -cache= Ns Ar cache +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl s | Fl t | Fl -test +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -v4 +.Op Fl T | Fl -tokens +.Op Fl 5 | Fl -v5 +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl f +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +reads and displays the current tickets in the crential cache (also +known as the ticket file). +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar cache , +.Fl -cache= Ns Ar cache +.Xc +credentials cache to list +.It Xo +.Fl s , +.Fl t , +.Fl -test +.Xc +Test for there being an active and valid TGT for the local realm of +the user in the credential cache. +.It Xo +.Fl 4 , +.Fl -v4 +.Xc +display v4 tickets +.It Xo +.Fl T , +.Fl -tokens +.Xc +display AFS tokens +.It Xo +.Fl 5 , +.Fl -v5 +.Xc +display v5 cred cache (this is the default) +.It Fl f +Include ticket flags in short form, each charcted stands for a +specific flag, as follows: +.Bl -tag -width XXX -compact -offset indent +.It F +forwardable +.It f +forwarded +.It P +proxiable +.It p +proxied +.It D +postdate-able +.It d +postdated +.It R +renewable +.It I +initial +.It i +invalid +.It A +pre-authenticated +.It H +hardware authenticated +.El +.Pp +This information is also output with the +.Fl -verbose +option, but in a more verbose way. +.It Xo +.Fl v , +.Fl -verbose +.Xc +Verbose output. Include all possible information: +.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent +.It Server +the princial the ticket is for +.It Ticket etype +the encryption type use in the ticket, followed by the key version of +the ticket, if it is available +.It Session key +the encryption type of the session key, if it's different from the +encryption type of the ticket +.It Auth time +the time the authentication exchange took place +.It Start time +the time that this tickets is valid from (only printed if it's +different from the auth time) +.It End time +when the ticket expires, if it has already expired this is also noted +.It Renew till +the maximum possible end time of any ticket derived from this one +.It Ticket flags +the flags set on the ticket +.It Addresses +the set of addresses from which this ticket is valid +.El +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kdestroy 1 , +.Xr kinit 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3521e2e721 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.c @@ -0,0 +1,691 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +#include "rtbl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: klist.c,v 1.68.2.2 2003/10/13 15:13:39 joda Exp $"); + +static char* +printable_time(time_t t) +{ + static char s[128]; + strcpy(s, ctime(&t)+ 4); + s[15] = 0; + return s; +} + +static char* +printable_time_long(time_t t) +{ + static char s[128]; + strcpy(s, ctime(&t)+ 4); + s[20] = 0; + return s; +} + +#define COL_ISSUED " Issued" +#define COL_EXPIRES " Expires" +#define COL_FLAGS "Flags" +#define COL_PRINCIPAL " Principal" +#define COL_PRINCIPAL_KVNO " Principal (kvno)" + +static void +print_cred(krb5_context context, krb5_creds *cred, rtbl_t ct, int do_flags) +{ + char *str; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_timestamp sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + + if(cred->times.starttime) + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_ISSUED, + printable_time(cred->times.starttime)); + else + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_ISSUED, + printable_time(cred->times.authtime)); + + if(cred->times.endtime > sec) + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_EXPIRES, + printable_time(cred->times.endtime)); + else + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_EXPIRES, ">>>Expired<<<"); + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, cred->server, &str); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_PRINCIPAL, str); + if(do_flags) { + char s[16], *sp = s; + if(cred->flags.b.forwardable) + *sp++ = 'F'; + if(cred->flags.b.forwarded) + *sp++ = 'f'; + if(cred->flags.b.proxiable) + *sp++ = 'P'; + if(cred->flags.b.proxy) + *sp++ = 'p'; + if(cred->flags.b.may_postdate) + *sp++ = 'D'; + if(cred->flags.b.postdated) + *sp++ = 'd'; + if(cred->flags.b.renewable) + *sp++ = 'R'; + if(cred->flags.b.initial) + *sp++ = 'I'; + if(cred->flags.b.invalid) + *sp++ = 'i'; + if(cred->flags.b.pre_authent) + *sp++ = 'A'; + if(cred->flags.b.hw_authent) + *sp++ = 'H'; + *sp++ = '\0'; + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_FLAGS, s); + } + free(str); +} + +static void +print_cred_verbose(krb5_context context, krb5_creds *cred) +{ + int j; + char *str; + krb5_error_code ret; + int first_flag; + krb5_timestamp sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred->server, &str); + if(ret) + exit(1); + printf("Server: %s\n", str); + free (str); + { + Ticket t; + size_t len; + char *s; + + decode_Ticket(cred->ticket.data, cred->ticket.length, &t, &len); + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, t.enc_part.etype, &s); + printf("Ticket etype: "); + if (ret == 0) { + printf("%s", s); + free(s); + } else { + printf("unknown(%d)", t.enc_part.etype); + } + if(t.enc_part.kvno) + printf(", kvno %d", *t.enc_part.kvno); + printf("\n"); + if(cred->session.keytype != t.enc_part.etype) { + ret = krb5_keytype_to_string(context, cred->session.keytype, &str); + if(ret == KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP) + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cred->session.keytype, + &str); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "session keytype"); + else { + printf("Session key: %s\n", str); + free(str); + } + } + free_Ticket(&t); + } + printf("Auth time: %s\n", printable_time_long(cred->times.authtime)); + if(cred->times.authtime != cred->times.starttime) + printf("Start time: %s\n", printable_time_long(cred->times.starttime)); + printf("End time: %s", printable_time_long(cred->times.endtime)); + if(sec > cred->times.endtime) + printf(" (expired)"); + printf("\n"); + if(cred->flags.b.renewable) + printf("Renew till: %s\n", + printable_time_long(cred->times.renew_till)); + printf("Ticket flags: "); +#define PRINT_FLAG2(f, s) if(cred->flags.b.f) { if(!first_flag) printf(", "); printf("%s", #s); first_flag = 0; } +#define PRINT_FLAG(f) PRINT_FLAG2(f, f) + first_flag = 1; + PRINT_FLAG(forwardable); + PRINT_FLAG(forwarded); + PRINT_FLAG(proxiable); + PRINT_FLAG(proxy); + PRINT_FLAG2(may_postdate, may-postdate); + PRINT_FLAG(postdated); + PRINT_FLAG(invalid); + PRINT_FLAG(renewable); + PRINT_FLAG(initial); + PRINT_FLAG2(pre_authent, pre-authenticated); + PRINT_FLAG2(hw_authent, hw-authenticated); + PRINT_FLAG2(transited_policy_checked, transited-policy-checked); + PRINT_FLAG2(ok_as_delegate, ok-as-delegate); + PRINT_FLAG(anonymous); + printf("\n"); + printf("Addresses: "); + for(j = 0; j < cred->addresses.len; j++){ + char buf[128]; + size_t len; + if(j) printf(", "); + ret = krb5_print_address(&cred->addresses.val[j], + buf, sizeof(buf), &len); + + if(ret == 0) + printf("%s", buf); + } + printf("\n\n"); +} + +/* + * Print all tickets in `ccache' on stdout, verbosily iff do_verbose. + */ + +static void +print_tickets (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_principal principal, + int do_verbose, + int do_flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *str; + krb5_cc_cursor cursor; + krb5_creds creds; + + rtbl_t ct = NULL; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, principal, &str); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + printf ("%17s: %s:%s\n", + "Credentials cache", + krb5_cc_get_type(context, ccache), + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache)); + printf ("%17s: %s\n", "Principal", str); + free (str); + + if(do_verbose) + printf ("%17s: %d\n", "Cache version", + krb5_cc_get_version(context, ccache)); + + if (do_verbose && context->kdc_sec_offset) { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int val; + int sig; + + val = context->kdc_sec_offset; + sig = 1; + if (val < 0) { + sig = -1; + val = -val; + } + + unparse_time (val, buf, sizeof(buf)); + + printf ("%17s: %s%s\n", "KDC time offset", + sig == -1 ? "-" : "", buf); + } + + printf("\n"); + + ret = krb5_cc_start_seq_get (context, ccache, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_start_seq_get"); + + if(!do_verbose) { + ct = rtbl_create(); + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_ISSUED, 0); + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_EXPIRES, 0); + if(do_flags) + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_FLAGS, 0); + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_PRINCIPAL, 0); + rtbl_set_prefix(ct, " "); + rtbl_set_column_prefix(ct, COL_ISSUED, ""); + } + while ((ret = krb5_cc_next_cred (context, + ccache, + &cursor, + &creds)) == 0) { + if(do_verbose){ + print_cred_verbose(context, &creds); + }else{ + print_cred(context, &creds, ct, do_flags); + } + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &creds); + } + if(ret != KRB5_CC_END) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_next"); + ret = krb5_cc_end_seq_get (context, ccache, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_end_seq_get"); + if(!do_verbose) { + rtbl_format(ct, stdout); + rtbl_destroy(ct); + } +} + +/* + * Check if there's a tgt for the realm of `principal' and ccache and + * if so return 0, else 1 + */ + +static int +check_for_tgt (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds pattern; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + int expired; + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, principal); + + ret = krb5_make_principal (context, &pattern.server, + *client_realm, KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, + NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred (context, ccache, 0, &pattern, &creds); + expired = time(NULL) > creds.times.endtime; + krb5_free_principal (context, pattern.server); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &creds); + if (ret) { + if (ret == KRB5_CC_END) + return 1; + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_retrieve_cred"); + } + return expired; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +/* prints the approximate kdc time differential as something human + readable */ + +static void +print_time_diff(int do_verbose) +{ + int d = abs(krb_get_kdc_time_diff()); + char buf[80]; + + if ((do_verbose && d > 0) || d > 60) { + unparse_time_approx (d, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf ("Time diff:\t%s\n", buf); + } +} + +/* + * return a short representation of `dp' in string form. + */ + +static char * +short_date(int32_t dp) +{ + char *cp; + time_t t = (time_t)dp; + + if (t == (time_t)(-1L)) return "*** Never *** "; + cp = ctime(&t) + 4; + cp[15] = '\0'; + return (cp); +} + +/* + * Print a list of all the v4 tickets + */ + +static int +display_v4_tickets (int do_verbose) +{ + char *file; + int ret; + krb_principal princ; + CREDENTIALS cred; + int found = 0; + + rtbl_t ct; + + file = getenv ("KRBTKFILE"); + if (file == NULL) + file = TKT_FILE; + + printf("%17s: %s\n", "V4-ticket file", file); + + ret = krb_get_tf_realm (file, princ.realm); + if (ret) { + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = tf_init (file, R_TKT_FIL); + if (ret) { + warnx ("tf_init: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + ret = tf_get_pname (princ.name); + if (ret) { + tf_close (); + warnx ("tf_get_pname: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + ret = tf_get_pinst (princ.instance); + if (ret) { + tf_close (); + warnx ("tf_get_pname: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + + printf ("%17s: %s\n", "Principal", krb_unparse_name(&princ)); + print_time_diff(do_verbose); + printf("\n"); + + ct = rtbl_create(); + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_ISSUED, 0); + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_EXPIRES, 0); + if (do_verbose) + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_PRINCIPAL_KVNO, 0); + else + rtbl_add_column(ct, COL_PRINCIPAL, 0); + rtbl_set_prefix(ct, " "); + rtbl_set_column_prefix(ct, COL_ISSUED, ""); + + while ((ret = tf_get_cred(&cred)) == KSUCCESS) { + struct timeval tv; + char buf1[20], buf2[20]; + const char *pp; + + found++; + + strlcpy(buf1, + short_date(cred.issue_date), + sizeof(buf1)); + cred.issue_date = krb_life_to_time(cred.issue_date, cred.lifetime); + krb_kdctimeofday(&tv); + if (do_verbose || tv.tv_sec < (unsigned long) cred.issue_date) + strlcpy(buf2, + short_date(cred.issue_date), + sizeof(buf2)); + else + strlcpy(buf2, + ">>> Expired <<<", + sizeof(buf2)); + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_ISSUED, buf1); + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_EXPIRES, buf2); + pp = krb_unparse_name_long(cred.service, + cred.instance, + cred.realm); + if (do_verbose) { + char *tmp; + + asprintf(&tmp, "%s (%d)", pp, cred.kvno); + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_PRINCIPAL_KVNO, tmp); + free(tmp); + } else { + rtbl_add_column_entry(ct, COL_PRINCIPAL, pp); + } + } + rtbl_format(ct, stdout); + rtbl_destroy(ct); + if (!found && ret == EOF) + printf("No tickets in file.\n"); + tf_close(); + + /* + * should do NAT stuff here + */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +/* + * Print a list of all AFS tokens + */ + +static void +display_tokens(int do_verbose) +{ + u_int32_t i; + unsigned char t[4096]; + struct ViceIoctl parms; + + parms.in = (void *)&i; + parms.in_size = sizeof(i); + parms.out = (void *)t; + parms.out_size = sizeof(t); + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + int32_t size_secret_tok, size_public_tok; + unsigned char *cell; + struct ClearToken ct; + unsigned char *r = t; + struct timeval tv; + char buf1[20], buf2[20]; + + if(k_pioctl(NULL, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) < 0) { + if(errno == EDOM) + break; + continue; + } + if(parms.out_size > sizeof(t)) + continue; + if(parms.out_size < sizeof(size_secret_tok)) + continue; + t[min(parms.out_size,sizeof(t)-1)] = 0; + memcpy(&size_secret_tok, r, sizeof(size_secret_tok)); + /* dont bother about the secret token */ + r += size_secret_tok + sizeof(size_secret_tok); + if (parms.out_size < (r - t) + sizeof(size_public_tok)) + continue; + memcpy(&size_public_tok, r, sizeof(size_public_tok)); + r += sizeof(size_public_tok); + if (parms.out_size < (r - t) + size_public_tok + sizeof(int32_t)) + continue; + memcpy(&ct, r, size_public_tok); + r += size_public_tok; + /* there is a int32_t with length of cellname, but we dont read it */ + r += sizeof(int32_t); + cell = r; + + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); + strlcpy (buf1, printable_time(ct.BeginTimestamp), + sizeof(buf1)); + if (do_verbose || tv.tv_sec < ct.EndTimestamp) + strlcpy (buf2, printable_time(ct.EndTimestamp), + sizeof(buf2)); + else + strlcpy (buf2, ">>> Expired <<<", sizeof(buf2)); + + printf("%s %s ", buf1, buf2); + + if ((ct.EndTimestamp - ct.BeginTimestamp) & 1) + printf("User's (AFS ID %d) tokens for %s", ct.ViceId, cell); + else + printf("Tokens for %s", cell); + if (do_verbose) + printf(" (%d)", ct.AuthHandle); + putchar('\n'); + } +} + +/* + * display the ccache in `cred_cache' + */ + +static int +display_v5_ccache (const char *cred_cache, int do_test, int do_verbose, + int do_flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal principal; + int exit_status = 0; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(cred_cache) { + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, cred_cache, &ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "%s", cred_cache); + } else { + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_resolve"); + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (ret) { + if(ret == ENOENT) { + if (!do_test) + krb5_warnx(context, "No ticket file: %s", + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache)); + return 1; + } else + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + } + if (do_test) + exit_status = check_for_tgt (context, ccache, principal); + else + print_tickets (context, ccache, principal, do_verbose, do_flags); + + ret = krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_close"); + + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + krb5_free_context (context); + return exit_status; +} + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; +static int do_verbose = 0; +static int do_test = 0; +#ifdef KRB4 +static int do_v4 = 1; +#endif +static int do_tokens = 0; +static int do_v5 = 1; +static char *cred_cache; +static int do_flags = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, 'f', arg_flag, &do_flags }, + { "cache", 'c', arg_string, &cred_cache, + "credentials cache to list", "cache" }, + { "test", 't', arg_flag, &do_test, + "test for having tickets", NULL }, + { NULL, 's', arg_flag, &do_test }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "v4", '4', arg_flag, &do_v4, + "display v4 tickets", NULL }, +#endif + { "tokens", 'T', arg_flag, &do_tokens, + "display AFS tokens", NULL }, + { "v5", '5', arg_flag, &do_v5, + "display v5 cred cache", NULL}, + { "verbose", 'v', arg_flag, &do_verbose, + "verbose output", NULL }, + { NULL, 'a', arg_flag, &do_verbose }, + { NULL, 'n', arg_flag, &do_verbose }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL} +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int exit_status = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage (1); + + if (do_v5) + exit_status = display_v5_ccache (cred_cache, do_test, + do_verbose, do_flags); + + if (!do_test) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (do_v4) { + if (do_v5) + printf ("\n"); + display_v4_tickets (do_verbose); + } +#endif + if (do_tokens && k_hasafs ()) { + if (do_v5) + printf ("\n"); +#ifdef KRB4 + else if (do_v4) + printf ("\n"); +#endif + display_tokens (do_verbose); + } + } + + return exit_status; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6cea15b9c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/klist.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ + +KLIST(1) UNIX Reference Manual KLIST(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kklliisstt - list Kerberos credentials + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kklliisstt [--cc _c_a_c_h_e | ----ccaacchhee==_c_a_c_h_e] [--ss | --tt | ----tteesstt] [--44 | ----vv44] [--TT | + ----ttookkeennss] [--55 | ----vv55] [--vv | ----vveerrbboossee] [--ff] [----vveerrssiioonn] [----hheellpp] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kklliisstt reads and displays the current tickets in the crential cache (also + known as the ticket file). + + Options supported: + + --cc _c_a_c_h_e, ----ccaacchhee==_c_a_c_h_e + credentials cache to list + + --ss, --tt, ----tteesstt + Test for there being an active and valid TGT for the local realm + of the user in the credential cache. + + --44, ----vv44 + display v4 tickets + + --TT, ----ttookkeennss + display AFS tokens + + --55, ----vv55 + display v5 cred cache (this is the default) + + --ff Include ticket flags in short form, each charcted stands for a + specific flag, as follows: + F forwardable + f forwarded + P proxiable + p proxied + D postdate-able + d postdated + R renewable + I initial + i invalid + A pre-authenticated + H hardware authenticated + + This information is also output with the ----vveerrbboossee option, but in + a more verbose way. + + --vv, ----vveerrbboossee + Verbose output. Include all possible information: + + Server + the princial the ticket is for + + Ticket etype + the encryption type use in the ticket, followed by + the key version of the ticket, if it is available + + Session key + the encryption type of the session key, if it's dif- + ferent from the encryption type of the ticket + + Auth time + + the time the authentication exchange took place + + Start time + the time that this tickets is valid from (only print- + ed if it's different from the auth time) + + End time + when the ticket expires, if it has already expired + this is also noted + + Renew till + the maximum possible end time of any ticket derived + from this one + + Ticket flags + the flags set on the ticket + + Addresses + the set of addresses from which this ticket is valid + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kdestroy(1), kinit(1) + + HEIMDAL July 8, 2000 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kuser_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kuser_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..06403cbe67 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kuser_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kuser_locl.h,v 1.13 2003/01/21 14:13:51 nectar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KUSER_LOCL_H__ +#define __KUSER_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCCOM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "crypto-headers.h" /* for des_read_pw_string */ + +#endif /* __KUSER_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kverify.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kverify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3501f009cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/kuser/kverify.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kverify.c,v 1.6 2001/08/24 01:08:13 assar Exp $"); + +static int help_flag = 0; +static int version_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[principal]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_preauthtype pre_auth_types[] = {KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP}; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt get_options; + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt verify_options; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&get_options); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list (&get_options, + pre_auth_types, + 1); + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init (&verify_options); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + NULL, + NULL, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, + &get_options); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_get_init_creds: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds (context, + &cred, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + &verify_options); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_verify_init_creds: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + krb5_free_context (context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/45_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/45_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8104179d5b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/45_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef __45_LOCL_H__ +#define __45_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#endif /* __45_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..50d47fdb39 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +lib_LIBRARIES = @EXTRA_LIB45@ + +EXTRA_LIBRARIES = lib45.a + +lib45_a_SOURCES = get_ad_tkt.c mk_req.c 45_locl.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cef1000c19 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,758 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(lib45_a_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + 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b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3be18a1ead --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "45_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_ad_tkt.c,v 1.4 2001/06/18 13:11:05 assar Exp $"); + +/* get an additional version 4 ticket via the 524 protocol */ + +#ifndef NEVERDATE +#define NEVERDATE ((unsigned long)0x7fffffffL) +#endif + +int +get_ad_tkt(char *service, char *sinstance, char *realm, int lifetime) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int code; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache id; + krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds; + CREDENTIALS cred; + time_t now; + char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ]; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + return KFAILURE; + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + now = time(NULL); + in_creds.times.endtime = krb_life_to_time(time(NULL), lifetime); + if(in_creds.times.endtime == NEVERDATE) + in_creds.times.endtime = 0; + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, id, &in_creds.client); + if(ret){ + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, in_creds.client, + pname, pinst, prealm); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, service, sinstance, realm, + &in_creds.server); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, + 0, + id, + &in_creds, + &out_creds); + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client); + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.server); + if(ret){ + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(context, id, out_creds, &cred); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + krb5_free_creds(context, out_creds); + if(ret) + return KFAILURE; + code = save_credentials(cred.service, cred.instance, cred.realm, + cred.session, cred.lifetime, cred.kvno, + &cred.ticket_st, now); + if(code == NO_TKT_FIL) + code = tf_setup(&cred, pname, pinst); + memset(&cred.session, 0, sizeof(cred.session)); + return code; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/mk_req.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/mk_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b06f558562 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/45/mk_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* implementation of krb_mk_req that uses 524 protocol */ + +#include "45_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mk_req.c,v 1.7 2002/05/24 15:21:00 joda Exp $"); + +static int lifetime = 255; + +static void +build_request(KTEXT req, + const char *name, const char *inst, const char *realm, + u_int32_t checksum) +{ + struct timeval tv; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_data data; + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, name); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, inst); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + krb5_store_int32(sp, checksum); + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + krb5_store_int8(sp, tv.tv_usec / 5000); + krb5_store_int32(sp, tv.tv_sec); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + memcpy(req->dat, data.data, data.length); + req->length = (data.length + 7) & ~7; + krb5_data_free(&data); +} + +#ifdef KRB_MK_REQ_CONST +int +krb_mk_req(KTEXT authent, + const char *service, const char *instance, const char *realm, + int32_t checksum) +#else +int +krb_mk_req(KTEXT authent, + char *service, char *instance, char *realm, + int32_t checksum) + +#endif +{ + CREDENTIALS cr; + KTEXT_ST req; + krb5_storage *sp; + int code; + /* XXX get user realm */ + const char *myrealm = realm; + krb5_data a; + + code = krb_get_cred(service, instance, realm, &cr); + if(code || time(NULL) > krb_life_to_time(cr.issue_date, cr.lifetime)){ + code = get_ad_tkt((char *)service, + (char *)instance, (char *)realm, lifetime); + if(code == KSUCCESS) + code = krb_get_cred(service, instance, realm, &cr); + } + + if(code) + return code; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, KRB_PROT_VERSION); + krb5_store_int8(sp, AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, cr.kvno); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + krb5_store_int8(sp, cr.ticket_st.length); + + build_request(&req, cr.pname, cr.pinst, myrealm, checksum); + encrypt_ktext(&req, &cr.session, DES_ENCRYPT); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, req.length); + + krb5_storage_write(sp, cr.ticket_st.dat, cr.ticket_st.length); + krb5_storage_write(sp, req.dat, req.length); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &a); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + memcpy(authent->dat, a.data, a.length); + authent->length = a.length; + krb5_data_free(&a); + + memset(&cr, 0, sizeof(cr)); + memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); + + return KSUCCESS; +} + +/* + * krb_set_lifetime sets the default lifetime for additional tickets + * obtained via krb_mk_req(). + * + * It returns the previous value of the default lifetime. + */ + +int +krb_set_lifetime(int newval) +{ + int olife = lifetime; + + lifetime = newval; + return(olife); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c8dc71efb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.22 2001/08/28 18:44:41 nectar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +if KRB4 +dir_45 = 45 +endif +if OTP +dir_otp = otp +endif +if DCE +dir_dce = kdfs +endif + +SUBDIRS = @DIR_roken@ vers editline @DIR_com_err@ sl asn1 @DIR_des@ krb5 \ + kafs hdb kadm5 gssapi auth $(dir_45) $(dir_otp) $(dir_dce) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d2a76a759 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,782 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.22 2001/08/28 18:44:41 nectar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = .. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = 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2001/09/25 13:39:25 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include + +#ifndef __asn1_common_definitions__ +#define __asn1_common_definitions__ + +typedef struct octet_string { + size_t length; + void *data; +} octet_string; + +typedef char *general_string; + +typedef struct oid { + size_t length; + unsigned *components; +} oid; + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f1f272ccc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# +# Error messages for the asn.1 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: asn1_err.et,v 1.5 1998/02/16 16:17:17 joda Exp $" + +error_table asn1 +prefix ASN1 +error_code BAD_TIMEFORMAT, "ASN.1 failed call to system time library" +error_code MISSING_FIELD, "ASN.1 structure is missing a required field" +error_code MISPLACED_FIELD, "ASN.1 unexpected field number" +error_code TYPE_MISMATCH, "ASN.1 type numbers are inconsistent" +error_code OVERFLOW, "ASN.1 value too large" +error_code OVERRUN, "ASN.1 encoding ended unexpectedly" +error_code BAD_ID, "ASN.1 identifier doesn't match expected value" +error_code BAD_LENGTH, "ASN.1 length doesn't match expected value" +error_code BAD_FORMAT, "ASN.1 badly-formatted encoding" +error_code PARSE_ERROR, "ASN.1 parse error" +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d3199e8edd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: asn1_print.c,v 1.11 2002/08/29 20:45:35 assar Exp $"); + +const char *class_names[] = { + "UNIV", /* 0 */ + "APPL", /* 1 */ + "CONTEXT", /* 2 */ + "PRIVATE" /* 3 */ +}; + +const char *type_names[] = { + "PRIM", /* 0 */ + "CONS" /* 1 */ +}; + +const char *tag_names[] = { + NULL, /* 0 */ + NULL, /* 1 */ + "Integer", /* 2 */ + "BitString", /* 3 */ + "OctetString", /* 4 */ + "Null", /* 5 */ + "ObjectID", /* 6 */ + NULL, /* 7 */ + NULL, /* 8 */ + NULL, /* 9 */ + NULL, /* 10 */ + NULL, /* 11 */ + NULL, /* 12 */ + NULL, /* 13 */ + NULL, /* 14 */ + NULL, /* 15 */ + "Sequence", /* 16 */ + "Set", /* 17 */ + NULL, /* 18 */ + "PrintableString", /* 19 */ + NULL, /* 20 */ + NULL, /* 21 */ + "IA5String", /* 22 */ + "UTCTime", /* 23 */ + "GeneralizedTime", /* 24 */ + NULL, /* 25 */ + "VisibleString", /* 26 */ + "GeneralString" /* 27 */ +}; + +static int +loop (unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int indent) +{ + while (len > 0) { + int ret; + Der_class class; + Der_type type; + int tag; + size_t sz; + size_t length; + int i; + + ret = der_get_tag (buf, len, &class, &type, &tag, &sz); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_tag: %s", error_message (ret)); + if (sz > len) + errx (1, "unreasonable length (%u) > %u", + (unsigned)sz, (unsigned)len); + buf += sz; + len -= sz; + for (i = 0; i < indent; ++i) + printf (" "); + printf ("%s %s ", class_names[class], type_names[type]); + if (tag_names[tag]) + printf ("%s = ", tag_names[tag]); + else + printf ("tag %d = ", tag); + ret = der_get_length (buf, len, &length, &sz); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_tag: %s", error_message (ret)); + buf += sz; + len -= sz; + + if (class == CONTEXT) { + printf ("[%d]\n", tag); + loop (buf, length, indent); + } else if (class == UNIV) { + switch (tag) { + case UT_Sequence : + printf ("{\n"); + loop (buf, length, indent + 2); + for (i = 0; i < indent; ++i) + printf (" "); + printf ("}\n"); + break; + case UT_Integer : { + int val; + + ret = der_get_int (buf, length, &val, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_int: %s", error_message (ret)); + printf ("integer %d\n", val); + break; + } + case UT_OctetString : { + octet_string str; + int i; + unsigned char *uc; + + ret = der_get_octet_string (buf, length, &str, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_octet_string: %s", error_message (ret)); + printf ("(length %lu), ", (unsigned long)length); + uc = (unsigned char *)str.data; + for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) + printf ("%02x", uc[i]); + printf ("\n"); + free (str.data); + break; + } + case UT_GeneralizedTime : + case UT_GeneralString : { + general_string str; + + ret = der_get_general_string (buf, length, &str, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_general_string: %s", + error_message (ret)); + printf ("\"%s\"\n", str); + free (str); + break; + } + case UT_OID: { + oid o; + int i; + + ret = der_get_oid(buf, length, &o, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_oid: %s", error_message (ret)); + + for (i = 0; i < o.length ; i++) + printf("%d%s", o.components[i], + i < o.length - 1 ? "." : ""); + printf("\n"); + free_oid(&o); + break; + } + default : + printf ("%lu bytes\n", (unsigned long)length); + break; + } + } + buf += length; + len -= length; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (const char *filename) +{ + int fd = open (filename, O_RDONLY); + struct stat sb; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + int ret; + + if(fd < 0) + err (1, "opening %s for read", filename); + if (fstat (fd, &sb) < 0) + err (1, "stat %s", filename); + len = sb.st_size; + buf = malloc (len); + if (buf == NULL) + err (1, "malloc %u", (unsigned)len); + if (read (fd, buf, len) != len) + errx (1, "read failed"); + close (fd); + ret = loop (buf, len, 0); + free (buf); + return ret; +} + + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "dump-file"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + initialize_asn1_error_table (); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + if (argc != 1) + usage (1); + return doit (argv[0]); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20a41ad859 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-common.c @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "check-common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: check-common.c,v 1.1 2003/01/23 10:21:36 lha Exp $"); + +static void +print_bytes (unsigned const char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + printf ("%02x ", buf[i]); +} + +int +generic_test (const struct test_case *tests, + unsigned ntests, + size_t data_size, + int (*encode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *), + int (*length)(void *), + int (*decode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *), + int (*cmp)(void *a, void *b)) +{ + unsigned char buf[4711]; + int i; + int failures = 0; + void *val = malloc (data_size); + + if (data_size != 0 && val == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + int ret; + size_t sz, consumed_sz, length_sz; + unsigned char *beg; + + ret = (*encode) (buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + tests[i].val, &sz); + beg = buf + sizeof(buf) - sz; + if (ret != 0) { + printf ("encoding of %s failed\n", tests[i].name); + ++failures; + } + if (sz != tests[i].byte_len) { + printf ("encoding of %s has wrong len (%lu != %lu)\n", + tests[i].name, + (unsigned long)sz, (unsigned long)tests[i].byte_len); + ++failures; + } + + length_sz = (*length) (tests[i].val); + if (sz != length_sz) { + printf ("length for %s is bad (%lu != %lu)\n", + tests[i].name, (unsigned long)length_sz, (unsigned long)sz); + ++failures; + } + + if (memcmp (beg, tests[i].bytes, tests[i].byte_len) != 0) { + printf ("encoding of %s has bad bytes:\n" + "correct: ", tests[i].name); + print_bytes (tests[i].bytes, tests[i].byte_len); + printf ("\nactual: "); + print_bytes (beg, sz); + printf ("\n"); + ++failures; + } + ret = (*decode) (beg, sz, val, &consumed_sz); + if (ret != 0) { + printf ("decoding of %s failed\n", tests[i].name); + ++failures; + } + if (sz != consumed_sz) { + printf ("different length decoding %s (%ld != %ld)\n", + tests[i].name, + (unsigned long)sz, (unsigned long)consumed_sz); + ++failures; + } + if ((*cmp)(val, tests[i].val) != 0) { + printf ("%s: comparison failed\n", tests[i].name); + ++failures; + } + } + free (val); + return failures; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-common.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..52d59cb4f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-common.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +struct test_case { + void *val; + int byte_len; + const unsigned char *bytes; + char *name; +}; + +typedef int (*generic_encode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *); +typedef int (*generic_length)(void *); +typedef int (*generic_decode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *); + +int +generic_test (const struct test_case *tests, + unsigned ntests, + size_t data_size, + int (*encode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *), + int (*length)(void *), + int (*decode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *), + int (*cmp)(void *a, void *b)); + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-der.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-der.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7cb057749e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-der.c @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "check-common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: check-der.c,v 1.9 2003/01/23 10:19:49 lha Exp $"); + +static int +cmp_integer (void *a, void *b) +{ + int *ia = (int *)a; + int *ib = (int *)b; + + return *ib - *ia; +} + +static int +test_integer (void) +{ + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\x00"}, + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\x7f"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\x00\x80"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\x01\x00"}, + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\x80"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\xff\x7f"}, + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\xff"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\xff\x01"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\x00\xff"}, + {NULL, 6, "\x02\x04\x80\x00\x00\x00"}, + {NULL, 6, "\x02\x04\x7f\xff\xff\xff"} + }; + + int values[] = {0, 127, 128, 256, -128, -129, -1, -255, 255, + 0x80000000, 0x7fffffff}; + int i; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + tests[i].val = &values[i]; + asprintf (&tests[i].name, "integer %d", values[i]); + } + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(int), + (generic_encode)encode_integer, + (generic_length) length_integer, + (generic_decode)decode_integer, + cmp_integer); +} + +static int +cmp_octet_string (void *a, void *b) +{ + octet_string *oa = (octet_string *)a; + octet_string *ob = (octet_string *)b; + + if (oa->length != ob->length) + return ob->length - oa->length; + + return (memcmp (oa->data, ob->data, oa->length)); +} + +static int +test_octet_string (void) +{ + octet_string s1 = {8, "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xab\xcd\xef"}; + + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 10, "\x04\x08\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xab\xcd\xef"} + }; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + tests[0].val = &s1; + asprintf (&tests[0].name, "a octet string"); + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(octet_string), + (generic_encode)encode_octet_string, + (generic_length)length_octet_string, + (generic_decode)decode_octet_string, + cmp_octet_string); +} + +static int +cmp_general_string (void *a, void *b) +{ + unsigned char **sa = (unsigned char **)a; + unsigned char **sb = (unsigned char **)b; + + return strcmp (*sa, *sb); +} + +static int +test_general_string (void) +{ + unsigned char *s1 = "Test User 1"; + + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 13, "\x1b\x0b\x54\x65\x73\x74\x20\x55\x73\x65\x72\x20\x31"} + }; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + tests[0].val = &s1; + asprintf (&tests[0].name, "the string \"%s\"", s1); + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(unsigned char *), + (generic_encode)encode_general_string, + (generic_length)length_general_string, + (generic_decode)decode_general_string, + cmp_general_string); +} + +static int +cmp_generalized_time (void *a, void *b) +{ + time_t *ta = (time_t *)a; + time_t *tb = (time_t *)b; + + return *tb - *ta; +} + +static int +test_generalized_time (void) +{ + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 17, "\x18\x0f""19700101000000Z"}, + {NULL, 17, "\x18\x0f""19851106210627Z"} + }; + time_t values[] = {0, 500159187}; + int i; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + tests[i].val = &values[i]; + asprintf (&tests[i].name, "time %d", (int)values[i]); + } + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(time_t), + (generic_encode)encode_generalized_time, + (generic_length)length_generalized_time, + (generic_decode)decode_generalized_time, + cmp_generalized_time); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret += test_integer (); + ret += test_octet_string (); + ret += test_general_string (); + ret += test_generalized_time (); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-gen.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-gen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b0bec939b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/check-gen.c @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "check-common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: check-gen.c,v 1.2.2.1 2003/05/06 16:49:57 joda Exp $"); + +static char *lha_princ[] = { "lha" }; +static char *lharoot_princ[] = { "lha", "root" }; +static char *datan_princ[] = { "host", "nutcracker.e.kth.se" }; + + +#define COMPARE_STRING(ac,bc,e) \ + do { if (strcmp((ac)->e, (bc)->e) != 0) return 1; } while(0) +#define COMPARE_INTEGER(ac,bc,e) \ + do { if ((ac)->e != (bc)->e) return 1; } while(0) +#define COMPARE_MEM(ac,bc,e,len) \ + do { if (memcmp((ac)->e, (bc)->e,len) != 0) return 1; } while(0) + +static int +cmp_principal (void *a, void *b) +{ + Principal *pa = a; + Principal *pb = b; + int i; + + COMPARE_STRING(pa,pb,realm); + COMPARE_INTEGER(pa,pb,name.name_type); + COMPARE_INTEGER(pa,pb,name.name_string.len); + + for (i = 0; i < pa->name.name_string.len; i++) + COMPARE_STRING(pa,pb,name.name_string.val[i]); + + return 0; +} + +static int +test_principal (void) +{ + + struct test_case tests[] = { + { NULL, 29, + (unsigned char*)"\x30\x1b\xa0\x10\x30\x0e\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x01\xa1\x07\x30\x05\x1b" + "\x03\x6c\x68\x61\xa1\x07\x1b\x05\x53\x55\x2e\x53\x45" + }, + { NULL, 35, + (unsigned char*)"\x30\x21\xa0\x16\x30\x14\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x01\xa1\x0d\x30\x0b\x1b" + "\x03\x6c\x68\x61\x1b\x04\x72\x6f\x6f\x74\xa1\x07\x1b\x05\x53\x55" + "\x2e\x53\x45" + }, + { NULL, 54, + (unsigned char*)"\x30\x34\xa0\x26\x30\x24\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x03\xa1\x1d\x30\x1b\x1b" + "\x04\x68\x6f\x73\x74\x1b\x13\x6e\x75\x74\x63\x72\x61\x63\x6b\x65" + "\x72\x2e\x65\x2e\x6b\x74\x68\x2e\x73\x65\xa1\x0a\x1b\x08\x45\x2e" + "\x4b\x54\x48\x2e\x53\x45" + } + }; + + + Principal values[] = { + { { KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL, { 1, lha_princ } }, "SU.SE" }, + { { KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL, { 2, lharoot_princ } }, "SU.SE" }, + { { KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, { 2, datan_princ } }, "E.KTH.SE" } + }; + int i; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + tests[i].val = &values[i]; + asprintf (&tests[i].name, "Principal %d", i); + } + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(Principal), + (generic_encode)encode_Principal, + (generic_length)length_Principal, + (generic_decode)decode_Principal, + cmp_principal); +} + +static int +cmp_authenticator (void *a, void *b) +{ + Authenticator *aa = a; + Authenticator *ab = b; + int i; + + COMPARE_INTEGER(aa,ab,authenticator_vno); + COMPARE_STRING(aa,ab,crealm); + + COMPARE_INTEGER(aa,ab,cname.name_type); + COMPARE_INTEGER(aa,ab,cname.name_string.len); + + for (i = 0; i < aa->cname.name_string.len; i++) + COMPARE_STRING(aa,ab,cname.name_string.val[i]); + + return 0; +} + +static int +test_authenticator (void) +{ + struct test_case tests[] = { + { NULL, 63, + (unsigned char*)"\x62\x3d\x30\x3b\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xa1\x0a\x1b\x08" + "\x45\x2e\x4b\x54\x48\x2e\x53\x45\xa2\x10\x30\x0e\xa0" + "\x03\x02\x01\x01\xa1\x07\x30\x05\x1b\x03\x6c\x68\x61" + "\xa4\x03\x02\x01\x0a\xa5\x11\x18\x0f\x31\x39\x37\x30" + "\x30\x31\x30\x31\x30\x30\x30\x31\x33\x39\x5a" + }, + { NULL, 67, + (unsigned char*)"\x62\x41\x30\x3f\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xa1\x07\x1b\x05" + "\x53\x55\x2e\x53\x45\xa2\x16\x30\x14\xa0\x03\x02\x01" + "\x01\xa1\x0d\x30\x0b\x1b\x03\x6c\x68\x61\x1b\x04\x72" + "\x6f\x6f\x74\xa4\x04\x02\x02\x01\x24\xa5\x11\x18\x0f" + "\x31\x39\x37\x30\x30\x31\x30\x31\x30\x30\x31\x36\x33" + "\x39\x5a" + } + }; + + Authenticator values[] = { + { 5, "E.KTH.SE", { KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL, { 1, lha_princ } }, + NULL, 10, 99, NULL, NULL, NULL }, + { 5, "SU.SE", { KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL, { 2, lharoot_princ } }, + NULL, 292, 999, NULL, NULL, NULL } + }; + int i; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + tests[i].val = &values[i]; + asprintf (&tests[i].name, "Authenticator %d", i); + } + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(Authenticator), + (generic_encode)encode_Authenticator, + (generic_length)length_Authenticator, + (generic_decode)decode_Authenticator, + cmp_authenticator); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret += test_principal (); + ret += test_authenticator(); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..738c8d7e7a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der.h @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: der.h,v 1.22 2001/09/27 16:20:35 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __DER_H__ +#define __DER_H__ + +#include + +typedef enum {UNIV = 0, APPL = 1, CONTEXT = 2 , PRIVATE = 3} Der_class; + +typedef enum {PRIM = 0, CONS = 1} Der_type; + +/* Universal tags */ + +enum { + UT_Boolean = 1, + UT_Integer = 2, + UT_BitString = 3, + UT_OctetString = 4, + UT_Null = 5, + UT_OID = 6, + UT_Enumerated = 10, + UT_Sequence = 16, + UT_Set = 17, + UT_PrintableString = 19, + UT_IA5String = 22, + UT_UTCTime = 23, + UT_GeneralizedTime = 24, + UT_VisibleString = 26, + UT_GeneralString = 27 +}; + +#define ASN1_INDEFINITE 0xdce0deed + +#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM +time_t timegm (struct tm *); +#endif + +int time2generalizedtime (time_t t, octet_string *s); + +int der_get_int (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, int *ret, size_t *size); +int der_get_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + size_t *val, size_t *size); +int der_get_general_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + general_string *str, size_t *size); +int der_get_octet_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + octet_string *data, size_t *size); +int der_get_oid (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + oid *data, size_t *size); +int der_get_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class *class, Der_type *type, + int *tag, size_t *size); + +int der_match_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t *size); +int der_match_tag_and_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, int tag, + size_t *length_ret, size_t *size); + +int decode_integer (const unsigned char*, size_t, int*, size_t*); +int decode_unsigned (const unsigned char*, size_t, unsigned*, size_t*); +int decode_enumerated (const unsigned char*, size_t, unsigned*, size_t*); +int decode_general_string (const unsigned char*, size_t, + general_string*, size_t*); +int decode_oid (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + oid *k, size_t *size); +int decode_octet_string (const unsigned char*, size_t, octet_string*, size_t*); +int decode_generalized_time (const unsigned char*, size_t, time_t*, size_t*); + +int der_put_int (unsigned char *p, size_t len, int val, size_t*); +int der_put_length (unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t val, size_t*); +int der_put_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *str, size_t*); +int der_put_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *data, size_t*); +int der_put_oid (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const oid *data, size_t *size); +int der_put_tag (unsigned char *p, size_t len, Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t*); +int der_put_length_and_tag (unsigned char*, size_t, size_t, + Der_class, Der_type, int, size_t*); + +int encode_integer (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const int *data, size_t*); +int encode_unsigned (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const unsigned *data, size_t*); +int encode_enumerated (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const unsigned *data, size_t*); +int encode_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *data, size_t*); +int encode_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *k, size_t*); +int encode_oid (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const oid *k, size_t*); +int encode_generalized_time (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const time_t *t, size_t*); + +void free_integer (int *num); +void free_general_string (general_string *str); +void free_octet_string (octet_string *k); +void free_oid (oid *k); +void free_generalized_time (time_t *t); + +size_t length_len (size_t len); +size_t length_integer (const int *data); +size_t length_unsigned (const unsigned *data); +size_t length_enumerated (const unsigned *data); +size_t length_general_string (const general_string *data); +size_t length_octet_string (const octet_string *k); +size_t length_oid (const oid *k); +size_t length_generalized_time (const time_t *t); + +int copy_general_string (const general_string *from, general_string *to); +int copy_octet_string (const octet_string *from, octet_string *to); +int copy_oid (const oid *from, oid *to); + +int fix_dce(size_t reallen, size_t *len); + +#endif /* __DER_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_copy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eefc914170 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_copy.c,v 1.10 2003/04/17 07:13:08 lha Exp $"); + +int +copy_general_string (const general_string *from, general_string *to) +{ + *to = strdup(*from); + if(*to == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +int +copy_octet_string (const octet_string *from, octet_string *to) +{ + to->length = from->length; + to->data = malloc(to->length); + if(to->length != 0 && to->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(to->data, from->data, to->length); + return 0; +} + +int +copy_oid (const oid *from, oid *to) +{ + to->length = from->length; + to->components = malloc(to->length * sizeof(*to->components)); + if (to->length != 0 && to->components == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(to->components, from->components, to->length); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_free.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8cedeb73ed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_free.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_free.c,v 1.8.6.1 2003/08/20 16:24:20 joda Exp $"); + +void +free_general_string (general_string *str) +{ + free(*str); + *str = NULL; +} + +void +free_octet_string (octet_string *k) +{ + free(k->data); + k->data = NULL; +} + +void +free_oid (oid *k) +{ + free(k->components); + k->components = NULL; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_get.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_get.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..429fd66ed4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_get.c @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_get.c,v 1.33 2002/09/03 16:21:49 nectar Exp $"); + +#include + +/* + * All decoding functions take a pointer `p' to first position in + * which to read, from the left, `len' which means the maximum number + * of characters we are able to read, `ret' were the value will be + * returned and `size' where the number of used bytes is stored. + * Either 0 or an error code is returned. + */ + +static int +der_get_unsigned (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + unsigned *ret, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned val = 0; + size_t oldlen = len; + + while (len--) + val = val * 256 + *p++; + *ret = val; + if(size) *size = oldlen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_int (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + int *ret, size_t *size) +{ + int val = 0; + size_t oldlen = len; + + if (len > 0) { + val = (signed char)*p++; + while (--len) + val = val * 256 + *p++; + } + *ret = val; + if(size) *size = oldlen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + size_t *val, size_t *size) +{ + size_t v; + + if (len <= 0) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + --len; + v = *p++; + if (v < 128) { + *val = v; + if(size) *size = 1; + } else { + int e; + size_t l; + unsigned tmp; + + if(v == 0x80){ + *val = ASN1_INDEFINITE; + if(size) *size = 1; + return 0; + } + v &= 0x7F; + if (len < v) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + e = der_get_unsigned (p, v, &tmp, &l); + if(e) return e; + *val = tmp; + if(size) *size = l + 1; + } + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_general_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + general_string *str, size_t *size) +{ + char *s; + + s = malloc (len + 1); + if (s == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (s, p, len); + s[len] = '\0'; + *str = s; + if(size) *size = len; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_octet_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + octet_string *data, size_t *size) +{ + data->length = len; + data->data = malloc(len); + if (data->data == NULL && data->length != 0) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (data->data, p, len); + if(size) *size = len; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_oid (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + oid *data, size_t *size) +{ + int n; + size_t oldlen = len; + + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + + data->components = malloc(len * sizeof(*data->components)); + if (data->components == NULL && len != 0) + return ENOMEM; + data->components[0] = (*p) / 40; + data->components[1] = (*p) % 40; + --len; + ++p; + for (n = 2; len > 0; ++n) { + unsigned u = 0; + + do { + --len; + u = u * 128 + (*p++ % 128); + } while (len > 0 && p[-1] & 0x80); + data->components[n] = u; + } + if (p[-1] & 0x80) { + free_oid (data); + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + } + data->length = n; + if (size) + *size = oldlen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class *class, Der_type *type, + int *tag, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + *class = (Der_class)(((*p) >> 6) & 0x03); + *type = (Der_type)(((*p) >> 5) & 0x01); + *tag = (*p) & 0x1F; + if(size) *size = 1; + return 0; +} + +int +der_match_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t *size) +{ + size_t l; + Der_class thisclass; + Der_type thistype; + int thistag; + int e; + + e = der_get_tag (p, len, &thisclass, &thistype, &thistag, &l); + if (e) return e; + if (class != thisclass || type != thistype) + return ASN1_BAD_ID; + if(tag > thistag) + return ASN1_MISPLACED_FIELD; + if(tag < thistag) + return ASN1_MISSING_FIELD; + if(size) *size = l; + return 0; +} + +int +der_match_tag_and_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, int tag, + size_t *length_ret, size_t *size) +{ + size_t l, ret = 0; + int e; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, class, type, tag, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_length (p, len, length_ret, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_integer (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + int *num, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l, reallen; + int e; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Integer, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_length (p, len, &reallen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (reallen > len) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + e = der_get_int (p, reallen, num, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_unsigned (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + unsigned *num, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l, reallen; + int e; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Integer, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_length (p, len, &reallen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (reallen > len) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + e = der_get_unsigned (p, reallen, num, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_enumerated (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + unsigned *num, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l, reallen; + int e; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Enumerated, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_length (p, len, &reallen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_int (p, reallen, num, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_general_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + general_string *str, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_GeneralString, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + + e = der_get_general_string (p, slen, str, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_octet_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + octet_string *k, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_OctetString, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + + e = der_get_octet_string (p, slen, k, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_oid (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + oid *k, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_OID, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + + e = der_get_oid (p, slen, k, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +static void +generalizedtime2time (const char *s, time_t *t) +{ + struct tm tm; + + memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); + sscanf (s, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", + &tm.tm_year, &tm.tm_mon, &tm.tm_mday, &tm.tm_hour, + &tm.tm_min, &tm.tm_sec); + tm.tm_year -= 1900; + tm.tm_mon -= 1; + *t = timegm (&tm); +} + +int +decode_generalized_time (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + time_t *t, size_t *size) +{ + octet_string k; + char *times; + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_GeneralizedTime, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + e = der_get_octet_string (p, slen, &k, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + times = realloc(k.data, k.length + 1); + if (times == NULL){ + free(k.data); + return ENOMEM; + } + times[k.length] = 0; + generalizedtime2time (times, t); + free (times); + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + + +int +fix_dce(size_t reallen, size_t *len) +{ + if(reallen == ASN1_INDEFINITE) + return 1; + if(*len < reallen) + return -1; + *len = reallen; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_length.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_length.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..913a1f8ff8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_length.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_length.c,v 1.12.6.2 2004/02/12 18:45:51 joda Exp $"); + +size_t +_heim_len_unsigned (unsigned val) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + + do { + ++ret; + val /= 256; + } while (val); + return ret; +} + +size_t +_heim_len_int (int val) +{ + unsigned char q; + size_t ret = 0; + + if (val >= 0) { + do { + q = val % 256; + ret++; + val /= 256; + } while(val); + if(q >= 128) + ret++; + } else { + val = ~val; + do { + q = ~(val % 256); + ret++; + val /= 256; + } while(val); + if(q < 128) + ret++; + } + return ret; +} + +static size_t +len_oid (const oid *oid) +{ + size_t ret = 1; + int n; + + for (n = 2; n < oid->length; ++n) { + unsigned u = oid->components[n]; + + ++ret; + u /= 128; + while (u > 0) { + ++ret; + u /= 128; + } + } + return ret; +} + +size_t +length_len (size_t len) +{ + if (len < 128) + return 1; + else + return _heim_len_unsigned (len) + 1; +} + +size_t +length_integer (const int *data) +{ + size_t len = _heim_len_int (*data); + + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_unsigned (const unsigned *data) +{ + size_t len = _heim_len_unsigned (*data); + + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_enumerated (const unsigned *data) +{ + size_t len = _heim_len_int (*data); + + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_general_string (const general_string *data) +{ + char *str = *data; + size_t len = strlen(str); + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_octet_string (const octet_string *k) +{ + return 1 + length_len(k->length) + k->length; +} + +size_t +length_oid (const oid *k) +{ + size_t len = len_oid (k); + + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_generalized_time (const time_t *t) +{ + octet_string k; + size_t ret; + + time2generalizedtime (*t, &k); + ret = 1 + length_len(k.length) + k.length; + free (k.data); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d931d3135 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: der_locl.h,v 1.4.6.1 2004/02/09 17:54:05 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __DER_LOCL_H__ +#define __DER_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +size_t _heim_len_unsigned (unsigned); +size_t _heim_len_int (int); + +#endif /* __DER_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_put.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_put.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41733c57b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/der_put.c @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_put.c,v 1.28 2003/04/17 07:12:24 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * All encoding functions take a pointer `p' to first position in + * which to write, from the right, `len' which means the maximum + * number of characters we are able to write. The function returns + * the number of characters written in `size' (if non-NULL). + * The return value is 0 or an error. + */ + +static int +der_put_unsigned (unsigned char *p, size_t len, unsigned val, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned char *base = p; + + if (val) { + while (len > 0 && val) { + *p-- = val % 256; + val /= 256; + --len; + } + if (val != 0) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + else { + *size = base - p; + return 0; + } + } else if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + else { + *p = 0; + *size = 1; + return 0; + } +} + +int +der_put_int (unsigned char *p, size_t len, int val, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned char *base = p; + + if(val >= 0) { + do { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = val % 256; + len--; + val /= 256; + } while(val); + if(p[1] >= 128) { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = 0; + len--; + } + } else { + val = ~val; + do { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = ~(val % 256); + len--; + val /= 256; + } while(val); + if(p[1] < 128) { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = 0xff; + len--; + } + } + *size = base - p; + return 0; +} + + +int +der_put_length (unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t val, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + if (val < 128) { + *p = val; + *size = 1; + return 0; + } else { + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_unsigned (p, len - 1, val, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + *p = 0x80 | l; + *size = l + 1; + return 0; + } +} + +int +der_put_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *str, size_t *size) +{ + size_t slen = strlen(*str); + + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + p -= slen; + len -= slen; + memcpy (p+1, *str, slen); + *size = slen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *data, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < data->length) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + p -= data->length; + len -= data->length; + memcpy (p+1, data->data, data->length); + *size = data->length; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_oid (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const oid *data, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned char *base = p; + int n; + + for (n = data->length - 1; n >= 2; --n) { + unsigned u = data->components[n]; + + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = u % 128; + u /= 128; + --len; + while (u > 0) { + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = 128 + u % 128; + u /= 128; + --len; + } + } + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = 40 * data->components[0] + data->components[1]; + *size = base - p; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_tag (unsigned char *p, size_t len, Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p = (class << 6) | (type << 5) | tag; /* XXX */ + *size = 1; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_length_and_tag (unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t len_val, + Der_class class, Der_type type, int tag, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_length (p, len, len_val, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_tag (p, len, class, type, tag, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_integer (unsigned char *p, size_t len, const int *data, size_t *size) +{ + int num = *data; + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_int (p, len, num, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Integer, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_unsigned (unsigned char *p, size_t len, const unsigned *data, + size_t *size) +{ + unsigned num = *data; + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_unsigned (p, len, num, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Integer, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_enumerated (unsigned char *p, size_t len, const unsigned *data, + size_t *size) +{ + unsigned num = *data; + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_int (p, len, num, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Enumerated, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *data, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_general_string (p, len, data, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_GeneralString, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *k, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_octet_string (p, len, k, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_OctetString, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_oid(unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const oid *k, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_oid (p, len, k, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_OID, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +time2generalizedtime (time_t t, octet_string *s) +{ + struct tm *tm; + size_t len; + + len = 15; + + s->data = malloc(len + 1); + if (s->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + s->length = len; + tm = gmtime (&t); + snprintf (s->data, len + 1, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", + tm->tm_year + 1900, tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday, + tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec); + return 0; +} + +int +encode_generalized_time (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const time_t *t, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + octet_string k; + int e; + + e = time2generalizedtime (*t, &k); + if (e) + return e; + e = der_put_octet_string (p, len, &k, &l); + free (k.data); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, k.length, UNIV, PRIM, + UT_GeneralizedTime, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8580360c60 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen.c @@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen.c,v 1.50 2003/04/17 07:09:18 lha Exp $"); + +FILE *headerfile, *codefile, *logfile; + +#define STEM "asn1" + +static const char *orig_filename; +static char *header; +static char *headerbase = STEM; + +/* + * list of all IMPORTs + */ + +struct import { + const char *module; + struct import *next; +}; + +static struct import *imports = NULL; + +void +add_import (const char *module) +{ + struct import *tmp = emalloc (sizeof(*tmp)); + + tmp->module = module; + tmp->next = imports; + imports = tmp; +} + +const char * +filename (void) +{ + return orig_filename; +} + +void +init_generate (const char *filename, const char *base) +{ + orig_filename = filename; + if(base) + asprintf(&headerbase, "%s", base); + asprintf(&header, "%s.h", headerbase); + headerfile = fopen (header, "w"); + if (headerfile == NULL) + err (1, "open %s", header); + fprintf (headerfile, + "/* Generated from %s */\n" + "/* Do not edit */\n\n", + filename); + fprintf (headerfile, + "#ifndef __%s_h__\n" + "#define __%s_h__\n\n", headerbase, headerbase); + fprintf (headerfile, + "#include \n" + "#include \n\n"); +#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM + fprintf (headerfile, "time_t timegm (struct tm*);\n\n"); +#endif + fprintf (headerfile, + "#ifndef __asn1_common_definitions__\n" + "#define __asn1_common_definitions__\n\n"); + fprintf (headerfile, + "typedef struct octet_string {\n" + " size_t length;\n" + " void *data;\n" + "} octet_string;\n\n"); + fprintf (headerfile, + "typedef char *general_string;\n\n" + ); + fprintf (headerfile, + "typedef struct oid {\n" + " size_t length;\n" + " unsigned *components;\n" + "} oid;\n\n"); + fputs("#define ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(T, B, BL, S, L, R) \\\n" + " do { \\\n" + " (BL) = length_##T((S)); \\\n" + " (B) = malloc((BL)); \\\n" + " if((B) == NULL) { \\\n" + " (R) = ENOMEM; \\\n" + " } else { \\\n" + " (R) = encode_##T(((unsigned char*)(B)) + (BL) - 1, (BL), \\\n" + " (S), (L)); \\\n" + " if((R) != 0) { \\\n" + " free((B)); \\\n" + " (B) = NULL; \\\n" + " } \\\n" + " } \\\n" + " } while (0)\n\n", + headerfile); + fprintf (headerfile, "#endif\n\n"); + logfile = fopen(STEM "_files", "w"); + if (logfile == NULL) + err (1, "open " STEM "_files"); +} + +void +close_generate (void) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, "#endif /* __%s_h__ */\n", headerbase); + + fclose (headerfile); + fprintf (logfile, "\n"); + fclose (logfile); +} + +void +generate_constant (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, "enum { %s = %d };\n\n", + s->gen_name, s->constant); +} + +static void +space(int level) +{ + while(level-- > 0) + fprintf(headerfile, " "); +} + +static void +define_asn1 (int level, Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s", t->symbol->name); + break; + case TInteger: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "INTEGER"); + break; + case TUInteger: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "UNSIGNED INTEGER"); + break; + case TOctetString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "OCTET STRING"); + break; + case TOID : + space(level); + fprintf(headerfile, "OBJECT IDENTIFIER"); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "BIT STRING {\n"); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space(level + 1); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s(%d)%s\n", m->name, m->val, + m->next->val == tag?"":","); + + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "}"); + break; + } + case TEnumerated : { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "ENUMERATED {\n"); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space(level + 1); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s(%d)%s\n", m->name, m->val, + m->next->val == tag?"":","); + + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "}"); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag; + int max_width = 0; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "SEQUENCE {\n"); + for (m = t->members, tag = -1; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + if(strlen(m->name) + (m->val > 9) > max_width) + max_width = strlen(m->name) + (m->val > 9); + } + max_width += 3 + 2; + if(max_width < 16) max_width = 16; + for (m = t->members, tag = -1 ; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + int width; + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space(level + 1); + fprintf(headerfile, "%s[%d]", m->name, m->val); + width = max_width - strlen(m->name) - 3 - (m->val > 9) - 2; + fprintf(headerfile, "%*s", width, ""); + define_asn1(level + 1, m->type); + if(m->optional) + fprintf(headerfile, " OPTIONAL"); + if(m->next->val != tag) + fprintf (headerfile, ","); + fprintf (headerfile, "\n"); + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "}"); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "SEQUENCE OF "); + define_asn1 (0, t->subtype); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "GeneralizedTime"); + break; + case TGeneralString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "GeneralString"); + break; + case TApplication: + fprintf (headerfile, "[APPLICATION %d] ", t->application); + define_asn1 (level, t->subtype); + break; + default: + abort (); + } +} + +static void +define_type (int level, char *name, Type *t, int typedefp) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s %s;\n", t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + space(level); + if(t->members == NULL) { + fprintf (headerfile, "int %s;\n", name); + } else { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + fprintf (headerfile, "enum %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if(tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space (level + 1); + fprintf(headerfile, "%s = %d%s\n", m->gen_name, m->val, + m->next->val == tag ? "" : ","); + } + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n", name); + } + break; + case TUInteger: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "unsigned int %s;\n", name); + break; + case TOctetString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "octet_string %s;\n", name); + break; + case TOID : + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "oid %s;\n", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + Type i; + int tag = -1; + + i.type = TUInteger; + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "struct %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + char *n; + + asprintf (&n, "%s:1", m->gen_name); + define_type (level + 1, n, &i, FALSE); + free (n); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n\n", name); + break; + } + case TEnumerated: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "enum %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space(level + 1); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s = %d%s\n", m->gen_name, m->val, + m->next->val == tag ? "" : ","); + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n\n", name); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "struct %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (m->optional) { + char *n; + + asprintf (&n, "*%s", m->gen_name); + define_type (level + 1, n, m->type, FALSE); + free (n); + } else + define_type (level + 1, m->gen_name, m->type, FALSE); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n", name); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + Type i; + + i.type = TUInteger; + i.application = 0; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "struct %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + define_type (level + 1, "len", &i, FALSE); + define_type (level + 1, "*val", t->subtype, FALSE); + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n", name); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "time_t %s;\n", name); + break; + case TGeneralString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "general_string %s;\n", name); + break; + case TApplication: + define_type (level, name, t->subtype, FALSE); + break; + default: + abort (); + } +} + +static void +generate_type_header (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, "/*\n"); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s ::= ", s->name); + define_asn1 (0, s->type); + fprintf (headerfile, "\n*/\n\n"); + + fprintf (headerfile, "typedef "); + define_type (0, s->gen_name, s->type, TRUE); + + fprintf (headerfile, "\n"); +} + + +void +generate_type (const Symbol *s) +{ + struct import *i; + char *filename; + + asprintf (&filename, "%s_%s.x", STEM, s->gen_name); + codefile = fopen (filename, "w"); + if (codefile == NULL) + err (1, "fopen %s", filename); + fprintf(logfile, "%s ", filename); + free(filename); + fprintf (codefile, + "/* Generated from %s */\n" + "/* Do not edit */\n\n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n", + orig_filename); + + for (i = imports; i != NULL; i = i->next) + fprintf (codefile, + "#include <%s_asn1.h>\n", + i->module); + fprintf (codefile, + "#include <%s.h>\n", + headerbase); + fprintf (codefile, + "#include \n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n\n"); + generate_type_header (s); + generate_type_encode (s); + generate_type_decode (s); + generate_type_free (s); + generate_type_length (s); + generate_type_copy (s); + generate_glue (s); + fprintf(headerfile, "\n\n"); + fclose(codefile); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..369b6e392a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gen.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#include +#include "symbol.h" + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20f0d5b569 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_copy.c,v 1.12 2001/09/25 13:39:26 assar Exp $"); + +static void +copy_primitive (const char *typename, const char *from, const char *to) +{ + fprintf (codefile, "if(copy_%s(%s, %s)) return ENOMEM;\n", + typename, from, to); +} + +static void +copy_type (const char *from, const char *to, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + copy_type (from, to, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, "if(copy_%s(%s, %s)) return ENOMEM;\n", + t->symbol->gen_name, from, to); + break; + case TInteger: + case TUInteger: + case TEnumerated : + fprintf(codefile, "*(%s) = *(%s);\n", to, from); + break; + case TOctetString: + copy_primitive ("octet_string", from, to); + break; + case TOID: + copy_primitive ("oid", from, to); + break; + case TBitString: { + fprintf(codefile, "*(%s) = *(%s);\n", to, from); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *f; + char *t; + + asprintf (&f, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", from, m->gen_name); + asprintf (&t, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", to, m->gen_name); + if(m->optional){ + fprintf(codefile, "if(%s) {\n", f); + fprintf(codefile, "%s = malloc(sizeof(*%s));\n", t, t); + fprintf(codefile, "if(%s == NULL) return ENOMEM;\n", t); + } + copy_type (f, t, m->type); + if(m->optional){ + fprintf(codefile, "}else\n"); + fprintf(codefile, "%s = NULL;\n", t); + } + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (f); + free (t); + } + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *f; + char *T; + + fprintf (codefile, "if(((%s)->val = " + "malloc((%s)->len * sizeof(*(%s)->val))) == NULL && (%s)->len != 0)\n", + to, from, to, from); + fprintf (codefile, "return ENOMEM;\n"); + fprintf(codefile, + "for((%s)->len = 0; (%s)->len < (%s)->len; (%s)->len++){\n", + to, to, from, to); + asprintf(&f, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len]", from, to); + asprintf(&T, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len]", to, to); + copy_type(f, T, t->subtype); + fprintf(codefile, "}\n"); + free(f); + free(T); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + fprintf(codefile, "*(%s) = *(%s);\n", to, from); + break; + case TGeneralString: + copy_primitive ("general_string", from, to); + break; + case TApplication: + copy_type (from, to, t->subtype); + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_copy (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int copy_%s (const %s *, %s *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "copy_%s(const %s *from, %s *to)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + copy_type ("from", "to", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, "return 0;\n}\n\n"); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7237e4e421 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_decode.c,v 1.18 2002/08/09 15:37:34 joda Exp $"); + +static void +decode_primitive (const char *typename, const char *name) +{ + fprintf (codefile, + "e = decode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n", + typename, + name); +} + +static void +decode_type (const char *name, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + decode_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, + "e = decode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n", + t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + if(t->members == NULL) + decode_primitive ("integer", name); + else { + char *s; + asprintf(&s, "(int*)%s", name); + if(s == NULL) + errx (1, "out of memory"); + decode_primitive ("integer", s); + free(s); + } + break; + case TUInteger: + decode_primitive ("unsigned", name); + break; + case TEnumerated: + decode_primitive ("enumerated", name); + break; + case TOctetString: + decode_primitive ("octet_string", name); + break; + case TOID : + decode_primitive ("oid", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + int pos; + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_BitString," + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "if(len < reallen)\n" + "return ASN1_OVERRUN;\n" + "p++;\n" + "len--;\n" + "reallen--;\n" + "ret++;\n"); + pos = 0; + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + while (m->val / 8 > pos / 8) { + fprintf (codefile, + "p++; len--; reallen--; ret++;\n"); + pos += 8; + } + fprintf (codefile, + "%s->%s = (*p >> %d) & 1;\n", + name, m->gen_name, 7 - m->val % 8); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + fprintf (codefile, + "p += reallen; len -= reallen; ret += reallen;\n"); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence," + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "{\n" + "int dce_fix;\n" + "if((dce_fix = fix_dce(reallen, &len)) < 0)\n" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n"); + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if (0 && m->type->type == TType){ + if(m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "%s = malloc(sizeof(*%s));\n" + "if(%s == NULL) return ENOMEM;\n", s, s, s); + fprintf (codefile, + "e = decode_seq_%s(p, len, %d, %d, %s, &l);\n", + m->type->symbol->gen_name, + m->val, + m->optional, + s); + if(m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "if (e == ASN1_MISSING_FIELD) {\n" + "free(%s);\n" + "%s = NULL;\n" + "e = l = 0;\n" + "}\n", + s, s); + + fprintf (codefile, "FORW;\n"); + + }else{ + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "size_t newlen, oldlen;\n\n" + "e = der_match_tag (p, len, CONTEXT, CONS, %d, &l);\n", + m->val); + fprintf (codefile, + "if (e)\n"); + if(m->optional) + /* XXX should look at e */ + fprintf (codefile, + "%s = NULL;\n", s); + else + fprintf (codefile, + "return e;\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "else {\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "e = der_get_length (p, len, &newlen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "{\n" + + "int dce_fix;\n" + "oldlen = len;\n" + "if((dce_fix = fix_dce(newlen, &len)) < 0)" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n"); + if (m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "%s = malloc(sizeof(*%s));\n" + "if(%s == NULL) return ENOMEM;\n", s, s, s); + decode_type (s, m->type); + fprintf (codefile, + "if(dce_fix){\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "}else \n" + "len = oldlen - newlen;\n" + "}\n" + "}\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "}\n"); + } + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + fprintf(codefile, + "if(dce_fix){\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "}\n" + "}\n"); + + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence," + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "if(len < reallen)\n" + "return ASN1_OVERRUN;\n" + "len = reallen;\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, + "{\n" + "size_t origlen = len;\n" + "int oldret = ret;\n" + "ret = 0;\n" + "(%s)->len = 0;\n" + "(%s)->val = NULL;\n" + "while(ret < origlen) {\n" + "(%s)->len++;\n" + "(%s)->val = realloc((%s)->val, sizeof(*((%s)->val)) * (%s)->len);\n", + name, name, name, name, name, name, name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len-1]", name, name); + decode_type (n, t->subtype); + fprintf (codefile, + "len = origlen - ret;\n" + "}\n" + "ret += oldret;\n" + "}\n"); + free (n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + decode_primitive ("generalized_time", name); + break; + case TGeneralString: + decode_primitive ("general_string", name); + break; + case TApplication: + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, APPL, CONS, %d, " + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "{\n" + "int dce_fix;\n" + "if((dce_fix = fix_dce(reallen, &len)) < 0)\n" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n", + t->application); + decode_type (name, t->subtype); + fprintf(codefile, + "if(dce_fix){\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "}\n" + "}\n"); + + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_decode (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int " + "decode_%s(const unsigned char *, size_t, %s *, size_t *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "#define FORW " + "if(e) goto fail; " + "p += l; " + "len -= l; " + "ret += l\n\n"); + + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "decode_%s(const unsigned char *p," + " size_t len, %s *data, size_t *size)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + switch (s->type->type) { + case TInteger: + case TUInteger: + case TOctetString: + case TOID: + case TGeneralizedTime: + case TGeneralString: + case TBitString: + case TSequence: + case TSequenceOf: + case TApplication: + case TType: + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t ret = 0, reallen;\n" + "size_t l;\n" + "int e;\n\n"); + fprintf (codefile, "memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));\n"); + fprintf (codefile, "reallen = 0;\n"); /* hack to avoid `unused variable' */ + + decode_type ("data", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, + "if(size) *size = ret;\n" + "return 0;\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "fail:\n" + "free_%s(data);\n" + "return e;\n", + s->gen_name); + break; + default: + abort (); + } + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} + +void +generate_seq_type_decode (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int decode_seq_%s(const unsigned char *, size_t, int, int, " + "%s *, size_t *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "decode_seq_%s(const unsigned char *p, size_t len, int tag, " + "int optional, %s *data, size_t *size)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t newlen, oldlen;\n" + "size_t l, ret = 0;\n" + "int e;\n" + "int dce_fix;\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag(p, len, CONTEXT, CONS, tag, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "e = der_get_length(p, len, &newlen, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n" + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "oldlen = len;\n" + "if ((dce_fix = fix_dce(newlen, &len)) < 0)\n" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n" + "e = decode_%s(p, len, data, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n" + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "if (dce_fix) {\n" + "size_t reallen;\n\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length(p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "}\n", + s->gen_name); + fprintf (codefile, + "if(size) *size = ret;\n" + "return 0;\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ba50d5da4c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_encode.c,v 1.12 2001/09/25 13:39:26 assar Exp $"); + +static void +encode_primitive (const char *typename, const char *name) +{ + fprintf (codefile, + "e = encode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + typename, + name); +} + +static void +encode_type (const char *name, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + encode_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, + "e = encode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + if(t->members == NULL) + encode_primitive ("integer", name); + else { + char *s; + asprintf(&s, "(const int*)%s", name); + if(s == NULL) + errx(1, "out of memory"); + encode_primitive ("integer", s); + free(s); + } + break; + case TUInteger: + encode_primitive ("unsigned", name); + break; + case TOctetString: + encode_primitive ("octet_string", name); + break; + case TOID : + encode_primitive ("oid", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + int pos; + int rest; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "unsigned char c = 0;\n"); + pos = t->members->prev->val; + /* fix for buggy MIT (and OSF?) code */ + if (pos > 31) + abort (); + /* + * It seems that if we do not always set pos to 31 here, the MIT + * code will do the wrong thing. + * + * I hate ASN.1 (and DER), but I hate it even more when everybody + * has to screw it up differently. + */ + pos = 31; + rest = 7 - (pos % 8); + + for (m = t->members->prev; m && tag != m->val; m = m->prev) { + while (m->val / 8 < pos / 8) { + fprintf (codefile, + "*p-- = c; len--; ret++;\n" + "c = 0;\n"); + pos -= 8; + } + fprintf (codefile, + "if(%s->%s) c |= 1<<%d;\n", name, m->gen_name, + 7 - m->val % 8); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + + fprintf (codefile, + "*p-- = c;\n" + "*p-- = %d;\n" + "len -= 2;\n" + "ret += 2;\n" + "}\n\n" + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, UNIV, PRIM," + "UT_BitString, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + rest); + break; + } + case TEnumerated : { + encode_primitive ("enumerated", name); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members->prev; m && tag != m->val; m = m->prev) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if (m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "if(%s)\n", + s); +#if 1 + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "int oldret = ret;\n" + "ret = 0;\n"); +#endif + encode_type (s, m->type); + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, CONTEXT, CONS, " + "%d, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + m->val); +#if 1 + fprintf (codefile, + "ret += oldret;\n" + "}\n"); +#endif + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n"); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, + "for(i = (%s)->len - 1; i >= 0; --i) {\n" +#if 1 + "int oldret = ret;\n" + "ret = 0;\n", +#else + , +#endif + name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[i]", name); + encode_type (n, t->subtype); + fprintf (codefile, +#if 1 + "ret += oldret;\n" +#endif + "}\n" + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n"); + free (n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + encode_primitive ("generalized_time", name); + break; + case TGeneralString: + encode_primitive ("general_string", name); + break; + case TApplication: + encode_type (name, t->subtype); + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, APPL, CONS, %d, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + t->application); + break; + default: + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_encode (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int " + "encode_%s(unsigned char *, size_t, const %s *, size_t *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "#define BACK if (e) return e; p -= l; len -= l; ret += l\n\n"); + + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "encode_%s(unsigned char *p, size_t len," + " const %s *data, size_t *size)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + switch (s->type->type) { + case TInteger: + case TUInteger: + case TOctetString: + case TGeneralizedTime: + case TGeneralString: + case TBitString: + case TEnumerated: + case TOID: + case TSequence: + case TSequenceOf: + case TApplication: + case TType: + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t ret = 0;\n" + "size_t l;\n" + "int i, e;\n\n"); + fprintf(codefile, "i = 0;\n"); /* hack to avoid `unused variable' */ + + encode_type("data", s->type); + + fprintf (codefile, "*size = ret;\n" + "return 0;\n"); + break; + default: + abort (); + } + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_free.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9487c42d0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_free.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_free.c,v 1.9.6.1 2003/08/20 16:25:01 joda Exp $"); + +static void +free_primitive (const char *typename, const char *name) +{ + fprintf (codefile, "free_%s(%s);\n", typename, name); +} + +static void +free_type (const char *name, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + free_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, "free_%s(%s);\n", t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + case TUInteger: + case TEnumerated : + break; + case TOctetString: + free_primitive ("octet_string", name); + break; + case TOID : + free_primitive ("oid", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if(m->optional) + fprintf(codefile, "if(%s) {\n", s); + free_type (s, m->type); + if(m->optional) + fprintf(codefile, + "free(%s);\n" + "%s = NULL;\n" + "}\n", s, s); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, "while((%s)->len){\n", name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len-1]", name, name); + free_type(n, t->subtype); + fprintf(codefile, + "(%s)->len--;\n" + "}\n", + name); + fprintf(codefile, + "free((%s)->val);\n" + "(%s)->val = NULL;\n", name, name); + free(n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + break; + case TGeneralString: + free_primitive ("general_string", name); + break; + case TApplication: + free_type (name, t->subtype); + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_free (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "void free_%s (%s *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "void\n" + "free_%s(%s *data)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + free_type ("data", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f6280ad6c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_glue.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +generate_2int (const Symbol *s) +{ + Type *t = s->type; + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + fprintf (headerfile, + "unsigned %s2int(%s);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "unsigned %s2int(%s f)\n" + "{\n" + "unsigned r = 0;\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + fprintf (codefile, "if(f.%s) r |= (1U << %d);\n", + m->gen_name, m->val); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + fprintf (codefile, "return r;\n" + "}\n\n"); +} + +static void +generate_int2 (const Symbol *s) +{ + Type *t = s->type; + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + fprintf (headerfile, + "%s int2%s(unsigned);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "%s int2%s(unsigned n)\n" + "{\n" + "\t%s flags;\n\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + fprintf (codefile, "\tflags.%s = (n >> %d) & 1;\n", + m->gen_name, m->val); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + fprintf (codefile, "\treturn flags;\n" + "}\n\n"); +} + +/* + * This depends on the bit string being declared in increasing order + */ + +static void +generate_units (const Symbol *s) +{ + Type *t = s->type; + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + fprintf (headerfile, + "extern struct units %s_units[];", + s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "struct units %s_units[] = {\n", + s->gen_name); + + if(t->members) + for (m = t->members->prev; m && m->val != tag; m = m->prev) { + fprintf (codefile, + "\t{\"%s\",\t1U << %d},\n", m->gen_name, m->val); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + + fprintf (codefile, + "\t{NULL,\t0}\n" + "};\n\n"); +} + +void +generate_glue (const Symbol *s) +{ + switch(s->type->type) { + case TBitString : + generate_2int (s); + generate_int2 (s); + generate_units (s); + break; + default : + break; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_length.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_length.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b60997b0f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_length.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_length.c,v 1.11.6.1 2004/01/26 09:26:10 lha Exp $"); + +static void +length_primitive (const char *typename, + const char *name, + const char *variable) +{ + fprintf (codefile, "%s += length_%s(%s);\n", variable, typename, name); +} + +static void +length_type (const char *name, const Type *t, const char *variable) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + length_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, "%s += length_%s(%s);\n", + variable, t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + if(t->members == NULL) + length_primitive ("integer", name, variable); + else { + char *s; + asprintf(&s, "(const int*)%s", name); + if(s == NULL) + errx (1, "out of memory"); + length_primitive ("integer", s, variable); + free(s); + } + break; + case TUInteger: + length_primitive ("unsigned", name, variable); + break; + case TEnumerated : + length_primitive ("enumerated", name, variable); + break; + case TOctetString: + length_primitive ("octet_string", name, variable); + break; + case TOID : + length_primitive ("oid", name, variable); + break; + case TBitString: { + /* + * XXX - Hope this is correct + * look at TBitString case in `encode_type' + */ + fprintf (codefile, "%s += 7;\n", variable); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if (m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, "if(%s)", s); + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "int oldret = %s;\n" + "%s = 0;\n", variable, variable); + length_type (s, m->type, "ret"); + fprintf (codefile, "%s += 1 + length_len(%s) + oldret;\n", + variable, variable); + fprintf (codefile, "}\n"); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + fprintf (codefile, + "%s += 1 + length_len(%s);\n", variable, variable); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, + "{\n" + "int oldret = %s;\n" + "int i;\n" + "%s = 0;\n", + variable, variable); + + fprintf (codefile, "for(i = (%s)->len - 1; i >= 0; --i){\n", name); + fprintf (codefile, "int oldret = %s;\n" + "%s = 0;\n", variable, variable); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[i]", name); + length_type(n, t->subtype, variable); + fprintf (codefile, "%s += oldret;\n", + variable); + fprintf (codefile, "}\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, + "%s += 1 + length_len(%s) + oldret;\n" + "}\n", variable, variable); + free(n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + length_primitive ("generalized_time", name, variable); + break; + case TGeneralString: + length_primitive ("general_string", name, variable); + break; + case TApplication: + length_type (name, t->subtype, variable); + fprintf (codefile, "ret += 1 + length_len (ret);\n"); + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_length (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "size_t length_%s(const %s *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t\n" + "length_%s(const %s *data)\n" + "{\n" + "size_t ret = 0;\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + length_type ("data", s->type, "ret"); + fprintf (codefile, "return ret;\n}\n\n"); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..212c3217c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gen_locl.h,v 1.9 2001/09/27 16:21:47 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __GEN_LOCL_H__ +#define __GEN_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "hash.h" +#include "symbol.h" + +void generate_type (const Symbol *); +void generate_constant (const Symbol *); +void generate_type_encode (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_decode (const Symbol *s); +void generate_seq_type_decode (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_free (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_length (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_copy (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_maybe (const Symbol *s); +void generate_glue (const Symbol *s); + +void init_generate (const char *filename, const char *basename); +const char *filename (void); +void close_generate(void); +void add_import(const char *module); +int yyparse(void); + +extern FILE *headerfile, *codefile, *logfile; + +#endif /* __GEN_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/hash.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a8d3eb39f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Hash table functions + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hash.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static Hashentry *_search(Hashtab * htab, /* The hash table */ + void *ptr); /* And key */ + +Hashtab * +hashtabnew(int sz, + int (*cmp) (void *, void *), + unsigned (*hash) (void *)) +{ + Hashtab *htab; + int i; + + assert(sz > 0); + + htab = (Hashtab *) malloc(sizeof(Hashtab) + (sz - 1) * sizeof(Hashentry *)); + for (i = 0; i < sz; ++i) + htab->tab[i] = NULL; + + if (htab == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + htab->cmp = cmp; + htab->hash = hash; + htab->sz = sz; + return htab; + } +} + +/* Intern search function */ + +static Hashentry * +_search(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr) +{ + Hashentry *hptr; + + assert(htab && ptr); + + for (hptr = htab->tab[(*htab->hash) (ptr) % htab->sz]; + hptr; + hptr = hptr->next) + if ((*htab->cmp) (ptr, hptr->ptr) == 0) + break; + return hptr; +} + +/* Search for element in hash table */ + +void * +hashtabsearch(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr) +{ + Hashentry *tmp; + + tmp = _search(htab, ptr); + return tmp ? tmp->ptr : tmp; +} + +/* add element to hash table */ +/* if already there, set new value */ +/* !NULL if succesful */ + +void * +hashtabadd(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr) +{ + Hashentry *h = _search(htab, ptr); + Hashentry **tabptr; + + assert(htab && ptr); + + if (h) + free((void *) h->ptr); + else { + h = (Hashentry *) malloc(sizeof(Hashentry)); + if (h == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + tabptr = &htab->tab[(*htab->hash) (ptr) % htab->sz]; + h->next = *tabptr; + *tabptr = h; + h->prev = tabptr; + if (h->next) + h->next->prev = &h->next; + } + h->ptr = ptr; + return h; +} + +/* delete element with key key. Iff freep, free Hashentry->ptr */ + +int +_hashtabdel(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr, int freep) +{ + Hashentry *h; + + assert(htab && ptr); + + h = _search(htab, ptr); + if (h) { + if (freep) + free(h->ptr); + if ((*(h->prev) = h->next)) + h->next->prev = h->prev; + free(h); + return 0; + } else + return -1; +} + +/* Do something for each element */ + +void +hashtabforeach(Hashtab * htab, int (*func) (void *ptr, void *arg), + void *arg) +{ + Hashentry **h, *g; + + assert(htab); + + for (h = htab->tab; h < &htab->tab[htab->sz]; ++h) + for (g = *h; g; g = g->next) + if ((*func) (g->ptr, arg)) + return; +} + +/* standard hash-functions for strings */ + +unsigned +hashadd(const char *s) +{ /* Standard hash function */ + unsigned i; + + assert(s); + + for (i = 0; *s; ++s) + i += *s; + return i; +} + +unsigned +hashcaseadd(const char *s) +{ /* Standard hash function */ + unsigned i; + + assert(s); + + for (i = 0; *s; ++s) + i += toupper(*s); + return i; +} + +#define TWELVE (sizeof(unsigned)) +#define SEVENTYFIVE (6*sizeof(unsigned)) +#define HIGH_BITS (~((unsigned)(~0) >> TWELVE)) + +unsigned +hashjpw(const char *ss) +{ /* another hash function */ + unsigned h = 0; + unsigned g; + const unsigned char *s = (const unsigned char *)ss; + + for (; *s; ++s) { + h = (h << TWELVE) + *s; + if ((g = h & HIGH_BITS)) + h = (h ^ (g >> SEVENTYFIVE)) & ~HIGH_BITS; + } + return h; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/hash.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/hash.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b54e10234a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * hash.h. Header file for hash table functions + */ + +/* $Id: hash.h,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +struct hashentry { /* Entry in bucket */ + struct hashentry **prev; + struct hashentry *next; + void *ptr; +}; + +typedef struct hashentry Hashentry; + +struct hashtab { /* Hash table */ + int (*cmp)(void *, void *); /* Compare function */ + unsigned (*hash)(void *); /* hash function */ + int sz; /* Size */ + Hashentry *tab[1]; /* The table */ +}; + +typedef struct hashtab Hashtab; + +/* prototypes */ + +Hashtab *hashtabnew(int sz, + int (*cmp)(void *, void *), + unsigned (*hash)(void *)); /* Make new hash table */ + +void *hashtabsearch(Hashtab *htab, /* The hash table */ + void *ptr); /* The key */ + + +void *hashtabadd(Hashtab *htab, /* The hash table */ + void *ptr); /* The element */ + +int _hashtabdel(Hashtab *htab, /* The table */ + void *ptr, /* Key */ + int freep); /* Free data part? */ + +void hashtabforeach(Hashtab *htab, + int (*func)(void *ptr, void *arg), + void *arg); + +unsigned hashadd(const char *s); /* Standard hash function */ +unsigned hashcaseadd(const char *s); /* Standard hash function */ +unsigned hashjpw(const char *s); /* another hash function */ + +/* macros */ + + /* Don't free space */ +#define hashtabdel(htab,key) _hashtabdel(htab,key,FALSE) + +#define hashtabfree(htab,key) _hashtabdel(htab,key,TRUE) /* Do! */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9be266174 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ +-- $Id: k5.asn1,v 1.28.2.1 2004/06/21 08:25:45 lha Exp $ + +KERBEROS5 DEFINITIONS ::= +BEGIN + +NAME-TYPE ::= INTEGER { + KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN(0), -- Name type not known + KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL(1), -- Just the name of the principal as in + KRB5_NT_SRV_INST(2), -- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST(3), -- Service with host name as instance + KRB5_NT_SRV_XHST(4), -- Service with host as remaining components + KRB5_NT_UID(5), -- Unique ID + KRB5_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL(6) -- PKINIT +} + +-- message types + +MESSAGE-TYPE ::= INTEGER { + krb-as-req(10), -- Request for initial authentication + krb-as-rep(11), -- Response to KRB_AS_REQ request + krb-tgs-req(12), -- Request for authentication based on TGT + krb-tgs-rep(13), -- Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request + krb-ap-req(14), -- application request to server + krb-ap-rep(15), -- Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL + krb-safe(20), -- Safe (checksummed) application message + krb-priv(21), -- Private (encrypted) application message + krb-cred(22), -- Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials + krb-error(30) -- Error response +} + + +-- pa-data types + +PADATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER { + KRB5-PADATA-NONE(0), + KRB5-PADATA-TGS-REQ(1), + KRB5-PADATA-AP-REQ(1), + KRB5-PADATA-ENC-TIMESTAMP(2), + KRB5-PADATA-PW-SALT(3), + KRB5-PADATA-ENC-UNIX-TIME(5), + KRB5-PADATA-SANDIA-SECUREID(6), + KRB5-PADATA-SESAME(7), + KRB5-PADATA-OSF-DCE(8), + KRB5-PADATA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID(9), + KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT(10), + KRB5-PADATA-ETYPE-INFO(11), + KRB5-PADATA-SAM-CHALLENGE(12), -- (sam/otp) + KRB5-PADATA-SAM-RESPONSE(13), -- (sam/otp) + KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ(14), -- (PKINIT) + KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REP(15), -- (PKINIT) + KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-SIGN(16), -- (PKINIT) + KRB5-PADATA-PK-KEY-REQ(17), -- (PKINIT) + KRB5-PADATA-PK-KEY-REP(18), -- (PKINIT) + KRB5-PADATA-ETYPE-INFO2(19), + KRB5-PADATA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO(20), + KRB5-PADATA-SAM-REDIRECT(21), -- (sam/otp) + KRB5-PADATA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA(22), + KRB5-PADATA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO(23) +} + +-- checksumtypes + +CKSUMTYPE ::= INTEGER { + CKSUMTYPE_NONE(0), + CKSUMTYPE_CRC32(1), + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4(2), + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES(3), + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC(4), + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC_K(5), + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES_K(6), + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5(7), + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES(8), + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES3(9), + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_128(10), + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_256(11), + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3(12), + CKSUMTYPE_SHA1(1000), -- correct value? 10 (9 also) + CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI(0x8003), + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5(-138), -- unofficial microsoft number + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ENC(-1138) -- even more unofficial +} + +--enctypes +ENCTYPE ::= INTEGER { + ETYPE_NULL(0), + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC(1), + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4(2), + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5(3), + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5(5), + ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1(7), + ETYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE(8), + ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV(9), + ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB(10), + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1(16), -- with key derivation + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96(17), + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96(18), + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5(23), + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56(24), + ETYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS(48), +-- these are for Heimdal internal use + ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE(-0x1000), + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE(-0x1001), + ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE(-0x1002), + ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE(-0x1003) +} + +-- this is sugar to make something ASN1 does not have: unsigned + +UNSIGNED ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] NAME-TYPE, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +-- this is not part of RFC1510 +Principal ::= SEQUENCE { + name[0] PrincipalName, + realm[1] Realm +} + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +-- This is from RFC1510. +-- +-- HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { +-- addr-type[0] INTEGER, +-- address[1] OCTET STRING +-- } + +-- This seems much better. +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11), + transited-policy-checked(12), + ok-as-delegate(13), + anonymous(14) +} + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + request-anonymous(14), + canonicalize(15), + disable-transited-check(26), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) +} + +LR-TYPE ::= INTEGER { + LR_NONE(0), -- no information + LR_INITIAL_TGT(1), -- last initial TGT request + LR_INITIAL(2), -- last initial request + LR_ISSUE_USE_TGT(3), -- time of newest TGT used + LR_RENEWAL(4), -- time of last renewal + LR_REQUEST(5), -- time of last request (of any type) + LR_PW_EXPTIME(6), -- expiration time of password + LR_ACCT_EXPTIME(7) -- expiration time of account +} + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] LR-TYPE, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + +EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING +} + +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + +Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] CKSUMTYPE, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] UNSIGNED OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + -- might be encoded AP-REQ + padata-type[1] PADATA-TYPE, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING +} + +ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] ENCTYPE, + salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + salttype[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + +METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] MESSAGE-TYPE, + padata[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +-- padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP +-- padata-value ::= EncryptedData - PA-ENC-TS-ENC + +PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, + padata[2] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] UNSIGNED OPTIONAL +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] UNSIGNED OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] UNSIGNED OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL +} + +ChangePasswdDataMS ::= SEQUENCE { + newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING, + targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL +} + +pvno INTEGER ::= 5 -- current Kerberos protocol version number + +-- transited encodings + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS INTEGER ::= 1 + +END + +-- etags -r '/\([A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9]*\).*::=/\1/' k5.asn1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/lex.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/lex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9f5cadf92b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/lex.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: lex.h,v 1.5 2000/07/01 20:21:34 assar Exp $ */ + +#include + +void error_message (const char *, ...) +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); + +int yylex(void); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/lex.l b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/lex.l new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3abc17ee67 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/lex.l @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: lex.l,v 1.19 2001/09/25 23:28:03 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#undef ECHO +#include "symbol.h" +#include "parse.h" +#include "lex.h" +#include "gen_locl.h" + +static unsigned lineno = 1; + +#define YY_NO_UNPUT + +#undef ECHO + +%} + + +%% +INTEGER { return INTEGER; } +IMPORTS { return IMPORTS; } +FROM { return FROM; } +SEQUENCE { return SEQUENCE; } +OF { return OF; } +OCTET { return OCTET; } +STRING { return STRING; } +GeneralizedTime { return GeneralizedTime; } +GeneralString { return GeneralString; } +BIT { return BIT; } +APPLICATION { return APPLICATION; } +OPTIONAL { return OPTIONAL; } +BEGIN { return TBEGIN; } +END { return END; } +DEFINITIONS { return DEFINITIONS; } +ENUMERATED { return ENUMERATED; } +EXTERNAL { return EXTERNAL; } +OBJECT { return OBJECT; } +IDENTIFIER { return IDENTIFIER; } +[,;{}()|] { return *yytext; } +"[" { return *yytext; } +"]" { return *yytext; } +::= { return EEQUAL; } +--[^\n]*\n { ++lineno; } +-?(0x)?[0-9]+ { char *e, *y = yytext; + yylval.constant = strtol((const char *)yytext, + &e, 0); + if(e == y) + error_message("malformed constant (%s)", yytext); + else + return CONSTANT; + } +[A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9_]* { + yylval.name = strdup ((const char *)yytext); + return IDENT; + } +[ \t] ; +\n { ++lineno; } +\.\. { return DOTDOT; } +. { error_message("Ignoring char(%c)\n", *yytext); } +%% + +#ifndef yywrap /* XXX */ +int +yywrap () +{ + return 1; +} +#endif + +void +error_message (const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start (args, format); + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d: ", filename(), lineno); + vfprintf (stderr, format, args); + va_end (args); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/main.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b1b4093cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.11 2001/02/20 01:44:52 assar Exp $"); + +extern FILE *yyin; + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "[asn1-file [name]]"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + char *file; + char *name = NULL; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + if (argc == optind) { + file = "stdin"; + name = "stdin"; + yyin = stdin; + } else { + file = argv[optind]; + yyin = fopen (file, "r"); + if (yyin == NULL) + err (1, "open %s", file); + name = argv[optind + 1]; + } + + init_generate (file, name); + initsym (); + ret = yyparse (); + close_generate (); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/parse.y b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/parse.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc78086036 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/parse.y @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse.y,v 1.19 2001/09/27 16:21:47 assar Exp $ */ + +%{ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include "symbol.h" +#include "lex.h" +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: parse.y,v 1.19 2001/09/27 16:21:47 assar Exp $"); + +static Type *new_type (Typetype t); +void yyerror (char *); + +static void append (Member *l, Member *r); + +%} + +%union { + int constant; + char *name; + Type *type; + Member *member; +} + +%token INTEGER SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING GeneralizedTime GeneralString +%token BIT APPLICATION OPTIONAL EEQUAL TBEGIN END DEFINITIONS ENUMERATED +%token EXTERNAL +%token DOTDOT +%token IMPORTS FROM +%token OBJECT IDENTIFIER +%token IDENT +%token CONSTANT + +%type constant optional2 +%type type +%type memberdecls memberdecl bitdecls bitdecl + +%start envelope + +%% + +envelope : IDENT DEFINITIONS EEQUAL TBEGIN specification END {} + ; + +specification : + | specification declaration + ; + +declaration : imports_decl + | type_decl + | constant_decl + ; + +referencenames : IDENT ',' referencenames + { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + s->stype = Stype; + } + | IDENT + { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + s->stype = Stype; + } + ; + +imports_decl : IMPORTS referencenames FROM IDENT ';' + { add_import($4); } + ; + +type_decl : IDENT EEQUAL type + { + Symbol *s = addsym ($1); + s->stype = Stype; + s->type = $3; + generate_type (s); + } + ; + +constant_decl : IDENT type EEQUAL constant + { + Symbol *s = addsym ($1); + s->stype = SConstant; + s->constant = $4; + generate_constant (s); + } + ; + +type : INTEGER { $$ = new_type(TInteger); } + | INTEGER '(' constant DOTDOT constant ')' { + if($3 != 0) + error_message("Only 0 supported as low range"); + if($5 != INT_MIN && $5 != UINT_MAX && $5 != INT_MAX) + error_message("Only %u supported as high range", + UINT_MAX); + $$ = new_type(TUInteger); + } + | INTEGER '{' bitdecls '}' + { + $$ = new_type(TInteger); + $$->members = $3; + } + | OBJECT IDENTIFIER { $$ = new_type(TOID); } + | ENUMERATED '{' bitdecls '}' + { + $$ = new_type(TEnumerated); + $$->members = $3; + } + | OCTET STRING { $$ = new_type(TOctetString); } + | GeneralString { $$ = new_type(TGeneralString); } + | GeneralizedTime { $$ = new_type(TGeneralizedTime); } + | SEQUENCE OF type + { + $$ = new_type(TSequenceOf); + $$->subtype = $3; + } + | SEQUENCE '{' memberdecls '}' + { + $$ = new_type(TSequence); + $$->members = $3; + } + | BIT STRING '{' bitdecls '}' + { + $$ = new_type(TBitString); + $$->members = $4; + } + | IDENT + { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + $$ = new_type(TType); + if(s->stype != Stype) + error_message ("%s is not a type\n", $1); + else + $$->symbol = s; + } + | '[' APPLICATION constant ']' type + { + $$ = new_type(TApplication); + $$->subtype = $5; + $$->application = $3; + } + ; + +memberdecls : { $$ = NULL; } + | memberdecl { $$ = $1; } + | memberdecls ',' memberdecl { $$ = $1; append($$, $3); } + ; + +memberdecl : IDENT '[' constant ']' type optional2 + { + $$ = malloc(sizeof(*$$)); + $$->name = $1; + $$->gen_name = strdup($1); + output_name ($$->gen_name); + $$->val = $3; + $$->optional = $6; + $$->type = $5; + $$->next = $$->prev = $$; + } + ; + +optional2 : { $$ = 0; } + | OPTIONAL { $$ = 1; } + ; + +bitdecls : { $$ = NULL; } + | bitdecl { $$ = $1; } + | bitdecls ',' bitdecl { $$ = $1; append($$, $3); } + ; + +bitdecl : IDENT '(' constant ')' + { + $$ = malloc(sizeof(*$$)); + $$->name = $1; + $$->gen_name = strdup($1); + output_name ($$->gen_name); + $$->val = $3; + $$->optional = 0; + $$->type = NULL; + $$->prev = $$->next = $$; + } + ; + +constant : CONSTANT { $$ = $1; } + | IDENT { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + if(s->stype != SConstant) + error_message ("%s is not a constant\n", + s->name); + else + $$ = s->constant; + } + ; +%% + +void +yyerror (char *s) +{ + error_message ("%s\n", s); +} + +static Type * +new_type (Typetype tt) +{ + Type *t = malloc(sizeof(*t)); + if (t == NULL) { + error_message ("out of memory in malloc(%lu)", + (unsigned long)sizeof(*t)); + exit (1); + } + t->type = tt; + t->application = 0; + t->members = NULL; + t->subtype = NULL; + t->symbol = NULL; + return t; +} + +static void +append (Member *l, Member *r) +{ + l->prev->next = r; + r->prev = l->prev; + l->prev = r; + r->next = l; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/pkinit.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/pkinit.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92c5de75da --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/pkinit.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +PKINIT DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN + +IMPORTS EncryptionKey, PrincipalName, Realm, KerberosTime, TypedData + FROM krb5; +IMPORTS SignedData, EnvelopedData FROM CMS; +IMPORTS CertificateSerialNumber, AttributeTypeAndValue, Name FROM X509; + + +-- 3.1 + +CertPrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF UTF8String +} + + +-- 3.2.2 + + +TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + -- X.500 name encoded as a principal name + -- see Section 3.1 +CertificateIndex ::= INTEGER + -- 0 = 1st certificate, + -- (in order of encoding) + -- 1 = 2nd certificate, etc + +PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE { + -- PA TYPE 15 + dhSignedData[0] SignedData, + -- Defined in CMS and used only with + -- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (if the + -- client public value was present in the + -- request). + -- This choice MUST be supported + -- by compliant implementations. + encKeyPack[1] EnvelopedData + -- Defined in CMS + -- The temporary key is encrypted + -- using the client public key + -- key + -- SignedReplyKeyPack, encrypted + -- with the temporary key, is also + -- included. +} + + + +KdcDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + -- used only when utilizing Diffie-Hellman + nonce[0] INTEGER, + -- binds responce to the request + subjectPublicKey[2] BIT STRING + -- Equals public exponent (g^a mod p) + -- INTEGER encoded as payload of + -- BIT STRING +} + +ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE { + -- not used for Diffie-Hellman + replyKey[0] EncryptionKey, + -- used to encrypt main reply + -- ENCTYPE is at least as strong as + -- ENCTYPE of session key + nonce[1] INTEGER + -- binds response to the request + -- must be same as the nonce + -- passed in the PKAuthenticator +} + +-- subjectAltName EXTENSION ::= { +-- SYNTAX GeneralNames +-- IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectAltName +-- } + +OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + value[0] OCTET STRING +-- value[0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id +} + +GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + otherName [0] OtherName, + ... +} + +GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE -- SIZE(1..MAX) + OF GeneralName + +KerberosName ::= SEQUENCE { + realm[0] Realm, + -- as defined in RFC 1510 + principalName[1] CertPrincipalName + -- defined above +} + + +-- krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +-- iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5) kerberosv5 (2) +-- } + +-- krb5PrincipalName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { krb5 2 } + +-- 3.2.1 + + +IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { + issuer Name, + serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber +} + +TrustedCas ::= CHOICE { + principalName[0] KerberosName, + -- as defined below + caName[1] Name, + -- fully qualified X.500 name + -- as defined by X.509 + issuerAndSerial[2] IssuerAndSerialNumber + -- Since a CA may have a number of + -- certificates, only one of which + -- a client trusts +} + +PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 14 + signedAuthPack[0] SignedData, + -- defined in CMS [11] + -- AuthPack (below) defines the data + -- that is signed + trustedCertifiers[1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCas OPTIONAL, + -- CAs that the client trusts + kdcCert[2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL, + -- as defined in CMS [11] + -- specifies a particular KDC + -- certificate if the client + -- already has it; + encryptionCert[3] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL + -- For example, this may be the + -- client's Diffie-Hellman + -- certificate, or it may be the + -- client's RSA encryption + -- certificate. +} + +PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE { + kdcName[0] PrincipalName, + kdcRealm[1] Realm, + cusec[2] INTEGER, + -- for replay prevention as in RFC1510 + ctime[3] KerberosTime, + -- for replay prevention as in RFC1510 + nonce[4] INTEGER +} + +-- This is the real definition of AlgorithmIdentifier +-- AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { +-- algorithm ALGORITHM.&id, +-- parameters ALGORITHM.&Type +-- } -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation[10] + +-- But we'll use this one instead: + +AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + parameters CHOICE { + a INTEGER + } +} + + + +SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + -- dhKeyAgreement + subjectPublicKey BIT STRING + -- for DH, equals + -- public exponent (INTEGER encoded + -- as payload of BIT STRING) +} -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation[10] + +AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE { + pkAuthenticator[0] PKAuthenticator, + clientPublicValue[1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL + -- if client is using Diffie-Hellman + -- (ephemeral-ephemeral only) +} + + +END diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/rfc2459.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/rfc2459.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c9adec6093 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/rfc2459.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +RFC2459 DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN + +AttributeType ::= OBJECT-IDENTIFIER + +AttributeValue ::= OCTET STRING --ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + +AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + type AttributeType, + value AttributeValue +} + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= --SET +SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue + +RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +Name ::= CHOICE { -- RFC2459 + x RDNSequence +} + +END \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/symbol.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/symbol.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f69c10925 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/symbol.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: symbol.c,v 1.9 2001/09/25 13:39:27 assar Exp $"); + +static Hashtab *htab; + +static int +cmp (void *a, void *b) +{ + Symbol *s1 = (Symbol *)a; + Symbol *s2 = (Symbol *)b; + + return strcmp (s1->name, s2->name); +} + +static unsigned +hash (void *a) +{ + Symbol *s = (Symbol *)a; + + return hashjpw (s->name); +} + +void +initsym (void) +{ + htab = hashtabnew (101, cmp, hash); +} + + +void +output_name (char *s) +{ + char *p; + + for (p = s; *p; ++p) + if (*p == '-') + *p = '_'; +} + +Symbol* +addsym (char *name) +{ + Symbol key, *s; + + key.name = name; + s = (Symbol *)hashtabsearch (htab, (void *)&key); + if (s == NULL) { + s = (Symbol *)malloc (sizeof (*s)); + s->name = name; + s->gen_name = strdup(name); + output_name (s->gen_name); + s->stype = SUndefined; + hashtabadd (htab, s); + } + return s; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/symbol.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/symbol.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1bd9cd8ade --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/symbol.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: symbol.h,v 1.6 2001/09/25 13:39:27 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _SYMBOL_H +#define _SYMBOL_H + +enum typetype { TInteger, TOctetString, TBitString, TSequence, TSequenceOf, + TGeneralizedTime, TGeneralString, TApplication, TType, + TUInteger, TEnumerated, TOID }; + +typedef enum typetype Typetype; + +struct type; + +struct member { + char *name; + char *gen_name; + int val; + int optional; + struct type *type; + struct member *next, *prev; +}; + +typedef struct member Member; + +struct symbol; + +struct type { + Typetype type; + int application; + Member *members; + struct type *subtype; + struct symbol *symbol; +}; + +typedef struct type Type; + +struct symbol { + char *name; + char *gen_name; + enum { SUndefined, SConstant, Stype } stype; + int constant; + Type *type; +}; + +typedef struct symbol Symbol; + +void initsym (void); +Symbol *addsym (char *); +void output_name (char *); +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/timegm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/timegm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bdc997fa44 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/timegm.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: timegm.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM + +static int +is_leap(unsigned y) +{ + y += 1900; + return (y % 4) == 0 && ((y % 100) != 0 || (y % 400) == 0); +} + +time_t +timegm (struct tm *tm) +{ + static const unsigned ndays[2][12] ={ + {31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31}, + {31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31}}; + time_t res = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 70; i < tm->tm_year; ++i) + res += is_leap(i) ? 366 : 365; + + for (i = 0; i < tm->tm_mon; ++i) + res += ndays[is_leap(tm->tm_year)][i]; + res += tm->tm_mday - 1; + res *= 24; + res += tm->tm_hour; + res *= 60; + res += tm->tm_min; + res *= 60; + res += tm->tm_sec; + return res; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_TIMEGM */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/x509.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/x509.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4a15844c85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/asn1/x509.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +X509 DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN + +CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER -- X.509 '97 + +AttributeType ::= OBJECT-IDENTIFIER + +AttributeValue ::= OCTET STRING --ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + +AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + type AttributeType, + value AttributeValue +} + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= --SET +SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue + +RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +Name ::= CHOICE { -- RFC2459 + x RDNSequence +} + +END \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c85ad35efa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +2004-09-08 Johan Danielsson + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: pull up 1.27->1.28: use + krb5_appdefault_boolean instead of krb5_config_get_bool + +2003-05-08 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * sia/Makefile.am: 1.15->1.16: inline COMPILE since (modern) + automake doesn't add it by itself for some reason + +2003-03-27 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * sia/Makefile.am: libkafs is always built now, lets include it + +2002-05-19 Johan Danielsson + + * pam/Makefile.am: set SUFFIXES with += + +2001-10-27 Assar Westerlund + + * pam/Makefile.am: actually build the pam module + +2001-09-18 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/Makefile.am: also don't compress krb5 library, at least + siacfg fails with compressed libraries + +2001-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/sia.c: move krb5_error_code inside a ifdef KRB5 + * sia/sia_locl.h: move roken.h earlier to grab definition of + socklen_t + +2001-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/krb5_matrix.conf: athena -> heimdal + +2001-07-17 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am: use make-rpath to sort rpath arguments + +2001-07-15 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/Makefile.am: use LIB_des, so that we link with + libcrypto/libdes from krb4 + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am: use $(CC) instead of ld for linking + +2001-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am: use LDFLAGS, and conditional libdes + +2001-03-06 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am: make sure of using -rpath and not -R when + calling ld + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * pam/pam.c (psyslog): do not log to console + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am (libsia_krb5.so): actually run ld in the case + shared library case + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/sia.c (siad_ses_init): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): handle krb5_init_context + failure consistently + +2000-11-30 Johan Danielsson + + * afskauthlib/Makefile.am: use libtool + + * afskauthlib/Makefile.am: work with krb4 only + +2000-07-30 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/Makefile.am: don't compress library, since 5.0 seems to have + a problem with this + +2000-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: fixes for pag setting + +1999-12-30 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am: try to link with shared libraries if we don't + find any static ones + +1999-12-20 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia.c: don't use string concatenation with TKT_ROOT + +1999-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * */lib/Makefile.in: set LIBNAME. From Enrico Scholz + + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): need realm for v5 -> v4 + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): update to new + krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/sia.c (doauth): use krb5_get_local_realms and + krb5_verify_user_lrealm + + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): remove krb5_kuserok. use + krb5_verify_user_lrealm + +1999-08-27 Johan Danielsson + + * pam/Makefile.in: link with res_search/dn_expand libraries + +1999-08-11 Johan Danielsson + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: make this compile w/o krb4 + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: incorporate patches from Miroslav Ruda + + +Thu Apr 8 14:35:34 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER (moved to + config.h) + + * sia/Makefile.am: make it build w/o krb4 + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: add krb5 support + + * afskauthlib/Makefile.am: build afskauthlib.so + +Wed Apr 7 14:06:22 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia.c: make it compile w/o krb4 + + * sia/Makefile.am: make it compile w/o krb4 + +Thu Apr 1 18:09:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia_locl.h: POSIX_GETPWNAM_R is defined in config.h + +Sun Mar 21 14:08:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/Makefile.in: add posix_getpw.c + + * sia/Makefile.am: makefile for sia + + * sia/posix_getpw.c: move from sia.c + + * sia/sia_locl.h: merge with krb5 version + + * sia/sia.c: merge with krb5 version + + * sia/sia5.c: remove unused variables diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0310dc36d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 1999/03/21 17:11:08 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +DIST_SUBDIRS = afskauthlib pam sia diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0eafe827b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,776 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 1999/03/21 17:11:08 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 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for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +afskauthlib.so: $(OBJS) + $(LINK) -shared $(OBJS) $(L) + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +$(OBJS): $(top_builddir)/include/config.h +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f24298ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2000, 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verify.c,v 1.25.12.1 2004/09/08 09:14:26 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +static char krb5ccname[128]; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +static char krbtkfile[128]; +#endif + +/* + In some cases is afs_gettktstring called twice (once before + afs_verify and once after afs_verify). + In some cases (rlogin with access allowed via .rhosts) + afs_verify is not called! + So we can't rely on correct value in krbtkfile in some + cases! +*/ + +static int correct_tkfilename=0; +static int pag_set=0; + +#ifdef KRB4 +static void +set_krbtkfile(uid_t uid) +{ + snprintf (krbtkfile, sizeof(krbtkfile), "%s%d", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)uid); + krb_set_tkt_string (krbtkfile); + correct_tkfilename = 1; +} +#endif + +/* XXX this has to be the default cache name, since the KRB5CCNAME + * environment variable isn't exported by login/xdm + */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static void +set_krb5ccname(uid_t uid) +{ + snprintf (krb5ccname, sizeof(krb5ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d", uid); +#ifdef KRB4 + snprintf (krbtkfile, sizeof(krbtkfile), "%s%d", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)uid); +#endif + correct_tkfilename = 1; +} +#endif + +static void +set_spec_krbtkfile(void) +{ + int fd; +#ifdef KRB4 + snprintf (krbtkfile, sizeof(krbtkfile), "%s_XXXXXX", TKT_ROOT); + fd = mkstemp(krbtkfile); + close(fd); + unlink(krbtkfile); + krb_set_tkt_string (krbtkfile); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + snprintf(krb5ccname, sizeof(krb5ccname),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_XXXXXX"); + fd=mkstemp(krb5ccname+5); + close(fd); + unlink(krb5ccname+5); +#endif +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +verify_krb5(struct passwd *pwd, + char *password, + int32_t *exp, + int quiet) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal principal; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, pwd->pw_name, &principal); + if (ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_parse_name: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + + set_krb5ccname(pwd->pw_uid); + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, krb5ccname, &ccache); + if(ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_cc_resolve: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(context, + principal, + ccache, + password, + TRUE, + NULL); + if(ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_verify_user: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + + if(chown(krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache), pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid)) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "chown: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, errno)); + goto out; + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + { + krb5_realm realm = NULL; + krb5_boolean get_v4_tgt; + + krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, "afskauthlib", + realm, + "krb4_get_tickets", FALSE, &get_v4_tgt); + if (get_v4_tgt) { + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + + krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, realm, + "krbtgt", + realm, + NULL); + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(context, ccache, &cred, &c); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "converting creds"); + else { + set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid); + tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + } + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + } else + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_cc_retrieve_cred: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + + krb5_free_principal(context, mcred.server); + } + free(realm); + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set = 1; + } + + if (pag_set) + krb5_afslog_uid_home(context, ccache, NULL, NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + } +#endif + out: + if(ret && !quiet) + printf ("%s\n", krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return ret; +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +verify_krb4(struct passwd *pwd, + char *password, + int32_t *exp, + int quiet) +{ + int ret = 1; + char lrealm[REALM_SZ]; + + if (krb_get_lrealm (lrealm, 1) != KFAILURE) { + set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid); + ret = krb_verify_user (pwd->pw_name, "", lrealm, password, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL); + if (ret == KSUCCESS) { + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag (); + pag_set = 1; + } + if (pag_set) + krb_afslog_uid_home (0, 0, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + } else if (!quiet) + printf ("%s\n", krb_get_err_text (ret)); + } + return ret; +} +#endif + +int +afs_verify(char *name, + char *password, + int32_t *exp, + int quiet) +{ + int ret = 1; + struct passwd *pwd = k_getpwnam (name); + + if(pwd == NULL) + return 1; + + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set=1; + } + + if (ret) + ret = unix_verify_user (name, password); +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret) + ret = verify_krb5(pwd, password, exp, quiet); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if(ret) + ret = verify_krb4(pwd, password, exp, quiet); +#endif + return ret; +} + +char * +afs_gettktstring (void) +{ + char *ptr; + struct passwd *pwd; + + if (!correct_tkfilename) { + ptr = getenv("LOGNAME"); + if (ptr != NULL && ((pwd = getpwnam(ptr)) != NULL)) { + set_krb5ccname(pwd->pw_uid); +#ifdef KRB4 + set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid); + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set=1; + } +#endif + } else { + set_spec_krbtkfile(); + } + } +#ifdef KRB5 + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME",krb5ccname,1); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + esetenv("KRBTKFILE",krbtkfile,1); + return krbtkfile; +#else + return ""; +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..963d2ce5ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.4 2002/05/19 18:43:44 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +WFLAGS += $(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT) + +DEFS = @DEFS@ + +## this is horribly ugly, but automake/libtool doesn't allow us to +## unconditionally build shared libraries, and it does not allow us to +## link with non-installed libraries + +if KRB4 +KAFS=$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/.libs/libkafs.a +KAFS_S=$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/.libs/libkafs.so + +L = \ + $(KAFS) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.a \ + $(LIB_des_a) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.a \ + -lc + +L_shared = \ + $(KAFS_S) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.so \ + $(LIB_des_so) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.so \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +MOD = pam_krb4.so + +endif + +EXTRA_DIST = pam.conf.add + +foodir = $(libdir) +foo_DATA = $(MOD) + +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ + +OBJS = pam.o + +pam_krb4.so: $(OBJS) + @if test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.a; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L)"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L); \ + elif test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.so; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared)"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared); \ + else \ + echo "missing libraries"; exit 1; \ + fi + +CLEANFILES = $(MOD) $(OBJS) + +SUFFIXES += .c .o + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..349c18c34a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,699 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.4 2002/05/19 18:43:44 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ 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install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +pam_krb4.so: $(OBJS) + @if test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.a; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L)"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L); \ + elif test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.so; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared)"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared); \ + else \ + echo "missing libraries"; exit 1; \ + fi + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/pam.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/pam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68446c3fc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/pam.c @@ -0,0 +1,443 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: pam.c,v 1.28 2002/09/09 15:57:24 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifndef PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR /* Fix linsux typo. */ +#define PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVER_ERR +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +/* Debugging PAM modules is a royal pain, truss helps. */ +#define DEBUG(msg) (access(msg " at line", __LINE__)) +#endif + +static void +psyslog(int level, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, format); + openlog("pam_krb4", LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH); + vsyslog(level, format, args); + va_end(args); + closelog(); +} + +enum { + KRB4_DEBUG, + KRB4_USE_FIRST_PASS, + KRB4_TRY_FIRST_PASS, + KRB4_IGNORE_ROOT, + KRB4_NO_VERIFY, + KRB4_REAFSLOG, + KRB4_CTRLS /* Number of ctrl arguments defined. */ +}; + +#define KRB4_DEFAULTS 0 + +static int ctrl_flags = KRB4_DEFAULTS; +#define ctrl_on(x) (krb4_args[x].flag & ctrl_flags) +#define ctrl_off(x) (!ctrl_on(x)) + +typedef struct +{ + const char *token; + unsigned int flag; +} krb4_ctrls_t; + +static krb4_ctrls_t krb4_args[KRB4_CTRLS] = +{ + /* KRB4_DEBUG */ { "debug", 0x01 }, + /* KRB4_USE_FIRST_PASS */ { "use_first_pass", 0x02 }, + /* KRB4_TRY_FIRST_PASS */ { "try_first_pass", 0x04 }, + /* KRB4_IGNORE_ROOT */ { "ignore_root", 0x08 }, + /* KRB4_NO_VERIFY */ { "no_verify", 0x10 }, + /* KRB4_REAFSLOG */ { "reafslog", 0x20 }, +}; + +static void +parse_ctrl(int argc, const char **argv) +{ + int i, j; + + ctrl_flags = KRB4_DEFAULTS; + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + { + for (j = 0; j < KRB4_CTRLS; j++) + if (strcmp(argv[i], krb4_args[j].token) == 0) + break; + + if (j >= KRB4_CTRLS) + psyslog(LOG_ALERT, "unrecognized option [%s]", *argv); + else + ctrl_flags |= krb4_args[j].flag; + } +} + +static void +pdeb(const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + if (ctrl_off(KRB4_DEBUG)) + return; + va_start(args, format); + openlog("pam_krb4", LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH); + vsyslog(LOG_DEBUG, format, args); + va_end(args); + closelog(); +} + +#define ENTRY(func) pdeb("%s() flags = %d ruid = %d euid = %d", func, flags, getuid(), geteuid()) + +static void +set_tkt_string(uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[128]; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)uid); + krb_set_tkt_string(buf); + +#if 0 + /* pam_set_data+pam_get_data are not guaranteed to work, grr. */ + pam_set_data(pamh, "KRBTKFILE", strdup(t), cleanup); + if (pam_get_data(pamh, "KRBTKFILE", (const void**)&tkt) == PAM_SUCCESS) + { + pam_putenv(pamh, var); + } +#endif + + /* We don't want to inherit this variable. + * If we still do, it must have a sane value. */ + if (getenv("KRBTKFILE") != 0) + { + char *var = malloc(sizeof(buf)); + snprintf(var, sizeof(buf), "KRBTKFILE=%s", tkt_string()); + putenv(var); + /* free(var); XXX */ + } +} + +static int +verify_pass(pam_handle_t *pamh, + const char *name, + const char *inst, + const char *pass) +{ + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + int ret, krb_verify, old_euid, old_ruid; + + krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1); + if (ctrl_on(KRB4_NO_VERIFY)) + krb_verify = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL; + else + krb_verify = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE; + old_ruid = getuid(); + old_euid = geteuid(); + setreuid(0, 0); + ret = krb_verify_user(name, inst, realm, pass, krb_verify, NULL); + pdeb("krb_verify_user(`%s', `%s', `%s', pw, %d, NULL) returns %s", + name, inst, realm, krb_verify, + krb_get_err_text(ret)); + setreuid(old_ruid, old_euid); + if (getuid() != old_ruid || geteuid() != old_euid) + { + psyslog(LOG_ALERT , "setreuid(%d, %d) failed at line %d", + old_ruid, old_euid, __LINE__); + exit(1); + } + + switch(ret) { + case KSUCCESS: + return PAM_SUCCESS; + case KDC_PR_UNKNOWN: + return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; + case SKDC_CANT: + case SKDC_RETRY: + case RD_AP_TIME: + return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; + default: + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } +} + +static int +krb4_auth(pam_handle_t *pamh, + int flags, + const char *name, + const char *inst, + struct pam_conv *conv) +{ + struct pam_response *resp; + char prompt[128]; + struct pam_message msg, *pmsg = &msg; + int ret; + + if (ctrl_on(KRB4_TRY_FIRST_PASS) || ctrl_on(KRB4_USE_FIRST_PASS)) + { + char *pass = 0; + ret = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, (void **) &pass); + if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + { + psyslog(LOG_ERR , "pam_get_item returned error to get-password"); + return ret; + } + else if (pass != 0 && verify_pass(pamh, name, inst, pass) == PAM_SUCCESS) + return PAM_SUCCESS; + else if (ctrl_on(KRB4_USE_FIRST_PASS)) + return PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR; /* Wrong password! */ + else + /* We tried the first password but it didn't work, cont. */; + } + + msg.msg_style = PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF; + if (*inst == 0) + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's Password: ", name); + else + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s.%s's Password: ", name, inst); + msg.msg = prompt; + + ret = conv->conv(1, &pmsg, &resp, conv->appdata_ptr); + if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = verify_pass(pamh, name, inst, resp->resp); + if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS) + { + memset(resp->resp, 0, strlen(resp->resp)); /* Erase password! */ + free(resp->resp); + free(resp); + } + else + { + pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, resp->resp); /* Save password. */ + /* free(resp->resp); XXX */ + /* free(resp); XXX */ + } + + return ret; +} + +int +pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, + int flags, + int argc, + const char **argv) +{ + char *user; + int ret; + struct pam_conv *conv; + struct passwd *pw; + uid_t uid = -1; + const char *name, *inst; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + realm[0] = 0; + + parse_ctrl(argc, argv); + ENTRY("pam_sm_authenticate"); + + ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, "login: "); + if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + if (ctrl_on(KRB4_IGNORE_ROOT) && strcmp(user, "root") == 0) + return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; + + ret = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, (void*)&conv); + if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + pw = getpwnam(user); + if (pw != 0) + { + uid = pw->pw_uid; + set_tkt_string(uid); + } + + if (strcmp(user, "root") == 0 && getuid() != 0) + { + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if (pw != 0) + { + name = strdup(pw->pw_name); + inst = "root"; + } + } + else + { + name = user; + inst = ""; + } + + ret = krb4_auth(pamh, flags, name, inst, conv); + + /* + * The realm was lost inside krb_verify_user() so we can't simply do + * a krb_kuserok() when inst != "". + */ + if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS && inst[0] != 0) + { + uid_t old_euid = geteuid(); + uid_t old_ruid = getuid(); + + setreuid(0, 0); /* To read ticket file. */ + if (krb_get_tf_fullname(tkt_string(), 0, 0, realm) != KSUCCESS) + ret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR; + else if (krb_kuserok(name, inst, realm, user) != KSUCCESS) + { + setreuid(0, uid); /* To read ~/.klogin. */ + if (krb_kuserok(name, inst, realm, user) != KSUCCESS) + ret = PAM_PERM_DENIED; + } + + if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + { + dest_tkt(); /* Passwd known, ok to kill ticket. */ + psyslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "%s.%s@%s is not allowed to log in as %s", + name, inst, realm, user); + } + + setreuid(old_ruid, old_euid); + if (getuid() != old_ruid || geteuid() != old_euid) + { + psyslog(LOG_ALERT , "setreuid(%d, %d) failed at line %d", + old_ruid, old_euid, __LINE__); + exit(1); + } + } + + if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS) + { + psyslog(LOG_INFO, + "%s.%s@%s authenticated as user %s", + name, inst, realm, user); + if (chown(tkt_string(), uid, -1) == -1) + { + dest_tkt(); + psyslog(LOG_ALERT , "chown(%s, %d, -1) failed", tkt_string(), uid); + exit(1); + } + } + + /* + * Kludge alert!!! Sun dtlogin unlock screen fails to call + * pam_setcred(3) with PAM_REFRESH_CRED after a successful + * authentication attempt, sic. + * + * This hack is designed as a workaround to that problem. + */ + if (ctrl_on(KRB4_REAFSLOG)) + if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS) + pam_sm_setcred(pamh, PAM_REFRESH_CRED, argc, argv); + + return ret; +} + +int +pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) +{ + parse_ctrl(argc, argv); + ENTRY("pam_sm_setcred"); + + switch (flags & ~PAM_SILENT) { + case 0: + case PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED: + if (k_hasafs()) + k_setpag(); + /* Fall through, fill PAG with credentials below. */ + case PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED: + case PAM_REFRESH_CRED: + if (k_hasafs()) + { + void *user = 0; + + if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &user) == PAM_SUCCESS) + { + struct passwd *pw = getpwnam((char *)user); + if (pw != 0) + krb_afslog_uid_home(/*cell*/ 0,/*realm_hint*/ 0, + pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_dir); + } + } + break; + case PAM_DELETE_CRED: + dest_tkt(); + if (k_hasafs()) + k_unlog(); + break; + default: + psyslog(LOG_ALERT , "pam_sm_setcred: unknown flags 0x%x", flags); + break; + } + + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + +int +pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) +{ + parse_ctrl(argc, argv); + ENTRY("pam_sm_open_session"); + + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + + +int +pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char**argv) +{ + parse_ctrl(argc, argv); + ENTRY("pam_sm_close_session"); + + /* This isn't really kosher, but it's handy. */ + pam_sm_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED, argc, argv); + + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7db3e3d85a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +To enable PAM in dtlogin and /bin/login under SunOS 5.6 apply this patch: + +--- /etc/pam.conf.DIST Mon Jul 20 15:37:46 1998 ++++ /etc/pam.conf Tue Feb 15 19:39:12 2000 +@@ -4,15 +4,19 @@ + # + # Authentication management + # ++login auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so + login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_dial_auth.so.1 + # + rlogin auth sufficient /usr/lib/security/pam_rhosts_auth.so.1 + rlogin auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # ++dtlogin auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so + dtlogin auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # + rsh auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_rhosts_auth.so.1 ++# Reafslog is for dtlogin lock display ++other auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so reafslog + other auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # + # Account management +@@ -24,6 +28,8 @@ + # + # Session management + # ++dtlogin session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so ++login session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so + other session required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # + # Password management +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +To enable PAM in /bin/login and xdm under Red Hat 6.? apply these patches: + +--- /etc/pam.d/login~ Tue Dec 7 12:01:35 1999 ++++ /etc/pam.d/login Wed May 31 16:27:55 2000 +@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ + #%PAM-1.0 ++# Updated to work with kerberos ++auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so.1.0.1 + auth required /lib/security/pam_securetty.so + auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok + auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so + account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so + password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok use_authtok md5 shadow ++session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so.1.0.1 + session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so +--- /etc/pam.d/xdm~ Wed May 31 16:33:54 2000 ++++ /etc/pam.d/xdm Wed May 31 16:28:29 2000 +@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ + #%PAM-1.0 ++# Updated to work with kerberos ++auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so.1.0.1 + auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok + auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so + account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so + password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok ++session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so.1.0.1 + session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so +--- /etc/pam.d/gdm~ Wed May 31 16:33:54 2000 ++++ /etc/pam.d/gdm Wed May 31 16:34:28 2000 +@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ + #%PAM-1.0 ++# Updated to work with kerberos ++auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so.1.0.1 + auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok + auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so + account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so + password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok ++session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so.1.0.1 + session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +This stuff may work under some other system. + +# To get this to work, you will have to add entries to /etc/pam.conf +# +# To make login kerberos-aware, you might change pam.conf to look +# like: + +# login authorization +login auth sufficient /lib/security/pam_krb4.so +login auth required /lib/security/pam_securetty.so +login auth required /lib/security/pam_unix_auth.so +login account required /lib/security/pam_unix_acct.so +login password required /lib/security/pam_unix_passwd.so +login session required /lib/security/pam_krb4.so +login session required /lib/security/pam_unix_session.so diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30bf011cd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15.2.1 2003/05/08 10:31:48 lha Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +WFLAGS += $(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT) + +DEFS = @DEFS@ + +## this is horribly ugly, but automake/libtool doesn't allow us to +## unconditionally build shared libraries, and it does not allow us to +## link with non-installed libraries + +KAFS=$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/.libs/libkafs.a +KAFS_S=$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/.libs/libkafs.so + +if KRB5 +L = \ + $(KAFS) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.a \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/.libs/libasn1.a \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des_a) \ + $(LIB_com_err_a) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.a \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +L_shared = \ + $(KAFS_S) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.so \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/.libs/libasn1.so \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_des_so) \ + $(LIB_com_err_so) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.so \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +MOD = libsia_krb5.so + +else + +L = \ + $(KAFS) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm/.libs/libkadm.a \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.a \ + $(LIB_des_a) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/.libs/libcom_err.a \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.a \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +L_shared = \ + $(KAFS_S) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm/.libs/libkadm.so \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.so \ + $(LIB_des_so) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/.libs/libcom_err.so \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.so \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +MOD = libsia_krb4.so + +endif + +EXTRA_DIST = sia.c krb4_matrix.conf krb4+c2_matrix.conf \ + krb5_matrix.conf krb5+c2_matrix.conf security.patch + +foodir = $(libdir) +foo_DATA = $(MOD) + +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ -rpath $(libdir) -Wl,-hidden -Wl,-exported_symbol -Wl,siad_\* + +OBJS = sia.o posix_getpw.o + +libsia_krb5.so: $(OBJS) + @if test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.a; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L)`"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L)`; \ + elif test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.so; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared)`"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared)`; \ + else \ + echo "missing libraries"; exit 1; \ + fi + ostrip -x $@ + +libsia_krb4.so: $(OBJS) + @if test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.a; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L)`"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L)`; \ + elif test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb/.libs/libkrb.so; then \ + echo "$(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared)`"; \ + $(CC) -shared -o $@ `$(SHELL) $(srcdir)/make-rpath $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared)`; \ + else \ + echo "missing libraries"; exit 1; \ + fi + ostrip -x $@ + +CLEANFILES = $(MOD) $(OBJS) so_locations + +SUFFIXES += .c .o + +# XXX inline COMPILE since automake wont add it + +.c.o: + $(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \ + $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) \ + -c `test -f '$<' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`$< diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6dd8f89b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,746 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15.2.1 2003/05/08 10:31:48 lha Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in 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$(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) \ + -c `test -f '$<' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`$< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b90e0264a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +# Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +# (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +# are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# +# 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +# may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +# without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +# ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +# SUCH DAMAGE. + +# $Id: krb4+c2_matrix.conf,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:37 joda Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 4 + C2) + +siad_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_estab=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_finger=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_password=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_shell=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chk_user=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4f55a810ce --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +# (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +# are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# +# 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +# may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +# without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +# ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +# SUCH DAMAGE. + +# $Id: krb4_matrix.conf,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:37 joda Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 4 + BSD) + +siad_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_estab=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_finger=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_password=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_shell=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_user=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c2952e2db8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id: krb5+c2_matrix.conf,v 1.2 1998/11/26 20:58:18 assar Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 5 + C2) + +siad_init=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_estab=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_finger=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_password=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_shell=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chk_user=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8804725dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id: krb5_matrix.conf,v 1.2 2001/08/28 08:49:20 joda Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 5 + BSD) + +siad_init=(KRB5,/usr/heimdal/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB5,/usr/heimdal/lib/libsia_krb5.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB5,/usr/heimdal/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_estab=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB5,/usr/heimdal/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB5,/usr/heimdal/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_finger=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_password=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_shell=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB5,/usr/heimdal/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_user=(BSD,libc.so) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/make-rpath b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/make-rpath new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2223aa00b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/make-rpath @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: make-rpath,v 1.1 2001/07/17 15:15:31 assar Exp $ +rlist= +rest= +while test $# -gt 0; do +case $1 in +-R|-rpath) + if test "$rlist"; then + rlist="${rlist}:$2" + else + rlist="$2" + fi + shift 2 + ;; +-R*) + d=`echo $1 | sed 's,^-R,,'` + if test "$rlist"; then + rlist="${rlist}:${d}" + else + rlist="${d}" + fi + shift + ;; +*) + rest="${rest} $1" + shift + ;; +esac +done +rpath= +if test "$rlist"; then + rpath="-rpath $rlist " +fi +echo "${rpath}${rest}" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c5961dcd2c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "sia_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: posix_getpw.c,v 1.1 1999/03/21 17:07:02 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef POSIX_GETPWNAM_R +/* + * These functions translate from the old Digital UNIX 3.x interface + * to POSIX.1c. + */ + +int +posix_getpwnam_r(const char *name, struct passwd *pwd, + char *buffer, int len, struct passwd **result) +{ + int ret = getpwnam_r(name, pwd, buffer, len); + if(ret == 0) + *result = pwd; + else{ + *result = NULL; + ret = _Geterrno(); + if(ret == 0){ + ret = ERANGE; + _Seterrno(ret); + } + } + return ret; +} + +int +posix_getpwuid_r(uid_t uid, struct passwd *pwd, + char *buffer, int len, struct passwd **result) +{ + int ret = getpwuid_r(uid, pwd, buffer, len); + if(ret == 0) + *result = pwd; + else{ + *result = NULL; + ret = _Geterrno(); + if(ret == 0){ + ret = ERANGE; + _Seterrno(ret); + } + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* POSIX_GETPWNAM_R */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/security.patch b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/security.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c407876d63 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/security.patch @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- /sbin/init.d/security~ Tue Aug 20 22:44:09 1996 ++++ /sbin/init.d/security Fri Nov 1 14:52:56 1996 +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ + SECURITY=BASE + fi + ;; +- BASE) ++ BASE|KRB4) + ;; + *) + echo "security configuration set to default (BASE)." diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/sia.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/sia.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2de063218 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/sia.c @@ -0,0 +1,678 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "sia_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sia.c,v 1.36 2001/09/13 01:19:14 assar Exp $"); + +int +siad_init(void) +{ + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_chk_invoker(void) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_chk_invoker")); + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_ses_init(SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind) +{ + struct state *s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_init")); + if(s == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + { + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_init_context(&s->context); + if (ret) + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif + entity->mech[pkgind] = (int*)s; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +static int +setup_name(SIAENTITY *e, prompt_t *p) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "setup_name")); + e->name = malloc(SIANAMEMIN + 1); + if(e->name == NULL){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to malloc %u bytes", SIANAMEMIN+1)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + p->prompt = (unsigned char*)"login: "; + p->result = (unsigned char*)e->name; + p->min_result_length = 1; + p->max_result_length = SIANAMEMIN; + p->control_flags = 0; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +static int +setup_password(SIAENTITY *e, prompt_t *p) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "setup_password")); + e->password = malloc(SIAMXPASSWORD + 1); + if(e->password == NULL){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to malloc %u bytes", SIAMXPASSWORD+1)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + p->prompt = (unsigned char*)"Password: "; + p->result = (unsigned char*)e->password; + p->min_result_length = 0; + p->max_result_length = SIAMXPASSWORD; + p->control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + + +static int +doauth(SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind, char *name) +{ + struct passwd pw, *pwd; + char pwbuf[1024]; + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + krb5_realm *realms, *r; + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_error_code ret; +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char *toname, *toinst; + int ret; + struct passwd fpw, *fpwd; + char fpwbuf[1024]; + int secure; +#endif + + if(getpwnam_r(name, &pw, pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), &pwd) != 0){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to getpwnam(%s)", name)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + ret = krb5_get_default_realms(s->context, &realms); + + for (r = realms; *r != NULL; ++r) { + krb5_make_principal (s->context, &principal, *r, entity->name, NULL); + + if(krb5_kuserok(s->context, principal, entity->name)) + break; + } + krb5_free_host_realm (s->context, realms); + if (*r == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + + sprintf(s->ticket, "FILE:/tmp/krb5_cc%d_%d", pwd->pw_uid, getpid()); + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(s->context, s->ticket, &ccache); + if(ret) + return SIADFAIL; +#endif + +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + snprintf(s->ticket, sizeof(s->ticket), + "%s%u_%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid, (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1); + toname = name; + toinst = ""; + if(entity->authtype == SIA_A_SUAUTH){ + uid_t ouid; +#ifdef HAVE_SIAENTITY_OUID + ouid = entity->ouid; +#else + ouid = getuid(); +#endif + if(getpwuid_r(ouid, &fpw, fpwbuf, sizeof(fpwbuf), &fpwd) != 0){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to getpwuid(%u)", ouid)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + snprintf(s->ticket, sizeof(s->ticket), "%s_%s_to_%s_%d", + TKT_ROOT, fpwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_name, getpid()); + if(strcmp(pwd->pw_name, "root") == 0){ + toname = fpwd->pw_name; + toinst = pwd->pw_name; + } + } + if(entity->authtype == SIA_A_REAUTH) + snprintf(s->ticket, sizeof(s->ticket), "%s", tkt_string()); + + krb_set_tkt_string(s->ticket); + + setuid(0); /* XXX fix for fix in tf_util.c */ + if(krb_kuserok(toname, toinst, realm, name)){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "%s.%s@%s is not allowed to login as %s", + toname, toinst, realm, name)); + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(s->context, principal, ccache, + entity->password, 1, NULL); + if(ret){ + /* if this is most likely a local user (such as + root), just silently return failure when the + principal doesn't exist */ + if(ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN && + ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN) + SIALOG("WARNING", "krb5_verify_user(%s): %s", + entity->name, error_message(ret)); + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + if (getuid () == 0) + secure = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE; + else + secure = KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE; + + ret = krb_verify_user(toname, toinst, realm, + entity->password, secure, NULL); + if(ret){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "krb_verify_user: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret))); + if(ret != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) + /* since this is most likely a local user (such as + root), just silently return failure when the + principal doesn't exist */ + SIALOG("WARNING", "krb_verify_user(%s.%s): %s", + toname, toinst, krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif + if(sia_make_entity_pwd(pwd, entity) == SIAFAIL) + return SIADFAIL; + s->valid = 1; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + + +static int +common_auth(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + prompt_t prompts[2], *pr; + char *name; + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "common_auth")); + if((siastat == SIADSUCCESS) && (geteuid() == 0)) + return SIADSUCCESS; + if(entity == NULL) { + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "entity == NULL")); + return SIADFAIL | SIADSTOP; + } + name = entity->name; + if(entity->acctname) + name = entity->acctname; + + if((collect != NULL) && entity->colinput) { + int num; + pr = prompts; + if(name == NULL){ + if(setup_name(entity, pr) != SIADSUCCESS) + return SIADFAIL; + pr++; + } + if(entity->password == NULL){ + if(setup_password(entity, pr) != SIADSUCCESS) + return SIADFAIL; + pr++; + } + num = pr - prompts; + if(num == 1){ + if((*collect)(240, SIAONELINER, (unsigned char*)"", num, + prompts) != SIACOLSUCCESS){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "collect failed")); + return SIADFAIL | SIADSTOP; + } + } else if(num > 0){ + if((*collect)(0, SIAFORM, (unsigned char*)"", num, + prompts) != SIACOLSUCCESS){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "collect failed")); + return SIADFAIL | SIADSTOP; + } + } + } + if(name == NULL) + name = entity->name; + if(name == NULL || name[0] == '\0'){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "name is null")); + return SIADFAIL; + } + + if(entity->password == NULL || strlen(entity->password) > SIAMXPASSWORD){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "entity->password is null")); + return SIADFAIL; + } + + return doauth(entity, pkgind, name); +} + + +int +siad_ses_authent(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_authent")); + return common_auth(collect, entity, siastat, pkgind); +} + +int +siad_ses_estab(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_estab")); + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_ses_launch(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int pkgind) +{ + static char env[MaxPathLen]; + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_launch")); + if(s->valid){ +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + chown(s->ticket + sizeof("FILE:") - 1, + entity->pwd->pw_uid, + entity->pwd->pw_gid); + snprintf(env, sizeof(env), "KRB5CCNAME=%s", s->ticket); +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + chown(s->ticket, entity->pwd->pw_uid, entity->pwd->pw_gid); + snprintf(env, sizeof(env), "KRBTKFILE=%s", s->ticket); +#endif + putenv(env); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if (k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + k_setpag(); + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(entity->pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + krb_afslog_home(0, 0, entity->pwd->pw_dir); + } +#endif + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_ses_release(SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_release")); + if(entity->mech[pkgind]){ +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; + krb5_free_context(s->context); +#endif + free(entity->mech[pkgind]); + } + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_ses_suauthent(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_suauth")); + if(geteuid() != 0) + return SIADFAIL; + if(entity->name == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + if(entity->name[0] == '\0') { + free(entity->name); + entity->name = strdup("root"); + if (entity->name == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + } + return common_auth(collect, entity, siastat, pkgind); +} + +int +siad_ses_reauthent (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + int ret; + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_reauthent")); + if(entity == NULL || entity->name == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + ret = common_auth(collect, entity, siastat, pkgind); + if((ret & SIADSUCCESS)){ + /* launch isn't (always?) called when doing reauth, so we must + duplicate some code here... */ + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; + chown(s->ticket, entity->pwd->pw_uid, entity->pwd->pw_gid); +#ifdef KRB4 + if(k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(entity->pwd->pw_dir, + cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + krb_afslog_home(0, 0, entity->pwd->pw_dir); + } +#endif + } + return ret; +} + +int +siad_chg_finger (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_chg_finger")); + return SIADFAIL; +} + +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 +int +siad_chg_password (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} +#endif + +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 +static void +sia_message(sia_collect_func_t *collect, int rendition, + const char *title, const char *message) +{ + prompt_t prompt; + prompt.prompt = (unsigned char*)message; + (*collect)(0, rendition, (unsigned char*)title, 1, &prompt); +} + +static int +init_change(sia_collect_func_t *collect, krb_principal *princ) +{ + prompt_t prompt; + char old_pw[MAX_KPW_LEN+1]; + char *msg; + char tktstring[128]; + int ret; + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "init_change")); + prompt.prompt = (unsigned char*)"Old password: "; + prompt.result = (unsigned char*)old_pw; + prompt.min_result_length = 0; + prompt.max_result_length = sizeof(old_pw) - 1; + prompt.control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + asprintf(&msg, "Changing password for %s", krb_unparse_name(princ)); + if(msg == NULL){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "out of memory")); + return SIADFAIL; + } + ret = (*collect)(60, SIAONELINER, (unsigned char*)msg, 1, &prompt); + free(msg); + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "ret = %d", ret)); + if(ret != SIACOLSUCCESS) + return SIADFAIL; + snprintf(tktstring, sizeof(tktstring), + "%s_cpw_%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(tktstring); + + ret = krb_get_pw_in_tkt(princ->name, princ->instance, princ->realm, + PWSERV_NAME, KADM_SINST, 1, old_pw); + if (ret != KSUCCESS) { + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "krb_get_pw_in_tkt: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret))); + if (ret == INTK_BADPW) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Incorrect old password."); + else + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Kerberos error."); + memset(old_pw, 0, sizeof(old_pw)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + if(chown(tktstring, getuid(), -1) < 0){ + dest_tkt(); + return SIADFAIL; + } + memset(old_pw, 0, sizeof(old_pw)); + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_chg_password (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + prompt_t prompts[2]; + krb_principal princ; + int ret; + char new_pw1[MAX_KPW_LEN+1]; + char new_pw2[MAX_KPW_LEN+1]; + static struct et_list *et_list; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_chg_password")); + if(collect == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + + if(username == NULL) + username = getlogin(); + + ret = krb_parse_name(username, &princ); + if(ret) + return SIADFAIL; + if(princ.realm[0] == '\0') + krb_get_lrealm(princ.realm, 1); + + if(et_list == NULL) { + initialize_kadm_error_table_r(&et_list); + initialize_krb_error_table_r(&et_list); + } + + ret = init_change(collect, &princ); + if(ret != SIADSUCCESS) + return ret; + +again: + prompts[0].prompt = (unsigned char*)"New password: "; + prompts[0].result = (unsigned char*)new_pw1; + prompts[0].min_result_length = MIN_KPW_LEN; + prompts[0].max_result_length = sizeof(new_pw1) - 1; + prompts[0].control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + prompts[1].prompt = (unsigned char*)"Verify new password: "; + prompts[1].result = (unsigned char*)new_pw2; + prompts[1].min_result_length = MIN_KPW_LEN; + prompts[1].max_result_length = sizeof(new_pw2) - 1; + prompts[1].control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + if((*collect)(120, SIAFORM, (unsigned char*)"", 2, prompts) != + SIACOLSUCCESS) { + dest_tkt(); + return SIADFAIL; + } + if(strcmp(new_pw1, new_pw2) != 0){ + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Password mismatch."); + goto again; + } + ret = kadm_check_pw(new_pw1); + if(ret) { + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", com_right(et_list, ret)); + goto again; + } + + memset(new_pw2, 0, sizeof(new_pw2)); + ret = kadm_init_link (PWSERV_NAME, KRB_MASTER, princ.realm); + if (ret != KADM_SUCCESS) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "Error initing kadmin connection", + com_right(et_list, ret)); + else { + des_cblock newkey; + char *pw_msg; /* message from server */ + + des_string_to_key(new_pw1, &newkey); + ret = kadm_change_pw_plain((unsigned char*)&newkey, new_pw1, &pw_msg); + memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey)); + + if (ret == KADM_INSECURE_PW) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "Insecure password", pw_msg); + else if (ret != KADM_SUCCESS) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "Error changing password", + com_right(et_list, ret)); + } + memset(new_pw1, 0, sizeof(new_pw1)); + + if (ret != KADM_SUCCESS) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Password NOT changed."); + else + sia_message(collect, SIAINFO, "", "Password changed."); + + dest_tkt(); + if(ret) + return SIADFAIL; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} +#endif + +int +siad_chg_shell (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getpwent(struct passwd *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getpwuid (uid_t uid, + struct passwd *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getpwnam (const char *name, + struct passwd *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_setpwent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_endpwent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getgrent(struct group *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getgrgid (gid_t gid, + struct group *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getgrnam (const char *name, + struct group *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_setgrent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_endgrent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_chk_user (const char *logname, int checkflag) +{ + if(checkflag != CHGPASSWD) + return SIADFAIL; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b411596f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* $Id: sia_locl.h,v 1.3 2001/09/13 01:15:34 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __sia_locl_h__ +#define __sia_locl_h__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +#define SIA_KRB5 +#elif defined(KRB4) +#define SIA_KRB4 +#endif + +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif + +#ifndef POSIX_GETPWNAM_R + +#define getpwnam_r posix_getpwnam_r +#define getpwuid_r posix_getpwuid_r + +#endif /* POSIX_GETPWNAM_R */ + +#ifndef DEBUG +#define SIA_DEBUG(X) +#else +#define SIA_DEBUG(X) SIALOG X +#endif + +struct state{ +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; +#endif + char ticket[MaxPathLen]; + int valid; +}; + +#endif /* __sia_locl_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..23d5403894 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +2002-08-20 Johan Danielsson + + * compile_et.c: don't add comma after last enum member + +2002-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * compile_et.c: just declare er_list directly instead of including + com_right in generated header files + +2002-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libcom_err_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 2:1:1 + +2002-03-10 Assar Westerlund + + * com_err.c (error_message): do not call strerror with a negative error + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 2:0:1 + +2001-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * com_err.h (add_to_error_table): add prototype + * com_err.c (add_to_error_table): new function, from Derrick J + Brashear + +2001-05-06 Assar Westerlund + + * com_err.h: add printf formats for gcc + +2001-02-28 Johan Danielsson + + * error.c (initialize_error_table_r): put table at end of the list + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * com_err.c (default_proc): add printf attributes + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 1:1:0 + +2000-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * com_right.h (initialize_error_table_r): fix prototype + +2000-04-05 Assar Westerlund + + * com_err.c (_et_lit): explicitly initialize it to NULL to make + dyld on Darwin/MacOS X happy + +2000-01-16 Assar Westerlund + + * com_err.h: remove __P definition (now in com_right.h). this + file always includes com_right.h so that's where it should reside. + * com_right.h: moved __P here and added it to the function + prototypes + * com_err.h (error_table_name): add __P + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y (statement): use asprintf + +1999-06-13 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: make it solaris make vpath-safe + +Thu Apr 1 11:13:53 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * compile_et.c: use getargs + +Sat Mar 20 00:16:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * compile_et.c: static-ize + +Thu Mar 18 11:22:13 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Tue Mar 16 22:30:05 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: use YYACCEPT instead of return + +Sat Mar 13 22:22:56 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * compile_et.c (generate_h): cast when calling is* to get rid of a + warning + +Thu Mar 11 15:00:51 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * parse.y: prototype for error_message + +Sun Nov 22 10:39:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * compile_et.h: include ctype and roken + + * compile_et.c: include err.h + (generate_h): remove unused variable + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Fri Nov 20 06:58:59 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lex.l: undef ECHO to work around AIX lex bug + +Sun Sep 27 02:23:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * com_err.c (error_message): try to pass code to strerror, to see + if it might be an errno code (this if broken, but some MIT code + seems to expect this behaviour) + +Sat Sep 26 17:42:39 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * compile_et.c: -> "foo_err.h" + +Tue Jun 30 17:17:36 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add str{cpy,cat}_truncate + +Mon May 25 05:24:39 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + +Sun Apr 19 09:50:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sun Apr 5 09:22:11 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: define alloca to malloc in case we're using bison but + don't have alloca + +Tue Mar 24 05:13:01 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: link with snprintf (From Derrick J Brashear + ) + +Fri Feb 27 05:01:42 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: initialize ec->next + +Thu Feb 26 02:22:25 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: @LEXLIB@ + +Sat Feb 21 15:18:54 1998 assar westerlund + + * Makefile.in: set YACC and LEX + +Tue Feb 17 22:20:27 1998 Bjoern Groenvall + + * com_right.h: Change typedefs so that one may mix MIT compile_et + generated code with krb4 dito. + +Tue Feb 17 16:30:55 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * compile_et.c (generate): Always return a value. + + * parse.y: Files don't have to end with `end'. + +Mon Feb 16 16:09:20 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lex.l (getstring): Replace getc() with input(). + + * Makefile.am: Fixes for new compile_et. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae48cb5f3b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.27 2002/03/10 23:52:41 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +YFLAGS = -d + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libcom_err.la +libcom_err_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 2:1:1 + +bin_PROGRAMS = compile_et + +include_HEADERS = com_err.h com_right.h + +compile_et_SOURCES = compile_et.c compile_et.h parse.y lex.l + +libcom_err_la_SOURCES = error.c com_err.c roken_rename.h + +CLEANFILES = lex.c parse.c parse.h + +$(compile_et_OBJECTS): parse.h parse.c ## XXX broken automake 1.4s + +compile_et_LDADD = \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LEXLIB) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..579f9c14a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,867 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.27 2002/03/10 23:52:41 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + + +SOURCES = $(libcom_err_la_SOURCES) $(compile_et_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) 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+uninstall-am: uninstall-binPROGRAMS uninstall-includeHEADERS \ + uninstall-info-am uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES + +.PHONY: CTAGS GTAGS all all-am all-local check check-am check-local \ + clean clean-binPROGRAMS clean-generic clean-libLTLIBRARIES \ + clean-libtool ctags distclean distclean-compile \ + distclean-generic distclean-libtool distclean-tags distdir dvi \ + dvi-am html html-am info info-am install install-am \ + install-binPROGRAMS install-data install-data-am install-exec \ + install-exec-am install-includeHEADERS install-info \ + install-info-am install-libLTLIBRARIES install-man \ + install-strip installcheck installcheck-am installdirs \ + maintainer-clean maintainer-clean-generic mostlyclean \ + mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic mostlyclean-libtool \ + pdf pdf-am ps ps-am tags uninstall uninstall-am \ + uninstall-binPROGRAMS uninstall-includeHEADERS \ + uninstall-info-am uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES + + +install-suid-programs: + @foo='$(bin_SUIDS)'; \ + for file in $$foo; do \ + x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + echo "*"; \ + echo "* Failed to install $$x setuid root"; \ + echo "*"; \ + fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(nodist_include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +$(compile_et_OBJECTS): parse.h parse.c ## XXX broken automake 1.4s +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_err.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea0ac7c967 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_err.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: com_err.c,v 1.18 2002/03/10 23:07:01 assar Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "com_err.h" + +struct et_list *_et_list = NULL; + + +const char * +error_message (long code) +{ + static char msg[128]; + const char *p = com_right(_et_list, code); + if (p == NULL) { + if (code < 0) + sprintf(msg, "Unknown error %ld", code); + else + p = strerror(code); + } + if (p != NULL && *p != '\0') { + strncpy(msg, p, sizeof(msg) - 1); + msg[sizeof(msg) - 1] = 0; + } else + sprintf(msg, "Unknown error %ld", code); + return msg; +} + +int +init_error_table(const char **msgs, long base, int count) +{ + initialize_error_table_r(&_et_list, msgs, count, base); + return 0; +} + +static void +default_proc (const char *whoami, long code, const char *fmt, va_list args) + __attribute__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 0))); + +static void +default_proc (const char *whoami, long code, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + if (whoami) + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", whoami); + if (code) + fprintf(stderr, "%s ", error_message(code)); + if (fmt) + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); + fprintf(stderr, "\r\n"); /* ??? */ +} + +static errf com_err_hook = default_proc; + +void +com_err_va (const char *whoami, + long code, + const char *fmt, + va_list args) +{ + (*com_err_hook) (whoami, code, fmt, args); +} + +void +com_err (const char *whoami, + long code, + const char *fmt, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + com_err_va (whoami, code, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +errf +set_com_err_hook (errf new) +{ + errf old = com_err_hook; + + if (new) + com_err_hook = new; + else + com_err_hook = default_proc; + + return old; +} + +errf +reset_com_err_hook (void) +{ + return set_com_err_hook(NULL); +} + +#define ERRCODE_RANGE 8 /* # of bits to shift table number */ +#define BITS_PER_CHAR 6 /* # bits to shift per character in name */ + +static const char char_set[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_"; + +static char buf[6]; + +const char * +error_table_name(int num) +{ + int ch; + int i; + char *p; + + /* num = aa aaa abb bbb bcc ccc cdd ddd d?? ??? ??? */ + p = buf; + num >>= ERRCODE_RANGE; + /* num = ?? ??? ??? aaa aaa bbb bbb ccc ccc ddd ddd */ + num &= 077777777; + /* num = 00 000 000 aaa aaa bbb bbb ccc ccc ddd ddd */ + for (i = 4; i >= 0; i--) { + ch = (num >> BITS_PER_CHAR * i) & ((1 << BITS_PER_CHAR) - 1); + if (ch != 0) + *p++ = char_set[ch-1]; + } + *p = '\0'; + return(buf); +} + +void +add_to_error_table(struct et_list *new_table) +{ + struct et_list *et; + + for (et = _et_list; et; et = et->next) { + if (et->table->base == new_table->table->base) + return; + } + + new_table->next = _et_list; + _et_list = new_table; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_err.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a76214bdc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_err.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: com_err.h,v 1.9 2001/05/11 20:03:36 assar Exp $ */ + +/* MIT compatible com_err library */ + +#ifndef __COM_ERR_H__ +#define __COM_ERR_H__ + +#include + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(X) +#endif + +typedef void (*errf) __P((const char *, long, const char *, va_list)); + +const char * error_message __P((long)); +int init_error_table __P((const char**, long, int)); + +void com_err_va __P((const char *, long, const char *, va_list)) + __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 0))); + +void com_err __P((const char *, long, const char *, ...)) + __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); + +errf set_com_err_hook __P((errf)); +errf reset_com_err_hook __P((void)); + +const char *error_table_name __P((int num)); + +void add_to_error_table __P((struct et_list *new_table)); + +#endif /* __COM_ERR_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_right.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_right.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c87bb0d1de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/com_right.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: com_right.h,v 1.11 2000/07/31 01:11:08 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __COM_RIGHT_H__ +#define __COM_RIGHT_H__ + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#endif + +#ifndef __P +#ifdef __STDC__ +#define __P(X) X +#else +#define __P(X) () +#endif +#endif + +struct error_table { + char const * const * msgs; + long base; + int n_msgs; +}; +struct et_list { + struct et_list *next; + struct error_table *table; +}; +extern struct et_list *_et_list; + +const char *com_right __P((struct et_list *list, long code)); +void initialize_error_table_r __P((struct et_list **, const char **, int, long)); +void free_error_table __P((struct et_list *)); + +#endif /* __COM_RIGHT_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/compile_et.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/compile_et.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b19b21808e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/compile_et.c @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#undef ROKEN_RENAME +#include "compile_et.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: compile_et.c,v 1.16 2002/08/20 12:44:51 joda Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include "parse.h" + +int numerror; +extern FILE *yyin; + +extern void yyparse(void); + +long base; +int number; +char *prefix; +char *id_str; + +char name[128]; +char Basename[128]; + +#ifdef YYDEBUG +extern int yydebug = 1; +#endif + +char *filename; +char hfn[128]; +char cfn[128]; + +struct error_code *codes = NULL; + +static int +generate_c(void) +{ + int n; + struct error_code *ec; + + FILE *c_file = fopen(cfn, "w"); + if(c_file == NULL) + return 1; + + fprintf(c_file, "/* Generated from %s */\n", filename); + if(id_str) + fprintf(c_file, "/* %s */\n", id_str); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \"%s\"\n", hfn); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + + fprintf(c_file, "static const char *%s_error_strings[] = {\n", name); + + for(ec = codes, n = 0; ec; ec = ec->next, n++) { + while(n < ec->number) { + fprintf(c_file, "\t/* %03d */ \"Reserved %s error (%d)\",\n", + n, name, n); + n++; + + } + fprintf(c_file, "\t/* %03d */ \"%s\",\n", ec->number, ec->string); + } + + fprintf(c_file, "\tNULL\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "};\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#define num_errors %d\n", number); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + fprintf(c_file, + "void initialize_%s_error_table_r(struct et_list **list)\n", + name); + fprintf(c_file, "{\n"); + fprintf(c_file, + " initialize_error_table_r(list, %s_error_strings, " + "num_errors, ERROR_TABLE_BASE_%s);\n", name, name); + fprintf(c_file, "}\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "void initialize_%s_error_table(void)\n", name); + fprintf(c_file, "{\n"); + fprintf(c_file, + " init_error_table(%s_error_strings, ERROR_TABLE_BASE_%s, " + "num_errors);\n", name, name); + fprintf(c_file, "}\n"); + + fclose(c_file); + return 0; +} + +static int +generate_h(void) +{ + struct error_code *ec; + char fn[128]; + FILE *h_file = fopen(hfn, "w"); + char *p; + + if(h_file == NULL) + return 1; + + snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "__%s__", hfn); + for(p = fn; *p; p++) + if(!isalnum((unsigned char)*p)) + *p = '_'; + + fprintf(h_file, "/* Generated from %s */\n", filename); + if(id_str) + fprintf(h_file, "/* %s */\n", id_str); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "#ifndef %s\n", fn); + fprintf(h_file, "#define %s\n", fn); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "struct et_list;\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, + "void initialize_%s_error_table_r(struct et_list **);\n", + name); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "void initialize_%s_error_table(void);\n", name); + fprintf(h_file, "#define init_%s_err_tbl initialize_%s_error_table\n", + name, name); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "typedef enum %s_error_number{\n", name); + + for(ec = codes; ec; ec = ec->next) { + fprintf(h_file, "\t%s = %ld%s\n", ec->name, base + ec->number, + (ec->next != NULL) ? "," : ""); + } + + fprintf(h_file, "} %s_error_number;\n", name); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "#define ERROR_TABLE_BASE_%s %ld\n", name, base); + fprintf(h_file, "\n"); + fprintf(h_file, "#endif /* %s */\n", fn); + + + fclose(h_file); + return 0; +} + +static int +generate(void) +{ + return generate_c() || generate_h(); +} + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "error-table"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *p; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(optind == argc) + usage(1); + filename = argv[optind]; + yyin = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(yyin == NULL) + err(1, "%s", filename); + + + p = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = filename; + strncpy(Basename, p, sizeof(Basename)); + Basename[sizeof(Basename) - 1] = '\0'; + + Basename[strcspn(Basename, ".")] = '\0'; + + snprintf(hfn, sizeof(hfn), "%s.h", Basename); + snprintf(cfn, sizeof(cfn), "%s.c", Basename); + + yyparse(); + if(numerror) + return 1; + + return generate(); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/compile_et.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/compile_et.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..86dd1131a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/compile_et.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: compile_et.h,v 1.6 2000/07/01 20:21:48 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __COMPILE_ET_H__ +#define __COMPILE_ET_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern long base; +extern int number; +extern char *prefix; +extern char name[128]; +extern char *id_str; +extern char *filename; +extern int numerror; + +struct error_code { + unsigned number; + char *name; + char *string; + struct error_code *next, **tail; +}; + +extern struct error_code *codes; + +#define APPEND(L, V) \ +do { \ + if((L) == NULL) { \ + (L) = (V); \ + (L)->tail = &(V)->next; \ + (L)->next = NULL; \ + }else{ \ + *(L)->tail = (V); \ + (L)->tail = &(V)->next; \ + } \ +}while(0) + +#endif /* __COMPILE_ET_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/error.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b22f25b41a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: error.c,v 1.15 2001/02/28 20:00:13 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +const char * +com_right(struct et_list *list, long code) +{ + struct et_list *p; + for (p = list; p; p = p->next) { + if (code >= p->table->base && code < p->table->base + p->table->n_msgs) + return p->table->msgs[code - p->table->base]; + } + return NULL; +} + +struct foobar { + struct et_list etl; + struct error_table et; +}; + +void +initialize_error_table_r(struct et_list **list, + const char **messages, + int num_errors, + long base) +{ + struct et_list *et, **end; + struct foobar *f; + for (end = list, et = *list; et; end = &et->next, et = et->next) + if (et->table->msgs == messages) + return; + f = malloc(sizeof(*f)); + if (f == NULL) + return; + et = &f->etl; + et->table = &f->et; + et->table->msgs = messages; + et->table->n_msgs = num_errors; + et->table->base = base; + et->next = NULL; + *end = et; +} + + +void +free_error_table(struct et_list *et) +{ + while(et){ + struct et_list *p = et; + et = et->next; + free(p); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/lex.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/lex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9912bf4f09 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/lex.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: lex.h,v 1.1 2000/06/22 00:42:52 assar Exp $ */ + +void error_message (const char *, ...) +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); + +int yylex(void); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/lex.l b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/lex.l new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e98db6f865 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/lex.l @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This is to handle the definition of this symbol in some AIX + * headers, which will conflict with the definition that lex will + * generate for it. It's only a problem for AIX lex. + */ + +#undef ECHO + +#include "compile_et.h" +#include "parse.h" +#include "lex.h" + +RCSID("$Id: lex.l,v 1.6 2000/06/22 00:42:52 assar Exp $"); + +static unsigned lineno = 1; +static int getstring(void); + +#define YY_NO_UNPUT + +#undef ECHO + +%} + + +%% +et { return ET; } +error_table { return ET; } +ec { return EC; } +error_code { return EC; } +prefix { return PREFIX; } +index { return INDEX; } +id { return ID; } +end { return END; } +[0-9]+ { yylval.number = atoi(yytext); return NUMBER; } +#[^\n]* ; +[ \t] ; +\n { lineno++; } +\" { return getstring(); } +[a-zA-Z0-9_]+ { yylval.string = strdup(yytext); return STRING; } +. { return *yytext; } +%% + +#ifndef yywrap /* XXX */ +int +yywrap () +{ + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int +getstring(void) +{ + char x[128]; + int i = 0; + int c; + int quote = 0; + while((c = input()) != EOF){ + if(quote) { + x[i++] = c; + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(c == '\n'){ + error_message("unterminated string"); + lineno++; + break; + } + if(c == '\\'){ + quote++; + continue; + } + if(c == '\"') + break; + x[i++] = c; + } + x[i] = '\0'; + yylval.string = strdup(x); + return STRING; +} + +void +error_message (const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start (args, format); + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d:", filename, lineno); + vfprintf (stderr, format, args); + va_end (args); + numerror++; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/parse.y b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/parse.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82e99ffb80 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/parse.y @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "compile_et.h" +#include "lex.h" + +RCSID("$Id: parse.y,v 1.11 2000/06/22 00:42:52 assar Exp $"); + +void yyerror (char *s); +static long name2number(const char *str); + +extern char *yytext; + +/* This is for bison */ + +#if !defined(alloca) && !defined(HAVE_ALLOCA) +#define alloca(x) malloc(x) +#endif + +%} + +%union { + char *string; + int number; +} + +%token ET INDEX PREFIX EC ID END +%token STRING +%token NUMBER + +%% + +file : /* */ + | header statements + ; + +header : id et + | et + ; + +id : ID STRING + { + id_str = $2; + } + ; + +et : ET STRING + { + base = name2number($2); + strncpy(name, $2, sizeof(name)); + name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0'; + free($2); + } + | ET STRING STRING + { + base = name2number($2); + strncpy(name, $3, sizeof(name)); + name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0'; + free($2); + free($3); + } + ; + +statements : statement + | statements statement + ; + +statement : INDEX NUMBER + { + number = $2; + } + | PREFIX STRING + { + prefix = realloc(prefix, strlen($2) + 2); + strcpy(prefix, $2); + strcat(prefix, "_"); + free($2); + } + | PREFIX + { + prefix = realloc(prefix, 1); + *prefix = '\0'; + } + | EC STRING ',' STRING + { + struct error_code *ec = malloc(sizeof(*ec)); + + ec->next = NULL; + ec->number = number; + if(prefix && *prefix != '\0') { + asprintf (&ec->name, "%s%s", prefix, $2); + free($2); + } else + ec->name = $2; + ec->string = $4; + APPEND(codes, ec); + number++; + } + | END + { + YYACCEPT; + } + ; + +%% + +static long +name2number(const char *str) +{ + const char *p; + long base = 0; + const char *x = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_"; + if(strlen(str) > 4) { + yyerror("table name too long"); + return 0; + } + for(p = str; *p; p++){ + char *q = strchr(x, *p); + if(q == NULL) { + yyerror("invalid character in table name"); + return 0; + } + base = (base << 6) + (q - x) + 1; + } + base <<= 8; + if(base > 0x7fffffff) + base = -(0xffffffff - base + 1); + return base; +} + +void +yyerror (char *s) +{ + error_message ("%s\n", s); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/roken_rename.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/roken_rename.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..173c9a7d5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/com_err/roken_rename.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken_rename.h,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:38 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __roken_rename_h__ +#define __roken_rename_h__ + +#endif /* __roken_rename_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/COPYRIGHT b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/COPYRIGHT new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db46855817 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/COPYRIGHT @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) +All rights reserved. + +This package is an DES implementation written by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). +The implementation was written so as to conform with MIT's libdes. + +This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as +the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions +apply to all code found in this distribution. + +Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in +the code are not to be removed. +If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution +as the author of that the SSL library. This can be in the form of a textual +message at program startup or in documentation (online or textual) provided +with the package. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +The license and distribution terms for any publically available version or +derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be +copied and put under another distrubution license +[including the GNU Public License.] + +The reason behind this being stated in this direct manner is past +experience in code simply being copied and the attribution removed +from it and then being distributed as part of other packages. This +implementation was a non-trivial and unpaid effort. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9f988da392 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +2003-03-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * des.1: sunOS -> SunOS, from jmc + +2003-03-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * des.1: spelling, from + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * read_pwd.c: move NeXT SGTTY stuff here + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 3:1:0 + +2001-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * str2key.c (des_string_to_key, des_string_to_2keys): avoid weak + keys + +2001-02-16 Assar Westerlund + + * set_key.c: correct weak keys and update comment + +2001-02-14 Assar Westerlund + + * set_key.c: correct the two last weak keys in accordance with + FIPS 74. noted by + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libdes_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 3:0:0 + +2000-10-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (LIBSRC, LIBOBJ): add rc4* and enc_{read,write} + files so that this library contains the same things as libdes in + Heimdal + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 2:1:0 + +2000-08-03 Johan Danielsson + + * enc_writ.c: BSIZE -> des_BSIZE to avoid conflicts with AIX + jfs/fsparam.h + + * enc_read.c: BSIZE -> des_BSIZE to avoid conflicts with AIX + jfs/fsparam.h + + * des_locl.h: BSIZE -> des_BSIZE to avoid conflicts with AIX + jfs/fsparam.h + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 2:0:0 + +2000-01-26 Assar Westerlund + + * mdtest.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. + * md4.c, md4.h, md5.c, md5.h, sha.c, sha.h: move to the + pseudo-standard APIs + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + +1999-11-29 Assar Westerlund + + * fcrypt.c (crypt_md5): add trailing $ + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (include_HEADERS): add rc4.h + (libdes_la_SOURCES): add rc4_skey.c + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * md5crypt_test.c: change the test case. apparently we should not + include $ after the salt. also make it print more useful stuff + when failing. + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 0:2:0 + +1999-09-21 Johan Danielsson + + * des.h: make this work with mips 64-bit abi + +1999-08-14 Johan Danielsson + + * fcrypt.c (crypt_md5): don't use snprintf + +1999-08-13 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add md5crypt_test + + * Makefile.in: add md5crypt_test + + * md5crypt_test.c: test md5 crypt + + * fcrypt.c: always enable md5 crypt + +1999-07-26 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump version number (changes to md*, sha) + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * sha.c (swap_u_int32_t): add _CRAY + +Sat Apr 10 23:02:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * destest.c: fixes for crays + +Thu Apr 1 11:26:38 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: noinst_PROGRAMS -> check_PROGRAMS; add TESTS; don't + build rpw, and speed + +Mon Mar 22 20:16:26 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: hash.h + + * sha.c: use hash.h; fixes for crays + + * md5.c: use hash.h; fixes for crays + + * md4.c: use hash.h; fixes for crays + + * hash.h: common stuff from md4, md5, and sha1 + +Sat Mar 20 00:16:53 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * rnd_keys.c (des_rand_data): move declaration to get rid of + warning + +Thu Mar 18 11:22:28 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Mon Mar 15 17:36:41 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * rnd_keys.c (des_rand_data): if not using setitimer, block + SIGCHLD around fork(), also make sure we get the status of the + child process + (fake_signal): emulate signal using sigaction + +Tue Jan 12 05:06:54 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * des.h: sparcv9 is also 64 bits, use `unsigned int' instead of + `unsigned long' + +Sun Nov 22 10:40:09 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Mon May 25 05:24:56 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + +Sun Apr 19 09:50:53 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sun Nov 9 07:14:45 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * mdtest.c: print out old and new string + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.pm b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.pm new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6a175b6ca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.pm @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +package DES; + +require Exporter; +require DynaLoader; +@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader); +# Items to export into callers namespace by default +# (move infrequently used names to @EXPORT_OK below) +@EXPORT = qw( +); +# Other items we are prepared to export if requested +@EXPORT_OK = qw( +crypt +); + +# Preloaded methods go here. Autoload methods go after __END__, and are +# processed by the autosplit program. +bootstrap DES; +1; +__END__ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.pod b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.pod new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a739e7ca0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.pod @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +crypt <= crypt(buf,salt) +key <= set_odd_parity(key) +int <= is_weak_key(key) +keysched<= set_key(key) +key <= ecb_encrypt(string8,ks,enc) +key <= ecb3_encrypt(input,ks1,ks2,enc) +string <= cbc_encrypt(input,ks,ivec,enc) => ivec +string <= cbc3_encrypt(input,ks1,ks2,ivec1,ivec2,enc) => ivec1&ivec2 +ck1,ck2 <= cbc_cksum(input,ks,ivec) => ivec +string <= pcbc_encrypt(input,ks,ivec,enc) => ivec +string <= ofb_encrypt(input,numbits,ks,ivec) => ivec +string <= cfb_encrypt(input,numbits,ks,ivec,enc) => ivec +key <= random_key() +key <= string_to_key(string) +key1,key2<= string_to_2keys(string) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.xs b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.xs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..def220b36b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/DES.xs @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ +#include "EXTERN.h" +#include "perl.h" +#include "XSUB.h" +#include "des.h" + +#define deschar char +static STRLEN len; + +static int +not_here(s) +char *s; +{ + croak("%s not implemented on this architecture", s); + return -1; +} + +MODULE = DES PACKAGE = DES PREFIX = des_ + +char * +des_crypt(buf,salt) + char * buf + char * salt + +void +des_set_odd_parity(key) + des_cblock * key +PPCODE: + { + SV *s; + + s=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s,(char *)key,8); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)SvPV(s,na)); + PUSHs(s); + } + +int +des_is_weak_key(key) + des_cblock * key + +des_key_schedule +des_set_key(key) + des_cblock * key +CODE: + des_set_key(key,RETVAL); +OUTPUT: +RETVAL + +des_cblock +des_ecb_encrypt(input,ks,encrypt) + des_cblock * input + des_key_schedule * ks + int encrypt +CODE: + des_ecb_encrypt(input,&RETVAL,*ks,encrypt); +OUTPUT: +RETVAL + +void +des_cbc_encrypt(input,ks,ivec,encrypt) + char * input + des_key_schedule * ks + des_cblock * ivec + int encrypt +PPCODE: + { + SV *s; + STRLEN len,l; + char *c; + + l=SvCUR(ST(0)); + len=((((unsigned long)l)+7)/8)*8; + s=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s,"",0); + SvGROW(s,len); + SvCUR_set(s,len); + c=(char *)SvPV(s,na); + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)input,(des_cblock *)c, + l,*ks,ivec,encrypt); + sv_setpvn(ST(2),(char *)c[len-8],8); + PUSHs(s); + } + +void +des_cbc3_encrypt(input,ks1,ks2,ivec1,ivec2,encrypt) + char * input + des_key_schedule * ks1 + des_key_schedule * ks2 + des_cblock * ivec1 + des_cblock * ivec2 + int encrypt +PPCODE: + { + SV *s; + STRLEN len,l; + + l=SvCUR(ST(0)); + len=((((unsigned long)l)+7)/8)*8; + s=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s,"",0); + SvGROW(s,len); + SvCUR_set(s,len); + des_3cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)input,(des_cblock *)SvPV(s,na), + l,*ks1,*ks2,ivec1,ivec2,encrypt); + sv_setpvn(ST(3),(char *)ivec1,8); + sv_setpvn(ST(4),(char *)ivec2,8); + PUSHs(s); + } + +void +des_cbc_cksum(input,ks,ivec) + char * input + des_key_schedule * ks + des_cblock * ivec +PPCODE: + { + SV *s1,*s2; + STRLEN len,l; + des_cblock c; + unsigned long i1,i2; + + s1=sv_newmortal(); + s2=sv_newmortal(); + l=SvCUR(ST(0)); + des_cbc_cksum((des_cblock *)input,(des_cblock *)c, + l,*ks,ivec); + i1=c[4]|(c[5]<<8)|(c[6]<<16)|(c[7]<<24); + i2=c[0]|(c[1]<<8)|(c[2]<<16)|(c[3]<<24); + sv_setiv(s1,i1); + sv_setiv(s2,i2); + sv_setpvn(ST(2),(char *)c,8); + PUSHs(s1); + PUSHs(s2); + } + +void +des_cfb_encrypt(input,numbits,ks,ivec,encrypt) + char * input + int numbits + des_key_schedule * ks + des_cblock * ivec + int encrypt +PPCODE: + { + SV *s; + STRLEN len; + char *c; + + len=SvCUR(ST(0)); + s=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s,"",0); + SvGROW(s,len); + SvCUR_set(s,len); + c=(char *)SvPV(s,na); + des_cfb_encrypt((unsigned char *)input,(unsigned char *)c, + (int)numbits,(long)len,*ks,ivec,encrypt); + sv_setpvn(ST(3),(char *)ivec,8); + PUSHs(s); + } + +des_cblock * +des_ecb3_encrypt(input,ks1,ks2,encrypt) + des_cblock * input + des_key_schedule * ks1 + des_key_schedule * ks2 + int encrypt +CODE: + { + des_cblock c; + + des_3ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)input,(des_cblock *)&c, + *ks1,*ks2,encrypt); + RETVAL= &c; + } +OUTPUT: +RETVAL + +void +des_ofb_encrypt(input,numbits,ks,ivec) + unsigned char * input + int numbits + des_key_schedule * ks + des_cblock * ivec +PPCODE: + { + SV *s; + STRLEN len,l; + unsigned char *c; + + len=SvCUR(ST(0)); + s=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s,"",0); + SvGROW(s,len); + SvCUR_set(s,len); + c=(unsigned char *)SvPV(s,na); + des_ofb_encrypt((unsigned char *)input,(unsigned char *)c, + numbits,len,*ks,ivec); + sv_setpvn(ST(3),(char *)ivec,8); + PUSHs(s); + } + +void +des_pcbc_encrypt(input,ks,ivec,encrypt) + char * input + des_key_schedule * ks + des_cblock * ivec + int encrypt +PPCODE: + { + SV *s; + STRLEN len,l; + char *c; + + l=SvCUR(ST(0)); + len=((((unsigned long)l)+7)/8)*8; + s=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s,"",0); + SvGROW(s,len); + SvCUR_set(s,len); + c=(char *)SvPV(s,na); + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)input,(des_cblock *)c, + l,*ks,ivec,encrypt); + sv_setpvn(ST(2),(char *)c[len-8],8); + PUSHs(s); + } + +des_cblock * +des_random_key() +CODE: + { + des_cblock c; + + des_random_key(c); + RETVAL=&c; + } +OUTPUT: +RETVAL + +des_cblock * +des_string_to_key(str) +char * str +CODE: + { + des_cblock c; + + des_string_to_key(str,&c); + RETVAL=&c; + } +OUTPUT: +RETVAL + +void +des_string_to_2keys(str) +char * str +PPCODE: + { + des_cblock c1,c2; + SV *s1,*s2; + + des_string_to_2keys(str,&c1,&c2); + EXTEND(sp,2); + s1=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s1,(char *)c1,8); + s2=sv_newmortal(); + sv_setpvn(s2,(char *)c2,8); + PUSHs(s1); + PUSHs(s2); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/FILES b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/FILES new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4c7ea2de7a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/FILES @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* General stuff */ +COPYRIGHT - Copyright info. +MODES.DES - A description of the features of the different modes of DES. +FILES - This file. +INSTALL - How to make things compile. +Imakefile - For use with kerberos. +README - What this package is. +VERSION - Which version this is and what was changed. +KERBEROS - Kerberos version 4 notes. +Makefile.PL - An old makefile to build with perl5, not current. +Makefile.ssl - The SSLeay makefile +Makefile.uni - The normal unix makefile. +GNUmakefile - The makefile for use with glibc. +makefile.bc - A Borland C makefile +times - Some outputs from 'speed' on some machines. +vms.com - For use when compiling under VMS + +/* My SunOS des(1) replacement */ +des.c - des(1) source code. +des.man - des(1) manual. + +/* Testing and timing programs. */ +destest.c - Source for libdes.a test program. +speed.c - Source for libdes.a timing program. +rpw.c - Source for libdes.a testing password reading routines. + +/* libdes.a source code */ +des_crypt.man - libdes.a manual page. +des.h - Public libdes.a header file. +ecb_enc.c - des_ecb_encrypt() source, this contains the basic DES code. +ecb3_enc.c - des_ecb3_encrypt() source. +cbc_ckm.c - des_cbc_cksum() source. +cbc_enc.c - des_cbc_encrypt() source. +ncbc_enc.c - des_cbc_encrypt() that is 'normal' in that it copies + the new iv values back in the passed iv vector. +ede_enc.c - des_ede3_cbc_encrypt() cbc mode des using triple DES. +cbc3_enc.c - des_3cbc_encrypt() source, don't use this function. +cfb_enc.c - des_cfb_encrypt() source. +cfb64enc.c - des_cfb64_encrypt() cfb in 64 bit mode but setup to be + used as a stream cipher. +cfb64ede.c - des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() cfb in 64 bit mode but setup to be + used as a stream cipher and using triple DES. +ofb_enc.c - des_cfb_encrypt() source. +ofb64_enc.c - des_ofb_encrypt() ofb in 64 bit mode but setup to be + used as a stream cipher. +ofb64ede.c - des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt() ofb in 64 bit mode but setup to be + used as a stream cipher and using triple DES. +enc_read.c - des_enc_read() source. +enc_writ.c - des_enc_write() source. +pcbc_enc.c - des_pcbc_encrypt() source. +qud_cksm.c - quad_cksum() source. +rand_key.c - des_random_key() source. +read_pwd.c - Source for des_read_password() plus related functions. +set_key.c - Source for des_set_key(). +str2key.c - Covert a string of any length into a key. +fcrypt.c - A small, fast version of crypt(3). +des_locl.h - Internal libdes.a header file. +podd.h - Odd parity tables - used in des_set_key(). +sk.h - Lookup tables used in des_set_key(). +spr.h - What is left of the S tables - used in ecb_encrypt(). +des_ver.h - header file for the external definition of the + version string. +des.doc - SSLeay documentation for the library. + +/* The perl scripts - you can ignore these files they are only + * included for the curious */ +des.pl - des in perl anyone? des_set_key and des_ecb_encrypt + both done in a perl library. +testdes.pl - Testing program for des.pl +doIP - Perl script used to develop IP xor/shift code. +doPC1 - Perl script used to develop PC1 xor/shift code. +doPC2 - Generates sk.h. +PC1 - Output of doPC1 should be the same as output from PC1. +PC2 - used in development of doPC2. +shifts.pl - Perl library used by my perl scripts. + +/* I started making a perl5 dynamic library for libdes + * but did not fully finish, these files are part of that effort. */ +DES.pm +DES.pod +DES.xs +t +typemap + +/* The following are for use with sun RPC implementaions. */ +rpc_des.h +rpc_enc.c + +/* The following are contibuted by Mark Murray . They + * are not normally built into libdes due to machine specific routines + * contained in them. They are for use in the most recent incarnation of + * export kerberos v 4 (eBones). */ +supp.c +new_rkey.c + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/INSTALL b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/INSTALL new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b8dae6b5f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/INSTALL @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +Check the CC and CFLAGS lines in the makefile + +If your C library does not support the times(3) function, change the +#define TIMES to +#undef TIMES in speed.c +If it does, check the HZ value for the times(3) function. +If your system does not define CLK_TCK it will be assumed to +be 100.0. + +If possible use gcc v 2.7.? +Turn on the maximum optimising (normally '-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer' for gcc) +In recent times, some system compilers give better performace. + +type 'make' + +run './destest' to check things are ok. +run './rpw' to check the tty code for reading passwords works. +run './speed' to see how fast those optimisations make the library run :-) +run './des_opts' to determin the best compile time options. + +The output from des_opts should be put in the makefile options and des_enc.c +should be rebuilt. For 64 bit computers, do not use the DES_PTR option. +For the DEC Alpha, edit des.h and change DES_LONG to 'unsigned int' +and then you can use the 'DES_PTR' option. + +The file options.txt has the options listed for best speed on quite a +few systems. Look and the options (UNROLL, PTR, RISC2 etc) and then +turn on the relevent option in the Makefile + +There are some special Makefile targets that make life easier. +make cc - standard cc build +make gcc - standard gcc build +make x86-elf - x86 assember (elf), linux-elf. +make x86-out - x86 assember (a.out), FreeBSD +make x86-solaris- x86 assember +make x86-bsdi - x86 assember (a.out with primative assember). + +If at all possible use the assember (for Windows NT/95, use +asm/win32.obj to link with). The x86 assember is very very fast. + +A make install will by default install +libdes.a in /usr/local/lib/libdes.a +des in /usr/local/bin/des +des_crypt.man in /usr/local/man/man3/des_crypt.3 +des.man in /usr/local/man/man1/des.1 +des.h in /usr/include/des.h + +des(1) should be compatible with sunOS's but I have been unable to +test it. + +These routines should compile on MSDOS, most 32bit and 64bit version +of Unix (BSD and SYSV) and VMS, without modification. +The only problems should be #include files that are in the wrong places. + +These routines can be compiled under MSDOS. +I have successfully encrypted files using des(1) under MSDOS and then +decrypted the files on a SparcStation. +I have been able to compile and test the routines with +Microsoft C v 5.1 and Turbo C v 2.0. +The code in this library is in no way optimised for the 16bit +operation of MSDOS. + +When building for glibc, ignore all of the above and just unpack into +glibc-1.??/des and then gmake as per normal. + +As a final note on performace. Certain CPUs like sparcs and Alpha often give +a %10 speed difference depending on the link order. It is rather anoying +when one program reports 'x' DES encrypts a second and another reports +'x*0.9' the speed. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Imakefile b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Imakefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b9b5629e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Imakefile @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# This Imakefile has not been tested for a while but it should still +# work when placed in the correct directory in the kerberos v 4 distribution + +SRCS= cbc_cksm.c cbc_enc.c ecb_enc.c pcbc_enc.c \ + qud_cksm.c rand_key.c read_pwd.c set_key.c str2key.c \ + enc_read.c enc_writ.c fcrypt.c cfb_enc.c \ + ecb3_enc.c ofb_enc.c ofb64enc.c + +OBJS= cbc_cksm.o cbc_enc.o ecb_enc.o pcbc_enc.o \ + qud_cksm.o rand_key.o read_pwd.o set_key.o str2key.o \ + enc_read.o enc_writ.o fcrypt.o cfb_enc.o \ + ecb3_enc.o ofb_enc.o ofb64enc.o + +GENERAL=COPYRIGHT FILES INSTALL Imakefile README VERSION makefile times \ + vms.com KERBEROS +DES= des.c des.man +TESTING=destest.c speed.c rpw.c +LIBDES= des_crypt.man des.h des_locl.h podd.h sk.h spr.h + +PERL= des.pl testdes.pl doIP doPC1 doPC2 PC1 PC2 shifts.pl + +CODE= $(GENERAL) $(DES) $(TESTING) $(SRCS) $(LIBDES) $(PERL) + +SRCDIR=$(SRCTOP)/lib/des + +DBG= -O +INCLUDE= -I$(SRCDIR) +CC= cc + +library_obj_rule() + +install_library_target(des,$(OBJS),$(SRCS),) + +test(destest,libdes.a,) +test(rpw,libdes.a,) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/KERBEROS b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/KERBEROS new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f401b10014 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/KERBEROS @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ + [ This is an old file, I don't know if it is true anymore + but I will leave the file here - eay 21/11/95 ] + +To use this library with Bones (kerberos without DES): +1) Get my modified Bones - eBones. It can be found on + gondwana.ecr.mu.oz.au (128.250.1.63) /pub/athena/eBones-p9.tar.Z + and + nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/unix/security/Kerberos/eBones-p9.tar.Z + +2) Unpack this library in src/lib/des, makeing sure it is version + 3.00 or greater (libdes.tar.93-10-07.Z). This versions differences + from the version in comp.sources.misc volume 29 patchlevel2. + The primarily difference is that it should compile under kerberos :-). + It can be found at. + ftp.psy.uq.oz.au (130.102.32.1) /pub/DES/libdes.tar.93-10-07.Z + +Now do a normal kerberos build and things should work. + +One problem I found when I was build on my local sun. +--- +For sunOS 4.1.1 apply the following patch to src/util/ss/make_commands.c + +*** make_commands.c.orig Fri Jul 3 04:18:35 1987 +--- make_commands.c Wed May 20 08:47:42 1992 +*************** +*** 98,104 **** + if (!rename(o_file, z_file)) { + if (!vfork()) { + chdir("/tmp"); +! execl("/bin/ld", "ld", "-o", o_file+5, "-s", "-r", "-n", + z_file+5, 0); + perror("/bin/ld"); + _exit(1); +--- 98,104 ---- + if (!rename(o_file, z_file)) { + if (!vfork()) { + chdir("/tmp"); +! execl("/bin/ld", "ld", "-o", o_file+5, "-s", "-r", + z_file+5, 0); + perror("/bin/ld"); + _exit(1); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/MODES.DES b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/MODES.DES new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18934b56c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/MODES.DES @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +Modes of DES +Quite a bit of the following information has been taken from + AS 2805.5.2 + Australian Standard + Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, + Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm + Appendix A + +There are several different modes in which DES can be used, they are +as follows. + +Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) (des_ecb_encrypt()) +- 64 bits are enciphered at a time. +- The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. +- The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block + (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. +- An error will only affect one ciphertext block. + +Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) (des_cbc_encrypt()) +- a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. +- The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. +- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the + current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not + be rearranged. +- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext + enciphering to the same ciphertext. +- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. + +Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) (des_cfb_encrypt()) +- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. +- The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. +- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the + current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are + chained together and con not be rearranged. +- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext + enciphering to the same ciphertext. +- The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if + j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. +- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through + the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause + greater processing overheads. +- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. +- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. + +Output Feedback Mode (OFB) (des_ofb_encrypt()) +- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. +- The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More + over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same + key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons + a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. +- The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. +- The use of different start variables values prevents the same + plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different + key streams. +- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through + the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause + greater processing overheads. +- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. +- OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the + resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes + only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. +- OFB mode is not self-synchronising. If the two operation of + encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs + to be re-initialised. +- Each re-initialisation should use a value of the start variable +different from the start variable values used before with the same +key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be +produced each time from the same parameters. This would be +susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. + +Triple ECB Mode (des_3ecb_encrypt()) +- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key1 again. +- As for ECB encryption but increases the effective key length to 112 bits. +- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with + just one key. + +Triple CBC Mode (des_3cbc_encrypt()) +- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key1 again. +- As for CBC encryption but increases the effective key length to 112 bits. +- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with + just one key. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.PL b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.PL new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b54a24387c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.PL @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +use ExtUtils::MakeMaker; +# See lib/ExtUtils/MakeMaker.pm for details of how to influence +# the contents of the Makefile being created. +&writeMakefile( + 'potential_libs' => '', # e.g., '-lm' + 'INC' => '', # e.g., '-I/usr/include/other' + 'DISTNAME' => 'DES', + 'VERSION' => '0.1', + 'DEFINE' => '-DPERL5', + 'OBJECT' => 'DES.o cbc_cksm.o cbc_enc.o ecb_enc.o pcbc_enc.o \ + rand_key.o set_key.o str2key.o \ + enc_read.o enc_writ.o fcrypt.o cfb_enc.o \ + ecb3_enc.o ofb_enc.o cbc3_enc.o des_enc.o', + ); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8a745ba42 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.26 2001/08/04 03:10:23 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libdes.la +libdes_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 3:1:0 + +include_HEADERS = des.h md4.h md5.h sha.h rc4.h + +build_HEADERZ = $(include_HEADERS) + +check_PROGRAMS = destest mdtest md5crypt_test + +TESTS = destest mdtest md5crypt_test +CHECK_LOCAL = +bin_PROGRAMS = des #rpw speed + +des_SOURCES = des.c des_ver.h + +LDADD = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + +libdes_la_SOURCES = \ + cbc3_enc.c \ + cbc_cksm.c \ + cbc_enc.c \ + cfb64ede.c \ + cfb64enc.c \ + cfb_enc.c \ + des_enc.c \ + des_locl.h \ + ecb3_enc.c \ + ecb_enc.c \ + ede_enc.c \ + enc_read.c \ + enc_writ.c \ + fcrypt.c \ + hash.h \ + key_par.c \ + md4.c \ + md5.c \ + ncbc_enc.c \ + ofb64ede.c \ + ofb64enc.c \ + ofb_enc.c \ + pcbc_enc.c \ + podd.h \ + qud_cksm.c \ + rc4_skey.c \ + rc4_enc.c \ + read_pwd.c \ + rnd_keys.c \ + set_key.c \ + sha.c \ + sk.h \ + spr.h \ + str2key.c \ + xcbc_enc.c + +EXTRA_libdes_la_SOURCES = dllmain.c passwd_dialog.aps passwd_dialog.clw \ + passwd_dialog.rc passwd_dialog.res passwd_dlg.c passwd_dlg.h resource.h + +man_MANS = des.1 des_crypt.3 + +## this is an awful lot of junk, but it's just as well to include everything +EXTRA_DIST = \ + COPYRIGHT \ + DES.pm \ + DES.pod \ + DES.xs \ + FILES \ + Imakefile \ + KERBEROS \ + MODES.DES \ + Makefile.PL \ + Makefile.ssl \ + Makefile.uni \ + PC1 \ + PC2 \ + VERSION \ + des.def \ + des.dsp \ + des.doc \ + des.mak \ + des.man \ + des.org \ + des.pl \ + des_crypt.man \ + des_locl.org \ + des_opts.c \ + doIP \ + doPC1 \ + doPC2 \ + makefile.bc \ + rand_key.c \ + rpc_des.h \ + rpc_enc.c \ + shifts.pl \ + supp.c \ + testdes.pl \ + times \ + typemap \ + version.h \ + vms.com + +asm_files = des-som2.pl des-som3.pl des586.pl des686.pl desboth.pl \ + dx86-cpp.s dx86unix.cpp readme win32.asm win32.obj win32.uu x86ms.pl \ + x86unix.pl + +dist-hook: + $(mkinstalldirs) $(distdir)/t + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/t/perl $(distdir)/t + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/t/test $(distdir)/t + $(mkinstalldirs) $(distdir)/asm + (cd $(srcdir)/asm && tar cf - $(asm_files)) \ + | (cd $(distdir)/asm; tar xf -) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..676d1e7e98 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,1124 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.26 2001/08/04 03:10:23 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + + +SOURCES = $(libdes_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libdes_la_SOURCES) $(des_SOURCES) destest.c md5crypt_test.c mdtest.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = README $(include_HEADERS) $(srcdir)/Makefile.am \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog INSTALL +check_PROGRAMS = destest$(EXEEXT) mdtest$(EXEEXT) \ + md5crypt_test$(EXEEXT) +bin_PROGRAMS = des$(EXEEXT) +subdir = lib/des +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken2.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/c-attribute.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/capabilities.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-compile-et.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-declaration.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-man.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-type-extra.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-var.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-x.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/check-xau.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/crypto.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/db.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/destdirs.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/dlopen.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/find-func.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/have-struct-field.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/have-type.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/irix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-readline.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/mips-abi.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/misc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/need-proto.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/osfc2.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/otp.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/proto-compat.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/retsigtype.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/roken-frag.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/sunos.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/telnet.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/test-package.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/wflags.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/with-all.m4 $(top_srcdir)/configure.in +am__configure_deps = $(am__aclocal_m4_deps) $(CONFIGURE_DEPENDENCIES) \ + $(ACLOCAL_M4) +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = $(top_builddir)/include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +am__installdirs = "$(DESTDIR)$(libdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(man1dir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(man3dir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(includedir)" +libLTLIBRARIES_INSTALL = $(INSTALL) +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) +libdes_la_LIBADD = +am_libdes_la_OBJECTS = cbc3_enc.lo cbc_cksm.lo cbc_enc.lo cfb64ede.lo \ + cfb64enc.lo cfb_enc.lo des_enc.lo ecb3_enc.lo ecb_enc.lo \ + ede_enc.lo enc_read.lo enc_writ.lo fcrypt.lo key_par.lo md4.lo \ + md5.lo ncbc_enc.lo ofb64ede.lo ofb64enc.lo ofb_enc.lo \ + pcbc_enc.lo qud_cksm.lo rc4_skey.lo rc4_enc.lo read_pwd.lo \ + rnd_keys.lo set_key.lo sha.lo str2key.lo xcbc_enc.lo +libdes_la_OBJECTS = $(am_libdes_la_OBJECTS) +binPROGRAMS_INSTALL = $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) +am_des_OBJECTS = des.$(OBJEXT) +des_OBJECTS = $(am_des_OBJECTS) +des_LDADD = $(LDADD) +am__DEPENDENCIES_1 = libdes.la +des_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) +destest_SOURCES = destest.c +destest_OBJECTS = destest.$(OBJEXT) +destest_LDADD = $(LDADD) +destest_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) +md5crypt_test_SOURCES = md5crypt_test.c +md5crypt_test_OBJECTS = md5crypt_test.$(OBJEXT) +md5crypt_test_LDADD = $(LDADD) +md5crypt_test_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) +mdtest_SOURCES = mdtest.c +mdtest_OBJECTS = mdtest.$(OBJEXT) +mdtest_LDADD = $(LDADD) +mdtest_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) +DEFAULT_INCLUDES = -I. -I$(srcdir) -I$(top_builddir)/include +depcomp = +am__depfiles_maybe = +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \ + $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) \ + $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) \ + $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) \ + $(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +SOURCES = $(libdes_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libdes_la_SOURCES) \ + $(des_SOURCES) destest.c md5crypt_test.c mdtest.c +DIST_SOURCES = $(libdes_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libdes_la_SOURCES) \ + $(des_SOURCES) destest.c md5crypt_test.c mdtest.c +man1dir = $(mandir)/man1 +man3dir = $(mandir)/man3 +MANS = $(man_MANS) +includeHEADERS_INSTALL = $(INSTALL_HEADER) +HEADERS = $(include_HEADERS) +ETAGS = etags +CTAGS = ctags +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(DIST_SOURCES) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AIX4_FALSE = @AIX4_FALSE@ +AIX4_TRUE = @AIX4_TRUE@ +AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE = @AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@ +AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE = @AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AIX_FALSE = @AIX_FALSE@ +AIX_TRUE = @AIX_TRUE@ +AMTAR = @AMTAR@ +AR = @AR@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CATMAN_FALSE = @CATMAN_FALSE@ +CATMAN_TRUE = @CATMAN_TRUE@ +CC = @CC@ +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE_ET = @COMPILE_ET@ +CPP = @CPP@ +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +CXX = @CXX@ +CXXCPP = @CXXCPP@ +CXXFLAGS = @CXXFLAGS@ +CYGPATH_W = @CYGPATH_W@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +DCE_FALSE = @DCE_FALSE@ +DCE_TRUE = @DCE_TRUE@ +DEFS = @DEFS@ +DIR_com_err = @DIR_com_err@ 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exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.ssl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c415d393c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.ssl @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +# +# SSLeay/crypto/des/Makefile +# + +DIR= des +TOP= ../.. +CC= cc +CPP= cc -E +INCLUDES= +CFLAG=-g +INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl +MAKE= make -f Makefile.ssl +MAKEDEPEND= makedepend -fMakefile.ssl +MAKEFILE= Makefile.ssl +DES_ENC= des_enc.o + +CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) + +GENERAL=Makefile des.org des_locl.org +TEST=destest.c +APPS= + +LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a +LIBSRC= cbc3_enc.c cbc_cksm.c cbc_enc.c cfb64enc.c cfb_enc.c \ + ecb3_enc.c ecb_enc.c ede_enc.c enc_read.c enc_writ.c \ + fcrypt.c ncbc_enc.c ofb64enc.c ofb_enc.c pcbc_enc.c \ + qud_cksm.c rand_key.c read_pwd.c rpc_enc.c set_key.c \ + xcbc_enc.c des_enc.c \ + str2key.c cfb64ede.c ofb64ede.c supp.c + +LIBOBJ= set_key.o ecb_enc.o ede_enc.o cbc_enc.o cbc3_enc.o \ + ecb3_enc.o cfb64enc.o cfb64ede.o cfb_enc.o ofb64ede.o \ + enc_read.o enc_writ.o fcrypt.o ncbc_enc.o ofb64enc.o \ + ofb_enc.o str2key.o pcbc_enc.o qud_cksm.o rand_key.o \ + xcbc_enc.o ${DES_ENC} \ + read_pwd.o rpc_enc.o cbc_cksm.o supp.o + +SRC= $(LIBSRC) + +EXHEADER= des.h +HEADER= des_locl.h rpc_des.h podd.h sk.h spr.h des_ver.h $(EXHEADER) + +ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) + +top: + (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) + +all: lib + +lib: $(LIBOBJ) + ar r $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) + sh $(TOP)/util/ranlib.sh $(LIB) + @touch lib + +asm/dx86-elf.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DELF asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-elf.o + +asm/dx86-sol.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DSOL asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-sol.o + +asm/dx86-out.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DOUT asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-out.o + +asm/dx86bsdi.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DBSDI asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86bsdi.o + +files: + perl $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile.ssl >> $(TOP)/MINFO + +links: + /bin/rm -f Makefile + $(TOP)/util/point.sh Makefile.ssl Makefile ; + /bin/rm -f des.doc + $(TOP)/util/point.sh ../../doc/des.doc des.doc ; + $(TOP)/util/mklink.sh ../../include $(EXHEADER) + $(TOP)/util/mklink.sh ../../test $(TEST) + $(TOP)/util/mklink.sh ../../apps $(APPS) + +install: installs + +installs: + @for i in $(EXHEADER) ; \ + do \ + (cp $$i $(INSTALLTOP)/include/$$i; \ + chmod 644 $(INSTALLTOP)/include/$$i ) \ + done; + +tags: + ctags $(SRC) + +tests: + +lint: + lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff + +depend: + $(MAKEDEPEND) $(INCLUDES) $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) + +dclean: + perl -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new + mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) + +clean: + /bin/rm -f *.o asm/*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff + +errors: + +# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.uni b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.uni new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f78ea14c95 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/Makefile.uni @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +# You must select the correct terminal control system to be used to +# turn character echo off when reading passwords. There a 5 systems +# SGTTY - the old BSD system +# TERMIO - most system V boxes +# TERMIOS - SGI (ala IRIX). +# VMS - the DEC operating system +# MSDOS - we all know what it is :-) +# read_pwd.c makes a reasonable guess at what is correct. + +# If you are on a DEC Alpha, edit des.h and change the DES_LONG +# define to 'unsigned int'. I have seen this give a %20 speedup. + +OPTS0= -DRAND -DTERMIO #-DNOCONST + +# Version 1.94 has changed the strings_to_key function so that it is +# now compatible with MITs when the string is longer than 8 characters. +# If you wish to keep the old version, uncomment the following line. +# This will affect the -E/-D options on des(1). +#OPTS1= -DOLD_STR_TO_KEY + +# There are 4 possible performance options +# -DDES_PTR +# -DDES_RISC1 +# -DDES_RISC2 (only one of DES_RISC1 and DES_RISC2) +# -DDES_UNROLL +# after the initial build, run 'des_opts' to see which options are best +# for your platform. There are some listed in options.txt +#OPTS2= -DDES_PTR +#OPTS3= -DDES_RISC1 # or DES_RISC2 +OPTS4= -DDES_UNROLL + +OPTS= $(OPTS0) $(OPTS1) $(OPTS2) $(OPTS3) $(OPTS4) + +CC=cc +CFLAGS= -D_HPUX_SOURCE -Aa +O2 $(OPTS) $(CFLAG) + +#CC=gcc +#CFLAGS= -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer $(OPTS) $(CFLAG) + +CPP=$(CC) -E + +DES_ENC=des_enc.o # normal C version +#DES_ENC=asm/dx86-elf.o # elf format x86 +#DES_ENC=asm/dx86-out.o # a.out format x86 +#DES_ENC=asm/dx86-sol.o # solaris format x86 +#DES_ENC=asm/dx86bsdi.o # bsdi format x86 + +LIBDIR=/usr/local/lib +BINDIR=/usr/local/bin +INCDIR=/usr/local/include +MANDIR=/usr/local/man +MAN1=1 +MAN3=3 +SHELL=/bin/sh +OBJS= cbc3_enc.o cbc_cksm.o cbc_enc.o ncbc_enc.o pcbc_enc.o qud_cksm.o \ + cfb64ede.o cfb64enc.o cfb_enc.o ecb3_enc.o ecb_enc.o ede_enc.o \ + enc_read.o enc_writ.o fcrypt.o ofb64ede.o ofb64enc.o ofb_enc.o \ + rand_key.o read_pwd.o set_key.o rpc_enc.o str2key.o supp.o \ + $(DES_ENC) xcbc_enc.o + +GENERAL=$(GENERAL_LIT) FILES Imakefile times vms.com KERBEROS MODES.DES \ + GNUmakefile des.man DES.pm DES.pod DES.xs Makefile.PL \ + Makefile.uni typemap t Makefile.ssl makefile.bc Makefile.lit \ + des.org des_locl.org +DES= des.c +TESTING=rpw.c $(TESTING_LIT) +HEADERS= $(HEADERS_LIT) rpc_des.h +LIBDES= cbc_cksm.c pcbc_enc.c qud_cksm.c \ + cfb64ede.c cfb64enc.c cfb_enc.c ecb3_enc.c cbc3_enc.c \ + enc_read.c enc_writ.c ofb64ede.c ofb64enc.c ofb_enc.c \ + rand_key.c rpc_enc.c str2key.c supp.c \ + xcbc_enc.c $(LIBDES_LIT) read_pwd.c + +TESTING_LIT=destest.c speed.c des_opts.c +GENERAL_LIT=COPYRIGHT INSTALL README VERSION Makefile des_crypt.man \ + des.doc options.txt asm +HEADERS_LIT=des_ver.h des.h des_locl.h podd.h sk.h spr.h +LIBDES_LIT=ede_enc.c cbc_enc.c ncbc_enc.c ecb_enc.c fcrypt.c set_key.c des_enc.c + +PERL= des.pl testdes.pl doIP doIP2 doPC1 doPC2 PC1 PC2 shifts.pl + +ALL= $(GENERAL) $(DES) $(TESTING) $(LIBDES) $(PERL) $(HEADERS) + +DLIB= libdes.a + +all: $(DLIB) destest rpw des speed des_opts + +cc: + make CC=cc CFLAGS="-O $(OPTS) $(CFLAG)" all + +gcc: + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer $(OPTS) $(CFLAG)" all + +x86-elf: + make DES_ENC=asm/dx86-elf.o CC=gcc CFLAGS="-DELF -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer $(OPTS) $(CFLAG)" all + +x86-out: + make DES_ENC=asm/dx86-out.o CC=gcc CFLAGS="-DOUT -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer $(OPTS) $(CFLAG)" all + +x86-solaris: + make DES_ENC=asm/dx86-sol.o CFLAGS="-DSOL -O $(OPTS) $(CFLAG)" all + +x86-bsdi: + make DES_ENC=asm/dx86bsdi.o CC=gcc CFLAGS="-DBSDI -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer $(OPTS) $(CFLAG)" all + +asm/dx86-elf.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DELF asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-elf.o + +asm/dx86-sol.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DSOL asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-sol.o + +asm/dx86-out.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DOUT asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-out.o + +asm/dx86bsdi.o: asm/dx86-cpp.s asm/dx86unix.cpp + $(CPP) -DBSDI asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86bsdi.o + +test: all + ./destest + +$(DLIB): $(OBJS) + /bin/rm -f $(DLIB) + ar cr $(DLIB) $(OBJS) + -if test -s /bin/ranlib; then /bin/ranlib $(DLIB); \ + else if test -s /usr/bin/ranlib; then /usr/bin/ranlib $(DLIB); \ + else exit 0; fi; fi + +des_opts: des_opts.o libdes.a + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o des_opts des_opts.o libdes.a + +destest: destest.o libdes.a + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o destest destest.o libdes.a + +rpw: rpw.o libdes.a + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o rpw rpw.o libdes.a + +speed: speed.o libdes.a + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o speed speed.o libdes.a + +des: des.o libdes.a + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o des des.o libdes.a + +tags: + ctags $(DES) $(TESTING) $(LIBDES) + +tar_lit: + /bin/mv Makefile Makefile.tmp + /bin/cp Makefile.lit Makefile + tar chf libdes-l.tar $(LIBDES_LIT) $(HEADERS_LIT) \ + $(GENERAL_LIT) $(TESTING_LIT) + /bin/rm -f Makefile + /bin/mv Makefile.tmp Makefile + +tar: + tar chf libdes.tar $(ALL) + +shar: + shar $(ALL) >libdes.shar + +depend: + makedepend $(LIBDES) $(DES) $(TESTING) + +clean: + /bin/rm -f *.o tags core rpw destest des speed $(DLIB) .nfs* *.old \ + *.bak destest rpw des_opts asm/*.o + +dclean: + sed -e '/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/ q' Makefile >Makefile.new + mv -f Makefile.new Makefile + +# Eric is probably going to choke when he next looks at this --tjh +install: $(DLIB) des + if test $(INSTALLTOP); then \ + echo SSL style install; \ + cp $(DLIB) $(INSTALLTOP)/lib; \ + if test -s /bin/ranlib; then \ + /bin/ranlib $(INSTALLTOP)/lib/$(DLIB); \ + else \ + if test -s /usr/bin/ranlib; then \ + /usr/bin/ranlib $(INSTALLTOP)/lib/$(DLIB); \ + fi; fi; \ + chmod 644 $(INSTALLTOP)/lib/$(DLIB); \ + cp des.h $(INSTALLTOP)/include; \ + chmod 644 $(INSTALLTOP)/include/des.h; \ + cp des $(INSTALLTOP)/bin; \ + chmod 755 $(INSTALLTOP)/bin/des; \ + else \ + echo Standalone install; \ + cp $(DLIB) $(LIBDIR)/$(DLIB); \ + if test -s /bin/ranlib; then \ + /bin/ranlib $(LIBDIR)/$(DLIB); \ + else \ + if test -s /usr/bin/ranlib; then \ + /usr/bin/ranlib $(LIBDIR)/$(DLIB); \ + fi; \ + fi; \ + chmod 644 $(LIBDIR)/$(DLIB); \ + cp des $(BINDIR)/des; \ + chmod 711 $(BINDIR)/des; \ + cp des_crypt.man $(MANDIR)/man$(MAN3)/des_crypt.$(MAN3); \ + chmod 644 $(MANDIR)/man$(MAN3)/des_crypt.$(MAN3); \ + cp des.man $(MANDIR)/man$(MAN1)/des.$(MAN1); \ + chmod 644 $(MANDIR)/man$(MAN1)/des.$(MAN1); \ + cp des.h $(INCDIR)/des.h; \ + chmod 644 $(INCDIR)/des.h; \ + fi +# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/PC1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/PC1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..efb8348b72 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/PC1 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +@PC1=( 57,49,41,33,25,17, 9, + 1,58,50,42,34,26,18, + 10, 2,59,51,43,35,27, + 19,11, 3,60,52,44,36, + "-","-","-","-", + 63,55,47,39,31,23,15, + 7,62,54,46,38,30,22, + 14, 6,61,53,45,37,29, + 21,13, 5,28,20,12, 4, + "-","-","-","-", + ); + +foreach (@PC1) + { + if ($_ ne "-") + { + $_--; + $_=int($_/8)*8+7-($_%8); + printf "%2d ",$_; + } + else + { print "-- "; } + print "\n" if (((++$i) % 8) == 0); + print "\n" if ((($i) % 32) == 0); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/PC2 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/PC2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d560270ec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/PC2 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +@PC2_C=(14,17,11,24, 1, 5, + 3,28,15, 6,21,10, + 23,19,12, 4,26, 8, + 16, 7,27,20,13, 2, + ); + +@PC2_D=(41,52,31,37,47,55, + 30,40,51,45,33,48, + 44,49,39,56,34,53, + 46,42,50,36,29,32, + ); + +foreach (@PC2_C) { + if ($_ ne "-") + { + $_--; + printf "%2d ",$_; } + else { print "-- "; } + $C{$_}=1; + print "\n" if (((++$i) % 8) == 0); + } +$i=0; +print "\n"; +foreach (@PC2_D) { + if ($_ ne "-") + { + $_-=29; + printf "%2d ",$_; } + else { print "-- "; } + $D{$_}=1; + print "\n" if (((++$i) % 8) == 0); } + +print "\n"; +foreach $i (0 .. 27) + { + $_=$C{$i}; + if ($_ ne "-") {printf "%2d ",$_;} + else { print "-- "; } + print "\n" if (((++$i) % 8) == 0); + } +print "\n"; + +print "\n"; +foreach $i (0 .. 27) + { + $_=$D{$i}; + if ($_ ne "-") {printf "%2d ",$_;} + else { print "-- "; } + print "\n" if (((++$i) % 8) == 0); + } +print "\n"; +sub numsort + { + $a-$b; + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/README b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58280c26e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/README @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ + + libdes, Version 4.01 13-Jan-97 + + Copyright (c) 1997, Eric Young + All rights reserved. + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms specified in COPYRIGHT. + +-- +The primary ftp site for this library is +ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/DES/libdes-x.xx.tar.gz +libdes is now also shipped with SSLeay. Primary ftp site of +ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL/SSLeay-x.x.x.tar.gz + +The best way to build this library is to build it as part of SSLeay. + +This kit builds a DES encryption library and a DES encryption program. +It supports ecb, cbc, ofb, cfb, triple ecb, triple cbc, triple ofb, +triple cfb, desx, and MIT's pcbc encryption modes and also has a fast +implementation of crypt(3). +It contains support routines to read keys from a terminal, +generate a random key, generate a key from an arbitrary length string, +read/write encrypted data from/to a file descriptor. + +The implementation was written so as to conform with the manual entry +for the des_crypt(3) library routines from MIT's project Athena. + +destest should be run after compilation to test the des routines. +rpw should be run after compilation to test the read password routines. +The des program is a replacement for the sun des command. I believe it +conforms to the sun version. + +The Imakefile is setup for use in the kerberos distribution. + +These routines are best compiled with gcc or any other good +optimising compiler. +Just turn you optimiser up to the highest settings and run destest +after the build to make sure everything works. + +I believe these routines are close to the fastest and most portable DES +routines that use small lookup tables (4.5k) that are publicly available. +The fcrypt routine is faster than ufc's fcrypt (when compiling with +gcc2 -O2) on the sparc 2 (1410 vs 1270) but is not so good on other machines +(on a sun3/260 168 vs 336). It is a function of CPU on chip cache size. +[ 10-Jan-97 and a function of an incorrect speed testing program in + ufc which gave much better test figures that reality ]. + +It is worth noting that on sparc and Alpha CPUs, performance of the DES +library can vary by upto %10 due to the positioning of files after application +linkage. + +Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/VERSION b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/VERSION new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb00c3eb12 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/VERSION @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +Version 4.01 14/01/97 + Even faster inner loop in the DES assember for x86 and a modification + for IP/FP which is faster on x86. Both of these changes are + from Svend Olaf Mikkelsen . His + changes make the assember run %40 faster on a pentium. This is just + a case of getting the instruction sequence 'just right'. + All credit to 'Svend' :-) + Quite a few special x86 'make' targets. + A libdes-l (lite) distribution. + +Version 4.00 + After a bit of a pause, I'll up the major version number since this + is mostly a performace release. I've added x86 assember and + added more options for performance. A %28 speedup for gcc + on a pentium and the assember is a %50 speedup. + MIPS CPU's, sparc and Alpha are the main CPU's with speedups. + Run des_opts to work out which options should be used. + DES_RISC1/DES_RISC2 use alternative inner loops which use + more registers but should give speedups on any CPU that does + dual issue (pentium). DES_UNROLL unrolls the inner loop, + which costs in code size. + +Version 3.26 + I've finally removed one of the shifts in D_ENCRYPT. This + meant I've changed the des_SPtrans table (spr.h), the set_key() + function and some things in des_enc.c. This has definitly + made things faster :-). I've known about this one for some + time but I've been too lazy to follow it up :-). + Noticed that in the D_ENCRYPT() macro, we can just do L^=(..)^(..)^.. + instead of L^=((..)|(..)|(..).. This should save a register at + least. + Assember for x86. The file to replace is des_enc.c, which is replaced + by one of the assember files found in asm. Look at des/asm/readme + for more info. + + /* Modification to fcrypt so it can be compiled to support + HPUX 10.x's long password format, define -DLONGCRYPT to use this. + Thanks to Jens Kupferschmidt . */ + + SIGWINCH case put in des_read_passwd() so the function does not + 'exit' if this function is recieved. + +Version 3.25 17/07/96 + Modified read_pwd.c so that stdin can be read if not a tty. + Thanks to Jeff Barber for the patches. + des_init_random_number_generator() shortened due to VMS linker + limits. + Added RSA's DESX cbc mode. It is a form of cbc encryption, with 2 + 8 byte quantites xored before and after encryption. + des_xcbc_encryption() - the name is funny to preserve the des_ + prefix on all functions. + +Version 3.24 20/04/96 + The DES_PTR macro option checked and used by SSLeay configuration + +Version 3.23 11/04/96 + Added DES_LONG. If defined to 'unsigned int' on the DEC Alpha, + it gives a %20 speedup :-) + Fixed the problem with des.pl under perl5. The patches were + sent by Ed Kubaitis (ejk@uiuc.edu). + if fcrypt.c, changed values to handle illegal salt values the way + normal crypt() implementations do. Some programs apparently use + them :-(. The patch was sent by Bjorn Gronvall + +Version 3.22 29/11/95 + Bug in des(1), an error with the uuencoding stuff when the + 'data' is small, thanks to Geoff Keating + for the patch. + +Version 3.21 22/11/95 + After some emailing back and forth with + Colin Plumb , I've tweaked a few things + and in a future version I will probably put in some of the + optimisation he suggested for use with the DES_USE_PTR option. + Extra routines from Mark Murray for use in + freeBSD. They mostly involve random number generation for use + with kerberos. They involve evil machine specific system calls + etc so I would normally suggest pushing this stuff into the + application and/or using RAND_seed()/RAND_bytes() if you are + using this DES library as part of SSLeay. + Redone the read_pw() function so that it is cleaner and + supports termios, thanks to Sameer Parekh + for the initial patches for this. + Renamed 3ecb_encrypt() to ecb3_encrypt(). This has been + done just to make things more consistent. + I have also now added triple DES versions of cfb and ofb. + +Version 3.20 + Damn, Damn, Damn, as pointed out by Mike_Spreitzer.PARC@xerox.com, + my des_random_seed() function was only copying 4 bytes of the + passed seed into the init structure. It is now fixed to copy 8. + My own suggestion is to used something like MD5 :-) + +Version 3.19 + While looking at my code one day, I though, why do I keep on + calling des_encrypt(in,out,ks,enc) when every function that + calls it has in and out the same. So I dropped the 'out' + parameter, people should not be using this function. + +Version 3.18 30/08/95 + Fixed a few bit with the distribution and the filenames. + 3.17 had been munged via a move to DOS and back again. + NO CODE CHANGES + +Version 3.17 14/07/95 + Fixed ede3 cbc which I had broken in 3.16. I have also + removed some unneeded variables in 7-8 of the routines. + +Version 3.16 26/06/95 + Added des_encrypt2() which does not use IP/FP, used by triple + des routines. Tweaked things a bit elsewhere. %13 speedup on + sparc and %6 on a R4400 for ede3 cbc mode. + +Version 3.15 06/06/95 + Added des_ncbc_encrypt(), it is des_cbc mode except that it is + 'normal' and copies the new iv value back over the top of the + passed parameter. + CHANGED des_ede3_cbc_encrypt() so that it too now overwrites + the iv. THIS WILL BREAK EXISTING CODE, but since this function + only new, I feel I can change it, not so with des_cbc_encrypt :-(. + I need to update the documentation. + +Version 3.14 31/05/95 + New release upon the world, as part of my SSL implementation. + New copyright and usage stuff. Basically free for all to use + as long as you say it came from me :-) + +Version 3.13 31/05/95 + A fix in speed.c, if HZ is not defined, I set it to 100.0 + which is reasonable for most unixes except SunOS 4.x. + I now have a #ifdef sun but timing for SunOS 4.x looked very + good :-(. At my last job where I used SunOS 4.x, it was + defined to be 60.0 (look at the old INSTALL documentation), at + the last release had it changed to 100.0 since I now work with + Solaris2 and SVR4 boxes. + Thanks to Rory Chisholm for pointing this + one out. + +Version 3.12 08/05/95 + As pointed out by The Crypt Keeper , + my D_ENCRYPT macro in crypt() had an un-necessary variable. + It has been removed. + +Version 3.11 03/05/95 + Added des_ede3_cbc_encrypt() which is cbc mode des with 3 keys + and one iv. It is a standard and I needed it for my SSL code. + It makes more sense to use this for triple DES than + 3cbc_encrypt(). I have also added (or should I say tested :-) + cfb64_encrypt() which is cfb64 but it will encrypt a partial + number of bytes - 3 bytes in 3 bytes out. Again this is for + my SSL library, as a form of encryption to use with SSL + telnet. + +Version 3.10 22/03/95 + Fixed a bug in 3cbc_encrypt() :-(. When making repeated calls + to cbc3_encrypt, the 2 iv values that were being returned to + be used in the next call were reversed :-(. + Many thanks to Bill Wade for pointing out + this error. + +Version 3.09 01/02/95 + Fixed des_random_key to far more random, it was rather feeble + with regards to picking the initial seed. The problem was + pointed out by Olaf Kirch . + +Version 3.08 14/12/94 + Added Makefile.PL so libdes can be built into perl5. + Changed des_locl.h so RAND is always defined. + +Version 3.07 05/12/94 + Added GNUmake and stuff so the library can be build with + glibc. + +Version 3.06 30/08/94 + Added rpc_enc.c which contains _des_crypt. This is for use in + secure_rpc v 4.0 + Finally fixed the cfb_enc problems. + Fixed a few parameter parsing bugs in des (-3 and -b), thanks + to Rob McMillan + +Version 3.05 21/04/94 + for unsigned long l; gcc does not produce ((l>>34) == 0) + This causes bugs in cfb_enc. + Thanks to Hadmut Danisch + +Version 3.04 20/04/94 + Added a version number to des.c and libdes.a + +Version 3.03 12/01/94 + Fixed a bug in non zero iv in 3cbc_enc. + +Version 3.02 29/10/93 + I now work in a place where there are 6+ architectures and 14+ + OS versions :-). + Fixed TERMIO definition so the most sys V boxes will work :-) + +Release upon comp.sources.misc +Version 3.01 08/10/93 + Added des_3cbc_encrypt() + +Version 3.00 07/10/93 + Fixed up documentation. + quad_cksum definitely compatible with MIT's now. + +Version 2.30 24/08/93 + Triple DES now defaults to triple cbc but can do triple ecb + with the -b flag. + Fixed some MSDOS uuen/uudecoding problems, thanks to + Added prototypes. + +Version 2.22 29/06/93 + Fixed a bug in des_is_weak_key() which stopped it working :-( + thanks to engineering@MorningStar.Com. + +Version 2.21 03/06/93 + des(1) with no arguments gives quite a bit of help. + Added -c (generate ckecksum) flag to des(1). + Added -3 (triple DES) flag to des(1). + Added cfb and ofb routines to the library. + +Version 2.20 11/03/93 + Added -u (uuencode) flag to des(1). + I have been playing with byte order in quad_cksum to make it + compatible with MIT's version. All I can say is avid this + function if possible since MIT's output is endian dependent. + +Version 2.12 14/10/92 + Added MSDOS specific macro in ecb_encrypt which gives a %70 + speed up when the code is compiled with turbo C. + +Version 2.11 12/10/92 + Speedup in set_key (recoding of PC-1) + I now do it in 47 simple operations, down from 60. + Thanks to John Fletcher (john_fletcher@lccmail.ocf.llnl.gov) + for motivating me to look for a faster system :-) + The speedup is probably less that 1% but it is still 13 + instructions less :-). + +Version 2.10 06/10/92 + The code now works on the 64bit ETA10 and CRAY without modifications or + #defines. I believe the code should work on any machine that + defines long, int or short to be 8 bytes long. + Thanks to Shabbir J. Safdar (shabby@mentor.cc.purdue.edu) + for helping me fix the code to run on 64bit machines (he had + access to an ETA10). + Thanks also to John Fletcher + for testing the routines on a CRAY. + read_password.c has been renamed to read_passwd.c + string_to_key.c has been renamed to string2key.c + +Version 2.00 14/09/92 + Made mods so that the library should work on 64bit CPU's. + Removed all my uchar and ulong defs. To many different + versions of unix define them in their header files in too many + different combinations :-) + IRIX - Sillicon Graphics mods (mostly in read_password.c). + Thanks to Andrew Daviel (advax@erich.triumf.ca) + +Version 1.99 26/08/92 + Fixed a bug or 2 in enc_read.c + Fixed a bug in enc_write.c + Fixed a pseudo bug in fcrypt.c (very obscure). + +Version 1.98 31/07/92 + Support for the ETA10. This is a strange machine that defines + longs and ints as 8 bytes and shorts as 4 bytes. + Since I do evil things with long * that assume that they are 4 + bytes. Look in the Makefile for the option to compile for + this machine. quad_cksum appears to have problems but I + will don't have the time to fix it right now, and this is not + a function that uses DES and so will not effect the main uses + of the library. + +Version 1.97 20/05/92 eay + Fixed the Imakefile and made some changes to des.h to fix some + problems when building this package with Kerberos v 4. + +Version 1.96 18/05/92 eay + Fixed a small bug in string_to_key() where problems could + occur if des_check_key was set to true and the string + generated a weak key. + +Patch2 posted to comp.sources.misc +Version 1.95 13/05/92 eay + Added an alternative version of the D_ENCRYPT macro in + ecb_encrypt and fcrypt. Depending on the compiler, one version or the + other will be faster. This was inspired by + Dana How , and her pointers about doing the + *(ulong *)((uchar *)ptr+(value&0xfc)) + vs + ptr[value&0x3f] + to stop the C compiler doing a <<2 to convert the long array index. + +Version 1.94 05/05/92 eay + Fixed an incompatibility between my string_to_key and the MIT + version. When the key is longer than 8 chars, I was wrapping + with a different method. To use the old version, define + OLD_STR_TO_KEY in the makefile. Thanks to + viktor@newsu.shearson.com (Viktor Dukhovni). + +Version 1.93 28/04/92 eay + Fixed the VMS mods so that echo is now turned off in + read_password. Thanks again to brennan@coco.cchs.su.oz.AU. + MSDOS support added. The routines can be compiled with + Turbo C (v2.0) and MSC (v5.1). Make sure MSDOS is defined. + +Patch1 posted to comp.sources.misc +Version 1.92 13/04/92 eay + Changed D_ENCRYPT so that the rotation of R occurs outside of + the loop. This required rotating all the longs in sp.h (now + called spr.h). Thanks to Richard Outerbridge <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> + speed.c has been changed so it will work without SIGALRM. If + times(3) is not present it will try to use ftime() instead. + +Version 1.91 08/04/92 eay + Added -E/-D options to des(1) so it can use string_to_key. + Added SVR4 mods suggested by witr@rwwa.COM + Added VMS mods suggested by brennan@coco.cchs.su.oz.AU. If + anyone knows how to turn of tty echo in VMS please tell me or + implement it yourself :-). + Changed FILE *IN/*OUT to *DES_IN/*DES_OUT since it appears VMS + does not like IN/OUT being used. + +Libdes posted to comp.sources.misc +Version 1.9 24/03/92 eay + Now contains a fast small crypt replacement. + Added des(1) command. + Added des_rw_mode so people can use cbc encryption with + enc_read and enc_write. + +Version 1.8 15/10/91 eay + Bug in cbc_cksum. + Many thanks to Keith Reynolds (keithr@sco.COM) for pointing this + one out. + +Version 1.7 24/09/91 eay + Fixed set_key :-) + set_key is 4 times faster and takes less space. + There are a few minor changes that could be made. + +Version 1.6 19/09/1991 eay + Finally go IP and FP finished. + Now I need to fix set_key. + This version is quite a bit faster that 1.51 + +Version 1.52 15/06/1991 eay + 20% speedup in ecb_encrypt by changing the E bit selection + to use 2 32bit words. This also required modification of the + sp table. There is still a way to speedup the IP and IP-1 + (hints from outer@sq.com) still working on this one :-(. + +Version 1.51 07/06/1991 eay + Faster des_encrypt by loop unrolling + Fixed bug in quad_cksum.c (thanks to hughes@logos.ucs.indiana.edu) + +Version 1.50 28/05/1991 eay + Optimised the code a bit more for the sparc. I have improved the + speed of the inner des_encrypt by speeding up the initial and + final permutations. + +Version 1.40 23/10/1990 eay + Fixed des_random_key, it did not produce a random key :-( + +Version 1.30 2/10/1990 eay + Have made des_quad_cksum the same as MIT's, the full package + should be compatible with MIT's + Have tested on a DECstation 3100 + Still need to fix des_set_key (make it faster). + Does des_cbc_encrypts at 70.5k/sec on a 3100. + +Version 1.20 18/09/1990 eay + Fixed byte order dependencies. + Fixed (I hope) all the word alignment problems. + Speedup in des_ecb_encrypt. + +Version 1.10 11/09/1990 eay + Added des_enc_read and des_enc_write. + Still need to fix des_quad_cksum. + Still need to document des_enc_read and des_enc_write. + +Version 1.00 27/08/1990 eay + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des-som2.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des-som2.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..911d985e84 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des-som2.pl @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl +# +# The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications are from +# Svend Olaf Mikkelsen +# + +$prog="des-som2.pl"; + +# base code is in microsft +# op dest, source +# format. +# + +require "desboth.pl"; + +if ( ($ARGV[0] eq "elf")) + { require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "a.out")) + { $aout=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "sol")) + { $sol=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "cpp")) + { $cpp=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "win32")) + { require "x86ms.pl"; } +else + { + print STDERR <<"EOF"; +Pick one target type from + elf - linux, FreeBSD etc + a.out - old linux + sol - x86 solaris + cpp - format so x86unix.cpp can be used + win32 - Windows 95/Windows NT +EOF + exit(1); + } + +&comment("Don't even think of reading this code"); +&comment("It was automatically generated by $prog"); +&comment("Which is a perl program used to generate the x86 assember for"); +&comment("any of elf, a.out, Win32, or Solaris"); +&comment("It can be found in SSLeay 0.6.5+ or in libdes 3.26+"); +&comment("eric "); +&comment("The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications"); +&comment("are from Svend Olaf Mikkelsen "); + +&comment(""); + +&file("dx86xxxx"); + +$L="edi"; +$R="esi"; + +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt",1); +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt2",0); + +&des_encrypt3("des_encrypt3",1); +&des_encrypt3("des_decrypt3",0); + +&file_end(); + +sub des_encrypt + { + local($name,$do_ip)=@_; + + &function_begin($name,3); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Load the 2 words"); + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &mov($R,&DWP(0,"eax","",0)); + &mov($L,&DWP(4,"eax","",0)); + + if ($do_ip) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("IP"); + &IP_new($R,$L,"eax",3); +# &comment(""); +# &comment("fixup rotate"); +# &rotl($R,3); +# &rotl($L,3); + } + else + { + &comment(""); + &comment("fixup rotate"); + &rotl($R,3); + &rotl($L,3); + } + + &comment(""); + &comment("load counter, key_schedule and enc flag"); + + # encrypting part + + $ks="ebp"; +# &xor( "ebx", "ebx" ); + &mov("eax",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag + &xor( "ecx", "ecx" ); + &cmp("eax","0"); + &mov( $ks, &wparam(1) ); + &je(&label("start_decrypt")); + + for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); + &D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + } + &jmp(&label("end")); + + &set_label("start_decrypt"); + + for ($i=15; $i>0; $i-=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i,$L,$R,$i*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1)); + &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i+1,$R,$L,($i-1)*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + } + + &set_label("end"); + + if ($do_ip) + { +# &comment(""); +# &comment("Fixup"); +# &rotr($L,3); # r +# &rotr($R,3); # l + &comment(""); + &comment("FP"); + &FP_new($R,$L,"eax",3); + } + else + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Fixup"); + &rotr($L,3); # r + &rotr($R,3); # l + } + + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &mov(&DWP(0,"eax","",0),$L); + &mov(&DWP(4,"eax","",0),$R); + + &function_end($name); + } + +sub D_ENCRYPT + { + local($r,$L,$R,$S,$ks,$desSP,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t)=@_; + + &mov( $u, &DWP(&n2a($S*4),$ks,"",0)); + &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); + &mov( $t, &DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$ks,"",0)); + &xor( $u, $R); + &xor( $t, $R); + &and( $u, "0xfcfcfcfc" ); + &and( $t, "0xcfcfcfcf" ); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($u) ); + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($u) ); + &rotr( $t, 4 ); + &mov( $ks, &DWP(" $desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($t) ); + &xor( $L, $ks); + &mov( $ks, &DWP("0x200+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $ks); ###### + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); + &shr( $u, 16); + &mov( $ks, &DWP("0x100+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $ks); ###### + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($u) ); + &shr( $t, 16); + &mov( $ks, &DWP("0x300+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $ks); + &mov( $ks, &DWP(24,"esp","",0)); #### + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); + &and( $u, "0xff" ); + &and( $t, "0xff" ); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x600+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x700+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x400+$desSP",$u,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x500+$desSP",$t,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + } + +sub PERM_OP + { + local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask)=@_; + + &mov( $tt, $a ); + &shr( $tt, $shift ); + &xor( $tt, $b ); + &and( $tt, $mask ); + &xor( $b, $tt ); + &shl( $tt, $shift ); + &xor( $a, $tt ); + } + +sub IP + { + local($l,$r,$tt)=@_; + + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 4,"0x0f0f0f0f"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,16,"0x0000ffff"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 2,"0x33333333"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 8,"0x00ff00ff"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 1,"0x55555555"); + } + +sub FP + { + local($l,$r,$tt)=@_; + + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 1,"0x55555555"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 8,"0x00ff00ff"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 2,"0x33333333"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,16,"0x0000ffff"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0x0f0f0f0f"); + } + +sub n2a + { + sprintf("%d",$_[0]); + } + +# now has a side affect of rotating $a by $shift +sub R_PERM_OP + { + local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask,$last)=@_; + + &rotl( $a, $shift ) if ($shift != 0); + &mov( $tt, $b ); + &xor( $tt, $a ); + &and( $tt, $mask ); + if ($last eq $b) + { + &xor( $a, $tt ); + &xor( $b, $tt ); + } + else + { + &xor( $b, $tt ); + &xor( $a, $tt ); + } + &comment(""); + } + +sub IP_new + { + local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; + + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0xf0f0f0f0",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,20,"0xfff0000f",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,14,"0x33333333",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,22,"0x03fc03fc",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 9,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); + + if ($lr != 3) + { + if (($lr-3) < 0) + { &rotr($l, 3-$lr); } + else { &rotl($l, $lr-3); } + } + if ($lr != 2) + { + if (($lr-2) < 0) + { &rotr($r, 2-$lr); } + else { &rotl($r, $lr-2); } + } + } + +sub FP_new + { + local($r,$l,$tt,$lr)=@_; + + if ($lr != 2) + { + if (($lr-2) < 0) + { &rotl($r, 2-$lr); } + else { &rotr($r, $lr-2); } + } + if ($lr != 3) + { + if (($lr-3) < 0) + { &rotl($l, 3-$lr); } + else { &rotr($l, $lr-3); } + } + + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 0,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,23,"0x03fc03fc",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,10,"0x33333333",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,18,"0xfff0000f",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,12,"0xf0f0f0f0",$r); + &rotr($l , 4); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des-som3.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des-som3.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e1ba3bc2b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des-som3.pl @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl +# +# The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications are from +# Svend Olaf Mikkelsen +# + +$prog="des-som3.pl"; + +# base code is in microsft +# op dest, source +# format. +# + +require "desboth.pl"; + +if ( ($ARGV[0] eq "elf")) + { require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "a.out")) + { $aout=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "sol")) + { $sol=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "cpp")) + { $cpp=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "win32")) + { require "x86ms.pl"; } +else + { + print STDERR <<"EOF"; +Pick one target type from + elf - linux, FreeBSD etc + a.out - old linux + sol - x86 solaris + cpp - format so x86unix.cpp can be used + win32 - Windows 95/Windows NT +EOF + exit(1); + } + +&comment("Don't even think of reading this code"); +&comment("It was automatically generated by $prog"); +&comment("Which is a perl program used to generate the x86 assember for"); +&comment("any of elf, a.out, Win32, or Solaris"); +&comment("It can be found in SSLeay 0.6.5+ or in libdes 3.26+"); +&comment("eric "); +&comment("The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications"); +&comment("are from Svend Olaf Mikkelsen "); + +&comment(""); + +&file("dx86xxxx"); + +$L="edi"; +$R="esi"; + +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt",1); +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt2",0); + +&des_encrypt3("des_encrypt3",1); +&des_encrypt3("des_decrypt3",0); + +&file_end(); + +sub des_encrypt + { + local($name,$do_ip)=@_; + + &function_begin($name,3); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Load the 2 words"); + $ks="ebp"; + + if ($do_ip) + { + &mov($R,&wparam(0)); + &xor( "ecx", "ecx" ); + &mov("eax",&DWP(0,$R,"",0)); + &mov("ebx",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag + &mov($L,&DWP(4,$R,"",0)); + &comment(""); + &comment("IP"); + &IP_new("eax",$L,$R,3); + } + else + { + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &xor( "ecx", "ecx" ); + &mov($R,&DWP(0,"eax","",0)); + &mov("ebx",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag + &rotl($R,3); + &mov($L,&DWP(4,"eax","",0)); + &rotl($L,3); + } + + &cmp("ebx","0"); + &mov( $ks, &wparam(1) ); + &je(&label("start_decrypt")); + + for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); + &D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + } + &jmp(&label("end")); + + &set_label("start_decrypt"); + + for ($i=15; $i>0; $i-=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i,$L,$R,$i*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1)); + &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i+1,$R,$L,($i-1)*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + } + + &set_label("end"); + + if ($do_ip) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("FP"); + &mov("edx",&wparam(0)); + &FP_new($L,$R,"eax",3); + + &mov(&DWP(0,"edx","",0),"eax"); + &mov(&DWP(4,"edx","",0),$R); + } + else + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Fixup"); + &rotr($L,3); # r + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &rotr($R,3); # l + &mov(&DWP(0,"eax","",0),$L); + &mov(&DWP(4,"eax","",0),$R); + } + + + &function_end($name); + } + +sub D_ENCRYPT + { + local($r,$L,$R,$S,$ks,$desSP,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t)=@_; + + &mov( $u, &DWP(&n2a($S*4),$ks,"",0)); + &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); + &mov( $t, &DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$ks,"",0)); + &xor( $u, $R); + &xor( $t, $R); + &and( $u, "0xfcfcfcfc" ); + &and( $t, "0xcfcfcfcf" ); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($u) ); + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($u) ); + &rotr( $t, 4 ); + &mov( $ks, &DWP(" $desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($t) ); + &xor( $L, $ks); + &mov( $ks, &DWP("0x200+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $ks); ###### + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); + &shr( $u, 16); + &mov( $ks, &DWP("0x100+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $ks); ###### + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($u) ); + &shr( $t, 16); + &mov( $ks, &DWP("0x300+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $ks); + &mov( $ks, &DWP(24,"esp","",0)); #### + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); + &and( $u, "0xff" ); + &and( $t, "0xff" ); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x600+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x700+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x400+$desSP",$u,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x500+$desSP",$t,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $tmp1); + } + +sub n2a + { + sprintf("%d",$_[0]); + } + +# now has a side affect of rotating $a by $shift +sub R_PERM_OP + { + local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask,$last)=@_; + + &rotl( $a, $shift ) if ($shift != 0); + &mov( $tt, $a ); + &xor( $a, $b ); + &and( $a, $mask ); + if ($notlast eq $b) + { + &xor( $b, $a ); + &xor( $tt, $a ); + } + else + { + &xor( $tt, $a ); + &xor( $b, $a ); + } + &comment(""); + } + +sub IP_new + { + local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; + + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0xf0f0f0f0",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,20,"0xfff0000f",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,14,"0x33333333",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,22,"0x03fc03fc",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 9,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); + + if ($lr != 3) + { + if (($lr-3) < 0) + { &rotr($tt, 3-$lr); } + else { &rotl($tt, $lr-3); } + } + if ($lr != 2) + { + if (($lr-2) < 0) + { &rotr($r, 2-$lr); } + else { &rotl($r, $lr-2); } + } + } + +sub FP_new + { + local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; + + if ($lr != 2) + { + if (($lr-2) < 0) + { &rotl($r, 2-$lr); } + else { &rotr($r, $lr-2); } + } + if ($lr != 3) + { + if (($lr-3) < 0) + { &rotl($l, 3-$lr); } + else { &rotr($l, $lr-3); } + } + + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 0,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,23,"0x03fc03fc",$r); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,10,"0x33333333",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,18,"0xfff0000f",$l); + &R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,12,"0xf0f0f0f0",$r); + &rotr($tt , 4); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des586.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des586.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c2bee84b70 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des586.pl @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +$prog="des586.pl"; + +# base code is in microsft +# op dest, source +# format. +# + +# WILL NOT WORK ANYMORE WITH desboth.pl +require "desboth.pl"; + +if ( ($ARGV[0] eq "elf")) + { require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "a.out")) + { $aout=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "sol")) + { $sol=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "cpp")) + { $cpp=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "win32")) + { require "x86ms.pl"; } +else + { + print STDERR <<"EOF"; +Pick one target type from + elf - linux, FreeBSD etc + a.out - old linux + sol - x86 solaris + cpp - format so x86unix.cpp can be used + win32 - Windows 95/Windows NT +EOF + exit(1); + } + +&comment("Don't even think of reading this code"); +&comment("It was automatically generated by $prog"); +&comment("Which is a perl program used to generate the x86 assember for"); +&comment("any of elf, a.out, Win32, or Solaris"); +&comment("It can be found in SSLeay 0.6.5+ or in libdes 3.26+"); +&comment("eric "); +&comment(""); + +&file("dx86xxxx"); + +$L="edi"; +$R="esi"; + +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt",1); +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt2",0); + +&des_encrypt3("des_encrypt3",1); +&des_encrypt3("des_decrypt3",0); + +&file_end(); + +sub des_encrypt + { + local($name,$do_ip)=@_; + + &function_begin($name,3); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Load the 2 words"); + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &mov($R,&DWP(0,"eax","",0)); + &mov($L,&DWP(4,"eax","",0)); + + if ($do_ip) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("IP"); + &IP($R,$L,"eax"); + } + + &comment(""); + &comment("fixup rotate"); + &rotl($R,3); + &rotl($L,3); + + &comment(""); + &comment("load counter, key_schedule and enc flag"); + + # encrypting part + + $ks="ebp"; + &xor( "ebx", "ebx" ); + &mov("eax",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag + &xor( "ecx", "ecx" ); + &cmp("eax","0"); + &mov( $ks, &wparam(1) ); + &je(&label("start_decrypt")); + + for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); + &D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + } + &jmp(&label("end")); + + &set_label("start_decrypt"); + + for ($i=15; $i>0; $i-=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i,$L,$R,$i*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1)); + &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i+1,$R,$L,($i-1)*2,$ks,"des_SPtrans","eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); + } + + &set_label("end"); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Fixup"); + &rotr($L,3); # r + &rotr($R,3); # l + + if ($do_ip) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("FP"); + &FP($R,$L,"eax"); + } + + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &mov(&DWP(0,"eax","",0),$L); + &mov(&DWP(4,"eax","",0),$R); + + &function_end($name); + } + +sub D_ENCRYPT + { + local($r,$L,$R,$S,$ks,$desSP,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t)=@_; + + &mov( $t, &DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$ks,"",0)); + &mov( $u, &DWP(&n2a($S*4),$ks,"",0)); + &xor( $t, $R); + &xor( $u, $R); + &rotr( $t, 4 ); + &and( $u, "0xfcfcfcfc" ); + &and( $t, "0xfcfcfcfc" ); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($u) ); + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($u) ); + &xor( $L, &DWP(" $desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &shr( $u, 16); + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x200+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($u) ); + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($u) ); + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x400+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &mov( $u, &DWP("0x600+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($t) ); + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x100+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &shr( $t, 16); + &xor( $u, &DWP("0x300+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($t) ); + &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x500+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); + &xor( $u, &DWP("0x700+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); + &xor( $L, $u); + } + +sub PERM_OP + { + local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask)=@_; + + &mov( $tt, $a ); + &shr( $tt, $shift ); + &xor( $tt, $b ); + &and( $tt, $mask ); + &xor( $b, $tt ); + &shl( $tt, $shift ); + &xor( $a, $tt ); + } + +sub IP + { + local($l,$r,$tt)=@_; + + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 4,"0x0f0f0f0f"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,16,"0x0000ffff"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 2,"0x33333333"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 8,"0x00ff00ff"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 1,"0x55555555"); + } + +sub FP + { + local($l,$r,$tt)=@_; + + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 1,"0x55555555"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 8,"0x00ff00ff"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 2,"0x33333333"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,16,"0x0000ffff"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0x0f0f0f0f"); + } + +sub n2a + { + sprintf("%d",$_[0]); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des686.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des686.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eda500312b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/des686.pl @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +$prog="des686.pl"; + +# base code is in microsft +# op dest, source +# format. +# + +# WILL NOT WORK ANYMORE WITH desboth.pl +require "desboth.pl"; + +if ( ($ARGV[0] eq "elf")) + { require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "a.out")) + { $aout=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "sol")) + { $sol=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "cpp")) + { $cpp=1; require "x86unix.pl"; } +elsif ( ($ARGV[0] eq "win32")) + { require "x86ms.pl"; } +else + { + print STDERR <<"EOF"; +Pick one target type from + elf - linux, FreeBSD etc + a.out - old linux + sol - x86 solaris + cpp - format so x86unix.cpp can be used + win32 - Windows 95/Windows NT +EOF + exit(1); + } + +&comment("Don't even think of reading this code"); +&comment("It was automatically generated by $prog"); +&comment("Which is a perl program used to generate the x86 assember for"); +&comment("any of elf, a.out, Win32, or Solaris"); +&comment("It can be found in SSLeay 0.6.5+ or in libdes 3.26+"); +&comment("eric "); +&comment(""); + +&file("dx86xxxx"); + +$L="edi"; +$R="esi"; + +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt",1); +&des_encrypt("des_encrypt2",0); + +&des_encrypt3("des_encrypt3",1); +&des_encrypt3("des_decrypt3",0); + +&file_end(); + +sub des_encrypt + { + local($name,$do_ip)=@_; + + &function_begin($name,3); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Load the 2 words"); + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &mov($L,&DWP(0,"eax","",0)); + &mov($R,&DWP(4,"eax","",0)); + + $ksp=&wparam(1); + + if ($do_ip) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("IP"); + &IP($L,$R,"eax"); + } + + &comment(""); + &comment("fixup rotate"); + &rotl($R,3); + &rotl($L,3); + &exch($L,$R); + + &comment(""); + &comment("load counter, key_schedule and enc flag"); + &mov("eax",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag + &mov("ebp",&wparam(1)); # get ks + &cmp("eax","0"); + &je(&label("start_decrypt")); + + # encrypting part + + for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT($L,$R,$i*2,"ebp","des_SPtrans","ecx","edx","eax","ebx"); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); + &D_ENCRYPT($R,$L,($i+1)*2,"ebp","des_SPtrans","ecx","edx","eax","ebx"); + } + &jmp(&label("end")); + + &set_label("start_decrypt"); + + for ($i=15; $i>0; $i-=2) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("Round $i"); + &D_ENCRYPT($L,$R,$i*2,"ebp","des_SPtrans","ecx","edx","eax","ebx"); + &comment(""); + &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1)); + &D_ENCRYPT($R,$L,($i-1)*2,"ebp","des_SPtrans","ecx","edx","eax","ebx"); + } + + &set_label("end"); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Fixup"); + &rotr($L,3); # r + &rotr($R,3); # l + + if ($do_ip) + { + &comment(""); + &comment("FP"); + &FP($R,$L,"eax"); + } + + &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); + &mov(&DWP(0,"eax","",0),$L); + &mov(&DWP(4,"eax","",0),$R); + + &function_end($name); + } + + +# The logic is to load R into 2 registers and operate on both at the same time. +# We also load the 2 R's into 2 more registers so we can do the 'move word down a byte' +# while also masking the other copy and doing a lookup. We then also accumulate the +# L value in 2 registers then combine them at the end. +sub D_ENCRYPT + { + local($L,$R,$S,$ks,$desSP,$u,$t,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3)=@_; + + &mov( $u, &DWP(&n2a($S*4),$ks,"",0)); + &mov( $t, &DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$ks,"",0)); + &xor( $u, $R ); + &xor( $t, $R ); + &rotr( $t, 4 ); + + # the numbers at the end of the line are origional instruction order + &mov( $tmp2, $u ); # 1 2 + &mov( $tmp1, $t ); # 1 1 + &and( $tmp2, "0xfc" ); # 1 4 + &and( $tmp1, "0xfc" ); # 1 3 + &shr( $t, 8 ); # 1 5 + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x100+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); # 1 7 + &shr( $u, 8 ); # 1 6 + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP(" $desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); # 1 8 + + &mov( $tmp2, $u ); # 2 2 + &xor( $L, $tmp1 ); # 1 9 + &and( $tmp2, "0xfc" ); # 2 4 + &mov( $tmp1, $t ); # 2 1 + &and( $tmp1, "0xfc" ); # 2 3 + &shr( $t, 8 ); # 2 5 + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x300+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); # 2 7 + &shr( $u, 8 ); # 2 6 + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x200+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); # 2 8 + &mov( $tmp2, $u ); # 3 2 + + &xor( $L, $tmp1 ); # 2 9 + &and( $tmp2, "0xfc" ); # 3 4 + + &mov( $tmp1, $t ); # 3 1 + &shr( $u, 8 ); # 3 6 + &and( $tmp1, "0xfc" ); # 3 3 + &shr( $t, 8 ); # 3 5 + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x500+$desSP",$tmp1,"",0)); # 3 7 + &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x400+$desSP",$tmp2,"",0)); # 3 8 + + &and( $t, "0xfc" ); # 4 1 + &xor( $L, $tmp1 ); # 3 9 + + &and( $u, "0xfc" ); # 4 2 + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x700+$desSP",$t,"",0)); # 4 3 + &xor( $L, &DWP("0x600+$desSP",$u,"",0)); # 4 4 + } + +sub PERM_OP + { + local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask)=@_; + + &mov( $tt, $a ); + &shr( $tt, $shift ); + &xor( $tt, $b ); + &and( $tt, $mask ); + &xor( $b, $tt ); + &shl( $tt, $shift ); + &xor( $a, $tt ); + } + +sub IP + { + local($l,$r,$tt)=@_; + + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 4,"0x0f0f0f0f"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,16,"0x0000ffff"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 2,"0x33333333"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 8,"0x00ff00ff"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 1,"0x55555555"); + } + +sub FP + { + local($l,$r,$tt)=@_; + + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 1,"0x55555555"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt, 8,"0x00ff00ff"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 2,"0x33333333"); + &PERM_OP($r,$l,$tt,16,"0x0000ffff"); + &PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0x0f0f0f0f"); + } + +sub n2a + { + sprintf("%d",$_[0]); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/desboth.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/desboth.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..125aec8f33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/desboth.pl @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +$L="edi"; +$R="esi"; + +sub des_encrypt3 + { + local($name,$enc)=@_; + + &function_begin($name,4); + + &comment(""); + &comment("Load the data words"); + &mov("ebx",&wparam(0)); + &mov($L,&DWP(0,"ebx","",0)); + &mov($R,&DWP(4,"ebx","",0)); + + &comment(""); + &comment("IP"); + &IP_new($L,$R,"edx",0); + + # put them back + + if ($enc) + { + &mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R); + &mov("eax",&wparam(1)); + &mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"edx"); + &mov("edi",&wparam(2)); + &mov("esi",&wparam(3)); + } + else + { + &mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R); + &mov("esi",&wparam(1)); + &mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"edx"); + &mov("edi",&wparam(2)); + &mov("eax",&wparam(3)); + } + &push(($enc)?"1":"0"); + &push("eax"); + &push("ebx"); + &call("des_encrypt2"); + &push(($enc)?"0":"1"); + &push("edi"); + &push("ebx"); + &call("des_encrypt2"); + &push(($enc)?"1":"0"); + &push("esi"); + &push("ebx"); + &call("des_encrypt2"); + + &mov($L,&DWP(0,"ebx","",0)); + &add("esp",36); + &mov($R,&DWP(4,"ebx","",0)); + + &comment(""); + &comment("FP"); + &FP_new($L,$R,"eax",0); + + &mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"eax"); + &mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R); + + &function_end($name); + } + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/dx86-cpp.s b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/dx86-cpp.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27d6ceea27 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/dx86-cpp.s @@ -0,0 +1,2780 @@ + /* Don't even think of reading this code */ + /* It was automatically generated by des-som2.pl */ + /* Which is a perl program used to generate the x86 assember for */ + /* any of elf, a.out, Win32, or Solaris */ + /* It can be found in SSLeay 0.6.5+ or in libdes 3.26+ */ + /* eric */ + /* The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications */ + /* are from Svend Olaf Mikkelsen */ + + .file "dx86xxxx.s" + .version "01.01" +gcc2_compiled.: +.text + .align ALIGN +.globl des_encrypt + TYPE(des_encrypt,@function) +des_encrypt: + pushl %ebp + pushl %ebx + pushl %esi + pushl %edi + + + /* Load the 2 words */ + movl 20(%esp), %esi + xorl %ecx, %ecx + movl (%esi), %eax + movl 28(%esp), %ebx + movl 4(%esi), %edi + + /* IP */ + roll $4, %eax + movl %eax, %esi + xorl %edi, %eax + andl $0xf0f0f0f0, %eax + xorl %eax, %esi + xorl %eax, %edi + + roll $20, %edi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xfff0000f, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $14, %eax + movl %eax, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + andl $0x33333333, %eax + xorl %eax, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + + roll $22, %esi + movl %esi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + andl $0x03fc03fc, %esi + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + + roll $9, %eax + movl %eax, %esi + xorl %edi, %eax + andl $0xaaaaaaaa, %eax + xorl %eax, %esi + xorl %eax, %edi + + roll $1, %edi + cmpl $0, %ebx + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + je .L000start_decrypt + + /* Round 0 */ + movl (%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 4(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 1 */ + movl 8(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 12(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 2 */ + movl 16(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 20(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 3 */ + movl 24(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 28(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 4 */ + movl 32(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 36(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 5 */ + movl 40(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 44(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 6 */ + movl 48(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 52(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 7 */ + movl 56(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 60(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 8 */ + movl 64(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 68(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 9 */ + movl 72(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 76(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 10 */ + movl 80(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 84(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 11 */ + movl 88(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 92(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 12 */ + movl 96(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 100(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 13 */ + movl 104(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 108(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 14 */ + movl 112(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 116(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 15 */ + movl 120(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 124(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + jmp .L001end +.align ALIGN +.L000start_decrypt: + + /* Round 15 */ + movl 120(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 124(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 14 */ + movl 112(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 116(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 13 */ + movl 104(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 108(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 12 */ + movl 96(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 100(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 11 */ + movl 88(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 92(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 10 */ + movl 80(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 84(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 9 */ + movl 72(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 76(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 8 */ + movl 64(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 68(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 7 */ + movl 56(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 60(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 6 */ + movl 48(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 52(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 5 */ + movl 40(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 44(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 4 */ + movl 32(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 36(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 3 */ + movl 24(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 28(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 2 */ + movl 16(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 20(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 1 */ + movl 8(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 12(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 0 */ + movl (%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 4(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi +.align ALIGN +.L001end: + + /* FP */ + movl 20(%esp), %edx + rorl $1, %esi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xaaaaaaaa, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $23, %eax + movl %eax, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + andl $0x03fc03fc, %eax + xorl %eax, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + + roll $10, %edi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0x33333333, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $18, %esi + movl %esi, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + andl $0xfff0000f, %esi + xorl %esi, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + + roll $12, %edi + movl %edi, %esi + xorl %eax, %edi + andl $0xf0f0f0f0, %edi + xorl %edi, %esi + xorl %edi, %eax + + rorl $4, %eax + movl %eax, (%edx) + movl %esi, 4(%edx) + popl %edi + popl %esi + popl %ebx + popl %ebp + ret +.des_encrypt_end: + SIZE(des_encrypt,.des_encrypt_end-des_encrypt) +.ident "desasm.pl" +.text + .align ALIGN +.globl des_encrypt2 + TYPE(des_encrypt2,@function) +des_encrypt2: + pushl %ebp + pushl %ebx + pushl %esi + pushl %edi + + + /* Load the 2 words */ + movl 20(%esp), %eax + xorl %ecx, %ecx + movl (%eax), %esi + movl 28(%esp), %ebx + roll $3, %esi + movl 4(%eax), %edi + roll $3, %edi + cmpl $0, %ebx + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + je .L002start_decrypt + + /* Round 0 */ + movl (%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 4(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 1 */ + movl 8(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 12(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 2 */ + movl 16(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 20(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 3 */ + movl 24(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 28(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 4 */ + movl 32(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 36(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 5 */ + movl 40(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 44(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 6 */ + movl 48(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 52(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 7 */ + movl 56(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 60(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 8 */ + movl 64(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 68(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 9 */ + movl 72(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 76(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 10 */ + movl 80(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 84(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 11 */ + movl 88(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 92(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 12 */ + movl 96(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 100(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 13 */ + movl 104(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 108(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 14 */ + movl 112(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 116(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 15 */ + movl 120(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 124(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + jmp .L003end +.align ALIGN +.L002start_decrypt: + + /* Round 15 */ + movl 120(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 124(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 14 */ + movl 112(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 116(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 13 */ + movl 104(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 108(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 12 */ + movl 96(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 100(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 11 */ + movl 88(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 92(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 10 */ + movl 80(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 84(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 9 */ + movl 72(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 76(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 8 */ + movl 64(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 68(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 7 */ + movl 56(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 60(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 6 */ + movl 48(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 52(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 5 */ + movl 40(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 44(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 4 */ + movl 32(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 36(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 3 */ + movl 24(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 28(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 2 */ + movl 16(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 20(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + + /* Round 1 */ + movl 8(%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 12(%ebp), %edx + xorl %esi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %edi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %edi + + /* Round 0 */ + movl (%ebp), %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movl 4(%ebp), %edx + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %edx + andl $0xfcfcfcfc, %eax + andl $0xcfcfcfcf, %edx + movb %al, %bl + movb %ah, %cl + rorl $4, %edx + movl des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + movb %dl, %bl + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 0x200+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %dh, %cl + shrl $16, %eax + movl 0x100+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movb %ah, %bl + shrl $16, %edx + movl 0x300+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebp + xorl %ebp, %esi + movl 24(%esp), %ebp + movb %dh, %cl + andl $0xff, %eax + andl $0xff, %edx + movl 0x600+des_SPtrans(%ebx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x700+des_SPtrans(%ecx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x400+des_SPtrans(%eax),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi + movl 0x500+des_SPtrans(%edx),%ebx + xorl %ebx, %esi +.align ALIGN +.L003end: + + /* Fixup */ + rorl $3, %edi + movl 20(%esp), %eax + rorl $3, %esi + movl %edi, (%eax) + movl %esi, 4(%eax) + popl %edi + popl %esi + popl %ebx + popl %ebp + ret +.des_encrypt2_end: + SIZE(des_encrypt2,.des_encrypt2_end-des_encrypt2) +.ident "desasm.pl" +.text + .align ALIGN +.globl des_encrypt3 + TYPE(des_encrypt3,@function) +des_encrypt3: + pushl %ebp + pushl %ebx + pushl %esi + pushl %edi + + + /* Load the data words */ + movl 20(%esp), %ebx + movl (%ebx), %edi + movl 4(%ebx), %esi + + /* IP */ + roll $4, %edi + movl %edi, %edx + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xf0f0f0f0, %edi + xorl %edi, %edx + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $20, %esi + movl %esi, %edi + xorl %edx, %esi + andl $0xfff0000f, %esi + xorl %esi, %edi + xorl %esi, %edx + + roll $14, %edi + movl %edi, %esi + xorl %edx, %edi + andl $0x33333333, %edi + xorl %edi, %esi + xorl %edi, %edx + + roll $22, %edx + movl %edx, %edi + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0x03fc03fc, %edx + xorl %edx, %edi + xorl %edx, %esi + + roll $9, %edi + movl %edi, %edx + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xaaaaaaaa, %edi + xorl %edi, %edx + xorl %edi, %esi + + rorl $3, %edx + rorl $2, %esi + movl %esi, 4(%ebx) + movl 24(%esp), %eax + movl %edx, (%ebx) + movl 28(%esp), %edi + movl 32(%esp), %esi + pushl $1 + pushl %eax + pushl %ebx + call des_encrypt2 + pushl $0 + pushl %edi + pushl %ebx + call des_encrypt2 + pushl $1 + pushl %esi + pushl %ebx + call des_encrypt2 + movl (%ebx), %edi + addl $36, %esp + movl 4(%ebx), %esi + + /* FP */ + roll $2, %esi + roll $3, %edi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xaaaaaaaa, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $23, %eax + movl %eax, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + andl $0x03fc03fc, %eax + xorl %eax, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + + roll $10, %edi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0x33333333, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $18, %esi + movl %esi, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + andl $0xfff0000f, %esi + xorl %esi, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + + roll $12, %edi + movl %edi, %esi + xorl %eax, %edi + andl $0xf0f0f0f0, %edi + xorl %edi, %esi + xorl %edi, %eax + + rorl $4, %eax + movl %eax, (%ebx) + movl %esi, 4(%ebx) + popl %edi + popl %esi + popl %ebx + popl %ebp + ret +.des_encrypt3_end: + SIZE(des_encrypt3,.des_encrypt3_end-des_encrypt3) +.ident "desasm.pl" +.text + .align ALIGN +.globl des_decrypt3 + TYPE(des_decrypt3,@function) +des_decrypt3: + pushl %ebp + pushl %ebx + pushl %esi + pushl %edi + + + /* Load the data words */ + movl 20(%esp), %ebx + movl (%ebx), %edi + movl 4(%ebx), %esi + + /* IP */ + roll $4, %edi + movl %edi, %edx + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xf0f0f0f0, %edi + xorl %edi, %edx + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $20, %esi + movl %esi, %edi + xorl %edx, %esi + andl $0xfff0000f, %esi + xorl %esi, %edi + xorl %esi, %edx + + roll $14, %edi + movl %edi, %esi + xorl %edx, %edi + andl $0x33333333, %edi + xorl %edi, %esi + xorl %edi, %edx + + roll $22, %edx + movl %edx, %edi + xorl %esi, %edx + andl $0x03fc03fc, %edx + xorl %edx, %edi + xorl %edx, %esi + + roll $9, %edi + movl %edi, %edx + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xaaaaaaaa, %edi + xorl %edi, %edx + xorl %edi, %esi + + rorl $3, %edx + rorl $2, %esi + movl %esi, 4(%ebx) + movl 24(%esp), %esi + movl %edx, (%ebx) + movl 28(%esp), %edi + movl 32(%esp), %eax + pushl $0 + pushl %eax + pushl %ebx + call des_encrypt2 + pushl $1 + pushl %edi + pushl %ebx + call des_encrypt2 + pushl $0 + pushl %esi + pushl %ebx + call des_encrypt2 + movl (%ebx), %edi + addl $36, %esp + movl 4(%ebx), %esi + + /* FP */ + roll $2, %esi + roll $3, %edi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0xaaaaaaaa, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $23, %eax + movl %eax, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + andl $0x03fc03fc, %eax + xorl %eax, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + + roll $10, %edi + movl %edi, %eax + xorl %esi, %edi + andl $0x33333333, %edi + xorl %edi, %eax + xorl %edi, %esi + + roll $18, %esi + movl %esi, %edi + xorl %eax, %esi + andl $0xfff0000f, %esi + xorl %esi, %edi + xorl %esi, %eax + + roll $12, %edi + movl %edi, %esi + xorl %eax, %edi + andl $0xf0f0f0f0, %edi + xorl %edi, %esi + xorl %edi, %eax + + rorl $4, %eax + movl %eax, (%ebx) + movl %esi, 4(%ebx) + popl %edi + popl %esi + popl %ebx + popl %ebp + ret +.des_decrypt3_end: + SIZE(des_decrypt3,.des_decrypt3_end-des_decrypt3) +.ident "desasm.pl" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/dx86unix.cpp b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/dx86unix.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b4eb397d58 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/dx86unix.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ + +#define TYPE(a,b) .type a,b +#define SIZE(a,b) .size a,b + +#ifdef OUT +#define OK 1 +#define des_SPtrans _des_SPtrans +#define des_encrypt _des_encrypt +#define des_encrypt2 _des_encrypt2 +#define des_encrypt3 _des_encrypt3 +#define ALIGN 4 +#endif + +#ifdef BSDI +#define OK 1 +#define des_SPtrans _des_SPtrans +#define des_encrypt _des_encrypt +#define des_encrypt2 _des_encrypt2 +#define des_encrypt3 _des_encrypt3 +#define ALIGN 4 +#undef SIZE +#undef TYPE +#endif + +#if defined(ELF) || defined(SOL) +#define OK 1 +#define ALIGN 16 +#endif + +#ifndef OK +You need to define one of +ELF - elf systems - linux-elf, NetBSD and DG-UX +OUT - a.out systems - linux-a.out and FreeBSD +SOL - solaris systems, which are elf with strange comment lines +BSDI - a.out with a very primative version of as. +#endif + +#include "dx86-cpp.s" + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/readme b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/readme new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb1a8e9956 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/readme @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +First up, let me say I don't like writing in assembler. It is not portable, +dependant on the particular CPU architecture release and is generally a pig +to debug and get right. Having said that, the x86 architecture is probably +the most important for speed due to number of boxes and since +it appears to be the worst architecture to to get +good C compilers for. So due to this, I have lowered myself to do +assembler for the inner DES routines in libdes :-). + +The file to implement in assembler is des_enc.c. Replace the following +4 functions +des_encrypt(DES_LONG data[2],des_key_schedule ks, int encrypt); +des_encrypt2(DES_LONG data[2],des_key_schedule ks, int encrypt); +des_encrypt3(DES_LONG data[2],des_key_schedule ks1,ks2,ks3); +des_decrypt3(DES_LONG data[2],des_key_schedule ks1,ks2,ks3); + +They encrypt/decrypt the 64 bits held in 'data' using +the 'ks' key schedules. The only difference between the 4 functions is that +des_encrypt2() does not perform IP() or FP() on the data (this is an +optimization for when doing triple DES and des_encrypt3() and des_decrypt3() +perform triple des. The triple DES routines are in here because it does +make a big difference to have them located near the des_encrypt2 function +at link time.. + +Now as we all know, there are lots of different operating systems running on +x86 boxes, and unfortunately they normally try to make sure their assembler +formating is not the same as the other peoples. +The 4 main formats I know of are +Microsoft Windows 95/Windows NT +Elf Includes Linux and FreeBSD(?). +a.out The older Linux. +Solaris Same as Elf but different comments :-(. + +Now I was not overly keen to write 4 different copies of the same code, +so I wrote a few perl routines to output the correct assembler, given +a target assembler type. This code is ugly and is just a hack. +The libraries are x86unix.pl and x86ms.pl. +des586.pl, des686.pl and des-som[23].pl are the programs to actually +generate the assembler. + +So to generate elf assembler +perl des-som3.pl elf >dx86-elf.s +For Windows 95/NT +perl des-som2.pl win32 >win32.asm + +[ update 4 Jan 1996 ] +I have added another way to do things. +perl des-som3.pl cpp >dx86-cpp.s +generates a file that will be included by dx86unix.cpp when it is compiled. +To build for elf, a.out, solaris, bsdi etc, +cc -E -DELF asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-elf.o +cc -E -DSOL asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-sol.o +cc -E -DOUT asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86-out.o +cc -E -DBSDI asm/dx86unix.cpp | as -o asm/dx86bsdi.o +This was done to cut down the number of files in the distribution. + +Now the ugly part. I acquired my copy of Intels +"Optimization's For Intel's 32-Bit Processors" and found a few interesting +things. First, the aim of the exersize is to 'extract' one byte at a time +from a word and do an array lookup. This involves getting the byte from +the 4 locations in the word and moving it to a new word and doing the lookup. +The most obvious way to do this is +xor eax, eax # clear word +movb al, cl # get low byte +xor edi DWORD PTR 0x100+des_SP[eax] # xor in word +movb al, ch # get next byte +xor edi DWORD PTR 0x300+des_SP[eax] # xor in word +shr ecx 16 +which seems ok. For the pentium, this system appears to be the best. +One has to do instruction interleaving to keep both functional units +operating, but it is basically very efficient. + +Now the crunch. When a full register is used after a partial write, eg. +mov al, cl +xor edi, DWORD PTR 0x100+des_SP[eax] +386 - 1 cycle stall +486 - 1 cycle stall +586 - 0 cycle stall +686 - at least 7 cycle stall (page 22 of the above mentioned document). + +So the technique that produces the best results on a pentium, according to +the documentation, will produce hideous results on a pentium pro. + +To get around this, des686.pl will generate code that is not as fast on +a pentium, should be very good on a pentium pro. +mov eax, ecx # copy word +shr ecx, 8 # line up next byte +and eax, 0fch # mask byte +xor edi DWORD PTR 0x100+des_SP[eax] # xor in array lookup +mov eax, ecx # get word +shr ecx 8 # line up next byte +and eax, 0fch # mask byte +xor edi DWORD PTR 0x300+des_SP[eax] # xor in array lookup + +Due to the execution units in the pentium, this actually works quite well. +For a pentium pro it should be very good. This is the type of output +Visual C++ generates. + +There is a third option. instead of using +mov al, ch +which is bad on the pentium pro, one may be able to use +movzx eax, ch +which may not incur the partial write penalty. On the pentium, +this instruction takes 4 cycles so is not worth using but on the +pentium pro it appears it may be worth while. I need access to one to +experiment :-). + +eric (20 Oct 1996) + +22 Nov 1996 - I have asked people to run the 2 different version on pentium +pros and it appears that the intel documentation is wrong. The +mov al,bh is still faster on a pentium pro, so just use the des586.pl +install des686.pl + +3 Dec 1996 - I added des_encrypt3/des_decrypt3 because I have moved these +functions into des_enc.c because it does make a massive performance +difference on some boxes to have the functions code located close to +the des_encrypt2() function. + +9 Jan 1996 - des-som2.pl is now the correct perl script to use for +pentiums. It contains an inner loop from +Svend Olaf Mikkelsen which does raw ecb DES calls at +273,000 per second. He had a previous version at 250,000 and the best +I was able to get was 203,000. The content has not changed, this is all +due to instruction sequencing (and actual instructions choice) which is able +to keep both functional units of the pentium going. +We may have lost the ugly register usage restrictions when x86 went 32 bit +but for the pentium it has been replaced by evil instruction ordering tricks. + +13 Jan 1996 - des-som3.pl, more optimizations from Svend Olaf. +raw DES at 281,000 per second on a pentium 100. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.asm b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.asm new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29c915f78f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.asm @@ -0,0 +1,2766 @@ + ; Don't even think of reading this code + ; It was automatically generated by des-som2.pl + ; Which is a perl program used to generate the x86 assember for + ; any of elf, a.out, Win32, or Solaris + ; It can be found in SSLeay 0.6.5+ or in libdes 3.26+ + ; eric + ; The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications + ; are from Svend Olaf Mikkelsen + + ; + TITLE dx86xxxx.asm + .386 +.model FLAT +_TEXT SEGMENT +PUBLIC _des_encrypt +EXTRN _des_SPtrans:DWORD +_des_encrypt PROC NEAR + push ebp + push ebx + push esi + push edi + ; + ; Load the 2 words + mov esi, DWORD PTR 20[esp] + xor ecx, ecx + mov eax, DWORD PTR [esi] + mov ebx, DWORD PTR 28[esp] + mov edi, DWORD PTR 4[esi] + ; + ; IP + rol eax, 4 + mov esi, eax + xor eax, edi + and eax, 0f0f0f0f0h + xor esi, eax + xor edi, eax + ; + rol edi, 20 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0fff0000fh + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol eax, 14 + mov edi, eax + xor eax, esi + and eax, 033333333h + xor edi, eax + xor esi, eax + ; + rol esi, 22 + mov eax, esi + xor esi, edi + and esi, 003fc03fch + xor eax, esi + xor edi, esi + ; + rol eax, 9 + mov esi, eax + xor eax, edi + and eax, 0aaaaaaaah + xor esi, eax + xor edi, eax + ; + rol edi, 1 + cmp ebx, 0 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + je $L000start_decrypt + ; + ; Round 0 + mov eax, DWORD PTR [ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 4[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 1 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 8[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 12[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 2 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 16[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 20[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 3 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 24[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 28[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 4 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 32[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 36[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 5 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 40[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 44[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 6 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 48[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 52[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 7 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 56[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 60[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 8 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 64[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 68[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 9 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 72[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 76[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 10 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 80[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 84[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 11 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 88[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 92[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 12 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 96[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 100[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 13 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 104[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 108[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 14 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 112[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 116[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 15 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 120[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 124[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + jmp $L001end +$L000start_decrypt: + ; + ; Round 15 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 120[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 124[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 14 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 112[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 116[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 13 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 104[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 108[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 12 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 96[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 100[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 11 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 88[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 92[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 10 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 80[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 84[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 9 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 72[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 76[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 8 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 64[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 68[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 7 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 56[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 60[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 6 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 48[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 52[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 5 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 40[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 44[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 4 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 32[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 36[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 3 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 24[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 28[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 2 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 16[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 20[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 1 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 8[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 12[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 0 + mov eax, DWORD PTR [ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 4[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx +$L001end: + ; + ; FP + mov edx, DWORD PTR 20[esp] + ror esi, 1 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0aaaaaaaah + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol eax, 23 + mov edi, eax + xor eax, esi + and eax, 003fc03fch + xor edi, eax + xor esi, eax + ; + rol edi, 10 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 033333333h + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol esi, 18 + mov edi, esi + xor esi, eax + and esi, 0fff0000fh + xor edi, esi + xor eax, esi + ; + rol edi, 12 + mov esi, edi + xor edi, eax + and edi, 0f0f0f0f0h + xor esi, edi + xor eax, edi + ; + ror eax, 4 + mov DWORD PTR [edx],eax + mov DWORD PTR 4[edx],esi + pop edi + pop esi + pop ebx + pop ebp + ret +_des_encrypt ENDP +_TEXT ENDS +_TEXT SEGMENT +PUBLIC _des_encrypt2 +EXTRN _des_SPtrans:DWORD +_des_encrypt2 PROC NEAR + push ebp + push ebx + push esi + push edi + ; + ; Load the 2 words + mov eax, DWORD PTR 20[esp] + xor ecx, ecx + mov esi, DWORD PTR [eax] + mov ebx, DWORD PTR 28[esp] + rol esi, 3 + mov edi, DWORD PTR 4[eax] + rol edi, 3 + cmp ebx, 0 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + je $L002start_decrypt + ; + ; Round 0 + mov eax, DWORD PTR [ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 4[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 1 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 8[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 12[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 2 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 16[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 20[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 3 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 24[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 28[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 4 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 32[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 36[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 5 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 40[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 44[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 6 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 48[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 52[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 7 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 56[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 60[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 8 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 64[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 68[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 9 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 72[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 76[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 10 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 80[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 84[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 11 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 88[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 92[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 12 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 96[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 100[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 13 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 104[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 108[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 14 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 112[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 116[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 15 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 120[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 124[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + jmp $L003end +$L002start_decrypt: + ; + ; Round 15 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 120[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 124[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 14 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 112[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 116[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 13 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 104[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 108[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 12 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 96[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 100[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 11 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 88[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 92[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 10 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 80[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 84[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 9 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 72[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 76[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 8 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 64[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 68[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 7 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 56[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 60[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 6 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 48[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 52[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 5 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 40[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 44[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 4 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 32[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 36[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 3 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 24[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 28[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 2 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 16[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 20[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx + ; + ; Round 1 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 8[ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 12[ebp] + xor eax, esi + xor edx, esi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor edi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor edi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor edi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor edi, ebx + ; + ; Round 0 + mov eax, DWORD PTR [ebp] + xor ebx, ebx + mov edx, DWORD PTR 4[ebp] + xor eax, edi + xor edx, edi + and eax, 0fcfcfcfch + and edx, 0cfcfcfcfh + mov bl, al + mov cl, ah + ror edx, 4 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[ebx] + mov bl, dl + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0200h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov cl, dh + shr eax, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0100h+ebx] + xor esi, ebp + mov bl, ah + shr edx, 16 + mov ebp, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0300h+ecx] + xor esi, ebp + mov ebp, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov cl, dh + and eax, 0ffh + and edx, 0ffh + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0600h+ebx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0700h+ecx] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0400h+eax] + xor esi, ebx + mov ebx, DWORD PTR _des_SPtrans[0500h+edx] + xor esi, ebx +$L003end: + ; + ; Fixup + ror edi, 3 + mov eax, DWORD PTR 20[esp] + ror esi, 3 + mov DWORD PTR [eax],edi + mov DWORD PTR 4[eax],esi + pop edi + pop esi + pop ebx + pop ebp + ret +_des_encrypt2 ENDP +_TEXT ENDS +_TEXT SEGMENT +PUBLIC _des_encrypt3 +EXTRN _des_SPtrans:DWORD +_des_encrypt3 PROC NEAR + push ebp + push ebx + push esi + push edi + ; + ; Load the data words + mov ebx, DWORD PTR 20[esp] + mov edi, DWORD PTR [ebx] + mov esi, DWORD PTR 4[ebx] + ; + ; IP + rol edi, 4 + mov edx, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0f0f0f0f0h + xor edx, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol esi, 20 + mov edi, esi + xor esi, edx + and esi, 0fff0000fh + xor edi, esi + xor edx, esi + ; + rol edi, 14 + mov esi, edi + xor edi, edx + and edi, 033333333h + xor esi, edi + xor edx, edi + ; + rol edx, 22 + mov edi, edx + xor edx, esi + and edx, 003fc03fch + xor edi, edx + xor esi, edx + ; + rol edi, 9 + mov edx, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0aaaaaaaah + xor edx, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + ror edx, 3 + ror esi, 2 + mov DWORD PTR 4[ebx],esi + mov eax, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov DWORD PTR [ebx],edx + mov edi, DWORD PTR 28[esp] + mov esi, DWORD PTR 32[esp] + push 1 + push eax + push ebx + call _des_encrypt2 + push 0 + push edi + push ebx + call _des_encrypt2 + push 1 + push esi + push ebx + call _des_encrypt2 + mov edi, DWORD PTR [ebx] + add esp, 36 + mov esi, DWORD PTR 4[ebx] + ; + ; FP + rol esi, 2 + rol edi, 3 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0aaaaaaaah + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol eax, 23 + mov edi, eax + xor eax, esi + and eax, 003fc03fch + xor edi, eax + xor esi, eax + ; + rol edi, 10 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 033333333h + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol esi, 18 + mov edi, esi + xor esi, eax + and esi, 0fff0000fh + xor edi, esi + xor eax, esi + ; + rol edi, 12 + mov esi, edi + xor edi, eax + and edi, 0f0f0f0f0h + xor esi, edi + xor eax, edi + ; + ror eax, 4 + mov DWORD PTR [ebx],eax + mov DWORD PTR 4[ebx],esi + pop edi + pop esi + pop ebx + pop ebp + ret +_des_encrypt3 ENDP +_TEXT ENDS +_TEXT SEGMENT +PUBLIC _des_decrypt3 +EXTRN _des_SPtrans:DWORD +_des_decrypt3 PROC NEAR + push ebp + push ebx + push esi + push edi + ; + ; Load the data words + mov ebx, DWORD PTR 20[esp] + mov edi, DWORD PTR [ebx] + mov esi, DWORD PTR 4[ebx] + ; + ; IP + rol edi, 4 + mov edx, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0f0f0f0f0h + xor edx, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol esi, 20 + mov edi, esi + xor esi, edx + and esi, 0fff0000fh + xor edi, esi + xor edx, esi + ; + rol edi, 14 + mov esi, edi + xor edi, edx + and edi, 033333333h + xor esi, edi + xor edx, edi + ; + rol edx, 22 + mov edi, edx + xor edx, esi + and edx, 003fc03fch + xor edi, edx + xor esi, edx + ; + rol edi, 9 + mov edx, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0aaaaaaaah + xor edx, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + ror edx, 3 + ror esi, 2 + mov DWORD PTR 4[ebx],esi + mov esi, DWORD PTR 24[esp] + mov DWORD PTR [ebx],edx + mov edi, DWORD PTR 28[esp] + mov eax, DWORD PTR 32[esp] + push 0 + push eax + push ebx + call _des_encrypt2 + push 1 + push edi + push ebx + call _des_encrypt2 + push 0 + push esi + push ebx + call _des_encrypt2 + mov edi, DWORD PTR [ebx] + add esp, 36 + mov esi, DWORD PTR 4[ebx] + ; + ; FP + rol esi, 2 + rol edi, 3 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 0aaaaaaaah + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol eax, 23 + mov edi, eax + xor eax, esi + and eax, 003fc03fch + xor edi, eax + xor esi, eax + ; + rol edi, 10 + mov eax, edi + xor edi, esi + and edi, 033333333h + xor eax, edi + xor esi, edi + ; + rol esi, 18 + mov edi, esi + xor esi, eax + and esi, 0fff0000fh + xor edi, esi + xor eax, esi + ; + rol edi, 12 + mov esi, edi + xor edi, eax + and edi, 0f0f0f0f0h + xor esi, edi + xor eax, edi + ; + ror eax, 4 + mov DWORD PTR [ebx],eax + mov DWORD PTR 4[ebx],esi + pop edi + pop esi + pop ebx + pop ebp + ret +_des_decrypt3 ENDP +_TEXT ENDS +END diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.obj b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.obj new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..935b7e0cfe Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.obj differ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.uu b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.uu new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8fc7702b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/win32.uu @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +begin 644 win32.obj +M3`$"`&*'V3)`-@``#``````````N=&5X=```````````````W"$``&0```!` 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+M``8`GQH```<````&`*D:```'````!@"V&@``!P````8`PQH```<````&`-P: +M```'````!@#D&@``!P````8`[!H```<````&`/0:```'````!@`:&P``!P`` +M``8`)!L```<````&`#$;```'````!@`^&P``!P````8`5QL```<````&`%\; +M```'````!@!G&P``!P````8`;QL```<````&`)4;```'````!@"?&P``!P`` +M``8`K!L```<````&`+D;```'````!@#2&P``!P````8`VAL```<````&`.(; +M```'````!@#J&P``!P````8`$!P```<````&`!H<```'````!@`G'```!P`` +M``8`-!P```<````&`$T<```'````!@!5'```!P````8`71P```<````&`&4< +M```'````!@"+'```!P````8`E1P```<````&`*(<```'````!@"O'```!P`` +M``8`R!P```<````&`-`<```'````!@#8'```!P````8`X!P```<````&``8= +M```'````!@`0'0``!P````8`'1T```<````&`"H=```'````!@!#'0``!P`` +M``8`2QT```<````&`%,=```'````!@!;'0``!P````8`@1T```<````&`(L= +M```'````!@"8'0``!P````8`I1T```<````&`+X=```'````!@#&'0``!P`` +M``8`SAT```<````&`-8=```'````!@#\'0``!P````8`!AX```<````&`!,> +M```'````!@`@'@``!P````8`.1X```<````&`$$>```'````!@!)'@``!P`` +M``8`41X```<````&`'<>```'````!@"!'@``!P````8`CAX```<````&`)L> +M```'````!@"T'@``!P````8`O!X```<````&`,0>```'````!@#,'@``!P`` +M``8`\AX```<````&`/P>```'````!@`)'P``!P````8`%A\```<````&`"\? +M```'````!@`W'P``!P````8`/Q\```<````&`$````/1````$`(``"```````L````W!\```$`(``" +M```````Z````W"````$`(``"`$@```!?9&5S7U-0=')A;G,`7V1E7!T`%]D97-?96YC7!T,P!?9&5S7V1E8W)Y<'0S +!```` +` +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/x86ms.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/x86ms.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18b11864c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/x86ms.pl @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +package x86ms; + +$label="L000"; + +%lb=( 'eax', 'al', + 'ebx', 'bl', + 'ecx', 'cl', + 'edx', 'dl', + 'ax', 'al', + 'bx', 'bl', + 'cx', 'cl', + 'dx', 'dl', + ); + +%hb=( 'eax', 'ah', + 'ebx', 'bh', + 'ecx', 'ch', + 'edx', 'dh', + 'ax', 'ah', + 'bx', 'bh', + 'cx', 'ch', + 'dx', 'dh', + ); + +sub main'LB + { + (defined($lb{$_[0]})) || die "$_[0] does not have a 'low byte'\n"; + return($lb{$_[0]}); + } + +sub main'HB + { + (defined($hb{$_[0]})) || die "$_[0] does not have a 'high byte'\n"; + return($hb{$_[0]}); + } + +sub main'DWP + { + local($addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_; + local($t); + local($ret)="DWORD PTR "; + + $addr =~ s/^\s+//; + if ($addr =~ /^(.+)\+(.+)$/) + { + $reg2=&conv($1); + $addr="_$2"; + } + elsif ($addr =~ /^[_a-zA-Z]/) + { + $addr="_$addr"; + } + + $reg1="$regs{$reg1}" if defined($regs{$reg1}); + $reg2="$regs{$reg2}" if defined($regs{$reg2}); + $ret.=$addr if ($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0); + if ($reg2 ne "") + { + $t=""; + $t="*$idx" if ($idx != 0); + $ret.="[$reg2$t+$reg1]"; + } + else + { + $ret.="[$reg1]" + } + return($ret); + } + +sub main'mov { &out2("mov",@_); } +sub main'movb { &out2("mov",@_); } +sub main'and { &out2("and",@_); } +sub main'or { &out2("or",@_); } +sub main'shl { &out2("shl",@_); } +sub main'shr { &out2("shr",@_); } +sub main'xor { &out2("xor",@_); } +sub main'add { &out2("add",@_); } +sub main'sub { &out2("sub",@_); } +sub main'rotl { &out2("rol",@_); } +sub main'rotr { &out2("ror",@_); } +sub main'exch { &out2("xchg",@_); } +sub main'cmp { &out2("cmp",@_); } +sub main'dec { &out1("dec",@_); } +sub main'jmp { &out1("jmp",@_); } +sub main'je { &out1("je",@_); } +sub main'jz { &out1("jz",@_); } +sub main'push { &out1("push",@_); } +sub main'call { &out1("call",'_'.$_[0]); } + + +sub out2 + { + local($name,$p1,$p2)=@_; + local($l,$t); + + print "\t$name\t"; + $t=&conv($p1).","; + $l=length($t); + print $t; + $l=4-($l+9)/8; + print "\t" x $l; + print &conv($p2); + print "\n"; + } + +sub out1 + { + local($name,$p1)=@_; + local($l,$t); + + print "\t$name\t"; + print &conv($p1); + print "\n"; + } + +sub conv + { + local($p)=@_; + + $p =~ s/0x([0-9A-Fa-f]+)/0$1h/; + return $p; + } + +sub main'file + { + local($file)=@_; + + print <<"EOF"; + TITLE $file.asm + .386 +.model FLAT +EOF + } + +sub main'function_begin + { + local($func,$num)=@_; + + $params=$num*4; + + print <<"EOF"; +_TEXT SEGMENT +PUBLIC _$func +EXTRN _des_SPtrans:DWORD +_$func PROC NEAR + push ebp + push ebx + push esi + push edi +EOF + $stack=20; + } + +sub main'function_end + { + local($func)=@_; + + print <<"EOF"; + pop edi + pop esi + pop ebx + pop ebp + ret +_$func ENDP +_TEXT ENDS +EOF + $stack=0; + %label=(); + } + +sub main'file_end + { + print "END\n" + } + +sub main'wparam + { + local($num)=@_; + + return(&main'DWP($stack+$num*4,"esp","",0)); + } + +sub main'wtmp + { + local($num)=@_; + + return(&main'DWP($stack+$params+$num*4,"esp","",0)); + } + +sub main'comment + { + foreach (@_) + { + print "\t; $_\n"; + } + } + +sub main'label + { + if (!defined($label{$_[0]})) + { + $label{$_[0]}="\$${label}${_[0]}"; + $label++; + } + return($label{$_[0]}); + } + +sub main'set_label + { + if (!defined($label{$_[0]})) + { + $label{$_[0]}="${label}${_[0]}"; + $label++; + } + print "$label{$_[0]}:\n"; + } + +sub main'file_end + { + print "END\n"; + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/x86unix.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/x86unix.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2048a9cc3a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/asm/x86unix.pl @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +package x86ms; + +$label="L000"; + +$align=($main'aout)?"4":"16"; +$under=($main'aout)?"_":""; +$com_start=($main'sol)?"/":"#"; + +if ($main'cpp) + { + $align="ALIGN"; + $under=""; + $com_start='/*'; + $com_end='*/'; + } + +%lb=( 'eax', '%al', + 'ebx', '%bl', + 'ecx', '%cl', + 'edx', '%dl', + 'ax', '%al', + 'bx', '%bl', + 'cx', '%cl', + 'dx', '%dl', + ); + +%hb=( 'eax', '%ah', + 'ebx', '%bh', + 'ecx', '%ch', + 'edx', '%dh', + 'ax', '%ah', + 'bx', '%bh', + 'cx', '%ch', + 'dx', '%dh', + ); + +%regs=( 'eax', '%eax', + 'ebx', '%ebx', + 'ecx', '%ecx', + 'edx', '%edx', + 'esi', '%esi', + 'edi', '%edi', + 'ebp', '%ebp', + 'esp', '%esp', + ); + +sub main'LB + { + (defined($lb{$_[0]})) || die "$_[0] does not have a 'low byte'\n"; + return($lb{$_[0]}); + } + +sub main'HB + { + (defined($hb{$_[0]})) || die "$_[0] does not have a 'high byte'\n"; + return($hb{$_[0]}); + } + +sub main'DWP + { + local($addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_; + + + $ret=""; + + $addr =~ s/(^|[+ \t])([A-Za-z_]+)($|[+ \t])/$1$under$2$3/; + + $reg1="$regs{$reg1}" if defined($regs{$reg1}); + $reg2="$regs{$reg2}" if defined($regs{$reg2}); + $ret.=$addr if ($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0); + if ($reg2 ne "") + { + $ret.="($reg1,$reg2,$idx)"; + } + else + { + $ret.="($reg1)" + } + return($ret); + } + +sub main'mov { &out2("movl",@_); } +sub main'movb { &out2("movb",@_); } +sub main'and { &out2("andl",@_); } +sub main'or { &out2("orl",@_); } +sub main'shl { &out2("shll",@_); } +sub main'shr { &out2("shrl",@_); } +sub main'xor { &out2("xorl",@_); } +sub main'add { &out2("addl",@_); } +sub main'sub { &out2("subl",@_); } +sub main'rotl { &out2("roll",@_); } +sub main'rotr { &out2("rorl",@_); } +sub main'exch { &out2("xchg",@_); } +sub main'cmp { &out2("cmpl",@_); } +sub main'jmp { &out1("jmp",@_); } +sub main'je { &out1("je",@_); } +sub main'jne { &out1("jne",@_); } +sub main'jnz { &out1("jnz",@_); } +sub main'dec { &out1("decl",@_); } +sub main'push { &out1("pushl",@_); } +sub main'call { &out1("call",$under.$_[0]); } + + +sub out2 + { + local($name,$p1,$p2)=@_; + local($l,$ll,$t); + + print "\t$name\t"; + $t=&conv($p2).","; + $l=length($t); + print $t; + $ll=4-($l+9)/8; + print "\t" x $ll; + print &conv($p1); + print "\n"; + } + +sub out1 + { + local($name,$p1)=@_; + local($l,$t); + + print "\t$name\t"; + print &conv($p1); + print "\n"; + } + +sub conv + { + local($p)=@_; + +# $p =~ s/0x([0-9A-Fa-f]+)/0$1h/; + + $p=$regs{$p} if (defined($regs{$p})); + + $p =~ s/^([0-9A-Fa-f]+)$/\$$1/; + $p =~ s/^(0x[0-9A-Fa-f]+)$/\$$1/; + return $p; + } + +sub main'file + { + local($file)=@_; + + print <<"EOF"; + .file "$file.s" + .version "01.01" +gcc2_compiled.: +EOF + } + +sub main'function_begin + { + local($func,$num)=@_; + + $params=$num*4; + + $func=$under.$func; + + print <<"EOF"; +.text + .align $align +.globl $func +EOF + if ($main'cpp) + { printf("\tTYPE($func,\@function)\n"); } + else { printf("\t.type $func,\@function\n"); } + print <<"EOF"; +$func: + pushl %ebp + pushl %ebx + pushl %esi + pushl %edi + +EOF + $stack=20; + } + +sub main'function_end + { + local($func)=@_; + + $func=$under.$func; + + print <<"EOF"; + popl %edi + popl %esi + popl %ebx + popl %ebp + ret +.${func}_end: +EOF + if ($main'cpp) + { printf("\tSIZE($func,.${func}_end-$func)\n"); } + else { printf("\t.size\t$func,.${func}_end-$func\n"); } + print ".ident \"desasm.pl\"\n"; + $stack=0; + %label=(); + } + + +sub main'wparam + { + local($num)=@_; + + return(&main'DWP($stack+$num*4,"esp","",0)); + } + +sub main'wtmp + { + local($num)=@_; + + return(&main'DWP(-($num+1)*4,"esp","",0)); + } + +sub main'comment + { + foreach (@_) + { + if (/^\s*$/) + { print "\n"; } + else + { print "\t$com_start $_ $com_end\n"; } + } + } + +sub main'label + { + if (!defined($label{$_[0]})) + { + $label{$_[0]}=".${label}${_[0]}"; + $label++; + } + return($label{$_[0]}); + } + +sub main'set_label + { + if (!defined($label{$_[0]})) + { + $label{$_[0]}=".${label}${_[0]}"; + $label++; + } + print ".align $align\n"; + print "$label{$_[0]}:\n"; + } + +sub main'file_end + { + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc3_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc3_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b3f2821d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc3_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* crypto/des/cbc3_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* HAS BUGS? DON'T USE */ +void des_3cbc_encrypt(input, output, length, ks1, ks2, iv1, iv2, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule ks1; +des_key_schedule ks2; +des_cblock (*iv1); +des_cblock (*iv2); +int encrypt; + { + int off=((int)length-1)/8; + long l8=((length+7)/8)*8; + des_cblock niv1,niv2; + + if (encrypt == DES_ENCRYPT) + { + des_cbc_encrypt(input,output,length,ks1,iv1,encrypt); + if (length >= sizeof(des_cblock)) + memcpy(niv1,output[off],sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_cbc_encrypt(output,output,l8,ks2,iv1,!encrypt); + des_cbc_encrypt(output,output,l8,ks1,iv2, encrypt); + if (length >= sizeof(des_cblock)) + memcpy(niv2,output[off],sizeof(des_cblock)); + } + else + { + if (length >= sizeof(des_cblock)) + memcpy(niv2,input[off],sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_cbc_encrypt(input,output,l8,ks1,iv2,encrypt); + des_cbc_encrypt(output,output,l8,ks2,iv1,!encrypt); + if (length >= sizeof(des_cblock)) + memcpy(niv1,output[off],sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_cbc_encrypt(output,output,length,ks1,iv1, encrypt); + } + memcpy(*iv1,niv1,sizeof(des_cblock)); + memcpy(*iv2,niv2,sizeof(des_cblock)); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc_cksm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc_cksm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5dfa9b8a61 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc_cksm.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* crypto/des/cbc_cksm.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +DES_LONG des_cbc_cksum(input, output, length, schedule, ivec) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); + { + register DES_LONG tout0,tout1,tin0,tin1; + register long l=length; + DES_LONG tin[2]; + unsigned char *in,*out,*iv; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + + c2l(iv,tout0); + c2l(iv,tout1); + for (; l>0; l-=8) + { + if (l >= 8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + } + else + c2ln(in,tin0,tin1,l); + + tin0^=tout0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + /* fix 15/10/91 eay - thanks to keithr@sco.COM */ + tout0=tin[0]; + tout1=tin[1]; + } + if (out != NULL) + { + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + } + tout0=tin0=tin1=tin[0]=tin[1]=0; + return(tout1); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7a90ce985 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cbc_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* crypto/des/cbc_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_cbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG tin0,tin1; + register DES_LONG tout0,tout1,xor0,xor1; + register unsigned char *in,*out; + register long l=length; + DES_LONG tin[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + + if (encrypt) + { + c2l(iv,tout0); + c2l(iv,tout1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + tin0^=tout0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]; l2c(tout0,out); + tout1=tin[1]; l2c(tout1,out); + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2ln(in,tin0,tin1,l+8); + tin0^=tout0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]; l2c(tout0,out); + tout1=tin[1]; l2c(tout1,out); + } + } + else + { + c2l(iv,xor0); + c2l(iv,xor1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); tin[0]=tin0; + c2l(in,tin1); tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1; + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + xor0=tin0; + xor1=tin1; + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); tin[0]=tin0; + c2l(in,tin1); tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1; + l2cn(tout0,tout1,out,l+8); + /* xor0=tin0; + xor1=tin1; */ + } + } + tin0=tin1=tout0=tout1=xor0=xor1=0; + tin[0]=tin[1]=0; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb64ede.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb64ede.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1e127a1e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb64ede.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* crypto/des/cfb64ede.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being + * used. The extra state information to record how much of the + * 64bit block we have used is contained in *num; + */ + +void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, length, ks1,ks2,ks3, ivec, num, encrypt) +unsigned char *in; +unsigned char *out; +long length; +des_key_schedule ks1,ks2,ks3; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int *num; +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG v0,v1; + register long l=length; + register int n= *num; + DES_LONG ti[2]; + unsigned char *iv,c,cc; + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + if (encrypt) + { + while (l--) + { + if (n == 0) + { + c2l(iv,v0); + c2l(iv,v1); + + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)ti,ks1,ks2,ks3); + v0=ti[0]; + v1=ti[1]; + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(v0,iv); + l2c(v1,iv); + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + } + c= *(in++)^iv[n]; + *(out++)=c; + iv[n]=c; + n=(n+1)&0x07; + } + } + else + { + while (l--) + { + if (n == 0) + { + c2l(iv,v0); + c2l(iv,v1); + + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)ti,ks1,ks2,ks3); + v0=ti[0]; + v1=ti[1]; + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(v0,iv); + l2c(v1,iv); + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + } + cc= *(in++); + c=iv[n]; + iv[n]=cc; + *(out++)=c^cc; + n=(n+1)&0x07; + } + } + v0=v1=ti[0]=ti[1]=c=cc=0; + *num=n; + } + +#ifdef undef /* MACRO */ +void des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, length, ks1,ks2, ivec, num, encrypt) +unsigned char *in; +unsigned char *out; +long length; +des_key_schedule ks1,ks2; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int *num; +int encrypt; + { + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in,out,length,ks1,ks2,ks1,ivec,num,encrypt); + } +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb64enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb64enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..66c944a82d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb64enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* crypto/des/cfb64enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being + * used. The extra state information to record how much of the + * 64bit block we have used is contained in *num; + */ + +void des_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, length, schedule, ivec, num, encrypt) +unsigned char *in; +unsigned char *out; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int *num; +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG v0,v1; + register long l=length; + register int n= *num; + DES_LONG ti[2]; + unsigned char *iv,c,cc; + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + if (encrypt) + { + while (l--) + { + if (n == 0) + { + c2l(iv,v0); ti[0]=v0; + c2l(iv,v1); ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)ti, + schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + v0=ti[0]; l2c(v0,iv); + v0=ti[1]; l2c(v0,iv); + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + } + c= *(in++)^iv[n]; + *(out++)=c; + iv[n]=c; + n=(n+1)&0x07; + } + } + else + { + while (l--) + { + if (n == 0) + { + c2l(iv,v0); ti[0]=v0; + c2l(iv,v1); ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)ti, + schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + v0=ti[0]; l2c(v0,iv); + v0=ti[1]; l2c(v0,iv); + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + } + cc= *(in++); + c=iv[n]; + iv[n]=cc; + *(out++)=c^cc; + n=(n+1)&0x07; + } + } + v0=v1=ti[0]=ti[1]=c=cc=0; + *num=n; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..52a360dcb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/cfb_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/* crypto/des/cfb_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. + * What this means is that if you hame numbits=12 and length=2 + * the first 12 bits will be retrieved from the first byte and half + * the second. The second 12 bits will come from the 3rd and half the 4th + * byte. + */ +void des_cfb_encrypt(in, out, numbits, length, schedule, ivec, encrypt) +unsigned char *in; +unsigned char *out; +int numbits; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG d0,d1,v0,v1,n=(numbits+7)/8; + register DES_LONG mask0,mask1; + register unsigned long l=length; + register int num=numbits; + DES_LONG ti[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + + if (num > 64) return; + if (num > 32) + { + mask0=0xffffffffL; + if (num == 64) + mask1=mask0; + else mask1=(1L<<(num-32))-1; + } + else + { + if (num == 32) + mask0=0xffffffffL; + else mask0=(1L<= n) + { + l-=n; + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)ti,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + c2ln(in,d0,d1,n); + in+=n; + d0=(d0^ti[0])&mask0; + d1=(d1^ti[1])&mask1; + l2cn(d0,d1,out,n); + out+=n; + /* 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and + * l<<32 are bad under gcc :-( */ + if (num == 32) + { v0=v1; v1=d0; } + else if (num == 64) + { v0=d0; v1=d1; } + else if (num > 32) /* && num != 64 */ + { + v0=((v1>>(num-32))|(d0<<(64-num)))&0xffffffffL; + v1=((d0>>(num-32))|(d1<<(64-num)))&0xffffffffL; + } + else /* num < 32 */ + { + v0=((v0>>num)|(v1<<(32-num)))&0xffffffffL; + v1=((v1>>num)|(d0<<(32-num)))&0xffffffffL; + } + } + } + else + { + while (l >= n) + { + l-=n; + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)ti,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + c2ln(in,d0,d1,n); + in+=n; + /* 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and + * l<<32 are bad under gcc :-( */ + if (num == 32) + { v0=v1; v1=d0; } + else if (num == 64) + { v0=d0; v1=d1; } + else if (num > 32) /* && num != 64 */ + { + v0=((v1>>(num-32))|(d0<<(64-num)))&0xffffffffL; + v1=((d0>>(num-32))|(d1<<(64-num)))&0xffffffffL; + } + else /* num < 32 */ + { + v0=((v0>>num)|(v1<<(32-num)))&0xffffffffL; + v1=((v1>>num)|(d0<<(32-num)))&0xffffffffL; + } + d0=(d0^ti[0])&mask0; + d1=(d1^ti[1])&mask1; + l2cn(d0,d1,out,n); + out+=n; + } + } + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(v0,iv); + l2c(v1,iv); + v0=v1=d0=d1=ti[0]=ti[1]=0; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..17ee6e62e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.1 @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +.TH DES 1 +.SH NAME +des - encrypt or decrypt data using Data Encryption Standard +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B des +( +.B \-e +| +.B \-E +) | ( +.B \-d +| +.B \-D +) | ( +.B \-\fR[\fPcC\fR][\fPckname\fR]\fP +) | +[ +.B \-b3hfs +] [ +.B \-k +.I key +] +] [ +.B \-u\fR[\fIuuname\fR] +[ +.I input-file +[ +.I output-file +] ] +.SH DESCRIPTION +.B des +encrypts and decrypts data using the +Data Encryption Standard algorithm. +One of +.B \-e, \-E +(for encrypt) or +.B \-d, \-D +(for decrypt) must be specified. +It is also possible to use +.B \-c +or +.B \-C +in conjunction or instead of the a encrypt/decrypt option to generate +a 16 character hexadecimal checksum, generated via the +.I des_cbc_cksum. +.LP +Two standard encryption modes are supported by the +.B des +program, Cipher Block Chaining (the default) and Electronic Code Book +(specified with +.B \-b +). +.LP +The key used for the DES +algorithm is obtained by prompting the user unless the +.B `\-k +.I key' +option is given. +If the key is an argument to the +.B des +command, it is potentially visible to users executing +.BR ps (1) +or a derivative. To minimise this possibility, +.B des +takes care to destroy the key argument immediately upon entry. +If your shell keeps a history file be careful to make sure it is not +world readable. +.LP +Since this program attempts to maintain compatibility with SunOS's +des(1) command, there are 2 different methods used to convert the user +supplied key to a des key. +Whenever and one or more of +.B \-E, \-D, \-C +or +.B \-3 +options are used, the key conversion procedure will not be compatible +with the SunOS des(1) version but will use all the user supplied +character to generate the des key. +.B des +command reads from standard input unless +.I input-file +is specified and writes to standard output unless +.I output-file +is given. +.SH OPTIONS +.TP +.B \-b +Select ECB +(eight bytes at a time) encryption mode. +.TP +.B \-3 +Encrypt using triple encryption. +By default triple cbc encryption is used but if the +.B \-b +option is used then triple ecb encryption is performed. +If the key is less than 8 characters long, the flag has no effect. +.TP +.B \-e +Encrypt data using an 8 byte key in a manner compatible with SunOS +des(1). +.TP +.B \-E +Encrypt data using a key of nearly unlimited length (1024 bytes). +This will product a more secure encryption. +.TP +.B \-d +Decrypt data that was encrypted with the \-e option. +.TP +.B \-D +Decrypt data that was encrypted with the \-E option. +.TP +.B \-c +Generate a 16 character hexadecimal cbc checksum and output this to +stderr. +If a filename was specified after the +.B \-c +option, the checksum is output to that file. +The checksum is generated using a key generated in a SunOS compatible +manner. +.TP +.B \-C +A cbc checksum is generated in the same manner as described for the +.B \-c +option but the DES key is generated in the same manner as used for the +.B \-E +and +.B \-D +options +.TP +.B \-f +Does nothing - allowed for compatibility with SunOS des(1) command. +.TP +.B \-s +Does nothing - allowed for compatibility with SunOS des(1) command. +.TP +.B "\-k \fIkey\fP" +Use the encryption +.I key +specified. +.TP +.B "\-h" +The +.I key +is assumed to be a 16 character hexadecimal number. +If the +.B "\-3" +option is used the key is assumed to be a 32 character hexadecimal +number. +.TP +.B \-u +This flag is used to read and write uuencoded files. If decrypting, +the input file is assumed to contain uuencoded, DES encrypted data. +If encrypting, the characters following the -u are used as the name of +the uuencoded file to embed in the begin line of the uuencoded +output. If there is no name specified after the -u, the name text.des +will be embedded in the header. +.SH SEE ALSO +.B ps (1) +.B des_crypt(3) +.SH BUGS +.LP +The problem with using the +.B -e +option is the short key length. +It would be better to use a real 56-bit key rather than an +ASCII-based 56-bit pattern. Knowing that the key was derived from ASCII +radically reduces the time necessary for a brute-force cryptographic attack. +My attempt to remove this problem is to add an alternative text-key to +DES-key function. This alternative function (accessed via +.B -E, -D, -S +and +.B -3 +) +uses DES to help generate the key. +.LP +Be carefully when using the -u option. Doing des -ud will +not decrypt filename (the -u option will gobble the d option). +.LP +The VMS operating system operates in a world where files are always a +multiple of 512 bytes. This causes problems when encrypted data is +send from unix to VMS since a 88 byte file will suddenly be padded +with 424 null bytes. To get around this problem, use the -u option +to uuencode the data before it is send to the VMS system. +.SH AUTHOR +.LP +Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au or eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a8d0bc5e21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.c @@ -0,0 +1,959 @@ +/* crypto/des/des.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include "des_ver.h" + +#ifdef VMS +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#include "des.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_RANDOM +#define random rand +#define srandom(s) srand(s) +#endif + +#ifndef NOPROTO +void usage(void); +void doencryption(void); +int uufwrite(unsigned char *data, int size, unsigned int num, FILE *fp); +void uufwriteEnd(FILE *fp); +int uufread(unsigned char *out,int size,unsigned int num,FILE *fp); +int uuencode(unsigned char *in,int num,unsigned char *out); +int uudecode(unsigned char *in,int num,unsigned char *out); +#else +void usage(); +void doencryption(); +int uufwrite(); +void uufwriteEnd(); +int uufread(); +int uuencode(); +int uudecode(); +#endif + +#ifdef VMS +#define EXIT(a) exit(a&0x10000000) +#else +#define EXIT(a) exit(a) +#endif + +#define BUFSIZE (8*1024) +#define VERIFY 1 +#define KEYSIZ 8 +#define KEYSIZB 1024 /* should hit tty line limit first :-) */ +char key[KEYSIZB+1]; +int do_encrypt,longk=0; +FILE *DES_IN,*DES_OUT,*CKSUM_OUT; +char uuname[200]; +unsigned char uubuf[50]; +int uubufnum=0; +#define INUUBUFN (45*100) +#define OUTUUBUF (65*100) +unsigned char b[OUTUUBUF]; +unsigned char bb[300]; +des_cblock cksum={0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; +char cksumname[200]=""; + +int vflag,cflag,eflag,dflag,kflag,bflag,fflag,sflag,uflag,flag3,hflag,error; + +int main(argc, argv) +int argc; +char **argv; + { + int i; + struct stat ins,outs; + char *p; + char *in=NULL,*out=NULL; + + vflag=cflag=eflag=dflag=kflag=hflag=bflag=fflag=sflag=uflag=flag3=0; + error=0; + memset(key,0,sizeof(key)); + + for (i=1; i=0; j--) + argv[i][j]='\0'; + } + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr,"'%c' unknown flag\n",p[-1]); + error=1; + break; + } + } + } + else + { + if (in == NULL) + in=argv[i]; + else if (out == NULL) + out=argv[i]; + else + error=1; + } + } + if (error) usage(); + /* We either + * do checksum or + * do encrypt or + * do decrypt or + * do decrypt then ckecksum or + * do checksum then encrypt + */ + if (((eflag+dflag) == 1) || cflag) + { + if (eflag) do_encrypt=DES_ENCRYPT; + if (dflag) do_encrypt=DES_DECRYPT; + } + else + { + if (vflag) + { +#ifndef _Windows + fprintf(stderr,"des(1) built with %s\n",libdes_version); +#endif + EXIT(1); + } + else usage(); + } + +#ifndef _Windows + if (vflag) fprintf(stderr,"des(1) built with %s\n",libdes_version); +#endif + if ( (in != NULL) && + (out != NULL) && +#ifndef MSDOS + (stat(in,&ins) != -1) && + (stat(out,&outs) != -1) && + (ins.st_dev == outs.st_dev) && + (ins.st_ino == outs.st_ino)) +#else /* MSDOS */ + (strcmp(in,out) == 0)) +#endif + { + fputs("input and output file are the same\n",stderr); + EXIT(3); + } + + if (!kflag) + if (des_read_pw_string(key,KEYSIZB+1,"Enter key:",eflag?VERIFY:0)) + { + fputs("password error\n",stderr); + EXIT(2); + } + + if (in == NULL) + DES_IN=stdin; + else if ((DES_IN=fopen(in,"r")) == NULL) + { + perror("opening input file"); + EXIT(4); + } + + CKSUM_OUT=stdout; + if (out == NULL) + { + DES_OUT=stdout; + CKSUM_OUT=stderr; + } + else if ((DES_OUT=fopen(out,"w")) == NULL) + { + perror("opening output file"); + EXIT(5); + } + +#ifdef MSDOS + /* This should set the file to binary mode. */ + { +#include + if (!(uflag && dflag)) + setmode(fileno(DES_IN),O_BINARY); + if (!(uflag && eflag)) + setmode(fileno(DES_OUT),O_BINARY); + } +#endif + + doencryption(); + fclose(DES_IN); + fclose(DES_OUT); + EXIT(0); + } + +void usage() + { + char **u; + static const char *Usage[]={ +"des [input-file [output-file]]", +"options:", +"-v : des(1) version number", +"-e : encrypt using sunOS compatible user key to DES key conversion.", +"-E : encrypt ", +"-d : decrypt using sunOS compatible user key to DES key conversion.", +"-D : decrypt ", +"-c[ckname] : generate a cbc_cksum using sunOS compatible user key to", +" DES key conversion and output to ckname (stdout default,", +" stderr if data being output on stdout). The checksum is", +" generated before encryption and after decryption if used", +" in conjunction with -[eEdD].", +"-C[ckname] : generate a cbc_cksum as for -c but compatible with -[ED].", +"-k key : use key 'key'", +"-h : the key that is entered will be a hexidecimal number", +" that is used directly as the des key", +"-u[uuname] : input file is uudecoded if -[dD] or output uuencoded data if -[eE]", +" (uuname is the filename to put in the uuencode header).", +"-b : encrypt using DES in ecb encryption mode, the defaut is cbc mode.", +"-3 : encrypt using tripple DES encryption. This uses 2 keys", +" generated from the input key. If the input key is less", +" than 8 characters long, this is equivelent to normal", +" encryption. Default is tripple cbc, -b makes it tripple ecb.", +NULL +}; + for (u=(char **)Usage; *u; u++) + { + fputs(*u,stderr); + fputc('\n',stderr); + } + + EXIT(1); + } + +void doencryption() + { +#ifdef _LIBC + extern int srandom(); + extern int random(); + extern unsigned long time(); +#endif + + register int i; + des_key_schedule ks,ks2; + unsigned char iv[8],iv2[8]; + char *p; + int num=0,j,k,l,rem,ll,len,last,ex=0; + des_cblock kk,k2; + FILE *O; + int Exit=0; +#ifndef MSDOS + static unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE+8],obuf[BUFSIZE+8]; +#else + static unsigned char *buf=NULL,*obuf=NULL; + + if (buf == NULL) + { + if ( (( buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(BUFSIZE+8)) == NULL) || + ((obuf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(BUFSIZE+8)) == NULL)) + { + fputs("Not enough memory\n",stderr); + Exit=10; + goto problems; + } + } +#endif + + if (hflag) + { + j=(flag3?16:8); + p=key; + for (i=0; i= '0')) + k=(*p-'0')<<4; + else if ((*p <= 'f') && (*p >= 'a')) + k=(*p-'a'+10)<<4; + else if ((*p <= 'F') && (*p >= 'A')) + k=(*p-'A'+10)<<4; + else + { + fputs("Bad hex key\n",stderr); + Exit=9; + goto problems; + } + p++; + if ((*p <= '9') && (*p >= '0')) + k|=(*p-'0'); + else if ((*p <= 'f') && (*p >= 'a')) + k|=(*p-'a'+10); + else if ((*p <= 'F') && (*p >= 'A')) + k|=(*p-'A'+10); + else + { + fputs("Bad hex key\n",stderr); + Exit=9; + goto problems; + } + p++; + if (i < 8) + kk[i]=k; + else + k2[i-8]=k; + } + des_set_key((C_Block *)k2,ks2); + memset(k2,0,sizeof(k2)); + } + else if (longk || flag3) + { + if (flag3) + { + des_string_to_2keys(key,(C_Block *)kk,(C_Block *)k2); + des_set_key((C_Block *)k2,ks2); + memset(k2,0,sizeof(k2)); + } + else + des_string_to_key(key,(C_Block *)kk); + } + else + for (i=0; i>=1; + } + if (l & 1) + kk[i]=key[i]&0x7f; + else + kk[i]=key[i]|0x80; + } + + des_set_key((C_Block *)kk,ks); + memset(key,0,sizeof(key)); + memset(kk,0,sizeof(kk)); + /* woops - A bug that does not showup under unix :-( */ + memset(iv,0,sizeof(iv)); + memset(iv2,0,sizeof(iv2)); + + l=1; + rem=0; + /* first read */ + if (eflag || (!dflag && cflag)) + { + for (;;) + { + num=l=fread(&(buf[rem]),1,BUFSIZE,DES_IN); + l+=rem; + num+=rem; + if (l < 0) + { + perror("read error"); + Exit=6; + goto problems; + } + + rem=l%8; + len=l-rem; + if (feof(DES_IN)) + { + srandom((unsigned int)time(NULL)); + for (i=7-rem; i>0; i--) + buf[l++]=random()&0xff; + buf[l++]=rem; + ex=1; + len+=rem; + } + else + l-=rem; + + if (cflag) + { + des_cbc_cksum((C_Block *)buf,(C_Block *)cksum, + (long)len,ks,(C_Block *)cksum); + if (!eflag) + { + if (feof(DES_IN)) break; + else continue; + } + } + + if (bflag && !flag3) + for (i=0; i= 8) memcpy(iv,&(obuf[l-8]),8); + } + if (rem) memcpy(buf,&(buf[l]),(unsigned int)rem); + + i=0; + while (i < l) + { + if (uflag) + j=uufwrite(obuf,1,(unsigned int)l-i, + DES_OUT); + else + j=fwrite(obuf,1,(unsigned int)l-i, + DES_OUT); + if (j == -1) + { + perror("Write error"); + Exit=7; + goto problems; + } + i+=j; + } + if (feof(DES_IN)) + { + if (uflag) uufwriteEnd(DES_OUT); + break; + } + } + } + else /* decrypt */ + { + ex=1; + for (;;) + { + if (ex) { + if (uflag) + l=uufread(buf,1,BUFSIZE,DES_IN); + else + l=fread(buf,1,BUFSIZE,DES_IN); + ex=0; + rem=l%8; + l-=rem; + } + if (l < 0) + { + perror("read error"); + Exit=6; + goto problems; + } + + if (bflag && !flag3) + for (i=0; i= 8) memcpy(iv,&(buf[l-8]),8); + } + + if (uflag) + ll=uufread(&(buf[rem]),1,BUFSIZE,DES_IN); + else + ll=fread(&(buf[rem]),1,BUFSIZE,DES_IN); + ll+=rem; + rem=ll%8; + ll-=rem; + if (feof(DES_IN) && (ll == 0)) + { + last=obuf[l-1]; + + if ((last > 7) || (last < 0)) + { + fputs("The file was not decrypted correctly.\n", + stderr); + Exit=8; + last=0; + } + l=l-8+last; + } + i=0; + if (cflag) des_cbc_cksum((C_Block *)obuf, + (C_Block *)cksum,(long)l/8*8,ks, + (C_Block *)cksum); + while (i != l) + { + j=fwrite(obuf,1,(unsigned int)l-i,DES_OUT); + if (j == -1) + { + perror("Write error"); + Exit=7; + goto problems; + } + i+=j; + } + l=ll; + if ((l == 0) && feof(DES_IN)) break; + } + } + if (cflag) + { + l=0; + if (cksumname[0] != '\0') + { + if ((O=fopen(cksumname,"w")) != NULL) + { + CKSUM_OUT=O; + l=1; + } + } + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + fprintf(CKSUM_OUT,"%02X",cksum[i]); + fprintf(CKSUM_OUT,"\n"); + if (l) fclose(CKSUM_OUT); + } +problems: + memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf)); + memset(obuf,0,sizeof(obuf)); + memset(ks,0,sizeof(ks)); + memset(ks2,0,sizeof(ks2)); + memset(iv,0,sizeof(iv)); + memset(iv2,0,sizeof(iv2)); + memset(kk,0,sizeof(kk)); + memset(k2,0,sizeof(k2)); + memset(uubuf,0,sizeof(uubuf)); + memset(b,0,sizeof(b)); + memset(bb,0,sizeof(bb)); + memset(cksum,0,sizeof(cksum)); + if (Exit) EXIT(Exit); + } + +int uufwrite(data, size, num, fp) +unsigned char *data; +int size; +unsigned int num; +FILE *fp; + + /* We ignore this parameter but it should be > ~50 I believe */ + + + { + int i,j,left,rem,ret=num; + static int start=1; + + if (start) + { + fprintf(fp,"begin 600 %s\n", + (uuname[0] == '\0')?"text.d":uuname); + start=0; + } + + if (uubufnum) + { + if (uubufnum+num < 45) + { + memcpy(&(uubuf[uubufnum]),data,(unsigned int)num); + uubufnum+=num; + return(num); + } + else + { + i=45-uubufnum; + memcpy(&(uubuf[uubufnum]),data,(unsigned int)i); + j=uuencode((unsigned char *)uubuf,45,b); + fwrite(b,1,(unsigned int)j,fp); + uubufnum=0; + data+=i; + num-=i; + } + } + + for (i=0; i<(((int)num)-INUUBUFN); i+=INUUBUFN) + { + j=uuencode(&(data[i]),INUUBUFN,b); + fwrite(b,1,(unsigned int)j,fp); + } + rem=(num-i)%45; + left=(num-i-rem); + if (left) + { + j=uuencode(&(data[i]),left,b); + fwrite(b,1,(unsigned int)j,fp); + i+=left; + } + if (i != num) + { + memcpy(uubuf,&(data[i]),(unsigned int)rem); + uubufnum=rem; + } + return(ret); + } + +void uufwriteEnd(fp) +FILE *fp; + { + int j; + static const char *end=" \nend\n"; + + if (uubufnum != 0) + { + uubuf[uubufnum]='\0'; + uubuf[uubufnum+1]='\0'; + uubuf[uubufnum+2]='\0'; + j=uuencode(uubuf,uubufnum,b); + fwrite(b,1,(unsigned int)j,fp); + } + fwrite(end,1,strlen(end),fp); + } + +int uufread(out, size, num, fp) +unsigned char *out; +int size; /* should always be > ~ 60; I actually ignore this parameter :-) */ +unsigned int num; +FILE *fp; + { + int i,j,tot; + static int done=0; + static int valid=0; + static int start=1; + + if (start) + { + for (;;) + { + b[0]='\0'; + fgets((char *)b,300,fp); + if (b[0] == '\0') + { + fprintf(stderr,"no 'begin' found in uuencoded input\n"); + return(-1); + } + if (strncmp((char *)b,"begin ",6) == 0) break; + } + start=0; + } + if (done) return(0); + tot=0; + if (valid) + { + memcpy(out,bb,(unsigned int)valid); + tot=valid; + valid=0; + } + for (;;) + { + b[0]='\0'; + fgets((char *)b,300,fp); + if (b[0] == '\0') break; + i=strlen((char *)b); + if ((b[0] == 'e') && (b[1] == 'n') && (b[2] == 'd')) + { + done=1; + while (!feof(fp)) + { + fgets((char *)b,300,fp); + } + break; + } + i=uudecode(b,i,bb); + if (i < 0) break; + if ((i+tot+8) > num) + { + /* num to copy to make it a multiple of 8 */ + j=(num/8*8)-tot-8; + memcpy(&(out[tot]),bb,(unsigned int)j); + tot+=j; + memcpy(bb,&(bb[j]),(unsigned int)i-j); + valid=i-j; + break; + } + memcpy(&(out[tot]),bb,(unsigned int)i); + tot+=i; + } + return(tot); + } + +#define ccc2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))) + +#define l2ccc(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) + + +int uuencode(in, num, out) +unsigned char *in; +int num; +unsigned char *out; + { + int j,i,n,tot=0; + DES_LONG l; + register unsigned char *p; + p=out; + + for (j=0; j num) + i=(num-j); + else i=45; + *(p++)=i+' '; + for (n=0; n>18)&0x3f)+' '; + *(p++)=((l>>12)&0x3f)+' '; + *(p++)=((l>> 6)&0x3f)+' '; + *(p++)=((l )&0x3f)+' '; + tot+=4; + } + *(p++)='\n'; + tot+=2; + } + *p='\0'; + l=0; + return(tot); + } + +int uudecode(in, num, out) +unsigned char *in; +int num; +unsigned char *out; + { + int j,i,k; + unsigned int n=0,space=0; + DES_LONG l; + DES_LONG w,x,y,z; + unsigned int blank=(unsigned int)'\n'-' '; + + for (j=0; j 60) + { + fprintf(stderr,"uuencoded line length too long\n"); + return(-1); + } + j++; + + for (i=0; i 63) || (x > 63) || (y > 63) || (z > 63)) + { + k=0; + if (w == blank) k=1; + if (x == blank) k=2; + if (y == blank) k=3; + if (z == blank) k=4; + space=1; + switch (k) { + case 1: w=0; in--; + case 2: x=0; in--; + case 3: y=0; in--; + case 4: z=0; in--; + break; + case 0: + space=0; + fprintf(stderr,"bad uuencoded data values\n"); + w=x=y=z=0; + return(-1); + break; + } + } + l=(w<<18)|(x<<12)|(y<< 6)|(z ); + l2ccc(l,out); + } + if (*(in++) != '\n') + { + fprintf(stderr,"missing nl in uuencoded line\n"); + w=x=y=z=0; + return(-1); + } + j++; + } + *out='\0'; + w=x=y=z=0; + return(n); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a78c18de3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ + + + +DES(1) DES(1) + + + +NAME + des - encrypt or decrypt data using Data Encryption Standard + +SYNOPSIS + ddeess ( --ee | --EE ) | ( --dd | --DD ) | ( --[ccCC][cckknnaammee] ) | [ --bb33hhffss ] [ --kk _k_e_y ] ] + [ --uu[_u_u_n_a_m_e] [ _i_n_p_u_t_-_f_i_l_e [ _o_u_t_p_u_t_-_f_i_l_e ] ] + +DESCRIPTION + ddeess encrypts and decrypts data using the Data Encryption Standard algo- + rithm. One of --ee,, --EE (for encrypt) or --dd,, --DD (for decrypt) must be speci- + fied. It is also possible to use --cc or --CC in conjunction or instead of the + a encrypt/decrypt option to generate a 16 character hexadecimal checksum, + generated via the _d_e_s___c_b_c___c_k_s_u_m_. + + Two standard encryption modes are supported by the ddeess program, Cipher + Block Chaining (the default) and Electronic Code Book (specified with --bb ). + + The key used for the DES algorithm is obtained by prompting the user unless + the ``--kk _k_e_y_' option is given. If the key is an argument to the ddeess com- + mand, it is potentially visible to users executing ppss(1) or a derivative. + To minimise this possibility, ddeess takes care to destroy the key argument + immediately upon entry. If your shell keeps a history file be careful to + make sure it is not world readable. + + Since this program attempts to maintain compatibility with SunOS's des(1) + command, there are 2 different methods used to convert the user supplied + key to a des key. Whenever and one or more of --EE,, --DD,, --CC or --33 options are + used, the key conversion procedure will not be compatible with the SunOS + des(1) version but will use all the user supplied character to generate the + des key. ddeess command reads from standard input unless _i_n_p_u_t_-_f_i_l_e is speci- + fied and writes to standard output unless _o_u_t_p_u_t_-_f_i_l_e is given. + +OPTIONS + + --bb Select ECB (eight bytes at a time) encryption mode. + + --33 Encrypt using triple encryption. By default triple cbc encryption is + used but if the --bb option is used then triple ecb encryption is per- + formed. If the key is less than 8 characters long, the flag has no + effect. + + --ee Encrypt data using an 8 byte key in a manner compatible with SunOS + des(1). + + --EE Encrypt data using a key of nearly unlimited length (1024 bytes). + This will product a more secure encryption. + + --dd Decrypt data that was encrypted with the -e option. + + --DD Decrypt data that was encrypted with the -E option. + + --cc Generate a 16 character hexadecimal cbc checksum and output this to + stderr. If a filename was specified after the --cc option, the checksum + is output to that file. The checksum is generated using a key gener- + ated in a SunOS compatible manner. + + --CC A cbc checksum is generated in the same manner as described for the --cc + option but the DES key is generated in the same manner as used for the + --EE and --DD options + + --ff Does nothing - allowed for compatibility with SunOS des(1) command. + + --ss Does nothing - allowed for compatibility with SunOS des(1) command. + + --kk _k_e_y + Use the encryption _k_e_y specified. + + --hh The _k_e_y is assumed to be a 16 character hexadecimal number. If the --33 + option is used the key is assumed to be a 32 character hexadecimal + number. + + --uu This flag is used to read and write uuencoded files. If decrypting, + the input file is assumed to contain uuencoded, DES encrypted data. + If encrypting, the characters following the -u are used as the name of + the uuencoded file to embed in the begin line of the uuencoded output. + If there is no name specified after the -u, the name text.des will be + embedded in the header. + +SEE ALSO + ppss ((11)) ddeess__ccrryypptt((33)) + +BUGS + + The problem with using the --ee option is the short key length. It would be + better to use a real 56-bit key rather than an ASCII-based 56-bit pattern. + Knowing that the key was derived from ASCII radically reduces the time nec- + essary for a brute-force cryptographic attack. My attempt to remove this + problem is to add an alternative text-key to DES-key function. This alter- + native function (accessed via --EE,, --DD,, --SS and --33 ) uses DES to help generate + the key. + + Be carefully when using the -u option. Doing des -ud will not + decrypt filename (the -u option will gobble the d option). + + The VMS operating system operates in a world where files are always a mul- + tiple of 512 bytes. This causes problems when encrypted data is send from + unix to VMS since a 88 byte file will suddenly be padded with 424 null + bytes. To get around this problem, use the -u option to uuencode the data + before it is send to the VMS system. + +AUTHOR + + Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au or eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.def b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.def new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24b1de2d3d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.def @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +LIBRARY des BASE=0x06000000 +EXPORTS + des_ecb3_encrypt + des_cbc_cksum + des_cbc_encrypt + des_ncbc_encrypt + des_3cbc_encrypt + des_cfb_encrypt + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt + des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt + des_ecb_encrypt + des_encrypt + des_encrypt2 + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt + des_enc_read + des_enc_write + crypt + des_ofb_encrypt + des_pcbc_encrypt + des_quad_cksum + des_read_password + des_read_2passwords + des_read_pw_string + des_set_odd_parity + des_is_weak_key + des_set_key + des_key_sched + des_string_to_key + des_string_to_2keys + des_cfb64_encrypt + des_ofb64_encrypt + des_cblock_print_file + des_new_random_key + des_init_random_number_generator + des_set_random_generator_seed + des_set_sequence_number + des_generate_random_block diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.doc b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.doc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e30158129 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.doc @@ -0,0 +1,505 @@ +The DES library. + +Please note that this library was originally written to operate with +eBones, a version of Kerberos that had had encryption removed when it left +the USA and then put back in. As such there are some routines that I will +advise not using but they are still in the library for historical reasons. +For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the +same. + +This library requires the inclusion of 'des.h'. + +All of the encryption functions take what is called a des_key_schedule as an +argument. A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the des key. +A des_key is 8 bytes of odd parity, the type used to hold the key is a +des_cblock. A des_cblock is an array of 8 bytes, often in this library +description I will refer to input bytes when the function specifies +des_cblock's as input or output, this just means that the variable should +be a multiple of 8 bytes. + +The define DES_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption, DES_DECRYPT to +specify decryption. The functions and global variable are as follows: + +int des_check_key; + DES keys are supposed to be odd parity. If this variable is set to + a non-zero value, des_set_key() will check that the key has odd + parity and is not one of the known weak DES keys. By default this + variable is turned off; + +void des_set_odd_parity( +des_cblock *key ); + This function takes a DES key (8 bytes) and sets the parity to odd. + +int des_is_weak_key( +des_cblock *key ); + This function returns a non-zero value if the DES key passed is a + weak, DES key. If it is a weak key, don't use it, try a different + one. If you are using 'random' keys, the chances of hitting a weak + key are 1/2^52 so it is probably not worth checking for them. + +int des_set_key( +des_cblock *key, +des_key_schedule schedule); + Des_set_key converts an 8 byte DES key into a des_key_schedule. + A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the key which is used to + perform actual encryption. It can be regenerated from the DES key + so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about + to occur. Don't save or pass around des_key_schedule's since they + are CPU architecture dependent, DES keys are not. If des_check_key + is non zero, zero is returned if the key has the wrong parity or + the key is a weak key, else 1 is returned. + +int des_key_sched( +des_cblock *key, +des_key_schedule schedule); + An alternative name for des_set_key(). + +int des_rw_mode; /* defaults to DES_PCBC_MODE */ + This flag holds either DES_CBC_MODE or DES_PCBC_MODE (default). + This specifies the function to use in the enc_read() and enc_write() + functions. + +void des_encrypt( +unsigned long *data, +des_key_schedule ks, +int enc); + This is the DES encryption function that gets called by just about + every other DES routine in the library. You should not use this + function except to implement 'modes' of DES. I say this because the + functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to + long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory + access do not occur. The characters are loaded 'little endian', + have a look at my source code for more details on how I use this + function. + Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and ks is the + des_key_schedule to use. enc, is non zero specifies encryption, + zero if decryption. + +void des_encrypt2( +unsigned long *data, +des_key_schedule ks, +int enc); + This functions is the same as des_encrypt() except that the DES + initial permutation (IP) and final permutation (FP) have been left + out. As for des_encrypt(), you should not use this function. + It is used by the routines in my library that implement triple DES. + IP() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() FP() is the same + as des_encrypt() des_encrypt() des_encrypt() except faster :-). + +void des_ecb_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +des_key_schedule ks, +int enc); + This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of DES, the most basic + form. Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by + ks. If enc is non zero (DES_ENCRYPT), encryption occurs, otherwise + decryption occurs. Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes. + (the des_cblock structure is 8 chars). + +void des_ecb3_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +int enc); + This is the 3 key EDE mode of ECB DES. What this means is that + the 8 bytes of input is encrypted with ks1, decrypted with ks2 and + then encrypted again with ks3, before being put into output; + C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). There is a macro, des_ecb2_encrypt() + that only takes 2 des_key_schedules that implements, + C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))) in that the final encrypt is done with ks1. + +void des_cbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + This routine implements DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode. + Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted + (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes. + The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above, + should be a multiple of 8). If length is not a multiple of 8, I'm + not being held responsible :-). ivec is the initialisation vector. + This function does not modify this variable. To correctly implement + cbc mode, you need to do one of 2 things; copy the last 8 bytes of + cipher text for use as the next ivec in your application, + or use des_ncbc_encrypt(). + Only this routine has this problem with updating the ivec, all + other routines that are implementing cbc mode update ivec. + +void des_ncbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule sk, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + For historical reasons, des_cbc_encrypt() did not update the + ivec with the value requires so that subsequent calls to + des_cbc_encrypt() would 'chain'. This was needed so that the same + 'length' values would not need to be used when decrypting. + des_ncbc_encrypt() does the right thing. It is the same as + des_cbc_encrypt accept that ivec is updates with the correct value + to pass in subsequent calls to des_ncbc_encrypt(). I advise using + des_ncbc_encrypt() instead of des_cbc_encrypt(); + +void des_xcbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule sk, +des_cblock *ivec, +des_cblock *inw, +des_cblock *outw, +int enc); + This is RSA's DESX mode of DES. It uses inw and outw to + 'whiten' the encryption. inw and outw are secret (unlike the iv) + and are as such, part of the key. So the key is sort of 24 bytes. + This is much better than cbc des. + +void des_3cbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule sk1, +des_key_schedule sk2, +des_cblock *ivec1, +des_cblock *ivec2, +int enc); + This function is flawed, do not use it. I have left it in the + library because it is used in my des(1) program and will function + correctly when used by des(1). If I removed the function, people + could end up unable to decrypt files. + This routine implements outer triple cbc encryption using 2 ks and + 2 ivec's. Use des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() instead. + +void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + This function implements inner triple CBC DES encryption with 3 + keys. What this means is that each 'DES' operation + inside the cbc mode is really an C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). + Again, this is cbc mode so an ivec is requires. + This mode is used by SSL. + There is also a des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() that only uses 2 + des_key_schedule's, the first being reused for the final + encryption. C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). This form of triple DES + is used by the RSAref library. + +void des_pcbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + This is Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode of DES. It is used + by Kerberos v4. It's parameters are the same as des_ncbc_encrypt(). + +void des_cfb_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +int numbits, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + Cipher Feedback Back mode of DES. This implementation 'feeds back' + in numbit blocks. The input (and output) is in multiples of numbits + bits. numbits should to be a multiple of 8 bits. Length is the + number of bytes input. If numbits is not a multiple of 8 bits, + the extra bits in the bytes will be considered padding. So if + numbits is 12, for each 2 input bytes, the 4 high bits of the + second byte will be ignored. So to encode 72 bits when using + a numbits of 12 take 12 bytes. To encode 72 bits when using + numbits of 9 will take 16 bytes. To encode 80 bits when using + numbits of 16 will take 10 bytes. etc, etc. This padding will + apply to both input and output. + + +void des_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num, +int enc); + This is one of the more useful functions in this DES library, it + implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this + useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an + arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. If this does + not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-). + +void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num, +int enc); + Same as des_cfb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is + triple DES. As usual, there is a macro for + des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1. + +void des_ofb_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +int numbits, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec); + This is a implementation of Output Feed Back mode of DES. It is + the same as des_cfb_encrypt() in that numbits is the size of the + units dealt with during input and output (in bits). + +void des_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num); + The same as des_cfb64_encrypt() except that it is Output Feed Back + mode. + +void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num); + Same as des_ofb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is + triple DES. As usual, there is a macro for + des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1. + +int des_read_pw_string( +char *buf, +int length, +char *prompt, +int verify); + This routine is used to get a password from the terminal with echo + turned off. Buf is where the string will end up and length is the + size of buf. Prompt is a string presented to the 'user' and if + verify is set, the key is asked for twice and unless the 2 copies + match, an error is returned. A return code of -1 indicates a + system error, 1 failure due to use interaction, and 0 is success. + +unsigned long des_cbc_cksum( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec); + This function produces an 8 byte checksum from input that it puts in + output and returns the last 4 bytes as a long. The checksum is + generated via cbc mode of DES in which only the last 8 byes are + kept. I would recommend not using this function but instead using + the EVP_Digest routines, or at least using MD5 or SHA. This + function is used by Kerberos v4 so that is why it stays in the + library. + +char *des_fcrypt( +const char *buf, +const char *salt +char *ret); + This is my fast version of the unix crypt(3) function. This version + takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast + crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt + in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value + is written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This + function is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt. + +char *crypt( +const char *buf, +const char *salt); + This function calls des_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the + third parameter. This emulates the normal non-thread safe semantics + of crypt(3). + +void des_string_to_key( +char *str, +des_cblock *key); + This function takes str and converts it into a DES key. I would + recommend using MD5 instead and use the first 8 bytes of output. + When I wrote the first version of these routines back in 1990, MD5 + did not exist but I feel these routines are still sound. This + routines is compatible with the one in MIT's libdes. + +void des_string_to_2keys( +char *str, +des_cblock *key1, +des_cblock *key2); + This function takes str and converts it into 2 DES keys. + I would recommend using MD5 and using the 16 bytes as the 2 keys. + I have nothing against these 2 'string_to_key' routines, it's just + that if you say that your encryption key is generated by using the + 16 bytes of an MD5 hash, every-one knows how you generated your + keys. + +int des_read_password( +des_cblock *key, +char *prompt, +int verify); + This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_key(). + +int des_read_2passwords( +des_cblock *key1, +des_cblock *key2, +char *prompt, +int verify); + This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_2key(). + +void des_random_seed( +des_cblock key); + This routine sets a starting point for des_random_key(). + +void des_random_key( +des_cblock ret); + This function return a random key. Make sure to 'seed' the random + number generator (with des_random_seed()) before using this function. + I personally now use a MD5 based random number system. + +int des_enc_read( +int fd, +char *buf, +int len, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *iv); + This function will write to a file descriptor the encrypted data + from buf. This data will be preceded by a 4 byte 'byte count' and + will be padded out to 8 bytes. The encryption is either CBC of + PCBC depending on the value of des_rw_mode. If it is DES_PCBC_MODE, + pcbc is used, if DES_CBC_MODE, cbc is used. The default is to use + DES_PCBC_MODE. + +int des_enc_write( +int fd, +char *buf, +int len, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *iv); + This routines read stuff written by des_enc_read() and decrypts it. + I have used these routines quite a lot but I don't believe they are + suitable for non-blocking io. If you are after a full + authentication/encryption over networks, have a look at SSL instead. + +unsigned long des_quad_cksum( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +int out_count, +des_cblock *seed); + This is a function from Kerberos v4 that is not anything to do with + DES but was needed. It is a cksum that is quicker to generate than + des_cbc_cksum(); I personally would use MD5 routines now. +===== +Modes of DES +Quite a bit of the following information has been taken from + AS 2805.5.2 + Australian Standard + Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, + Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm + Appendix A + +There are several different modes in which DES can be used, they are +as follows. + +Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) (des_ecb_encrypt()) +- 64 bits are enciphered at a time. +- The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. +- The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block + (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. +- An error will only affect one ciphertext block. + +Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) (des_cbc_encrypt()) +- a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. +- The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. +- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the + current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not + be rearranged. +- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext + enciphering to the same ciphertext. +- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. + +Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) (des_cfb_encrypt()) +- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. +- The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. +- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the + current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are + chained together and can not be rearranged. +- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext + enciphering to the same ciphertext. +- The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if + j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. +- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through + the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause + greater processing overheads. +- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. +- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. + +Output Feedback Mode (OFB) (des_ofb_encrypt()) +- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. +- The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More + over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same + key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons + a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. +- The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. +- The use of different start variables values prevents the same + plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different + key streams. +- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through + the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause + greater processing overheads. +- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. +- OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the + resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes + only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. +- OFB mode is not self-synchronising. If the two operation of + encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs + to be re-initialised. +- Each re-initialisation should use a value of the start variable + different from the start variable values used before with the same + key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be + produced each time from the same parameters. This would be + susceptible to a ' known plaintext' attack. + +Triple ECB Mode (des_ecb3_encrypt()) +- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. +- As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. + There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective + key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of + memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. +- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with + just one key. +- If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. + There are attacks that could reduce the key space to 55 bit's but it + requires 2^56 blocks of memory. +- If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal + ecb mode. + +Triple CBC Mode (des_ede3_cbc_encrypt()) +- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. +- As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with + the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.dsp b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.dsp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..628742bbd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.dsp @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +# Microsoft Developer Studio Project File - Name="des" - Package Owner=<4> +# Microsoft Developer Studio Generated Build File, Format Version 5.00 +# ** DO NOT EDIT ** + +# TARGTYPE "Win32 (x86) Dynamic-Link Library" 0x0102 + +CFG=des - Win32 Release +!MESSAGE This is not a valid makefile. To build this project using NMAKE, +!MESSAGE use the Export Makefile command and run +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f "des.mak". +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE You can specify a configuration when running NMAKE +!MESSAGE by defining the macro CFG on the command line. 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Win32 Debug" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP Output_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP Ignore_Export_Lib 0 +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /MTd /W3 /Gm /GX /Zi /Od /D "WIN32" /D "_DEBUG" /D "_WINDOWS" /YX /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /MDd /W3 /Gm /GX /Zi /Od /I "..\roken" /I "." /I "..\..\include" /I "..\..\include\win32" /D "WIN32" /D "_DEBUG" /D "_WINDOWS" /D "HAVE_CONFIG_H" /YX /FD /c +# ADD BASE MTL /nologo /D "_DEBUG" /win32 +# ADD MTL /nologo /D "_DEBUG" /mktyplib203 /win32 +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x409 /d "_DEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x409 /d "_DEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LINK32=link.exe +# ADD BASE LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:windows /dll /debug /machine:I386 +# ADD LINK32 ..\roken\Debug\roken.lib kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib /nologo /subsystem:windows /dll /debug /machine:I386 + +!ENDIF + +# Begin Target + +# Name "des - 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The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#ifndef HEADER_DES_H +#define HEADER_DES_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include + +#ifndef DES_LIB_FUNCTION +#if defined(__BORLANDC__) +#define DES_LIB_FUNCTION /* not-ready-definition-yet */ +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#define DES_LIB_FUNCTION /* not-ready-definition-yet2 */ +#else +#define DES_LIB_FUNCTION +#endif +#endif + +/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a + * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ +#ifndef DES_LONG +#if defined(__alpha) || defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__sparc_v9__) || _MIPS_SZLONG == 64 +#define DES_LONG unsigned int +#else /* Not a 64 bit machine */ +#define DES_LONG unsigned long +#endif +#endif + +typedef unsigned char des_cblock[8]; +typedef struct des_ks_struct + { + union { + des_cblock _; + /* make sure things are correct size on machines with + * 8 byte longs */ + DES_LONG pad[2]; + } ks; +#undef _ +#define _ ks._ + } des_key_schedule[16]; + +#define DES_KEY_SZ (sizeof(des_cblock)) +#define DES_SCHEDULE_SZ (sizeof(des_key_schedule)) + +#define DES_ENCRYPT 1 +#define DES_DECRYPT 0 + +#define DES_CBC_MODE 0 +#define DES_PCBC_MODE 1 + +#define des_ecb2_encrypt(i,o,k1,k2,e) \ + des_ecb3_encrypt((i),(o),(k1),(k2),(k1),(e)) + +#define des_ede2_cbc_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,e) \ + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(e)) + +#define des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n,e) \ + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n),(e)) + +#define des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n) \ + des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n)) + +#define C_Block des_cblock +#define Key_schedule des_key_schedule +#ifdef KERBEROS +#define ENCRYPT DES_ENCRYPT +#define DECRYPT DES_DECRYPT +#endif +#define KEY_SZ DES_KEY_SZ +#define string_to_key des_string_to_key +#define read_pw_string des_read_pw_string +#define random_key des_random_key +#define pcbc_encrypt des_pcbc_encrypt +#define set_key des_set_key +#define key_sched des_key_sched +#define ecb_encrypt des_ecb_encrypt +#define cbc_encrypt des_cbc_encrypt +#define ncbc_encrypt des_ncbc_encrypt +#define xcbc_encrypt des_xcbc_encrypt +#define cbc_cksum des_cbc_cksum +#define quad_cksum des_quad_cksum + +/* For compatibility with the MIT lib - eay 20/05/92 */ +typedef des_key_schedule bit_64; +#define des_fixup_key_parity des_set_odd_parity +#define des_check_key_parity check_parity + +extern int des_check_key; /* defaults to false */ +extern int des_rw_mode; /* defaults to DES_PCBC_MODE */ + +#ifdef cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* The next line is used to disable full ANSI prototypes, if your + * compiler has problems with the prototypes, make sure this line always + * evaluates to true :-) */ +#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(__STDC__) +#undef NOPROTO +#endif +#ifndef NOPROTO +char *DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_options(void); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ecb3_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + des_key_schedule ks1,des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, int enc); +DES_LONG DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_cbc_cksum(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + long length,des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_cbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ncbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_xcbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec, + des_cblock *inw,des_cblock *outw,int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_3cbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule sk1,des_key_schedule sk2, + des_cblock *ivec1,des_cblock *ivec2,int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_cfb_encrypt(unsigned char *in,unsigned char *out,int numbits, + long length,des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ecb_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + des_key_schedule ks,int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_encrypt(DES_LONG *data,des_key_schedule ks, int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_encrypt2(DES_LONG *data,des_key_schedule ks, int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_encrypt3(DES_LONG *data, des_key_schedule ks1, + des_key_schedule ks2, des_key_schedule ks3); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_decrypt3(DES_LONG *data, des_key_schedule ks1, + des_key_schedule ks2, des_key_schedule ks3); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input, des_cblock *output, + long length, des_key_schedule ks1, des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock *ivec, int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, des_key_schedule ks1, des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock *ivec, int *num, int encrypt); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, des_key_schedule ks1, des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock *ivec, int *num); + +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_enc_read(int fd,char *buf,int len,des_key_schedule sched, + des_cblock *iv); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_enc_write(int fd,char *buf,int len,des_key_schedule sched, + des_cblock *iv); +char *DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_fcrypt(const char *buf,const char *salt, char *ret); +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(const char *buf,const char *salt); +#else +/* some stupid compilers complain because I have declared char instead + * of const char */ +#ifdef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +char *DES_LIB_FUNCTION crypt(const char *buf,const char *salt); +#else +char *crypt(); +#endif +#endif +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ofb_encrypt(unsigned char *in,unsigned char *out, + int numbits,long length,des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_pcbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +DES_LONG DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_quad_cksum(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + long length,int out_count,des_cblock *seed); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_random_seed(des_cblock key); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_random_key(des_cblock ret); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_read_password(des_cblock *key,char *prompt,int verify); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_read_2passwords(des_cblock *key1,des_cblock *key2, + char *prompt,int verify); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_read_pw_string(char *buf,int length,char *prompt,int verify); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_set_odd_parity(des_cblock *key); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_is_weak_key(des_cblock *key); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_set_key(des_cblock *key,des_key_schedule schedule); +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_key_sched(des_cblock *key,des_key_schedule schedule); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_string_to_key(char *str,des_cblock *key); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_string_to_2keys(char *str,des_cblock *key1,des_cblock *key2); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_cfb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, + des_key_schedule schedule, des_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_ofb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, + des_key_schedule schedule, des_cblock *ivec, int *num); + +/* Extra functions from Mark Murray */ +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_cblock_print_file(des_cblock *cb, FILE *fp); +/* The following functions are not in the normal unix build or the + * SSLeay build. When using the SSLeay build, use RAND_seed() + * and RAND_bytes() instead. */ +int DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_new_random_key(des_cblock *key); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_init_random_number_generator(des_cblock *key); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_set_random_generator_seed(des_cblock *key); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_set_sequence_number(des_cblock new_sequence_number); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_generate_random_block(des_cblock *block); +void DES_LIB_FUNCTION des_rand_data(unsigned char *data, int size); + +#else + +char *des_options(); +void des_ecb3_encrypt(); +DES_LONG des_cbc_cksum(); +void des_cbc_encrypt(); +void des_ncbc_encrypt(); +void des_xcbc_encrypt(); +void des_3cbc_encrypt(); +void des_cfb_encrypt(); +void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(); +void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(); +void des_ecb_encrypt(); +void des_encrypt(); +void des_encrypt2(); +void des_encrypt3(); +void des_decrypt3(); +void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(); +int des_enc_read(); +int des_enc_write(); +char *des_fcrypt(); +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(); +#else +char *crypt(); +#endif +void des_ofb_encrypt(); +void des_pcbc_encrypt(); +DES_LONG des_quad_cksum(); +void des_random_seed(); +void des_random_key(); +int des_read_password(); +int des_read_2passwords(); +int des_read_pw_string(); +void des_set_odd_parity(); +int des_is_weak_key(); +int des_set_key(); +int des_key_sched(); +void des_string_to_key(); +void des_string_to_2keys(); +void des_cfb64_encrypt(); +void des_ofb64_encrypt(); + +/* Extra functions from Mark Murray */ +void des_cblock_print_file(); +/* The following functions are not in the normal unix build or the + * SSLeay build. When using the SSLeay build, use RAND_seed() + * and RAND_bytes() instead. */ +int des_new_random_key(); +void des_init_random_number_generator(); +void des_set_random_generator_seed(); +void des_set_sequence_number(); +void des_generate_random_block(); +void des_rand_data(); + +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.mak b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.mak new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c200527065 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.mak @@ -0,0 +1,659 @@ +# Microsoft Developer Studio Generated NMAKE File, Based on des.dsp +!IF "$(CFG)" == "" +CFG=des - Win32 Release +!MESSAGE No configuration specified. Defaulting to des - Win32 Release. +!ENDIF + +!IF "$(CFG)" != "des - Win32 Release" && "$(CFG)" != "des - Win32 Debug" +!MESSAGE Invalid configuration "$(CFG)" specified. +!MESSAGE You can specify a configuration when running NMAKE +!MESSAGE by defining the macro CFG on the command line. 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/$(MAKEFLAGS) /F ".\roken.mak" CFG="roken - Win32 Debug" + cd "..\des" + +"roken - Win32 DebugCLEAN" : + cd "\tmp\wirus-krb\krb4-pre-0.9.9\lib\roken" + $(MAKE) /$(MAKEFLAGS) CLEAN /F ".\roken.mak" CFG="roken - Win32 Debug"\ + RECURSE=1 + cd "..\des" + +!ENDIF + + +!ENDIF + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.man b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.man new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..734119906b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.man @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +.TH DES 1 +.SH NAME +des - encrypt or decrypt data using Data Encryption Standard +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B des +( +.B \-e +| +.B \-E +) | ( +.B \-d +| +.B \-D +) | ( +.B \-\fR[\fPcC\fR][\fPckname\fR]\fP +) | +[ +.B \-b3hfs +] [ +.B \-k +.I key +] +] [ +.B \-u\fR[\fIuuname\fR] +[ +.I input-file +[ +.I output-file +] ] +.SH DESCRIPTION +.B des +encrypts and decrypts data using the +Data Encryption Standard algorithm. +One of +.B \-e, \-E +(for encrypt) or +.B \-d, \-D +(for decrypt) must be specified. +It is also possible to use +.B \-c +or +.B \-C +in conjunction or instead of the a encrypt/decrypt option to generate +a 16 character hexadecimal checksum, generated via the +.I des_cbc_cksum. +.LP +Two standard encryption modes are supported by the +.B des +program, Cipher Block Chaining (the default) and Electronic Code Book +(specified with +.B \-b +). +.LP +The key used for the DES +algorithm is obtained by prompting the user unless the +.B `\-k +.I key' +option is given. +If the key is an argument to the +.B des +command, it is potentially visible to users executing +.BR ps (1) +or a derivative. To minimise this possibility, +.B des +takes care to destroy the key argument immediately upon entry. +If your shell keeps a history file be careful to make sure it is not +world readable. +.LP +Since this program attempts to maintain compatability with sunOS's +des(1) command, there are 2 different methods used to convert the user +supplied key to a des key. +Whenever and one or more of +.B \-E, \-D, \-C +or +.B \-3 +options are used, the key conversion procedure will not be compatible +with the sunOS des(1) version but will use all the user supplied +character to generate the des key. +.B des +command reads from standard input unless +.I input-file +is specified and writes to standard output unless +.I output-file +is given. +.SH OPTIONS +.TP +.B \-b +Select ECB +(eight bytes at a time) encryption mode. +.TP +.B \-3 +Encrypt using triple encryption. +By default triple cbc encryption is used but if the +.B \-b +option is used then triple ecb encryption is performed. +If the key is less than 8 characters long, the flag has no effect. +.TP +.B \-e +Encrypt data using an 8 byte key in a manner compatible with sunOS +des(1). +.TP +.B \-E +Encrypt data using a key of nearly unlimited length (1024 bytes). +This will product a more secure encryption. +.TP +.B \-d +Decrypt data that was encrypted with the \-e option. +.TP +.B \-D +Decrypt data that was encrypted with the \-E option. +.TP +.B \-c +Generate a 16 character hexadecimal cbc checksum and output this to +stderr. +If a filename was specified after the +.B \-c +option, the checksum is output to that file. +The checksum is generated using a key generated in a sunOS compatible +manner. +.TP +.B \-C +A cbc checksum is generated in the same manner as described for the +.B \-c +option but the DES key is generated in the same manner as used for the +.B \-E +and +.B \-D +options +.TP +.B \-f +Does nothing - allowed for compatibility with sunOS des(1) command. +.TP +.B \-s +Does nothing - allowed for compatibility with sunOS des(1) command. +.TP +.B "\-k \fIkey\fP" +Use the encryption +.I key +specified. +.TP +.B "\-h" +The +.I key +is assumed to be a 16 character hexadecimal number. +If the +.B "\-3" +option is used the key is assumed to be a 32 character hexadecimal +number. +.TP +.B \-u +This flag is used to read and write uuencoded files. If decrypting, +the input file is assumed to contain uuencoded, DES encrypted data. +If encrypting, the characters following the -u are used as the name of +the uuencoded file to embed in the begin line of the uuencoded +output. If there is no name specified after the -u, the name text.des +will be embedded in the header. +.SH SEE ALSO +.B ps (1) +.B des_crypt(3) +.SH BUGS +.LP +The problem with using the +.B -e +option is the short key length. +It would be better to use a real 56-bit key rather than an +ASCII-based 56-bit pattern. Knowing that the key was derived from ASCII +radically reduces the time necessary for a brute-force cryptographic attack. +My attempt to remove this problem is to add an alternative text-key to +DES-key function. This alternative function (accessed via +.B -E, -D, -S +and +.B -3 +) +uses DES to help generate the key. +.LP +Be carefully when using the -u option. Doing des -ud will +not decrypt filename (the -u option will gobble the d option). +.LP +The VMS operating system operates in a world where files are always a +multiple of 512 bytes. This causes problems when encrypted data is +send from unix to VMS since a 88 byte file will suddenly be padded +with 424 null bytes. To get around this problem, use the -u option +to uuencode the data before it is send to the VMS system. +.SH AUTHOR +.LP +Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au or eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.org b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.org new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1eef51bfe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.org @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +/* crypto/des/des.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#ifndef HEADER_DES_H +#define HEADER_DES_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include + +/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a + * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ +#ifndef DES_LONG +#define DES_LONG unsigned long +#endif + +typedef unsigned char des_cblock[8]; +typedef struct des_ks_struct + { + union { + des_cblock _; + /* make sure things are correct size on machines with + * 8 byte longs */ + DES_LONG pad[2]; + } ks; +#undef _ +#define _ ks._ + } des_key_schedule[16]; + +#define DES_KEY_SZ (sizeof(des_cblock)) +#define DES_SCHEDULE_SZ (sizeof(des_key_schedule)) + +#define DES_ENCRYPT 1 +#define DES_DECRYPT 0 + +#define DES_CBC_MODE 0 +#define DES_PCBC_MODE 1 + +#define des_ecb2_encrypt(i,o,k1,k2,e) \ + des_ecb3_encrypt((i),(o),(k1),(k2),(k1),(e)) + +#define des_ede2_cbc_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,e) \ + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(e)) + +#define des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n,e) \ + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n),(e)) + +#define des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n) \ + des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n)) + +#define C_Block des_cblock +#define Key_schedule des_key_schedule +#ifdef KERBEROS +#define ENCRYPT DES_ENCRYPT +#define DECRYPT DES_DECRYPT +#endif +#define KEY_SZ DES_KEY_SZ +#define string_to_key des_string_to_key +#define read_pw_string des_read_pw_string +#define random_key des_random_key +#define pcbc_encrypt des_pcbc_encrypt +#define set_key des_set_key +#define key_sched des_key_sched +#define ecb_encrypt des_ecb_encrypt +#define cbc_encrypt des_cbc_encrypt +#define ncbc_encrypt des_ncbc_encrypt +#define xcbc_encrypt des_xcbc_encrypt +#define cbc_cksum des_cbc_cksum +#define quad_cksum des_quad_cksum + +/* For compatibility with the MIT lib - eay 20/05/92 */ +typedef des_key_schedule bit_64; +#define des_fixup_key_parity des_set_odd_parity +#define des_check_key_parity check_parity + +extern int des_check_key; /* defaults to false */ +extern int des_rw_mode; /* defaults to DES_PCBC_MODE */ + +/* The next line is used to disable full ANSI prototypes, if your + * compiler has problems with the prototypes, make sure this line always + * evaluates to true :-) */ +#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(__STDC__) +#undef NOPROTO +#endif +#ifndef NOPROTO +char *des_options(void); +void des_ecb3_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + des_key_schedule ks1,des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, int enc); +DES_LONG des_cbc_cksum(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + long length,des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec); +void des_cbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +void des_ncbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +void des_xcbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec, + des_cblock *inw,des_cblock *outw,int enc); +void des_3cbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule sk1,des_key_schedule sk2, + des_cblock *ivec1,des_cblock *ivec2,int enc); +void des_cfb_encrypt(unsigned char *in,unsigned char *out,int numbits, + long length,des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +void des_ecb_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + des_key_schedule ks,int enc); +void des_encrypt(DES_LONG *data,des_key_schedule ks, int enc); +void des_encrypt2(DES_LONG *data,des_key_schedule ks, int enc); +void des_encrypt3(DES_LONG *data, des_key_schedule ks1, + des_key_schedule ks2, des_key_schedule ks3); +void des_decrypt3(DES_LONG *data, des_key_schedule ks1, + des_key_schedule ks2, des_key_schedule ks3); +void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input, des_cblock *output, + long length, des_key_schedule ks1, des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock *ivec, int enc); +void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, des_key_schedule ks1, des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock *ivec, int *num, int encrypt); +void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, des_key_schedule ks1, des_key_schedule ks2, + des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock *ivec, int *num); + +int des_enc_read(int fd,char *buf,int len,des_key_schedule sched, + des_cblock *iv); +int des_enc_write(int fd,char *buf,int len,des_key_schedule sched, + des_cblock *iv); +char *des_fcrypt(const char *buf,const char *salt, char *ret); +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(const char *buf,const char *salt); +#else +/* some stupid compilers complain because I have declared char instead + * of const char */ +#ifdef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +char *crypt(const char *buf,const char *salt); +#else +char *crypt(); +#endif +#endif +void des_ofb_encrypt(unsigned char *in,unsigned char *out, + int numbits,long length,des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec); +void des_pcbc_encrypt(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output,long length, + des_key_schedule schedule,des_cblock *ivec,int enc); +DES_LONG des_quad_cksum(des_cblock *input,des_cblock *output, + long length,int out_count,des_cblock *seed); +void des_random_seed(des_cblock key); +void des_random_key(des_cblock ret); +int des_read_password(des_cblock *key,char *prompt,int verify); +int des_read_2passwords(des_cblock *key1,des_cblock *key2, + char *prompt,int verify); +int des_read_pw_string(char *buf,int length,char *prompt,int verify); +void des_set_odd_parity(des_cblock *key); +int des_is_weak_key(des_cblock *key); +int des_set_key(des_cblock *key,des_key_schedule schedule); +int des_key_sched(des_cblock *key,des_key_schedule schedule); +void des_string_to_key(char *str,des_cblock *key); +void des_string_to_2keys(char *str,des_cblock *key1,des_cblock *key2); +void des_cfb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, + des_key_schedule schedule, des_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); +void des_ofb64_encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, + des_key_schedule schedule, des_cblock *ivec, int *num); + +/* Extra functions from Mark Murray */ +void des_cblock_print_file(des_cblock *cb, FILE *fp); +/* The following functions are not in the normal unix build or the + * SSLeay build. When using the SSLeay build, use RAND_seed() + * and RAND_bytes() instead. */ +int des_new_random_key(des_cblock *key); +void des_init_random_number_generator(des_cblock *key); +void des_set_random_generator_seed(des_cblock *key); +void des_set_sequence_number(des_cblock new_sequence_number); +void des_generate_random_block(des_cblock *block); + +#else + +char *des_options(); +void des_ecb3_encrypt(); +DES_LONG des_cbc_cksum(); +void des_cbc_encrypt(); +void des_ncbc_encrypt(); +void des_xcbc_encrypt(); +void des_3cbc_encrypt(); +void des_cfb_encrypt(); +void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(); +void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(); +void des_ecb_encrypt(); +void des_encrypt(); +void des_encrypt2(); +void des_encrypt3(); +void des_decrypt3(); +void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(); +int des_enc_read(); +int des_enc_write(); +char *des_fcrypt(); +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(); +#else +char *crypt(); +#endif +void des_ofb_encrypt(); +void des_pcbc_encrypt(); +DES_LONG des_quad_cksum(); +void des_random_seed(); +void des_random_key(); +int des_read_password(); +int des_read_2passwords(); +int des_read_pw_string(); +void des_set_odd_parity(); +int des_is_weak_key(); +int des_set_key(); +int des_key_sched(); +void des_string_to_key(); +void des_string_to_2keys(); +void des_cfb64_encrypt(); +void des_ofb64_encrypt(); + +/* Extra functions from Mark Murray */ +void des_cblock_print_file(); +/* The following functions are not in the normal unix build or the + * SSLeay build. When using the SSLeay build, use RAND_seed() + * and RAND_bytes() instead. */ +#ifdef FreeBSD +int des_new_random_key(); +void des_init_random_number_generator(); +void des_set_random_generator_seed(); +void des_set_sequence_number(); +void des_generate_random_block(); +#endif + +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..449c782534 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des.pl @@ -0,0 +1,552 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl +# des.pl - eric young 22/11/1991 eay@mincom.oz.au or eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au +# +# Copyright (C) 1993 Eric Young +# +# 11 April 1996 - patched to circumvent Perl 5 (through 5.002) problem +# with sign-extension on right shift operations. +# Ed Kubaitis - ejk@uiuc.edu +# +# eay - 92/08/31 - I think I have fixed all problems for 64bit +# versions of perl but I could be wrong since I have not tested it yet :-). +# +# This is an implementation of DES in perl. +# The two routines (des_set_key and des_ecb_encrypt) +# take 8 byte objects as arguments. +# +# des_set_key takes an 8 byte string as a key and returns a key schedule +# for use in calls to des_ecb_encrypt. +# des_ecb_encrypt takes three arguments, the first is a key schedule +# (make sure to pass it by reference with the *), the second is 1 +# to encrypt, 0 to decrypt. The third argument is an 8 byte object +# to encrypt. The function returns an 8 byte object that has been +# DES encrypted. +# +# example: +# require 'des.pl' +# +# $key =pack("C8",0x12,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef); +# @ks= &des_set_key($key); +# +# $outbytes= &des_ecb_encrypt(*ks,1,$data); +# @enc =unpack("C8",$outbytes); +# + +package des; + +eval("usr integer;") if (int($]) > 4); + +# The following 8 arrays are used in des_set_key +@skb0=( +# for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 +0x00000000,0x00000010,0x20000000,0x20000010, +0x00010000,0x00010010,0x20010000,0x20010010, +0x00000800,0x00000810,0x20000800,0x20000810, +0x00010800,0x00010810,0x20010800,0x20010810, +0x00000020,0x00000030,0x20000020,0x20000030, +0x00010020,0x00010030,0x20010020,0x20010030, +0x00000820,0x00000830,0x20000820,0x20000830, +0x00010820,0x00010830,0x20010820,0x20010830, +0x00080000,0x00080010,0x20080000,0x20080010, +0x00090000,0x00090010,0x20090000,0x20090010, +0x00080800,0x00080810,0x20080800,0x20080810, +0x00090800,0x00090810,0x20090800,0x20090810, +0x00080020,0x00080030,0x20080020,0x20080030, +0x00090020,0x00090030,0x20090020,0x20090030, +0x00080820,0x00080830,0x20080820,0x20080830, +0x00090820,0x00090830,0x20090820,0x20090830, +); +@skb1=( +# for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 7 8 10 11 12 13 +0x00000000,0x02000000,0x00002000,0x02002000, +0x00200000,0x02200000,0x00202000,0x02202000, +0x00000004,0x02000004,0x00002004,0x02002004, +0x00200004,0x02200004,0x00202004,0x02202004, +0x00000400,0x02000400,0x00002400,0x02002400, +0x00200400,0x02200400,0x00202400,0x02202400, +0x00000404,0x02000404,0x00002404,0x02002404, +0x00200404,0x02200404,0x00202404,0x02202404, +0x10000000,0x12000000,0x10002000,0x12002000, +0x10200000,0x12200000,0x10202000,0x12202000, +0x10000004,0x12000004,0x10002004,0x12002004, +0x10200004,0x12200004,0x10202004,0x12202004, +0x10000400,0x12000400,0x10002400,0x12002400, +0x10200400,0x12200400,0x10202400,0x12202400, +0x10000404,0x12000404,0x10002404,0x12002404, +0x10200404,0x12200404,0x10202404,0x12202404, +); +@skb2=( +# for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 14 15 16 17 19 20 +0x00000000,0x00000001,0x00040000,0x00040001, +0x01000000,0x01000001,0x01040000,0x01040001, +0x00000002,0x00000003,0x00040002,0x00040003, +0x01000002,0x01000003,0x01040002,0x01040003, +0x00000200,0x00000201,0x00040200,0x00040201, +0x01000200,0x01000201,0x01040200,0x01040201, +0x00000202,0x00000203,0x00040202,0x00040203, +0x01000202,0x01000203,0x01040202,0x01040203, +0x08000000,0x08000001,0x08040000,0x08040001, +0x09000000,0x09000001,0x09040000,0x09040001, +0x08000002,0x08000003,0x08040002,0x08040003, +0x09000002,0x09000003,0x09040002,0x09040003, +0x08000200,0x08000201,0x08040200,0x08040201, +0x09000200,0x09000201,0x09040200,0x09040201, +0x08000202,0x08000203,0x08040202,0x08040203, +0x09000202,0x09000203,0x09040202,0x09040203, +); +@skb3=( +# for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 21 23 24 26 27 28 +0x00000000,0x00100000,0x00000100,0x00100100, +0x00000008,0x00100008,0x00000108,0x00100108, +0x00001000,0x00101000,0x00001100,0x00101100, +0x00001008,0x00101008,0x00001108,0x00101108, +0x04000000,0x04100000,0x04000100,0x04100100, +0x04000008,0x04100008,0x04000108,0x04100108, +0x04001000,0x04101000,0x04001100,0x04101100, +0x04001008,0x04101008,0x04001108,0x04101108, +0x00020000,0x00120000,0x00020100,0x00120100, +0x00020008,0x00120008,0x00020108,0x00120108, +0x00021000,0x00121000,0x00021100,0x00121100, +0x00021008,0x00121008,0x00021108,0x00121108, +0x04020000,0x04120000,0x04020100,0x04120100, +0x04020008,0x04120008,0x04020108,0x04120108, +0x04021000,0x04121000,0x04021100,0x04121100, +0x04021008,0x04121008,0x04021108,0x04121108, +); +@skb4=( +# for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 +0x00000000,0x10000000,0x00010000,0x10010000, +0x00000004,0x10000004,0x00010004,0x10010004, +0x20000000,0x30000000,0x20010000,0x30010000, +0x20000004,0x30000004,0x20010004,0x30010004, +0x00100000,0x10100000,0x00110000,0x10110000, +0x00100004,0x10100004,0x00110004,0x10110004, +0x20100000,0x30100000,0x20110000,0x30110000, +0x20100004,0x30100004,0x20110004,0x30110004, +0x00001000,0x10001000,0x00011000,0x10011000, +0x00001004,0x10001004,0x00011004,0x10011004, +0x20001000,0x30001000,0x20011000,0x30011000, +0x20001004,0x30001004,0x20011004,0x30011004, +0x00101000,0x10101000,0x00111000,0x10111000, +0x00101004,0x10101004,0x00111004,0x10111004, +0x20101000,0x30101000,0x20111000,0x30111000, +0x20101004,0x30101004,0x20111004,0x30111004, +); +@skb5=( +# for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 8 9 11 12 13 14 +0x00000000,0x08000000,0x00000008,0x08000008, +0x00000400,0x08000400,0x00000408,0x08000408, +0x00020000,0x08020000,0x00020008,0x08020008, +0x00020400,0x08020400,0x00020408,0x08020408, +0x00000001,0x08000001,0x00000009,0x08000009, +0x00000401,0x08000401,0x00000409,0x08000409, +0x00020001,0x08020001,0x00020009,0x08020009, +0x00020401,0x08020401,0x00020409,0x08020409, +0x02000000,0x0A000000,0x02000008,0x0A000008, +0x02000400,0x0A000400,0x02000408,0x0A000408, +0x02020000,0x0A020000,0x02020008,0x0A020008, +0x02020400,0x0A020400,0x02020408,0x0A020408, +0x02000001,0x0A000001,0x02000009,0x0A000009, +0x02000401,0x0A000401,0x02000409,0x0A000409, +0x02020001,0x0A020001,0x02020009,0x0A020009, +0x02020401,0x0A020401,0x02020409,0x0A020409, +); +@skb6=( +# for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 16 17 18 19 20 21 +0x00000000,0x00000100,0x00080000,0x00080100, +0x01000000,0x01000100,0x01080000,0x01080100, +0x00000010,0x00000110,0x00080010,0x00080110, +0x01000010,0x01000110,0x01080010,0x01080110, +0x00200000,0x00200100,0x00280000,0x00280100, +0x01200000,0x01200100,0x01280000,0x01280100, +0x00200010,0x00200110,0x00280010,0x00280110, +0x01200010,0x01200110,0x01280010,0x01280110, +0x00000200,0x00000300,0x00080200,0x00080300, +0x01000200,0x01000300,0x01080200,0x01080300, +0x00000210,0x00000310,0x00080210,0x00080310, +0x01000210,0x01000310,0x01080210,0x01080310, +0x00200200,0x00200300,0x00280200,0x00280300, +0x01200200,0x01200300,0x01280200,0x01280300, +0x00200210,0x00200310,0x00280210,0x00280310, +0x01200210,0x01200310,0x01280210,0x01280310, +); +@skb7=( +# for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 22 23 24 25 27 28 +0x00000000,0x04000000,0x00040000,0x04040000, +0x00000002,0x04000002,0x00040002,0x04040002, +0x00002000,0x04002000,0x00042000,0x04042000, +0x00002002,0x04002002,0x00042002,0x04042002, +0x00000020,0x04000020,0x00040020,0x04040020, +0x00000022,0x04000022,0x00040022,0x04040022, +0x00002020,0x04002020,0x00042020,0x04042020, +0x00002022,0x04002022,0x00042022,0x04042022, +0x00000800,0x04000800,0x00040800,0x04040800, +0x00000802,0x04000802,0x00040802,0x04040802, +0x00002800,0x04002800,0x00042800,0x04042800, +0x00002802,0x04002802,0x00042802,0x04042802, +0x00000820,0x04000820,0x00040820,0x04040820, +0x00000822,0x04000822,0x00040822,0x04040822, +0x00002820,0x04002820,0x00042820,0x04042820, +0x00002822,0x04002822,0x00042822,0x04042822, +); + +@shifts2=(0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0); + +# used in ecb_encrypt +@SP0=( +0x00410100, 0x00010000, 0x40400000, 0x40410100, +0x00400000, 0x40010100, 0x40010000, 0x40400000, +0x40010100, 0x00410100, 0x00410000, 0x40000100, +0x40400100, 0x00400000, 0x00000000, 0x40010000, +0x00010000, 0x40000000, 0x00400100, 0x00010100, +0x40410100, 0x00410000, 0x40000100, 0x00400100, +0x40000000, 0x00000100, 0x00010100, 0x40410000, +0x00000100, 0x40400100, 0x40410000, 0x00000000, +0x00000000, 0x40410100, 0x00400100, 0x40010000, +0x00410100, 0x00010000, 0x40000100, 0x00400100, +0x40410000, 0x00000100, 0x00010100, 0x40400000, +0x40010100, 0x40000000, 0x40400000, 0x00410000, +0x40410100, 0x00010100, 0x00410000, 0x40400100, +0x00400000, 0x40000100, 0x40010000, 0x00000000, +0x00010000, 0x00400000, 0x40400100, 0x00410100, +0x40000000, 0x40410000, 0x00000100, 0x40010100, +); +@SP1=( +0x08021002, 0x00000000, 0x00021000, 0x08020000, +0x08000002, 0x00001002, 0x08001000, 0x00021000, +0x00001000, 0x08020002, 0x00000002, 0x08001000, +0x00020002, 0x08021000, 0x08020000, 0x00000002, +0x00020000, 0x08001002, 0x08020002, 0x00001000, +0x00021002, 0x08000000, 0x00000000, 0x00020002, +0x08001002, 0x00021002, 0x08021000, 0x08000002, +0x08000000, 0x00020000, 0x00001002, 0x08021002, +0x00020002, 0x08021000, 0x08001000, 0x00021002, +0x08021002, 0x00020002, 0x08000002, 0x00000000, +0x08000000, 0x00001002, 0x00020000, 0x08020002, +0x00001000, 0x08000000, 0x00021002, 0x08001002, +0x08021000, 0x00001000, 0x00000000, 0x08000002, +0x00000002, 0x08021002, 0x00021000, 0x08020000, +0x08020002, 0x00020000, 0x00001002, 0x08001000, +0x08001002, 0x00000002, 0x08020000, 0x00021000, +); +@SP2=( +0x20800000, 0x00808020, 0x00000020, 0x20800020, +0x20008000, 0x00800000, 0x20800020, 0x00008020, +0x00800020, 0x00008000, 0x00808000, 0x20000000, +0x20808020, 0x20000020, 0x20000000, 0x20808000, +0x00000000, 0x20008000, 0x00808020, 0x00000020, +0x20000020, 0x20808020, 0x00008000, 0x20800000, +0x20808000, 0x00800020, 0x20008020, 0x00808000, +0x00008020, 0x00000000, 0x00800000, 0x20008020, +0x00808020, 0x00000020, 0x20000000, 0x00008000, +0x20000020, 0x20008000, 0x00808000, 0x20800020, +0x00000000, 0x00808020, 0x00008020, 0x20808000, +0x20008000, 0x00800000, 0x20808020, 0x20000000, +0x20008020, 0x20800000, 0x00800000, 0x20808020, +0x00008000, 0x00800020, 0x20800020, 0x00008020, +0x00800020, 0x00000000, 0x20808000, 0x20000020, +0x20800000, 0x20008020, 0x00000020, 0x00808000, +); +@SP3=( +0x00080201, 0x02000200, 0x00000001, 0x02080201, +0x00000000, 0x02080000, 0x02000201, 0x00080001, +0x02080200, 0x02000001, 0x02000000, 0x00000201, +0x02000001, 0x00080201, 0x00080000, 0x02000000, +0x02080001, 0x00080200, 0x00000200, 0x00000001, +0x00080200, 0x02000201, 0x02080000, 0x00000200, +0x00000201, 0x00000000, 0x00080001, 0x02080200, +0x02000200, 0x02080001, 0x02080201, 0x00080000, +0x02080001, 0x00000201, 0x00080000, 0x02000001, +0x00080200, 0x02000200, 0x00000001, 0x02080000, +0x02000201, 0x00000000, 0x00000200, 0x00080001, +0x00000000, 0x02080001, 0x02080200, 0x00000200, +0x02000000, 0x02080201, 0x00080201, 0x00080000, +0x02080201, 0x00000001, 0x02000200, 0x00080201, +0x00080001, 0x00080200, 0x02080000, 0x02000201, +0x00000201, 0x02000000, 0x02000001, 0x02080200, +); +@SP4=( +0x01000000, 0x00002000, 0x00000080, 0x01002084, +0x01002004, 0x01000080, 0x00002084, 0x01002000, +0x00002000, 0x00000004, 0x01000004, 0x00002080, +0x01000084, 0x01002004, 0x01002080, 0x00000000, +0x00002080, 0x01000000, 0x00002004, 0x00000084, +0x01000080, 0x00002084, 0x00000000, 0x01000004, +0x00000004, 0x01000084, 0x01002084, 0x00002004, +0x01002000, 0x00000080, 0x00000084, 0x01002080, +0x01002080, 0x01000084, 0x00002004, 0x01002000, +0x00002000, 0x00000004, 0x01000004, 0x01000080, +0x01000000, 0x00002080, 0x01002084, 0x00000000, +0x00002084, 0x01000000, 0x00000080, 0x00002004, +0x01000084, 0x00000080, 0x00000000, 0x01002084, +0x01002004, 0x01002080, 0x00000084, 0x00002000, +0x00002080, 0x01002004, 0x01000080, 0x00000084, +0x00000004, 0x00002084, 0x01002000, 0x01000004, +); +@SP5=( +0x10000008, 0x00040008, 0x00000000, 0x10040400, +0x00040008, 0x00000400, 0x10000408, 0x00040000, +0x00000408, 0x10040408, 0x00040400, 0x10000000, +0x10000400, 0x10000008, 0x10040000, 0x00040408, +0x00040000, 0x10000408, 0x10040008, 0x00000000, +0x00000400, 0x00000008, 0x10040400, 0x10040008, +0x10040408, 0x10040000, 0x10000000, 0x00000408, +0x00000008, 0x00040400, 0x00040408, 0x10000400, +0x00000408, 0x10000000, 0x10000400, 0x00040408, +0x10040400, 0x00040008, 0x00000000, 0x10000400, +0x10000000, 0x00000400, 0x10040008, 0x00040000, +0x00040008, 0x10040408, 0x00040400, 0x00000008, +0x10040408, 0x00040400, 0x00040000, 0x10000408, +0x10000008, 0x10040000, 0x00040408, 0x00000000, +0x00000400, 0x10000008, 0x10000408, 0x10040400, +0x10040000, 0x00000408, 0x00000008, 0x10040008, +); +@SP6=( +0x00000800, 0x00000040, 0x00200040, 0x80200000, +0x80200840, 0x80000800, 0x00000840, 0x00000000, +0x00200000, 0x80200040, 0x80000040, 0x00200800, +0x80000000, 0x00200840, 0x00200800, 0x80000040, +0x80200040, 0x00000800, 0x80000800, 0x80200840, +0x00000000, 0x00200040, 0x80200000, 0x00000840, +0x80200800, 0x80000840, 0x00200840, 0x80000000, +0x80000840, 0x80200800, 0x00000040, 0x00200000, +0x80000840, 0x00200800, 0x80200800, 0x80000040, +0x00000800, 0x00000040, 0x00200000, 0x80200800, +0x80200040, 0x80000840, 0x00000840, 0x00000000, +0x00000040, 0x80200000, 0x80000000, 0x00200040, +0x00000000, 0x80200040, 0x00200040, 0x00000840, +0x80000040, 0x00000800, 0x80200840, 0x00200000, +0x00200840, 0x80000000, 0x80000800, 0x80200840, +0x80200000, 0x00200840, 0x00200800, 0x80000800, +); +@SP7=( +0x04100010, 0x04104000, 0x00004010, 0x00000000, +0x04004000, 0x00100010, 0x04100000, 0x04104010, +0x00000010, 0x04000000, 0x00104000, 0x00004010, +0x00104010, 0x04004010, 0x04000010, 0x04100000, +0x00004000, 0x00104010, 0x00100010, 0x04004000, +0x04104010, 0x04000010, 0x00000000, 0x00104000, +0x04000000, 0x00100000, 0x04004010, 0x04100010, +0x00100000, 0x00004000, 0x04104000, 0x00000010, +0x00100000, 0x00004000, 0x04000010, 0x04104010, +0x00004010, 0x04000000, 0x00000000, 0x00104000, +0x04100010, 0x04004010, 0x04004000, 0x00100010, +0x04104000, 0x00000010, 0x00100010, 0x04004000, +0x04104010, 0x00100000, 0x04100000, 0x04000010, +0x00104000, 0x00004010, 0x04004010, 0x04100000, +0x00000010, 0x04104000, 0x00104010, 0x00000000, +0x04000000, 0x04100010, 0x00004000, 0x00104010, +); + +sub main'des_set_key + { + local($param)=@_; + local(@key); + local($c,$d,$i,$s,$t); + local(@ks)=(); + + # Get the bytes in the order we want. + @key=unpack("C8",$param); + + $c= ($key[0] )| + ($key[1]<< 8)| + ($key[2]<<16)| + ($key[3]<<24); + $d= ($key[4] )| + ($key[5]<< 8)| + ($key[6]<<16)| + ($key[7]<<24); + + &doPC1(*c,*d); + + for $i (@shifts2) + { + if ($i) + { + $c=($c>>2)|($c<<26); + $d=($d>>2)|($d<<26); + } + else + { + $c=($c>>1)|($c<<27); + $d=($d>>1)|($d<<27); + } + $c&=0x0fffffff; + $d&=0x0fffffff; + $s= $skb0[ ($c )&0x3f ]| + $skb1[(($c>> 6)&0x03)|(($c>> 7)&0x3c)]| + $skb2[(($c>>13)&0x0f)|(($c>>14)&0x30)]| + $skb3[(($c>>20)&0x01)|(($c>>21)&0x06) | + (($c>>22)&0x38)]; + $t= $skb4[ ($d )&0x3f ]| + $skb5[(($d>> 7)&0x03)|(($d>> 8)&0x3c)]| + $skb6[ ($d>>15)&0x3f ]| + $skb7[(($d>>21)&0x0f)|(($d>>22)&0x30)]; + push(@ks,(($t<<16)|($s&0x0000ffff))&0xffffffff); + $s= (($s>>16)&0x0000ffff)|($t&0xffff0000) ; + push(@ks,(($s<<4)|(($s>>28)&0xf))&0xffffffff); + } + @ks; + } + +sub doPC1 + { + local(*a,*b)=@_; + local($t); + + $t=(($b>>4)^$a)&0x0f0f0f0f; + $b^=($t<<4); $a^=$t; + # do $a first + $t=(($a<<18)^$a)&0xcccc0000; + $a=$a^$t^(($t>>18)&0x00003fff); + $t=(($a<<17)^$a)&0xaaaa0000; + $a=$a^$t^(($t>>17)&0x00007fff); + $t=(($a<< 8)^$a)&0x00ff0000; + $a=$a^$t^(($t>> 8)&0x00ffffff); + $t=(($a<<17)^$a)&0xaaaa0000; + $a=$a^$t^(($t>>17)&0x00007fff); + + # now do $b + $t=(($b<<24)^$b)&0xff000000; + $b=$b^$t^(($t>>24)&0x000000ff); + $t=(($b<< 8)^$b)&0x00ff0000; + $b=$b^$t^(($t>> 8)&0x00ffffff); + $t=(($b<<14)^$b)&0x33330000; + $b=$b^$t^(($t>>14)&0x0003ffff); + $b=(($b&0x00aa00aa)<<7)|(($b&0x55005500)>>7)|($b&0xaa55aa55); + $b=(($b>>8)&0x00ffffff)|((($a&0xf0000000)>>4)&0x0fffffff); + $a&=0x0fffffff; + } + +sub doIP + { + local(*a,*b)=@_; + local($t); + + $t=(($b>> 4)^$a)&0x0f0f0f0f; + $b^=($t<< 4); $a^=$t; + $t=(($a>>16)^$b)&0x0000ffff; + $a^=($t<<16); $b^=$t; + $t=(($b>> 2)^$a)&0x33333333; + $b^=($t<< 2); $a^=$t; + $t=(($a>> 8)^$b)&0x00ff00ff; + $a^=($t<< 8); $b^=$t; + $t=(($b>> 1)^$a)&0x55555555; + $b^=($t<< 1); $a^=$t; + $t=$a; + $a=$b&0xffffffff; + $b=$t&0xffffffff; + } + +sub doFP + { + local(*a,*b)=@_; + local($t); + + $t=(($b>> 1)^$a)&0x55555555; + $b^=($t<< 1); $a^=$t; + $t=(($a>> 8)^$b)&0x00ff00ff; + $a^=($t<< 8); $b^=$t; + $t=(($b>> 2)^$a)&0x33333333; + $b^=($t<< 2); $a^=$t; + $t=(($a>>16)^$b)&0x0000ffff; + $a^=($t<<16); $b^=$t; + $t=(($b>> 4)^$a)&0x0f0f0f0f; + $b^=($t<< 4); $a^=$t; + $a&=0xffffffff; + $b&=0xffffffff; + } + +sub main'des_ecb_encrypt + { + local(*ks,$encrypt,$in)=@_; + local($l,$r,$i,$t,$u,@input); + + @input=unpack("C8",$in); + # Get the bytes in the order we want. + $l= ($input[0] )| + ($input[1]<< 8)| + ($input[2]<<16)| + ($input[3]<<24); + $r= ($input[4] )| + ($input[5]<< 8)| + ($input[6]<<16)| + ($input[7]<<24); + + $l&=0xffffffff; + $r&=0xffffffff; + &doIP(*l,*r); + if ($encrypt) + { + for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4) + { + $t=((($r&0x7fffffff)<<1)|(($r>>31)&0x00000001)); + $u=$t^$ks[$i ]; + $t=$t^$ks[$i+1]; + $t2=(($t&0x0000000f)<<28); + + $t=((($t>>4)&0x0fffffff)|(($t&0x0000000f)<<28)); + $l^= $SP1[ $t &0x3f]| + $SP3[($t>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP5[($t>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP7[($t>>24)&0x3f]| + $SP0[ $u &0x3f]| + $SP2[($u>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP4[($u>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP6[($u>>24)&0x3f]; + + $t=(($l<<1)|(($l>>31)&0x1))&0xffffffff; + $u=$t^$ks[$i+2]; + $t=$t^$ks[$i+3]; + $t=((($t>>4)&0x0fffffff)|($t<<28))&0xffffffff; + $r^= $SP1[ $t &0x3f]| + $SP3[($t>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP5[($t>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP7[($t>>24)&0x3f]| + $SP0[ $u &0x3f]| + $SP2[($u>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP4[($u>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP6[($u>>24)&0x3f]; + } + } + else + { + for ($i=30; $i>0; $i-=4) + { + $t=(($r<<1)|(($r>>31)&0x1))&0xffffffff; + $u=$t^$ks[$i ]; + $t=$t^$ks[$i+1]; + $t=((($t>>4)&0x0fffffff)|($t<<28))&0xffffffff; + $l^= $SP1[ $t &0x3f]| + $SP3[($t>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP5[($t>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP7[($t>>24)&0x3f]| + $SP0[ $u &0x3f]| + $SP2[($u>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP4[($u>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP6[($u>>24)&0x3f]; + + $t=(($l<<1)|(($l>>31)&0x1))&0xffffffff; + $u=$t^$ks[$i-2]; + $t=$t^$ks[$i-1]; + $t=((($t>>4)&0x0fffffff)|($t<<28))&0xffffffff; + $r^= $SP1[ $t &0x3f]| + $SP3[($t>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP5[($t>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP7[($t>>24)&0x3f]| + $SP0[ $u &0x3f]| + $SP2[($u>> 8)&0x3f]| + $SP4[($u>>16)&0x3f]| + $SP6[($u>>24)&0x3f]; + } + } + &doFP(*l,*r); + pack("C8",$l&0xff, + ($l>> 8)&0x00ffffff, + ($l>>16)&0x0000ffff, + ($l>>24)&0x000000ff, + $r&0xff, + ($r>> 8)&0x00ffffff, + ($r>>16)&0x0000ffff, + ($r>>24)&0x000000ff); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3955e2350 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.3 @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +.\" $Id: des_crypt.3,v 1.2 1996/06/12 21:29:09 bg Exp $ +.\" Copyright 1989 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. +.\" +.\" For copying and distribution information, +.\" please see the file . +.\" +.TH DES_CRYPT 3 "Kerberos Version 4.0" "MIT Project Athena" +.SH NAME +des_read_password, des_string_to_key, des_random_key, des_set_key, +des_ecb_encrypt, des_cbc_encrypt, des_pcbc_encrypt, des_cbc_cksum, +des_quad_cksum, \- (new) DES encryption +.SH SYNOPSIS +.nf +.nj +.ft B +#include +.PP +.ft B +.B int des_read_password(key,prompt,verify) +des_cblock *key; +char *prompt; +int verify; +.PP +.ft B +int des_string_to_key(str,key) +char *str; +des_cblock key; +.PP +.ft B +int des_random_key(key) +des_cblock *key; +.PP +.ft B +int des_set_key(key,schedule) +des_cblock *key; +des_key_schedule schedule; +.PP +.ft B +int des_ecb_encrypt(input,output,schedule,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +des_key_schedule schedule; +int encrypt; +.PP +.ft B +int des_cbc_encrypt(input,output,length,schedule,ivec,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +int encrypt; +.PP +.ft B +int des_pcbc_encrypt(input,output,length,schedule,ivec,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +int encrypt; +.PP +.ft B +unsigned long des_cbc_cksum(input,output,length,schedule,ivec) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +.PP +.ft B +unsigned long quad_cksum(input,output,length,out_count,seed) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +int out_count; +des_cblock *seed; +.PP +.fi +.SH DESCRIPTION +This library supports various DES encryption related operations. It differs +from the +.I crypt, setkey, and encrypt +library routines in that it provides +a true DES encryption, without modifying the algorithm, +and executes much faster. +.PP +For each key that may be simultaneously active, create a +.B des_key_schedule +struct, +defined in "des.h". Next, create key schedules (from the 8-byte keys) as +needed, via +.I des_set_key, +prior to using the encryption or checksum routines. Then +setup the input and output areas. Make sure to note the restrictions +on lengths being multiples of eight bytes. Finally, invoke the +encryption/decryption routines, +.I des_ecb_encrypt +or +.I des_cbc_encrypt +or +.I des_pcbc_encrypt, +or, to generate a cryptographic checksum, use +.I quad_cksum +(fast) or +.I des_cbc_cksum +(slow). +.PP +A +.I des_cblock +struct is an 8 byte block used as the fundamental unit for DES data and +keys, and is defined as: +.PP +.B typedef unsigned char des_cblock[8]; +.PP +and a +.I des_key_schedule, +is defined as: +.PP +.B typedef struct des_ks_struct {des_cblock _;} des_key_schedule[16]; +.PP +.I des_read_password +writes the string specified by +.I prompt +to the standard +output, turns off echo (if possible) +and reads an input string from standard input until terminated with a newline. +If +.I verify +is non-zero, it prompts and reads input again, for use +in applications such as changing a password; both +versions are compared, and the input is requested repeatedly until they +match. Then +.I des_read_password +converts the input string into a valid DES key, internally +using the +.I des_string_to_key +routine. The newly created key is copied to the +area pointed to by the +.I key +argument. +.I des_read_password +returns a zero if no errors occurred, or a -1 +indicating that an error +occurred trying to manipulate the terminal echo. +.PP +.PP +.I des_string_to_key +converts an arbitrary length null-terminated string +to an 8 byte DES key, with odd byte parity, per FIPS specification. +A one-way function is used to convert the string to a key, making it +very difficult to reconstruct the string from the key. +The +.I str +argument is a pointer to the string, and +.I key +should +point to a +.I des_cblock +supplied by the caller to receive the generated key. +No meaningful value is returned. Void is not used for compatibility with +other compilers. +.PP +.PP +.I des_random_key +generates a random DES encryption key (eight bytes), set to odd parity per +FIPS +specifications. +This routine uses the current time, process id, and a counter +as a seed for the random number generator. +The caller must supply space for the output key, pointed to +by argument +.I key, +then after calling +.I des_random_key +should +call the +.I des_set_key +routine when needed. +No meaningful value is returned. Void is not used for compatibility +with other compilers. +.PP +.PP +.I des_set_key +calculates a key schedule from all eight bytes of the input key, pointed +to by the +.I key +argument, and outputs the schedule into the +.I des_key_schedule +indicated by the +.I schedule +argument. Make sure to pass a valid eight byte +key; no padding is done. The key schedule may then be used in subsequent +encryption/decryption/checksum operations. Many key schedules may be +cached for later use. The user is responsible to clear keys and schedules +as soon as no longer needed, to prevent their disclosure. +The routine also checks the key +parity, and returns a zero if the key parity is correct (odd), a -1 +indicating a key parity error, or a -2 indicating use of an illegal +weak key. If an error is returned, the key schedule was not created. +.PP +.PP +.I des_ecb_encrypt +is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or decrypts a single 8-byte +block in +.B electronic code book +mode. It always transforms the input data, pointed to by +.I input, +into the output data, pointed to by the +.I output +argument. +.PP +If the +.I encrypt +argument is non-zero, the +.I input +(cleartext) is encrypted into the +.I output +(ciphertext) using the key_schedule specified by the +.I schedule +argument, previously set via +.I des_set_key +.PP +If encrypt is zero, the +.I input +(now ciphertext) is decrypted into the +.I output +(now cleartext). +.PP +Input and output may overlap. +.PP +No meaningful value is returned. Void is not used for compatibility +with other compilers. +.PP +.PP +.I des_cbc_encrypt +encrypts/decrypts using the +.B cipher-block-chaining mode of DES. +If the +.I encrypt +argument is non-zero, the routine cipher-block-chain encrypts +the cleartext data pointed to by the +.I input +argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the +.I output +argument, using the key schedule provided by the +.I schedule +argument, and initialization vector provided by the +.I ivec +argument. +If the +.I length +argument is not an integral +multiple of eight bytes, the last block is copied to a temp and zero +filled (highest addresses). The output is ALWAYS an integral multiple +of eight bytes. +.PP +If +.I encrypt +is zero, the routine cipher-block chain decrypts the (now) ciphertext +data pointed to by the +.I input +argument into (now) cleartext pointed to by the +.I output +argument using the key schedule provided by the +.I schedule +argument, and initialization vector provided by the +.I ivec +argument. Decryption ALWAYS operates on integral +multiples of 8 bytes, so it will round the +.I length +provided up to the +appropriate multiple. Consequently, it will always produce the rounded-up +number of bytes of output cleartext. The application must determine if +the output cleartext was zero-padded due to original cleartext lengths that +were not integral multiples of 8. +.PP +No errors or meaningful values are returned. Void is not used for +compatibility with other compilers. +.PP +A characteristic of cbc mode is that changing a single bit of the +cleartext, then encrypting using cbc mode, +affects ALL the subsequent ciphertext. This makes cryptanalysis +much more difficult. However, modifying a single bit of the ciphertext, +then decrypting, only affects the resulting cleartext from +the modified block and the succeeding block. Therefore, +.I des_pcbc_encrypt +is STRONGLY recommended for applications where +indefinite propagation of errors is required in order to detect modifications. +.PP +.PP +.I des_pcbc_encrypt +encrypts/decrypts using a modified block chaining mode. Its calling +sequence is identical to +.I des_cbc_encrypt. +It differs in its error propagation characteristics. +.PP +.I des_pcbc_encrypt +is highly recommended for most encryption purposes, in that +modification of a single bit of the ciphertext will affect ALL the +subsequent (decrypted) cleartext. Similarly, modifying a single bit of +the cleartext will affect ALL the subsequent (encrypted) ciphertext. +"PCBC" mode, on encryption, "xors" both the +cleartext of block N and the ciphertext resulting from block N with the +cleartext for block N+1 prior to encrypting block N+1. +.PP +.I des_cbc_cksum +produces an 8 byte cryptographic checksum by cipher-block-chain +encrypting the cleartext data pointed to by the +.I input +argument. All of the ciphertext output is discarded, except the +last 8-byte ciphertext block, which is written into the area pointed to by +the +.I output +argument. +It uses the key schedule, +provided by the +.I schedule +argument and initialization vector provided by the +.I ivec +argument. +If the +.I length +argument is not an integral +multiple of eight bytes, the last cleartext block is copied to a temp and zero +filled (highest addresses). The output is ALWAYS eight bytes. +.PP +The routine also returns an unsigned long, which is the last (highest address) +half of the 8 byte checksum computed. +.PP +.PP +.I quad_cksum +produces a checksum by chaining quadratic operations on the cleartext data +pointed to by the +.I input +argument. The +.I length +argument specifies the length of the +input -- only exactly that many bytes are included for the checksum, +without any padding. +.PP +The algorithm may be iterated over the same input data, if the +.I out_count +argument is 2, 3 or 4, and the optional +.I output +argument is a non-null pointer . +The default is one iteration, and it will not run +more than 4 times. Multiple iterations run slower, but provide +a longer checksum if desired. The +.I seed +argument provides an 8-byte seed for the first iteration. If multiple iterations are +requested, the results of one iteration are automatically used as +the seed for the next iteration. +.PP +It returns both an unsigned long checksum value, and +if the +.I output +argument is not a null pointer, up to 16 bytes of +the computed checksum are written into the output. +.PP +.PP +.SH FILES +/usr/include/des.h +.br +/usr/lib/libdes.a +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.SH DIAGNOSTICS +.SH BUGS +This software has not yet been compiled or tested on machines other than the +VAX and the IBM PC. +.SH AUTHORS +Steve Miller, MIT Project Athena/Digital Equipment Corporation +.SH RESTRICTIONS +COPYRIGHT 1985,1986 Massachusetts Institute of Technology +.PP +This software may not be exported outside of the US without a special +license from the US Dept of Commerce. It may be replaced by any secret +key block cipher with block length and key length of 8 bytes, as long +as the interface is the same as described here. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f7370a3af5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ + + + +DES_CRYPT(3) DES_CRYPT(3) + + + +NAME + des_read_password, des_string_to_key, des_random_key, des_set_key, + des_ecb_encrypt, des_cbc_encrypt, des_pcbc_encrypt, des_cbc_cksum, + des_quad_cksum, - (new) DES encryption + +SYNOPSIS + ##iinncclluuddee <> + + iinntt ddeess__rreeaadd__ppaasssswwoorrdd((kkeeyy,,pprroommpptt,,vveerriiffyy)) + des_cblock *key; + char *prompt; + int verify; + + iinntt ddeess__ssttrriinngg__ttoo__kkeeyy((ssttrr,,kkeeyy)) + cchhaarr **ssttrr;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk kkeeyy;; + + iinntt ddeess__rraannddoomm__kkeeyy((kkeeyy)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **kkeeyy;; + + iinntt ddeess__sseett__kkeeyy((kkeeyy,,sscchheedduullee)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **kkeeyy;; + ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee sscchheedduullee;; + + iinntt ddeess__eeccbb__eennccrryypptt((iinnppuutt,,oouuttppuutt,,sscchheedduullee,,eennccrryypptt)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iinnppuutt;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **oouuttppuutt;; + ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee sscchheedduullee;; + iinntt eennccrryypptt;; + + iinntt ddeess__ccbbcc__eennccrryypptt((iinnppuutt,,oouuttppuutt,,lleennggtthh,,sscchheedduullee,,iivveecc,,eennccrryypptt)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iinnppuutt;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **oouuttppuutt;; + lloonngg lleennggtthh;; + ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee sscchheedduullee;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iivveecc;; + iinntt eennccrryypptt;; + + iinntt ddeess__ppccbbcc__eennccrryypptt((iinnppuutt,,oouuttppuutt,,lleennggtthh,,sscchheedduullee,,iivveecc,,eennccrryypptt)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iinnppuutt;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **oouuttppuutt;; + lloonngg lleennggtthh;; + ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee sscchheedduullee;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iivveecc;; + iinntt eennccrryypptt;; + + uunnssiiggnneedd lloonngg ddeess__ccbbcc__cckkssuumm((iinnppuutt,,oouuttppuutt,,lleennggtthh,,sscchheedduullee,,iivveecc)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iinnppuutt;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **oouuttppuutt;; + lloonngg lleennggtthh;; + ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee sscchheedduullee;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iivveecc;; + + uunnssiiggnneedd lloonngg qquuaadd__cckkssuumm((iinnppuutt,,oouuttppuutt,,lleennggtthh,,oouutt__ccoouunntt,,sseeeedd)) + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **iinnppuutt;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **oouuttppuutt;; + lloonngg lleennggtthh;; + iinntt oouutt__ccoouunntt;; + ddeess__ccbblloocckk **sseeeedd;; + +DESCRIPTION + This library supports various DES encryption related operations. It differs + from the _c_r_y_p_t_, _s_e_t_k_e_y_, _a_n_d _e_n_c_r_y_p_t library routines in that it provides a + true DES encryption, without modifying the algorithm, and executes much + faster. + + For each key that may be simultaneously active, create a ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee + struct, defined in "des.h". Next, create key schedules (from the 8-byte + keys) as needed, via _d_e_s___s_e_t___k_e_y_, prior to using the encryption or checksum + routines. Then setup the input and output areas. Make sure to note the + restrictions on lengths being multiples of eight bytes. Finally, invoke the + encryption/decryption routines, _d_e_s___e_c_b___e_n_c_r_y_p_t or _d_e_s___c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t or + _d_e_s___p_c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t_, or, to generate a cryptographic checksum, use _q_u_a_d___c_k_s_u_m + (fast) or _d_e_s___c_b_c___c_k_s_u_m (slow). + + A _d_e_s___c_b_l_o_c_k struct is an 8 byte block used as the fundamental unit for DES + data and keys, and is defined as: + + ttyyppeeddeeff uunnssiiggnneedd cchhaarr ddeess__ccbblloocckk[[88]];; + + and a _d_e_s___k_e_y___s_c_h_e_d_u_l_e_, is defined as: + + ttyyppeeddeeff ssttrruucctt ddeess__kkss__ssttrruucctt {{ddeess__ccbblloocckk __;;}} ddeess__kkeeyy__sscchheedduullee[[1166]];; + + _d_e_s___r_e_a_d___p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d writes the string specified by _p_r_o_m_p_t to the standard + output, turns off echo (if possible) and reads an input string from stan- + dard input until terminated with a newline. If _v_e_r_i_f_y is non-zero, it + prompts and reads input again, for use in applications such as changing a + password; both versions are compared, and the input is requested repeatedly + until they match. Then _d_e_s___r_e_a_d___p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d converts the input string into a + valid DES key, internally using the _d_e_s___s_t_r_i_n_g___t_o___k_e_y routine. The newly + created key is copied to the area pointed to by the _k_e_y argument. + _d_e_s___r_e_a_d___p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d returns a zero if no errors occurred, or a -1 indicating + that an error occurred trying to manipulate the terminal echo. + + _d_e_s___s_t_r_i_n_g___t_o___k_e_y converts an arbitrary length null-terminated string to an + 8 byte DES key, with odd byte parity, per FIPS specification. A one-way + function is used to convert the string to a key, making it very difficult + to reconstruct the string from the key. The _s_t_r argument is a pointer to + the string, and _k_e_y should point to a _d_e_s___c_b_l_o_c_k supplied by the caller to + receive the generated key. No meaningful value is returned. Void is not + used for compatibility with other compilers. + + _d_e_s___r_a_n_d_o_m___k_e_y generates a random DES encryption key (eight bytes), set to + odd parity per FIPS specifications. This routine uses the current time, + process id, and a counter as a seed for the random number generator. The + caller must supply space for the output key, pointed to by argument _k_e_y_, + then after calling _d_e_s___r_a_n_d_o_m___k_e_y should call the _d_e_s___s_e_t___k_e_y routine when + needed. No meaningful value is returned. Void is not used for compatibil- + ity with other compilers. + + _d_e_s___s_e_t___k_e_y calculates a key schedule from all eight bytes of the input + key, pointed to by the _k_e_y argument, and outputs the schedule into the + _d_e_s___k_e_y___s_c_h_e_d_u_l_e indicated by the _s_c_h_e_d_u_l_e argument. Make sure to pass a + valid eight byte key; no padding is done. The key schedule may then be + used in subsequent encryption/decryption/checksum operations. Many key + schedules may be cached for later use. The user is responsible to clear + keys and schedules as soon as no longer needed, to prevent their disclo- + sure. The routine also checks the key parity, and returns a zero if the + key parity is correct (odd), a -1 indicating a key parity error, or a -2 + indicating use of an illegal weak key. If an error is returned, the key + schedule was not created. + + _d_e_s___e_c_b___e_n_c_r_y_p_t is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or + decrypts a single 8-byte block in eelleeccttrroonniicc ccooddee bbooookk mode. It always + transforms the input data, pointed to by _i_n_p_u_t_, into the output data, + pointed to by the _o_u_t_p_u_t argument. + + If the _e_n_c_r_y_p_t argument is non-zero, the _i_n_p_u_t (cleartext) is encrypted + into the _o_u_t_p_u_t (ciphertext) using the key_schedule specified by the _s_c_h_e_d_- + _u_l_e argument, previously set via _d_e_s___s_e_t___k_e_y + + If encrypt is zero, the _i_n_p_u_t (now ciphertext) is decrypted into the _o_u_t_p_u_t + (now cleartext). + + Input and output may overlap. + + No meaningful value is returned. Void is not used for compatibility with + other compilers. + + _d_e_s___c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t encrypts/decrypts using the cciipphheerr--bblloocckk--cchhaaiinniinngg mmooddee ooff + DDEESS.. If the _e_n_c_r_y_p_t argument is non-zero, the routine cipher-block-chain + encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by the _i_n_p_u_t argument into the + ciphertext pointed to by the _o_u_t_p_u_t argument, using the key schedule pro- + vided by the _s_c_h_e_d_u_l_e argument, and initialization vector provided by the + _i_v_e_c argument. If the _l_e_n_g_t_h argument is not an integral multiple of eight + bytes, the last block is copied to a temp and zero filled (highest + addresses). The output is ALWAYS an integral multiple of eight bytes. + + If _e_n_c_r_y_p_t is zero, the routine cipher-block chain decrypts the (now) + ciphertext data pointed to by the _i_n_p_u_t argument into (now) cleartext + pointed to by the _o_u_t_p_u_t argument using the key schedule provided by the + _s_c_h_e_d_u_l_e argument, and initialization vector provided by the _i_v_e_c argument. + Decryption ALWAYS operates on integral multiples of 8 bytes, so it will + round the _l_e_n_g_t_h provided up to the appropriate multiple. Consequently, it + will always produce the rounded-up number of bytes of output cleartext. The + application must determine if the output cleartext was zero-padded due to + original cleartext lengths that were not integral multiples of 8. + + No errors or meaningful values are returned. Void is not used for compati- + bility with other compilers. + + A characteristic of cbc mode is that changing a single bit of the cleart- + ext, then encrypting using cbc mode, affects ALL the subsequent ciphertext. + This makes cryptanalysis much more difficult. However, modifying a single + bit of the ciphertext, then decrypting, only affects the resulting cleart- + ext from the modified block and the succeeding block. Therefore, + _d_e_s___p_c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t is STRONGLY recommended for applications where indefinite + propagation of errors is required in order to detect modifications. + + _d_e_s___p_c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t encrypts/decrypts using a modified block chaining mode. + Its calling sequence is identical to _d_e_s___c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t_. It differs in its + error propagation characteristics. + + _d_e_s___p_c_b_c___e_n_c_r_y_p_t is highly recommended for most encryption purposes, in + that modification of a single bit of the ciphertext will affect ALL the + subsequent (decrypted) cleartext. Similarly, modifying a single bit of the + cleartext will affect ALL the subsequent (encrypted) ciphertext. "PCBC" + mode, on encryption, "xors" both the cleartext of block N and the cipher- + text resulting from block N with the cleartext for block N+1 prior to + encrypting block N+1. + + _d_e_s___c_b_c___c_k_s_u_m produces an 8 byte cryptographic checksum by cipher-block- + chain encrypting the cleartext data pointed to by the _i_n_p_u_t argument. All + of the ciphertext output is discarded, except the last 8-byte ciphertext + block, which is written into the area pointed to by the _o_u_t_p_u_t argument. + It uses the key schedule, provided by the _s_c_h_e_d_u_l_e argument and initializa- + tion vector provided by the _i_v_e_c argument. If the _l_e_n_g_t_h argument is not + an integral multiple of eight bytes, the last cleartext block is copied to + a temp and zero filled (highest addresses). The output is ALWAYS eight + bytes. + + The routine also returns an unsigned long, which is the last (highest + address) half of the 8 byte checksum computed. + + _q_u_a_d___c_k_s_u_m produces a checksum by chaining quadratic operations on the + cleartext data pointed to by the _i_n_p_u_t argument. The _l_e_n_g_t_h argument speci- + fies the length of the input -- only exactly that many bytes are included + for the checksum, without any padding. + + The algorithm may be iterated over the same input data, if the _o_u_t___c_o_u_n_t + argument is 2, 3 or 4, and the optional _o_u_t_p_u_t argument is a non-null + pointer . The default is one iteration, and it will not run more than 4 + times. Multiple iterations run slower, but provide a longer checksum if + desired. The _s_e_e_d argument provides an 8-byte seed for the first iteration. + If multiple iterations are requested, the results of one iteration are + automatically used as the seed for the next iteration. + + It returns both an unsigned long checksum value, and if the _o_u_t_p_u_t argument + is not a null pointer, up to 16 bytes of the computed checksum are written + into the output. + +FILES + /usr/include/des.h + /usr/lib/libdes.a + +SEE ALSO + +DIAGNOSTICS + +BUGS + This software has not yet been compiled or tested on machines other than + the VAX and the IBM PC. + +AUTHORS + Steve Miller, MIT Project Athena/Digital Equipment Corporation + +RESTRICTIONS + COPYRIGHT 1985,1986 Massachusetts Institute of Technology + + This software may not be exported outside of the US without a special + license from the US Dept of Commerce. It may be replaced by any secret key + block cipher with block length and key length of 8 bytes, as long as the + interface is the same as described here. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.man b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.man new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9feb447129 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_crypt.man @@ -0,0 +1,508 @@ +.TH DES_CRYPT 3 +.SH NAME +des_read_password, des_read_2password, +des_string_to_key, des_string_to_2key, des_read_pw_string, +des_random_key, des_set_key, +des_key_sched, des_ecb_encrypt, des_3ecb_encrypt, des_cbc_encrypt, +des_3cbc_encrypt, +des_pcbc_encrypt, des_cfb_encrypt, des_ofb_encrypt, +des_cbc_cksum, des_quad_cksum, +des_enc_read, des_enc_write, des_set_odd_parity, +des_is_weak_key, crypt \- (non USA) DES encryption +.SH SYNOPSIS +.nf +.nj +.ft B +#include +.PP +.B int des_read_password(key,prompt,verify) +des_cblock *key; +char *prompt; +int verify; +.PP +.B int des_read_2password(key1,key2,prompt,verify) +des_cblock *key1,*key2; +char *prompt; +int verify; +.PP +.B int des_string_to_key(str,key) +char *str; +des_cblock *key; +.PP +.B int des_string_to_2keys(str,key1,key2) +char *str; +des_cblock *key1,*key2; +.PP +.B int des_read_pw_string(buf,length,prompt,verify) +char *buf; +int length; +char *prompt; +int verify; +.PP +.B int des_random_key(key) +des_cblock *key; +.PP +.B int des_set_key(key,schedule) +des_cblock *key; +des_key_schedule schedule; +.PP +.B int des_key_sched(key,schedule) +des_cblock *key; +des_key_schedule schedule; +.PP +.B int des_ecb_encrypt(input,output,schedule,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +des_key_schedule schedule; +int encrypt; +.PP +.B int des_3ecb_encrypt(input,output,ks1,ks2,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +des_key_schedule ks1,ks2; +int encrypt; +.PP +.B int des_cbc_encrypt(input,output,length,schedule,ivec,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +int encrypt; +.PP +.B int des_3cbc_encrypt(input,output,length,sk1,sk2,ivec1,ivec2,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule sk1; +des_key_schedule sk2; +des_cblock *ivec1; +des_cblock *ivec2; +int encrypt; +.PP +.B int des_pcbc_encrypt(input,output,length,schedule,ivec,encrypt) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +int encrypt; +.PP +.B int des_cfb_encrypt(input,output,numbits,length,schedule,ivec,encrypt) +unsigned char *input; +unsigned char *output; +int numbits; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +int encrypt; +.PP +.B int des_ofb_encrypt(input,output,numbits,length,schedule,ivec) +unsigned char *input,*output; +int numbits; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +.PP +.B unsigned long des_cbc_cksum(input,output,length,schedule,ivec) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock *ivec; +.PP +.B unsigned long des_quad_cksum(input,output,length,out_count,seed) +des_cblock *input; +des_cblock *output; +long length; +int out_count; +des_cblock *seed; +.PP +.B int des_check_key; +.PP +.B int des_enc_read(fd,buf,len,sched,iv) +int fd; +char *buf; +int len; +des_key_schedule sched; +des_cblock *iv; +.PP +.B int des_enc_write(fd,buf,len,sched,iv) +int fd; +char *buf; +int len; +des_key_schedule sched; +des_cblock *iv; +.PP +.B extern int des_rw_mode; +.PP +.B void des_set_odd_parity(key) +des_cblock *key; +.PP +.B int des_is_weak_key(key) +des_cblock *key; +.PP +.B char *crypt(passwd,salt) +char *passwd; +char *salt; +.PP +.fi +.SH DESCRIPTION +This library contains a fast implementation of the DES encryption +algorithm. +.PP +There are two phases to the use of DES encryption. +The first is the generation of a +.I des_key_schedule +from a key, +the second is the actual encryption. +A des key is of type +.I des_cblock. +This type is made from 8 characters with odd parity. +The least significant bit in the character is the parity bit. +The key schedule is an expanded form of the key; it is used to speed the +encryption process. +.PP +.I des_read_password +writes the string specified by prompt to the standard output, +turns off echo and reads an input string from standard input +until terminated with a newline. +If verify is non-zero, it prompts and reads the input again and verifies +that both entered passwords are the same. +The entered string is converted into a des key by using the +.I des_string_to_key +routine. +The new key is placed in the +.I des_cblock +that was passed (by reference) to the routine. +If there were no errors, +.I des_read_password +returns 0, +-1 is returned if there was a terminal error and 1 is returned for +any other error. +.PP +.I des_read_2password +operates in the same way as +.I des_read_password +except that it generates 2 keys by using the +.I des_string_to_2key +function. +.PP +.I des_read_pw_string +is called by +.I des_read_password +to read and verify a string from a terminal device. +The string is returned in +.I buf. +The size of +.I buf +is passed to the routine via the +.I length +parameter. +.PP +.I des_string_to_key +converts a string into a valid des key. +.PP +.I des_string_to_2key +converts a string into 2 valid des keys. +This routine is best suited for used to generate keys for use with +.I des_3ecb_encrypt. +.PP +.I des_random_key +returns a random key that is made of a combination of process id, +time and an increasing counter. +.PP +Before a des key can be used it is converted into a +.I des_key_schedule +via the +.I des_set_key +routine. +If the +.I des_check_key +flag is non-zero, +.I des_set_key +will check that the key passed is of odd parity and is not a week or +semi-weak key. +If the parity is wrong, +then -1 is returned. +If the key is a weak key, +then -2 is returned. +If an error is returned, +the key schedule is not generated. +.PP +.I des_key_sched +is another name for the +.I des_set_key +function. +.PP +The following routines mostly operate on an input and output stream of +.I des_cblock's. +.PP +.I des_ecb_encrypt +is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or decrypts a single 8-byte +.I des_cblock +in +.I electronic code book +mode. +It always transforms the input data, pointed to by +.I input, +into the output data, +pointed to by the +.I output +argument. +If the +.I encrypt +argument is non-zero (DES_ENCRYPT), +the +.I input +(cleartext) is encrypted in to the +.I output +(ciphertext) using the key_schedule specified by the +.I schedule +argument, +previously set via +.I des_set_key. +If +.I encrypt +is zero (DES_DECRYPT), +the +.I input +(now ciphertext) +is decrypted into the +.I output +(now cleartext). +Input and output may overlap. +No meaningful value is returned. +.PP +.I des_3ecb_encrypt +encrypts/decrypts the +.I input +block by using triple ecb DES encryption. +This involves encrypting the input with +.I ks1, +decryption with the key schedule +.I ks2, +and then encryption with the first again. +This routine greatly reduces the chances of brute force breaking of +DES and has the advantage of if +.I ks1 +and +.I ks2 +are the same, it is equivalent to just encryption using ecb mode and +.I ks1 +as the key. +.PP +.I des_cbc_encrypt +encrypts/decrypts using the +.I cipher-block-chaining +mode of DES. +If the +.I encrypt +argument is non-zero, +the routine cipher-block-chain encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by the +.I input +argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the +.I output +argument, +using the key schedule provided by the +.I schedule +argument, +and initialisation vector provided by the +.I ivec +argument. +If the +.I length +argument is not an integral multiple of eight bytes, +the last block is copied to a temporary area and zero filled. +The output is always +an integral multiple of eight bytes. +To make multiple cbc encrypt calls on a large amount of data appear to +be one +.I des_cbc_encrypt +call, the +.I ivec +of subsequent calls should be the last 8 bytes of the output. +.PP +.I des_3cbc_encrypt +encrypts/decrypts the +.I input +block by using triple cbc DES encryption. +This involves encrypting the input with key schedule +.I ks1, +decryption with the key schedule +.I ks2, +and then encryption with the first again. +2 initialisation vectors are required, +.I ivec1 +and +.I ivec2. +Unlike +.I des_cbc_encrypt, +these initialisation vectors are modified by the subroutine. +This routine greatly reduces the chances of brute force breaking of +DES and has the advantage of if +.I ks1 +and +.I ks2 +are the same, it is equivalent to just encryption using cbc mode and +.I ks1 +as the key. +.PP +.I des_pcbc_encrypt +encrypt/decrypts using a modified block chaining mode. +It provides better error propagation characteristics than cbc +encryption. +.PP +.I des_cfb_encrypt +encrypt/decrypts using cipher feedback mode. This method takes an +array of characters as input and outputs and array of characters. It +does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the ivec +variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to +the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete +DES ecb encryption per numbits, this function is only suggested for +use when sending small numbers of characters. +.PP +.I des_ofb_encrypt +encrypt using output feedback mode. This method takes an +array of characters as input and outputs and array of characters. It +does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the ivec +variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to +the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete +DES ecb encryption per numbits, this function is only suggested for +use when sending small numbers of characters. +.PP +.I des_cbc_cksum +produces an 8 byte checksum based on the input stream (via cbc encryption). +The last 4 bytes of the checksum is returned and the complete 8 bytes is +placed in +.I output. +.PP +.I des_quad_cksum +returns a 4 byte checksum from the input bytes. +The algorithm can be iterated over the input, +depending on +.I out_count, +1, 2, 3 or 4 times. +If +.I output +is non-NULL, +the 8 bytes generated by each pass are written into +.I output. +.PP +.I des_enc_write +is used to write +.I len +bytes +to file descriptor +.I fd +from buffer +.I buf. +The data is encrypted via +.I pcbc_encrypt +(default) using +.I sched +for the key and +.I iv +as a starting vector. +The actual data send down +.I fd +consists of 4 bytes (in network byte order) containing the length of the +following encrypted data. The encrypted data then follows, padded with random +data out to a multiple of 8 bytes. +.PP +.I des_enc_read +is used to read +.I len +bytes +from file descriptor +.I fd +into buffer +.I buf. +The data being read from +.I fd +is assumed to have come from +.I des_enc_write +and is decrypted using +.I sched +for the key schedule and +.I iv +for the initial vector. +The +.I des_enc_read/des_enc_write +pair can be used to read/write to files, pipes and sockets. +I have used them in implementing a version of rlogin in which all +data is encrypted. +.PP +.I des_rw_mode +is used to specify the encryption mode to use with +.I des_enc_read +and +.I des_end_write. +If set to +.I DES_PCBC_MODE +(the default), des_pcbc_encrypt is used. +If set to +.I DES_CBC_MODE +des_cbc_encrypt is used. +These two routines and the variable are not part of the normal MIT library. +.PP +.I des_set_odd_parity +sets the parity of the passed +.I key +to odd. This routine is not part of the standard MIT library. +.PP +.I des_is_weak_key +returns 1 is the passed key is a weak key (pick again :-), +0 if it is ok. +This routine is not part of the standard MIT library. +.PP +.I crypt +is a replacement for the normal system crypt. +It is much faster than the system crypt. +.PP +.SH FILES +/usr/include/des.h +.br +/usr/lib/libdes.a +.PP +The encryption routines have been tested on 16bit, 32bit and 64bit +machines of various endian and even works under VMS. +.PP +.SH BUGS +.PP +If you think this manual is sparse, +read the des_crypt(3) manual from the MIT kerberos (or bones outside +of the USA) distribution. +.PP +.I des_cfb_encrypt +and +.I des_ofb_encrypt +operates on input of 8 bits. What this means is that if you set +numbits to 12, and length to 2, the first 12 bits will come from the 1st +input byte and the low half of the second input byte. The second 12 +bits will have the low 8 bits taken from the 3rd input byte and the +top 4 bits taken from the 4th input byte. The same holds for output. +This function has been implemented this way because most people will +be using a multiple of 8 and because once you get into pulling bytes input +bytes apart things get ugly! +.PP +.I des_read_pw_string +is the most machine/OS dependent function and normally generates the +most problems when porting this code. +.PP +.I des_string_to_key +is probably different from the MIT version since there are lots +of fun ways to implement one-way encryption of a text string. +.PP +The routines are optimised for 32 bit machines and so are not efficient +on IBM PCs. +.PP +NOTE: extensive work has been done on this library since this document +was origionally written. Please try to read des.doc from the libdes +distribution since it is far more upto date and documents more of the +functions. Libdes is now also being shipped as part of SSLeay, a +general cryptographic library that amonst other things implements +netscapes SSL protocoll. The most recent version can be found in +SSLeay distributions. +.SH AUTHOR +Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au or eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d08fe65013 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +/* crypto/des/des_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_encrypt(data, ks, encrypt) +DES_LONG *data; +des_key_schedule ks; +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG l,r,t,u; +#ifdef DES_PTR + register unsigned char *des_SP=(unsigned char *)des_SPtrans; +#endif +#ifndef DES_UNROLL + register int i; +#endif + register DES_LONG *s; + + r=data[0]; + l=data[1]; + + IP(r,l); + /* Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is + * done outside the loop. This required the + * des_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated 1 bit to the right. + * One perl script later and things have a 5% speed up on a sparc2. + * Thanks to Richard Outerbridge <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> + * for pointing this out. */ + /* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ + /* shift left by 2 */ + r=ROTATE(r,29)&0xffffffffL; + l=ROTATE(l,29)&0xffffffffL; + + s=(DES_LONG *)ks; + /* I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the + * inner loop */ + if (encrypt) + { +#ifdef DES_UNROLL + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 0); /* 1 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 6); /* 4 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 8); /* 5 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,10); /* 6 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,12); /* 7 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,14); /* 8 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,16); /* 9 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,18); /* 10 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,20); /* 11 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,22); /* 12 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,24); /* 13 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,26); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,28); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,30); /* 16 */ +#else + for (i=0; i<32; i+=8) + { + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+0); /* 1 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+6); /* 4 */ + } +#endif + } + else + { +#ifdef DES_UNROLL + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,30); /* 16 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,28); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,26); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,24); /* 13 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,22); /* 12 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,20); /* 11 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,18); /* 10 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,16); /* 9 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,14); /* 8 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,12); /* 7 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,10); /* 6 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 8); /* 5 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 6); /* 4 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 0); /* 1 */ +#else + for (i=30; i>0; i-=8) + { + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i-0); /* 16 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i-2); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i-4); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i-6); /* 13 */ + } +#endif + } + + /* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ + l=ROTATE(l,3)&0xffffffffL; + r=ROTATE(r,3)&0xffffffffL; + + FP(r,l); + data[0]=l; + data[1]=r; + l=r=t=u=0; + } + +void des_encrypt2(data, ks, encrypt) +DES_LONG *data; +des_key_schedule ks; +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG l,r,t,u; +#ifdef DES_PTR + register unsigned char *des_SP=(unsigned char *)des_SPtrans; +#endif +#ifndef DES_UNROLL + register int i; +#endif + register DES_LONG *s; + + r=data[0]; + l=data[1]; + + /* Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is + * done outside the loop. This required the + * des_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated 1 bit to the right. + * One perl script later and things have a 5% speed up on a sparc2. + * Thanks to Richard Outerbridge <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> + * for pointing this out. */ + /* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ + r=ROTATE(r,29)&0xffffffff; + l=ROTATE(l,29)&0xffffffff; + + s=(DES_LONG *)ks; + /* I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the + * inner loop */ + if (encrypt) + { +#ifdef DES_UNROLL + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 0); /* 1 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 6); /* 4 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 8); /* 5 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,10); /* 6 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,12); /* 7 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,14); /* 8 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,16); /* 9 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,18); /* 10 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,20); /* 11 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,22); /* 12 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,24); /* 13 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,26); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,28); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,30); /* 16 */ +#else + for (i=0; i<32; i+=8) + { + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+0); /* 1 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+6); /* 4 */ + } +#endif + } + else + { +#ifdef DES_UNROLL + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,30); /* 16 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,28); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,26); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,24); /* 13 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,22); /* 12 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,20); /* 11 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,18); /* 10 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,16); /* 9 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,14); /* 8 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,12); /* 7 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,10); /* 6 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 8); /* 5 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 6); /* 4 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 0); /* 1 */ +#else + for (i=30; i>0; i-=8) + { + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i-0); /* 16 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i-2); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i-4); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i-6); /* 13 */ + } +#endif + } + /* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ + data[0]=ROTATE(l,3)&0xffffffff; + data[1]=ROTATE(r,3)&0xffffffff; + l=r=t=u=0; + } + +void des_encrypt3(data,ks1,ks2,ks3) +DES_LONG *data; +des_key_schedule ks1; +des_key_schedule ks2; +des_key_schedule ks3; + { + register DES_LONG l,r; + + l=data[0]; + r=data[1]; + IP(l,r); + data[0]=l; + data[1]=r; + des_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data,ks1,DES_ENCRYPT); + des_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data,ks2,DES_DECRYPT); + des_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data,ks3,DES_ENCRYPT); + l=data[0]; + r=data[1]; + FP(r,l); + data[0]=l; + data[1]=r; + } + +void des_decrypt3(data,ks1,ks2,ks3) +DES_LONG *data; +des_key_schedule ks1; +des_key_schedule ks2; +des_key_schedule ks3; + { + register DES_LONG l,r; + + l=data[0]; + r=data[1]; + IP(l,r); + data[0]=l; + data[1]=r; + des_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data,ks3,DES_DECRYPT); + des_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data,ks2,DES_ENCRYPT); + des_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data,ks1,DES_DECRYPT); + l=data[0]; + r=data[1]; + FP(r,l); + data[0]=l; + data[1]=r; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5de15dbead --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,535 @@ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" + +/* + if (we have termios.h) + define TERMIOS + else if (we have termio.h) + define TERMIO +*/ +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H + +#define TERMIOS + +#else /* !HAVE_TERMIOS_H */ + +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIO_H +#define TERMIO +#endif + +#endif /* !HAVE_TERMIOS_H */ + +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +/* crypto/des/des_locl.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING + * + * Always modify des_locl.org since des_locl.h is automatically generated from + * it during SSLeay configuration. + * + * WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING + */ + +#ifndef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H + +#if defined(WIN32) || defined(WIN16) +#ifndef MSDOS +#define MSDOS +#endif +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif +#include "des.h" + +#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS +/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a + * protected undef/define */ +#ifndef DES_PTR +#undef DES_PTR +#endif + +/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional + * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more + * registers */ +#ifndef DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC1 +#endif + +#ifndef DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#endif + +#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2) +YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!! +#endif + +/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. + * Very mucy CPU dependant */ +#ifndef DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_UNROLL +#endif + +/* These default values were supplied by + * Peter Gutman + * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */ +#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL) +/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the + CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find + even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for + optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but + there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */ + +#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC1 + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC2 + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC2 +#elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */ + /* Unknown */ +#elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */ + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */ + /* Unknown */ +#elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */ + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC2 + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( i386 ) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC1 + #define DES_UNROLL +#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */ +#endif + +#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */ + +#ifdef MSDOS /* Visual C++ 2.1 (Windows NT/95) */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifndef RAND +#define RAND +#endif +#undef NOPROTO +#endif + +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(VMS) || defined(M_XENIX) || defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#ifndef RAND +#define RAND +#endif + +#ifdef linux +#undef RAND +#endif + +#ifdef MSDOS +#define getpid() 2 +#define RAND +#undef NOPROTO +#endif + +#if defined(NOCONST) +#define const +#endif + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#undef NOPROTO +#endif + +#ifdef RAND +#define srandom(s) srand(s) +#define random rand +#endif + +#define ITERATIONS 16 +#define HALF_ITERATIONS 8 + +/* used in des_read and des_write */ +#define MAXWRITE (1024*16) +#define des_BSIZE (MAXWRITE+4) + +#define c2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++))) , \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L) + +/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ +#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ + c+=n; \ + l1=l2=0; \ + switch (n) { \ + case 8: l2 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ + case 7: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ + case 6: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ + case 5: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c)))); \ + case 4: l1 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ + case 3: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ + case 2: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ + case 1: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c)))); \ + } \ + } + +#define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) + +/* replacements for htonl and ntohl since I have no idea what to do + * when faced with machines with 8 byte longs. */ +#define HDRSIZE 4 + +#define n2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))) + +#define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) + +/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ +#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ + c+=n; \ + switch (n) { \ + case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \ + case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \ + case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \ + case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ + case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \ + case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \ + case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \ + case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ + } \ + } + +#if defined(WIN32) +#define ROTATE(a,n) (_lrotr(a,n)) +#else +#define ROTATE(a,n) (((a)>>(n))+((a)<<(32-(n)))) +#endif + +/* Don't worry about the LOAD_DATA() stuff, that is used by + * fcrypt() to add it's little bit to the front */ + +#ifdef DES_FCRYPT + +#define LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1) \ + { DES_LONG tmp; LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp); } + +#define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ + t=R^(R>>16L); \ + u=t&E0; t&=E1; \ + tmp=(u<<16); u^=R^s[S ]; u^=tmp; \ + tmp=(t<<16); t^=R^s[S+1]; t^=tmp +#else +#define LOAD_DATA_tmp(a,b,c,d,e,f) LOAD_DATA(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) +#define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ + u=R^s[S ]; \ + t=R^s[S+1] +#endif + +/* The changes to this macro may help or hinder, depending on the + * compiler and the achitecture. gcc2 always seems to do well :-). + * Inspired by Dana How + * DO NOT use the alternative version on machines with 8 byte longs. + * It does not seem to work on the Alpha, even when DES_LONG is 4 + * bytes, probably an issue of accessing non-word aligned objects :-( */ +#ifdef DES_PTR + +/* It recently occured to me that 0^0^0^0^0^0^0 == 0, so there + * is no reason to not xor all the sub items together. This potentially + * saves a register since things can be xored directly into L */ + +#if defined(DES_RISC1) || defined(DES_RISC2) +#ifdef DES_RISC1 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ + unsigned int u1,u2,u3; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + u>>=16L; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP +u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x200+u2); \ + u3=(int)(u>>8L); \ + u1=(int)u&0xfc; \ + u3&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x400+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x600+u3); \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + t>>=16L; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x100+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x300+u2); \ + u3=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0xfc; \ + u3&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x500+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x700+u3); } +#endif +#ifdef DES_RISC2 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ + unsigned int u1,u2,s1,s2; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP +u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x200+u2); \ + s1=(int)(u>>16L); \ + s2=(int)(u>>24L); \ + s1&=0xfc; \ + s2&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x400+s1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x600+s2); \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x100+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x300+u2); \ + s1=(int)(t>>16L); \ + s2=(int)(t>>24L); \ + s1&=0xfc; \ + s2&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x500+s1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x700+s2); } +#endif +#else +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ + LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1); \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + LL^= \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP +((u )&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x200+((u>> 8L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x400+((u>>16L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x600+((u>>24L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x100+((t )&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x300+((t>> 8L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x500+((t>>16L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x700+((t>>24L)&0xfc)); } +#endif + +#else /* original version */ + +#if defined(DES_RISC1) || defined(DES_RISC2) +#ifdef DES_RISC1 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) {\ + unsigned int u1,u2,u3; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u>>=2L; \ + t=ROTATE(t,6); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + u>>=16L; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[0][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[2][u2]; \ + u3=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0x3f; \ + u3&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[4][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[6][u3]; \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + t>>=16L; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[1][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[3][u2]; \ + u3=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0x3f; \ + u3&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[5][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[7][u3]; } +#endif +#ifdef DES_RISC2 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) {\ + unsigned int u1,u2,s1,s2; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u>>=2L; \ + t=ROTATE(t,6); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[0][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[2][u2]; \ + s1=(int)u>>16L; \ + s2=(int)u>>24L; \ + s1&=0x3f; \ + s2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[4][s1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[6][s2]; \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[1][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[3][u2]; \ + s1=(int)t>>16; \ + s2=(int)t>>24L; \ + s1&=0x3f; \ + s2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[5][s1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[7][s2]; } +#endif + +#else + +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) {\ + LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1); \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + LL^=\ + des_SPtrans[0][(u>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[2][(u>>10L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[4][(u>>18L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[6][(u>>26L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[1][(t>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[3][(t>>10L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[5][(t>>18L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[7][(t>>26L)&0x3f]; } +#endif +#endif + + /* IP and FP + * The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling. + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 + 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 + 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 + 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 to 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 0 + + 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 + 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 + 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 + 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 + + The output has been subject to swaps of the form + 0 1 -> 3 1 but the odd and even bits have been put into + 2 3 2 0 + different words. The main trick is to remember that + t=((l>>size)^r)&(mask); + r^=t; + l^=(t<>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ + (b)^=(t),\ + (a)^=((t)<<(n))) + +#define IP(l,r) \ + { \ + register DES_LONG tt; \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \ + } + +#define FP(l,r) \ + { \ + register DES_LONG tt; \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \ + } + +extern const DES_LONG des_SPtrans[8][64]; + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_locl.org b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_locl.org new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3853ddc834 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_locl.org @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +/* crypto/des/des_locl.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING + * + * Always modify des_locl.org since des_locl.h is automatically generated from + * it during SSLeay configuration. + * + * WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING + */ + +#ifndef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H + +#if defined(WIN32) || defined(WIN16) +#ifndef MSDOS +#define MSDOS +#endif +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifndef MSDOS +#include +#endif +#include "des.h" + +#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS +/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a + * protected undef/define */ +#ifndef DES_PTR +#undef DES_PTR +#endif + +/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional + * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more + * registers */ +#ifndef DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC1 +#endif + +#ifndef DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#endif + +#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2) +YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!! +#endif + +/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. + * Very mucy CPU dependant */ +#ifndef DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_UNROLL +#endif + +/* These default values were supplied by + * Peter Gutman + * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */ +#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL) +/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the + CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find + even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for + optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but + there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */ + +#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC1 + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC2 + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC2 +#elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */ + /* Unknown */ +#elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */ + /* Unknown */ +#elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */ + /* Unknown */ +#elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */ + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC2 + #define DES_UNROLL +#elif defined( i386 ) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */ + #define DES_PTR + #define DES_RISC1 + #define DES_UNROLL +#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */ +#endif + +#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */ + +#ifdef MSDOS /* Visual C++ 2.1 (Windows NT/95) */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifndef RAND +#define RAND +#endif +#undef NOPROTO +#endif + +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(VMS) || defined(M_XENIX) || defined(MSDOS) +#include +#endif + +#ifndef RAND +#define RAND +#endif + +#ifdef linux +#undef RAND +#endif + +#ifdef MSDOS +#define getpid() 2 +#define RAND +#undef NOPROTO +#endif + +#if defined(NOCONST) +#define const +#endif + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#undef NOPROTO +#endif + +#ifdef RAND +#define srandom(s) srand(s) +#define random rand +#endif + +#define ITERATIONS 16 +#define HALF_ITERATIONS 8 + +/* used in des_read and des_write */ +#define MAXWRITE (1024*16) +#define BSIZE (MAXWRITE+4) + +#define c2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++))) , \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L) + +/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ +#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ + c+=n; \ + l1=l2=0; \ + switch (n) { \ + case 8: l2 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ + case 7: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ + case 6: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ + case 5: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c)))); \ + case 4: l1 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ + case 3: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ + case 2: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ + case 1: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c)))); \ + } \ + } + +#define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) + +/* replacements for htonl and ntohl since I have no idea what to do + * when faced with machines with 8 byte longs. */ +#define HDRSIZE 4 + +#define n2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ + l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))) + +#define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) + +/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ +#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ + c+=n; \ + switch (n) { \ + case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \ + case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \ + case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \ + case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ + case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \ + case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \ + case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \ + case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ + } \ + } + +#if defined(WIN32) +#define ROTATE(a,n) (_lrotr(a,n)) +#else +#define ROTATE(a,n) (((a)>>(n))+((a)<<(32-(n)))) +#endif + +/* Don't worry about the LOAD_DATA() stuff, that is used by + * fcrypt() to add it's little bit to the front */ + +#ifdef DES_FCRYPT + +#define LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1) \ + { DES_LONG tmp; LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp); } + +#define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ + t=R^(R>>16L); \ + u=t&E0; t&=E1; \ + tmp=(u<<16); u^=R^s[S ]; u^=tmp; \ + tmp=(t<<16); t^=R^s[S+1]; t^=tmp +#else +#define LOAD_DATA_tmp(a,b,c,d,e,f) LOAD_DATA(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) +#define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ + u=R^s[S ]; \ + t=R^s[S+1] +#endif + +/* The changes to this macro may help or hinder, depending on the + * compiler and the achitecture. gcc2 always seems to do well :-). + * Inspired by Dana How + * DO NOT use the alternative version on machines with 8 byte longs. + * It does not seem to work on the Alpha, even when DES_LONG is 4 + * bytes, probably an issue of accessing non-word aligned objects :-( */ +#ifdef DES_PTR + +/* It recently occured to me that 0^0^0^0^0^0^0 == 0, so there + * is no reason to not xor all the sub items together. This potentially + * saves a register since things can be xored directly into L */ + +#if defined(DES_RISC1) || defined(DES_RISC2) +#ifdef DES_RISC1 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ + unsigned int u1,u2,u3; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + u>>=16L; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP +u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x200+u2); \ + u3=(int)(u>>8L); \ + u1=(int)u&0xfc; \ + u3&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x400+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x600+u3); \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + t>>=16L; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x100+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x300+u2); \ + u3=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0xfc; \ + u3&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x500+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x700+u3); } +#endif +#ifdef DES_RISC2 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ + unsigned int u1,u2,s1,s2; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP +u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x200+u2); \ + s1=(int)(u>>16L); \ + s2=(int)(u>>24L); \ + s1&=0xfc; \ + s2&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x400+s1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x600+s2); \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0xfc; \ + u2&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x100+u1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x300+u2); \ + s1=(int)(t>>16L); \ + s2=(int)(t>>24L); \ + s1&=0xfc; \ + s2&=0xfc; \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x500+s1); \ + LL^= *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x700+s2); } +#endif +#else +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ + LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1); \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + LL^= \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP +((u )&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x200+((u>> 8L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x400+((u>>16L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x600+((u>>24L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x100+((t )&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x300+((t>> 8L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x500+((t>>16L)&0xfc))^ \ + *(DES_LONG *)((unsigned char *)des_SP+0x700+((t>>24L)&0xfc)); } +#endif + +#else /* original version */ + +#if defined(DES_RISC1) || defined(DES_RISC2) +#ifdef DES_RISC1 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) {\ + unsigned int u1,u2,u3; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u>>=2L; \ + t=ROTATE(t,6); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + u>>=16L; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[0][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[2][u2]; \ + u3=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0x3f; \ + u3&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[4][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[6][u3]; \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + t>>=16L; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[1][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[3][u2]; \ + u3=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0x3f; \ + u3&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[5][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[7][u3]; } +#endif +#ifdef DES_RISC2 +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) {\ + unsigned int u1,u2,s1,s2; \ + LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,u1); \ + u>>=2L; \ + t=ROTATE(t,6); \ + u2=(int)u>>8L; \ + u1=(int)u&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[0][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[2][u2]; \ + s1=(int)u>>16L; \ + s2=(int)u>>24L; \ + s1&=0x3f; \ + s2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[4][s1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[6][s2]; \ + u2=(int)t>>8L; \ + u1=(int)t&0x3f; \ + u2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[1][u1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[3][u2]; \ + s1=(int)t>>16; \ + s2=(int)t>>24L; \ + s1&=0x3f; \ + s2&=0x3f; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[5][s1]; \ + LL^=des_SPtrans[7][s2]; } +#endif + +#else + +#define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) {\ + LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1); \ + t=ROTATE(t,4); \ + LL^=\ + des_SPtrans[0][(u>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[2][(u>>10L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[4][(u>>18L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[6][(u>>26L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[1][(t>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[3][(t>>10L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[5][(t>>18L)&0x3f]^ \ + des_SPtrans[7][(t>>26L)&0x3f]; } +#endif +#endif + + /* IP and FP + * The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling. + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 + 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 + 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 + 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 to 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 0 + + 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 + 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 + 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 + 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 + + The output has been subject to swaps of the form + 0 1 -> 3 1 but the odd and even bits have been put into + 2 3 2 0 + different words. The main trick is to remember that + t=((l>>size)^r)&(mask); + r^=t; + l^=(t<>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ + (b)^=(t),\ + (a)^=((t)<<(n))) + +#define IP(l,r) \ + { \ + register DES_LONG tt; \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \ + } + +#define FP(l,r) \ + { \ + register DES_LONG tt; \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \ + PERM_OP(r,l,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \ + PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \ + } + +extern const DES_LONG des_SPtrans[8][64]; + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_opts.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_opts.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..90b035baef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_opts.c @@ -0,0 +1,616 @@ +/* crypto/des/des_opts.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* define PART1, PART2, PART3 or PART4 to build only with a few of the options. + * This is for machines with 64k code segment size restrictions. */ + +#ifndef MSDOS +#define TIMES +#endif + +#include +#ifndef MSDOS +#include +#else +#include +extern void exit(); +#endif +#include +#ifndef VMS +#ifndef _IRIX +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIMES +#include +#include +#endif +#else /* VMS */ +#include +struct tms { + time_t tms_utime; + time_t tms_stime; + time_t tms_uchild; /* I dunno... */ + time_t tms_uchildsys; /* so these names are a guess :-) */ + } +#endif +#ifndef TIMES +#include +#endif + +#ifdef sun +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "des.h" +#include "spr.h" + +#define DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS + +#if !defined(PART1) && !defined(PART2) && !defined(PART3) && !defined(PART4) +#define PART1 +#define PART2 +#define PART3 +#define PART4 +#endif + +#ifdef PART1 + +#undef DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u4_cisc_idx +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u4_cisc_idx +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u4_cisc_idx +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u4_cisc_idx +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#define DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u16_cisc_idx +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u16_cisc_idx +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u16_cisc_idx +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u16_cisc_idx +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#undef DES_UNROLL +#define DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u4_risc1_idx +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u4_risc1_idx +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u4_risc1_idx +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u4_risc1_idx +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#endif + +#ifdef PART2 + +#undef DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#define DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u4_risc2_idx +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u4_risc2_idx +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u4_risc2_idx +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u4_risc2_idx +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#define DES_UNROLL +#define DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u16_risc1_idx +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u16_risc1_idx +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u16_risc1_idx +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u16_risc1_idx +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#define DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#define DES_RISC2 +#undef DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u16_risc2_idx +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u16_risc2_idx +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u16_risc2_idx +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u16_risc2_idx +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#endif + +#ifdef PART3 + +#undef DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#define DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u4_cisc_ptr +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u4_cisc_ptr +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u4_cisc_ptr +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u4_cisc_ptr +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#define DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#define DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u16_cisc_ptr +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u16_cisc_ptr +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u16_cisc_ptr +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u16_cisc_ptr +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#undef DES_UNROLL +#define DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#define DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u4_risc1_ptr +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u4_risc1_ptr +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u4_risc1_ptr +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u4_risc1_ptr +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#endif + +#ifdef PART4 + +#undef DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#define DES_RISC2 +#define DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u4_risc2_ptr +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u4_risc2_ptr +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u4_risc2_ptr +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u4_risc2_ptr +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#define DES_UNROLL +#define DES_RISC1 +#undef DES_RISC2 +#define DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u16_risc1_ptr +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u16_risc1_ptr +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u16_risc1_ptr +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u16_risc1_ptr +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#define DES_UNROLL +#undef DES_RISC1 +#define DES_RISC2 +#define DES_PTR +#undef D_ENCRYPT +#undef des_encrypt +#undef des_encrypt2 +#undef des_encrypt3 +#undef des_decrypt3 +#define des_encrypt des_encrypt_u16_risc2_ptr +#define des_encrypt2 des_encrypt2_u16_risc2_ptr +#define des_encrypt3 des_encrypt3_u16_risc2_ptr +#define des_decrypt3 des_decrypt3_u16_risc2_ptr +#undef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H +#include "des_enc.c" + +#endif + +/* The following if from times(3) man page. It may need to be changed */ +#ifndef HZ +#ifndef CLK_TCK +#ifndef VMS +#define HZ 100.0 +#else /* VMS */ +#define HZ 100.0 +#endif +#else /* CLK_TCK */ +#define HZ ((double)CLK_TCK) +#endif +#endif + +#define BUFSIZE ((long)1024) +long run=0; + +#ifndef NOPROTO +double Time_F(int s); +#else +double Time_F(); +#endif + +#ifdef SIGALRM +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(sgi) +#define SIGRETTYPE void +#else +#define SIGRETTYPE int +#endif + +#ifndef NOPROTO +SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig); +#else +SIGRETTYPE sig_done(); +#endif + +SIGRETTYPE sig_done(sig) +int sig; + { + signal(SIGALRM,sig_done); + run=0; +#ifdef LINT + sig=sig; +#endif + } +#endif + +#define START 0 +#define STOP 1 + +double Time_F(s) +int s; + { + double ret; +#ifdef TIMES + static struct tms tstart,tend; + + if (s == START) + { + times(&tstart); + return(0); + } + else + { + times(&tend); + ret=((double)(tend.tms_utime-tstart.tms_utime))/HZ; + return((ret == 0.0)?1e-6:ret); + } +#else /* !times() */ + static struct timeb tstart,tend; + long i; + + if (s == START) + { + ftime(&tstart); + return(0); + } + else + { + ftime(&tend); + i=(long)tend.millitm-(long)tstart.millitm; + ret=((double)(tend.time-tstart.time))+((double)i)/1000.0; + return((ret == 0.0)?1e-6:ret); + } +#endif + } + +#ifdef SIGALRM +#define print_name(name) fprintf(stderr,"Doing %s's for 10 seconds\n",name); alarm(10); +#else +#define print_name(name) fprintf(stderr,"Doing %s %ld times\n",name,cb); +#endif + +#define time_it(func,name,index) \ + print_name(name); \ + Time_F(START); \ + for (count=0,run=1; COND(cb); count++) \ + { \ + unsigned long d[2]; \ + func(d,&(sch[0]),DES_ENCRYPT); \ + } \ + tm[index]=Time_F(STOP); \ + fprintf(stderr,"%ld %s's in %.2f second\n",count,name,tm[index]); \ + tm[index]=((double)COUNT(cb))/tm[index]; + +#define print_it(name,index) \ + fprintf(stderr,"%s bytes per sec = %12.2f (%5.1fuS)\n",name, \ + tm[index]*8,1.0e6/tm[index]); + +int main(argc,argv) +int argc; +char **argv; + { + long count; + static unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; + static des_cblock key ={0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0}; + static des_cblock key2={0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0,0x12}; + static des_cblock key3={0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0,0x12,0x34}; + des_key_schedule sch,sch2,sch3; + double d,tm[16],max=0; + int rank[16]; + char *str[16]; + int max_idx=0,i,num=0,j; +#ifndef SIGALARM + long ca,cb,cc,cd,ce; +#endif + + for (i=0; i<12; i++) + { + tm[i]=0.0; + rank[i]=0; + } + +#ifndef TIMES + fprintf(stderr,"To get the most acurate results, try to run this\n"); + fprintf(stderr,"program when this computer is idle.\n"); +#endif + + des_set_key((C_Block *)key,sch); + des_set_key((C_Block *)key2,sch2); + des_set_key((C_Block *)key3,sch3); + +#ifndef SIGALRM + fprintf(stderr,"First we calculate the approximate speed ...\n"); + des_set_key((C_Block *)key,sch); + count=10; + do { + long i; + unsigned long data[2]; + + count*=2; + Time_F(START); + for (i=count; i; i--) + des_encrypt(data,&(sch[0]),DES_ENCRYPT); + d=Time_F(STOP); + } while (d < 3.0); + ca=count; + cb=count*3; + cc=count*3*8/BUFSIZE+1; + cd=count*8/BUFSIZE+1; + + ce=count/20+1; +#define COND(d) (count != (d)) +#define COUNT(d) (d) +#else +#define COND(c) (run) +#define COUNT(d) (count) + signal(SIGALRM,sig_done); + alarm(10); +#endif + +#ifdef PART1 + time_it(des_encrypt_u4_cisc_idx, "des_encrypt_u4_cisc_idx ", 0); + time_it(des_encrypt_u16_cisc_idx, "des_encrypt_u16_cisc_idx ", 1); + time_it(des_encrypt_u4_risc1_idx, "des_encrypt_u4_risc1_idx ", 2); + num+=3; +#endif +#ifdef PART2 + time_it(des_encrypt_u16_risc1_idx,"des_encrypt_u16_risc1_idx", 3); + time_it(des_encrypt_u4_risc2_idx, "des_encrypt_u4_risc2_idx ", 4); + time_it(des_encrypt_u16_risc2_idx,"des_encrypt_u16_risc2_idx", 5); + num+=3; +#endif +#ifdef PART3 + time_it(des_encrypt_u4_cisc_ptr, "des_encrypt_u4_cisc_ptr ", 6); + time_it(des_encrypt_u16_cisc_ptr, "des_encrypt_u16_cisc_ptr ", 7); + time_it(des_encrypt_u4_risc1_ptr, "des_encrypt_u4_risc1_ptr ", 8); + num+=3; +#endif +#ifdef PART4 + time_it(des_encrypt_u16_risc1_ptr,"des_encrypt_u16_risc1_ptr", 9); + time_it(des_encrypt_u4_risc2_ptr, "des_encrypt_u4_risc2_ptr ",10); + time_it(des_encrypt_u16_risc2_ptr,"des_encrypt_u16_risc2_ptr",11); + num+=3; +#endif + +#ifdef PART1 + str[0]=" 4 c i"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u4_cisc_idx ",0); + max=tm[0]; + max_idx=0; + str[1]="16 c i"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u16_cisc_idx ",1); + if (max < tm[1]) { max=tm[1]; max_idx=1; } + str[2]=" 4 r1 i"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u4_risc1_idx ",2); + if (max < tm[2]) { max=tm[2]; max_idx=2; } +#endif +#ifdef PART2 + str[3]="16 r1 i"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u16_risc1_idx",3); + if (max < tm[3]) { max=tm[3]; max_idx=3; } + str[4]=" 4 r2 i"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u4_risc2_idx ",4); + if (max < tm[4]) { max=tm[4]; max_idx=4; } + str[5]="16 r2 i"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u16_risc2_idx",5); + if (max < tm[5]) { max=tm[5]; max_idx=5; } +#endif +#ifdef PART3 + str[6]=" 4 c p"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u4_cisc_ptr ",6); + if (max < tm[6]) { max=tm[6]; max_idx=6; } + str[7]="16 c p"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u16_cisc_ptr ",7); + if (max < tm[7]) { max=tm[7]; max_idx=7; } + str[8]=" 4 r1 p"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u4_risc1_ptr ",8); + if (max < tm[8]) { max=tm[8]; max_idx=8; } +#endif +#ifdef PART4 + str[9]="16 r1 p"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u16_risc1_ptr",9); + if (max < tm[9]) { max=tm[9]; max_idx=9; } + str[10]=" 4 r2 p"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u4_risc2_ptr ",10); + if (max < tm[10]) { max=tm[10]; max_idx=10; } + str[11]="16 r2 p"; + print_it("des_encrypt_u16_risc2_ptr",11); + if (max < tm[11]) { max=tm[11]; max_idx=11; } +#endif + printf("options des ecb/s\n"); + printf("%s %12.2f 100.0%%\n",str[max_idx],tm[max_idx]); + d=tm[max_idx]; + tm[max_idx]= -2.0; + max= -1.0; + for (;;) + { + for (i=0; i<12; i++) + { + if (max < tm[i]) { max=tm[i]; j=i; } + } + if (max < 0.0) break; + printf("%s %12.2f %4.1f%%\n",str[j],tm[j],tm[j]/d*100.0); + tm[j]= -2.0; + max= -1.0; + } + + switch (max_idx) + { + case 0: + printf("-DDES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS\n"); + break; + case 1: + printf("-DDES_UNROLL\n"); + break; + case 2: + printf("-DDES_RISC1\n"); + break; + case 3: + printf("-DDES_UNROLL -DDES_RISC1\n"); + break; + case 4: + printf("-DDES_RISC2\n"); + break; + case 5: + printf("-DDES_UNROLL -DDES_RISC2\n"); + break; + case 6: + printf("-DDES_PTR\n"); + break; + case 7: + printf("-DDES_UNROLL -DDES_PTR\n"); + break; + case 8: + printf("-DDES_RISC1 -DDES_PTR\n"); + break; + case 9: + printf("-DDES_UNROLL -DDES_RISC1 -DDES_PTR\n"); + break; + case 10: + printf("-DDES_RISC2 -DDES_PTR\n"); + break; + case 11: + printf("-DDES_UNROLL -DDES_RISC2 -DDES_PTR\n"); + break; + } + exit(0); +#if defined(LINT) || defined(MSDOS) + return(0); +#endif + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_ver.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_ver.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5edda07db7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/des_ver.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* crypto/des/des_ver.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +extern char *DES_version; /* SSLeay version string */ +extern char *libdes_version; /* old libdes version string */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/destest.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/destest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0d3ec7b44 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/destest.c @@ -0,0 +1,876 @@ +/* crypto/des/destest.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#if defined(WIN32) || defined(WIN16) || defined(WINDOWS) +#ifndef MSDOS +#define MSDOS +#endif +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif + +#include "des.h" + +/* tisk tisk - the test keys don't all have odd parity :-( */ +/* test data */ +#define NUM_TESTS 34 +static unsigned char key_data[NUM_TESTS][8]={ + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}, + {0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0xFE,0xDC,0xBA,0x98,0x76,0x54,0x32,0x10}, + {0x7C,0xA1,0x10,0x45,0x4A,0x1A,0x6E,0x57}, + {0x01,0x31,0xD9,0x61,0x9D,0xC1,0x37,0x6E}, + {0x07,0xA1,0x13,0x3E,0x4A,0x0B,0x26,0x86}, + {0x38,0x49,0x67,0x4C,0x26,0x02,0x31,0x9E}, + {0x04,0xB9,0x15,0xBA,0x43,0xFE,0xB5,0xB6}, + {0x01,0x13,0xB9,0x70,0xFD,0x34,0xF2,0xCE}, + {0x01,0x70,0xF1,0x75,0x46,0x8F,0xB5,0xE6}, + {0x43,0x29,0x7F,0xAD,0x38,0xE3,0x73,0xFE}, + {0x07,0xA7,0x13,0x70,0x45,0xDA,0x2A,0x16}, + {0x04,0x68,0x91,0x04,0xC2,0xFD,0x3B,0x2F}, + {0x37,0xD0,0x6B,0xB5,0x16,0xCB,0x75,0x46}, + {0x1F,0x08,0x26,0x0D,0x1A,0xC2,0x46,0x5E}, + {0x58,0x40,0x23,0x64,0x1A,0xBA,0x61,0x76}, + {0x02,0x58,0x16,0x16,0x46,0x29,0xB0,0x07}, + {0x49,0x79,0x3E,0xBC,0x79,0xB3,0x25,0x8F}, + {0x4F,0xB0,0x5E,0x15,0x15,0xAB,0x73,0xA7}, + {0x49,0xE9,0x5D,0x6D,0x4C,0xA2,0x29,0xBF}, + {0x01,0x83,0x10,0xDC,0x40,0x9B,0x26,0xD6}, + {0x1C,0x58,0x7F,0x1C,0x13,0x92,0x4F,0xEF}, + {0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01}, + {0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E}, + {0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0xFE,0xDC,0xBA,0x98,0x76,0x54,0x32,0x10}}; + +static unsigned char plain_data[NUM_TESTS][8]={ + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}, + {0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01}, + {0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11}, + {0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0x01,0xA1,0xD6,0xD0,0x39,0x77,0x67,0x42}, + {0x5C,0xD5,0x4C,0xA8,0x3D,0xEF,0x57,0xDA}, + {0x02,0x48,0xD4,0x38,0x06,0xF6,0x71,0x72}, + {0x51,0x45,0x4B,0x58,0x2D,0xDF,0x44,0x0A}, + {0x42,0xFD,0x44,0x30,0x59,0x57,0x7F,0xA2}, + {0x05,0x9B,0x5E,0x08,0x51,0xCF,0x14,0x3A}, + {0x07,0x56,0xD8,0xE0,0x77,0x47,0x61,0xD2}, + {0x76,0x25,0x14,0xB8,0x29,0xBF,0x48,0x6A}, + {0x3B,0xDD,0x11,0x90,0x49,0x37,0x28,0x02}, + {0x26,0x95,0x5F,0x68,0x35,0xAF,0x60,0x9A}, + {0x16,0x4D,0x5E,0x40,0x4F,0x27,0x52,0x32}, + {0x6B,0x05,0x6E,0x18,0x75,0x9F,0x5C,0xCA}, + {0x00,0x4B,0xD6,0xEF,0x09,0x17,0x60,0x62}, + {0x48,0x0D,0x39,0x00,0x6E,0xE7,0x62,0xF2}, + {0x43,0x75,0x40,0xC8,0x69,0x8F,0x3C,0xFA}, + {0x07,0x2D,0x43,0xA0,0x77,0x07,0x52,0x92}, + {0x02,0xFE,0x55,0x77,0x81,0x17,0xF1,0x2A}, + {0x1D,0x9D,0x5C,0x50,0x18,0xF7,0x28,0xC2}, + {0x30,0x55,0x32,0x28,0x6D,0x6F,0x29,0x5A}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF}, + {0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}; + +static unsigned char cipher_data[NUM_TESTS][8]={ + {0x8C,0xA6,0x4D,0xE9,0xC1,0xB1,0x23,0xA7}, + {0x73,0x59,0xB2,0x16,0x3E,0x4E,0xDC,0x58}, + {0x95,0x8E,0x6E,0x62,0x7A,0x05,0x55,0x7B}, + {0xF4,0x03,0x79,0xAB,0x9E,0x0E,0xC5,0x33}, + {0x17,0x66,0x8D,0xFC,0x72,0x92,0x53,0x2D}, + {0x8A,0x5A,0xE1,0xF8,0x1A,0xB8,0xF2,0xDD}, + {0x8C,0xA6,0x4D,0xE9,0xC1,0xB1,0x23,0xA7}, + {0xED,0x39,0xD9,0x50,0xFA,0x74,0xBC,0xC4}, + {0x69,0x0F,0x5B,0x0D,0x9A,0x26,0x93,0x9B}, + {0x7A,0x38,0x9D,0x10,0x35,0x4B,0xD2,0x71}, + {0x86,0x8E,0xBB,0x51,0xCA,0xB4,0x59,0x9A}, + {0x71,0x78,0x87,0x6E,0x01,0xF1,0x9B,0x2A}, + {0xAF,0x37,0xFB,0x42,0x1F,0x8C,0x40,0x95}, + {0x86,0xA5,0x60,0xF1,0x0E,0xC6,0xD8,0x5B}, + {0x0C,0xD3,0xDA,0x02,0x00,0x21,0xDC,0x09}, + {0xEA,0x67,0x6B,0x2C,0xB7,0xDB,0x2B,0x7A}, + {0xDF,0xD6,0x4A,0x81,0x5C,0xAF,0x1A,0x0F}, + {0x5C,0x51,0x3C,0x9C,0x48,0x86,0xC0,0x88}, + {0x0A,0x2A,0xEE,0xAE,0x3F,0xF4,0xAB,0x77}, + {0xEF,0x1B,0xF0,0x3E,0x5D,0xFA,0x57,0x5A}, + {0x88,0xBF,0x0D,0xB6,0xD7,0x0D,0xEE,0x56}, + {0xA1,0xF9,0x91,0x55,0x41,0x02,0x0B,0x56}, + {0x6F,0xBF,0x1C,0xAF,0xCF,0xFD,0x05,0x56}, + {0x2F,0x22,0xE4,0x9B,0xAB,0x7C,0xA1,0xAC}, + {0x5A,0x6B,0x61,0x2C,0xC2,0x6C,0xCE,0x4A}, + {0x5F,0x4C,0x03,0x8E,0xD1,0x2B,0x2E,0x41}, + {0x63,0xFA,0xC0,0xD0,0x34,0xD9,0xF7,0x93}, + {0x61,0x7B,0x3A,0x0C,0xE8,0xF0,0x71,0x00}, + {0xDB,0x95,0x86,0x05,0xF8,0xC8,0xC6,0x06}, + {0xED,0xBF,0xD1,0xC6,0x6C,0x29,0xCC,0xC7}, + {0x35,0x55,0x50,0xB2,0x15,0x0E,0x24,0x51}, + {0xCA,0xAA,0xAF,0x4D,0xEA,0xF1,0xDB,0xAE}, + {0xD5,0xD4,0x4F,0xF7,0x20,0x68,0x3D,0x0D}, + {0x2A,0x2B,0xB0,0x08,0xDF,0x97,0xC2,0xF2}}; + +static unsigned char cipher_ecb2[NUM_TESTS-1][8]={ + {0x92,0x95,0xB5,0x9B,0xB3,0x84,0x73,0x6E}, + {0x19,0x9E,0x9D,0x6D,0xF3,0x9A,0xA8,0x16}, + {0x2A,0x4B,0x4D,0x24,0x52,0x43,0x84,0x27}, + {0x35,0x84,0x3C,0x01,0x9D,0x18,0xC5,0xB6}, + {0x4A,0x5B,0x2F,0x42,0xAA,0x77,0x19,0x25}, + {0xA0,0x6B,0xA9,0xB8,0xCA,0x5B,0x17,0x8A}, + {0xAB,0x9D,0xB7,0xFB,0xED,0x95,0xF2,0x74}, + {0x3D,0x25,0x6C,0x23,0xA7,0x25,0x2F,0xD6}, + {0xB7,0x6F,0xAB,0x4F,0xBD,0xBD,0xB7,0x67}, + {0x8F,0x68,0x27,0xD6,0x9C,0xF4,0x1A,0x10}, + {0x82,0x57,0xA1,0xD6,0x50,0x5E,0x81,0x85}, + {0xA2,0x0F,0x0A,0xCD,0x80,0x89,0x7D,0xFA}, + {0xCD,0x2A,0x53,0x3A,0xDB,0x0D,0x7E,0xF3}, + {0xD2,0xC2,0xBE,0x27,0xE8,0x1B,0x68,0xE3}, + {0xE9,0x24,0xCF,0x4F,0x89,0x3C,0x5B,0x0A}, + {0xA7,0x18,0xC3,0x9F,0xFA,0x9F,0xD7,0x69}, + {0x77,0x2C,0x79,0xB1,0xD2,0x31,0x7E,0xB1}, + {0x49,0xAB,0x92,0x7F,0xD0,0x22,0x00,0xB7}, + {0xCE,0x1C,0x6C,0x7D,0x85,0xE3,0x4A,0x6F}, + {0xBE,0x91,0xD6,0xE1,0x27,0xB2,0xE9,0x87}, + {0x70,0x28,0xAE,0x8F,0xD1,0xF5,0x74,0x1A}, + {0xAA,0x37,0x80,0xBB,0xF3,0x22,0x1D,0xDE}, + {0xA6,0xC4,0xD2,0x5E,0x28,0x93,0xAC,0xB3}, + {0x22,0x07,0x81,0x5A,0xE4,0xB7,0x1A,0xAD}, + {0xDC,0xCE,0x05,0xE7,0x07,0xBD,0xF5,0x84}, + {0x26,0x1D,0x39,0x2C,0xB3,0xBA,0xA5,0x85}, + {0xB4,0xF7,0x0F,0x72,0xFB,0x04,0xF0,0xDC}, + {0x95,0xBA,0xA9,0x4E,0x87,0x36,0xF2,0x89}, + {0xD4,0x07,0x3A,0xF1,0x5A,0x17,0x82,0x0E}, + {0xEF,0x6F,0xAF,0xA7,0x66,0x1A,0x7E,0x89}, + {0xC1,0x97,0xF5,0x58,0x74,0x8A,0x20,0xE7}, + {0x43,0x34,0xCF,0xDA,0x22,0xC4,0x86,0xC8}, + {0x08,0xD7,0xB4,0xFB,0x62,0x9D,0x08,0x85}}; + +static unsigned char cbc_key [8]={0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}; +static unsigned char cbc2_key[8]={0xf0,0xe1,0xd2,0xc3,0xb4,0xa5,0x96,0x87}; +static unsigned char cbc3_key[8]={0xfe,0xdc,0xba,0x98,0x76,0x54,0x32,0x10}; +static unsigned char cbc_iv [8]={0xfe,0xdc,0xba,0x98,0x76,0x54,0x32,0x10}; +static char cbc_data[40]="7654321 Now is the time for "; + +static unsigned char cbc_ok[32]={ + 0xcc,0xd1,0x73,0xff,0xab,0x20,0x39,0xf4, + 0xac,0xd8,0xae,0xfd,0xdf,0xd8,0xa1,0xeb, + 0x46,0x8e,0x91,0x15,0x78,0x88,0xba,0x68, + 0x1d,0x26,0x93,0x97,0xf7,0xfe,0x62,0xb4}; + +static unsigned char xcbc_ok[32]={ + 0x86,0x74,0x81,0x0D,0x61,0xA4,0xA5,0x48, + 0xB9,0x93,0x03,0xE1,0xB8,0xBB,0xBD,0xBD, + 0x64,0x30,0x0B,0xB9,0x06,0x65,0x81,0x76, + 0x04,0x1D,0x77,0x62,0x17,0xCA,0x2B,0xD2, + }; + +static unsigned char cbc3_ok[32]={ + 0x3F,0xE3,0x01,0xC9,0x62,0xAC,0x01,0xD0, + 0x22,0x13,0x76,0x3C,0x1C,0xBD,0x4C,0xDC, + 0x79,0x96,0x57,0xC0,0x64,0xEC,0xF5,0xD4, + 0x1C,0x67,0x38,0x12,0xCF,0xDE,0x96,0x75}; + +static unsigned char pcbc_ok[32]={ + 0xcc,0xd1,0x73,0xff,0xab,0x20,0x39,0xf4, + 0x6d,0xec,0xb4,0x70,0xa0,0xe5,0x6b,0x15, + 0xae,0xa6,0xbf,0x61,0xed,0x7d,0x9c,0x9f, + 0xf7,0x17,0x46,0x3b,0x8a,0xb3,0xcc,0x88}; + +static unsigned char cfb_key[8]={0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}; +static unsigned char cfb_iv[8]={0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x90,0xab,0xcd,0xef}; +static unsigned char cfb_buf1[40],cfb_buf2[40],cfb_tmp[8]; +static unsigned char plain[24]= + { + 0x4e,0x6f,0x77,0x20,0x69,0x73, + 0x20,0x74,0x68,0x65,0x20,0x74, + 0x69,0x6d,0x65,0x20,0x66,0x6f, + 0x72,0x20,0x61,0x6c,0x6c,0x20 + }; +static unsigned char cfb_cipher8[24]= { + 0xf3,0x1f,0xda,0x07,0x01,0x14, 0x62,0xee,0x18,0x7f,0x43,0xd8, + 0x0a,0x7c,0xd9,0xb5,0xb0,0xd2, 0x90,0xda,0x6e,0x5b,0x9a,0x87 }; +static unsigned char cfb_cipher16[24]={ + 0xF3,0x09,0x87,0x87,0x7F,0x57, 0xF7,0x3C,0x36,0xB6,0xDB,0x70, + 0xD8,0xD5,0x34,0x19,0xD3,0x86, 0xB2,0x23,0xB7,0xB2,0xAD,0x1B }; +static unsigned char cfb_cipher32[24]={ + 0xF3,0x09,0x62,0x49,0xA4,0xDF, 0xA4,0x9F,0x33,0xDC,0x7B,0xAD, + 0x4C,0xC8,0x9F,0x64,0xE4,0x53, 0xE5,0xEC,0x67,0x20,0xDA,0xB6 }; +static unsigned char cfb_cipher48[24]={ + 0xF3,0x09,0x62,0x49,0xC7,0xF4, 0x30,0xB5,0x15,0xEC,0xBB,0x85, + 0x97,0x5A,0x13,0x8C,0x68,0x60, 0xE2,0x38,0x34,0x3C,0xDC,0x1F }; +static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[24]={ + 0xF3,0x09,0x62,0x49,0xC7,0xF4, 0x6E,0x51,0xA6,0x9E,0x83,0x9B, + 0x1A,0x92,0xF7,0x84,0x03,0x46, 0x71,0x33,0x89,0x8E,0xA6,0x22 }; + +static unsigned char ofb_key[8]={0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}; +static unsigned char ofb_iv[8]={0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x90,0xab,0xcd,0xef}; +static unsigned char ofb_buf1[24],ofb_buf2[24],ofb_tmp[8]; +static unsigned char ofb_cipher[24]= + { + 0xf3,0x09,0x62,0x49,0xc7,0xf4,0x6e,0x51, + 0x35,0xf2,0x4a,0x24,0x2e,0xeb,0x3d,0x3f, + 0x3d,0x6d,0x5b,0xe3,0x25,0x5a,0xf8,0xc3 + }; + +DES_LONG cbc_cksum_ret=0xB462FEF7L; +unsigned char cbc_cksum_data[8]={0x1D,0x26,0x93,0x97,0xf7,0xfe,0x62,0xb4}; + +#ifndef NOPROTO +static char *pt(unsigned char *p); +static int cfb_test(int bits, unsigned char *cfb_cipher); +static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher); +static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher); +#else +static char *pt(); +static int cfb_test(); +static int cfb64_test(); +static int ede_cfb64_test(); +#endif + +int main(argc,argv) +int argc; +char *argv[]; + { + int i,j,err=0; + des_cblock in,out,outin,iv3; + des_key_schedule ks,ks2,ks3; + unsigned char cbc_in[40]; + unsigned char cbc_out[40]; + DES_LONG cs; + unsigned char cret[8]; +#ifdef _CRAY + struct { + int a:32; + int b:32; + } lqret[2]; +#else + DES_LONG lqret[4]; +#endif + int num; + char *str; + + printf("Doing ecb\n"); + for (i=0; i>4)&0xf]; + ret[i*2+1]=f[p[i]&0xf]; + } + ret[16]='\0'; + return(ret); + } + +#ifndef LIBDES_LIT + +static int cfb_test(bits, cfb_cipher) +int bits; +unsigned char *cfb_cipher; + { + des_key_schedule ks; + int i,err=0; + + des_key_sched((C_Block *)cfb_key,ks); + memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,sizeof(cfb_iv)); + des_cfb_encrypt(plain,cfb_buf1,bits,(long)sizeof(plain),ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,DES_ENCRYPT); + if (memcmp(cfb_cipher,cfb_buf1,sizeof(plain)) != 0) + { + err=1; + printf("cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); + for (i=0; i<24; i+=8) + printf("%s\n",pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); + } + memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,sizeof(cfb_iv)); + des_cfb_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,bits,(long)sizeof(plain),ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,DES_DECRYPT); + if (memcmp(plain,cfb_buf2,sizeof(plain)) != 0) + { + err=1; + printf("cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); + for (i=0; i<24; i+=8) + printf("%s\n",pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); + } + return(err); + } + +static int cfb64_test(cfb_cipher) +unsigned char *cfb_cipher; + { + des_key_schedule ks; + int err=0,i,n; + + des_key_sched((C_Block *)cfb_key,ks); + memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,sizeof(cfb_iv)); + n=0; + des_cfb64_encrypt(plain,cfb_buf1,(long)12,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_ENCRYPT); + des_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]),&(cfb_buf1[12]), + (long)sizeof(plain)-12,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_ENCRYPT); + if (memcmp(cfb_cipher,cfb_buf1,sizeof(plain)) != 0) + { + err=1; + printf("cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); + for (i=0; i<24; i+=8) + printf("%s\n",pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); + } + memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,sizeof(cfb_iv)); + n=0; + des_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)17,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_DECRYPT); + des_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]),&(cfb_buf2[17]), + (long)sizeof(plain)-17,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_DECRYPT); + if (memcmp(plain,cfb_buf2,sizeof(plain)) != 0) + { + err=1; + printf("cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); + for (i=0; i<24; i+=8) + printf("%s\n",pt(&(cfb_buf2[i]))); + } + return(err); + } + +static int ede_cfb64_test(cfb_cipher) +unsigned char *cfb_cipher; + { + des_key_schedule ks; + int err=0,i,n; + + des_key_sched((C_Block *)cfb_key,ks); + memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,sizeof(cfb_iv)); + n=0; + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(plain,cfb_buf1,(long)12,ks,ks,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_ENCRYPT); + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]),&(cfb_buf1[12]), + (long)sizeof(plain)-12,ks,ks,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_ENCRYPT); + if (memcmp(cfb_cipher,cfb_buf1,sizeof(plain)) != 0) + { + err=1; + printf("ede_cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); + for (i=0; i<24; i+=8) + printf("%s\n",pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); + } + memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,sizeof(cfb_iv)); + n=0; + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)17,ks,ks,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_DECRYPT); + des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]),&(cfb_buf2[17]), + (long)sizeof(plain)-17,ks,ks,ks, + (C_Block *)cfb_tmp,&n,DES_DECRYPT); + if (memcmp(plain,cfb_buf2,sizeof(plain)) != 0) + { + err=1; + printf("ede_cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); + for (i=0; i<24; i+=8) + printf("%s\n",pt(&(cfb_buf2[i]))); + } + return(err); + } + +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/dllmain.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/dllmain.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5250967507 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/dllmain.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: dllmain.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:38 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +BOOL WINAPI +DllMain (HANDLE hInst, + ULONG reason, + LPVOID lpReserved) +{ + switch(reason) { + case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: + case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: + default: + return TRUE; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doIP b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doIP new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18cf231303 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doIP @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +@l=( + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, + 8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,15, + 16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23, + 24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 + ); +@r=( + 32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39, + 40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47, + 48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55, + 56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63 + ); + +require 'shifts.pl'; + +sub PERM_OP + { + local(*a,*b,*t,$n,$m)=@_; + + @z=&shift(*a,-$n); + @z=&xor(*b,*z); + @z=&and(*z,$m); + @b=&xor(*b,*z); + @z=&shift(*z,$n); + @a=&xor(*a,*z); + } + + +@L=@l; +@R=@r; +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,4,0x0f0f0f0f); +&PERM_OP(*L,*R,*T,16,0x0000ffff); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,2,0x33333333); +&PERM_OP(*L,*R,*T,8,0x00ff00ff); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,1,0x55555555); + &printit(@L); + &printit(@R); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,1,0x55555555); +&PERM_OP(*L,*R,*T,8,0x00ff00ff); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,2,0x33333333); +&PERM_OP(*L,*R,*T,16,0x0000ffff); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,4,0x0f0f0f0f); + &printit(@L); + &printit(@R); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doPC1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doPC1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..096afd8c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doPC1 @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +@l=( + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, + 8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,15, + 16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23, + 24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 + ); +@r=( + 32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39, + 40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47, + 48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55, + 56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63 + ); + +require 'shifts.pl'; + +sub PERM_OP + { + local(*a,*b,*t,$n,$m)=@_; + + @z=&shift(*a,-$n); + @z=&xor(*b,*z); + @z=&and(*z,$m); + @b=&xor(*b,*z); + @z=&shift(*z,$n); + @a=&xor(*a,*z); + } + +sub HPERM_OP2 + { + local(*a,*t,$n,$m)=@_; + local(@x,@y,$i); + + @z=&shift(*a,16-$n); + @z=&xor(*a,*z); + @z=&and(*z,$m); + @a=&xor(*a,*z); + @z=&shift(*z,$n-16); + @a=&xor(*a,*z); + } + +sub HPERM_OP + { + local(*a,*t,$n,$m)=@_; + local(@x,@y,$i); + + for ($i=0; $i<16; $i++) + { + $x[$i]=$a[$i]; + $y[$i]=$a[16+$i]; + } + @z=&shift(*x,-$n); + @z=&xor(*y,*z); + @z=&and(*z,$m); + @y=&xor(*y,*z); + @z=&shift(*z,$n); + @x=&xor(*x,*z); + for ($i=0; $i<16; $i++) + { + $a[$i]=$x[$i]; + $a[16+$i]=$y[$i]; + } + } + +@L=@l; +@R=@r; + + print "---\n"; &printit(@R); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,4,0x0f0f0f0f); + print "---\n"; &printit(@R); +&HPERM_OP2(*L,*T,-2,0xcccc0000); +&HPERM_OP2(*R,*T,-2,0xcccc0000); + print "---\n"; &printit(@R); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,1,0x55555555); + print "---\n"; &printit(@R); +&PERM_OP(*L,*R,*T,8,0x00ff00ff); + print "---\n"; &printit(@R); +&PERM_OP(*R,*L,*T,1,0x55555555); + print "---\n"; &printit(@R); +# &printit(@L); + &printit(@R); +print <<"EOF"; +============================== +63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 +62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 +61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 +60 52 44 36 -- -- -- -- + +57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 +58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 +59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 +28 20 12 4 -- -- -- -- +EOF +exit(1); +@A=&and(*R,0x000000ff); +@A=&shift(*A,16); +@B=&and(*R,0x0000ff00); +@C=&and(*R,0x00ff0000); +@C=&shift(*C,-16); +@D=&and(*L,0xf0000000); +@D=&shift(*D,-4); +@A=&or(*A,*B); +@B=&or(*D,*C); +@R=&or(*A,*B); +@L=&and(*L,0x0fffffff); + + &printit(@L); + &printit(@R); + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doPC2 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doPC2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa5cf74cf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/doPC2 @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +@PC2_C=(14,17,11,24, 1, 5, + 3,28,15, 6,21,10, + 23,19,12, 4,26, 8, + 16, 7,27,20,13, 2, + ); + +@PC2_D=(41,52,31,37,47,55, + 30,40,51,45,33,48, + 44,49,39,56,34,53, + 46,42,50,36,29,32, + ); + +$i=0; +foreach (@PC2_C) { + $_--; +# printf "%2d,",$_; + $C{$_}=$i; + ++$i; +# print "\n" if ((($i) % 8) == 0); + } +$i=0; +#print "\n"; +foreach (@PC2_D) { + $_-=28; + $_--; +# printf "%2d,",$_; + $D{$_}=$i; + $i++; +# print "\n" if ((($i) % 8) == 0); + } + +#print "\n"; +foreach $i (0 .. 27) + { + $_=$C{$i}; +# printf "%2d,",$_; + $i++; +# print "\n" if ((($i) % 8) == 0); + } +#print "\n"; + +#print "\n"; +foreach $i (0 .. 27) + { + $_=$D{$i}; +# printf "%2d,",$_; + $i++; +# print "\n" if ((($i) % 8) == 0); + } +#print "\n"; + +print "static ulong skb[8][64]={\n"; +&doit("C",*C, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); +&doit("C",*C, 6, 7, 9,10,11,12); +&doit("C",*C,13,14,15,16,18,19); +&doit("C",*C,20,22,23,25,26,27); + +&doit("D",*D, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); +&doit("D",*D, 7, 8,10,11,12,13); +&doit("D",*D,15,16,17,18,19,20); +&doit("D",*D,21,22,23,24,26,27); +print "};\n"; + +sub doit + { + local($l,*A,@b)=@_; + local(@out); + + printf("/* for $l bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) %d %d %d %d %d %d */\n", + $b[0]+1, $b[1]+1, $b[2]+1, $b[3]+1, $b[4]+1, $b[5]+1); + for ($i=0; $i<64; $i++) + { + $out[$i]=0; + $j=1; +#print "\n"; + for ($k=0; $k<6; $k++) + { + $l=$A{$b[$k]}; +#print"$l - "; + if ((1<<$k) & $i) + { + $ll=int($l/6)*8+($l%6); + $out[$i]|=1<<($ll); + } + } + $pp=$out[$i]; + $pp=($pp&0xff0000ff)| (($pp&0x00ff0000)>>8)| + (($pp&0x0000ff00)<<8); + printf("0x%08X,",$pp); + print "\n" if (($i+1) % 4 == 0); + } + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ecb3_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ecb3_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..03d8f87771 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ecb3_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* crypto/des/ecb3_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_ecb3_encrypt(input, output, ks1, ks2, ks3, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +des_key_schedule ks1; +des_key_schedule ks2; +des_key_schedule ks3; +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG l0,l1; + register unsigned char *in,*out; + DES_LONG ll[2]; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + c2l(in,l0); + c2l(in,l1); + ll[0]=l0; + ll[1]=l1; + if (encrypt) + des_encrypt3(ll,ks1,ks2,ks3); + else + des_decrypt3(ll,ks1,ks2,ks3); + l0=ll[0]; + l1=ll[1]; + l2c(l0,out); + l2c(l1,out); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ecb_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ecb_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5fcaf19289 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ecb_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* crypto/des/ecb_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "spr.h" + +char *libdes_version="libdes v 4.01 - 13-Jan-1997 - eay"; +char *DES_version="DES part of SSLeay 0.6.6 14-Jan-1997"; + +char *des_options() + { + static int init=1; + static char buf[32]; + + if (init) + { + char *ptr,*unroll,*risc,*size; + + init=0; +#ifdef DES_PTR + ptr="ptr"; +#else + ptr="idx"; +#endif +#if defined(DES_RISC1) || defined(DES_RISC2) +#ifdef DES_RISC1 + risc="risc1"; +#endif +#ifdef DES_RISC2 + risc="risc2"; +#endif +#else + risc="cisc"; +#endif +#ifdef DES_UNROLL + unroll="16"; +#else + unroll="4"; +#endif + if (sizeof(DES_LONG) != sizeof(long)) + size="int"; + else + size="long"; + sprintf(buf,"des(%s,%s,%s,%s)",ptr,risc,unroll,size); + } + return(buf); + } + + +void des_ecb_encrypt(input, output, ks, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +des_key_schedule ks; +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG l; + register unsigned char *in,*out; + DES_LONG ll[2]; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + c2l(in,l); ll[0]=l; + c2l(in,l); ll[1]=l; + des_encrypt(ll,ks,encrypt); + l=ll[0]; l2c(l,out); + l=ll[1]; l2c(l,out); + l=ll[0]=ll[1]=0; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ede_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ede_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c62efac4e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ede_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +/* crypto/des/ede_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(input, output, length, ks1, ks2, ks3, ivec, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule ks1; +des_key_schedule ks2; +des_key_schedule ks3; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG tin0,tin1; + register DES_LONG tout0,tout1,xor0,xor1; + register unsigned char *in,*out; + register long l=length; + DES_LONG tin[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + + if (encrypt) + { + c2l(iv,tout0); + c2l(iv,tout1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + tin0^=tout0; + tin1^=tout1; + + tin[0]=tin0; + tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin,ks1,ks2,ks3); + tout0=tin[0]; + tout1=tin[1]; + + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2ln(in,tin0,tin1,l+8); + tin0^=tout0; + tin1^=tout1; + + tin[0]=tin0; + tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin,ks1,ks2,ks3); + tout0=tin[0]; + tout1=tin[1]; + + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + } + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(tout0,iv); + l2c(tout1,iv); + } + else + { + register DES_LONG t0,t1; + + c2l(iv,xor0); + c2l(iv,xor1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + + t0=tin0; + t1=tin1; + + tin[0]=tin0; + tin[1]=tin1; + des_decrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin,ks1,ks2,ks3); + tout0=tin[0]; + tout1=tin[1]; + + tout0^=xor0; + tout1^=xor1; + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + xor0=t0; + xor1=t1; + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + + t0=tin0; + t1=tin1; + + tin[0]=tin0; + tin[1]=tin1; + des_decrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin,ks1,ks2,ks3); + tout0=tin[0]; + tout1=tin[1]; + + tout0^=xor0; + tout1^=xor1; + l2cn(tout0,tout1,out,l+8); + xor0=t0; + xor1=t1; + } + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(xor0,iv); + l2c(xor1,iv); + } + tin0=tin1=tout0=tout1=xor0=xor1=0; + tin[0]=tin[1]=0; + } + +#ifdef undef /* MACRO */ +void des_ede2_cbc_encrypt(input, output, length, ks1, ks2, ivec, enc) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule ks1; +des_key_schedule ks2; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int enc; + { + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(input,output,length,ks1,ks2,ks1,ivec,enc); + } +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/enc_read.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/enc_read.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa2612cd8b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/enc_read.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* crypto/des/enc_read.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include +#include +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* This has some uglies in it but it works - even over sockets. */ +/*extern int errno;*/ +int des_rw_mode=DES_PCBC_MODE; + +int des_enc_read(fd, buf, len, sched, iv) +int fd; +char *buf; +int len; +des_key_schedule sched; +des_cblock (*iv); + { + /* data to be unencrypted */ + int net_num=0; + static unsigned char *net=NULL; + /* extra unencrypted data + * for when a block of 100 comes in but is des_read one byte at + * a time. */ + static char *unnet=NULL; + static int unnet_start=0; + static int unnet_left=0; + static char *tmpbuf=NULL; + int i; + long num=0,rnum; + unsigned char *p; + + if (tmpbuf == NULL) + { + tmpbuf=(char *)malloc(des_BSIZE); + if (tmpbuf == NULL) return(-1); + } + if (net == NULL) + { + net=(unsigned char *)malloc(des_BSIZE); + if (net == NULL) return(-1); + } + if (unnet == NULL) + { + unnet=(char *)malloc(des_BSIZE); + if (unnet == NULL) return(-1); + } + /* left over data from last decrypt */ + if (unnet_left != 0) + { + if (unnet_left < len) + { + /* we still still need more data but will return + * with the number of bytes we have - should always + * check the return value */ + memcpy(buf,&(unnet[unnet_start]), + (unsigned int)unnet_left); + /* eay 26/08/92 I had the next 2 lines + * reversed :-( */ + i=unnet_left; + unnet_start=unnet_left=0; + } + else + { + memcpy(buf,&(unnet[unnet_start]),(unsigned int)len); + unnet_start+=len; + unnet_left-=len; + i=len; + } + return(i); + } + + /* We need to get more data. */ + if (len > MAXWRITE) len=MAXWRITE; + + /* first - get the length */ + while (net_num < HDRSIZE) + { + i=read(fd,&(net[net_num]),(unsigned int)HDRSIZE-net_num); + if ((i == -1) && (errno == EINTR)) continue; + if (i <= 0) return(0); + net_num+=i; + } + + /* we now have at net_num bytes in net */ + p=net; + /* num=0; */ + n2l(p,num); + /* num should be rounded up to the next group of eight + * we make sure that we have read a multiple of 8 bytes from the net. + */ + if ((num > MAXWRITE) || (num < 0)) /* error */ + return(-1); + rnum=(num < 8)?8:((num+7)/8*8); + + net_num=0; + while (net_num < rnum) + { + i=read(fd,&(net[net_num]),(unsigned int)rnum-net_num); + if ((i == -1) && (errno == EINTR)) continue; + if (i <= 0) return(0); + net_num+=i; + } + + /* Check if there will be data left over. */ + if (len < num) + { + if (des_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE) + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)net,(des_cblock *)unnet, + num,sched,iv,DES_DECRYPT); + else + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)net,(des_cblock *)unnet, + num,sched,iv,DES_DECRYPT); + memcpy(buf,unnet,(unsigned int)len); + unnet_start=len; + unnet_left=(int)num-len; + + /* The following line is done because we return num + * as the number of bytes read. */ + num=len; + } + else + { + /* >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum + * >we must be careful. The user must be aware that this + * >routine will write more bytes than he asked for. + * >The length of the buffer must be correct. + * FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */ + if (len < rnum) + { + + if (des_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE) + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)net, + (des_cblock *)tmpbuf, + num,sched,iv,DES_DECRYPT); + else + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)net, + (des_cblock *)tmpbuf, + num,sched,iv,DES_DECRYPT); + + /* eay 26/08/92 fix a bug that returned more + * bytes than you asked for (returned len bytes :-( */ + memcpy(buf,tmpbuf,(unsigned int)num); + } + else + { + if (des_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE) + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)net, + (des_cblock *)buf,num,sched,iv, + DES_DECRYPT); + else + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)net, + (des_cblock *)buf,num,sched,iv, + DES_DECRYPT); + } + } + return((int)num); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/enc_writ.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fbc93e35d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/enc_writ.c @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/* crypto/des/enc_writ.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include +#include +#include "des_locl.h" + +int des_enc_write(fd, buf, len, sched, iv) +int fd; +char *buf; +int len; +des_key_schedule sched; +des_cblock (*iv); + { +#ifdef _LIBC + extern int srandom(); + extern unsigned long time(); + extern int random(); + extern int write(); +#endif + + long rnum; + int i,j,k,outnum; + char *outbuf=NULL; + char shortbuf[8]; + char *p; + static int start=1; + + if (outbuf == NULL) + { + outbuf=(char *)malloc(des_BSIZE+HDRSIZE); + if (outbuf == NULL) return(-1); + } + /* If we are sending less than 8 bytes, the same char will look + * the same if we don't pad it out with random bytes */ + if (start) + { + start=0; + srandom((unsigned int)time(NULL)); + } + + /* lets recurse if we want to send the data in small chunks */ + if (len > MAXWRITE) + { + j=0; + for (i=0; i MAXWRITE)?MAXWRITE:(len-i),sched,iv); + if (k < 0) + return(k); + else + j+=k; + } + return(j); + } + + /* write length first */ + p=outbuf; + l2n(len,p); + + /* pad short strings */ + if (len < 8) + { + p=shortbuf; + memcpy(shortbuf,buf,(unsigned int)len); + for (i=len; i<8; i++) + shortbuf[i]=random(); + rnum=8; + } + else + { + p=buf; + rnum=((len+7)/8*8); /* round up to nearest eight */ + } + + if (des_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE) + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)p, + (des_cblock *)&(outbuf[HDRSIZE]), + (long)((len<8)?8:len),sched,iv,DES_ENCRYPT); + else + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)p, + (des_cblock *)&(outbuf[HDRSIZE]), + (long)((len<8)?8:len),sched,iv,DES_ENCRYPT); + + /* output */ + outnum=(int)rnum+HDRSIZE; + + for (j=0; j + +/* Eric Young. + * This version of crypt has been developed from my MIT compatable + * DES library. + * The library is available at pub/Crypto/DES at ftp.psy.uq.oz.au + * eay@mincom.oz.au or eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au + */ + +/* Modification by Jens Kupferschmidt (Cu) + * I have included directive PARA for shared memory computers. + * I have included a directive LONGCRYPT to using this routine to cipher + * passwords with more than 8 bytes like HP-UX 10.x it used. The MAXPLEN + * definition is the maximum of lenght of password and can changed. I have + * defined 24. + */ + +#define FCRYPT_MOD(R,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ + u=R>>16; \ + t=R^u; \ + u=t&E0; t=t&E1; \ + tmp=(u<<16); u^=R^s[S ]; u^=tmp; \ + tmp=(t<<16); t^=R^s[S+1]; t^=tmp + +#define DES_FCRYPT +#include "des_locl.h" +#undef DES_FCRYPT + +#undef PERM_OP +#define PERM_OP(a,b,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)>>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ + (b)^=(t),\ + (a)^=((t)<<(n))) + +#undef HPERM_OP +#define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\ + (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n))))\ + +#ifdef PARA +#define STATIC +#else +#define STATIC static +#endif + +/* It used to be Only FreeBSD that had MD5 based crypts, but now it's + * also the case on Redhat linux 6.0 and OpenBSD so we always include + * this code. That solves the problem of making the test program + * conditional as well. + */ + +#define MD5_CRYPT_SUPPORT 1 + +#if MD5_CRYPT_SUPPORT +/* + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): + * wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you + * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think + * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include + +static unsigned char itoa64[] = /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */ + "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + +static void +to64(s, v, n) + char *s; + unsigned long v; + int n; +{ + while (--n >= 0) { + *s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f]; + v >>= 6; + } +} + +/* + * UNIX password + * + * Use MD5 for what it is best at... + */ + +static +char * +crypt_md5(pw, salt) + register const char *pw; + register const char *salt; +{ + static char *magic = "$1$"; /* + * This string is magic for + * this algorithm. Having + * it this way, we can get + * get better later on + */ + static char passwd[120], *p; + static const char *sp,*ep; + unsigned char final[16]; + int sl,pl,i,j; + MD5_CTX ctx,ctx1; + unsigned long l; + + /* Refine the Salt first */ + sp = salt; + + /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */ + if(!strncmp(sp,magic,strlen(magic))) + sp += strlen(magic); + + /* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */ + for(ep=sp;*ep && *ep != '$' && ep < (sp+8);ep++) + continue; + + /* get the length of the true salt */ + sl = ep - sp; + + MD5_Init(&ctx); + + /* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */ + MD5_Update(&ctx,pw,strlen(pw)); + + /* Then our magic string */ + MD5_Update(&ctx,magic,strlen(magic)); + + /* Then the raw salt */ + MD5_Update(&ctx,sp,sl); + + /* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw,salt,pw) */ + MD5_Init(&ctx1); + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + MD5_Update(&ctx1,sp,sl); + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + MD5_Final(final,&ctx1); + for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16) + MD5_Update(&ctx,final,pl>16 ? 16 : pl); + + /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ + memset(final,0,sizeof final); + + /* Then something really weird... */ + for (j=0,i = strlen(pw); i ; i >>= 1) + if(i&1) + MD5_Update(&ctx, final+j, 1); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx, pw+j, 1); + + /* Now make the output string */ + strcpy(passwd, magic); /* sizeof(passwd) > sizeof(magic) */ + strncat(passwd, sp, sl); /* ok, since sl <= 8 */ + strcat(passwd, "$"); + + MD5_Final(final,&ctx); + + /* + * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast + * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would + * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary... + */ + for(i=0;i<1000;i++) { + MD5_Init(&ctx1); + if(i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx1,final,16); + + if(i % 3) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,sp,sl); + + if(i % 7) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + + if(i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,final,16); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + MD5_Final(final,&ctx1); + } + + p = passwd + strlen(passwd); + + l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = final[11] ; to64(p,l,2); p += 2; + *p = '\0'; + + /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ + memset(final,0,sizeof final); + + return passwd; +} +#endif /* MD5_CRYPT_SUPPORT */ + +#ifndef NOPROTO + +STATIC int fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out0, DES_LONG *out1, + des_key_schedule ks, DES_LONG Eswap0, DES_LONG Eswap1); + +#else + +STATIC int fcrypt_body(); + +#endif + +/* Added more values to handle illegal salt values the way normal + * crypt() implementations do. The patch was sent by + * Bjorn Gronvall + */ +static unsigned const char con_salt[128]={ +0xD2,0xD3,0xD4,0xD5,0xD6,0xD7,0xD8,0xD9, +0xDA,0xDB,0xDC,0xDD,0xDE,0xDF,0xE0,0xE1, +0xE2,0xE3,0xE4,0xE5,0xE6,0xE7,0xE8,0xE9, +0xEA,0xEB,0xEC,0xED,0xEE,0xEF,0xF0,0xF1, +0xF2,0xF3,0xF4,0xF5,0xF6,0xF7,0xF8,0xF9, +0xFA,0xFB,0xFC,0xFD,0xFE,0xFF,0x00,0x01, +0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,0x08,0x09, +0x0A,0x0B,0x05,0x06,0x07,0x08,0x09,0x0A, +0x0B,0x0C,0x0D,0x0E,0x0F,0x10,0x11,0x12, +0x13,0x14,0x15,0x16,0x17,0x18,0x19,0x1A, +0x1B,0x1C,0x1D,0x1E,0x1F,0x20,0x21,0x22, +0x23,0x24,0x25,0x20,0x21,0x22,0x23,0x24, +0x25,0x26,0x27,0x28,0x29,0x2A,0x2B,0x2C, +0x2D,0x2E,0x2F,0x30,0x31,0x32,0x33,0x34, +0x35,0x36,0x37,0x38,0x39,0x3A,0x3B,0x3C, +0x3D,0x3E,0x3F,0x40,0x41,0x42,0x43,0x44, +}; + +static unsigned const char cov_2char[64]={ +0x2E,0x2F,0x30,0x31,0x32,0x33,0x34,0x35, +0x36,0x37,0x38,0x39,0x41,0x42,0x43,0x44, +0x45,0x46,0x47,0x48,0x49,0x4A,0x4B,0x4C, +0x4D,0x4E,0x4F,0x50,0x51,0x52,0x53,0x54, +0x55,0x56,0x57,0x58,0x59,0x5A,0x61,0x62, +0x63,0x64,0x65,0x66,0x67,0x68,0x69,0x6A, +0x6B,0x6C,0x6D,0x6E,0x6F,0x70,0x71,0x72, +0x73,0x74,0x75,0x76,0x77,0x78,0x79,0x7A +}; + +#ifndef NOPROTO +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(const char *buf,const char *salt); +#else +char *crypt(const char *buf,const char *salt); +#endif +#else +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(); +#else +char *crypt(); +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef PERL5 +char *des_crypt(buf,salt) +#else +char *crypt(buf,salt) +#endif +const char *buf; +const char *salt; + { + static char buff[14]; + +#if MD5_CRYPT_SUPPORT + if (!strncmp(salt, "$1$", 3)) + return crypt_md5(buf, salt); +#endif + + return(des_fcrypt(buf,salt,buff)); + } + + +char *des_fcrypt(buf,salt,ret) +const char *buf; +const char *salt; +char *ret; + { + unsigned int i,j,x,y; + DES_LONG Eswap0,Eswap1; + DES_LONG out[2],ll; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule ks; + unsigned char bb[9]; + unsigned char *b=bb; + unsigned char c,u; + + /* eay 25/08/92 + * If you call crypt("pwd","*") as often happens when you + * have * as the pwd field in /etc/passwd, the function + * returns *\0XXXXXXXXX + * The \0 makes the string look like * so the pwd "*" would + * crypt to "*". This was found when replacing the crypt in + * our shared libraries. People found that the disbled + * accounts effectivly had no passwd :-(. */ + x=ret[0]=((salt[0] == '\0')?'A':salt[0]); + Eswap0=con_salt[x]<<2; + x=ret[1]=((salt[1] == '\0')?'A':salt[1]); + Eswap1=con_salt[x]<<6; + +/* EAY +r=strlen(buf); +r=(r+7)/8; +*/ + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + { + c= *(buf++); + if (!c) break; + key[i]=(c<<1); + } + for (; i<8; i++) + key[i]=0; + + des_set_key((des_cblock *)(key),ks); + fcrypt_body(&(out[0]),&(out[1]),ks,Eswap0,Eswap1); + + ll=out[0]; l2c(ll,b); + ll=out[1]; l2c(ll,b); + y=0; + u=0x80; + bb[8]=0; + for (i=2; i<13; i++) + { + c=0; + for (j=0; j<6; j++) + { + c<<=1; + if (bb[y] & u) c|=1; + u>>=1; + if (!u) + { + y++; + u=0x80; + } + } + ret[i]=cov_2char[c]; + } + ret[13]='\0'; + return(ret); + } + +STATIC int fcrypt_body(out0, out1, ks, Eswap0, Eswap1) +DES_LONG *out0; +DES_LONG *out1; +des_key_schedule ks; +DES_LONG Eswap0; +DES_LONG Eswap1; + { + register DES_LONG l,r,t,u; +#ifdef DES_PTR + register unsigned char *des_SP=(unsigned char *)des_SPtrans; +#endif + register DES_LONG *s; + register int j; + register DES_LONG E0,E1; + + l=0; + r=0; + + s=(DES_LONG *)ks; + E0=Eswap0; + E1=Eswap1; + + for (j=0; j<25; j++) + { +#ifdef DES_UNROLL + register int i; + + for (i=0; i<32; i+=8) + { + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+0); /* 1 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+6); /* 4 */ + } +#else + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 0); /* 1 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 2); /* 2 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 4); /* 3 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 6); /* 4 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 8); /* 5 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,10); /* 6 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,12); /* 7 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,14); /* 8 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,16); /* 9 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,18); /* 10 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,20); /* 11 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,22); /* 12 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,24); /* 13 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,26); /* 14 */ + D_ENCRYPT(l,r,28); /* 15 */ + D_ENCRYPT(r,l,30); /* 16 */ +#endif + t=l; + l=r; + r=t; + } + l=ROTATE(l,3)&0xffffffffL; + r=ROTATE(r,3)&0xffffffffL; + + PERM_OP(l,r,t, 1,0x55555555L); + PERM_OP(r,l,t, 8,0x00ff00ffL); + PERM_OP(l,r,t, 2,0x33333333L); + PERM_OP(r,l,t,16,0x0000ffffL); + PERM_OP(l,r,t, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); + + *out0=r; + *out1=l; + return(0); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/hash.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/hash.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6761d7f433 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* $Id: hash.h,v 1.1 1999/03/22 19:16:25 joda Exp $ */ + +/* stuff in common between md4, md5, and sha1 */ + +#ifndef __hash_h__ +#define __hash_h__ + +#include +#include + +#ifndef min +#define min(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(b):(a)) +#endif + +/* Vector Crays doesn't have a good 32-bit type, or more precisely, + int32_t as defined by isn't 32 bits, and we don't + want to depend in being able to redefine this type. To cope with + this we have to clamp the result in some places to [0,2^32); no + need to do this on other machines. Did I say this was a mess? + */ + +#ifdef _CRAY +#define CRAYFIX(X) ((X) & 0xffffffff) +#else +#define CRAYFIX(X) (X) +#endif + +static inline u_int32_t +cshift (u_int32_t x, unsigned int n) +{ + x = CRAYFIX(x); + return CRAYFIX((x << n) | (x >> (32 - n))); +} + +#endif /* __hash_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/key_par.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/key_par.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b7e69463e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/key_par.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* MIT Link and source compatibility */ + +#ifdef des_fixup_key_parity +#undef des_fixup_key_parity +#endif /* des_fixup_key_parity */ + +void des_fixup_key_parity(des_cblock *key); + +void +des_fixup_key_parity(des_cblock *key) +{ + des_set_odd_parity(key); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/makefile.bc b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/makefile.bc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1fe6d4915a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/makefile.bc @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# +# Origional BC Makefile from Teun +# +# +CC = bcc +TLIB = tlib /0 /C +# note: the -3 flag produces code for 386, 486, Pentium etc; omit it for 286s +OPTIMIZE= -3 -O2 +#WINDOWS= -W +CFLAGS = -c -ml -d $(OPTIMIZE) $(WINDOWS) -DMSDOS +LFLAGS = -ml $(WINDOWS) + +.c.obj: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $*.c + +.obj.exe: + $(CC) $(LFLAGS) -e$*.exe $*.obj libdes.lib + +all: $(LIB) destest.exe rpw.exe des.exe speed.exe + +# "make clean": use a directory containing only libdes .exe and .obj files... +clean: + del *.exe + del *.obj + del libdes.lib + del libdes.rsp + +OBJS= cbc_cksm.obj cbc_enc.obj ecb_enc.obj pcbc_enc.obj \ + qud_cksm.obj rand_key.obj set_key.obj str2key.obj \ + enc_read.obj enc_writ.obj fcrypt.obj cfb_enc.obj \ + ecb3_enc.obj ofb_enc.obj cbc3_enc.obj read_pwd.obj\ + cfb64enc.obj ofb64enc.obj ede_enc.obj cfb64ede.obj\ + ofb64ede.obj supp.obj + +LIB= libdes.lib + +$(LIB): $(OBJS) + del $(LIB) + makersp "+%s &\n" &&| + $(OBJS) +| >libdes.rsp + $(TLIB) libdes.lib @libdes.rsp,nul + del libdes.rsp + +destest.exe: destest.obj libdes.lib +rpw.exe: rpw.obj libdes.lib +speed.exe: speed.obj libdes.lib +des.exe: des.obj libdes.lib + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md4.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47330ef4f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md4.c @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" + +RCSID("$Id: md4.c,v 1.15 2001/01/29 04:33:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "md4.h" +#include "hash.h" + +#define A m->counter[0] +#define B m->counter[1] +#define C m->counter[2] +#define D m->counter[3] +#define X data + +void +MD4_Init (struct md4 *m) +{ + m->sz[0] = 0; + m->sz[1] = 0; + D = 0x10325476; + C = 0x98badcfe; + B = 0xefcdab89; + A = 0x67452301; +} + +#define F(x,y,z) CRAYFIX((x & y) | (~x & z)) +#define G(x,y,z) ((x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z)) +#define H(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) + +#define DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,OP) \ +a = cshift(a + OP(b,c,d) + X[k] + i, s) + +#define DO1(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,F) +#define DO2(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,G) +#define DO3(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,H) + +static inline void +calc (struct md4 *m, u_int32_t *data) +{ + u_int32_t AA, BB, CC, DD; + + AA = A; + BB = B; + CC = C; + DD = D; + + /* Round 1 */ + + DO1(A,B,C,D,0,3,0); + DO1(D,A,B,C,1,7,0); + DO1(C,D,A,B,2,11,0); + DO1(B,C,D,A,3,19,0); + + DO1(A,B,C,D,4,3,0); + DO1(D,A,B,C,5,7,0); + DO1(C,D,A,B,6,11,0); + DO1(B,C,D,A,7,19,0); + + DO1(A,B,C,D,8,3,0); + DO1(D,A,B,C,9,7,0); + DO1(C,D,A,B,10,11,0); + DO1(B,C,D,A,11,19,0); + + DO1(A,B,C,D,12,3,0); + DO1(D,A,B,C,13,7,0); + DO1(C,D,A,B,14,11,0); + DO1(B,C,D,A,15,19,0); + + /* Round 2 */ + + DO2(A,B,C,D,0,3,0x5A827999); + DO2(D,A,B,C,4,5,0x5A827999); + DO2(C,D,A,B,8,9,0x5A827999); + DO2(B,C,D,A,12,13,0x5A827999); + + DO2(A,B,C,D,1,3,0x5A827999); + DO2(D,A,B,C,5,5,0x5A827999); + DO2(C,D,A,B,9,9,0x5A827999); + DO2(B,C,D,A,13,13,0x5A827999); + + DO2(A,B,C,D,2,3,0x5A827999); + DO2(D,A,B,C,6,5,0x5A827999); + DO2(C,D,A,B,10,9,0x5A827999); + DO2(B,C,D,A,14,13,0x5A827999); + + DO2(A,B,C,D,3,3,0x5A827999); + DO2(D,A,B,C,7,5,0x5A827999); + DO2(C,D,A,B,11,9,0x5A827999); + DO2(B,C,D,A,15,13,0x5A827999); + + /* Round 3 */ + + DO3(A,B,C,D,0,3,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(D,A,B,C,8,9,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(C,D,A,B,4,11,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(B,C,D,A,12,15,0x6ED9EBA1); + + DO3(A,B,C,D,2,3,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(D,A,B,C,10,9,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(C,D,A,B,6,11,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(B,C,D,A,14,15,0x6ED9EBA1); + + DO3(A,B,C,D,1,3,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(D,A,B,C,9,9,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(C,D,A,B,5,11,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(B,C,D,A,13,15,0x6ED9EBA1); + + DO3(A,B,C,D,3,3,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(D,A,B,C,11,9,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(C,D,A,B,7,11,0x6ED9EBA1); + DO3(B,C,D,A,15,15,0x6ED9EBA1); + + A += AA; + B += BB; + C += CC; + D += DD; +} + +/* + * From `Performance analysis of MD5' by Joseph D. Touch + */ + +#if defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN) +static inline u_int32_t +swap_u_int32_t (u_int32_t t) +{ + u_int32_t temp1, temp2; + + temp1 = cshift(t, 16); + temp2 = temp1 >> 8; + temp1 &= 0x00ff00ff; + temp2 &= 0x00ff00ff; + temp1 <<= 8; + return temp1 | temp2; +} +#endif + +struct x32{ + unsigned int a:32; + unsigned int b:32; +}; + +void +MD4_Update (struct md4 *m, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = v; + size_t old_sz = m->sz[0]; + size_t offset; + + m->sz[0] += len * 8; + if (m->sz[0] < old_sz) + ++m->sz[1]; + offset = (old_sz / 8) % 64; + while(len > 0) { + size_t l = min(len, 64 - offset); + memcpy(m->save + offset, p, l); + offset += l; + p += l; + len -= l; + if(offset == 64) { +#if defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN) + int i; + u_int32_t current[16]; + struct x32 *u = (struct x32*)m->save; + for(i = 0; i < 8; i++){ + current[2*i+0] = swap_u_int32_t(u[i].a); + current[2*i+1] = swap_u_int32_t(u[i].b); + } + calc(m, current); +#else + calc(m, (u_int32_t*)m->save); +#endif + offset = 0; + } + } +} + +void +MD4_Final (void *res, struct md4 *m) +{ + static unsigned char zeros[72]; + unsigned offset = (m->sz[0] / 8) % 64; + unsigned int dstart = (120 - offset - 1) % 64 + 1; + + *zeros = 0x80; + memset (zeros + 1, 0, sizeof(zeros) - 1); + zeros[dstart+0] = (m->sz[0] >> 0) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+1] = (m->sz[0] >> 8) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+2] = (m->sz[0] >> 16) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+3] = (m->sz[0] >> 24) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+4] = (m->sz[1] >> 0) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+5] = (m->sz[1] >> 8) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+6] = (m->sz[1] >> 16) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+7] = (m->sz[1] >> 24) & 0xff; + MD4_Update (m, zeros, dstart + 8); + { + int i; + unsigned char *r = (unsigned char *)res; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + r[4*i] = m->counter[i] & 0xFF; + r[4*i+1] = (m->counter[i] >> 8) & 0xFF; + r[4*i+2] = (m->counter[i] >> 16) & 0xFF; + r[4*i+3] = (m->counter[i] >> 24) & 0xFF; + } + } +#if 0 + { + int i; + u_int32_t *r = (u_int32_t *)res; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) + r[i] = swap_u_int32_t (m->counter[i]); + } +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md4.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md4.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2377376ff --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md4.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: md4.h,v 1.8 2001/01/29 02:08:56 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#elif defined(KRB4) +#include +#endif + +struct md4 { + unsigned int sz[2]; + u_int32_t counter[4]; + unsigned char save[64]; +}; + +typedef struct md4 MD4_CTX; + +void MD4_Init (struct md4 *m); +void MD4_Update (struct md4 *m, const void *p, size_t len); +void MD4_Final (void *res, struct md4 *m); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8abba27ac --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5.c @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" + +RCSID("$Id: md5.c,v 1.15 2001/01/29 04:33:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "md5.h" +#include "hash.h" + +#define A m->counter[0] +#define B m->counter[1] +#define C m->counter[2] +#define D m->counter[3] +#define X data + +void +MD5_Init (struct md5 *m) +{ + m->sz[0] = 0; + m->sz[1] = 0; + D = 0x10325476; + C = 0x98badcfe; + B = 0xefcdab89; + A = 0x67452301; +} + +#define F(x,y,z) CRAYFIX((x & y) | (~x & z)) +#define G(x,y,z) CRAYFIX((x & z) | (y & ~z)) +#define H(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define I(x,y,z) CRAYFIX(y ^ (x | ~z)) + +#define DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,OP) \ +a = b + cshift(a + OP(b,c,d) + X[k] + (i), s) + +#define DO1(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,F) +#define DO2(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,G) +#define DO3(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,H) +#define DO4(a,b,c,d,k,s,i) DOIT(a,b,c,d,k,s,i,I) + +static inline void +calc (struct md5 *m, u_int32_t *data) +{ + u_int32_t AA, BB, CC, DD; + + AA = A; + BB = B; + CC = C; + DD = D; + + /* Round 1 */ + + DO1(A,B,C,D,0,7,0xd76aa478); + DO1(D,A,B,C,1,12,0xe8c7b756); + DO1(C,D,A,B,2,17,0x242070db); + DO1(B,C,D,A,3,22,0xc1bdceee); + + DO1(A,B,C,D,4,7,0xf57c0faf); + DO1(D,A,B,C,5,12,0x4787c62a); + DO1(C,D,A,B,6,17,0xa8304613); + DO1(B,C,D,A,7,22,0xfd469501); + + DO1(A,B,C,D,8,7,0x698098d8); + DO1(D,A,B,C,9,12,0x8b44f7af); + DO1(C,D,A,B,10,17,0xffff5bb1); + DO1(B,C,D,A,11,22,0x895cd7be); + + DO1(A,B,C,D,12,7,0x6b901122); + DO1(D,A,B,C,13,12,0xfd987193); + DO1(C,D,A,B,14,17,0xa679438e); + DO1(B,C,D,A,15,22,0x49b40821); + + /* Round 2 */ + + DO2(A,B,C,D,1,5,0xf61e2562); + DO2(D,A,B,C,6,9,0xc040b340); + DO2(C,D,A,B,11,14,0x265e5a51); + DO2(B,C,D,A,0,20,0xe9b6c7aa); + + DO2(A,B,C,D,5,5,0xd62f105d); + DO2(D,A,B,C,10,9,0x2441453); + DO2(C,D,A,B,15,14,0xd8a1e681); + DO2(B,C,D,A,4,20,0xe7d3fbc8); + + DO2(A,B,C,D,9,5,0x21e1cde6); + DO2(D,A,B,C,14,9,0xc33707d6); + DO2(C,D,A,B,3,14,0xf4d50d87); + DO2(B,C,D,A,8,20,0x455a14ed); + + DO2(A,B,C,D,13,5,0xa9e3e905); + DO2(D,A,B,C,2,9,0xfcefa3f8); + DO2(C,D,A,B,7,14,0x676f02d9); + DO2(B,C,D,A,12,20,0x8d2a4c8a); + + /* Round 3 */ + + DO3(A,B,C,D,5,4,0xfffa3942); + DO3(D,A,B,C,8,11,0x8771f681); + DO3(C,D,A,B,11,16,0x6d9d6122); + DO3(B,C,D,A,14,23,0xfde5380c); + + DO3(A,B,C,D,1,4,0xa4beea44); + DO3(D,A,B,C,4,11,0x4bdecfa9); + DO3(C,D,A,B,7,16,0xf6bb4b60); + DO3(B,C,D,A,10,23,0xbebfbc70); + + DO3(A,B,C,D,13,4,0x289b7ec6); + DO3(D,A,B,C,0,11,0xeaa127fa); + DO3(C,D,A,B,3,16,0xd4ef3085); + DO3(B,C,D,A,6,23,0x4881d05); + + DO3(A,B,C,D,9,4,0xd9d4d039); + DO3(D,A,B,C,12,11,0xe6db99e5); + DO3(C,D,A,B,15,16,0x1fa27cf8); + DO3(B,C,D,A,2,23,0xc4ac5665); + + /* Round 4 */ + + DO4(A,B,C,D,0,6,0xf4292244); + DO4(D,A,B,C,7,10,0x432aff97); + DO4(C,D,A,B,14,15,0xab9423a7); + DO4(B,C,D,A,5,21,0xfc93a039); + + DO4(A,B,C,D,12,6,0x655b59c3); + DO4(D,A,B,C,3,10,0x8f0ccc92); + DO4(C,D,A,B,10,15,0xffeff47d); + DO4(B,C,D,A,1,21,0x85845dd1); + + DO4(A,B,C,D,8,6,0x6fa87e4f); + DO4(D,A,B,C,15,10,0xfe2ce6e0); + DO4(C,D,A,B,6,15,0xa3014314); + DO4(B,C,D,A,13,21,0x4e0811a1); + + DO4(A,B,C,D,4,6,0xf7537e82); + DO4(D,A,B,C,11,10,0xbd3af235); + DO4(C,D,A,B,2,15,0x2ad7d2bb); + DO4(B,C,D,A,9,21,0xeb86d391); + + A += AA; + B += BB; + C += CC; + D += DD; +} + +/* + * From `Performance analysis of MD5' by Joseph D. Touch + */ + +#if defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN) +static inline u_int32_t +swap_u_int32_t (u_int32_t t) +{ + u_int32_t temp1, temp2; + + temp1 = cshift(t, 16); + temp2 = temp1 >> 8; + temp1 &= 0x00ff00ff; + temp2 &= 0x00ff00ff; + temp1 <<= 8; + return temp1 | temp2; +} +#endif + +struct x32{ + unsigned int a:32; + unsigned int b:32; +}; + +void +MD5_Update (struct md5 *m, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = v; + size_t old_sz = m->sz[0]; + size_t offset; + + m->sz[0] += len * 8; + if (m->sz[0] < old_sz) + ++m->sz[1]; + offset = (old_sz / 8) % 64; + while(len > 0){ + size_t l = min(len, 64 - offset); + memcpy(m->save + offset, p, l); + offset += l; + p += l; + len -= l; + if(offset == 64){ +#if defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN) + int i; + u_int32_t current[16]; + struct x32 *u = (struct x32*)m->save; + for(i = 0; i < 8; i++){ + current[2*i+0] = swap_u_int32_t(u[i].a); + current[2*i+1] = swap_u_int32_t(u[i].b); + } + calc(m, current); +#else + calc(m, (u_int32_t*)m->save); +#endif + offset = 0; + } + } +} + +void +MD5_Final (void *res, struct md5 *m) +{ + static unsigned char zeros[72]; + unsigned offset = (m->sz[0] / 8) % 64; + unsigned int dstart = (120 - offset - 1) % 64 + 1; + + *zeros = 0x80; + memset (zeros + 1, 0, sizeof(zeros) - 1); + zeros[dstart+0] = (m->sz[0] >> 0) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+1] = (m->sz[0] >> 8) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+2] = (m->sz[0] >> 16) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+3] = (m->sz[0] >> 24) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+4] = (m->sz[1] >> 0) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+5] = (m->sz[1] >> 8) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+6] = (m->sz[1] >> 16) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+7] = (m->sz[1] >> 24) & 0xff; + MD5_Update (m, zeros, dstart + 8); + { + int i; + unsigned char *r = (unsigned char *)res; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + r[4*i] = m->counter[i] & 0xFF; + r[4*i+1] = (m->counter[i] >> 8) & 0xFF; + r[4*i+2] = (m->counter[i] >> 16) & 0xFF; + r[4*i+3] = (m->counter[i] >> 24) & 0xFF; + } + } +#if 0 + { + int i; + u_int32_t *r = (u_int32_t *)res; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) + r[i] = swap_u_int32_t (m->counter[i]); + } +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f4dd6a819e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: md5.h,v 1.8 2001/01/29 02:08:57 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#elif defined(KRB4) +#include +#endif + +struct md5 { + unsigned int sz[2]; + u_int32_t counter[4]; + unsigned char save[64]; +}; + +typedef struct md5 MD5_CTX; + +void MD5_Init (struct md5 *m); +void MD5_Update (struct md5 *m, const void *p, size_t len); +void MD5_Final (void *res, struct md5 *m); /* u_int32_t res[4] */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5crypt_test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5crypt_test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89ea727658 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/md5crypt_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: md5crypt_test.c,v 1.4 1999/12/17 05:15:32 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +struct test { + const char *str; + const char *salt; + const char *result; +} tests[] = { + {"Hello world!", "$1$saltstring", "$1$saltstri$YMyguxXMBpd2TEZ.vS/3q1"}, + {NULL, NULL, NULL} +}; + +static int +do_test (void) +{ + struct test *t; + int res = 0; + + for (t = tests; t->str != NULL; ++t) { + const char *c; + + c = crypt (t->str, t->salt); + + if (strcmp (c, t->result) != 0) { + res = 1; + printf ("should have been: \"%s\"\n", t->result); + printf ("result was: \"%s\"\n", c); + } + } + if (res) + printf ("failed\n"); + else + printf ("success\n"); + return res; +} + +int +main (void) +{ + return do_test (); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/mdtest.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/mdtest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c4ba0ffc5d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/mdtest.c @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: mdtest.c,v 1.16 2002/05/07 15:49:28 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define ONE_MILLION_A "one million a's" + +struct hash_foo { + const char *name; + size_t psize; + size_t hsize; + void (*init)(void*); + void (*update)(void*, const void*, size_t); + void (*final)(void*, void*); +} md4 = { + "MD4", + sizeof(MD4_CTX), + 16, + (void (*)(void*))MD4_Init, + (void (*)(void*,const void*, size_t))MD4_Update, + (void (*)(void*, void*))MD4_Final +}, md5 = { + "MD5", + sizeof(MD5_CTX), + 16, + (void (*)(void*))MD5_Init, + (void (*)(void*,const void*, size_t))MD5_Update, + (void (*)(void*, void*))MD5_Final +}, sha1 = { + "SHA-1", + sizeof(struct sha), + 20, + (void (*)(void*))SHA1_Init, + (void (*)(void*,const void*, size_t))SHA1_Update, + (void (*)(void*, void*))SHA1_Final +}; +#ifdef HAVE_SHA256 +struct hash_foo sha256 = { + "SHA-256", + sizeof(struct sha256), + 32, + (void (*)(void*))SHA256_Init, + (void (*)(void*,const void*, size_t))SHA256_Update, + (void (*)(void*, void*))SHA256_Final +}; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA384 +struct hash_foo sha384 = { + "SHA-384", + sizeof(struct sha512), + 48, + (void (*)(void*))SHA384_Init, + (void (*)(void*,const void*, size_t))SHA384_Update, + (void (*)(void*, void*))SHA384_Final +}; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA512 +struct hash_foo sha512 = { + "SHA-512", + sizeof(struct sha512), + 64, + (void (*)(void*))SHA512_Init, + (void (*)(void*,const void*, size_t))SHA512_Update, + (void (*)(void*, void*))SHA512_Final +}; +#endif + +struct test { + char *str; + unsigned char hash[64]; +}; + +struct test md4_tests[] = { + {"", + {0x31, 0xd6, 0xcf, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x31, 0xb7, 0x3c, 0x59, + 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xc0}}, + {"a", + {0xbd, 0xe5, 0x2c, 0xb3, 0x1d, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0x46, 0x24, 0x5e, 0x05, + 0xfb, 0xdb, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0x24}}, + {"abc", + {0xa4, 0x48, 0x01, 0x7a, 0xaf, 0x21, 0xd8, 0x52, 0x5f, 0xc1, 0x0a, 0xe8, 0x7a, 0xa6, 0x72, 0x9d}}, + {"message digest", + {0xd9, 0x13, 0x0a, 0x81, 0x64, 0x54, 0x9f, 0xe8, 0x18, 0x87, 0x48, 0x06, 0xe1, 0xc7, 0x01, 0x4b}}, + {"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", {0xd7, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x8a, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0xcd, 0xee, 0xa8, 0xed, 0x63, 0xdf, 0x41, 0x2d, 0xa9, }}, + {"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", + {0x04, 0x3f, 0x85, 0x82, 0xf2, 0x41, 0xdb, 0x35, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x27, 0xe1, 0x53, 0xe7, 0xf0, 0xe4}}, + {"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", + {0xe3, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xdc, 0x9c, 0x38, 0xf2, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x3e, 0x7b, 0x16, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0x05, 0x36, }}, + {NULL, { 0x0 }}}; + +struct test md5_tests[] = { + {"", {0xd4, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x00, 0xb2, 0x04, 0xe9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xec, 0xf8, 0x42, 0x7e}}, + {"a", {0x0c, 0xc1, 0x75, 0xb9, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x31, 0xc3, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61}}, + {"abc", {0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x7d, 0x28, 0xe1, 0x7f, 0x72}}, + {"message digest", {0xf9, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x7d, 0x7c, 0xb7, 0x93, 0x8d, 0x52, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0x31, 0xaa, 0xf1, 0x61, 0xd0}}, + {"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", {0xc3, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0xd7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xe4, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xfb, 0x49, 0x6c, 0xca, 0x67, 0xe1, 0x3b}}, + {"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", {0xd1, 0x74, 0xab, 0x98, 0xd2, 0x77, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0xa5, 0x61, 0x1c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x41, 0x9d, 0x9f}}, + {"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", {0x57, 0xed, 0xf4, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0x55, 0xac, 0x49, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x21, 0x07, 0xb6, 0x7a}}, + {NULL, { 0x0 }}}; + +struct test sha1_tests[] = { + { "abc", + {0xA9, 0x99, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x47, 0x06, 0x81, 0x6A, + 0xBA, 0x3E, 0x25, 0x71, 0x78, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x6C, + 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x9D}}, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", + {0x84, 0x98, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, + 0xBA, 0xAE, 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x29, 0xE5, + 0xE5, 0x46, 0x70, 0xF1}}, + { ONE_MILLION_A, + {0x34, 0xaa, 0x97, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xc4, 0xda, 0xa4, + 0xf6, 0x1e, 0xeb, 0x2b, 0xdb, 0xad, 0x27, 0x31, + 0x65, 0x34, 0x01, 0x6f}}, + { NULL } +}; + +#ifdef HAVE_SHA256 +struct test sha256_tests[] = { + { "abc", + { 0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, + 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, + 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, + 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad }}, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", + { 0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8, + 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39, + 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67, + 0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1 }}, + { ONE_MILLION_A, + {0xcd,0xc7,0x6e,0x5c, 0x99,0x14,0xfb,0x92, + 0x81,0xa1,0xc7,0xe2, 0x84,0xd7,0x3e,0x67, + 0xf1,0x80,0x9a,0x48, 0xa4,0x97,0x20,0x0e, + 0x04,0x6d,0x39,0xcc, 0xc7,0x11,0x2c,0xd0 }}, + { NULL } +}; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA384 +struct test sha384_tests[] = { + { "abc", + { 0xcb,0x00,0x75,0x3f,0x45,0xa3,0x5e,0x8b, + 0xb5,0xa0,0x3d,0x69,0x9a,0xc6,0x50,0x07, + 0x27,0x2c,0x32,0xab,0x0e,0xde,0xd1,0x63, + 0x1a,0x8b,0x60,0x5a,0x43,0xff,0x5b,0xed, + 0x80,0x86,0x07,0x2b,0xa1,0xe7,0xcc,0x23, + 0x58,0xba,0xec,0xa1,0x34,0xc8,0x25,0xa7}}, + { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmno" + "ijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu", + { 0x09,0x33,0x0c,0x33,0xf7,0x11,0x47,0xe8, + 0x3d,0x19,0x2f,0xc7,0x82,0xcd,0x1b,0x47, + 0x53,0x11,0x1b,0x17,0x3b,0x3b,0x05,0xd2, + 0x2f,0xa0,0x80,0x86,0xe3,0xb0,0xf7,0x12, + 0xfc,0xc7,0xc7,0x1a,0x55,0x7e,0x2d,0xb9, + 0x66,0xc3,0xe9,0xfa,0x91,0x74,0x60,0x39}}, + { ONE_MILLION_A, + { 0x9d,0x0e,0x18,0x09,0x71,0x64,0x74,0xcb, + 0x08,0x6e,0x83,0x4e,0x31,0x0a,0x4a,0x1c, + 0xed,0x14,0x9e,0x9c,0x00,0xf2,0x48,0x52, + 0x79,0x72,0xce,0xc5,0x70,0x4c,0x2a,0x5b, + 0x07,0xb8,0xb3,0xdc,0x38,0xec,0xc4,0xeb, + 0xae,0x97,0xdd,0xd8,0x7f,0x3d,0x89,0x85}}, + {NULL} +}; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA512 +struct test sha512_tests[] = { + { "abc", + { 0xdd,0xaf,0x35,0xa1,0x93,0x61,0x7a,0xba, + 0xcc,0x41,0x73,0x49,0xae,0x20,0x41,0x31, + 0x12,0xe6,0xfa,0x4e,0x89,0xa9,0x7e,0xa2, + 0x0a,0x9e,0xee,0xe6,0x4b,0x55,0xd3,0x9a, + 0x21,0x92,0x99,0x2a,0x27,0x4f,0xc1,0xa8, + 0x36,0xba,0x3c,0x23,0xa3,0xfe,0xeb,0xbd, + 0x45,0x4d,0x44,0x23,0x64,0x3c,0xe8,0x0e, + 0x2a,0x9a,0xc9,0x4f,0xa5,0x4c,0xa4,0x9f }}, + { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmno" + "ijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu", + { 0x8e,0x95,0x9b,0x75,0xda,0xe3,0x13,0xda, + 0x8c,0xf4,0xf7,0x28,0x14,0xfc,0x14,0x3f, + 0x8f,0x77,0x79,0xc6,0xeb,0x9f,0x7f,0xa1, + 0x72,0x99,0xae,0xad,0xb6,0x88,0x90,0x18, + 0x50,0x1d,0x28,0x9e,0x49,0x00,0xf7,0xe4, + 0x33,0x1b,0x99,0xde,0xc4,0xb5,0x43,0x3a, + 0xc7,0xd3,0x29,0xee,0xb6,0xdd,0x26,0x54, + 0x5e,0x96,0xe5,0x5b,0x87,0x4b,0xe9,0x09 }}, + { ONE_MILLION_A, + { 0xe7,0x18,0x48,0x3d,0x0c,0xe7,0x69,0x64, + 0x4e,0x2e,0x42,0xc7,0xbc,0x15,0xb4,0x63, + 0x8e,0x1f,0x98,0xb1,0x3b,0x20,0x44,0x28, + 0x56,0x32,0xa8,0x03,0xaf,0xa9,0x73,0xeb, + 0xde,0x0f,0xf2,0x44,0x87,0x7e,0xa6,0x0a, + 0x4c,0xb0,0x43,0x2c,0xe5,0x77,0xc3,0x1b, + 0xeb,0x00,0x9c,0x5c,0x2c,0x49,0xaa,0x2e, + 0x4e,0xad,0xb2,0x17,0xad,0x8c,0xc0,0x9b }}, + { NULL } +}; +#endif + +static int +hash_test (struct hash_foo *hash, struct test *tests) +{ + struct test *t; + void *ctx = malloc(hash->psize); + unsigned char *res = malloc(hash->hsize); + + printf ("%s... ", hash->name); + for (t = tests; t->str; ++t) { + char buf[1000]; + + (*hash->init)(ctx); + if(strcmp(t->str, ONE_MILLION_A) == 0) { + int i; + memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); + for(i = 0; i < 1000; i++) + (*hash->update)(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf)); + } else + (*hash->update)(ctx, (unsigned char *)t->str, strlen(t->str)); + (*hash->final) (res, ctx); + if (memcmp (res, t->hash, hash->hsize) != 0) { + int i; + + printf ("%s(\"%s\") failed\n", hash->name, t->str); + printf("should be: "); + for(i = 0; i < hash->hsize; ++i) { + if(i > 0 && (i % 16) == 0) + printf("\n "); + printf("%02x ", t->hash[i]); + } + printf("\nresult was: "); + for(i = 0; i < hash->hsize; ++i) { + if(i > 0 && (i % 16) == 0) + printf("\n "); + printf("%02x ", res[i]); + } + printf("\n"); + return 1; + } + } + printf ("success\n"); + return 0; +} + +int +main (void) +{ + return hash_test(&md4, md4_tests) + + hash_test(&md5, md5_tests) + + hash_test(&sha1, sha1_tests) +#ifdef HAVE_SHA256 + + hash_test(&sha256, sha256_tests) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA384 + + hash_test(&sha384, sha384_tests) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA512 + + hash_test(&sha512, sha512_tests) +#endif + ; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ncbc_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ncbc_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4a972ac546 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ncbc_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_ncbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG tin0,tin1; + register DES_LONG tout0,tout1,xor0,xor1; + register unsigned char *in,*out; + register long l=length; + DES_LONG tin[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + + if (encrypt) + { + c2l(iv,tout0); + c2l(iv,tout1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + tin0^=tout0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]; l2c(tout0,out); + tout1=tin[1]; l2c(tout1,out); + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2ln(in,tin0,tin1,l+8); + tin0^=tout0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]; l2c(tout0,out); + tout1=tin[1]; l2c(tout1,out); + } + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(tout0,iv); + l2c(tout1,iv); + } + else + { + c2l(iv,xor0); + c2l(iv,xor1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); tin[0]=tin0; + c2l(in,tin1); tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1; + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + xor0=tin0; + xor1=tin1; + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); tin[0]=tin0; + c2l(in,tin1); tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1; + l2cn(tout0,tout1,out,l+8); + xor0=tin0; + xor1=tin1; + } + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(xor0,iv); + l2c(xor1,iv); + } + tin0=tin1=tout0=tout1=xor0=xor1=0; + tin[0]=tin[1]=0; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb64ede.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb64ede.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b33deef10e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb64ede.c @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* crypto/des/ofb64ede.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being + * used. The extra state information to record how much of the + * 64bit block we have used is contained in *num; + */ +void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, length, k1,k2,k3, ivec, num) +register unsigned char *in; +register unsigned char *out; +long length; +des_key_schedule k1,k2,k3; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int *num; + { + register DES_LONG v0,v1; + register int n= *num; + register long l=length; + des_cblock d; + register char *dp; + DES_LONG ti[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + int save=0; + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + c2l(iv,v0); + c2l(iv,v1); + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + dp=(char *)d; + l2c(v0,dp); + l2c(v1,dp); + while (l--) + { + if (n == 0) + { + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + des_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)ti,k1,k2,k3); + v0=ti[0]; + v1=ti[1]; + + dp=(char *)d; + l2c(v0,dp); + l2c(v1,dp); + save++; + } + *(out++)= *(in++)^d[n]; + n=(n+1)&0x07; + } + if (save) + { +/* v0=ti[0]; + v1=ti[1];*/ + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(v0,iv); + l2c(v1,iv); + } + v0=v1=ti[0]=ti[1]=0; + *num=n; + } + +#ifdef undef /* MACRO */ +void des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, length, k1,k2, ivec, num) +register unsigned char *in; +register unsigned char *out; +long length; +des_key_schedule k1,k2; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int *num; + { + des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, length, k1,k2,k1, ivec, num); + } +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb64enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb64enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..041f5b52b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb64enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* crypto/des/ofb64enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being + * used. The extra state information to record how much of the + * 64bit block we have used is contained in *num; + */ +void des_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, length, schedule, ivec, num) +register unsigned char *in; +register unsigned char *out; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int *num; + { + register DES_LONG v0,v1,t; + register int n= *num; + register long l=length; + des_cblock d; + register char *dp; + DES_LONG ti[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + int save=0; + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + c2l(iv,v0); + c2l(iv,v1); + ti[0]=v0; + ti[1]=v1; + dp=(char *)d; + l2c(v0,dp); + l2c(v1,dp); + while (l--) + { + if (n == 0) + { + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)ti,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + dp=(char *)d; + t=ti[0]; l2c(t,dp); + t=ti[1]; l2c(t,dp); + save++; + } + *(out++)= *(in++)^d[n]; + n=(n+1)&0x07; + } + if (save) + { + v0=ti[0]; + v1=ti[1]; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(v0,iv); + l2c(v1,iv); + } + t=v0=v1=ti[0]=ti[1]=0; + *num=n; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d0506100d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/ofb_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* crypto/des/ofb_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. + * What this means is that if you hame numbits=12 and length=2 + * the first 12 bits will be retrieved from the first byte and half + * the second. The second 12 bits will come from the 3rd and half the 4th + * byte. + */ +void des_ofb_encrypt(in, out, numbits, length, schedule, ivec) +unsigned char *in; +unsigned char *out; +int numbits; +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); + { + register DES_LONG d0,d1,v0,v1,n=(numbits+7)/8; + register DES_LONG mask0,mask1; + register long l=length; + register int num=numbits; + DES_LONG ti[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + + if (num > 64) return; + if (num > 32) + { + mask0=0xffffffffL; + if (num >= 64) + mask1=mask0; + else + mask1=(1L<<(num-32))-1; + } + else + { + if (num == 32) + mask0=0xffffffffL; + else + mask0=(1L< 0) + { + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)ti,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + c2ln(in,d0,d1,n); + in+=n; + d0=(d0^ti[0])&mask0; + d1=(d1^ti[1])&mask1; + l2cn(d0,d1,out,n); + out+=n; + } + v0=ti[0]; + v1=ti[1]; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(v0,iv); + l2c(v1,iv); + v0=v1=d0=d1=ti[0]=ti[1]=0; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.aps b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.aps new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c90d030918 Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.aps differ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.clw b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.clw new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3451af3fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.clw @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +; CLW file contains information for the MFC ClassWizard + +[General Info] +Version=1 +LastClass= +LastTemplate=CDialog +NewFileInclude1=#include "stdafx.h" +NewFileInclude2=#include "passwd_dialog.h" +LastPage=0 + +ClassCount=0 + +ResourceCount=2 +Resource1=IDD_DIALOG1 +Resource2=IDD_PASSWD_DIALOG + +[DLG:IDD_DIALOG1] +Type=1 +ControlCount=6 +Control1=IDOK,button,1342242817 +Control2=IDCANCEL,button,1342242816 +Control3=IDC_STATIC,static,1342308352 +Control4=IDC_STATIC,static,1342308352 +Control5=IDC_EDIT1,edit,1350631552 +Control6=IDC_EDIT2,edit,1350631584 + +[DLG:IDD_PASSWD_DIALOG] +Type=1 +ControlCount=4 +Control1=IDC_PASSWD_EDIT,edit,1350631456 +Control2=IDOK,button,1342242817 +Control3=IDCANCEL,button,1342242816 +Control4=IDC_STATIC,static,1342177280 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.rc b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.rc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62079f2aee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.rc @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +//Microsoft Developer Studio generated resource script. +// +#include "resource.h" + +#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource. +// +#include "afxres.h" + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Swedish resources + +#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_SVE) +#ifdef _WIN32 +LANGUAGE LANG_SWEDISH, SUBLANG_DEFAULT +#pragma code_page(1252) +#endif //_WIN32 + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Dialog +// + +IDD_PASSWD_DIALOG DIALOG DISCARDABLE 0, 0, 186, 66 +STYLE DS_ABSALIGN | DS_MODALFRAME | DS_SETFOREGROUND | DS_CENTER | WS_POPUP | + WS_VISIBLE | WS_CAPTION +CAPTION "Password query" +FONT 8, "MS Sans Serif" +BEGIN + EDITTEXT IDC_PASSWD_EDIT,30,22,125,14,ES_PASSWORD + DEFPUSHBUTTON "OK",IDOK,30,45,50,14 + PUSHBUTTON "Cancel",IDCANCEL,105,45,50,14 + LTEXT "Please insert password:",IDC_STATIC,30,13,87,8,NOT + WS_GROUP +END + + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// DESIGNINFO +// + +#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +GUIDELINES DESIGNINFO DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + IDD_PASSWD_DIALOG, DIALOG + BEGIN + LEFTMARGIN, 7 + RIGHTMARGIN, 179 + TOPMARGIN, 7 + BOTTOMMARGIN, 59 + END +END +#endif // APSTUDIO_INVOKED + + +#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// TEXTINCLUDE +// + +1 TEXTINCLUDE DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + "resource.h\0" +END + +2 TEXTINCLUDE DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + "#include ""afxres.h""\r\n" + "\0" +END + +3 TEXTINCLUDE DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + "\r\n" + "\0" +END + +#endif // APSTUDIO_INVOKED + + +#ifndef _MAC +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Version +// + +VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO + FILEVERSION 1,0,0,1 + PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,0,1 + FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL +#ifdef _DEBUG + FILEFLAGS 0x1L +#else + FILEFLAGS 0x0L +#endif + FILEOS 0x40004L + FILETYPE 0x2L + FILESUBTYPE 0x0L +BEGIN + BLOCK "StringFileInfo" + BEGIN + BLOCK "040904b0" + BEGIN + VALUE "CompanyName", "Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)\0" + VALUE "FileDescription", "des\0" + VALUE "FileVersion", "4, 0, 9, 9\0" + VALUE "InternalName", "des\0" + VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1996 - 1998 Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)\0" + VALUE "OriginalFilename", "des.dll\0" + VALUE "ProductName", "KTH Kerberos\0" + VALUE "ProductVersion", "4,0,9,9\0" + END + END + BLOCK "VarFileInfo" + BEGIN + VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200 + END +END + +#endif // !_MAC + +#endif // Swedish resources +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + + +#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource. +// + + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +#endif // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.res b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.res new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bdb2868700 Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dialog.res differ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dlg.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dlg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf5bc92582 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dlg.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* passwd_dlg.c - Dialog boxes for Windows95/NT + * Author: Jörgen Karlsson - d93-jka@nada.kth.se + * Date: June 1996 + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: passwd_dlg.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:39 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 /* Visual C++ 4.0 (Windows95/NT) */ +#include +#include "passwd_dlg.h" +#include "Resource.h" +#define passwdBufSZ 64 + +char passwd[passwdBufSZ]; + +BOOL CALLBACK +pwd_dialog_proc(HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) +{ + switch(uMsg) + { + case WM_COMMAND: + switch(wParam) + { + case IDOK: + if(!GetDlgItemText(hwndDlg,IDC_PASSWD_EDIT, passwd, passwdBufSZ)) + EndDialog(hwndDlg, IDCANCEL); + case IDCANCEL: + EndDialog(hwndDlg, wParam); + return TRUE; + } + } + return FALSE; +} + + +/* return 0 if ok, 1 otherwise */ +int +pwd_dialog(char *buf, int size) +{ + int i; + HWND wnd = GetActiveWindow(); + HANDLE hInst = GetModuleHandle("des"); + switch(DialogBox(hInst,MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDD_PASSWD_DIALOG),wnd,pwd_dialog_proc)) + { + case IDOK: + strlcpy(buf, passwd, size); + memset (passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + return 0; + case IDCANCEL: + default: + memset (passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + return 1; + } +} + +#endif /* WIN32 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dlg.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dlg.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5600e96d23 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/passwd_dlg.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* passwd_dlg.h - Dialog boxes for Windows95/NT + * Author: Jörgen Karlsson - d93-jka@nada.kth.se + * Date: June 1996 + */ + +/* $Id: passwd_dlg.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:39 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef PASSWD_DLG_H +#define PASSWD_DLG_H + +int pwd_dialog(char *buf, int size); + + +#endif /* PASSWD_DLG_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/pcbc_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/pcbc_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb2e785cfb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/pcbc_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* crypto/des/pcbc_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_pcbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG sin0,sin1,xor0,xor1,tout0,tout1; + DES_LONG tin[2]; + unsigned char *in,*out,*iv; + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + + if (encrypt) + { + c2l(iv,xor0); + c2l(iv,xor1); + for (; length>0; length-=8) + { + if (length >= 8) + { + c2l(in,sin0); + c2l(in,sin1); + } + else + c2ln(in,sin0,sin1,length); + tin[0]=sin0^xor0; + tin[1]=sin1^xor1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]; + tout1=tin[1]; + xor0=sin0^tout0; + xor1=sin1^tout1; + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + } + } + else + { + c2l(iv,xor0); c2l(iv,xor1); + for (; length>0; length-=8) + { + c2l(in,sin0); + c2l(in,sin1); + tin[0]=sin0; + tin[1]=sin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1; + if (length >= 8) + { + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + } + else + l2cn(tout0,tout1,out,length); + xor0=tout0^sin0; + xor1=tout1^sin1; + } + } + tin[0]=tin[1]=0; + sin0=sin1=xor0=xor1=tout0=tout1=0; + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/podd.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/podd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c984a3490d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/podd.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* crypto/des/podd.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +static const unsigned char odd_parity[256]={ + 1, 1, 2, 2, 4, 4, 7, 7, 8, 8, 11, 11, 13, 13, 14, 14, + 16, 16, 19, 19, 21, 21, 22, 22, 25, 25, 26, 26, 28, 28, 31, 31, + 32, 32, 35, 35, 37, 37, 38, 38, 41, 41, 42, 42, 44, 44, 47, 47, + 49, 49, 50, 50, 52, 52, 55, 55, 56, 56, 59, 59, 61, 61, 62, 62, + 64, 64, 67, 67, 69, 69, 70, 70, 73, 73, 74, 74, 76, 76, 79, 79, + 81, 81, 82, 82, 84, 84, 87, 87, 88, 88, 91, 91, 93, 93, 94, 94, + 97, 97, 98, 98,100,100,103,103,104,104,107,107,109,109,110,110, +112,112,115,115,117,117,118,118,121,121,122,122,124,124,127,127, +128,128,131,131,133,133,134,134,137,137,138,138,140,140,143,143, +145,145,146,146,148,148,151,151,152,152,155,155,157,157,158,158, +161,161,162,162,164,164,167,167,168,168,171,171,173,173,174,174, +176,176,179,179,181,181,182,182,185,185,186,186,188,188,191,191, +193,193,194,194,196,196,199,199,200,200,203,203,205,205,206,206, +208,208,211,211,213,213,214,214,217,217,218,218,220,220,223,223, +224,224,227,227,229,229,230,230,233,233,234,234,236,236,239,239, +241,241,242,242,244,244,247,247,248,248,251,251,253,253,254,254}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/qud_cksm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/qud_cksm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..783274854f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/qud_cksm.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +/* crypto/des/qud_cksm.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* From "Message Authentication" R.R. Jueneman, S.M. Matyas, C.H. Meyer + * IEEE Communications Magazine Sept 1985 Vol. 23 No. 9 p 29-40 + * This module in only based on the code in this paper and is + * almost definitely not the same as the MIT implementation. + */ +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* bug fix for dos - 7/6/91 - Larry hughes@logos.ucs.indiana.edu */ +#define Q_B0(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))) +#define Q_B1(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<8) +#define Q_B2(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<16) +#define Q_B3(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<24) + +/* used to scramble things a bit */ +/* Got the value MIT uses via brute force :-) 2/10/90 eay */ +#define NOISE ((DES_LONG)83653421L) + +DES_LONG des_quad_cksum(input, output, length, out_count, seed) + des_cblock (*input); + des_cblock (*output); + long length; + int out_count; + des_cblock (*seed); +{ + DES_LONG z0,z1,t0,t1; + int i; + long l; +#ifdef _CRAY + typedef struct { + unsigned int a:32; + unsigned int b:32; + } XXX; +#else + typedef DES_LONG XXX; +#endif + unsigned char *cp; + XXX *lp; + + if (out_count < 1) out_count=1; + lp=(XXX*)output; + + z0=Q_B0((*seed)[0])|Q_B1((*seed)[1])|Q_B2((*seed)[2])|Q_B3((*seed)[3]); + z1=Q_B0((*seed)[4])|Q_B1((*seed)[5])|Q_B2((*seed)[6])|Q_B3((*seed)[7]); + + for (i=0; ((i<4)&&(i 0) + { + if (l > 1) + { + t0= (DES_LONG)(*(cp++)); + t0|=(DES_LONG)Q_B1(*(cp++)); + l--; + } + else + t0= (DES_LONG)(*(cp++)); + l--; + /* add */ + t0+=z0; + t0&=0xffffffffL; + t1=z1; + /* square, well sort of square */ + z0=((((t0*t0)&0xffffffffL)+((t1*t1)&0xffffffffL)) + &0xffffffffL)%0x7fffffffL; + z1=((t0*((t1+NOISE)&0xffffffffL))&0xffffffffL)%0x7fffffffL; + } + if (lp != NULL) + { + /* The MIT library assumes that the checksum is + * composed of 2*out_count 32 bit ints */ +#ifdef _CRAY + lp->a = z0; + lp->b = z1; + lp++; +#else + *lp++ = (XXX)z0; + *lp++ = (XXX)z1; +#endif + } + } + return(z0); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rand_key.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rand_key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fd4c5ef4d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rand_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/* crypto/des/rand_key.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" +#include + +static int seed=0; +static des_cblock init; + +void des_random_seed(key) +des_cblock key; + { + memcpy(init,key,sizeof(des_cblock)); + seed=1; + } + +/* Old source */ +/* +void des_random_key(ret) +unsigned char *ret; + { + des_key_schedule ks; + static DES_LONG c=0; + static unsigned short pid=0; + static des_cblock data={0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}; + des_cblock key; + unsigned char *p; + DES_LONG t; + int i; + +#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32) + pid=1; +#else + if (!pid) pid=getpid(); +#endif + p=key; + if (seed) + { + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + { + data[i] ^= init[i]; + init[i]=0; + } + seed=0; + } + t=(DES_LONG)time(NULL); + l2c(t,p); + t=(DES_LONG)((pid)|((c++)<<16)); + l2c(t,p); + + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)data); + des_set_key((des_cblock *)data,ks); + des_cbc_cksum((des_cblock *)key,(des_cblock *)key, + (long)sizeof(key),ks,(des_cblock *)data); + + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key); + des_set_key((des_cblock *)key,ks); + des_cbc_cksum((des_cblock *)key,(des_cblock *)data, + (long)sizeof(key),ks,(des_cblock *)key); + + memcpy(ret,data,sizeof(key)); + memset(key,0,sizeof(key)); + memset(ks,0,sizeof(ks)); + t=0; + } +*/ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15441f6019 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* $Id: rc4.h,v 1.2 1999/10/21 12:58:31 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef HEADER_RC4_H +#define HEADER_RC4_H + +typedef unsigned int RC4_INT; + +typedef struct rc4_key_st { + RC4_INT x,y; + RC4_INT data[256]; +} RC4_KEY; + + +void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, unsigned char *data); +void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, unsigned char *indata, + unsigned char *outdata); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b1686f569 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "rc4.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rc4_enc.c,v 1.2 1999/10/21 12:58:43 joda Exp $"); + +/* RC4 as implemented from a posting from + * Newsgroups: sci.crypt + * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) + * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. + * Message-ID: + * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT + */ + +void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, unsigned char *indata, + unsigned char *outdata) + { + register RC4_INT *d; + register RC4_INT x,y,tx,ty; + int i; + + x=key->x; + y=key->y; + d=key->data; + +#define LOOP(in,out) \ + x=((x+1)&0xff); \ + tx=d[x]; \ + y=(tx+y)&0xff; \ + d[x]=ty=d[y]; \ + d[y]=tx; \ + (out) = d[(tx+ty)&0xff]^ (in); + +#ifndef RC4_INDEX +#define RC4_LOOP(a,b,i) LOOP(*((a)++),*((b)++)) +#else +#define RC4_LOOP(a,b,i) LOOP(a[i],b[i]) +#endif + + i=(int)(len>>3L); + if (i) + { + for (;;) + { + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,0); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,1); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,2); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,3); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,4); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,5); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,6); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,7); +#ifdef RC4_INDEX + indata+=8; + outdata+=8; +#endif + if (--i == 0) break; + } + } + i=(int)len&0x07; + if (i) + { + for (;;) + { + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,0); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,1); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,2); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,3); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,4); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,5); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,6); if (--i == 0) break; + } + } + key->x=x; + key->y=y; + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4_skey.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4_skey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5bce4683f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4_skey.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "rc4.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rc4_skey.c,v 1.2 1999/10/21 12:58:52 joda Exp $"); + +/* RC4 as implemented from a posting from + * Newsgroups: sci.crypt + * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) + * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. + * Message-ID: + * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT + */ + +void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, register unsigned char *data) + { + register RC4_INT tmp; + register int id1,id2; + register RC4_INT *d; + unsigned int i; + + d= &(key->data[0]); + for (i=0; i<256; i++) + d[i]=i; + key->x = 0; + key->y = 0; + id1=id2=0; + +#define SK_LOOP(n) { \ + tmp=d[(n)]; \ + id2 = (data[id1] + tmp + id2) & 0xff; \ + if (++id1 == len) id1=0; \ + d[(n)]=d[id2]; \ + d[id2]=tmp; } + + for (i=0; i < 256; i+=4) + { + SK_LOOP(i+0); + SK_LOOP(i+1); + SK_LOOP(i+2); + SK_LOOP(i+3); + } + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5abf8cff30 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rc4test.c @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4test.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef NO_RC4 +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("No RC4 support\n"); + return(0); +} +#else +#include + +unsigned char keys[7][30]={ + {8,0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}, + {8,0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}, + {8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {4,0xef,0x01,0x23,0x45}, + {8,0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}, + {4,0xef,0x01,0x23,0x45}, + }; + +unsigned char data_len[7]={8,8,8,20,28,10}; +unsigned char data[7][30]={ + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9A,0xBC,0xDE,0xF0, + 0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9A,0xBC,0xDE,0xF0, + 0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9A,0xBC,0xDE,0xF0, + 0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0}, + }; + +unsigned char output[7][30]={ + {0x75,0xb7,0x87,0x80,0x99,0xe0,0xc5,0x96,0x00}, + {0x74,0x94,0xc2,0xe7,0x10,0x4b,0x08,0x79,0x00}, + {0xde,0x18,0x89,0x41,0xa3,0x37,0x5d,0x3a,0x00}, + {0xd6,0xa1,0x41,0xa7,0xec,0x3c,0x38,0xdf, + 0xbd,0x61,0x5a,0x11,0x62,0xe1,0xc7,0xba, + 0x36,0xb6,0x78,0x58,0x00}, + {0x66,0xa0,0x94,0x9f,0x8a,0xf7,0xd6,0x89, + 0x1f,0x7f,0x83,0x2b,0xa8,0x33,0xc0,0x0c, + 0x89,0x2e,0xbe,0x30,0x14,0x3c,0xe2,0x87, + 0x40,0x01,0x1e,0xcf,0x00}, + {0xd6,0xa1,0x41,0xa7,0xec,0x3c,0x38,0xdf,0xbd,0x61,0x00}, + {0}, + }; + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + int i,err=0; + int j; + unsigned char *p; + RC4_KEY key; + unsigned char buf[512],obuf[512]; + + for (i=0; i<512; i++) buf[i]=0x01; + + for (i=0; i<6; i++) + { + RC4_set_key(&key,keys[i][0],&(keys[i][1])); + memset(obuf,0x00,sizeof(obuf)); + RC4(&key,data_len[i],&(data[i][0]),obuf); + if (memcmp(obuf,output[i],data_len[i]+1) != 0) + { + printf("error calculating RC4\n"); + printf("output:"); + for (j=0; j +#endif + +/* 06-Apr-92 Luke Brennan Support for VMS */ +#include "des_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* There are 5 types of terminal interface supported, + * TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS, MSDOS and SGTTY + */ + +#if defined(__sgi) && !defined(TERMIOS) +#define TERMIOS +#undef TERMIO +#undef SGTTY +#endif + +#if defined(linux) && !defined(TERMIO) +#undef TERMIOS +#define TERMIO +#undef SGTTY +#endif + +#ifdef _LIBC +#define TERMIO +#endif + +#if !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(VMS) && !defined(MSDOS) +#define SGTTY +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SGTTY_H) && defined(__NeXT__) +#define SGTTY +#endif + +#ifdef TERMIOS +#include +#define TTY_STRUCT struct termios +#define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag +#define TTY_get(tty,data) tcgetattr(tty,data) +#define TTY_set(tty,data) tcsetattr(tty,TCSANOW,data) +#endif + +#ifdef TERMIO +#include +#define TTY_STRUCT struct termio +#define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag +#define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCGETA,data) +#define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCSETA,data) +#endif + +#ifdef SGTTY +#include +#define TTY_STRUCT struct sgttyb +#define TTY_FLAGS sg_flags +#define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCGETP,data) +#define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCSETP,data) +#endif + +#if !defined(_LIBC) && !defined(MSDOS) && !defined(VMS) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef MSDOS +#include +#define fgets(a,b,c) noecho_fgets(a,b,c) +#endif + +#ifdef VMS +#include +#include +#include +#include +struct IOSB { + short iosb$w_value; + short iosb$w_count; + long iosb$l_info; + }; +#endif + +#ifndef NX509_SIG +#define NX509_SIG 32 +#endif + +#ifndef NOPROTO +static void read_till_nl(FILE *); +static int read_pw(char *buf, char *buff, int size, char *prompt, int verify); +static void recsig(int); +static void pushsig(void); +static void popsig(void); +#if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(WIN16) +static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty); +#endif +#else +static void read_till_nl(); +static int read_pw(); +static void recsig(); +static void pushsig(); +static void popsig(); +#if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(WIN16) +static int noecho_fgets(); +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef NOPROTO +static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG])(int ); +#else +static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG])(); +#endif +static jmp_buf save; + +int des_read_password(key, prompt, verify) +des_cblock (*key); +char *prompt; +int verify; + { + int ok; + char buf[BUFSIZ],buff[BUFSIZ]; + + if ((ok=read_pw(buf,buff,BUFSIZ,prompt,verify)) == 0) + des_string_to_key(buf,key); + memset(buf,0,BUFSIZ); + memset(buff,0,BUFSIZ); + return(ok); + } + +int des_read_2passwords(key1, key2, prompt, verify) +des_cblock (*key1); +des_cblock (*key2); +char *prompt; +int verify; + { + int ok; + char buf[BUFSIZ],buff[BUFSIZ]; + + if ((ok=read_pw(buf,buff,BUFSIZ,prompt,verify)) == 0) + des_string_to_2keys(buf,key1,key2); + memset(buf,0,BUFSIZ); + memset(buff,0,BUFSIZ); + return(ok); + } + +int des_read_pw_string(buf, length, prompt, verify) +char *buf; +int length; +char *prompt; +int verify; + { + char buff[BUFSIZ]; + int ret; + + ret=read_pw(buf,buff,(length>BUFSIZ)?BUFSIZ:length,prompt,verify); + memset(buff,0,BUFSIZ); + return(ret); + } + +#ifndef WIN16 + +static void read_till_nl(in) +FILE *in; + { +#define SIZE 4 + char buf[SIZE+1]; + + do { + fgets(buf,SIZE,in); + } while (strchr(buf,'\n') == NULL); + } + + +/* return 0 if ok, 1 (or -1) otherwise */ +static int read_pw(buf, buff, size, prompt, verify) +char *buf; +char *buff; +int size; +char *prompt; +int verify; + { +#ifdef VMS + struct IOSB iosb; + $DESCRIPTOR(terminal,"TT"); + long tty_orig[3], tty_new[3]; + long status; + unsigned short channel = 0; +#else +#ifndef MSDOS + TTY_STRUCT tty_orig,tty_new; +#endif +#endif + int number=5; + int ok=0; + int ps=0; + int is_a_tty=1; + + FILE *tty=NULL; + char *p; + +#ifdef __CYGWIN32__ + tty = stdin; +#elif !defined(MSDOS) + if ((tty=fopen("/dev/tty","r")) == NULL) + tty=stdin; +#else /* MSDOS */ + if ((tty=fopen("con","r")) == NULL) + tty=stdin; +#endif /* MSDOS */ + +#if defined(TTY_get) && !defined(VMS) + if (TTY_get(fileno(tty),&tty_orig) == -1) + { +#ifdef ENOTTY + if (errno == ENOTTY) + is_a_tty=0; + else +#endif + return(-1); + } + memcpy(&(tty_new),&(tty_orig),sizeof(tty_orig)); +#endif +#ifdef VMS + status = SYS$ASSIGN(&terminal,&channel,0,0); + if (status != SS$_NORMAL) + return(-1); + status=SYS$QIOW(0,channel,IO$_SENSEMODE,&iosb,0,0,tty_orig,12,0,0,0,0); + if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) + return(-1); +#endif + + if (setjmp(save)) + { + ok=0; + goto error; + } + pushsig(); + ps=1; + +#ifdef TTY_FLAGS + tty_new.TTY_FLAGS &= ~ECHO; +#endif + +#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(VMS) + if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty),&tty_new) == -1)) + return(-1); +#endif +#ifdef VMS + tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; + tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] | TT$M_NOECHO; + tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; + status = SYS$QIOW(0,channel,IO$_SETMODE,&iosb,0,0,tty_new,12,0,0,0,0); + if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) + return(-1); +#endif + ps=2; + + while ((!ok) && (number--)) + { + fputs(prompt,stderr); + fflush(stderr); + + buf[0]='\0'; + fgets(buf,size,tty); + if (feof(tty)) goto error; + if (ferror(tty)) goto error; + if ((p=(char *)strchr(buf,'\n')) != NULL) + *p='\0'; + else read_till_nl(tty); + if (verify) + { + fprintf(stderr,"\nVerifying password - %s",prompt); + fflush(stderr); + buff[0]='\0'; + fgets(buff,size,tty); + if (feof(tty)) goto error; + if ((p=(char *)strchr(buff,'\n')) != NULL) + *p='\0'; + else read_till_nl(tty); + + if (strcmp(buf,buff) != 0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"\nVerify failure"); + fflush(stderr); + break; + /* continue; */ + } + } + ok=1; + } + +error: + fprintf(stderr,"\n"); +#ifdef DEBUG + perror("fgets(tty)"); +#endif + /* What can we do if there is an error? */ +#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(VMS) + if (ps >= 2) TTY_set(fileno(tty),&tty_orig); +#endif +#ifdef VMS + if (ps >= 2) + status = SYS$QIOW(0,channel,IO$_SETMODE,&iosb,0,0 + ,tty_orig,12,0,0,0,0); +#endif + + if (ps >= 1) popsig(); + if (stdin != tty) fclose(tty); +#ifdef VMS + status = SYS$DASSGN(channel); +#endif + return(!ok); + } + +#else /* WIN16 */ + +static int read_pw(buf, buff, size, prompt, verify) +char *buf; +char *buff; +int size; +char *prompt; +int verify; + { + memset(buf,0,size); + memset(buff,0,size); + return(0); + } + +#endif + +static void pushsig() + { + int i; + + for (i=1; i +#include +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#elif defined(KRB4) +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +/* + * Generate "random" data by checksumming a file. + * + * Returns -1 if there were any problems with permissions or I/O + * errors. + */ +static +int +sumFile (const char *name, int len, void *res) +{ + u_int32_t sum[2]; + u_int32_t buf[1024*2]; + int fd, i; + + fd = open (name, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + + while (len > 0) + { + int n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (n < 0) + { + close(fd); + return n; + } + for (i = 0; i < (n/sizeof(buf[0])); i++) + { + sum[0] += buf[i]; + i++; + sum[1] += buf[i]; + } + len -= n; + } + close (fd); + memcpy (res, &sum, sizeof(sum)); + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +static +int +md5sumFile (const char *name, int len, int32_t sum[4]) +{ + int32_t buf[1024*2]; + int fd, cnt; + struct md5 md5; + + fd = open (name, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + + md5_init(&md5); + while (len > 0) + { + int n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (n < 0) + { + close(fd); + return n; + } + md5_update(&md5, buf, n); + len -= n; + } + md5_finito(&md5, (unsigned char *)sum); + close (fd); + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* + * Create a sequence of random 64 bit blocks. + * The sequence is indexed with a long long and + * based on an initial des key used as a seed. + */ +static des_key_schedule sequence_seed; +static u_int32_t sequence_index[2]; + +/* + * Random number generator based on ideas from truerand in cryptolib + * as described on page 424 in Applied Cryptography 2 ed. by Bruce + * Schneier. + */ + +static volatile int counter; +static volatile unsigned char *gdata; /* Global data */ +static volatile int igdata; /* Index into global data */ +static int gsize; + +#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__EMX__) && !defined(__OS2__) && !defined(__CYGWIN32__) +/* Visual C++ 4.0 (Windows95/NT) */ + +static +RETSIGTYPE +sigALRM(int sig) +{ + if (igdata < gsize) + gdata[igdata++] ^= counter & 0xff; + +#ifndef HAVE_SIGACTION + signal(SIGALRM, sigALRM); /* Reinstall SysV signal handler */ +#endif + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_RAND) +#ifndef srandom +#define srandom srand +#endif +#ifndef random +#define random rand +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETITIMER +static void +des_not_rand_data(unsigned char *data, int size) +{ + int i; + + srandom (time (NULL)); + + for(i = 0; i < size; ++i) + data[i] ^= random() % 0x100; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__EMX__) && !defined(__OS2__) && !defined(__CYGWIN32__) + +#ifndef HAVE_SETITIMER +static void +pacemaker(struct timeval *tv) +{ + fd_set fds; + pid_t pid; + pid = getppid(); + while(1){ + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(0, &fds); + select(1, &fds, NULL, NULL, tv); + kill(pid, SIGALRM); + } +} +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION +/* XXX ugly hack, should perhaps use function from roken */ +static RETSIGTYPE +(*fake_signal(int sig, RETSIGTYPE (*f)(int)))(int) +{ + struct sigaction sa, osa; + sa.sa_handler = f; + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sigaction(sig, &sa, &osa); + return osa.sa_handler; +} +#define signal(S, F) fake_signal((S), (F)) +#endif + +/* + * Generate size bytes of "random" data using timed interrupts. + * It takes about 40ms/byte random data. + * It's not neccessary to be root to run it. + */ +void +des_rand_data(unsigned char *data, int size) +{ + struct itimerval tv, otv; + RETSIGTYPE (*osa)(int); + int i, j; +#ifndef HAVE_SETITIMER + RETSIGTYPE (*ochld)(int); + pid_t pid; +#endif + char *rnd_devices[] = {"/dev/random", + "/dev/srandom", + "/dev/urandom", + NULL}; + char **p; + + for(p = rnd_devices; *p; p++) { + int fd = open(*p, O_RDONLY | O_NDELAY); + + if(fd >= 0 && read(fd, data, size) == size) { + close(fd); + return; + } + close(fd); + } + + /* Paranoia? Initialize data from /dev/mem if we can read it. */ + if (size >= 8) + sumFile("/dev/mem", (1024*1024*2), data); + + gdata = data; + gsize = size; + igdata = 0; + + osa = signal(SIGALRM, sigALRM); + + /* Start timer */ + tv.it_value.tv_sec = 0; + tv.it_value.tv_usec = 10 * 1000; /* 10 ms */ + tv.it_interval = tv.it_value; +#ifdef HAVE_SETITIMER + setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &tv, &otv); +#else + ochld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); + pid = fork(); + if(pid == -1){ + signal(SIGCHLD, ochld != SIG_ERR ? ochld : SIG_DFL); + des_not_rand_data(data, size); + return; + } + if(pid == 0) + pacemaker(&tv.it_interval); +#endif + + for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + for (igdata = 0; igdata < size;) /* igdata++ in sigALRM */ + counter++; + for (j = 0; j < size; j++) /* Only use 2 bits each lap */ + gdata[j] = (gdata[j]>>2) | (gdata[j]<<6); + } +#ifdef HAVE_SETITIMER + setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &otv, 0); +#else + kill(pid, SIGKILL); + while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid); + signal(SIGCHLD, ochld != SIG_ERR ? ochld : SIG_DFL); +#endif + signal(SIGALRM, osa != SIG_ERR ? osa : SIG_DFL); +} +#else +void +des_rand_data(unsigned char *p, int s) +{ + des_not_rand_data (p, s); +} +#endif + +void +des_generate_random_block(des_cblock *block) +{ + des_rand_data((unsigned char *)block, sizeof(*block)); +} + +/* + * Generate a "random" DES key. + */ +void +des_rand_data_key(des_cblock *key) +{ + unsigned char data[8]; + des_key_schedule sched; + do { + des_rand_data(data, sizeof(data)); + des_rand_data((unsigned char*)key, sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_set_odd_parity(key); + des_key_sched(key, sched); + des_ecb_encrypt(&data, key, sched, DES_ENCRYPT); + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + memset(&sched, 0, sizeof(sched)); + des_set_odd_parity(key); + } while(des_is_weak_key(key)); +} + +/* + * Generate "random" data by checksumming /dev/mem + * + * It's neccessary to be root to run it. Returns -1 if there were any + * problems with permissions. + */ +int +des_mem_rand8(unsigned char *data) +{ + return 1; +} + +/* + * In case the generator does not get initialized use this as fallback. + */ +static int initialized; + +static void +do_initialize(void) +{ + des_cblock default_seed; + do { + des_generate_random_block(&default_seed); + des_set_odd_parity(&default_seed); + } while (des_is_weak_key(&default_seed)); + des_init_random_number_generator(&default_seed); +} + +#define zero_long_long(ll) do { ll[0] = ll[1] = 0; } while (0) + +#define incr_long_long(ll) do { if (++ll[0] == 0) ++ll[1]; } while (0) + +#define set_sequence_number(ll) \ +memcpy((char *)sequence_index, (ll), sizeof(sequence_index)); + +/* + * Set the sequnce number to this value (a long long). + */ +void +des_set_sequence_number(unsigned char *ll) +{ + set_sequence_number(ll); +} + +/* + * Set the generator seed and reset the sequence number to 0. + */ +void +des_set_random_generator_seed(des_cblock *seed) +{ + des_key_sched(seed, sequence_seed); + zero_long_long(sequence_index); + initialized = 1; +} + +/* + * Generate a sequence of random des keys + * using the random block sequence, fixup + * parity and skip weak keys. + */ +int +des_new_random_key(des_cblock *key) +{ + if (!initialized) + do_initialize(); + + do { + des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *) sequence_index, + key, + sequence_seed, + DES_ENCRYPT); + incr_long_long(sequence_index); + /* random key must have odd parity and not be weak */ + des_set_odd_parity(key); + } while (des_is_weak_key(key)); + return(0); +} + +/* + * des_init_random_number_generator: + * + * Initialize the sequence of random 64 bit blocks. The input seed + * can be a secret key since it should be well hidden and is also not + * kept. + * + */ +void +des_init_random_number_generator(des_cblock *seed) +{ + struct timeval now; + des_cblock uniq; + des_cblock new_key; + + gettimeofday(&now, (struct timezone *)0); + des_generate_random_block(&uniq); + + /* Pick a unique random key from the shared sequence. */ + des_set_random_generator_seed(seed); + set_sequence_number((unsigned char *)&uniq); + des_new_random_key(&new_key); + + /* Select a new nonshared sequence, */ + des_set_random_generator_seed(&new_key); + + /* and use the current time to pick a key for the new sequence. */ + set_sequence_number((unsigned char *)&now); + des_new_random_key(&new_key); + des_set_random_generator_seed(&new_key); +} + +/* This is for backwards compatibility. */ +void +des_random_key(des_cblock ret) +{ + des_new_random_key((des_cblock *)ret); +} + +#ifdef TESTRUN +int +main() +{ + unsigned char data[8]; + int i; + + while (1) + { + if (sumFile("/dev/mem", (1024*1024*8), data) != 0) + { perror("sumFile"); exit(1); } + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + printf("%02x", data[i]); + printf("\n"); + } +} +#endif + +#ifdef TESTRUN2 +int +main() +{ + des_cblock data; + int i; + + while (1) + { + do_initialize(); + des_random_key(data); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + printf("%02x", data[i]); + printf("\n"); + } +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpc_des.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpc_des.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..683b397f6a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpc_des.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* crypto/des/rpc_des.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* @(#)des.h 2.2 88/08/10 4.0 RPCSRC; from 2.7 88/02/08 SMI */ +/* + * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for + * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape + * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part. Users + * may copy or modify Sun RPC without charge, but are not authorized + * to license or distribute it to anyone else except as part of a product or + * program developed by the user. + * + * SUN RPC IS PROVIDED AS IS WITH NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND INCLUDING THE + * WARRANTIES OF DESIGN, MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE, OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OR TRADE PRACTICE. + * + * Sun RPC is provided with no support and without any obligation on the + * part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. to assist in its use, correction, + * modification or enhancement. + * + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE + * INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS OR ANY PATENTS BY SUN RPC + * OR ANY PART THEREOF. + * + * In no event will Sun Microsystems, Inc. be liable for any lost revenue + * or profits or other special, indirect and consequential damages, even if + * Sun has been advised of the possibility of such damages. + * + * Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * 2550 Garcia Avenue + * Mountain View, California 94043 + */ +/* + * Generic DES driver interface + * Keep this file hardware independent! + * Copyright (c) 1986 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. + */ + +#define DES_MAXLEN 65536 /* maximum # of bytes to encrypt */ +#define DES_QUICKLEN 16 /* maximum # of bytes to encrypt quickly */ + +#ifdef HEADER_DES_H +#undef ENCRYPT +#undef DECRYPT +#endif + +enum desdir { ENCRYPT, DECRYPT }; +enum desmode { CBC, ECB }; + +/* + * parameters to ioctl call + */ +struct desparams { + unsigned char des_key[8]; /* key (with low bit parity) */ + enum desdir des_dir; /* direction */ + enum desmode des_mode; /* mode */ + unsigned char des_ivec[8]; /* input vector */ + unsigned des_len; /* number of bytes to crypt */ + union { + unsigned char UDES_data[DES_QUICKLEN]; + unsigned char *UDES_buf; + } UDES; +# define des_data UDES.UDES_data /* direct data here if quick */ +# define des_buf UDES.UDES_buf /* otherwise, pointer to data */ +}; + +/* + * Encrypt an arbitrary sized buffer + */ +#define DESIOCBLOCK _IOWR(d, 6, struct desparams) + +/* + * Encrypt of small amount of data, quickly + */ +#define DESIOCQUICK _IOWR(d, 7, struct desparams) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpc_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpc_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7a0fcf2a58 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpc_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* crypto/des/rpc_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "rpc_des.h" +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "des_ver.h" + +#ifndef NOPROTO +int _des_crypt(char *buf,int len,struct desparams *desp); +#else +int _des_crypt(); +#endif + +int _des_crypt(buf, len, desp) +char *buf; +int len; +struct desparams *desp; + { + des_key_schedule ks; + int enc; + + des_set_key((des_cblock *)desp->des_key,ks); + enc=(desp->des_dir == ENCRYPT)?DES_ENCRYPT:DES_DECRYPT; + + if (desp->des_mode == CBC) + des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf, + (des_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf,ks,enc); + else + { + des_ncbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf, + (des_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf, + (long)len,ks, + (des_cblock *)desp->des_ivec,enc); +#ifdef undef + /* len will always be %8 if called from common_crypt + * in secure_rpc. + * Libdes's cbc encrypt does not copy back the iv, + * so we have to do it here. */ + /* It does now :-) eay 20/09/95 */ + + a=(char *)&(desp->UDES.UDES_buf[len-8]); + b=(char *)&(desp->des_ivec[0]); + + *(a++)= *(b++); *(a++)= *(b++); + *(a++)= *(b++); *(a++)= *(b++); + *(a++)= *(b++); *(a++)= *(b++); + *(a++)= *(b++); *(a++)= *(b++); +#endif + } + return(1); + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpw.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d29ec9ab8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/rpw.c @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* crypto/des/rpw.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include "des.h" + +int main(argc,argv) +int argc; +char *argv[]; + { + des_cblock k,k1; + int i; + + printf("read passwd\n"); + if ((i=des_read_password((C_Block *)k,"Enter password:",0)) == 0) + { + printf("password = "); + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + printf("%02x ",k[i]); + } + else + printf("error %d\n",i); + printf("\n"); + printf("read 2passwds and verify\n"); + if ((i=des_read_2passwords((C_Block *)k,(C_Block *)k1, + "Enter verified password:",1)) == 0) + { + printf("password1 = "); + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + printf("%02x ",k[i]); + printf("\n"); + printf("password2 = "); + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + printf("%02x ",k1[i]); + printf("\n"); + exit(1); + } + else + { + printf("error %d\n",i); + exit(0); + } +#ifdef LINT + return(0); +#endif + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/set_key.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/set_key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6f307efe2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/set_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +/* crypto/des/set_key.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* set_key.c v 1.4 eay 24/9/91 + * 1.4 Speed up by 400% :-) + * 1.3 added register declarations. + * 1.2 unrolled make_key_sched a bit more + * 1.1 added norm_expand_bits + * 1.0 First working version + */ +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "podd.h" +#include "sk.h" + +#ifndef NOPROTO +static int check_parity(des_cblock (*key)); +#else +static int check_parity(); +#endif + +int des_check_key=0; + +void des_set_odd_parity(key) +des_cblock (*key); + { + int i; + + for (i=0; i>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ + * (b)^=(t),\ + * (a)=((a)^((t)<<(n)))) + */ + +#define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\ + (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n)))) + +/* return 0 if key parity is odd (correct), + * return -1 if key parity error, + * return -2 if illegal weak key. + */ +int des_set_key(key, schedule) +des_cblock (*key); +des_key_schedule schedule; + { + static int shifts2[16]={0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0}; + register DES_LONG c,d,t,s,t2; + register unsigned char *in; + register DES_LONG *k; + register int i; + + if (des_check_key) + { + if (!check_parity(key)) + return(-1); + + if (des_is_weak_key(key)) + return(-2); + } + + k=(DES_LONG *)schedule; + in=(unsigned char *)key; + + c2l(in,c); + c2l(in,d); + + /* do PC1 in 60 simple operations */ +/* PERM_OP(d,c,t,4,0x0f0f0f0fL); + HPERM_OP(c,t,-2, 0xcccc0000L); + HPERM_OP(c,t,-1, 0xaaaa0000L); + HPERM_OP(c,t, 8, 0x00ff0000L); + HPERM_OP(c,t,-1, 0xaaaa0000L); + HPERM_OP(d,t,-8, 0xff000000L); + HPERM_OP(d,t, 8, 0x00ff0000L); + HPERM_OP(d,t, 2, 0x33330000L); + d=((d&0x00aa00aaL)<<7L)|((d&0x55005500L)>>7L)|(d&0xaa55aa55L); + d=(d>>8)|((c&0xf0000000L)>>4); + c&=0x0fffffffL; */ + + /* I now do it in 47 simple operations :-) + * Thanks to John Fletcher (john_fletcher@lccmail.ocf.llnl.gov) + * for the inspiration. :-) */ + PERM_OP (d,c,t,4,0x0f0f0f0fL); + HPERM_OP(c,t,-2,0xcccc0000L); + HPERM_OP(d,t,-2,0xcccc0000L); + PERM_OP (d,c,t,1,0x55555555L); + PERM_OP (c,d,t,8,0x00ff00ffL); + PERM_OP (d,c,t,1,0x55555555L); + d= (((d&0x000000ffL)<<16L)| (d&0x0000ff00L) | + ((d&0x00ff0000L)>>16L)|((c&0xf0000000L)>>4L)); + c&=0x0fffffffL; + + for (i=0; i>2L)|(c<<26L)); d=((d>>2L)|(d<<26L)); } + else + { c=((c>>1L)|(c<<27L)); d=((d>>1L)|(d<<27L)); } + c&=0x0fffffffL; + d&=0x0fffffffL; + /* could be a few less shifts but I am to lazy at this + * point in time to investigate */ + s= des_skb[0][ (c )&0x3f ]| + des_skb[1][((c>> 6)&0x03)|((c>> 7L)&0x3c)]| + des_skb[2][((c>>13)&0x0f)|((c>>14L)&0x30)]| + des_skb[3][((c>>20)&0x01)|((c>>21L)&0x06) | + ((c>>22L)&0x38)]; + t= des_skb[4][ (d )&0x3f ]| + des_skb[5][((d>> 7L)&0x03)|((d>> 8L)&0x3c)]| + des_skb[6][ (d>>15L)&0x3f ]| + des_skb[7][((d>>21L)&0x0f)|((d>>22L)&0x30)]; + + /* table contained 0213 4657 */ + t2=((t<<16L)|(s&0x0000ffffL))&0xffffffffL; + *(k++)=ROTATE(t2,30)&0xffffffffL; + + t2=((s>>16L)|(t&0xffff0000L)); + *(k++)=ROTATE(t2,26)&0xffffffffL; + } + return(0); + } + +int des_key_sched(key, schedule) +des_cblock (*key); +des_key_schedule schedule; + { + return(des_set_key(key,schedule)); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sha.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sha.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8bf653dfb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sha.c @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sha.c,v 1.16 2001/01/29 04:33:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "sha.h" +#include "hash.h" + +#define A m->counter[0] +#define B m->counter[1] +#define C m->counter[2] +#define D m->counter[3] +#define E m->counter[4] +#define X data + +void +SHA1_Init (struct sha *m) +{ + m->sz[0] = 0; + m->sz[1] = 0; + A = 0x67452301; + B = 0xefcdab89; + C = 0x98badcfe; + D = 0x10325476; + E = 0xc3d2e1f0; +} + + +#define F0(x,y,z) CRAYFIX((x & y) | (~x & z)) +#define F1(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define F2(x,y,z) ((x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z)) +#define F3(x,y,z) F1(x,y,z) + +#define K0 0x5a827999 +#define K1 0x6ed9eba1 +#define K2 0x8f1bbcdc +#define K3 0xca62c1d6 + +#define DO(t,f,k) \ +do { \ + u_int32_t temp; \ + \ + temp = cshift(AA, 5) + f(BB,CC,DD) + EE + data[t] + k; \ + EE = DD; \ + DD = CC; \ + CC = cshift(BB, 30); \ + BB = AA; \ + AA = temp; \ +} while(0) + +static inline void +calc (struct sha *m, u_int32_t *in) +{ + u_int32_t AA, BB, CC, DD, EE; + u_int32_t data[80]; + int i; + + AA = A; + BB = B; + CC = C; + DD = D; + EE = E; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) + data[i] = in[i]; + for (i = 16; i < 80; ++i) + data[i] = cshift(data[i-3] ^ data[i-8] ^ data[i-14] ^ data[i-16], 1); + + /* t=[0,19] */ + + DO(0,F0,K0); + DO(1,F0,K0); + DO(2,F0,K0); + DO(3,F0,K0); + DO(4,F0,K0); + DO(5,F0,K0); + DO(6,F0,K0); + DO(7,F0,K0); + DO(8,F0,K0); + DO(9,F0,K0); + DO(10,F0,K0); + DO(11,F0,K0); + DO(12,F0,K0); + DO(13,F0,K0); + DO(14,F0,K0); + DO(15,F0,K0); + DO(16,F0,K0); + DO(17,F0,K0); + DO(18,F0,K0); + DO(19,F0,K0); + + /* t=[20,39] */ + + DO(20,F1,K1); + DO(21,F1,K1); + DO(22,F1,K1); + DO(23,F1,K1); + DO(24,F1,K1); + DO(25,F1,K1); + DO(26,F1,K1); + DO(27,F1,K1); + DO(28,F1,K1); + DO(29,F1,K1); + DO(30,F1,K1); + DO(31,F1,K1); + DO(32,F1,K1); + DO(33,F1,K1); + DO(34,F1,K1); + DO(35,F1,K1); + DO(36,F1,K1); + DO(37,F1,K1); + DO(38,F1,K1); + DO(39,F1,K1); + + /* t=[40,59] */ + + DO(40,F2,K2); + DO(41,F2,K2); + DO(42,F2,K2); + DO(43,F2,K2); + DO(44,F2,K2); + DO(45,F2,K2); + DO(46,F2,K2); + DO(47,F2,K2); + DO(48,F2,K2); + DO(49,F2,K2); + DO(50,F2,K2); + DO(51,F2,K2); + DO(52,F2,K2); + DO(53,F2,K2); + DO(54,F2,K2); + DO(55,F2,K2); + DO(56,F2,K2); + DO(57,F2,K2); + DO(58,F2,K2); + DO(59,F2,K2); + + /* t=[60,79] */ + + DO(60,F3,K3); + DO(61,F3,K3); + DO(62,F3,K3); + DO(63,F3,K3); + DO(64,F3,K3); + DO(65,F3,K3); + DO(66,F3,K3); + DO(67,F3,K3); + DO(68,F3,K3); + DO(69,F3,K3); + DO(70,F3,K3); + DO(71,F3,K3); + DO(72,F3,K3); + DO(73,F3,K3); + DO(74,F3,K3); + DO(75,F3,K3); + DO(76,F3,K3); + DO(77,F3,K3); + DO(78,F3,K3); + DO(79,F3,K3); + + A += AA; + B += BB; + C += CC; + D += DD; + E += EE; +} + +/* + * From `Performance analysis of MD5' by Joseph D. Touch + */ + +#if !defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN) || defined(_CRAY) +static inline u_int32_t +swap_u_int32_t (u_int32_t t) +{ +#define ROL(x,n) ((x)<<(n))|((x)>>(32-(n))) + u_int32_t temp1, temp2; + + temp1 = cshift(t, 16); + temp2 = temp1 >> 8; + temp1 &= 0x00ff00ff; + temp2 &= 0x00ff00ff; + temp1 <<= 8; + return temp1 | temp2; +} +#endif + +struct x32{ + unsigned int a:32; + unsigned int b:32; +}; + +void +SHA1_Update (struct sha *m, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = v; + size_t old_sz = m->sz[0]; + size_t offset; + + m->sz[0] += len * 8; + if (m->sz[0] < old_sz) + ++m->sz[1]; + offset = (old_sz / 8) % 64; + while(len > 0){ + size_t l = min(len, 64 - offset); + memcpy(m->save + offset, p, l); + offset += l; + p += l; + len -= l; + if(offset == 64){ +#if !defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN) || defined(_CRAY) + int i; + u_int32_t current[16]; + struct x32 *u = (struct x32*)m->save; + for(i = 0; i < 8; i++){ + current[2*i+0] = swap_u_int32_t(u[i].a); + current[2*i+1] = swap_u_int32_t(u[i].b); + } + calc(m, current); +#else + calc(m, (u_int32_t*)m->save); +#endif + offset = 0; + } + } +} + +void +SHA1_Final (void *res, struct sha *m) +{ + static unsigned char zeros[72]; + unsigned offset = (m->sz[0] / 8) % 64; + unsigned int dstart = (120 - offset - 1) % 64 + 1; + + *zeros = 0x80; + memset (zeros + 1, 0, sizeof(zeros) - 1); + zeros[dstart+7] = (m->sz[0] >> 0) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+6] = (m->sz[0] >> 8) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+5] = (m->sz[0] >> 16) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+4] = (m->sz[0] >> 24) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+3] = (m->sz[1] >> 0) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+2] = (m->sz[1] >> 8) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+1] = (m->sz[1] >> 16) & 0xff; + zeros[dstart+0] = (m->sz[1] >> 24) & 0xff; + SHA1_Update (m, zeros, dstart + 8); + { + int i; + unsigned char *r = (unsigned char*)res; + + for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) { + r[4*i+3] = m->counter[i] & 0xFF; + r[4*i+2] = (m->counter[i] >> 8) & 0xFF; + r[4*i+1] = (m->counter[i] >> 16) & 0xFF; + r[4*i] = (m->counter[i] >> 24) & 0xFF; + } + } +#if 0 + { + int i; + u_int32_t *r = (u_int32_t *)res; + + for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) + r[i] = swap_u_int32_t (m->counter[i]); + } +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sha.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sha.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5250e36259 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sha.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: sha.h,v 1.7 2001/01/29 02:08:57 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#elif defined(KRB4) +#include +#endif + +struct sha { + unsigned int sz[2]; + u_int32_t counter[5]; + unsigned char save[64]; +}; + +typedef struct sha SHA_CTX; + +void SHA1_Init (struct sha *m); +void SHA1_Update (struct sha *m, const void *v, size_t len); +void SHA1_Final (void *res, struct sha *m); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/shifts.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/shifts.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94afde35b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/shifts.pl @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +#/usr/local/bin/perl + +sub lab_shift + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@r,$i,$j,$k,$d,@z); + + @r=&shift(*a,$n); + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + @z=split(/\^/,$r[$i]); + for ($j=0; $j <= $#z; $j++) + { + ($d)=($z[$j] =~ /^(..)/); + ($k)=($z[$j] =~ /\[(.*)\]$/); + $k.=",$n" if ($k ne ""); + $k="$n" if ($k eq ""); + $d="$d[$k]"; + $z[$j]=$d; + } + $r[$i]=join('^',@z); + } + return(@r); + } + +sub shift + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@f); + + if ($n > 0) + { + @f=&shiftl(*a,$n); + } + else + { + @f=&shiftr(*a,-$n); + } + return(@f); + } + +sub rotate + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@f); + + if ($n > 0) + { @f=&rotatel(*a,$n); } + else + { @f=&rotater(*a,-$n); } + return(@f); + } + +sub rotater + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@f,@g); + + @f=&shiftr(*a,$n); + @g=&shiftl(*a,32-$n); + $#f=31; + $#g=31; + return(&or(*f,*g)); + } + +sub rotatel + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@f,@g); + + @f=&shiftl(*a,$n); + @g=&shiftr(*a,32-$n); + $#f=31; + $#g=31; + return(&or(*f,*g)); + } + +sub shiftr + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@r,$i); + + $#r=31; + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + if (($i+$n) > 31) + { + $r[$i]="--"; + } + else + { + $r[$i]=$a[$i+$n]; + } + } + return(@r); + } + +sub shiftl + { + local(*a,$n)=@_; + local(@r,$i); + + $#r=31; + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + if ($i < $n) + { + $r[$i]="--"; + } + else + { + $r[$i]=$a[$i-$n]; + } + } + return(@r); + } + +sub printit + { + local(@a)=@_; + local($i); + + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + printf "%2s ",$a[$i]; + print "\n" if (($i%8) == 7); + } + print "\n"; + } + +sub xor + { + local(*a,*b)=@_; + local(@r,$i); + + $#r=31; + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + $r[$i]=&compress($a[$i].'^'.$b[$i]); +# $r[$i]=$a[$i]."^".$b[$i]; + } + return(@r); + } + +sub and + { + local(*a,$m)=@_; + local(@r,$i); + + $#r=31; + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + $r[$i]=(($m & (1<<$i))?($a[$i]):('--')); + } + return(@r); + } + +sub or + { + local(*a,*b)=@_; + local(@r,$i); + + $#r=31; + foreach $i (0 .. 31) + { + $r[$i]='--' if (($a[$i] eq '--') && ($b[$i] eq '--')); + $r[$i]=$a[$i] if (($a[$i] ne '--') && ($b[$i] eq '--')); + $r[$i]=$b[$i] if (($a[$i] eq '--') && ($b[$i] ne '--')); + $r[$i]='++' if (($a[$i] ne '--') && ($b[$i] ne '--')); + } + return(@r); + } + +sub compress + { + local($s)=@_; + local($_,$i,@a,%a,$r); + + $s =~ s/\^\^/\^/g; + $s =~ s/^\^//; + $s =~ s/\^$//; + @a=split(/\^/,$s); + + while ($#a >= 0) + { + $_=shift(@a); + next unless /\d/; + $a{$_}++; + } + foreach $i (sort keys %a) + { + next if ($a{$i}%2 == 0); + $r.="$i^"; + } + chop($r); + return($r); + } +1; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sk.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sk.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6fe99cf825 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/sk.h @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +/* crypto/des/sk.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +static const DES_LONG des_skb[8][64]={ +{ +/* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 */ +0x00000000L,0x00000010L,0x20000000L,0x20000010L, +0x00010000L,0x00010010L,0x20010000L,0x20010010L, +0x00000800L,0x00000810L,0x20000800L,0x20000810L, +0x00010800L,0x00010810L,0x20010800L,0x20010810L, +0x00000020L,0x00000030L,0x20000020L,0x20000030L, +0x00010020L,0x00010030L,0x20010020L,0x20010030L, +0x00000820L,0x00000830L,0x20000820L,0x20000830L, +0x00010820L,0x00010830L,0x20010820L,0x20010830L, +0x00080000L,0x00080010L,0x20080000L,0x20080010L, +0x00090000L,0x00090010L,0x20090000L,0x20090010L, +0x00080800L,0x00080810L,0x20080800L,0x20080810L, +0x00090800L,0x00090810L,0x20090800L,0x20090810L, +0x00080020L,0x00080030L,0x20080020L,0x20080030L, +0x00090020L,0x00090030L,0x20090020L,0x20090030L, +0x00080820L,0x00080830L,0x20080820L,0x20080830L, +0x00090820L,0x00090830L,0x20090820L,0x20090830L, +},{ +/* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 7 8 10 11 12 13 */ +0x00000000L,0x02000000L,0x00002000L,0x02002000L, +0x00200000L,0x02200000L,0x00202000L,0x02202000L, +0x00000004L,0x02000004L,0x00002004L,0x02002004L, +0x00200004L,0x02200004L,0x00202004L,0x02202004L, +0x00000400L,0x02000400L,0x00002400L,0x02002400L, +0x00200400L,0x02200400L,0x00202400L,0x02202400L, +0x00000404L,0x02000404L,0x00002404L,0x02002404L, +0x00200404L,0x02200404L,0x00202404L,0x02202404L, +0x10000000L,0x12000000L,0x10002000L,0x12002000L, +0x10200000L,0x12200000L,0x10202000L,0x12202000L, +0x10000004L,0x12000004L,0x10002004L,0x12002004L, +0x10200004L,0x12200004L,0x10202004L,0x12202004L, +0x10000400L,0x12000400L,0x10002400L,0x12002400L, +0x10200400L,0x12200400L,0x10202400L,0x12202400L, +0x10000404L,0x12000404L,0x10002404L,0x12002404L, +0x10200404L,0x12200404L,0x10202404L,0x12202404L, +},{ +/* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 14 15 16 17 19 20 */ +0x00000000L,0x00000001L,0x00040000L,0x00040001L, +0x01000000L,0x01000001L,0x01040000L,0x01040001L, +0x00000002L,0x00000003L,0x00040002L,0x00040003L, +0x01000002L,0x01000003L,0x01040002L,0x01040003L, +0x00000200L,0x00000201L,0x00040200L,0x00040201L, +0x01000200L,0x01000201L,0x01040200L,0x01040201L, +0x00000202L,0x00000203L,0x00040202L,0x00040203L, +0x01000202L,0x01000203L,0x01040202L,0x01040203L, +0x08000000L,0x08000001L,0x08040000L,0x08040001L, +0x09000000L,0x09000001L,0x09040000L,0x09040001L, +0x08000002L,0x08000003L,0x08040002L,0x08040003L, +0x09000002L,0x09000003L,0x09040002L,0x09040003L, +0x08000200L,0x08000201L,0x08040200L,0x08040201L, +0x09000200L,0x09000201L,0x09040200L,0x09040201L, +0x08000202L,0x08000203L,0x08040202L,0x08040203L, +0x09000202L,0x09000203L,0x09040202L,0x09040203L, +},{ +/* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 21 23 24 26 27 28 */ +0x00000000L,0x00100000L,0x00000100L,0x00100100L, +0x00000008L,0x00100008L,0x00000108L,0x00100108L, +0x00001000L,0x00101000L,0x00001100L,0x00101100L, +0x00001008L,0x00101008L,0x00001108L,0x00101108L, +0x04000000L,0x04100000L,0x04000100L,0x04100100L, +0x04000008L,0x04100008L,0x04000108L,0x04100108L, +0x04001000L,0x04101000L,0x04001100L,0x04101100L, +0x04001008L,0x04101008L,0x04001108L,0x04101108L, +0x00020000L,0x00120000L,0x00020100L,0x00120100L, +0x00020008L,0x00120008L,0x00020108L,0x00120108L, +0x00021000L,0x00121000L,0x00021100L,0x00121100L, +0x00021008L,0x00121008L,0x00021108L,0x00121108L, +0x04020000L,0x04120000L,0x04020100L,0x04120100L, +0x04020008L,0x04120008L,0x04020108L,0x04120108L, +0x04021000L,0x04121000L,0x04021100L,0x04121100L, +0x04021008L,0x04121008L,0x04021108L,0x04121108L, +},{ +/* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 */ +0x00000000L,0x10000000L,0x00010000L,0x10010000L, +0x00000004L,0x10000004L,0x00010004L,0x10010004L, +0x20000000L,0x30000000L,0x20010000L,0x30010000L, +0x20000004L,0x30000004L,0x20010004L,0x30010004L, +0x00100000L,0x10100000L,0x00110000L,0x10110000L, +0x00100004L,0x10100004L,0x00110004L,0x10110004L, +0x20100000L,0x30100000L,0x20110000L,0x30110000L, +0x20100004L,0x30100004L,0x20110004L,0x30110004L, +0x00001000L,0x10001000L,0x00011000L,0x10011000L, +0x00001004L,0x10001004L,0x00011004L,0x10011004L, +0x20001000L,0x30001000L,0x20011000L,0x30011000L, +0x20001004L,0x30001004L,0x20011004L,0x30011004L, +0x00101000L,0x10101000L,0x00111000L,0x10111000L, +0x00101004L,0x10101004L,0x00111004L,0x10111004L, +0x20101000L,0x30101000L,0x20111000L,0x30111000L, +0x20101004L,0x30101004L,0x20111004L,0x30111004L, +},{ +/* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 8 9 11 12 13 14 */ +0x00000000L,0x08000000L,0x00000008L,0x08000008L, +0x00000400L,0x08000400L,0x00000408L,0x08000408L, +0x00020000L,0x08020000L,0x00020008L,0x08020008L, +0x00020400L,0x08020400L,0x00020408L,0x08020408L, +0x00000001L,0x08000001L,0x00000009L,0x08000009L, +0x00000401L,0x08000401L,0x00000409L,0x08000409L, +0x00020001L,0x08020001L,0x00020009L,0x08020009L, +0x00020401L,0x08020401L,0x00020409L,0x08020409L, +0x02000000L,0x0A000000L,0x02000008L,0x0A000008L, +0x02000400L,0x0A000400L,0x02000408L,0x0A000408L, +0x02020000L,0x0A020000L,0x02020008L,0x0A020008L, +0x02020400L,0x0A020400L,0x02020408L,0x0A020408L, +0x02000001L,0x0A000001L,0x02000009L,0x0A000009L, +0x02000401L,0x0A000401L,0x02000409L,0x0A000409L, +0x02020001L,0x0A020001L,0x02020009L,0x0A020009L, +0x02020401L,0x0A020401L,0x02020409L,0x0A020409L, +},{ +/* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 16 17 18 19 20 21 */ +0x00000000L,0x00000100L,0x00080000L,0x00080100L, +0x01000000L,0x01000100L,0x01080000L,0x01080100L, +0x00000010L,0x00000110L,0x00080010L,0x00080110L, +0x01000010L,0x01000110L,0x01080010L,0x01080110L, +0x00200000L,0x00200100L,0x00280000L,0x00280100L, +0x01200000L,0x01200100L,0x01280000L,0x01280100L, +0x00200010L,0x00200110L,0x00280010L,0x00280110L, +0x01200010L,0x01200110L,0x01280010L,0x01280110L, +0x00000200L,0x00000300L,0x00080200L,0x00080300L, +0x01000200L,0x01000300L,0x01080200L,0x01080300L, +0x00000210L,0x00000310L,0x00080210L,0x00080310L, +0x01000210L,0x01000310L,0x01080210L,0x01080310L, +0x00200200L,0x00200300L,0x00280200L,0x00280300L, +0x01200200L,0x01200300L,0x01280200L,0x01280300L, +0x00200210L,0x00200310L,0x00280210L,0x00280310L, +0x01200210L,0x01200310L,0x01280210L,0x01280310L, +},{ +/* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 22 23 24 25 27 28 */ +0x00000000L,0x04000000L,0x00040000L,0x04040000L, +0x00000002L,0x04000002L,0x00040002L,0x04040002L, +0x00002000L,0x04002000L,0x00042000L,0x04042000L, +0x00002002L,0x04002002L,0x00042002L,0x04042002L, +0x00000020L,0x04000020L,0x00040020L,0x04040020L, +0x00000022L,0x04000022L,0x00040022L,0x04040022L, +0x00002020L,0x04002020L,0x00042020L,0x04042020L, +0x00002022L,0x04002022L,0x00042022L,0x04042022L, +0x00000800L,0x04000800L,0x00040800L,0x04040800L, +0x00000802L,0x04000802L,0x00040802L,0x04040802L, +0x00002800L,0x04002800L,0x00042800L,0x04042800L, +0x00002802L,0x04002802L,0x00042802L,0x04042802L, +0x00000820L,0x04000820L,0x00040820L,0x04040820L, +0x00000822L,0x04000822L,0x00040822L,0x04040822L, +0x00002820L,0x04002820L,0x00042820L,0x04042820L, +0x00002822L,0x04002822L,0x00042822L,0x04042822L, +}}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/speed.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/speed.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d588ecd47 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/speed.c @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +/* crypto/des/speed.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* 11-Sep-92 Andrew Daviel Support for Silicon Graphics IRIX added */ +/* 06-Apr-92 Luke Brennan Support for VMS and add extra signal calls */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MSDOS) && !defined(WIN32) +#define TIMES +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef VMS +#include +struct tms { + time_t tms_utime; + time_t tms_stime; + time_t tms_uchild; /* I dunno... */ + time_t tms_uchildsys; /* so these names are a guess :-) */ + } +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMEB_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#include "des.h" + +/* The following if from times(3) man page. It may need to be changed */ +#ifndef HZ +#ifndef CLK_TCK +#ifndef VMS +#define HZ 100.0 +#else /* VMS */ +#define HZ 100.0 +#endif +#else /* CLK_TCK */ +#define HZ ((double)CLK_TCK) +#endif +#endif + +#define BUFSIZE ((long)1024) +long run=0; + +#ifndef NOPROTO +double Time_F(int s); +#else +double Time_F(); +#endif + +#ifdef SIGALRM +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(sgi) +#define SIGRETTYPE void +#else +#define SIGRETTYPE int +#endif + +#ifndef NOPROTO +SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig); +#else +SIGRETTYPE sig_done(); +#endif + +SIGRETTYPE sig_done(sig) +int sig; + { + signal(SIGALRM,sig_done); + run=0; +#ifdef LINT + sig=sig; +#endif + } +#endif + +#define START 0 +#define STOP 1 + +double Time_F(s) +int s; + { + double ret; +#ifdef TIMES + static struct tms tstart,tend; + + if (s == START) + { + times(&tstart); + return(0); + } + else + { + times(&tend); + ret=((double)(tend.tms_utime-tstart.tms_utime))/HZ; + return((ret == 0.0)?1e-6:ret); + } +#else /* !times() */ + static struct timeb tstart,tend; + long i; + + if (s == START) + { + ftime(&tstart); + return(0); + } + else + { + ftime(&tend); + i=(long)tend.millitm-(long)tstart.millitm; + ret=((double)(tend.time-tstart.time))+((double)i)/1000.0; + return((ret == 0.0)?1e-6:ret); + } +#endif + } + +int main(argc,argv) +int argc; +char **argv; + { + long count; + static unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; + static des_cblock key ={0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0}; + static des_cblock key2={0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0,0x12}; + static des_cblock key3={0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0,0x12,0x34}; + des_key_schedule sch,sch2,sch3; + double a,b,c,d,e; +#ifndef SIGALRM + long ca,cb,cc,cd,ce; +#endif + +#ifndef TIMES + printf("To get the most acurate results, try to run this\n"); + printf("program when this computer is idle.\n"); +#endif + + des_set_key((C_Block *)key2,sch2); + des_set_key((C_Block *)key3,sch3); + +#ifndef SIGALRM + printf("First we calculate the approximate speed ...\n"); + des_set_key((C_Block *)key,sch); + count=10; + do { + long i; + DES_LONG data[2]; + + count*=2; + Time_F(START); + for (i=count; i; i--) + des_encrypt(data,&(sch[0]),DES_ENCRYPT); + d=Time_F(STOP); + } while (d < 3.0); + ca=count; + cb=count*3; + cc=count*3*8/BUFSIZE+1; + cd=count*8/BUFSIZE+1; + ce=count/20+1; + printf("Doing set_key %ld times\n",ca); +#define COND(d) (count != (d)) +#define COUNT(d) (d) +#else +#define COND(c) (run) +#define COUNT(d) (count) + signal(SIGALRM,sig_done); + printf("Doing set_key for 10 seconds\n"); + alarm(10); +#endif + + Time_F(START); + for (count=0,run=1; COND(ca); count++) + des_set_key((C_Block *)key,sch); + d=Time_F(STOP); + printf("%ld set_key's in %.2f seconds\n",count,d); + a=((double)COUNT(ca))/d; + +#ifdef SIGALRM + printf("Doing des_encrypt's for 10 seconds\n"); + alarm(10); +#else + printf("Doing des_encrypt %ld times\n",cb); +#endif + Time_F(START); + for (count=0,run=1; COND(cb); count++) + { + DES_LONG data[2]; + + des_encrypt(data,&(sch[0]),DES_ENCRYPT); + } + d=Time_F(STOP); + printf("%ld des_encrypt's in %.2f second\n",count,d); + b=((double)COUNT(cb)*8)/d; + +#ifdef SIGALRM + printf("Doing des_cbc_encrypt on %ld byte blocks for 10 seconds\n", + BUFSIZE); + alarm(10); +#else + printf("Doing des_cbc_encrypt %ld times on %ld byte blocks\n",cc, + BUFSIZE); +#endif + Time_F(START); + for (count=0,run=1; COND(cc); count++) + des_ncbc_encrypt((C_Block *)buf,(C_Block *)buf,BUFSIZE,&(sch[0]), + (C_Block *)&(key[0]),DES_ENCRYPT); + d=Time_F(STOP); + printf("%ld des_cbc_encrypt's of %ld byte blocks in %.2f second\n", + count,BUFSIZE,d); + c=((double)COUNT(cc)*BUFSIZE)/d; + +#ifdef SIGALRM + printf("Doing des_ede_cbc_encrypt on %ld byte blocks for 10 seconds\n", + BUFSIZE); + alarm(10); +#else + printf("Doing des_ede_cbc_encrypt %ld times on %ld byte blocks\n",cd, + BUFSIZE); +#endif + Time_F(START); + for (count=0,run=1; COND(cd); count++) + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((C_Block *)buf,(C_Block *)buf,BUFSIZE, + &(sch[0]), + &(sch2[0]), + &(sch3[0]), + (C_Block *)&(key[0]), + DES_ENCRYPT); + d=Time_F(STOP); + printf("%ld des_ede_cbc_encrypt's of %ld byte blocks in %.2f second\n", + count,BUFSIZE,d); + d=((double)COUNT(cd)*BUFSIZE)/d; + +#ifdef SIGALRM + printf("Doing crypt for 10 seconds\n"); + alarm(10); +#else + printf("Doing crypt %ld times\n",ce); +#endif + Time_F(START); + for (count=0,run=1; COND(ce); count++) + crypt("testing1","ef"); + e=Time_F(STOP); + printf("%ld crypts in %.2f second\n",count,e); + e=((double)COUNT(ce))/e; + + printf("set_key per sec = %12.2f (%5.1fuS)\n",a,1.0e6/a); + printf("DES raw ecb bytes per sec = %12.2f (%5.1fuS)\n",b,8.0e6/b); + printf("DES cbc bytes per sec = %12.2f (%5.1fuS)\n",c,8.0e6/c); + printf("DES ede cbc bytes per sec = %12.2f (%5.1fuS)\n",d,8.0e6/d); + printf("crypt per sec = %12.2f (%5.1fuS)\n",e,1.0e6/e); + exit(0); +#if defined(LINT) || defined(MSDOS) + return(0); +#endif + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/spr.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/spr.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ac3e8db41 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/spr.h @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +/* crypto/des/spr.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +const DES_LONG des_SPtrans[8][64]={ +{ +/* nibble 0 */ +0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L, +0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L, +0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, +0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L, +0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L, +0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, +0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L, +0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L, +0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L, +0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, +0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L, +0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L, +0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L, +0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L, +0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L, +0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L, +},{ +/* nibble 1 */ +0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, +0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L, +0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L, +0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L, +0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L, +0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L, +0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L, +0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L, +0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L, +0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L, +0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L, +0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L, +0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L, +0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, +0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, +0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L, +},{ +/* nibble 2 */ +0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L, +0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, +0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L, +0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L, +0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, +0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L, +0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L, +0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L, +0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L, +0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L, +0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L, +0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L, +0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, +0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, +0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L, +0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L, +},{ +/* nibble 3 */ +0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L, +0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L, +0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L, +0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L, +0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L, +0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L, +0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L, +0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L, +0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L, +0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L, +0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L, +0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L, +0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, +0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L, +0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, +0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L, +},{ +/* nibble 4 */ +0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L, +0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, +0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L, +0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L, +0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L, +0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L, +0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L, +0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L, +0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L, +0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L, +0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L, +0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L, +0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L, +0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L, +0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L, +0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L, +},{ +/* nibble 5 */ +0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L, +0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L, +0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L, +0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, +0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L, +0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L, +0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L, +0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L, +0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L, +0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L, +0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L, +0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L, +0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, +0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L, +0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L, +0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L, +},{ +/* nibble 6 */ +0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, +0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L, +0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L, +0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L, +0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L, +0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L, +0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, +0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, +0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L, +0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L, +0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L, +0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L, +0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L, +0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L, +0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L, +0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L, +},{ +/* nibble 7 */ +0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L, +0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L, +0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, +0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L, +0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L, +0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L, +0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L, +0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, +0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L, +0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L, +0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, +0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L, +0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L, +0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L, +0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L, +0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, +}}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/str2key.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/str2key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c86368c8cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/str2key.c @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +/* crypto/des/str2key.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +extern int des_check_key; + +void des_string_to_key(str, key) +char *str; +des_cblock (*key); + { + des_key_schedule ks; + int i,length; + register unsigned char j; + + memset(key,0,8); + length=strlen(str); +#ifdef OLD_STR_TO_KEY + for (i=0; i>4)&0x0f); + j=((j<<2)&0xcc)|((j>>2)&0x33); + j=((j<<1)&0xaa)|((j>>1)&0x55); + (*key)[7-(i%8)]^=j; + } + } +#endif + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key); + i=des_check_key; + des_check_key=0; + if(des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)key)) + (*key)[7] ^= 0xF0; + des_set_key((des_cblock *)key,ks); + des_check_key=i; + des_cbc_cksum((des_cblock *)str,(des_cblock *)key,(long)length,ks, + (des_cblock *)key); + memset(ks,0,sizeof(ks)); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key); + } + +void des_string_to_2keys(str, key1, key2) +char *str; +des_cblock (*key1); +des_cblock (*key2); + { + des_key_schedule ks; + int i,length; + register unsigned char j; + + memset(key1,0,8); + memset(key2,0,8); + length=strlen(str); +#ifdef OLD_STR_TO_KEY + if (length <= 8) + { + for (i=0; i>4)&0x0f); + j=((j<<2)&0xcc)|((j>>2)&0x33); + j=((j<<1)&0xaa)|((j>>1)&0x55); + if ((i%16) < 8) + (*key1)[7-(i%8)]^=j; + else + (*key2)[7-(i%8)]^=j; + } + } + if (length <= 8) memcpy(key2,key1,8); +#endif + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key1); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key2); + i=des_check_key; + des_check_key=0; + if(des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)key1)) + (*key1)[7] ^= 0xF0; + des_set_key((des_cblock *)key1,ks); + des_cbc_cksum((des_cblock *)str,(des_cblock *)key1,(long)length,ks, + (des_cblock *)key1); + if(des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)key2)) + (*key2)[7] ^= 0xF0; + des_set_key((des_cblock *)key2,ks); + des_cbc_cksum((des_cblock *)str,(des_cblock *)key2,(long)length,ks, + (des_cblock *)key2); + des_check_key=i; + memset(ks,0,sizeof(ks)); + des_set_odd_parity(key1); + des_set_odd_parity(key2); + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/supp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/supp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8e8566b23 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/supp.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* crypto/des/supp.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 + * Mark Murray. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Mark Murray + * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY MARK MURRAY AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $Id: supp.c,v 1.4 1997/06/22 10:14:07 bg Exp $ + */ + +#include +#include "des_locl.h" + +void des_cblock_print_file(cb, fp) + des_cblock *cb; + FILE *fp; +{ + int i; + unsigned int *p = (unsigned int *)cb; + + fprintf(fp, " 0x { "); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + fprintf(fp, "%x", p[i]); + if (i != 7) fprintf(fp, ", "); + } + fprintf(fp, " }"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/t/perl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/t/perl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/t/test b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/t/test new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..97acd0552e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/t/test @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +#!./perl + +BEGIN { push(@INC, qw(../../../lib ../../lib ../lib lib)); } + +use DES; + +$key='00000000'; +$ks=DES::set_key($key); +@a=split(//,$ks); +foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } +print "\n"; + + +$key=DES::random_key(); +print "($_)\n"; +@a=split(//,$key); +foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } +print "\n"; +$str="this is and again into the breach"; +($k1,$k2)=DES::string_to_2keys($str); +@a=split(//,$k1); +foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } +print "\n"; +@a=split(//,$k2); +foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } +print "\n"; + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/testdes.pl b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/testdes.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01a165a963 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/testdes.pl @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +#!/usr/local/bin/perl + +# des.pl tesing code + +require 'des.pl'; + +$num_tests=34; +@key_data=( + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0xFE,0xDC,0xBA,0x98,0x76,0x54,0x32,0x10, + 0x7C,0xA1,0x10,0x45,0x4A,0x1A,0x6E,0x57, + 0x01,0x31,0xD9,0x61,0x9D,0xC1,0x37,0x6E, + 0x07,0xA1,0x13,0x3E,0x4A,0x0B,0x26,0x86, + 0x38,0x49,0x67,0x4C,0x26,0x02,0x31,0x9E, + 0x04,0xB9,0x15,0xBA,0x43,0xFE,0xB5,0xB6, + 0x01,0x13,0xB9,0x70,0xFD,0x34,0xF2,0xCE, + 0x01,0x70,0xF1,0x75,0x46,0x8F,0xB5,0xE6, + 0x43,0x29,0x7F,0xAD,0x38,0xE3,0x73,0xFE, + 0x07,0xA7,0x13,0x70,0x45,0xDA,0x2A,0x16, + 0x04,0x68,0x91,0x04,0xC2,0xFD,0x3B,0x2F, + 0x37,0xD0,0x6B,0xB5,0x16,0xCB,0x75,0x46, + 0x1F,0x08,0x26,0x0D,0x1A,0xC2,0x46,0x5E, + 0x58,0x40,0x23,0x64,0x1A,0xBA,0x61,0x76, + 0x02,0x58,0x16,0x16,0x46,0x29,0xB0,0x07, + 0x49,0x79,0x3E,0xBC,0x79,0xB3,0x25,0x8F, + 0x4F,0xB0,0x5E,0x15,0x15,0xAB,0x73,0xA7, + 0x49,0xE9,0x5D,0x6D,0x4C,0xA2,0x29,0xBF, + 0x01,0x83,0x10,0xDC,0x40,0x9B,0x26,0xD6, + 0x1C,0x58,0x7F,0x1C,0x13,0x92,0x4F,0xEF, + 0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01, + 0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E, + 0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0xFE,0xDC,0xBA,0x98,0x76,0x54,0x32,0x10, + ); + +@plain_data=( + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01, + 0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11, + 0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11,0x11, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0x01,0xA1,0xD6,0xD0,0x39,0x77,0x67,0x42, + 0x5C,0xD5,0x4C,0xA8,0x3D,0xEF,0x57,0xDA, + 0x02,0x48,0xD4,0x38,0x06,0xF6,0x71,0x72, + 0x51,0x45,0x4B,0x58,0x2D,0xDF,0x44,0x0A, + 0x42,0xFD,0x44,0x30,0x59,0x57,0x7F,0xA2, + 0x05,0x9B,0x5E,0x08,0x51,0xCF,0x14,0x3A, + 0x07,0x56,0xD8,0xE0,0x77,0x47,0x61,0xD2, + 0x76,0x25,0x14,0xB8,0x29,0xBF,0x48,0x6A, + 0x3B,0xDD,0x11,0x90,0x49,0x37,0x28,0x02, + 0x26,0x95,0x5F,0x68,0x35,0xAF,0x60,0x9A, + 0x16,0x4D,0x5E,0x40,0x4F,0x27,0x52,0x32, + 0x6B,0x05,0x6E,0x18,0x75,0x9F,0x5C,0xCA, + 0x00,0x4B,0xD6,0xEF,0x09,0x17,0x60,0x62, + 0x48,0x0D,0x39,0x00,0x6E,0xE7,0x62,0xF2, + 0x43,0x75,0x40,0xC8,0x69,0x8F,0x3C,0xFA, + 0x07,0x2D,0x43,0xA0,0x77,0x07,0x52,0x92, + 0x02,0xFE,0x55,0x77,0x81,0x17,0xF1,0x2A, + 0x1D,0x9D,0x5C,0x50,0x18,0xF7,0x28,0xC2, + 0x30,0x55,0x32,0x28,0x6D,0x6F,0x29,0x5A, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF); + +@cipher_data=( + 0x8C,0xA6,0x4D,0xE9,0xC1,0xB1,0x23,0xA7, + 0x73,0x59,0xB2,0x16,0x3E,0x4E,0xDC,0x58, + 0x95,0x8E,0x6E,0x62,0x7A,0x05,0x55,0x7B, + 0xF4,0x03,0x79,0xAB,0x9E,0x0E,0xC5,0x33, + 0x17,0x66,0x8D,0xFC,0x72,0x92,0x53,0x2D, + 0x8A,0x5A,0xE1,0xF8,0x1A,0xB8,0xF2,0xDD, + 0x8C,0xA6,0x4D,0xE9,0xC1,0xB1,0x23,0xA7, + 0xED,0x39,0xD9,0x50,0xFA,0x74,0xBC,0xC4, + 0x69,0x0F,0x5B,0x0D,0x9A,0x26,0x93,0x9B, + 0x7A,0x38,0x9D,0x10,0x35,0x4B,0xD2,0x71, + 0x86,0x8E,0xBB,0x51,0xCA,0xB4,0x59,0x9A, + 0x71,0x78,0x87,0x6E,0x01,0xF1,0x9B,0x2A, + 0xAF,0x37,0xFB,0x42,0x1F,0x8C,0x40,0x95, + 0x86,0xA5,0x60,0xF1,0x0E,0xC6,0xD8,0x5B, + 0x0C,0xD3,0xDA,0x02,0x00,0x21,0xDC,0x09, + 0xEA,0x67,0x6B,0x2C,0xB7,0xDB,0x2B,0x7A, + 0xDF,0xD6,0x4A,0x81,0x5C,0xAF,0x1A,0x0F, + 0x5C,0x51,0x3C,0x9C,0x48,0x86,0xC0,0x88, + 0x0A,0x2A,0xEE,0xAE,0x3F,0xF4,0xAB,0x77, + 0xEF,0x1B,0xF0,0x3E,0x5D,0xFA,0x57,0x5A, + 0x88,0xBF,0x0D,0xB6,0xD7,0x0D,0xEE,0x56, + 0xA1,0xF9,0x91,0x55,0x41,0x02,0x0B,0x56, + 0x6F,0xBF,0x1C,0xAF,0xCF,0xFD,0x05,0x56, + 0x2F,0x22,0xE4,0x9B,0xAB,0x7C,0xA1,0xAC, + 0x5A,0x6B,0x61,0x2C,0xC2,0x6C,0xCE,0x4A, + 0x5F,0x4C,0x03,0x8E,0xD1,0x2B,0x2E,0x41, + 0x63,0xFA,0xC0,0xD0,0x34,0xD9,0xF7,0x93, + 0x61,0x7B,0x3A,0x0C,0xE8,0xF0,0x71,0x00, + 0xDB,0x95,0x86,0x05,0xF8,0xC8,0xC6,0x06, + 0xED,0xBF,0xD1,0xC6,0x6C,0x29,0xCC,0xC7, + 0x35,0x55,0x50,0xB2,0x15,0x0E,0x24,0x51, + 0xCA,0xAA,0xAF,0x4D,0xEA,0xF1,0xDB,0xAE, + 0xD5,0xD4,0x4F,0xF7,0x20,0x68,0x3D,0x0D, + 0x2A,0x2B,0xB0,0x08,0xDF,0x97,0xC2,0xF2); + +print "Doing ecb tests\n"; +for ($i=0; $i<$num_tests; $i++) + { + printf "Doing test $i\n"; + $key =pack("C8",splice(@key_data ,0,8)); + $data=pack("C8",splice(@plain_data ,0,8)); + $res =pack("C8",splice(@cipher_data,0,8)); + + @ks= &des_set_key($key); + $out1= &des_ecb_encrypt(*ks,1,$data); + $out2= &des_ecb_encrypt(*ks,0,$out1); + $out3= &des_ecb_encrypt(*ks,0,$res); + &eprint("encryption failure",$res,$out1) + if ($out1 ne $res); + &eprint("encryption/decryption failure",$data,$out2) + if ($out2 ne $data); + &eprint("decryption failure",$data,$out3) + if ($data ne $out3); + } +print "Done\n"; + +print "doing speed test over 30 seconds\n"; +$SIG{'ALRM'}='done'; +sub done {$done=1;} +$done=0; + +$count=0; +$d=pack("C8",0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef); +@ks= &des_set_key($d); +alarm(30); +$start=(times)[0]; +while (!$done) + { + $count++; + $d=&des_ecb_encrypt(*ks,1,$d); + } +$end=(times)[0]; +$t=$end-$start; +printf "$count DESs in %.2f seconds is %.2f DESs/sec or %.2f bytes/sec\n", + 1.0*$t,1.0*$count/$t,$count*8.0/$t; + +sub eprint + { + local($s,$c,$e)=@_; + local(@k); + + @k=unpack("C8",$c); + printf "%02x%02x%02x%02x %02x%02x%02x%02x - ",unpack("C8",$c); + printf "%02x%02x%02x%02x %02x%02x%02x%02x :",unpack("C8",$e); + print " $s\n"; + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/times b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/times new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5080ef99c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/times @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +existing library on a DEC 3000/500 +set_key per sec = 256294.06 ( 3.9uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 3553694.40 ( 2.3uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 3661004.80 ( 2.2uS) +DES ede cbc bytes per sec = 1353115.99 ( 5.9uS) +crypt per sec = 16829.40 ( 59.4uS) + +Intel P6/200 (NEXTSTEP) - cc -O3 (cc: gcc 2.5.8) +set_key per sec = 219220.82 ( 4.6uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 2438014.04 ( 3.3uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 2467648.85 ( 3.2uS) +DES ede cbc bytes per sec = 942121.58 ( 8.5uS) +crypt per sec = 11398.73 ( 87.7uS) + +# DECstation Alpha 3000 Model 700 AXP / OSF1 V3.0 +# gcc 2.6.3 / Young libdes 3.21 +set_key per sec = 149369.74 ( 6.7uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 2011976.68 ( 4.0uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 2002245.35 ( 4.0uS) +DES ede cbc bytes per sec = 793677.19 ( 10.1uS) +crypt per sec = 9244.52 (108.2uS) + +# Sun Ultra I gcc 2.7.2 / Young libdes 3.21 +set_key per sec = 147172.22 ( 6.8uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1815054.70 ( 4.4uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1829405.18 ( 4.4uS) +DES ede cbc bytes per sec = 714490.23 ( 11.2uS) +crypt per sec = 8896.24 (112.4uS) + +SGI Challenge (MIPS R4400 200mhz) - gcc -O2 +set_key per sec = 114141.13 ( 8.8uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1573472.84 ( 5.1uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1580418.20 ( 5.1uS) +crypt per sec = 7137.84 (140.1uS) + +DEC Alpha DEC 4000/710 AXP OSF/1 v 3.0 - gcc -O2 2.6.1 +set_key per sec = 123138.49 ( 8.1uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1407546.76 ( 5.7uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1404103.21 ( 5.7uS) +crypt per sec = 7746.76 (129.1uS) + +DEC Alpha DEC 4000/710 AXP OSF/1 v 3.0 - cc -O4 'DEC Compiler Driver 3.11' +set_key per sec = 135160.83 ( 7.4uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1267753.22 ( 6.3uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1260564.90 ( 6.3uS) +crypt per sec = 6479.37 (154.3uS) + +SGI Challenge (MIPS R4400 200mhz) - cc -O2 +set_key per sec = 124000.10 ( 8.1uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1338138.45 ( 6.0uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1356515.84 ( 5.9uS) +crypt per sec = 6223.92 (160.7uS) + +Intel P5/133 (NEXTSTEP) - cc -O3 (cc: gcc 2.5.8) +set_key per sec = 81923.10 ( 12.2uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1104711.61 ( 7.2uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1091536.05 ( 7.3uS) +DES ede cbc bytes per sec = 410502.62 ( 19.5uS) +crypt per sec = 4849.60 (206.2uS) + +Sun SPARC 20 (NEXTSTEP) - cc -O3 (cc: gcc 2.5.8) +set_key per sec = 60973.05 ( 16.4uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 806032.15 ( 9.9uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 801534.95 ( 10.0uS) +DES ede cbc bytes per sec = 298799.73 ( 26.8uS) +crypt per sec = 3678.42 (271.9uS) + +SGI Indy (MIPS R4600 133mhz) -cc -O2 +set_key per sec = 88470.54 ( 11.3uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1023040.33 ( 7.8uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1033610.01 ( 7.7uS) +crypt per sec = 4641.51 (215.4uS) + +HP-UX 9000/887 cc +O3 +set_key per sec = 76824.30 ( 13.0uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1048911.20 ( 7.6uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1072332.80 ( 7.5uS) +crypt per sec = 4968.64 (201.3uS) + +IRIX 5.2 IP22 (R4000) cc -O2 (galilo) +set_key per sec = 60615.73 ( 16.5uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 584741.32 ( 13.7uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 584306.94 ( 13.7uS) +crypt per sec = 3049.33 (327.9uS) + +HP-UX 9000/867 cc -O +set_key per sec = 48600.00 ( 20.6uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 616235.14 ( 13.0uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 638669.44 ( 12.5uS) +crypt per sec = 3016.68 (331.5uS) + +HP-UX 9000/867 gcc -O2 +set_key per sec = 52120.50 ( 19.2uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 715156.55 ( 11.2uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 724424.28 ( 11.0uS) +crypt per sec = 3295.87 (303.4uS) + +DGUX AViiON mc88110 gcc -O2 +set_key per sec = 55604.91 ( 18.0uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 658513.25 ( 12.1uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 675552.71 ( 11.8uS) +crypt per sec = 3438.10 (290.9uS) + +Sparc 10 cc -O2 (orb) +set_key per sec = 53002.30 ( 18.9uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 705250.40 ( 11.3uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 714342.40 ( 11.2uS) +crypt per sec = 2943.99 (339.7uS) + +Sparc 10 gcc -O2 (orb) +set_key per sec = 58681.21 ( 17.0uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 772390.20 ( 10.4uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 774144.00 ( 10.3uS) +crypt per sec = 3606.90 (277.2uS) + +DEC Alpha DEC 4000/610 AXP OSF/1 v 1.3 - gcc v 2.3.3 +set_key per sec = 101840.19 ( 9.8uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1223712.35 ( 6.5uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1230542.98 ( 6.5uS) +crypt per sec = 6428.75 (155.6uS) + +DEC Alpha DEC 4000/610 APX OSF/1 v 1.3 - cc -O2 - OSF/1 AXP +set_key per sec = 114198.91 ( 8.8uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 1022710.93 ( 7.8uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 1008821.93 ( 7.9uS) +crypt per sec = 5454.13 (183.3uS) + +DEC Alpha - DEC 3000/500 AXP OSF/1 - cc -O2 - 02/12/92 +set_key per sec = 83587.04 ( 12.0uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 822620.82 ( 9.7uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 832929.60 ( 9.6uS) +crypt per sec = 4807.62 (208.0uS) + +sun sparc 10/30 - gcc -O2 +set_key per sec = 42005.24 ( 23.8uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 555949.47 ( 14.4uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 549440.28 ( 14.6uS) +crypt per sec = 2580.25 (387.6uS) + +PA-RISC 1.1 HP 710 +set_key per sec = 38916.86 +DES ecb bytes per sec = 505971.82 +DES cbc bytes per sec = 515381.13 +crypt per sec = 2438.24 + +iris (spike) cc -O2 +set_key per sec = 23128.83 ( 43.2uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 261577.94 ( 30.6uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 261746.41 ( 30.6uS) +crypt per sec = 1231.76 (811.8uS) + +sun sparc 10/30 - cc -O4 +set_key per sec = 38379.86 ( 26.1uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 460051.34 ( 17.4uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 464970.54 ( 17.2uS) +crypt per sec = 2092.64 (477.9uS) + +sun sparc 2 - gcc2 -O2 +set_key per sec = 21559.10 +DES ecb bytes per sec = 305566.92 +DES cbc bytes per sec = 303497.50 +crypt per sec = 1410.48 + +RS/6000 model 320 +set_key per sec = 14371.93 +DES ecb bytes per sec = 222231.26 +DES cbc bytes per sec = 223926.79 +crypt per sec = 981.20 + +80486dx/66MHz Solaris 2.1 - gcc -O2 (gcc 2.6.3) +set_key per sec = 26814.15 ( 37.3uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 345029.95 ( 23.2uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 344064.00 ( 23.3uS) +crypt per sec = 1551.97 (644.3uS) + +80486dx/50MHz Solaris 2.1 - gcc -O2 (gcc 2.5.2) +set_key per sec = 18558.29 ( 53.9uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 240873.90 ( 33.2uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 239993.37 ( 33.3uS) +crypt per sec = 1073.67 (931.4uS) + +80486dx/50MHz Solaris 2.1 - cc -xO4 (cc: PC2.0.1 30 April 1993) +set_key per sec = 18302.79 ( 54.6uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 242640.29 ( 33.0uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 239568.89 ( 33.4uS) +crypt per sec = 1057.92 (945.2uS) + +68030 HP400 +set_key per sec = 5251.28 +DES ecb bytes per sec = 56186.56 +DES cbc bytes per sec = 58681.53 +crypt per sec = 276.15 + +80486sx/33MHz MSDOS Turbo C v 2.0 +set_key per sec = 1883.22 (531.0uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 63393.31 (126.2uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 63416.83 (126.1uS) +crypt per sec = 158.71 (6300.6uS) + +80486sx/33MHz MSDOS djgpp gcc 1.39 (32bit compiler) +set_key per sec = 12603.08 (79.3) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 158875.15 (50.4) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 159893.85 (50.0) +crypt per sec = 780.24 (1281.7) + +Version 1.99 26/08/92 +8MHz 68000 Atari-ST gcc 2.1 -O2 MiNT 0.94 +set_key per sec = 325.68 (3070.5uS) +DES ecb bytes per sec = 4173.67 (1916.8uS) +DES cbc bytes per sec = 4249.89 (1882.4uS) +crypt per sec = 20.19 (49521.6uS) + +8088/4.77mh MSDOS Turbo C v 2.0 +set_key per sec = 35.09 +DES ecb bytes per sec = 563.63 +crypt per sec = 2.69 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/typemap b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/typemap new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a524f53634 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/typemap @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# +# DES SECTION +# +deschar * T_DESCHARP +des_cblock * T_CBLOCK +des_cblock T_CBLOCK +des_key_schedule T_SCHEDULE +des_key_schedule * T_SCHEDULE + +INPUT +T_CBLOCK + $var=(des_cblock *)SvPV($arg,len); + if (len < DES_KEY_SZ) + { + croak(\"$var needs to be at least %u bytes long\",DES_KEY_SZ); + } + +T_SCHEDULE + $var=(des_key_schedule *)SvPV($arg,len); + if (len < DES_SCHEDULE_SZ) + { + croak(\"$var needs to be at least %u bytes long\", + DES_SCHEDULE_SZ); + } + +OUTPUT +T_CBLOCK + sv_setpvn($arg,(char *)$var,DES_KEY_SZ); + +T_SCHEDULE + sv_setpvn($arg,(char *)$var,DES_SCHEDULE_SZ); + +T_DESCHARP + sv_setpvn($arg,(char *)$var,len); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/version.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/version.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aee11903f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/version.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* lib/des/version.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This file is part of an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL + * specification. This library and applications are + * FREE FOR COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL USE + * as long as the following conditions are aheared to. + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. If this code is used in a product, + * Eric Young should be given attribution as the author of the parts used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +extern char *DES_version; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/vms.com b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/vms.com new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..885ea8e36b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/vms.com @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +$! --- VMS.com --- +$! +$ GoSub defines +$ GoSub linker_options +$ If (P1 .nes. "") +$ Then +$ GoSub 'P1' +$ Else +$ GoSub lib +$ GoSub destest +$ GoSub rpw +$ GoSub speed +$ GoSub des +$ EndIF +$! +$ Exit +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$DEFINES: +$ OPT_FILE := "VAX_LINKER_OPTIONS.OPT" +$! +$ CC_OPTS := "/NODebug/OPTimize/NOWarn" +$! +$ LINK_OPTS := "/NODebug/NOTraceback/Contiguous" +$! +$ OBJS = "cbc_cksm.obj,cbc_enc.obj,ecb_enc.obj,pcbc_enc.obj," + - + "qud_cksm.obj,rand_key.obj,read_pwd.obj,set_key.obj," + - + "str2key.obj,enc_read.obj,enc_writ.obj,fcrypt.obj," + - + "cfb_enc.obj,3ecb_enc.obj,ofb_enc.obj" + + +$! +$ LIBDES = "cbc_cksm.c,cbc_enc.c,ecb_enc.c,enc_read.c," + - + "enc_writ.c,pcbc_enc.c,qud_cksm.c,rand_key.c," + - + "read_pwd.c,set_key.c,str2key.c,fcrypt.c," + - + "cfb_enc.c,3ecb_enc.c,ofb_enc.c" +$ Return +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$LINKER_OPTIONS: +$ If (f$search(OPT_FILE) .eqs. "") +$ Then +$ Create 'OPT_FILE' +$DECK +! Default system options file to link against the sharable C runtime library +! +Sys$Share:VAXcRTL.exe/Share +$EOD +$ EndIF +$ Return +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$LIB: +$ CC 'CC_OPTS' 'LIBDES' +$ If (f$search("LIBDES.OLB") .nes. "") +$ Then Library /Object /Replace libdes 'OBJS' +$ Else Library /Create /Object libdes 'OBJS' +$ EndIF +$ Return +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$DESTEST: +$ CC 'CC_OPTS' destest +$ Link 'link_opts' /Exec=destest destest.obj,libdes/LIBRARY,'opt_file'/Option +$ Return +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$RPW: +$ CC 'CC_OPTS' rpw +$ Link 'link_opts' /Exec=rpw rpw.obj,libdes/LIBRARY,'opt_file'/Option +$ Return +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$SPEED: +$ CC 'CC_OPTS' speed +$ Link 'link_opts' /Exec=speed speed.obj,libdes/LIBRARY,'opt_file'/Option +$ Return +$! +$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +$! +$DES: +$ CC 'CC_OPTS' des +$ Link 'link_opts' /Exec=des des.obj,libdes/LIBRARY,'opt_file'/Option +$ Return diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/xcbc_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/xcbc_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6a8626171d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/des/xcbc_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +/* crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@mincom.oz.au)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@mincom.oz.au)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" + +/* RSA's DESX */ + +static unsigned char desx_white_in2out[256]={ +0xBD,0x56,0xEA,0xF2,0xA2,0xF1,0xAC,0x2A,0xB0,0x93,0xD1,0x9C,0x1B,0x33,0xFD,0xD0, +0x30,0x04,0xB6,0xDC,0x7D,0xDF,0x32,0x4B,0xF7,0xCB,0x45,0x9B,0x31,0xBB,0x21,0x5A, +0x41,0x9F,0xE1,0xD9,0x4A,0x4D,0x9E,0xDA,0xA0,0x68,0x2C,0xC3,0x27,0x5F,0x80,0x36, +0x3E,0xEE,0xFB,0x95,0x1A,0xFE,0xCE,0xA8,0x34,0xA9,0x13,0xF0,0xA6,0x3F,0xD8,0x0C, +0x78,0x24,0xAF,0x23,0x52,0xC1,0x67,0x17,0xF5,0x66,0x90,0xE7,0xE8,0x07,0xB8,0x60, +0x48,0xE6,0x1E,0x53,0xF3,0x92,0xA4,0x72,0x8C,0x08,0x15,0x6E,0x86,0x00,0x84,0xFA, +0xF4,0x7F,0x8A,0x42,0x19,0xF6,0xDB,0xCD,0x14,0x8D,0x50,0x12,0xBA,0x3C,0x06,0x4E, +0xEC,0xB3,0x35,0x11,0xA1,0x88,0x8E,0x2B,0x94,0x99,0xB7,0x71,0x74,0xD3,0xE4,0xBF, +0x3A,0xDE,0x96,0x0E,0xBC,0x0A,0xED,0x77,0xFC,0x37,0x6B,0x03,0x79,0x89,0x62,0xC6, +0xD7,0xC0,0xD2,0x7C,0x6A,0x8B,0x22,0xA3,0x5B,0x05,0x5D,0x02,0x75,0xD5,0x61,0xE3, +0x18,0x8F,0x55,0x51,0xAD,0x1F,0x0B,0x5E,0x85,0xE5,0xC2,0x57,0x63,0xCA,0x3D,0x6C, +0xB4,0xC5,0xCC,0x70,0xB2,0x91,0x59,0x0D,0x47,0x20,0xC8,0x4F,0x58,0xE0,0x01,0xE2, +0x16,0x38,0xC4,0x6F,0x3B,0x0F,0x65,0x46,0xBE,0x7E,0x2D,0x7B,0x82,0xF9,0x40,0xB5, +0x1D,0x73,0xF8,0xEB,0x26,0xC7,0x87,0x97,0x25,0x54,0xB1,0x28,0xAA,0x98,0x9D,0xA5, +0x64,0x6D,0x7A,0xD4,0x10,0x81,0x44,0xEF,0x49,0xD6,0xAE,0x2E,0xDD,0x76,0x5C,0x2F, +0xA7,0x1C,0xC9,0x09,0x69,0x9A,0x83,0xCF,0x29,0x39,0xB9,0xE9,0x4C,0xFF,0x43,0xAB, + }; + +void des_xwhite_in2out(des_key,in_white,out_white) +des_cblock (*des_key); +des_cblock (*in_white); +des_cblock (*out_white); + { + unsigned char *key,*in,*out; + int out0,out1; + int i; + + key=(unsigned char *)des_key; + in=(unsigned char *)in_white; + out=(unsigned char *)out_white; + + out[0]=out[1]=out[2]=out[3]=out[4]=out[5]=out[6]=out[7]=0; + out0=out1=0; + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + { + out[i]=key[i]^desx_white_in2out[out0^out1]; + out0=out1; + out1=(int)out[i&0x07]; + } + + out0=out[0]; + out1=out[i]; + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + { + out[i]=in[i]^desx_white_in2out[out0^out1]; + out0=out1; + out1=(int)out[i&0x07]; + } + } + +void des_xcbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, inw,outw,encrypt) +des_cblock (*input); +des_cblock (*output); +long length; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock (*ivec); +des_cblock (*inw); +des_cblock (*outw); +int encrypt; + { + register DES_LONG tin0,tin1; + register DES_LONG tout0,tout1,xor0,xor1; + register DES_LONG inW0,inW1,outW0,outW1; + register unsigned char *in,*out; + register long l=length; + DES_LONG tin[2]; + unsigned char *iv; + + in=(unsigned char *)inw; + c2l(in,inW0); + c2l(in,inW1); + in=(unsigned char *)outw; + c2l(in,outW0); + c2l(in,outW1); + + in=(unsigned char *)input; + out=(unsigned char *)output; + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + + if (encrypt) + { + c2l(iv,tout0); + c2l(iv,tout1); + for (l-=8; l>=0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); + c2l(in,tin1); + tin0^=tout0^inW0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1^inW1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^outW0; l2c(tout0,out); + tout1=tin[1]^outW1; l2c(tout1,out); + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2ln(in,tin0,tin1,l+8); + tin0^=tout0^inW0; tin[0]=tin0; + tin1^=tout1^inW1; tin[1]=tin1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_ENCRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^outW0; l2c(tout0,out); + tout1=tin[1]^outW1; l2c(tout1,out); + } + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(tout0,iv); + l2c(tout1,iv); + } + else + { + c2l(iv,xor0); + c2l(iv,xor1); + for (l-=8; l>0; l-=8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); tin[0]=tin0^outW0; + c2l(in,tin1); tin[1]=tin1^outW1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0^inW0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1^inW1; + l2c(tout0,out); + l2c(tout1,out); + xor0=tin0; + xor1=tin1; + } + if (l != -8) + { + c2l(in,tin0); tin[0]=tin0^outW0; + c2l(in,tin1); tin[1]=tin1^outW1; + des_encrypt((DES_LONG *)tin,schedule,DES_DECRYPT); + tout0=tin[0]^xor0^inW0; + tout1=tin[1]^xor1^inW1; + l2cn(tout0,tout1,out,l+8); + xor0=tin0; + xor1=tin1; + } + + iv=(unsigned char *)ivec; + l2c(xor0,iv); + l2c(xor1,iv); + } + tin0=tin1=tout0=tout1=xor0=xor1=0; + inW0=inW1=outW0=outW1=0; + tin[0]=tin[1]=0; + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3773f8c6b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +2002-08-22 Assar Westerlund + + * testit.c: make it use getarg so that it can handle --help and + --version (and thus make check can pass) + +2001-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * editline.c: rename STATUS -> el_STATUS to avoid conflict with + STATUS in arpa/nameser.h + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: make libeditline and libel_compat into libtool + libraries but always make them static + +2000-03-01 Assar Westerlund + + * edit_compat.c (readline): be more liberal in what we accept from + el_gets. if count == 0 -> interpret it as EOF. also copy the + string first and then cut of the newline, it's cleaner + +1999-12-23 Assar Westerlund + + * editline.c (TTYinfo): add fallback if we fail to find "le" in + termcap. + +1999-08-06 Assar Westerlund + + * editline.c (TTYinfo): copy backspace string to avoid referencing + into a local variable. + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: don't run testit in `make check' + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: don't run testit as a check + +Sat Apr 10 23:01:18 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * complete.c (rl_complete_filename): return if there were no + matches + +Thu Apr 8 15:08:25 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: snprintf + + * roken_rename.h: add snprintf, asprintf + + * Makefile.am: build testit + + * complete.c: nuke NEW, DISPOSE, RENEW, and COPYFROMTO macros; + (rl_complete): call rl_list_possib instead of doing the same + + * editline.h: nuke NEW, DISPOSE, RENEW, and COPYFROMTO macros + + * editline.c: nuke NEW, DISPOSE, RENEW, and COPYFROMTO macros + + * sysunix.c: add some whitespace + +Thu Mar 18 11:22:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Tue Mar 16 17:10:34 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * editline.c: remove protos for read/write + +Sat Mar 13 22:23:22 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * : add + +Sun Nov 22 10:40:28 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Tue Sep 29 02:09:15 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (LIB_DEPS): add LIB_tgetent + +Thu Jul 2 15:10:08 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * edit_compat.c: support for newer libedit + +Tue Jun 30 17:18:09 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (distclean): don't remove roken_rename.h + +Fri May 29 19:03:38 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (strdup.c): remove dependency + +Mon May 25 05:25:16 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + +Sun Apr 19 09:53:46 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sat Feb 7 07:24:30 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * editline.h: add prototypes + +Tue Feb 3 10:24:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * editline.c: If read returns EINTR, try again. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5500d2664f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 2002/08/13 13:48:15 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +if do_roken_rename +ES = snprintf.c strdup.c +endif + +INCLUDES += $(ROKEN_RENAME) + +man_MANS = editline.3 + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libeditline.la +if el_compat +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libel_compat.la +else +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = +endif + +noinst_PROGRAMS = testit + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +testit_LDADD = \ + libeditline.la \ + $(LIB_tgetent) \ + $(LIB_roken) + +include_HEADERS = editline.h + +libeditline_la_SOURCES = \ + complete.c \ + editline.c \ + sysunix.c \ + editline.h \ + roken_rename.h \ + unix.h \ + $(EXTRA_SOURCE) + +libeditline_la_LDFLAGS = -static + +EXTRA_SOURCE = $(ES) + +libel_compat_la_SOURCES = edit_compat.c + +libel_compat_la_LDFLAGS = -static + +EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS) + +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . +strdup.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strdup.c . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7c3a4903f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,892 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 2002/08/13 13:48:15 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# 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foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . +strdup.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strdup.c . +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/README b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..829db995b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/README @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +$Revision: 1.1 $ + +This is a line-editing library. It can be linked into almost any +program to provide command-line editing and recall. + +It is call-compatible with the FSF readline library, but it is a +fraction of the size (and offers fewer features). It does not use +standard I/O. It is distributed under a "C News-like" copyright. + +Configuration is done in the Makefile. Type "make testit" to get +a small slow shell for testing. + +An earlier version was distributed with Byron's rc. Principal +changes over that version include: + Faster. + Is eight-bit clean (thanks to brendan@cs.widener.edu) + Written in K&R C, but ANSI compliant (gcc all warnings) + Propagates EOF properly; rc trip test now passes + Doesn't need or use or provide memmove. + More robust + Calling sequence changed to be compatible with readline. + Test program, new manpage, better configuration + More system-independant; includes Unix and OS-9 support. + +Enjoy, + Rich $alz + + + Copyright 1992 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved. + + This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone + and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + + Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on + any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it freely, subject + to the following restrictions: + 1. The authors are not responsible for the consequences of use of this + software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + 2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by + explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, + credits must appear in the documentation. + 3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be + misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users + ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + 4. This notice may not be removed or altered. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/complete.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/complete.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2a311d25e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/complete.c @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/* Copyright 1992 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved. + * + * This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone + * and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + * + * Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on + * any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it freely, subject + * to the following restrictions: + * 1. The authors are not responsible for the consequences of use of this + * software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + * 2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by + * explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, + * credits must appear in the documentation. + * 3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be + * misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users + * ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + * 4. This notice may not be removed or altered. + */ + +/* +** History and file completion functions for editline library. +*/ +#include +#include "editline.h" + +RCSID("$Id: complete.c,v 1.5 1999/04/10 21:01:16 joda Exp $"); + +/* +** strcmp-like sorting predicate for qsort. +*/ +static int +compare(const void *p1, const void *p2) +{ + const char **v1; + const char **v2; + + v1 = (const char **)p1; + v2 = (const char **)p2; + return strcmp(*v1, *v2); +} + +/* +** Fill in *avp with an array of names that match file, up to its length. +** Ignore . and .. . +*/ +static int +FindMatches(char *dir, char *file, char ***avp) +{ + char **av; + char **new; + char *p; + DIR *dp; + DIRENTRY *ep; + size_t ac; + size_t len; + + if ((dp = opendir(dir)) == NULL) + return 0; + + av = NULL; + ac = 0; + len = strlen(file); + while ((ep = readdir(dp)) != NULL) { + p = ep->d_name; + if (p[0] == '.' && (p[1] == '\0' || (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '\0'))) + continue; + if (len && strncmp(p, file, len) != 0) + continue; + + if ((ac % MEM_INC) == 0) { + if ((new = malloc(sizeof(char*) * (ac + MEM_INC))) == NULL) + break; + if (ac) { + memcpy(new, av, ac * sizeof (char **)); + free(av); + } + *avp = av = new; + } + + if ((av[ac] = strdup(p)) == NULL) { + if (ac == 0) + free(av); + break; + } + ac++; + } + + /* Clean up and return. */ + (void)closedir(dp); + if (ac) + qsort(av, ac, sizeof (char **), compare); + return ac; +} + +/* +** Split a pathname into allocated directory and trailing filename parts. +*/ +static int SplitPath(char *path, char **dirpart, char **filepart) +{ + static char DOT[] = "."; + char *dpart; + char *fpart; + + if ((fpart = strrchr(path, '/')) == NULL) { + if ((dpart = strdup(DOT)) == NULL) + return -1; + if ((fpart = strdup(path)) == NULL) { + free(dpart); + return -1; + } + } + else { + if ((dpart = strdup(path)) == NULL) + return -1; + dpart[fpart - path] = '\0'; + if ((fpart = strdup(++fpart)) == NULL) { + free(dpart); + return -1; + } + } + *dirpart = dpart; + *filepart = fpart; + return 0; +} + +/* +** Attempt to complete the pathname, returning an allocated copy. +** Fill in *unique if we completed it, or set it to 0 if ambiguous. +*/ + +static char * +rl_complete_filename(char *pathname, int *unique) +{ + char **av; + char *new; + char *p; + size_t ac; + size_t end; + size_t i; + size_t j; + size_t len; + char *s; + + ac = rl_list_possib(pathname, &av); + if(ac == 0) + return NULL; + + s = strrchr(pathname, '/'); + if(s == NULL) + len = strlen(pathname); + else + len = strlen(s + 1); + + p = NULL; + if (ac == 1) { + /* Exactly one match -- finish it off. */ + *unique = 1; + j = strlen(av[0]) - len + 2; + if ((p = malloc(j + 1)) != NULL) { + memcpy(p, av[0] + len, j); + asprintf(&new, "%s%s", pathname, p); + if(new != NULL) { + rl_add_slash(new, p); + free(new); + } + } + } + else { + *unique = 0; + if (len) { + /* Find largest matching substring. */ + for (i = len, end = strlen(av[0]); i < end; i++) + for (j = 1; j < ac; j++) + if (av[0][i] != av[j][i]) + goto breakout; + breakout: + if (i > len) { + j = i - len + 1; + if ((p = malloc(j)) != NULL) { + memcpy(p, av[0] + len, j); + p[j - 1] = '\0'; + } + } + } + } + + /* Clean up and return. */ + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + return p; +} + +static rl_complete_func_t complete_func = rl_complete_filename; + +char * +rl_complete(char *pathname, int *unique) +{ + return (*complete_func)(pathname, unique); +} + +rl_complete_func_t +rl_set_complete_func(rl_complete_func_t func) +{ + rl_complete_func_t old = complete_func; + complete_func = func; + return old; +} + + +/* +** Return all possible completions. +*/ +static int +rl_list_possib_filename(char *pathname, char ***avp) +{ + char *dir; + char *file; + int ac; + + if (SplitPath(pathname, &dir, &file) < 0) + return 0; + ac = FindMatches(dir, file, avp); + free(dir); + free(file); + return ac; +} + +static rl_list_possib_func_t list_possib_func = rl_list_possib_filename; + +int +rl_list_possib(char *pathname, char ***avp) +{ + return (*list_possib_func)(pathname, avp); +} + +rl_list_possib_func_t +rl_set_list_possib_func(rl_list_possib_func_t func) +{ + rl_list_possib_func_t old = list_possib_func; + list_possib_func = func; + return old; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/edit_compat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/edit_compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0f4962802 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/edit_compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "edit_compat.h" + +RCSID("$Id: edit_compat.c,v 1.9 2001/08/29 00:24:33 assar Exp $"); + +void +rl_reset_terminal(char *p) +{ +} + +void +rl_initialize(void) +{ +} + +static const char *pr; +static const char* ret_prompt(EditLine *e) +{ + return pr; +} + +static History *h; + +#ifdef H_SETSIZE +#define EL_INIT_FOUR 1 +#else +#ifdef H_SETMAXSIZE +/* backwards compatibility */ +#define H_SETSIZE H_SETMAXSIZE +#endif +#endif + +char * +readline(const char* prompt) +{ + static EditLine *e; +#ifdef H_SETSIZE + HistEvent ev; +#endif + int count; + const char *str; + + if(e == NULL){ +#ifdef EL_INIT_FOUR + e = el_init("", stdin, stdout, stderr); +#else + e = el_init("", stdin, stdout); +#endif + el_set(e, EL_PROMPT, ret_prompt); + h = history_init(); +#ifdef H_SETSIZE + history(h, &ev, H_SETSIZE, 25); +#else + history(h, H_EVENT, 25); +#endif + el_set(e, EL_HIST, history, h); + el_set(e, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); /* XXX? */ + } + pr = prompt ? prompt : ""; + str = el_gets(e, &count); + if (str && count > 0) { + char *ret = strdup (str); + + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (ret[strlen(ret) - 1] == '\n') + ret[strlen(ret) - 1] = '\0'; + return ret; + } + return NULL; +} + +void +add_history(char *p) +{ +#ifdef H_SETSIZE + HistEvent ev; + history(h, &ev, H_ENTER, p); +#else + history(h, H_ENTER, p); +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/edit_compat.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/edit_compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c0c40fe983 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/edit_compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: edit_compat.h,v 1.1 2001/08/29 00:24:33 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _EDIT_COMPAT_H +#define _EDIT_COMPAT_H + +void rl_reset_terminal(char *p); +void rl_initialize(void); +char *readline(const char *prompt); +void add_history(char *p); + +#endif /* _EDIT_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e30a09d91 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.3 @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +.\" $Revision: 1.2 $ +.TH EDITLINE 3 +.SH NAME +editline \- command-line editing library with history +.SH SYNOPSIS +.nf +.B "char *" +.B "readline(prompt)" +.B " char *prompt;" + +.B "void" +.B "add_history(line)" +.B " char *line;" +.fi +.SH DESCRIPTION +.I Editline +is a library that provides an line-editing interface with text recall. +It is intended to be compatible with the +.I readline +library provided by the Free Software Foundation, but much smaller. +The bulk of this manual page describes the user interface. +.PP +The +.I readline +routine returns a line of text with the trailing newline removed. +The data is returned in a buffer allocated with +.IR malloc (3), +so the space should be released with +.IR free (3) +when the calling program is done with it. +Before accepting input from the user, the specified +.I prompt +is displayed on the terminal. +.PP +The +.I add_history +routine makes a copy of the specified +.I line +and adds it to the internal history list. +.SS "User Interface" +A program that uses this library provides a simple emacs-like editing +interface to its users. +A line may be edited before it is sent to the calling program by typing either +control characters or escape sequences. +A control character, shown as a caret followed by a letter, is typed by +holding down the ``control'' key while the letter is typed. +For example, ``^A'' is a control-A. +An escape sequence is entered by typing the ``escape'' key followed by one or +more characters. +The escape key is abbreviated as ``ESC.'' +Note that unlike control keys, case matters in escape sequences; ``ESC\ F'' +is not the same as ``ESC\ f''. +.PP +An editing command may be typed anywhere on the line, not just at the +beginning. +In addition, a return may also be typed anywhere on the line, not just at +the end. +.PP +Most editing commands may be given a repeat count, +.IR n , +where +.I n +is a number. +To enter a repeat count, type the escape key, the number, and then +the command to execute. +For example, ``ESC\ 4\ ^f'' moves forward four characters. +If a command may be given a repeat count then the text ``[n]'' is given at the +end of its description. +.PP +The following control characters are accepted: +.RS +.nf +.ta \w'ESC DEL 'u +^A Move to the beginning of the line +^B Move left (backwards) [n] +^D Delete character [n] +^E Move to end of line +^F Move right (forwards) [n] +^G Ring the bell +^H Delete character before cursor (backspace key) [n] +^I Complete filename (tab key); see below +^J Done with line (return key) +^K Kill to end of line (or column [n]) +^L Redisplay line +^M Done with line (alternate return key) +^N Get next line from history [n] +^P Get previous line from history [n] +^R Search backward (forward if [n]) through history for text; +\& must start line if text begins with an uparrow +^T Transpose characters +^V Insert next character, even if it is an edit command +^W Wipe to the mark +^X^X Exchange current location and mark +^Y Yank back last killed text +^[ Start an escape sequence (escape key) +^]c Move forward to next character ``c'' +^? Delete character before cursor (delete key) [n] +.fi +.RE +.PP +The following escape sequences are provided. +.RS +.nf +.ta \w'ESC DEL 'u +ESC\ ^H Delete previous word (backspace key) [n] +ESC\ DEL Delete previous word (delete key) [n] +ESC\ SP Set the mark (space key); see ^X^X and ^Y above +ESC\ \. Get the last (or [n]'th) word from previous line +ESC\ ? Show possible completions; see below +ESC\ < Move to start of history +ESC\ > Move to end of history +ESC\ b Move backward a word [n] +ESC\ d Delete word under cursor [n] +ESC\ f Move forward a word [n] +ESC\ l Make word lowercase [n] +ESC\ u Make word uppercase [n] +ESC\ y Yank back last killed text +ESC\ v Show library version +ESC\ w Make area up to mark yankable +ESC\ nn Set repeat count to the number nn +ESC\ C Read from environment variable ``_C_'', where C is +\& an uppercase letter +.fi +.RE +.PP +The +.I editline +library has a small macro facility. +If you type the escape key followed by an uppercase letter, +.IR C , +then the contents of the environment variable +.I _C_ +are read in as if you had typed them at the keyboard. +For example, if the variable +.I _L_ +contains the following: +.RS +^A^Kecho '^V^[[H^V^[[2J'^M +.RE +Then typing ``ESC L'' will move to the beginning of the line, kill the +entire line, enter the echo command needed to clear the terminal (if your +terminal is like a VT-100), and send the line back to the shell. +.PP +The +.I editline +library also does filename completion. +Suppose the root directory has the following files in it: +.RS +.nf +.ta \w'core 'u +bin vmunix +core vmunix.old +.fi +.RE +If you type ``rm\ /v'' and then the tab key. +.I Editline +will then finish off as much of the name as possible by adding ``munix''. +Because the name is not unique, it will then beep. +If you type the escape key and a question mark, it will display the +two choices. +If you then type a period and a tab, the library will finish off the filename +for you: +.RS +.nf +.RI "rm /v[TAB]" munix .TAB old +.fi +.RE +The tab key is shown by ``[TAB]'' and the automatically-entered text +is shown in italics. +.SH "BUGS AND LIMITATIONS" +Cannot handle lines more than 80 columns. +.SH AUTHORS +Simmule R. Turner +and Rich $alz . +Original manual page by DaviD W. Sanderson . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24fa8464a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.c @@ -0,0 +1,1376 @@ +/* Copyright 1992 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved. + * + * This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone + * and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + * + * Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on + * any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it freely, subject + * to the following restrictions: + * 1. The authors are not responsible for the consequences of use of this + * software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + * 2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by + * explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, + * credits must appear in the documentation. + * 3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be + * misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users + * ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + * 4. This notice may not be removed or altered. + */ + +/* +** Main editing routines for editline library. +*/ +#include +#include "editline.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: editline.c,v 1.10 2001/09/13 01:19:54 assar Exp $"); + +/* +** Manifest constants. +*/ +#define SCREEN_WIDTH 80 +#define SCREEN_ROWS 24 +#define NO_ARG (-1) +#define DEL 127 +#define CTL(x) ((x) & 0x1F) +#define ISCTL(x) ((x) && (x) < ' ') +#define UNCTL(x) ((x) + 64) +#define META(x) ((x) | 0x80) +#define ISMETA(x) ((x) & 0x80) +#define UNMETA(x) ((x) & 0x7F) +#if !defined(HIST_SIZE) +#define HIST_SIZE 20 +#endif /* !defined(HIST_SIZE) */ + +/* +** Command status codes. +*/ +typedef enum _el_STATUS { + CSdone, CSeof, CSmove, CSdispatch, CSstay +} el_STATUS; + +/* +** The type of case-changing to perform. +*/ +typedef enum _CASE { + TOupper, TOlower +} CASE; + +/* +** Key to command mapping. +*/ +typedef struct _KEYMAP { + unsigned char Key; + el_STATUS (*Function)(); +} KEYMAP; + +/* +** Command history structure. +*/ +typedef struct _HISTORY { + int Size; + int Pos; + unsigned char *Lines[HIST_SIZE]; +} HISTORY; + +/* +** Globals. +*/ +int rl_eof; +int rl_erase; +int rl_intr; +int rl_kill; + +static unsigned char NIL[] = ""; +static const unsigned char *Input = NIL; +static unsigned char *Line; +static const char *Prompt; +static unsigned char *Yanked; +static char *Screen; +static char NEWLINE[]= CRLF; +static HISTORY H; +int rl_quit; +static int Repeat; +static int End; +static int Mark; +static int OldPoint; +static int Point; +static int PushBack; +static int Pushed; +static KEYMAP Map[33]; +static KEYMAP MetaMap[16]; +static size_t Length; +static size_t ScreenCount; +static size_t ScreenSize; +static char *backspace; +static int TTYwidth; +static int TTYrows; + +/* Display print 8-bit chars as `M-x' or as the actual 8-bit char? */ +int rl_meta_chars = 1; + +/* +** Declarations. +*/ +static unsigned char *editinput(void); +char *tgetstr(const char*, char**); +int tgetent(char*, const char*); +int tgetnum(const char*); + +/* +** TTY input/output functions. +*/ + +static void +TTYflush() +{ + if (ScreenCount) { + write(1, Screen, ScreenCount); + ScreenCount = 0; + } +} + +static void +TTYput(unsigned char c) +{ + Screen[ScreenCount] = c; + if (++ScreenCount >= ScreenSize - 1) { + ScreenSize += SCREEN_INC; + Screen = realloc(Screen, ScreenSize); + } +} + +static void +TTYputs(const char *p) +{ + while (*p) + TTYput(*p++); +} + +static void +TTYshow(unsigned char c) +{ + if (c == DEL) { + TTYput('^'); + TTYput('?'); + } + else if (ISCTL(c)) { + TTYput('^'); + TTYput(UNCTL(c)); + } + else if (rl_meta_chars && ISMETA(c)) { + TTYput('M'); + TTYput('-'); + TTYput(UNMETA(c)); + } + else + TTYput(c); +} + +static void +TTYstring(unsigned char *p) +{ + while (*p) + TTYshow(*p++); +} + +static int +TTYget() +{ + char c; + int e; + + TTYflush(); + if (Pushed) { + Pushed = 0; + return PushBack; + } + if (*Input) + return *Input++; + do { + e = read(0, &c, 1); + } while(e < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if(e == 1) + return c; + return EOF; +} + +static void +TTYback(void) +{ + if (backspace) + TTYputs(backspace); + else + TTYput('\b'); +} + +static void +TTYbackn(int n) +{ + while (--n >= 0) + TTYback(); +} + +static void +TTYinfo() +{ + static int init; + char *term; + char buff[2048]; + char *bp; + char *tmp; +#if defined(TIOCGWINSZ) + struct winsize W; +#endif /* defined(TIOCGWINSZ) */ + + if (init) { +#if defined(TIOCGWINSZ) + /* Perhaps we got resized. */ + if (ioctl(0, TIOCGWINSZ, &W) >= 0 + && W.ws_col > 0 && W.ws_row > 0) { + TTYwidth = (int)W.ws_col; + TTYrows = (int)W.ws_row; + } +#endif /* defined(TIOCGWINSZ) */ + return; + } + init++; + + TTYwidth = TTYrows = 0; + bp = &buff[0]; + if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL) + term = "dumb"; + if (tgetent(buff, term) < 0) { + TTYwidth = SCREEN_WIDTH; + TTYrows = SCREEN_ROWS; + return; + } + tmp = tgetstr("le", &bp); + if (tmp != NULL) + backspace = strdup(tmp); + else + backspace = "\b"; + TTYwidth = tgetnum("co"); + TTYrows = tgetnum("li"); + +#if defined(TIOCGWINSZ) + if (ioctl(0, TIOCGWINSZ, &W) >= 0) { + TTYwidth = (int)W.ws_col; + TTYrows = (int)W.ws_row; + } +#endif /* defined(TIOCGWINSZ) */ + + if (TTYwidth <= 0 || TTYrows <= 0) { + TTYwidth = SCREEN_WIDTH; + TTYrows = SCREEN_ROWS; + } +} + + +/* +** Print an array of words in columns. +*/ +static void +columns(int ac, unsigned char **av) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int i; + int j; + int k; + int len; + int skip; + int longest; + int cols; + + /* Find longest name, determine column count from that. */ + for (longest = 0, i = 0; i < ac; i++) + if ((j = strlen((char *)av[i])) > longest) + longest = j; + cols = TTYwidth / (longest + 3); + + TTYputs(NEWLINE); + for (skip = ac / cols + 1, i = 0; i < skip; i++) { + for (j = i; j < ac; j += skip) { + for (p = av[j], len = strlen((char *)p), k = len; --k >= 0; p++) + TTYput(*p); + if (j + skip < ac) + while (++len < longest + 3) + TTYput(' '); + } + TTYputs(NEWLINE); + } +} + +static void +reposition() +{ + int i; + unsigned char *p; + + TTYput('\r'); + TTYputs(Prompt); + for (i = Point, p = Line; --i >= 0; p++) + TTYshow(*p); +} + +static void +left(el_STATUS Change) +{ + TTYback(); + if (Point) { + if (ISCTL(Line[Point - 1])) + TTYback(); + else if (rl_meta_chars && ISMETA(Line[Point - 1])) { + TTYback(); + TTYback(); + } + } + if (Change == CSmove) + Point--; +} + +static void +right(el_STATUS Change) +{ + TTYshow(Line[Point]); + if (Change == CSmove) + Point++; +} + +static el_STATUS +ring_bell() +{ + TTYput('\07'); + TTYflush(); + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +do_macro(unsigned char c) +{ + unsigned char name[4]; + + name[0] = '_'; + name[1] = c; + name[2] = '_'; + name[3] = '\0'; + + if ((Input = (unsigned char *)getenv((char *)name)) == NULL) { + Input = NIL; + return ring_bell(); + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +do_forward(el_STATUS move) +{ + int i; + unsigned char *p; + + i = 0; + do { + p = &Line[Point]; + for ( ; Point < End && (*p == ' ' || !isalnum(*p)); Point++, p++) + if (move == CSmove) + right(CSstay); + + for (; Point < End && isalnum(*p); Point++, p++) + if (move == CSmove) + right(CSstay); + + if (Point == End) + break; + } while (++i < Repeat); + + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +do_case(CASE type) +{ + int i; + int end; + int count; + unsigned char *p; + + do_forward(CSstay); + if (OldPoint != Point) { + if ((count = Point - OldPoint) < 0) + count = -count; + Point = OldPoint; + if ((end = Point + count) > End) + end = End; + for (i = Point, p = &Line[i]; i < end; i++, p++) { + if (type == TOupper) { + if (islower(*p)) + *p = toupper(*p); + } + else if (isupper(*p)) + *p = tolower(*p); + right(CSmove); + } + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +case_down_word() +{ + return do_case(TOlower); +} + +static el_STATUS +case_up_word() +{ + return do_case(TOupper); +} + +static void +ceol() +{ + int extras; + int i; + unsigned char *p; + + for (extras = 0, i = Point, p = &Line[i]; i <= End; i++, p++) { + TTYput(' '); + if (ISCTL(*p)) { + TTYput(' '); + extras++; + } + else if (rl_meta_chars && ISMETA(*p)) { + TTYput(' '); + TTYput(' '); + extras += 2; + } + } + + for (i += extras; i > Point; i--) + TTYback(); +} + +static void +clear_line() +{ + Point = -strlen(Prompt); + TTYput('\r'); + ceol(); + Point = 0; + End = 0; + Line[0] = '\0'; +} + +static el_STATUS +insert_string(unsigned char *p) +{ + size_t len; + int i; + unsigned char *new; + unsigned char *q; + + len = strlen((char *)p); + if (End + len >= Length) { + if ((new = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * (Length + len + MEM_INC))) == NULL) + return CSstay; + if (Length) { + memcpy(new, Line, Length); + free(Line); + } + Line = new; + Length += len + MEM_INC; + } + + for (q = &Line[Point], i = End - Point; --i >= 0; ) + q[len + i] = q[i]; + memcpy(&Line[Point], p, len); + End += len; + Line[End] = '\0'; + TTYstring(&Line[Point]); + Point += len; + + return Point == End ? CSstay : CSmove; +} + + +static unsigned char * +next_hist() +{ + return H.Pos >= H.Size - 1 ? NULL : H.Lines[++H.Pos]; +} + +static unsigned char * +prev_hist() +{ + return H.Pos == 0 ? NULL : H.Lines[--H.Pos]; +} + +static el_STATUS +do_insert_hist(unsigned char *p) +{ + if (p == NULL) + return ring_bell(); + Point = 0; + reposition(); + ceol(); + End = 0; + return insert_string(p); +} + +static el_STATUS +do_hist(unsigned char *(*move)()) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int i; + + i = 0; + do { + if ((p = (*move)()) == NULL) + return ring_bell(); + } while (++i < Repeat); + return do_insert_hist(p); +} + +static el_STATUS +h_next() +{ + return do_hist(next_hist); +} + +static el_STATUS +h_prev() +{ + return do_hist(prev_hist); +} + +static el_STATUS +h_first() +{ + return do_insert_hist(H.Lines[H.Pos = 0]); +} + +static el_STATUS +h_last() +{ + return do_insert_hist(H.Lines[H.Pos = H.Size - 1]); +} + +/* +** Return zero if pat appears as a substring in text. +*/ +static int +substrcmp(char *text, char *pat, int len) +{ + unsigned char c; + + if ((c = *pat) == '\0') + return *text == '\0'; + for ( ; *text; text++) + if (*text == c && strncmp(text, pat, len) == 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static unsigned char * +search_hist(unsigned char *search, unsigned char *(*move)()) +{ + static unsigned char *old_search; + int len; + int pos; + int (*match)(); + char *pat; + + /* Save or get remembered search pattern. */ + if (search && *search) { + if (old_search) + free(old_search); + old_search = (unsigned char *)strdup((char *)search); + } + else { + if (old_search == NULL || *old_search == '\0') + return NULL; + search = old_search; + } + + /* Set up pattern-finder. */ + if (*search == '^') { + match = strncmp; + pat = (char *)(search + 1); + } + else { + match = substrcmp; + pat = (char *)search; + } + len = strlen(pat); + + for (pos = H.Pos; (*move)() != NULL; ) + if ((*match)((char *)H.Lines[H.Pos], pat, len) == 0) + return H.Lines[H.Pos]; + H.Pos = pos; + return NULL; +} + +static el_STATUS +h_search() +{ + static int Searching; + const char *old_prompt; + unsigned char *(*move)(); + unsigned char *p; + + if (Searching) + return ring_bell(); + Searching = 1; + + clear_line(); + old_prompt = Prompt; + Prompt = "Search: "; + TTYputs(Prompt); + move = Repeat == NO_ARG ? prev_hist : next_hist; + p = search_hist(editinput(), move); + clear_line(); + Prompt = old_prompt; + TTYputs(Prompt); + + Searching = 0; + return do_insert_hist(p); +} + +static el_STATUS +fd_char() +{ + int i; + + i = 0; + do { + if (Point >= End) + break; + right(CSmove); + } while (++i < Repeat); + return CSstay; +} + +static void +save_yank(int begin, int i) +{ + if (Yanked) { + free(Yanked); + Yanked = NULL; + } + + if (i < 1) + return; + + if ((Yanked = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * (i + 1))) != NULL) { + memcpy(Yanked, &Line[begin], i); + Yanked[i+1] = '\0'; + } +} + +static el_STATUS +delete_string(int count) +{ + int i; + unsigned char *p; + + if (count <= 0 || End == Point) + return ring_bell(); + + if (count == 1 && Point == End - 1) { + /* Optimize common case of delete at end of line. */ + End--; + p = &Line[Point]; + i = 1; + TTYput(' '); + if (ISCTL(*p)) { + i = 2; + TTYput(' '); + } + else if (rl_meta_chars && ISMETA(*p)) { + i = 3; + TTYput(' '); + TTYput(' '); + } + TTYbackn(i); + *p = '\0'; + return CSmove; + } + if (Point + count > End && (count = End - Point) <= 0) + return CSstay; + + if (count > 1) + save_yank(Point, count); + + for (p = &Line[Point], i = End - (Point + count) + 1; --i >= 0; p++) + p[0] = p[count]; + ceol(); + End -= count; + TTYstring(&Line[Point]); + return CSmove; +} + +static el_STATUS +bk_char() +{ + int i; + + i = 0; + do { + if (Point == 0) + break; + left(CSmove); + } while (++i < Repeat); + + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +bk_del_char() +{ + int i; + + i = 0; + do { + if (Point == 0) + break; + left(CSmove); + } while (++i < Repeat); + + return delete_string(i); +} + +static el_STATUS +redisplay() +{ + TTYputs(NEWLINE); + TTYputs(Prompt); + TTYstring(Line); + return CSmove; +} + +static el_STATUS +kill_line() +{ + int i; + + if (Repeat != NO_ARG) { + if (Repeat < Point) { + i = Point; + Point = Repeat; + reposition(); + delete_string(i - Point); + } + else if (Repeat > Point) { + right(CSmove); + delete_string(Repeat - Point - 1); + } + return CSmove; + } + + save_yank(Point, End - Point); + Line[Point] = '\0'; + ceol(); + End = Point; + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +insert_char(int c) +{ + el_STATUS s; + unsigned char buff[2]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *q; + int i; + + if (Repeat == NO_ARG || Repeat < 2) { + buff[0] = c; + buff[1] = '\0'; + return insert_string(buff); + } + + if ((p = malloc(Repeat + 1)) == NULL) + return CSstay; + for (i = Repeat, q = p; --i >= 0; ) + *q++ = c; + *q = '\0'; + Repeat = 0; + s = insert_string(p); + free(p); + return s; +} + +static el_STATUS +meta() +{ + unsigned int c; + KEYMAP *kp; + + if ((c = TTYget()) == EOF) + return CSeof; + /* Also include VT-100 arrows. */ + if (c == '[' || c == 'O') + switch (c = TTYget()) { + default: return ring_bell(); + case EOF: return CSeof; + case 'A': return h_prev(); + case 'B': return h_next(); + case 'C': return fd_char(); + case 'D': return bk_char(); + } + + if (isdigit(c)) { + for (Repeat = c - '0'; (c = TTYget()) != EOF && isdigit(c); ) + Repeat = Repeat * 10 + c - '0'; + Pushed = 1; + PushBack = c; + return CSstay; + } + + if (isupper(c)) + return do_macro(c); + for (OldPoint = Point, kp = MetaMap; kp->Function; kp++) + if (kp->Key == c) + return (*kp->Function)(); + + return ring_bell(); +} + +static el_STATUS +emacs(unsigned int c) +{ + el_STATUS s; + KEYMAP *kp; + + if (ISMETA(c)) { + Pushed = 1; + PushBack = UNMETA(c); + return meta(); + } + for (kp = Map; kp->Function; kp++) + if (kp->Key == c) + break; + s = kp->Function ? (*kp->Function)() : insert_char((int)c); + if (!Pushed) + /* No pushback means no repeat count; hacky, but true. */ + Repeat = NO_ARG; + return s; +} + +static el_STATUS +TTYspecial(unsigned int c) +{ + if (ISMETA(c)) + return CSdispatch; + + if (c == rl_erase || c == DEL) + return bk_del_char(); + if (c == rl_kill) { + if (Point != 0) { + Point = 0; + reposition(); + } + Repeat = NO_ARG; + return kill_line(); + } + if (c == rl_intr || c == rl_quit) { + Point = End = 0; + Line[0] = '\0'; + return redisplay(); + } + if (c == rl_eof && Point == 0 && End == 0) + return CSeof; + + return CSdispatch; +} + +static unsigned char * +editinput() +{ + unsigned int c; + + Repeat = NO_ARG; + OldPoint = Point = Mark = End = 0; + Line[0] = '\0'; + + while ((c = TTYget()) != EOF) + switch (TTYspecial(c)) { + case CSdone: + return Line; + case CSeof: + return NULL; + case CSmove: + reposition(); + break; + case CSdispatch: + switch (emacs(c)) { + case CSdone: + return Line; + case CSeof: + return NULL; + case CSmove: + reposition(); + break; + case CSdispatch: + case CSstay: + break; + } + break; + case CSstay: + break; + } + return NULL; +} + +static void +hist_add(unsigned char *p) +{ + int i; + + if ((p = (unsigned char *)strdup((char *)p)) == NULL) + return; + if (H.Size < HIST_SIZE) + H.Lines[H.Size++] = p; + else { + free(H.Lines[0]); + for (i = 0; i < HIST_SIZE - 1; i++) + H.Lines[i] = H.Lines[i + 1]; + H.Lines[i] = p; + } + H.Pos = H.Size - 1; +} + +/* +** For compatibility with FSF readline. +*/ +/* ARGSUSED0 */ +void +rl_reset_terminal(char *p) +{ +} + +void +rl_initialize(void) +{ +} + +char * +readline(const char* prompt) +{ + unsigned char *line; + + if (Line == NULL) { + Length = MEM_INC; + if ((Line = malloc(Length)) == NULL) + return NULL; + } + + TTYinfo(); + rl_ttyset(0); + hist_add(NIL); + ScreenSize = SCREEN_INC; + Screen = malloc(ScreenSize); + Prompt = prompt ? prompt : (char *)NIL; + TTYputs(Prompt); + if ((line = editinput()) != NULL) { + line = (unsigned char *)strdup((char *)line); + TTYputs(NEWLINE); + TTYflush(); + } + rl_ttyset(1); + free(Screen); + free(H.Lines[--H.Size]); + return (char *)line; +} + +void +add_history(char *p) +{ + if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') + return; + +#if defined(UNIQUE_HISTORY) + if (H.Pos && strcmp(p, H.Lines[H.Pos - 1]) == 0) + return; +#endif /* defined(UNIQUE_HISTORY) */ + hist_add((unsigned char *)p); +} + + +static el_STATUS +beg_line() +{ + if (Point) { + Point = 0; + return CSmove; + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +del_char() +{ + return delete_string(Repeat == NO_ARG ? 1 : Repeat); +} + +static el_STATUS +end_line() +{ + if (Point != End) { + Point = End; + return CSmove; + } + return CSstay; +} + +/* +** Move back to the beginning of the current word and return an +** allocated copy of it. +*/ +static unsigned char * +find_word() +{ + static char SEPS[] = "#;&|^$=`'{}()<>\n\t "; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *new; + size_t len; + + for (p = &Line[Point]; p > Line && strchr(SEPS, (char)p[-1]) == NULL; p--) + continue; + len = Point - (p - Line) + 1; + if ((new = malloc(len)) == NULL) + return NULL; + memcpy(new, p, len); + new[len - 1] = '\0'; + return new; +} + +static el_STATUS +c_complete() +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *word; + int unique; + el_STATUS s; + + word = find_word(); + p = (unsigned char *)rl_complete((char *)word, &unique); + if (word) + free(word); + if (p && *p) { + s = insert_string(p); + if (!unique) + ring_bell(); + free(p); + return s; + } + return ring_bell(); +} + +static el_STATUS +c_possible() +{ + unsigned char **av; + unsigned char *word; + int ac; + + word = find_word(); + ac = rl_list_possib((char *)word, (char ***)&av); + if (word) + free(word); + if (ac) { + columns(ac, av); + while (--ac >= 0) + free(av[ac]); + free(av); + return CSmove; + } + return ring_bell(); +} + +static el_STATUS +accept_line() +{ + Line[End] = '\0'; + return CSdone; +} + +static el_STATUS +transpose() +{ + unsigned char c; + + if (Point) { + if (Point == End) + left(CSmove); + c = Line[Point - 1]; + left(CSstay); + Line[Point - 1] = Line[Point]; + TTYshow(Line[Point - 1]); + Line[Point++] = c; + TTYshow(c); + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +quote() +{ + unsigned int c; + + return (c = TTYget()) == EOF ? CSeof : insert_char((int)c); +} + +static el_STATUS +wipe() +{ + int i; + + if (Mark > End) + return ring_bell(); + + if (Point > Mark) { + i = Point; + Point = Mark; + Mark = i; + reposition(); + } + + return delete_string(Mark - Point); +} + +static el_STATUS +mk_set() +{ + Mark = Point; + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +exchange() +{ + unsigned int c; + + if ((c = TTYget()) != CTL('X')) + return c == EOF ? CSeof : ring_bell(); + + if ((c = Mark) <= End) { + Mark = Point; + Point = c; + return CSmove; + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +yank() +{ + if (Yanked && *Yanked) + return insert_string(Yanked); + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +copy_region() +{ + if (Mark > End) + return ring_bell(); + + if (Point > Mark) + save_yank(Mark, Point - Mark); + else + save_yank(Point, Mark - Point); + + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +move_to_char() +{ + unsigned int c; + int i; + unsigned char *p; + + if ((c = TTYget()) == EOF) + return CSeof; + for (i = Point + 1, p = &Line[i]; i < End; i++, p++) + if (*p == c) { + Point = i; + return CSmove; + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +fd_word() +{ + return do_forward(CSmove); +} + +static el_STATUS +fd_kill_word() +{ + int i; + + do_forward(CSstay); + if (OldPoint != Point) { + i = Point - OldPoint; + Point = OldPoint; + return delete_string(i); + } + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +bk_word() +{ + int i; + unsigned char *p; + + i = 0; + do { + for (p = &Line[Point]; p > Line && !isalnum(p[-1]); p--) + left(CSmove); + + for (; p > Line && p[-1] != ' ' && isalnum(p[-1]); p--) + left(CSmove); + + if (Point == 0) + break; + } while (++i < Repeat); + + return CSstay; +} + +static el_STATUS +bk_kill_word() +{ + bk_word(); + if (OldPoint != Point) + return delete_string(OldPoint - Point); + return CSstay; +} + +static int +argify(unsigned char *line, unsigned char ***avp) +{ + unsigned char *c; + unsigned char **p; + unsigned char **new; + int ac; + int i; + + i = MEM_INC; + if ((*avp = p = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char*) * i))== NULL) + return 0; + + for (c = line; isspace(*c); c++) + continue; + if (*c == '\n' || *c == '\0') + return 0; + + for (ac = 0, p[ac++] = c; *c && *c != '\n'; ) { + if (isspace(*c)) { + *c++ = '\0'; + if (*c && *c != '\n') { + if (ac + 1 == i) { + new = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char*) * (i + MEM_INC)); + if (new == NULL) { + p[ac] = NULL; + return ac; + } + memcpy(new, p, i * sizeof (char **)); + i += MEM_INC; + free(p); + *avp = p = new; + } + p[ac++] = c; + } + } + else + c++; + } + *c = '\0'; + p[ac] = NULL; + return ac; +} + +static el_STATUS +last_argument() +{ + unsigned char **av; + unsigned char *p; + el_STATUS s; + int ac; + + if (H.Size == 1 || (p = H.Lines[H.Size - 2]) == NULL) + return ring_bell(); + + if ((p = (unsigned char *)strdup((char *)p)) == NULL) + return CSstay; + ac = argify(p, &av); + + if (Repeat != NO_ARG) + s = Repeat < ac ? insert_string(av[Repeat]) : ring_bell(); + else + s = ac ? insert_string(av[ac - 1]) : CSstay; + + if (ac) + free(av); + free(p); + return s; +} + +static KEYMAP Map[33] = { + { CTL('@'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('A'), beg_line }, + { CTL('B'), bk_char }, + { CTL('D'), del_char }, + { CTL('E'), end_line }, + { CTL('F'), fd_char }, + { CTL('G'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('H'), bk_del_char }, + { CTL('I'), c_complete }, + { CTL('J'), accept_line }, + { CTL('K'), kill_line }, + { CTL('L'), redisplay }, + { CTL('M'), accept_line }, + { CTL('N'), h_next }, + { CTL('O'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('P'), h_prev }, + { CTL('Q'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('R'), h_search }, + { CTL('S'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('T'), transpose }, + { CTL('U'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('V'), quote }, + { CTL('W'), wipe }, + { CTL('X'), exchange }, + { CTL('Y'), yank }, + { CTL('Z'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('['), meta }, + { CTL(']'), move_to_char }, + { CTL('^'), ring_bell }, + { CTL('_'), ring_bell }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static KEYMAP MetaMap[16]= { + { CTL('H'), bk_kill_word }, + { DEL, bk_kill_word }, + { ' ', mk_set }, + { '.', last_argument }, + { '<', h_first }, + { '>', h_last }, + { '?', c_possible }, + { 'b', bk_word }, + { 'd', fd_kill_word }, + { 'f', fd_word }, + { 'l', case_down_word }, + { 'u', case_up_word }, + { 'y', yank }, + { 'w', copy_region }, + { 0, NULL } +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e7e63ede1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ + + + +EDITLINE(3) EDITLINE(3) + + + +NAME + editline - command-line editing library with history + +SYNOPSIS + cchhaarr ** + rreeaaddlliinnee((pprroommpptt)) + cchhaarr **pprroommpptt;; + + vvooiidd + aadddd__hhiissttoorryy((lliinnee)) + cchhaarr **lliinnee;; + +DESCRIPTION + _E_d_i_t_l_i_n_e is a library that provides an line-editing interface with text + recall. It is intended to be compatible with the _r_e_a_d_l_i_n_e library provided + by the Free Software Foundation, but much smaller. The bulk of this manual + page describes the user interface. + + The _r_e_a_d_l_i_n_e routine returns a line of text with the trailing newline + removed. The data is returned in a buffer allocated with _m_a_l_l_o_c(3), so the + space should be released with _f_r_e_e(3) when the calling program is done with + it. Before accepting input from the user, the specified _p_r_o_m_p_t is dis- + played on the terminal. + + The _a_d_d___h_i_s_t_o_r_y routine makes a copy of the specified _l_i_n_e and adds it to + the internal history list. + + User Interface + + A program that uses this library provides a simple emacs-like editing + interface to its users. A line may be edited before it is sent to the + calling program by typing either control characters or escape sequences. A + control character, shown as a caret followed by a letter, is typed by hold- + ing down the ``control'' key while the letter is typed. For example, + ``^A'' is a control-A. An escape sequence is entered by typing the + ``escape'' key followed by one or more characters. The escape key is + abbreviated as ``ESC.'' Note that unlike control keys, case matters in + escape sequences; ``ESC F'' is not the same as ``ESC f''. + + An editing command may be typed anywhere on the line, not just at the + beginning. In addition, a return may also be typed anywhere on the line, + not just at the end. + + Most editing commands may be given a repeat count, _n, where _n is a number. + To enter a repeat count, type the escape key, the number, and then the com- + mand to execute. For example, ``ESC 4 ^f'' moves forward four characters. + If a command may be given a repeat count then the text ``[n]'' is given at + the end of its description. + + The following control characters are accepted: + ^A Move to the beginning of the line + ^B Move left (backwards) [n] + ^D Delete character [n] + ^E Move to end of line + ^F Move right (forwards) [n] + ^G Ring the bell + ^H Delete character before cursor (backspace key) [n] + ^I Complete filename (tab key); see below + ^J Done with line (return key) + ^K Kill to end of line (or column [n]) + ^L Redisplay line + ^M Done with line (alternate return key) + ^N Get next line from history [n] + ^P Get previous line from history [n] + ^R Search backward (forward if [n]) through history for text; + must start line if text begins with an uparrow + ^T Transpose characters + ^V Insert next character, even if it is an edit command + ^W Wipe to the mark + ^X^X Exchange current location and mark + ^Y Yank back last killed text + ^[ Start an escape sequence (escape key) + ^]c Move forward to next character ``c'' + ^? Delete character before cursor (delete key) [n] + + The following escape sequences are provided. + ESC ^H Delete previous word (backspace key) [n] + ESC DEL Delete previous word (delete key) [n] + ESC SP Set the mark (space key); see ^X^X and ^Y above + ESC . Get the last (or [n]'th) word from previous line + ESC ? Show possible completions; see below + ESC < Move to start of history + ESC > Move to end of history + ESC b Move backward a word [n] + ESC d Delete word under cursor [n] + ESC f Move forward a word [n] + ESC l Make word lowercase [n] + ESC u Make word uppercase [n] + ESC y Yank back last killed text + ESC v Show library version + ESC w Make area up to mark yankable + ESC nn Set repeat count to the number nn + ESC C Read from environment variable ``_C_'', where C is + an uppercase letter + + The _e_d_i_t_l_i_n_e library has a small macro facility. If you type the escape + key followed by an uppercase letter, _C, then the contents of the environ- + ment variable ___C__ are read in as if you had typed them at the keyboard. + For example, if the variable ___L__ contains the following: + ^A^Kecho '^V^[[H^V^[[2J'^M + Then typing ``ESC L'' will move to the beginning of the line, kill the + entire line, enter the echo command needed to clear the terminal (if your + terminal is like a VT-100), and send the line back to the shell. + + The _e_d_i_t_l_i_n_e library also does filename completion. Suppose the root + directory has the following files in it: + bin vmunix + core vmunix.old + If you type ``rm /v'' and then the tab key. _E_d_i_t_l_i_n_e will then finish off + as much of the name as possible by adding ``munix''. Because the name is + not unique, it will then beep. If you type the escape key and a question + mark, it will display the two choices. If you then type a period and a + tab, the library will finish off the filename for you: + rm /v[TAB]_m_u_n_i_x.TAB_o_l_d + The tab key is shown by ``[TAB]'' and the automatically-entered text is + shown in italics. + + + +BUGS AND LIMITATIONS + Cannot handle lines more than 80 columns. + + + + +AUTHORS + Simmule R. Turner and Rich $alz + . Original manual page by DaviD W. Sanderson + . + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a948ddc5c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/editline.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* $Revision: 1.4 $ +** +** Internal header file for editline library. +*/ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#define CRLF "\r\n" + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +typedef struct dirent DIRENTRY; +#else +#include +typedef struct direct DIRENTRY; +#endif + +#include + +#if !defined(S_ISDIR) +#define S_ISDIR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) +#endif /* !defined(S_ISDIR) */ + +typedef unsigned char CHAR; + +#define MEM_INC 64 +#define SCREEN_INC 256 + +/* +** Variables and routines internal to this package. +*/ +extern int rl_eof; +extern int rl_erase; +extern int rl_intr; +extern int rl_kill; +extern int rl_quit; + +typedef char* (*rl_complete_func_t)(char*, int*); + +typedef int (*rl_list_possib_func_t)(char*, char***); + +void add_history (char*); +char* readline (const char* prompt); +void rl_add_slash (char*, char*); +char* rl_complete (char*, int*); +void rl_initialize (void); +int rl_list_possib (char*, char***); +void rl_reset_terminal (char*); +void rl_ttyset (int); +rl_complete_func_t rl_set_complete_func (rl_complete_func_t); +rl_list_possib_func_t rl_set_list_possib_func (rl_list_possib_func_t); + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/roken_rename.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/roken_rename.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ea278d22f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/roken_rename.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken_rename.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:39 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __roken_rename_h__ +#define __roken_rename_h__ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +#define strdup _editline_strdup +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +#define snprintf _editline_snprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +#define vsnprintf _editline_vsnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +#define asprintf _editline_asprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASNPRINTF +#define asnprintf _editline_asnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF +#define vasprintf _editline_vasprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASNPRINTF +#define vasnprintf _editline_vasnprintf +#endif + +#endif /* __roken_rename_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/sysunix.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/sysunix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bcd6def6ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/sysunix.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* Copyright 1992 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved. + * + * This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone + * and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + * + * Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on + * any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it freely, subject + * to the following restrictions: + * 1. The authors are not responsible for the consequences of use of this + * software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + * 2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by + * explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, + * credits must appear in the documentation. + * 3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be + * misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users + * ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + * 4. This notice may not be removed or altered. + */ + +/* +** Unix system-dependant routines for editline library. +*/ +#include +#include "editline.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: sysunix.c,v 1.4 1999/04/08 13:08:24 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H + +void +rl_ttyset(int Reset) +{ + static struct termios old; + struct termios new; + + if (Reset == 0) { + tcgetattr(0, &old); + rl_erase = old.c_cc[VERASE]; + rl_kill = old.c_cc[VKILL]; + rl_eof = old.c_cc[VEOF]; + rl_intr = old.c_cc[VINTR]; + rl_quit = old.c_cc[VQUIT]; + + new = old; + new.c_cc[VINTR] = -1; + new.c_cc[VQUIT] = -1; + new.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ICANON); + new.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INPCK); + new.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; + new.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; + tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &new); + } + else + tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &old); +} + +#else /* !HAVE_TERMIOS_H */ + +void +rl_ttyset(int Reset) +{ + static struct sgttyb old; + struct sgttyb new; + + if (Reset == 0) { + ioctl(0, TIOCGETP, &old); + rl_erase = old.sg_erase; + rl_kill = old.sg_kill; + new = old; + new.sg_flags &= ~(ECHO | ICANON); + new.sg_flags &= ~(ISTRIP | INPCK); + ioctl(0, TIOCSETP, &new); + } else { + ioctl(0, TIOCSETP, &old); + } +} +#endif /* HAVE_TERMIOS_H */ + +void +rl_add_slash(char *path, char *p) +{ + struct stat Sb; + + if (stat(path, &Sb) >= 0) + strcat(p, S_ISDIR(Sb.st_mode) ? "/" : " "); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/testit.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/testit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c8ab847a7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/testit.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* $Revision: 1.3 $ +** +** A "micro-shell" to test editline library. +** If given any arguments, commands aren't executed. +*/ +#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H) +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include "editline.h" + +static int n_flag = 0; +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"dry-run", 'n', arg_flag, &n_flag, + "do not run commands", NULL }, + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *p; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + while ((p = readline("testit> ")) != NULL) { + (void)printf("\t\t\t|%s|\n", p); + if (!n_flag) { + if (strncmp(p, "cd ", 3) == 0) { + if (chdir(&p[3]) < 0) + perror(&p[3]); + } else if (system(p) != 0) { + perror(p); + } + } + add_history(p); + free(p); + } + exit(0); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/unix.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/unix.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fe6beedcec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/editline/unix.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* $Revision: 1.1 $ +** +** Editline system header file for Unix. +*/ + +#define CRLF "\r\n" +#define FORWARD STATIC + +#include +#include + +#if defined(USE_DIRENT) +#include +typedef struct dirent DIRENTRY; +#else +#include +typedef struct direct DIRENTRY; +#endif /* defined(USE_DIRENT) */ + +#if !defined(S_ISDIR) +#define S_ISDIR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) +#endif /* !defined(S_ISDIR) */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/8003.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/8003.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b481822b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/8003.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: 8003.c,v 1.12.2.2 2003/09/18 21:30:57 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_encode_om_uint32(OM_uint32 n, u_char *p) +{ + p[0] = (n >> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (n >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (n >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (n >> 24) & 0xFF; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_encode_be_om_uint32(OM_uint32 n, u_char *p) +{ + p[0] = (n >> 24) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (n >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (n >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (n >> 0) & 0xFF; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_decode_om_uint32(u_char *p, OM_uint32 *n) +{ + *n = (p[0] << 0) | (p[1] << 8) | (p[2] << 16) | (p[3] << 24); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_decode_be_om_uint32(u_char *p, OM_uint32 *n) +{ + *n = (p[0] <<24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | (p[3] << 0); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hash_input_chan_bindings (const gss_channel_bindings_t b, + u_char *p) +{ + u_char num[4]; + MD5_CTX md5; + + MD5_Init(&md5); + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (b->initiator_addrtype, num); + MD5_Update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (b->initiator_address.length, num); + MD5_Update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + if (b->initiator_address.length) + MD5_Update (&md5, + b->initiator_address.value, + b->initiator_address.length); + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (b->acceptor_addrtype, num); + MD5_Update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (b->acceptor_address.length, num); + MD5_Update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + if (b->acceptor_address.length) + MD5_Update (&md5, + b->acceptor_address.value, + b->acceptor_address.length); + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (b->application_data.length, num); + MD5_Update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + if (b->application_data.length) + MD5_Update (&md5, + b->application_data.value, + b->application_data.length); + MD5_Final (p, &md5); + return 0; +} + +/* + * create a checksum over the chanel bindings in + * `input_chan_bindings', `flags' and `fwd_data' and return it in + * `result' + */ + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + OM_uint32 flags, + const krb5_data *fwd_data, + Checksum *result) +{ + u_char *p; + + /* + * see rfc1964 (section 1.1.1 (Initial Token), and the checksum value + * field's format) */ + result->cksumtype = 0x8003; + if (fwd_data->length > 0 && (flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) + result->checksum.length = 24 + 4 + fwd_data->length; + else + result->checksum.length = 24; + result->checksum.data = malloc (result->checksum.length); + if (result->checksum.data == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p = result->checksum.data; + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (16, p); + p += 4; + if (input_chan_bindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) { + memset (p, 0, 16); + } else { + hash_input_chan_bindings (input_chan_bindings, p); + } + p += 16; + gssapi_encode_om_uint32 (flags, p); + p += 4; + + if (fwd_data->length > 0 && (flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) { +#if 0 + u_char *tmp; + + result->checksum.length = 28 + fwd_data->length; + tmp = realloc(result->checksum.data, result->checksum.length); + if (tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + result->checksum.data = tmp; + + p = (u_char*)result->checksum.data + 24; +#endif + *p++ = (1 >> 0) & 0xFF; /* DlgOpt */ /* == 1 */ + *p++ = (1 >> 8) & 0xFF; /* DlgOpt */ /* == 0 */ + *p++ = (fwd_data->length >> 0) & 0xFF; /* Dlgth */ + *p++ = (fwd_data->length >> 8) & 0xFF; /* Dlgth */ + memcpy(p, (unsigned char *) fwd_data->data, fwd_data->length); + + p += fwd_data->length; + } + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * verify the checksum in `cksum' over `input_chan_bindings' + * returning `flags' and `fwd_data' + */ + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const Checksum *cksum, + OM_uint32 *flags, + krb5_data *fwd_data) +{ + unsigned char hash[16]; + unsigned char *p; + OM_uint32 length; + int DlgOpt; + static unsigned char zeros[16]; + + /* XXX should handle checksums > 24 bytes */ + if(cksum->cksumtype != 0x8003 || cksum->checksum.length < 24) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + + p = cksum->checksum.data; + gssapi_decode_om_uint32(p, &length); + if(length != sizeof(hash)) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + + p += 4; + + if (input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS + && memcmp(p, zeros, sizeof(zeros)) != 0) { + if(hash_input_chan_bindings(input_chan_bindings, hash) != 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + if(memcmp(hash, p, sizeof(hash)) != 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + } + + p += sizeof(hash); + + gssapi_decode_om_uint32(p, flags); + p += 4; + + if (cksum->checksum.length > 24 && (*flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) { + if(cksum->checksum.length < 28) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + + DlgOpt = (p[0] << 0) | (p[1] << 8); + p += 2; + if (DlgOpt != 1) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + + fwd_data->length = (p[0] << 0) | (p[1] << 8); + p += 2; + if(cksum->checksum.length < 28 + fwd_data->length) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + } + fwd_data->data = malloc(fwd_data->length); + if (fwd_data->data == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(fwd_data->data, p, fwd_data->length); + } + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b18bde67ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,688 @@ +2003-12-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * accept_sec_context.c: 1.40->1.41: Don't require timestamp to be + set on delegated token, its already protected by the outer token + (and windows doesn't alway send it) Pointed out by Zi-Bin Yang + on heimdal-discuss + +2003-10-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * add_cred.c: 1.3->1.4: If its a MEMORY cc, make a copy. We need + to do this since now gss_release_cred will destroy the cred. This + should be really be solved a better way. + +2003-10-07 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * release_cred.c: 1.9->1.10: + (gss_release_cred): if its a mcc, destroy it rather the just release it + Found by: "Zi-Bin Yang" + +2003-09-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * arcfour.c: 1.13->1.14: remove depenency on gss_arcfour_mic_token + and gss_arcfour_warp_token + + * arcfour.h: 1.3->1.4: remove depenency on gss_arcfour_mic_token + and gss_arcfour_warp_token + + * arcfour.c: make build + + * get_mic.c, verify_mic.c, unwrap.c, wrap.c: + glue in arcfour support + + * gssapi_locl.h: 1.32->1.33: add _gssapi_verify_pad + +2003-09-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * encapsulate.c: add _gssapi_make_mech_header + + * gssapi_locl.h: add "arcfour.h" and prototype for + _gssapi_make_mech_header + + * gssapi_locl.h: add gssapi_{en,de}code_{be_,}om_uint32 + + * 8003.c: 1.12->1.13: export and rename + encode_om_uint32/decode_om_uint32 and start to use them + +2003-08-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * verify_mic.c: 1.21->1.22: make sure minor_status is always set, + pointed out by Luke Howard + +2003-08-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * context_time.c: 1.7->1.10: return time in seconds from now + + * gssapi_locl.h: add gssapi_lifetime_left + + * init_sec_context.c: part of 1.37->1.38: (init_auth): if the cred + is expired before we tries to create a token, fail so the peer + doesn't need reject us + (*): make sure time is returned in seconds from now, not in + kerberos time + + * acquire_cred.c: 1.14->1.15: (gss_aquire_cred): make sure time is + returned in seconds from now, not in kerberos time + + * accept_sec_context.c: 1.34->1.35: (gss_accept_sec_context): make + sure time is returned in seconds from now, not in kerberos time + +2003-05-07 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gssapi.h: 1.27->1.28: + if __cplusplus, wrap the extern variable (just to be safe) and + functions in extern "C" { } + +2003-04-30 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gssapi.3: more about the des3 mic mess + + * verify_mic.c 1.19->1.20 : (verify_mic_des3): always check if the + mic is the correct mic or the mic that old heimdal would have + generated + +2003-04-29 Jacques Vidrine + + * verify_mic.c: 1.18->1.19: verify_mic_des3: If MIC verification + fails, retry using the `old' MIC computation (with zero IV). + +2003-04-28 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * compat.c (_gss_DES3_get_mic_compat): default to use compat + + * gssapi.3: 1.5->1.6: document [gssapi]correct_des3_mic and + [gssapi]broken_des3_mic + + * compat.c: 1.2->1.4: + (gss_krb5_compat_des3_mci): return a value + (gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic): enable turning on/off des3 mic compat + (_gss_DES3_get_mic_compat): handle [gssapi]correct_des3_mic too + + * gssapi.h: 1.26->1.27: + (gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic): new function, turn on/off des3 mic compat + (GSS_C_KRB5_COMPAT_DES3_MIC): cpp symbol that exists if + gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic exists + +2003-04-23 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * Makefile.am: 1.44->1.45: test_acquire_cred_LDADD: use + libgssapi.la not ./libgssapi.la (makes make -jN work) + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gssapi.3: spelling + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: Change .Fd #include to .In + header.h, from Thomas Klausner + + +2003-04-06 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: spelling + + * Makefile.am: remove stuff that sneaked in with last commit + + * acquire_cred.c (acquire_initiator_cred): if the requested name + isn't in the ccache, also check keytab. Extact the krbtgt for the + default realm to check how long the credentials will last. + + * add_cred.c (gss_add_cred): don't create a new ccache, just open + the old one; better check if output handle is compatible with new + (copied) handle + + * test_acquire_cred.c: test gss_add_cred too + +2003-04-03 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * Makefile.am: build test_acquire_cred + + * test_acquire_cred.c: simple gss_acquire_cred test + +2003-04-02 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: s/gssapi/GSS-API/ + +2003-03-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: document v1 interface (and that they are + obsolete) + +2003-03-18 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: list supported mechanism and nametypes + +2003-03-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: text about gss_display_name + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): bump to 3:6:2 + (libgssapi_la_SOURCES): add all new functions + + * gssapi.3: now that we have a functions, uncomment the missing + ones + + * gss_acquire_cred.3: now that we have a functions, uncomment the + missing ones + + * process_context_token.c: implement gss_process_context_token + + * inquire_names_for_mech.c: implement gss_inquire_names_for_mech + + * inquire_mechs_for_name.c: implement gss_inquire_mechs_for_name + + * inquire_cred_by_mech.c: implement gss_inquire_cred_by_mech + + * add_cred.c: implement gss_add_cred + + * acquire_cred.c (gss_acquire_cred): more testing of input + argument, make sure output arguments are ok, since we don't know + the time_rec (for now), set it to time_req + + * export_sec_context.c: send lifetime, also set minor_status + + * get_mic.c: set minor_status + + * import_sec_context.c (gss_import_sec_context): add error + checking, pick up lifetime (if there is no lifetime, use + GSS_C_INDEFINITE) + + * init_sec_context.c: take care to set export value to something + sane before we start so caller will have harmless values in them + if then function fails + + * release_buffer.c (gss_release_buffer): set minor_status + + * wrap.c: make sure minor_status get set + + * verify_mic.c (gss_verify_mic_internal): rename verify_mic to + gss_verify_mic_internal and let it take the type as an argument, + (gss_verify_mic): call gss_verify_mic_internal + set minor_status + + * unwrap.c: set minor_status + + * test_oid_set_member.c (gss_test_oid_set_member): use + gss_oid_equal + + * release_oid_set.c (gss_release_oid_set): set minor_status + + * release_name.c (gss_release_name): set minor_status + + * release_cred.c (gss_release_cred): set minor_status + + * add_oid_set_member.c (gss_add_oid_set_member): set minor_status + + * compare_name.c (gss_compare_name): set minor_status + + * compat.c (check_compat): make sure ret have a defined value + + * context_time.c (gss_context_time): set minor_status + + * copy_ccache.c (gss_krb5_copy_ccache): set minor_status + + * create_emtpy_oid_set.c (gss_create_empty_oid_set): set + minor_status + + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): set minor_status + + * display_name.c (gss_display_name): set minor_status + + * display_status.c (gss_display_status): use gss_oid_equal, handle + supplementary errors + + * duplicate_name.c (gss_duplicate_name): set minor_status + + * inquire_context.c (gss_inquire_context): set lifetime_rec now + when we know it, set minor_status + + * inquire_cred.c (gss_inquire_cred): take care to set export value + to something sane before we start so caller will have harmless + values in them if the function fails + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): take care to set + export value to something sane before we start so caller will have + harmless values in them if then function fails, set lifetime from + ticket expiration date + + * indicate_mechs.c (gss_indicate_mechs): use + gss_create_empty_oid_set and gss_add_oid_set_member + + * gssapi.h (gss_ctx_id_t_desc): store the lifetime in the cred, + since there is no ticket transfered in the exported context + + * export_name.c (gss_export_name): export name with + GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME wrapping, not just the principal + + * import_name.c (import_export_name): new function, parses a + GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME + (import_krb5_name): factor out common code of parsing krb5 name + (gss_oid_equal): rename from oid_equal + + * gssapi_locl.h: add prototypes for gss_oid_equal and + gss_verify_mic_internal + + * gssapi.h: comment out the argument names + +2003-03-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gssapi.3: add LIST OF FUNCTIONS and copyright/license + + * Makefile.am: s/gss_aquire_cred.3/gss_acquire_cred.3/ + + * Makefile.am: man_MANS += gss_aquire_cred.3 + +2003-03-14 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * gss_aquire_cred.3: the gssapi api manpage + +2003-03-03 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * inquire_context.c: (gss_inquire_context): rename argument open + to open_context + + * gssapi.h (gss_inquire_context): rename argument open to open_context + +2003-02-27 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * init_sec_context.c (do_delegation): remove unused variable + subkey + + * gssapi.3: all 0.5.x version had broken token delegation + +2003-02-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * (init_auth): only generate one subkey + +2003-01-27 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * verify_mic.c (verify_mic_des3): fix 3des verify_mic to conform + to rfc (and mit kerberos), provide backward compat hook + + * get_mic.c (mic_des3): fix 3des get_mic to conform to rfc (and + mit kerberos), provide backward compat hook + + * init_sec_context.c (init_auth): check if we need compat for + older get_mic/verify_mic + + * gssapi_locl.h: add prototype for _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat + + * gssapi.h (more_flags): add COMPAT_OLD_DES3 + + * Makefile.am: add gssapi.3 and compat.c + + * gssapi.3: add gssapi COMPATIBILITY documentation + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): check if we need + compat for older get_mic/verify_mic + + * compat.c: check for compatiblity with other heimdal's 3des + get_mic/verify_mic + +2002-10-31 Johan Danielsson + + * check return value from gssapi_krb5_init + + * 8003.c (gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum): check size of input + +2002-09-03 Johan Danielsson + + * wrap.c (wrap_des3): use ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE + + * unwrap.c (unwrap_des3): use ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE + +2002-09-02 Johan Danielsson + + * init_sec_context.c: we need to generate a local subkey here + +2002-08-20 Jacques Vidrine + + * acquire_cred.c, inquire_cred.c, release_cred.c: Use default + credential resolution if gss_acquire_cred is called with + GSS_C_NO_NAME. + +2002-06-20 Jacques Vidrine + + * import_name.c: Compare name types by value if pointers do + not match. Reported by: "Douglas E. Engert" + +2002-05-20 Jacques Vidrine + + * verify_mic.c (gss_verify_mic), unwrap.c (gss_unwrap): initialize + the qop_state parameter. from Doug Rabson + +2002-05-09 Jacques Vidrine + + * acquire_cred.c: handle GSS_C_INITIATE/GSS_C_ACCEPT/GSS_C_BOTH + +2002-05-08 Jacques Vidrine + + * acquire_cred.c: initialize gssapi; handle null desired_name + +2002-03-22 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: remove non-functional stuff accidentally committed + +2002-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 3:5:2 + * 8003.c (gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum): handle zero channel + bindings + +2001-10-31 Jacques Vidrine + + * get_mic.c (mic_des3): MIC computation using DES3/SHA1 + was bogusly appending the message buffer to the result, + overwriting a heap buffer in the process. + +2001-08-29 Assar Westerlund + + * 8003.c (gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum, + gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum): make more consistent by always + returning an gssapi error and setting minor status. update + callers + +2001-08-28 Jacques Vidrine + + * accept_sec_context.c: Create a cache for delegated credentials + when needed. + +2001-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 3:4:2 + +2001-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * *.c: handle minor_status more consistently + + * display_status.c (gss_display_status): handle krb5_get_err_text + failing + +2001-08-15 Johan Danielsson + + * gssapi_locl.h: fix prototype for gssapi_krb5_init + +2001-08-13 Johan Danielsson + + * accept_sec_context.c (gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity): init + context and check return value from kt_resolve + + * init.c: return error code + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): update to 3:3:2 + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LIBADD): add required library + dependencies + +2001-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * accept_sec_context.c (gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity): set + the keytab to be used for gss_acquire_cred too' + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 3:2:2 + +2001-06-18 Assar Westerlund + + * wrap.c: replace gss_krb5_getsomekey with gss_krb5_get_localkey + and gss_krb5_get_remotekey + * verify_mic.c: update krb5_auth_con function names use + gss_krb5_get_remotekey + * unwrap.c: replace gss_krb5_getsomekey with gss_krb5_get_localkey + and gss_krb5_get_remotekey + * gssapi_locl.h (gss_krb5_get_remotekey, gss_krb5_get_localkey): + add prototypes + * get_mic.c: update krb5_auth_con function names. use + gss_krb5_get_localkey + * accept_sec_context.c: update krb5_auth_con function names + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 3:1:2 + +2001-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * address_to_krb5addr.c: adapt to new address functions + +2001-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * try to return the error string from libkrb5 where applicable + +2001-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): remember to free + the memory used by the ticket itself. from + +2001-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * gssapi_locl.h: add config.h for completeness + * gssapi.h: remove config.h, this is an installed header file + sys/types.h is not needed either + +2001-03-12 Assar Westerlund + + * acquire_cred.c (gss_acquire_cred): remove memory leaks. from + Jason R Thorpe + +2001-02-18 Assar Westerlund + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): either return + gss_name NULL-ed or set + + * import_name.c: set minor_status in some cases where it was not + done + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * wrap.c: use krb5_generate_random_block for the confounders + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 3:0:2 + * acquire_cred.c, init_sec_context.c, release_cred.c: add support + for getting creds from a keytab, from fvdl@netbsd.org + + * copy_ccache.c: add gss_krb5_copy_ccache + +2001-01-27 Assar Westerlund + + * get_mic.c: cast parameters to des function to non-const pointers + to handle the case where these functions actually take non-const + des_cblock * + +2001-01-09 Assar Westerlund + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): use krb5_rd_cred2 + instead of krb5_rd_cred + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): bump to 2:3:1 + +2000-12-08 Assar Westerlund + + * wrap.c (wrap_des3): use the checksum as ivec when encrypting the + sequence number + * unwrap.c (unwrap_des3): use the checksum as ivec when encrypting + the sequence number + * init_sec_context.c (init_auth): always zero fwd_data + +2000-12-06 Johan Danielsson + + * accept_sec_context.c: de-pointerise auth_context parameter to + krb5_mk_rep + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * init_sec_context.c (init_auth): update to new + krb5_build_authenticator + +2000-09-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): bump to 2:2:1 + +2000-08-27 Assar Westerlund + + * init_sec_context.c: actually pay attention to `time_req' + * init_sec_context.c: re-organize. leak less memory. + * gssapi_locl.h (gssapi_krb5_encapsulate, gss_krb5_getsomekey): + update prototypes add assert.h + * gssapi.h (GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES, GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES3_KD): + add + * verify_mic.c: re-organize and add 3DES code + * wrap.c: re-organize and add 3DES code + * unwrap.c: re-organize and add 3DES code + * get_mic.c: re-organize and add 3DES code + * encapsulate.c (gssapi_krb5_encapsulate): do not free `in_data', + let the caller do that. fix the callers. + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 2:1:1 + +2000-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * decapsulate.c (gssapi_krb5_verify_header): sanity-check length + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 2:0:1 + +2000-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * gssapi.h: update OID for GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE and other + details from rfc2744 + +2000-06-29 Assar Westerlund + + * address_to_krb5addr.c (gss_address_to_krb5addr): actually use + `int' instead of `sa_family_t' for the address family. + +2000-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * add support for token delegation. From Daniel Kouril + and Miroslav Ruda + +2000-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 1:1:1 + +2000-04-12 Assar Westerlund + + * release_oid_set.c (gss_release_oid_set): clear set for + robustness. From GOMBAS Gabor + * release_name.c (gss_release_name): reset input_name for + robustness. From GOMBAS Gabor + * release_buffer.c (gss_release_buffer): set value to NULL to be + more robust. From GOMBAS Gabor + * add_oid_set_member.c (gss_add_oid_set_member): actually check if + the oid is a member first. leave the oid_set unchanged if realloc + fails. + +2000-02-13 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + +2000-02-12 Assar Westerlund + + * gssapi_locl.h: add flags for import/export + * import_sec_context.c (import_sec_context: add flags for what + fields are included. do not include the authenticator for now. + * export_sec_context.c (export_sec_context: add flags for what + fields are included. do not include the authenticator for now. + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): set target in + context_handle + +2000-02-11 Assar Westerlund + + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): set context to + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT + + * Makefile.am: add {export,import}_sec_context.c + * export_sec_context.c: new file + * import_sec_context.c: new file + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): set trans flag + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:5:0 + +2000-01-26 Assar Westerlund + + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): handle a NULL + output_token + + * wrap.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. some + changes to libdes calls to make them more portable. + * verify_mic.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. + some changes to libdes calls to make them more portable. + * unwrap.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. some + changes to libdes calls to make them more portable. + * get_mic.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. some + changes to libdes calls to make them more portable. + * 8003.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:4:0 + +1999-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): always set + `output_token' + * init_sec_context.c (init_auth): always initialize `output_token' + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): always set + `output_token' + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 0:3:0 + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:2:0 + +1999-09-21 Assar Westerlund + + * init_sec_context.c (gss_init_sec_context): initialize `ticket' + + * gssapi.h (gss_ctx_id_t_desc): add ticket in here. ick. + + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): free ticket + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): stove away + `krb5_ticket' in context so that ugly programs such as + gss_nt_server can get at it. uck. + +1999-09-20 Johan Danielsson + + * accept_sec_context.c: set minor_status + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * display_status.c (calling_error, routine_error): right shift the + code to make it possible to index into the arrays + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * gssapi.h (GSS_C_AF_INET6): add + + * import_name.c (import_hostbased_name): set minor_status + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:1:0 + +Wed Apr 7 14:05:15 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * display_status.c: set minor_status + + * init_sec_context.c: set minor_status + + * lib/gssapi/init.c: remove donep (check gssapi_krb5_context + directly) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2988d6a4aa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.44.2.7 2003/10/14 16:13:13 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/../krb5 $(INCLUDE_des) $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libgssapi.la +libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 5:0:4 +libgssapi_la_LIBADD = ../krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_des) ../asn1/libasn1.la ../roken/libroken.la + +man_MANS = gssapi.3 gss_acquire_cred.3 + +include_HEADERS = gssapi.h + +libgssapi_la_SOURCES = \ + 8003.c \ + arcfour.c \ + accept_sec_context.c \ + acquire_cred.c \ + add_cred.c \ + add_oid_set_member.c \ + canonicalize_name.c \ + compare_name.c \ + compat.c \ + context_time.c \ + copy_ccache.c \ + create_emtpy_oid_set.c \ + decapsulate.c \ + delete_sec_context.c \ + display_name.c \ + display_status.c \ + duplicate_name.c \ + encapsulate.c \ + export_sec_context.c \ + export_name.c \ + external.c \ + get_mic.c \ + gssapi.h \ + gssapi_locl.h \ + import_name.c \ + import_sec_context.c \ + indicate_mechs.c \ + init.c \ + init_sec_context.c \ + inquire_context.c \ + inquire_cred.c \ + inquire_cred_by_mech.c \ + inquire_mechs_for_name.c \ + inquire_names_for_mech.c \ + release_buffer.c \ + release_cred.c \ + release_name.c \ + release_oid_set.c \ + process_context_token.c \ + test_oid_set_member.c \ + unwrap.c \ + v1.c \ + verify_mic.c \ + wrap.c \ + address_to_krb5addr.c + +#noinst_PROGRAMS = test_acquire_cred + +#test_acquire_cred_SOURCES = test_acquire_cred.c + +#test_acquire_cred_LDADD = libgssapi.la diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6dee23920e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,894 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.44.2.7 2003/10/14 16:13:13 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 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x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + echo "*"; \ + echo "* Failed to install $$x setuid root"; \ + echo "*"; \ + fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(nodist_include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +#noinst_PROGRAMS = test_acquire_cred + +#test_acquire_cred_SOURCES = test_acquire_cred.c + +#test_acquire_cred_LDADD = libgssapi.la +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d923c36fd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,445 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: accept_sec_context.c,v 1.33.2.2 2003/12/19 00:37:06 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_keytab gssapi_krb5_keytab; + +OM_uint32 +gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity (const char *identity) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *p; + + ret = gssapi_krb5_init(); + if(ret) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + if(gssapi_krb5_keytab != NULL) { + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, gssapi_krb5_keytab); + gssapi_krb5_keytab = NULL; + } + asprintf(&p, "FILE:%s", identity); + if(p == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(gssapi_krb5_context, p, &gssapi_krb5_keytab); + free(p); + if(ret) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 +gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_OID * mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + krb5_data indata; + krb5_flags ap_options; + OM_uint32 flags; + krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; + krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; + krb5_data fwd_data; + OM_uint32 minor; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT(); + + krb5_data_zero (&fwd_data); + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + + if (src_name != NULL) + *src_name = NULL; + if (mech_type) + *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { + *context_handle = malloc(sizeof(**context_handle)); + if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + } + + (*context_handle)->auth_context = NULL; + (*context_handle)->source = NULL; + (*context_handle)->target = NULL; + (*context_handle)->flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->more_flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->ticket = NULL; + (*context_handle)->lifetime = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + kret = krb5_auth_con_init (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + + if (input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS + && input_chan_bindings->application_data.length == + 2 * sizeof((*context_handle)->auth_context->local_port) + ) { + + /* Port numbers are expected to be in application_data.value, + * initator's port first */ + + krb5_address initiator_addr, acceptor_addr; + + memset(&initiator_addr, 0, sizeof(initiator_addr)); + memset(&acceptor_addr, 0, sizeof(acceptor_addr)); + + (*context_handle)->auth_context->remote_port = + *(int16_t *) input_chan_bindings->application_data.value; + + (*context_handle)->auth_context->local_port = + *((int16_t *) input_chan_bindings->application_data.value + 1); + + + kret = gss_address_to_krb5addr(input_chan_bindings->acceptor_addrtype, + &input_chan_bindings->acceptor_address, + (*context_handle)->auth_context->local_port, + &acceptor_addr); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + ret = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + kret = gss_address_to_krb5addr(input_chan_bindings->initiator_addrtype, + &input_chan_bindings->initiator_address, + (*context_handle)->auth_context->remote_port, + &initiator_addr); + if (kret) { + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, &acceptor_addr); + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + ret = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &acceptor_addr, /* local address */ + &initiator_addr); /* remote address */ + + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, &initiator_addr); + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, &acceptor_addr); + +#if 0 + free(input_chan_bindings->application_data.value); + input_chan_bindings->application_data.value = NULL; + input_chan_bindings->application_data.length = 0; +#endif + + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + ret = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + + + + { + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_auth_con_getflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &tmp); + tmp |= KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE; + krb5_auth_con_setflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + tmp); + } + + ret = gssapi_krb5_decapsulate (minor_status, + input_token_buffer, + &indata, + "\x01\x00"); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + if (acceptor_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + if (gssapi_krb5_keytab != NULL) { + keytab = gssapi_krb5_keytab; + } + } else if (acceptor_cred_handle->keytab != NULL) { + keytab = acceptor_cred_handle->keytab; + } + + kret = krb5_rd_req (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context, + &indata, + (acceptor_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) ? NULL + : acceptor_cred_handle->principal, + keytab, + &ap_options, + &ticket); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ticket->client, + &(*context_handle)->source); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ticket->server, + &(*context_handle)->target); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + + ret = _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(minor_status, *context_handle); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + if (src_name != NULL) { + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ticket->client, + src_name); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + } + + { + krb5_authenticator authenticator; + + kret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &authenticator); + if(kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum(minor_status, + input_chan_bindings, + authenticator->cksum, + &flags, + &fwd_data); + krb5_free_authenticator(gssapi_krb5_context, &authenticator); + if (ret) + goto failure; + } + + if (fwd_data.length > 0 && (flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) { + krb5_ccache ccache; + int32_t ac_flags; + + if (delegated_cred_handle == NULL) + /* XXX Create a new delegated_cred_handle? */ + kret = krb5_cc_default (gssapi_krb5_context, &ccache); + else if (*delegated_cred_handle == NULL) { + if ((*delegated_cred_handle = + calloc(1, sizeof(**delegated_cred_handle))) == NULL) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(gssapi_krb5_context, "out of memory"); + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string(); + goto failure; + } + if ((ret = gss_duplicate_name(minor_status, ticket->client, + &(*delegated_cred_handle)->principal)) != 0) { + flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + free(*delegated_cred_handle); + *delegated_cred_handle = NULL; + goto end_fwd; + } + } + if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL && + (*delegated_cred_handle)->ccache == NULL) { + kret = krb5_cc_gen_new (gssapi_krb5_context, + &krb5_mcc_ops, + &(*delegated_cred_handle)->ccache); + ccache = (*delegated_cred_handle)->ccache; + } + if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL && + (*delegated_cred_handle)->mechanisms == NULL) { + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, + &(*delegated_cred_handle)->mechanisms); + if (ret) + goto failure; + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + &(*delegated_cred_handle)->mechanisms); + if (ret) + goto failure; + } + + if (kret) { + flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + goto end_fwd; + } + + kret = krb5_cc_initialize(gssapi_krb5_context, + ccache, + *src_name); + if (kret) { + flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + goto end_fwd; + } + + krb5_auth_con_getflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &ac_flags); + krb5_auth_con_setflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + ac_flags & ~KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME); + kret = krb5_rd_cred2(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + ccache, + &fwd_data); + krb5_auth_con_setflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + ac_flags); + if (kret) { + flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + goto end_fwd; + } + + end_fwd: + free(fwd_data.data); + } + + + flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG; + + if (ret_flags) + *ret_flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->lifetime = ticket->ticket.endtime; + (*context_handle)->flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= OPEN; + + if (mech_type) + *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + if (time_rec) { + ret = gssapi_lifetime_left(minor_status, + (*context_handle)->lifetime, + time_rec); + if (ret) + goto failure; + } + + if(flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) { + krb5_data outbuf; + + kret = krb5_mk_rep (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &outbuf); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + goto failure; + } + ret = gssapi_krb5_encapsulate (minor_status, + &outbuf, + output_token, + "\x02\x00"); + krb5_data_free (&outbuf); + if (ret) + goto failure; + } else { + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + } + + (*context_handle)->ticket = ticket; + ticket = NULL; + +#if 0 + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); +#endif + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + + failure: + if (fwd_data.length > 0) + free(fwd_data.data); + if (ticket != NULL) + krb5_free_ticket (gssapi_krb5_context, ticket); + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if((*context_handle)->source) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->source); + if((*context_handle)->target) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->target); + free (*context_handle); + if (src_name != NULL) { + gss_release_name (&minor, src_name); + *src_name = NULL; + } + *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dfe2b4cca5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: acquire_cred.c,v 1.13.2.1 2003/08/15 14:18:24 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +get_keytab(krb5_keytab *keytab) +{ + char kt_name[256]; + krb5_error_code kret; + + if (gssapi_krb5_keytab != NULL) { + kret = krb5_kt_get_name(gssapi_krb5_context, + gssapi_krb5_keytab, + kt_name, sizeof(kt_name)); + if (kret == 0) + kret = krb5_kt_resolve(gssapi_krb5_context, kt_name, keytab); + } else + kret = krb5_kt_default(gssapi_krb5_context, keytab); + return (kret); +} + +static OM_uint32 acquire_initiator_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_principal def_princ; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_error_code kret; + + keytab = NULL; + ccache = NULL; + def_princ = NULL; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + + kret = krb5_cc_default(gssapi_krb5_context, &ccache); + if (kret) + goto end; + kret = krb5_cc_get_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache, + &def_princ); + if (kret != 0) { + /* we'll try to use a keytab below */ + krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache); + ccache = NULL; + kret = 0; + } else if (handle->principal == NULL) { + kret = krb5_copy_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, def_princ, + &handle->principal); + if (kret) + goto end; + } else if (handle->principal != NULL && + krb5_principal_compare(gssapi_krb5_context, handle->principal, + def_princ) == FALSE) { + /* Before failing, lets check the keytab */ + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, def_princ); + def_princ = NULL; + } + if (def_princ == NULL) { + /* We have no existing credentials cache, + * so attempt to get a TGT using a keytab. + */ + if (handle->principal == NULL) { + kret = krb5_get_default_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, + &handle->principal); + if (kret) + goto end; + } + kret = get_keytab(&keytab); + if (kret) + goto end; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&opt); + kret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(gssapi_krb5_context, &cred, + handle->principal, keytab, 0, NULL, &opt); + if (kret) + goto end; + kret = krb5_cc_gen_new(gssapi_krb5_context, &krb5_mcc_ops, + &ccache); + if (kret) + goto end; + kret = krb5_cc_initialize(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache, cred.client); + if (kret) + goto end; + kret = krb5_cc_store_cred(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache, &cred); + if (kret) + goto end; + handle->lifetime = cred.times.endtime; + } else { + krb5_creds in_cred, *out_cred; + krb5_const_realm realm; + + memset(&in_cred, 0, sizeof(in_cred)); + in_cred.client = handle->principal; + + realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(gssapi_krb5_context, + handle->principal); + if (realm == NULL) { + kret = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH; /* XXX */ + goto end; + } + + kret = krb5_make_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, &in_cred.server, + realm, KRB5_TGS_NAME, realm, NULL); + if (kret) + goto end; + + kret = krb5_get_credentials(gssapi_krb5_context, 0, + ccache, &in_cred, &out_cred); + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, in_cred.server); + if (kret) + goto end; + + handle->lifetime = out_cred->times.endtime; + krb5_free_creds(gssapi_krb5_context, out_cred); + } + + handle->ccache = ccache; + ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +end: + if (cred.client != NULL) + krb5_free_creds_contents(gssapi_krb5_context, &cred); + if (def_princ != NULL) + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, def_princ); + if (keytab != NULL) + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, keytab); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + if (ccache != NULL) + krb5_cc_close(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache); + if (kret != 0) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + } + } + return (ret); +} + +static OM_uint32 acquire_acceptor_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_error_code kret; + + kret = 0; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + kret = get_keytab(&handle->keytab); + if (kret) + goto end; + ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +end: + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + if (handle->keytab != NULL) + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, handle->keytab); + if (kret != 0) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + } + } + return (ret); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + gss_cred_id_t handle; + OM_uint32 ret; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + *output_cred_handle = NULL; + if (time_rec) + *time_rec = 0; + if (actual_mechs) + *actual_mechs = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET; + + if (desired_mechs) { + OM_uint32 present = 0; + + ret = gss_test_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + desired_mechs, &present); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (!present) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + } + } + + handle = (gss_cred_id_t)malloc(sizeof(*handle)); + if (handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return (GSS_S_FAILURE); + } + + memset(handle, 0, sizeof (*handle)); + + if (desired_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name(minor_status, desired_name, + &handle->principal); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + free(handle); + return (ret); + } + } + if (cred_usage == GSS_C_INITIATE || cred_usage == GSS_C_BOTH) { + ret = acquire_initiator_cred(minor_status, desired_name, time_req, + desired_mechs, cred_usage, handle, actual_mechs, time_rec); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + free(handle); + return (ret); + } + } else if (cred_usage == GSS_C_ACCEPT || cred_usage == GSS_C_BOTH) { + ret = acquire_acceptor_cred(minor_status, desired_name, time_req, + desired_mechs, cred_usage, handle, actual_mechs, time_rec); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + free(handle); + return (ret); + } + } else { + free(handle); + *minor_status = GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, &handle->mechanisms); + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + &handle->mechanisms); + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + ret = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, handle, NULL, time_rec, NULL, + actual_mechs); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + if (handle->mechanisms != NULL) + gss_release_oid_set(NULL, &handle->mechanisms); + free(handle); + return (ret); + } + *minor_status = 0; + if (time_rec) { + ret = gssapi_lifetime_left(minor_status, + handle->lifetime, + time_rec); + + if (ret) + return ret; + } + handle->usage = cred_usage; + *output_cred_handle = handle; + return (GSS_S_COMPLETE); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/add_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/add_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..53d4f33706 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/add_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add_cred.c,v 1.2.2.1 2003/10/21 21:00:47 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + const gss_OID desired_mech, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + OM_uint32 initiator_time_req, + OM_uint32 acceptor_time_req, + gss_cred_id_t *output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 *initiator_time_rec, + OM_uint32 *acceptor_time_rec) +{ + OM_uint32 ret, lifetime; + gss_cred_id_t cred, handle; + + handle = NULL; + cred = input_cred_handle; + + if (gss_oid_equal(desired_mech, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM) == 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + } + + if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && output_cred_handle == NULL) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_NO_CRED; + } + + /* check if requested output usage is compatible with output usage */ + if (output_cred_handle != NULL && + (cred->usage != cred_usage && cred->usage != GSS_C_BOTH)) { + *minor_status = GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE; + return(GSS_S_FAILURE); + } + + /* check that we have the same name */ + if (desired_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME && + krb5_principal_compare(gssapi_krb5_context, desired_name, + cred->principal) != FALSE) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } + + /* make a copy */ + if (output_cred_handle) { + + handle = (gss_cred_id_t)malloc(sizeof(*handle)); + if (handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return (GSS_S_FAILURE); + } + + memset(handle, 0, sizeof (*handle)); + + handle->usage = cred_usage; + handle->lifetime = cred->lifetime; + handle->principal = NULL; + handle->keytab = NULL; + handle->ccache = NULL; + handle->mechanisms = NULL; + + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + + ret = gss_duplicate_name(minor_status, cred->principal, + &handle->principal); + if (ret) { + free(handle); + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (cred->keytab) { + krb5_error_code kret; + char name[KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN + MAXPATHLEN]; + int len; + + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + + kret = krb5_kt_get_type(gssapi_krb5_context, cred->keytab, + name, KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + len = strlen(name); + name[len++] = ':'; + + kret = krb5_kt_get_name(gssapi_krb5_context, cred->keytab, + name + len, + sizeof(name) - len); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_kt_resolve(gssapi_krb5_context, name, + &handle->keytab); + if (kret){ + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + + if (cred->ccache) { + krb5_error_code kret; + const char *type, *name; + char *type_name; + + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + + type = krb5_cc_get_type(gssapi_krb5_context, cred->ccache); + if (type == NULL){ + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + goto failure; + } + + if (strcmp(type, "MEMORY") == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(gssapi_krb5_context, &krb5_mcc_ops, + &handle->ccache); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + goto failure; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache(gssapi_krb5_context, cred->ccache, + handle->ccache); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + goto failure; + } + + } else { + + name = krb5_cc_get_name(gssapi_krb5_context, cred->ccache); + if (name == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + goto failure; + } + + asprintf(&type_name, "%s:%s", type, name); + if (type_name == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_krb5_context, type_name, + &handle->ccache); + free(type_name); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + } + + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, &handle->mechanisms); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + &handle->mechanisms); + if (ret) + goto failure; + } + + ret = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, cred, NULL, &lifetime, + NULL, actual_mechs); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + if (initiator_time_rec) + *initiator_time_rec = lifetime; + if (acceptor_time_rec) + *acceptor_time_rec = lifetime; + + if (output_cred_handle) + *output_cred_handle = handle; + + *minor_status = 0; + return ret; + + failure: + + if (handle) { + if (handle->principal) + gss_release_name(NULL, &handle->principal); + if (handle->keytab) + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, handle->keytab); + if (handle->ccache) + krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, handle->ccache); + if (handle->mechanisms) + gss_release_oid_set(NULL, &handle->mechanisms); + free(handle); + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed654fc8c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add_oid_set_member.c,v 1.8 2003/03/16 17:50:49 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member_oid, + gss_OID_set * oid_set + ) +{ + gss_OID tmp; + size_t n; + OM_uint32 res; + int present; + + res = gss_test_oid_set_member(minor_status, member_oid, *oid_set, &present); + if (res != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + return res; + + if (present) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + n = (*oid_set)->count + 1; + tmp = realloc ((*oid_set)->elements, n * sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + (*oid_set)->elements = tmp; + (*oid_set)->count = n; + (*oid_set)->elements[n-1] = *member_oid; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/address_to_krb5addr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/address_to_krb5addr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c8041aa936 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/address_to_krb5addr.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +#include + +krb5_error_code +gss_address_to_krb5addr(OM_uint32 gss_addr_type, + gss_buffer_desc *gss_addr, + int16_t port, + krb5_address *address) +{ + int addr_type; + struct sockaddr sa; + int sa_size = sizeof(sa); + krb5_error_code problem; + + if (gss_addr == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + switch (gss_addr_type) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case GSS_C_AF_INET6: addr_type = AF_INET6; + break; +#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */ + + case GSS_C_AF_INET: addr_type = AF_INET; + break; + default: + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + problem = krb5_h_addr2sockaddr (gssapi_krb5_context, + addr_type, + gss_addr->value, + &sa, + &sa_size, + port); + if (problem) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + problem = krb5_sockaddr2address (gssapi_krb5_context, &sa, address); + + return problem; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/arcfour.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/arcfour.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..66d688ca0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/arcfour.c @@ -0,0 +1,623 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +/* + * Implements draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-04.txt + */ + +RCSID("$Id: arcfour.c,v 1.12.2.3 2003/09/19 15:15:11 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +arcfour_mic_key(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key, + void *cksum_data, size_t cksum_size, + void *key6_data, size_t key6_size) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + Checksum cksum_k5; + krb5_keyblock key5; + char k5_data[16]; + + Checksum cksum_k6; + + char T[4]; + + memset(T, 0, 4); + cksum_k5.checksum.data = k5_data; + cksum_k5.checksum.length = sizeof(k5_data); + + if (key->keytype == KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56) { + char L40[14] = "fortybits"; + + memcpy(L40 + 10, T, sizeof(T)); + ret = krb5_hmac(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + L40, 14, 0, key, &cksum_k5); + memset(&k5_data[7], 0xAB, 9); + } else { + ret = krb5_hmac(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + T, 4, 0, key, &cksum_k5); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + + key5.keytype = KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR; + key5.keyvalue = cksum_k5.checksum; + + cksum_k6.checksum.data = key6_data; + cksum_k6.checksum.length = key6_size; + + return krb5_hmac(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + cksum_data, cksum_size, 0, &key5, &cksum_k6); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +arcfour_mic_cksum(krb5_keyblock *key, unsigned usage, + u_char *sgn_cksum, size_t sgn_cksum_sz, + const char *v1, size_t l1, + const void *v2, size_t l2, + const void *v3, size_t l3) +{ + Checksum CKSUM; + u_char *ptr; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_error_code ret; + + assert(sgn_cksum_sz == 8); + + len = l1 + l2 + l3; + + ptr = malloc(len); + if (ptr == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + memcpy(ptr, v1, l1); + memcpy(ptr + l1, v2, l2); + memcpy(ptr + l1 + l2, v3, l3); + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(ptr); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_create_checksum(gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + usage, + 0, + ptr, len, + &CKSUM); + free(ptr); + if (ret == 0) { + memcpy(sgn_cksum, CKSUM.checksum.data, sgn_cksum_sz); + free_Checksum(&CKSUM); + } + krb5_crypto_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + + return ret; +} + + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_get_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len; + u_char k6_data[16], *p0, *p; + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (22, &len, &total_len); + + message_token->length = total_len; + message_token->value = malloc (total_len); + if (message_token->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p0 = _gssapi_make_mech_header(message_token->value, + len); + p = p0; + + *p++ = 0x01; /* TOK_ID */ + *p++ = 0x01; + *p++ = 0x11; /* SGN_ALG */ + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0xff; /* Filler */ + *p++ = 0xff; + *p++ = 0xff; + *p++ = 0xff; + + p = NULL; + + ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN, + p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */ + p0, 8, /* TOK_ID, SGN_ALG, Filer */ + message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length, + NULL, 0); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, message_token); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */ + k6_data, sizeof(k6_data)); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, message_token); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + p = p0 + 8; /* SND_SEQ */ + gssapi_encode_be_om_uint32(seq_number, p); + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + memset (p + 4, (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xff, 4); + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p, p); + + memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key)); + memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data)); + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key, + char *type) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t seq_number, seq_number2; + OM_uint32 omret; + char cksum_data[8], k6_data[16], SND_SEQ[8]; + u_char *p; + int cmp; + + if (qop_state) + *qop_state = 0; + + p = token_buffer->value; + omret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + token_buffer->length, + type); + if (omret) + return omret; + + if (memcmp(p, "\x11\x00", 2) != 0) /* SGN_ALG = HMAC MD5 ARCFOUR */ + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 4; + + ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN, + cksum_data, sizeof(cksum_data), + p - 8, 8, + message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length, + NULL, 0); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + cksum_data, sizeof(cksum_data), + k6_data, sizeof(k6_data)); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + cmp = memcmp(cksum_data, p + 8, 8); + if (cmp) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + { + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p, SND_SEQ); + + memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key)); + memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data)); + } + + gssapi_decode_be_om_uint32(SND_SEQ, &seq_number); + + if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) + cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4); + else + cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4); + + memset(SND_SEQ, 0, sizeof(SND_SEQ)); + if (cmp != 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number2); + + if (seq_number != seq_number2) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number2); + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_wrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + u_char Klocaldata[16], k6_data[16], *p, *p0; + size_t len, total_len, datalen; + krb5_keyblock Klocal; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t seq_number; + + if (conf_state) + *conf_state = 0; + + datalen = input_message_buffer->length + 1 /* padding */; + len = datalen + 30; + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (len, &len, &total_len); + + output_message_buffer->length = total_len; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc (total_len); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p0 = _gssapi_make_mech_header(output_message_buffer->value, + len); + p = p0; + + *p++ = 0x02; /* TOK_ID */ + *p++ = 0x01; + *p++ = 0x11; /* SGN_ALG */ + *p++ = 0x00; + if (conf_req_flag) { + *p++ = 0x10; /* SEAL_ALG */ + *p++ = 0x00; + } else { + *p++ = 0xff; /* SEAL_ALG */ + *p++ = 0xff; + } + *p++ = 0xff; /* Filler */ + *p++ = 0xff; + + p = NULL; + + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + gssapi_encode_be_om_uint32(seq_number, p0 + 8); + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + memset (p0 + 8 + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xff, + 4); + + krb5_generate_random_block(p0 + 24, 8); /* fill in Confounder */ + + /* p points to data */ + p = p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE; + memcpy(p, input_message_buffer->value, input_message_buffer->length); + p[input_message_buffer->length] = 1; /* PADDING */ + + ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL, + p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */ + p0, 8, /* TOK_ID, SGN_ALG, SEAL_ALG, Filler */ + p0 + 24, 8, /* Confounder */ + p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE, + datalen); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + { + int i; + + Klocal.keytype = key->keytype; + Klocal.keyvalue.data = Klocaldata; + Klocal.keyvalue.length = sizeof(Klocaldata); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + Klocaldata[i] = ((u_char *)key->keyvalue.data)[i] ^ 0xF0; + } + ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, &Klocal, + p0 + 8, 4, /* SND_SEQ */ + k6_data, sizeof(k6_data)); + memset(Klocaldata, 0, sizeof(Klocaldata)); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + + if(conf_req_flag) { + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data); + /* XXX ? */ + RC4 (&rc4_key, 8 + datalen, p0 + 24, p0 + 24); /* Confounder + data */ + memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key)); + } + memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data)); + + ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */ + k6_data, sizeof(k6_data)); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + { + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p0 + 8, p0 + 8); /* SND_SEQ */ + memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key)); + memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data)); + } + + if (conf_state) + *conf_state = conf_req_flag; + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_qop_t *qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + u_char Klocaldata[16]; + krb5_keyblock Klocal; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t seq_number, seq_number2; + size_t datalen; + OM_uint32 omret; + char k6_data[16], SND_SEQ[8], Confounder[8]; + char cksum_data[8]; + u_char *p, *p0; + int cmp; + int conf_flag; + size_t padlen; + + if (conf_state) + *conf_state = 0; + if (qop_state) + *qop_state = 0; + + p0 = input_message_buffer->value; + omret = _gssapi_verify_mech_header(&p0, + input_message_buffer->length); + if (omret) + return omret; + p = p0; + + datalen = input_message_buffer->length - + (p - ((u_char *)input_message_buffer->value)) - + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE; + + if (memcmp(p, "\x02\x01", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp(p, "\x11\x00", 2) != 0) /* SGN_ALG = HMAC MD5 ARCFOUR */ + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + + if (memcmp (p, "\x10\x00", 2) == 0) + conf_flag = 1; + else if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) == 0) + conf_flag = 0; + else + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p = NULL; + + ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */ + k6_data, sizeof(k6_data)); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + { + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p0 + 8, SND_SEQ); /* SND_SEQ */ + memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key)); + memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data)); + } + + gssapi_decode_be_om_uint32(SND_SEQ, &seq_number); + + if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) + cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4); + else + cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4); + + if (cmp != 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + { + int i; + + Klocal.keytype = key->keytype; + Klocal.keyvalue.data = Klocaldata; + Klocal.keyvalue.length = sizeof(Klocaldata); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + Klocaldata[i] = ((u_char *)key->keyvalue.data)[i] ^ 0xF0; + } + ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, &Klocal, + SND_SEQ, 4, + k6_data, sizeof(k6_data)); + memset(Klocaldata, 0, sizeof(Klocaldata)); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + output_message_buffer->value = malloc(datalen); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + output_message_buffer->length = datalen; + + if(conf_flag) { + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p0 + 24, Confounder); /* Confounder */ + RC4 (&rc4_key, datalen, p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE, + output_message_buffer->value); + memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key)); + } else { + memcpy(Confounder, p0 + 24, 8); /* Confounder */ + memcpy(output_message_buffer->value, + p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE, + datalen); + } + memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data)); + + ret = _gssapi_verify_pad(output_message_buffer, datalen, &padlen); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer); + *minor_status = 0; + return ret; + } + output_message_buffer->length -= padlen; + + ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL, + cksum_data, sizeof(cksum_data), + p0, 8, + Confounder, sizeof(Confounder), + output_message_buffer->value, + output_message_buffer->length + padlen); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + cmp = memcmp(cksum_data, p0 + 16, 8); /* SGN_CKSUM */ + if (cmp) { + gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer); + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number2); + + if (seq_number != seq_number2) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number2); + + if (conf_state) + *conf_state = conf_flag; + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/arcfour.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/arcfour.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88bdfb119f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/arcfour.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: arcfour.h,v 1.3.2.2 2003/09/19 15:14:14 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef GSSAPI_ARCFOUR_H_ +#define GSSAPI_ARCFOUR_H_ 1 + +/* + * The arcfour message have the following formats, these are only here + * for reference and is not used. + */ + +#if 0 +typedef struct gss_arcfour_mic_token { + u_char TOK_ID[2]; /* 01 01 */ + u_char SGN_ALG[2]; /* 11 00 */ + u_char Filler[4]; + u_char SND_SEQ[8]; + u_char SGN_CKSUM[8]; +} gss_arcfour_mic_token_desc, *gss_arcfour_mic_token; + +typedef struct gss_arcfour_wrap_token { + u_char TOK_ID[2]; /* 02 01 */ + u_char SGN_ALG[2]; + u_char SEAL_ALG[2]; + u_char Filler[2]; + u_char SND_SEQ[8]; + u_char SGN_CKSUM[8]; + u_char Confounder[8]; +} gss_arcfour_wrap_token_desc, *gss_arcfour_wrap_token; +#endif + +#define GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE 32 + +OM_uint32 _gssapi_wrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + krb5_keyblock *key); + +OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_qop_t *qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key); + +OM_uint32 _gssapi_get_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token, + krb5_keyblock *key); + +OM_uint32 _gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t *qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key, + char *type); + +#endif /* GSSAPI_ARCFOUR_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..afa39f3a4f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: canonicalize_name.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * output_name + ) +{ + return gss_duplicate_name (minor_status, input_name, output_name); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da494b0d10 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: compare_name.c,v 1.4 2003/03/16 17:50:07 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t name1, + const gss_name_t name2, + int * name_equal + ) +{ + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT(); + + *name_equal = krb5_principal_compare (gssapi_krb5_context, + name1, name2); + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/compat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..311b1cb71a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: compat.c,v 1.2.2.2 2003/04/28 13:58:09 lha Exp $"); + + +static krb5_error_code +check_compat(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_name_t name, + const char *option, krb5_boolean *compat, + krb5_boolean match_val) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char **p, **q; + krb5_principal match; + + + p = krb5_config_get_strings(gssapi_krb5_context, NULL, "gssapi", + option, NULL); + if(p == NULL) + return 0; + + for(q = p; *q; q++) { + + ret = krb5_parse_name(gssapi_krb5_context, *q, &match); + if (ret) + break; + + if (krb5_principal_match(gssapi_krb5_context, name, match)) { + *compat = match_val; + break; + } + + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, match); + } + krb5_config_free_strings(p); + + if (ret) { + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + return 0; +} + +OM_uint32 +_gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t ctx) +{ + krb5_boolean use_compat = TRUE; + OM_uint32 ret; + + if ((ctx->more_flags & COMPAT_OLD_DES3_SELECTED) == 0) { + ret = check_compat(minor_status, ctx->target, + "broken_des3_mic", &use_compat, TRUE); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = check_compat(minor_status, ctx->target, + "correct_des3_mic", &use_compat, FALSE); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (use_compat) + ctx->more_flags |= COMPAT_OLD_DES3; + ctx->more_flags |= COMPAT_OLD_DES3_SELECTED; + } + return 0; +} + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, int on) +{ + *minor_status = 0; + + if (on) { + ctx->more_flags |= COMPAT_OLD_DES3; + } else { + ctx->more_flags &= ~COMPAT_OLD_DES3; + } + ctx->more_flags |= COMPAT_OLD_DES3_SELECTED; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/context_time.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/context_time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..daeb25f26d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/context_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: context_time.c,v 1.7.2.1 2003/08/15 14:25:50 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_lifetime_left(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + OM_uint32 lifetime, + OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec) +{ + krb5_timestamp timeret; + krb5_error_code kret; + + kret = krb5_timeofday(gssapi_krb5_context, &timeret); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (lifetime < timeret) + *lifetime_rec = 0; + else + *lifetime_rec = lifetime - timeret; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + + +OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 lifetime; + OM_uint32 major_status; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + lifetime = context_handle->lifetime; + + major_status = gssapi_lifetime_left(minor_status, lifetime, time_rec); + if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + return major_status; + + *minor_status = 0; + + if (*time_rec == 0) + return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/copy_ccache.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/copy_ccache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2ffe0656d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/copy_ccache.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: copy_ccache.c,v 1.3 2003/03/16 17:47:44 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_copy_ccache(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + krb5_ccache out) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + + if (cred->ccache == NULL) { + *minor_status = EINVAL; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + kret = krb5_cc_copy_cache(gssapi_krb5_context, cred->ccache, out); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a25e0d781 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: create_emtpy_oid_set.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:47:07 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * oid_set + ) +{ + *oid_set = malloc(sizeof(**oid_set)); + if (*oid_set == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + (*oid_set)->count = 0; + (*oid_set)->elements = NULL; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2425453528 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: decapsulate.c,v 1.7.6.1 2003/09/18 22:00:41 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_verify_header(u_char **str, + size_t total_len, + char *type) +{ + size_t len, len_len, mech_len, foo; + int e; + u_char *p = *str; + + if (total_len < 1) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + if (*p++ != 0x60) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1, &len, &len_len); + if (e || 1 + len_len + len != total_len) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += len_len; + if (*p++ != 0x06) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1 - len_len - 1, + &mech_len, &foo); + if (e) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += foo; + if (mech_len != GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + if (memcmp(p, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + p += mech_len; + if (memcmp (p, type, 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += 2; + *str = p; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static ssize_t +gssapi_krb5_get_mech (const u_char *ptr, + size_t total_len, + const u_char **mech_ret) +{ + size_t len, len_len, mech_len, foo; + const u_char *p = ptr; + int e; + + if (total_len < 1) + return -1; + if (*p++ != 0x60) + return -1; + e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1, &len, &len_len); + if (e || 1 + len_len + len != total_len) + return -1; + p += len_len; + if (*p++ != 0x06) + return -1; + e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1 - len_len - 1, + &mech_len, &foo); + if (e) + return -1; + p += foo; + *mech_ret = p; + return mech_len; +} + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_verify_mech_header(u_char **str, + size_t total_len) +{ + const u_char *p; + ssize_t mech_len; + + mech_len = gssapi_krb5_get_mech (*str, total_len, &p); + if (mech_len < 0) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + if (mech_len != GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + if (memcmp(p, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + p += mech_len; + *str = (char *)p; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * Remove the GSS-API wrapping from `in_token' giving `out_data. + * Does not copy data, so just free `in_token'. + */ + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_decapsulate( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + krb5_data *out_data, + char *type +) +{ + u_char *p; + OM_uint32 ret; + + p = input_token_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header(&p, + input_token_buffer->length, + type); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = 0; + return ret; + } + + out_data->length = input_token_buffer->length - + (p - (u_char *)input_token_buffer->value); + out_data->data = p; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * Verify padding of a gss wrapped message and return its length. + */ + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_verify_pad(gss_buffer_t wrapped_token, + size_t datalen, + size_t *padlen) +{ + u_char *pad; + size_t padlength; + int i; + + pad = (u_char *)wrapped_token->value + wrapped_token->length - 1; + padlength = *pad; + + if (padlength > datalen) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + + for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--) + ; + if (i != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + *padlen = padlength; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/delete_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/delete_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2df1f39749 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/delete_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: delete_sec_context.c,v 1.11 2003/03/16 17:46:40 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token + ) +{ + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + if (output_token) { + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + } + + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if((*context_handle)->source) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->source); + if((*context_handle)->target) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->target); + if ((*context_handle)->ticket) { + krb5_free_ticket (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->ticket); + free((*context_handle)->ticket); + } + + free (*context_handle); + *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/display_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/display_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27a232fd3c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/display_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: display_name.c,v 1.9 2003/03/16 17:46:11 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_display_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID * output_name_type + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + char *buf; + size_t len; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + kret = krb5_unparse_name (gssapi_krb5_context, + input_name, + &buf); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + len = strlen (buf); + output_name_buffer->length = len; + output_name_buffer->value = malloc(len + 1); + if (output_name_buffer->value == NULL) { + free (buf); + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy (output_name_buffer->value, buf, len); + ((char *)output_name_buffer->value)[len] = '\0'; + free (buf); + if (output_name_type) + *output_name_type = GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/display_status.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/display_status.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d266fa46bf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/display_status.c @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: display_status.c,v 1.9 2003/03/16 17:45:36 lha Exp $"); + +static char *krb5_error_string; + +static char * +calling_error(OM_uint32 v) +{ + static char *msgs[] = { + NULL, /* 0 */ + "A required input parameter could not be read.", /* */ + "A required output parameter could not be written.", /* */ + "A parameter was malformed" + }; + + v >>= GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET; + + if (v == 0) + return ""; + else if (v >= sizeof(msgs)/sizeof(*msgs)) + return "unknown calling error"; + else + return msgs[v]; +} + +static char * +routine_error(OM_uint32 v) +{ + static char *msgs[] = { + NULL, /* 0 */ + "An unsupported mechanism was requested", + "An invalid name was supplied", + "A supplied name was of an unsupported type", + "Incorrect channel bindings were supplied", + "An invalid status code was supplied", + "A token had an invalid MIC", + "No credentials were supplied, " + "or the credentials were unavailable or inaccessible.", + "No context has been established", + "A token was invalid", + "A credential was invalid", + "The referenced credentials have expired", + "The context has expired", + "Miscellaneous failure (see text)", + "The quality-of-protection requested could not be provide", + "The operation is forbidden by local security policy", + "The operation or option is not available", + "The requested credential element already exists", + "The provided name was not a mechanism name.", + }; + + v >>= GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET; + + if (v == 0) + return ""; + else if (v >= sizeof(msgs)/sizeof(*msgs)) + return "unknown routine error"; + else + return msgs[v]; +} + +static char * +supplementary_error(OM_uint32 v) +{ + static char *msgs[] = { + "normal completion", + "continuation call to routine required", + "duplicate per-message token detected", + "timed-out per-message token detected", + "reordered (early) per-message token detected", + "skipped predecessor token(s) detected" + }; + + v >>= GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET; + + if (v >= sizeof(msgs)/sizeof(*msgs)) + return "unknown routine error"; + else + return msgs[v]; +} + +void +gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (void) +{ + krb5_error_string = krb5_get_error_string(gssapi_krb5_context); +} + +char * +gssapi_krb5_get_error_string (void) +{ + char *ret = krb5_error_string; + krb5_error_string = NULL; + return ret; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + OM_uint32 status_value, + int status_type, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 *message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string) +{ + char *buf; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + status_string->length = 0; + status_string->value = NULL; + + if (gss_oid_equal(mech_type, GSS_C_NO_OID) == 0 && + gss_oid_equal(mech_type, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM) == 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_C_GSS_CODE; + } + + if (status_type == GSS_C_GSS_CODE) { + if (GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(status_value)) + asprintf(&buf, "%s", + supplementary_error(GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(status_value))); + else + asprintf (&buf, "%s %s", + calling_error(GSS_CALLING_ERROR(status_value)), + routine_error(GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(status_value))); + } else if (status_type == GSS_C_MECH_CODE) { + buf = gssapi_krb5_get_error_string (); + if (buf == NULL) { + const char *tmp = krb5_get_err_text (gssapi_krb5_context, + status_value); + if (tmp == NULL) + asprintf(&buf, "unknown mech error-code %u", + (unsigned)status_value); + else + buf = strdup(tmp); + } + } else { + *minor_status = EINVAL; + return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS; + } + + if (buf == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + *message_context = 0; + *minor_status = 0; + + status_string->length = strlen(buf); + status_string->value = buf; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/duplicate_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/duplicate_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b54e90ec8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/duplicate_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: duplicate_name.c,v 1.7 2003/03/16 17:44:26 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t src_name, + gss_name_t * dest_name + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + src_name, + dest_name); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } else { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3cd1e49f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: encapsulate.c,v 1.6.6.1 2003/09/18 21:47:44 lha Exp $"); + +void +gssapi_krb5_encap_length (size_t data_len, + size_t *len, + size_t *total_len) +{ + size_t len_len; + + *len = 1 + 1 + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length + 2 + data_len; + + len_len = length_len(*len); + + *total_len = 1 + len_len + *len; +} + +u_char * +gssapi_krb5_make_header (u_char *p, + size_t len, + u_char *type) +{ + int e; + size_t len_len, foo; + + *p++ = 0x60; + len_len = length_len(len); + e = der_put_length (p + len_len - 1, len_len, len, &foo); + if(e || foo != len_len) + abort (); + p += len_len; + *p++ = 0x06; + *p++ = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + memcpy (p, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length); + p += GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + memcpy (p, type, 2); + p += 2; + return p; +} + +u_char * +_gssapi_make_mech_header(u_char *p, + size_t len) +{ + int e; + size_t len_len, foo; + + *p++ = 0x60; + len_len = length_len(len); + e = der_put_length (p + len_len - 1, len_len, len, &foo); + if(e || foo != len_len) + abort (); + p += len_len; + *p++ = 0x06; + *p++ = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + memcpy (p, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length); + p += GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + return p; +} + +/* + * Give it a krb5_data and it will encapsulate with extra GSS-API wrappings. + */ + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_encapsulate( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const krb5_data *in_data, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + u_char *type +) +{ + size_t len, outer_len; + u_char *p; + + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (in_data->length, &len, &outer_len); + + output_token->length = outer_len; + output_token->value = malloc (outer_len); + if (output_token->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header (output_token->value, len, type); + memcpy (p, in_data->data, in_data->length); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/export_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/export_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c5fcbd4fd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/export_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: export_name.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:34:46 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_export_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t exported_name + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + char *buf, *name; + size_t len; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + kret = krb5_unparse_name (gssapi_krb5_context, + input_name, + &name); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + len = strlen (name); + + exported_name->length = 10 + len + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + exported_name->value = malloc(exported_name->length); + if (exported_name->value == NULL) { + free (name); + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* TOK, MECH_OID_LEN, DER(MECH_OID), NAME_LEN, NAME */ + + buf = exported_name->value; + memcpy(buf, "\x04\x01", 2); + buf += 2; + buf[0] = ((GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length + 2) >> 8) & 0xff; + buf[1] = (GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length + 2) & 0xff; + buf+= 2; + buf[0] = 0x06; + buf[1] = (GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) & 0xFF; + buf+= 2; + + memcpy(buf, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length); + buf += GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + + buf[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xff; + buf[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xff; + buf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + buf[3] = (len) & 0xff; + buf += 4; + + memcpy (buf, name, len); + + free (name); + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/export_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/export_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7e6265242 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/export_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: export_sec_context.c,v 1.6 2003/03/16 18:02:52 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t interprocess_token + ) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_auth_context ac; + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + krb5_data data; + gss_buffer_desc buffer; + int flags; + OM_uint32 minor; + krb5_error_code kret; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + if (!((*context_handle)->flags & GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG)) { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + sp = krb5_storage_emem (); + if (sp == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + ac = (*context_handle)->auth_context; + + /* flagging included fields */ + + flags = 0; + if (ac->local_address) + flags |= SC_LOCAL_ADDRESS; + if (ac->remote_address) + flags |= SC_REMOTE_ADDRESS; + if (ac->keyblock) + flags |= SC_KEYBLOCK; + if (ac->local_subkey) + flags |= SC_LOCAL_SUBKEY; + if (ac->remote_subkey) + flags |= SC_REMOTE_SUBKEY; + + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, flags); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + /* marshall auth context */ + + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, ac->flags); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + if (ac->local_address) { + kret = krb5_store_address (sp, *ac->local_address); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + if (ac->remote_address) { + kret = krb5_store_address (sp, *ac->remote_address); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + kret = krb5_store_int16 (sp, ac->local_port); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + kret = krb5_store_int16 (sp, ac->remote_port); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + if (ac->keyblock) { + kret = krb5_store_keyblock (sp, *ac->keyblock); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + if (ac->local_subkey) { + kret = krb5_store_keyblock (sp, *ac->local_subkey); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + if (ac->remote_subkey) { + kret = krb5_store_keyblock (sp, *ac->remote_subkey); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + } + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, ac->local_seqnumber); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, ac->remote_seqnumber); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, ac->keytype); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, ac->cksumtype); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + /* names */ + + ret = gss_export_name (minor_status, (*context_handle)->source, &buffer); + if (ret) + goto failure; + data.data = buffer.value; + data.length = buffer.length; + kret = krb5_store_data (sp, data); + gss_release_buffer (&minor, &buffer); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + ret = gss_export_name (minor_status, (*context_handle)->target, &buffer); + if (ret) + goto failure; + data.data = buffer.value; + data.length = buffer.length; + + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + + kret = krb5_store_data (sp, data); + gss_release_buffer (&minor, &buffer); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, (*context_handle)->flags); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, (*context_handle)->more_flags); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + kret = krb5_store_int32 (sp, (*context_handle)->lifetime); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_storage_to_data (sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + interprocess_token->length = data.length; + interprocess_token->value = data.data; + ret = gss_delete_sec_context (minor_status, context_handle, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + gss_release_buffer (NULL, interprocess_token); + *minor_status = 0; + return ret; + failure: + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/external.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/external.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dca35ea943 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/external.c @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: external.c,v 1.5 2000/07/22 03:45:28 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user_name(1)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_user_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME = &gss_c_nt_user_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_machine_uid_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_machine_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_string_uid_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_string_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + * nametypes(6) gss-host-based-services(2)). The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. This is a deprecated OID value, and + * implementations wishing to support hostbased-service names + * should instead use the GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE OID, + * defined below, to identify such names; + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X should be accepted a synonym + * for GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE when presented as an input + * parameter, but should not be emitted by GSS-API + * implementations + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_hostbased_service_x_oid_desc = +{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X = &gss_c_nt_hostbased_service_x_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x04"}, corresponding to an + * object-identifier value of {iso(1) member-body(2) + * Unites States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) service_name(4)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE should be initialized + * to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_hostbased_service_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" "\x01\x02\x01\x04"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE = &gss_c_nt_hostbased_service_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 3(gss-anonymous-name)}. The constant + * and GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_anonymous_oid_desc = +{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS = &gss_c_nt_anonymous_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 4(gss-api-exported-name)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_export_name_oid_desc = +{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME = &gss_c_nt_export_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * krb5(2) krb5_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this type + * is "GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME". + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_nt_principal_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x01"}; + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME = &gss_krb5_nt_principal_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this + * type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME". + */ + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME = &gss_c_nt_user_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended symbolic name for + * this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". + */ + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_machine_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + * this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". + */ + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_string_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * To support ongoing experimentation, testing, and evolution of the + * specification, the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as defined in this + * and any successor memos will be identified with the following Object + * Identifier, as defined in RFC-1510, until the specification is + * advanced to the level of Proposed Standard RFC: + * + * {iso(1), org(3), dod(5), internet(1), security(5), kerberosv5(2)} + * + * Upon advancement to the level of Proposed Standard RFC, the Kerberos + * V5 GSS-API mechanism will be identified by an Object Identifier + * having the value: + * + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) + * gssapi(2) krb5(2)} + */ + +#if 0 /* This is the old OID */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_mechanism_oid_desc = +{5, (void *)"\x2b\x05\x01\x05\x02"}; + +#endif + +static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_mechanism_oid_desc = +{9, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}; + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM = &gss_krb5_mechanism_oid_desc; + +/* + * Context for krb5 calls. + */ + +krb5_context gssapi_krb5_context; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/get_mic.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/get_mic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f5b37e025 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/get_mic.c @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_mic.c,v 1.21.2.1 2003/09/18 22:05:12 lha Exp $"); + +static OM_uint32 +mic_des + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token, + krb5_keyblock *key + ) +{ + u_char *p; + MD5_CTX md5; + u_char hash[16]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock deskey; + des_cblock zero; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len; + + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (22, &len, &total_len); + + message_token->length = total_len; + message_token->value = malloc (total_len); + if (message_token->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header(message_token->value, + len, + "\x01\x01"); /* TOK_ID */ + + memcpy (p, "\x00\x00", 2); /* SGN_ALG = DES MAC MD5 */ + p += 2; + + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4); /* Filler */ + p += 4; + + /* Fill in later (SND-SEQ) */ + memset (p, 0, 16); + p += 16; + + /* checksum */ + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + MD5_Update (&md5, message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length); + MD5_Final (hash, &md5); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + memcpy (&deskey, key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(deskey)); + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((void *)hash, (void *)hash, sizeof(hash), + schedule, &zero); + memcpy (p - 8, hash, 8); /* SGN_CKSUM */ + + /* sequence number */ + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + p -= 16; /* SND_SEQ */ + p[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (p + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xFF, + 4); + + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((void *)p, (void *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)(p + 8), DES_ENCRYPT); + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + memset (deskey, 0, sizeof(deskey)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +mic_des3 + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token, + krb5_keyblock *key + ) +{ + u_char *p; + Checksum cksum; + u_char seq[8]; + + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len; + + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_error_code kret; + krb5_data encdata; + char *tmp; + char ivec[8]; + + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (36, &len, &total_len); + + message_token->length = total_len; + message_token->value = malloc (total_len); + if (message_token->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header(message_token->value, + len, + "\x01\x01"); /* TOK-ID */ + + memcpy (p, "\x04\x00", 2); /* SGN_ALG = HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD */ + p += 2; + + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4); /* filler */ + p += 4; + + /* this should be done in parts */ + + tmp = malloc (message_buffer->length + 8); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (message_token->value); + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy (tmp, p - 8, 8); + memcpy (tmp + 8, message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length); + + kret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (kret) { + free (message_token->value); + free (tmp); + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + kret = krb5_create_checksum (gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN, + 0, + tmp, + message_buffer->length + 8, + &cksum); + free (tmp); + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (kret) { + free (message_token->value); + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + memcpy (p + 8, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length); + + /* sequence number */ + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + seq[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xFF, + 4); + + kret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, &crypto); + if (kret) { + free (message_token->value); + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (context_handle->more_flags & COMPAT_OLD_DES3) + memset(ivec, 0, 8); + else + memcpy(ivec, p + 8, 8); + + kret = krb5_encrypt_ivec (gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ, + seq, 8, &encdata, ivec); + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (kret) { + free (message_token->value); + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + assert (encdata.length == 8); + + memcpy (p, encdata.data, encdata.length); + krb5_data_free (&encdata); + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + free_Checksum (&cksum); + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_get_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ) +{ + krb5_keyblock *key; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_keytype keytype; + + ret = gss_krb5_get_localkey(context_handle, &key); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (gssapi_krb5_context, key->keytype, &keytype); + + switch (keytype) { + case KEYTYPE_DES : + ret = mic_des (minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, + message_buffer, message_token, key); + break; + case KEYTYPE_DES3 : + ret = mic_des3 (minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, + message_buffer, message_token, key); + break; + case KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR: + ret = _gssapi_get_mic_arcfour (minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, + message_buffer, message_token, key); + break; + default : + *minor_status = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + break; + } + krb5_free_keyblock (gssapi_krb5_context, key); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gss_acquire_cred.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gss_acquire_cred.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d8c0a0f97 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gss_acquire_cred.3 @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: gss_acquire_cred.3,v 1.8.2.1 2003/04/28 13:41:42 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 2, 2003 +.Dt GSS_ACQUIRE_CRED 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm gss_accept_sec_context , +.Nm gss_acquire_cred , +.Nm gss_add_cred , +.Nm gss_add_oid_set_member , +.Nm gss_canonicalize_name , +.Nm gss_compare_name , +.Nm gss_context_time , +.Nm gss_create_empty_oid_set , +.Nm gss_delete_sec_context , +.Nm gss_display_name , +.Nm gss_display_status , +.Nm gss_duplicate_name , +.Nm gss_export_name , +.Nm gss_export_sec_context , +.Nm gss_get_mic , +.Nm gss_import_name , +.Nm gss_import_sec_context , +.Nm gss_indicate_mechs , +.Nm gss_init_sec_context , +.Nm gss_inquire_context , +.Nm gss_inquire_cred , +.Nm gss_inquire_cred_by_mech , +.Nm gss_inquire_mechs_for_name , +.Nm gss_inquire_names_for_mech , +.Nm gss_krb5_copy_ccache , +.Nm gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic , +.Nm gss_process_context_token , +.Nm gss_release_buffer , +.Nm gss_release_cred , +.Nm gss_release_name , +.Nm gss_release_oid_set , +.Nm gss_seal , +.Nm gss_sign , +.Nm gss_test_oid_set_member , +.Nm gss_unseal , +.Nm gss_unwrap , +.Nm gss_verify , +.Nm gss_verify_mic , +.Nm gss_wrap , +.Nm gss_wrap_size_limit +.Nd Generic Security Service Application Program Interface library +.Sh LIBRARY +GSS-API library (libgssapi, -lgssapi) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In gssapi.h +.Pp +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_accept_sec_context +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle" +.Fa "const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer" +.Fa "const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings" +.Fa "gss_name_t * src_name" +.Fa "gss_OID * mech_type" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_token" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * ret_flags" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * time_rec" +.Fa "gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle" +.Fc +.Pp +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_acquire_cred +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_name_t desired_name" +.Fa "OM_uint32 time_req" +.Fa "const gss_OID_set desired_mechs" +.Fa "gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage" +.Fa "gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle" +.Fa "gss_OID_set * actual_mechs" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * time_rec" +.Fc +.\" .Fn gss_add_cred +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_add_oid_set_member +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_OID member_oid" +.Fa "gss_OID_set * oid_set" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_canonicalize_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_name_t input_name" +.Fa "const gss_OID mech_type" +.Fa "gss_name_t * output_name" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_compare_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_name_t name1" +.Fa "const gss_name_t name2" +.Fa "int * name_equal" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_context_time +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * time_rec" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_create_empty_oid_set +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_OID_set * oid_set" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_delete_sec_context +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_token" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_display_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_name_t input_name" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer" +.Fa "gss_OID * output_name_type" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_display_status +.Fa "OM_uint32 *minor_status" +.Fa "OM_uint32 status_value" +.Fa "int status_type" +.Fa "const gss_OID mech_type" +.Fa "OM_uint32 *message_context" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t status_string" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_duplicate_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_name_t src_name" +.Fa "gss_name_t * dest_name" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_export_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_name_t input_name" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t exported_name" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_export_sec_context +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t interprocess_token" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_get_mic +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "gss_qop_t qop_req" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t message_buffer" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t message_token" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_import_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status, +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer" +.Fa "const gss_OID input_name_type" +.Fa "gss_name_t * output_name" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_import_sec_context +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_indicate_mechs +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_OID_set * mech_set" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_init_sec_context +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle" +.Fa "const gss_name_t target_name" +.Fa "const gss_OID mech_type" +.Fa "OM_uint32 req_flags" +.Fa "OM_uint32 time_req" +.Fa "const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t input_token" +.Fa "gss_OID * actual_mech_type" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_token" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * ret_flags" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * time_rec" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_inquire_context +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "gss_name_t * src_name" +.Fa "gss_name_t * targ_name" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * lifetime_rec" +.Fa "gss_OID * mech_type" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * ctx_flags" +.Fa "int * locally_initiated" +.Fa "int * open_context" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_inquire_cred +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle" +.Fa "gss_name_t * name" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * lifetime" +.Fa "gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage" +.Fa "gss_OID_set * mechanisms" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_inquire_cred_by_mech +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_inquire_mechs_for_name +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_inquire_names_for_mech +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_krb5_copy_ccache +.Fa "OM_uint32 *minor" +.Fa "gss_cred_id_t cred" +.Fa "krb5_ccache out" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "int onoff" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_process_context_token +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_release_buffer +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t buffer" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_release_cred +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_release_name +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_name_t * input_name" +.Fc +.Ft +.Fo gss_release_oid_set +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_OID_set * set" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_seal +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "int conf_req_flag" +.Fa "int qop_req" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer" +.Fa "int * conf_state" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_sign +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "int qop_req" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t message_buffer" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t message_token" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_test_oid_set_member +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_OID member" +.Fa "const gss_OID_set set" +.Fa "int * present" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_unseal +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer" +.Fa "int * conf_state" +.Fa "int * qop_state" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_unwrap +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer" +.Fa "int * conf_state" +.Fa "gss_qop_t * qop_state" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_verify +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t message_buffer" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t token_buffer" +.Fa "int * qop_state" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_verify_mic +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t message_buffer" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t token_buffer" +.Fa "gss_qop_t * qop_state" +.Fc +.Ft +.Fo gss_wrap +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "int conf_req_flag" +.Fa "gss_qop_t qop_req" +.Fa "const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer" +.Fa "int * conf_state" +.Fa "gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer" +.Fc +.Ft OM_uint32 +.Fo gss_wrap_size_limit +.Fa "OM_uint32 * minor_status" +.Fa "const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle" +.Fa "int conf_req_flag" +.Fa "gss_qop_t qop_req" +.Fa "OM_uint32 req_output_size" +.Fa "OM_uint32 * max_input_size" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +Generic Security Service API (GSS-API) version 2, and its C binding, +is described in +.Li RFC2743 +and +.Li RFC2744 . +Version 1 (deprecated) of the C binding is described in +.Li RFC1509 . +.Pp +Heimdals GSS-API implementation supports the following mechanisms +.Bl -bullet +.It +.Li GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM +.El +.Pp +GSS-API have generic name types that all mechanism are supposed to +implement (if possible) +.Bl -bullet +.It +.Li GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME +.It +.Li GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME +.It +.Li GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME +.It +.Li GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE +.It +.Li GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS +.It +.Li GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME +.El +.Pp +GSS-API implementations that supports Kerberos 5 have some additional +name types +.Bl -bullet +.It +.Li GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME +.It +.Li GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME +.It +.Li GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME +.It +.Li GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME +.El +.Pp +.Fn gss_display_name +takes the gss name in +.Fa input_name +and put a printable form in +.Fa output_name_buffer . +.Fa output_name_buffer +should be freed when done using +.Fn gss_release_buffer . +.Fa output_name_type +can either be +.Dv NULL +or a pointer to a +.Li gss_OID +and will in the later case contain the OID type of the name. +The name should only be used for printing. +Access control should be done with the result of +.Fn gss_export_name . +.Pp +.Fn gss_sign , +.Fn gss_verify , +.Fn gss_seal , +and +.Fn gss_unseal +are part of the GSS-API V1 interface and are obsolete. The functions +should not be used for new applications. +They are provided so that version 1 applications can link against the +library. +.Pp +.Fn gss_krb5_copy_ccache +is an extension to the GSS-API API. +The function will extract the krb5 credential that are transfered from +the initiator to the acceptor when using token delegation in the +Kerberos mechanism. +The acceptor receives the delegated token in the last argument to +.Fn gss_accept_sec_context . +.Pp +.Nm gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic +turns on or off the compatibly with older version of Heimdal using +des3 get and verify mic, this is way to programmatically set the +[gssapi]broken_des3_mic and [gssapi]correct_des3_mic flags (see +COMPATIBILITY section in +.Xr gssapi 3 ) . +If the CPP symbol +.Dv GSS_C_KRB5_COMPAT_DES3_MIC +is present, +.Nm gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic +exists. +.Nm gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic +will be removed in a later version of the GSS-API library. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5 3 , +.Xr krb5_ccache 3 , +.Xr gssapi 3 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gss_acquire_cred.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gss_acquire_cred.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37f2c74455 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gss_acquire_cred.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ + +GSS_ACQUIRE_CRED(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual GSS_ACQUIRE_CRED(3) + +NNAAMMEE + ggssss__aacccceepptt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt, ggssss__aaccqquuiirree__ccrreedd, ggssss__aadddd__ccrreedd, + ggssss__aadddd__ooiidd__sseett__mmeemmbbeerr, ggssss__ccaannoonniiccaalliizzee__nnaammee, ggssss__ccoommppaarree__nnaammee, + ggssss__ccoonntteexxtt__ttiimmee, ggssss__ccrreeaattee__eemmppttyy__ooiidd__sseett, ggssss__ddeelleettee__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt, + ggssss__ddiissppllaayy__nnaammee, ggssss__ddiissppllaayy__ssttaattuuss, ggssss__dduupplliiccaattee__nnaammee, + ggssss__eexxppoorrtt__nnaammee, ggssss__eexxppoorrtt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt, ggssss__ggeett__mmiicc, ggssss__iimmppoorrtt__nnaammee, + ggssss__iimmppoorrtt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt, ggssss__iinnddiiccaattee__mmeecchhss, ggssss__iinniitt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt, + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__ccoonntteexxtt, ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__ccrreedd, ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__ccrreedd__bbyy__mmeecchh, + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__mmeecchhss__ffoorr__nnaammee, ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__nnaammeess__ffoorr__mmeecchh, + ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__ccccaacchhee, ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccoommppaatt__ddeess33__mmiicc, + ggssss__pprroocceessss__ccoonntteexxtt__ttookkeenn, ggssss__rreelleeaassee__bbuuffffeerr, ggssss__rreelleeaassee__ccrreedd, + ggssss__rreelleeaassee__nnaammee, ggssss__rreelleeaassee__ooiidd__sseett, ggssss__sseeaall, ggssss__ssiiggnn, + ggssss__tteesstt__ooiidd__sseett__mmeemmbbeerr, ggssss__uunnsseeaall, ggssss__uunnwwrraapp, ggssss__vveerriiffyy, + ggssss__vveerriiffyy__mmiicc, ggssss__wwrraapp, ggssss__wwrraapp__ssiizzee__lliimmiitt - Generic Security Service + Application Program Interface library + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + GSS-API library (libgssapi, -lgssapi) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__aacccceepptt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _* _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _a_c_c_e_p_t_o_r___c_r_e_d___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___t_o_k_e_n___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_h_a_n_n_e_l___b_i_n_d_i_n_g_s___t _i_n_p_u_t___c_h_a_n___b_i_n_d_i_n_g_s, + _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _s_r_c___n_a_m_e, _g_s_s___O_I_D _* _m_e_c_h___t_y_p_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___t_o_k_e_n, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _r_e_t___f_l_a_g_s, + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _t_i_m_e___r_e_c, _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _* _d_e_l_e_g_a_t_e_d___c_r_e_d___h_a_n_d_l_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__aaccqquuiirree__ccrreedd(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _d_e_s_i_r_e_d___n_a_m_e, + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _t_i_m_e___r_e_q, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _d_e_s_i_r_e_d___m_e_c_h_s, + _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___u_s_a_g_e___t _c_r_e_d___u_s_a_g_e, _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _* _o_u_t_p_u_t___c_r_e_d___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _* _a_c_t_u_a_l___m_e_c_h_s, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _t_i_m_e___r_e_c) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__aadddd__ooiidd__sseett__mmeemmbbeerr(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D _m_e_m_b_e_r___o_i_d, _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _* _o_i_d___s_e_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ccaannoonniiccaalliizzee__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D _m_e_c_h___t_y_p_e, + _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ccoommppaarree__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _n_a_m_e_1, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _n_a_m_e_2, _i_n_t _* _n_a_m_e___e_q_u_a_l) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ccoonntteexxtt__ttiimmee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _t_i_m_e___r_e_c) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ccrreeaattee__eemmppttyy__ooiidd__sseett(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _* _o_i_d___s_e_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ddeelleettee__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _* _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___t_o_k_e_n) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ddiissppllaayy__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, _g_s_s___O_I_D _* _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___t_y_p_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ddiissppllaayy__ssttaattuuss(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _*_m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _s_t_a_t_u_s___v_a_l_u_e, + _i_n_t _s_t_a_t_u_s___t_y_p_e, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D _m_e_c_h___t_y_p_e, + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _*_m_e_s_s_a_g_e___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _s_t_a_t_u_s___s_t_r_i_n_g) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__dduupplliiccaattee__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _s_r_c___n_a_m_e, + _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _d_e_s_t___n_a_m_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__eexxppoorrtt__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _e_x_p_o_r_t_e_d___n_a_m_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__eexxppoorrtt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _* _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_t_e_r_p_r_o_c_e_s_s___t_o_k_e_n) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ggeett__mmiicc(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _g_s_s___q_o_p___t _q_o_p___r_e_q, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _m_e_s_s_a_g_e___t_o_k_e_n) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iimmppoorrtt__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s_,, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___t_y_p_e, _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iimmppoorrtt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_t_e_r_p_r_o_c_e_s_s___t_o_k_e_n, + _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _* _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinnddiiccaattee__mmeecchhss(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _* _m_e_c_h___s_e_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinniitt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _i_n_i_t_i_a_t_o_r___c_r_e_d___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _* _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _t_a_r_g_e_t___n_a_m_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D _m_e_c_h___t_y_p_e, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _r_e_q___f_l_a_g_s, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _t_i_m_e___r_e_q, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_h_a_n_n_e_l___b_i_n_d_i_n_g_s___t _i_n_p_u_t___c_h_a_n___b_i_n_d_i_n_g_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___t_o_k_e_n, _g_s_s___O_I_D _* _a_c_t_u_a_l___m_e_c_h___t_y_p_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___t_o_k_e_n, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _r_e_t___f_l_a_g_s, + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _t_i_m_e___r_e_c) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__ccoonntteexxtt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _s_r_c___n_a_m_e, + _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _t_a_r_g___n_a_m_e, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _l_i_f_e_t_i_m_e___r_e_c, + _g_s_s___O_I_D _* _m_e_c_h___t_y_p_e, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _c_t_x___f_l_a_g_s, + _i_n_t _* _l_o_c_a_l_l_y___i_n_i_t_i_a_t_e_d, _i_n_t _* _o_p_e_n___c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__ccrreedd(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _c_r_e_d___h_a_n_d_l_e, _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _n_a_m_e, + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _l_i_f_e_t_i_m_e, _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___u_s_a_g_e___t _* _c_r_e_d___u_s_a_g_e, + _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _* _m_e_c_h_a_n_i_s_m_s) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__ccrreedd__bbyy__mmeecchh() + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__mmeecchhss__ffoorr__nnaammee() + + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__iinnqquuiirree__nnaammeess__ffoorr__mmeecchh() + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__ccccaacchhee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _*_m_i_n_o_r, _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _c_r_e_d, + _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _o_u_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccoommppaatt__ddeess33__mmiicc(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _i_n_t _o_n_o_f_f) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__pprroocceessss__ccoonntteexxtt__ttookkeenn() + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__rreelleeaassee__bbuuffffeerr(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _b_u_f_f_e_r) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__rreelleeaassee__ccrreedd(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___c_r_e_d___i_d___t _* _c_r_e_d___h_a_n_d_l_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__rreelleeaassee__nnaammee(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___n_a_m_e___t _* _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e) + + + ggssss__rreelleeaassee__ooiidd__sseett(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _* _s_e_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__sseeaall(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _i_n_t _c_o_n_f___r_e_q___f_l_a_g, _i_n_t _q_o_p___r_e_q, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, _i_n_t _* _c_o_n_f___s_t_a_t_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__ssiiggnn(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _i_n_t _q_o_p___r_e_q, _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _m_e_s_s_a_g_e___t_o_k_e_n) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__tteesstt__ooiidd__sseett__mmeemmbbeerr(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D _m_e_m_b_e_r, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___O_I_D___s_e_t _s_e_t, _i_n_t _* _p_r_e_s_e_n_t) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__uunnsseeaall(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, _i_n_t _* _c_o_n_f___s_t_a_t_e, + _i_n_t _* _q_o_p___s_t_a_t_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__uunnwwrraapp(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, _i_n_t _* _c_o_n_f___s_t_a_t_e, + _g_s_s___q_o_p___t _* _q_o_p___s_t_a_t_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__vveerriiffyy(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _t_o_k_e_n___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _i_n_t _* _q_o_p___s_t_a_t_e) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__vveerriiffyy__mmiicc(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _t_o_k_e_n___b_u_f_f_e_r, _g_s_s___q_o_p___t _* _q_o_p___s_t_a_t_e) + + + + ggssss__wwrraapp(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, + _i_n_t _c_o_n_f___r_e_q___f_l_a_g, _g_s_s___q_o_p___t _q_o_p___r_e_q, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _i_n_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r, _i_n_t _* _c_o_n_f___s_t_a_t_e, + _g_s_s___b_u_f_f_e_r___t _o_u_t_p_u_t___m_e_s_s_a_g_e___b_u_f_f_e_r) + + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 + ggssss__wwrraapp__ssiizzee__lliimmiitt(_O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_i_n_o_r___s_t_a_t_u_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _g_s_s___c_t_x___i_d___t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t___h_a_n_d_l_e, _i_n_t _c_o_n_f___r_e_q___f_l_a_g, + _g_s_s___q_o_p___t _q_o_p___r_e_q, _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _r_e_q___o_u_t_p_u_t___s_i_z_e, + _O_M___u_i_n_t_3_2 _* _m_a_x___i_n_p_u_t___s_i_z_e) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + Generic Security Service API (GSS-API) version 2, and its C binding, is + described in RFC2743 and RFC2744. Version 1 (deprecated) of the C binding + is described in RFC1509. + + Heimdals GSS-API implementation supports the following mechanisms + + ++oo GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM + + GSS-API have generic name types that all mechanism are supposed to imple- + ment (if possible) + + ++oo GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME + + ++oo GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME + + ++oo GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME + + ++oo GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE + + ++oo GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS + + ++oo GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME + + GSS-API implementations that supports Kerberos 5 have some additional + name types + + ++oo GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME + + ++oo GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME + + ++oo GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME + + ++oo GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME + + ggssss__ddiissppllaayy__nnaammee() takes the gss name in _i_n_p_u_t___n_a_m_e and put a printable + form in _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___b_u_f_f_e_r. _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___b_u_f_f_e_r should be freed when done + using ggssss__rreelleeaassee__bbuuffffeerr(). _o_u_t_p_u_t___n_a_m_e___t_y_p_e can either be NULL or a + pointer to a gss_OID and will in the later case contain the OID type of + the name. The name should only be used for printing. Access control + should be done with the result of ggssss__eexxppoorrtt__nnaammee(). + + ggssss__ssiiggnn(), ggssss__vveerriiffyy(), ggssss__sseeaall(), and ggssss__uunnsseeaall() are part of the + GSS-API V1 interface and are obsolete. The functions should not be used + for new applications. They are provided so that version 1 applications + can link against the library. + + ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__ccccaacchhee() is an extension to the GSS-API API. The function + will extract the krb5 credential that are transfered from the initiator + to the acceptor when using token delegation in the Kerberos mechanism. + The acceptor receives the delegated token in the last argument to + ggssss__aacccceepptt__sseecc__ccoonntteexxtt(). + + + ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccoommppaatt__ddeess33__mmiicc turns on or off the compatibly with older ver- + sion of Heimdal using des3 get and verify mic, this is way to programmat- + ically set the [gssapi]broken_des3_mic and [gssapi]correct_des3_mic flags + (see COMPATIBILITY section in gssapi(3)). If the CPP symbol + GSS_C_KRB5_COMPAT_DES3_MIC is present, ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccoommppaatt__ddeess33__mmiicc exists. + ggssss__kkrrbb55__ccoommppaatt__ddeess33__mmiicc will be removed in a later version of the GSS- + API library. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5(3), krb5_ccache(3), gssapi(3), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL April 2, 2003 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff30042b8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.3 @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: gssapi.3,v 1.5.2.2 2003/04/30 09:56:26 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd January 23, 2003 +.Dt GSSAPI 3 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm gssapi +.Nd Generic Security Service Application Program Interface library +.Sh LIBRARY +GSS-API Library (libgssapi, -lgssapi) +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) +provides security services to callers in a generic fashion, +supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms and technologies and +hence allowing source-level portability of applications to different +environments. +.Sh LIST OF FUNCTIONS +These functions constitute the gssapi library, +.Em libgssapi . +Declarations for these functions may be obtained from the include file +.Pa gssapi.h . +.sp 2 +.nf +.ta \w'gss_inquire_names_for_mech'u+2n +\w'Description goes here'u +\fIName/Page\fP \fIDescription\fP +.ta \w'gss_inquire_names_for_mech'u+2n +\w'Description goes here'u+6nC +.sp 5p +gss_accept_sec_context.3 +gss_acquire_cred.3 +gss_add_cred.3 +gss_add_oid_set_member.3 +gss_canonicalize_name.3 +gss_compare_name.3 +gss_context_time.3 +gss_create_empty_oid_set.3 +gss_delete_sec_context.3 +gss_display_name.3 +gss_display_status.3 +gss_duplicate_name.3 +gss_export_name.3 +gss_export_sec_context.3 +gss_get_mic.3 +gss_import_name.3 +gss_import_sec_context.3 +gss_indicate_mechs.3 +gss_init_sec_context.3 +gss_inquire_context.3 +gss_inquire_cred.3 +gss_inquire_cred_by_mech.3 +gss_inquire_mechs_for_name.3 +gss_inquire_names_for_mech.3 +gss_krb5_copy_ccache.3 +gss_process_context_token.3 +gss_release_buffer.3 +gss_release_cred.3 +gss_release_name.3 +gss_release_oid_set.3 +gss_seal.3 +gss_sign.3 +gss_test_oid_set_member.3 +gss_unseal.3 +gss_unwrap.3 +gss_verify.3 +gss_verify_mic.3 +gss_wrap.3 +gss_wrap_size_limit.3 +.ta +.Fi +.Sh COMPATIBILITY +The +.Nm Heimdal +GSS-API implementation had a bug in releases before 0.6 that made it +fail to inter-operate when using DES3 with other GSS-API +implementations when using +.Fn gss_get_mic +/ +.Fn gss_verify_mic . +Its possible to modify the behavior of the generator of the MIC with +the +.Pa krb5.conf +configuration file so that old clients/servers will still +work. +.Pp +New clients/servers will try both the old and new MIC in Heimdal 0.6. +In 0.7 it will check only if configured and the compatibility code +will be removed in 0.8. +.Pp +Heimdal 0.6 still generates by default the broken GSS-API DES3 mic, +this will change in 0.7 to generate correct des3 mic. +.Pp +To turn on compatibility with older clients and servers, change the +.Nm [gssapi] +.Ar broken_des3_mic +in +.Pa krb5.conf +that contains a list of globbing expressions that will be matched +against the server name. +To turn off generation of the old (incompatible) mic of the MIC use +.Nm [gssapi] +.Ar correct_des3_mic . +.Pp +If a match for a entry is in both +.Nm [gssapi] +.Ar correct_des3_mic +and +.Nm [gssapi] +.Ar correct_des3_mic , +the later will override. +.Pp +This config option modifies behaviour for both clients and servers. +.Pp +Example: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[gssapi] + broken_des3_mic = cvs/*@SU.SE + broken_des3_mic = host/*@E.KTH.SE + correct_des3_mic = host/*@SU.SE +.Ed +.Sh BUGS +All of 0.5.x versions of +.Nm heimdal +had broken token delegations in the client side, the server side was +correct. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5969ecc2bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ + +GSSAPI(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual GSSAPI(3) + +NNAAMMEE + ggssssaappii - Generic Security Service Application Program Interface library + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + GSS-API Library (libgssapi, -lgssapi) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) pro- + vides security services to callers in a generic fashion, supportable with + a range of underlying mechanisms and technologies and hence allowing + source-level portability of applications to different environments. + +LLIISSTT OOFF FFUUNNCCTTIIOONNSS + These functions constitute the gssapi library, _l_i_b_g_s_s_a_p_i. Declarations + for these functions may be obtained from the include file _g_s_s_a_p_i_._h. + + + _N_a_m_e_/_P_a_g_e _D_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_o_n + gss_accept_sec_context.3 + gss_acquire_cred.3 + gss_add_cred.3 + gss_add_oid_set_member.3 + gss_canonicalize_name.3 + gss_compare_name.3 + gss_context_time.3 + gss_create_empty_oid_set.3 + gss_delete_sec_context.3 + gss_display_name.3 + gss_display_status.3 + gss_duplicate_name.3 + gss_export_name.3 + gss_export_sec_context.3 + gss_get_mic.3 + gss_import_name.3 + gss_import_sec_context.3 + gss_indicate_mechs.3 + gss_init_sec_context.3 + gss_inquire_context.3 + gss_inquire_cred.3 + gss_inquire_cred_by_mech.3 + gss_inquire_mechs_for_name.3 + gss_inquire_names_for_mech.3 + gss_krb5_copy_ccache.3 + gss_process_context_token.3 + gss_release_buffer.3 + gss_release_cred.3 + gss_release_name.3 + gss_release_oid_set.3 + gss_seal.3 + gss_sign.3 + gss_test_oid_set_member.3 + gss_unseal.3 + gss_unwrap.3 + gss_verify.3 + gss_verify_mic.3 + gss_wrap.3 + gss_wrap_size_limit.3 + +CCOOMMPPAATTIIBBIILLIITTYY + The HHeeiimmddaall GSS-API implementation had a bug in releases before 0.6 that + made it fail to inter-operate when using DES3 with other GSS-API imple- + mentations when using ggssss__ggeett__mmiicc() / ggssss__vveerriiffyy__mmiicc(). Its possible to + modify the behavior of the generator of the MIC with the _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f con- + figuration file so that old clients/servers will still work. + + New clients/servers will try both the old and new MIC in Heimdal 0.6. In + 0.7 it will check only if configured and the compatibility code will be + removed in 0.8. + + Heimdal 0.6 still generates by default the broken GSS-API DES3 mic, this + will change in 0.7 to generate correct des3 mic. + + To turn on compatibility with older clients and servers, change the + [[ggssssaappii]] _b_r_o_k_e_n___d_e_s_3___m_i_c in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f that contains a list of globbing + expressions that will be matched against the server name. To turn off + generation of the old (incompatible) mic of the MIC use [[ggssssaappii]] + _c_o_r_r_e_c_t___d_e_s_3___m_i_c. + + If a match for a entry is in both [[ggssssaappii]] _c_o_r_r_e_c_t___d_e_s_3___m_i_c and [[ggssssaappii]] + _c_o_r_r_e_c_t___d_e_s_3___m_i_c, the later will override. + + This config option modifies behaviour for both clients and servers. + + Example: + + [gssapi] + broken_des3_mic = cvs/*@SU.SE + broken_des3_mic = host/*@E.KTH.SE + correct_des3_mic = host/*@SU.SE + +BBUUGGSS + All of 0.5.x versions of hheeiimmddaall had broken token delegations in the + client side, the server side was correct. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5(3), krb5.conf(5), kerberos(8) + +BSD Experimental January 23, 2003 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12ac426b01 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi.h @@ -0,0 +1,788 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gssapi.h,v 1.26.2.2 2003/05/07 11:12:21 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef GSSAPI_H_ +#define GSSAPI_H_ + +/* + * First, include stddef.h to get size_t defined. + */ +#include + +#include + +/* + * Now define the three implementation-dependent types. + */ + +typedef u_int32_t OM_uint32; + +typedef u_int32_t gss_uint32; + +/* + * This is to avoid having to include + */ + +struct krb5_auth_context_data; + +struct Principal; + +/* typedef void *gss_name_t; */ + +typedef struct Principal *gss_name_t; + +typedef struct gss_ctx_id_t_desc_struct { + struct krb5_auth_context_data *auth_context; + gss_name_t source, target; + OM_uint32 flags; + enum { LOCAL = 1, OPEN = 2, + COMPAT_OLD_DES3 = 4, COMPAT_OLD_DES3_SELECTED = 8 } more_flags; + struct krb5_ticket *ticket; + time_t lifetime; +} gss_ctx_id_t_desc; + +typedef gss_ctx_id_t_desc *gss_ctx_id_t; + +typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; +} gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + +typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + size_t count; + gss_OID elements; +} gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + +struct krb5_keytab_data; + +struct krb5_ccache_data; + +typedef int gss_cred_usage_t; + +typedef struct gss_cred_id_t_desc_struct { + gss_name_t principal; + struct krb5_keytab_data *keytab; + OM_uint32 lifetime; + gss_cred_usage_t usage; + gss_OID_set mechanisms; + struct krb5_ccache_data *ccache; +} gss_cred_id_t_desc; + +typedef gss_cred_id_t_desc *gss_cred_id_t; + +typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; +} gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + +typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; +} *gss_channel_bindings_t; + +/* + * For now, define a QOP-type as an OM_uint32 + */ +typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t; + +/* + * Flag bits for context-level services. + */ +#define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 1 +#define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 2 +#define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 4 +#define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 8 +#define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 16 +#define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 32 +#define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG 64 +#define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG 128 +#define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG 256 + +/* + * Credential usage options + */ +#define GSS_C_BOTH 0 +#define GSS_C_INITIATE 1 +#define GSS_C_ACCEPT 2 + +/* + * Status code types for gss_display_status + */ +#define GSS_C_GSS_CODE 1 +#define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2 + +/* + * The constant definitions for channel-bindings address families + */ +#define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC 0 +#define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL 1 +#define GSS_C_AF_INET 2 +#define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK 3 +#define GSS_C_AF_PUP 4 +#define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS 5 +#define GSS_C_AF_NS 6 +#define GSS_C_AF_NBS 7 +#define GSS_C_AF_ECMA 8 +#define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT 9 +#define GSS_C_AF_CCITT 10 +#define GSS_C_AF_SNA 11 +#define GSS_C_AF_DECnet 12 +#define GSS_C_AF_DLI 13 +#define GSS_C_AF_LAT 14 +#define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK 15 +#define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK 16 +#define GSS_C_AF_BSC 17 +#define GSS_C_AF_DSS 18 +#define GSS_C_AF_OSI 19 +#define GSS_C_AF_X25 21 +#define GSS_C_AF_INET6 24 + +#define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR 255 + +/* + * Various Null values + */ +#define GSS_C_NO_NAME ((gss_name_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_OID ((gss_OID) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL} + +/* + * Some alternate names for a couple of the above + * values. These are defined for V1 compatibility. + */ +#define GSS_C_NULL_OID GSS_C_NO_OID +#define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET GSS_C_NO_OID_SET + +/* + * Define the default Quality of Protection for per-message + * services. Note that an implementation that offers multiple + * levels of QOP may define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT to be either zero + * (as done here) to mean "default protection", or to a specific + * explicit QOP value. However, a value of 0 should always be + * interpreted by a GSSAPI implementation as a request for the + * default protection level. + */ +#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0 + +#define GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES 0x0100 +#define GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES3_KD 0x0200 + +/* + * Expiration time of 2^32-1 seconds means infinite lifetime for a + * credential or security context + */ +#define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user_name(1)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + * nametypes(6) gss-host-based-services(2)). The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. This is a deprecated OID value, and + * implementations wishing to support hostbased-service names + * should instead use the GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE OID, + * defined below, to identify such names; + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X should be accepted a synonym + * for GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE when presented as an input + * parameter, but should not be emitted by GSS-API + * implementations + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_X; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x04"}, corresponding to an + * object-identifier value of {iso(1) member-body(2) + * Unites States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) service_name(4)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE should be initialized + * to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 3(gss-anonymous-name)}. The constant + * and GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 4(gss-api-exported-name)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME; + +/* + * This if for kerberos5 names. + */ + +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME; +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME; +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME; +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME; + +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + +/* for compatibility with MIT api */ + +#define gss_mech_krb5 GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM + +/* Major status codes */ + +#define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0 + +/* + * Some "helper" definitions to make the status code macros obvious. + */ +#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24 +#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16 +#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0 +#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul +#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul +#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul + +/* + * The macros that test status codes for error conditions. + * Note that the GSS_ERROR() macro has changed slightly from + * the V1 GSSAPI so that it now evaluates its argument + * only once. + */ +#define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)) +#define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)) +#define GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK << GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET)) +#define GSS_ERROR(x) \ + (x & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | \ + (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))) + +/* + * Now the actual status code definitions + */ + +/* + * Calling errors: + */ +#define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ \ + (1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE \ + (2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE \ + (3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + +/* + * Routine errors: + */ +#define GSS_S_BAD_MECH (1ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_NAME (2ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (3ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + +#define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS (4ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS (5ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_SIG (6ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_MIC GSS_S_BAD_SIG +#define GSS_S_NO_CRED (7ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT (8ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN (9ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED (11ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (12ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_FAILURE (13ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_QOP (14ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED (15ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE (16ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT (17ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN (18ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + +/* + * Supplementary info bits: + */ +#define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0)) +#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1)) +#define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2)) +#define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3)) +#define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4)) + +/* + * From RFC1964: + * + * 4.1.1. Non-Kerberos-specific codes + */ + +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_SERVICE_NAME 1 + /* "No @ in SERVICE-NAME name string" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_STRING_UID 2 + /* "STRING-UID-NAME contains nondigits" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_NOUSER 3 + /* "UID does not resolve to username" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_VALIDATE_FAILED 4 + /* "Validation error" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BUFFER_ALLOC 5 + /* "Couldn't allocate gss_buffer_t data" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_MSG_CTX 6 + /* "Message context invalid" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_WRONG_SIZE 7 + /* "Buffer is the wrong size" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE 8 + /* "Credential usage type is unknown" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_UNKNOWN_QOP 9 + /* "Unknown quality of protection specified" */ + + /* + * 4.1.2. Kerberos-specific-codes + */ + +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH 10 + /* "Principal in credential cache does not match desired name" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_KEYTAB_NOMATCH 11 + /* "No principal in keytab matches desired name" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_TGT_MISSING 12 + /* "Credential cache has no TGT" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_NO_SUBKEY 13 + /* "Authenticator has no subkey" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED 14 + /* "Context is already fully established" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_SIGN_TYPE 15 + /* "Unknown signature type in token" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_LENGTH 16 + /* "Invalid field length in token" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE 17 + /* "Attempt to use incomplete security context" */ + +/* + * Finally, function prototypes for the GSS-API routines. + */ + +OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*desired_name*/, + OM_uint32 /*time_req*/, + const gss_OID_set /*desired_mechs*/, + gss_cred_usage_t /*cred_usage*/, + gss_cred_id_t * /*output_cred_handle*/, + gss_OID_set * /*actual_mechs*/, + OM_uint32 * /*time_rec*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_cred + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_cred_id_t * /*cred_handle*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_cred_id_t /*initiator_cred_handle*/, + gss_ctx_id_t * /*context_handle*/, + const gss_name_t /*target_name*/, + const gss_OID /*mech_type*/, + OM_uint32 /*req_flags*/, + OM_uint32 /*time_req*/, + const gss_channel_bindings_t /*input_chan_bindings*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*input_token*/, + gss_OID * /*actual_mech_type*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_token*/, + OM_uint32 * /*ret_flags*/, + OM_uint32 * /*time_rec*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t * /*context_handle*/, + const gss_cred_id_t /*acceptor_cred_handle*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*input_token_buffer*/, + const gss_channel_bindings_t /*input_chan_bindings*/, + gss_name_t * /*src_name*/, + gss_OID * /*mech_type*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_token*/, + OM_uint32 * /*ret_flags*/, + OM_uint32 * /*time_rec*/, + gss_cred_id_t * /*delegated_cred_handle*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*token_buffer*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t * /*context_handle*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_token*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + OM_uint32 * /*time_rec*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_get_mic + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + gss_qop_t /*qop_req*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*message_buffer*/, + gss_buffer_t /*message_token*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*message_buffer*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*token_buffer*/, + gss_qop_t * /*qop_state*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + int /*conf_req_flag*/, + gss_qop_t /*qop_req*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*input_message_buffer*/, + int * /*conf_state*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_message_buffer*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_unwrap + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*input_message_buffer*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_message_buffer*/, + int * /*conf_state*/, + gss_qop_t * /*qop_state*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + OM_uint32 /*status_value*/, + int /*status_type*/, + const gss_OID /*mech_type*/, + OM_uint32 * /*message_context*/, + gss_buffer_t /*status_string*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_OID_set * /*mech_set*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*name1*/, + const gss_name_t /*name2*/, + int * /*name_equal*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_display_name + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*input_name*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_name_buffer*/, + gss_OID * /*output_name_type*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*input_name_buffer*/, + const gss_OID /*input_name_type*/, + gss_name_t * /*output_name*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_export_name + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*input_name*/, + gss_buffer_t /*exported_name*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_name_t * /*input_name*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_buffer_t /*buffer*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_OID_set * /*set*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_cred_id_t /*cred_handle*/, + gss_name_t * /*name*/, + OM_uint32 * /*lifetime*/, + gss_cred_usage_t * /*cred_usage*/, + gss_OID_set * /*mechanisms*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + gss_name_t * /*src_name*/, + gss_name_t * /*targ_name*/, + OM_uint32 * /*lifetime_rec*/, + gss_OID * /*mech_type*/, + OM_uint32 * /*ctx_flags*/, + int * /*locally_initiated*/, + int * /*open_context*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + int /*conf_req_flag*/, + gss_qop_t /*qop_req*/, + OM_uint32 /*req_output_size*/, + OM_uint32 * /*max_input_size*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_cred_id_t /*input_cred_handle*/, + const gss_name_t /*desired_name*/, + const gss_OID /*desired_mech*/, + gss_cred_usage_t /*cred_usage*/, + OM_uint32 /*initiator_time_req*/, + OM_uint32 /*acceptor_time_req*/, + gss_cred_id_t * /*output_cred_handle*/, + gss_OID_set * /*actual_mechs*/, + OM_uint32 * /*initiator_time_rec*/, + OM_uint32 * /*acceptor_time_rec*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_cred_id_t /*cred_handle*/, + const gss_OID /*mech_type*/, + gss_name_t * /*name*/, + OM_uint32 * /*initiator_lifetime*/, + OM_uint32 * /*acceptor_lifetime*/, + gss_cred_usage_t * /*cred_usage*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t * /*context_handle*/, + gss_buffer_t /*interprocess_token*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_import_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_buffer_t /*interprocess_token*/, + gss_ctx_id_t * /*context_handle*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_OID_set * /*oid_set*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_OID /*member_oid*/, + gss_OID_set * /*oid_set*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_OID /*member*/, + const gss_OID_set /*set*/, + int * /*present*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_OID /*mechanism*/, + gss_OID_set * /*name_types*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*input_name*/, + gss_OID_set * /*mech_types*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*input_name*/, + const gss_OID /*mech_type*/, + gss_name_t * /*output_name*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + const gss_name_t /*src_name*/, + gss_name_t * /*dest_name*/ + ); + +/* + * The following routines are obsolete variants of gss_get_mic, + * gss_verify_mic, gss_wrap and gss_unwrap. They should be + * provided by GSSAPI V2 implementations for backwards + * compatibility with V1 applications. Distinct entrypoints + * (as opposed to #defines) should be provided, both to allow + * GSSAPI V1 applications to link against GSSAPI V2 implementations, + * and to retain the slight parameter type differences between the + * obsolete versions of these routines and their current forms. + */ + +OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + int /*qop_req*/, + gss_buffer_t /*message_buffer*/, + gss_buffer_t /*message_token*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + gss_buffer_t /*message_buffer*/, + gss_buffer_t /*token_buffer*/, + int * /*qop_state*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + int /*conf_req_flag*/, + int /*qop_req*/, + gss_buffer_t /*input_message_buffer*/, + int * /*conf_state*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_message_buffer*/ + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32 * /*minor_status*/, + gss_ctx_id_t /*context_handle*/, + gss_buffer_t /*input_message_buffer*/, + gss_buffer_t /*output_message_buffer*/, + int * /*conf_state*/, + int * /*qop_state*/ + ); + +/* + * kerberos mechanism specific functions + */ + +OM_uint32 gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity + (const char */*identity*/); + +OM_uint32 gss_krb5_copy_ccache + (OM_uint32 */*minor*/, + gss_cred_id_t /*cred*/, + struct krb5_ccache_data */*out*/); + +#define GSS_C_KRB5_COMPAT_DES3_MIC 1 + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_compat_des3_mic(OM_uint32 *, gss_ctx_id_t, int); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* GSSAPI_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..154c4b120d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/gssapi_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gssapi_locl.h,v 1.24.2.5 2003/09/18 22:01:52 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef GSSAPI_LOCL_H +#define GSSAPI_LOCL_H + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "arcfour.h" + +extern krb5_context gssapi_krb5_context; + +extern krb5_keytab gssapi_krb5_keytab; + +krb5_error_code gssapi_krb5_init (void); + +#define GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT() do { \ + krb5_error_code kret; \ + if((kret = gssapi_krb5_init ()) != 0) { \ + *minor_status = kret; \ + return GSS_S_FAILURE; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + OM_uint32 flags, + const krb5_data *fwd_data, + Checksum *result); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const Checksum *cksum, + OM_uint32 *flags, + krb5_data *fwd_data); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_encapsulate( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const krb5_data *in_data, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + u_char *type); + +u_char * +_gssapi_make_mech_header(u_char *p, + size_t len); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_decapsulate( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + krb5_data *out_data, + char *type); + +void +gssapi_krb5_encap_length (size_t data_len, + size_t *len, + size_t *total_len); + +u_char * +gssapi_krb5_make_header (u_char *p, + size_t len, + u_char *type); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_verify_header(u_char **str, + size_t total_len, + char *type); + + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_verify_mech_header(u_char **str, + size_t total_len); + +OM_uint32 +_gssapi_verify_pad(gss_buffer_t, size_t, size_t *); + +OM_uint32 +gss_verify_mic_internal(OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + char * type); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_get_remotekey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + krb5_keyblock **key); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_get_localkey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + krb5_keyblock **key); + +krb5_error_code +gss_address_to_krb5addr(OM_uint32 gss_addr_type, + gss_buffer_desc *gss_addr, + int16_t port, + krb5_address *address); + +/* sec_context flags */ + +#define SC_LOCAL_ADDRESS 0x01 +#define SC_REMOTE_ADDRESS 0x02 +#define SC_KEYBLOCK 0x04 +#define SC_LOCAL_SUBKEY 0x08 +#define SC_REMOTE_SUBKEY 0x10 + +int +gss_oid_equal(const gss_OID a, const gss_OID b); + +void +gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (void); + +char * +gssapi_krb5_get_error_string (void); + +OM_uint32 +_gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t ctx); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_lifetime_left(OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32, OM_uint32 *); + +/* 8003 */ + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_encode_om_uint32(OM_uint32, u_char *); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_encode_be_om_uint32(OM_uint32, u_char *); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_decode_om_uint32(u_char *, OM_uint32 *); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_decode_be_om_uint32(u_char *, OM_uint32 *); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/import_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/import_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..423e757146 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/import_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: import_name.c,v 1.13 2003/03/16 17:33:31 lha Exp $"); + +static OM_uint32 +parse_krb5_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const char *name, + gss_name_t *output_name) +{ + krb5_error_code kerr; + + kerr = krb5_parse_name (gssapi_krb5_context, name, output_name); + + if (kerr == 0) + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + else if (kerr == KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR || kerr == KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kerr; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } else { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kerr; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } +} + +static OM_uint32 +import_krb5_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_name_t *output_name) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + char *tmp; + + tmp = malloc (input_name_buffer->length + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy (tmp, + input_name_buffer->value, + input_name_buffer->length); + tmp[input_name_buffer->length] = '\0'; + + ret = parse_krb5_name(minor_status, tmp, output_name); + free(tmp); + + return ret; +} + +static OM_uint32 +import_hostbased_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_name_t *output_name) +{ + krb5_error_code kerr; + char *tmp; + char *p; + char *host; + char local_hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + *output_name = NULL; + + tmp = malloc (input_name_buffer->length + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy (tmp, + input_name_buffer->value, + input_name_buffer->length); + tmp[input_name_buffer->length] = '\0'; + + p = strchr (tmp, '@'); + if (p != NULL) { + *p = '\0'; + host = p + 1; + } else { + if (gethostname(local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)) < 0) { + *minor_status = errno; + free (tmp); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + host = local_hostname; + } + + kerr = krb5_sname_to_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + host, + tmp, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + output_name); + free (tmp); + *minor_status = kerr; + if (kerr == 0) + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + else if (kerr == KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR || kerr == KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kerr; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } else { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kerr; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } +} + +static OM_uint32 +import_export_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_name_t *output_name) +{ + unsigned char *p; + uint32_t length; + OM_uint32 ret; + char *name; + + if (input_name_buffer->length < 10 + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + + /* TOK, MECH_OID_LEN, DER(MECH_OID), NAME_LEN, NAME */ + + p = input_name_buffer->value; + + if (memcmp(&p[0], "\x04\x01\x00", 3) != 0 || + p[3] != GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length + 2 || + p[4] != 0x06 || + p[5] != GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length || + memcmp(&p[6], GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + + p += 6 + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + + length = p[0] << 24 | p[1] << 16 | p[2] << 8 | p[3]; + p += 4; + + if (length > input_name_buffer->length - 10 - GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + + name = malloc(length + 1); + if (name == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(name, p, length); + name[length] = '\0'; + + ret = parse_krb5_name(minor_status, name, output_name); + free(name); + + return ret; +} + +int +gss_oid_equal(const gss_OID a, const gss_OID b) +{ + if (a == b) + return 1; + else if (a == GSS_C_NO_OID || b == GSS_C_NO_OID || a->length != b->length) + return 0; + else + return memcmp(a->elements, b->elements, a->length) == 0; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + const gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t * output_name + ) +{ + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + *minor_status = 0; + *output_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + + if (gss_oid_equal(input_name_type, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE)) + return import_hostbased_name (minor_status, + input_name_buffer, + output_name); + else if (gss_oid_equal(input_name_type, GSS_C_NO_OID) + || gss_oid_equal(input_name_type, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME) + || gss_oid_equal(input_name_type, GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME)) + /* default printable syntax */ + return import_krb5_name (minor_status, + input_name_buffer, + output_name); + else if (gss_oid_equal(input_name_type, GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME)) { + return import_export_name(minor_status, + input_name_buffer, + output_name); + } else { + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/import_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/import_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2daa5736ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/import_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: import_sec_context.c,v 1.7 2003/03/16 18:01:32 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gss_import_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + krb5_error_code kret; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_auth_context ac; + krb5_address local, remote; + krb5_address *localp, *remotep; + krb5_data data; + gss_buffer_desc buffer; + krb5_keyblock keyblock; + int32_t tmp; + int32_t flags; + OM_uint32 minor; + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + localp = remotep = NULL; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (interprocess_token->value, + interprocess_token->length); + if (sp == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + *context_handle = malloc(sizeof(**context_handle)); + if (*context_handle == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memset (*context_handle, 0, sizeof(**context_handle)); + + kret = krb5_auth_con_init (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + /* flags */ + + *minor_status = 0; + + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &flags) != 0) + goto failure; + + /* retrieve the auth context */ + + ac = (*context_handle)->auth_context; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &ac->flags); + if (flags & SC_LOCAL_ADDRESS) { + if (krb5_ret_address (sp, localp = &local) != 0) + goto failure; + } + + if (flags & SC_REMOTE_ADDRESS) { + if (krb5_ret_address (sp, remotep = &remote) != 0) + goto failure; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (gssapi_krb5_context, ac, localp, remotep); + if (localp) + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, localp); + if (remotep) + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, remotep); + localp = remotep = NULL; + + if (krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &ac->local_port) != 0) + goto failure; + + if (krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &ac->remote_port) != 0) + goto failure; + if (flags & SC_KEYBLOCK) { + if (krb5_ret_keyblock (sp, &keyblock) != 0) + goto failure; + krb5_auth_con_setkey (gssapi_krb5_context, ac, &keyblock); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (gssapi_krb5_context, &keyblock); + } + if (flags & SC_LOCAL_SUBKEY) { + if (krb5_ret_keyblock (sp, &keyblock) != 0) + goto failure; + krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey (gssapi_krb5_context, ac, &keyblock); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (gssapi_krb5_context, &keyblock); + } + if (flags & SC_REMOTE_SUBKEY) { + if (krb5_ret_keyblock (sp, &keyblock) != 0) + goto failure; + krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey (gssapi_krb5_context, ac, &keyblock); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (gssapi_krb5_context, &keyblock); + } + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &ac->local_seqnumber)) + goto failure; + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &ac->remote_seqnumber)) + goto failure; + + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp) != 0) + goto failure; + ac->keytype = tmp; + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp) != 0) + goto failure; + ac->cksumtype = tmp; + + /* names */ + + if (krb5_ret_data (sp, &data)) + goto failure; + buffer.value = data.data; + buffer.length = data.length; + + ret = gss_import_name (minor_status, &buffer, GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, + &(*context_handle)->source); + if (ret) { + ret = gss_import_name (minor_status, &buffer, GSS_C_NO_OID, + &(*context_handle)->source); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&data); + goto failure; + } + } + krb5_data_free (&data); + + if (krb5_ret_data (sp, &data) != 0) + goto failure; + buffer.value = data.data; + buffer.length = data.length; + + ret = gss_import_name (minor_status, &buffer, GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, + &(*context_handle)->target); + if (ret) { + ret = gss_import_name (minor_status, &buffer, GSS_C_NO_OID, + &(*context_handle)->target); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&data); + goto failure; + } + } + krb5_data_free (&data); + + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp)) + goto failure; + (*context_handle)->flags = tmp; + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp)) + goto failure; + (*context_handle)->more_flags = tmp; + if (krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp) == 0) + (*context_handle)->lifetime = tmp; + else + (*context_handle)->lifetime = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +failure: + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if ((*context_handle)->source != NULL) + gss_release_name(&minor, &(*context_handle)->source); + if ((*context_handle)->target != NULL) + gss_release_name(&minor, &(*context_handle)->target); + if (localp) + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, localp); + if (remotep) + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, remotep); + free (*context_handle); + *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/indicate_mechs.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/indicate_mechs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89191bb935 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/indicate_mechs.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: indicate_mechs.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:38:20 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * mech_set + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mech_set); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, mech_set); + if (ret) + return ret; + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/init.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ddc0d7090a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init.c,v 1.6 2001/08/13 13:14:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_krb5_init (void) +{ + if(gssapi_krb5_context == NULL) + return krb5_init_context (&gssapi_krb5_context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72286a399f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,578 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_sec_context.c,v 1.36.2.1 2003/08/15 14:21:18 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * copy the addresses from `input_chan_bindings' (if any) to + * the auth context `ac' + */ + +static OM_uint32 +set_addresses (krb5_auth_context ac, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings) +{ + /* Port numbers are expected to be in application_data.value, + * initator's port first */ + + krb5_address initiator_addr, acceptor_addr; + krb5_error_code kret; + + if (input_chan_bindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS + || input_chan_bindings->application_data.length != + 2 * sizeof(ac->local_port)) + return 0; + + memset(&initiator_addr, 0, sizeof(initiator_addr)); + memset(&acceptor_addr, 0, sizeof(acceptor_addr)); + + ac->local_port = + *(int16_t *) input_chan_bindings->application_data.value; + + ac->remote_port = + *((int16_t *) input_chan_bindings->application_data.value + 1); + + kret = gss_address_to_krb5addr(input_chan_bindings->acceptor_addrtype, + &input_chan_bindings->acceptor_address, + ac->remote_port, + &acceptor_addr); + if (kret) + return kret; + + kret = gss_address_to_krb5addr(input_chan_bindings->initiator_addrtype, + &input_chan_bindings->initiator_address, + ac->local_port, + &initiator_addr); + if (kret) { + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, &acceptor_addr); + return kret; + } + + kret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(gssapi_krb5_context, + ac, + &initiator_addr, /* local address */ + &acceptor_addr); /* remote address */ + + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, &initiator_addr); + krb5_free_address (gssapi_krb5_context, &acceptor_addr); + +#if 0 + free(input_chan_bindings->application_data.value); + input_chan_bindings->application_data.value = NULL; + input_chan_bindings->application_data.length = 0; +#endif + + return kret; +} + +/* + * handle delegated creds in init-sec-context + */ + +static void +do_delegation (krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *cred, + const gss_name_t target_name, + krb5_data *fwd_data, + int *flags) +{ + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags fwd_flags; + krb5_error_code kret; + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + krb5_data_zero (fwd_data); + + kret = krb5_cc_get_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, ccache, &creds.client); + if (kret) + goto out; + + kret = krb5_build_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, + &creds.server, + strlen(creds.client->realm), + creds.client->realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + creds.client->realm, + NULL); + if (kret) + goto out; + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + fwd_flags.i = 0; + fwd_flags.b.forwarded = 1; + fwd_flags.b.forwardable = 1; + + if ( /*target_name->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||*/ + target_name->name.name_string.len < 2) + goto out; + + kret = krb5_get_forwarded_creds(gssapi_krb5_context, + ac, + ccache, + fwd_flags.i, + target_name->name.name_string.val[1], + &creds, + fwd_data); + + out: + if (kret) + *flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + else + *flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + + if (creds.client) + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, creds.client); + if (creds.server) + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, creds.server); +} + +/* + * first stage of init-sec-context + */ + +static OM_uint32 +init_auth +(OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + krb5_error_code kret; + krb5_flags ap_options; + krb5_creds this_cred, *cred; + krb5_data outbuf; + krb5_ccache ccache; + u_int32_t flags; + Authenticator *auth; + krb5_data authenticator; + Checksum cksum; + krb5_enctype enctype; + krb5_data fwd_data; + OM_uint32 lifetime_rec; + + krb5_data_zero(&outbuf); + krb5_data_zero(&fwd_data); + + *minor_status = 0; + + *context_handle = malloc(sizeof(**context_handle)); + if (*context_handle == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + (*context_handle)->auth_context = NULL; + (*context_handle)->source = NULL; + (*context_handle)->target = NULL; + (*context_handle)->flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->more_flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->ticket = NULL; + (*context_handle)->lifetime = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + kret = krb5_auth_con_init (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = set_addresses ((*context_handle)->auth_context, + input_chan_bindings); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + goto failure; + } + + { + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_auth_con_getflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &tmp); + tmp |= KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE; + krb5_auth_con_setflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + tmp); + } + + if (actual_mech_type) + *actual_mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + if (initiator_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + kret = krb5_cc_default (gssapi_krb5_context, &ccache); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + } else + ccache = initiator_cred_handle->ccache; + + kret = krb5_cc_get_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ccache, + &(*context_handle)->source); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + target_name, + &(*context_handle)->target); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + ret = _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(minor_status, *context_handle); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + + memset(&this_cred, 0, sizeof(this_cred)); + this_cred.client = (*context_handle)->source; + this_cred.server = (*context_handle)->target; + if (time_req && time_req != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) { + krb5_timestamp ts; + + krb5_timeofday (gssapi_krb5_context, &ts); + this_cred.times.endtime = ts + time_req; + } else + this_cred.times.endtime = 0; + this_cred.session.keytype = 0; + + kret = krb5_get_credentials (gssapi_krb5_context, + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE, + ccache, + &this_cred, + &cred); + + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + (*context_handle)->lifetime = cred->times.endtime; + + ret = gssapi_lifetime_left(minor_status, + (*context_handle)->lifetime, + &lifetime_rec); + if (ret) { + goto failure; + } + + if (lifetime_rec == 0) { + *minor_status = 0; + ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; + goto failure; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &cred->session); + + kret = krb5_auth_con_generatelocalsubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &cred->session); + if(kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + flags = 0; + ap_options = 0; + if (req_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) + do_delegation ((*context_handle)->auth_context, + ccache, cred, target_name, &fwd_data, &flags); + + if (req_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) { + flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG; + ap_options |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED; + } + + if (req_flags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + if (req_flags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + if (req_flags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG; + flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG; + flags |= GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG; + flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG; + + if (ret_flags) + *ret_flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= LOCAL; + + ret = gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum (minor_status, + input_chan_bindings, + flags, + &fwd_data, + &cksum); + krb5_data_free (&fwd_data); + if (ret) + goto failure; + +#if 1 + enctype = (*context_handle)->auth_context->keyblock->keytype; +#else + if ((*context_handle)->auth_context->enctype) + enctype = (*context_handle)->auth_context->enctype; + else { + kret = krb5_keytype_to_enctype(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context->keyblock->keytype, + &enctype); + if (kret) + return kret; + } +#endif + + kret = krb5_build_authenticator (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + enctype, + cred, + &cksum, + &auth, + &authenticator, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH); + + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_build_ap_req (gssapi_krb5_context, + enctype, + cred, + ap_options, + authenticator, + &outbuf); + + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + ret = gssapi_krb5_encapsulate (minor_status, &outbuf, output_token, + "\x01\x00"); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + krb5_data_free (&outbuf); + + if (flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) { + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + } else { + if (time_rec) + *time_rec = lifetime_rec; + + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= OPEN; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + failure: + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if((*context_handle)->source) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->source); + if((*context_handle)->target) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->target); + free (*context_handle); + krb5_data_free (&outbuf); + *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + return ret; +} + +static OM_uint32 +repl_mutual + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_error_code kret; + krb5_data indata; + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl; + + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + + if (actual_mech_type) + *actual_mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + ret = gssapi_krb5_decapsulate (minor_status, input_token, &indata, + "\x02\x00"); + if (ret) + /* XXX - Handle AP_ERROR */ + return ret; + + kret = krb5_rd_rep (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &indata, + &repl); + if (kret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (gssapi_krb5_context, + repl); + + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= OPEN; + + *minor_status = 0; + if (time_rec) { + ret = gssapi_lifetime_left(minor_status, + (*context_handle)->lifetime, + time_rec); + } else { + ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + if (ret_flags) + *ret_flags = (*context_handle)->flags; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * gss_init_sec_context + */ + +OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + + if (ret_flags) + *ret_flags = 0; + if (time_rec) + *time_rec = 0; + + if (target_name == GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + if (actual_mech_type) + *actual_mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } + + if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) + return init_auth (minor_status, + initiator_cred_handle, + context_handle, + target_name, + mech_type, + req_flags, + time_req, + input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + actual_mech_type, + output_token, + ret_flags, + time_rec); + else + return repl_mutual(minor_status, + initiator_cred_handle, + context_handle, + target_name, + mech_type, + req_flags, + time_req, + input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + actual_mech_type, + output_token, + ret_flags, + time_rec); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95cd2c576e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_context.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:43:30 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_name_t * targ_name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime_rec, + gss_OID * mech_type, + OM_uint32 * ctx_flags, + int * locally_initiated, + int * open_context + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + if (src_name) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name (minor_status, + context_handle->source, + src_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + if (targ_name) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name (minor_status, + context_handle->target, + targ_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + if (lifetime_rec) + *lifetime_rec = context_handle->lifetime; + + if (mech_type) + *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + if (ctx_flags) + *ctx_flags = context_handle->flags; + + if (locally_initiated) + *locally_initiated = context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL; + + if (open_context) + *open_context = context_handle->more_flags & OPEN; + + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4938d564e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_cred.c,v 1.4 2003/03/16 17:42:14 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage, + gss_OID_set * mechanisms + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + *minor_status = 0; + + if (name) + *name = NULL; + if (mechanisms) + *mechanisms = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET; + + if (cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (name != NULL) { + if (cred_handle->principal != NULL) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name(minor_status, cred_handle->principal, + name); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else if (cred_handle->usage == GSS_C_ACCEPT) { + *minor_status = krb5_sname_to_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, NULL, + NULL, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, name); + if (*minor_status) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } else { + *minor_status = krb5_get_default_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, + name); + if (*minor_status) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + } + if (lifetime != NULL) { + *lifetime = cred_handle->lifetime; + } + if (cred_usage != NULL) { + *cred_usage = cred_handle->usage; + } + if (mechanisms != NULL) { + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mechanisms); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, + &cred_handle->mechanisms->elements[0], + mechanisms); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + } + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred_by_mech.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred_by_mech.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b09d1e1d5f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred_by_mech.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_cred_by_mech.c,v 1.1 2003/03/16 18:11:16 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * initiator_lifetime, + OM_uint32 * acceptor_lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + OM_uint32 lifetime; + + if (gss_oid_equal(mech_type, GSS_C_NO_OID) == 0 && + gss_oid_equal(mech_type, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM) == 0) { + *minor_status = EINVAL; + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + } + + ret = gss_inquire_cred (minor_status, + cred_handle, + name, + &lifetime, + cred_usage, + NULL); + + if (ret == 0 && cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + gss_cred_usage_t usage; + + usage = cred_handle->usage; + + if (initiator_lifetime) { + if (usage == GSS_C_INITIATE || usage == GSS_C_BOTH) + *initiator_lifetime = lifetime; + } + if (acceptor_lifetime) { + if (usage == GSS_C_ACCEPT || usage == GSS_C_BOTH) + *acceptor_lifetime = lifetime; + } + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_mechs_for_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_mechs_for_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67ebb04db4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_mechs_for_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_mechs_for_name.c,v 1.1 2003/03/16 18:12:33 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_OID_set * mech_types + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mech_types); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + mech_types); + if (ret) + gss_release_oid_set(NULL, mech_types); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_names_for_mech.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_names_for_mech.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e93de6854 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/inquire_names_for_mech.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_names_for_mech.c,v 1.1 2003/03/16 18:15:29 lha Exp $"); + + +static gss_OID *name_list[] = { + &GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + &GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME, + &GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, + NULL +}; + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID mechanism, + gss_OID_set * name_types + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + int i; + + *minor_status = 0; + + if (gss_oid_equal(mechanism, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM) == 0 && + gss_oid_equal(mechanism, GSS_C_NULL_OID) == 0) { + *name_types = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET; + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + } + + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, name_types); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + return ret; + + for (i = 0; name_list[i] != NULL; i++) { + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, + *(name_list[i]), + name_types); + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + break; + } + + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + gss_release_oid_set(NULL, name_types); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/process_context_token.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/process_context_token.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cec33cc3e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/process_context_token.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: process_context_token.c,v 1.1 2003/03/16 18:19:05 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token ( + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + gss_buffer_desc empty_buffer; + gss_qop_t qop_state; + + empty_buffer.length = 0; + empty_buffer.value = NULL; + + qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT; + + ret = gss_verify_mic_internal(minor_status, context_handle, + token_buffer, &empty_buffer, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, "\x01\x02"); + + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, + (gss_ctx_id_t *)&context_handle, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + *minor_status = 0; + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_buffer.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..258b76f627 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_buffer.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:58:20 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer + ) +{ + *minor_status = 0; + free (buffer->value); + buffer->value = NULL; + buffer->length = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01cbb6a0f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_cred.c,v 1.8.2.1 2003/10/07 01:08:21 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle + ) +{ + *minor_status = 0; + + if (*cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + + if ((*cred_handle)->principal != NULL) + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->principal); + if ((*cred_handle)->keytab != NULL) + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->keytab); + if ((*cred_handle)->ccache != NULL) { + const krb5_cc_ops *ops; + ops = krb5_cc_get_ops(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->ccache); + if (ops == &krb5_mcc_ops) + krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->ccache); + else + krb5_cc_close(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->ccache); + } + gss_release_oid_set(NULL, &(*cred_handle)->mechanisms); + free(*cred_handle); + *cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_name.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6894ffae49 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_name.c,v 1.7 2003/03/16 17:52:48 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t * input_name + ) +{ + GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (); + if (minor_status) + *minor_status = 0; + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, + *input_name); + *input_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_oid_set.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_oid_set.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04eb01565f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/release_oid_set.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_oid_set.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:53:25 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * set + ) +{ + if (minor_status) + *minor_status = 0; + free ((*set)->elements); + free (*set); + *set = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/test_acquire_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/test_acquire_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29ed830d28 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/test_acquire_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: test_acquire_cred.c,v 1.2 2003/04/06 00:20:37 lha Exp $"); + +static void +print_time(OM_uint32 time_rec) +{ + if (time_rec == GSS_C_INDEFINITE) { + printf("cred never expire\n"); + } else { + time_t t = time_rec; + printf("expiration time: %s", ctime(&t)); + } +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status; + gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, copy_cred; + OM_uint32 time_rec; + + major_status = gss_acquire_cred(&minor_status, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, + 0, + NULL, + GSS_C_INITIATE, + &cred_handle, + NULL, + &time_rec); + if (GSS_ERROR(major_status)) + errx(1, "acquire_cred failed"); + + + print_time(time_rec); + + major_status = gss_add_cred (&minor_status, + cred_handle, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + GSS_C_INITIATE, + 0, + 0, + ©_cred, + NULL, + &time_rec, + NULL); + + if (GSS_ERROR(major_status)) + errx(1, "add_cred failed"); + + print_time(time_rec); + + major_status = gss_release_cred(&minor_status, + &cred_handle); + if (GSS_ERROR(major_status)) + errx(1, "release_cred failed"); + + major_status = gss_release_cred(&minor_status, + ©_cred); + if (GSS_ERROR(major_status)) + errx(1, "release_cred failed"); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/test_oid_set_member.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/test_oid_set_member.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e747c5acc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/test_oid_set_member.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: test_oid_set_member.c,v 1.5 2003/03/16 17:54:06 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member, + const gss_OID_set set, + int * present + ) +{ + size_t i; + + *minor_status = 0; + *present = 0; + for (i = 0; i < set->count; ++i) + if (gss_oid_equal(member, &set->elements[i]) != 0) { + *present = 1; + break; + } + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/unwrap.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/unwrap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b798438dc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/unwrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: unwrap.c,v 1.22.2.1 2003/09/18 22:05:22 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_get_remotekey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_keyblock *skey; + + krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_getkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + return GSS_KRB5_S_KG_NO_SUBKEY; /* XXX */ + *key = skey; + return 0; +} + +static OM_uint32 +unwrap_des + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key + ) +{ + u_char *p, *pad; + size_t len; + MD5_CTX md5; + u_char hash[16], seq_data[8]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock deskey; + des_cblock zero; + int i; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t padlength; + OM_uint32 ret; + int cstate; + + p = input_message_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + input_message_buffer->length, + "\x02\x01"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) == 0) { + cstate = 1; + } else if (memcmp (p, "\xFF\xFF", 2) == 0) { + cstate = 0; + } else + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 2; + if(conf_state != NULL) + *conf_state = cstate; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += 2; + p += 16; + + len = p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value; + + if(cstate) { + /* decrypt data */ + memcpy (&deskey, key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(deskey)); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(deskey); ++i) + deskey[i] ^= 0xf0; + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + des_cbc_encrypt ((void *)p, + (void *)p, + input_message_buffer->length - len, + schedule, + &zero, + DES_DECRYPT); + + memset (deskey, 0, sizeof(deskey)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + } + /* check pad */ + + pad = (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value + input_message_buffer->length - 1; + padlength = *pad; + + for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--) + ; + if (i != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + MD5_Update (&md5, p, input_message_buffer->length - len); + MD5_Final (hash, &md5); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + memcpy (&deskey, key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(deskey)); + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((void *)hash, (void *)hash, sizeof(hash), + schedule, &zero); + if (memcmp (p - 8, hash, 8) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + /* verify sequence number */ + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + seq_data[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq_data[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq_data[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq_data[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq_data + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0xFF : 0, + 4); + + p -= 16; + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((void *)p, (void *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)hash, DES_DECRYPT); + + memset (deskey, 0, sizeof(deskey)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + if (memcmp (p, seq_data, 8) != 0) { + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + /* copy out data */ + + output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length + - len - padlength - 8; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length); + if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + memcpy (output_message_buffer->value, + p + 24, + output_message_buffer->length); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +unwrap_des3 + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key + ) +{ + u_char *p, *pad; + size_t len; + u_char seq[8]; + krb5_data seq_data; + u_char cksum[20]; + int i; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t padlength; + OM_uint32 ret; + int cstate; + krb5_crypto crypto; + Checksum csum; + int cmp; + + p = input_message_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + input_message_buffer->length, + "\x02\x01"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp (p, "\x04\x00", 2) != 0) /* HMAC SHA1 DES3_KD */ + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\x02\x00", 2) == 0) { + cstate = 1; + } else if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) == 0) { + cstate = 0; + } else + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 2; + if(conf_state != NULL) + *conf_state = cstate; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += 2; + p += 28; + + len = p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value; + + if(cstate) { + /* decrypt data */ + krb5_data tmp; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, &crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_decrypt(gssapi_krb5_context, crypto, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL, + p, input_message_buffer->length - len, &tmp); + krb5_crypto_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + assert (tmp.length == input_message_buffer->length - len); + + memcpy (p, tmp.data, tmp.length); + krb5_data_free(&tmp); + } + /* check pad */ + + pad = (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value + input_message_buffer->length - 1; + padlength = *pad; + + for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--) + ; + if (i != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + /* verify sequence number */ + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + seq[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0xFF : 0, + 4); + + p -= 28; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, &crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + { + des_cblock ivec; + + memcpy(&ivec, p + 8, 8); + ret = krb5_decrypt_ivec (gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ, + p, 8, &seq_data, + &ivec); + } + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + if (seq_data.length != 8) { + krb5_data_free (&seq_data); + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + cmp = memcmp (seq, seq_data.data, seq_data.length); + krb5_data_free (&seq_data); + if (cmp != 0) { + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + /* verify checksum */ + + memcpy (cksum, p + 8, 20); + + memcpy (p + 20, p - 8, 8); + + csum.cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3; + csum.checksum.length = 20; + csum.checksum.data = cksum; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + ret = krb5_verify_checksum (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN, + p + 20, + input_message_buffer->length - len + 8, + &csum); + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* copy out data */ + + output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length + - len - padlength - 8; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length); + if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + memcpy (output_message_buffer->value, + p + 36, + output_message_buffer->length); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_unwrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ) +{ + krb5_keyblock *key; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_keytype keytype; + + if (qop_state != NULL) + *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT; + ret = gss_krb5_get_remotekey(context_handle, &key); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (gssapi_krb5_context, key->keytype, &keytype); + + *minor_status = 0; + + switch (keytype) { + case KEYTYPE_DES : + ret = unwrap_des (minor_status, context_handle, + input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer, + conf_state, qop_state, key); + break; + case KEYTYPE_DES3 : + ret = unwrap_des3 (minor_status, context_handle, + input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer, + conf_state, qop_state, key); + break; + case KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR: + ret = _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour (minor_status, context_handle, + input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer, + conf_state, qop_state, key); + break; + default : + *minor_status = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + break; + } + krb5_free_keyblock (gssapi_krb5_context, key); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/v1.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/v1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34091ea715 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/v1.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: v1.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +/* These functions are for V1 compatibility */ + +OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ) +{ + return gss_get_mic(minor_status, + context_handle, + (gss_qop_t)qop_req, + message_buffer, + message_token); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + int * qop_state + ) +{ + return gss_verify_mic(minor_status, + context_handle, + message_buffer, + token_buffer, + (gss_qop_t *)qop_state); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ) +{ + return gss_wrap(minor_status, + context_handle, + conf_req_flag, + (gss_qop_t)qop_req, + input_message_buffer, + conf_state, + output_message_buffer); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + int * qop_state + ) +{ + return gss_unwrap(minor_status, + context_handle, + input_message_buffer, + output_message_buffer, + conf_state, + (gss_qop_t *)qop_state); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/verify_mic.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/verify_mic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aef2d07da6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/verify_mic.c @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: verify_mic.c,v 1.18.2.4 2003/09/18 22:05:34 lha Exp $"); + +static OM_uint32 +verify_mic_des + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key, + char *type + ) +{ + u_char *p; + MD5_CTX md5; + u_char hash[16], seq_data[8]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock zero; + des_cblock deskey; + int32_t seq_number; + OM_uint32 ret; + + p = token_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + token_buffer->length, + type); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp(p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 4; + p += 16; + + /* verify checksum */ + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + MD5_Update (&md5, message_buffer->value, + message_buffer->length); + MD5_Final (hash, &md5); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + memcpy (&deskey, key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(deskey)); + + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((void *)hash, (void *)hash, sizeof(hash), + schedule, &zero); + if (memcmp (p - 8, hash, 8) != 0) { + memset (deskey, 0, sizeof(deskey)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + /* verify sequence number */ + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + seq_data[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq_data[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq_data[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq_data[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq_data + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0xFF : 0, + 4); + + p -= 16; + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((void *)p, (void *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)hash, DES_DECRYPT); + + memset (deskey, 0, sizeof(deskey)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + if (memcmp (p, seq_data, 8) != 0) { + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +verify_mic_des3 + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + krb5_keyblock *key, + char *type + ) +{ + u_char *p; + u_char seq[8]; + int32_t seq_number; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_data seq_data; + int cmp, docompat; + Checksum csum; + char *tmp; + char ivec[8]; + + p = token_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + token_buffer->length, + type); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp(p, "\x04\x00", 2) != 0) /* SGN_ALG = HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD */ + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 4; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, &crypto); + if (ret){ + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* verify sequence number */ + docompat = 0; +retry: + if (docompat) + memset(ivec, 0, 8); + else + memcpy(ivec, p + 8, 8); + + ret = krb5_decrypt_ivec (gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ, + p, 8, &seq_data, ivec); + if (ret) { + if (docompat++) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } else + goto retry; + } + + if (seq_data.length != 8) { + krb5_data_free (&seq_data); + if (docompat++) { + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } else + goto retry; + } + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + seq[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0xFF : 0, + 4); + cmp = memcmp (seq, seq_data.data, seq_data.length); + krb5_data_free (&seq_data); + if (cmp != 0) { + if (docompat++) { + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } else + goto retry; + } + + /* verify checksum */ + + tmp = malloc (message_buffer->length + 8); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + memcpy (tmp, p - 8, 8); + memcpy (tmp + 8, message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length); + + csum.cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3; + csum.checksum.length = 20; + csum.checksum.data = p + 8; + + ret = krb5_verify_checksum (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN, + tmp, message_buffer->length + 8, + &csum); + free (tmp); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 +gss_verify_mic_internal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state, + char * type + ) +{ + krb5_keyblock *key; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_keytype keytype; + + ret = gss_krb5_get_remotekey(context_handle, &key); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + *minor_status = 0; + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (gssapi_krb5_context, key->keytype, &keytype); + switch (keytype) { + case KEYTYPE_DES : + ret = verify_mic_des (minor_status, context_handle, + message_buffer, token_buffer, qop_state, key, + type); + break; + case KEYTYPE_DES3 : + ret = verify_mic_des3 (minor_status, context_handle, + message_buffer, token_buffer, qop_state, key, + type); + break; + case KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR : + ret = _gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour (minor_status, context_handle, + message_buffer, token_buffer, + qop_state, key, type); + break; + default : + *minor_status = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + break; + } + krb5_free_keyblock (gssapi_krb5_context, key); + + return ret; +} + +OM_uint32 +gss_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + if (qop_state != NULL) + *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT; + + ret = gss_verify_mic_internal(minor_status, context_handle, + message_buffer, token_buffer, + qop_state, "\x01\x01"); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/wrap.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a0f9d2ff52 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/gssapi/wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: wrap.c,v 1.21.2.1 2003/09/18 22:05:45 lha Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_get_localkey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_keyblock *skey; + + krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_getkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + *key = skey; + return 0; +} + +static OM_uint32 +sub_wrap_size ( + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 * max_input_size, + int blocksize, + int extrasize + ) +{ + size_t len, total_len, padlength; + padlength = blocksize - (req_output_size % blocksize); + len = req_output_size + 8 + padlength + extrasize; + gssapi_krb5_encap_length(len, &len, &total_len); + *max_input_size = (OM_uint32)total_len; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 +gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 * max_input_size + ) +{ + krb5_keyblock *key; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_keytype keytype; + + ret = gss_krb5_get_localkey(context_handle, &key); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (gssapi_krb5_context, key->keytype, &keytype); + + switch (keytype) { + case KEYTYPE_DES : + case KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR: + ret = sub_wrap_size(req_output_size, max_input_size, 8, 22); + break; + case KEYTYPE_DES3 : + ret = sub_wrap_size(req_output_size, max_input_size, 8, 34); + break; + default : + *minor_status = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + break; + } + krb5_free_keyblock (gssapi_krb5_context, key); + *minor_status = 0; + return ret; +} + +static OM_uint32 +wrap_des + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + krb5_keyblock *key + ) +{ + u_char *p; + MD5_CTX md5; + u_char hash[16]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock deskey; + des_cblock zero; + int i; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len, padlength, datalen; + + padlength = 8 - (input_message_buffer->length % 8); + datalen = input_message_buffer->length + padlength + 8; + len = datalen + 22; + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (len, &len, &total_len); + + output_message_buffer->length = total_len; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc (total_len); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header(output_message_buffer->value, + len, + "\x02\x01"); /* TOK_ID */ + + /* SGN_ALG */ + memcpy (p, "\x00\x00", 2); + p += 2; + /* SEAL_ALG */ + if(conf_req_flag) + memcpy (p, "\x00\x00", 2); + else + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff", 2); + p += 2; + /* Filler */ + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff", 2); + p += 2; + + /* fill in later */ + memset (p, 0, 16); + p += 16; + + /* confounder + data + pad */ + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + memcpy (p + 8, input_message_buffer->value, + input_message_buffer->length); + memset (p + 8 + input_message_buffer->length, padlength, padlength); + + /* checksum */ + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + MD5_Update (&md5, p, datalen); + MD5_Final (hash, &md5); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + memcpy (&deskey, key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(deskey)); + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((void *)hash, (void *)hash, sizeof(hash), + schedule, &zero); + memcpy (p - 8, hash, 8); + + /* sequence number */ + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + p -= 16; + p[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (p + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xFF, + 4); + + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((void *)p, (void *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)(p + 8), DES_ENCRYPT); + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + /* encrypt the data */ + p += 16; + + if(conf_req_flag) { + memcpy (&deskey, key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(deskey)); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(deskey); ++i) + deskey[i] ^= 0xf0; + des_set_key (&deskey, schedule); + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + des_cbc_encrypt ((void *)p, + (void *)p, + datalen, + schedule, + &zero, + DES_ENCRYPT); + + memset (deskey, 0, sizeof(deskey)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + } + if(conf_state != NULL) + *conf_state = conf_req_flag; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +wrap_des3 + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + krb5_keyblock *key + ) +{ + u_char *p; + u_char seq[8]; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len, padlength, datalen; + u_int32_t ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + Checksum cksum; + krb5_data encdata; + + padlength = 8 - (input_message_buffer->length % 8); + datalen = input_message_buffer->length + padlength + 8; + len = datalen + 34; + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (len, &len, &total_len); + + output_message_buffer->length = total_len; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc (total_len); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header(output_message_buffer->value, + len, + "\x02\x01"); /* TOK_ID */ + + /* SGN_ALG */ + memcpy (p, "\x04\x00", 2); /* HMAC SHA1 DES3-KD */ + p += 2; + /* SEAL_ALG */ + if(conf_req_flag) + memcpy (p, "\x02\x00", 2); /* DES3-KD */ + else + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff", 2); + p += 2; + /* Filler */ + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff", 2); + p += 2; + + /* calculate checksum (the above + confounder + data + pad) */ + + memcpy (p + 20, p - 8, 8); + krb5_generate_random_block(p + 28, 8); + memcpy (p + 28 + 8, input_message_buffer->value, + input_message_buffer->length); + memset (p + 28 + 8 + input_message_buffer->length, padlength, padlength); + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + free (output_message_buffer->value); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + ret = krb5_create_checksum (gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN, + 0, + p + 20, + datalen + 8, + &cksum); + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + free (output_message_buffer->value); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* zero out SND_SEQ + SGN_CKSUM in case */ + memset (p, 0, 28); + + memcpy (p + 8, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length); + free_Checksum (&cksum); + + /* sequence number */ + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + seq[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xFF, + 4); + + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, + &crypto); + if (ret) { + free (output_message_buffer->value); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + { + des_cblock ivec; + + memcpy (&ivec, p + 8, 8); + ret = krb5_encrypt_ivec (gssapi_krb5_context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ, + seq, 8, &encdata, + &ivec); + } + krb5_crypto_destroy (gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + free (output_message_buffer->value); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + assert (encdata.length == 8); + + memcpy (p, encdata.data, encdata.length); + krb5_data_free (&encdata); + + krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + /* encrypt the data */ + p += 28; + + if(conf_req_flag) { + krb5_data tmp; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, &crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + free (output_message_buffer->value); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_encrypt(gssapi_krb5_context, crypto, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL, + p, datalen, &tmp); + krb5_crypto_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, crypto); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + free (output_message_buffer->value); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + assert (tmp.length == datalen); + + memcpy (p, tmp.data, datalen); + krb5_data_free(&tmp); + } + if(conf_state != NULL) + *conf_state = conf_req_flag; + *minor_status = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ) +{ + krb5_keyblock *key; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_keytype keytype; + + ret = gss_krb5_get_localkey(context_handle, &key); + if (ret) { + gssapi_krb5_set_error_string (); + *minor_status = ret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (gssapi_krb5_context, key->keytype, &keytype); + + switch (keytype) { + case KEYTYPE_DES : + ret = wrap_des (minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, + qop_req, input_message_buffer, conf_state, + output_message_buffer, key); + break; + case KEYTYPE_DES3 : + ret = wrap_des3 (minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, + qop_req, input_message_buffer, conf_state, + output_message_buffer, key); + break; + case KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR: + ret = _gssapi_wrap_arcfour (minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, + qop_req, input_message_buffer, conf_state, + output_message_buffer, key); + break; + default : + *minor_status = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + break; + } + krb5_free_keyblock (gssapi_krb5_context, key); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..952944bda3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.53.4.2 2003/10/14 16:13:14 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I../asn1 -I$(srcdir)/../asn1 $(INCLUDE_des) + +BUILT_SOURCES = asn1_Key.c asn1_Event.c asn1_HDBFlags.c asn1_hdb_entry.c \ + asn1_Salt.c hdb_err.c hdb_err.h asn1_GENERATION.c + +foo = asn1_Key.x asn1_GENERATION.x asn1_Event.x asn1_HDBFlags.x asn1_hdb_entry.x asn1_Salt.x + +CLEANFILES = $(BUILT_SOURCES) $(foo) hdb_asn1.h asn1_files + +noinst_PROGRAMS = convert_db +LDADD = libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + ../krb5/libkrb5.la \ + ../asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libhdb.la +libhdb_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 7:7:0 + +libhdb_la_SOURCES = \ + common.c \ + db.c \ + db3.c \ + hdb-ldap.c \ + hdb.c \ + keytab.c \ + mkey.c \ + ndbm.c \ + print.c \ + $(BUILT_SOURCES) + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_openldap) + +include_HEADERS = hdb.h hdb_err.h hdb_asn1.h hdb-protos.h hdb-private.h + +libhdb_la_LIBADD = ../krb5/libkrb5.la ../asn1/libasn1.la ../roken/libroken.la $(LIB_openldap) $(DBLIB) $(LIB_NDBM) + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/hdb-protos.h $(srcdir)/hdb-private.h + +$(srcdir)/hdb-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -q -P comment -o hdb-protos.h $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) || rm -f hdb-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/hdb-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -q -P comment -p hdb-private.h $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) || rm -f hdb-private.h + +$(foo) hdb_asn1.h: asn1_files + +asn1_files: ../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 + ../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 hdb_asn1 + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +$(convert_db_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +hdb_err.h: hdb_err.et diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..28ca7d5f6b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,850 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.53.4.2 2003/10/14 16:13:14 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + + +SOURCES = $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) convert_db.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = 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../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 hdb_asn1 + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +$(convert_db_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +hdb_err.h: hdb_err.et +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f0e73071c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.12 2003/01/14 06:54:32 lha Exp $"); + +int +hdb_principal2key(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, krb5_data *key) +{ + Principal new; + size_t len; + int ret; + + ret = copy_Principal(p, &new); + if(ret) + return ret; + new.name.name_type = 0; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Principal, key->data, key->length, &new, &len, ret); + free_Principal(&new); + return ret; +} + +int +hdb_key2principal(krb5_context context, krb5_data *key, krb5_principal p) +{ + return decode_Principal(key->data, key->length, p, NULL); +} + +int +hdb_entry2value(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, krb5_data *value) +{ + size_t len; + int ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(hdb_entry, value->data, value->length, ent, &len, ret); + return ret; +} + +int +hdb_value2entry(krb5_context context, krb5_data *value, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + return decode_hdb_entry(value->data, value->length, ent, NULL); +} + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_data key, value; + int code; + + hdb_principal2key(context, entry->principal, &key); + code = db->_get(context, db, key, &value); + krb5_data_free(&key); + if(code) + return code; + code = hdb_value2entry(context, &value, entry); + krb5_data_free(&value); + if (code) + return code; + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) { + code = hdb_unseal_keys (context, db, entry); + if (code) + hdb_free_entry(context, entry); + } + return code; +} + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_store(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_data key, value; + int code; + + if(entry->generation == NULL) { + struct timeval t; + entry->generation = malloc(sizeof(*entry->generation)); + if(entry->generation == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + gettimeofday(&t, NULL); + entry->generation->time = t.tv_sec; + entry->generation->usec = t.tv_usec; + entry->generation->gen = 0; + } else + entry->generation->gen++; + hdb_principal2key(context, entry->principal, &key); + code = hdb_seal_keys(context, db, entry); + if (code) { + krb5_data_free(&key); + return code; + } + hdb_entry2value(context, entry, &value); + code = db->_put(context, db, flags & HDB_F_REPLACE, key, value); + krb5_data_free(&value); + krb5_data_free(&key); + return code; +} + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_data key; + int code; + + hdb_principal2key(context, entry->principal, &key); + code = db->_del(context, db, key); + krb5_data_free(&key); + return code; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/convert_db.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/convert_db.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b300a55fc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/convert_db.c @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* Converts a database from version 0.0* to 0.1. This is done by + * making three copies of each DES key (DES-CBC-CRC, DES-CBC-MD4, and + * DES-CBC-MD5). + * + * Use with care. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: convert_db.c,v 1.12 2001/02/20 01:44:53 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +update_keytypes(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *data) +{ + int i; + int n = 0; + Key *k; + int save_len; + Key *save_val; + HDB *new = data; + krb5_error_code ret; + + for(i = 0; i < entry->keys.len; i++) + if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES) + n += 2; + else if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES3) + n += 1; + k = malloc(sizeof(*k) * (entry->keys.len + n)); + n = 0; + for(i = 0; i < entry->keys.len; i++) { + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n]); + if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES) { + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n+1]); + k[n+1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n+2]); + k[n+2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + n += 2; + } + else if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES3) { + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n+1]); + k[n+1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5; + n += 1; + } + n++; + } + save_len = entry->keys.len; + save_val = entry->keys.val; + entry->keys.len = n; + entry->keys.val = k; + ret = new->store(context, new, HDB_F_REPLACE, entry); + entry->keys.len = save_len; + entry->keys.val = save_val; + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) + free_Key(&k[i]); + free(k); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +update_version2(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *data) +{ + HDB *new = data; + if(!db->master_key_set) { + int i; + for(i = 0; i < entry->keys.len; i++) { + free(entry->keys.val[i].mkvno); + entry->keys.val[i].mkvno = NULL; + } + } + new->store(context, new, HDB_F_REPLACE, entry); + return 0; +} + +char *old_database = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; +char *new_database = HDB_DEFAULT_DB ".new"; +char *mkeyfile; +int update_version; +int help_flag; +int version_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "old-database", 0, arg_string, &old_database, + "name of database to convert", "file" }, + { "new-database", 0, arg_string, &new_database, + "name of converted database", "file" }, + { "master-key", 0, arg_string, &mkeyfile, + "v5 master key file", "file" }, + { "update-version", 0, arg_flag, &update_version, + "update the database to the current version" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + HDB *db, *new; + int optind = 0; + int master_key_set = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + krb5_std_usage(1, args, num_args); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret != 0) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + ret = hdb_create(context, &db, old_database); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create"); + + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile(context, db, mkeyfile); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + master_key_set = 1; + ret = hdb_create(context, &new, new_database); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create"); + if (master_key_set) { + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile(context, new, mkeyfile); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + } + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_BADVERSION) { + krb5_data tag; + krb5_data version; + int foo; + unsigned ver; + tag.data = HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY; + tag.length = strlen(tag.data); + ret = (*db->_get)(context, db, tag, &version); + if(ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "database is wrong version, " + "but couldn't find version key (%s)", + HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY); + foo = sscanf(version.data, "%u", &ver); + krb5_data_free (&version); + if(foo != 1) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "database version is not a number"); + if(ver == 1 && HDB_DB_FORMAT == 2) { + krb5_warnx(context, "will upgrade database from version %d to %d", + ver, HDB_DB_FORMAT); + krb5_warnx(context, "rerun to do other conversions"); + update_version = 1; + } else + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "don't know how to upgrade from version %d to %d", + ver, HDB_DB_FORMAT); + } else if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", old_database); + ret = new->open(context, new, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, 0600); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", new_database); + if(update_version) + ret = hdb_foreach(context, db, 0, update_version2, new); + else + ret = hdb_foreach(context, db, 0, update_keytypes, new); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_foreach"); + db->close(context, db); + new->close(context, new); + krb5_warnx(context, "wrote converted database to `%s'", new_database); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/db.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/db.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4dfbc66b8d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/db.c @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: db.c,v 1.30 2001/08/09 08:41:48 assar Exp $"); + +#if HAVE_DB1 + +#if defined(HAVE_DB_185_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#include +#endif + +static krb5_error_code +DB_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + d->close(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_clear_master_key (context, db); + free(db->name); + free(db); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + int fd = (*d->fd)(d); + if(fd < 0) + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + return hdb_lock(fd, operation); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + int fd = (*d->fd)(d); + if(fd < 0) + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + return hdb_unlock(fd); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry, int flag) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT key, value; + krb5_data key_data, data; + int code; + + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(code == -1) + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; + code = d->seq(d, &key, &value, flag); + db->unlock(context, db); /* XXX check value */ + if(code == -1) + return errno; + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + key_data.data = key.data; + key_data.length = key.size; + data.data = value.data; + data.length = value.size; + if (hdb_value2entry(context, &data, entry)) + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, R_NEXT); + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) { + code = hdb_unseal_keys (context, db, entry); + if (code) + hdb_free_entry (context, entry); + } + if (code == 0 && entry->principal == NULL) { + entry->principal = malloc(sizeof(*entry->principal)); + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + code = ENOMEM; + hdb_free_entry (context, entry); + } else { + hdb_key2principal(context, &key_data, entry->principal); + } + } + return code; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, R_FIRST); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, R_NEXT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name) +{ + int ret; + char *old, *new; + + asprintf(&old, "%s.db", db->name); + asprintf(&new, "%s.db", new_name); + ret = rename(old, new); + free(old); + free(new); + if(ret) + return errno; + + free(db->name); + db->name = strdup(new_name); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__get(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key, krb5_data *reply) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k, v; + int code; + + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->get(d, &k, &v, 0); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code < 0) + return errno; + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + krb5_data_copy(reply, v.data, v.size); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__put(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int replace, + krb5_data key, krb5_data value) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k, v; + int code; + + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + v.data = value.data; + v.size = value.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->put(d, &k, &v, replace ? 0 : R_NOOVERWRITE); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code < 0) + return errno; + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_EXISTS; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__del(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k; + krb5_error_code code; + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->del(d, &k, 0); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + if(code < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + char *fn; + krb5_error_code ret; + + asprintf(&fn, "%s.db", db->name); + if (fn == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + db->db = dbopen(fn, flags, mode, DB_BTREE, NULL); + free(fn); + /* try to open without .db extension */ + if(db->db == NULL && errno == ENOENT) + db->db = dbopen(db->name, flags, mode, DB_BTREE, NULL); + if(db->db == NULL) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "dbopen (%s): %s", + db->name, strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + if((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + else + ret = hdb_init_db(context, db); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return 0; + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_db_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, + const char *filename) +{ + *db = malloc(sizeof(**db)); + if (*db == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*db)->db = NULL; + (*db)->name = strdup(filename); + if ((*db)->name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free(*db); + *db = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + (*db)->master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->openp = 0; + (*db)->open = DB_open; + (*db)->close = DB_close; + (*db)->fetch = _hdb_fetch; + (*db)->store = _hdb_store; + (*db)->remove = _hdb_remove; + (*db)->firstkey = DB_firstkey; + (*db)->nextkey= DB_nextkey; + (*db)->lock = DB_lock; + (*db)->unlock = DB_unlock; + (*db)->rename = DB_rename; + (*db)->_get = DB__get; + (*db)->_put = DB__put; + (*db)->_del = DB__del; + (*db)->destroy = DB_destroy; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_DB1 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/db3.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/db3.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ae35350c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/db3.c @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: db3.c,v 1.8.6.1 2003/08/29 16:59:39 lha Exp $"); + +#if HAVE_DB3 + +#ifdef HAVE_DB4_DB_H +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB3_DB_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +static krb5_error_code +DB_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBC *dbcp = (DBC*)db->dbc; + + dbcp->c_close(dbcp); + db->dbc = 0; + d->close(d, 0); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_clear_master_key (context, db); + free(db->name); + free(db); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + int fd; + if ((*d->fd)(d, &fd)) + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + return hdb_lock(fd, operation); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + int fd; + if ((*d->fd)(d, &fd)) + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + return hdb_unlock(fd); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry, int flag) +{ + DBT key, value; + DBC *dbcp = db->dbc; + krb5_data key_data, data; + int code; + + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + memset(&value, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + if (db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK)) + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; + code = dbcp->c_get(dbcp, &key, &value, flag); + db->unlock(context, db); /* XXX check value */ + if (code == DB_NOTFOUND) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + if (code) + return code; + + key_data.data = key.data; + key_data.length = key.size; + data.data = value.data; + data.length = value.size; + if (hdb_value2entry(context, &data, entry)) + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, DB_NEXT); + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) { + code = hdb_unseal_keys (context, db, entry); + if (code) + hdb_free_entry (context, entry); + } + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + entry->principal = malloc(sizeof(*entry->principal)); + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + hdb_free_entry (context, entry); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } else { + hdb_key2principal(context, &key_data, entry->principal); + } + } + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, DB_FIRST); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, DB_NEXT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name) +{ + int ret; + char *old, *new; + + asprintf(&old, "%s.db", db->name); + asprintf(&new, "%s.db", new_name); + ret = rename(old, new); + free(old); + free(new); + if(ret) + return errno; + + free(db->name); + db->name = strdup(new_name); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__get(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key, krb5_data *reply) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k, v; + int code; + + memset(&k, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + memset(&v, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + k.flags = 0; + if ((code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK))) + return code; + code = d->get(d, NULL, &k, &v, 0); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == DB_NOTFOUND) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + if(code) + return code; + + krb5_data_copy(reply, v.data, v.size); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__put(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int replace, + krb5_data key, krb5_data value) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k, v; + int code; + + memset(&k, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + memset(&v, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + k.flags = 0; + v.data = value.data; + v.size = value.length; + v.flags = 0; + if ((code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK))) + return code; + code = d->put(d, NULL, &k, &v, replace ? 0 : DB_NOOVERWRITE); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == DB_KEYEXIST) + return HDB_ERR_EXISTS; + if(code) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__del(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k; + krb5_error_code code; + memset(&k, 0, sizeof(DBT)); + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + k.flags = 0; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->del(d, NULL, &k, 0); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == DB_NOTFOUND) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + if(code) + return code; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + char *fn; + krb5_error_code ret; + DB *d; + int myflags = 0; + + if (flags & O_CREAT) + myflags |= DB_CREATE; + + if (flags & O_EXCL) + myflags |= DB_EXCL; + + if (flags & O_RDONLY) + myflags |= DB_RDONLY; + + if (flags & O_TRUNC) + myflags |= DB_TRUNCATE; + + asprintf(&fn, "%s.db", db->name); + if (fn == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + db_create(&d, NULL, 0); + db->db = d; +#if (DB_VERSION_MAJOR > 3) && (DB_VERSION_MINOR > 0) + if ((ret = d->open(db->db, NULL, fn, NULL, DB_BTREE, myflags, mode))) { +#else + if ((ret = d->open(db->db, fn, NULL, DB_BTREE, myflags, mode))) { +#endif + if(ret == ENOENT) + /* try to open without .db extension */ +#if (DB_VERSION_MAJOR > 3) && (DB_VERSION_MINOR > 0) + if (d->open(db->db, NULL, db->name, NULL, DB_BTREE, myflags, mode)) { +#else + if (d->open(db->db, db->name, NULL, DB_BTREE, myflags, mode)) { +#endif + free(fn); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "opening %s: %s", + db->name, strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + } + free(fn); + + ret = d->cursor(d, NULL, (DBC **)&db->dbc, 0); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "d->cursor: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + if((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + else + ret = hdb_init_db(context, db); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return 0; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_db_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, + const char *filename) +{ + *db = malloc(sizeof(**db)); + if (*db == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*db)->db = NULL; + (*db)->name = strdup(filename); + if ((*db)->name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free(*db); + *db = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + (*db)->master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->openp = 0; + (*db)->open = DB_open; + (*db)->close = DB_close; + (*db)->fetch = _hdb_fetch; + (*db)->store = _hdb_store; + (*db)->remove = _hdb_remove; + (*db)->firstkey = DB_firstkey; + (*db)->nextkey= DB_nextkey; + (*db)->lock = DB_lock; + (*db)->unlock = DB_unlock; + (*db)->rename = DB_rename; + (*db)->_get = DB__get; + (*db)->_put = DB__put; + (*db)->_del = DB__del; + (*db)->destroy = DB_destroy; + return 0; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DB3 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aed29b3caa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-ldap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1324 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2001, PADL Software Pty Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of PADL Software nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY PADL SOFTWARE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL PADL SOFTWARE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hdb-ldap.c,v 1.10.4.1 2003/09/18 20:49:09 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef OPENLDAP + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static krb5_error_code LDAP__connect(krb5_context context, HDB * db); + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB * db, LDAPMessage * msg, + hdb_entry * ent); + +static char *krb5kdcentry_attrs[] = + { "krb5PrincipalName", "cn", "krb5PrincipalRealm", + "krb5KeyVersionNumber", "krb5Key", + "krb5ValidStart", "krb5ValidEnd", "krb5PasswordEnd", + "krb5MaxLife", "krb5MaxRenew", "krb5KDCFlags", "krb5EncryptionType", + "modifiersName", "modifyTimestamp", "creatorsName", "createTimestamp", + NULL +}; + +static char *krb5principal_attrs[] = + { "krb5PrincipalName", "cn", "krb5PrincipalRealm", + "modifiersName", "modifyTimestamp", "creatorsName", "createTimestamp", + NULL +}; + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP__setmod(LDAPMod *** modlist, int modop, const char *attribute, + int *pIndex) +{ + int cMods; + + if (*modlist == NULL) { + *modlist = (LDAPMod **)ber_memcalloc(1, sizeof(LDAPMod *)); + if (*modlist == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + } + + for (cMods = 0; (*modlist)[cMods] != NULL; cMods++) { + if ((*modlist)[cMods]->mod_op == modop && + strcasecmp((*modlist)[cMods]->mod_type, attribute) == 0) { + break; + } + } + + *pIndex = cMods; + + if ((*modlist)[cMods] == NULL) { + LDAPMod *mod; + + *modlist = (LDAPMod **)ber_memrealloc(*modlist, + (cMods + 2) * sizeof(LDAPMod *)); + if (*modlist == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + (*modlist)[cMods] = (LDAPMod *)ber_memalloc(sizeof(LDAPMod)); + if ((*modlist)[cMods] == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + + mod = (*modlist)[cMods]; + mod->mod_op = modop; + mod->mod_type = ber_strdup(attribute); + if (mod->mod_type == NULL) { + ber_memfree(mod); + (*modlist)[cMods] = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + + if (modop & LDAP_MOD_BVALUES) { + mod->mod_bvalues = NULL; + } else { + mod->mod_values = NULL; + } + + (*modlist)[cMods + 1] = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_addmod_len(LDAPMod *** modlist, int modop, const char *attribute, + unsigned char *value, size_t len) +{ + int cMods, cValues = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = LDAP__setmod(modlist, modop | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, attribute, &cMods); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (value != NULL) { + struct berval *bValue; + struct berval ***pbValues = &((*modlist)[cMods]->mod_bvalues); + + if (*pbValues != NULL) { + for (cValues = 0; (*pbValues)[cValues] != NULL; cValues++) + ; + *pbValues = (struct berval **)ber_memrealloc(*pbValues, (cValues + 2) + * sizeof(struct berval *)); + } else { + *pbValues = (struct berval **)ber_memalloc(2 * sizeof(struct berval *)); + } + if (*pbValues == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + (*pbValues)[cValues] = (struct berval *)ber_memalloc(sizeof(struct berval));; + if ((*pbValues)[cValues] == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + + bValue = (*pbValues)[cValues]; + bValue->bv_val = value; + bValue->bv_len = len; + + (*pbValues)[cValues + 1] = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_addmod(LDAPMod *** modlist, int modop, const char *attribute, + const char *value) +{ + int cMods, cValues = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = LDAP__setmod(modlist, modop, attribute, &cMods); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (value != NULL) { + char ***pValues = &((*modlist)[cMods]->mod_values); + + if (*pValues != NULL) { + for (cValues = 0; (*pValues)[cValues] != NULL; cValues++) + ; + *pValues = (char **)ber_memrealloc(*pValues, (cValues + 2) * sizeof(char *)); + } else { + *pValues = (char **)ber_memalloc(2 * sizeof(char *)); + } + if (*pValues == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + (*pValues)[cValues] = ber_strdup(value); + if ((*pValues)[cValues] == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + } + (*pValues)[cValues + 1] = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_addmod_generalized_time(LDAPMod *** mods, int modop, + const char *attribute, KerberosTime * time) +{ + char buf[22]; + struct tm *tm; + + /* XXX not threadsafe */ + tm = gmtime(time); + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", tm); + + return LDAP_addmod(mods, modop, attribute, buf); +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_get_string_value(HDB * db, LDAPMessage * entry, + const char *attribute, char **ptr) +{ + char **vals; + int ret; + + vals = ldap_get_values((LDAP *) db->db, entry, (char *) attribute); + if (vals == NULL) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + *ptr = strdup(vals[0]); + if (*ptr == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + + ldap_value_free(vals); + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_get_integer_value(HDB * db, LDAPMessage * entry, + const char *attribute, int *ptr) +{ + char **vals; + + vals = ldap_get_values((LDAP *) db->db, entry, (char *) attribute); + if (vals == NULL) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + *ptr = atoi(vals[0]); + ldap_value_free(vals); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_get_generalized_time_value(HDB * db, LDAPMessage * entry, + const char *attribute, KerberosTime * kt) +{ + char *tmp, *gentime; + struct tm tm; + int ret; + + *kt = 0; + + ret = LDAP_get_string_value(db, entry, attribute, &gentime); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free(gentime); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + free(gentime); + + *kt = timegm(&tm); + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_entry2mods(krb5_context context, HDB * db, hdb_entry * ent, + LDAPMessage * msg, LDAPMod *** pmods) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_boolean is_new_entry; + int rc, i; + char *tmp = NULL; + LDAPMod **mods = NULL; + hdb_entry orig; + unsigned long oflags, nflags; + + if (msg != NULL) { + ret = LDAP_message2entry(context, db, msg, &orig); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + is_new_entry = FALSE; + } else { + /* to make it perfectly obvious we're depending on + * orig being intiialized to zero */ + memset(&orig, 0, sizeof(orig)); + is_new_entry = TRUE; + } + + if (is_new_entry) { + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "objectClass", "top"); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + /* person is the structural object class */ + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "objectClass", "person"); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "objectClass", + "krb5Principal"); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "objectClass", + "krb5KDCEntry"); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + + if (is_new_entry || + krb5_principal_compare(context, ent->principal, orig.principal) == + FALSE) { + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, "krb5PrincipalName", tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + free(tmp); + goto out; + } + free(tmp); + } + + if (ent->kvno != orig.kvno) { + rc = asprintf(&tmp, "%d", ent->kvno); + if (rc < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, "krb5KeyVersionNumber", + tmp); + free(tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + + if (ent->valid_start) { + if (orig.valid_end == NULL + || (*(ent->valid_start) != *(orig.valid_start))) { + ret = + LDAP_addmod_generalized_time(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, + "krb5ValidStart", + ent->valid_start); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + } + + if (ent->valid_end) { + if (orig.valid_end == NULL + || (*(ent->valid_end) != *(orig.valid_end))) { + ret = + LDAP_addmod_generalized_time(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, + "krb5ValidEnd", + ent->valid_end); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + } + + if (ent->pw_end) { + if (orig.pw_end == NULL || (*(ent->pw_end) != *(orig.pw_end))) { + ret = + LDAP_addmod_generalized_time(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, + "krb5PasswordEnd", + ent->pw_end); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + } + + if (ent->max_life) { + if (orig.max_life == NULL + || (*(ent->max_life) != *(orig.max_life))) { + rc = asprintf(&tmp, "%d", *(ent->max_life)); + if (rc < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, "krb5MaxLife", tmp); + free(tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + } + + if (ent->max_renew) { + if (orig.max_renew == NULL + || (*(ent->max_renew) != *(orig.max_renew))) { + rc = asprintf(&tmp, "%d", *(ent->max_renew)); + if (rc < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, "krb5MaxRenew", tmp); + free(tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + } + + oflags = HDBFlags2int(orig.flags); + nflags = HDBFlags2int(ent->flags); + + if (oflags != nflags) { + rc = asprintf(&tmp, "%lu", nflags); + if (rc < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, "krb5KDCFlags", tmp); + free(tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + + if (is_new_entry == FALSE && orig.keys.len > 0) { + /* for the moment, clobber and replace keys. */ + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_DELETE, "krb5Key", NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, len, &ent->keys.val[i], &len, ret); + if (ret != 0) + goto out; + + /* addmod_len _owns_ the key, doesn't need to copy it */ + ret = LDAP_addmod_len(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "krb5Key", buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + + if (ent->etypes) { + /* clobber and replace encryption types. */ + if (is_new_entry == FALSE) { + ret = + LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_DELETE, "krb5EncryptionType", + NULL); + } + for (i = 0; i < ent->etypes->len; i++) { + rc = asprintf(&tmp, "%d", ent->etypes->val[i]); + if (rc < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + free(tmp); + ret = + LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "krb5EncryptionType", + tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + } + } + + /* for clarity */ + ret = 0; + + out: + + if (ret == 0) { + *pmods = mods; + } else if (mods != NULL) { + ldap_mods_free(mods, 1); + *pmods = NULL; + } + + if (msg != NULL) { + hdb_free_entry(context, &orig); + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_dn2principal(krb5_context context, HDB * db, const char *dn, + krb5_principal * principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int rc, limit = 1; + char **values; + LDAPMessage *res = NULL, *e; + + rc = ldap_set_option((LDAP *) db->db, LDAP_OPT_SIZELIMIT, (const void *)&limit); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_set_option: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto out; + } + + rc = ldap_search_s((LDAP *) db->db, dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, + "(objectclass=krb5Principal)", krb5principal_attrs, + 0, &res); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_search_s: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + e = ldap_first_entry((LDAP *) db->db, res); + if (e == NULL) { + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + values = ldap_get_values((LDAP *) db->db, e, "krb5PrincipalName"); + if (values == NULL) { + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, values[0], principal); + ldap_value_free(values); + + out: + if (res != NULL) { + ldap_msgfree(res); + } + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP__lookup_princ(krb5_context context, HDB * db, const char *princname, + LDAPMessage ** msg) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int rc, limit = 1; + char *filter = NULL; + + (void) LDAP__connect(context, db); + + rc = + asprintf(&filter, + "(&(objectclass=krb5KDCEntry)(krb5PrincipalName=%s))", + princname); + if (rc < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ldap_set_option((LDAP *) db->db, LDAP_OPT_SIZELIMIT, (const void *)&limit); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_set_option: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto out; + } + + rc = ldap_search_s((LDAP *) db->db, db->name, LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL, filter, + krb5kdcentry_attrs, 0, msg); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_search_s: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; + + out: + if (filter != NULL) { + free(filter); + } + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_principal2message(krb5_context context, HDB * db, + krb5_principal princ, LDAPMessage ** msg) +{ + char *princname = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &princname); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = LDAP__lookup_princ(context, db, princname, msg); + free(princname); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. + */ +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB * db, LDAPMessage * msg, + hdb_entry * ent) +{ + char *unparsed_name = NULL, *dn = NULL; + int ret; + unsigned long tmp; + struct berval **keys; + char **values; + + memset(ent, 0, sizeof(*ent)); + ent->flags = int2HDBFlags(0); + + ret = + LDAP_get_string_value(db, msg, "krb5PrincipalName", + &unparsed_name); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, unparsed_name, &ent->principal); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = + LDAP_get_integer_value(db, msg, "krb5KeyVersionNumber", + &ent->kvno); + if (ret != 0) { + ent->kvno = 0; + } + + keys = ldap_get_values_len((LDAP *) db->db, msg, "krb5Key"); + if (keys != NULL) { + int i; + size_t l; + + ent->keys.len = ldap_count_values_len(keys); + ent->keys.val = (Key *) calloc(ent->keys.len, sizeof(Key)); + if (ent->keys.val == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "calloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++) { + decode_Key((unsigned char *) keys[i]->bv_val, + (size_t) keys[i]->bv_len, &ent->keys.val[i], &l); + } + ber_bvecfree(keys); + } else { +#if 1 + /* + * This violates the ASN1 but it allows a principal to + * be related to a general directory entry without creating + * the keys. Hopefully it's OK. + */ + ent->keys.len = 0; + ent->keys.val = NULL; +#else + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; +#endif + } + + ret = + LDAP_get_generalized_time_value(db, msg, "createTimestamp", + &ent->created_by.time); + if (ret != 0) { + ent->created_by.time = time(NULL); + } + + ent->created_by.principal = NULL; + + ret = LDAP_get_string_value(db, msg, "creatorsName", &dn); + if (ret == 0) { + if (LDAP_dn2principal(context, db, dn, &ent->created_by.principal) + != 0) { + ent->created_by.principal = NULL; + } + free(dn); + } + + ent->modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event)); + if (ent->modified_by == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_get_generalized_time_value(db, msg, "modifyTimestamp", + &ent->modified_by->time); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = LDAP_get_string_value(db, msg, "modifiersName", &dn); + if (LDAP_dn2principal + (context, db, dn, &ent->modified_by->principal) != 0) { + ent->modified_by->principal = NULL; + } + free(dn); + } else { + free(ent->modified_by); + ent->modified_by = NULL; + } + + if ((ent->valid_start = (KerberosTime *) malloc(sizeof(KerberosTime))) + == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_get_generalized_time_value(db, msg, "krb5ValidStart", + ent->valid_start); + if (ret != 0) { + /* OPTIONAL */ + free(ent->valid_start); + ent->valid_start = NULL; + } + + if ((ent->valid_end = (KerberosTime *) malloc(sizeof(KerberosTime))) == + NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_get_generalized_time_value(db, msg, "krb5ValidEnd", + ent->valid_end); + if (ret != 0) { + /* OPTIONAL */ + free(ent->valid_end); + ent->valid_end = NULL; + } + + if ((ent->pw_end = (KerberosTime *) malloc(sizeof(KerberosTime))) == + NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = + LDAP_get_generalized_time_value(db, msg, "krb5PasswordEnd", + ent->pw_end); + if (ret != 0) { + /* OPTIONAL */ + free(ent->pw_end); + ent->pw_end = NULL; + } + + ent->max_life = (int *) malloc(sizeof(int)); + if (ent->max_life == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = LDAP_get_integer_value(db, msg, "krb5MaxLife", ent->max_life); + if (ret != 0) { + free(ent->max_life); + ent->max_life = NULL; + } + + ent->max_renew = (int *) malloc(sizeof(int)); + if (ent->max_renew == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = LDAP_get_integer_value(db, msg, "krb5MaxRenew", ent->max_renew); + if (ret != 0) { + free(ent->max_renew); + ent->max_renew = NULL; + } + + values = ldap_get_values((LDAP *) db->db, msg, "krb5KDCFlags"); + if (values != NULL) { + tmp = strtoul(values[0], (char **) NULL, 10); + if (tmp == ULONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "strtoul: could not convert flag"); + ret = ERANGE; + goto out; + } + } else { + tmp = 0; + } + ent->flags = int2HDBFlags(tmp); + + values = ldap_get_values((LDAP *) db->db, msg, "krb5EncryptionType"); + if (values != NULL) { + int i; + + ent->etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(ent->etypes))); + if (ent->etypes == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ent->etypes->len = ldap_count_values(values); + ent->etypes->val = calloc(ent->etypes->len, sizeof(int)); + for (i = 0; i < ent->etypes->len; i++) { + ent->etypes->val[i] = atoi(values[i]); + } + ldap_value_free(values); + } + + ret = 0; + + out: + if (unparsed_name != NULL) { + free(unparsed_name); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + /* I don't think this frees ent itself. */ + hdb_free_entry(context, ent); + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDAP_close(krb5_context context, HDB * db) +{ + ldap_unbind_ext((LDAP *) db->db, NULL, NULL); + db->db = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_lock(krb5_context context, HDB * db, int operation) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDAP_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB * db) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_seq(krb5_context context, HDB * db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry * entry) +{ + int msgid, rc, parserc; + krb5_error_code ret; + LDAPMessage *e; + + msgid = db->openp; /* BOGUS OVERLOADING */ + if (msgid < 0) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + do { + rc = ldap_result((LDAP *) db->db, msgid, LDAP_MSG_ONE, NULL, &e); + switch (rc) { + case LDAP_RES_SEARCH_ENTRY: + /* We have an entry. Parse it. */ + ret = LDAP_message2entry(context, db, e, entry); + ldap_msgfree(e); + break; + case LDAP_RES_SEARCH_RESULT: + /* We're probably at the end of the results. If not, abandon. */ + parserc = + ldap_parse_result((LDAP *) db->db, e, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, 1); + if (parserc != LDAP_SUCCESS + && parserc != LDAP_MORE_RESULTS_TO_RETURN) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_parse_result: %s", ldap_err2string(parserc)); + ldap_abandon((LDAP *) db->db, msgid); + } + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + db->openp = -1; + break; + case 0: + case -1: + default: + /* Some unspecified error (timeout?). Abandon. */ + ldap_msgfree(e); + ldap_abandon((LDAP *) db->db, msgid); + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + db->openp = -1; + break; + } + } while (rc == LDAP_RES_SEARCH_REFERENCE); + + if (ret == 0) { + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) { + ret = hdb_unseal_keys(context, db, entry); + if (ret) + hdb_free_entry(context,entry); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB * db, unsigned flags, + hdb_entry * entry) +{ + int msgid, limit = LDAP_NO_LIMIT, rc; + + (void) LDAP__connect(context, db); + + rc = ldap_set_option((LDAP *) db->db, LDAP_OPT_SIZELIMIT, (const void *)&limit); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_set_option: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + + msgid = ldap_search((LDAP *) db->db, db->name, + LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "(objectclass=krb5KDCEntry)", + krb5kdcentry_attrs, 0); + if (msgid < 0) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + db->openp = msgid; + + return LDAP_seq(context, db, flags, entry); +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB * db, unsigned flags, + hdb_entry * entry) +{ + return LDAP_seq(context, db, flags, entry); +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_rename(krb5_context context, HDB * db, const char *new_name) +{ + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDAP__connect(krb5_context context, HDB * db) +{ + int rc, version = LDAP_VERSION3; + /* + * Empty credentials to do a SASL bind with LDAP. Note that empty + * different from NULL credentials. If you provide NULL + * credentials instead of empty credentials you will get a SASL + * bind in progress message. + */ + struct berval bv = { 0, "" }; + + if (db->db != NULL) { + /* connection has been opened. ping server. */ + struct sockaddr_un addr; + socklen_t len; + int sd; + + if (ldap_get_option((LDAP *) db->db, LDAP_OPT_DESC, &sd) == 0 && + getpeername(sd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, &len) < 0) { + /* the other end has died. reopen. */ + LDAP_close(context, db); + } + } + + if (db->db != NULL) { + /* server is UP */ + return 0; + } + + rc = ldap_initialize((LDAP **) & db->db, "ldapi:///"); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_initialize: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + rc = ldap_set_option((LDAP *) db->db, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, (const void *)&version); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_set_option: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ldap_unbind_ext((LDAP *) db->db, NULL, NULL); + db->db = NULL; + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + + rc = ldap_sasl_bind_s((LDAP *) db->db, NULL, "EXTERNAL", &bv, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_sasl_bind_s: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ldap_unbind_ext((LDAP *) db->db, NULL, NULL); + db->db = NULL; + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_open(krb5_context context, HDB * db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + /* Not the right place for this. */ +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + struct sigaction sa; + + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + + sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL); +#else + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +#endif /* HAVE_SIGACTION */ + + return LDAP__connect(context, db); +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB * db, unsigned flags, + hdb_entry * entry) +{ + LDAPMessage *msg, *e; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = LDAP_principal2message(context, db, entry->principal, &msg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + e = ldap_first_entry((LDAP *) db->db, msg); + if (e == NULL) { + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + ret = LDAP_message2entry(context, db, e, entry); + if (ret == 0) { + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) { + ret = hdb_unseal_keys(context, db, entry); + if (ret) + hdb_free_entry(context,entry); + } + } + + out: + ldap_msgfree(msg); + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_store(krb5_context context, HDB * db, unsigned flags, + hdb_entry * entry) +{ + LDAPMod **mods = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *errfn; + int rc; + LDAPMessage *msg = NULL, *e = NULL; + char *dn = NULL, *name = NULL; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->principal, &name); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = LDAP__lookup_princ(context, db, name, &msg); + if (ret == 0) { + e = ldap_first_entry((LDAP *) db->db, msg); + } + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context, db, entry); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* turn new entry into LDAPMod array */ + ret = LDAP_entry2mods(context, db, entry, e, &mods); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + if (e == NULL) { + /* Doesn't exist yet. */ + char *p; + + e = NULL; + + /* normalize the naming attribute */ + for (p = name; *p != '\0'; p++) { + *p = (char) tolower((int) *p); + } + + /* + * We could do getpwnam() on the local component of + * the principal to find cn/sn but that's probably + * bad thing to do from inside a KDC. Better leave + * it to management tools. + */ + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "cn", name); + if (ret < 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = LDAP_addmod(&mods, LDAP_MOD_ADD, "sn", name); + if (ret < 0) { + goto out; + } + + if (db->name != NULL) { + ret = asprintf(&dn, "cn=%s,%s", name, db->name); + } else { + /* A bit bogus, but we don't have a search base */ + ret = asprintf(&dn, "cn=%s", name); + } + if (ret < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "asprintf: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + } else if (flags & HDB_F_REPLACE) { + /* Entry exists, and we're allowed to replace it. */ + dn = ldap_get_dn((LDAP *) db->db, e); + } else { + /* Entry exists, but we're not allowed to replace it. Bail. */ + ret = HDB_ERR_EXISTS; + goto out; + } + + /* write entry into directory */ + if (e == NULL) { + /* didn't exist before */ + rc = ldap_add_s((LDAP *) db->db, dn, mods); + errfn = "ldap_add_s"; + } else { + /* already existed, send deltas only */ + rc = ldap_modify_s((LDAP *) db->db, dn, mods); + errfn = "ldap_modify_s"; + } + + if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS) { + ret = 0; + } else { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "%s: %s (dn=%s) %s", + errfn, name, dn, ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + } + + out: + /* free stuff */ + if (dn != NULL) { + free(dn); + } + + if (msg != NULL) { + ldap_msgfree(msg); + } + + if (mods != NULL) { + ldap_mods_free(mods, 1); + } + + if (name != NULL) { + free(name); + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP_remove(krb5_context context, HDB * db, hdb_entry * entry) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + LDAPMessage *msg, *e; + char *dn = NULL; + int rc, limit = LDAP_NO_LIMIT; + + ret = LDAP_principal2message(context, db, entry->principal, &msg); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + e = ldap_first_entry((LDAP *) db->db, msg); + if (e == NULL) { + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + dn = ldap_get_dn((LDAP *) db->db, e); + if (dn == NULL) { + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + goto out; + } + + rc = ldap_set_option((LDAP *) db->db, LDAP_OPT_SIZELIMIT, (const void *)&limit); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_set_option: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto out; + } + + rc = ldap_delete_s((LDAP *) db->db, dn); + if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS) { + ret = 0; + } else { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ldap_delete_s: %s", ldap_err2string(rc)); + ret = HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + } + + out: + if (dn != NULL) { + free(dn); + } + + if (msg != NULL) { + ldap_msgfree(msg); + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP__get(krb5_context context, HDB * db, krb5_data key, krb5_data * reply) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "LDAP__get not implemented\n"); + abort(); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP__put(krb5_context context, HDB * db, int replace, + krb5_data key, krb5_data value) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "LDAP__put not implemented\n"); + abort(); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +LDAP__del(krb5_context context, HDB * db, krb5_data key) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "LDAP__del not implemented\n"); + abort(); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDAP_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB * db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_clear_master_key(context, db); + if (db->name != NULL) { + free(db->name); + } + free(db); + + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_ldap_create(krb5_context context, HDB ** db, const char *arg) +{ + *db = malloc(sizeof(**db)); + if (*db == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*db)->db = NULL; + + if (arg == NULL || arg[0] == '\0') { + /* + * if no argument specified in the configuration file + * then use NULL, which tells OpenLDAP to look in + * the ldap.conf file. This doesn't work for + * writing entries because we don't know where to + * put new principals. + */ + (*db)->name = NULL; + } else { + (*db)->name = strdup(arg); + if ((*db)->name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "strdup: out of memory"); + free(*db); + *db = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + } + + (*db)->master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->openp = 0; + (*db)->open = LDAP_open; + (*db)->close = LDAP_close; + (*db)->fetch = LDAP_fetch; + (*db)->store = LDAP_store; + (*db)->remove = LDAP_remove; + (*db)->firstkey = LDAP_firstkey; + (*db)->nextkey = LDAP_nextkey; + (*db)->lock = LDAP_lock; + (*db)->unlock = LDAP_unlock; + (*db)->rename = LDAP_rename; + /* can we ditch these? */ + (*db)->_get = LDAP__get; + (*db)->_put = LDAP__put; + (*db)->_del = LDAP__del; + (*db)->destroy = LDAP_destroy; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* OPENLDAP */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-private.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a47de70210 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-private.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __hdb_private_h__ +#define __hdb_private_h__ + +#include + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_fetch ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + unsigned /*flags*/, + hdb_entry */*entry*/); + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_remove ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + hdb_entry */*entry*/); + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_store ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + unsigned /*flags*/, + hdb_entry */*entry*/); + +#endif /* __hdb_private_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-protos.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce85fcb056 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb-protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __hdb_protos_h__ +#define __hdb_protos_h__ + +#include + +krb5_error_code +hdb_add_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + hdb_master_key */*inout*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_check_db_format ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_clear_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_create ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB **/*db*/, + const char */*filename*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_db_create ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB **/*db*/, + const char */*filename*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_enctype2key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_entry */*e*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + Key **/*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_entry2string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + char **/*str*/); + +int +hdb_entry2value ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + krb5_data */*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_foreach ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + unsigned /*flags*/, + hdb_foreach_func_t /*func*/, + void */*data*/); + +void +hdb_free_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +void +hdb_free_key (Key */*key*/); + +void +hdb_free_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_master_key /*mkey*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_init_db ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/); + +int +hdb_key2principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data */*key*/, + krb5_principal /*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_ldap_create ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB ** /*db*/, + const char */*arg*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_lock ( + int /*fd*/, + int /*operation*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_ndbm_create ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB **/*db*/, + const char */*filename*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_next_enctype2key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const hdb_entry */*e*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + Key **/*key*/); + +int +hdb_principal2key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*p*/, + krb5_data */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_print_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + hdb_entry */*entry*/, + void */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_process_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*kvno*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + hdb_master_key */*mkey*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_read_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*filename*/, + hdb_master_key */*mkey*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_seal_keys ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_seal_keys_mkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + hdb_master_key /*mkey*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_keyfile ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + const char */*keyfile*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unlock (int /*fd*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unseal_keys ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + HDB */*db*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unseal_keys_mkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + hdb_master_key /*mkey*/); + +int +hdb_value2entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data */*value*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_write_master_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*filename*/, + hdb_master_key /*mkey*/); + +#endif /* __hdb_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..084d5a1bb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +-- $Id: hdb.asn1,v 1.9 2001/06/21 14:54:53 joda Exp $ +HDB DEFINITIONS ::= +BEGIN + +IMPORTS EncryptionKey, KerberosTime, Principal FROM krb5; + +HDB_DB_FORMAT INTEGER ::= 2 -- format of database, + -- update when making changes + +-- these must have the same value as the pa-* counterparts +hdb-pw-salt INTEGER ::= 3 +hdb-afs3-salt INTEGER ::= 10 + +Salt ::= SEQUENCE { + type[0] INTEGER, + salt[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Key ::= SEQUENCE { + mkvno[0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- master key version number + key[1] EncryptionKey, + salt[2] Salt OPTIONAL +} + +Event ::= SEQUENCE { + time[0] KerberosTime, + principal[1] Principal OPTIONAL +} + +HDBFlags ::= BIT STRING { + initial(0), -- require as-req + forwardable(1), -- may issue forwardable + proxiable(2), -- may issue proxiable + renewable(3), -- may issue renewable + postdate(4), -- may issue postdatable + server(5), -- may be server + client(6), -- may be client + invalid(7), -- entry is invalid + require-preauth(8), -- must use preauth + change-pw(9), -- change password service + require-hwauth(10), -- must use hwauth + ok-as-delegate(11), -- as in TicketFlags + user-to-user(12), -- may use user-to-user auth + immutable(13) -- may not be deleted +} + +GENERATION ::= SEQUENCE { + time[0] KerberosTime, -- timestamp + usec[1] INTEGER, -- microseconds + gen[2] INTEGER -- generation number +} + +hdb_entry ::= SEQUENCE { + principal[0] Principal OPTIONAL, -- this is optional only + -- for compatibility with libkrb5 + kvno[1] INTEGER, + keys[2] SEQUENCE OF Key, + created-by[3] Event, + modified-by[4] Event OPTIONAL, + valid-start[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + valid-end[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + pw-end[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + max-life[8] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + max-renew[9] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + flags[10] HDBFlags, + etypes[11] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER OPTIONAL, + generation[12] GENERATION OPTIONAL +} + +END diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95fde19db7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hdb.c,v 1.44 2001/08/09 08:41:48 assar Exp $"); + +struct hdb_method { + const char *prefix; + krb5_error_code (*create)(krb5_context, HDB **, const char *filename); +}; + +static struct hdb_method methods[] = { +#if HAVE_DB1 || HAVE_DB3 + {"db:", hdb_db_create}, +#endif +#if HAVE_NDBM + {"ndbm:", hdb_ndbm_create}, +#endif +#ifdef OPENLDAP + {"ldap:", hdb_ldap_create}, +#endif +#if HAVE_DB1 || HAVE_DB3 + {"", hdb_db_create}, +#elif defined(HAVE_NDBM) + {"", hdb_ndbm_create}, +#elif defined(OPENLDAP) + {"", hdb_ldap_create}, +#endif + {NULL, NULL} +}; + +krb5_error_code +hdb_next_enctype2key(krb5_context context, + const hdb_entry *e, + krb5_enctype enctype, + Key **key) +{ + Key *k; + + for (k = *key ? (*key) + 1 : e->keys.val; + k < e->keys.val + e->keys.len; + k++) + if(k->key.keytype == enctype){ + *key = k; + return 0; + } + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_enctype2key(krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *e, + krb5_enctype enctype, + Key **key) +{ + *key = NULL; + return hdb_next_enctype2key(context, e, enctype, key); +} + +void +hdb_free_key(Key *key) +{ + memset(key->key.keyvalue.data, + 0, + key->key.keyvalue.length); + free_Key(key); + free(key); +} + + +krb5_error_code +hdb_lock(int fd, int operation) +{ + int i, code = 0; + + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++){ + code = flock(fd, (operation == HDB_RLOCK ? LOCK_SH : LOCK_EX) | LOCK_NB); + if(code == 0 || errno != EWOULDBLOCK) + break; + sleep(1); + } + if(code == 0) + return 0; + if(errno == EWOULDBLOCK) + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unlock(int fd) +{ + int code; + code = flock(fd, LOCK_UN); + if(code) + return 4711 /* XXX */; + return 0; +} + +void +hdb_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; ++i) { + Key *k = &ent->keys.val[i]; + + memset (k->key.keyvalue.data, 0, k->key.keyvalue.length); + } + free_hdb_entry(ent); +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_foreach(krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + unsigned flags, + hdb_foreach_func_t func, + void *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry entry; + ret = db->firstkey(context, db, flags, &entry); + while(ret == 0){ + ret = (*func)(context, db, &entry, data); + hdb_free_entry(context, &entry); + if(ret == 0) + ret = db->nextkey(context, db, flags, &entry); + } + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + ret = 0; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_check_db_format(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_data tag; + krb5_data version; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned ver; + int foo; + + tag.data = HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY; + tag.length = strlen(tag.data); + ret = (*db->_get)(context, db, tag, &version); + if(ret) + return ret; + foo = sscanf(version.data, "%u", &ver); + krb5_data_free (&version); + if (foo != 1) + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + if(ver != HDB_DB_FORMAT) + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_init_db(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data tag; + krb5_data version; + char ver[32]; + + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + if(ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return ret; + + tag.data = HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY; + tag.length = strlen(tag.data); + snprintf(ver, sizeof(ver), "%u", HDB_DB_FORMAT); + version.data = ver; + version.length = strlen(version.data) + 1; /* zero terminated */ + ret = (*db->_put)(context, db, 0, tag, version); + return ret; +} + +/* + * find the relevant method for `filename', returning a pointer to the + * rest in `rest'. + * return NULL if there's no such method. + */ + +static const struct hdb_method * +find_method (const char *filename, const char **rest) +{ + const struct hdb_method *h; + + for (h = methods; h->prefix != NULL; ++h) + if (strncmp (filename, h->prefix, strlen(h->prefix)) == 0) { + *rest = filename + strlen(h->prefix); + return h; + } + return NULL; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, const char *filename) +{ + const struct hdb_method *h; + const char *residual; + + if(filename == NULL) + filename = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; + krb5_add_et_list(context, initialize_hdb_error_table_r); + h = find_method (filename, &residual); + if (h == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No database support! (hdb_create)"); + return (*h->create)(context, db, residual); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21d739b98b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: hdb.h,v 1.31 2000/07/08 16:03:37 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __HDB_H__ +#define __HDB_H__ + +#include + +#include + +enum hdb_lockop{ HDB_RLOCK, HDB_WLOCK }; + +/* flags for various functions */ +#define HDB_F_DECRYPT 1 /* decrypt keys */ +#define HDB_F_REPLACE 2 /* replace entry */ + +/* key usage for master key */ +#define HDB_KU_MKEY 0x484442 + +typedef struct hdb_master_key_data *hdb_master_key; + +typedef struct HDB{ + void *db; + void *dbc; + char *name; + int master_key_set; + hdb_master_key master_key; + int openp; + + krb5_error_code (*open)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, int, mode_t); + krb5_error_code (*close)(krb5_context, struct HDB*); + krb5_error_code (*fetch)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*store)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*remove)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*firstkey)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, + unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*nextkey)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, + unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*lock)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, int operation); + krb5_error_code (*unlock)(krb5_context, struct HDB*); + krb5_error_code (*rename)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, const char*); + krb5_error_code (*_get)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, krb5_data, krb5_data*); + krb5_error_code (*_put)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, int, + krb5_data, krb5_data); + krb5_error_code (*_del)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, krb5_data); + krb5_error_code (*destroy)(krb5_context, struct HDB*); +}HDB; + +#define HDB_DB_DIR "/var/heimdal" +#define HDB_DEFAULT_DB HDB_DB_DIR "/heimdal" +#define HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY "hdb/db-format" + +typedef krb5_error_code (*hdb_foreach_func_t)(krb5_context, HDB*, + hdb_entry*, void*); +extern krb5_kt_ops hdb_kt_ops; + +#include + +#endif /* __HDB_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb_err.et b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9929a56311 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# +# Error messages for the hdb library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: hdb_err.et,v 1.5 2001/01/28 23:05:52 assar Exp $" + +error_table hdb + +prefix HDB_ERR + +index 1 +#error_code INUSE, "Entry already exists in database" +error_code UK_SERROR, "Database store error" +error_code UK_RERROR, "Database read error" +error_code NOENTRY, "No such entry in the database" +error_code DB_INUSE, "Database is locked or in use--try again later" +error_code DB_CHANGED, "Database was modified during read" +error_code RECURSIVELOCK, "Attempt to lock database twice" +error_code NOTLOCKED, "Attempt to unlock database when not locked" +error_code BADLOCKMODE, "Invalid kdb lock mode" +error_code CANT_LOCK_DB, "Insufficient access to lock database" +error_code EXISTS, "Entry already exists in database" +error_code BADVERSION, "Wrong database version" +error_code NO_MKEY, "No correct master key" + +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3405fdd085 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: hdb_locl.h,v 1.18.4.1 2003/09/10 22:04:39 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __HDB_LOCL_H__ +#define __HDB_LOCL_H__ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include "crypto-headers.h" +#include +#include +#include + +#endif /* __HDB_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/keytab.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/keytab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ede2b9c1f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/keytab.c @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +/* keytab backend for HDB databases */ + +RCSID("$Id: keytab.c,v 1.5 2002/08/26 13:28:11 assar Exp $"); + +struct hdb_data { + char *dbname; + char *mkey; +}; + +/* + * the format for HDB keytabs is: + * HDB:[database:mkey] + */ + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct hdb_data *d; + const char *db, *mkey; + + d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + db = name; + mkey = strchr(name, ':'); + if(mkey == NULL || mkey[1] == '\0') { + if(*name == '\0') + d->dbname = NULL; + else { + d->dbname = strdup(name); + if(d->dbname == NULL) { + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + d->mkey = NULL; + } else { + if((mkey - db) == 0) { + d->dbname = NULL; + } else { + d->dbname = malloc(mkey - db); + if(d->dbname == NULL) { + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memmove(d->dbname, db, mkey - db); + d->dbname[mkey - db] = '\0'; + } + d->mkey = strdup(mkey + 1); + if(d->mkey == NULL) { + free(d->dbname); + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct hdb_data *d = id->data; + + free(d->dbname); + free(d->mkey); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + struct hdb_data *d = id->data; + + snprintf(name, namesize, "%s%s%s", + d->dbname ? d->dbname : "", + (d->dbname || d->mkey) ? ":" : "", + d->mkey ? d->mkey : ""); + return 0; +} + +static void +set_config (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_binding *binding, + const char **dbname, + const char **mkey) +{ + *dbname = krb5_config_get_string(context, binding, "dbname", NULL); + *mkey = krb5_config_get_string(context, binding, "mkey_file", NULL); +} + +/* + * try to figure out the database (`dbname') and master-key (`mkey') + * that should be used for `principal'. + */ + +static void +find_db (krb5_context context, + const char **dbname, + const char **mkey, + krb5_const_principal principal) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *top_bind = NULL; + krb5_config_binding *default_binding = NULL; + krb5_config_binding *db; + krb5_realm *prealm = krb5_princ_realm(context, (krb5_principal)principal); + + *dbname = *mkey = NULL; + + while ((db = (krb5_config_binding *) + krb5_config_get_next(context, + NULL, + &top_bind, + krb5_config_list, + "kdc", + "database", + NULL)) != NULL) { + const char *p; + + p = krb5_config_get_string (context, db, "realm", NULL); + if (p == NULL) { + if(default_binding) { + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: more than one realm-less " + "database specification"); + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: using the first encountered"); + } else + default_binding = db; + } else if (strcmp (*prealm, p) == 0) { + set_config (context, db, dbname, mkey); + break; + } + } + if (*dbname == NULL && default_binding != NULL) + set_config (context, default_binding, dbname, mkey); + if (*dbname == NULL) + *dbname = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; +} + +/* + * find the keytab entry in `id' for `principal, kvno, enctype' and return + * it in `entry'. return 0 or an error code + */ + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_get_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno kvno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + hdb_entry ent; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct hdb_data *d = id->data; + int i; + HDB *db; + const char *dbname = d->dbname; + const char *mkey = d->mkey; + + if (dbname == NULL) + find_db (context, &dbname, &mkey, principal); + + ret = hdb_create (context, &db, dbname); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile (context, db, mkey); + if (ret) { + (*db->destroy)(context, db); + return ret; + } + + ret = (*db->open)(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (ret) { + (*db->destroy)(context, db); + return ret; + } + ent.principal = (krb5_principal)principal; + ret = (*db->fetch)(context, db, HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + (*db->close)(context, db); + (*db->destroy)(context, db); + + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + else if(ret) + return ret; + if(kvno && ent.kvno != kvno) { + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + } + if(enctype == 0) + if(ent.keys.len > 0) + enctype = ent.keys.val[0].key.keytype; + ret = KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + for(i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; i++) { + if(ent.keys.val[i].key.keytype == enctype) { + krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal); + entry->vno = ent.kvno; + krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, + &ent.keys.val[i].key, + &entry->keyblock); + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + return ret; +} + +krb5_kt_ops hdb_kt_ops = { + "HDB", + hdb_resolve, + hdb_get_name, + hdb_close, + hdb_get_entry, + NULL, /* start_seq_get */ + NULL, /* next_entry */ + NULL, /* end_seq_get */ + NULL, /* add */ + NULL /* remove */ +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/mkey.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/mkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92bcd86f3a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/mkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,525 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" +#ifndef O_BINARY +#define O_BINARY 0 +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: mkey.c,v 1.15 2003/03/28 02:01:33 lha Exp $"); + +struct hdb_master_key_data { + krb5_keytab_entry keytab; + krb5_crypto crypto; + struct hdb_master_key_data *next; +}; + +void +hdb_free_master_key(krb5_context context, hdb_master_key mkey) +{ + struct hdb_master_key_data *ptr; + while(mkey) { + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &mkey->keytab); + if (mkey->crypto) + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, mkey->crypto); + ptr = mkey; + mkey = mkey->next; + free(ptr); + } +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_process_master_key(krb5_context context, + int kvno, krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_enctype etype, + hdb_master_key *mkey) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + *mkey = calloc(1, sizeof(**mkey)); + if(*mkey == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*mkey)->keytab.vno = kvno; + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, "K/M", &(*mkey)->keytab.principal); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, key, &(*mkey)->keytab.keyblock); + if(ret) + goto fail; + if(etype != 0) + (*mkey)->keytab.keyblock.keytype = etype; + (*mkey)->keytab.timestamp = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, etype, &(*mkey)->crypto); + if(ret) + goto fail; + return 0; + fail: + hdb_free_master_key(context, *mkey); + *mkey = NULL; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_add_master_key(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key, + hdb_master_key *inout) +{ + int vno = 0; + hdb_master_key p; + krb5_error_code ret; + + for(p = *inout; p; p = p->next) + vno = max(vno, p->keytab.vno); + vno++; + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, vno, key, 0, &p); + if(ret) + return ret; + p->next = *inout; + *inout = p; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +read_master_keytab(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + hdb_master_key *mkey) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab id; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + hdb_master_key p; + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, filename, &id); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + if(ret) + goto out; + *mkey = NULL; + while(krb5_kt_next_entry(context, id, &entry, &cursor) == 0) { + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + p->keytab = entry; + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &p->keytab.keyblock, 0, &p->crypto); + p->next = *mkey; + *mkey = p; + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + out: + krb5_kt_close(context, id); + return ret; +} + +/* read a MIT master keyfile */ +static krb5_error_code +read_master_mit(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + hdb_master_key *mkey) +{ + int fd; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + u_int16_t enctype; + krb5_keyblock key; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed to open %s: %s", filename, + strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + if(sp == NULL) { + close(fd); + return errno; + } + krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER); +#if 0 + /* could possibly use ret_keyblock here, but do it with more + checks for now */ + ret = krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, &key); +#else + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &enctype); + if((htons(enctype) & 0xff00) == 0x3000) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "unknown keytype in %s: %#x, expected %#x", + filename, htons(enctype), 0x3000); + ret = HEIM_ERR_BAD_MKEY; + goto out; + } + key.keytype = enctype; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &key.keyvalue); + if(ret) + goto out; +#endif + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, &key, 0, mkey); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +/* read an old master key file */ +static krb5_error_code +read_master_encryptionkey(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + hdb_master_key *mkey) +{ + int fd; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char buf[256]; + ssize_t len; + size_t ret_len; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed to open %s: %s", + filename, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + + len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + close(fd); + if(len < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "error reading %s: %s", + filename, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + + ret = decode_EncryptionKey(buf, len, &key, &ret_len); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + if(ret) + return ret; + + /* Originally, the keytype was just that, and later it got changed + to des-cbc-md5, but we always used des in cfb64 mode. This + should cover all cases, but will break if someone has hacked + this code to really use des-cbc-md5 -- but then that's not my + problem. */ + if(key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES || key.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) + key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE; + + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, &key, 0, mkey); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + return ret; +} + +/* read a krb4 /.k style file */ +static krb5_error_code +read_master_krb4(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + hdb_master_key *mkey) +{ + int fd; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char buf[256]; + ssize_t len; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed to open %s: %s", + filename, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + + len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + close(fd); + if(len < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "error reading %s: %s", + filename, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + if(len != 8) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "bad contents of %s", filename); + return HEIM_ERR_EOF; /* XXX file might be too large */ + } + + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE; + ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.keyvalue, buf, len); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, &key, 0, mkey); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_read_master_key(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + hdb_master_key *mkey) +{ + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[16]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + off_t len; + + *mkey = NULL; + + if(filename == NULL) + filename = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(f == NULL) { + int save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed to open %s: %s", + filename, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + + if(fread(buf, 1, 2, f) != 2) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "end of file reading %s", filename); + fclose(f); + return HEIM_ERR_EOF; + } + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + len = ftell(f); + + if(fclose(f) != 0) + return errno; + + if(len < 0) + return errno; + + if(len == 8) { + ret = read_master_krb4(context, filename, mkey); + } else if(buf[0] == 0x30 && len <= 127 && buf[1] == len - 2) { + ret = read_master_encryptionkey(context, filename, mkey); + } else if(buf[0] == 5 && buf[1] >= 1 && buf[1] <= 2) { + ret = read_master_keytab(context, filename, mkey); + } else { + ret = read_master_mit(context, filename, mkey); + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_write_master_key(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + hdb_master_key mkey) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_master_key p; + krb5_keytab kt; + + if(filename == NULL) + filename = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, filename, &kt); + if(ret) + return ret; + + for(p = mkey; p; p = p->next) { + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, kt, &p->keytab); + } + + krb5_kt_close(context, kt); + + return ret; +} + +static hdb_master_key +find_master_key(Key *key, hdb_master_key mkey) +{ + hdb_master_key ret = NULL; + while(mkey) { + if(ret == NULL && mkey->keytab.vno == 0) + ret = mkey; + if(key->mkvno == NULL) { + if(ret == NULL || mkey->keytab.vno > ret->keytab.vno) + ret = mkey; + } else if(mkey->keytab.vno == *key->mkvno) + return mkey; + mkey = mkey->next; + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, hdb_master_key mkey) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data res; + size_t keysize; + Key *k; + + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){ + hdb_master_key key; + + k = &ent->keys.val[i]; + if(k->mkvno == NULL) + continue; + + key = find_master_key(&ent->keys.val[i], mkey); + + if (key == NULL) + return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY; + + ret = krb5_decrypt(context, key->crypto, HDB_KU_MKEY, + k->key.keyvalue.data, + k->key.keyvalue.length, + &res); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* fixup keylength if the key got padded when encrypting it */ + ret = krb5_enctype_keysize(context, k->key.keytype, &keysize); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free(&res); + return ret; + } + if (keysize > res.length) { + krb5_data_free(&res); + return KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE; + } + + memset(k->key.keyvalue.data, 0, k->key.keyvalue.length); + free(k->key.keyvalue.data); + k->key.keyvalue = res; + k->key.keyvalue.length = keysize; + free(k->mkvno); + k->mkvno = NULL; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unseal_keys(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + if (db->master_key_set == 0) + return 0; + return hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(context, ent, db->master_key); +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_seal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, hdb_master_key mkey) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data res; + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){ + Key *k = &ent->keys.val[i]; + hdb_master_key key; + + if(k->mkvno != NULL) + continue; + + key = find_master_key(k, mkey); + + if (key == NULL) + return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY; + + ret = krb5_encrypt(context, key->crypto, HDB_KU_MKEY, + k->key.keyvalue.data, + k->key.keyvalue.length, + &res); + if (ret) + return ret; + + memset(k->key.keyvalue.data, 0, k->key.keyvalue.length); + free(k->key.keyvalue.data); + k->key.keyvalue = res; + + k->mkvno = malloc(sizeof(*k->mkvno)); + if (k->mkvno == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *k->mkvno = key->keytab.vno; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_seal_keys(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + if (db->master_key_set == 0) + return 0; + + return hdb_seal_keys_mkey(context, ent, db->master_key); +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_key (krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_master_key mkey; + + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, key, 0, &mkey); + if (ret) + return ret; + db->master_key = mkey; +#if 0 /* XXX - why? */ + des_set_random_generator_seed(key.keyvalue.data); +#endif + db->master_key_set = 1; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_keyfile (krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + const char *keyfile) +{ + hdb_master_key key; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, keyfile, &key); + if (ret) { + if (ret != ENOENT) + return ret; + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return 0; + } + db->master_key = key; + db->master_key_set = 1; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_clear_master_key (krb5_context context, + HDB *db) +{ + if (db->master_key_set) { + hdb_free_master_key(context, db->master_key); + db->master_key_set = 0; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/ndbm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/ndbm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c162145294 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/ndbm.c @@ -0,0 +1,361 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ndbm.c,v 1.33 2001/09/03 05:03:01 assar Exp $"); + +#if HAVE_NDBM + +#if defined(HAVE_GDBM_NDBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_NDBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DBM_H) +#include +#endif + +struct ndbm_db { + DBM *db; + int lock_fd; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_clear_master_key (context, db); + free(db->name); + free(db); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + return hdb_lock(d->lock_fd, operation); +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + return hdb_unlock(d->lock_fd); +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry, int first) + +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum key, value; + krb5_data key_data, data; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + if(first) + key = dbm_firstkey(d->db); + else + key = dbm_nextkey(d->db); + if(key.dptr == NULL) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + key_data.data = key.dptr; + key_data.length = key.dsize; + ret = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(ret) return ret; + value = dbm_fetch(d->db, key); + db->unlock(context, db); + data.data = value.dptr; + data.length = value.dsize; + if(hdb_value2entry(context, &data, entry)) + return NDBM_seq(context, db, flags, entry, 0); + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) { + ret = hdb_unseal_keys (context, db, entry); + if (ret) + hdb_free_entry (context, entry); + } + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + entry->principal = malloc (sizeof(*entry->principal)); + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + hdb_free_entry (context, entry); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + } else { + hdb_key2principal (context, &key_data, entry->principal); + } + } + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return NDBM_seq(context, db, flags, entry, 1); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return NDBM_seq(context, db, flags, entry, 0); +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name) +{ + /* XXX this function will break */ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + + int ret; + char *old_dir, *old_pag, *new_dir, *new_pag; + char *new_lock; + int lock_fd; + + /* lock old and new databases */ + ret = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(ret) + return ret; + asprintf(&new_lock, "%s.lock", new_name); + if(new_lock == NULL) { + db->unlock(context, db); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + lock_fd = open(new_lock, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if(lock_fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + db->unlock(context, db); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", new_lock, + strerror(ret)); + free(new_lock); + return ret; + } + free(new_lock); + ret = hdb_lock(lock_fd, HDB_WLOCK); + if(ret) { + db->unlock(context, db); + close(lock_fd); + return ret; + } + + asprintf(&old_dir, "%s.dir", db->name); + asprintf(&old_pag, "%s.pag", db->name); + asprintf(&new_dir, "%s.dir", new_name); + asprintf(&new_pag, "%s.pag", new_name); + + ret = rename(old_dir, new_dir) || rename(old_pag, new_pag); + free(old_dir); + free(old_pag); + free(new_dir); + free(new_pag); + hdb_unlock(lock_fd); + db->unlock(context, db); + + if(ret) { + ret = errno; + close(lock_fd); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "rename: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + close(d->lock_fd); + d->lock_fd = lock_fd; + + free(db->name); + db->name = strdup(new_name); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM__get(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key, krb5_data *reply) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum k, v; + int code; + + k.dptr = key.data; + k.dsize = key.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + v = dbm_fetch(d->db, k); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(v.dptr == NULL) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + krb5_data_copy(reply, v.dptr, v.dsize); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM__put(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int replace, + krb5_data key, krb5_data value) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum k, v; + int code; + + k.dptr = key.data; + k.dsize = key.length; + v.dptr = value.data; + v.dsize = value.length; + + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = dbm_store(d->db, k, v, replace ? DBM_REPLACE : DBM_INSERT); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_EXISTS; + if (code < 0) + return code; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM__del(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum k; + int code; + krb5_error_code ret; + + k.dptr = key.data; + k.dsize = key.length; + ret = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(ret) return ret; + code = dbm_delete(d->db, k); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct ndbm_db *d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + char *lock_file; + + if(d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + asprintf(&lock_file, "%s.lock", (char*)db->name); + if(lock_file == NULL) { + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + d->db = dbm_open((char*)db->name, flags, mode); + if(d->db == NULL){ + ret = errno; + free(d); + free(lock_file); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "dbm_open(%s): %s", db->name, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + d->lock_fd = open(lock_file, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if(d->lock_fd < 0){ + ret = errno; + dbm_close(d->db); + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", lock_file, + strerror(ret)); + free(lock_file); + return ret; + } + free(lock_file); + db->db = d; + if((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + else + ret = hdb_init_db(context, db); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return 0; + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + dbm_close(d->db); + close(d->lock_fd); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_ndbm_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, + const char *filename) +{ + *db = malloc(sizeof(**db)); + if (*db == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*db)->db = NULL; + (*db)->name = strdup(filename); + if ((*db)->name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free(*db); + *db = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + (*db)->master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->openp = 0; + (*db)->open = NDBM_open; + (*db)->close = NDBM_close; + (*db)->fetch = _hdb_fetch; + (*db)->store = _hdb_store; + (*db)->remove = _hdb_remove; + (*db)->firstkey = NDBM_firstkey; + (*db)->nextkey= NDBM_nextkey; + (*db)->lock = NDBM_lock; + (*db)->unlock = NDBM_unlock; + (*db)->rename = NDBM_rename; + (*db)->_get = NDBM__get; + (*db)->_put = NDBM__put; + (*db)->_del = NDBM__del; + (*db)->destroy = NDBM_destroy; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_NDBM */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/print.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/print.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ad172f748 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/hdb/print.c @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: print.c,v 1.8 2002/05/24 15:18:02 joda Exp $"); + +/* + This is the present contents of a dump line. This might change at + any time. Fields are separated by white space. + + principal + keyblock + kvno + keys... + mkvno + enctype + keyvalue + salt (- means use normal salt) + creation date and principal + modification date and principal + principal valid from date (not used) + principal valid end date (not used) + principal key expires (not used) + max ticket life + max renewable life + flags + generation number + */ + +static krb5_error_code +append_string(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *s; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vasprintf(&s, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(s == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, s, strlen(s)); + free(s); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +append_hex(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, krb5_data *data) +{ + int i, printable = 1; + char *p; + + p = data->data; + for(i = 0; i < data->length; i++) + if(!isalnum((unsigned char)p[i]) && p[i] != '.'){ + printable = 0; + break; + } + if(printable) + return append_string(context, sp, "\"%.*s\"", + data->length, data->data); + for(i = 0; i < data->length; i++) + append_string(context, sp, "%02x", ((unsigned char*)data->data)[i]); + return 0; +} + +static char * +time2str(time_t t) +{ + static char buf[128]; + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", gmtime(&t)); + return buf; +} + +static krb5_error_code +append_event(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, Event *ev) +{ + char *pr = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + if(ev == NULL) + return append_string(context, sp, "- "); + if (ev->principal != NULL) { + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ev->principal, &pr); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + ret = append_string(context, sp, "%s:%s ", + time2str(ev->time), pr ? pr : "UNKNOWN"); + free(pr); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +entry2string_int (krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + char *p; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + + /* --- principal */ + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &p); + if(ret) + return ret; + append_string(context, sp, "%s ", p); + free(p); + /* --- kvno */ + append_string(context, sp, "%d", ent->kvno); + /* --- keys */ + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){ + /* --- mkvno, keytype */ + if(ent->keys.val[i].mkvno) + append_string(context, sp, ":%d:%d:", + *ent->keys.val[i].mkvno, + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype); + else + append_string(context, sp, "::%d:", + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype); + /* --- keydata */ + append_hex(context, sp, &ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue); + append_string(context, sp, ":"); + /* --- salt */ + if(ent->keys.val[i].salt){ + append_string(context, sp, "%u/", ent->keys.val[i].salt->type); + append_hex(context, sp, &ent->keys.val[i].salt->salt); + }else + append_string(context, sp, "-"); + } + append_string(context, sp, " "); + /* --- created by */ + append_event(context, sp, &ent->created_by); + /* --- modified by */ + append_event(context, sp, ent->modified_by); + + /* --- valid start */ + if(ent->valid_start) + append_string(context, sp, "%s ", time2str(*ent->valid_start)); + else + append_string(context, sp, "- "); + + /* --- valid end */ + if(ent->valid_end) + append_string(context, sp, "%s ", time2str(*ent->valid_end)); + else + append_string(context, sp, "- "); + + /* --- password ends */ + if(ent->pw_end) + append_string(context, sp, "%s ", time2str(*ent->pw_end)); + else + append_string(context, sp, "- "); + + /* --- max life */ + if(ent->max_life) + append_string(context, sp, "%d ", *ent->max_life); + else + append_string(context, sp, "- "); + + /* --- max renewable life */ + if(ent->max_renew) + append_string(context, sp, "%d ", *ent->max_renew); + else + append_string(context, sp, "- "); + + /* --- flags */ + append_string(context, sp, "%d ", HDBFlags2int(ent->flags)); + + /* --- generation number */ + if(ent->generation) { + append_string(context, sp, "%s:%d:%d", time2str(ent->generation->time), + ent->generation->usec, + ent->generation->gen); + } else + append_string(context, sp, "-"); + + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_entry2string (krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, char **str) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + krb5_storage *sp; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + if(sp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = entry2string_int(context, sp, ent); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + + krb5_storage_write(sp, "\0", 1); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + *str = data.data; + return 0; +} + +/* print a hdb_entry to (FILE*)data; suitable for hdb_foreach */ + +krb5_error_code +hdb_print_entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + + FILE *f = data; + + fflush(f); + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fileno(f)); + if(sp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = entry2string_int(context, sp, entry); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + + krb5_storage_write(sp, "\n", 1); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..51b559bf71 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,662 @@ +2003-12-30 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * chpass_s.c: from 1.14->1.15: + (change): fix same-password-again by decrypting keys and setting + an error code. From: Buck Huppmann + +2003-12-21 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * init_c.c: 1.47->1.48: (_kadm5_c_init_context): catch errors from + strdup and other krb5_ functions + +2003-08-15 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ipropd_slave.c: 1.27->1.28: (receive_everything): switch close + and rename From: Alf Wachsmann + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * send_recv.c: check return values from krb5_data_alloc + * log.c: check return values from krb5_data_alloc + +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * dump_log.c (print_entry): check return values from + krb5_data_alloc + +2003-04-01 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * init_c.c (kadm_connect): if a context realm was passed in, use + that to form the kadmin/admin principal + +2003-03-19 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * ipropd_master.c (main): make sure we don't consider dead slave + for select processing + (write_stats): use slave_stats_file variable, + check return value of strftime + (args): allow specifying slave stats file + (slave_dead): close the fd when the slave dies + +2002-10-21 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_slave.c (from Derrick Brashear): Propagating a large + database without this means the slave kdcs can get erroneous + HDB_NOENTRY and return the resulting errors. This creates a new db + handle, populates it, and moves it into place. + +2002-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_slave.c (receive_everything): type-correctness calling + _krb5_get_int + + * context_s.c (find_db_spec): const-correctness in parameters to + krb5_config_get_next + +2002-08-16 Johan Danielsson + + * private.h: rename header file flag macro + + * Makefile.am: generate kadm5-{protos,private}.h + +2002-08-15 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_master.c: check return value of krb5_sockaddr2address + +2002-07-04 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_master.c: handle slaves that come and go; add status + reporting (both from Love) + + * iprop.h: KADM5_SLAVE_STATS + +2002-03-25 Jacques Vidrine + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): bug fix: the default credentials + cache was not being used if a client name was specified. + +2002-03-25 Johan Danielsson + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): when getting the default_client from + the cred cache, make sure the instance part is "admin"; this + should require fewer uses of -p + +2002-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 7:5:0 + (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 6:3:2 + +2002-02-08 Johan Danielsson + + * init_c.c: we have to create our own param struct before + marshaling + +2001-09-05 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: link with LIB_pidfile + + * iprop.h: include util.h for pidfile + +2001-08-31 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_slave.c (main): syslog with the correct name + +2001-08-30 Jacques Vidrine + + * ipropd_slave.c, ipropd_master.c (main): call pidfile + +2001-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 7:4:0 + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * acl.c (fetch_acl): do not return bogus flags and re-organize + function + + * Makefile.am: rename variable name to avoid error from current + automake + +2001-08-13 Johan Danielsson + + * set_keys.c: add easier afs configuration, defaulting to the + local realm in lower case; also try to remove duplicate salts + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add required library dependencies + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 6:2:2 + +2001-06-29 Johan Danielsson + + * init_c.c: call krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags + +2001-02-19 Johan Danielsson + + * replay_log.c: add --{start-end}-version flags to replay just + part of the log + +2001-02-15 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_master.c (main): fix select-loop to decrement ret + correctly. from "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump versions + +2000-12-31 Assar Westerlund + + * init_s.c (*): handle krb5_init_context failure consistently + * init_c.c (init_context): handle krb5_init_context failure + consistently + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 7:2:0 + +2000-11-16 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (make_keys): clean-up salting loop and try not to + leak memory + + * ipropd_master.c (main): check for fd's being too large to select + on + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 7:1:0 + +2000-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * acl.c (fetch_acl): fix wrong cases, use krb5_principal_match + +2000-08-07 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_master.c (main): ignore SIGPIPE + +2000-08-06 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_slave.c (receive_everything): make `fd' an int instead of + a pointer. From Derrick J Brashear + +2000-08-04 Johan Danielsson + + * admin.h: change void** to void* + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump versions to 7:0:0 and 6:0:2 + +2000-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * log.c (kadm5_log_get_version): rename kadm5_log_get_version_fd + and make a new that takes a context + (kadm5_log_nop): add logging of missing lengths + (kadm5_log_truncate): new function + + * dump_log.c (print_entry): update and correct + * randkey_s.c: call _kadm5_bump_pw_expire + * truncate_log.c: new program for truncating the log + * Makefile.am (sbin_PROGRAMS): add truncate_log + (C_SOURCES): add bump_pw_expire.c + * bump_pw_expire.c: new function for extending password expiration + +2000-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * keys.c: new file with _kadm5_free_keys, _kadm5_init_keys + + * set_keys.c (free_keys, init_keys): elevate to internal kadm5 + functions + + * chpass_s.c (kadm5_s_chpass_principal_cond): new function + * Makefile.am (C_SOURCES): add keys.c + * init_c.c: remove unused variable and handle some parameters + being NULL + +2000-07-22 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_slave.c: use krb5_read_priv_message + + * ipropd_master.c: use krb5_{read,write}_priv_message + + * init_c.c: use krb5_write_priv_message + +2000-07-11 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_slave.c: no need to call gethostname, since + sname_to_principal will + + * send_recv.c: assert that we have a connected socket + + * get_princs_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * rename_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * randkey_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * privs_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * modify_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * get_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * delete_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * create_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * chpass_c.c: call _kadm5_connect + + * private.h: add more fields to client context; remove prototypes + + * admin.h: remove prototypes + + * kadm5-protos.h: move public prototypes here + + * kadm5-private.h: move private prototypes here + + * init_c.c: break out connection code to separate function, and + defer calling it until we actually do something + +2000-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (make_keys): also support `[kadmin]use_v4_salt' for + backwards compatability + +2000-06-26 Johan Danielsson + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): rewrite this to be more easily + adaptable to different salts + +2000-06-19 Johan Danielsson + + * get_s.c: pa_* -> KRB5_PADATA_* + +2000-06-16 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_slave.c: change default keytab to default keytab (as in + typically FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab) + +2000-06-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ipropd_slave.c: bug fixes, for actually writing the full dump to + the database. based on a patch from Love + +2000-06-07 Assar Westerlund + + * acl.c: add support for patterns of principals + * log.c (kadm5_log_replay_create): handle more NULL pointers + (should they really happen?) + * log.c (kadm5_log_replay_modify): handle max_life == NULL and + max_renew == NULL + + * ipropd_master.c: use syslog. be less verbose + * ipropd_slave.c: use syslog + +2000-06-05 Assar Westerlund + + * private.h (kadm_ops): add kadm_nop more prototypes + * log.c (kadm5_log_set_version, kadm5_log_reinit, kadm5_log_nop, + kadm5_log_replay_nop): add + * ipropd_slave.c: and some more improvements + * ipropd_master.c: lots of improvements + * iprop.h (IPROP_PORT, IPROP_SERVICE): add + (iprop_cmd): add new commands + + * dump_log.c: add nop + +2000-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 5:1:1 + +2000-05-12 Assar Westerlund + + * get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): set life, rlife to INT_MAX as a + fallback. handle not having any creator. + * destroy_s.c (kadm5_s_destroy): free all allocated memory + * context_s.c (set_field): free variable if it's already set + (find_db_spec): malloc space for all strings + +2000-04-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): add LIB_openldap + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 6:0:1 + (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 5:0:1 + +2000-03-24 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys2): rewrite + (_kadm5_set_keys3): add + + * private.h (struct kadm_func): add chpass_principal_with_key + * init_c.c (set_funcs): add chpass_principal_with_key + +2000-03-23 Assar Westerlund + + * context_s.c (set_funcs): add chpass_principal_with_key + * common_glue.c (kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key): add + * chpass_s.c: comment-ize and change calling convention for + _kadm5_set_keys* + * chpass_c.c (kadm5_c_chpass_principal_with_key): add + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 4:2:0 + +2000-01-28 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_new_cache): make sure to request non-forwardable, + non-proxiable + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv.la): bump version to 5:1:0 + + * context_s.c (_kadm5_s_init_context): handle params == NULL + +1999-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): handle modified_by->principal + == NULL + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:1:0 + + * init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): handle getting back port + number from admin host + (kadm5_c_init_with_context): remove `proto/' part before doing + getaddrinfo() + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 and 4:0:0 + + * init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_context): don't use unitialized + stuff + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * replay_log.c: adapt to changed kadm5_log_foreach + + * log.c (kadm5_log_foreach): change to take a + `kadm5_server_context' + + * init_c.c: use krb5_warn{,x} + + * dump_log.c: adapt to changed kadm5_log_foreach + + * init_c.c: re-write to use getaddrinfo + * Makefile.am (install-build-headers): add dependency + +1999-12-03 Johan Danielsson + + * log.c (kadm5_log_foreach): pass context + + * dump_log.c: print more interesting things + +1999-12-02 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_master.c (process_msg): check for short reads + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * modify_s.c (kadm5_s_modify_principal): support key_data + (kadm5_s_modify_principal_with_key): remove + + * admin.h (kadm5_s_modify_principal_with_key): remove + +1999-11-20 Assar Westerlund + + * context_s.c (find_db_spec): ugly cast work-around. + +1999-11-14 Assar Westerlund + + * context_s.c (_kadm5_s_init_context): call krb5_add_et_list so + that we aren't dependent on the layout of krb5_context_data + * init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): call krb5_add_et_list so that + we aren't dependent on the layout of krb5_context_data + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * password_quality.c (kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check): use + correct types for function pointers + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * randkey_s.c: always bail out if the fetch fails + + * admin.h (kadm5_config_params): remove fields we're not using + + * ipropd_slave.c: allow passing a realm + + * ipropd_master.c: allow passing a realm + + * dump_log.c: allow passing a realm + + * acl.c: correctly get acl file + + * private.h (kadm5_server_context): add config_params struct and + remove acl_file; bump protocol version number + + * marshall.c: marshalling of config parameters + + * init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_context): try to cope with old + servers + + * init_s.c (kadm5_s_init_with_context): actually use some passed + values + + * context_s.c (_kadm5_s_init_context): get dbname, acl_file, and + stash_file from the config parameters, try to figure out these if + they're not provided + +1999-11-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (install-build-headers): use `cp' instead of + INSTALL_DATA + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:0 and 3:0:0 (they access fields + directly in libkrb5's context - bad functions) + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys_randomly): set enctypes correctly in + the copied keys + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version of kadm5srv to 3:0:2 (new password + quality functions). + set version of kdam5clnt to 2:1:1 (no interface changes) + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): add $(LIB_dlopen) + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * randkey_s.c (kadm5_s_randkey_principal): use + _kadm5_set_keys_randomly + + * set_keys.c (free_keys): free more memory + (_kadm5_set_keys): a little bit more generic + (_kadm5_set_keys_randomly): new function for setting random keys. + +1999-10-14 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): ignore old keys when setting new + ones and always add 3 DES keys and one 3DES key + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): use `krb5_get_krb_admin_hst'. + check return value from strdup + +1999-09-26 Assar Westerlund + + * acl.c (_kadm5_privs_to_string): forgot one strcpy_truncate -> + strlcpy + +1999-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * dump_log.c: remove unused `optind' + + * replay_log.c: remove unused `optind' + +1999-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * chpass_c.c (kadm5_c_chpass_principal): new _kadm5_client_recv + + * send_recv.c (_kadm5_client_recv): return result in a `krb5_data' + so that we avoid copying it and don't need to dimension in + advance. change all callers. + +1999-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * password_quality.c: new file + + * admin.h + (kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check,kadm5_check_password_quality): + add prototypes + + * Makefile.am (S_SOURCES): add password_quality.c + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: update versions to 2:0:1 + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): make princ_expire_time == 0 + and pw_expiration == 0 mean never + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * log.c (kadm5_log_flush): extra cast + +1999-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * marshall.c (store_principal_ent): encoding princ_expire_time and + pw_expiration in correct order + +1999-06-28 Assar Westerlund + + * randkey_s.c (kadm5_s_randkey_principal): nuke old mkvno, + otherwise hdb will think that the new random keys are already + encrypted which will cause lots of confusion later. + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): handle 0 == unlimited + correctly. From Michal Vocu + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): use get_default_username + +1999-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * create_s.c (create_principal): if there's no default entry the + mask should be zero. + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): use $USERNAME + +1999-05-17 Johan Danielsson + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): figure out principal + +1999-05-05 Johan Danielsson + + * send_recv.c: cleanup _kadm5_client_{send,recv} + +1999-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys2): don't check the recently created + memory for NULL pointers + + * private.h (_kadm5_setup_entry): change prototype + + * modify_s.c: call new _kadm5_setup_entry + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): change so that it takes three + masks, one for what bits to set and one for each of principal and + def containing the bits that are set there. + + * create_s.c: call new _kadm5_setup_entry + + * create_s.c (get_default): check return value + (create_principal): send wider mask to _kadm5_setup_entry + +1999-05-04 Johan Danielsson + + * send_recv.c (_kadm5_client_recv): handle arbitrarily sized + packets, check for errors + + * get_c.c: check for failure from _kadm5_client_{send,recv} + +1999-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_new_cache): don't abort when interrupted from + password prompt + + * destroy_c.c (kadm5_c_destroy): check if we should destroy the + auth context + +1999-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * chpass_s.c: fix arguments to _kadm5_set_keys2 + + * private.h: proto + + * set_keys.c: clear mkvno + + * rename_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * randkey_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * modify_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * log.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before logging + + * get_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before logging + + * get_princs_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * delete_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * create_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * chpass_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * Makefile.am: remove server.c + + * admin.h: add prototypes + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): set key_data + + * set_keys.c: add _kadm5_set_keys2 to sey keys from key_data + + * modify_s.c: add kadm5_s_modify_principal_with_key + + * create_s.c: add kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key + + * chpass_s.c: add kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key + + * kadm5_locl.h: move stuff to private.h + + * private.h: move stuff from kadm5_locl.h + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b0c49d920 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.51.6.1 2003/05/12 15:20:46 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkadm5srv.la libkadm5clnt.la +libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 7:6:0 +libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 6:4:2 +sbin_PROGRAMS = dump_log replay_log truncate_log + +libkadm5srv_la_LIBADD = ../krb5/libkrb5.la ../hdb/libhdb.la ../roken/libroken.la +libkadm5clnt_la_LIBADD = ../krb5/libkrb5.la ../hdb/libhdb.la ../roken/libroken.la + +libexec_PROGRAMS = ipropd-master ipropd-slave + +kadm5includedir = $(includedir)/kadm5 +buildkadm5include = $(buildinclude)/kadm5 + +kadm5include_HEADERS = kadm5_err.h admin.h private.h \ + kadm5-protos.h kadm5-private.h + +install-build-headers:: $(kadm5include_HEADERS) + @foo='$(kadm5include_HEADERS)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo "cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f";\ + cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +SOURCES_client = \ + admin.h \ + chpass_c.c \ + common_glue.c \ + create_c.c \ + delete_c.c \ + destroy_c.c \ + flush_c.c \ + free.c \ + get_c.c \ + get_princs_c.c \ + init_c.c \ + kadm5_err.c \ + kadm5_locl.h \ + marshall.c \ + modify_c.c \ + private.h \ + privs_c.c \ + randkey_c.c \ + rename_c.c \ + send_recv.c + +SOURCES_server = \ + acl.c \ + admin.h \ + bump_pw_expire.c \ + chpass_s.c \ + common_glue.c \ + context_s.c \ + create_s.c \ + delete_s.c \ + destroy_s.c \ + ent_setup.c \ + error.c \ + flush_s.c \ + free.c \ + get_princs_s.c \ + get_s.c \ + init_s.c \ + kadm5_err.c \ + kadm5_locl.h \ + keys.c \ + log.c \ + marshall.c \ + modify_s.c \ + private.h \ + privs_s.c \ + randkey_s.c \ + rename_s.c \ + set_keys.c \ + set_modifier.c \ + password_quality.c + +libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES = $(SOURCES_server) server_glue.c +libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES = $(SOURCES_client) client_glue.c + +dump_log_SOURCES = dump_log.c kadm5_locl.h + +replay_log_SOURCES = replay_log.c kadm5_locl.h + +ipropd_master_SOURCES = ipropd_master.c iprop.h kadm5_locl.h + +ipropd_slave_SOURCES = ipropd_slave.c iprop.h kadm5_locl.h + +truncate_log_SOURCES = truncate_log.c + +LDADD = \ + libkadm5srv.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LIB_openldap) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) \ + $(LIB_pidfile) + +CLEANFILES = kadm5_err.c kadm5_err.h + +$(libkadm5srv_la_OBJECTS): kadm5_err.h + +client_glue.lo server_glue.lo: $(srcdir)/common_glue.c + +# to help stupid solaris make + +kadm5_err.h: kadm5_err.et + +$(libkadm5clnt_la_OBJECTS) $(libkadm5srv_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/kadm5-protos.h $(srcdir)/kadm5-private.h + +proto_opts = -q -R '^(_|kadm5_c_|kadm5_s_|kadm5_log)' -P comment +$(srcdir)/kadm5-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl $(proto_opts) \ + -o kadm5-protos.h \ + $(libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES) $(libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES) \ + || rm -f kadm5-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/kadm5-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl $(proto_opts) \ + -p kadm5-private.h \ + $(libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES) $(libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES) \ + || rm -f kadm5-private.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8695002cb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of 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+ +ps: ps-am + +ps-am: + +uninstall-am: uninstall-info-am uninstall-kadm5includeHEADERS \ + uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES uninstall-libexecPROGRAMS \ + uninstall-sbinPROGRAMS + +.PHONY: CTAGS GTAGS all all-am all-local check check-am check-local \ + clean clean-generic clean-libLTLIBRARIES clean-libexecPROGRAMS \ + clean-libtool clean-sbinPROGRAMS ctags distclean \ + distclean-compile distclean-generic distclean-libtool \ + distclean-tags distdir dvi dvi-am html html-am info info-am \ + install install-am install-data install-data-am install-exec \ + install-exec-am install-info install-info-am \ + install-kadm5includeHEADERS install-libLTLIBRARIES \ + install-libexecPROGRAMS install-man install-sbinPROGRAMS \ + install-strip installcheck installcheck-am installdirs \ + maintainer-clean maintainer-clean-generic mostlyclean \ + mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic mostlyclean-libtool \ + pdf pdf-am ps ps-am tags uninstall uninstall-am \ + uninstall-info-am uninstall-kadm5includeHEADERS \ + uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES uninstall-libexecPROGRAMS \ + uninstall-sbinPROGRAMS + + +install-suid-programs: + @foo='$(bin_SUIDS)'; \ + for file in $$foo; do \ + x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + echo "*"; \ + echo "* Failed to install $$x setuid root"; \ + echo "*"; \ + fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(nodist_include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +install-build-headers:: $(kadm5include_HEADERS) + @foo='$(kadm5include_HEADERS)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo "cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f";\ + cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +$(libkadm5srv_la_OBJECTS): kadm5_err.h + +client_glue.lo server_glue.lo: $(srcdir)/common_glue.c + +# to help stupid solaris make + +kadm5_err.h: kadm5_err.et + +$(libkadm5clnt_la_OBJECTS) $(libkadm5srv_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/kadm5-protos.h $(srcdir)/kadm5-private.h +$(srcdir)/kadm5-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl $(proto_opts) \ + -o kadm5-protos.h \ + $(libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES) $(libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES) \ + || rm -f kadm5-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/kadm5-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl $(proto_opts) \ + -p kadm5-private.h \ + $(libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES) $(libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES) \ + || rm -f kadm5-private.h +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/acl.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6240588f68 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: acl.c,v 1.13 2001/08/24 04:01:42 assar Exp $"); + +static struct units acl_units[] = { + { "all", KADM5_PRIV_ALL }, + { "change-password",KADM5_PRIV_CPW }, + { "cpw", KADM5_PRIV_CPW }, + { "list", KADM5_PRIV_LIST }, + { "delete", KADM5_PRIV_DELETE }, + { "modify", KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY }, + { "add", KADM5_PRIV_ADD }, + { "get", KADM5_PRIV_GET }, + { NULL } +}; + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_string_to_privs(const char *s, u_int32_t* privs) +{ + int flags; + flags = parse_flags(s, acl_units, 0); + if(flags < 0) + return KADM5_FAILURE; + *privs = flags; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_privs_to_string(u_int32_t privs, char *string, size_t len) +{ + if(privs == 0) + strlcpy(string, "none", len); + else + unparse_flags(privs, acl_units + 1, string, len); + return 0; +} + +/* + * retrieve the right for the current caller on `princ' (NULL means all) + * and store them in `ret_flags' + * return 0 or an error. + */ + +static kadm5_ret_t +fetch_acl (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_const_principal princ, + unsigned *ret_flags) +{ + FILE *f; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char buf[256]; + + *ret_flags = 0; + + /* no acl file -> no rights */ + f = fopen(context->config.acl_file, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + char *foo = NULL, *p; + krb5_principal this_princ; + unsigned flags = 0; + + p = strtok_r(buf, " \t\n", &foo); + if(p == NULL) + continue; + if (*p == '#') /* comment */ + continue; + ret = krb5_parse_name(context->context, p, &this_princ); + if(ret) + break; + if(!krb5_principal_compare(context->context, + context->caller, this_princ)) { + krb5_free_principal(context->context, this_princ); + continue; + } + krb5_free_principal(context->context, this_princ); + p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n", &foo); + if(p == NULL) + continue; + ret = _kadm5_string_to_privs(p, &flags); + if (ret) + break; + p = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &foo); + if (p == NULL) { + *ret_flags = flags; + break; + } + if (princ != NULL) { + krb5_principal pattern_princ; + krb5_boolean match; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context->context, p, &pattern_princ); + if (ret) + break; + match = krb5_principal_match (context->context, + princ, pattern_princ); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, pattern_princ); + if (match) { + *ret_flags = flags; + break; + } + } + } + fclose(f); + return ret; +} + +/* + * set global acl flags in `context' for the current caller. + * return 0 on success or an error + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_init(kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context->context, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, &princ); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_principal_compare(context->context, context->caller, princ); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + if(ret != 0) { + context->acl_flags = KADM5_PRIV_ALL; + return 0; + } + + return fetch_acl (context, NULL, &context->acl_flags); +} + +/* + * check if `flags' allows `op' + * return 0 if OK or an error + */ + +static kadm5_ret_t +check_flags (unsigned op, + unsigned flags) +{ + unsigned res = ~flags & op; + + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_GET) + return KADM5_AUTH_GET; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_ADD) + return KADM5_AUTH_ADD; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY) + return KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_DELETE) + return KADM5_AUTH_DELETE; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_CPW) + return KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_LIST) + return KADM5_AUTH_LIST; + if(res) + return KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT; + return 0; +} + +/* + * return 0 if the current caller in `context' is allowed to perform + * `op' on `princ' and otherwise an error + * princ == NULL if it's not relevant. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_check_permission(kadm5_server_context *context, + unsigned op, + krb5_const_principal princ) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + unsigned princ_flags; + + ret = check_flags (op, context->acl_flags); + if (ret == 0) + return ret; + ret = fetch_acl (context, princ, &princ_flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + return check_flags (op, princ_flags); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/admin.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/admin.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9bd85f963 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/admin.h @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* $Id: admin.h,v 1.18 2000/08/04 11:26:21 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KADM5_ADMIN_H__ +#define __KADM5_ADMIN_H__ + +#define KADM5_API_VERSION_1 1 +#define KADM5_API_VERSION_2 2 + +#ifndef USE_KADM5_API_VERSION +#define USE_KADM5_API_VERSION KADM5_API_VERSION_2 +#endif + +#if USE_KADM5_API_VERSION != KADM5_API_VERSION_2 +#error No support for API versions other than 2 +#endif + +#define KADM5_STRUCT_VERSION 0 + +#include + +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED 0x00000001 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE 0x00000002 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED 0x00000004 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE 0x00000008 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE 0x00000010 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY 0x00000020 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX 0x00000040 +#define KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH 0x00000080 +#define KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH 0x00000100 +#define KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE 0x00000200 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR 0x00001000 +#define KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE 0x00002000 +#define KRB5_KDB_SUPPORT_DESMD5 0x00004000 +#define KRB5_KDB_NEW_PRINC 0x00008000 + +#define KADM5_PRINCIPAL 0x000001 +#define KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME 0x000002 +#define KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION 0x000004 +#define KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE 0x000008 +#define KADM5_ATTRIBUTES 0x000010 +#define KADM5_MAX_LIFE 0x000020 +#define KADM5_MOD_TIME 0x000040 +#define KADM5_MOD_NAME 0x000080 +#define KADM5_KVNO 0x000100 +#define KADM5_MKVNO 0x000200 +#define KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES 0x000400 +#define KADM5_POLICY 0x000800 +#define KADM5_POLICY_CLR 0x001000 +#define KADM5_MAX_RLIFE 0x002000 +#define KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS 0x004000 +#define KADM5_LAST_FAILED 0x008000 +#define KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT 0x010000 +#define KADM5_KEY_DATA 0x020000 +#define KADM5_TL_DATA 0x040000 + +#define KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK (~(KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_TL_DATA)) + +#define KADM5_PW_MAX_LIFE 0x004000 +#define KADM5_PW_MIN_LIFE 0x008000 +#define KADM5_PW_MIN_LENGTH 0x010000 +#define KADM5_PW_MIN_CLASSES 0x020000 +#define KADM5_PW_HISTORY_NUM 0x040000 +#define KADM5_REF_COUNT 0x080000 + +#define KADM5_POLICY_NORMAL_MASK (~0) + +#define KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE "kadmin/admin" +#define KADM5_HIST_PRINCIPAL "kadmin/history" +#define KADM5_CHANGEPW_SERVICE "kadmin/changepw" + +typedef struct _krb5_key_data { + int16_t key_data_ver; /* Version */ + int16_t key_data_kvno; /* Key Version */ + int16_t key_data_type[2]; /* Array of types */ + int16_t key_data_length[2]; /* Array of lengths */ + void* key_data_contents[2];/* Array of pointers */ +} krb5_key_data; + +typedef struct _krb5_tl_data { + struct _krb5_tl_data* tl_data_next; + int16_t tl_data_type; + int16_t tl_data_length; + void* tl_data_contents; +} krb5_tl_data; + +typedef struct _kadm5_principal_ent_t { + krb5_principal principal; + + krb5_timestamp princ_expire_time; + krb5_timestamp last_pwd_change; + krb5_timestamp pw_expiration; + krb5_deltat max_life; + krb5_principal mod_name; + krb5_timestamp mod_date; + krb5_flags attributes; + krb5_kvno kvno; + krb5_kvno mkvno; + + char * policy; + u_int32_t aux_attributes; + + krb5_deltat max_renewable_life; + krb5_timestamp last_success; + krb5_timestamp last_failed; + krb5_kvno fail_auth_count; + int16_t n_key_data; + int16_t n_tl_data; + krb5_tl_data *tl_data; + krb5_key_data *key_data; +} kadm5_principal_ent_rec, *kadm5_principal_ent_t; + +typedef struct _kadm5_policy_ent_t { + char *policy; + + u_int32_t pw_min_life; + u_int32_t pw_max_life; + u_int32_t pw_min_length; + u_int32_t pw_min_classes; + u_int32_t pw_history_num; + u_int32_t policy_refcnt; +} kadm5_policy_ent_rec, *kadm5_policy_ent_t; + +#define KADM5_CONFIG_REALM (1 << 0) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_PROFILE (1 << 1) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT (1 << 2) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER (1 << 3) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_DBNAME (1 << 4) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADBNAME (1 << 5) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADB_LOCKFILE (1 << 6) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ACL_FILE (1 << 7) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_DICT_FILE (1 << 8) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_KEYTAB (1 << 9) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD (1 << 10) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_STASH_FILE (1 << 11) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MKEY_NAME (1 << 12) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ENCTYPE (1 << 13) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MAX_LIFE (1 << 14) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MAX_RLIFE (1 << 15) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_EXPIRATION (1 << 16) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_FLAGS (1 << 17) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ENCTYPES (1 << 18) + +#define KADM5_PRIV_GET (1 << 0) +#define KADM5_PRIV_ADD (1 << 1) +#define KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY (1 << 2) +#define KADM5_PRIV_DELETE (1 << 3) +#define KADM5_PRIV_LIST (1 << 4) +#define KADM5_PRIV_CPW (1 << 5) +#define KADM5_PRIV_ALL (KADM5_PRIV_GET | KADM5_PRIV_ADD | KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY | KADM5_PRIV_DELETE | KADM5_PRIV_LIST | KADM5_PRIV_CPW) + +typedef struct { + int XXX; +}krb5_key_salt_tuple; + +typedef struct _kadm5_config_params { + u_int32_t mask; + + /* Client and server fields */ + char *realm; + int kadmind_port; + + /* client fields */ + char *admin_server; + + /* server fields */ + char *dbname; + char *acl_file; + + /* server library (database) fields */ + char *stash_file; +} kadm5_config_params; + +typedef krb5_error_code kadm5_ret_t; + +#include "kadm5-protos.h" + +#if 0 +/* unimplemented functions */ +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_decrypt_key(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, int32_t + ktype, int32_t stype, int32_t + kvno, krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_keysalt *keysalt, int *kvnop); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_policy(void *server_handle, + kadm5_policy_ent_t policy, u_int32_t mask); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy); + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_policy(void *server_handle, + kadm5_policy_ent_t policy, + u_int32_t mask); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy, kadm5_policy_ent_t ent); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policies(void *server_handle, char *exp, + char ***pols, int *count); + +void +kadm5_free_policy_ent(kadm5_policy_ent_t policy); + +#endif + +#endif /* __KADM5_ADMIN_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/bump_pw_expire.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/bump_pw_expire.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a185c20daf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/bump_pw_expire.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: bump_pw_expire.c,v 1.1 2000/07/24 03:47:54 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * extend password_expiration if it's defined + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_bump_pw_expire(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + if (ent->pw_end != NULL) { + time_t life; + + life = krb5_config_get_time_default(context->context, + NULL, + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60, + "kadmin", + "password_lifetime", + NULL); + + *(ent->pw_end) = time(NULL) + life; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/chpass_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/chpass_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b06b8cd2a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/chpass_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: chpass_c.c,v 1.5 2000/07/11 15:59:14 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_chpass); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + krb5_store_string(sp, password); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_chpass_principal_with_key(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + int n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + int i; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_chpass_with_key); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, n_key_data); + for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; ++i) + kadm5_store_key_data (sp, &key_data[i]); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1a4b4395d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: chpass_s.c,v 1.13.8.1 2003/12/30 15:59:58 lha Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +change(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password, + int cond) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + Key *keys; + size_t num_keys; + int cmp = 1; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + goto out; + + num_keys = ent.keys.len; + keys = ent.keys.val; + + ent.keys.len = 0; + ent.keys.val = NULL; + + ret = _kadm5_set_keys(context, &ent, password); + if(ret) { + _kadm5_free_keys (server_handle, num_keys, keys); + goto out2; + } + if (cond) + cmp = _kadm5_cmp_keys (ent.keys.val, ent.keys.len, + keys, num_keys); + _kadm5_free_keys (server_handle, num_keys, keys); + + if (cmp == 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context->context, "Password reuse forbidden"); + ret = KADM5_PASS_REUSE; + goto out2; + } + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + ret = _kadm5_bump_pw_expire(context, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + + + +/* + * change the password of `princ' to `password' if it's not already that. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal_cond(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + return change (server_handle, princ, password, 1); +} + +/* + * change the password of `princ' to `password' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + return change (server_handle, princ, password, 0); +} + +/* + * change keys for `princ' to `keys' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + int n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + goto out; + ret = _kadm5_set_keys2(context, &ent, n_key_data, key_data); + if(ret) + goto out2; + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + ret = _kadm5_bump_pw_expire(context, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/client_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/client_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..395577ddb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/client_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: client_glue.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_password(client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_skey(client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_creds(client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_creds_ctx(context, + client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/common_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/common_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b508282690 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/common_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common_glue.c,v 1.5 2000/03/23 22:58:26 assar Exp $"); + +#define __CALL(F, P) (*((kadm5_common_context*)server_handle)->funcs.F)P; + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + return __CALL(chpass_principal, (server_handle, princ, password)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + int n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + return __CALL(chpass_principal_with_key, + (server_handle, princ, n_key_data, key_data)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password) +{ + return __CALL(create_principal, (server_handle, princ, mask, password)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ) +{ + return __CALL(delete_principal, (server_handle, princ)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_destroy (void *server_handle) +{ + return __CALL(destroy, (server_handle)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_flush (void *server_handle) +{ + return __CALL(flush, (server_handle)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + return __CALL(get_principal, (server_handle, princ, out, mask)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + return __CALL(modify_principal, (server_handle, princ, mask)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + return __CALL(randkey_principal, (server_handle, princ, new_keys, n_keys)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_rename_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target) +{ + return __CALL(rename_principal, (server_handle, source, target)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principals(void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count) +{ + return __CALL(get_principals, (server_handle, exp, princs, count)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_privs(void *server_handle, + u_int32_t *privs) +{ + return __CALL(get_privs, (server_handle, privs)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/context_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/context_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a5a78e6bab --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/context_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: context_s.c,v 1.17 2002/08/26 13:28:36 assar Exp $"); + +static void +set_funcs(kadm5_server_context *c) +{ +#define SET(C, F) (C)->funcs.F = kadm5_s_ ## F + SET(c, chpass_principal); + SET(c, chpass_principal_with_key); + SET(c, create_principal); + SET(c, delete_principal); + SET(c, destroy); + SET(c, flush); + SET(c, get_principal); + SET(c, get_principals); + SET(c, get_privs); + SET(c, modify_principal); + SET(c, randkey_principal); + SET(c, rename_principal); +} + +struct database_spec { + char *dbpath; + char *logfile; + char *mkeyfile; + char *aclfile; +}; + +static void +set_field(krb5_context context, krb5_config_binding *binding, + const char *dbname, const char *name, const char *ext, + char **variable) +{ + const char *p; + + if (*variable != NULL) + free (*variable); + + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, binding, name, NULL); + if(p) + *variable = strdup(p); + else { + p = strrchr(dbname, '.'); + if(p == NULL) + asprintf(variable, "%s.%s", dbname, ext); + else + asprintf(variable, "%.*s.%s", (int)(p - dbname), dbname, ext); + } +} + +static void +set_socket_name(const char *dbname, struct sockaddr_un *un) +{ + const char *p; + memset(un, 0, sizeof(*un)); + un->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + p = strrchr(dbname, '.'); + if(p == NULL) + snprintf(un->sun_path, sizeof(un->sun_path), "%s.signal", + dbname); + else + snprintf(un->sun_path, sizeof(un->sun_path), "%.*s.signal", + (int)(p - dbname), dbname); +} + +static void +set_config(kadm5_server_context *ctx, + krb5_config_binding *binding) +{ + const char *p; + if(ctx->config.dbname == NULL) { + p = krb5_config_get_string(ctx->context, binding, "dbname", NULL); + if(p) + ctx->config.dbname = strdup(p); + else + ctx->config.dbname = strdup(HDB_DEFAULT_DB); + } + if(ctx->log_context.log_file == NULL) + set_field(ctx->context, binding, ctx->config.dbname, + "log_file", "log", &ctx->log_context.log_file); + set_socket_name(ctx->config.dbname, &ctx->log_context.socket_name); + if(ctx->config.acl_file == NULL) + set_field(ctx->context, binding, ctx->config.dbname, + "acl_file", "acl", &ctx->config.acl_file); + if(ctx->config.stash_file == NULL) + set_field(ctx->context, binding, ctx->config.dbname, + "mkey_file", "mkey", &ctx->config.stash_file); +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +find_db_spec(kadm5_server_context *ctx) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *top_binding = NULL; + krb5_config_binding *db_binding; + krb5_config_binding *default_binding = NULL; + krb5_context context = ctx->context; + + while((db_binding = (krb5_config_binding *) + krb5_config_get_next(context, + NULL, + &top_binding, + krb5_config_list, + "kdc", + "database", + NULL))) { + const char *p; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "realm", NULL); + if(p == NULL) { + if(default_binding) { + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: more than one realm-less " + "database specification"); + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: using the first encountered"); + } else + default_binding = db_binding; + continue; + } + if(strcmp(ctx->config.realm, p) != 0) + continue; + + set_config(ctx, db_binding); + return 0; + } + if(default_binding) + set_config(ctx, default_binding); + else { + ctx->config.dbname = strdup(HDB_DEFAULT_DB); + ctx->config.acl_file = strdup(HDB_DB_DIR "/kadmind.acl"); + ctx->config.stash_file = strdup(HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"); + ctx->log_context.log_file = strdup(HDB_DB_DIR "/log"); + memset(&ctx->log_context.socket_name, 0, + sizeof(ctx->log_context.socket_name)); + ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_path, + KADM5_LOG_SIGNAL, + sizeof(ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_path)); + } + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_s_init_context(kadm5_server_context **ctx, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_context context) +{ + *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); + if(*ctx == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); + set_funcs(*ctx); + (*ctx)->context = context; + krb5_add_et_list (context, initialize_kadm5_error_table_r); +#define is_set(M) (params && params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_ ## M) + if(is_set(REALM)) + (*ctx)->config.realm = strdup(params->realm); + else + krb5_get_default_realm(context, &(*ctx)->config.realm); + if(is_set(DBNAME)) + (*ctx)->config.dbname = strdup(params->dbname); + if(is_set(ACL_FILE)) + (*ctx)->config.acl_file = strdup(params->acl_file); + if(is_set(STASH_FILE)) + (*ctx)->config.stash_file = strdup(params->stash_file); + + find_db_spec(*ctx); + + /* PROFILE can't be specified for now */ + /* KADMIND_PORT is supposed to be used on the server also, + but this doesn't make sense */ + /* ADMIN_SERVER is client only */ + /* ADNAME is not used at all (as far as I can tell) */ + /* ADB_LOCKFILE ditto */ + /* DICT_FILE */ + /* ADMIN_KEYTAB */ + /* MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD is not supported */ + /* MKEY_NAME neither */ + /* ENCTYPE */ + /* MAX_LIFE */ + /* MAX_RLIFE */ + /* EXPIRATION */ + /* FLAGS */ + /* ENCTYPES */ + + return 0; +} + +HDB * +_kadm5_s_get_db(void *server_handle) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + return context->db; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/create_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/create_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d81cb3c55 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/create_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: create_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 15:59:21 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_create); + kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + krb5_store_string(sp, password); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/create_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/create_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..287211b332 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/create_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: create_s.c,v 1.19 2001/01/30 01:24:28 assar Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +get_default(kadm5_server_context *context, krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t def) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_principal def_principal; + krb5_realm *realm = krb5_princ_realm(context->context, princ); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context->context, &def_principal, + *realm, "default", NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_s_get_principal(context, def_principal, def, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, def_principal); + return ret; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +create_principal(kadm5_server_context *context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t required_mask, + u_int32_t forbidden_mask) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec defrec, *defent; + u_int32_t def_mask; + + if((mask & required_mask) != required_mask) + return KADM5_BAD_MASK; + if((mask & forbidden_mask)) + return KADM5_BAD_MASK; + if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && strcmp(princ->policy, "default")) + /* XXX no real policies for now */ + return KADM5_UNK_POLICY; + memset(ent, 0, sizeof(*ent)); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, princ->principal, + &ent->principal); + if(ret) + return ret; + + defent = &defrec; + ret = get_default(context, princ->principal, defent); + if(ret) { + defent = NULL; + def_mask = 0; + } else { + def_mask = KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_MAX_LIFE | KADM5_MAX_RLIFE; + } + + ret = _kadm5_setup_entry(context, + ent, mask | def_mask, + princ, mask, + defent, def_mask); + if(defent) + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, defent); + + ent->created_by.time = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, context->caller, + &ent->created_by.principal); + + return ret; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + + ret = create_principal(context, princ, mask, &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KEY_DATA, + KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE | KADM5_MOD_TIME + | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MKVNO + | KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES + | KADM5_POLICY_CLR | KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS + | KADM5_LAST_FAILED | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT); + if(ret) + goto out; + + ret = _kadm5_set_keys2(context, &ent, princ->n_key_data, princ->key_data); + if(ret) + goto out; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out; + + kadm5_log_create (context, &ent); + + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + + ret = create_principal(context, princ, mask, &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL, + KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE | KADM5_MOD_TIME + | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MKVNO + | KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_KEY_DATA + | KADM5_POLICY_CLR | KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS + | KADM5_LAST_FAILED | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT); + if(ret) + goto out; + + /* XXX this should be fixed */ + ent.keys.len = 4; + ent.keys.val = calloc(ent.keys.len, sizeof(*ent.keys.val)); + ent.keys.val[0].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + /* flag as version 4 compatible salt; ignored by _kadm5_set_keys + if we don't want to be compatible */ + ent.keys.val[0].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[0].salt)); + ent.keys.val[0].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ent.keys.val[1].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[1].salt)); + ent.keys.val[1].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + ent.keys.val[2].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[2].salt)); + ent.keys.val[2].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[3].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1; + ret = _kadm5_set_keys(context, &ent, password); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out; + + kadm5_log_create (context, &ent); + + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/delete_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/delete_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7575c5e438 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/delete_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: delete_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 15:59:29 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_delete_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_delete); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if (ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if(sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/delete_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/delete_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f2bf881d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/delete_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: delete_s.c,v 1.9 2001/01/30 01:24:28 assar Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_delete_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context->context, ret, "opening database"); + return ret; + } + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + goto out2; + if(ent.flags.immutable) { + ret = KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out; + + kadm5_log_delete (context, princ); + + ret = context->db->remove(context->context, context->db, &ent); +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out2: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/destroy_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/destroy_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b42c84ce79 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/destroy_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: destroy_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_destroy(void *server_handle) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + + free(context->realm); + free(context->admin_server); + close(context->sock); + if (context->ac != NULL) + krb5_auth_con_free(context->context, context->ac); + if(context->my_context) + krb5_free_context(context->context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a8ad3285d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: destroy_s.c,v 1.6 2000/05/12 15:23:13 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * dealloc a `kadm5_config_params' + */ + +static void +destroy_config (kadm5_config_params *c) +{ + free (c->realm); + free (c->dbname); + free (c->acl_file); + free (c->stash_file); +} + +/* + * dealloc a kadm5_log_context + */ + +static void +destroy_kadm5_log_context (kadm5_log_context *c) +{ + free (c->log_file); + close (c->socket_fd); +} + +/* + * destroy a kadm5 handle + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_destroy(void *server_handle) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + krb5_context kcontext = context->context; + + ret = context->db->destroy(kcontext, context->db); + destroy_kadm5_log_context (&context->log_context); + destroy_config (&context->config); + krb5_free_principal (kcontext, context->caller); + if(context->my_context) + krb5_free_context(kcontext); + free (context); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/dump_log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/dump_log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8309fb5ac --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/dump_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" +#include "parse_time.h" + +RCSID("$Id: dump_log.c,v 1.13 2003/04/16 17:56:02 lha Exp $"); + +static char *op_names[] = { + "get", + "delete", + "create", + "rename", + "chpass", + "modify", + "randkey", + "get_privs", + "get_princs", + "chpass_with_key", + "nop" +}; + +static void +print_entry(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + char t[256]; + int32_t mask; + hdb_entry ent; + krb5_principal source; + char *name1, *name2; + krb5_data data; + krb5_context context = server_context->context; + + off_t end = krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) + len; + + krb5_error_code ret; + + strftime(t, sizeof(t), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", localtime(×tamp)); + + if(op < kadm_get || op > kadm_nop) { + printf("unknown op: %d\n", op); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, end, SEEK_SET); + return; + } + + printf ("%s: ver = %u, timestamp = %s, len = %u\n", + op_names[op], ver, t, len); + switch(op) { + case kadm_delete: + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &source); + krb5_unparse_name(context, source, &name1); + printf(" %s\n", name1); + free(name1); + krb5_free_principal(context, source); + break; + case kadm_rename: + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&data, len); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm_rename: data alloc: %d", len); + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &source); + krb5_storage_read(sp, data.data, data.length); + hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &ent); + krb5_unparse_name(context, source, &name1); + krb5_unparse_name(context, ent.principal, &name2); + printf(" %s -> %s\n", name1, name2); + free(name1); + free(name2); + krb5_free_principal(context, source); + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + break; + case kadm_create: + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&data, len); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm_create: data alloc: %d", len); + krb5_storage_read(sp, data.data, data.length); + ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &ent); + if(ret) + abort(); + mask = ~0; + goto foo; + case kadm_modify: + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&data, len); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm_modify: data alloc: %d", len); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + krb5_storage_read(sp, data.data, data.length); + ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &ent); + if(ret) + abort(); + foo: + if(ent.principal /* mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL */) { + krb5_unparse_name(context, ent.principal, &name1); + printf(" principal = %s\n", name1); + free(name1); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if(ent.valid_end == NULL) { + strcpy(t, "never"); + } else { + strftime(t, sizeof(t), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", + localtime(ent.valid_end)); + } + printf(" expires = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if(ent.pw_end == NULL) { + strcpy(t, "never"); + } else { + strftime(t, sizeof(t), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", + localtime(ent.pw_end)); + } + printf(" password exp = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) { + } + if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + unparse_flags(HDBFlags2int(ent.flags), + HDBFlags_units, t, sizeof(t)); + printf(" attributes = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(ent.max_life == NULL) + strcpy(t, "for ever"); + else + unparse_time(*ent.max_life, t, sizeof(t)); + printf(" max life = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(ent.max_renew == NULL) + strcpy(t, "for ever"); + else + unparse_time(*ent.max_renew, t, sizeof(t)); + printf(" max rlife = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + printf(" mod time\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + printf(" mod name\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_KVNO) { + printf(" kvno = %d\n", ent.kvno); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + printf(" mkvno\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) { + printf(" aux attributes\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + printf(" policy\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) { + printf(" mod time\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { + printf(" last success\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { + printf(" last failed\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + printf(" fail auth count\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + printf(" key data\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + printf(" tl data\n"); + } + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + break; + case kadm_nop : + break; + default: + abort(); + } + krb5_storage_seek(sp, end, SEEK_SET); +} + +static char *realm; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_init"); + + ret = kadm5_log_foreach (server_context, print_entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_foreach"); + + ret = kadm5_log_end (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_end"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29fab740ba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ent_setup.c,v 1.12 2000/03/23 23:02:35 assar Exp $"); + +#define set_value(X, V) do { if((X) == NULL) (X) = malloc(sizeof(*(X))); *(X) = V; } while(0) +#define set_null(X) do { if((X) != NULL) free((X)); (X) = NULL; } while (0) + +static void +attr_to_flags(unsigned attr, HDBFlags *flags) +{ + flags->postdate = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED); + flags->forwardable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE); + flags->initial = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED); + flags->renewable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE); + flags->proxiable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE); + /* DUP_SKEY */ + flags->invalid = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + flags->require_preauth = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + /* HW_AUTH */ + flags->server = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR); + flags->change_pw = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE); + flags->client = 1; /* XXX */ +} + +/* + * Create the hdb entry `ent' based on data from `princ' with + * `princ_mask' specifying what fields to be gotten from there and + * `mask' specifying what fields we want filled in. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_setup_entry(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t princ_mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t def, + u_int32_t def_mask) +{ + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME + && princ_mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if (princ->princ_expire_time) + set_value(ent->valid_end, princ->princ_expire_time); + else + set_null(ent->valid_end); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION + && princ_mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if (princ->pw_expiration) + set_value(ent->pw_end, princ->pw_expiration); + else + set_null(ent->pw_end); + } + if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + if (princ_mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + attr_to_flags(princ->attributes, &ent->flags); + } else if(def_mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + attr_to_flags(def->attributes, &ent->flags); + ent->flags.invalid = 0; + } else { + ent->flags.client = 1; + ent->flags.server = 1; + ent->flags.forwardable = 1; + ent->flags.proxiable = 1; + ent->flags.renewable = 1; + ent->flags.postdate = 1; + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(princ_mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(princ->max_life) + set_value(ent->max_life, princ->max_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_life); + } else if(def_mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(def->max_life) + set_value(ent->max_life, def->max_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_life); + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_KVNO + && princ_mask & KADM5_KVNO) + ent->kvno = princ->kvno; + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(princ_mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(princ->max_renewable_life) + set_value(ent->max_renew, princ->max_renewable_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_renew); + } else if(def_mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(def->max_renewable_life) + set_value(ent->max_renew, def->max_renewable_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_renew); + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA + && princ_mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + _kadm5_set_keys2(context, ent, princ->n_key_data, princ->key_data); + } + if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + /* XXX */ + } + if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + /* XXX */ + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/error.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11b1ded7d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: error.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_error_code(kadm5_ret_t code) +{ + switch(code){ + case HDB_ERR_EXISTS: + return KADM5_DUP; + case HDB_ERR_NOENTRY: + return KADM5_UNK_PRINC; + } + return code; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4808259de7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: flush.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01cdcf723a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: flush_c.c,v 1.1 1999/03/23 18:23:36 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dffbe2f2ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/flush_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: flush_s.c,v 1.1 1999/03/23 18:23:37 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/free.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fcc1e70f0d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/free.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: free.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +void +kadm5_free_key_data(void *server_handle, + int16_t *n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < *n_key_data; i++){ + if(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0]){ + memset(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], + 0, + key_data[i].key_data_length[0]); + free(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0]); + } + if(key_data[i].key_data_contents[1]) + free(key_data[i].key_data_contents[1]); + } + *n_key_data = 0; +} + + +void +kadm5_free_principal_ent(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + if(princ->principal) + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ->principal); + if(princ->mod_name) + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ->mod_name); + kadm5_free_key_data(server_handle, &princ->n_key_data, princ->key_data); + while(princ->n_tl_data && princ->tl_data) { + krb5_tl_data *tp; + tp = princ->tl_data; + princ->tl_data = tp->tl_data_next; + princ->n_tl_data--; + memset(tp->tl_data_contents, 0, tp->tl_data_length); + free(tp->tl_data_contents); + free(tp); + } + if (princ->key_data != NULL) + free (princ->key_data); +} + +void +kadm5_free_name_list(void *server_handle, + char **names, + int *count) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < *count; i++) + free(names[i]); + free(names); + *count = 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..279a77aa6b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_c.c,v 1.6 2000/07/11 15:59:36 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_get); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if (ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0) + kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_princs_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_princs_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3536cdfc5f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_princs_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_princs_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 16:00:19 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principals(void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_get_princs); + krb5_store_int32(sp, exp != NULL); + if(exp) + krb5_store_string(sp, exp); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0) { + int i; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + *princs = calloc(tmp + 1, sizeof(**princs)); + if (*princs == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for(i = 0; i < tmp; i++) + krb5_ret_string(sp, &(*princs)[i]); + *count = tmp; + } +out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2702bae461 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_princs_s.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +struct foreach_data { + const char *exp; + char *exp2; + char **princs; + int count; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +add_princ(struct foreach_data *d, char *princ) +{ + char **tmp; + tmp = realloc(d->princs, (d->count + 1) * sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + d->princs = tmp; + d->princs[d->count++] = princ; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +foreach(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent, void *data) +{ + struct foreach_data *d = data; + char *princ; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &princ); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(d->exp){ + if(fnmatch(d->exp, princ, 0) == 0 || fnmatch(d->exp2, princ, 0) == 0) + ret = add_princ(d, princ); + else + free(princ); + }else{ + ret = add_princ(d, princ); + } + if(ret) + free(princ); + return ret; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principals(void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count) +{ + struct foreach_data d; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context->context, ret, "opening database"); + return ret; + } + d.exp = exp; + { + krb5_realm r; + krb5_get_default_realm(context->context, &r); + asprintf(&d.exp2, "%s@%s", exp, r); + free(r); + } + d.princs = NULL; + d.count = 0; + ret = hdb_foreach(context->context, context->db, 0, foreach, &d); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + if(ret == 0) + ret = add_princ(&d, NULL); + if(ret == 0){ + *princs = d.princs; + *count = d.count - 1; + }else + kadm5_free_name_list(context, d.princs, &d.count); + free(d.exp2); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08519009c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/get_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_s.c,v 1.13 2000/06/19 16:11:31 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + if(ret) + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); + if(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, ent.principal, + &out->principal); + if(ret) + goto out; + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME && ent.valid_end) + out->princ_expire_time = *ent.valid_end; + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION && ent.pw_end) + out->pw_expiration = *ent.pw_end; + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES){ + out->attributes |= ent.flags.postdate ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.forwardable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.initial ? KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED : 0; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.renewable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.proxiable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.invalid ? KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX : 0; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.require_preauth ? KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH : 0; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.server ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.change_pw ? KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE : 0; + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(ent.max_life) + out->max_life = *ent.max_life; + else + out->max_life = INT_MAX; + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + if(ent.modified_by) + out->mod_date = ent.modified_by->time; + else + out->mod_date = ent.created_by.time; + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + if(ent.modified_by) { + if (ent.modified_by->principal != NULL) + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, + ent.modified_by->principal, + &out->mod_name); + } else if(ent.created_by.principal != NULL) + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, + ent.created_by.principal, + &out->mod_name); + else + out->mod_name = NULL; + } + if(ret) + goto out; + + if(mask & KADM5_KVNO) + out->kvno = ent.kvno; + if(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + int n; + out->mkvno = 0; /* XXX */ + for(n = 0; n < ent.keys.len; n++) + if(ent.keys.val[n].mkvno) { + out->mkvno = *ent.keys.val[n].mkvno; /* XXX this isn't right */ + break; + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_POLICY) + out->policy = NULL; + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(ent.max_renew) + out->max_renewable_life = *ent.max_renew; + else + out->max_renewable_life = INT_MAX; + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA){ + int i; + Key *key; + krb5_key_data *kd; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_data *sp; + krb5_get_pw_salt(context->context, ent.principal, &salt); + out->key_data = malloc(ent.keys.len * sizeof(*out->key_data)); + for(i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; i++){ + key = &ent.keys.val[i]; + kd = &out->key_data[i]; + kd->key_data_ver = 2; + kd->key_data_kvno = ent.kvno; + kd->key_data_type[0] = key->key.keytype; + if(key->salt) + kd->key_data_type[1] = key->salt->type; + else + kd->key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; + /* setup key */ + kd->key_data_length[0] = key->key.keyvalue.length; + kd->key_data_contents[0] = malloc(kd->key_data_length[0]); + if(kd->key_data_contents[0] == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + break; + } + memcpy(kd->key_data_contents[0], key->key.keyvalue.data, + kd->key_data_length[0]); + /* setup salt */ + if(key->salt) + sp = &key->salt->salt; + else + sp = &salt.saltvalue; + kd->key_data_length[1] = sp->length; + kd->key_data_contents[1] = malloc(kd->key_data_length[1]); + if(kd->key_data_length[1] != 0 + && kd->key_data_contents[1] == NULL) { + memset(kd->key_data_contents[0], 0, kd->key_data_length[0]); + ret = ENOMEM; + break; + } + memcpy(kd->key_data_contents[1], sp->data, kd->key_data_length[1]); + out->n_key_data = i + 1; + } + krb5_free_salt(context->context, salt); + } + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out); + goto out; + } + if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) + /* XXX implement */; +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); + + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/init_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/init_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..05b7adb343 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/init_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,716 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: init_c.c,v 1.45.2.1 2003/12/21 22:48:13 lha Exp $"); + +static void +set_funcs(kadm5_client_context *c) +{ +#define SET(C, F) (C)->funcs.F = kadm5 ## _c_ ## F + SET(c, chpass_principal); + SET(c, chpass_principal_with_key); + SET(c, create_principal); + SET(c, delete_principal); + SET(c, destroy); + SET(c, flush); + SET(c, get_principal); + SET(c, get_principals); + SET(c, get_privs); + SET(c, modify_principal); + SET(c, randkey_principal); + SET(c, rename_principal); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_c_init_context(kadm5_client_context **ctx, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_context context) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *colon; + + *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); + if(*ctx == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); + krb5_add_et_list (context, initialize_kadm5_error_table_r); + set_funcs(*ctx); + (*ctx)->context = context; + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM) { + ret = 0; + (*ctx)->realm = strdup(params->realm); + if ((*ctx)->realm == NULL) + ret = ENOMEM; + } else + ret = krb5_get_default_realm((*ctx)->context, &(*ctx)->realm); + if (ret) { + free(*ctx); + return ret; + } + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER) + (*ctx)->admin_server = strdup(params->admin_server); + else { + char **hostlist; + + ret = krb5_get_krb_admin_hst (context, &(*ctx)->realm, &hostlist); + if (ret) { + free((*ctx)->realm); + free(*ctx); + return ret; + } + (*ctx)->admin_server = strdup(*hostlist); + krb5_free_krbhst (context, hostlist); + } + + if ((*ctx)->admin_server == NULL) { + return ENOMEM; + free((*ctx)->realm); + free(*ctx); + } + colon = strchr ((*ctx)->admin_server, ':'); + if (colon != NULL) + *colon++ = '\0'; + + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = 0; + + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT) + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = params->kadmind_port; + else if (colon != NULL) { + char *end; + + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = htons(strtol (colon, &end, 0)); + } + if ((*ctx)->kadmind_port == 0) + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos-adm", + "tcp", 749); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_kadm_ticket(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal client, + const char *server_name) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds in, *out; + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + in.client = client; + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, server_name, &in.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, id, &in, &out); + if(ret == 0) + krb5_free_creds(context, out); + krb5_free_principal(context, in.server); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_new_cache(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + const char *server_name, + krb5_ccache *ret_cache) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_ccache id; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(context, "kadmin", + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, + client), + &opt); + + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable (&opt, FALSE); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (&opt, FALSE); + + if(password == NULL && prompter == NULL) { + krb5_keytab kt; + if(keytab == NULL) + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &kt); + else + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab, &kt); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab (context, + &cred, + client, + kt, + 0, + server_name, + &opt); + krb5_kt_close(context, kt); + } else { + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + client, + password, + prompter, + NULL, + 0, + server_name, + &opt); + } + switch(ret){ + case 0: + break; + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR: /* don't print anything if it was just C-c:ed */ + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: + return KADM5_BAD_PASSWORD; + default: + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &id); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, id, cred.client); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, id, &cred); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + *ret_cache = id; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_cache(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *server_name, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_ccache *ret_cache) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id = NULL; + krb5_principal default_client = NULL, client = NULL; + + /* treat empty password as NULL */ + if(password && *password == '\0') + password = NULL; + if(server_name == NULL) + server_name = KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE; + + if(client_name != NULL) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, client_name, &client); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + if(password != NULL || prompter != NULL) { + /* get principal from default cache, ok if this doesn't work */ + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, id, &default_client); + if(ret) { + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + id = NULL; + } else { + const char *name, *inst; + krb5_principal tmp; + name = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, + default_client, 0); + inst = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, + default_client, 1); + if(inst == NULL || strcmp(inst, "admin") != 0) { + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &tmp, NULL, + name, "admin", NULL); + if(ret != 0) { + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + return ret; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + default_client = tmp; + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + id = NULL; + } + } + } + + if (client != NULL) { + /* A client was specified by the caller. */ + if (default_client != NULL) { + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + default_client = NULL; + } + } + else if (default_client != NULL) + /* No client was specified by the caller, but we have a + * client from the default credentials cache. + */ + client = default_client; + else { + /* No client was specified by the caller and we cannot determine + * the client from a credentials cache. + */ + const char *user; + + user = get_default_username (); + + if(user == NULL) + return KADM5_FAILURE; + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &client, + NULL, user, "admin", NULL); + if(ret) + return ret; + if (id != NULL) { + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + id = NULL; + } + } + } else if(ccache != NULL) + id = ccache; + + if(id && (default_client == NULL || + krb5_principal_compare(context, client, default_client))) { + ret = get_kadm_ticket(context, id, client, server_name); + if(ret == 0) { + *ret_cache = id; + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + if (default_client != client) + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + return 0; + } + if(ccache != NULL) + /* couldn't get ticket from cache */ + return -1; + } + /* get creds via AS request */ + if(id) + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + if (client != default_client) + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + + ret = get_new_cache(context, client, password, prompter, keytab, + server_name, ret_cache); + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + return ret; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm_connect(kadm5_client_context *ctx) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_ccache cc; + int s; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + char *hostname, *slash; + char *service_name; + krb5_context context = ctx->context; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(ctx->kadmind_port)); + + hostname = ctx->admin_server; + slash = strchr (hostname, '/'); + if (slash != NULL) + hostname = slash + 1; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return KADM5_BAD_SERVER_NAME; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + if (a == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + krb5_warnx (context, "failed to contact %s", hostname); + return KADM5_FAILURE; + } + ret = get_cred_cache(context, ctx->client_name, ctx->service_name, + NULL, ctx->prompter, ctx->keytab, + ctx->ccache, &cc); + + if(ret) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + close(s); + return ret; + } + + if (ctx->realm) + asprintf(&service_name, "%s@%s", KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, ctx->realm); + else + asprintf(&service_name, "%s", KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE); + + if (service_name == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + close(s); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, service_name, &server); + free(service_name); + if(ret) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if(ctx->ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, cc); + close(s); + return ret; + } + ctx->ac = NULL; + + ret = krb5_sendauth(context, &ctx->ac, &s, + KADMIN_APPL_VERSION, NULL, + server, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, NULL, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if(ret == 0) { + krb5_data params; + kadm5_config_params p; + memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p)); + if(ctx->realm) { + p.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + p.realm = ctx->realm; + } + ret = _kadm5_marshal_params(context, &p, ¶ms); + + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, ctx->ac, &s, ¶ms); + krb5_data_free(¶ms); + if(ret) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + close(s); + if(ctx->ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, cc); + return ret; + } + } else if(ret == KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS) { + close(s); + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return errno; + } + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (s); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return errno; + } + ret = krb5_sendauth(context, &ctx->ac, &s, + KADMIN_OLD_APPL_VERSION, NULL, + server, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, NULL, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if(ret) { + close(s); + return ret; + } + + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + if(ctx->ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, cc); + if(ret) { + close(s); + return ret; + } + ctx->sock = s; + + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_connect(void *handle) +{ + kadm5_client_context *ctx = handle; + if(ctx->sock == -1) + return kadm_connect(ctx); + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_context(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_client_context *ctx; + krb5_ccache cc; + + ret = _kadm5_c_init_context(&ctx, realm_params, context); + if(ret) + return ret; + + if(password != NULL && *password != '\0') { + ret = get_cred_cache(context, client_name, service_name, + password, prompter, keytab, ccache, &cc); + if(ret) + return ret; /* XXX */ + ccache = cc; + } + + + if (client_name != NULL) + ctx->client_name = strdup(client_name); + else + ctx->client_name = NULL; + if (service_name != NULL) + ctx->service_name = strdup(service_name); + else + ctx->service_name = NULL; + ctx->prompter = prompter; + ctx->keytab = keytab; + ctx->ccache = ccache; + /* maybe we should copy the params here */ + ctx->sock = -1; + + *server_handle = ctx; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +init_context(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + password, + prompter, + keytab, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return init_context(client_name, + password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + keytab, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return init_context(client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + keytab, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return init_context(client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +#if 0 +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init(char *client_name, char *pass, + char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/init_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/init_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf5d036d8f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/init_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_s.c,v 1.10 2000/12/31 08:01:16 assar Exp $"); + + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_context(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + ret = _kadm5_s_init_context(&ctx, realm_params, context); + if(ret) + return ret; + + assert(ctx->config.dbname != NULL); + assert(ctx->config.stash_file != NULL); + assert(ctx->config.acl_file != NULL); + assert(ctx->log_context.log_file != NULL); + assert(ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_path[0] != '\0'); + + ret = hdb_create(ctx->context, &ctx->db, ctx->config.dbname); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile (ctx->context, + ctx->db, ctx->config.stash_file); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ctx->log_context.log_fd = -1; + + ctx->log_context.socket_fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(ctx->context, client_name, &ctx->caller); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = _kadm5_acl_init(ctx); + if(ret) + return ret; + + *server_handle = ctx; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx(context, + client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/iprop.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/iprop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e02a9d604a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/iprop.h @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: iprop.h,v 1.7 2002/07/04 14:39:19 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __IPROP_H__ +#define __IPROP_H__ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" +#include /* _krb5_{get,put}_int */ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif + +#define IPROP_VERSION "iprop-0.0" + +#define KADM5_SLAVE_ACL HDB_DB_DIR "/slaves" + +#define KADM5_SLAVE_STATS HDB_DB_DIR "/slaves-stats" + +#define IPROP_NAME "iprop" + +#define IPROP_SERVICE "iprop" + +#define IPROP_PORT 2121 + +enum iprop_cmd { I_HAVE = 1, + FOR_YOU = 2, + TELL_YOU_EVERYTHING = 3, + ONE_PRINC = 4, + NOW_YOU_HAVE = 5 +}; + +#endif /* __IPROP_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..537d403195 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c @@ -0,0 +1,638 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: ipropd_master.c,v 1.29 2003/03/19 11:56:38 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_log_facility *log_facility; + +const char *slave_stats_file = KADM5_SLAVE_STATS; + +static int +make_signal_socket (krb5_context context) +{ + struct sockaddr_un addr; + int fd; + + fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket AF_UNIX"); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy (addr.sun_path, KADM5_LOG_SIGNAL, sizeof(addr.sun_path)); + unlink (addr.sun_path); + if (bind (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "bind %s", addr.sun_path); + return fd; +} + +static int +make_listen_socket (krb5_context context) +{ + int fd; + int one = 1; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + + fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket AF_INET"); + setsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&one, sizeof(one)); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr.sin_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, + IPROP_SERVICE, "tcp", IPROP_PORT); + if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "bind"); + if (listen(fd, SOMAXCONN) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "listen"); + return fd; +} + +struct slave { + int fd; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + char *name; + krb5_auth_context ac; + u_int32_t version; + time_t seen; + unsigned long flags; +#define SLAVE_F_DEAD 0x1 + struct slave *next; +}; + +typedef struct slave slave; + +static int +check_acl (krb5_context context, const char *name) +{ + FILE *fp; + char buf[256]; + int ret = 1; + + fp = fopen (KADM5_SLAVE_ACL, "r"); + if (fp == NULL) + return 1; + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) { + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1 ] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1 ] = '\0'; + if (strcmp (buf, name) == 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + fclose (fp); + return ret; +} + +static void +slave_seen(slave *s) +{ + s->seen = time(NULL); +} + +static void +slave_dead(slave *s) +{ + if (s->fd >= 0) { + close (s->fd); + s->fd = -1; + } + s->flags |= SLAVE_F_DEAD; + slave_seen(s); +} + +static void +remove_slave (krb5_context context, slave *s, slave **root) +{ + slave **p; + + if (s->fd >= 0) + close (s->fd); + if (s->name) + free (s->name); + if (s->ac) + krb5_auth_con_free (context, s->ac); + + for (p = root; *p; p = &(*p)->next) + if (*p == s) { + *p = s->next; + break; + } + free (s); +} + +static void +add_slave (krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab, slave **root, int fd) +{ + krb5_principal server; + krb5_error_code ret; + slave *s; + socklen_t addr_len; + krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; + char hostname[128]; + + s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + if (s == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "add_slave: no memory"); + return; + } + s->name = NULL; + s->ac = NULL; + + addr_len = sizeof(s->addr); + s->fd = accept (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&s->addr, &addr_len); + if (s->fd < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "accept"); + goto error; + } + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, hostname, IPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + goto error; + } + + ret = krb5_recvauth (context, &s->ac, &s->fd, + IPROP_VERSION, server, 0, keytab, &ticket); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + goto error; + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, ticket->client, &s->name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + goto error; + } + if (check_acl (context, s->name)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "%s not in acl", s->name); + goto error; + } + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + ticket = NULL; + + { + slave *l = *root; + + while (l) { + if (strcmp(l->name, s->name) == 0) + break; + l = l->next; + } + if (l) { + if (l->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) { + remove_slave(context, l, root); + } else { + krb5_warnx (context, "second connection from %s", s->name); + goto error; + } + } + } + + krb5_warnx (context, "connection from %s", s->name); + + s->version = 0; + s->flags = 0; + slave_seen(s); + s->next = *root; + *root = s; + return; +error: + remove_slave(context, s, root); +} + +struct prop_context { + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + int fd; +}; + +static int +prop_one (krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *v) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + struct slave *slave = (struct slave *)v; + + ret = hdb_entry2value (context, entry, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_data_realloc (&data, data.length + 4); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&data); + return ret; + } + memmove ((char *)data.data + 4, data.data, data.length - 4); + _krb5_put_int (data.data, ONE_PRINC, 4); + + ret = krb5_write_priv_message (context, slave->ac, &slave->fd, &data); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return ret; +} + +static int +send_complete (krb5_context context, slave *s, + const char *database, u_int32_t current_version) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + HDB *db; + krb5_data data; + char buf[8]; + + ret = hdb_create (context, &db, database); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "hdb_create: %s", database); + ret = db->open (context, db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + + _krb5_put_int(buf, TELL_YOU_EVERYTHING, 4); + + data.data = buf; + data.length = 4; + + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, s->ac, &s->fd, &data); + + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message"); + slave_dead(s); + return ret; + } + + ret = hdb_foreach (context, db, 0, prop_one, s); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "hdb_foreach"); + slave_dead(s); + return ret; + } + + _krb5_put_int (buf, NOW_YOU_HAVE, 4); + _krb5_put_int (buf + 4, current_version, 4); + data.length = 8; + + s->version = current_version; + + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, s->ac, &s->fd, &data); + if (ret) { + slave_dead(s); + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message"); + return ret; + } + + slave_seen(s); + + return 0; +} + +static int +send_diffs (krb5_context context, slave *s, int log_fd, + const char *database, u_int32_t current_version) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + u_int32_t ver; + time_t timestamp; + enum kadm_ops op; + u_int32_t len; + off_t right, left; + krb5_data data; + int ret = 0; + + if (s->version == current_version) + return 0; + + if (s->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) + return 0; + + sp = kadm5_log_goto_end (log_fd); + right = krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + for (;;) { + if (kadm5_log_previous (sp, &ver, ×tamp, &op, &len)) + abort (); + left = krb5_storage_seek(sp, -16, SEEK_CUR); + if (ver == s->version) + return 0; + if (ver == s->version + 1) + break; + if (left == 0) + return send_complete (context, s, database, current_version); + } + krb5_data_alloc (&data, right - left + 4); + krb5_storage_read (sp, (char *)data.data + 4, data.length - 4); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + _krb5_put_int(data.data, FOR_YOU, 4); + + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(context, s->ac, &s->fd, &data); + krb5_data_free(&data); + + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message"); + slave_dead(s); + return 1; + } + slave_seen(s); + + return 0; +} + +static int +process_msg (krb5_context context, slave *s, int log_fd, + const char *database, u_int32_t current_version) +{ + int ret = 0; + krb5_data out; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, s->ac, &s->fd, &out); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "error reading message from %s", s->name); + return 1; + } + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (out.data, out.length); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + switch (tmp) { + case I_HAVE : + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + s->version = tmp; + ret = send_diffs (context, s, log_fd, database, current_version); + break; + case FOR_YOU : + default : + krb5_warnx (context, "Ignoring command %d", tmp); + break; + } + + krb5_data_free (&out); + + slave_seen(s); + + return ret; +} + +#define SLAVE_NAME "Name" +#define SLAVE_ADDRESS "Address" +#define SLAVE_VERSION "Version" +#define SLAVE_STATUS "Status" +#define SLAVE_SEEN "Last Seen" + +static void +write_stats(krb5_context context, slave *slaves, u_int32_t current_version) +{ + char str[100]; + rtbl_t tbl; + time_t t = time(NULL); + FILE *fp; + + fp = fopen(slave_stats_file, "w"); + if (fp == NULL) + return; + + strftime(str, sizeof(str), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", + localtime(&t)); + fprintf(fp, "Status for slaves, last updated: %s\n\n", str); + + fprintf(fp, "Master version: %lu\n\n", (unsigned long)current_version); + + tbl = rtbl_create(); + if (tbl == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + return; + } + + rtbl_add_column(tbl, SLAVE_NAME, 0); + rtbl_add_column(tbl, SLAVE_ADDRESS, 0); + rtbl_add_column(tbl, SLAVE_VERSION, RTBL_ALIGN_RIGHT); + rtbl_add_column(tbl, SLAVE_STATUS, 0); + rtbl_add_column(tbl, SLAVE_SEEN, 0); + + rtbl_set_prefix(tbl, " "); + rtbl_set_column_prefix(tbl, SLAVE_NAME, ""); + + while (slaves) { + krb5_address addr; + krb5_error_code ret; + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_NAME, slaves->name); + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, + (struct sockaddr*)&slaves->addr, &addr); + if(ret == 0) { + krb5_print_address(&addr, str, sizeof(str), NULL); + krb5_free_address(context, &addr); + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_ADDRESS, str); + } else + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_ADDRESS, ""); + + snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%u", (unsigned)slaves->version); + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_VERSION, str); + + if (slaves->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_STATUS, "Down"); + else + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_STATUS, "Up"); + + if (strftime(str, sizeof(str), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z", + localtime(&slaves->seen)) == 0) + strlcpy(str, "Unknown time", sizeof(str)); + rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_SEEN, str); + + slaves = slaves->next; + } + + rtbl_format(tbl, fp); + rtbl_destroy(tbl); + + fclose(fp); +} + + +static char *realm; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +static char *keytab_str = "HDB:"; +static char *database; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &keytab_str, + "keytab to get authentication from", "kspec" }, + { "database", 'd', arg_string, &database, "database", "file"}, + { "slave-stats-file", 0, arg_string, &slave_stats_file, "file"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + int signal_fd, listen_fd; + int log_fd; + slave *slaves = NULL; + u_int32_t current_version, old_version = 0; + krb5_keytab keytab; + int optind; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + pidfile (NULL); + krb5_openlog (context, "ipropd-master", &log_facility); + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, log_facility); + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve: %s", keytab_str); + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + ret = kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + log_fd = open (server_context->log_context.log_file, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (log_fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "open %s", + server_context->log_context.log_file); + + signal_fd = make_signal_socket (context); + listen_fd = make_listen_socket (context); + + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + for (;;) { + slave *p; + fd_set readset; + int max_fd = 0; + struct timeval to = {30, 0}; + u_int32_t vers; + + if (signal_fd >= FD_SETSIZE || listen_fd >= FD_SETSIZE) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "fd too large"); + + FD_ZERO(&readset); + FD_SET(signal_fd, &readset); + max_fd = max(max_fd, signal_fd); + FD_SET(listen_fd, &readset); + max_fd = max(max_fd, listen_fd); + + for (p = slaves; p != NULL; p = p->next) { + if (p->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) + continue; + FD_SET(p->fd, &readset); + max_fd = max(max_fd, p->fd); + } + + ret = select (max_fd + 1, + &readset, NULL, NULL, &to); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "select"); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + old_version = current_version; + kadm5_log_get_version_fd (log_fd, ¤t_version); + + if (current_version > old_version) + for (p = slaves; p != NULL; p = p->next) { + if (p->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) + continue; + send_diffs (context, p, log_fd, database, current_version); + } + } + + if (ret && FD_ISSET(signal_fd, &readset)) { + struct sockaddr_un peer_addr; + socklen_t peer_len = sizeof(peer_addr); + + if(recvfrom(signal_fd, (void *)&vers, sizeof(vers), 0, + (struct sockaddr *)&peer_addr, &peer_len) < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "recvfrom"); + continue; + } + --ret; + old_version = current_version; + kadm5_log_get_version_fd (log_fd, ¤t_version); + for (p = slaves; p != NULL; p = p->next) + send_diffs (context, p, log_fd, database, current_version); + } + + for(p = slaves; ret && p != NULL; p = p->next) { + if (p->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) + continue; + if (FD_ISSET(p->fd, &readset)) { + --ret; + if(process_msg (context, p, log_fd, database, current_version)) + slave_dead(p); + } + } + + if (ret && FD_ISSET(listen_fd, &readset)) { + add_slave (context, keytab, &slaves, listen_fd); + --ret; + } + write_stats(context, slaves, current_version); + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..abeb29d9ac --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c @@ -0,0 +1,455 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ipropd_slave.c,v 1.27.2.1 2003/08/15 16:45:15 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_log_facility *log_facility; + +static int +connect_to_master (krb5_context context, const char *master) +{ + int fd; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + struct hostent *he; + + fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket AF_INET"); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr.sin_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, + IPROP_SERVICE, "tcp", IPROP_PORT); + he = roken_gethostbyname (master); + if (he == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "gethostbyname: %s", hstrerror(h_errno)); + memcpy (&addr.sin_addr, he->h_addr, sizeof(addr.sin_addr)); + if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "connect"); + return fd; +} + +static void +get_creds(krb5_context context, const char *keytab_str, + krb5_ccache *cache, const char *host) +{ + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt init_opts; + krb5_creds creds; + char *server; + char keytab_buf[256]; + + if (keytab_str == NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_default_name (context, keytab_buf, sizeof(keytab_buf)); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default_name"); + keytab_str = keytab_buf; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", keytab_str); + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, NULL, IPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &client); + if (ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&init_opts); + + asprintf (&server, "%s/%s", IPROP_NAME, host); + if (server == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: no memory"); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(context, &creds, client, keytab, + 0, server, &init_opts); + free (server); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + + ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close"); + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, cache); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_gen_new"); + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, *cache, client); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, *cache, &creds); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); +} + +static void +ihave (krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int fd, u_int32_t version) +{ + int ret; + u_char buf[8]; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_data data, priv_data; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (buf, 8); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, I_HAVE); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, version); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + data.length = 8; + data.data = buf; + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, auth_context, &data, &priv_data, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb_mk_priv"); + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, &fd, &priv_data); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_write_message"); + + krb5_data_free (&priv_data); +} + +static void +receive_loop (krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_server_context *server_context) +{ + int ret; + off_t left, right; + void *buf; + int32_t vers; + + do { + int32_t len, timestamp, tmp; + enum kadm_ops op; + + if(krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &vers) != 0) + return; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, ×tamp); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + op = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &len); + if (vers <= server_context->log_context.version) + krb5_storage_seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + } while(vers <= server_context->log_context.version); + + left = krb5_storage_seek (sp, -16, SEEK_CUR); + right = krb5_storage_seek (sp, 0, SEEK_END); + buf = malloc (right - left); + if (buf == NULL && (right - left) != 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "malloc: no memory"); + return; + } + krb5_storage_seek (sp, left, SEEK_SET); + krb5_storage_read (sp, buf, right - left); + write (server_context->log_context.log_fd, buf, right-left); + fsync (server_context->log_context.log_fd); + free (buf); + + krb5_storage_seek (sp, left, SEEK_SET); + + for(;;) { + int32_t len, timestamp, tmp; + enum kadm_ops op; + + if(krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &vers) != 0) + break; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, ×tamp); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + op = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &len); + + ret = kadm5_log_replay (server_context, + op, vers, len, sp); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_log_replay"); + else + server_context->log_context.version = vers; + krb5_storage_seek (sp, 8, SEEK_CUR); + } +} + +static void +receive (krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_server_context *server_context) +{ + int ret; + + ret = server_context->db->open(context, + server_context->db, + O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + + receive_loop (context, sp, server_context); + + ret = server_context->db->close (context, server_context->db); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->close"); +} + +static void +receive_everything (krb5_context context, int fd, + kadm5_server_context *server_context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context) +{ + int ret; + krb5_data data; + int32_t vno; + int32_t opcode; + unsigned long tmp; + + char *dbname; + HDB *mydb; + + asprintf(&dbname, "%s-NEW", server_context->db->name); + ret = hdb_create(context, &mydb, dbname); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context,1, ret, "hdb_create"); + free(dbname); + + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile (context, + mydb, server_context->config.stash_file); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context,1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + + /* I really want to use O_EXCL here, but given that I can't easily clean + up on error, I won't */ + ret = mydb->open(context, mydb, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + + do { + krb5_storage *sp; + + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, auth_context, &fd, &data); + + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&data); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &opcode); + if (opcode == ONE_PRINC) { + krb5_data fake_data; + hdb_entry entry; + + fake_data.data = (char *)data.data + 4; + fake_data.length = data.length - 4; + + ret = hdb_value2entry (context, &fake_data, &entry); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "hdb_value2entry"); + ret = mydb->store(server_context->context, + mydb, + 0, &entry); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "hdb_store"); + + hdb_free_entry (context, &entry); + krb5_data_free (&data); + } + } while (opcode == ONE_PRINC); + + if (opcode != NOW_YOU_HAVE) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "receive_everything: strange %d", opcode); + + _krb5_get_int ((char *)data.data + 4, &tmp, 4); + vno = tmp; + + ret = kadm5_log_reinit (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_reinit"); + + ret = kadm5_log_set_version (server_context, vno - 1); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_set_version"); + + ret = kadm5_log_nop (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_nop"); + + krb5_data_free (&data); + + ret = mydb->rename (context, mydb, server_context->db->name); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->rename"); + + ret = mydb->close (context, mydb); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->close"); + + ret = mydb->destroy (context, mydb); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->destroy"); +} + +static char *realm; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +static char *keytab_str; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &keytab_str, + "keytab to get authentication from", "kspec" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage (int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "master"); + exit (code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + int master_fd; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal server; + + int optind; + const char *master; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + usage (0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) + usage (1, args, num_args); + + master = argv[0]; + + pidfile (NULL); + krb5_openlog (context, "ipropd-slave", &log_facility); + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, log_facility); + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_init"); + + get_creds(context, keytab_str, &ccache, master); + + master_fd = connect_to_master (context, master); + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, master, IPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + auth_context = NULL; + ret = krb5_sendauth (context, &auth_context, &master_fd, + IPROP_VERSION, NULL, server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, NULL, NULL, + ccache, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_sendauth"); + + ihave (context, auth_context, master_fd, + server_context->log_context.version); + + for (;;) { + int ret; + krb5_data out; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, auth_context, &master_fd, &out); + + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (out.data, out.length); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + switch (tmp) { + case FOR_YOU : + receive (context, sp, server_context); + ihave (context, auth_context, master_fd, + server_context->log_context.version); + break; + case TELL_YOU_EVERYTHING : + receive_everything (context, master_fd, server_context, + auth_context); + break; + case NOW_YOU_HAVE : + case I_HAVE : + case ONE_PRINC : + default : + krb5_warnx (context, "Ignoring command %d", tmp); + break; + } + krb5_storage_free (sp); + krb5_data_free (&out); + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5-private.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5-private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63e579f99c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5-private.h @@ -0,0 +1,522 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __kadm5_private_h__ +#define __kadm5_private_h__ + +#include + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_check_permission ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + unsigned /*op*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_init (kadm5_server_context */*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_bump_pw_expire ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_c_init_context ( + kadm5_client_context **/*ctx*/, + kadm5_config_params */*params*/, + krb5_context /*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_recv ( + kadm5_client_context */*context*/, + krb5_data */*reply*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_send ( + kadm5_client_context */*context*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +int +_kadm5_cmp_keys ( + Key */*keys1*/, + int /*len1*/, + Key */*keys2*/, + int /*len2*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_connect (void */*handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_error_code (kadm5_ret_t /*code*/); + +void +_kadm5_free_keys ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + int /*len*/, + Key */*keys*/); + +void +_kadm5_init_keys ( + Key */*keys*/, + int /*len*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_marshal_params ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + kadm5_config_params */*params*/, + krb5_data */*out*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_privs_to_string ( + u_int32_t /*privs*/, + char */*string*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +HDB * +_kadm5_s_get_db (void */*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_s_init_context ( + kadm5_server_context **/*ctx*/, + kadm5_config_params */*params*/, + krb5_context /*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + const char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys2 ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + int16_t /*n_key_data*/, + krb5_key_data */*key_data*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys3 ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + int /*n_keys*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblocks*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys_randomly ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*new_keys*/, + int */*n_keys*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_modifier ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_setup_entry ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*princ_mask*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*def*/, + u_int32_t /*def_mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_string_to_privs ( + const char */*s*/, + u_int32_t* /*privs*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_unmarshal_params ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data */*in*/, + kadm5_config_params */*params*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_chpass_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_chpass_principal_with_key ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + int /*n_key_data*/, + krb5_key_data */*key_data*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_create_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_delete_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_destroy (void */*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_flush (void */*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*out*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principals ( + void */*server_handle*/, + const char */*exp*/, + char ***/*princs*/, + int */*count*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_privs ( + void */*server_handle*/, + u_int32_t */*privs*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds ( + const char */*client_name*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password ( + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*password*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*password*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey ( + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*keytab*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*keytab*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_modify_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_randkey_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*new_keys*/, + int */*n_keys*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_rename_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*source*/, + krb5_principal /*target*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_create ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_delete ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_end (kadm5_server_context */*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_foreach ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + void (*/*func*/)(kadm5_server_context *server_context, u_int32_t ver, time_t timestamp, enum kadm_ops op, u_int32_t len, krb5_storage *sp)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_get_version ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t */*ver*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_get_version_fd ( + int /*fd*/, + u_int32_t */*ver*/); + +krb5_storage * +kadm5_log_goto_end (int /*fd*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_init (kadm5_server_context */*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_modify ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_nop (kadm5_server_context */*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_previous ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + u_int32_t */*ver*/, + time_t */*timestamp*/, + enum kadm_ops */*op*/, + u_int32_t */*len*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_reinit (kadm5_server_context */*context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_rename ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + krb5_principal /*source*/, + hdb_entry */*ent*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + enum kadm_ops /*op*/, + u_int32_t /*ver*/, + u_int32_t /*len*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_create ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t /*ver*/, + u_int32_t /*len*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_delete ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t /*ver*/, + u_int32_t /*len*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_modify ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t /*ver*/, + u_int32_t /*len*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_nop ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t /*ver*/, + u_int32_t /*len*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_rename ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t /*ver*/, + u_int32_t /*len*/, + krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_set_version ( + kadm5_server_context */*context*/, + u_int32_t /*vno*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_truncate (kadm5_server_context */*server_context*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal_cond ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + int /*n_key_data*/, + krb5_key_data */*key_data*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_delete_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_destroy (void */*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_flush (void */*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*out*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principals ( + void */*server_handle*/, + const char */*exp*/, + char ***/*princs*/, + int */*count*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_privs ( + void */*server_handle*/, + u_int32_t */*privs*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds ( + const char */*client_name*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password ( + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*password*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*password*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey ( + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*keytab*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*keytab*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_modify_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_randkey_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*new_keys*/, + int */*n_keys*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_rename_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*source*/, + krb5_principal /*target*/); + +#endif /* __kadm5_private_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5-protos.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5-protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c0a0cce7a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5-protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __kadm5_protos_h__ +#define __kadm5_protos_h__ + +#include + +const char * +kadm5_check_password_quality ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_data */*pwd_data*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + int /*n_key_data*/, + krb5_key_data */*key_data*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/, + char */*password*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_destroy (void */*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_flush (void */*server_handle*/); + +void +kadm5_free_key_data ( + void */*server_handle*/, + int16_t */*n_key_data*/, + krb5_key_data */*key_data*/); + +void +kadm5_free_name_list ( + void */*server_handle*/, + char **/*names*/, + int */*count*/); + +void +kadm5_free_principal_ent ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*out*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principals ( + void */*server_handle*/, + const char */*exp*/, + char ***/*princs*/, + int */*count*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_privs ( + void */*server_handle*/, + u_int32_t */*privs*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds ( + const char */*client_name*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password ( + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*password*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*password*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey ( + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*keytab*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*client_name*/, + const char */*keytab*/, + const char */*service_name*/, + kadm5_config_params */*realm_params*/, + unsigned long /*struct_version*/, + unsigned long /*api_version*/, + void **/*server_handle*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_randkey_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*princ*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*new_keys*/, + int */*n_keys*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_rename_principal ( + void */*server_handle*/, + krb5_principal /*source*/, + krb5_principal /*target*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_key_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_key_data */*key*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent_mask ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t */*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_tl_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_tl_data */*tl*/); + +void +kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*check_library*/, + const char */*check_function*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_key_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_key_data */*key*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent_mask ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + kadm5_principal_ent_t /*princ*/, + u_int32_t /*mask*/); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_tl_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_tl_data */*tl*/); + +#endif /* __kadm5_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5_err.et b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..674fbe73ba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# +# Error messages for the kadm5 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: kadm5_err.et,v 1.5 2001/12/06 17:02:55 assar Exp $" + +error_table ovk kadm5 + +prefix KADM5 +error_code FAILURE, "Operation failed for unspecified reason" +error_code AUTH_GET, "Operation requires `get' privilege" +error_code AUTH_ADD, "Operation requires `add' privilege" +error_code AUTH_MODIFY, "Operation requires `modify' privilege" +error_code AUTH_DELETE, "Operation requires `delete' privilege" +error_code AUTH_INSUFFICIENT, "Insufficient authorization for operation" +error_code BAD_DB, "Database inconsistency detected" +error_code DUP, "Principal or policy already exists" +error_code RPC_ERROR, "Communication failure with server" +error_code NO_SRV, "No administration server found for realm" +error_code BAD_HIST_KEY, "Password history principal key version mismatch" +error_code NOT_INIT, "Connection to server not initialized" +error_code UNK_PRINC, "Principal does not exist" +error_code UNK_POLICY, "Policy does not exist" +error_code BAD_MASK, "Invalid field mask for operation" +error_code BAD_CLASS, "Invalid number of character classes" +error_code BAD_LENGTH, "Invalid password length" +error_code BAD_POLICY, "Invalid policy name" +error_code BAD_PRINCIPAL, "Invalid principal name." +error_code BAD_AUX_ATTR, "Invalid auxillary attributes" +error_code BAD_HISTORY, "Invalid password history count" +error_code BAD_MIN_PASS_LIFE, "Password minimum life is greater than password maximum life" +error_code PASS_Q_TOOSHORT, "Password is too short" +error_code PASS_Q_CLASS, "Password does not contain enough character classes" +error_code PASS_Q_DICT, "Password is in the password dictionary" +error_code PASS_REUSE, "Can't resuse password" +error_code PASS_TOOSOON, "Current password's minimum life has not expired" +error_code POLICY_REF, "Policy is in use" +error_code INIT, "Connection to server already initialized" +error_code BAD_PASSWORD, "Incorrect password" +error_code PROTECT_PRINCIPAL, "Can't change protected principal" +error_code BAD_SERVER_HANDLE, "Programmer error! Bad Admin server handle" +error_code BAD_STRUCT_VERSION, "Programmer error! Bad API structure version" +error_code OLD_STRUCT_VERSION, "API structure version specified by application is no longer supported" +error_code NEW_STRUCT_VERSION, "API structure version specified by application is unknown to libraries" +error_code BAD_API_VERSION, "Programmer error! Bad API version" +error_code OLD_LIB_API_VERSION, "API version specified by application is no longer supported by libraries" +error_code OLD_SERVER_API_VERSION,"API version specified by application is no longer supported by server" +error_code NEW_LIB_API_VERSION, "API version specified by application is unknown to libraries" +error_code NEW_SERVER_API_VERSION,"API version specified by application is unknown to server" +error_code SECURE_PRINC_MISSING,"Database error! Required principal missing" +error_code NO_RENAME_SALT, "The salt type of the specified principal does not support renaming" +error_code BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS, "Invalid configuration parameter for remote KADM5 client" +error_code BAD_SERVER_PARAMS, "Invalid configuration parameter for local KADM5 client." +error_code AUTH_LIST, "Operation requires `list' privilege" +error_code AUTH_CHANGEPW, "Operation requires `change-password' privilege" +error_code BAD_TL_TYPE, "Programmer error! Invalid tagged data list element type" +error_code MISSING_CONF_PARAMS, "Required parameters in kdc.conf missing" +error_code BAD_SERVER_NAME, "Bad krb5 admin server hostname" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f634ed8c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kadm5_locl.h,v 1.23 2000/07/08 11:57:40 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KADM5_LOCL_H__ +#define __KADM5_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "admin.h" +#include "kadm5_err.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "private.h" + +#endif /* __KADM5_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/keys.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/keys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ae21abb47 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keys.c,v 1.1 2000/07/22 05:53:02 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * free all the memory used by (len, keys) + */ + +void +_kadm5_free_keys (kadm5_server_context *context, + int len, Key *keys) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + free (keys[i].mkvno); + keys[i].mkvno = NULL; + if (keys[i].salt != NULL) { + free_Salt(keys[i].salt); + free(keys[i].salt); + keys[i].salt = NULL; + } + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context->context, &keys[i].key); + } + free (keys); +} + +/* + * null-ify `len', `keys' + */ + +void +_kadm5_init_keys (Key *keys, int len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + keys[i].mkvno = NULL; + keys[i].salt = NULL; + keys[i].key.keyvalue.length = 0; + keys[i].key.keyvalue.data = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * return 0 iff `keys1, len1' and `keys2, len2' are identical + */ + +int +_kadm5_cmp_keys(Key *keys1, int len1, Key *keys2, int len2) +{ + int i; + + if (len1 != len2) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < len1; ++i) { + if ((keys1[i].salt != NULL && keys2[i].salt == NULL) + || (keys1[i].salt == NULL && keys2[i].salt != NULL)) + return 1; + if (keys1[i].salt != NULL) { + if (keys1[i].salt->type != keys2[i].salt->type) + return 1; + if (keys1[i].salt->salt.length != keys2[i].salt->salt.length) + return 1; + if (memcmp (keys1[i].salt->salt.data, keys2[i].salt->salt.data, + keys1[i].salt->salt.length) != 0) + return 1; + } + if (keys1[i].key.keytype != keys2[i].key.keytype) + return 1; + if (keys1[i].key.keyvalue.length != keys2[i].key.keyvalue.length) + return 1; + if (memcmp (keys1[i].key.keyvalue.data, keys2[i].key.keyvalue.data, + keys1[i].key.keyvalue.length) != 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ea3ca9c8a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,813 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: log.c,v 1.20 2003/04/16 17:56:55 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * A log record consists of: + * + * version number 4 bytes + * time in seconds 4 bytes + * operation (enum kadm_ops) 4 bytes + * length of record 4 bytes + * data... n bytes + * length of record 4 bytes + * version number 4 bytes + * + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_get_version_fd (int fd, + u_int32_t *ver) +{ + int ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t old_version; + + ret = lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_END); + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + if(ret == 0) { + *ver = 0; + return 0; + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd (fd); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, -4, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &old_version); + *ver = old_version; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_END); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_get_version (kadm5_server_context *context, u_int32_t *ver) +{ + return kadm5_log_get_version_fd (context->log_context.log_fd, ver); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_set_version (kadm5_server_context *context, u_int32_t vno) +{ + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + log_context->version = vno; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_init (kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + int fd; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + if (log_context->log_fd != -1) + return 0; + fd = open (log_context->log_file, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + if (flock (fd, LOCK_EX) < 0) { + close (fd); + return errno; + } + + ret = kadm5_log_get_version_fd (fd, &log_context->version); + if (ret) + return ret; + + log_context->log_fd = fd; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_reinit (kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + int fd; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + if (log_context->log_fd != -1) { + close (log_context->log_fd); + log_context->log_fd = -1; + } + fd = open (log_context->log_file, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + if (flock (fd, LOCK_EX) < 0) { + close (fd); + return errno; + } + + log_context->version = 0; + log_context->log_fd = fd; + return 0; +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_end (kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + int fd = log_context->log_fd; + + flock (fd, LOCK_UN); + close(fd); + log_context->log_fd = -1; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_preamble (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_storage *sp, + enum kadm_ops op) +{ + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + kadm5_ret_t kadm_ret; + + kadm_ret = kadm5_log_init (context); + if (kadm_ret) + return kadm_ret; + + krb5_store_int32 (sp, ++log_context->version); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, time(NULL)); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, op); + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_postamble (kadm5_log_context *context, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_store_int32 (sp, context->version); + return 0; +} + +/* + * flush the log record in `sp'. + */ + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_flush (kadm5_log_context *log_context, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_data data; + size_t len; + int ret; + + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + len = data.length; + ret = write (log_context->log_fd, data.data, len); + if (ret != len) { + krb5_data_free(&data); + return errno; + } + if (fsync (log_context->log_fd) < 0) { + krb5_data_free(&data); + return errno; + } + /* + * Try to send a signal to any running `ipropd-master' + */ + sendto (log_context->socket_fd, + (void *)&log_context->version, + sizeof(log_context->version), + 0, + (struct sockaddr *)&log_context->socket_name, + sizeof(log_context->socket_name)); + + krb5_data_free(&data); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Add a `create' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_create (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_data value; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = hdb_entry2value (context->context, ent, &value); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_create); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&value); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, value.length); + krb5_storage_write(sp, value.data, value.length); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, value.length); + krb5_data_free (&value); + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read the data of a create log record from `sp' and change the + * database. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_create (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + hdb_entry ent; + + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&data, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_storage_read (sp, data.data, len); + ret = hdb_value2entry (context->context, &data, &ent); + krb5_data_free(&data); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &ent); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add a `delete' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_delete (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal princ) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + off_t off; + off_t len; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_delete); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 0); + off = krb5_storage_seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_principal (sp, princ); + len = krb5_storage_seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) - off; + krb5_storage_seek(sp, -(len + 4), SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `delete' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_delete (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry ent; + + krb5_ret_principal (sp, &ent.principal); + + ret = context->db->remove(context->context, context->db, &ent); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, ent.principal); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add a `rename' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_rename (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal source, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + off_t off; + off_t len; + krb5_data value; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = hdb_entry2value (context->context, ent, &value); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_rename); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&value); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 0); + off = krb5_storage_seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_principal (sp, source); + krb5_storage_write(sp, value.data, value.length); + krb5_data_free (&value); + len = krb5_storage_seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) - off; + + krb5_storage_seek(sp, -(len + 4), SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `rename' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_rename (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal source; + hdb_entry source_ent, target_ent; + krb5_data value; + off_t off; + size_t princ_len, data_len; + + off = krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_principal (sp, &source); + princ_len = krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) - off; + data_len = len - princ_len; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&value, data_len); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; + } + krb5_storage_read (sp, value.data, data_len); + ret = hdb_value2entry (context->context, &value, &target_ent); + krb5_data_free(&value); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; + } + ret = context->db->store (context->context, context->db, 0, &target_ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &target_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; + } + source_ent.principal = source; + ret = context->db->remove (context->context, context->db, &source_ent); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Add a `modify' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_modify (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_data value; + u_int32_t len; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = hdb_entry2value (context->context, ent, &value); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_modify); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&value); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + len = value.length + 4; + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, mask); + krb5_storage_write (sp, value.data, value.length); + krb5_data_free (&value); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `modify' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_modify (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t mask; + krb5_data value; + hdb_entry ent, log_ent; + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &mask); + len -= 4; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&value, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_storage_read (sp, value.data, len); + ret = hdb_value2entry (context->context, &value, &log_ent); + krb5_data_free(&value); + if (ret) + return ret; + ent.principal = log_ent.principal; + log_ent.principal = NULL; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if (log_ent.valid_end == NULL) { + ent.valid_end = NULL; + } else { + if (ent.valid_end == NULL) + ent.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*ent.valid_end)); + *ent.valid_end = *log_ent.valid_end; + } + } + if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if (log_ent.pw_end == NULL) { + ent.pw_end = NULL; + } else { + if (ent.pw_end == NULL) + ent.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*ent.pw_end)); + *ent.pw_end = *log_ent.pw_end; + } + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + ent.flags = log_ent.flags; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if (log_ent.max_life == NULL) { + ent.max_life = NULL; + } else { + if (ent.max_life == NULL) + ent.max_life = malloc (sizeof(*ent.max_life)); + *ent.max_life = *log_ent.max_life; + } + } + if ((mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) && (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME)) { + if (ent.modified_by == NULL) { + ent.modified_by = malloc(sizeof(*ent.modified_by)); + } else + free_Event(ent.modified_by); + copy_Event(log_ent.modified_by, ent.modified_by); + } + if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) { + ent.kvno = log_ent.kvno; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if (log_ent.max_renew == NULL) { + ent.max_renew = NULL; + } else { + if (ent.max_renew == NULL) + ent.max_renew = malloc (sizeof(*ent.max_renew)); + *ent.max_renew = *log_ent.max_renew; + } + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + size_t len; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; ++i) + free_Key(&ent.keys.val[i]); + free (ent.keys.val); + + len = log_ent.keys.len; + + ent.keys.len = len; + ent.keys.val = malloc(len * sizeof(*ent.keys.val)); + for (i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; ++i) + copy_Key(&log_ent.keys.val[i], + &ent.keys.val[i]); + } + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &log_ent); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add a `nop' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_nop (kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_nop); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 0); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 0); + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `nop' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_nop (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Call `func' for each log record in the log in `context' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_foreach (kadm5_server_context *context, + void (*func)(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp)) +{ + int fd = context->log_context.log_fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + + lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd (fd); + for (;;) { + int32_t ver, timestamp, op, len; + + if(krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &ver) != 0) + break; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, ×tamp); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &op); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &len); + (*func)(context, ver, timestamp, op, len, sp); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, 8, SEEK_CUR); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Go to end of log. + */ + +krb5_storage * +kadm5_log_goto_end (int fd) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd (fd); + krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_END); + return sp; +} + +/* + * Return previous log entry. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_previous (krb5_storage *sp, + u_int32_t *ver, + time_t *timestamp, + enum kadm_ops *op, + u_int32_t *len) +{ + off_t off; + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_storage_seek(sp, -8, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *len = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *ver = tmp; + off = 24 + *len; + krb5_storage_seek(sp, -off, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + assert(tmp == *ver); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *timestamp = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *op = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + assert(tmp == *len); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Replay a record from the log + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay (kadm5_server_context *context, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + switch (op) { + case kadm_create : + return kadm5_log_replay_create (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_delete : + return kadm5_log_replay_delete (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_rename : + return kadm5_log_replay_rename (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_modify : + return kadm5_log_replay_modify (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_nop : + return kadm5_log_replay_nop (context, ver, len, sp); + default : + return KADM5_FAILURE; + } +} + +/* + * truncate the log - i.e. create an empty file with just (nop vno + 2) + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_truncate (kadm5_server_context *server_context) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + u_int32_t vno; + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kadm5_log_get_version (server_context, &vno); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kadm5_log_reinit (server_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kadm5_log_set_version (server_context, vno + 1); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kadm5_log_nop (server_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kadm5_log_end (server_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + return 0; + +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/marshall.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/marshall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98288376c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/marshall.c @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: marshall.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_key_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_key_data *key) +{ + krb5_data c; + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_ver); + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_kvno); + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[0]); + c.length = key->key_data_length[0]; + c.data = key->key_data_contents[0]; + krb5_store_data(sp, c); + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[1]); + c.length = key->key_data_length[1]; + c.data = key->key_data_contents[1]; + krb5_store_data(sp, c); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_key_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_key_data *key) +{ + krb5_data c; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_ver = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_kvno = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_type[0] = tmp; + krb5_ret_data(sp, &c); + key->key_data_length[0] = c.length; + key->key_data_contents[0] = c.data; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_type[1] = tmp; + krb5_ret_data(sp, &c); + key->key_data_length[1] = c.length; + key->key_data_contents[1] = c.data; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_tl_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_tl_data *tl) +{ + krb5_data c; + krb5_store_int32(sp, tl->tl_data_type); + c.length = tl->tl_data_length; + c.data = tl->tl_data_contents; + krb5_store_data(sp, c); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_tl_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_tl_data *tl) +{ + krb5_data c; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + tl->tl_data_type = tmp; + krb5_ret_data(sp, &c); + tl->tl_data_length = c.length; + tl->tl_data_contents = c.data; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + int i; + + if (mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ->principal); + if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->princ_expire_time); + if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->pw_expiration); + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->last_pwd_change); + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->max_life); + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->mod_name != NULL); + if(princ->mod_name) + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ->mod_name); + } + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->mod_date); + if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->attributes); + if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->kvno); + if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->mkvno); + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->policy != NULL); + if(princ->policy) + krb5_store_string(sp, princ->policy); + } + if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->aux_attributes); + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->max_renewable_life); + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->last_success); + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->last_failed); + if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->fail_auth_count); + if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->n_key_data); + for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++) + kadm5_store_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]); + } + if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + krb5_tl_data *tp; + + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->n_tl_data); + for(tp = princ->tl_data; tp; tp = tp->tl_data_next) + kadm5_store_tl_data(sp, tp); + } + return 0; +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent_mask(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, mask); +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +ret_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + int i; + int32_t tmp; + + if (mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ->principal); + + if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->princ_expire_time = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->pw_expiration = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->last_pwd_change = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->max_life = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(tmp) + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ->mod_name); + else + princ->mod_name = NULL; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->mod_date = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->attributes = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->kvno = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->mkvno = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(tmp) + krb5_ret_string(sp, &princ->policy); + else + princ->policy = NULL; + } + if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->aux_attributes = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->max_renewable_life = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->last_success = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->last_failed = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->fail_auth_count = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->n_key_data = tmp; + princ->key_data = malloc(princ->n_key_data * sizeof(*princ->key_data)); + for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++) + kadm5_ret_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]); + } + if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->n_tl_data = tmp; + princ->tl_data = NULL; + for(i = 0; i < princ->n_tl_data; i++){ + krb5_tl_data *tp = malloc(sizeof(*tp)); + kadm5_ret_tl_data(sp, tp); + tp->tl_data_next = princ->tl_data; + princ->tl_data = tp; + } + } + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + return ret_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent_mask(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t *mask) +{ + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *mask = tmp; + return ret_principal_ent (sp, princ, *mask); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_marshal_params(krb5_context context, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_data *out) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + + krb5_store_int32(sp, params->mask & (KADM5_CONFIG_REALM)); + + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM) + krb5_store_string(sp, params->realm); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_unmarshal_params(krb5_context context, + krb5_data *in, + kadm5_config_params *params) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in); + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, ¶ms->mask); + + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM) + krb5_ret_string(sp, ¶ms->realm); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/modify_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/modify_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d8ca56bb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/modify_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: modify_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 15:59:46 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_modify); + kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/modify_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/modify_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c595a957b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/modify_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: modify_s.c,v 1.12 2001/01/30 01:24:28 assar Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + u_int32_t forbidden_mask) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + if((mask & forbidden_mask)) + return KADM5_BAD_MASK; + if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && strcmp(princ->policy, "default")) + return KADM5_UNK_POLICY; + + ent.principal = princ->principal; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = _kadm5_setup_entry(context, &ent, mask, princ, mask, NULL, 0); + if(ret) + goto out2; + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + mask | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + return modify_principal(server_handle, princ, mask, + KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE | KADM5_MOD_TIME + | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MKVNO + | KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS + | KADM5_LAST_FAILED); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/password_quality.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/password_quality.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc1463fed9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/password_quality.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: password_quality.c,v 1.4 2000/07/05 13:14:45 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H +#include +#endif + +static const char * +simple_passwd_quality (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *pwd) +{ + if (pwd->length < 6) + return "Password too short"; + else + return NULL; +} + +typedef const char* (*passwd_quality_check_func)(krb5_context, + krb5_principal, + krb5_data*); + +static passwd_quality_check_func passwd_quality_check = simple_passwd_quality; + +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN + +#define PASSWD_VERSION 0 + +#endif + +/* + * setup the password quality hook + */ + +void +kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check(krb5_context context, + const char *check_library, + const char *check_function) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN + void *handle; + void *sym; + int *version; + int flags; + const char *tmp; + +#ifdef RTLD_NOW + flags = RTLD_NOW; +#else + flags = 0; +#endif + + if(check_library == NULL) { + tmp = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "password_quality", + "check_library", + NULL); + if(tmp != NULL) + check_library = tmp; + } + if(check_function == NULL) { + tmp = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "password_quality", + "check_function", + NULL); + if(tmp != NULL) + check_function = tmp; + } + if(check_library != NULL && check_function == NULL) + check_function = "passwd_check"; + + if(check_library == NULL) + return; + handle = dlopen(check_library, flags); + if(handle == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "failed to open `%s'", check_library); + return; + } + version = dlsym(handle, "version"); + if(version == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "didn't find `version' symbol in `%s'", check_library); + dlclose(handle); + return; + } + if(*version != PASSWD_VERSION) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "version of loaded library is %d (expected %d)", + *version, PASSWD_VERSION); + dlclose(handle); + return; + } + sym = dlsym(handle, check_function); + if(sym == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "didn't find `%s' symbol in `%s'", + check_function, check_library); + dlclose(handle); + return; + } + passwd_quality_check = (passwd_quality_check_func) sym; +#endif /* HAVE_DLOPEN */ +} + +const char * +kadm5_check_password_quality (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *pwd_data) +{ + return (*passwd_quality_check) (context, principal, pwd_data); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/private.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b09545fd67 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/private.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: private.h,v 1.15 2002/08/16 20:57:44 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __kadm5_privatex_h__ +#define __kadm5_privatex_h__ + +struct kadm_func { + kadm5_ret_t (*chpass_principal) (void *, krb5_principal, char*); + kadm5_ret_t (*create_principal) (void*, kadm5_principal_ent_t, + u_int32_t, char*); + kadm5_ret_t (*delete_principal) (void*, krb5_principal); + kadm5_ret_t (*destroy) (void*); + kadm5_ret_t (*flush) (void*); + kadm5_ret_t (*get_principal) (void*, krb5_principal, + kadm5_principal_ent_t, u_int32_t); + kadm5_ret_t (*get_principals) (void*, const char*, char***, int*); + kadm5_ret_t (*get_privs) (void*, u_int32_t*); + kadm5_ret_t (*modify_principal) (void*, kadm5_principal_ent_t, u_int32_t); + kadm5_ret_t (*randkey_principal) (void*, krb5_principal, + krb5_keyblock**, int*); + kadm5_ret_t (*rename_principal) (void*, krb5_principal, krb5_principal); + kadm5_ret_t (*chpass_principal_with_key) (void *, krb5_principal, + int, krb5_key_data *); +}; + +/* XXX should be integrated */ +typedef struct kadm5_common_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_boolean my_context; + struct kadm_func funcs; + void *data; +}kadm5_common_context; + +typedef struct kadm5_log_peer { + int fd; + char *name; + krb5_auth_context ac; + struct kadm5_log_peer *next; +} kadm5_log_peer; + +typedef struct kadm5_log_context { + char *log_file; + int log_fd; + u_int32_t version; + struct sockaddr_un socket_name; + int socket_fd; +} kadm5_log_context; + +typedef struct kadm5_server_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_boolean my_context; + struct kadm_func funcs; + /* */ + kadm5_config_params config; + HDB *db; + krb5_principal caller; + unsigned acl_flags; + kadm5_log_context log_context; +} kadm5_server_context; + +typedef struct kadm5_client_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_boolean my_context; + struct kadm_func funcs; + /* */ + krb5_auth_context ac; + char *realm; + char *admin_server; + int kadmind_port; + int sock; + char *client_name; + char *service_name; + krb5_prompter_fct prompter; + const char *keytab; + krb5_ccache ccache; + kadm5_config_params *realm_params; +}kadm5_client_context; + +enum kadm_ops { + kadm_get, + kadm_delete, + kadm_create, + kadm_rename, + kadm_chpass, + kadm_modify, + kadm_randkey, + kadm_get_privs, + kadm_get_princs, + kadm_chpass_with_key, + kadm_nop +}; + +#define KADMIN_APPL_VERSION "KADM0.1" +#define KADMIN_OLD_APPL_VERSION "KADM0.0" + +#define KADM5_LOG_SIGNAL HDB_DB_DIR "/signal" + +#include "kadm5-private.h" + +#endif /* __kadm5_privatex_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/privs_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/privs_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83d293cfbf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/privs_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: privs_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 15:59:54 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_privs(void *server_handle, u_int32_t *privs) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_get_privs); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if (ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0){ + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + *privs = tmp; + } + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/privs_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/privs_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85cd5d597d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/privs_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: privs_s.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_privs(void *server_handle, u_int32_t *privs) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + *privs = context->acl_flags; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/randkey_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/randkey_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eedf697906 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/randkey_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: randkey_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 16:00:02 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_randkey); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0){ + krb5_keyblock *k; + int i; + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + k = malloc(tmp * sizeof(*k)); + if (k == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for(i = 0; i < tmp; i++) + krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, &k[i]); + *n_keys = tmp; + *new_keys = k; + } +out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9780b11131 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: randkey_s.c,v 1.13 2001/01/30 01:24:28 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Set the keys of `princ' to random values, returning the random keys + * in `new_keys', `n_keys'. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out; + + ret = _kadm5_set_keys_randomly (context, + &ent, + new_keys, + n_keys); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out3; + ret = _kadm5_bump_pw_expire(context, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out3: + if (ret) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < *n_keys; ++i) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context->context, &(*new_keys)[i]); + free (*new_keys); + *new_keys = NULL; + *n_keys = 0; + } +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/rename_c.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/rename_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95ccf25036 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/rename_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename_c.c,v 1.4 2000/07/11 16:00:08 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_rename_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + ret = _kadm5_connect(server_handle); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_rename); + krb5_store_principal(sp, source); + krb5_store_principal(sp, target); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/rename_s.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/rename_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a478e0acd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/rename_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename_s.c,v 1.11 2001/01/30 01:24:29 assar Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_rename_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent, ent2; + ent.principal = source; + if(krb5_principal_compare(context->context, source, target)) + return KADM5_DUP; /* XXX is this right? */ + if(!krb5_realm_compare(context->context, source, target)) + return KADM5_FAILURE; /* XXX better code */ + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret){ + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + goto out; + } + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + { + /* fix salt */ + int i; + Salt salt; + krb5_salt salt2; + krb5_get_pw_salt(context->context, source, &salt2); + salt.type = hdb_pw_salt; + salt.salt = salt2.saltvalue; + for(i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; i++){ + if(ent.keys.val[i].salt == NULL){ + ent.keys.val[i].salt = malloc(sizeof(*ent.keys.val[i].salt)); + ret = copy_Salt(&salt, ent.keys.val[i].salt); + if(ret) + break; + } + } + krb5_free_salt(context->context, salt2); + } + if(ret) + goto out2; + ent2.principal = ent.principal; + ent.principal = target; + + ret = hdb_seal_keys(context->context, context->db, &ent); + if (ret) { + ent.principal = ent2.principal; + goto out2; + } + + kadm5_log_rename (context, + source, + &ent); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret){ + ent.principal = ent2.principal; + goto out2; + } + ret = context->db->remove(context->context, context->db, &ent2); + ent.principal = ent2.principal; +out2: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/replay_log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/replay_log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b2d71635f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/replay_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: replay_log.c,v 1.9 2002/05/24 15:19:22 joda Exp $"); + +int start_version = -1; +int end_version = -1; + +static void +apply_entry(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if((start_version != -1 && ver < start_version) || + (end_version != -1 && ver > end_version)) { + /* XXX skip this entry */ + krb5_storage_seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + return; + } + printf ("ver %u... ", ver); + fflush (stdout); + + ret = kadm5_log_replay (server_context, + op, ver, len, sp); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (server_context->context, ret, "kadm5_log_replay"); + + + printf ("done\n"); +} + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "start-version", 0, arg_integer, &start_version, "start replay with this version" }, + { "end-version", 0, arg_integer, &end_version, "end replay with this version" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_config_params conf; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = server_context->db->open(context, + server_context->db, + O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_init"); + + ret = kadm5_log_foreach (server_context, apply_entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_foreach"); + ret = kadm5_log_end (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_end"); + ret = server_context->db->close (context, server_context->db); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->close"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/sample_passwd_check.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/sample_passwd_check.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ff5122c16 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/sample_passwd_check.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* $Id: sample_passwd_check.c,v 1.1 1999/09/10 10:11:03 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#include + +/* specify the api-version this library conforms to */ + +int version = 0; + +/* just check the length of the password, this is what the default + check does, but this lets you specify the minimum length in + krb5.conf */ +const char* +check_length(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal prinipal, + krb5_data *password) +{ + int min_length = krb5_config_get_int_default(context, NULL, 6, + "password_quality", + "min_length", + NULL); + if(password->length < min_length) + return "Password too short"; + return NULL; +} + +#ifdef DICTPATH + +/* use cracklib to check password quality; this requires a patch for + cracklib that can be found at + ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/krb/src/cracklib.patch */ + +const char* +check_cracklib(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *password) +{ + char *s = malloc(password->length + 1); + char *msg; + char *strings[2]; + if(s == NULL) + return NULL; /* XXX */ + strings[0] = principal->name.name_string.val[0]; /* XXX */ + strings[1] = NULL; + memcpy(s, password->data, password->length); + s[password->length] = '\0'; + msg = FascistCheck(s, DICTPATH, strings); + memset(s, 0, password->length); + free(s); + return msg; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/send_recv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/send_recv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fe44b76b8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/send_recv.c @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: send_recv.c,v 1.10 2003/04/16 17:58:59 lha Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_send(kadm5_client_context *context, krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_data msg, out; + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len; + krb5_storage *sock; + + assert(context->sock != -1); + + len = krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&msg, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET); + krb5_storage_read(sp, msg.data, msg.length); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv(context->context, context->ac, &msg, &out, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&msg); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sock = krb5_storage_from_fd(context->sock); + if(sock == NULL) { + krb5_data_free(&out); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_store_data(sock, out); + krb5_storage_free(sock); + krb5_data_free(&out); + return ret; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_recv(kadm5_client_context *context, krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + krb5_storage *sock; + + sock = krb5_storage_from_fd(context->sock); + if(sock == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sock, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sock); + if(ret == KRB5_CC_END) + return KADM5_RPC_ERROR; + else if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_priv(context->context, context->ac, &data, reply, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&data); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/server_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/server_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21b60776ad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/server_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: server_glue.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_password(client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_skey(client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_creds(client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx(context, + client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d69c509b22 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,499 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: set_keys.c,v 1.25 2001/08/13 15:12:16 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * the known and used DES enctypes + */ + +static krb5_enctype des_types[] = { ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 }; +static unsigned n_des_types = sizeof(des_types) / sizeof(des_types[0]); + +static krb5_error_code +make_keys(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal, const char *password, + Key **keys_ret, size_t *num_keys_ret) +{ + krb5_enctype all_etypes[] = { ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC }; + + + krb5_enctype e; + + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char **ktypes, **kp; + + Key *keys = NULL, *tmp; + int num_keys = 0; + Key key; + + int i; + char *v4_ktypes[] = {"des3:pw-salt", "v4", NULL}; + + ktypes = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "kadmin", + "default_keys", NULL); + + /* for each entry in `default_keys' try to parse it as a sequence + of etype:salttype:salt, syntax of this if something like: + [(des|des3|etype):](pw|afs3)[:string], if etype is omitted it + means all etypes, and if string is omitted is means the default + string (for that principal). Additional special values: + v5 == pw-salt, and + v4 == des:pw-salt: + afs or afs3 == des:afs3-salt + */ + + if (ktypes == NULL + && krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, "kadmin", + "use_v4_salt", NULL)) + ktypes = v4_ktypes; + + for(kp = ktypes; kp && *kp; kp++) { + krb5_enctype *etypes; + int num_etypes; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_boolean salt_set; + + const char *p; + char buf[3][256]; + int num_buf = 0; + + p = *kp; + if(strcmp(p, "v5") == 0) + p = "pw-salt"; + else if(strcmp(p, "v4") == 0) + p = "des:pw-salt:"; + else if(strcmp(p, "afs") == 0 || strcmp(p, "afs3") == 0) + p = "des:afs3-salt"; + + /* split p in a list of :-separated strings */ + for(num_buf = 0; num_buf < 3; num_buf++) + if(strsep_copy(&p, ":", buf[num_buf], sizeof(buf[num_buf])) == -1) + break; + + etypes = NULL; + num_etypes = 0; + memset(&salt, 0, sizeof(salt)); + salt_set = FALSE; + + for(i = 0; i < num_buf; i++) { + if(etypes == NULL) { + /* this might be a etype specifier */ + /* XXX there should be a string_to_etypes handling + special cases like `des' and `all' */ + if(strcmp(buf[i], "des") == 0) { + etypes = all_etypes + 1; + num_etypes = 3; + continue; + } else if(strcmp(buf[i], "des3") == 0) { + e = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1; + etypes = &e; + num_etypes = 1; + continue; + } else { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, buf[i], &e); + if(ret == 0) { + etypes = &e; + num_etypes = 1; + continue; + } + } + } + if(salt.salttype == 0) { + /* interpret string as a salt specifier, if no etype + is set, this sets default values */ + /* XXX should perhaps use string_to_salttype, but that + interface sucks */ + if(strcmp(buf[i], "pw-salt") == 0) { + if(etypes == NULL) { + etypes = all_etypes; + num_etypes = 4; + } + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + } else if(strcmp(buf[i], "afs3-salt") == 0) { + if(etypes == NULL) { + etypes = all_etypes + 1; + num_etypes = 3; + } + salt.salttype = KRB5_AFS3_SALT; + } + } else { + /* if there is a final string, use it as the string to + salt with, this is mostly useful with null salt for + v4 compat, and a cell name for afs compat */ + salt.saltvalue.data = buf[i]; + salt.saltvalue.length = strlen(buf[i]); + salt_set = TRUE; + } + } + + if(etypes == NULL || salt.salttype == 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "bad value for default_keys `%s'", *kp); + continue; + } + + if(!salt_set) { + /* make up default salt */ + if(salt.salttype == KRB5_PW_SALT) + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, principal, &salt); + else if(salt.salttype == KRB5_AFS3_SALT) { + krb5_realm *realm = krb5_princ_realm(context, principal); + salt.saltvalue.data = strdup(*realm); + if(salt.saltvalue.data == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "out of memory while " + "parsinig salt specifiers"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + strlwr(salt.saltvalue.data); + salt.saltvalue.length = strlen(*realm); + salt_set = 1; + } + } + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + for(i = 0; i < num_etypes; i++) { + Key *k; + for(k = keys; k < keys + num_keys; k++) { + if(k->key.keytype == etypes[i] && + ((k->salt != NULL && + k->salt->type == salt.salttype && + k->salt->salt.length == salt.saltvalue.length && + memcmp(k->salt->salt.data, salt.saltvalue.data, + salt.saltvalue.length) == 0) || + (k->salt == NULL && + salt.salttype == KRB5_PW_SALT && + !salt_set))) + goto next_etype; + } + + ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt (context, + etypes[i], + password, + salt, + &key.key); + + if(ret) + goto out; + + if (salt.salttype != KRB5_PW_SALT || salt_set) { + key.salt = malloc (sizeof(*key.salt)); + if (key.salt == NULL) { + free_Key(&key); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + key.salt->type = salt.salttype; + krb5_data_zero (&key.salt->salt); + + /* is the salt has not been set explicitly, it will be + the default salt, so there's no need to explicitly + copy it */ + if (salt_set) { + ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, + salt.saltvalue.data, + salt.saltvalue.length); + if (ret) { + free_Key(&key); + goto out; + } + } + } + tmp = realloc(keys, (num_keys + 1) * sizeof(*keys)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + free_Key(&key); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + keys = tmp; + keys[num_keys++] = key; + next_etype:; + } + } + + if(num_keys == 0) { + /* if we didn't manage to find a single valid key, create a + default set */ + /* XXX only do this is there is no `default_keys'? */ + krb5_salt v5_salt; + tmp = realloc(keys, (num_keys + 4) * sizeof(*keys)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + keys = tmp; + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, principal, &v5_salt); + if(ret) + goto out; + for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, all_etypes[i], password, + v5_salt, &key.key); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_salt(context, v5_salt); + goto out; + } + keys[num_keys++] = key; + } + krb5_free_salt(context, v5_salt); + } + + out: + if(ret == 0) { + *keys_ret = keys; + *num_keys_ret = num_keys; + } else { + for(i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) { + free_Key(&keys[i]); + } + free(keys); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to the string-to-key of `password' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + const char *password) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + Key *keys; + size_t num_keys; + + ret = make_keys(context->context, ent->principal, password, + &keys, &num_keys); + + if(ret) + return ret; + + _kadm5_free_keys (context, ent->keys.len, ent->keys.val); + ent->keys.val = keys; + ent->keys.len = num_keys; + ent->kvno++; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to (`n_key_data', `key_data') + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys2(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + int16_t n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + unsigned len; + Key *keys; + + len = n_key_data; + keys = malloc (len * sizeof(*keys)); + if (keys == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + _kadm5_init_keys (keys, len); + + for(i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) { + keys[i].mkvno = NULL; + keys[i].key.keytype = key_data[i].key_data_type[0]; + ret = krb5_data_copy(&keys[i].key.keyvalue, + key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], + key_data[i].key_data_length[0]); + if(ret) + goto out; + if(key_data[i].key_data_ver == 2) { + Salt *salt; + + salt = malloc(sizeof(*salt)); + if(salt == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + keys[i].salt = salt; + salt->type = key_data[i].key_data_type[1]; + krb5_data_copy(&salt->salt, + key_data[i].key_data_contents[1], + key_data[i].key_data_length[1]); + } else + keys[i].salt = NULL; + } + _kadm5_free_keys (context, ent->keys.len, ent->keys.val); + ent->keys.len = len; + ent->keys.val = keys; + ent->kvno++; + return 0; + out: + _kadm5_free_keys (context, len, keys); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to `n_keys, keys' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys3(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + int n_keys, + krb5_keyblock *keyblocks) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + unsigned len; + Key *keys; + + len = n_keys; + keys = malloc (len * sizeof(*keys)); + if (keys == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + _kadm5_init_keys (keys, len); + + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + keys[i].mkvno = NULL; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keyblocks[i], + &keys[i].key); + if(ret) + goto out; + keys[i].salt = NULL; + } + _kadm5_free_keys (context, ent->keys.len, ent->keys.val); + ent->keys.len = len; + ent->keys.val = keys; + ent->kvno++; + return 0; + out: + _kadm5_free_keys (context, len, keys); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to random keys and return them in `n_keys' + * and `new_keys'. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys_randomly (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret = 0; + int i; + unsigned len; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + Key *hkeys; + + len = n_des_types + 1; + keys = malloc (len * sizeof(*keys)); + if (keys == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + keys[i].keyvalue.length = 0; + keys[i].keyvalue.data = NULL; + } + + hkeys = malloc (len * sizeof(*hkeys)); + if (hkeys == NULL) { + free (keys); + return ENOMEM; + } + + _kadm5_init_keys (hkeys, len); + + ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock (context->context, + des_types[0], + &keys[0]); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[0], + &hkeys[0].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + + for (i = 1; i < n_des_types; ++i) { + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[0], + &keys[i]); + if (ret) + goto out; + keys[i].keytype = des_types[i]; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[0], + &hkeys[i].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + hkeys[i].key.keytype = des_types[i]; + } + + ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock (context->context, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + &keys[n_des_types]); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[n_des_types], + &hkeys[n_des_types].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + + _kadm5_free_keys (context, ent->keys.len, ent->keys.val); + ent->keys.len = len; + ent->keys.val = hkeys; + ent->kvno++; + *new_keys = keys; + *n_keys = len; + return ret; +out: + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context->context, &keys[i]); + free (keys); + _kadm5_free_keys (context, len, hkeys); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/set_modifier.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/set_modifier.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b097459b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/set_modifier.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: set_modifier.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_modifier(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + if(ent->modified_by == NULL){ + ent->modified_by = malloc(sizeof(*ent->modified_by)); + if(ent->modified_by == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + } else + free_Event(ent->modified_by); + ent->modified_by->time = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, context->caller, + &ent->modified_by->principal); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/truncate_log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/truncate_log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf4af26e73 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kadm5/truncate_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: truncate_log.c,v 1.1.8.1 2003/10/14 15:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +static char *realm; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = kadm5_log_truncate (server_context); + if(ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_truncate"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f1bb02e7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,417 @@ +2004-06-22 Love + + * afssys.c: 1.70->1.72: s/arla/nnpfs/ + +2004-06-22 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * afssys.c: 1.70: support the linux /proc/fs/mumel/afs_ioctl afs + "syscall" interface + +2003-04-23 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * common.c, kafs.h: drop the int argument (the error code) from + the logging function + +2003-04-22 Johan Danielsson + + * afskrb5.c (v5_convert): better match what other functions do + with values from krb5.conf, like case insensitivity + +2003-04-16 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kafs.3: Change .Fd #include to .In header.h + from Thomas Klausner + +2003-04-14 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * Makefile.am: (libkafs_la_LDFLAGS): update version + + * Makefile.am (ROKEN_SRCS): drop strupr.c + + * kafs.3: document kafs_set_verbose + + * common.c (kafs_set_verbose): add function that (re)sets the + logging function + (_kafs_try_get_cred): add function that does (krb_data->get_cred) to + make logging easier (that is now done in this function) + (*): use _kafs_try_get_cred + + * afskrb5.c (get_cred): handle that inst can be the empty string too + (v5_convert): use _kafs_foldup + (krb5_afslog_uid_home): set name + (krb5_afslog_uid_home): ditto + + * afskrb.c (krb_afslog_uid_home): set name + (krb_afslog_uid_home): ditto + + * kafs_locl.h (kafs_data): add name + (_kafs_foldup): internally export + +2003-04-11 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kafs.3: tell that cell-name is uppercased + + * Makefile.am: add INCLUDE_krb4 when using krb4, add INCLUDE_des + when using krb5, add strupr.c + + * afskrb5.c: Check the cell part of the name, not the realm part + when checking if 2b should be used. The reson is afs@REALM might + have updated their servers but not afs/cell@REALM. Add constant + KAFS_RXKAD_2B_KVNO. + +2003-04-06 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kafs.3: s/kerberos/Kerberos/ + +2003-03-19 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * kafs.3: spelling, from + + * kafs.3: document the kafs_settoken functions write about the + krb5_appdefault option for kerberos 5 afs tokens fix prototypes + +2003-03-18 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * afskrb5.c (kafs_settoken5): change signature to include a + krb5_context, use v5_convert + (v5_convert): new function, converts a krb5_ccreds to a kafs_token in + three diffrent ways, not at all, local 524/2b, and using 524 + (v5_to_kt): add code to do local 524/2b + (get_cred): use v5_convert + + + * kafs.h (kafs_settoken5): change signature to include a + krb5_context + + * Makefile.am: always build the libkafs library now that the + kerberos 5 can stand on their own + + * kafs.3: expose the krb5 functions + + * common.c (kafs_settoken_rxkad): move all content kerberos + version from kafs_settoken to kafs_settoken_rxkad + (_kafs_fixup_viceid): move the fixup the timestamp to make client + happy code here. + (_kafs_v4_to_kt): move all the kerberos 4 dependant parts from + kafs_settoken here. + (*): adapt to kafs_token + + * afskrb5.c (kafs_settoken5): new function, inserts a krb5_creds + into kernel + (v5_to_kt): new function, stores a krb5_creds in struct kafs_token + (get_cred): add a appdefault boolean ("libkafs", realm, "afs-use-524") + that can used to toggle if there should v5 token should be used + directly or converted via 524 first. + + * afskrb.c: move kafs_settoken here, use struct kafs_token + + * kafs_locl.h: include krb5-v4compat.h if needed, define an + internal structure struct kafs_token that carries around for rxkad + data that is independant of kerberos version + +2003-02-18 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * dlfcn.h: s/intialize/initialize, from + + +2003-02-08 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h: fix FreeBSD section + +2003-02-06 Love Hörquist Åstrand + + * afssysdefs.h: use syscall 208 on openbsd (all version) use + syscall 339 on freebsd 5.0 and later, use 210 on 4.x and earlier + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * kafs.3: move around sections (from NetBSD) + +2002-05-31 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c: remove the trial of afs@REALM for cell != realm, it + tries to use the wrong key for foreign cells + +2002-05-20 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: version number + +2002-04-18 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c (find_cells): make file parameter const + +2001-11-01 Assar Westerlund + + * add strsep, and bump version to 3:3:3 + +2001-10-27 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkafs_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 3:2:3 + +2001-10-24 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb.c (afslog_uid_int): handle krb_get_tf_fullname that + cannot take NULLs + (such as the MIT one) + +2001-10-22 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (ROKEN_SRCS): add strlcpy.c + +2001-10-09 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (ROKEN_SRCS): add strtok_r.c + * roken_rename.h (dns_srv_order): rename correctly + (strtok_r): add renaming + +2001-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * kafs.h, common.c: look for configuration files in /etc/arla (the + location in debian's arla package) + +2001-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: handle both krb5 and krb4 cases + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkafs_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 3:0:3 + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c: look in /etc/openafs for debian openafs + * kafs.h: add paths for openafs debian (/etc/openafs) + + * Makefile.am: add required library dependencies + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkafs_la_LDFLAGS): set versoin to 2:4:2 + +2001-06-19 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (_kafs_realm_of_cell): changed to first try exact match + in CellServDB, then exact match in DNS, and finally in-exact match + in CellServDB + +2001-05-18 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: only build resolve.c if doing renaming + +2001-02-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am, roken_rename.h: add rename of dns functions + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkafs_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 2:3:2 + +2000-11-17 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h: solaris 8 apperently uses 65 + +2000-09-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkafs_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 2:2:2 + +2000-09-12 Johan Danielsson + + * dlfcn.c: correct arguments to some snprintf:s + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 2:1:2 + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 2:0:2 + +2000-03-20 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h: make versions later than 5.7 of solaris also use + 73 + +2000-03-16 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb.c (afslog_uid_int): use krb_get_tf_fullname instead of + krb_get_default_principal + +2000-03-15 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c (map_syscall_name_to_number): ignore # at + beginning-of-line + +2000-03-13 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h: add 230 for MacOS X per information from + + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:2:1 + +1999-11-22 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): handle d->realm == NULL + +1999-11-17 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): don't look at the local realm at + all. just use the realm from the ticket file. + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:1:1 + + * afskrb5.c (get_cred): always request a DES key + +Mon Oct 18 17:40:21 1999 Bjoern Groenvall + + * common.c (find_cells): Trim trailing whitespace from + cellname. Lines starting with # are regarded as comments. + +Fri Oct 8 18:17:22 1999 Bjoern Groenvall + + * afskrb.c, common.c : Change code to make a clear distinction + between hinted realm and ticket realm. + + * kafs_locl.h: Added argument realm_hint. + + * common.c (_kafs_get_cred): Change code to acquire the ``best'' + possible ticket. Use cross-cell authentication only as method of + last resort. + + * afskrb.c (afslog_uid_int): Add realm_hint argument and extract + realm from ticket file. + + * afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): Added argument realm_hint. + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (get_cred): update to new krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: ignore the comlicated aix construct if !krb4 + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h: define AFS_SYSCALL to 73 for Solaris 2.7 + +1999-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (krb5_realm_of_cell): new function + + * afskrb.c (krb_realm_of_cell): new function + (afslog_uid_int): call krb_get_lrealm correctly + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (realm_of_cell): rename to _kafs_realm_of_cell and + un-staticize + +Fri Mar 19 14:52:29 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 11:24:02 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Sat Feb 27 19:46:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: remove EXTRA_DATA (as of autoconf 2.13/automake + 1.4) + +Thu Feb 11 22:57:37 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: set AIX_SRC also if !AIX + +Tue Dec 1 14:45:15 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: fix AIX linkage + +Sun Nov 22 10:40:44 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sat Nov 21 16:55:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * afskrb5.c: add homedir support + +Sun Sep 6 20:16:27 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * add new functionality for specifying the homedir to krb_afslog + et al + +Thu Jul 16 01:27:19 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c: reorganize order of definitions. + (try_one, try_two): conditionalize + +Thu Jul 9 18:31:52 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c (realm_of_cell): make the dns fallback work + +Wed Jul 8 01:39:44 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c (map_syscall_name_to_number): new function for finding + the number of a syscall given the name on solaris + (k_hasafs): try using map_syscall_name_to_number + +Tue Jun 30 17:19:00 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c: rewrite and add support for environment variable + AFS_SYSCALL + + * Makefile.in (distclean): don't remove roken_rename.h + +Fri May 29 19:03:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (roken_rename.h): remove dependency + +Mon May 25 05:25:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + +Sun Apr 19 09:58:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sat Apr 4 15:08:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kafs.h: add arla paths + + * common.c (_kafs_afslog_all_local_cells): Try _PATH_ARLA_* + (_realm_of_cell): Try _PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB + +Thu Feb 19 14:50:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c: Don't store expired tokens (this broke when using + pag-less rsh-sessions, and `non-standard' ticket files). + +Thu Feb 12 11:20:15 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: Install/uninstall one library at a time. + +Thu Feb 12 05:38:58 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (install): one library at a time. + +Mon Feb 9 23:40:32 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (find_cells): ignore empty lines + +Tue Jan 6 04:25:58 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h (AFS_SYSCALL): add FreeBSD + +Fri Jan 2 17:08:24 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kafs.h: new VICEIOCTL's. From + + * afssysdefs.h: Add OpenBSD diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a08c47761a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.43.2.1 2003/05/12 15:20:46 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(AFS_EXTRA_DEFS) $(ROKEN_RENAME) + +if KRB4 +DEPLIB_krb4 = $(LIB_krb4) $(LIB_des) +krb4_am_workaround = $(INCLUDE_krb4) +else +DEPLIB_krb4 = +krb4_am_workaround = +endif # KRB4 +INCLUDES += $(krb4_am_workaround) + +if KRB5 +DEPLIB_krb5 = ../krb5/libkrb5.la +krb5_am_workaround = $(INCLUDE_des) -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/krb5 +else +DEPLIB_krb5 = +krb5_am_workaround = +endif # KRB5 +INCLUDES += $(krb5_am_workaround) + + +if AIX +AFSL_EXP = $(srcdir)/afsl.exp + +if AIX4 +AFS_EXTRA_LD = -bnoentry +else +AFS_EXTRA_LD = -e _nostart +endif + +if AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS +if HAVE_DLOPEN +AIX_SRC = +else +AIX_SRC = dlfcn.c +endif +AFS_EXTRA_LIBS = afslib.so +AFS_EXTRA_DEFS = +else +AIX_SRC = afslib.c +AFS_EXTRA_LIBS = +AFS_EXTRA_DEFS = -DSTATIC_AFS +endif + +else +AFSL_EXP = +AIX_SRC = +endif # AIX + +libkafs_la_LIBADD = $(DEPLIB_krb5) ../roken/libroken.la $(DEPLIB_krb4) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkafs.la +libkafs_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 4:0:4 +foodir = $(libdir) +foo_DATA = $(AFS_EXTRA_LIBS) +# EXTRA_DATA = afslib.so + +CLEANFILES= $(AFS_EXTRA_LIBS) $(ROKEN_SRCS) + +include_HEADERS = kafs.h + +if KRB5 +afskrb5_c = afskrb5.c +endif + +if KRB4 +afskrb_c = afskrb.c +endif + + +if do_roken_rename +ROKEN_SRCS = resolve.c strtok_r.c strlcpy.c strsep.c +endif + +libkafs_la_SOURCES = \ + afssys.c \ + $(afskrb_c) \ + $(afskrb5_c) \ + common.c \ + $(AIX_SRC) \ + kafs_locl.h \ + afssysdefs.h \ + $(ROKEN_SRCS) + +#afslib_so_SOURCES = afslib.c + +EXTRA_libkafs_la_SOURCES = afskrb.c afskrb5.c dlfcn.c afslib.c dlfcn.h + +EXTRA_DIST = README.dlfcn afsl.exp afslib.exp + +man_MANS = kafs.3 + +# AIX: this almost works with gcc, but somehow it fails to use the +# correct ld, use ld instead +afslib.so: afslib.o + ld -o $@ -bM:SRE -bI:$(srcdir)/afsl.exp -bE:$(srcdir)/afslib.exp $(AFS_EXTRA_LD) afslib.o -lc + +$(OBJECTS): ../../include/config.h + +resolve.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/resolve.c . + +strtok_r.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strtok_r.c . + +strlcpy.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlcpy.c . + +strsep.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strsep.c . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b221833e21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,924 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.43.2.1 2003/05/12 15:20:46 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + + +SOURCES = $(libkafs_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libkafs_la_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = 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-0,0 +1,246 @@ +Copyright (c) 1992,1993,1995,1996, Jens-Uwe Mager, Helios Software GmbH +Not derived from licensed software. + +Permission is granted to freely use, copy, modify, and redistribute +this software, provided that the author is not construed to be liable +for any results of using the software, alterations are clearly marked +as such, and this notice is not modified. + +libdl.a +------- + +This is an emulation library to emulate the SunOS/System V.4 functions +to access the runtime linker. The functions are emulated by using the +AIX load() function and by reading the .loader section of the loaded +module to find the exports. The to be loaded module should be linked as +follows (if using AIX 3): + + cc -o module.so -bM:SRE -bE:module.exp -e _nostart $(OBJS) + +For AIX 4: + + cc -o module.so -bM:SRE -bE:module.exp -bnoentry $(OBJS) + +If you want to reference symbols from the main part of the program in a +loaded module, you will have to link against the export file of the +main part: + + cc -o main -bE:main.exp $(MAIN_OBJS) + cc -o module.so -bM:SRE -bI:main.exp -bE:module.exp -bnoentry $(OBJS) + +Note that you explicitely have to specify what functions are supposed +to be accessible from your loaded modules, this is different from +SunOS/System V.4 where any global is automatically exported. If you +want to export all globals, the following script might be of help: + +#!/bin/sh +/usr/ucb/nm -g $* | awk '$2 == "B" || $2 == "D" { print $3 }' + +The module export file contains the symbols to be exported. Because +this library uses the loader section, the final module.so file can be +stripped. C++ users should build their shared objects using the script +makeC++SharedLib (part of the IBM C++ compiler), this will make sure +that constructors and destructors for static and global objects will be +called upon loading and unloading the module. GNU C++ users should use +the -shared option to g++ to link the shared object: + + g++ -o module.so -shared $(OBJS) + +If the shared object does have permissions for anybody, the shared +object will be loaded into the shared library segment and it will stay +there even if the main application terminates. If you rebuild your +shared object after a bugfix and you want to make sure that you really +get the newest version you will have to use the "slibclean" command +before starting the application again to garbage collect the shared +library segment. If the performance utilities (bosperf) are installed +you can use the following command to see what shared objects are +loaded: + +/usr/lpp/bosperf/genkld | sort | uniq + +For easier debugging you can avoid loading the shared object into the +shared library segment alltogether by removing permissions for others +from the module.so file: + +chmod o-rwx module.so + +This will ensure you get a fresh copy of the shared object for every +dlopen() call which is loaded into the application's data segment. + +Usage +----- + +void *dlopen(const char *path, int mode); + +This routine loads the module pointed to by path and reads its export +table. If the path does not contain a '/' character, dlopen will search +for the module using the LIBPATH environment variable. It returns an +opaque handle to the module or NULL on error. The mode parameter can be +either RTLD_LAZY (for lazy function binding) or RTLD_NOW for immediate +function binding. The AIX implementation currently does treat RTLD_NOW +the same as RTLD_LAZY. The flag RTLD_GLOBAL might be or'ed into the +mode parameter to allow loaded modules to bind to global variables or +functions in other loaded modules loaded by dlopen(). If RTLD_GLOBAL is +not specified, only globals from the main part of the executable or +shared libraries are used to look for undefined symbols in loaded +modules. + + +void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol); + +This routine searches for the symbol in the module referred to by +handle and returns its address. If the symbol could not be found, the +function returns NULL. The return value must be casted to a proper +function pointer before it can be used. SunOS/System V.4 allows handle +to be a NULL pointer to refer to the module the call is made from, this +is not implemented. + +int dlclose(void *handle); + +This routine unloads the module referred to by the handle and disposes +of any local storage. this function returns -1 on failure. Any function +pointers obtained through dlsym() should be considered invalid after +closing a module. + +As AIX caches shared objects in the shared library segment, function +pointers obtained through dlsym() might still work even though the +module has been unloaded. This can introduce subtle bugs that will +segment fault later if AIX garbage collects or immediatly on +SunOS/System V.4 as the text segment is unmapped. + +char *dlerror(void); + +This routine can be used to retrieve a text message describing the most +recent error that occured on on of the above routines. This function +returns NULL if there is no error information. + +Initialization and termination handlers +--------------------------------------- + +The emulation provides for an initialization and a termination +handler. The dlfcn.h file contains a structure declaration named +dl_info with following members: + + void (*init)(void); + void (*fini)(void); + +The init function is called upon first referencing the library. The +fini function is called at dlclose() time or when the process exits. +The module should declare a variable named dl_info that contains this +structure which must be exported. These functions correspond to the +documented _init() and _fini() functions of SunOS 4.x, but these are +appearently not implemented in SunOS. When using SunOS 5.0, these +correspond to #pragma init and #pragma fini respectively. At the same +time any static or global C++ object's constructors or destructors will +be called. + +BUGS +---- + +Please note that there is currently a problem with implicitely loaded +shared C++ libaries: if you refer to a shared C++ library from a loaded +module that is not yet used by the main program, the dlopen() emulator +does not notice this and does not call the static constructors for the +implicitely loaded library. This can be easily demonstrated by +referencing the C++ standard streams from a loaded module if the main +program is a plain C program. + +Jens-Uwe Mager + +HELIOS Software GmbH +Lavesstr. 80 +30159 Hannover +Germany + +Phone: +49 511 36482-0 +FAX: +49 511 36482-69 +AppleLink: helios.de/jum +Internet: jum@helios.de + +Revison History +--------------- + +SCCS/s.dlfcn.h: + +D 1.4 95/04/25 09:36:52 jum 4 3 00018/00004/00028 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added RTLD_GLOBAL, include and C++ guards + +D 1.3 92/12/27 20:58:32 jum 3 2 00001/00001/00031 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +we always have prototypes on RS/6000 + +D 1.2 92/08/16 17:45:11 jum 2 1 00009/00000/00023 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added dl_info structure to implement initialize and terminate functions + +D 1.1 92/08/02 18:08:45 jum 1 0 00023/00000/00000 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Erstellungsdatum und -uhrzeit 92/08/02 18:08:45 von jum + +SCCS/s.dlfcn.c: + +D 1.11 96/04/10 20:12:51 jum 13 12 00037/00000/00533 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Integrated the changes from John W. Eaton to initialize +g++ generated shared objects. + +D 1.10 96/02/15 17:42:44 jum 12 10 00012/00007/00521 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +the C++ constructor and destructor chains are now called properly for either +xlC 2 or xlC 3 (CSet++). + +D 1.9 95/09/22 11:09:38 markus 10 9 00001/00008/00527 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Fix version number + +D 1.8 95/09/22 10:14:34 markus 9 8 00008/00001/00527 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Added version number for dl lib + +D 1.7 95/08/14 19:08:38 jum 8 6 00026/00004/00502 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Integrated the fixes from Kirk Benell (kirk@rsinc.com) to allow loading of +shared objects generated under AIX 4. Fixed bug that symbols with exactly +8 characters would use garbage characters from the following symbol value. + +D 1.6 95/04/25 09:38:03 jum 6 5 00046/00006/00460 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added handling of C++ static constructors and destructors, added RTLD_GLOBAL to bind against other loaded modules + +D 1.5 93/02/14 20:14:17 jum 5 4 00002/00000/00464 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added path to dlopen error message to make clear where there error occured. + +D 1.4 93/01/03 19:13:56 jum 4 3 00061/00005/00403 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +to allow calling symbols in the main module call load with L_NOAUTODEFER and +do a loadbind later with the main module. + +D 1.3 92/12/27 20:59:55 jum 3 2 00066/00008/00342 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added search by L_GETINFO if module got loaded by LIBPATH + +D 1.2 92/08/16 17:45:43 jum 2 1 00074/00006/00276 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +implemented initialize and terminate functions, added reference counting to avoid multiple loads of the same library + +D 1.1 92/08/02 18:08:45 jum 1 0 00282/00000/00000 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Erstellungsdatum und -uhrzeit 92/08/02 18:08:45 von jum + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afskrb.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afskrb.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..523a7b9a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afskrb.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afskrb.c,v 1.17 2003/04/14 08:32:11 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +struct krb_kafs_data { + const char *realm; +}; + +static int +get_cred(kafs_data *data, const char *name, const char *inst, + const char *realm, uid_t uid, struct kafs_token *kt) +{ + CREDENTIALS c; + KTEXT_ST tkt; + int ret = krb_get_cred((char*)name, (char*)inst, (char*)realm, &c); + + if (ret) { + ret = krb_mk_req(&tkt, (char*)name, (char*)inst, (char*)realm, 0); + if (ret == KSUCCESS) + ret = krb_get_cred((char*)name, (char*)inst, (char*)realm, &c); + } + if (ret == 0) + ret = _kafs_v4_to_kt(&c, uid, kt); + return ret; +} + +static int +afslog_uid_int(kafs_data *data, + const char *cell, + const char *realm_hint, + uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + int ret; + struct kafs_token kt; + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char inst[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + + kt.ticket = NULL; + + if (cell == 0 || cell[0] == 0) + return _kafs_afslog_all_local_cells (data, uid, homedir); + + /* Extract realm from ticket file. */ + ret = krb_get_tf_fullname(tkt_string(), name, inst, realm); + if (ret != KSUCCESS) + return ret; + + kt.ticket = NULL; + ret = _kafs_get_cred(data, cell, realm_hint, realm, uid, &kt); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = kafs_settoken_rxkad(cell, &kt.ct, kt.ticket, kt.ticket_len); + free(kt.ticket); + } + return ret; +} + +static char * +get_realm(kafs_data *data, const char *host) +{ + char *r = krb_realmofhost(host); + if(r != NULL) + return strdup(r); + else + return NULL; +} + +int +krb_afslog_uid_home(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + kafs_data kd; + + kd.name = "krb4"; + kd.afslog_uid = afslog_uid_int; + kd.get_cred = get_cred; + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + kd.data = 0; + return afslog_uid_int(&kd, cell, realm_hint, uid, homedir); +} + +int +krb_afslog_uid(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint, uid_t uid) +{ + return krb_afslog_uid_home(cell, realm_hint, uid, NULL); +} + +int +krb_afslog(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint) +{ + return krb_afslog_uid(cell, realm_hint, getuid()); +} + +int +krb_afslog_home(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint, const char *homedir) +{ + return krb_afslog_uid_home(cell, realm_hint, getuid(), homedir); +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +krb_realm_of_cell(const char *cell, char **realm) +{ + kafs_data kd; + + kd.name = "krb4"; + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + return _kafs_realm_of_cell(&kd, cell, realm); +} + +int +kafs_settoken(const char *cell, uid_t uid, CREDENTIALS *c) +{ + struct kafs_token kt; + int ret; + + kt.ticket = NULL; + + ret = _kafs_v4_to_kt(c, uid, &kt); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (kt.ct.EndTimestamp < time(NULL)) { + free(kt.ticket); + return 0; + } + + ret = kafs_settoken_rxkad(cell, &kt.ct, kt.ticket, kt.ticket_len); + free(kt.ticket); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d415db6ea0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c @@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afskrb5.c,v 1.18.2.1 2003/04/22 14:25:43 joda Exp $"); + +struct krb5_kafs_data { + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache id; + krb5_const_realm realm; +}; + +enum { + KAFS_RXKAD_2B_KVNO = 213, + KAFS_RXKAD_K5_KVNO = 256 +}; + +static int +v5_to_kt(krb5_creds *cred, uid_t uid, struct kafs_token *kt, int local524) +{ + int kvno, ret; + + kt->ticket = NULL; + + /* check if des key */ + if (cred->session.keyvalue.length != 8) + return EINVAL; + + if (local524) { + Ticket t; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + size_t len; + + kvno = KAFS_RXKAD_2B_KVNO; + + ret = decode_Ticket(cred->ticket.data, cred->ticket.length, &t, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (t.tkt_vno != 5) + return -1; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_len, &t.enc_part, + &len, ret); + free_Ticket(&t); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_len != len) { + free(buf); + return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + + kt->ticket = buf; + kt->ticket_len = buf_len; + + } else { + kvno = KAFS_RXKAD_K5_KVNO; + kt->ticket = malloc(cred->ticket.length); + if (kt->ticket == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + kt->ticket_len = cred->ticket.length; + memcpy(kt->ticket, cred->ticket.data, kt->ticket_len); + + ret = 0; + } + + + /* + * Build a struct ClearToken + */ + + kt->ct.AuthHandle = kvno; + memcpy(kt->ct.HandShakeKey, cred->session.keyvalue.data, 8); + kt->ct.ViceId = uid; + kt->ct.BeginTimestamp = cred->times.starttime; + kt->ct.EndTimestamp = cred->times.endtime; + + _kafs_fixup_viceid(&kt->ct, uid); + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +v5_convert(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *cred, uid_t uid, + const char *cell, + struct kafs_token *kt) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *c, *val; + + c = strdup(cell); + if (c == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + _kafs_foldup(c, c); + krb5_appdefault_string (context, "libkafs", + c, + "afs-use-524", "yes", &val); + free(c); + + if (strcasecmp(val, "local") == 0 || + strcasecmp(val, "2b") == 0) + ret = v5_to_kt(cred, uid, kt, 1); + else if(strcasecmp(val, "yes") == 0 || + strcasecmp(val, "true") == 0 || + atoi(val)) { + struct credentials c; + + if (id == NULL) + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(context, cred, &c); + else + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(context, id, cred, &c); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = _kafs_v4_to_kt(&c, uid, kt); + } else + ret = v5_to_kt(cred, uid, kt, 0); + + out: + free(val); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * + */ + +static int +get_cred(kafs_data *data, const char *name, const char *inst, + const char *realm, uid_t uid, struct kafs_token *kt) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds; + struct krb5_kafs_data *d = data->data; + + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(d->context, name, inst, realm, + &in_creds.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(d->context, d->id, &in_creds.client); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(d->context, in_creds.server); + return ret; + } + in_creds.session.keytype = KEYTYPE_DES; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(d->context, 0, d->id, &in_creds, &out_creds); + krb5_free_principal(d->context, in_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(d->context, in_creds.client); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = v5_convert(d->context, d->id, out_creds, uid, + (inst != NULL && inst[0] != '\0') ? inst : realm, kt); + krb5_free_creds(d->context, out_creds); + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +afslog_uid_int(kafs_data *data, const char *cell, const char *rh, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct kafs_token kt; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_realm *trealm; /* ticket realm */ + struct krb5_kafs_data *d = data->data; + + if (cell == 0 || cell[0] == 0) + return _kafs_afslog_all_local_cells (data, uid, homedir); + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (d->context, d->id, &princ); + if (ret) + return ret; + + trealm = krb5_princ_realm (d->context, princ); + + if (d->realm != NULL && strcmp (d->realm, *trealm) == 0) { + trealm = NULL; + krb5_free_principal (d->context, princ); + } + + kt.ticket = NULL; + ret = _kafs_get_cred(data, cell, d->realm, *trealm, uid, &kt); + if(trealm) + krb5_free_principal (d->context, princ); + + if(ret == 0) { + ret = kafs_settoken_rxkad(cell, &kt.ct, kt.ticket, kt.ticket_len); + free(kt.ticket); + } + return ret; +} + +static char * +get_realm(kafs_data *data, const char *host) +{ + struct krb5_kafs_data *d = data->data; + krb5_realm *realms; + char *r; + if(krb5_get_host_realm(d->context, host, &realms)) + return NULL; + r = strdup(realms[0]); + krb5_free_host_realm(d->context, realms); + return r; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog_uid_home(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + kafs_data kd; + struct krb5_kafs_data d; + kd.name = "krb5"; + kd.afslog_uid = afslog_uid_int; + kd.get_cred = get_cred; + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + kd.data = &d; + d.context = context; + d.id = id; + d.realm = realm; + return afslog_uid_int(&kd, cell, 0, uid, homedir); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog_uid(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid) +{ + return krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id, cell, realm, uid, NULL); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm) +{ + return krb5_afslog_uid (context, id, cell, realm, getuid()); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog_home(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + const char *homedir) +{ + return krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id, cell, realm, getuid(), homedir); +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_realm_of_cell(const char *cell, char **realm) +{ + kafs_data kd; + + kd.name = "krb5"; + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + return _kafs_realm_of_cell(&kd, cell, realm); +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +kafs_settoken5(krb5_context context, const char *cell, uid_t uid, + krb5_creds *cred) +{ + struct kafs_token kt; + int ret; + + ret = v5_convert(context, NULL, cred, uid, cell, &kt); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kafs_settoken_rxkad(cell, &kt.ct, kt.ticket, kt.ticket_len); + + free(kt.ticket); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afsl.exp b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afsl.exp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d2b00e283 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afsl.exp @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +#!/unix + +* This mumbo jumbo creates entry points to syscalls in _AIX + +lpioctl syscall +lsetpag syscall diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afslib.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afslib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae3b5a5692 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afslib.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This file is only used with AIX + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afslib.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $"); + +int +aix_pioctl(char *a_path, + int o_opcode, + struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP, + int a_followSymlinks) +{ + return lpioctl(a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +} + +int +aix_setpag(void) +{ + return lsetpag(); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afslib.exp b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afslib.exp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f288717706 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afslib.exp @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +#! +aix_pioctl +aix_setpag diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afssys.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afssys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5cd994c566 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afssys.c @@ -0,0 +1,459 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000, 2002, 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afssys.c,v 1.69.2.2 2004/06/22 14:29:48 lha Exp $"); + +struct procdata { + unsigned long param4; + unsigned long param3; + unsigned long param2; + unsigned long param1; + unsigned long syscall; +}; +#define VIOC_SYSCALL _IOW('C', 1, void *) + + +int _kafs_debug; /* this should be done in a better way */ + +#define NO_ENTRY_POINT 0 +#define SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT 1 +#define MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT 2 +#define SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT2 3 +#define SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT3 4 +#define LINUX_PROC_POINT 5 +#define AIX_ENTRY_POINTS 6 +#define UNKNOWN_ENTRY_POINT 7 +static int afs_entry_point = UNKNOWN_ENTRY_POINT; +static int afs_syscalls[2]; +static char *afs_procpath; + +/* Magic to get AIX syscalls to work */ +#ifdef _AIX + +static int (*Pioctl)(char*, int, struct ViceIoctl*, int); +static int (*Setpag)(void); + +#include "dlfcn.h" + +/* + * + */ + +static int +try_aix(void) +{ +#ifdef STATIC_AFS_SYSCALLS + Pioctl = aix_pioctl; + Setpag = aix_setpag; +#else + void *ptr; + char path[MaxPathLen], *p; + /* + * If we are root or running setuid don't trust AFSLIBPATH! + */ + if (getuid() != 0 && !issuid() && (p = getenv("AFSLIBPATH")) != NULL) + strlcpy(path, p, sizeof(path)); + else + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/afslib.so", LIBDIR); + + ptr = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW); + if(ptr == NULL) { + if(_kafs_debug) { + if(errno == ENOEXEC && (p = dlerror()) != NULL) + fprintf(stderr, "dlopen(%s): %s\n", path, p); + else if (errno != ENOENT) + fprintf(stderr, "dlopen(%s): %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); + } + return 1; + } + Setpag = (int (*)(void))dlsym(ptr, "aix_setpag"); + Pioctl = (int (*)(char*, int, + struct ViceIoctl*, int))dlsym(ptr, "aix_pioctl"); +#endif + afs_entry_point = AIX_ENTRY_POINTS; + return 0; +} +#endif /* _AIX */ + +/* + * This probably only works under Solaris and could get confused if + * there's a /etc/name_to_sysnum file. + */ + +#define _PATH_ETC_NAME_TO_SYSNUM "/etc/name_to_sysnum" + +static int +map_syscall_name_to_number (const char *str, int *res) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + size_t str_len = strlen (str); + + f = fopen (_PATH_ETC_NAME_TO_SYSNUM, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return -1; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + if (buf[0] == '#') + continue; + + if (strncmp (str, buf, str_len) == 0) { + char *begptr = buf + str_len; + char *endptr; + long val = strtol (begptr, &endptr, 0); + + if (val != 0 && endptr != begptr) { + fclose (f); + *res = val; + return 0; + } + } + } + fclose (f); + return -1; +} + +static int +try_proc(const char *path) +{ + int fd; + fd = open(path, O_RDWR); + if (fd < 0) + return 1; + close(fd); + afs_procpath = strdup(path); + if (afs_procpath == NULL) + return 1; + afs_entry_point = LINUX_PROC_POINT; + return 0; +} + +static int +do_proc(struct procdata *data) +{ + int fd, ret, saved_errno; + fd = open(afs_procpath, O_RDWR); + if (fd < 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + ret = ioctl(fd, VIOC_SYSCALL, data); + saved_errno = errno; + close(fd); + errno = saved_errno; + return ret; +} + +int +k_pioctl(char *a_path, + int o_opcode, + struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP, + int a_followSymlinks) +{ +#ifndef NO_AFS + switch(afs_entry_point){ +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT2: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT3: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[0], AFSCALL_PIOCTL, + a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +#endif +#if defined(AFS_PIOCTL) + case MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[0], + a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +#endif + case LINUX_PROC_POINT: { + struct procdata data = { 0, 0, 0, 0, AFSCALL_PIOCTL }; + data.param1 = (unsigned long)a_path; + data.param2 = (unsigned long)o_opcode; + data.param3 = (unsigned long)a_paramsP; + data.param4 = (unsigned long)a_followSymlinks; + return do_proc(&data); + } +#ifdef _AIX + case AIX_ENTRY_POINTS: + return Pioctl(a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +#endif + } + errno = ENOSYS; +#ifdef SIGSYS + kill(getpid(), SIGSYS); /* You lose! */ +#endif +#endif /* NO_AFS */ + return -1; +} + +int +k_afs_cell_of_file(const char *path, char *cell, int len) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + parms.in = NULL; + parms.in_size = 0; + parms.out = cell; + parms.out_size = len; + return k_pioctl((char*)path, VIOC_FILE_CELL_NAME, &parms, 1); +} + +int +k_unlog(void) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms)); + return k_pioctl(0, VIOCUNLOG, &parms, 0); +} + +int +k_setpag(void) +{ +#ifndef NO_AFS + switch(afs_entry_point){ +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT2: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT3: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[0], AFSCALL_SETPAG); +#endif +#if defined(AFS_PIOCTL) + case MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[1]); +#endif + case LINUX_PROC_POINT: { + struct procdata data = { 0, 0, 0, 0, AFSCALL_SETPAG }; + return do_proc(&data); + } +#ifdef _AIX + case AIX_ENTRY_POINTS: + return Setpag(); +#endif + } + + errno = ENOSYS; +#ifdef SIGSYS + kill(getpid(), SIGSYS); /* You lose! */ +#endif +#endif /* NO_AFS */ + return -1; +} + +static jmp_buf catch_SIGSYS; + +#ifdef SIGSYS + +static RETSIGTYPE +SIGSYS_handler(int sig) +{ + errno = 0; + signal(SIGSYS, SIGSYS_handler); /* Need to reinstall handler on SYSV */ + longjmp(catch_SIGSYS, 1); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Try to see if `syscall' is a pioctl. Return 0 iff succesful. + */ + +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) +static int +try_one (int syscall_num) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms)); + + if (setjmp(catch_SIGSYS) == 0) { + syscall(syscall_num, AFSCALL_PIOCTL, + 0, VIOCSETTOK, &parms, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (errno == EINVAL) { + afs_entry_point = SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT; + afs_syscalls[0] = syscall_num; + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Try to see if `syscall_pioctl' is a pioctl syscall. Return 0 iff + * succesful. + * + */ + +#ifdef AFS_PIOCTL +static int +try_two (int syscall_pioctl, int syscall_setpag) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms)); + + if (setjmp(catch_SIGSYS) == 0) { + syscall(syscall_pioctl, + 0, VIOCSETTOK, &parms, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (errno == EINVAL) { + afs_entry_point = MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT; + afs_syscalls[0] = syscall_pioctl; + afs_syscalls[1] = syscall_setpag; + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} +#endif + +int +k_hasafs(void) +{ +#if !defined(NO_AFS) && defined(SIGSYS) + RETSIGTYPE (*saved_func)(int); +#endif + int saved_errno; + char *env = getenv ("AFS_SYSCALL"); + + /* + * Already checked presence of AFS syscalls? + */ + if (afs_entry_point != UNKNOWN_ENTRY_POINT) + return afs_entry_point != NO_ENTRY_POINT; + + /* + * Probe kernel for AFS specific syscalls, + * they (currently) come in two flavors. + * If the syscall is absent we recive a SIGSYS. + */ + afs_entry_point = NO_ENTRY_POINT; + + saved_errno = errno; +#ifndef NO_AFS +#ifdef SIGSYS + saved_func = signal(SIGSYS, SIGSYS_handler); +#endif + +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) + { + int tmp; + + if (env != NULL) { + if (sscanf (env, "%d", &tmp) == 1) { + if (try_one (tmp) == 0) + goto done; + } else { + char *end = NULL; + char *p; + char *s = strdup (env); + + if (s != NULL) { + for (p = strtok_r (s, ",", &end); + p != NULL; + p = strtok_r (NULL, ",", &end)) { + if (map_syscall_name_to_number (p, &tmp) == 0) + if (try_one (tmp) == 0) { + free (s); + goto done; + } + } + free (s); + } + } + } + } +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL || AFS_SYSCALL2 || AFS_SYSCALL3 */ + +#ifdef AFS_SYSCALL + if (try_one (AFS_SYSCALL) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL */ + +#ifdef AFS_PIOCTL + { + int tmp[2]; + + if (env != NULL && sscanf (env, "%d%d", &tmp[0], &tmp[1]) == 2) + if (try_two (tmp[0], tmp[1]) == 2) + goto done; + } +#endif /* AFS_PIOCTL */ + +#ifdef AFS_PIOCTL + if (try_two (AFS_PIOCTL, AFS_SETPAG) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_PIOCTL */ + +#ifdef AFS_SYSCALL2 + if (try_one (AFS_SYSCALL2) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL2 */ + +#ifdef AFS_SYSCALL3 + if (try_one (AFS_SYSCALL3) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL3 */ + +#ifdef _AIX +#if 0 + if (env != NULL) { + char *pos = NULL; + char *pioctl_name; + char *setpag_name; + + pioctl_name = strtok_r (env, ", \t", &pos); + if (pioctl_name != NULL) { + setpag_name = strtok_r (NULL, ", \t", &pos); + if (setpag_name != NULL) + if (try_aix (pioctl_name, setpag_name) == 0) + goto done; + } + } +#endif + + if(try_aix() == 0) + goto done; +#endif + + if (try_proc("/proc/fs/openafs/afs_ioctl") == 0) + goto done; + if (try_proc("/proc/fs/nnpfs/afs_ioctl") == 0) + goto done; + if (env && try_proc(env) == 0) + goto done; + +done: +#ifdef SIGSYS + signal(SIGSYS, saved_func); +#endif +#endif /* NO_AFS */ + errno = saved_errno; + return afs_entry_point != NO_ENTRY_POINT; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afssysdefs.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afssysdefs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfda36a07e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/afssysdefs.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: afssysdefs.h,v 1.26 2003/02/08 22:55:55 assar Exp $ */ + +/* + * This section is for machines using single entry point AFS syscalls! + * and/or + * This section is for machines using multiple entry point AFS syscalls! + * + * SunOS 4 is an example of single entry point and sgi of multiple + * entry point syscalls. + */ + +#if SunOS == 40 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 31 +#endif + +#if SunOS >= 50 && SunOS < 57 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 105 +#endif + +#if SunOS == 57 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 73 +#endif + +#if SunOS >= 58 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 65 +#endif + +#if defined(__hpux) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 50 +#define AFS_SYSCALL2 49 +#define AFS_SYSCALL3 48 +#endif + +#if defined(_AIX) +/* _AIX is too weird */ +#endif + +#if defined(__sgi) +#define AFS_PIOCTL (64+1000) +#define AFS_SETPAG (65+1000) +#endif + +#if defined(__osf__) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 232 +#define AFS_SYSCALL2 258 +#endif + +#if defined(__ultrix) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 31 +#endif + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) +#if __FreeBSD_version >= 500000 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 339 +#else +#define AFS_SYSCALL 210 +#endif +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ + +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ +#define AFS_SYSCALL 208 +#endif + +#if defined(__NetBSD__) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 210 +#endif + +#ifdef __APPLE__ /* MacOS X */ +#define AFS_SYSCALL 230 +#endif + +#ifdef SYS_afs_syscall +#define AFS_SYSCALL3 SYS_afs_syscall +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/common.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..291dcac3c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.26.2.1 2003/04/23 18:03:20 lha Exp $"); + +#define AUTH_SUPERUSER "afs" + +/* + * Here only ASCII characters are relevant. + */ + +#define IsAsciiLower(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z') + +#define ToAsciiUpper(c) ((c) - 'a' + 'A') + +static void (*kafs_verbose)(void *, const char *); +static void *kafs_verbose_ctx; + +void +_kafs_foldup(char *a, const char *b) +{ + for (; *b; a++, b++) + if (IsAsciiLower(*b)) + *a = ToAsciiUpper(*b); + else + *a = *b; + *a = '\0'; +} + +void +kafs_set_verbose(void (*f)(void *, const char *), void *ctx) +{ + if (f) { + kafs_verbose = f; + kafs_verbose_ctx = ctx; + } +} + +int +kafs_settoken_rxkad(const char *cell, struct ClearToken *ct, + void *ticket, size_t ticket_len) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + char buf[2048], *t; + int32_t sizeof_x; + + t = buf; + /* + * length of secret token followed by secret token + */ + sizeof_x = ticket_len; + memcpy(t, &sizeof_x, sizeof(sizeof_x)); + t += sizeof(sizeof_x); + memcpy(t, ticket, sizeof_x); + t += sizeof_x; + /* + * length of clear token followed by clear token + */ + sizeof_x = sizeof(*ct); + memcpy(t, &sizeof_x, sizeof(sizeof_x)); + t += sizeof(sizeof_x); + memcpy(t, ct, sizeof_x); + t += sizeof_x; + + /* + * do *not* mark as primary cell + */ + sizeof_x = 0; + memcpy(t, &sizeof_x, sizeof(sizeof_x)); + t += sizeof(sizeof_x); + /* + * follow with cell name + */ + sizeof_x = strlen(cell) + 1; + memcpy(t, cell, sizeof_x); + t += sizeof_x; + + /* + * Build argument block + */ + parms.in = buf; + parms.in_size = t - buf; + parms.out = 0; + parms.out_size = 0; + + return k_pioctl(0, VIOCSETTOK, &parms, 0); +} + +void +_kafs_fixup_viceid(struct ClearToken *ct, uid_t uid) +{ +#define ODD(x) ((x) & 1) + /* According to Transarc conventions ViceId is valid iff + * (EndTimestamp - BeginTimestamp) is odd. By decrementing EndTime + * the transformations: + * + * (issue_date, life) -> (StartTime, EndTime) -> (issue_date, life) + * preserves the original values. + */ + if (uid != 0) /* valid ViceId */ + { + if (!ODD(ct->EndTimestamp - ct->BeginTimestamp)) + ct->EndTimestamp--; + } + else /* not valid ViceId */ + { + if (ODD(ct->EndTimestamp - ct->BeginTimestamp)) + ct->EndTimestamp--; + } +} + + +int +_kafs_v4_to_kt(CREDENTIALS *c, uid_t uid, struct kafs_token *kt) +{ + kt->ticket = NULL; + + if (c->ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN) + return EINVAL; + + kt->ticket = malloc(c->ticket_st.length); + if (kt->ticket == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + kt->ticket_len = c->ticket_st.length; + memcpy(kt->ticket, c->ticket_st.dat, kt->ticket_len); + + /* + * Build a struct ClearToken + */ + kt->ct.AuthHandle = c->kvno; + memcpy (kt->ct.HandShakeKey, c->session, sizeof(c->session)); + kt->ct.ViceId = uid; + kt->ct.BeginTimestamp = c->issue_date; + kt->ct.EndTimestamp = krb_life_to_time(c->issue_date, c->lifetime); + + _kafs_fixup_viceid(&kt->ct, uid); + + return 0; +} + +/* Try to get a db-server for an AFS cell from a AFSDB record */ + +static int +dns_find_cell(const char *cell, char *dbserver, size_t len) +{ + struct dns_reply *r; + int ok = -1; + r = dns_lookup(cell, "afsdb"); + if(r){ + struct resource_record *rr = r->head; + while(rr){ + if(rr->type == T_AFSDB && rr->u.afsdb->preference == 1){ + strlcpy(dbserver, + rr->u.afsdb->domain, + len); + ok = 0; + break; + } + rr = rr->next; + } + dns_free_data(r); + } + return ok; +} + + +/* + * Try to find the cells we should try to klog to in "file". + */ +static void +find_cells(const char *file, char ***cells, int *index) +{ + FILE *f; + char cell[64]; + int i; + int ind = *index; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return; + while (fgets(cell, sizeof(cell), f)) { + char *t; + t = cell + strlen(cell); + for (; t >= cell; t--) + if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\t' || *t == ' ') + *t = 0; + if (cell[0] == '\0' || cell[0] == '#') + continue; + for(i = 0; i < ind; i++) + if(strcmp((*cells)[i], cell) == 0) + break; + if(i == ind){ + char **tmp; + + tmp = realloc(*cells, (ind + 1) * sizeof(**cells)); + if (tmp == NULL) + break; + *cells = tmp; + (*cells)[ind] = strdup(cell); + if ((*cells)[ind] == NULL) + break; + ++ind; + } + } + fclose(f); + *index = ind; +} + +/* + * Get tokens for all cells[] + */ +static int +afslog_cells(kafs_data *data, char **cells, int max, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < max; i++) { + int er = (*data->afslog_uid)(data, cells[i], 0, uid, homedir); + if (er) + ret = er; + } + return ret; +} + +int +_kafs_afslog_all_local_cells(kafs_data *data, uid_t uid, const char *homedir) +{ + int ret; + char **cells = NULL; + int index = 0; + + if (homedir == NULL) + homedir = getenv("HOME"); + if (homedir != NULL) { + char home[MaxPathLen]; + snprintf(home, sizeof(home), "%s/.TheseCells", homedir); + find_cells(home, &cells, &index); + } + find_cells(_PATH_THESECELLS, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_THISCELL, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_ARLA_THESECELLS, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_ARLA_THISCELL, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_THESECELLS, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_THISCELL, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_THESECELLS, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_THISCELL, &cells, &index); + + ret = afslog_cells(data, cells, index, uid, homedir); + while(index > 0) + free(cells[--index]); + free(cells); + return ret; +} + + +static int +file_find_cell(kafs_data *data, const char *cell, char **realm, int exact) +{ + FILE *F; + char buf[1024]; + char *p; + int ret = -1; + + if ((F = fopen(_PATH_CELLSERVDB, "r")) + || (F = fopen(_PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB, "r")) + || (F = fopen(_PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_CELLSERVDB, "r")) + || (F = fopen(_PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_CELLSERVDB, "r"))) { + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), F)) { + int cmp; + + if (buf[0] != '>') + continue; /* Not a cell name line, try next line */ + p = buf; + strsep(&p, " \t\n#"); + + if (exact) + cmp = strcmp(buf + 1, cell); + else + cmp = strncmp(buf + 1, cell, strlen(cell)); + + if (cmp == 0) { + /* + * We found the cell name we're looking for. + * Read next line on the form ip-address '#' hostname + */ + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), F) == NULL) + break; /* Read failed, give up */ + p = strchr(buf, '#'); + if (p == NULL) + break; /* No '#', give up */ + p++; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + *realm = (*data->get_realm)(data, p); + if (*realm && **realm != '\0') + ret = 0; + break; /* Won't try any more */ + } + } + fclose(F); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Find the realm associated with cell. Do this by opening + /usr/vice/etc/CellServDB and getting the realm-of-host for the + first VL-server for the cell. + + This does not work when the VL-server is living in one realm, but + the cell it is serving is living in another realm. + + Return 0 on success, -1 otherwise. + */ + +int +_kafs_realm_of_cell(kafs_data *data, const char *cell, char **realm) +{ + char buf[1024]; + int ret; + + ret = file_find_cell(data, cell, realm, 1); + if (ret == 0) + return ret; + if (dns_find_cell(cell, buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) { + *realm = (*data->get_realm)(data, buf); + if(*realm != NULL) + return 0; + } + return file_find_cell(data, cell, realm, 0); +} + +static int +_kafs_try_get_cred(kafs_data *data, const char *user, const char *cell, + const char *realm, uid_t uid, struct kafs_token *kt) +{ + int ret; + + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, user, cell, realm, uid, kt); + if (kafs_verbose) { + char *str; + asprintf(&str, "%s tried afs%s%s@%s -> %d", + data->name, cell[0] == '\0' ? "" : "/", + cell, realm, ret); + (*kafs_verbose)(kafs_verbose_ctx, str); + free(str); + } + + return ret; +} + + +int +_kafs_get_cred(kafs_data *data, + const char *cell, + const char *realm_hint, + const char *realm, + uid_t uid, + struct kafs_token *kt) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *vl_realm; + char CELL[64]; + + /* We're about to find the the realm that holds the key for afs in + * the specified cell. The problem is that null-instance + * afs-principals are common and that hitting the wrong realm might + * yield the wrong afs key. The following assumptions were made. + * + * Any realm passed to us is preferred. + * + * If there is a realm with the same name as the cell, it is most + * likely the correct realm to talk to. + * + * In most (maybe even all) cases the database servers of the cell + * will live in the realm we are looking for. + * + * Try the local realm, but if the previous cases fail, this is + * really a long shot. + * + */ + + /* comments on the ordering of these tests */ + + /* If the user passes a realm, she probably knows something we don't + * know and we should try afs@realm_hint. + */ + + if (realm_hint) { + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + cell, realm_hint, uid, kt); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + "", realm_hint, uid, kt); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + } + + _kafs_foldup(CELL, cell); + + /* + * If cell == realm we don't need no cross-cell authentication. + * Try afs@REALM. + */ + if (strcmp(CELL, realm) == 0) { + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + "", realm, uid, kt); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + /* Try afs.cell@REALM below. */ + } + + /* + * If the AFS servers have a file /usr/afs/etc/krb.conf containing + * REALM we still don't have to resort to cross-cell authentication. + * Try afs.cell@REALM. + */ + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + cell, realm, uid, kt); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + + /* + * We failed to get ``first class tickets'' for afs, + * fall back to cross-cell authentication. + * Try afs@CELL. + * Try afs.cell@CELL. + */ + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + "", CELL, uid, kt); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + cell, CELL, uid, kt); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + + /* + * Perhaps the cell doesn't correspond to any realm? + * Use realm of first volume location DB server. + * Try afs.cell@VL_REALM. + * Try afs@VL_REALM??? + */ + if (_kafs_realm_of_cell(data, cell, &vl_realm) == 0 + && strcmp(vl_realm, realm) != 0 + && strcmp(vl_realm, CELL) != 0) { + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + cell, vl_realm, uid, kt); + if (ret) + ret = _kafs_try_get_cred(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, + "", vl_realm, uid, kt); + free(vl_realm); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/dlfcn.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/dlfcn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..728cf5cdd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/dlfcn.c @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +/* + * @(#)dlfcn.c 1.11 revision of 96/04/10 20:12:51 + * This is an unpublished work copyright (c) 1992 HELIOS Software GmbH + * 30159 Hannover, Germany + */ + +/* + * Changes marked with `--jwe' were made on April 7 1996 by John W. Eaton + * to support g++ and/or use with Octave. + */ + +/* + * This makes my life easier with Octave. --jwe + */ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "dlfcn.h" + +/* + * We simulate dlopen() et al. through a call to load. Because AIX has + * no call to find an exported symbol we read the loader section of the + * loaded module and build a list of exported symbols and their virtual + * address. + */ + +typedef struct { + char *name; /* the symbols's name */ + void *addr; /* its relocated virtual address */ +} Export, *ExportPtr; + +/* + * xlC uses the following structure to list its constructors and + * destructors. This is gleaned from the output of munch. + */ +typedef struct { + void (*init)(void); /* call static constructors */ + void (*term)(void); /* call static destructors */ +} Cdtor, *CdtorPtr; + +typedef void (*GccCDtorPtr)(void); + +/* + * The void * handle returned from dlopen is actually a ModulePtr. + */ +typedef struct Module { + struct Module *next; + char *name; /* module name for refcounting */ + int refCnt; /* the number of references */ + void *entry; /* entry point from load */ + struct dl_info *info; /* optional init/terminate functions */ + CdtorPtr cdtors; /* optional C++ constructors */ + GccCDtorPtr gcc_ctor; /* g++ constructors --jwe */ + GccCDtorPtr gcc_dtor; /* g++ destructors --jwe */ + int nExports; /* the number of exports found */ + ExportPtr exports; /* the array of exports */ +} Module, *ModulePtr; + +/* + * We keep a list of all loaded modules to be able to call the fini + * handlers and destructors at atexit() time. + */ +static ModulePtr modList; + +/* + * The last error from one of the dl* routines is kept in static + * variables here. Each error is returned only once to the caller. + */ +static char errbuf[BUFSIZ]; +static int errvalid; + +/* + * The `fixed' gcc header files on AIX 3.2.5 provide a prototype for + * strdup(). --jwe + */ +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +extern char *strdup(const char *); +#endif +static void caterr(char *); +static int readExports(ModulePtr); +static void terminate(void); +static void *findMain(void); + +void *dlopen(const char *path, int mode) +{ + ModulePtr mp; + static void *mainModule; + + /* + * Upon the first call register a terminate handler that will + * close all libraries. Also get a reference to the main module + * for use with loadbind. + */ + if (!mainModule) { + if ((mainModule = findMain()) == NULL) + return NULL; + atexit(terminate); + } + /* + * Scan the list of modules if we have the module already loaded. + */ + for (mp = modList; mp; mp = mp->next) + if (strcmp(mp->name, path) == 0) { + mp->refCnt++; + return mp; + } + if ((mp = (ModulePtr)calloc(1, sizeof(*mp))) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "calloc: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + if ((mp->name = strdup(path)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "strdup: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(mp); + return NULL; + } + /* + * load should be declared load(const char *...). Thus we + * cast the path to a normal char *. Ugly. + */ + if ((mp->entry = (void *)load((char *)path, L_NOAUTODEFER, NULL)) == NULL) { + free(mp->name); + free(mp); + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "dlopen: %s: ", path); + /* + * If AIX says the file is not executable, the error + * can be further described by querying the loader about + * the last error. + */ + if (errno == ENOEXEC) { + char *tmp[BUFSIZ/sizeof(char *)]; + if (loadquery(L_GETMESSAGES, tmp, sizeof(tmp)) == -1) + strlcpy(errbuf, + strerror(errno), + sizeof(errbuf)); + else { + char **p; + for (p = tmp; *p; p++) + caterr(*p); + } + } else + strlcat(errbuf, + strerror(errno), + sizeof(errbuf)); + return NULL; + } + mp->refCnt = 1; + mp->next = modList; + modList = mp; + if (loadbind(0, mainModule, mp->entry) == -1) { + dlclose(mp); + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "loadbind: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + /* + * If the user wants global binding, loadbind against all other + * loaded modules. + */ + if (mode & RTLD_GLOBAL) { + ModulePtr mp1; + for (mp1 = mp->next; mp1; mp1 = mp1->next) + if (loadbind(0, mp1->entry, mp->entry) == -1) { + dlclose(mp); + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "loadbind: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + } + if (readExports(mp) == -1) { + dlclose(mp); + return NULL; + } + /* + * If there is a dl_info structure, call the init function. + */ + if (mp->info = (struct dl_info *)dlsym(mp, "dl_info")) { + if (mp->info->init) + (*mp->info->init)(); + } else + errvalid = 0; + /* + * If the shared object was compiled using xlC we will need + * to call static constructors (and later on dlclose destructors). + */ + if (mp->cdtors = (CdtorPtr)dlsym(mp, "__cdtors")) { + CdtorPtr cp = mp->cdtors; + while (cp->init || cp->term) { + if (cp->init && cp->init != (void (*)(void))0xffffffff) + (*cp->init)(); + cp++; + } + /* + * If the shared object was compiled using g++, we will need + * to call global constructors using the _GLOBAL__DI function, + * and later, global destructors using the _GLOBAL_DD + * funciton. --jwe + */ + } else if (mp->gcc_ctor = (GccCDtorPtr)dlsym(mp, "_GLOBAL__DI")) { + (*mp->gcc_ctor)(); + mp->gcc_dtor = (GccCDtorPtr)dlsym(mp, "_GLOBAL__DD"); + } else + errvalid = 0; + return mp; +} + +/* + * Attempt to decipher an AIX loader error message and append it + * to our static error message buffer. + */ +static void caterr(char *s) +{ + char *p = s; + + while (*p >= '0' && *p <= '9') + p++; + switch(atoi(s)) { + case L_ERROR_TOOMANY: + strlcat(errbuf, "to many errors", sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_NOLIB: + strlcat(errbuf, "can't load library", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_UNDEF: + strlcat(errbuf, "can't find symbol", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_RLDBAD: + strlcat(errbuf, "bad RLD", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_FORMAT: + strlcat(errbuf, "bad exec format in", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_ERRNO: + strlcat(errbuf, strerror(atoi(++p)), sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + default: + strlcat(errbuf, s, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + } +} + +void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol) +{ + ModulePtr mp = (ModulePtr)handle; + ExportPtr ep; + int i; + + /* + * Could speed up the search, but I assume that one assigns + * the result to function pointers anyways. + */ + for (ep = mp->exports, i = mp->nExports; i; i--, ep++) + if (strcmp(ep->name, symbol) == 0) + return ep->addr; + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "dlsym: undefined symbol %s", symbol); + return NULL; +} + +char *dlerror(void) +{ + if (errvalid) { + errvalid = 0; + return errbuf; + } + return NULL; +} + +int dlclose(void *handle) +{ + ModulePtr mp = (ModulePtr)handle; + int result; + ModulePtr mp1; + + if (--mp->refCnt > 0) + return 0; + if (mp->info && mp->info->fini) + (*mp->info->fini)(); + if (mp->cdtors) { + CdtorPtr cp = mp->cdtors; + while (cp->init || cp->term) { + if (cp->term && cp->init != (void (*)(void))0xffffffff) + (*cp->term)(); + cp++; + } + /* + * If the function to handle global destructors for g++ + * exists, call it. --jwe + */ + } else if (mp->gcc_dtor) { + (*mp->gcc_dtor)(); + } + result = unload(mp->entry); + if (result == -1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "%s", strerror(errno)); + } + if (mp->exports) { + ExportPtr ep; + int i; + for (ep = mp->exports, i = mp->nExports; i; i--, ep++) + if (ep->name) + free(ep->name); + free(mp->exports); + } + if (mp == modList) + modList = mp->next; + else { + for (mp1 = modList; mp1; mp1 = mp1->next) + if (mp1->next == mp) { + mp1->next = mp->next; + break; + } + } + free(mp->name); + free(mp); + return result; +} + +static void terminate(void) +{ + while (modList) + dlclose(modList); +} + +/* + * Build the export table from the XCOFF .loader section. + */ +static int readExports(ModulePtr mp) +{ + LDFILE *ldp = NULL; + SCNHDR sh, shdata; + LDHDR *lhp; + char *ldbuf; + LDSYM *ls; + int i; + ExportPtr ep; + + if ((ldp = ldopen(mp->name, ldp)) == NULL) { + struct ld_info *lp; + char *buf; + int size = 4*1024; + if (errno != ENOENT) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + /* + * The module might be loaded due to the LIBPATH + * environment variable. Search for the loaded + * module using L_GETINFO. + */ + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + while ((i = loadquery(L_GETINFO, buf, size)) == -1 && errno == ENOMEM) { + free(buf); + size += 4*1024; + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (i == -1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + free(buf); + return -1; + } + /* + * Traverse the list of loaded modules. The entry point + * returned by load() does actually point to the data + * segment origin. + */ + lp = (struct ld_info *)buf; + while (lp) { + if (lp->ldinfo_dataorg == mp->entry) { + ldp = ldopen(lp->ldinfo_filename, ldp); + break; + } + if (lp->ldinfo_next == 0) + lp = NULL; + else + lp = (struct ld_info *)((char *)lp + lp->ldinfo_next); + } + free(buf); + if (!ldp) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (TYPE(ldp) != U802TOCMAGIC) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "readExports: bad magic"); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + /* + * Get the padding for the data section. This is needed for + * AIX 4.1 compilers. This is used when building the final + * function pointer to the exported symbol. + */ + if (ldnshread(ldp, _DATA, &shdata) != SUCCESS) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot read data section header"); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + if (ldnshread(ldp, _LOADER, &sh) != SUCCESS) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot read loader section header"); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + /* + * We read the complete loader section in one chunk, this makes + * finding long symbol names residing in the string table easier. + */ + if ((ldbuf = (char *)malloc(sh.s_size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", strerror(errno)); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + if (FSEEK(ldp, sh.s_scnptr, BEGINNING) != OKFSEEK) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot seek to loader section"); + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + if (FREAD(ldbuf, sh.s_size, 1, ldp) != 1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot read loader section"); + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + lhp = (LDHDR *)ldbuf; + ls = (LDSYM *)(ldbuf+LDHDRSZ); + /* + * Count the number of exports to include in our export table. + */ + for (i = lhp->l_nsyms; i; i--, ls++) { + if (!LDR_EXPORT(*ls)) + continue; + mp->nExports++; + } + if ((mp->exports = (ExportPtr)calloc(mp->nExports, sizeof(*mp->exports))) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + /* + * Fill in the export table. All entries are relative to + * the entry point we got from load. + */ + ep = mp->exports; + ls = (LDSYM *)(ldbuf+LDHDRSZ); + for (i = lhp->l_nsyms; i; i--, ls++) { + char *symname; + char tmpsym[SYMNMLEN+1]; + if (!LDR_EXPORT(*ls)) + continue; + if (ls->l_zeroes == 0) + symname = ls->l_offset+lhp->l_stoff+ldbuf; + else { + /* + * The l_name member is not zero terminated, we + * must copy the first SYMNMLEN chars and make + * sure we have a zero byte at the end. + */ + strlcpy (tmpsym, ls->l_name, + SYMNMLEN + 1); + symname = tmpsym; + } + ep->name = strdup(symname); + ep->addr = (void *)((unsigned long)mp->entry + + ls->l_value - shdata.s_vaddr); + ep++; + } + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find the main modules entry point. This is used as export pointer + * for loadbind() to be able to resolve references to the main part. + */ +static void * findMain(void) +{ + struct ld_info *lp; + char *buf; + int size = 4*1024; + int i; + void *ret; + + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "findMail: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + while ((i = loadquery(L_GETINFO, buf, size)) == -1 && errno == ENOMEM) { + free(buf); + size += 4*1024; + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "findMail: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + } + if (i == -1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "findMail: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(buf); + return NULL; + } + /* + * The first entry is the main module. The entry point + * returned by load() does actually point to the data + * segment origin. + */ + lp = (struct ld_info *)buf; + ret = lp->ldinfo_dataorg; + free(buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/dlfcn.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/dlfcn.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8dfd985a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/dlfcn.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * @(#)dlfcn.h 1.4 revision of 95/04/25 09:36:52 + * This is an unpublished work copyright (c) 1992 HELIOS Software GmbH + * 30159 Hannover, Germany + */ + +#ifndef __dlfcn_h__ +#define __dlfcn_h__ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Mode flags for the dlopen routine. + */ +#define RTLD_LAZY 1 /* lazy function call binding */ +#define RTLD_NOW 2 /* immediate function call binding */ +#define RTLD_GLOBAL 0x100 /* allow symbols to be global */ + +/* + * To be able to initialize, a library may provide a dl_info structure + * that contains functions to be called to initialize and terminate. + */ +struct dl_info { + void (*init)(void); + void (*fini)(void); +}; + +#if __STDC__ || defined(_IBMR2) +void *dlopen(const char *path, int mode); +void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol); +char *dlerror(void); +int dlclose(void *handle); +#else +void *dlopen(); +void *dlsym(); +char *dlerror(); +int dlclose(); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* __dlfcn_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c6cff4da7d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.3 @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1998 - 1999, 2001 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kafs.3,v 1.16 2003/04/16 13:58:27 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Mar 17, 2003 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Dt KAFS 3 +.Sh NAME +.Nm k_hasafs , +.Nm k_pioctl , +.Nm k_unlog , +.Nm k_setpag , +.Nm k_afs_cell_of_file , +.Nm kafs_set_verbose , +.Nm kafs_settoken_rxkad , +.Nm kafs_settoken , +.Nm krb_afslog , +.Nm krb_afslog_uid +.Nm kafs_settoken5 , +.Nm krb5_afslog , +.Nm krb5_afslog_uid +.Nd AFS library +.Sh LIBRARY +AFS cache manager access library (libkafs, -lkafs) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In kafs.h +.Ft int +.Fn k_afs_cell_of_file "const char *path" "char *cell" "int len" +.Ft int +.Fn k_hasafs "void" +.Ft int +.Fn k_pioctl "char *a_path" "int o_opcode" "struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP" "int a_followSymlinks" +.Ft int +.Fn k_setpag "void" +.Ft int +.Fn k_unlog "void" +.Ft void +.Fn kafs_set_verbose "void (*func)(void *, const char *, int)" "void *" +.Ft int +.Fn kafs_settoken_rxkad "const char *cell" "struct ClearToken *token" "void *ticket" "size_t ticket_len" +.Ft int +.Fn kafs_settoken "const char *cell" "uid_t uid" "CREDENTIALS *c" +.Fn krb_afslog "char *cell" "char *realm" +.Ft int +.Fn krb_afslog_uid "char *cell" "char *realm" "uid_t uid" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_afslog_uid "krb5_context context" "krb5_ccache id" "const char *cell" "krb5_const_realm realm" "uid_t uid" +.Ft int +.Fn kafs_settoken5 "const char *cell" "uid_t uid" "krb5_creds *c" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_afslog "krb5_context context" "krb5_ccache id" "const char *cell" "krb5_const_realm realm" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn k_hasafs +initializes some library internal structures, and tests for the +presence of AFS in the kernel, none of the other functions should be +called before +.Fn k_hasafs +is called, or if it fails. +.Pp +.Fn kafs_set_verbose +set a log function that will be called each time the kafs library does +something important so that the application using libkafs can output +verbose logging. +Calling the function +.Fa kafs_set_verbose +with the function argument set to +.Dv NULL +will stop libkafs from calling the logging function (if set). +.Pp +.Fn kafs_settoken_rxkad +set +.Li rxkad +with the +.Fa token +and +.Fa ticket +(that have the length +.Fa ticket_len ) +for a given +.Fa cell . +.Pp +.Fn kafs_settoken +and +.Fn kafs_settoken5 +work the same way as +.Fn kafs_settoken_rxkad +but internally converts the Kerberos 4 or 5 credential to a afs +cleartoken and ticket. +.Pp +.Fn krb_afslog , +and +.Fn krb_afslog_uid +obtains new tokens (and possibly tickets) for the specified +.Fa cell +and +.Fa realm . +If +.Fa cell +is +.Dv NULL , +the local cell is used. If +.Fa realm +is +.Dv NULL , +the function tries to guess what realm to use. Unless you have some good knowledge of what cell or realm to use, you should pass +.Dv NULL . +.Fn krb_afslog +will use the real user-id for the +.Dv ViceId +field in the token, +.Fn krb_afslog_uid +will use +.Fa uid . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_afslog , +and +.Fn krb5_afslog_uid +are the Kerberos 5 equivalents of +.Fn krb_afslog , +and +.Fn krb_afslog_uid . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_afslog , +.Fn kafs_settoken5 +can be configured to behave diffrently via a +.Nm krb5_appdefault +option +.Li afs-use-524 +in +.Pa krb5.conf . +Possible values for +.Li afs-use-524 +are: +.Bl -tag -width local +.It yes +use the 524 server in the realm to convert the ticket +.It no +use the Kerberos 5 ticket directly, can be used with if the afs cell +support 2b token. +.It local, 2b +convert the Kerberos 5 credential to a 2b token locally (the same work +as a 2b 524 server should have done). +.El +.Pp +Example: +.Pp +.Bd -literal +[appdefaults] + SU.SE = { afs-use-524 = local } + PDC.KTH.SE = { afs-use-524 = yes } + afs-use-524 = yes +.Ed +.Pp +libkafs will use the +.Li libkafs +as application name when running the +.Nm krb5_appdefault +function call. +.Pp +The (uppercased) cellname is used as the realm to the +.Nm krb5_appdefault function. +.Pp +.\" The extra arguments are the ubiquitous context, and the cache id where +.\" to store any obtained tickets. Since AFS servers normally can't handle +.\" Kerberos 5 tickets directly, these functions will first obtain version +.\" 5 tickets for the requested cells, and then convert them to version 4 +.\" tickets, that can be stashed in the kernel. To convert tickets the +.\" .Fn krb524_convert_creds_kdc +.\" function will be used. +.\" .Pp +.Fn k_afs_cell_of_file +will in +.Fa cell +return the cell of a specified file, no more than +.Fa len +characters is put in +.Fa cell . +.Pp +.Fn k_pioctl +does a +.Fn pioctl +syscall with the specified arguments. This function is equivalent to +.Fn lpioctl . +.Pp +.Fn k_setpag +initializes a new PAG. +.Pp +.Fn k_unlog +removes destroys all tokens in the current PAG. +.Sh RETURN VALUES +.Fn k_hasafs +returns 1 if AFS is present in the kernel, 0 otherwise. +.Fn krb_afslog +and +.Fn krb_afslog_uid +returns 0 on success, or a Kerberos error number on failure. +.Fn k_afs_cell_of_file , +.Fn k_pioctl , +.Fn k_setpag , +and +.Fn k_unlog +all return the value of the underlaying system call, 0 on success. +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +The following environment variable affect the mode of operation of +.Nm kafs : +.Bl -tag -width AFS_SYSCALL +.It Ev AFS_SYSCALL +Normally, +.Nm kafs +will try to figure out the correct system call(s) that are used by AFS +by itself. If it does not manage to do that, or does it incorrectly, +you can set this variable to the system call number or list of system +call numbers that should be used. +.El +.Sh EXAMPLES +The following code from +.Nm login +will obtain a new PAG and tokens for the local cell and the cell of +the users home directory. +.Bd -literal +if (k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + k_setpag(); + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, NULL); + krb_afslog(NULL, NULL); +} +.Ed +.Sh ERRORS +If any of these functions (apart from +.Fn k_hasafs ) +is called without AFS being present in the kernel, the process will +usually (depending on the operating system) receive a SIGSYS signal. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Rs +.%A Transarc Corporation +.%J AFS-3 Programmer's Reference +.%T File Server/Cache Manager Interface +.%D 1991 +.Re +.Pp +.Xr krb5_appdefaults 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 +.Sh BUGS +.Ev AFS_SYSCALL +has no effect under AIX. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c962490e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ + +KAFS(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KAFS(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kk__hhaassaaffss, kk__ppiiooccttll, kk__uunnlloogg, kk__sseettppaagg, kk__aaffss__cceellll__ooff__ffiillee, + kkaaffss__sseett__vveerrbboossee, kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn__rrxxkkaadd, kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn, kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg, + kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn55, kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg, kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd - AFS library + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + AFS cache manager access library (libkafs, -lkafs) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _i_n_t + kk__aaffss__cceellll__ooff__ffiillee(_c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_a_t_h, _c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, _i_n_t _l_e_n) + + _i_n_t + kk__hhaassaaffss(_v_o_i_d) + + _i_n_t + kk__ppiiooccttll(_c_h_a_r _*_a___p_a_t_h, _i_n_t _o___o_p_c_o_d_e, _s_t_r_u_c_t _V_i_c_e_I_o_c_t_l _*_a___p_a_r_a_m_s_P, + _i_n_t _a___f_o_l_l_o_w_S_y_m_l_i_n_k_s) + + _i_n_t + kk__sseettppaagg(_v_o_i_d) + + _i_n_t + kk__uunnlloogg(_v_o_i_d) + + _v_o_i_d + kkaaffss__sseett__vveerrbboossee(_v_o_i_d _(_*_f_u_n_c_)_(_v_o_i_d _*_, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_, _i_n_t_), _v_o_i_d _*) + + _i_n_t + kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn__rrxxkkaadd(_c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, _s_t_r_u_c_t _C_l_e_a_r_T_o_k_e_n _*_t_o_k_e_n, + _v_o_i_d _*_t_i_c_k_e_t, _s_i_z_e___t _t_i_c_k_e_t___l_e_n) + + _i_n_t + kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn(_c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, _u_i_d___t _u_i_d, _C_R_E_D_E_N_T_I_A_L_S _*_c) + + kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg(_c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m) + + _i_n_t + kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd(_c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m, _u_i_d___t _u_i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _u_i_d___t _u_i_d) + + _i_n_t + kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn55(_c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, _u_i_d___t _u_i_d, _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_c_e_l_l, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kk__hhaassaaffss() initializes some library internal structures, and tests for + the presence of AFS in the kernel, none of the other functions should be + called before kk__hhaassaaffss() is called, or if it fails. + + kkaaffss__sseett__vveerrbboossee() set a log function that will be called each time the + kafs library does something important so that the application using + libkafs can output verbose logging. Calling the function + _k_a_f_s___s_e_t___v_e_r_b_o_s_e with the function argument set to NULL will stop libkafs + from calling the logging function (if set). + + + kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn__rrxxkkaadd() set rxkad with the _t_o_k_e_n and _t_i_c_k_e_t (that have the + length _t_i_c_k_e_t___l_e_n) for a given _c_e_l_l. + + kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn() and kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn55() work the same way as + kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn__rrxxkkaadd() but internally converts the Kerberos 4 or 5 creden- + tial to a afs cleartoken and ticket. + + kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg(), and kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd() obtains new tokens (and possibly tick- + ets) for the specified _c_e_l_l and _r_e_a_l_m. If _c_e_l_l is NULL, the local cell is + used. If _r_e_a_l_m is NULL, the function tries to guess what realm to use. + Unless you have some good knowledge of what cell or realm to use, you + should pass NULL. kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg() will use the real user-id for the ViceId + field in the token, kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd() will use _u_i_d. + + kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg(), and kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd() are the Kerberos 5 equivalents of + kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg(), and kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd(). + + kkrrbb55__aaffsslloogg(), kkaaffss__sseettttookkeenn55() can be configured to behave diffrently + via a kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt option afs-use-524 in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f. Possible values + for afs-use-524 are: + + yes use the 524 server in the realm to convert the ticket + + no use the Kerberos 5 ticket directly, can be used with if the afs + cell support 2b token. + + local, 2b + convert the Kerberos 5 credential to a 2b token locally (the same + work as a 2b 524 server should have done). + + Example: + + [appdefaults] + SU.SE = { afs-use-524 = local } + PDC.KTH.SE = { afs-use-524 = yes } + afs-use-524 = yes + + libkafs will use the libkafs as application name when running the + kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt function call. + + The (uppercased) cellname is used as the realm to the kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt + ffuunnccttiioonn.. + + kk__aaffss__cceellll__ooff__ffiillee() will in _c_e_l_l return the cell of a specified file, no + more than _l_e_n characters is put in _c_e_l_l. + + kk__ppiiooccttll() does a ppiiooccttll() syscall with the specified arguments. This + function is equivalent to llppiiooccttll(). + + kk__sseettppaagg() initializes a new PAG. + + kk__uunnlloogg() removes destroys all tokens in the current PAG. + +RREETTUURRNN VVAALLUUEESS + kk__hhaassaaffss() returns 1 if AFS is present in the kernel, 0 otherwise. + kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg() and kkrrbb__aaffsslloogg__uuiidd() returns 0 on success, or a Kerberos er- + ror number on failure. kk__aaffss__cceellll__ooff__ffiillee(), kk__ppiiooccttll(), kk__sseettppaagg(), and + kk__uunnlloogg() all return the value of the underlaying system call, 0 on suc- + cess. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + The following environment variable affect the mode of operation of kkaaffss: + + AFS_SYSCALL Normally, kkaaffss will try to figure out the correct system + call(s) that are used by AFS by itself. If it does not man- + age to do that, or does it incorrectly, you can set this + variable to the system call number or list of system call + numbers that should be used. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + The following code from llooggiinn will obtain a new PAG and tokens for the + local cell and the cell of the users home directory. + + if (k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + k_setpag(); + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, NULL); + krb_afslog(NULL, NULL); + } + +EERRRROORRSS + If any of these functions (apart from kk__hhaassaaffss()) is called without AFS + being present in the kernel, the process will usually (depending on the + operating system) receive a SIGSYS signal. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + Transarc Corporation, "File Server/Cache Manager Interface", _A_F_S_-_3 + _P_r_o_g_r_a_m_m_e_r_'_s _R_e_f_e_r_e_n_c_e, 1991. + + krb5_appdefaults(3), krb5.conf(5) + +BBUUGGSS + AFS_SYSCALL has no effect under AIX. + + HEIMDAL Mar 17, 2003 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f95b7769a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs.h @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kafs.h,v 1.39.2.1 2003/04/23 18:03:21 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KAFS_H +#define __KAFS_H + +/* XXX must include krb5.h or krb.h */ + +/* sys/ioctl.h must be included manually before kafs.h */ + +/* + */ +#define AFSCALL_PIOCTL 20 +#define AFSCALL_SETPAG 21 + +#ifndef _VICEIOCTL +#define _VICEIOCTL(id) ((unsigned int ) _IOW('V', id, struct ViceIoctl)) +#endif /* _VICEIOCTL */ + +#define VIOCSETAL _VICEIOCTL(1) +#define VIOCGETAL _VICEIOCTL(2) +#define VIOCSETTOK _VICEIOCTL(3) +#define VIOCGETVOLSTAT _VICEIOCTL(4) +#define VIOCSETVOLSTAT _VICEIOCTL(5) +#define VIOCFLUSH _VICEIOCTL(6) +#define VIOCGETTOK _VICEIOCTL(8) +#define VIOCUNLOG _VICEIOCTL(9) +#define VIOCCKSERV _VICEIOCTL(10) +#define VIOCCKBACK _VICEIOCTL(11) +#define VIOCCKCONN _VICEIOCTL(12) +#define VIOCWHEREIS _VICEIOCTL(14) +#define VIOCACCESS _VICEIOCTL(20) +#define VIOCUNPAG _VICEIOCTL(21) +#define VIOCGETFID _VICEIOCTL(22) +#define VIOCSETCACHESIZE _VICEIOCTL(24) +#define VIOCFLUSHCB _VICEIOCTL(25) +#define VIOCNEWCELL _VICEIOCTL(26) +#define VIOCGETCELL _VICEIOCTL(27) +#define VIOC_AFS_DELETE_MT_PT _VICEIOCTL(28) +#define VIOC_AFS_STAT_MT_PT _VICEIOCTL(29) +#define VIOC_FILE_CELL_NAME _VICEIOCTL(30) +#define VIOC_GET_WS_CELL _VICEIOCTL(31) +#define VIOC_AFS_MARINER_HOST _VICEIOCTL(32) +#define VIOC_GET_PRIMARY_CELL _VICEIOCTL(33) +#define VIOC_VENUSLOG _VICEIOCTL(34) +#define VIOC_GETCELLSTATUS _VICEIOCTL(35) +#define VIOC_SETCELLSTATUS _VICEIOCTL(36) +#define VIOC_FLUSHVOLUME _VICEIOCTL(37) +#define VIOC_AFS_SYSNAME _VICEIOCTL(38) +#define VIOC_EXPORTAFS _VICEIOCTL(39) +#define VIOCGETCACHEPARAMS _VICEIOCTL(40) +#define VIOC_GCPAGS _VICEIOCTL(48) + +struct ViceIoctl { + caddr_t in, out; + short in_size; + short out_size; +}; + +struct ClearToken { + int32_t AuthHandle; + char HandShakeKey[8]; + int32_t ViceId; + int32_t BeginTimestamp; + int32_t EndTimestamp; +}; + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +/* Use k_hasafs() to probe if the machine supports AFS syscalls. + The other functions will generate a SIGSYS if AFS is not supported */ + +int k_hasafs __P((void)); + +int krb_afslog __P((const char *cell, const char *realm)); +int krb_afslog_uid __P((const char *cell, const char *realm, uid_t uid)); +int krb_afslog_home __P((const char *cell, const char *realm, + const char *homedir)); +int krb_afslog_uid_home __P((const char *cell, const char *realm, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir)); + +int krb_realm_of_cell __P((const char *cell, char **realm)); + +/* compat */ +#define k_afsklog krb_afslog +#define k_afsklog_uid krb_afslog_uid + +int k_pioctl __P((char *a_path, + int o_opcode, + struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP, + int a_followSymlinks)); +int k_unlog __P((void)); +int k_setpag __P((void)); +int k_afs_cell_of_file __P((const char *path, char *cell, int len)); + + + +/* XXX */ +#ifdef KFAILURE +#define KRB_H_INCLUDED +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION +#define KRB5_H_INCLUDED +#endif + +void kafs_set_verbose __P((void (*kafs_verbose)(void *, const char *), void *)); +int kafs_settoken_rxkad __P((const char *, struct ClearToken *, + void *ticket, size_t ticket_len)); +#ifdef KRB_H_INCLUDED +int kafs_settoken __P((const char*, uid_t, CREDENTIALS*)); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5_H_INCLUDED +int kafs_settoken5 __P((krb5_context, const char*, uid_t, krb5_creds*)); +#endif + + +#ifdef KRB5_H_INCLUDED +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog_uid __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid)); +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm)); +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog_uid_home __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid, + const char *homedir)); + +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog_home __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + const char *homedir)); + +krb5_error_code krb5_realm_of_cell __P((const char *cell, char **realm)); + +#endif + + +#define _PATH_VICE "/usr/vice/etc/" +#define _PATH_THISCELL _PATH_VICE "ThisCell" +#define _PATH_CELLSERVDB _PATH_VICE "CellServDB" +#define _PATH_THESECELLS _PATH_VICE "TheseCells" + +#define _PATH_ARLA_VICE "/usr/arla/etc/" +#define _PATH_ARLA_THISCELL _PATH_ARLA_VICE "ThisCell" +#define _PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB _PATH_ARLA_VICE "CellServDB" +#define _PATH_ARLA_THESECELLS _PATH_ARLA_VICE "TheseCells" + +#define _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_VICE "/etc/openafs/" +#define _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_THISCELL _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_VICE "ThisCell" +#define _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_CELLSERVDB _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_VICE "CellServDB" +#define _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_THESECELLS _PATH_OPENAFS_DEBIAN_VICE "TheseCells" + +#define _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_VICE "/etc/arla/" +#define _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_THISCELL _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_VICE "ThisCell" +#define _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_CELLSERVDB _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_VICE "CellServDB" +#define _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_THESECELLS _PATH_ARLA_DEBIAN_VICE "TheseCells" + +extern int _kafs_debug; + +#endif /* __KAFS_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e82b81bf98 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/kafs_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kafs_locl.h,v 1.17 2003/04/14 08:28:37 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KAFS_LOCL_H__ +#define __KAFS_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#else +#ifdef KRB5 +#include "crypto-headers.h" +#include +typedef struct credentials CREDENTIALS; +#endif /* KRB5 */ +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#include + +#include + +#include "afssysdefs.h" + +struct kafs_data; +struct kafs_token; +typedef int (*afslog_uid_func_t)(struct kafs_data *, + const char *, + const char *, + uid_t, + const char *); + +typedef int (*get_cred_func_t)(struct kafs_data*, const char*, const char*, + const char*, uid_t, struct kafs_token *); + +typedef char* (*get_realm_func_t)(struct kafs_data*, const char*); + +typedef struct kafs_data { + const char *name; + afslog_uid_func_t afslog_uid; + get_cred_func_t get_cred; + get_realm_func_t get_realm; + void *data; +} kafs_data; + +struct kafs_token { + struct ClearToken ct; + void *ticket; + size_t ticket_len; +}; + +void _kafs_foldup(char *, const char *); + +int _kafs_afslog_all_local_cells(kafs_data*, uid_t, const char*); + +int _kafs_get_cred(kafs_data*, const char*, const char*, const char *, + uid_t, struct kafs_token *); + +int +_kafs_realm_of_cell(kafs_data *, const char *, char **); + +int +_kafs_v4_to_kt(CREDENTIALS *, uid_t, struct kafs_token *); + +void +_kafs_fixup_viceid(struct ClearToken *, uid_t); + +#ifdef _AIX +int aix_pioctl(char*, int, struct ViceIoctl*, int); +int aix_setpag(void); +#endif + +#endif /* __KAFS_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/roken_rename.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/roken_rename.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fbb653dc93 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kafs/roken_rename.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken_rename.h,v 1.6 2002/08/19 15:08:24 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __roken_rename_h__ +#define __roken_rename_h__ + +/* + * Libroken routines that are added libkafs + */ + +#define _resolve_debug _kafs_resolve_debug + +#define rk_dns_free_data _kafs_dns_free_data +#define rk_dns_lookup _kafs_dns_lookup +#define rk_dns_string_to_type _kafs_dns_string_to_type +#define rk_dns_type_to_string _kafs_dns_type_to_string +#define rk_dns_srv_order _kafs_dns_srv_order + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOK_R +#define strtok_r _kafs_strtok_r +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY +#define strlcpy _kafs_strlcpy +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP +#define strsep _kafs_strsep +#endif + +#endif /* __roken_rename_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c4bc2a367c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +2002-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * k5dfspag.c: don't use ## in string concatenation + +2002-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkdfs_la_LDFLAGS): set versoin to 0:2:0 + +2002-01-23 Assar Westerlund + + * k5dfspag.c: use SIG_DFL and not SIG_IGN for SIGCHLD. + from "Todd C. Miller" + +2001-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * k5dfspag.c: add config.h + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkdfs_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 0:1:0 + +2000-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * k5dfspag.c: use krb5.h instead of krb5_locl.h + + * initial import from Ake Sandgren + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e0e6d5637 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.3 2002/03/10 23:53:22 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkdfs.la + +libkdfs_la_SOURCES = \ + k5dfspag.c + +libkdfs_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:2:0 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..523dc5fceb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,754 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.3 2002/03/10 23:53:22 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + +SOURCES = $(libkdfs_la_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog +subdir = lib/kdfs +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + 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then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/k5dfspag.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/k5dfspag.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84161b84b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/kdfs/k5dfspag.c @@ -0,0 +1,368 @@ +/* + * lib/krb5/os/k5dfspag.c + * + * New Kerberos module to issue the DFS PAG syscalls. + * It also contains the routine to fork and exec the + * k5dcecon routine to do most of the work. + * + * This file is designed to be as independent of DCE + * and DFS as possible. The only dependencies are on + * the syscall numbers. If DFS not running or not installed, + * the sig handlers will catch and the signal and + * will continue. + * + * krb5_dfs_newpag and krb5_dfs_getpag should not be real + * Kerberos routines, since they should be setpag and getpag + * in the DCE library, but without the DCE baggage. + * Thus they don't have context, and don't return a krb5 error. + * + * + * + * krb5_dfs_pag() + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: k5dfspag.c,v 1.6 2002/08/12 15:11:58 joda Exp $"); + +#include + +#ifdef DCE + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* Only run this DFS PAG code on systems with POSIX + * All that we are interested in dor:, AIX 4.x, + * Solaris 2.5.x, HPUX 10.x Even SunOS 4.1.4, AIX 3.2.5 + * and SGI 5.3 are OK. This simplifies + * the build/configure which I don't want to change now. + * All of them also have waitpid as well. + */ + +#define POSIX_SETJMP +#define POSIX_SIGNALS +#define HAVE_WAITPID + +#include +#include +#ifndef POSIX_SETJMP +#undef sigjmp_buf +#undef sigsetjmp +#undef siglongjmp +#define sigjmp_buf jmp_buf +#define sigsetjmp(j,s) setjmp(j) +#define siglongjmp longjmp +#endif + +#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS +typedef struct sigaction handler; +#define handler_init(H,F) (sigemptyset(&(H).sa_mask), \ + (H).sa_flags=0, \ + (H).sa_handler=(F)) +#define handler_swap(S,NEW,OLD) sigaction(S, &NEW, &OLD) +#define handler_set(S,OLD) sigaction(S, &OLD, NULL) +#else +typedef sigtype (*handler)(); +#define handler_init(H,F) ((H) = (F)) +#define handler_swap(S,NEW,OLD) ((OLD) = signal ((S), (NEW))) +#define handler_set(S,OLD) (signal ((S), (OLD))) +#endif + +#define krb5_sigtype void +#define WAIT_USES_INT +typedef krb5_sigtype sigtype; + + +/* + * Need some syscall numbers based on different systems. + * These are based on: + * HPUX 10.10 /opt/dce/include/dcedfs/syscall.h + * Solaris 2.5 /opt/dcelocal/share/include/dcedfs/syscall.h + * AIX 4.2 - needs some funny games with load and kafs_syscall + * to get the kernel extentions. There should be a better way! + * + * DEE 5/27/97 + * + */ + + +#define AFSCALL_SETPAG 2 +#define AFSCALL_GETPAG 11 + +#if defined(sun) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 72 + +#elif defined(hpux) +/* assume HPUX 10 + or is it 50 */ +#define AFS_SYSCALL 326 + +#elif defined(_AIX) +#ifndef DPAGAIX +#define DPAGAIX LIBEXECDIR "/dpagaix" +#endif +int *load(); +static int (*dpagaix)(int, int, int, int, int, int) = 0; + +#elif defined(sgi) || defined(_sgi) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 206+1000 + +#else +#define AFS_SYSCALL (Unknown_DFS_AFS_SYSCALL) +#endif + + +#ifdef WAIT_USES_INT + int wait_status; +#else /* WAIT_USES_INT */ + union wait wait_status; +#endif /* WAIT_USES_INT */ + +#ifndef K5DCECON +#define K5DCECON LIBEXECDIR "/k5dcecon" +#endif + +/* + * mysig() + * + * signal handler if DFS not running + * + */ + +static sigjmp_buf setpag_buf; + +static sigtype mysig() +{ + siglongjmp(setpag_buf, 1); +} + +/* + * krb5_dfs_pag_syscall() + * + * wrapper for the syscall with signal handlers + * + */ + +static int krb5_dfs_pag_syscall(opt1,opt2) + int opt1; + int opt2; +{ + handler sa1, osa1; + handler sa2, osa2; + int pag = -2; + + handler_init (sa1, mysig); + handler_init (sa2, mysig); + handler_swap (SIGSYS, sa1, osa1); + handler_swap (SIGSEGV, sa2, osa2); + + if (sigsetjmp(setpag_buf, 1) == 0) { + +#if defined(_AIX) + if (!dpagaix) + dpagaix = load(DPAGAIX, 0, 0); + if (dpagaix) + pag = (*dpagaix)(opt1, opt2, 0, 0, 0, 0); +#else + pag = syscall(AFS_SYSCALL, opt1, opt2, 0, 0, 0, 0); +#endif + + handler_set (SIGSYS, osa1); + handler_set (SIGSEGV, osa2); + return(pag); + } + + /* syscall failed! return 0 */ + handler_set (SIGSYS, osa1); + handler_set (SIGSEGV, osa2); + return(-2); +} + +/* + * krb5_dfs_newpag() + * + * issue a DCE/DFS setpag system call to set the newpag + * for this process. This takes advantage of a currently + * undocumented feature of the Transarc port of DFS. + * Even in DCE 1.2.2 for which the source is available, + * (but no vendors have released), this feature is not + * there, but it should be, or could be added. + * If new_pag is zero, then the syscall will get a new pag + * and return its value. + */ + +int krb5_dfs_newpag(new_pag) + int new_pag; +{ + return(krb5_dfs_pag_syscall(AFSCALL_SETPAG, new_pag)); +} + +/* + * krb5_dfs_getpag() + * + * get the current PAG. Used mostly as a test. + */ + +int krb5_dfs_getpag() +{ + return(krb5_dfs_pag_syscall(AFSCALL_GETPAG, 0)); +} + +/* + * krb5_dfs_pag() + * + * Given a principal and local username, + * fork and exec the k5dcecon module to create + * refresh or join a new DCE/DFS + * Process Authentication Group (PAG) + * + * This routine should be called after krb5_kuserok has + * determined that this combination of local user and + * principal are acceptable for the local host. + * + * It should also be called after a forwarded ticket has + * been received, and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable + * has been set to point at it. k5dcecon will convert this + * to a new DCE context and a new pag and replace KRB5CCNAME + * in the environment. + * + * If there is no forwarded ticket, k5dcecon will attempt + * to join an existing PAG for the same principal and local + * user. + * + * And it should be called before access to the home directory + * as this may be in DFS, not accessable by root, and require + * the PAG to have been setup. + * + * The krb5_afs_pag can be called after this routine to + * use the the cache obtained by k5dcecon to get an AFS token. + * DEE - 7/97 + */ + +int krb5_dfs_pag(context, flag, principal, luser) + krb5_context context; + int flag; /* 1 if a forwarded TGT is to be used */ + krb5_principal principal; + const char *luser; + +{ + + struct stat stx; + int fd[2]; + int i,j; + int pid; + int new_pag; + int pag; + char newccname[MAXPATHLEN] = ""; + char *princ; + int err; + struct sigaction newsig, oldsig; + +#ifdef WAIT_USES_INT + int wait_status; +#else /* WAIT_USES_INT */ + union wait wait_status; +#endif /* WAIT_USES_INT */ + + if (krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &princ)) + return(0); + + /* test if DFS is running or installed */ + if (krb5_dfs_getpag() == -2) + return(0); /* DFS not running, dont try */ + + if (pipe(fd) == -1) + return(0); + + /* Make sure that telnetd.c's SIGCHLD action don't happen right now... */ + memset((char *)&newsig, 0, sizeof(newsig)); + newsig.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; + sigaction(SIGCHLD, &newsig, &oldsig); + + pid = fork(); + if (pid <0) + return(0); + + if (pid == 0) { /* child process */ + + close(1); /* close stdout */ + dup(fd[1]); /* point stdout at pipe here */ + close(fd[0]); /* don't use end of pipe here */ + close(fd[1]); /* pipe now as stdout */ + + execl(K5DCECON, "k5dcecon", + (flag) ? "-f" : "-s" , + "-l", luser, + "-p", princ, (char *)0); + + exit(127); /* incase execl fails */ + } + + /* parent, wait for child to finish */ + + close(fd[1]); /* dont need this end of pipe */ + +/* #if defined(sgi) || defined(_sgi) */ + /* wait_status.w_status = 0; */ + /* waitpid((pid_t) pid, &wait_status.w_status, 0); */ +/* #else */ + + + wait_status = 0; +#ifdef HAVE_WAITPID + err = waitpid((pid_t) pid, &wait_status, 0); +#else /* HAVE_WAITPID */ + err = wait4(pid, &wait_status, 0, (struct rusage *) NULL); +#endif /* HAVE_WAITPID */ +/* #endif */ + + sigaction(SIGCHLD, &oldsig, 0); + if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)){ + if (WEXITSTATUS(wait_status) == 0) { + i = 1; + j = 0; + while (i != 0) { + i = read(fd[0], &newccname[j], sizeof(newccname)-1-j); + if ( i > 0) + j += i; + if (j >= sizeof(newccname)-1) + i = 0; + } + close(fd[0]); + if (j > 0) { + newccname[j] = '\0'; + esetenv("KRB5CCNAME",newccname,1); + sscanf(&newccname[j-8],"%8x",&new_pag); + if (new_pag && strncmp("FILE:/opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds/dcecred_", newccname, 46) == 0) { + if((pag = krb5_dfs_newpag(new_pag)) != -2) { + return(pag); + } + } + } + } + } + return(0); /* something not right */ +} + +#else /* DCE */ + +/* + * krb5_dfs_pag - dummy version for the lib for systems + * which don't have DFS, or the needed setpag kernel code. + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_dfs_pag(context, principal, luser) + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal principal; + const char *luser; +{ + return(0); +} + +#endif /* DCE */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ca638bcbd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.156.2.4 2004/06/21 10:52:01 lha Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_des) -I../com_err -I$(srcdir)/../com_err + +bin_PROGRAMS = verify_krb5_conf + +noinst_PROGRAMS = dump_config test_get_addrs krbhst-test test_alname + +TESTS = \ + aes-test \ + n-fold-test \ + string-to-key-test \ + derived-key-test \ + store-test \ + parse-name-test \ + test_cc \ + name-45-test + +check_PROGRAMS = $(TESTS) + +LDADD = libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) + +libkrb5_la_LIBADD = \ + ../com_err/error.lo ../com_err/com_err.lo \ + $(LIB_des) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkrb5.la + +ERR_FILES = krb5_err.c heim_err.c k524_err.c + +libkrb5_la_SOURCES = \ + acl.c \ + add_et_list.c \ + addr_families.c \ + aname_to_localname.c \ + appdefault.c \ + asn1_glue.c \ + auth_context.c \ + build_ap_req.c \ + build_auth.c \ + cache.c \ + changepw.c \ + codec.c \ + config_file.c \ + config_file_netinfo.c \ + convert_creds.c \ + constants.c \ + context.c \ + copy_host_realm.c \ + crc.c \ + creds.c \ + crypto.c \ + data.c \ + eai_to_heim_errno.c \ + error_string.c \ + expand_hostname.c \ + fcache.c \ + free.c \ + free_host_realm.c \ + generate_seq_number.c \ + generate_subkey.c \ + get_addrs.c \ + get_cred.c \ + get_default_principal.c \ + get_default_realm.c \ + get_for_creds.c \ + get_host_realm.c \ + get_in_tkt.c \ + get_in_tkt_pw.c \ + get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c \ + get_in_tkt_with_skey.c \ + get_port.c \ + init_creds.c \ + init_creds_pw.c \ + keyblock.c \ + keytab.c \ + keytab_any.c \ + keytab_file.c \ + keytab_memory.c \ + keytab_keyfile.c \ + keytab_krb4.c \ + krbhst.c \ + kuserok.c \ + log.c \ + mcache.c \ + misc.c \ + mk_error.c \ + mk_priv.c \ + mk_rep.c \ + mk_req.c \ + mk_req_ext.c \ + mk_safe.c \ + net_read.c \ + net_write.c \ + n-fold.c \ + padata.c \ + principal.c \ + prog_setup.c \ + prompter_posix.c \ + rd_cred.c \ + rd_error.c \ + rd_priv.c \ + rd_rep.c \ + rd_req.c \ + rd_safe.c \ + read_message.c \ + recvauth.c \ + replay.c \ + send_to_kdc.c \ + sendauth.c \ + set_default_realm.c \ + sock_principal.c \ + store.c \ + store-int.h \ + store_emem.c \ + store_fd.c \ + store_mem.c \ + ticket.c \ + time.c \ + transited.c \ + verify_init.c \ + verify_user.c \ + version.c \ + warn.c \ + write_message.c \ + $(ERR_FILES) + +libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 20:0:3 + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/krb5-protos.h $(srcdir)/krb5-private.h + +$(srcdir)/krb5-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir) && perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -q -P comment -o krb5-protos.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/krb5-private.h: + cd $(srcdir) && perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -q -P comment -p krb5-private.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-private.h + +#libkrb5_la_LIBADD = ../com_err/error.lo ../com_err/com_err.lo + +man_MANS = \ + kerberos.8 \ + krb5.3 \ + krb5.conf.5 \ + krb5_425_conv_principal.3 \ + krb5_address.3 \ + krb5_aname_to_localname.3 \ + krb5_appdefault.3 \ + krb5_auth_context.3 \ + krb5_build_principal.3 \ + krb5_ccache.3 \ + krb5_config.3 \ + krb5_context.3 \ + krb5_create_checksum.3 \ + krb5_crypto_init.3 \ + krb5_data.3 \ + krb5_encrypt.3 \ + krb5_free_addresses.3 \ + krb5_free_principal.3 \ + krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3 \ + krb5_get_krbhst.3 \ + krb5_init_context.3 \ + krb5_keytab.3 \ + krb5_krbhst_init.3 \ + krb5_kuserok.3 \ + krb5_openlog.3 \ + krb5_parse_name.3 \ + krb5_principal_get_realm.3 \ + krb5_set_default_realm.3 \ + krb5_set_password.3 \ + krb5_sname_to_principal.3 \ + krb5_timeofday.3 \ + krb5_unparse_name.3 \ + krb5_verify_user.3 \ + krb5_warn.3 \ + verify_krb5_conf.8 + +include_HEADERS = krb5.h krb5-protos.h krb5-private.h krb5_err.h heim_err.h k524_err.h + +CLEANFILES = krb5_err.c krb5_err.h heim_err.c heim_err.h k524_err.c k524_err.h + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): krb5_err.h heim_err.h k524_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +krb5_err.h: krb5_err.et + +heim_err.h: heim_err.et + +k524_err.h: k524_err.et diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..78017a784c --- /dev/null +++ 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n-fold-test.c name-45-test.c parse-name-test.c store-test.c string-to-key-test.c test_alname.c test_cc.c test_get_addrs.c verify_krb5_conf.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(include_HEADERS) $(srcdir)/Makefile.am \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common +bin_PROGRAMS = verify_krb5_conf$(EXEEXT) +noinst_PROGRAMS = dump_config$(EXEEXT) 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../../cf/make-proto.pl -q -P comment -p krb5-private.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-private.h + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): krb5_err.h heim_err.h k524_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +krb5_err.h: krb5_err.et + +heim_err.h: heim_err.et + +k524_err.h: k524_err.et +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/acl.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c3568699c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: acl.c,v 1.3 2002/04/18 16:16:24 joda Exp $"); + +struct acl_field { + enum { acl_string, acl_fnmatch, acl_retval } type; + union { + const char *cstr; + char **retv; + } u; + struct acl_field *next, **last; +}; + +static void +acl_free_list(struct acl_field *acl) +{ + struct acl_field *next; + while(acl != NULL) { + next = acl->next; + free(acl); + acl = next; + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +acl_parse_format(krb5_context context, + struct acl_field **acl_ret, + const char *format, + va_list ap) +{ + const char *p; + struct acl_field *acl = NULL, *tmp; + + for(p = format; *p != '\0'; p++) { + tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + acl_free_list(acl); + return ENOMEM; + } + if(*p == 's') { + tmp->type = acl_string; + tmp->u.cstr = va_arg(ap, const char*); + } else if(*p == 'f') { + tmp->type = acl_fnmatch; + tmp->u.cstr = va_arg(ap, const char*); + } else if(*p == 'r') { + tmp->type = acl_retval; + tmp->u.retv = va_arg(ap, char **); + } + tmp->next = NULL; + if(acl == NULL) + acl = tmp; + else + *acl->last = tmp; + acl->last = &tmp->next; + } + *acl_ret = acl; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_boolean +acl_match_field(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + struct acl_field *field) +{ + if(field->type == acl_string) { + return !strcmp(string, field->u.cstr); + } else if(field->type == acl_fnmatch) { + return !fnmatch(string, field->u.cstr, 0); + } else if(field->type == acl_retval) { + *field->u.retv = strdup(string); + return TRUE; + } + return FALSE; +} + +static krb5_boolean +acl_match_acl(krb5_context context, + struct acl_field *acl, + const char *string) +{ + char buf[256]; + for(;strsep_copy(&string, " \t", buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1; + acl = acl->next) { + if(buf[0] == '\0') + continue; /* skip ws */ + if(!acl_match_field(context, buf, acl)) { + return FALSE; + } + } + return TRUE; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_acl_match_string(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + const char *format, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_boolean found; + struct acl_field *acl; + + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, format); + ret = acl_parse_format(context, &acl, format, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(ret) + return ret; + + found = acl_match_acl(context, acl, string); + acl_free_list(acl); + if (found) { + return 0; + } else { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ACL did not match"); + return EACCES; + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_acl_match_file(krb5_context context, + const char *file, + const char *format, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct acl_field *acl; + char buf[256]; + va_list ap; + FILE *f; + krb5_boolean found; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if(f == NULL) { + int save_errno = errno; + + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", file, + strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + + va_start(ap, format); + ret = acl_parse_format(context, &acl, format, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(ret) { + fclose(f); + return ret; + } + + found = FALSE; + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + if(buf[0] == '#') + continue; + if(acl_match_acl(context, acl, buf)) { + found = TRUE; + break; + } + } + + fclose(f); + acl_free_list(acl); + if (found) { + return 0; + } else { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "ACL did not match"); + return EACCES; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/add_et_list.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/add_et_list.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfc42f493c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/add_et_list.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add_et_list.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Add a specified list of error messages to the et list in context. + * Call func (probably a comerr-generated function) with a pointer to + * the current et_list. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_et_list (krb5_context context, + void (*func)(struct et_list **)) +{ + (*func)(&context->et_list); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/addr_families.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/addr_families.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be32458eaa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/addr_families.c @@ -0,0 +1,984 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: addr_families.c,v 1.38 2003/03/25 12:37:02 joda Exp $"); + +struct addr_operations { + int af; + krb5_address_type atype; + size_t max_sockaddr_size; + krb5_error_code (*sockaddr2addr)(const struct sockaddr *, krb5_address *); + krb5_error_code (*sockaddr2port)(const struct sockaddr *, int16_t *); + void (*addr2sockaddr)(const krb5_address *, struct sockaddr *, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, int port); + void (*h_addr2sockaddr)(const char *, struct sockaddr *, krb5_socklen_t *, int); + krb5_error_code (*h_addr2addr)(const char *, krb5_address *); + krb5_boolean (*uninteresting)(const struct sockaddr *); + void (*anyaddr)(struct sockaddr *, krb5_socklen_t *, int); + int (*print_addr)(const krb5_address *, char *, size_t); + int (*parse_addr)(krb5_context, const char*, krb5_address *); + int (*order_addr)(krb5_context, const krb5_address*, const krb5_address*); + int (*free_addr)(krb5_context, krb5_address*); + int (*copy_addr)(krb5_context, const krb5_address*, krb5_address*); +}; + +/* + * AF_INET - aka IPv4 implementation + */ + +static krb5_error_code +ipv4_sockaddr2addr (const struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_address *a) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + unsigned char buf[4]; + + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; + memcpy (buf, &sin->sin_addr, 4); + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, buf, 4); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv4_sockaddr2port (const struct sockaddr *sa, int16_t *port) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + *port = sin->sin_port; + return 0; +} + +static void +ipv4_addr2sockaddr (const krb5_address *a, + struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in tmp; + + memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.sin_family = AF_INET; + memcpy (&tmp.sin_addr, a->address.data, 4); + tmp.sin_port = port; + memcpy(sa, &tmp, min(sizeof(tmp), *sa_size)); + *sa_size = sizeof(tmp); +} + +static void +ipv4_h_addr2sockaddr(const char *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in tmp; + + memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.sin_family = AF_INET; + tmp.sin_port = port; + tmp.sin_addr = *((const struct in_addr *)addr); + memcpy(sa, &tmp, min(sizeof(tmp), *sa_size)); + *sa_size = sizeof(tmp); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv4_h_addr2addr (const char *addr, + krb5_address *a) +{ + unsigned char buf[4]; + + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; + memcpy(buf, addr, 4); + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, buf, 4); +} + +/* + * Are there any addresses that should be considered `uninteresting'? + */ + +static krb5_boolean +ipv4_uninteresting (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + if (sin->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) + return TRUE; + + return FALSE; +} + +static void +ipv4_anyaddr (struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in tmp; + + memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.sin_family = AF_INET; + tmp.sin_port = port; + tmp.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + memcpy(sa, &tmp, min(sizeof(tmp), *sa_size)); + *sa_size = sizeof(tmp); +} + +static int +ipv4_print_addr (const krb5_address *addr, char *str, size_t len) +{ + struct in_addr ia; + + memcpy (&ia, addr->address.data, 4); + + return snprintf (str, len, "IPv4:%s", inet_ntoa(ia)); +} + +static int +ipv4_parse_addr (krb5_context context, const char *address, krb5_address *addr) +{ + const char *p; + struct in_addr a; + + p = strchr(address, ':'); + if(p) { + p++; + if(strncasecmp(address, "ip:", p - address) != 0 && + strncasecmp(address, "ip4:", p - address) != 0 && + strncasecmp(address, "ipv4:", p - address) != 0 && + strncasecmp(address, "inet:", p - address) != 0) + return -1; + } else + p = address; +#ifdef HAVE_INET_ATON + if(inet_aton(p, &a) == 0) + return -1; +#elif defined(HAVE_INET_ADDR) + a.s_addr = inet_addr(p); + if(a.s_addr == INADDR_NONE) + return -1; +#else + return -1; +#endif + addr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; + if(krb5_data_alloc(&addr->address, 4) != 0) + return -1; + _krb5_put_int(addr->address.data, ntohl(a.s_addr), addr->address.length); + return 0; +} + +/* + * AF_INET6 - aka IPv6 implementation + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + +static krb5_error_code +ipv6_sockaddr2addr (const struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_address *a) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sin6->sin6_addr)) { + unsigned char buf[4]; + + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; +#ifndef IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4 +#ifdef IN6_EXTRACT_V4ADDR +#define IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4(x) (&IN6_EXTRACT_V4ADDR(x)) +#else +#define IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4(x) ((const struct in_addr *)&(x)->s6_addr[12]) +#endif +#endif + memcpy (buf, IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4(&sin6->sin6_addr), 4); + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, buf, 4); + } else { + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6; + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, + &sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr)); + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv6_sockaddr2port (const struct sockaddr *sa, int16_t *port) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + *port = sin6->sin6_port; + return 0; +} + +static void +ipv6_addr2sockaddr (const krb5_address *a, + struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 tmp; + + memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + memcpy (&tmp.sin6_addr, a->address.data, sizeof(tmp.sin6_addr)); + tmp.sin6_port = port; + memcpy(sa, &tmp, min(sizeof(tmp), *sa_size)); + *sa_size = sizeof(tmp); +} + +static void +ipv6_h_addr2sockaddr(const char *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 tmp; + + memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + tmp.sin6_port = port; + tmp.sin6_addr = *((const struct in6_addr *)addr); + memcpy(sa, &tmp, min(sizeof(tmp), *sa_size)); + *sa_size = sizeof(tmp); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv6_h_addr2addr (const char *addr, + krb5_address *a) +{ + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6; + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); +} + +/* + * + */ + +static krb5_boolean +ipv6_uninteresting (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + const struct in6_addr *in6 = (const struct in6_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr; + + return + IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(in6) + || IN6_IS_ADDR_V4COMPAT(in6); +} + +static void +ipv6_anyaddr (struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 tmp; + + memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + tmp.sin6_port = port; + tmp.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + *sa_size = sizeof(tmp); +} + +static int +ipv6_print_addr (const krb5_address *addr, char *str, size_t len) +{ + char buf[128], buf2[3]; +#ifdef HAVE_INET_NTOP + if(inet_ntop(AF_INET6, addr->address.data, buf, sizeof(buf)) == NULL) +#endif + { + /* XXX this is pretty ugly, but better than abort() */ + int i; + unsigned char *p = addr->address.data; + buf[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < addr->address.length; i++) { + snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%02x", p[i]); + if(i > 0 && (i & 1) == 0) + strlcat(buf, ":", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, buf2, sizeof(buf)); + } + } + return snprintf(str, len, "IPv6:%s", buf); +} + +static int +ipv6_parse_addr (krb5_context context, const char *address, krb5_address *addr) +{ + int ret; + struct in6_addr in6; + const char *p; + + p = strchr(address, ':'); + if(p) { + p++; + if(strncasecmp(address, "ip6:", p - address) == 0 || + strncasecmp(address, "ipv6:", p - address) == 0 || + strncasecmp(address, "inet6:", p - address) == 0) + address = p; + } + + ret = inet_pton(AF_INET6, address, &in6.s6_addr); + if(ret == 1) { + addr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6; + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&addr->address, sizeof(in6.s6_addr)); + if (ret) + return -1; + memcpy(addr->address.data, in6.s6_addr, sizeof(in6.s6_addr)); + return 0; + } + return -1; +} + +#endif /* IPv6 */ + +/* + * table + */ + +#define KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE (-100) + +struct arange { + krb5_address low; + krb5_address high; +}; + +static int +arange_parse_addr (krb5_context context, + const char *address, krb5_address *addr) +{ + char buf[1024]; + krb5_addresses low, high; + struct arange *a; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(strncasecmp(address, "RANGE:", 6) != 0) + return -1; + + address += 6; + + /* should handle netmasks */ + strsep_copy(&address, "-", buf, sizeof(buf)); + ret = krb5_parse_address(context, buf, &low); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(low.len != 1) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, &low); + return -1; + } + + strsep_copy(&address, "-", buf, sizeof(buf)); + ret = krb5_parse_address(context, buf, &high); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, &low); + return ret; + } + + if(high.len != 1 || high.val[0].addr_type != low.val[0].addr_type) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, &low); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &high); + return -1; + } + + krb5_data_alloc(&addr->address, sizeof(*a)); + addr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE; + a = addr->address.data; + + if(krb5_address_order(context, &low.val[0], &high.val[0]) < 0) { + a->low = low.val[0]; + a->high = high.val[0]; + } else { + a->low = high.val[0]; + a->high = low.val[0]; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +arange_free (krb5_context context, krb5_address *addr) +{ + struct arange *a; + a = addr->address.data; + krb5_free_address(context, &a->low); + krb5_free_address(context, &a->high); + return 0; +} + + +static int +arange_copy (krb5_context context, const krb5_address *inaddr, + krb5_address *outaddr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct arange *i, *o; + + outaddr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE; + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&outaddr->address, sizeof(*o)); + if(ret) + return ret; + i = inaddr->address.data; + o = outaddr->address.data; + ret = krb5_copy_address(context, &i->low, &o->low); + if(ret) { + krb5_data_free(&outaddr->address); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_address(context, &i->high, &o->high); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_address(context, &o->low); + krb5_data_free(&outaddr->address); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +arange_print_addr (const krb5_address *addr, char *str, size_t len) +{ + struct arange *a; + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t l, ret_len = 0; + + a = addr->address.data; + + l = strlcpy(str, "RANGE:", len); + ret_len += l; + + ret = krb5_print_address (&a->low, str + ret_len, len - ret_len, &l); + ret_len += l; + + l = strlcat(str, "-", len); + ret_len += l; + + ret = krb5_print_address (&a->high, str + ret_len, len - ret_len, &l); + ret_len += l; + + return ret_len; +} + +static int +arange_order_addr(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2) +{ + int tmp1, tmp2, sign; + struct arange *a; + const krb5_address *a2; + + if(addr1->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE) { + a = addr1->address.data; + a2 = addr2; + sign = 1; + } else if(addr2->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE) { + a = addr2->address.data; + a2 = addr1; + sign = -1; + } else + abort(); + + if(a2->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE) { + struct arange *b = a2->address.data; + tmp1 = krb5_address_order(context, &a->low, &b->low); + if(tmp1 != 0) + return sign * tmp1; + return sign * krb5_address_order(context, &a->high, &b->high); + } else if(a2->addr_type == a->low.addr_type) { + tmp1 = krb5_address_order(context, &a->low, a2); + if(tmp1 > 0) + return sign; + tmp2 = krb5_address_order(context, &a->high, a2); + if(tmp2 < 0) + return -sign; + return 0; + } else { + return sign * (addr1->addr_type - addr2->addr_type); + } +} + +static int +addrport_print_addr (const krb5_address *addr, char *str, size_t len) +{ + krb5_address addr1, addr2; + uint16_t port = 0; + size_t ret_len = 0, l; + krb5_storage *sp = krb5_storage_from_data((krb5_data*)&addr->address); + /* for totally obscure reasons, these are not in network byteorder */ + krb5_storage_set_byteorder(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE); + + krb5_storage_seek(sp, 2, SEEK_CUR); /* skip first two bytes */ + krb5_ret_address(sp, &addr1); + + krb5_storage_seek(sp, 2, SEEK_CUR); /* skip two bytes */ + krb5_ret_address(sp, &addr2); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(addr2.addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT && addr2.address.length == 2) { + unsigned long value; + _krb5_get_int(addr2.address.data, &value, 2); + port = value; + } + l = strlcpy(str, "ADDRPORT:", len); + ret_len += l; + krb5_print_address(&addr1, str + ret_len, len - ret_len, &l); + ret_len += l; + l = snprintf(str + ret_len, len - ret_len, ",PORT=%u", port); + ret_len += l; + return ret_len; +} + +static struct addr_operations at[] = { + {AF_INET, KRB5_ADDRESS_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), + ipv4_sockaddr2addr, + ipv4_sockaddr2port, + ipv4_addr2sockaddr, + ipv4_h_addr2sockaddr, + ipv4_h_addr2addr, + ipv4_uninteresting, ipv4_anyaddr, ipv4_print_addr, ipv4_parse_addr}, +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + {AF_INET6, KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), + ipv6_sockaddr2addr, + ipv6_sockaddr2port, + ipv6_addr2sockaddr, + ipv6_h_addr2sockaddr, + ipv6_h_addr2addr, + ipv6_uninteresting, ipv6_anyaddr, ipv6_print_addr, ipv6_parse_addr} , +#endif + {KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT, KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT, 0, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, addrport_print_addr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, + /* fake address type */ + {KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE, KRB5_ADDRESS_ARANGE, sizeof(struct arange), + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + arange_print_addr, arange_parse_addr, + arange_order_addr, arange_free, arange_copy } +}; + +static int num_addrs = sizeof(at) / sizeof(at[0]); + +static size_t max_sockaddr_size = 0; + +/* + * generic functions + */ + +static struct addr_operations * +find_af(int af) +{ + struct addr_operations *a; + + for (a = at; a < at + num_addrs; ++a) + if (af == a->af) + return a; + return NULL; +} + +static struct addr_operations * +find_atype(int atype) +{ + struct addr_operations *a; + + for (a = at; a < at + num_addrs; ++a) + if (atype == a->atype) + return a; + return NULL; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2address (krb5_context context, + const struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_address *addr) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(sa->sa_family); + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", + sa->sa_family); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + return (*a->sockaddr2addr)(sa, addr); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2port (krb5_context context, + const struct sockaddr *sa, int16_t *port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(sa->sa_family); + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", + sa->sa_family); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + return (*a->sockaddr2port)(sa, port); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addr2sockaddr (krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_atype(addr->addr_type); + + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address type %d not supported", + addr->addr_type); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + if (a->addr2sockaddr == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Can't convert address type %d to sockaddr", + addr->addr_type); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + (*a->addr2sockaddr)(addr, sa, sa_size, port); + return 0; +} + +size_t +krb5_max_sockaddr_size (void) +{ + if (max_sockaddr_size == 0) { + struct addr_operations *a; + + for(a = at; a < at + num_addrs; ++a) + max_sockaddr_size = max(max_sockaddr_size, a->max_sockaddr_size); + } + return max_sockaddr_size; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting(const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(sa->sa_family); + if (a == NULL || a->uninteresting == NULL) + return TRUE; + return (*a->uninteresting)(sa); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2sockaddr (krb5_context context, + int af, + const char *addr, struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(af); + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", af); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + (*a->h_addr2sockaddr)(addr, sa, sa_size, port); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2addr (krb5_context context, + int af, + const char *haddr, krb5_address *addr) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(af); + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", af); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + return (*a->h_addr2addr)(haddr, addr); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_anyaddr (krb5_context context, + int af, + struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_socklen_t *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af (af); + + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", af); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + (*a->anyaddr)(sa, sa_size, port); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_print_address (const krb5_address *addr, + char *str, size_t len, size_t *ret_len) +{ + size_t ret; + struct addr_operations *a = find_atype(addr->addr_type); + + if (a == NULL || a->print_addr == NULL) { + char *s; + int l; + int i; + + s = str; + l = snprintf(s, len, "TYPE_%d:", addr->addr_type); + if (l < 0) + return EINVAL; + s += l; + len -= l; + for(i = 0; i < addr->address.length; i++) { + l = snprintf(s, len, "%02x", ((char*)addr->address.data)[i]); + if (l < 0) + return EINVAL; + len -= l; + s += l; + } + if(ret_len != NULL) + *ret_len = s - str; + return 0; + } + ret = (*a->print_addr)(addr, str, len); + if(ret_len != NULL) + *ret_len = ret; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_address(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + int i, n; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + int error; + int save_errno; + + for(i = 0; i < num_addrs; i++) { + if(at[i].parse_addr) { + krb5_address addr; + if((*at[i].parse_addr)(context, string, &addr) == 0) { + ALLOC_SEQ(addresses, 1); + addresses->val[0] = addr; + return 0; + } + } + } + + error = getaddrinfo (string, NULL, NULL, &ai); + if (error) { + save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "%s: %s", string, gai_strerror(error)); + return krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(error, save_errno); + } + + n = 0; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + ++n; + + ALLOC_SEQ(addresses, n); + + for (a = ai, i = 0; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if(krb5_sockaddr2address (context, ai->ai_addr, + &addresses->val[i]) == 0) + i++; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 0; +} + +int +krb5_address_order(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2) +{ + /* this sucks; what if both addresses have order functions, which + should we call? this works for now, though */ + struct addr_operations *a; + a = find_atype(addr1->addr_type); + if(a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", + addr1->addr_type); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + if(a->order_addr != NULL) + return (*a->order_addr)(context, addr1, addr2); + a = find_atype(addr2->addr_type); + if(a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "Address family %d not supported", + addr2->addr_type); + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + } + if(a->order_addr != NULL) + return (*a->order_addr)(context, addr1, addr2); + + if(addr1->addr_type != addr2->addr_type) + return addr1->addr_type - addr2->addr_type; + if(addr1->address.length != addr2->address.length) + return addr1->address.length - addr2->address.length; + return memcmp (addr1->address.data, + addr2->address.data, + addr1->address.length); +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_compare(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2) +{ + return krb5_address_order (context, addr1, addr2) == 0; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_search(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr, + const krb5_addresses *addrlist) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < addrlist->len; ++i) + if (krb5_address_compare (context, addr, &addrlist->val[i])) + return TRUE; + return FALSE; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_address(krb5_context context, + krb5_address *address) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af (address->addr_type); + if(a != NULL && a->free_addr != NULL) + return (*a->free_addr)(context, address); + krb5_data_free (&address->address); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_addresses(krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < addresses->len; i++) + krb5_free_address(context, &addresses->val[i]); + free(addresses->val); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_address(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *inaddr, + krb5_address *outaddr) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af (inaddr->addr_type); + if(a != NULL && a->copy_addr != NULL) + return (*a->copy_addr)(context, inaddr, outaddr); + return copy_HostAddress(inaddr, outaddr); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_addresses(krb5_context context, + const krb5_addresses *inaddr, + krb5_addresses *outaddr) +{ + int i; + ALLOC_SEQ(outaddr, inaddr->len); + if(inaddr->len > 0 && outaddr->val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for(i = 0; i < inaddr->len; i++) + krb5_copy_address(context, &inaddr->val[i], &outaddr->val[i]); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_append_addresses(krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *dest, + const krb5_addresses *source) +{ + krb5_address *tmp; + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + if(source->len > 0) { + tmp = realloc(dest->val, (dest->len + source->len) * sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "realloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + dest->val = tmp; + for(i = 0; i < source->len; i++) { + /* skip duplicates */ + if(krb5_address_search(context, &source->val[i], dest)) + continue; + ret = krb5_copy_address(context, + &source->val[i], + &dest->val[dest->len]); + if(ret) + return ret; + dest->len++; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create an address of type KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT from (addr, port) + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_addrport (krb5_context context, + krb5_address **res, const krb5_address *addr, int16_t port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len = addr->address.length + 2 + 4 * 4; + u_char *p; + + *res = malloc (sizeof(**res)); + if (*res == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*res)->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&(*res)->address, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free (*res); + return ret; + } + p = (*res)->address.data; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = (addr->addr_type ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->addr_type >> 8) & 0xFF; + + *p++ = (addr->address.length ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->address.length >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->address.length >> 16) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->address.length >> 24) & 0xFF; + + memcpy (p, addr->address.data, addr->address.length); + p += addr->address.length; + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = (KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT >> 8) & 0xFF; + + *p++ = (2 ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (2 >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (2 >> 16) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (2 >> 24) & 0xFF; + + memcpy (p, &port, 2); + p += 2; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/aes-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/aes-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfee8e25a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/aes-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,472 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: aes-test.c,v 1.3 2003/03/25 11:30:41 lha Exp $"); + +static int verbose = 0; + +static void +hex_dump_data(krb5_data *data) +{ + unsigned char *p = data->data; + int i, j; + + for (i = j = 0; i < data->length; i++, j++) { + printf("%02x ", p[i]); + if (j > 15) { + printf("\n"); + j = 0; + } + } + if (j != 0) + printf("\n"); +} + +struct { + char *password; + char *salt; + int saltlen; + int iterations; + krb5_enctype enctype; + int keylen; + char *pbkdf2; + char *key; +} keys[] = { +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + { + "password", "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", -1, + 1, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15", + "\x42\x26\x3c\x6e\x89\xf4\xfc\x28\xb8\xdf\x68\xee\x09\x79\x9f\x15" + }, + { + "password", "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", -1, + 1, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15" + "\x0a\xd1\xf7\xa0\x4b\xb9\xf3\xa3\x33\xec\xc0\xe2\xe1\xf7\x08\x37", + "\xfe\x69\x7b\x52\xbc\x0d\x3c\xe1\x44\x32\xba\x03\x6a\x92\xe6\x5b" + "\xbb\x52\x28\x09\x90\xa2\xfa\x27\x88\x39\x98\xd7\x2a\xf3\x01\x61" + }, + { + "password", "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", -1, + 2, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d", + "\xc6\x51\xbf\x29\xe2\x30\x0a\xc2\x7f\xa4\x69\xd6\x93\xbd\xda\x13" + }, + { + "password", "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", -1, + 2, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d" + "\xa0\x53\x78\xb9\x32\x44\xec\x8f\x48\xa9\x9e\x61\xad\x79\x9d\x86", + "\xa2\xe1\x6d\x16\xb3\x60\x69\xc1\x35\xd5\xe9\xd2\xe2\x5f\x89\x61" + "\x02\x68\x56\x18\xb9\x59\x14\xb4\x67\xc6\x76\x22\x22\x58\x24\xff" + }, + { + "password", "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", -1, + 1200, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b", + "\x4c\x01\xcd\x46\xd6\x32\xd0\x1e\x6d\xbe\x23\x0a\x01\xed\x64\x2a" + }, + { + "password", "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", -1, + 1200, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b" + "\xa7\xe5\x2d\xdb\xc5\xe5\x14\x2f\x70\x8a\x31\xe2\xe6\x2b\x1e\x13", + "\x55\xa6\xac\x74\x0a\xd1\x7b\x48\x46\x94\x10\x51\xe1\xe8\xb0\xa7" + "\x54\x8d\x93\xb0\xab\x30\xa8\xbc\x3f\xf1\x62\x80\x38\x2b\x8c\x2a" + }, + { + "password", "\x12\x34\x56\x78\x78\x56\x34\x12", 8, + 5, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49", + "\xe9\xb2\x3d\x52\x27\x37\x47\xdd\x5c\x35\xcb\x55\xbe\x61\x9d\x8e" + }, + { + "password", "\x12\x34\x56\x78\x78\x56\x34\x12", 8, + 5, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49" + "\x3f\x98\xd2\x03\xe6\xbe\x49\xa6\xad\xf4\xfa\x57\x4b\x6e\x64\xee", + "\x97\xa4\xe7\x86\xbe\x20\xd8\x1a\x38\x2d\x5e\xbc\x96\xd5\x90\x9c" + "\xab\xcd\xad\xc8\x7c\xa4\x8f\x57\x45\x04\x15\x9f\x16\xc3\x6e\x31" + }, + { + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", + "pass phrase equals block size", -1, + 1200, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9", + "\x59\xd1\xbb\x78\x9a\x82\x8b\x1a\xa5\x4e\xf9\xc2\x88\x3f\x69\xed" + }, + { + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", + "pass phrase equals block size", -1, + 1200, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9" + "\xc5\xec\x59\xf1\xa4\x52\xf5\xcc\x9a\xd9\x40\xfe\xa0\x59\x8e\xd1", + "\x89\xad\xee\x36\x08\xdb\x8b\xc7\x1f\x1b\xfb\xfe\x45\x94\x86\xb0" + "\x56\x18\xb7\x0c\xba\xe2\x20\x92\x53\x4e\x56\xc5\x53\xba\x4b\x34" + }, + { + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", + "pass phrase exceeds block size", -1, + 1200, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61", + "\xcb\x80\x05\xdc\x5f\x90\x17\x9a\x7f\x02\x10\x4c\x00\x18\x75\x1d" + }, + { + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", + "pass phrase exceeds block size", -1, + 1200, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61" + "\x1a\x8b\x4d\x28\x26\x01\xdb\x3b\x36\xbe\x92\x46\x91\x5e\xc8\x2a", + "\xd7\x8c\x5c\x9c\xb8\x72\xa8\xc9\xda\xd4\x69\x7f\x0b\xb5\xb2\xd2" + "\x14\x96\xc8\x2b\xeb\x2c\xae\xda\x21\x12\xfc\xee\xa0\x57\x40\x1b" + + }, + { + "\xf0\x9d\x84\x9e" /* g-clef */, "EXAMPLE.COMpianist", -1, + 50, + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 16, + "\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39", + "\xf1\x49\xc1\xf2\xe1\x54\xa7\x34\x52\xd4\x3e\x7f\xe6\x2a\x56\xe5" + }, + { + "\xf0\x9d\x84\x9e" /* g-clef */, "EXAMPLE.COMpianist", -1, + 50, + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, 32, + "\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39" + "\xe7\xfe\x37\xa0\xc4\x1e\x02\xc2\x81\xff\x30\x69\xe1\xe9\x4f\x52", + "\x4b\x6d\x98\x39\xf8\x44\x06\xdf\x1f\x09\xcc\x16\x6d\xb4\xb8\x3c" + "\x57\x18\x48\xb7\x84\xa3\xd6\xbd\xc3\x46\x58\x9a\x3e\x39\x3f\x9e" + }, +#endif + { + "foo", "", -1, + 0, + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, 16, + NULL, + "\xac\x8e\x65\x7f\x83\xdf\x82\xbe\xea\x5d\x43\xbd\xaf\x78\x00\xcc" + }, + { + "test", "", -1, + 0, + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, 16, + NULL, + "\x0c\xb6\x94\x88\x05\xf7\x97\xbf\x2a\x82\x80\x79\x73\xb8\x95\x37" + } +}; + +static int +string_to_key_test(krb5_context context) +{ + krb5_data password, opaque; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_salt salt; + int i, val = 0; + char iter[4]; + char keyout[32]; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(keys)/sizeof(keys[0]); i++) { + + password.data = keys[i].password; + password.length = strlen(password.data); + + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.data = keys[i].salt; + if (keys[i].saltlen == -1) + salt.saltvalue.length = strlen(salt.saltvalue.data); + else + salt.saltvalue.length = keys[i].saltlen; + + opaque.data = iter; + opaque.length = sizeof(iter); + _krb5_put_int(iter, keys[i].iterations, 4); + + if (verbose) + printf("%d: password: %s salt: %s\n", + i, keys[i].password, keys[i].salt); + + if (keys[i].keylen > sizeof(keyout)) + abort(); + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + if (keys[i].pbkdf2) { + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(password.data, password.length, + salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length, + keys[i].iterations, + keys[i].keylen, keyout); + + if (memcmp(keyout, keys[i].pbkdf2, keys[i].keylen) != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: openssl key pbkdf2", i); + val = 1; + continue; + } +#endif + + ret = krb5_PKCS5_PBKDF2(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, password, salt, + keys[i].iterations - 1, + keys[i].enctype, + &key); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%d: krb5_PKCS5_PBKDF2", i); + val = 1; + continue; + } + + if (key.keyvalue.length != keys[i].keylen) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: size key pbkdf2", i); + val = 1; + continue; + } + + if (memcmp(key.keyvalue.data, keys[i].pbkdf2, keys[i].keylen) != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: key pbkdf2 pl %d", + i, password.length); + val = 1; + continue; + } + + if (verbose) { + printf("PBKDF2:\n"); + hex_dump_data(&key.keyvalue); + } + + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + } +#endif + + ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt_opaque (context, keys[i].enctype, + password, salt, opaque, + &key); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%d: string_to_key_data_salt_opaque", i); + val = 1; + continue; + } + + if (key.keyvalue.length != keys[i].keylen) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: key wrong length (%d/%d)", + i, key.keyvalue.length, keys[i].keylen); + val = 1; + continue; + } + + if (memcmp(key.keyvalue.data, keys[i].key, keys[i].keylen) != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: key wrong", i); + val = 1; + continue; + } + + if (verbose) { + printf("key:\n"); + hex_dump_data(&key.keyvalue); + } + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + } + return val; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + +struct { + size_t len; + char *input; + char *output; +} encs[] = { + { + 17, + "\x49\x20\x77\x6f\x75\x6c\x64\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20", + "\xc6\x35\x35\x68\xf2\xbf\x8c\xb4\xd8\xa5\x80\x36\x2d\xa7\xff\x7f" + "\x97" + }, + { + 31, + "\x49\x20\x77\x6f\x75\x6c\x64\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20\x47\x65\x6e\x65\x72\x61\x6c\x20\x47\x61\x75\x27\x73\x20", + "\xfc\x00\x78\x3e\x0e\xfd\xb2\xc1\xd4\x45\xd4\xc8\xef\xf7\xed\x22" + "\x97\x68\x72\x68\xd6\xec\xcc\xc0\xc0\x7b\x25\xe2\x5e\xcf\xe5" + }, + { + 32, + "\x49\x20\x77\x6f\x75\x6c\x64\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20\x47\x65\x6e\x65\x72\x61\x6c\x20\x47\x61\x75\x27\x73\x20\x43", + "\x39\x31\x25\x23\xa7\x86\x62\xd5\xbe\x7f\xcb\xcc\x98\xeb\xf5\xa8" + "\x97\x68\x72\x68\xd6\xec\xcc\xc0\xc0\x7b\x25\xe2\x5e\xcf\xe5\x84" + }, + { + 47, + "\x49\x20\x77\x6f\x75\x6c\x64\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20\x47\x65\x6e\x65\x72\x61\x6c\x20\x47\x61\x75\x27\x73\x20\x43" + "\x68\x69\x63\x6b\x65\x6e\x2c\x20\x70\x6c\x65\x61\x73\x65\x2c", + "\x97\x68\x72\x68\xd6\xec\xcc\xc0\xc0\x7b\x25\xe2\x5e\xcf\xe5\x84" + "\xb3\xff\xfd\x94\x0c\x16\xa1\x8c\x1b\x55\x49\xd2\xf8\x38\x02\x9e" + "\x39\x31\x25\x23\xa7\x86\x62\xd5\xbe\x7f\xcb\xcc\x98\xeb\xf5" + }, + { + 64, + "\x49\x20\x77\x6f\x75\x6c\x64\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20\x47\x65\x6e\x65\x72\x61\x6c\x20\x47\x61\x75\x27\x73\x20\x43" + "\x68\x69\x63\x6b\x65\x6e\x2c\x20\x70\x6c\x65\x61\x73\x65\x2c\x20" + "\x61\x6e\x64\x20\x77\x6f\x6e\x74\x6f\x6e\x20\x73\x6f\x75\x70\x2e", + "\x97\x68\x72\x68\xd6\xec\xcc\xc0\xc0\x7b\x25\xe2\x5e\xcf\xe5\x84" + "\x39\x31\x25\x23\xa7\x86\x62\xd5\xbe\x7f\xcb\xcc\x98\xeb\xf5\xa8" + "\x48\x07\xef\xe8\x36\xee\x89\xa5\x26\x73\x0d\xbc\x2f\x7b\xc8\x40" + "\x9d\xad\x8b\xbb\x96\xc4\xcd\xc0\x3b\xc1\x03\xe1\xa1\x94\xbb\xd8" + } +}; + +char *enc_key = + "\x63\x68\x69\x63\x6b\x65\x6e\x20\x74\x65\x72\x69\x79\x61\x6b\x69"; + +static int +samep(int testn, char *type, const char *p1, const char *p2, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + int val = 1; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (p1[i] != p2[i]) { + if (verbose) + printf("M"); + val = 0; + } else { + if (verbose) + printf("."); + } + } + if (verbose) + printf("\n"); + return val; +} + +static int +encryption_test(krb5_context context) +{ + char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int i, val = 0; + AES_KEY ekey, dkey; + char *p; + + AES_set_encrypt_key(enc_key, 128, &ekey); + AES_set_decrypt_key(enc_key, 128, &dkey); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(encs)/sizeof(encs[0]); i++) { + if (verbose) + printf("test: %d\n", i); + memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); + + p = malloc(encs[i].len + 1); + if (p == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "malloc"); + + p[encs[i].len] = '\0'; + + memcpy(p, encs[i].input, encs[i].len); + + _krb5_aes_cts_encrypt(p, p, encs[i].len, + &ekey, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); + + if (p[encs[i].len] != '\0') { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: encrypt modified off end", i); + val = 1; + } + + if (!samep(i, "cipher", p, encs[i].output, encs[i].len)) + val = 1; + + memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); + + _krb5_aes_cts_encrypt(p, p, encs[i].len, + &dkey, iv, AES_DECRYPT); + + if (p[encs[i].len] != '\0') { + krb5_warnx(context, "%d: decrypt modified off end", i); + val = 1; + } + + if (!samep(i, "clear", p, encs[i].input, encs[i].len)) + val = 1; + + free(p); + } + return val; +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + int val = 0; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + val |= string_to_key_test(context); + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + val |= encryption_test(context); +#endif + + if (verbose && val == 0) + printf("all ok\n"); + if (val) + printf("tests failed\n"); + + krb5_free_context(context); + + return val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5b5f87a6c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: aname_to_localname.c,v 1.6 2003/04/16 16:01:06 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_aname_to_localname (krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal aname, + size_t lnsize, + char *lname) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm *lrealms, *r; + int valid; + size_t len; + const char *res; + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &lrealms); + if (ret) + return ret; + + valid = 0; + for (r = lrealms; *r != NULL; ++r) { + if (strcmp (*r, aname->realm) == 0) { + valid = 1; + break; + } + } + krb5_free_host_realm (context, lrealms); + if (valid == 0) + return KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME; + + if (aname->name.name_string.len == 1) + res = aname->name.name_string.val[0]; + else if (aname->name.name_string.len == 2 + && strcmp (aname->name.name_string.val[1], "root") == 0) { + krb5_principal rootprinc; + krb5_boolean userok; + + res = "root"; + + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, aname, &rootprinc); + if (ret) + return ret; + + userok = krb5_kuserok(context, rootprinc, res); + krb5_free_principal(context, rootprinc); + if (!userok) + return KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME; + + } else + return KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME; + + len = strlen (res); + if (len >= lnsize) + return ERANGE; + strlcpy (lname, res, lnsize); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/appdefault.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/appdefault.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..831b6036bf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/appdefault.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: appdefault.c,v 1.7 2001/09/16 04:48:55 assar Exp $"); + +void +krb5_appdefault_boolean(krb5_context context, const char *appname, + krb5_const_realm realm, const char *option, + krb5_boolean def_val, krb5_boolean *ret_val) +{ + + if(appname == NULL) + appname = getprogname(); + + def_val = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "libdefaults", option, NULL); + if(realm != NULL) + def_val = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "realms", realm, option, NULL); + + def_val = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + option, + NULL); + if(realm != NULL) + def_val = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + realm, + option, + NULL); + if(appname != NULL) { + def_val = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + appname, + option, + NULL); + if(realm != NULL) + def_val = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + appname, + realm, + option, + NULL); + } + *ret_val = def_val; +} + +void +krb5_appdefault_string(krb5_context context, const char *appname, + krb5_const_realm realm, const char *option, + const char *def_val, char **ret_val) +{ + if(appname == NULL) + appname = getprogname(); + + def_val = krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "libdefaults", option, NULL); + if(realm != NULL) + def_val = krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "realms", realm, option, NULL); + + def_val = krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + option, + NULL); + if(realm != NULL) + def_val = krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + realm, + option, + NULL); + if(appname != NULL) { + def_val = krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + appname, + option, + NULL); + if(realm != NULL) + def_val = krb5_config_get_string_default(context, NULL, def_val, + "appdefaults", + appname, + realm, + option, + NULL); + } + if(def_val != NULL) + *ret_val = strdup(def_val); + else + *ret_val = NULL; +} + +void +krb5_appdefault_time(krb5_context context, const char *appname, + krb5_const_realm realm, const char *option, + time_t def_val, time_t *ret_val) +{ + time_t t; + char tstr[32]; + char *val; + snprintf(tstr, sizeof(tstr), "%ld", (long)def_val); + krb5_appdefault_string(context, appname, realm, option, tstr, &val); + t = parse_time (val, NULL); + free(val); + *ret_val = t; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac83ff78bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: asn1_glue.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_principal2principalname (PrincipalName *p, + const krb5_principal from) +{ + return copy_PrincipalName(&from->name, p); +} + +krb5_error_code +principalname2krb5_principal (krb5_principal *principal, + const PrincipalName from, + const Realm realm) +{ + krb5_principal p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + copy_PrincipalName(&from, &p->name); + p->realm = strdup(realm); + *principal = p; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/auth_context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/auth_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2e7a8f49cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/auth_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: auth_context.c,v 1.59 2002/09/02 17:11:02 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_init(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context) +{ + krb5_auth_context p; + + ALLOC(p, 1); + if(!p) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); + ALLOC(p->authenticator, 1); + if (!p->authenticator) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free(p); + return ENOMEM; + } + memset (p->authenticator, 0, sizeof(*p->authenticator)); + p->flags = KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME; + + p->local_address = NULL; + p->remote_address = NULL; + p->local_port = 0; + p->remote_port = 0; + p->keytype = KEYTYPE_NULL; + p->cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_NONE; + *auth_context = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_free(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context) +{ + if (auth_context != NULL) { + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth_context->authenticator); + if(auth_context->local_address){ + free_HostAddress(auth_context->local_address); + free(auth_context->local_address); + } + if(auth_context->remote_address){ + free_HostAddress(auth_context->remote_address); + free(auth_context->remote_address); + } + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->remote_subkey); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->local_subkey); + free (auth_context); + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setflags(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t flags) +{ + auth_context->flags = flags; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getflags(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *flags) +{ + *flags = auth_context->flags; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_address *local_addr, + krb5_address *remote_addr) +{ + if (local_addr) { + if (auth_context->local_address) + krb5_free_address (context, auth_context->local_address); + else + auth_context->local_address = malloc(sizeof(krb5_address)); + krb5_copy_address(context, local_addr, auth_context->local_address); + } + if (remote_addr) { + if (auth_context->remote_address) + krb5_free_address (context, auth_context->remote_address); + else + auth_context->remote_address = malloc(sizeof(krb5_address)); + krb5_copy_address(context, remote_addr, auth_context->remote_address); + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int fd, int flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_address local_k_address, remote_k_address; + krb5_address *lptr = NULL, *rptr = NULL; + struct sockaddr_storage ss_local, ss_remote; + struct sockaddr *local = (struct sockaddr *)&ss_local; + struct sockaddr *remote = (struct sockaddr *)&ss_remote; + socklen_t len; + + if(flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_ADDR) { + if (auth_context->local_address == NULL) { + len = sizeof(ss_local); + if(getsockname(fd, local, &len) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "getsockname: %s", + strerror(ret)); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, local, &local_k_address); + if(ret) goto out; + if(flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR) { + krb5_sockaddr2port (context, local, &auth_context->local_port); + } else + auth_context->local_port = 0; + lptr = &local_k_address; + } + } + if(flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_ADDR) { + len = sizeof(ss_remote); + if(getpeername(fd, remote, &len) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "getpeername: %s", strerror(ret)); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, remote, &remote_k_address); + if(ret) goto out; + if(flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR) { + krb5_sockaddr2port (context, remote, &auth_context->remote_port); + } else + auth_context->remote_port = 0; + rptr = &remote_k_address; + } + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + lptr, + rptr); + out: + if (lptr) + krb5_free_address (context, lptr); + if (rptr) + krb5_free_address (context, rptr); + return ret; + +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + void *p_fd) +{ + int fd = *(int*)p_fd; + int flags = 0; + if(auth_context->local_address == NULL) + flags |= KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR; + if(auth_context->remote_address == NULL) + flags |= KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR; + return krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(context, auth_context, fd, flags); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getaddrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_address **local_addr, + krb5_address **remote_addr) +{ + if(*local_addr) + krb5_free_address (context, *local_addr); + *local_addr = malloc (sizeof(**local_addr)); + if (*local_addr == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_copy_address(context, + auth_context->local_address, + *local_addr); + + if(*remote_addr) + krb5_free_address (context, *remote_addr); + *remote_addr = malloc (sizeof(**remote_addr)); + if (*remote_addr == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + krb5_free_address (context, *local_addr); + *local_addr = NULL; + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_copy_address(context, + auth_context->remote_address, + *remote_addr); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +copy_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *in, + krb5_keyblock **out) +{ + if(in) + return krb5_copy_keyblock(context, in, out); + *out = NULL; /* is this right? */ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock) +{ + return copy_key(context, auth_context->keyblock, keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock) +{ + return copy_key(context, auth_context->local_subkey, keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock) +{ + return copy_key(context, auth_context->remote_subkey, keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + return copy_key(context, keyblock, &auth_context->keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->local_subkey) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->local_subkey); + return copy_key(context, keyblock, &auth_context->local_subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_generatelocalsubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keyblock *subkey; + + ret = krb5_generate_subkey (context, key, &subkey); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(auth_context->local_subkey) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->local_subkey); + auth_context->local_subkey = subkey; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->remote_subkey) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->remote_subkey); + return copy_key(context, keyblock, &auth_context->remote_subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setcksumtype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_cksumtype cksumtype) +{ + auth_context->cksumtype = cksumtype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_cksumtype *cksumtype) +{ + *cksumtype = auth_context->cksumtype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setkeytype (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keytype keytype) +{ + auth_context->keytype = keytype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getkeytype (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keytype *keytype) +{ + *keytype = auth_context->keytype; + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setenctype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype etype) +{ + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + ALLOC(auth_context->keyblock, 1); + if(auth_context->keyblock == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + auth_context->keyblock->keytype = etype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getenctype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype *etype) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_getenctype called"); +} +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *seqnumber) +{ + *seqnumber = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t seqnumber) +{ + auth_context->local_seqnumber = seqnumber; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *seqnumber) +{ + *seqnumber = auth_context->remote_seqnumber; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t seqnumber) +{ + auth_context->remote_seqnumber = seqnumber; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator) +{ + *authenticator = malloc(sizeof(**authenticator)); + if (*authenticator == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + copy_Authenticator(auth_context->authenticator, + *authenticator); + return 0; +} + + +void +krb5_free_authenticator(krb5_context context, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator) +{ + free_Authenticator (*authenticator); + free (*authenticator); + *authenticator = NULL; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setuserkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + return krb5_copy_keyblock(context, keyblock, &auth_context->keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_rcache *rcache) +{ + *rcache = auth_context->rcache; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_rcache rcache) +{ + auth_context->rcache = rcache; + return 0; +} + +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_initivector(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_con_initivector called"); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setivector(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_pointer ivector) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_con_setivector called"); +} + +#endif /* not implemented */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cab5e6fd2d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: build_ap_req.c,v 1.18 2002/09/04 16:26:04 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_ap_req (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_flags ap_options, + krb5_data authenticator, + krb5_data *retdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + AP_REQ ap; + Ticket t; + size_t len; + + ap.pvno = 5; + ap.msg_type = krb_ap_req; + memset(&ap.ap_options, 0, sizeof(ap.ap_options)); + ap.ap_options.use_session_key = (ap_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY) > 0; + ap.ap_options.mutual_required = (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) > 0; + + ap.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; + copy_Realm(&cred->server->realm, &ap.ticket.realm); + copy_PrincipalName(&cred->server->name, &ap.ticket.sname); + + decode_Ticket(cred->ticket.data, cred->ticket.length, &t, &len); + copy_EncryptedData(&t.enc_part, &ap.ticket.enc_part); + free_Ticket(&t); + + ap.authenticator.etype = enctype; + ap.authenticator.kvno = NULL; + ap.authenticator.cipher = authenticator; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AP_REQ, retdata->data, retdata->length, + &ap, &len, ret); + + free_AP_REQ(&ap); + return ret; + +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/build_auth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/build_auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a2ca3e28e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/build_auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: build_auth.c,v 1.38 2002/09/04 16:26:04 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_authenticator (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_creds *cred, + Checksum *cksum, + Authenticator **auth_result, + krb5_data *result, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + Authenticator *auth; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + auth = malloc(sizeof(*auth)); + if (auth == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + memset (auth, 0, sizeof(*auth)); + auth->authenticator_vno = 5; + copy_Realm(&cred->client->realm, &auth->crealm); + copy_PrincipalName(&cred->client->name, &auth->cname); + + { + int32_t sec, usec; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + auth->ctime = sec; + auth->cusec = usec; + } + ret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(context, auth_context, &auth->subkey); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + krb5_generate_seq_number (context, + &cred->session, + &auth_context->local_seqnumber); + ALLOC(auth->seq_number, 1); + *auth->seq_number = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + } else + auth->seq_number = NULL; + auth->authorization_data = NULL; + auth->cksum = cksum; + + /* XXX - Copy more to auth_context? */ + + if (auth_context) { + auth_context->authenticator->ctime = auth->ctime; + auth_context->authenticator->cusec = auth->cusec; + } + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Authenticator, buf, buf_size, auth, &len, ret); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &cred->session, enctype, &crypto); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_encrypt (context, + crypto, + usage /* KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH */, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + result); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + free (buf); + + if (auth_result) + *auth_result = auth; + else { + /* Don't free the `cksum', it's allocated by the caller */ + auth->cksum = NULL; + free_Authenticator (auth); + free (auth); + } + return ret; +fail: + free_Authenticator (auth); + free (auth); + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/cache.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/cache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26cda9a626 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,470 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: cache.c,v 1.52 2003/03/16 18:23:59 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * Add a new ccache type with operations `ops', overwriting any + * existing one if `override'. + * Return an error code or 0. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_register(krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + krb5_boolean override) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < context->num_cc_ops && context->cc_ops[i].prefix; i++) { + if(strcmp(context->cc_ops[i].prefix, ops->prefix) == 0) { + if(!override) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "ccache type %s already exists", + ops->prefix); + return KRB5_CC_TYPE_EXISTS; + } + break; + } + } + if(i == context->num_cc_ops) { + krb5_cc_ops *o = realloc(context->cc_ops, + (context->num_cc_ops + 1) * + sizeof(*context->cc_ops)); + if(o == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + context->num_cc_ops++; + context->cc_ops = o; + memset(context->cc_ops + i, 0, + (context->num_cc_ops - i) * sizeof(*context->cc_ops)); + } + memcpy(&context->cc_ops[i], ops, sizeof(context->cc_ops[i])); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Allocate memory for a new ccache in `id' with operations `ops' + * and name `residual'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +allocate_ccache (krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + const char *residual, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache p; + + p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + p->ops = ops; + *id = p; + ret = p->ops->resolve(context, id, residual); + if(ret) + free(p); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Find and allocate a ccache in `id' from the specification in `residual'. + * If the ccache name doesn't contain any colon, interpret it as a file name. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_resolve(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < context->num_cc_ops && context->cc_ops[i].prefix; i++) { + size_t prefix_len = strlen(context->cc_ops[i].prefix); + + if(strncmp(context->cc_ops[i].prefix, name, prefix_len) == 0 + && name[prefix_len] == ':') { + return allocate_ccache (context, &context->cc_ops[i], + name + prefix_len + 1, + id); + } + } + if (strchr (name, ':') == NULL) + return allocate_ccache (context, &krb5_fcc_ops, name, id); + else { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "unknown ccache type %s", name); + return KRB5_CC_UNKNOWN_TYPE; + } +} + +/* + * Generate a new ccache of type `ops' in `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_gen_new(krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_ccache p; + + p = malloc (sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + p->ops = ops; + *id = p; + return p->ops->gen_new(context, id); +} + +/* + * Return the name of the ccache `id' + */ + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return id->ops->get_name(context, id); +} + +/* + * Return the type of the ccache `id'. + */ + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return id->ops->prefix; +} + +/* + * Return krb5_cc_ops of a the ccache `id'. + */ + +const krb5_cc_ops * +krb5_cc_get_ops(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id) +{ + return id->ops; +} + +/* + * Set the default cc name for `context' to `name'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_set_default_name(krb5_context context, const char *name) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char *p; + + if (name == NULL) { + char *e; + e = getenv("KRB5CCNAME"); + if (e) + p = strdup(e); + else + asprintf(&p,"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u", (unsigned)getuid()); + } else + p = strdup(name); + + if (p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + if (context->default_cc_name) + free(context->default_cc_name); + + context->default_cc_name = p; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return a pointer to a context static string containing the default ccache name. + */ + +const char* +krb5_cc_default_name(krb5_context context) +{ + if (context->default_cc_name == NULL) + krb5_cc_set_default_name(context, NULL); + + return context->default_cc_name; +} + +/* + * Open the default ccache in `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_default(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + const char *p = krb5_cc_default_name(context); + + if (p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return krb5_cc_resolve(context, p, id); +} + +/* + * Create a new ccache in `id' for `primary_principal'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal) +{ + return id->ops->init(context, id, primary_principal); +} + + +/* + * Remove the ccache `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = id->ops->destroy(context, id); + krb5_cc_close (context, id); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Stop using the ccache `id' and free the related resources. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = id->ops->close(context, id); + free(id); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Store `creds' in the ccache `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_store_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return id->ops->store(context, id, creds); +} + +/* + * Retrieve the credential identified by `mcreds' (and `whichfields') + * from `id' in `creds'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags whichfields, + const krb5_creds *mcreds, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_cc_cursor cursor; + krb5_cc_start_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + while((ret = krb5_cc_next_cred(context, id, &cursor, creds)) == 0){ + if(krb5_compare_creds(context, whichfields, mcreds, creds)){ + ret = 0; + break; + } + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, creds); + } + krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the principal of `id' in `principal'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + return id->ops->get_princ(context, id, principal); +} + +/* + * Start iterating over `id', `cursor' is initialized to the + * beginning. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_start_seq_get (krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return id->ops->get_first(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Retrieve the next cred pointed to by (`id', `cursor') in `creds' + * and advance `cursor'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_next_cred (krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return id->ops->get_next(context, id, cursor, creds); +} + +/* + * Destroy the cursor `cursor'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_end_seq_get (krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return id->ops->end_get(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Remove the credential identified by `cred', `which' from `id'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_remove_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *cred) +{ + if(id->ops->remove_cred == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "ccache %s does not support remove_cred", + id->ops->prefix); + return EACCES; /* XXX */ + } + return (*id->ops->remove_cred)(context, id, which, cred); +} + +/* + * Set the flags of `id' to `flags'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_set_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + return id->ops->set_flags(context, id, flags); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of `from' to `to'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_copy_cache(krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache from, + krb5_ccache to) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_cc_cursor cursor; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, from, &princ); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, to, princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(context, from, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; + } + while(ret == 0 && krb5_cc_next_cred(context, from, &cursor, &cred) == 0){ + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, to, &cred); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + } + krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, from, &cursor); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the version of `id'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_version(krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id) +{ + if(id->ops->get_version) + return id->ops->get_version(context, id); + else + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/changepw.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/changepw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c4013b500 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/changepw.c @@ -0,0 +1,814 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: changepw.c,v 1.38.2.1 2004/06/21 08:38:10 lha Exp $"); + +static void +str2data (krb5_data *d, + const char *fmt, + ...) __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); + +static void +str2data (krb5_data *d, + const char *fmt, + ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + d->length = vasprintf ((char **)&d->data, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* + * Change password protocol defined by + * draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt + * + * Share the response part of the protocol with MS set password + * (RFC3244) + */ + +static krb5_error_code +chgpw_send_request (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal targprinc, + int is_stream, + int sock, + char *passwd, + const char *host) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data ap_req_data; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + krb5_data passwd_data; + size_t len; + u_char header[6]; + u_char *p; + struct iovec iov[3]; + struct msghdr msghdr; + + if (is_stream) + return KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + + if (targprinc && + krb5_principal_compare(context, creds->client, targprinc) != TRUE) + return KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + + krb5_data_zero (&ap_req_data); + + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY, + NULL, /* in_data */ + creds, + &ap_req_data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + passwd_data.data = passwd; + passwd_data.length = strlen(passwd); + + krb5_data_zero (&krb_priv_data); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, + *auth_context, + &passwd_data, + &krb_priv_data, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + len = 6 + ap_req_data.length + krb_priv_data.length; + p = header; + *p++ = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = (ap_req_data.length >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (ap_req_data.length >> 0) & 0xFF; + + memset(&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + msghdr.msg_name = NULL; + msghdr.msg_namelen = 0; + msghdr.msg_iov = iov; + msghdr.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov)/sizeof(*iov); +#if 0 + msghdr.msg_control = NULL; + msghdr.msg_controllen = 0; +#endif + + iov[0].iov_base = (void*)header; + iov[0].iov_len = 6; + iov[1].iov_base = ap_req_data.data; + iov[1].iov_len = ap_req_data.length; + iov[2].iov_base = krb_priv_data.data; + iov[2].iov_len = krb_priv_data.length; + + if (sendmsg (sock, &msghdr, 0) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "sendmsg %s: %s", host, strerror(ret)); + } + + krb5_data_free (&krb_priv_data); +out2: + krb5_data_free (&ap_req_data); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set password protocol as defined by RFC3244 -- + * Microsoft Windows 2000 Kerberos Change Password and Set Password Protocols + */ + +static krb5_error_code +setpw_send_request (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal targprinc, + int is_stream, + int sock, + char *passwd, + const char *host) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data ap_req_data; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + krb5_data pwd_data; + ChangePasswdDataMS chpw; + size_t len; + u_char header[4 + 6]; + u_char *p; + struct iovec iov[3]; + struct msghdr msghdr; + + krb5_data_zero (&ap_req_data); + + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY, + NULL, /* in_data */ + creds, + &ap_req_data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + chpw.newpasswd.length = strlen(passwd); + chpw.newpasswd.data = passwd; + if (targprinc) { + chpw.targname = &targprinc->name; + chpw.targrealm = &targprinc->realm; + } else { + chpw.targname = NULL; + chpw.targrealm = NULL; + } + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ChangePasswdDataMS, pwd_data.data, pwd_data.length, + &chpw, &len, ret); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&ap_req_data); + return ret; + } + + if(pwd_data.length != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, + *auth_context, + &pwd_data, + &krb_priv_data, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + len = 6 + ap_req_data.length + krb_priv_data.length; + p = header; + if (is_stream) { + _krb5_put_int(p, len, 4); + p += 4; + } + *p++ = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + *p++ = 0xff; + *p++ = 0x80; + *p++ = (ap_req_data.length >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (ap_req_data.length >> 0) & 0xFF; + + memset(&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + msghdr.msg_name = NULL; + msghdr.msg_namelen = 0; + msghdr.msg_iov = iov; + msghdr.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov)/sizeof(*iov); +#if 0 + msghdr.msg_control = NULL; + msghdr.msg_controllen = 0; +#endif + + iov[0].iov_base = (void*)header; + if (is_stream) + iov[0].iov_len = 10; + else + iov[0].iov_len = 6; + iov[1].iov_base = ap_req_data.data; + iov[1].iov_len = ap_req_data.length; + iov[2].iov_base = krb_priv_data.data; + iov[2].iov_len = krb_priv_data.length; + + if (sendmsg (sock, &msghdr, 0) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "sendmsg %s: %s", host, strerror(ret)); + } + + krb5_data_free (&krb_priv_data); +out2: + krb5_data_free (&ap_req_data); + krb5_data_free (&pwd_data); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +process_reply (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int is_stream, + int sock, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string, + const char *host) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_char reply[1024 * 3]; + ssize_t len; + u_int16_t pkt_len, pkt_ver; + krb5_data ap_rep_data; + int save_errno; + + len = 0; + if (is_stream) { + while (len < sizeof(reply)) { + unsigned long size; + + ret = recvfrom (sock, reply + len, sizeof(reply) - len, + 0, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "recvfrom %s: %s", + host, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } else if (ret == 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "recvfrom timeout %s", host); + return 1; + } + len += ret; + if (len < 4) + continue; + _krb5_get_int(reply, &size, 4); + if (size + 4 < len) + continue; + memmove(reply, reply + 4, size); + len = size; + break; + } + if (len == sizeof(reply)) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "message too large from %s", + host); + return ENOMEM; + } + } else { + ret = recvfrom (sock, reply, sizeof(reply), 0, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "recvfrom %s: %s", + host, strerror(save_errno)); + return save_errno; + } + len = ret; + } + + if (len < 6) { + str2data (result_string, "server %s sent to too short message " + "(%d bytes)", host, len); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + + pkt_len = (reply[0] << 8) | (reply[1]); + pkt_ver = (reply[2] << 8) | (reply[3]); + + if ((pkt_len != len) || (reply[1] == 0x7e || reply[1] == 0x5e)) { + KRB_ERROR error; + size_t size; + u_char *p; + + memset(&error, 0, sizeof(error)); + + ret = decode_KRB_ERROR(reply, len, &error, &size); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (error.e_data->length < 2) { + str2data(result_string, "server %s sent too short " + "e_data to print anything usable", host); + free_KRB_ERROR(&error); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + + p = error.e_data->data; + *result_code = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + if (error.e_data->length == 2) + str2data(result_string, "server only sent error code"); + else + krb5_data_copy (result_string, + p + 2, + error.e_data->length - 2); + free_KRB_ERROR(&error); + return 0; + } + + if (pkt_len != len) { + str2data (result_string, "client: wrong len in reply"); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + if (pkt_ver != KRB5_KPASSWD_VERS_CHANGEPW) { + str2data (result_string, + "client: wrong version number (%d)", pkt_ver); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + + ap_rep_data.data = reply + 6; + ap_rep_data.length = (reply[4] << 8) | (reply[5]); + + if (reply + len < (u_char *)ap_rep_data.data + ap_rep_data.length) { + str2data (result_string, "client: wrong AP len in reply"); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + + if (ap_rep_data.length) { + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *ap_rep; + krb5_data priv_data; + u_char *p; + + priv_data.data = (u_char*)ap_rep_data.data + ap_rep_data.length; + priv_data.length = len - ap_rep_data.length - 6; + + ret = krb5_rd_rep (context, + auth_context, + &ap_rep_data, + &ap_rep); + if (ret) + return ret; + + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (context, ap_rep); + + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &priv_data, + result_code_string, + NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (result_code_string); + return ret; + } + + if (result_code_string->length < 2) { + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + str2data (result_string, + "client: bad length in result"); + return 0; + } + + p = result_code_string->data; + + *result_code = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + krb5_data_copy (result_string, + (unsigned char*)result_code_string->data + 2, + result_code_string->length - 2); + return 0; + } else { + KRB_ERROR error; + size_t size; + u_char *p; + + ret = decode_KRB_ERROR(reply + 6, len - 6, &error, &size); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + if (error.e_data->length < 2) { + krb5_warnx (context, "too short e_data to print anything usable"); + return 1; /* XXX */ + } + + p = error.e_data->data; + *result_code = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + krb5_data_copy (result_string, + p + 2, + error.e_data->length - 2); + return 0; + } +} + + +/* + * change the password using the credentials in `creds' (for the + * principal indicated in them) to `newpw', storing the result of + * the operation in `result_*' and an error code or 0. + */ + +typedef krb5_error_code (*kpwd_send_request) (krb5_context, + krb5_auth_context *, + krb5_creds *, + krb5_principal, + int, + int, + char *, + const char *); +typedef krb5_error_code (*kpwd_process_reply) (krb5_context, + krb5_auth_context, + int, + int, + int *, + krb5_data *, + krb5_data *, + const char *); + +struct kpwd_proc { + const char *name; + int flags; +#define SUPPORT_TCP 1 +#define SUPPORT_UDP 2 + kpwd_send_request send_req; + kpwd_process_reply process_rep; +} procs[] = { + { + "MS set password", + SUPPORT_TCP|SUPPORT_UDP, + setpw_send_request, + process_reply + }, + { + "change password", + SUPPORT_UDP, + chgpw_send_request, + process_reply + }, + { NULL } +}; + +static struct kpwd_proc * +find_chpw_proto(const char *name) +{ + struct kpwd_proc *p; + for (p = procs; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (strcmp(p->name, name) == 0) + return p; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * + */ + +static krb5_error_code +change_password_loop (krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal targprinc, + char *newpw, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string, + struct kpwd_proc *proc) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_krbhst_handle handle = NULL; + krb5_krbhst_info *hi; + int sock; + int i; + int done = 0; + krb5_realm realm = creds->client->realm; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + + krb5_auth_con_setflags (context, auth_context, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE); + + ret = krb5_krbhst_init (context, realm, KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW, &handle); + if (ret) + goto out; + + while (!done && (ret = krb5_krbhst_next(context, handle, &hi)) == 0) { + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + int is_stream; + + switch (hi->proto) { + case KRB5_KRBHST_UDP: + if ((proc->flags & SUPPORT_UDP) == 0) + continue; + is_stream = 0; + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_TCP: + if ((proc->flags & SUPPORT_TCP) == 0) + continue; + is_stream = 1; + break; + default: + continue; + } + + ret = krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo(context, hi, &ai); + if (ret) + continue; + + for (a = ai; !done && a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int replied = 0; + + sock = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) + continue; + + ret = connect(sock, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen); + if (ret < 0) { + close (sock); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_genaddrs (context, auth_context, sock, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_ADDR); + if (ret) { + close (sock); + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; !done && i < 5; ++i) { + fd_set fdset; + struct timeval tv; + + if (!replied) { + replied = 0; + + ret = (*proc->send_req) (context, + &auth_context, + creds, + targprinc, + is_stream, + sock, + newpw, + hi->hostname); + if (ret) { + close(sock); + goto out; + } + } + + if (sock >= FD_SETSIZE) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "fd %d too large", sock); + ret = ERANGE; + close (sock); + goto out; + } + + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(sock, &fdset); + tv.tv_usec = 0; + tv.tv_sec = 1 + (1 << i); + + ret = select (sock + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &tv); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) { + close(sock); + goto out; + } + if (ret == 1) { + ret = (*proc->process_rep) (context, + auth_context, + is_stream, + sock, + result_code, + result_code_string, + result_string, + hi->hostname); + if (ret == 0) + done = 1; + else if (i > 0 && ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL) + replied = 1; + } else { + ret = KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; + } + } + close (sock); + } + } + + out: + krb5_krbhst_free (context, handle); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + if (done) + return 0; + else { + if (ret == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH) + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "unable to reach any changepw server " + " in realm %s", realm); + return ret; + } +} + + +/* + * change the password using the credentials in `creds' (for the + * principal indicated in them) to `newpw', storing the result of + * the operation in `result_*' and an error code or 0. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_change_password (krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + char *newpw, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string) +{ + struct kpwd_proc *p = find_chpw_proto("change password"); + + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + result_code_string->data = result_string->data = NULL; + result_code_string->length = result_string->length = 0; + + if (p == NULL) + return KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + + return change_password_loop(context, creds, NULL, newpw, + result_code, result_code_string, + result_string, p); +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_password(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + char *newpw, + krb5_principal targprinc, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string) +{ + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int i; + + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + result_code_string->data = result_string->data = NULL; + result_code_string->length = result_string->length = 0; + + if (targprinc == NULL) { + ret = krb5_get_default_principal(context, &principal); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else + principal = targprinc; + + for (i = 0; procs[i].name != NULL; i++) { + *result_code = 0; + ret = change_password_loop(context, creds, targprinc, newpw, + result_code, result_code_string, + result_string, + &procs[i]); + if (ret == 0 && *result_code == 0) + break; + } + + if (targprinc == NULL) + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_password_using_ccache(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + char *newpw, + krb5_principal targprinc, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string) +{ + krb5_creds creds, *credsp; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + result_code_string->data = result_string->data = NULL; + result_code_string->length = result_string->length = 0; + + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + if (targprinc == NULL) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &principal); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else + principal = targprinc; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &creds.server, + krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal), + "kadmin", "changepw", NULL); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &creds.client); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, ccache, &creds, &credsp); + krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, creds.client); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_set_password(context, + credsp, + newpw, + principal, + result_code, + result_code_string, + result_string); + + krb5_free_creds(context, credsp); + + return ret; + out: + if (targprinc == NULL) + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +const char* +krb5_passwd_result_to_string (krb5_context context, + int result) +{ + static const char *strings[] = { + "Success", + "Malformed", + "Hard error", + "Auth error", + "Soft error" , + "Access denied", + "Bad version", + "Initial flag needed" + }; + + if (result < 0 || result > KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED) + return "unknown result code"; + else + return strings[result]; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/codec.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/codec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6a49e68ec9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/codec.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: codec.c,v 1.7 2001/05/16 22:08:08 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTicketPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncTicketPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_EncTicketPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTicketPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncTicketPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_EncTicketPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncASRepPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncASRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_EncASRepPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncASRepPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncASRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_EncASRepPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncTGSRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_EncTGSRepPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTGSRepPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncTGSRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_EncTGSRepPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncAPRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_EncAPRepPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncAPRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_EncAPRepPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_Authenticator (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + Authenticator *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_Authenticator(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_Authenticator (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + Authenticator *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_Authenticator(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncKrbCredPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_EncKrbCredPart(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncKrbCredPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_EncKrbCredPart (data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ETYPE_INFO (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + ETYPE_INFO *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return decode_ETYPE_INFO(data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_ETYPE_INFO (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + ETYPE_INFO *t, + size_t *len) +{ + return encode_ETYPE_INFO (data, length, t, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/config_file.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/config_file.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47c1a945cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/config_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,722 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: config_file.c,v 1.46.4.2 2003/10/13 13:46:10 lha Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_NETINFO + +static krb5_error_code parse_section(char *p, krb5_config_section **s, + krb5_config_section **res, + const char **error_message); +static krb5_error_code parse_binding(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, char *p, + krb5_config_binding **b, + krb5_config_binding **parent, + const char **error_message); +static krb5_error_code parse_list(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, + krb5_config_binding **parent, + const char **error_message); + +static krb5_config_section * +get_entry(krb5_config_section **parent, const char *name, int type) +{ + krb5_config_section **q; + + for(q = parent; *q != NULL; q = &(*q)->next) + if(type == krb5_config_list && + type == (*q)->type && + strcmp(name, (*q)->name) == 0) + return *q; + *q = calloc(1, sizeof(**q)); + if(*q == NULL) + return NULL; + (*q)->name = strdup(name); + (*q)->type = type; + if((*q)->name == NULL) { + free(*q); + *q = NULL; + return NULL; + } + return *q; +} + +/* + * Parse a section: + * + * [section] + * foo = bar + * b = { + * a + * } + * ... + * + * starting at the line in `p', storing the resulting structure in + * `s' and hooking it into `parent'. + * Store the error message in `error_message'. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +parse_section(char *p, krb5_config_section **s, krb5_config_section **parent, + const char **error_message) +{ + char *p1; + krb5_config_section *tmp; + + p1 = strchr (p + 1, ']'); + if (p1 == NULL) { + *error_message = "missing ]"; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; + } + *p1 = '\0'; + tmp = get_entry(parent, p + 1, krb5_config_list); + if(tmp == NULL) { + *error_message = "out of memory"; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; + } + *s = tmp; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse a brace-enclosed list from `f', hooking in the structure at + * `parent'. + * Store the error message in `error_message'. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +parse_list(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, krb5_config_binding **parent, + const char **error_message) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_binding *b = NULL; + unsigned beg_lineno = *lineno; + + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + char *p; + + ++*lineno; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + p = buf; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '#' || *p == ';' || *p == '\0') + continue; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '}') + return 0; + if (*p == '\0') + continue; + ret = parse_binding (f, lineno, p, &b, parent, error_message); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + *lineno = beg_lineno; + *error_message = "unclosed {"; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; +} + +/* + * + */ + +static krb5_error_code +parse_binding(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, char *p, + krb5_config_binding **b, krb5_config_binding **parent, + const char **error_message) +{ + krb5_config_binding *tmp; + char *p1, *p2; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + p1 = p; + while (*p && *p != '=' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '\0') { + *error_message = "missing ="; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; + } + p2 = p; + while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p != '=') { + *error_message = "missing ="; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; + } + ++p; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + *p2 = '\0'; + if (*p == '{') { + tmp = get_entry(parent, p1, krb5_config_list); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_message = "out of memory"; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; + } + ret = parse_list (f, lineno, &tmp->u.list, error_message); + } else { + tmp = get_entry(parent, p1, krb5_config_string); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_message = "out of memory"; + return KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; + } + p1 = p; + p = p1 + strlen(p1); + while(p > p1 && isspace((unsigned char)*(p-1))) + --p; + *p = '\0'; + tmp->u.string = strdup(p1); + } + *b = tmp; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse the config file `fname', generating the structures into `res' + * returning error messages in `error_message' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file_debug (const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res, + unsigned *lineno, + const char **error_message) +{ + FILE *f; + krb5_config_section *s; + krb5_config_binding *b; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + s = NULL; + b = NULL; + *lineno = 0; + f = fopen (fname, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + *error_message = "cannot open file"; + return ENOENT; + } + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + char *p; + + ++*lineno; + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + p = buf; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '#' || *p == ';') + continue; + if (*p == '[') { + ret = parse_section(p, &s, res, error_message); + if (ret) { + goto out; + } + b = NULL; + } else if (*p == '}') { + *error_message = "unmatched }"; + ret = EINVAL; /* XXX */ + goto out; + } else if(*p != '\0') { + if (s == NULL) { + *error_message = "binding before section"; + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + ret = parse_binding(f, lineno, p, &b, &s->u.list, error_message); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + } +out: + fclose (f); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file_multi (krb5_context context, + const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res) +{ + const char *str; + unsigned lineno; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_config_parse_file_debug (fname, res, &lineno, &str); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "%s:%u: %s", fname, lineno, str); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file (krb5_context context, + const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res) +{ + *res = NULL; + return krb5_config_parse_file_multi(context, fname, res); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_NETINFO */ + +static void +free_binding (krb5_context context, krb5_config_binding *b) +{ + krb5_config_binding *next_b; + + while (b) { + free (b->name); + if (b->type == krb5_config_string) + free (b->u.string); + else if (b->type == krb5_config_list) + free_binding (context, b->u.list); + else + krb5_abortx(context, "unknown binding type (%d) in free_binding", + b->type); + next_b = b->next; + free (b); + b = next_b; + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_file_free (krb5_context context, krb5_config_section *s) +{ + free_binding (context, s); + return 0; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_get_next (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + const krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + ...) +{ + const char *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, type); + ret = krb5_config_vget_next (context, c, pointer, type, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +static const void * +vget_next(krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_binding *b, + const krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + const char *name, + va_list args) +{ + const char *p = va_arg(args, const char *); + while(b != NULL) { + if(strcmp(b->name, name) == 0) { + if(b->type == type && p == NULL) { + *pointer = b; + return b->u.generic; + } else if(b->type == krb5_config_list && p != NULL) { + return vget_next(context, b->u.list, pointer, type, p, args); + } + } + b = b->next; + } + return NULL; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_vget_next (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + const krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + va_list args) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *b; + const char *p; + + if(c == NULL) + c = context->cf; + + if (c == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (*pointer == NULL) { + /* first time here, walk down the tree looking for the right + section */ + p = va_arg(args, const char *); + if (p == NULL) + return NULL; + return vget_next(context, c, pointer, type, p, args); + } + + /* we were called again, so just look for more entries with the + same name and type */ + for (b = (*pointer)->next; b != NULL; b = b->next) { + if(strcmp(b->name, (*pointer)->name) == 0 && b->type == type) { + *pointer = b; + return b->u.generic; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_get (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + int type, + ...) +{ + const void *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, type); + ret = krb5_config_vget (context, c, type, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_vget (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + int type, + va_list args) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *foo = NULL; + + return krb5_config_vget_next (context, c, &foo, type, args); +} + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_get_list (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_list (context, c, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_vget_list (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget (context, c, krb5_config_list, args); +} + +const char * +krb5_config_get_string (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + const char *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const char * +krb5_config_vget_string (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget (context, c, krb5_config_string, args); +} + +const char * +krb5_config_vget_string_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + const char *def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *ret; + + ret = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if (ret == NULL) + ret = def_value; + return ret; +} + +const char * +krb5_config_get_string_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + const char *def_value, + ...) +{ + const char *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_string_default (context, c, def_value, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +char ** +krb5_config_vget_strings(krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + char **strings = NULL; + int nstr = 0; + const krb5_config_binding *b = NULL; + const char *p; + + while((p = krb5_config_vget_next(context, c, &b, + krb5_config_string, args))) { + char *tmp = strdup(p); + char *pos = NULL; + char *s; + if(tmp == NULL) + goto cleanup; + s = strtok_r(tmp, " \t", &pos); + while(s){ + char **tmp = realloc(strings, (nstr + 1) * sizeof(*strings)); + if(tmp == NULL) + goto cleanup; + strings = tmp; + strings[nstr] = strdup(s); + nstr++; + if(strings[nstr-1] == NULL) + goto cleanup; + s = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &pos); + } + free(tmp); + } + if(nstr){ + char **tmp = realloc(strings, (nstr + 1) * sizeof(*strings)); + if(strings == NULL) + goto cleanup; + strings = tmp; + strings[nstr] = NULL; + } + return strings; +cleanup: + while(nstr--) + free(strings[nstr]); + free(strings); + return NULL; + +} + +char** +krb5_config_get_strings(krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char **ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_strings(context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +void +krb5_config_free_strings(char **strings) +{ + char **s = strings; + while(s && *s){ + free(*s); + s++; + } + free(strings); +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_boolean def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *str; + str = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if(str == NULL) + return def_value; + if(strcasecmp(str, "yes") == 0 || + strcasecmp(str, "true") == 0 || + atoi(str)) return TRUE; + return FALSE; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget_bool_default (context, c, FALSE, args); +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_boolean def_value, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_boolean ret; + va_start(ap, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_bool_default(context, c, def_value, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_boolean ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_bool (context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +krb5_config_vget_time_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *str; + str = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if(str == NULL) + return def_value; + return parse_time (str, NULL); +} + +int +krb5_config_vget_time (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget_time_default (context, c, -1, args); +} + +int +krb5_config_get_time_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_time_default(context, c, def_value, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +krb5_config_get_time (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_time (context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + + +int +krb5_config_vget_int_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *str; + str = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if(str == NULL) + return def_value; + else { + char *endptr; + long l; + l = strtol(str, &endptr, 0); + if (endptr == str) + return def_value; + else + return l; + } +} + +int +krb5_config_vget_int (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget_int_default (context, c, -1, args); +} + +int +krb5_config_get_int_default (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_int_default(context, c, def_value, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +krb5_config_get_int (krb5_context context, + const krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_int (context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a035e887b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: config_file_netinfo.c,v 1.3 2001/05/14 06:14:45 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Netinfo implementation from Luke Howard + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO +#include +static ni_status +ni_proplist2binding(ni_proplist *pl, krb5_config_section **ret) +{ + int i, j; + krb5_config_section **next = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < pl->ni_proplist_len; i++) { + if (!strcmp(pl->nipl_val[i].nip_name, "name")) + continue; + + for (j = 0; j < pl->nipl_val[i].nip_val.ni_namelist_len; j++) { + krb5_config_binding *b; + + b = malloc(sizeof(*b)); + if (b == NULL) + return NI_FAILED; + + b->next = NULL; + b->type = krb5_config_string; + b->name = ni_name_dup(pl->nipl_val[i].nip_name); + b->u.string = ni_name_dup(pl->nipl_val[i].nip_val.ninl_val[j]); + + if (next == NULL) { + *ret = b; + } else { + *next = b; + } + next = &b->next; + } + } + return NI_OK; +} + +static ni_status +ni_idlist2binding(void *ni, ni_idlist *idlist, krb5_config_section **ret) +{ + int i; + ni_status nis; + krb5_config_section **next; + + for (i = 0; i < idlist->ni_idlist_len; i++) { + ni_proplist pl; + ni_id nid; + ni_idlist children; + krb5_config_binding *b; + ni_index index; + + nid.nii_instance = 0; + nid.nii_object = idlist->ni_idlist_val[i]; + + nis = ni_read(ni, &nid, &pl); + + if (nis != NI_OK) { + return nis; + } + index = ni_proplist_match(pl, "name", NULL); + b = malloc(sizeof(*b)); + if (b == NULL) return NI_FAILED; + + if (i == 0) { + *ret = b; + } else { + *next = b; + } + + b->type = krb5_config_list; + b->name = ni_name_dup(pl.nipl_val[index].nip_val.ninl_val[0]); + b->next = NULL; + b->u.list = NULL; + + /* get the child directories */ + nis = ni_children(ni, &nid, &children); + if (nis == NI_OK) { + nis = ni_idlist2binding(ni, &children, &b->u.list); + if (nis != NI_OK) { + return nis; + } + } + + nis = ni_proplist2binding(&pl, b->u.list == NULL ? &b->u.list : &b->u.list->next); + ni_proplist_free(&pl); + if (nis != NI_OK) { + return nis; + } + next = &b->next; + } + ni_idlist_free(idlist); + return NI_OK; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file (krb5_context context, + const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res) +{ + void *ni = NULL, *lastni = NULL; + int i; + ni_status nis; + ni_id nid; + ni_idlist children; + + krb5_config_section *s; + int ret; + + s = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (i == 0) { + nis = ni_open(NULL, ".", &ni); + } else { + if (lastni != NULL) ni_free(lastni); + lastni = ni; + nis = ni_open(lastni, "..", &ni); + } + if (nis != NI_OK) + break; + nis = ni_pathsearch(ni, &nid, "/locations/kerberos"); + if (nis == NI_OK) { + nis = ni_children(ni, &nid, &children); + if (nis != NI_OK) + break; + nis = ni_idlist2binding(ni, &children, &s); + break; + } + } + + if (ni != NULL) ni_free(ni); + if (ni != lastni && lastni != NULL) ni_free(lastni); + + ret = (nis == NI_OK) ? 0 : -1; + if (ret == 0) { + *res = s; + } else { + *res = NULL; + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* HAVE_NETINFO */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/constants.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/constants.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..280bf620af --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/constants.c @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: constants.c,v 1.7 2002/08/16 20:52:15 joda Exp $"); + +const char *krb5_config_file = SYSCONFDIR "/krb5.conf:/etc/krb5.conf"; +const char *krb5_defkeyname = KEYTAB_DEFAULT; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/context.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d3982e8e9a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/context.c @@ -0,0 +1,545 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: context.c,v 1.83.2.1 2004/08/20 15:30:24 lha Exp $"); + +#define INIT_FIELD(C, T, E, D, F) \ + (C)->E = krb5_config_get_ ## T ## _default ((C), NULL, (D), \ + "libdefaults", F, NULL) + +/* + * Set the list of etypes `ret_etypes' from the configuration variable + * `name' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +set_etypes (krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_enctype **ret_enctypes) +{ + char **etypes_str; + krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL; + + etypes_str = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + name, NULL); + if(etypes_str){ + int i, j, k; + for(i = 0; etypes_str[i]; i++); + etypes = malloc((i+1) * sizeof(*etypes)); + if (etypes == NULL) { + krb5_config_free_strings (etypes_str); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + for(j = 0, k = 0; j < i; j++) { + if(krb5_string_to_enctype(context, etypes_str[j], &etypes[k]) == 0) + k++; + } + etypes[k] = ETYPE_NULL; + krb5_config_free_strings(etypes_str); + } + *ret_enctypes = etypes; + return 0; +} + +/* + * read variables from the configuration file and set in `context' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +init_context_from_config_file(krb5_context context) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + const char * tmp; + krb5_enctype *tmptypes; + + INIT_FIELD(context, time, max_skew, 5 * 60, "clockskew"); + INIT_FIELD(context, time, kdc_timeout, 3, "kdc_timeout"); + INIT_FIELD(context, int, max_retries, 3, "max_retries"); + + INIT_FIELD(context, string, http_proxy, NULL, "http_proxy"); + + ret = set_etypes (context, "default_etypes", &tmptypes); + if(ret) + return ret; + free(context->etypes); + context->etypes = tmptypes; + + ret = set_etypes (context, "default_etypes_des", &tmptypes); + if(ret) + return ret; + free(context->etypes_des); + context->etypes_des = tmptypes; + + /* default keytab name */ + tmp = NULL; + if(!issuid()) + tmp = getenv("KRB5_KTNAME"); + if(tmp != NULL) + context->default_keytab = tmp; + else + INIT_FIELD(context, string, default_keytab, + KEYTAB_DEFAULT, "default_keytab_name"); + + INIT_FIELD(context, string, default_keytab_modify, + NULL, "default_keytab_modify_name"); + + INIT_FIELD(context, string, time_fmt, + "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", "time_format"); + + INIT_FIELD(context, string, date_fmt, + "%Y-%m-%d", "date_format"); + + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, log_utc, + FALSE, "log_utc"); + + + + /* init dns-proxy slime */ + tmp = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "dns_proxy", NULL); + if(tmp) + roken_gethostby_setup(context->http_proxy, tmp); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, context->default_realms); + context->default_realms = NULL; + + { + krb5_addresses addresses; + char **adr, **a; + + krb5_set_extra_addresses(context, NULL); + adr = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "extra_addresses", + NULL); + memset(&addresses, 0, sizeof(addresses)); + for(a = adr; a && *a; a++) { + ret = krb5_parse_address(context, *a, &addresses); + if (ret == 0) { + krb5_add_extra_addresses(context, &addresses); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &addresses); + } + } + krb5_config_free_strings(adr); + + krb5_set_ignore_addresses(context, NULL); + adr = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "ignore_addresses", + NULL); + memset(&addresses, 0, sizeof(addresses)); + for(a = adr; a && *a; a++) { + ret = krb5_parse_address(context, *a, &addresses); + if (ret == 0) { + krb5_add_ignore_addresses(context, &addresses); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &addresses); + } + } + krb5_config_free_strings(adr); + } + + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, scan_interfaces, TRUE, "scan_interfaces"); + INIT_FIELD(context, int, fcache_vno, 0, "fcache_version"); + /* prefer dns_lookup_kdc over srv_lookup. */ + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, srv_lookup, TRUE, "srv_lookup"); + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, srv_lookup, context->srv_lookup, "dns_lookup_kdc"); + context->default_cc_name = NULL; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_context(krb5_context *context) +{ + krb5_context p; + krb5_error_code ret; + char **files; + + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if(!p) + return ENOMEM; + + ret = krb5_get_default_config_files(&files); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_set_config_files(p, files); + krb5_free_config_files(files); + if(ret) + goto out; + + /* init error tables */ + krb5_init_ets(p); + + p->cc_ops = NULL; + p->num_cc_ops = 0; + krb5_cc_register(p, &krb5_fcc_ops, TRUE); + krb5_cc_register(p, &krb5_mcc_ops, TRUE); + + p->num_kt_types = 0; + p->kt_types = NULL; + krb5_kt_register (p, &krb5_fkt_ops); + krb5_kt_register (p, &krb5_mkt_ops); + krb5_kt_register (p, &krb5_akf_ops); + krb5_kt_register (p, &krb4_fkt_ops); + krb5_kt_register (p, &krb5_srvtab_fkt_ops); + krb5_kt_register (p, &krb5_any_ops); + +out: + if(ret) { + krb5_free_context(p); + p = NULL; + } + *context = p; + return ret; +} + +void +krb5_free_context(krb5_context context) +{ + if (context->default_cc_name) + free(context->default_cc_name); + free(context->etypes); + free(context->etypes_des); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, context->default_realms); + krb5_config_file_free (context, context->cf); + free_error_table (context->et_list); + free(context->cc_ops); + free(context->kt_types); + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + if(context->warn_dest != NULL) + krb5_closelog(context, context->warn_dest); + krb5_set_extra_addresses(context, NULL); + krb5_set_ignore_addresses(context, NULL); + free(context); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_config_files(krb5_context context, char **filenames) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_binding *tmp = NULL; + while(filenames != NULL && *filenames != NULL && **filenames != '\0') { + ret = krb5_config_parse_file_multi(context, *filenames, &tmp); + if(ret != 0 && ret != ENOENT) { + krb5_config_file_free(context, tmp); + return ret; + } + filenames++; + } +#if 0 + /* with this enabled and if there are no config files, Kerberos is + considererd disabled */ + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENXIO; +#endif + krb5_config_file_free(context, context->cf); + context->cf = tmp; + ret = init_context_from_config_file(context); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_config_files(char ***pfilenames) +{ + const char *p, *q; + char **pp; + int n, i; + + const char *files = NULL; + if (pfilenames == NULL) + return EINVAL; + if(!issuid()) + files = getenv("KRB5_CONFIG"); + if (files == NULL) + files = krb5_config_file; + + for(n = 0, p = files; strsep_copy(&p, ":", NULL, 0) != -1; n++); + pp = malloc((n + 1) * sizeof(*pp)); + if(pp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + n = 0; + p = files; + while(1) { + ssize_t l; + q = p; + l = strsep_copy(&q, ":", NULL, 0); + if(l == -1) + break; + pp[n] = malloc(l + 1); + if(pp[n] == NULL) { + krb5_free_config_files(pp); + return ENOMEM; + } + l = strsep_copy(&p, ":", pp[n], l + 1); + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) + if(strcmp(pp[i], pp[n]) == 0) { + free(pp[n]); + goto skip; + } + n++; + skip:; + } + pp[n] = NULL; + *pfilenames = pp; + return 0; +} + +void +krb5_free_config_files(char **filenames) +{ + char **p; + for(p = filenames; *p != NULL; p++) + free(*p); + free(filenames); +} + +/* + * set `etype' to a malloced list of the default enctypes + */ + +static krb5_error_code +default_etypes(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype **etype) +{ + krb5_enctype p[] = { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + ETYPE_NULL + }; + + *etype = malloc(sizeof(p)); + if(*etype == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(*etype, p, sizeof(p)); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_in_tkt_etypes(krb5_context context, + const krb5_enctype *etypes) +{ + int i; + krb5_enctype *p = NULL; + + if(etypes) { + for (i = 0; etypes[i]; ++i) + if(!krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i])) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "enctype %d not supported", + etypes[i]); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + ++i; + ALLOC(p, i); + if(!p) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memmove(p, etypes, i * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + } + if(context->etypes) + free(context->etypes); + context->etypes = p; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype **etypes) +{ + krb5_enctype *p; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(context->etypes) { + for(i = 0; context->etypes[i]; i++); + ++i; + ALLOC(p, i); + if(!p) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memmove(p, context->etypes, i * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + } else { + ret = default_etypes(context, &p); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + *etypes = p; + return 0; +} + +const char * +krb5_get_err_text(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code) +{ + const char *p = NULL; + if(context != NULL) + p = com_right(context->et_list, code); + if(p == NULL) + p = strerror(code); + if (p == NULL) + p = "Unknown error"; + return p; +} + +void +krb5_init_ets(krb5_context context) +{ + if(context->et_list == NULL){ + krb5_add_et_list(context, initialize_krb5_error_table_r); + krb5_add_et_list(context, initialize_asn1_error_table_r); + krb5_add_et_list(context, initialize_heim_error_table_r); + krb5_add_et_list(context, initialize_k524_error_table_r); + } +} + +void +krb5_set_use_admin_kdc (krb5_context context, krb5_boolean flag) +{ + context->use_admin_kdc = flag; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_get_use_admin_kdc (krb5_context context) +{ + return context->use_admin_kdc; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_extra_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + + if(context->extra_addresses) + return krb5_append_addresses(context, + context->extra_addresses, addresses); + else + return krb5_set_extra_addresses(context, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_extra_addresses(krb5_context context, const krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + if(context->extra_addresses) + krb5_free_addresses(context, context->extra_addresses); + + if(addresses == NULL) { + if(context->extra_addresses != NULL) { + free(context->extra_addresses); + context->extra_addresses = NULL; + } + return 0; + } + if(context->extra_addresses == NULL) { + context->extra_addresses = malloc(sizeof(*context->extra_addresses)); + if(context->extra_addresses == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + return krb5_copy_addresses(context, addresses, context->extra_addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_extra_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + if(context->extra_addresses == NULL) { + memset(addresses, 0, sizeof(*addresses)); + return 0; + } + return krb5_copy_addresses(context,context->extra_addresses, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_ignore_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + + if(context->ignore_addresses) + return krb5_append_addresses(context, + context->ignore_addresses, addresses); + else + return krb5_set_ignore_addresses(context, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_ignore_addresses(krb5_context context, const krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + if(context->ignore_addresses) + krb5_free_addresses(context, context->ignore_addresses); + if(addresses == NULL) { + if(context->ignore_addresses != NULL) { + free(context->ignore_addresses); + context->ignore_addresses = NULL; + } + return 0; + } + if(context->ignore_addresses == NULL) { + context->ignore_addresses = malloc(sizeof(*context->ignore_addresses)); + if(context->ignore_addresses == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + return krb5_copy_addresses(context, addresses, context->ignore_addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_ignore_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + if(context->ignore_addresses == NULL) { + memset(addresses, 0, sizeof(*addresses)); + return 0; + } + return krb5_copy_addresses(context, context->ignore_addresses, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_fcache_version(krb5_context context, int version) +{ + context->fcache_vno = version; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_fcache_version(krb5_context context, int *version) +{ + *version = context->fcache_vno; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/convert_creds.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/convert_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c119e742b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/convert_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: convert_creds.c,v 1.26 2003/03/18 03:11:16 lha Exp $"); + +#include "krb5-v4compat.h" + +static krb5_error_code +check_ticket_flags(TicketFlags f) +{ + return 0; /* maybe add some more tests here? */ +} + +/* include this here, to avoid dependencies on libkrb */ + +static const int _tkt_lifetimes[TKTLIFENUMFIXED] = { + 38400, 41055, 43894, 46929, 50174, 53643, 57352, 61318, + 65558, 70091, 74937, 80119, 85658, 91581, 97914, 104684, + 111922, 119661, 127935, 136781, 146239, 156350, 167161, 178720, + 191077, 204289, 218415, 233517, 249664, 266926, 285383, 305116, + 326213, 348769, 372885, 398668, 426234, 455705, 487215, 520904, + 556921, 595430, 636601, 680618, 727680, 777995, 831789, 889303, + 950794, 1016537, 1086825, 1161973, 1242318, 1328218, 1420057, 1518247, + 1623226, 1735464, 1855462, 1983758, 2120925, 2267576, 2424367, 2592000 +}; + +int +_krb5_krb_time_to_life(time_t start, time_t end) +{ + int i; + time_t life = end - start; + + if (life > MAXTKTLIFETIME || life <= 0) + return 0; +#if 0 + if (krb_no_long_lifetimes) + return (life + 5*60 - 1)/(5*60); +#endif + + if (end >= NEVERDATE) + return TKTLIFENOEXPIRE; + if (life < _tkt_lifetimes[0]) + return (life + 5*60 - 1)/(5*60); + for (i=0; i TKTLIFEMAXFIXED) + return start + MAXTKTLIFETIME; + return start + _tkt_lifetimes[life - TKTLIFEMINFIXED]; +} + + +/* Convert the v5 credentials in `in_cred' to v4-dito in `v4creds'. + * This is done by sending them to the 524 function in the KDC. If + * `in_cred' doesn't contain a DES session key, then a new one is + * gotten from the KDC and stored in the cred cache `ccache'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb524_convert_creds_kdc(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *in_cred, + struct credentials *v4creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data reply; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data ticket; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + krb5_creds *v5_creds = in_cred; + + ret = check_ticket_flags(v5_creds->flags.b); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + { + krb5_krbhst_handle handle; + + ret = krb5_krbhst_init(context, + *krb5_princ_realm(context, + v5_creds->server), + KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524, + &handle); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + ret = krb5_sendto (context, + &v5_creds->ticket, + handle, + &reply); + krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); + if (ret) + goto out2; + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(reply.data, reply.length); + if(sp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out2; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0) { + memset(v4creds, 0, sizeof(*v4creds)); + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) + goto out; + v4creds->kvno = tmp; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &ticket); + if(ret) + goto out; + v4creds->ticket_st.length = ticket.length; + memcpy(v4creds->ticket_st.dat, ticket.data, ticket.length); + krb5_data_free(&ticket); + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, + v5_creds->server, + v4creds->service, + v4creds->instance, + v4creds->realm); + if(ret) + goto out; + v4creds->issue_date = v5_creds->times.starttime; + v4creds->lifetime = _krb5_krb_time_to_life(v4creds->issue_date, + v5_creds->times.endtime); + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, v5_creds->client, + v4creds->pname, + v4creds->pinst, + realm); + if(ret) + goto out; + memcpy(v4creds->session, v5_creds->session.keyvalue.data, 8); + } else { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "converting credentials: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } +out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free(&reply); +out2: + if (v5_creds != in_cred) + krb5_free_creds (context, v5_creds); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_cred, + struct credentials *v4creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *v5_creds = in_cred; + krb5_keytype keytype; + + keytype = v5_creds->session.keytype; + + if (keytype != ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) { + /* MIT krb524d doesn't like nothing but des-cbc-crc tickets, + so go get one */ + krb5_creds template; + + memset (&template, 0, sizeof(template)); + template.session.keytype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in_cred->client, &template.client); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &template); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in_cred->server, &template.server); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &template); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, 0, ccache, + &template, &v5_creds); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &template); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(context, v5_creds, v4creds); + + if (v5_creds != in_cred) + krb5_free_creds (context, v5_creds); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38fdfa894d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: copy_host_realm.c,v 1.4 2001/05/14 06:14:45 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Copy the list of realms from `from' to `to'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_host_realm(krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *from, + krb5_realm **to) +{ + int n, i; + const krb5_realm *p; + + for (n = 0, p = from; *p != NULL; ++p) + ++n; + ++n; + *to = malloc (n * sizeof(**to)); + if (*to == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + (*to)[i] = NULL; + for (i = 0, p = from; *p != NULL; ++p, ++i) { + (*to)[i] = strdup(*p); + if ((*to)[i] == NULL) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, *to); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/crc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/crc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7cedd8c9e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/crc.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: crc.c,v 1.9 2000/08/03 01:45:14 assar Exp $"); + +static u_long table[256]; + +#define CRC_GEN 0xEDB88320L + +void +_krb5_crc_init_table(void) +{ + static int flag = 0; + unsigned long crc, poly; + int i, j; + + if(flag) return; + poly = CRC_GEN; + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + crc = i; + for (j = 8; j > 0; j--) { + if (crc & 1) { + crc = (crc >> 1) ^ poly; + } else { + crc >>= 1; + } + } + table[i] = crc; + } + flag = 1; +} + +u_int32_t +_krb5_crc_update (const char *p, size_t len, u_int32_t res) +{ + while (len--) + res = table[(res ^ *p++) & 0xFF] ^ (res >> 8); + return res & 0xFFFFFFFF; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/creds.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01c1c30a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: creds.c,v 1.15 2001/05/14 06:14:45 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_cred_contents (krb5_context context, krb5_creds *c) +{ + return krb5_free_creds_contents (context, c); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds_contents (krb5_context context, krb5_creds *c) +{ + krb5_free_principal (context, c->client); + c->client = NULL; + krb5_free_principal (context, c->server); + c->server = NULL; + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &c->session); + krb5_data_free (&c->ticket); + krb5_data_free (&c->second_ticket); + free_AuthorizationData (&c->authdata); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &c->addresses); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds_contents (krb5_context context, + const krb5_creds *incred, + krb5_creds *c) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, incred->client, &c->client); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, incred->server, &c->server); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context, &incred->session, &c->session); + if (ret) + goto fail; + c->times = incred->times; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&c->ticket, + incred->ticket.data, + incred->ticket.length); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&c->second_ticket, + incred->second_ticket.data, + incred->second_ticket.length); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = copy_AuthorizationData(&incred->authdata, &c->authdata); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_addresses (context, + &incred->addresses, + &c->addresses); + if (ret) + goto fail; + c->flags = incred->flags; + return 0; + +fail: + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, c); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds (krb5_context context, + const krb5_creds *incred, + krb5_creds **outcred) +{ + krb5_creds *c; + + c = malloc (sizeof (*c)); + if (c == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memset (c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + *outcred = c; + return krb5_copy_creds_contents (context, incred, c); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds (krb5_context context, krb5_creds *c) +{ + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, c); + free (c); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return TRUE if `mcreds' and `creds' are equal (`whichfields' + * determines what equal means). + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_compare_creds(krb5_context context, krb5_flags whichfields, + const krb5_creds *mcreds, const krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_boolean match; + + if(whichfields & KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM) + match = krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, + mcreds->server, + creds->server); + else + match = krb5_principal_compare(context, mcreds->server, creds->server); + if(match && (whichfields & KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE) && + !krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys (context, + mcreds->session.keytype, + creds->session.keytype)) + match = FALSE; + return match; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/crypto.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3da8d303e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,3774 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: crypto.c,v 1.73.2.4 2004/03/06 16:38:00 lha Exp $"); + +#undef CRYPTO_DEBUG +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG +static void krb5_crypto_debug(krb5_context, int, size_t, krb5_keyblock*); +#endif + + +struct key_data { + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_data *schedule; +}; + +struct key_usage { + unsigned usage; + struct key_data key; +}; + +struct krb5_crypto_data { + struct encryption_type *et; + struct key_data key; + int num_key_usage; + struct key_usage *key_usage; +}; + +#define CRYPTO_ETYPE(C) ((C)->et->type) + +/* bits for `flags' below */ +#define F_KEYED 1 /* checksum is keyed */ +#define F_CPROOF 2 /* checksum is collision proof */ +#define F_DERIVED 4 /* uses derived keys */ +#define F_VARIANT 8 /* uses `variant' keys (6.4.3) */ +#define F_PSEUDO 16 /* not a real protocol type */ +#define F_SPECIAL 32 /* backwards */ + +struct salt_type { + krb5_salttype type; + const char *name; + krb5_error_code (*string_to_key)(krb5_context, krb5_enctype, krb5_data, + krb5_salt, krb5_data, krb5_keyblock*); +}; + +struct key_type { + krb5_keytype type; /* XXX */ + const char *name; + size_t bits; + size_t size; + size_t schedule_size; +#if 0 + krb5_enctype best_etype; +#endif + void (*random_key)(krb5_context, krb5_keyblock*); + void (*schedule)(krb5_context, struct key_data *); + struct salt_type *string_to_key; +}; + +struct checksum_type { + krb5_cksumtype type; + const char *name; + size_t blocksize; + size_t checksumsize; + unsigned flags; + void (*checksum)(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *buf, size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *csum); + krb5_error_code (*verify)(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *buf, size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *csum); +}; + +struct encryption_type { + krb5_enctype type; + const char *name; + size_t blocksize; + size_t padsize; + size_t confoundersize; + struct key_type *keytype; + struct checksum_type *checksum; + struct checksum_type *keyed_checksum; + unsigned flags; + krb5_error_code (*encrypt)(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ivec); +}; + +#define ENCRYPTION_USAGE(U) (((U) << 8) | 0xAA) +#define INTEGRITY_USAGE(U) (((U) << 8) | 0x55) +#define CHECKSUM_USAGE(U) (((U) << 8) | 0x99) + +static struct checksum_type *_find_checksum(krb5_cksumtype type); +static struct encryption_type *_find_enctype(krb5_enctype type); +static struct key_type *_find_keytype(krb5_keytype type); +static krb5_error_code _get_derived_key(krb5_context, krb5_crypto, + unsigned, struct key_data**); +static struct key_data *_new_derived_key(krb5_crypto crypto, unsigned usage); +static krb5_error_code derive_key(krb5_context context, + struct encryption_type *et, + struct key_data *key, + const void *constant, + size_t len); +static krb5_error_code hmac(krb5_context context, + struct checksum_type *cm, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + struct key_data *keyblock, + Checksum *result); +static void free_key_data(krb5_context context, struct key_data *key); +static krb5_error_code usage2arcfour (krb5_context, int *); + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +static void +krb5_DES_random_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + des_cblock *k = key->keyvalue.data; + do { + krb5_generate_random_block(k, sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_set_odd_parity(k); + } while(des_is_weak_key(k)); +} + +static void +krb5_DES_schedule(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key) +{ + des_set_key(key->key->keyvalue.data, key->schedule->data); +} + +static void +DES_string_to_key_int(unsigned char *data, size_t length, des_cblock *key) +{ + des_key_schedule schedule; + int i; + int reverse = 0; + unsigned char *p; + + unsigned char swap[] = { 0x0, 0x8, 0x4, 0xc, 0x2, 0xa, 0x6, 0xe, + 0x1, 0x9, 0x5, 0xd, 0x3, 0xb, 0x7, 0xf }; + memset(key, 0, 8); + + p = (unsigned char*)key; + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { + unsigned char tmp = data[i]; + if (!reverse) + *p++ ^= (tmp << 1); + else + *--p ^= (swap[tmp & 0xf] << 4) | swap[(tmp & 0xf0) >> 4]; + if((i % 8) == 7) + reverse = !reverse; + } + des_set_odd_parity(key); + if(des_is_weak_key(key)) + (*key)[7] ^= 0xF0; + des_set_key(key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum((void*)data, key, length, schedule, key); + memset(schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + des_set_odd_parity(key); +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_DES_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + unsigned char *s; + size_t len; + des_cblock tmp; + + len = password.length + salt.saltvalue.length; + s = malloc(len); + if(len > 0 && s == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(s, password.data, password.length); + memcpy(s + password.length, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + DES_string_to_key_int(s, len, &tmp); + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_copy(&key->keyvalue, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(s, 0, len); + free(s); + return 0; +} + +/* This defines the Andrew string_to_key function. It accepts a password + * string as input and converts its via a one-way encryption algorithm to a DES + * encryption key. It is compatible with the original Andrew authentication + * service password database. + */ + +/* + * Short passwords, i.e 8 characters or less. + */ +static void +krb5_DES_AFS3_CMU_string_to_key (krb5_data pw, + krb5_data cell, + des_cblock *key) +{ + char password[8+1]; /* crypt is limited to 8 chars anyway */ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + char c = ((i < pw.length) ? ((char*)pw.data)[i] : 0) ^ + ((i < cell.length) ? + tolower(((unsigned char*)cell.data)[i]) : 0); + password[i] = c ? c : 'X'; + } + password[8] = '\0'; + + memcpy(key, crypt(password, "p1") + 2, sizeof(des_cblock)); + + /* parity is inserted into the LSB so left shift each byte up one + bit. This allows ascii characters with a zero MSB to retain as + much significance as possible. */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(des_cblock); i++) + ((unsigned char*)key)[i] <<= 1; + des_set_odd_parity (key); +} + +/* + * Long passwords, i.e 9 characters or more. + */ +static void +krb5_DES_AFS3_Transarc_string_to_key (krb5_data pw, + krb5_data cell, + des_cblock *key) +{ + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock temp_key; + des_cblock ivec; + char password[512]; + size_t passlen; + + memcpy(password, pw.data, min(pw.length, sizeof(password))); + if(pw.length < sizeof(password)) { + int len = min(cell.length, sizeof(password) - pw.length); + int i; + + memcpy(password + pw.length, cell.data, len); + for (i = pw.length; i < pw.length + len; ++i) + password[i] = tolower((unsigned char)password[i]); + } + passlen = min(sizeof(password), pw.length + cell.length); + memcpy(&ivec, "kerberos", 8); + memcpy(&temp_key, "kerberos", 8); + des_set_odd_parity (&temp_key); + des_set_key (&temp_key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum (password, &ivec, passlen, schedule, &ivec); + + memcpy(&temp_key, &ivec, 8); + des_set_odd_parity (&temp_key); + des_set_key (&temp_key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum (password, key, passlen, schedule, &ivec); + memset(&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + memset(&temp_key, 0, sizeof(temp_key)); + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + memset(password, 0, sizeof(password)); + + des_set_odd_parity (key); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_AFS3_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + des_cblock tmp; + if(password.length > 8) + krb5_DES_AFS3_Transarc_string_to_key(password, salt.saltvalue, &tmp); + else + krb5_DES_AFS3_CMU_string_to_key(password, salt.saltvalue, &tmp); + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_copy(&key->keyvalue, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + return 0; +} + +static void +DES3_random_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + des_cblock *k = key->keyvalue.data; + do { + krb5_generate_random_block(k, 3 * sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_set_odd_parity(&k[0]); + des_set_odd_parity(&k[1]); + des_set_odd_parity(&k[2]); + } while(des_is_weak_key(&k[0]) || + des_is_weak_key(&k[1]) || + des_is_weak_key(&k[2])); +} + +static void +DES3_schedule(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key) +{ + des_cblock *k = key->key->keyvalue.data; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + des_set_key(&k[0], s[0]); + des_set_key(&k[1], s[1]); + des_set_key(&k[2], s[2]); +} + +/* + * A = A xor B. A & B are 8 bytes. + */ + +static void +xor (des_cblock *key, const unsigned char *b) +{ + unsigned char *a = (unsigned char*)key; + a[0] ^= b[0]; + a[1] ^= b[1]; + a[2] ^= b[2]; + a[3] ^= b[3]; + a[4] ^= b[4]; + a[5] ^= b[5]; + a[6] ^= b[6]; + a[7] ^= b[7]; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES3_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + char *str; + size_t len; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + des_cblock keys[3]; + + len = password.length + salt.saltvalue.length; + str = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && str == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(str, password.data, password.length); + memcpy(str + password.length, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + { + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule s[3]; + int i; + + _krb5_n_fold(str, len, tmp, 24); + + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++){ + memcpy(keys + i, tmp + i * 8, sizeof(keys[i])); + des_set_odd_parity(keys + i); + if(des_is_weak_key(keys + i)) + xor(keys + i, (const unsigned char*)"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\xf0"); + des_set_key(keys + i, s[i]); + } + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(tmp, + tmp, sizeof(tmp), + s[0], s[1], s[2], &ivec, DES_ENCRYPT); + memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++){ + memcpy(keys + i, tmp + i * 8, sizeof(keys[i])); + des_set_odd_parity(keys + i); + if(des_is_weak_key(keys + i)) + xor(keys + i, (const unsigned char*)"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\xf0"); + } + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + } + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_copy(&key->keyvalue, keys, sizeof(keys)); + memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memset(str, 0, len); + free(str); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES3_string_to_key_derived(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len = password.length + salt.saltvalue.length; + char *s; + + s = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && s == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(s, password.data, password.length); + memcpy(s + password.length, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + ret = krb5_string_to_key_derived(context, + s, + len, + enctype, + key); + memset(s, 0, len); + free(s); + return ret; +} + +/* + * ARCFOUR + */ + +static void +ARCFOUR_random_key(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_generate_random_block (key->keyvalue.data, + key->keyvalue.length); +} + +static void +ARCFOUR_schedule(krb5_context context, struct key_data *kd) +{ + RC4_set_key (kd->schedule->data, + kd->key->keyvalue.length, kd->key->keyvalue.data); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ARCFOUR_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + char *s, *p; + size_t len; + int i; + MD4_CTX m; + + len = 2 * password.length; + s = malloc (len); + if (len != 0 && s == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + for (p = s, i = 0; i < password.length; ++i) { + *p++ = ((char *)password.data)[i]; + *p++ = 0; + } + MD4_Init (&m); + MD4_Update (&m, s, len); + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_alloc (&key->keyvalue, 16); + MD4_Final (key->keyvalue.data, &m); + memset (s, 0, len); + free (s); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES +/* + * AES + */ + +/* iter is really 1 based, so iter == 0 will be 1 iteration */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_PKCS5_PBKDF2(krb5_context context, krb5_cksumtype cktype, + krb5_data password, krb5_salt salt, u_int32_t iter, + krb5_keytype type, krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum(cktype); + struct key_type *kt; + size_t datalen, leftofkey; + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t keypart; + struct key_data ksign; + krb5_keyblock kb; + Checksum result; + char *data, *tmpcksum; + int i, j; + char *p; + + if (c == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "checksum %d not supported", cktype); + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + kt = _find_keytype(type); + if (kt == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "key type %d not supported", type); + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + key->keytype = type; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&key->keyvalue, kt->bits / 8); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&result.checksum, c->checksumsize); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + krb5_data_free (&key->keyvalue); + return ret; + } + + tmpcksum = malloc(c->checksumsize); + if (tmpcksum == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + krb5_data_free (&key->keyvalue); + krb5_data_free (&result.checksum); + return ENOMEM; + } + + datalen = salt.saltvalue.length + 4; + data = malloc(datalen); + if (data == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free(tmpcksum); + krb5_data_free (&key->keyvalue); + krb5_data_free (&result.checksum); + return ENOMEM; + } + + kb.keyvalue = password; + ksign.key = &kb; + + memcpy(data, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + + keypart = 1; + leftofkey = key->keyvalue.length; + p = key->keyvalue.data; + + while (leftofkey) { + int len; + + if (leftofkey > c->checksumsize) + len = c->checksumsize; + else + len = leftofkey; + + _krb5_put_int(data + datalen - 4, keypart, 4); + + ret = hmac(context, c, data, datalen, 0, &ksign, &result); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + memcpy(p, result.checksum.data, len); + memcpy(tmpcksum, result.checksum.data, result.checksum.length); + for (i = 0; i < iter; i++) { + ret = hmac(context, c, tmpcksum, result.checksum.length, + 0, &ksign, &result); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + memcpy(tmpcksum, result.checksum.data, result.checksum.length); + for (j = 0; j < len; j++) + p[j] ^= tmpcksum[j]; + } + + p += len; + leftofkey -= len; + keypart++; + } + + free(data); + free(tmpcksum); + krb5_data_free (&result.checksum); + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +AES_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t iter; + struct encryption_type *et; + struct key_data kd; + + if (opaque.length == 0) + iter = 45056 - 1; + else if (opaque.length == 4) { + unsigned long v; + _krb5_get_int(opaque.data, &v, 4); + iter = ((u_int32_t)v) - 1; + } else + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + + + et = _find_enctype(enctype); + if (et == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + + ret = krb5_PKCS5_PBKDF2(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, password, salt, + iter, enctype, key); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, key, &kd.key); + kd.schedule = NULL; + + ret = derive_key(context, et, &kd, "kerberos", strlen("kerberos")); + + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free(&key->keyvalue); + } else { + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, kd.key, key); + free_key_data(context, &kd); + } + + return ret; +} + +static void +AES_schedule(krb5_context context, struct key_data *kd) +{ + AES_KEY *key = kd->schedule->data; + int bits = kd->key->keyvalue.length * 8; + + AES_set_encrypt_key(kd->key->keyvalue.data, bits, &key[0]); + AES_set_decrypt_key(kd->key->keyvalue.data, bits, &key[1]); +} + +/* + * + */ + +extern struct salt_type AES_salt[]; + +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + +extern struct salt_type des_salt[], + des3_salt[], des3_salt_derived[], arcfour_salt[]; + +struct key_type keytype_null = { + KEYTYPE_NULL, + "null", + 0, + 0, + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +struct key_type keytype_des = { + KEYTYPE_DES, + "des", + 56, + sizeof(des_cblock), + sizeof(des_key_schedule), + krb5_DES_random_key, + krb5_DES_schedule, + des_salt +}; + +struct key_type keytype_des3 = { + KEYTYPE_DES3, + "des3", + 168, + 3 * sizeof(des_cblock), + 3 * sizeof(des_key_schedule), + DES3_random_key, + DES3_schedule, + des3_salt +}; + +struct key_type keytype_des3_derived = { + KEYTYPE_DES3, + "des3", + 168, + 3 * sizeof(des_cblock), + 3 * sizeof(des_key_schedule), + DES3_random_key, + DES3_schedule, + des3_salt_derived +}; + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES +struct key_type keytype_aes128 = { + KEYTYPE_AES128, + "aes-128", + 128, + 16, + sizeof(AES_KEY) * 2, + NULL, + AES_schedule, + AES_salt +}; + +struct key_type keytype_aes256 = { + KEYTYPE_AES256, + "aes-256", + 256, + 16, + sizeof(AES_KEY) * 2, + NULL, + AES_schedule, + AES_salt +}; +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + +struct key_type keytype_arcfour = { + KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR, + "arcfour", + 128, + 16, + sizeof(RC4_KEY), + ARCFOUR_random_key, + ARCFOUR_schedule, + arcfour_salt +}; + +struct key_type *keytypes[] = { + &keytype_null, + &keytype_des, + &keytype_des3_derived, + &keytype_des3, +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + &keytype_aes128, + &keytype_aes256, +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + &keytype_arcfour +}; + +static int num_keytypes = sizeof(keytypes) / sizeof(keytypes[0]); + +static struct key_type * +_find_keytype(krb5_keytype type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_keytypes; i++) + if(keytypes[i]->type == type) + return keytypes[i]; + return NULL; +} + + +struct salt_type des_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + krb5_DES_string_to_key + }, + { + KRB5_AFS3_SALT, + "afs3-salt", + DES_AFS3_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; + +struct salt_type des3_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + DES3_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; + +struct salt_type des3_salt_derived[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + DES3_string_to_key_derived + }, + { 0 } +}; + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES +struct salt_type AES_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + AES_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + +struct salt_type arcfour_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + ARCFOUR_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; + +krb5_error_code +krb5_salttype_to_string (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_salttype stype, + char **string) +{ + struct encryption_type *e; + struct salt_type *st; + + e = _find_enctype (etype); + if (e == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + for (st = e->keytype->string_to_key; st && st->type; st++) { + if (st->type == stype) { + *string = strdup (st->name); + if (*string == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + return 0; + } + } + krb5_set_error_string(context, "salttype %d not supported", stype); + return HEIM_ERR_SALTTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_salttype (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + const char *string, + krb5_salttype *salttype) +{ + struct encryption_type *e; + struct salt_type *st; + + e = _find_enctype (etype); + if (e == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + for (st = e->keytype->string_to_key; st && st->type; st++) { + if (strcasecmp (st->name, string) == 0) { + *salttype = st->type; + return 0; + } + } + krb5_set_error_string(context, "salttype %s not supported", string); + return HEIM_ERR_SALTTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_pw_salt(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_salt *salt) +{ + size_t len; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *p; + + salt->salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + len = strlen(principal->realm); + for (i = 0; i < principal->name.name_string.len; ++i) + len += strlen(principal->name.name_string.val[i]); + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&salt->saltvalue, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + p = salt->saltvalue.data; + memcpy (p, principal->realm, strlen(principal->realm)); + p += strlen(principal->realm); + for (i = 0; i < principal->name.name_string.len; ++i) { + memcpy (p, + principal->name.name_string.val[i], + strlen(principal->name.name_string.val[i])); + p += strlen(principal->name.name_string.val[i]); + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_salt(krb5_context context, + krb5_salt salt) +{ + krb5_data_free(&salt.saltvalue); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_salt salt; + + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, principal, &salt); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context, enctype, password, salt, key); + krb5_free_salt(context, salt); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_data pw; + pw.data = (void*)password; + pw.length = strlen(password); + return krb5_string_to_key_data(context, enctype, pw, principal, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data_salt (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_data opaque; + krb5_data_zero(&opaque); + return krb5_string_to_key_data_salt_opaque(context, enctype, password, + salt, opaque, key); +} + +/* + * Do a string -> key for encryption type `enctype' operation on + * `password' (with salt `salt' and the enctype specific data string + * `opaque'), returning the resulting key in `key' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data_salt_opaque (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_data opaque, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + struct encryption_type *et =_find_enctype(enctype); + struct salt_type *st; + if(et == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "encryption type %d not supported", + enctype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + for(st = et->keytype->string_to_key; st && st->type; st++) + if(st->type == salt.salttype) + return (*st->string_to_key)(context, enctype, password, + salt, opaque, key); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "salt type %d not supported", + salt.salttype); + return HEIM_ERR_SALTTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +/* + * Do a string -> key for encryption type `enctype' operation on the + * string `password' (with salt `salt'), returning the resulting key + * in `key' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_salt (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_data pw; + pw.data = (void*)password; + pw.length = strlen(password); + return krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context, enctype, pw, salt, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + char **string) +{ + struct key_type *kt = _find_keytype(keytype); + if(kt == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "key type %d not supported", keytype); + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + *string = strdup(kt->name); + if(*string == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_keytype(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_keytype *keytype) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_keytypes; i++) + if(strcasecmp(keytypes[i]->name, string) == 0){ + *keytype = keytypes[i]->type; + return 0; + } + krb5_set_error_string(context, "key type %s not supported", string); + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_keysize(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + size_t *keysize) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(type); + if(et == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "encryption type %d not supported", + type); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + *keysize = et->keytype->size; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_random_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(type); + if(et == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "encryption type %d not supported", + type); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&key->keyvalue, et->keytype->size); + if(ret) + return ret; + key->keytype = type; + if(et->keytype->random_key) + (*et->keytype->random_key)(context, key); + else + krb5_generate_random_block(key->keyvalue.data, + key->keyvalue.length); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +_key_schedule(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(key->key->keytype); + struct key_type *kt = et->keytype; + + if(kt->schedule == NULL) + return 0; + if (key->schedule != NULL) + return 0; + ALLOC(key->schedule, 1); + if(key->schedule == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_data_alloc(key->schedule, kt->schedule_size); + if(ret) { + free(key->schedule); + key->schedule = NULL; + return ret; + } + (*kt->schedule)(context, key); + return 0; +} + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +static void +NONE_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ +} + +static void +CRC32_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + u_int32_t crc; + unsigned char *r = C->checksum.data; + _krb5_crc_init_table (); + crc = _krb5_crc_update (data, len, 0); + r[0] = crc & 0xff; + r[1] = (crc >> 8) & 0xff; + r[2] = (crc >> 16) & 0xff; + r[3] = (crc >> 24) & 0xff; +} + +static void +RSA_MD4_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD4_CTX m; + + MD4_Init (&m); + MD4_Update (&m, data, len); + MD4_Final (C->checksum.data, &m); +} + +static void +RSA_MD4_DES_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *cksum) +{ + MD4_CTX md4; + des_cblock ivec; + unsigned char *p = cksum->checksum.data; + + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + MD4_Init (&md4); + MD4_Update (&md4, p, 8); + MD4_Update (&md4, data, len); + MD4_Final (p + 8, &md4); + memset (&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(p, + p, + 24, + key->schedule->data, + &ivec, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +RSA_MD4_DES_verify(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD4_CTX md4; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + unsigned char res[16]; + des_cblock ivec; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(C->checksum.data, + (void*)tmp, + C->checksum.length, + key->schedule->data, + &ivec, + DES_DECRYPT); + MD4_Init (&md4); + MD4_Update (&md4, tmp, 8); /* confounder */ + MD4_Update (&md4, data, len); + MD4_Final (res, &md4); + if(memcmp(res, tmp + 8, sizeof(res)) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + } + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(res, 0, sizeof(res)); + return ret; +} + +static void +RSA_MD5_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD5_CTX m; + + MD5_Init (&m); + MD5_Update(&m, data, len); + MD5_Final (C->checksum.data, &m); +} + +static void +RSA_MD5_DES_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + des_cblock ivec; + unsigned char *p = C->checksum.data; + + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, p, 8); + MD5_Update (&md5, data, len); + MD5_Final (p + 8, &md5); + memset (&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(p, + p, + 24, + key->schedule->data, + &ivec, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +RSA_MD5_DES_verify(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + unsigned char res[16]; + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *sched = key->schedule->data; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(C->checksum.data, + (void*)tmp, + C->checksum.length, + sched[0], + &ivec, + DES_DECRYPT); + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, tmp, 8); /* confounder */ + MD5_Update (&md5, data, len); + MD5_Final (res, &md5); + if(memcmp(res, tmp + 8, sizeof(res)) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + } + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(res, 0, sizeof(res)); + return ret; +} + +static void +RSA_MD5_DES3_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + des_cblock ivec; + unsigned char *p = C->checksum.data; + des_key_schedule *sched = key->schedule->data; + + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, p, 8); + MD5_Update (&md5, data, len); + MD5_Final (p + 8, &md5); + memset (&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(p, + p, + 24, + sched[0], sched[1], sched[2], + &ivec, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +RSA_MD5_DES3_verify(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + unsigned char res[16]; + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *sched = key->schedule->data; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(C->checksum.data, + (void*)tmp, + C->checksum.length, + sched[0], sched[1], sched[2], + &ivec, + DES_DECRYPT); + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, tmp, 8); /* confounder */ + MD5_Update (&md5, data, len); + MD5_Final (res, &md5); + if(memcmp(res, tmp + 8, sizeof(res)) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + } + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(res, 0, sizeof(res)); + return ret; +} + +static void +SHA1_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *C) +{ + SHA_CTX m; + + SHA1_Init(&m); + SHA1_Update(&m, data, len); + SHA1_Final(C->checksum.data, &m); +} + +/* HMAC according to RFC2104 */ +static krb5_error_code +hmac(krb5_context context, + struct checksum_type *cm, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + struct key_data *keyblock, + Checksum *result) +{ + unsigned char *ipad, *opad; + unsigned char *key; + size_t key_len; + int i; + + ipad = malloc(cm->blocksize + len); + if (ipad == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + opad = malloc(cm->blocksize + cm->checksumsize); + if (opad == NULL) { + free(ipad); + return ENOMEM; + } + memset(ipad, 0x36, cm->blocksize); + memset(opad, 0x5c, cm->blocksize); + + if(keyblock->key->keyvalue.length > cm->blocksize){ + (*cm->checksum)(context, + keyblock, + keyblock->key->keyvalue.data, + keyblock->key->keyvalue.length, + usage, + result); + key = result->checksum.data; + key_len = result->checksum.length; + } else { + key = keyblock->key->keyvalue.data; + key_len = keyblock->key->keyvalue.length; + } + for(i = 0; i < key_len; i++){ + ipad[i] ^= key[i]; + opad[i] ^= key[i]; + } + memcpy(ipad + cm->blocksize, data, len); + (*cm->checksum)(context, keyblock, ipad, cm->blocksize + len, + usage, result); + memcpy(opad + cm->blocksize, result->checksum.data, + result->checksum.length); + (*cm->checksum)(context, keyblock, opad, + cm->blocksize + cm->checksumsize, usage, result); + memset(ipad, 0, cm->blocksize + len); + free(ipad); + memset(opad, 0, cm->blocksize + cm->checksumsize); + free(opad); + + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_hmac(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype cktype, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + krb5_keyblock *key, + Checksum *result) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum(cktype); + struct key_data kd; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if (c == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + cktype); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + kd.key = key; + kd.schedule = NULL; + + ret = hmac(context, c, data, len, usage, &kd, result); + + if (kd.schedule) + krb5_free_data(context, kd.schedule); + + return ret; + } + +static void +SP_HMAC_SHA1_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *result) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum(CKSUMTYPE_SHA1); + Checksum res; + char sha1_data[20]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + res.checksum.data = sha1_data; + res.checksum.length = sizeof(sha1_data); + + ret = hmac(context, c, data, len, usage, key, &res); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + memcpy(result->checksum.data, res.checksum.data, result->checksum.length); +} + +/* + * checksum according to section 5. of draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03.txt + */ + +static void +HMAC_MD5_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *result) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum (CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5); + const char signature[] = "signaturekey"; + Checksum ksign_c; + struct key_data ksign; + krb5_keyblock kb; + unsigned char t[4]; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + unsigned char ksign_c_data[16]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ksign_c.checksum.length = sizeof(ksign_c_data); + ksign_c.checksum.data = ksign_c_data; + ret = hmac(context, c, signature, sizeof(signature), 0, key, &ksign_c); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + ksign.key = &kb; + kb.keyvalue = ksign_c.checksum; + MD5_Init (&md5); + t[0] = (usage >> 0) & 0xFF; + t[1] = (usage >> 8) & 0xFF; + t[2] = (usage >> 16) & 0xFF; + t[3] = (usage >> 24) & 0xFF; + MD5_Update (&md5, t, 4); + MD5_Update (&md5, data, len); + MD5_Final (tmp, &md5); + ret = hmac(context, c, tmp, sizeof(tmp), 0, &ksign, result); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); +} + +/* + * same as previous but being used while encrypting. + */ + +static void +HMAC_MD5_checksum_enc(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + const void *data, + size_t len, + unsigned usage, + Checksum *result) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum (CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5); + Checksum ksign_c; + struct key_data ksign; + krb5_keyblock kb; + unsigned char t[4]; + unsigned char ksign_c_data[16]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + t[0] = (usage >> 0) & 0xFF; + t[1] = (usage >> 8) & 0xFF; + t[2] = (usage >> 16) & 0xFF; + t[3] = (usage >> 24) & 0xFF; + + ksign_c.checksum.length = sizeof(ksign_c_data); + ksign_c.checksum.data = ksign_c_data; + ret = hmac(context, c, t, sizeof(t), 0, key, &ksign_c); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + ksign.key = &kb; + kb.keyvalue = ksign_c.checksum; + ret = hmac(context, c, data, len, 0, &ksign, result); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); +} + +struct checksum_type checksum_none = { + CKSUMTYPE_NONE, + "none", + 1, + 0, + 0, + NONE_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_crc32 = { + CKSUMTYPE_CRC32, + "crc32", + 1, + 4, + 0, + CRC32_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md4 = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4, + "rsa-md4", + 64, + 16, + F_CPROOF, + RSA_MD4_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md4_des = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES, + "rsa-md4-des", + 64, + 24, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_VARIANT, + RSA_MD4_DES_checksum, + RSA_MD4_DES_verify +}; +#if 0 +struct checksum_type checksum_des_mac = { + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC, + "des-mac", + 0, + 0, + 0, + DES_MAC_checksum +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_des_mac_k = { + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC_K, + "des-mac-k", + 0, + 0, + 0, + DES_MAC_K_checksum +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md4_des_k = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES_K, + "rsa-md4-des-k", + 0, + 0, + 0, + RSA_MD4_DES_K_checksum, + RSA_MD4_DES_K_verify +}; +#endif +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md5 = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + "rsa-md5", + 64, + 16, + F_CPROOF, + RSA_MD5_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md5_des = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES, + "rsa-md5-des", + 64, + 24, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_VARIANT, + RSA_MD5_DES_checksum, + RSA_MD5_DES_verify +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md5_des3 = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES3, + "rsa-md5-des3", + 64, + 24, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_VARIANT, + RSA_MD5_DES3_checksum, + RSA_MD5_DES3_verify +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_sha1 = { + CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, + "sha1", + 64, + 20, + F_CPROOF, + SHA1_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_hmac_sha1_des3 = { + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3, + "hmac-sha1-des3", + 64, + 20, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_DERIVED, + SP_HMAC_SHA1_checksum, + NULL +}; + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES +struct checksum_type checksum_hmac_sha1_aes128 = { + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_128, + "hmac-sha1-96-aes128", + 64, + 12, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_DERIVED, + SP_HMAC_SHA1_checksum, + NULL +}; + +struct checksum_type checksum_hmac_sha1_aes256 = { + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_256, + "hmac-sha1-96-aes256", + 64, + 12, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_DERIVED, + SP_HMAC_SHA1_checksum, + NULL +}; +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + +struct checksum_type checksum_hmac_md5 = { + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5, + "hmac-md5", + 64, + 16, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF, + HMAC_MD5_checksum, + NULL +}; + +struct checksum_type checksum_hmac_md5_enc = { + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ENC, + "hmac-md5-enc", + 64, + 16, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_PSEUDO, + HMAC_MD5_checksum_enc, + NULL +}; + +struct checksum_type *checksum_types[] = { + &checksum_none, + &checksum_crc32, + &checksum_rsa_md4, + &checksum_rsa_md4_des, +#if 0 + &checksum_des_mac, + &checksum_des_mac_k, + &checksum_rsa_md4_des_k, +#endif + &checksum_rsa_md5, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des3, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_des3, +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + &checksum_hmac_sha1_aes128, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_aes256, +#endif + &checksum_hmac_md5, + &checksum_hmac_md5_enc +}; + +static int num_checksums = sizeof(checksum_types) / sizeof(checksum_types[0]); + +static struct checksum_type * +_find_checksum(krb5_cksumtype type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_checksums; i++) + if(checksum_types[i]->type == type) + return checksum_types[i]; + return NULL; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_checksum_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, /* not krb5_key_usage */ + struct checksum_type *ct, + struct key_data **key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + if(ct->flags & F_DERIVED) + ret = _get_derived_key(context, crypto, usage, key); + else if(ct->flags & F_VARIANT) { + int i; + + *key = _new_derived_key(crypto, 0xff/* KRB5_KU_RFC1510_VARIANT */); + if(*key == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, crypto->key.key, &(*key)->key); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < (*key)->key->keyvalue.length; i++) + ((unsigned char*)(*key)->key->keyvalue.data)[i] ^= 0xF0; + } else { + *key = &crypto->key; + } + if(ret == 0) + ret = _key_schedule(context, *key); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +create_checksum (krb5_context context, + struct checksum_type *ct, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + int keyed_checksum; + + keyed_checksum = (ct->flags & F_KEYED) != 0; + if(keyed_checksum && crypto == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + } + if(keyed_checksum) { + ret = get_checksum_key(context, crypto, usage, ct, &dkey); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else + dkey = NULL; + result->cksumtype = ct->type; + krb5_data_alloc(&result->checksum, ct->checksumsize); + (*ct->checksum)(context, dkey, data, len, usage, result); + return 0; +} + +static int +arcfour_checksum_p(struct checksum_type *ct, krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + return (ct->type == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) && + (crypto->key.key->keytype == KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_create_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + krb5_key_usage usage, + int type, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = NULL; + unsigned keyusage; + + /* type 0 -> pick from crypto */ + if (type) { + ct = _find_checksum(type); + } else if (crypto) { + ct = crypto->et->keyed_checksum; + if (ct == NULL) + ct = crypto->et->checksum; + } + + if(ct == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + type); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + if (arcfour_checksum_p(ct, crypto)) { + keyusage = usage; + usage2arcfour(context, &keyusage); + } else + keyusage = CHECKSUM_USAGE(usage); + + return create_checksum(context, ct, crypto, keyusage, + data, len, result); +} + +static krb5_error_code +verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, /* not krb5_key_usage */ + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *cksum) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + int keyed_checksum; + Checksum c; + struct checksum_type *ct; + + ct = _find_checksum(cksum->cksumtype); + if (ct == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + cksum->cksumtype); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + if(ct->checksumsize != cksum->checksum.length) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* XXX */ + } + keyed_checksum = (ct->flags & F_KEYED) != 0; + if(keyed_checksum && crypto == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + } + if(keyed_checksum) + ret = get_checksum_key(context, crypto, usage, ct, &dkey); + else + dkey = NULL; + if(ct->verify) + return (*ct->verify)(context, dkey, data, len, usage, cksum); + + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&c.checksum, ct->checksumsize); + if (ret) + return ret; + + (*ct->checksum)(context, dkey, data, len, usage, &c); + + if(c.checksum.length != cksum->checksum.length || + memcmp(c.checksum.data, cksum->checksum.data, c.checksum.length)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + krb5_data_free (&c.checksum); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + krb5_key_usage usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *cksum) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct; + unsigned keyusage; + + ct = _find_checksum(cksum->cksumtype); + if(ct == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + cksum->cksumtype); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + if (arcfour_checksum_p(ct, crypto)) { + keyusage = usage; + usage2arcfour(context, &keyusage); + } else + keyusage = CHECKSUM_USAGE(usage); + + return verify_checksum(context, crypto, keyusage, + data, len, cksum); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_checksumsize(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type, + size_t *size) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + type); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + *size = ct->checksumsize; + return 0; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_keyed(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + type); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + return ct->flags & F_KEYED; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "checksum type %d not supported", + type); + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + return ct->flags & F_CPROOF; +} + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +static krb5_error_code +NULL_encrypt(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ivec) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ignore_ivec) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, *s, &ivec, encrypt); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_CBC_encrypt_key_ivec(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ignore_ivec) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memcpy(&ivec, key->key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, *s, &ivec, encrypt); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES3_CBC_encrypt(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ivec) +{ + des_cblock local_ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + if(ivec == NULL) { + ivec = &local_ivec; + memset(local_ivec, 0, sizeof(local_ivec)); + } + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, s[0], s[1], s[2], ivec, encrypt); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_CFB64_encrypt_null_ivec(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ignore_ivec) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + int num = 0; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + + des_cfb64_encrypt(data, data, len, *s, &ivec, &num, encrypt); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_PCBC_encrypt_key_ivec(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ignore_ivec) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memcpy(&ivec, key->key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(ivec)); + + des_pcbc_encrypt(data, data, len, *s, &ivec, encrypt); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + +/* + * AES draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-02 + */ + +void +_krb5_aes_cts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + size_t len, const void *aes_key, + unsigned char *ivec, const int enc) +{ + unsigned char tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + const AES_KEY *key = aes_key; /* XXX remove this when we always have AES */ + int i; + + /* + * In the framework of kerberos, the length can never be shorter + * then at least one blocksize. + */ + + if (enc == AES_ENCRYPT) { + + while(len > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) + tmp[i] = in[i] ^ ivec[i]; + AES_encrypt(tmp, out, key); + memcpy(ivec, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + tmp[i] = in[i] ^ ivec[i]; + for (; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) + tmp[i] = 0 ^ ivec[i]; + + AES_encrypt(tmp, out - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, key); + + memcpy(out, ivec, len); + + } else { + char tmp2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + char tmp3[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + while(len > AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) { + memcpy(tmp, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + AES_decrypt(in, out, key); + for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) + out[i] ^= ivec[i]; + memcpy(ivec, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + + AES_decrypt(in, tmp2, key); + + memcpy(tmp3, in + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, len); + memcpy(tmp3 + len, tmp2 + len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - len); /* xor 0 */ + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + out[i + AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = tmp2[i] ^ tmp3[i]; + + AES_decrypt(tmp3, out, key); + for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) + out[i] ^= ivec[i]; + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +AES_CTS_encrypt(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ivec) +{ + AES_KEY *k = key->schedule->data; + char local_ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (encrypt) + k = &k[0]; + else + k = &k[1]; + + if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + krb5_abortx(context, "invalid use of AES_CTS_encrypt"); + if (len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (encrypt) + AES_encrypt(data, data, k); + else + AES_decrypt(data, data, k); + } else { + if(ivec == NULL) { + memset(local_ivec, 0, sizeof(local_ivec)); + ivec = local_ivec; + } + _krb5_aes_cts_encrypt(data, data, len, k, ivec, encrypt); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + +/* + * section 6 of draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-03 + * + * warning: not for small children + */ + +static krb5_error_code +ARCFOUR_subencrypt(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + int usage, + void *ivec) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum (CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5); + Checksum k1_c, k2_c, k3_c, cksum; + struct key_data ke; + krb5_keyblock kb; + unsigned char t[4]; + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + unsigned char *cdata = data; + unsigned char k1_c_data[16], k2_c_data[16], k3_c_data[16]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + t[0] = (usage >> 0) & 0xFF; + t[1] = (usage >> 8) & 0xFF; + t[2] = (usage >> 16) & 0xFF; + t[3] = (usage >> 24) & 0xFF; + + k1_c.checksum.length = sizeof(k1_c_data); + k1_c.checksum.data = k1_c_data; + + ret = hmac(NULL, c, t, sizeof(t), 0, key, &k1_c); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + + memcpy (k2_c_data, k1_c_data, sizeof(k1_c_data)); + + k2_c.checksum.length = sizeof(k2_c_data); + k2_c.checksum.data = k2_c_data; + + ke.key = &kb; + kb.keyvalue = k2_c.checksum; + + cksum.checksum.length = 16; + cksum.checksum.data = data; + + ret = hmac(NULL, c, cdata + 16, len - 16, 0, &ke, &cksum); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + + ke.key = &kb; + kb.keyvalue = k1_c.checksum; + + k3_c.checksum.length = sizeof(k3_c_data); + k3_c.checksum.data = k3_c_data; + + ret = hmac(NULL, c, data, 16, 0, &ke, &k3_c); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, k3_c.checksum.length, k3_c.checksum.data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, len - 16, cdata + 16, cdata + 16); + memset (k1_c_data, 0, sizeof(k1_c_data)); + memset (k2_c_data, 0, sizeof(k2_c_data)); + memset (k3_c_data, 0, sizeof(k3_c_data)); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +ARCFOUR_subdecrypt(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + int usage, + void *ivec) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum (CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5); + Checksum k1_c, k2_c, k3_c, cksum; + struct key_data ke; + krb5_keyblock kb; + unsigned char t[4]; + RC4_KEY rc4_key; + unsigned char *cdata = data; + unsigned char k1_c_data[16], k2_c_data[16], k3_c_data[16]; + unsigned char cksum_data[16]; + krb5_error_code ret; + + t[0] = (usage >> 0) & 0xFF; + t[1] = (usage >> 8) & 0xFF; + t[2] = (usage >> 16) & 0xFF; + t[3] = (usage >> 24) & 0xFF; + + k1_c.checksum.length = sizeof(k1_c_data); + k1_c.checksum.data = k1_c_data; + + ret = hmac(NULL, c, t, sizeof(t), 0, key, &k1_c); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + + memcpy (k2_c_data, k1_c_data, sizeof(k1_c_data)); + + k2_c.checksum.length = sizeof(k2_c_data); + k2_c.checksum.data = k2_c_data; + + ke.key = &kb; + kb.keyvalue = k1_c.checksum; + + k3_c.checksum.length = sizeof(k3_c_data); + k3_c.checksum.data = k3_c_data; + + ret = hmac(NULL, c, cdata, 16, 0, &ke, &k3_c); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + + RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, k3_c.checksum.length, k3_c.checksum.data); + RC4 (&rc4_key, len - 16, cdata + 16, cdata + 16); + + ke.key = &kb; + kb.keyvalue = k2_c.checksum; + + cksum.checksum.length = 16; + cksum.checksum.data = cksum_data; + + ret = hmac(NULL, c, cdata + 16, len - 16, 0, &ke, &cksum); + if (ret) + krb5_abortx(context, "hmac failed"); + + memset (k1_c_data, 0, sizeof(k1_c_data)); + memset (k2_c_data, 0, sizeof(k2_c_data)); + memset (k3_c_data, 0, sizeof(k3_c_data)); + + if (memcmp (cksum.checksum.data, data, 16) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * convert the usage numbers used in + * draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt to the ones in + * draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-04.txt + */ + +static krb5_error_code +usage2arcfour (krb5_context context, int *usage) +{ + switch (*usage) { + case KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART : /* 3 */ + case KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : /* 9 */ + *usage = 8; + return 0; + case KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL : /* 22 */ + *usage = 13; + return 0; + case KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN : /* 23 */ + *usage = 15; + return 0; + case KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ: /* 24 */ + *usage = 0; + return 0; + default : + return 0; + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +ARCFOUR_encrypt(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt, + int usage, + void *ivec) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + if((ret = usage2arcfour (context, &usage)) != 0) + return ret; + + if (encrypt) + return ARCFOUR_subencrypt (context, key, data, len, usage, ivec); + else + return ARCFOUR_subdecrypt (context, key, data, len, usage, ivec); +} + + +/* + * these should currently be in reverse preference order. + * (only relevant for !F_PSEUDO) */ + +static struct encryption_type enctype_null = { + ETYPE_NULL, + "null", + 1, + 1, + 0, + &keytype_null, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + 0, + NULL_encrypt, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des_cbc_crc = { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + "des-cbc-crc", + 8, + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_crc32, + NULL, + 0, + DES_CBC_encrypt_key_ivec, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des_cbc_md4 = { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + "des-cbc-md4", + 8, + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_rsa_md4, + &checksum_rsa_md4_des, + 0, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des_cbc_md5 = { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + "des-cbc-md5", + 8, + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_rsa_md5, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des, + 0, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_arcfour_hmac_md5 = { + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, + "arcfour-hmac-md5", + 1, + 1, + 8, + &keytype_arcfour, + &checksum_hmac_md5, + /* &checksum_hmac_md5_enc */ NULL, + F_SPECIAL, + ARCFOUR_encrypt +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des3_cbc_md5 = { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5, + "des3-cbc-md5", + 8, + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des3, + &checksum_rsa_md5, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des3, + 0, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des3_cbc_sha1 = { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + "des3-cbc-sha1", + 8, + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des3_derived, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_des3, + F_DERIVED, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_old_des3_cbc_sha1 = { + ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + "old-des3-cbc-sha1", + 8, + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des3, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_des3, + 0, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, +}; +#ifdef ENABLE_AES +static struct encryption_type enctype_aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 = { + ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, + "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96", + 16, + 1, + 16, + &keytype_aes128, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_aes128, + 0, + AES_CTS_encrypt, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 = { + ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, + "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96", + 16, + 1, + 16, + &keytype_aes256, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_aes256, + 0, + AES_CTS_encrypt, +}; +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ +static struct encryption_type enctype_des_cbc_none = { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE, + "des-cbc-none", + 8, + 8, + 0, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + F_PSEUDO, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des_cfb64_none = { + ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE, + "des-cfb64-none", + 1, + 1, + 0, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + F_PSEUDO, + DES_CFB64_encrypt_null_ivec, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des_pcbc_none = { + ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE, + "des-pcbc-none", + 8, + 8, + 0, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + F_PSEUDO, + DES_PCBC_encrypt_key_ivec, +}; +static struct encryption_type enctype_des3_cbc_none = { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, + "des3-cbc-none", + 8, + 8, + 0, + &keytype_des3_derived, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + F_PSEUDO, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, +}; + +static struct encryption_type *etypes[] = { + &enctype_null, + &enctype_des_cbc_crc, + &enctype_des_cbc_md4, + &enctype_des_cbc_md5, + &enctype_arcfour_hmac_md5, + &enctype_des3_cbc_md5, + &enctype_des3_cbc_sha1, + &enctype_old_des3_cbc_sha1, +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + &enctype_aes128_cts_hmac_sha1, + &enctype_aes256_cts_hmac_sha1, +#endif + &enctype_des_cbc_none, + &enctype_des_cfb64_none, + &enctype_des_pcbc_none, + &enctype_des3_cbc_none +}; + +static unsigned num_etypes = sizeof(etypes) / sizeof(etypes[0]); + + +static struct encryption_type * +_find_enctype(krb5_enctype type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_etypes; i++) + if(etypes[i]->type == type) + return etypes[i]; + return NULL; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + char **string) +{ + struct encryption_type *e; + e = _find_enctype(etype); + if(e == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + *string = strdup(e->name); + if(*string == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_enctype(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_enctype *etype) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_etypes; i++) + if(strcasecmp(etypes[i]->name, string) == 0){ + *etype = etypes[i]->type; + return 0; + } + krb5_set_error_string (context, "encryption type %s not supported", + string); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_keytype(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_keytype *keytype) +{ + struct encryption_type *e = _find_enctype(etype); + if(e == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + *keytype = e->keytype->type; /* XXX */ + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctype(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + krb5_enctype *etype) +{ + struct key_type *kt = _find_keytype(keytype); + krb5_warnx(context, "krb5_keytype_to_enctype(%u)", keytype); + if(kt == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + *etype = kt->best_etype; + return 0; +} +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + unsigned *len, + krb5_enctype **val) +{ + int i; + unsigned n = 0; + krb5_enctype *ret; + + for (i = num_etypes - 1; i >= 0; --i) { + if (etypes[i]->keytype->type == keytype + && !(etypes[i]->flags & F_PSEUDO)) + ++n; + } + ret = malloc(n * sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret == NULL && n != 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + n = 0; + for (i = num_etypes - 1; i >= 0; --i) { + if (etypes[i]->keytype->type == keytype + && !(etypes[i]->flags & F_PSEUDO)) + ret[n++] = etypes[i]->type; + } + *len = n; + *val = ret; + return 0; +} + +/* + * First take the configured list of etypes for `keytype' if available, + * else, do `krb5_keytype_to_enctypes'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + unsigned *len, + krb5_enctype **val) +{ + int i, n; + krb5_enctype *ret; + + if (keytype != KEYTYPE_DES || context->etypes_des == NULL) + return krb5_keytype_to_enctypes (context, keytype, len, val); + + for (n = 0; context->etypes_des[n]; ++n) + ; + ret = malloc (n * sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret == NULL && n != 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + ret[i] = context->etypes_des[i]; + *len = n; + *val = ret; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_valid(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype) +{ + return _find_enctype(etype) != NULL; +} + +/* if two enctypes have compatible keys */ +krb5_boolean +krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype1, + krb5_enctype etype2) +{ + struct encryption_type *e1 = _find_enctype(etype1); + struct encryption_type *e2 = _find_enctype(etype2); + return e1 != NULL && e2 != NULL && e1->keytype == e2->keytype; +} + +static krb5_boolean +derived_crypto(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + return (crypto->et->flags & F_DERIVED) != 0; +} + +static krb5_boolean +special_crypto(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + return (crypto->et->flags & F_SPECIAL) != 0; +} + +#define CHECKSUMSIZE(C) ((C)->checksumsize) +#define CHECKSUMTYPE(C) ((C)->type) + +static krb5_error_code +encrypt_internal_derived(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + size_t sz, block_sz, checksum_sz, total_sz; + Checksum cksum; + unsigned char *p, *q; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + const struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->keyed_checksum); + + sz = et->confoundersize + len; + block_sz = (sz + et->padsize - 1) &~ (et->padsize - 1); /* pad */ + total_sz = block_sz + checksum_sz; + p = calloc(1, total_sz); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + q = p; + krb5_generate_random_block(q, et->confoundersize); /* XXX */ + q += et->confoundersize; + memcpy(q, data, len); + + ret = create_checksum(context, + et->keyed_checksum, + crypto, + INTEGRITY_USAGE(usage), + p, + block_sz, + &cksum); + if(ret == 0 && cksum.checksum.length != checksum_sz) { + free_Checksum (&cksum); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + } + if(ret) + goto fail; + memcpy(p + block_sz, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length); + free_Checksum (&cksum); + ret = _get_derived_key(context, crypto, ENCRYPTION_USAGE(usage), &dkey); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = _key_schedule(context, dkey); + if(ret) + goto fail; +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 1, block_sz, dkey->key); +#endif + ret = (*et->encrypt)(context, dkey, p, block_sz, 1, usage, ivec); + if (ret) + goto fail; + result->data = p; + result->length = total_sz; + return 0; + fail: + memset(p, 0, total_sz); + free(p); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +encrypt_internal(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + size_t sz, block_sz, checksum_sz; + Checksum cksum; + unsigned char *p, *q; + krb5_error_code ret; + const struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->checksum); + + sz = et->confoundersize + checksum_sz + len; + block_sz = (sz + et->padsize - 1) &~ (et->padsize - 1); /* pad */ + p = calloc(1, block_sz); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + q = p; + krb5_generate_random_block(q, et->confoundersize); /* XXX */ + q += et->confoundersize; + memset(q, 0, checksum_sz); + q += checksum_sz; + memcpy(q, data, len); + + ret = create_checksum(context, + et->checksum, + crypto, + 0, + p, + block_sz, + &cksum); + if(ret == 0 && cksum.checksum.length != checksum_sz) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + free_Checksum(&cksum); + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + } + if(ret) + goto fail; + memcpy(p + et->confoundersize, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length); + free_Checksum(&cksum); + ret = _key_schedule(context, &crypto->key); + if(ret) + goto fail; +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 1, block_sz, crypto->key.key); +#endif + ret = (*et->encrypt)(context, &crypto->key, p, block_sz, 1, 0, ivec); + if (ret) { + memset(p, 0, block_sz); + free(p); + return ret; + } + result->data = p; + result->length = block_sz; + return 0; + fail: + memset(p, 0, block_sz); + free(p); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +encrypt_internal_special(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + int usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + size_t cksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->checksum); + size_t sz = len + cksum_sz + et->confoundersize; + char *tmp, *p; + krb5_error_code ret; + + tmp = malloc (sz); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + p = tmp; + memset (p, 0, cksum_sz); + p += cksum_sz; + krb5_generate_random_block(p, et->confoundersize); + p += et->confoundersize; + memcpy (p, data, len); + ret = (*et->encrypt)(context, &crypto->key, tmp, sz, TRUE, usage, ivec); + if (ret) { + memset(tmp, 0, sz); + free(tmp); + return ret; + } + result->data = tmp; + result->length = sz; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_internal_derived(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + size_t checksum_sz; + Checksum cksum; + unsigned char *p; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + unsigned long l; + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->keyed_checksum); + if (len < checksum_sz) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return EINVAL; /* XXX - better error code? */ + } + + if (((len - checksum_sz) % et->padsize) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + } + + p = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(p, data, len); + + len -= checksum_sz; + + ret = _get_derived_key(context, crypto, ENCRYPTION_USAGE(usage), &dkey); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + ret = _key_schedule(context, dkey); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 0, len, dkey->key); +#endif + ret = (*et->encrypt)(context, dkey, p, len, 0, usage, ivec); + if (ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + + cksum.checksum.data = p + len; + cksum.checksum.length = checksum_sz; + cksum.cksumtype = CHECKSUMTYPE(et->keyed_checksum); + + ret = verify_checksum(context, + crypto, + INTEGRITY_USAGE(usage), + p, + len, + &cksum); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + l = len - et->confoundersize; + memmove(p, p + et->confoundersize, l); + result->data = realloc(p, l); + if(result->data == NULL) { + free(p); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + result->length = l; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_internal(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char *p; + Checksum cksum; + size_t checksum_sz, l; + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + + if ((len % et->padsize) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + } + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->checksum); + p = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(p, data, len); + + ret = _key_schedule(context, &crypto->key); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 0, len, crypto->key.key); +#endif + ret = (*et->encrypt)(context, &crypto->key, p, len, 0, 0, ivec); + if (ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_data_copy(&cksum.checksum, p + et->confoundersize, checksum_sz); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + memset(p + et->confoundersize, 0, checksum_sz); + cksum.cksumtype = CHECKSUMTYPE(et->checksum); + ret = verify_checksum(context, NULL, 0, p, len, &cksum); + free_Checksum(&cksum); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + l = len - et->confoundersize - checksum_sz; + memmove(p, p + et->confoundersize + checksum_sz, l); + result->data = realloc(p, l); + if(result->data == NULL) { + free(p); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + result->length = l; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_internal_special(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + int usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + size_t cksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->checksum); + size_t sz = len - cksum_sz - et->confoundersize; + unsigned char *p; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if ((len % et->padsize) != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + } + + p = malloc (len); + if (p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(p, data, len); + + ret = (*et->encrypt)(context, &crypto->key, p, len, FALSE, usage, ivec); + if (ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + + memmove (p, p + cksum_sz + et->confoundersize, sz); + result->data = realloc(p, sz); + if(result->data == NULL) { + free(p); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + result->length = sz; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt_ivec(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + if(derived_crypto(context, crypto)) + return encrypt_internal_derived(context, crypto, usage, + data, len, result, ivec); + else if (special_crypto(context, crypto)) + return encrypt_internal_special (context, crypto, usage, + data, len, result, ivec); + else + return encrypt_internal(context, crypto, data, len, result, ivec); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + return krb5_encrypt_ivec(context, crypto, usage, data, len, result, NULL); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + int kvno, + EncryptedData *result) +{ + result->etype = CRYPTO_ETYPE(crypto); + if(kvno){ + ALLOC(result->kvno, 1); + *result->kvno = kvno; + }else + result->kvno = NULL; + return krb5_encrypt(context, crypto, usage, data, len, &result->cipher); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_ivec(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result, + void *ivec) +{ + if(derived_crypto(context, crypto)) + return decrypt_internal_derived(context, crypto, usage, + data, len, result, ivec); + else if (special_crypto (context, crypto)) + return decrypt_internal_special(context, crypto, usage, + data, len, result, ivec); + else + return decrypt_internal(context, crypto, data, len, result, ivec); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + return krb5_decrypt_ivec (context, crypto, usage, data, len, result, + NULL); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + const EncryptedData *e, + krb5_data *result) +{ + return krb5_decrypt(context, crypto, usage, + e->cipher.data, e->cipher.length, result); +} + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#include + +/* From openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h */ +#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 20 +static int +seed_something(void) +{ + int fd = -1; + char buf[1024], seedfile[256]; + + /* If there is a seed file, load it. But such a file cannot be trusted, + so use 0 for the entropy estimate */ + if (RAND_file_name(seedfile, sizeof(seedfile))) { + fd = open(seedfile, O_RDONLY); + if (fd >= 0) { + read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + /* Use the full buffer anyway */ + RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), 0.0); + } else + seedfile[0] = '\0'; + } else + seedfile[0] = '\0'; + + /* Calling RAND_status() will try to use /dev/urandom if it exists so + we do not have to deal with it. */ + if (RAND_status() != 1) { + krb5_context context; + const char *p; + + /* Try using egd */ + if (!krb5_init_context(&context)) { + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "egd_socket", NULL); + if (p != NULL) + RAND_egd_bytes(p, ENTROPY_NEEDED); + krb5_free_context(context); + } + } + + if (RAND_status() == 1) { + /* Update the seed file */ + if (seedfile[0]) + RAND_write_file(seedfile); + + return 0; + } else + return -1; +} + +void +krb5_generate_random_block(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + static int rng_initialized = 0; + + if (!rng_initialized) { + if (seed_something()) + krb5_abortx(NULL, "Fatal: could not seed the random number generator"); + + rng_initialized = 1; + } + RAND_bytes(buf, len); +} + +#else + +void +krb5_generate_random_block(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + des_cblock key, out; + static des_cblock counter; + static des_key_schedule schedule; + int i; + static int initialized = 0; + + if(!initialized) { + des_new_random_key(&key); + des_set_key(&key, schedule); + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + des_new_random_key(&counter); + } + while(len > 0) { + des_ecb_encrypt(&counter, &out, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); + for(i = 7; i >=0; i--) + if(counter[i]++) + break; + memcpy(buf, out, min(len, sizeof(out))); + len -= min(len, sizeof(out)); + buf = (char*)buf + sizeof(out); + } +} +#endif + +static void +DES3_postproc(krb5_context context, + unsigned char *k, size_t len, struct key_data *key) +{ + unsigned char x[24]; + int i, j; + + memset(x, 0, sizeof(x)); + for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) { + unsigned char foo; + + for (j = 0; j < 7; ++j) { + unsigned char b = k[7 * i + j]; + + x[8 * i + j] = b; + } + foo = 0; + for (j = 6; j >= 0; --j) { + foo |= k[7 * i + j] & 1; + foo <<= 1; + } + x[8 * i + 7] = foo; + } + k = key->key->keyvalue.data; + memcpy(k, x, 24); + memset(x, 0, sizeof(x)); + if (key->schedule) { + krb5_free_data(context, key->schedule); + key->schedule = NULL; + } + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock*)k); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock*)(k + 8)); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock*)(k + 16)); +} + +static krb5_error_code +derive_key(krb5_context context, + struct encryption_type *et, + struct key_data *key, + const void *constant, + size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *k; + unsigned int nblocks = 0, i; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + struct key_type *kt = et->keytype; + ret = _key_schedule(context, key); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(et->blocksize * 8 < kt->bits || + len != et->blocksize) { + nblocks = (kt->bits + et->blocksize * 8 - 1) / (et->blocksize * 8); + k = malloc(nblocks * et->blocksize); + if(k == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + _krb5_n_fold(constant, len, k, et->blocksize); + for(i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) { + if(i > 0) + memcpy(k + i * et->blocksize, + k + (i - 1) * et->blocksize, + et->blocksize); + (*et->encrypt)(context, key, k + i * et->blocksize, et->blocksize, + 1, 0, NULL); + } + } else { + /* this case is probably broken, but won't be run anyway */ + void *c = malloc(len); + size_t res_len = (kt->bits + 7) / 8; + + if(len != 0 && c == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(c, constant, len); + (*et->encrypt)(context, key, c, len, 1, 0, NULL); + k = malloc(res_len); + if(res_len != 0 && k == NULL) { + free(c); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + _krb5_n_fold(c, len, k, res_len); + free(c); + } + + /* XXX keytype dependent post-processing */ + switch(kt->type) { + case KEYTYPE_DES3: + DES3_postproc(context, k, nblocks * et->blocksize, key); + break; +#ifdef ENABLE_AES + case KEYTYPE_AES128: + case KEYTYPE_AES256: + memcpy(key->key->keyvalue.data, k, key->key->keyvalue.length); + break; +#endif /* ENABLE_AES */ + default: + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "derive_key() called with unknown keytype (%u)", + kt->type); + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + break; + } + memset(k, 0, nblocks * et->blocksize); + free(k); + return ret; +} + +static struct key_data * +_new_derived_key(krb5_crypto crypto, unsigned usage) +{ + struct key_usage *d = crypto->key_usage; + d = realloc(d, (crypto->num_key_usage + 1) * sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) + return NULL; + crypto->key_usage = d; + d += crypto->num_key_usage++; + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->usage = usage; + return &d->key; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_derive_key(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_enctype etype, + const void *constant, + size_t constant_len, + krb5_keyblock **derived_key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct encryption_type *et; + struct key_data d; + + et = _find_enctype (etype); + if (et == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, key, derived_key); + if (ret) + return ret; + + d.key = *derived_key; + d.schedule = NULL; + ret = derive_key(context, et, &d, constant, constant_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, d.key, derived_key); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +_get_derived_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + struct key_data **key) +{ + int i; + struct key_data *d; + unsigned char constant[5]; + + for(i = 0; i < crypto->num_key_usage; i++) + if(crypto->key_usage[i].usage == usage) { + *key = &crypto->key_usage[i].key; + return 0; + } + d = _new_derived_key(crypto, usage); + if(d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, crypto->key.key, &d->key); + _krb5_put_int(constant, usage, 5); + derive_key(context, crypto->et, d, constant, sizeof(constant)); + *key = d; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_init(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_crypto *crypto) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ALLOC(*crypto, 1); + if(*crypto == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if(etype == ETYPE_NULL) + etype = key->keytype; + (*crypto)->et = _find_enctype(etype); + if((*crypto)->et == NULL) { + free(*crypto); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + if((*crypto)->et->keytype->size != key->keyvalue.length) { + free(*crypto); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "encryption key has bad length"); + return KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE; + } + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, key, &(*crypto)->key.key); + if(ret) { + free(*crypto); + return ret; + } + (*crypto)->key.schedule = NULL; + (*crypto)->num_key_usage = 0; + (*crypto)->key_usage = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static void +free_key_data(krb5_context context, struct key_data *key) +{ + krb5_free_keyblock(context, key->key); + if(key->schedule) { + memset(key->schedule->data, 0, key->schedule->length); + krb5_free_data(context, key->schedule); + } +} + +static void +free_key_usage(krb5_context context, struct key_usage *ku) +{ + free_key_data(context, &ku->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < crypto->num_key_usage; i++) + free_key_usage(context, &crypto->key_usage[i]); + free(crypto->key_usage); + free_key_data(context, &crypto->key); + free (crypto); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_getblocksize(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + size_t *blocksize) +{ + *blocksize = crypto->et->blocksize; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_derived(krb5_context context, + const void *str, + size_t len, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(etype); + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data kd; + size_t keylen = et->keytype->bits / 8; + u_char *tmp; + + if(et == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "encryption type %d not supported", + etype); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + ALLOC(kd.key, 1); + if(kd.key == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&kd.key->keyvalue, et->keytype->size); + if(ret) { + free(kd.key); + return ret; + } + kd.key->keytype = etype; + tmp = malloc (keylen); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_free_keyblock(context, kd.key); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + _krb5_n_fold(str, len, tmp, keylen); + kd.schedule = NULL; + DES3_postproc (context, tmp, keylen, &kd); /* XXX */ + memset(tmp, 0, keylen); + free(tmp); + ret = derive_key(context, + et, + &kd, + "kerberos", /* XXX well known constant */ + strlen("kerberos")); + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, kd.key, key); + free_key_data(context, &kd); + return ret; +} + +static size_t +wrapped_length (krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + size_t data_len) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + size_t padsize = et->padsize; + size_t res; + + res = et->confoundersize + et->checksum->checksumsize + data_len; + res = (res + padsize - 1) / padsize * padsize; + return res; +} + +static size_t +wrapped_length_dervied (krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + size_t data_len) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + size_t padsize = et->padsize; + size_t res; + + res = et->confoundersize + data_len; + res = (res + padsize - 1) / padsize * padsize; + res += et->checksum->checksumsize; + return res; +} + +/* + * Return the size of an encrypted packet of length `data_len' + */ + +size_t +krb5_get_wrapped_length (krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + size_t data_len) +{ + if (derived_crypto (context, crypto)) + return wrapped_length_dervied (context, crypto, data_len); + else + return wrapped_length (context, crypto, data_len); +} + +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_get_keyid(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + u_int32_t *keyid) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, key->keyvalue.data, key->keyvalue.length); + MD5_Final (tmp, &md5); + *keyid = (tmp[12] << 24) | (tmp[13] << 16) | (tmp[14] << 8) | tmp[15]; + return 0; +} + +static void +krb5_crypto_debug(krb5_context context, + int encrypt, + size_t len, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + u_int32_t keyid; + char *kt; + krb5_get_keyid(context, key, &keyid); + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, key->keytype, &kt); + krb5_warnx(context, "%s %lu bytes with key-id %#x (%s)", + encrypt ? "encrypting" : "decrypting", + (unsigned long)len, + keyid, + kt); + free(kt); +} + +#endif /* CRYPTO_DEBUG */ + +#if 0 +int +main() +{ +#if 0 + int i; + krb5_context context; + krb5_crypto crypto; + struct key_data *d; + krb5_keyblock key; + char constant[4]; + unsigned usage = ENCRYPTION_USAGE(3); + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + key.keytype = ETYPE_NEW_DES3_CBC_SHA1; + key.keyvalue.data = "\xb3\x85\x58\x94\xd9\xdc\x7c\xc8" + "\x25\xe9\x85\xab\x3e\xb5\xfb\x0e" + "\xc8\xdf\xab\x26\x86\x64\x15\x25"; + key.keyvalue.length = 24; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, &key, 0, &crypto); + + d = _new_derived_key(crypto, usage); + if(d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, crypto->key.key, &d->key); + _krb5_put_int(constant, usage, 4); + derive_key(context, crypto->et, d, constant, sizeof(constant)); + return 0; +#else + int i; + krb5_context context; + krb5_crypto crypto; + struct key_data *d; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_error_code ret; + Checksum res; + + char *data = "what do ya want for nothing?"; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + key.keytype = ETYPE_NEW_DES3_CBC_SHA1; + key.keyvalue.data = "Jefe"; + /* "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b" + "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"; */ + key.keyvalue.length = 4; + + d = calloc(1, sizeof(*d)); + + d->key = &key; + res.checksum.length = 20; + res.checksum.data = malloc(res.checksum.length); + SP_HMAC_SHA1_checksum(context, d, data, 28, &res); + + return 0; +#endif +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/data.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/data.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2bfeb2090 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/data.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: data.c,v 1.17 2003/03/25 22:07:17 lha Exp $"); + +void +krb5_data_zero(krb5_data *p) +{ + p->length = 0; + p->data = NULL; +} + +void +krb5_data_free(krb5_data *p) +{ + if(p->data != NULL) + free(p->data); + p->length = 0; +} + +void +krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_data_free(data); +} + +void +krb5_free_data(krb5_context context, + krb5_data *p) +{ + krb5_data_free(p); + free(p); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_alloc(krb5_data *p, int len) +{ + p->data = malloc(len); + if(len && p->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + p->length = len; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_realloc(krb5_data *p, int len) +{ + void *tmp; + tmp = realloc(p->data, len); + if(len && !tmp) + return ENOMEM; + p->data = tmp; + p->length = len; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_copy(krb5_data *p, const void *data, size_t len) +{ + if (len) { + if(krb5_data_alloc(p, len)) + return ENOMEM; + memmove(p->data, data, len); + } else + p->data = NULL; + p->length = len; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_data(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *indata, + krb5_data **outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ALLOC(*outdata, 1); + if(*outdata == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = copy_octet_string(indata, *outdata); + if(ret) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + free(*outdata); + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/derived-key-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/derived-key-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a47dd3f25 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/derived-key-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: derived-key-test.c,v 1.1 2001/03/12 07:44:52 assar Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 24 }; + +static struct testcase { + krb5_enctype enctype; + unsigned char constant[MAXSIZE]; + size_t constant_len; + unsigned char key[MAXSIZE]; + unsigned char res[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x55}, 5, + {0xdc, 0xe0, 0x6b, 0x1f, 0x64, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x3d, 0xb5, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x89, 0x9b, 0x2c, 0xc1, 0x79, 0x10, 0x08, 0xce, 0x97, 0x3b, 0x92}, + {0x92, 0x51, 0x79, 0xd0, 0x45, 0x91, 0xa7, 0x9b, 0x5d, 0x31, 0x92, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0xe9, 0xc2, 0x89, 0xb0, 0x49, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0x6e, 0xe6, 0x04, 0xcd}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xaa}, 5, + {0x5e, 0x13, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0x70, 0xef, 0x76, 0x57, 0x46, 0x57, 0x85, 0x31, 0xcb, 0x51, 0xc1, 0x5b, 0xf1, 0x1c, 0xa8, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xce, 0xe9, 0xf2}, + {0x9e, 0x58, 0xe5, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x94, 0x2a, 0x10, 0x1c, 0x46, 0x98, 0x45, 0xd6, 0x7a, 0x20, 0xe3, 0xc4, 0x25, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x13, 0xf2, 0x07}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x55}, 5, + {0x98, 0xe6, 0xfd, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xa4, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x9b, 0x75, 0xa1, 0x76, 0x54, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x52, 0xba, 0xd3, 0xec, 0xd6, 0x10, 0xa2, 0x52, 0xbc}, + {0x13, 0xfe, 0xf8, 0x0d, 0x76, 0x3e, 0x94, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x13, 0xfd, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0xd0, 0x85, 0x07, 0x02, 0x49, 0xda, 0xd3, 0x98, 0x08, 0xea, 0xbf}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xaa}, 5, + {0x62, 0x2a, 0xec, 0x25, 0xa2, 0xfe, 0x2c, 0xad, 0x70, 0x94, 0x68, 0x0b, 0x7c, 0x64, 0x94, 0x02, 0x80, 0x08, 0x4c, 0x1a, 0x7c, 0xec, 0x92, 0xb5}, + {0xf8, 0xdf, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xb0, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xd9, 0xdc, 0x07, 0x02, 0x68, 0x6b, 0xcb, 0x34, 0x89, 0xd9, 0x1f, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x51, 0x6b, 0x70, 0x3e}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73}, 8, + {0xd3, 0xf8, 0x29, 0x8c, 0xcb, 0x16, 0x64, 0x38, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0xb9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa7, 0x62, 0x92, 0x86, 0xa4, 0x91, 0xf8, 0x38, 0xf8, 0x02, 0xfb}, + {0x23, 0x70, 0xda, 0x57, 0x5d, 0x2a, 0x3d, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xce, 0xbf, 0xdc, 0x52, 0x04, 0xd5, 0x6d, 0xf7, 0x79, 0xa7, 0xdf, 0x43, 0xd9, 0xda, 0x43}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x65}, 7, + {0xb5, 0x5e, 0x98, 0x34, 0x67, 0xe5, 0x51, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0xe5, 0xb6, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x76, 0x94, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x73, 0xdc, 0x62, 0xb3, 0x0e}, + {0x01, 0x26, 0x38, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x1a, 0x1f, 0x2a, 0x62, 0xbc, 0x45, 0xf8, 0xd5, 0xc1, 0x91, 0x51, 0xba, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x79, 0x8a, 0x3e}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x55}, 5, + {0xc1, 0x08, 0x16, 0x49, 0xad, 0xa7, 0x43, 0x62, 0xe6, 0xa1, 0x45, 0x9d, 0x01, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0x0d, 0x67, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x4c, 0x94, 0x07, 0x04, 0xda}, + {0x34, 0x80, 0x57, 0xec, 0x98, 0xfd, 0xc4, 0x80, 0x16, 0x16, 0x1c, 0x2a, 0x4c, 0x7a, 0x94, 0x3e, 0x92, 0xae, 0x49, 0x2c, 0x98, 0x91, 0x75, 0xf7}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xaa}, 5, + {0x5d, 0x15, 0x4a, 0xf2, 0x38, 0xf4, 0x67, 0x13, 0x15, 0x57, 0x19, 0xd5, 0x5e, 0x2f, 0x1f, 0x79, 0x0d, 0xd6, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x91, 0x7c}, + {0xa8, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x67, 0xda, 0xda, 0x3d, 0xcb, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x46, 0x26, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x94, 0xb0, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe5, 0xc1}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x55}, 5, + {0x79, 0x85, 0x62, 0xe0, 0x49, 0x85, 0x2f, 0x57, 0xdc, 0x8c, 0x34, 0x3b, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0xd9, 0x73, 0x94, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xad, 0xc4, 0x43}, + {0xc8, 0x13, 0xf8, 0x8a, 0x3b, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0x34, 0xf7, 0x54, 0x25, 0xce, 0x91, 0x75, 0xfb, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0x49, 0x3b, 0x89, 0xc8, 0x70, 0x3b, 0x49}}, + {ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xaa}, 5, + {0x26, 0xdc, 0xe3, 0x34, 0xb5, 0x45, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0xea, 0xb9, 0xa8, 0x70, 0x1a, 0x89, 0xa4, 0xb9, 0x9e, 0xb9, 0x94, 0x2c, 0xec, 0xd0, 0x16}, + {0xf4, 0x8f, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x83, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0x73, 0x54, 0xe6, 0x94, 0xfd, 0x25, 0x2c, 0xf8, 0x3b, 0xfe, 0x58, 0xf7, 0xd5, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x5d}}, + {0} +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct testcase *t; + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + int val = 0; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + for (t = tests; t->enctype != 0; ++t) { + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_keyblock *dkey; + + key.keytype = KEYTYPE_DES3; + key.keyvalue.length = MAXSIZE; + key.keyvalue.data = t->key; + + ret = krb5_derive_key(context, &key, t->enctype, t->constant, + t->constant_len, &dkey); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_derive_key"); + if (memcmp (dkey->keyvalue.data, t->res, dkey->keyvalue.length) != 0) { + const unsigned char *p = dkey->keyvalue.data; + int i; + + printf ("derive_key failed\n"); + printf ("should be: "); + for (i = 0; i < dkey->keyvalue.length; ++i) + printf ("%02x", t->res[i]); + printf ("\nresult was: "); + for (i = 0; i < dkey->keyvalue.length; ++i) + printf ("%02x", p[i]); + printf ("\n"); + val = 1; + } + } + return val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/dump_config.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/dump_config.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..074595e213 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/dump_config.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: dump_config.c,v 1.2 1999/10/28 23:22:41 assar Exp $"); + +/* print contents of krb5.conf */ + +static void +print_tree(struct krb5_config_binding *b, int level) +{ + if (b == NULL) + return; + + printf("%*s%s%s%s", level * 4, "", + (level == 0) ? "[" : "", b->name, (level == 0) ? "]" : ""); + if(b->type == krb5_config_list) { + if(level > 0) + printf(" = {"); + printf("\n"); + print_tree(b->u.list, level + 1); + if(level > 0) + printf("%*s}\n", level * 4, ""); + } else if(b->type == krb5_config_string) { + printf(" = %s\n", b->u.string); + } + if(b->next) + print_tree(b->next, level); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret == 0) { + print_tree(context->cf, 0); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b30640f72d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/eai_to_heim_errno.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: eai_to_heim_errno.c,v 1.3.8.1 2004/02/13 16:15:16 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * convert the getaddrinfo error code in `eai_errno' into a + * krb5_error_code. `system_error' should have the value of the errno + * after the failed call. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(int eai_errno, int system_error) +{ + switch(eai_errno) { + case EAI_NOERROR: + return 0; +#ifdef EAI_ADDRFAMILY + case EAI_ADDRFAMILY: + return HEIM_EAI_ADDRFAMILY; +#endif + case EAI_AGAIN: + return HEIM_EAI_AGAIN; + case EAI_BADFLAGS: + return HEIM_EAI_BADFLAGS; + case EAI_FAIL: + return HEIM_EAI_FAIL; + case EAI_FAMILY: + return HEIM_EAI_FAMILY; + case EAI_MEMORY: + return HEIM_EAI_MEMORY; +#if defined(EAI_NODATA) && EAI_NODATA != EAI_NONAME + case EAI_NODATA: + return HEIM_EAI_NODATA; +#endif + case EAI_NONAME: + return HEIM_EAI_NONAME; + case EAI_SERVICE: + return HEIM_EAI_SERVICE; + case EAI_SOCKTYPE: + return HEIM_EAI_SOCKTYPE; + case EAI_SYSTEM: + return system_error; + default: + return HEIM_EAI_UNKNOWN; /* XXX */ + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_errno_to_heim_errno(int eai_errno) +{ + switch(eai_errno) { + case 0: + return 0; + case HOST_NOT_FOUND: + return HEIM_EAI_NONAME; + case TRY_AGAIN: + return HEIM_EAI_AGAIN; + case NO_RECOVERY: + return HEIM_EAI_FAIL; + case NO_DATA: + return HEIM_EAI_NONAME; + default: + return HEIM_EAI_UNKNOWN; /* XXX */ + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/error_string.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/error_string.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf734481c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/error_string.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: error_string.c,v 1.1 2001/05/06 23:07:22 assar Exp $"); + +#undef __attribute__ +#define __attribute__(X) + +void +krb5_free_error_string(krb5_context context, char *str) +{ + if (str != context->error_buf) + free(str); +} + +void +krb5_clear_error_string(krb5_context context) +{ + if (context->error_string != NULL + && context->error_string != context->error_buf) + free(context->error_string); + context->error_string = NULL; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_error_string(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 2, 3))) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = krb5_vset_error_string (context, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vset_error_string(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, va_list args) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))) +{ + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + vasprintf(&context->error_string, fmt, args); + if(context->error_string == NULL) { + vsnprintf (context->error_buf, sizeof(context->error_buf), fmt, args); + context->error_string = context->error_buf; + } + return 0; +} + +char* +krb5_get_error_string(krb5_context context) +{ + char *ret = context->error_string; + context->error_string = NULL; + return ret; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_have_error_string(krb5_context context) +{ + return context->error_string != NULL; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ed2dd53f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: expand_hostname.c,v 1.11 2001/09/18 09:35:47 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +copy_hostname(krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname) +{ + *new_hostname = strdup (orig_hostname); + if (*new_hostname == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + strlwr (*new_hostname); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to make `orig_hostname' into a more canonical one in the newly + * allocated space returned in `new_hostname'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_expand_hostname (krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a, hints; + int error; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + error = getaddrinfo (orig_hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return copy_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname); + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + *new_hostname = strdup (a->ai_canonname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (*new_hostname == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } else { + return 0; + } + } + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return copy_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname); +} + +/* + * handle the case of the hostname being unresolvable and thus identical + */ + +static krb5_error_code +vanilla_hostname (krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname, + char ***realms) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = copy_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname); + if (ret) + return ret; + strlwr (*new_hostname); + + ret = krb5_get_host_realm (context, *new_hostname, realms); + if (ret) { + free (*new_hostname); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * expand `hostname' to a name we believe to be a hostname in newly + * allocated space in `host' and return realms in `realms'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_expand_hostname_realms (krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname, + char ***realms) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a, hints; + int error; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + error = getaddrinfo (orig_hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return vanilla_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname, + realms); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + ret = copy_hostname (context, a->ai_canonname, new_hostname); + if (ret) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return ret; + } + strlwr (*new_hostname); + ret = krb5_get_host_realm (context, *new_hostname, realms); + if (ret == 0) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 0; + } + free (*new_hostname); + } + } + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return vanilla_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname, realms); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/fcache.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/fcache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38006c3e3a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/fcache.c @@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: fcache.c,v 1.34.6.6 2004/03/10 13:30:59 lha Exp $"); + +typedef struct krb5_fcache{ + char *filename; + int version; +}krb5_fcache; + +struct fcc_cursor { + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; +}; + +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_1 1 +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_2 2 +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_3 3 +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4 4 + +#define FCC_TAG_DELTATIME 1 + +#define FCACHE(X) ((krb5_fcache*)(X)->data.data) + +#define FILENAME(X) (FCACHE(X)->filename) + +#define FCC_CURSOR(C) ((struct fcc_cursor*)(C)) + +static const char* +fcc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return FILENAME(id); +} + +int +_krb5_xlock(krb5_context context, int fd, krb5_boolean exclusive, + const char *filename) +{ + int ret; +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL + struct flock l; + + l.l_start = 0; + l.l_len = 0; + l.l_type = exclusive ? F_WRLCK : F_RDLCK; + l.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &l); +#else + ret = flock(fd, exclusive ? LOCK_EX : LOCK_SH); +#endif + if(ret < 0) + ret = errno; + if(ret == EACCES) /* fcntl can return EACCES instead of EAGAIN */ + ret = EAGAIN; + + switch (ret) { + case 0: + break; + case EINVAL: /* filesystem doesn't support locking, let the user have it */ + ret = 0; + break; + case EAGAIN: + krb5_set_error_string(context, "timed out locking cache file %s", + filename); + break; + default: + krb5_set_error_string(context, "error locking cache file %s: %s", + filename, strerror(ret)); + break; + } + return ret; +} + +int +_krb5_xunlock(int fd) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_LOCK + struct flock l; + l.l_start = 0; + l.l_len = 0; + l.l_type = F_UNLCK; + l.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + return fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &l); +#else + return flock(fd, LOCK_UN); +#endif +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_lock(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, + int fd, krb5_boolean exclusive) +{ + return _krb5_xlock(context, fd, exclusive, fcc_get_name(context, id)); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_unlock(krb5_context context, int fd) +{ + return _krb5_xunlock(fd); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_resolve(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id, const char *res) +{ + krb5_fcache *f; + f = malloc(sizeof(*f)); + if(f == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + f->filename = strdup(res); + if(f->filename == NULL){ + free(f); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + f->version = 0; + (*id)->data.data = f; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*f); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to scrub the contents of `filename' safely. + */ + +static int +scrub_file (int fd) +{ + off_t pos; + char buf[128]; + + pos = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END); + if (pos < 0) + return errno; + if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) + return errno; + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + while(pos > 0) { + ssize_t tmp = write(fd, buf, min(sizeof(buf), pos)); + + if (tmp < 0) + return errno; + pos -= tmp; + } + fsync (fd); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Erase `filename' if it exists, trying to remove the contents if + * it's `safe'. We always try to remove the file, it it exists. It's + * only overwritten if it's a regular file (not a symlink and not a + * hardlink) + */ + +static krb5_error_code +erase_file(const char *filename) +{ + int fd; + struct stat sb1, sb2; + int ret; + + ret = lstat (filename, &sb1); + if (ret < 0) + return errno; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0) { + if(errno == ENOENT) + return 0; + else + return errno; + } + if (unlink(filename) < 0) { + close (fd); + return errno; + } + ret = fstat (fd, &sb2); + if (ret < 0) { + close (fd); + return errno; + } + + /* check if someone was playing with symlinks */ + + if (sb1.st_dev != sb2.st_dev || sb1.st_ino != sb2.st_ino) { + close (fd); + return EPERM; + } + + /* there are still hard links to this file */ + + if (sb2.st_nlink != 0) { + close (fd); + return 0; + } + + ret = scrub_file (fd); + close (fd); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_gen_new(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_fcache *f; + int fd; + char *file; + + f = malloc(sizeof(*f)); + if(f == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + asprintf (&file, "%sXXXXXX", KRB5_DEFAULT_CCFILE_ROOT); + if(file == NULL) { + free(f); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + fd = mkstemp(file); + if(fd < 0) { + free(f); + free(file); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "mkstemp %s", file); + return errno; + } + close(fd); + f->filename = file; + f->version = 0; + (*id)->data.data = f; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*f); + return 0; +} + +static void +storage_set_flags(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, int vno) +{ + int flags = 0; + switch(vno) { + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_1: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER; + break; + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_2: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER; + break; + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_3: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE; + break; + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4: + break; + default: + krb5_abortx(context, + "storage_set_flags called with bad vno (%x)", vno); + } + krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, flags); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_open(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + int *fd_ret, + int flags, + mode_t mode) +{ + krb5_boolean exclusive = ((flags | O_WRONLY) == flags || + (flags | O_RDWR) == flags); + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *filename = FILENAME(id); + int fd; + fd = open(filename, flags, mode); + if(fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + if((ret = fcc_lock(context, id, fd, exclusive)) != 0) { + close(fd); + return ret; + } + *fd_ret = fd; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal) +{ + krb5_fcache *f = FCACHE(id); + int ret = 0; + int fd; + char *filename = f->filename; + + unlink (filename); + + ret = fcc_open(context, id, &fd, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY, 0600); + if(ret) + return ret; + { + krb5_storage *sp; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(sp, KRB5_CC_END); + if(context->fcache_vno != 0) + f->version = context->fcache_vno; + else + f->version = KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4; + ret |= krb5_store_int8(sp, 5); + ret |= krb5_store_int8(sp, f->version); + storage_set_flags(context, sp, f->version); + if(f->version == KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4 && ret == 0) { + /* V4 stuff */ + if (context->kdc_sec_offset) { + ret |= krb5_store_int16 (sp, 12); /* length */ + ret |= krb5_store_int16 (sp, FCC_TAG_DELTATIME); /* Tag */ + ret |= krb5_store_int16 (sp, 8); /* length of data */ + ret |= krb5_store_int32 (sp, context->kdc_sec_offset); + ret |= krb5_store_int32 (sp, context->kdc_usec_offset); + } else { + ret |= krb5_store_int16 (sp, 0); + } + } + ret |= krb5_store_principal(sp, primary_principal); + + krb5_storage_free(sp); + } + fcc_unlock(context, fd); + if (close(fd) < 0) + if (ret == 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "close %s: %s", + FILENAME(id), strerror(ret)); + } + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + free (FILENAME(id)); + krb5_data_free(&id->data); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + erase_file(FILENAME(id)); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_store_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + int ret; + int fd; + + ret = fcc_open(context, id, &fd, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + { + krb5_storage *sp; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(sp, KRB5_CC_END); + storage_set_flags(context, sp, FCACHE(id)->version); + if (krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, + "libdefaults", + "fcc-mit-ticketflags", + NULL)) + ret = _krb5_store_creds_heimdal_0_7(sp, creds); + else + ret = _krb5_store_creds_heimdal_pre_0_7(sp, creds); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + } + fcc_unlock(context, fd); + if (close(fd) < 0) + if (ret == 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "close %s: %s", + FILENAME(id), strerror(ret)); + } + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +init_fcc (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_storage **ret_sp, + int *ret_fd) +{ + int fd; + int8_t pvno, tag; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = fcc_open(context, id, &fd, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0); + + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + if(sp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(sp, KRB5_CC_END); + ret = krb5_ret_int8(sp, &pvno); + if(ret != 0) { + if(ret == KRB5_CC_END) + ret = ENOENT; /* empty file */ + goto out; + } + if(pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO; + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int8(sp, &tag); /* should not be host byte order */ + if(ret != 0) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + FCACHE(id)->version = tag; + storage_set_flags(context, sp, FCACHE(id)->version); + switch (tag) { + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4: { + int16_t length; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &length); + if(ret) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + while(length > 0) { + int16_t tag, data_len; + int i; + int8_t dummy; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &tag); + if(ret) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &data_len); + if(ret) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + switch (tag) { + case FCC_TAG_DELTATIME : + ret = krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &context->kdc_sec_offset); + if(ret) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &context->kdc_usec_offset); + if(ret) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + break; + default : + for (i = 0; i < data_len; ++i) { + ret = krb5_ret_int8 (sp, &dummy); + if(ret) { + ret = KRB5_CC_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + break; + } + length -= 4 + data_len; + } + break; + } + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_3: + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_2: + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_1: + break; + default : + ret = KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO; + goto out; + } + *ret_sp = sp; + *ret_fd = fd; + + return 0; + out: + if(sp != NULL) + krb5_storage_free(sp); + fcc_unlock(context, fd); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + + ret = init_fcc (context, id, &sp, &fd); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, principal); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + fcc_unlock(context, fd); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_end_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor); + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_first (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal principal; + + *cursor = malloc(sizeof(struct fcc_cursor)); + + ret = init_fcc (context, id, &FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp, + &FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd); + if (ret) { + free(*cursor); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal (FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp, &principal); + if(ret) { + fcc_end_get(context, id, cursor); + return ret; + } + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + fcc_unlock(context, FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_next (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + if((ret = fcc_lock(context, id, FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd, FALSE)) != 0) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_ret_creds(FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp, creds); + + fcc_unlock(context, FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_end_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_storage_free(FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp); + close (FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd); + free(*cursor); + *cursor = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_remove_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *cred) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_set_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_version(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return FCACHE(id)->version; +} + +const krb5_cc_ops krb5_fcc_ops = { + "FILE", + fcc_get_name, + fcc_resolve, + fcc_gen_new, + fcc_initialize, + fcc_destroy, + fcc_close, + fcc_store_cred, + NULL, /* fcc_retrieve */ + fcc_get_principal, + fcc_get_first, + fcc_get_next, + fcc_end_get, + fcc_remove_cred, + fcc_set_flags, + fcc_get_version +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/free.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..251ec32010 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/free.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: free.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_kdc_rep(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_rep *rep) +{ + free_KDC_REP(&rep->kdc_rep); + free_EncTGSRepPart(&rep->enc_part); + free_KRB_ERROR(&rep->error); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_xfree (void *ptr) +{ + free (ptr); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a69f29b988 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: free_host_realm.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Free all memory allocated by `realmlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_host_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realmlist) +{ + krb5_realm *p; + + if(realmlist == NULL) + return 0; + for (p = realmlist; *p; ++p) + free (*p); + free (realmlist); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..795c3f3ff6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: generate_seq_number.c,v 1.8 2001/05/08 14:05:37 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_seq_number(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + u_int32_t *seqno) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keyblock *subkey; + u_int32_t q; + u_char *p; + int i; + + ret = krb5_generate_subkey (context, key, &subkey); + if (ret) + return ret; + + q = 0; + for (p = (u_char *)subkey->keyvalue.data, i = 0; + i < subkey->keyvalue.length; + ++i, ++p) + q = (q << 8) | *p; + q &= 0xffffffff; + *seqno = q; + krb5_free_keyblock (context, subkey); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3fb22f970e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: generate_subkey.c,v 1.8 2001/05/14 06:14:46 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_subkey(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_keyblock **subkey) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ALLOC(*subkey, 1); + if (*subkey == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, key->keytype, *subkey); + if(ret) + free(*subkey); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_addrs.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_addrs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94a0350e8b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_addrs.c @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_addrs.c,v 1.45 2003/01/25 15:19:49 lha Exp $"); + +#ifdef __osf__ +/* hate */ +struct rtentry; +struct mbuf; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_H +#include +#endif +#include + +static krb5_error_code +gethostname_fallback (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + struct hostent *hostent; + + if (gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname))) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "gethostname: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + hostent = roken_gethostbyname (hostname); + if (hostent == NULL) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "gethostbyname %s: %s", + hostname, strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + res->len = 1; + res->val = malloc (sizeof(*res->val)); + if (res->val == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + res->val[0].addr_type = hostent->h_addrtype; + res->val[0].address.data = NULL; + res->val[0].address.length = 0; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&res->val[0].address, + hostent->h_addr, + hostent->h_length); + if (ret) { + free (res->val); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +enum { + LOOP = 1, /* do include loopback interfaces */ + LOOP_IF_NONE = 2, /* include loopback if no other if's */ + EXTRA_ADDRESSES = 4, /* include extra addresses */ + SCAN_INTERFACES = 8 /* scan interfaces for addresses */ +}; + +/* + * Try to figure out the addresses of all configured interfaces with a + * lot of magic ioctls. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +find_all_addresses (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res, int flags) +{ + struct sockaddr sa_zero; + struct ifaddrs *ifa0, *ifa; + krb5_error_code ret = ENXIO; + int num, idx; + krb5_addresses ignore_addresses; + + res->val = NULL; + + if (getifaddrs(&ifa0) == -1) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "getifaddrs: %s", strerror(ret)); + return (ret); + } + + memset(&sa_zero, 0, sizeof(sa_zero)); + + /* First, count all the ifaddrs. */ + for (ifa = ifa0, num = 0; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next, num++) + /* nothing */; + + if (num == 0) { + freeifaddrs(ifa0); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "no addresses found"); + return (ENXIO); + } + + if (flags & EXTRA_ADDRESSES) { + /* we'll remove the addresses we don't care about */ + ret = krb5_get_ignore_addresses(context, &ignore_addresses); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + /* Allocate storage for them. */ + res->val = calloc(num, sizeof(*res->val)); + if (res->val == NULL) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, &ignore_addresses); + freeifaddrs(ifa0); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return (ENOMEM); + } + + /* Now traverse the list. */ + for (ifa = ifa0, idx = 0; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) { + if ((ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) + continue; + if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL) + continue; + if (memcmp(ifa->ifa_addr, &sa_zero, sizeof(sa_zero)) == 0) + continue; + if (krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting(ifa->ifa_addr)) + continue; + if ((ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) != 0) { + /* We'll deal with the LOOP_IF_NONE case later. */ + if ((flags & LOOP) == 0) + continue; + } + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address(context, ifa->ifa_addr, &res->val[idx]); + if (ret) { + /* + * The most likely error here is going to be "Program + * lacks support for address type". This is no big + * deal -- just continue, and we'll listen on the + * addresses who's type we *do* support. + */ + continue; + } + /* possibly skip this address? */ + if((flags & EXTRA_ADDRESSES) && + krb5_address_search(context, &res->val[idx], &ignore_addresses)) { + krb5_free_address(context, &res->val[idx]); + flags &= ~LOOP_IF_NONE; /* we actually found an address, + so don't add any loop-back + addresses */ + continue; + } + + idx++; + } + + /* + * If no addresses were found, and LOOP_IF_NONE is set, then find + * the loopback addresses and add them to our list. + */ + if ((flags & LOOP_IF_NONE) != 0 && idx == 0) { + for (ifa = ifa0; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) { + if ((ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) + continue; + if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL) + continue; + if (memcmp(ifa->ifa_addr, &sa_zero, sizeof(sa_zero)) == 0) + continue; + if (krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting(ifa->ifa_addr)) + continue; + + if ((ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) != 0) { + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address(context, + ifa->ifa_addr, &res->val[idx]); + if (ret) { + /* + * See comment above. + */ + continue; + } + if((flags & EXTRA_ADDRESSES) && + krb5_address_search(context, &res->val[idx], + &ignore_addresses)) { + krb5_free_address(context, &res->val[idx]); + continue; + } + idx++; + } + } + } + + if (flags & EXTRA_ADDRESSES) + krb5_free_addresses(context, &ignore_addresses); + freeifaddrs(ifa0); + if (ret) + free(res->val); + else + res->len = idx; /* Now a count. */ + return (ret); +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_addrs_int (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res, int flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = -1; + + if (flags & SCAN_INTERFACES) { + ret = find_all_addresses (context, res, flags); + if(ret || res->len == 0) + ret = gethostname_fallback (context, res); + } else { + res->len = 0; + res->val = NULL; + ret = 0; + } + + if(ret == 0 && (flags & EXTRA_ADDRESSES)) { + krb5_addresses a; + /* append user specified addresses */ + ret = krb5_get_extra_addresses(context, &a); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, res); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_append_addresses(context, res, &a); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, res); + return ret; + } + krb5_free_addresses(context, &a); + } + if(res->len == 0) { + free(res->val); + res->val = NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Try to get all addresses, but return the one corresponding to + * `hostname' if we fail. + * + * Only include loopback address if there are no other. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_client_addrs (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res) +{ + int flags = LOOP_IF_NONE | EXTRA_ADDRESSES; + + if (context->scan_interfaces) + flags |= SCAN_INTERFACES; + + return get_addrs_int (context, res, flags); +} + +/* + * Try to get all local addresses that a server should listen to. + * If that fails, we return the address corresponding to `hostname'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_server_addrs (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res) +{ + return get_addrs_int (context, res, LOOP | SCAN_INTERFACES); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cae47f5763 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,868 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_cred.c,v 1.91.4.3 2004/01/09 00:47:17 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * Take the `body' and encode it into `padata' using the credentials + * in `creds'. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +make_pa_tgs_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + KDC_REQ_BODY *body, + PA_DATA *padata, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_data in_data; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KDC_REQ_BODY, buf, buf_size, body, &len, ret); + if (ret) + goto out; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + in_data.length = len; + in_data.data = buf; + ret = krb5_mk_req_internal(context, &ac, 0, &in_data, creds, + &padata->padata_value, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, + usage + /* KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH */); +out: + free (buf); + if(ret) + return ret; + padata->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the `enc-authorization-data' in `req_body' based on `authdata' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +set_auth_data (krb5_context context, + KDC_REQ_BODY *req_body, + krb5_authdata *authdata, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + if(authdata->len) { + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData, buf, len, authdata, &len, ret); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ALLOC(req_body->enc_authorization_data, 1); + if (req_body->enc_authorization_data == NULL) { + free (buf); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + free (req_body->enc_authorization_data); + return ret; + } + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY, + /* KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION? */ + buf, + len, + 0, + req_body->enc_authorization_data); + free (buf); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + } else { + req_body->enc_authorization_data = NULL; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create a tgs-req in `t' with `addresses', `flags', `second_ticket' + * (if not-NULL), `in_creds', `krbtgt', and returning the generated + * subkey in `subkey'. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +init_tgs_req (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + Ticket *second_ticket, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds *krbtgt, + unsigned nonce, + krb5_keyblock **subkey, + TGS_REQ *t, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t)); + t->pvno = 5; + t->msg_type = krb_tgs_req; + if (in_creds->session.keytype) { + ALLOC_SEQ(&t->req_body.etype, 1); + if(t->req_body.etype.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + t->req_body.etype.val[0] = in_creds->session.keytype; + } else { + ret = krb5_init_etype(context, + &t->req_body.etype.len, + &t->req_body.etype.val, + NULL); + } + if (ret) + goto fail; + t->req_body.addresses = addresses; + t->req_body.kdc_options = flags.b; + ret = copy_Realm(&in_creds->server->realm, &t->req_body.realm); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ALLOC(t->req_body.sname, 1); + if (t->req_body.sname == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + + /* some versions of some code might require that the client be + present in TGS-REQs, but this is clearly against the spec */ + + ret = copy_PrincipalName(&in_creds->server->name, t->req_body.sname); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* req_body.till should be NULL if there is no endtime specified, + but old MIT code (like DCE secd) doesn't like that */ + ALLOC(t->req_body.till, 1); + if(t->req_body.till == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + *t->req_body.till = in_creds->times.endtime; + + t->req_body.nonce = nonce; + if(second_ticket){ + ALLOC(t->req_body.additional_tickets, 1); + if (t->req_body.additional_tickets == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + ALLOC_SEQ(t->req_body.additional_tickets, 1); + if (t->req_body.additional_tickets->val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + ret = copy_Ticket(second_ticket, t->req_body.additional_tickets->val); + if (ret) + goto fail; + } + ALLOC(t->padata, 1); + if (t->padata == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + ALLOC_SEQ(t->padata, 1); + if (t->padata->val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + + { + krb5_auth_context ac; + krb5_keyblock *key = NULL; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + if (krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, + "realms", + krbtgt->server->realm, + "tgs_require_subkey", + NULL)) + { + ret = krb5_generate_subkey (context, &krbtgt->session, &key); + if (ret) { + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + goto fail; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context, ac, key); + if (ret) { + if (key) + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + goto fail; + } + } + + ret = set_auth_data (context, &t->req_body, &in_creds->authdata, key); + if (ret) { + if (key) + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + goto fail; + } + + ret = make_pa_tgs_req(context, + ac, + &t->req_body, + t->padata->val, + krbtgt, + usage); + if(ret) { + if (key) + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + goto fail; + } + *subkey = key; + + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + } +fail: + if (ret) { + t->req_body.addresses = NULL; + free_TGS_REQ (t); + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_get_krbtgt(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_realm realm, + krb5_creds **cred) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds tmp_cred; + + memset(&tmp_cred, 0, sizeof(tmp_cred)); + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, id, &tmp_cred.client); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, + &tmp_cred.server, + realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + realm, + NULL); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_cred.client); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, + KRB5_GC_CACHED, + id, + &tmp_cred, + cred); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_cred.client); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_cred.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +/* DCE compatible decrypt proc */ +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_tkt_with_subkey (krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_key_usage usage, + krb5_const_pointer subkey, + krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + size_t size; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + usage, + &dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret && subkey){ + /* DCE compat -- try to decrypt with subkey */ + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, (krb5_keyblock*)subkey, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY, + &dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_EncASRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + if (ret) + ret = krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_kdc_usage(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds *krbtgt, + krb5_creds *out_creds, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + TGS_REQ req; + krb5_data enc; + krb5_data resp; + krb5_kdc_rep rep; + KRB_ERROR error; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned nonce; + krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + Ticket second_ticket; + + krb5_generate_random_block(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + nonce &= 0xffffffff; + + if(flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey){ + ret = decode_Ticket(in_creds->second_ticket.data, + in_creds->second_ticket.length, + &second_ticket, &len); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = init_tgs_req (context, + id, + addresses, + flags, + flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey ? &second_ticket : NULL, + in_creds, + krbtgt, + nonce, + &subkey, + &req, + usage); + if(flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey) + free_Ticket(&second_ticket); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REQ, buf, buf_size, &req, &enc.length, ret); + if (ret) + goto out; + if(enc.length != buf_size) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + /* don't free addresses */ + req.req_body.addresses = NULL; + free_TGS_REQ(&req); + + enc.data = buf + buf_size - enc.length; + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* + * Send and receive + */ + + ret = krb5_sendto_kdc (context, &enc, + &krbtgt->server->name.name_string.val[1], &resp); + if(ret) + goto out; + + memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + if(decode_TGS_REP(resp.data, resp.length, &rep.kdc_rep, &len) == 0){ + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, + in_creds->client, + &out_creds->client); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, + in_creds->server, + &out_creds->server); + if(ret) + goto out; + /* this should go someplace else */ + out_creds->times.endtime = in_creds->times.endtime; + + ret = _krb5_extract_ticket(context, + &rep, + out_creds, + &krbtgt->session, + NULL, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION, + &krbtgt->addresses, + nonce, + TRUE, + flags.b.request_anonymous, + decrypt_tkt_with_subkey, + subkey); + krb5_free_kdc_rep(context, &rep); + if (ret) + goto out; + } else if(krb5_rd_error(context, &resp, &error) == 0) { + ret = krb5_error_from_rd_error(context, &error, in_creds); + krb5_free_error_contents(context, &error); + } else if(resp.data && ((char*)resp.data)[0] == 4) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY; + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + } else { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + } + krb5_data_free(&resp); + out: + if(subkey){ + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, subkey); + free(subkey); + } + if (buf) + free (buf); + return ret; + +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_kdc(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds *krbtgt, + krb5_creds *out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = get_cred_kdc_usage(context, id, flags, addresses, in_creds, + krbtgt, out_creds, KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH); + if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = get_cred_kdc_usage(context, id, flags, addresses, in_creds, + krbtgt, out_creds, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH); + } + return ret; +} + +/* same as above, just get local addresses first */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_kdc_la(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_creds *krbtgt, + krb5_creds *out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_addresses addresses, *addrs = &addresses; + + krb5_get_all_client_addrs(context, &addresses); + /* XXX this sucks. */ + if(addresses.len == 0) + addrs = NULL; + ret = get_cred_kdc(context, id, flags, addrs, + in_creds, krbtgt, out_creds); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &addresses); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_kdc_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + Ticket *second_ticket, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds + ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *krbtgt; + + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if(*out_creds == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = _krb5_get_krbtgt (context, + id, + in_creds->server->realm, + &krbtgt); + if(ret) { + free(*out_creds); + return ret; + } + ret = get_cred_kdc(context, id, flags, addresses, + in_creds, krbtgt, *out_creds); + krb5_free_creds (context, krbtgt); + if(ret) + free(*out_creds); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +find_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_creds **tgts, + krb5_creds *out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds mcreds; + mcreds.server = server; + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, id, KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM, + &mcreds, out_creds); + if(ret == 0) + return 0; + while(tgts && *tgts){ + if(krb5_compare_creds(context, KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM, + &mcreds, *tgts)){ + ret = krb5_copy_creds_contents(context, *tgts, out_creds); + return ret; + } + tgts++; + } + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND; +} + +static krb5_error_code +add_cred(krb5_context context, krb5_creds ***tgts, krb5_creds *tkt) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds **tmp = *tgts; + + for(i = 0; tmp && tmp[i]; i++); /* XXX */ + tmp = realloc(tmp, (i+2)*sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *tgts = tmp; + ret = krb5_copy_creds(context, tkt, &tmp[i]); + tmp[i+1] = NULL; + return ret; +} + +/* +get_cred(server) + creds = cc_get_cred(server) + if(creds) return creds + tgt = cc_get_cred(krbtgt/server_realm@any_realm) + if(tgt) + return get_cred_tgt(server, tgt) + if(client_realm == server_realm) + return NULL + tgt = get_cred(krbtgt/server_realm@client_realm) + while(tgt_inst != server_realm) + tgt = get_cred(krbtgt/server_realm@tgt_inst) + return get_cred_tgt(server, tgt) + */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_from_kdc_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds, + krb5_creds ***ret_tgts) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *tgt, tmp_creds; + krb5_const_realm client_realm, server_realm, try_realm; + + *out_creds = NULL; + + client_realm = *krb5_princ_realm(context, in_creds->client); + server_realm = *krb5_princ_realm(context, in_creds->server); + memset(&tmp_creds, 0, sizeof(tmp_creds)); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, in_creds->client, &tmp_creds.client); + if(ret) + return ret; + + try_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "capaths", + client_realm, server_realm, NULL); + +#if 1 + /* XXX remove in future release */ + if(try_realm == NULL) + try_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "capath", server_realm, NULL); +#endif + + if (try_realm == NULL) + try_realm = client_realm; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, + &tmp_creds.server, + try_realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + server_realm, + NULL); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + { + krb5_creds tgts; + /* XXX try krb5_cc_retrieve_cred first? */ + ret = find_cred(context, ccache, tmp_creds.server, + *ret_tgts, &tgts); + if(ret == 0){ + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if(*out_creds == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + } else { + krb5_boolean noaddr; + + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, tgts.server->realm, + "no-addresses", FALSE, &noaddr); + + if (noaddr) + ret = get_cred_kdc(context, ccache, flags, NULL, + in_creds, &tgts, *out_creds); + else + ret = get_cred_kdc_la(context, ccache, flags, + in_creds, &tgts, *out_creds); + if (ret) { + free (*out_creds); + *out_creds = NULL; + } + } + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &tgts); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + } + if(krb5_realm_compare(context, in_creds->client, in_creds->server)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND; + } + /* XXX this can loop forever */ + while(1){ + general_string tgt_inst; + + ret = get_cred_from_kdc_flags(context, flags, ccache, &tmp_creds, + &tgt, ret_tgts); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + ret = add_cred(context, ret_tgts, tgt); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + tgt_inst = tgt->server->name.name_string.val[1]; + if(strcmp(tgt_inst, server_realm) == 0) + break; + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &tmp_creds.server, + tgt_inst, KRB5_TGS_NAME, server_realm, NULL); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_free_creds(context, tgt); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + } + + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if(*out_creds == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + } else { + krb5_boolean noaddr; + + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, tgt->server->realm, + "no-addresses", FALSE, &noaddr); + if (noaddr) + ret = get_cred_kdc (context, ccache, flags, NULL, + in_creds, tgt, *out_creds); + else + ret = get_cred_kdc_la(context, ccache, flags, + in_creds, tgt, *out_creds); + if (ret) { + free (*out_creds); + *out_creds = NULL; + } + } + krb5_free_creds(context, tgt); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_cred_from_kdc_opt(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds, + krb5_creds ***ret_tgts, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + krb5_kdc_flags f; + f.i = flags; + return get_cred_from_kdc_flags(context, f, ccache, + in_creds, out_creds, ret_tgts); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_cred_from_kdc(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds, + krb5_creds ***ret_tgts) +{ + return krb5_get_cred_from_kdc_opt(context, ccache, + in_creds, out_creds, ret_tgts, 0); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials_with_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds **tgts; + krb5_creds *res_creds; + int i; + + *out_creds = NULL; + res_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(*res_creds)); + if (res_creds == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, + ccache, + in_creds->session.keytype ? + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE : 0, + in_creds, res_creds); + if(ret == 0) { + *out_creds = res_creds; + return 0; + } + free(res_creds); + if(ret != KRB5_CC_END) + return ret; + if(options & KRB5_GC_CACHED) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND; + } + if(options & KRB5_GC_USER_USER) + flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey = 1; + tgts = NULL; + ret = get_cred_from_kdc_flags(context, flags, ccache, + in_creds, out_creds, &tgts); + for(i = 0; tgts && tgts[i]; i++) { + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, tgts[i]); + krb5_free_creds(context, tgts[i]); + } + free(tgts); + if(ret == 0 && flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0) + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, *out_creds); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + flags.i = 0; + return krb5_get_credentials_with_flags(context, options, flags, + ccache, in_creds, out_creds); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8ed48f958 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_default_principal.c,v 1.7 2001/05/14 06:14:46 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Try to find out what's a reasonable default principal. + */ + +static const char* +get_env_user(void) +{ + const char *user = getenv("USER"); + if(user == NULL) + user = getenv("LOGNAME"); + if(user == NULL) + user = getenv("USERNAME"); + return user; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_principal (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id; + const char *user; + uid_t uid; + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &id); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, id, princ); + krb5_cc_close (context, id); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + } + + + uid = getuid(); + if(uid == 0) { + user = getlogin(); + if(user == NULL) + user = get_env_user(); + if(user != NULL && strcmp(user, "root") != 0) + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, princ, NULL, user, "root", NULL); + else + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, princ, NULL, "root", NULL); + } else { + struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid); + if(pw != NULL) + user = pw->pw_name; + else { + user = get_env_user(); + if(user == NULL) + user = getlogin(); + } + if(user == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "unable to figure out current principal"); + return ENOTTY; /* XXX */ + } + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, princ, NULL, user, NULL); + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74a880d144 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_default_realm.c,v 1.10 2001/07/19 16:55:27 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Return a NULL-terminated list of default realms in `realms'. + * Free this memory with krb5_free_host_realm. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realms (krb5_context context, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + if (context->default_realms == NULL) { + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_set_default_realm (context, NULL); + if (ret) + return KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM; + } + + return krb5_copy_host_realm (context, + context->default_realms, + realms); +} + +/* + * Return the first default realm. For compatability. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realm) +{ + char *res; + + if (context->default_realms == NULL + || context->default_realms[0] == NULL) { + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_set_default_realm (context, NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "no default realm configured"); + return KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM; + } + } + + res = strdup (context->default_realms[0]); + if (res == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *realm = res; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6bdffe5500 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_for_creds.c,v 1.34.4.1 2004/01/09 00:51:55 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +add_addrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addr, + struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned n, i; + void *tmp; + struct addrinfo *a; + + n = 0; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + ++n; + + tmp = realloc(addr->val, (addr->len + n) * sizeof(*addr->val)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + addr->val = tmp; + for (i = addr->len; i < (addr->len + n); ++i) { + addr->val[i].addr_type = 0; + krb5_data_zero(&addr->val[i].address); + } + i = addr->len; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + krb5_address ad; + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, a->ai_addr, &ad); + if (ret == 0) { + if (krb5_address_search(context, &ad, addr)) + krb5_free_address(context, &ad); + else + addr->val[i++] = ad; + } + else if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP) + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + else + goto fail; + addr->len = i; + } + return 0; +fail: + krb5_free_addresses (context, addr); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Forward credentials for `client' to host `hostname`, + * making them forwardable if `forwardable', and returning the + * blob of data to sent in `out_data'. + * If hostname == NULL, pick it from `server' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_fwd_tgt_creds (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const char *hostname, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_ccache ccache, + int forwardable, + krb5_data *out_data) +{ + krb5_flags flags = 0; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_const_realm client_realm; + + flags |= KDC_OPT_FORWARDED; + + if (forwardable) + flags |= KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE; + + if (hostname == NULL && + krb5_principal_get_type(context, server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST) { + const char *inst = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, server, 0); + const char *host = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, server, 1); + + if (inst != NULL && + strcmp(inst, "host") == 0 && + host != NULL && + krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, server, 2) == NULL) + hostname = host; + } + + client_realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client); + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + creds.client = client; + + ret = krb5_build_principal(context, + &creds.server, + strlen(client_realm), + client_realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + client_realm, + NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags, + hostname, + &creds, + out_data); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_forwarded_creds (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_flags flags, + const char *hostname, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *out_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *out_creds; + krb5_addresses addrs, *paddrs; + KRB_CRED cred; + KrbCredInfo *krb_cred_info; + EncKrbCredPart enc_krb_cred_part; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + krb5_kdc_flags kdc_flags; + krb5_crypto crypto; + struct addrinfo *ai; + int save_errno; + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_creds *ticket; + char *realm; + + if (in_creds->client && in_creds->client->realm) + realm = in_creds->client->realm; + else + realm = in_creds->server->realm; + + addrs.len = 0; + addrs.val = NULL; + paddrs = &addrs; + + /* + * If tickets are address-less, forward address-less tickets. + */ + + ret = _krb5_get_krbtgt (context, + ccache, + realm, + &ticket); + if(ret == 0) { + if (ticket->addresses.len == 0) + paddrs = NULL; + krb5_free_creds (context, ticket); + } + + if (paddrs != NULL) { + + ret = getaddrinfo (hostname, NULL, NULL, &ai); + if (ret) { + save_errno = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "resolving %s: %s", + hostname, gai_strerror(ret)); + return krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(ret, save_errno); + } + + ret = add_addrs (context, &addrs, ai); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + kdc_flags.i = flags; + + ret = krb5_get_kdc_cred (context, + ccache, + kdc_flags, + paddrs, + NULL, + in_creds, + &out_creds); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addrs); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + memset (&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + cred.pvno = 5; + cred.msg_type = krb_cred; + ALLOC_SEQ(&cred.tickets, 1); + if (cred.tickets.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out2; + } + ret = decode_Ticket(out_creds->ticket.data, + out_creds->ticket.length, + cred.tickets.val, &len); + if (ret) + goto out3; + + memset (&enc_krb_cred_part, 0, sizeof(enc_krb_cred_part)); + ALLOC_SEQ(&enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out4; + } + + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + int32_t sec, usec; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + ALLOC(enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out4; + } + *enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp = sec; + ALLOC(enc_krb_cred_part.usec, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.usec == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out4; + } + *enc_krb_cred_part.usec = usec; + } else { + enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp = NULL; + enc_krb_cred_part.usec = NULL; + } + + if (auth_context->local_address && auth_context->local_port) { + krb5_boolean noaddr; + krb5_const_realm realm; + + realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, out_creds->server); + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, realm, "no-addresses", FALSE, + &noaddr); + if (!noaddr) { + ret = krb5_make_addrport (context, + &enc_krb_cred_part.s_address, + auth_context->local_address, + auth_context->local_port); + if (ret) + goto out4; + } + } + + if (auth_context->remote_address) { + if (auth_context->remote_port) { + krb5_boolean noaddr; + krb5_const_realm realm; + + realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, out_creds->server); + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, NULL, realm, "no-addresses", + FALSE, &noaddr); + if (!noaddr) { + ret = krb5_make_addrport (context, + &enc_krb_cred_part.r_address, + auth_context->remote_address, + auth_context->remote_port); + if (ret) + goto out4; + } + } else { + ALLOC(enc_krb_cred_part.r_address, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.r_address == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out4; + } + + ret = krb5_copy_address (context, auth_context->remote_address, + enc_krb_cred_part.r_address); + if (ret) + goto out4; + } + } + + /* fill ticket_info.val[0] */ + + enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.len = 1; + + krb_cred_info = enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.val; + + copy_EncryptionKey (&out_creds->session, &krb_cred_info->key); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->prealm, 1); + copy_Realm (&out_creds->client->realm, krb_cred_info->prealm); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->pname, 1); + copy_PrincipalName(&out_creds->client->name, krb_cred_info->pname); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->flags, 1); + *krb_cred_info->flags = out_creds->flags.b; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->authtime, 1); + *krb_cred_info->authtime = out_creds->times.authtime; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->starttime, 1); + *krb_cred_info->starttime = out_creds->times.starttime; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->endtime, 1); + *krb_cred_info->endtime = out_creds->times.endtime; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->renew_till, 1); + *krb_cred_info->renew_till = out_creds->times.renew_till; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->srealm, 1); + copy_Realm (&out_creds->server->realm, krb_cred_info->srealm); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->sname, 1); + copy_PrincipalName (&out_creds->server->name, krb_cred_info->sname); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->caddr, 1); + copy_HostAddresses (&out_creds->addresses, krb_cred_info->caddr); + + krb5_free_creds (context, out_creds); + + /* encode EncKrbCredPart */ + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncKrbCredPart, buf, buf_size, + &enc_krb_cred_part, &len, ret); + free_EncKrbCredPart (&enc_krb_cred_part); + if (ret) { + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); + return ret; + } + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_CRED, + buf, + len, + 0, + &cred.enc_part); + free(buf); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); + return ret; + } + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB_CRED, buf, buf_size, &cred, &len, ret); + free_KRB_CRED (&cred); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + out_data->length = len; + out_data->data = buf; + return 0; + out4: + free_EncKrbCredPart(&enc_krb_cred_part); + out3: + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); + out2: + krb5_free_creds (context, out_creds); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2b4280f8b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_host_realm.c,v 1.29 2002/08/28 13:36:57 nectar Exp $"); + +/* To automagically find the correct realm of a host (without + * [domain_realm] in krb5.conf) add a text record for your domain with + * the name of your realm, like this: + * + * _kerberos IN TXT "FOO.SE" + * + * The search is recursive, so you can add entries for specific + * hosts. To find the realm of host a.b.c, it first tries + * _kerberos.a.b.c, then _kerberos.b.c and so on. + * + * This method is described in draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-03.txt. + * + */ + +static int +copy_txt_to_realms (struct resource_record *head, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + struct resource_record *rr; + int n, i; + + for(n = 0, rr = head; rr; rr = rr->next) + if (rr->type == T_TXT) + ++n; + + if (n == 0) + return -1; + + *realms = malloc ((n + 1) * sizeof(krb5_realm)); + if (*realms == NULL) + return -1; + + for (i = 0; i < n + 1; ++i) + (*realms)[i] = NULL; + + for (i = 0, rr = head; rr; rr = rr->next) { + if (rr->type == T_TXT) { + char *tmp; + + tmp = strdup(rr->u.txt); + if (tmp == NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + free ((*realms)[i]); + free (*realms); + return -1; + } + (*realms)[i] = tmp; + ++i; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +dns_find_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *domain, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + static char *default_labels[] = { "_kerberos", NULL }; + char dom[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + struct dns_reply *r; + char **labels; + int i, ret; + + labels = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "dns_lookup_realm_labels", NULL); + if(labels == NULL) + labels = default_labels; + if(*domain == '.') + domain++; + for (i = 0; labels[i] != NULL; i++) { + if(snprintf(dom, sizeof(dom), "%s.%s.", labels[i], domain) >= + sizeof(dom)) + return -1; + r = dns_lookup(dom, "TXT"); + if(r != NULL) { + ret = copy_txt_to_realms (r->head, realms); + dns_free_data(r); + if(ret == 0) + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * Try to figure out what realms host in `domain' belong to from the + * configuration file. + */ + +static int +config_find_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *domain, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + char **tmp = krb5_config_get_strings (context, NULL, + "domain_realm", + domain, + NULL); + + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; + *realms = tmp; + return 0; +} + +/* + * This function assumes that `host' is a FQDN (and doesn't handle the + * special case of host == NULL either). + * Try to find mapping in the config file or DNS and it that fails, + * fall back to guessing + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm_int (krb5_context context, + const char *host, + krb5_boolean use_dns, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + const char *p, *q; + krb5_boolean dns_locate_enable; + + dns_locate_enable = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, TRUE, + "libdefaults", "dns_lookup_realm", NULL); + for (p = host; p != NULL; p = strchr (p + 1, '.')) { + if(config_find_realm(context, p, realms) == 0) { + if(strcasecmp(*realms[0], "dns_locate") == 0) { + if(use_dns) + for (q = host; q != NULL; q = strchr(q + 1, '.')) + if(dns_find_realm(context, q, realms) == 0) + return 0; + continue; + } else + return 0; + } + else if(use_dns && dns_locate_enable) { + if(dns_find_realm(context, p, realms) == 0) + return 0; + } + } + p = strchr(host, '.'); + if(p != NULL) { + p++; + *realms = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_realm)); + if (*realms == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*realms)[0] = strdup(p); + if((*realms)[0] == NULL) { + free(*realms); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + strupr((*realms)[0]); + (*realms)[1] = NULL; + return 0; + } + krb5_set_error_string(context, "unable to find realm of host %s", host); + return KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN; +} + +/* + * Return the realm(s) of `host' as a NULL-terminated list in `realms'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *host, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + if (host == NULL) { + if (gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname))) + return errno; + host = hostname; + } + + return krb5_get_host_realm_int (context, host, 1, realms); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88943e7e0f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c @@ -0,0 +1,827 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt.c,v 1.107.2.1 2003/09/18 21:00:09 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_etype (krb5_context context, + unsigned *len, + krb5_enctype **val, + const krb5_enctype *etypes) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_enctype *tmp = NULL; + + ret = 0; + if (etypes == NULL) { + ret = krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes(context, + &tmp); + if (ret) + return ret; + etypes = tmp; + } + + for (i = 0; etypes[i]; ++i) + ; + *len = i; + *val = malloc(i * sizeof(**val)); + if (i != 0 && *val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto cleanup; + } + memmove (*val, + etypes, + i * sizeof(*tmp)); +cleanup: + if (tmp != NULL) + free (tmp); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_tkt (krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_key_usage usage, + krb5_const_pointer decrypt_arg, + krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + size_t size; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + usage, + &dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_EncASRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + if (ret) + ret = krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + krb5_data_free (&data); + if (ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +int +_krb5_extract_ticket(krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_rep *rep, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_key_usage key_usage, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + unsigned nonce, + krb5_boolean allow_server_mismatch, + krb5_boolean ignore_cname, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal tmp_principal; + int tmp; + time_t tmp_time; + krb5_timestamp sec_now; + + ret = principalname2krb5_principal (&tmp_principal, + rep->kdc_rep.cname, + rep->kdc_rep.crealm); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* compare client */ + + if (!ignore_cname) { + tmp = krb5_principal_compare (context, tmp_principal, creds->client); + if (!tmp) { + krb5_free_principal (context, tmp_principal); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + } + + krb5_free_principal (context, creds->client); + creds->client = tmp_principal; + + /* extract ticket */ + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, creds->ticket.data, creds->ticket.length, + &rep->kdc_rep.ticket, &creds->ticket.length, ret); + if(ret) + goto out; + creds->second_ticket.length = 0; + creds->second_ticket.data = NULL; + + /* compare server */ + + ret = principalname2krb5_principal (&tmp_principal, + rep->kdc_rep.ticket.sname, + rep->kdc_rep.ticket.realm); + if (ret) + goto out; + if(allow_server_mismatch){ + krb5_free_principal(context, creds->server); + creds->server = tmp_principal; + tmp_principal = NULL; + }else{ + tmp = krb5_principal_compare (context, tmp_principal, creds->server); + krb5_free_principal (context, tmp_principal); + if (!tmp) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + } + + /* decrypt */ + + if (decrypt_proc == NULL) + decrypt_proc = decrypt_tkt; + + ret = (*decrypt_proc)(context, key, key_usage, decryptarg, rep); + if (ret) + goto out; + +#if 0 + /* XXX should this decode be here, or in the decrypt_proc? */ + ret = krb5_decode_keyblock(context, &rep->enc_part.key, 1); + if(ret) + goto out; +#endif + + /* compare nonces */ + + if (nonce != rep->enc_part.nonce) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out; + } + + /* set kdc-offset */ + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec_now); + if (rep->enc_part.flags.initial + && context->kdc_sec_offset == 0 + && krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "kdc_timesync", + NULL)) { + context->kdc_sec_offset = rep->enc_part.authtime - sec_now; + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec_now); + } + + /* check all times */ + + if (rep->enc_part.starttime) { + tmp_time = *rep->enc_part.starttime; + } else + tmp_time = rep->enc_part.authtime; + + if (creds->times.starttime == 0 + && abs(tmp_time - sec_now) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "time skew (%d) larger than max (%d)", + abs(tmp_time - sec_now), + (int)context->max_skew); + goto out; + } + + if (creds->times.starttime != 0 + && tmp_time != creds->times.starttime) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + creds->times.starttime = tmp_time; + + if (rep->enc_part.renew_till) { + tmp_time = *rep->enc_part.renew_till; + } else + tmp_time = 0; + + if (creds->times.renew_till != 0 + && tmp_time > creds->times.renew_till) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + creds->times.renew_till = tmp_time; + + creds->times.authtime = rep->enc_part.authtime; + + if (creds->times.endtime != 0 + && rep->enc_part.endtime > creds->times.endtime) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + creds->times.endtime = rep->enc_part.endtime; + + if(rep->enc_part.caddr) + krb5_copy_addresses (context, rep->enc_part.caddr, &creds->addresses); + else if(addrs) + krb5_copy_addresses (context, addrs, &creds->addresses); + else { + creds->addresses.len = 0; + creds->addresses.val = NULL; + } + creds->flags.b = rep->enc_part.flags; + + creds->authdata.len = 0; + creds->authdata.val = NULL; + creds->session.keyvalue.length = 0; + creds->session.keyvalue.data = NULL; + creds->session.keytype = rep->enc_part.key.keytype; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&creds->session.keyvalue, + rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.data, + rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.length); + +out: + memset (rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.data, 0, + rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.length); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +make_pa_enc_timestamp(krb5_context context, PA_DATA *pa, + krb5_enctype etype, krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + EncryptedData encdata; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t sec, usec; + int usec2; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + p.patimestamp = sec; + usec2 = usec; + p.pausec = &usec2; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, + buf, + len, + 0, + &encdata); + free(buf); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret); + free_EncryptedData(&encdata); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; + pa->padata_value.length = len; + pa->padata_value.data = buf; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +add_padata(krb5_context context, + METHOD_DATA *md, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_enctype *enctypes, + unsigned netypes, + krb5_salt *salt) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + PA_DATA *pa2; + krb5_salt salt2; + krb5_enctype *ep; + int i; + + if(salt == NULL) { + /* default to standard salt */ + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt (context, client, &salt2); + salt = &salt2; + } + if (!enctypes) { + enctypes = context->etypes; + netypes = 0; + for (ep = enctypes; *ep != ETYPE_NULL; ep++) + netypes++; + } + pa2 = realloc (md->val, (md->len + netypes) * sizeof(*md->val)); + if (pa2 == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + md->val = pa2; + + for (i = 0; i < netypes; ++i) { + krb5_keyblock *key; + + ret = (*key_proc)(context, enctypes[i], *salt, keyseed, &key); + if (ret) + continue; + ret = make_pa_enc_timestamp (context, &md->val[md->len], + enctypes[i], key); + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + if (ret) + return ret; + ++md->len; + } + if(salt == &salt2) + krb5_free_salt(context, salt2); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +init_as_req (krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_flags opts, + krb5_creds *creds, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + const krb5_preauthdata *preauth, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + unsigned nonce, + AS_REQ *a) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_salt salt; + + memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); + + a->pvno = 5; + a->msg_type = krb_as_req; + a->req_body.kdc_options = opts.b; + a->req_body.cname = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.cname)); + if (a->req_body.cname == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + a->req_body.sname = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.sname)); + if (a->req_body.sname == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_principal2principalname (a->req_body.cname, creds->client); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_principal2principalname (a->req_body.sname, creds->server); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = copy_Realm(&creds->client->realm, &a->req_body.realm); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + if(creds->times.starttime) { + a->req_body.from = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.from)); + if (a->req_body.from == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + *a->req_body.from = creds->times.starttime; + } + if(creds->times.endtime){ + ALLOC(a->req_body.till, 1); + *a->req_body.till = creds->times.endtime; + } + if(creds->times.renew_till){ + a->req_body.rtime = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.rtime)); + if (a->req_body.rtime == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + *a->req_body.rtime = creds->times.renew_till; + } + a->req_body.nonce = nonce; + ret = krb5_init_etype (context, + &a->req_body.etype.len, + &a->req_body.etype.val, + etypes); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* + * This means no addresses + */ + + if (addrs && addrs->len == 0) { + a->req_body.addresses = NULL; + } else { + a->req_body.addresses = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.addresses)); + if (a->req_body.addresses == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + + if (addrs) + ret = krb5_copy_addresses(context, addrs, a->req_body.addresses); + else { + ret = krb5_get_all_client_addrs (context, a->req_body.addresses); + if(ret == 0 && a->req_body.addresses->len == 0) { + free(a->req_body.addresses); + a->req_body.addresses = NULL; + } + } + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + a->req_body.enc_authorization_data = NULL; + a->req_body.additional_tickets = NULL; + + if(preauth != NULL) { + int i; + ALLOC(a->padata, 1); + if(a->padata == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + for(i = 0; i < preauth->len; i++) { + if(preauth->val[i].type == KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP){ + int j; + PA_DATA *tmp = realloc(a->padata->val, + (a->padata->len + + preauth->val[i].info.len) * + sizeof(*a->padata->val)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + a->padata->val = tmp; + for(j = 0; j < preauth->val[i].info.len; j++) { + krb5_salt *sp = &salt; + if(preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salttype) + salt.salttype = *preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salttype; + else + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + if(preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salt) + salt.saltvalue = *preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salt; + else + if(salt.salttype == KRB5_PW_SALT) + sp = NULL; + else + krb5_data_zero(&salt.saltvalue); + ret = add_padata(context, a->padata, creds->client, + key_proc, keyseed, + &preauth->val[i].info.val[j].etype, 1, + sp); + if (ret == 0) + break; + } + } + } + } else + /* not sure this is the way to use `ptypes' */ + if (ptypes == NULL || *ptypes == KRB5_PADATA_NONE) + a->padata = NULL; + else if (*ptypes == KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP) { + ALLOC(a->padata, 1); + if (a->padata == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto fail; + } + a->padata->len = 0; + a->padata->val = NULL; + + /* make a v5 salted pa-data */ + add_padata(context, a->padata, creds->client, + key_proc, keyseed, a->req_body.etype.val, + a->req_body.etype.len, NULL); + + /* make a v4 salted pa-data */ + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + krb5_data_zero(&salt.saltvalue); + add_padata(context, a->padata, creds->client, + key_proc, keyseed, a->req_body.etype.val, + a->req_body.etype.len, &salt); + } else { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "pre-auth type %d not supported", + *ptypes); + ret = KRB5_PREAUTH_BAD_TYPE; + goto fail; + } + return 0; +fail: + free_AS_REQ(a); + return ret; +} + +static int +set_ptypes(krb5_context context, + KRB_ERROR *error, + krb5_preauthtype **ptypes, + krb5_preauthdata **preauth) +{ + static krb5_preauthdata preauth2; + static krb5_preauthtype ptypes2[] = { KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, KRB5_PADATA_NONE }; + + if(error->e_data) { + METHOD_DATA md; + int i; + decode_METHOD_DATA(error->e_data->data, + error->e_data->length, + &md, + NULL); + for(i = 0; i < md.len; i++){ + switch(md.val[i].padata_type){ + case KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP: + *ptypes = ptypes2; + break; + case KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO: + *preauth = &preauth2; + ALLOC_SEQ(*preauth, 1); + (*preauth)->val[0].type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; + krb5_decode_ETYPE_INFO(context, + md.val[i].padata_value.data, + md.val[i].padata_value.length, + &(*preauth)->val[0].info, + NULL); + break; + default: + break; + } + } + free_METHOD_DATA(&md); + } else { + *ptypes = ptypes2; + } + return(1); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + const krb5_preauthdata *preauth, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + AS_REQ a; + krb5_kdc_rep rep; + krb5_data req, resp; + size_t len; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_keyblock *key; + size_t size; + krb5_kdc_flags opts; + PA_DATA *pa; + krb5_enctype etype; + krb5_preauthdata *my_preauth = NULL; + unsigned nonce; + int done; + + opts.i = options; + + krb5_generate_random_block (&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + nonce &= 0xffffffff; + + do { + done = 1; + ret = init_as_req (context, + opts, + creds, + addrs, + etypes, + ptypes, + preauth, + key_proc, + keyseed, + nonce, + &a); + if (my_preauth) { + free_ETYPE_INFO(&my_preauth->val[0].info); + free (my_preauth->val); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REQ, req.data, req.length, &a, &len, ret); + free_AS_REQ(&a); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(len != req.length) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + ret = krb5_sendto_kdc (context, &req, &creds->client->realm, &resp); + krb5_data_free(&req); + if (ret) + return ret; + + memset (&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + ret = decode_AS_REP(resp.data, resp.length, &rep.kdc_rep, &size); + if(ret) { + /* let's try to parse it as a KRB-ERROR */ + KRB_ERROR error; + int ret2; + + ret2 = krb5_rd_error(context, &resp, &error); + if(ret2 && resp.data && ((char*)resp.data)[0] == 4) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY; + krb5_data_free(&resp); + if (ret2 == 0) { + ret = krb5_error_from_rd_error(context, &error, creds); + /* if no preauth was set and KDC requires it, give it + one more try */ + if (!ptypes && !preauth + && ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED +#if 0 + || ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION +#endif + && set_ptypes(context, &error, &ptypes, &my_preauth)) { + done = 0; + preauth = my_preauth; + krb5_free_error_contents(context, &error); + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + continue; + } + if(ret_as_reply) + ret_as_reply->error = error; + else + free_KRB_ERROR (&error); + return ret; + } + return ret; + } + krb5_data_free(&resp); + } while(!done); + + pa = NULL; + etype = rep.kdc_rep.enc_part.etype; + if(rep.kdc_rep.padata){ + int index = 0; + pa = krb5_find_padata(rep.kdc_rep.padata->val, rep.kdc_rep.padata->len, + KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT, &index); + if(pa == NULL) { + index = 0; + pa = krb5_find_padata(rep.kdc_rep.padata->val, + rep.kdc_rep.padata->len, + KRB5_PADATA_AFS3_SALT, &index); + } + } + if(pa) { + salt.salttype = pa->padata_type; + salt.saltvalue = pa->padata_value; + + ret = (*key_proc)(context, etype, salt, keyseed, &key); + } else { + /* make a v5 salted pa-data */ + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt (context, creds->client, &salt); + + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = (*key_proc)(context, etype, salt, keyseed, &key); + krb5_free_salt(context, salt); + } + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = _krb5_extract_ticket(context, + &rep, + creds, + key, + keyseed, + KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART, + NULL, + nonce, + FALSE, + opts.b.request_anonymous, + decrypt_proc, + decryptarg); + memset (key->keyvalue.data, 0, key->keyvalue.length); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, key); + free (key); + +out: + if (ret == 0 && ret_as_reply) + *ret_as_reply = rep; + else + krb5_free_kdc_rep (context, &rep); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kdc_flags opts; + opts.i = 0; + opts.b = int2KDCOptions(options); + + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, + opts.i, + addrs, + etypes, + ptypes, + NULL, + key_proc, + keyseed, + decrypt_proc, + decryptarg, + creds, + ret_as_reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + if (ccache) + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, ccache, creds); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4f5c80134 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt_pw.c,v 1.16 2001/05/14 06:14:48 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_password_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *password = (const char *)keyseed; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + + *key = malloc (sizeof (**key)); + if (*key == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if (password == NULL) { + if(des_read_pw_string (buf, sizeof(buf), "Password: ", 0)) { + free (*key); + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR; + } + password = buf; + } + ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt (context, type, password, salt, *key); + memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password (krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + const char *password, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + return krb5_get_in_tkt (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + krb5_password_key_proc, + password, + NULL, + NULL, + creds, + ccache, + ret_as_reply); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c5feee4581 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c,v 1.6 2001/05/14 06:14:48 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytab_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *args = (krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *)keyseed; + krb5_keytab keytab = args->keytab; + krb5_principal principal = args->principal; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab real_keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + if(keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_default(context, &real_keytab); + else + real_keytab = keytab; + + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, real_keytab, principal, + 0, enctype, &entry); + + if (keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_close (context, real_keytab); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab (krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *a; + + a = malloc(sizeof(*a)); + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + a->principal = creds->client; + a->keytab = keytab; + + return krb5_get_in_tkt (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + krb5_keytab_key_proc, + a, + NULL, + NULL, + creds, + ccache, + ret_as_reply); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..773d361758 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt_with_skey.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_skey_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + return krb5_copy_keyblock (context, keyseed, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_skey (krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + if(key == NULL) + return krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + NULL, + ccache, + creds, + ret_as_reply); + else + return krb5_get_in_tkt (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + krb5_skey_key_proc, + key, + NULL, + NULL, + creds, + ccache, + ret_as_reply); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_port.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_port.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c517414bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/get_port.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_port.c,v 1.8 2001/01/27 19:24:34 joda Exp $"); + +int +krb5_getportbyname (krb5_context context, + const char *service, + const char *proto, + int default_port) +{ + struct servent *sp; + + if ((sp = roken_getservbyname (service, proto)) == NULL) { +#if 0 + krb5_warnx(context, "%s/%s unknown service, using default port %d", + service, proto, default_port); +#endif + return htons(default_port); + } else + return sp->s_port; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/heim_err.et b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/heim_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67642a53db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/heim_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +# +# Error messages for the krb5 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: heim_err.et,v 1.12 2001/06/21 03:51:36 assar Exp $" + +error_table heim + +prefix HEIM_ERR + +error_code LOG_PARSE, "Error parsing log destination" +error_code V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, "Failed to convert v4 principal" +error_code SALTTYPE_NOSUPP, "Salt type is not supported by enctype" +error_code NOHOST, "Host not found" +error_code OPNOTSUPP, "Operation not supported" +error_code EOF, "End of file" +error_code BAD_MKEY, "Failed to get the master key" +error_code SERVICE_NOMATCH, "Unacceptable service used" + +index 128 +prefix HEIM_EAI +#error_code NOERROR, "no error" +error_code UNKNOWN, "unknown error from getaddrinfo" +error_code ADDRFAMILY, "address family for nodename not supported" +error_code AGAIN, "temporary failure in name resolution" +error_code BADFLAGS, "invalid value for ai_flags" +error_code FAIL, "non-recoverable failure in name resolution" +error_code FAMILY, "ai_family not supported" +error_code MEMORY, "memory allocation failure" +error_code NODATA, "no address associated with nodename" +error_code NONAME, "nodename nor servname provided, or not known" +error_code SERVICE, "servname not supported for ai_socktype" +error_code SOCKTYPE, "ai_socktype not supported" +error_code SYSTEM, "system error returned in errno" +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/init_creds.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/init_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f9300596e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/init_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_creds.c,v 1.9 2001/07/03 18:42:07 assar Exp $"); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt) +{ + memset (opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); + opt->flags = 0; +} + +static int +get_config_time (krb5_context context, + const char *realm, + const char *name, + int def) +{ + int ret; + + ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + name, + NULL); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + name, + NULL); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + return def; +} + +static krb5_boolean +get_config_bool (krb5_context context, + const char *realm, + const char *name) +{ + return krb5_config_get_bool (context, + NULL, + "realms", + realm, + name, + NULL) + || krb5_config_get_bool (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + name, + NULL); +} + +/* + * set all the values in `opt' to the appropriate values for + * application `appname' (default to getprogname() if NULL), and realm + * `realm'. First looks in [appdefaults] but falls back to + * [realms] or [libdefaults] for some of the values. + */ + +static krb5_addresses no_addrs = {0, NULL}; + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(krb5_context context, + const char *appname, + krb5_const_realm realm, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt) +{ + krb5_boolean b; + time_t t; + + b = get_config_bool (context, realm, "forwardable"); + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, appname, realm, "forwardable", b, &b); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opt, b); + + b = get_config_bool (context, realm, "proxiable"); + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, appname, realm, "proxiable", b, &b); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (opt, b); + + krb5_appdefault_time(context, appname, realm, "ticket_lifetime", 0, &t); + if (t == 0) + t = get_config_time (context, realm, "ticket_lifetime", 0); + if(t != 0) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opt, t); + + krb5_appdefault_time(context, appname, realm, "renew_lifetime", 0, &t); + if (t == 0) + t = get_config_time (context, realm, "renew_lifetime", 0); + if(t != 0) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opt, t); + + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, appname, realm, "no-addresses", FALSE, &b); + if (b) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list (opt, &no_addrs); + +#if 0 + krb5_appdefault_boolean(context, appname, realm, "anonymous", FALSE, &b); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous (opt, b); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(opt, enctype, + etype_str.num_strings); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_data *salt); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list, + int preauth_list_length); +#endif +} + + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat tkt_life) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE; + opt->tkt_life = tkt_life; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat renew_life) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE; + opt->renew_life = renew_life; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int forwardable) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE; + opt->forwardable = forwardable; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int proxiable) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE; + opt->proxiable = proxiable; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_enctype *etype_list, + int etype_list_length) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST; + opt->etype_list = etype_list; + opt->etype_list_length = etype_list_length; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST; + opt->address_list = addresses; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list, + int preauth_list_length) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST; + opt->preauth_list_length = preauth_list_length; + opt->preauth_list = preauth_list; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_data *salt) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT; + opt->salt = salt; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int anonymous) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS; + opt->anonymous = anonymous; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e54e7c4f2d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c @@ -0,0 +1,575 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_creds_pw.c,v 1.55.2.1 2004/08/30 23:21:07 lha Exp $"); + +static int +get_config_time (krb5_context context, + const char *realm, + const char *name, + int def) +{ + int ret; + + ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + name, + NULL); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + name, + NULL); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + return def; +} + +static krb5_error_code +init_cred (krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + int tmp; + krb5_timestamp now; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &now); + + memset (cred, 0, sizeof(*cred)); + + if (client) + krb5_copy_principal(context, client, &cred->client); + else { + ret = krb5_get_default_principal (context, + &cred->client); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, cred->client); + + if (start_time) + cred->times.starttime = now + start_time; + + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE) + tmp = options->tkt_life; + else + tmp = 10 * 60 * 60; + cred->times.endtime = now + tmp; + + if ((options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE) && + options->renew_life > 0) { + cred->times.renew_till = now + options->renew_life; + } + + if (in_tkt_service) { + krb5_realm server_realm; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, in_tkt_service, &cred->server); + if (ret) + goto out; + server_realm = strdup (*client_realm); + free (*krb5_princ_realm(context, cred->server)); + krb5_princ_set_realm (context, cred->server, &server_realm); + } else { + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &cred->server, + *client_realm, KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + return 0; + +out: + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, cred); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Print a message (str) to the user about the expiration in `lr' + */ + +static void +report_expiration (krb5_context context, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + krb5_data *data, + const char *str, + time_t time) +{ + char *p; + + asprintf (&p, "%s%s", str, ctime(&time)); + (*prompter) (context, data, NULL, p, 0, NULL); + free (p); +} + +/* + * Parse the last_req data and show it to the user if it's interesting + */ + +static void +print_expire (krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realm, + krb5_kdc_rep *rep, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int i; + LastReq *lr = &rep->enc_part.last_req; + krb5_timestamp sec; + time_t t; + krb5_boolean reported = FALSE; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + t = sec + get_config_time (context, + *realm, + "warn_pwexpire", + 7 * 24 * 60 * 60); + + for (i = 0; i < lr->len; ++i) { + if (lr->val[i].lr_value <= t) { + switch (abs(lr->val[i].lr_type)) { + case LR_PW_EXPTIME : + report_expiration(context, prompter, data, + "Your password will expire at ", + lr->val[i].lr_value); + reported = TRUE; + break; + case LR_ACCT_EXPTIME : + report_expiration(context, prompter, data, + "Your account will expire at ", + lr->val[i].lr_value); + reported = TRUE; + break; + } + } + } + + if (!reported + && rep->enc_part.key_expiration + && *rep->enc_part.key_expiration <= t) { + report_expiration(context, prompter, data, + "Your password/account will expire at ", + *rep->enc_part.key_expiration); + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_init_creds_common(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options, + krb5_addresses **addrs, + krb5_enctype **etypes, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_preauthtype **pre_auth_types, + krb5_kdc_flags *flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt default_opt; + + if (options == NULL) { + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&default_opt); + options = &default_opt; + } + + ret = init_cred (context, cred, client, start_time, + in_tkt_service, options); + if (ret) + return ret; + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, cred->client); + + flags->i = 0; + + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE) + flags->b.forwardable = options->forwardable; + + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE) + flags->b.proxiable = options->proxiable; + + if (start_time) + flags->b.postdated = 1; + if (cred->times.renew_till) + flags->b.renewable = 1; + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST) + *addrs = options->address_list; + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST) { + *etypes = malloc((options->etype_list_length + 1) + * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + if (*etypes == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*etypes, options->etype_list, + options->etype_list_length * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + (*etypes)[options->etype_list_length] = ETYPE_NULL; + } + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST) { + *pre_auth_types = malloc((options->preauth_list_length + 1) + * sizeof(krb5_preauthtype)); + if (*pre_auth_types == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*pre_auth_types, options->preauth_list, + options->preauth_list_length * sizeof(krb5_preauthtype)); + (*pre_auth_types)[options->preauth_list_length] = KRB5_PADATA_NONE; + } + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT) + ; /* XXX */ + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS) + flags->b.request_anonymous = options->anonymous; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +change_password (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + char *newpw, + size_t newpw_sz, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *old_options) +{ + krb5_prompt prompts[2]; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cpw_cred; + char buf1[BUFSIZ], buf2[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_data password_data[2]; + int result_code; + krb5_data result_code_string; + krb5_data result_string; + char *p; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt options; + + memset (&cpw_cred, 0, sizeof(cpw_cred)); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&options); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&options, 60); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable (&options, FALSE); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (&options, FALSE); + if (old_options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list (&options, + old_options->preauth_list, + old_options->preauth_list_length); + + krb5_data_zero (&result_code_string); + krb5_data_zero (&result_string); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cpw_cred, + client, + password, + prompter, + data, + 0, + "kadmin/changepw", + &options); + if (ret) + goto out; + + for(;;) { + password_data[0].data = buf1; + password_data[0].length = sizeof(buf1); + + prompts[0].hidden = 1; + prompts[0].prompt = "New password: "; + prompts[0].reply = &password_data[0]; + prompts[0].type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD; + + password_data[1].data = buf2; + password_data[1].length = sizeof(buf2); + + prompts[1].hidden = 1; + prompts[1].prompt = "Repeat new password: "; + prompts[1].reply = &password_data[1]; + prompts[1].type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD_AGAIN; + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, NULL, "Changing password", + 2, prompts); + if (ret) { + memset (buf1, 0, sizeof(buf1)); + memset (buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2)); + goto out; + } + + if (strcmp (buf1, buf2) == 0) + break; + memset (buf1, 0, sizeof(buf1)); + memset (buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2)); + } + + ret = krb5_change_password (context, + &cpw_cred, + buf1, + &result_code, + &result_code_string, + &result_string); + if (ret) + goto out; + asprintf (&p, "%s: %.*s\n", + result_code ? "Error" : "Success", + (int)result_string.length, + (char*)result_string.data); + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, NULL, p, 0, NULL); + free (p); + if (result_code == 0) { + strlcpy (newpw, buf1, newpw_sz); + ret = 0; + } else { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "failed changing password"); + ret = ENOTTY; + } + +out: + memset (buf1, 0, sizeof(buf1)); + memset (buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2)); + krb5_data_free (&result_string); + krb5_data_free (&result_code_string); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cpw_cred); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_password(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_addresses *addrs = NULL; + krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL; + krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types = NULL; + krb5_creds this_cred; + krb5_kdc_rep kdc_reply; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_data password_data; + int done; + + memset(&kdc_reply, 0, sizeof(kdc_reply)); + + ret = get_init_creds_common(context, creds, client, start_time, + in_tkt_service, options, + &addrs, &etypes, &this_cred, &pre_auth_types, + &flags); + if(ret) + goto out; + + if (password == NULL) { + krb5_prompt prompt; + char *p, *q; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, this_cred.client, &p); + asprintf (&q, "%s's Password: ", p); + free (p); + prompt.prompt = q; + password_data.data = buf; + password_data.length = sizeof(buf); + prompt.hidden = 1; + prompt.reply = &password_data; + prompt.type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PASSWORD; + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, NULL, NULL, 1, &prompt); + free (q); + if (ret) { + memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + ret = KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + password = password_data.data; + } + + done = 0; + while(!done) { + memset(&kdc_reply, 0, sizeof(kdc_reply)); + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, + flags.i, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + NULL, + krb5_password_key_proc, + password, + NULL, + NULL, + &this_cred, + &kdc_reply); + switch (ret) { + case 0 : + done = 1; + break; + case KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED : + /* try to avoid recursion */ + + if (prompter == NULL) + goto out; + + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + + if (in_tkt_service != NULL + && strcmp (in_tkt_service, "kadmin/changepw") == 0) + goto out; + + ret = change_password (context, + client, + password, + buf, + sizeof(buf), + prompter, + data, + options); + if (ret) + goto out; + password = buf; + break; + default: + goto out; + } + } + + if (prompter) + print_expire (context, + krb5_princ_realm (context, this_cred.client), + &kdc_reply, + prompter, + data); +out: + memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + krb5_free_kdc_rep (context, &kdc_reply); + + free (pre_auth_types); + free (etypes); + if (ret == 0 && creds) + *creds = this_cred; + else + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keyblock_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype type, + krb5_data *salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + return krb5_copy_keyblock (context, keyseed, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_addresses *addrs = NULL; + krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL; + krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types = NULL; + krb5_creds this_cred; + krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *a; + + ret = get_init_creds_common(context, creds, client, start_time, + in_tkt_service, options, + &addrs, &etypes, &this_cred, &pre_auth_types, + &flags); + if(ret) + goto out; + + a = malloc (sizeof(*a)); + if (a == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + a->principal = this_cred.client; + a->keytab = keytab; + + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, + flags.i, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + NULL, + krb5_keytab_key_proc, + a, + NULL, + NULL, + &this_cred, + NULL); + free (a); + + if (ret) + goto out; + free (pre_auth_types); + free (etypes); + if (creds) + *creds = this_cred; + else + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return 0; + +out: + free (pre_auth_types); + free (etypes); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/k524_err.et b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/k524_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2dc60f46ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/k524_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# +# Error messages for the k524 functions +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: k524_err.et,v 1.1 2001/06/20 02:44:11 joda Exp $" + +error_table k524 + +prefix KRB524 +error_code BADKEY, "wrong keytype in ticket" +error_code BADADDR, "incorrect network address" +error_code BADPRINC, "cannot convert V5 principal" #unused +error_code BADREALM, "V5 realm name longer than V4 maximum" #unused +error_code V4ERR, "kerberos V4 error server" +error_code ENCFULL, "encoding too large at server" +error_code DECEMPTY, "decoding out of data" #unused +error_code NOTRESP, "service not responding" #unused +end + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kerberos.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kerberos.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b0b4980778 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kerberos.8 @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: kerberos.8,v 1.6 2003/03/10 02:19:23 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 1, 2000 +.Dt KERBEROS 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kerberos +.Nd introduction to the Kerberos system +.Sh DESCRIPTION +Kerberos is a network authentication system. Its purpose is to +securely authenticate users and services in an insecure network +environment. +.Pp +This is done with a Kerberos server acting as a trusted third party, +keeping a database with secret keys for all users and services +(collectively called +.Em principals ) . +.Pp +Each principal belongs to exactly one +.Em realm , +which is the administrative domain in Kerberos. A realm usually +corresponds to an organisation, and the realm should normally be +derived from that organisation's domain name. A realm is served by one +or more Kerberos servers. +.Pp +The authentication process involves exchange of +.Sq tickets +and +.Sq authenticators +which together prove the principal's identity. +.Pp +When you login to the Kerberos system, either through the normal +system login or with the +.Xr kinit 1 +program, you acquire a +.Em ticket granting ticket +which allows you to get new tickets for other services, such as +.Ic telnet +or +.Ic ftp , +without giving your password. +.Pp +For more information on how Kerberos works, and other general Kerberos +questions see the Kerberos FAQ at +.Pa http://www.nrl.navy.mil/CCS/people/kenh/kerberos-faq.html . +.Pp +For setup instructions see the Heimdal Texinfo manual. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftp 1 , +.Xr kdestroy 1 , +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr klist 1 , +.Xr kpasswd 1 , +.Xr telnet 1 +.Sh HISTORY +The Kerberos authentication system was developed in the late 1980's as +part of the Athena Project at the Massachusetts Institute of +Technology. Versions one through three never reached outside MIT, but +version 4 was (and still is) quite popular, especially in the academic +community, but is also used in commercial products like the AFS +filesystem. +.Pp +The problems with version 4 are that it has many limitations, the code +was not too well written (since it had been developed over a long +time), and it has a number of known security problems. To resolve many +of these issues work on version five started, and resulted in IETF +RFC1510 in 1993. Since then much work has been put into the further +development, and a new RFC will hopefully appear soon. +.Pp +This manual manual page is part of the +.Nm Heimdal +Kerberos 5 distribution, which has been in development at the Royal +Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden, since about 1997. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kerberos.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kerberos.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..532f38cd17 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kerberos.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ + +KERBEROS(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual KERBEROS(8) + +NNAAMMEE + kkeerrbbeerrooss - introduction to the Kerberos system + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + Kerberos is a network authentication system. Its purpose is to securely + authenticate users and services in an insecure network environment. + + This is done with a Kerberos server acting as a trusted third party, + keeping a database with secret keys for all users and services (collec- + tively called _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_s). + + Each principal belongs to exactly one _r_e_a_l_m, which is the administrative + domain in Kerberos. A realm usually corresponds to an organisation, and + the realm should normally be derived from that organisation's domain + name. A realm is served by one or more Kerberos servers. + + The authentication process involves exchange of `tickets' and + `authenticators' which together prove the principal's identity. + + When you login to the Kerberos system, either through the normal system + login or with the kinit(1) program, you acquire a _t_i_c_k_e_t _g_r_a_n_t_i_n_g _t_i_c_k_e_t + which allows you to get new tickets for other services, such as tteellnneett or + ffttpp, without giving your password. + + For more information on how Kerberos works, and other general Kerberos + questions see the Kerberos FAQ at + _h_t_t_p_:_/_/_w_w_w_._n_r_l_._n_a_v_y_._m_i_l_/_C_C_S_/_p_e_o_p_l_e_/_k_e_n_h_/_k_e_r_b_e_r_o_s_-_f_a_q_._h_t_m_l. + + For setup instructions see the Heimdal Texinfo manual. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + ftp(1), kdestroy(1), kinit(1), klist(1), kpasswd(1), telnet(1) + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + The Kerberos authentication system was developed in the late 1980's as + part of the Athena Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. + Versions one through three never reached outside MIT, but version 4 was + (and still is) quite popular, especially in the academic community, but + is also used in commercial products like the AFS filesystem. + + The problems with version 4 are that it has many limitations, the code + was not too well written (since it had been developed over a long time), + and it has a number of known security problems. To resolve many of these + issues work on version five started, and resulted in IETF RFC1510 in + 1993. Since then much work has been put into the further development, and + a new RFC will hopefully appear soon. + + This manual manual page is part of the HHeeiimmddaall Kerberos 5 distribution, + which has been in development at the Royal Institute of Technology in + Stockholm, Sweden, since about 1997. + + HEIMDAL September 1, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keyblock.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keyblock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7eb7067aab --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keyblock.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keyblock.c,v 1.12 2001/05/14 06:14:48 assar Exp $"); + +void +krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(keyblock) { + if (keyblock->keyvalue.data != NULL) + memset(keyblock->keyvalue.data, 0, keyblock->keyvalue.length); + krb5_data_free (&keyblock->keyvalue); + } +} + +void +krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(keyblock){ + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, keyblock); + free(keyblock); + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *inblock, + krb5_keyblock *to) +{ + return copy_EncryptionKey(inblock, to); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock (krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *inblock, + krb5_keyblock **to) +{ + krb5_keyblock *k; + + k = malloc (sizeof(*k)); + if (k == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *to = k; + return krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context, inblock, k); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9adf99bc08 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab.c @@ -0,0 +1,505 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab.c,v 1.55 2003/03/27 03:45:01 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * Register a new keytab in `ops' + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_register(krb5_context context, + const krb5_kt_ops *ops) +{ + struct krb5_keytab_data *tmp; + + if (strlen(ops->prefix) > KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN - 1) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "krb5_kt_register; prefix too long"); + return KRB5_KT_NAME_TOOLONG; + } + + tmp = realloc(context->kt_types, + (context->num_kt_types + 1) * sizeof(*context->kt_types)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(&tmp[context->num_kt_types], ops, + sizeof(tmp[context->num_kt_types])); + context->kt_types = tmp; + context->num_kt_types++; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Resolve the keytab name (of the form `type:residual') in `name' + * into a keytab in `id'. + * Return 0 or an error + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_keytab *id) +{ + krb5_keytab k; + int i; + const char *type, *residual; + size_t type_len; + krb5_error_code ret; + + residual = strchr(name, ':'); + if(residual == NULL) { + type = "FILE"; + type_len = strlen(type); + residual = name; + } else { + type = name; + type_len = residual - name; + residual++; + } + + for(i = 0; i < context->num_kt_types; i++) { + if(strncasecmp(type, context->kt_types[i].prefix, type_len) == 0) + break; + } + if(i == context->num_kt_types) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "unknown keytab type %.*s", + (int)type_len, type); + return KRB5_KT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; + } + + k = malloc (sizeof(*k)); + if (k == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(k, &context->kt_types[i], sizeof(*k)); + k->data = NULL; + ret = (*k->resolve)(context, residual, k); + if(ret) { + free(k); + k = NULL; + } + *id = k; + return ret; +} + +/* + * copy the name of the default keytab into `name'. + * Return 0 or KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE if `namesize' is too short. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default_name(krb5_context context, char *name, size_t namesize) +{ + if (strlcpy (name, context->default_keytab, namesize) >= namesize) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * copy the name of the default modify keytab into `name'. + * Return 0 or KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE if `namesize' is too short. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default_modify_name(krb5_context context, char *name, size_t namesize) +{ + const char *kt = NULL; + if(context->default_keytab_modify == NULL) { + if(strncasecmp(context->default_keytab, "ANY:", 4) != 0) + kt = context->default_keytab; + else { + size_t len = strcspn(context->default_keytab + 4, ","); + if(len >= namesize) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE; + } + strlcpy(name, context->default_keytab + 4, namesize); + name[len] = '\0'; + return 0; + } + } else + kt = context->default_keytab_modify; + if (strlcpy (name, kt, namesize) >= namesize) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set `id' to the default keytab. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab *id) +{ + return krb5_kt_resolve (context, context->default_keytab, id); +} + +/* + * Read the key identified by `(principal, vno, enctype)' from the + * keytab in `keyprocarg' (the default if == NULL) into `*key'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_read_service_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer keyprocarg, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_kvno vno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if (keyprocarg) + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, keyprocarg, &keytab); + else + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, keytab, principal, vno, enctype, &entry); + krb5_kt_close (context, keytab); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the type of the `keytab' in the string `prefix of length + * `prefixsize'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab keytab, + char *prefix, + size_t prefixsize) +{ + strlcpy(prefix, keytab->prefix, prefixsize); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Retrieve the name of the keytab `keytab' into `name', `namesize' + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab keytab, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + return (*keytab->get_name)(context, keytab, name, namesize); +} + +/* + * Finish using the keytab in `id'. All resources will be released. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = (*id->close)(context, id); + if(ret == 0) + free(id); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compare `entry' against `principal, vno, enctype'. + * Any of `principal, vno, enctype' might be 0 which acts as a wildcard. + * Return TRUE if they compare the same, FALSE otherwise. + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kt_compare(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno vno, + krb5_enctype enctype) +{ + if(principal != NULL && + !krb5_principal_compare(context, entry->principal, principal)) + return FALSE; + if(vno && vno != entry->vno) + return FALSE; + if(enctype && enctype != entry->keyblock.keytype) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +/* + * Retrieve the keytab entry for `principal, kvno, enctype' into `entry' + * from the keytab `id'. + * kvno == 0 is a wildcard and gives the keytab with the highest vno. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno kvno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_keytab_entry tmp; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + + if(id->get) + return (*id->get)(context, id, principal, kvno, enctype, entry); + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get (context, id, &cursor); + if (ret) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; /* XXX i.e. file not found */ + + entry->vno = 0; + while (krb5_kt_next_entry(context, id, &tmp, &cursor) == 0) { + if (krb5_kt_compare(context, &tmp, principal, 0, enctype)) { + /* the file keytab might only store the lower 8 bits of + the kvno, so only compare those bits */ + if (kvno == tmp.vno + || (tmp.vno < 256 && kvno % 256 == tmp.vno)) { + krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents (context, &tmp, entry); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &tmp); + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + return 0; + } else if (kvno == 0 && tmp.vno > entry->vno) { + if (entry->vno) + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, entry); + krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents (context, &tmp, entry); + } + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &tmp); + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get (context, id, &cursor); + if (entry->vno) { + return 0; + } else { + char princ[256], kt_name[256], kvno_str[25]; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed (context, principal, princ, sizeof(princ)); + krb5_kt_get_name (context, id, kt_name, sizeof(kt_name)); + + if (kvno) + snprintf(kvno_str, sizeof(kvno_str), "(kvno %d)", kvno); + else + kvno_str[0] = '\0'; + + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "failed to find %s%s in keytab %s", + princ, + kvno_str, + kt_name); + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + } +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of `in' into `out'. + * Return 0 or an error. */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keytab_entry *in, + krb5_keytab_entry *out) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); + out->vno = in->vno; + + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in->principal, &out->principal); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context, + &in->keyblock, + &out->keyblock); + if (ret) + goto fail; + out->timestamp = in->timestamp; + return 0; +fail: + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, out); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Free the contents of `entry'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_free_principal (context, entry->principal); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &entry->keyblock); + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +static int +xxxlock(int fd, int write) +{ + if(flock(fd, (write ? LOCK_EX : LOCK_SH) | LOCK_NB) < 0) { + sleep(1); + if(flock(fd, (write ? LOCK_EX : LOCK_SH) | LOCK_NB) < 0) + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +xxxunlock(int fd) +{ + flock(fd, LOCK_UN); +} +#endif + +/* + * Set `cursor' to point at the beginning of `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + if(id->start_seq_get == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "start_seq_get is not supported in the %s " + " keytab", id->prefix); + return HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP; + } + return (*id->start_seq_get)(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Get the next entry from `id' pointed to by `cursor' and advance the + * `cursor'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + if(id->next_entry == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "next_entry is not supported in the %s " + " keytab", id->prefix); + return HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP; + } + return (*id->next_entry)(context, id, entry, cursor); +} + +/* + * Release all resources associated with `cursor'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + if(id->end_seq_get == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "end_seq_get is not supported in the %s " + " keytab", id->prefix); + return HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP; + } + return (*id->end_seq_get)(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Add the entry in `entry' to the keytab `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + if(id->add == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "Add is not supported in the %s keytab", + id->prefix); + return KRB5_KT_NOWRITE; + } + entry->timestamp = time(NULL); + return (*id->add)(context, id,entry); +} + +/* + * Remove the entry `entry' from the keytab `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + if(id->remove == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "Remove is not supported in the %s keytab", + id->prefix); + return KRB5_KT_NOWRITE; + } + return (*id->remove)(context, id, entry); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_any.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_any.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..667788c69d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_any.c @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_any.c,v 1.7 2002/10/21 13:36:59 joda Exp $"); + +struct any_data { + krb5_keytab kt; + char *name; + struct any_data *next; +}; + +static void +free_list (krb5_context context, struct any_data *a) +{ + struct any_data *next; + + for (; a != NULL; a = next) { + next = a->next; + free (a->name); + if(a->kt) + krb5_kt_close(context, a->kt); + free (a); + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct any_data *a, *a0 = NULL, *prev = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + char buf[256]; + + while (strsep_copy(&name, ",", buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1) { + a = malloc(sizeof(*a)); + if (a == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + if (a0 == NULL) { + a0 = a; + a->name = strdup(buf); + if (a->name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + } else + a->name = NULL; + if (prev != NULL) + prev->next = a; + a->next = NULL; + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, buf, &a->kt); + if (ret) + goto fail; + prev = a; + } + if (a0 == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "empty ANY: keytab"); + return ENOENT; + } + id->data = a0; + return 0; + fail: + free_list (context, a0); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_get_name (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + struct any_data *a = id->data; + strlcpy(name, a->name, namesize); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_close (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct any_data *a = id->data; + + free_list (context, a); + return 0; +} + +struct any_cursor_extra_data { + struct any_data *a; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +any_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct any_data *a = id->data; + struct any_cursor_extra_data *ed; + krb5_error_code ret; + + c->data = malloc (sizeof(struct any_cursor_extra_data)); + if(c->data == NULL){ + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ed = (struct any_cursor_extra_data *)c->data; + ed->a = a; + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, ed->a->kt, &ed->cursor); + if (ret) { + free (c->data); + c->data = NULL; + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_next_entry (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_error_code ret, ret2; + struct any_cursor_extra_data *ed; + + ed = (struct any_cursor_extra_data *)cursor->data; + do { + ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, ed->a->kt, entry, &ed->cursor); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + else if (ret == KRB5_KT_END) { + ret2 = krb5_kt_end_seq_get (context, ed->a->kt, &ed->cursor); + if (ret2) + return ret2; + while ((ed->a = ed->a->next) != NULL) { + ret2 = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, ed->a->kt, &ed->cursor); + if (ret2 == 0) + break; + } + if (ed->a == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_KT_END; + } + } else + return ret; + } while (ret == KRB5_KT_END); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + struct any_cursor_extra_data *ed; + + ed = (struct any_cursor_extra_data *)cursor->data; + if (ed->a != NULL) + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, ed->a->kt, &ed->cursor); + free (ed); + cursor->data = NULL; + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct any_data *a = id->data; + krb5_error_code ret; + while(a != NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, a->kt, entry); + if(ret != 0 && ret != KRB5_KT_NOWRITE) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed to add entry to %s", + a->name); + return ret; + } + a = a->next; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +any_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct any_data *a = id->data; + krb5_error_code ret; + int found = 0; + while(a != NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry(context, a->kt, entry); + if(ret == 0) + found++; + else { + if(ret != KRB5_KT_NOWRITE && ret != KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed to remove entry from %s", + a->name); + return ret; + } + } + a = a->next; + } + if(!found) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_any_ops = { + "ANY", + any_resolve, + any_get_name, + any_close, + NULL, /* get */ + any_start_seq_get, + any_next_entry, + any_end_seq_get, + any_add_entry, + any_remove_entry +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_file.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_file.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2ff53867c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,617 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_file.c,v 1.12 2002/09/24 16:43:30 joda Exp $"); + +#define KRB5_KT_VNO_1 1 +#define KRB5_KT_VNO_2 2 +#define KRB5_KT_VNO KRB5_KT_VNO_2 + +/* file operations -------------------------------------------- */ + +struct fkt_data { + char *filename; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_data(krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int ret; + int16_t size; + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + data->length = size; + data->data = malloc(size); + if (data->data == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_storage_read(sp, data->data, size); + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_KT_END; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + general_string *data) +{ + int ret; + int16_t size; + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + *data = malloc(size + 1); + if (*data == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb5_storage_read(sp, *data, size); + (*data)[size] = '\0'; + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_KT_END; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_data(krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, data.length); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, data.data, data.length); + if(ret != data.length){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_KT_END; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_string(krb5_storage *sp, + general_string data) +{ + int ret; + size_t len = strlen(data); + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, len); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, data, len); + if(ret != len){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_KT_END; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_keyblock(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, krb5_keyblock *p) +{ + int ret; + int16_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); /* keytype + etype */ + if(ret) return ret; + p->keytype = tmp; + ret = krb5_kt_ret_data(context, sp, &p->keyvalue); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_keyblock *p) +{ + int ret; + + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p->keytype); /* keytype + etype */ + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_kt_store_data(context, sp, p->keyvalue); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + int i; + int ret; + krb5_principal p; + int16_t tmp; + + ALLOC(p, 1); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + tmp--; + p->name.name_string.len = tmp; + ret = krb5_kt_ret_string(context, sp, &p->realm); + if(ret) + return ret; + p->name.name_string.val = calloc(p->name.name_string.len, + sizeof(*p->name.name_string.val)); + if(p->name.name_string.val == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + for(i = 0; i < p->name.name_string.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_kt_ret_string(context, sp, p->name.name_string.val + i); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + if (krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) + p->name.name_type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + else { + int32_t tmp32; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp32); + p->name.name_type = tmp32; + if (ret) + return ret; + } + *princ = p; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal p) +{ + int i; + int ret; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p->name.name_string.len + 1); + else + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p->name.name_string.len); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_kt_store_string(sp, p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; i < p->name.name_string.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_kt_store_string(sp, p->name.name_string.val[i]); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + if(!krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) { + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_type); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct fkt_data *d; + + d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + d->filename = strdup(name); + if(d->filename == NULL) { + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + free(d->filename); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + /* This function is XXX */ + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + strlcpy(name, d->filename, namesize); + return 0; +} + +static void +storage_set_flags(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, int vno) +{ + int flags = 0; + switch(vno) { + case KRB5_KT_VNO_1: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER; + break; + case KRB5_KT_VNO_2: + break; + default: + krb5_warnx(context, + "storage_set_flags called with bad vno (%d)", vno); + } + krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, flags); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_start_seq_get_int(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + int flags, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + int8_t pvno, tag; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + + c->fd = open (d->filename, flags); + if (c->fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "%s: %s", d->filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + c->sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(c->fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(c->sp, KRB5_KT_END); + ret = krb5_ret_int8(c->sp, &pvno); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + return ret; + } + if(pvno != 5) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int8(c->sp, &tag); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + return ret; + } + id->version = tag; + storage_set_flags(context, c->sp, id->version); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + return fkt_start_seq_get_int(context, id, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, c); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_next_entry_int(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor, + off_t *start, + off_t *end) +{ + int32_t len; + int ret; + int8_t tmp8; + int32_t tmp32; + off_t pos, curpos; + + pos = krb5_storage_seek(cursor->sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); +loop: + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(len < 0) { + pos = krb5_storage_seek(cursor->sp, -len, SEEK_CUR); + goto loop; + } + ret = krb5_kt_ret_principal (context, cursor->sp, &entry->principal); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &tmp32); + entry->timestamp = tmp32; + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_ret_int8(cursor->sp, &tmp8); + if (ret) + goto out; + entry->vno = tmp8; + ret = krb5_kt_ret_keyblock (context, cursor->sp, &entry->keyblock); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* there might be a 32 bit kvno here + * if it's zero, assume that the 8bit one was right, + * otherwise trust the new value */ + curpos = krb5_storage_seek(cursor->sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + if(len + 4 + pos - curpos == 4) { + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &tmp32); + if (ret == 0 && tmp32 != 0) { + entry->vno = tmp32; + } + } + if(start) *start = pos; + if(end) *end = *start + 4 + len; + out: + krb5_storage_seek(cursor->sp, pos + 4 + len, SEEK_SET); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + return fkt_next_entry_int(context, id, entry, cursor, NULL, NULL); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_storage_free(cursor->sp); + close(cursor->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_setup_keytab(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_store_int8(sp, 5); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(id->version == 0) + id->version = KRB5_KT_VNO; + return krb5_store_int8 (sp, id->version); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + int ret; + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_data keytab; + int32_t len; + + fd = open (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY); + if (fd < 0) { + fd = open (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY, 0600); + if (fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", d->filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(sp, KRB5_KT_END); + ret = fkt_setup_keytab(context, id, sp); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + storage_set_flags(context, sp, id->version); + } else { + int8_t pvno, tag; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(sp, KRB5_KT_END); + ret = krb5_ret_int8(sp, &pvno); + if(ret) { + /* we probably have a zero byte file, so try to set it up + properly */ + ret = fkt_setup_keytab(context, id, sp); + if(ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "%s: keytab is corrupted: %s", + d->filename, strerror(ret)); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + storage_set_flags(context, sp, id->version); + } else { + if(pvno != 5) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "%s: %s", + d->filename, strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int8 (sp, &tag); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "%s: reading tag: %s", + d->filename, strerror(ret)); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + id->version = tag; + storage_set_flags(context, sp, id->version); + } + } + + { + krb5_storage *emem; + emem = krb5_storage_emem(); + if(emem == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_kt_store_principal(context, emem, entry->principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_store_int32 (emem, entry->timestamp); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_store_int8 (emem, entry->vno % 256); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_kt_store_keyblock (context, emem, &entry->keyblock); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_store_int32 (emem, entry->vno); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_storage_to_data(emem, &keytab); + krb5_storage_free(emem); + if(ret) + goto out; + } + + while(1) { + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &len); + if(ret == KRB5_KT_END) { + len = keytab.length; + break; + } + if(len < 0) { + len = -len; + if(len >= keytab.length) { + krb5_storage_seek(sp, -4, SEEK_CUR); + break; + } + } + krb5_storage_seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + } + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, len); + if(krb5_storage_write(sp, keytab.data, keytab.length) < 0) + ret = errno; + memset(keytab.data, 0, keytab.length); + krb5_data_free(&keytab); + out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_keytab_entry e; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + off_t pos_start, pos_end; + int found = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = fkt_start_seq_get_int(context, id, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, &cursor); + if(ret != 0) + goto out; /* return other error here? */ + while(fkt_next_entry_int(context, id, &e, &cursor, + &pos_start, &pos_end) == 0) { + if(krb5_kt_compare(context, &e, entry->principal, + entry->vno, entry->keyblock.keytype)) { + int32_t len; + unsigned char buf[128]; + found = 1; + krb5_storage_seek(cursor.sp, pos_start, SEEK_SET); + len = pos_end - pos_start - 4; + krb5_store_int32(cursor.sp, -len); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + while(len > 0) { + krb5_storage_write(cursor.sp, buf, min(len, sizeof(buf))); + len -= min(len, sizeof(buf)); + } + } + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + out: + if (!found) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + } + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_fkt_ops = { + "FILE", + fkt_resolve, + fkt_get_name, + fkt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + fkt_start_seq_get, + fkt_next_entry, + fkt_end_seq_get, + fkt_add_entry, + fkt_remove_entry +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aca930fa55 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_keyfile.c,v 1.15 2002/10/21 15:42:06 joda Exp $"); + +/* afs keyfile operations --------------------------------------- */ + +/* + * Minimum tools to handle the AFS KeyFile. + * + * Format of the KeyFile is: + * {[ ] * numkeys} + * + * It just adds to the end of the keyfile, deleting isn't implemented. + * Use your favorite text/hex editor to delete keys. + * + */ + +#define AFS_SERVERTHISCELL "/usr/afs/etc/ThisCell" +#define AFS_SERVERMAGICKRBCONF "/usr/afs/etc/krb.conf" + +struct akf_data { + int num_entries; + char *filename; + char *cell; + char *realm; +}; + +/* + * set `d->cell' and `d->realm' + */ + +static int +get_cell_and_realm (krb5_context context, + struct akf_data *d) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[BUFSIZ], *cp; + int ret; + + f = fopen (AFS_SERVERTHISCELL, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "open %s: %s", AFS_SERVERTHISCELL, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + if (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { + fclose (f); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "no cell in %s", AFS_SERVERTHISCELL); + return EINVAL; + } + buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; + fclose(f); + + d->cell = strdup (buf); + if (d->cell == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + f = fopen (AFS_SERVERMAGICKRBCONF, "r"); + if (f != NULL) { + if (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { + fclose (f); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "no realm in %s", + AFS_SERVERMAGICKRBCONF); + return EINVAL; + } + buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; + fclose(f); + } + /* uppercase */ + for (cp = buf; *cp != '\0'; cp++) + *cp = toupper(*cp); + + d->realm = strdup (buf); + if (d->realm == NULL) { + free (d->cell); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * init and get filename + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + int ret; + struct akf_data *d = malloc(sizeof (struct akf_data)); + + if (d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + d->num_entries = 0; + ret = get_cell_and_realm (context, d); + if (ret) { + free (d); + return ret; + } + d->filename = strdup (name); + if (d->filename == NULL) { + free (d->cell); + free (d->realm); + free (d); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + id->data = d; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * cleanup + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + + free (d->filename); + free (d->cell); + free (d); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return filename + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t name_sz) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + + strlcpy (name, d->filename, name_sz); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Init + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + int32_t ret; + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + + c->fd = open (d->filename, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY, 0600); + if (c->fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", d->filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + c->sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(c->fd); + ret = krb5_ret_int32(c->sp, &d->num_entries); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + if(ret == KRB5_KT_END) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +akf_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + int32_t kvno; + off_t pos; + int ret; + + pos = krb5_storage_seek(cursor->sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + + if ((pos - 4) / (4 + 8) >= d->num_entries) + return KRB5_KT_END; + + ret = krb5_make_principal (context, &entry->principal, + d->realm, "afs", d->cell, NULL); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &kvno); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry->principal); + goto out; + } + + entry->vno = kvno; + + entry->keyblock.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length = 8; + entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data = malloc (8); + if (entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data == NULL) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry->principal); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_storage_read(cursor->sp, entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data, 8); + if(ret != 8) + ret = (ret < 0) ? errno : KRB5_KT_END; + else + ret = 0; + + entry->timestamp = time(NULL); + + out: + krb5_storage_seek(cursor->sp, pos + 4 + 8, SEEK_SET); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +akf_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_storage_free(cursor->sp); + close(cursor->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +akf_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + int fd, created = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t len; + krb5_storage *sp; + + + if (entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length != 8 + || entry->keyblock.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) + return 0; + + fd = open (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY); + if (fd < 0) { + fd = open (d->filename, + O_RDWR | O_BINARY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600); + if (fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", d->filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + created = 1; + } + + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + if(sp == NULL) { + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if (created) + len = 0; + else { + if(krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "seek: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &len); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + } + len++; + + if(krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "seek: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, len); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + + + if(krb5_storage_seek(sp, (len - 1) * (8 + 4), SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "seek: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, entry->vno); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data, + entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length); + if(ret != entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return ENOTTY; + } + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close (fd); + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_akf_ops = { + "AFSKEYFILE", + akf_resolve, + akf_get_name, + akf_close, + NULL, /* get */ + akf_start_seq_get, + akf_next_entry, + akf_end_seq_get, + akf_add_entry, + NULL /* remove */ +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2405f8256a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c @@ -0,0 +1,427 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_krb4.c,v 1.10 2002/04/18 14:04:46 joda Exp $"); + +struct krb4_kt_data { + char *filename; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d; + + d = malloc (sizeof(*d)); + if (d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + d->filename = strdup (name); + if (d->filename == NULL) { + free(d); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_get_name (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t name_sz) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + + strlcpy (name, d->filename, name_sz); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_close (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + + free (d->filename); + free (d); + return 0; +} + +struct krb4_cursor_extra_data { + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + int num; +}; + +static int +open_flock(const char *filename, int flags, int mode) +{ + int lock_mode; + int tries = 0; + int fd = open(filename, flags, mode); + if(fd < 0) + return fd; + if((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + lock_mode = LOCK_SH | LOCK_NB; + else + lock_mode = LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB; + while(flock(fd, lock_mode) < 0) { + if(++tries < 5) { + sleep(1); + } else { + close(fd); + return -1; + } + } + return fd; +} + + + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_start_seq_get_int (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + int flags, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed; + int ret; + + ed = malloc (sizeof(*ed)); + if (ed == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ed->entry.principal = NULL; + ed->num = -1; + c->data = ed; + c->fd = open_flock (d->filename, flags, 0); + if (c->fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + free (ed); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", d->filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + c->sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(c->fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(c->sp, KRB5_KT_END); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_start_seq_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + return krb4_kt_start_seq_get_int (context, id, O_BINARY | O_RDONLY, c); +} + +static krb5_error_code +read_v4_entry (krb5_context context, + struct krb4_kt_data *d, + krb5_kt_cursor *c, + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *service, *instance, *realm; + int8_t kvno; + des_cblock key; + + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(c->sp, &service); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(c->sp, &instance); + if (ret) { + free (service); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(c->sp, &realm); + if (ret) { + free (service); + free (instance); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal (context, service, instance, realm, + &ed->entry.principal); + free (service); + free (instance); + free (realm); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int8(c->sp, &kvno); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, ed->entry.principal); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_storage_read(c->sp, key, 8); + if (ret < 0) { + krb5_free_principal(context, ed->entry.principal); + return ret; + } + if (ret < 8) { + krb5_free_principal(context, ed->entry.principal); + return EINVAL; + } + ed->entry.vno = kvno; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&ed->entry.keyblock.keyvalue, + key, 8); + if (ret) + return ret; + ed->entry.timestamp = time(NULL); + ed->num = 0; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_next_entry (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed = c->data; + const krb5_enctype keytypes[] = {ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC}; + + if (ed->num == -1) { + ret = read_v4_entry (context, d, c, ed); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents (context, + &ed->entry, + entry); + if (ret) + return ret; + entry->keyblock.keytype = keytypes[ed->num]; + if (++ed->num == 3) { + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &ed->entry); + ed->num = -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_end_seq_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed = c->data; + + krb5_storage_free (c->sp); + if (ed->num != -1) + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &ed->entry); + free (c->data); + close (c->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_store_keytab_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; +#define ANAME_SZ 40 +#define INST_SZ 40 +#define REALM_SZ 40 + char service[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal (context, entry->principal, + service, instance, realm); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length == 8 + && entry->keyblock.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) { + ret = krb5_store_stringz(sp, service); + ret = krb5_store_stringz(sp, instance); + ret = krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + ret = krb5_store_int8(sp, entry->vno); + ret = krb5_storage_write(sp, entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data, 8); + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_add_entry (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_error_code ret; + int fd; + + fd = open_flock (d->filename, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + fd = open_flock (d->filename, + O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string(context, "open(%s): %s", d->filename, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + krb5_storage_set_eof_code(sp, KRB5_KT_END); + if(sp == NULL) { + close(fd); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = krb4_store_keytab_entry(context, entry, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(close (fd) < 0) + return errno; + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab_entry e; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_storage *sp; + int remove_flag = 0; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + while(krb5_kt_next_entry(context, id, &e, &cursor) == 0) { + if(!krb5_kt_compare(context, &e, entry->principal, + entry->vno, entry->keyblock.keytype)) { + ret = krb4_store_keytab_entry(context, &e, sp); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + } else + remove_flag = 1; + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + if(remove_flag) { + int fd; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + ssize_t n; + krb5_data data; + struct stat st; + + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + fd = open_flock (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0); + if(fd < 0) { + memset(data.data, 0, data.length); + krb5_data_free(&data); + if(errno == EACCES || errno == EROFS) + return KRB5_KT_NOWRITE; + return errno; + } + + if(write(fd, data.data, data.length) != data.length) { + memset(data.data, 0, data.length); + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed writing to \"%s\"", d->filename); + return errno; + } + memset(data.data, 0, data.length); + if(fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed getting size of \"%s\"", d->filename); + return errno; + } + st.st_size -= data.length; + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + while(st.st_size > 0) { + n = min(st.st_size, sizeof(buf)); + n = write(fd, buf, n); + if(n <= 0) { + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed writing to \"%s\"", d->filename); + return errno; + + } + st.st_size -= n; + } + if(ftruncate(fd, data.length) < 0) { + close(fd); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "failed truncating \"%s\"", d->filename); + return errno; + } + krb5_data_free(&data); + if(close(fd) < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "error closing \"%s\"", d->filename); + return errno; + } + return 0; + } else + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; +} + + +const krb5_kt_ops krb4_fkt_ops = { + "krb4", + krb4_kt_resolve, + krb4_kt_get_name, + krb4_kt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + krb4_kt_start_seq_get, + krb4_kt_next_entry, + krb4_kt_end_seq_get, + krb4_kt_add_entry, /* add_entry */ + krb4_kt_remove_entry /* remove_entry */ +}; + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_srvtab_fkt_ops = { + "SRVTAB", + krb4_kt_resolve, + krb4_kt_get_name, + krb4_kt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + krb4_kt_start_seq_get, + krb4_kt_next_entry, + krb4_kt_end_seq_get, + krb4_kt_add_entry, /* add_entry */ + krb4_kt_remove_entry /* remove_entry */ +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cde894335f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_memory.c,v 1.5 2001/05/14 06:14:49 assar Exp $"); + +/* memory operations -------------------------------------------- */ + +struct mkt_data { + krb5_keytab_entry *entries; + int num_entries; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct mkt_data *d; + d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + d->entries = NULL; + d->num_entries = 0; + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < d->num_entries; i++) + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &d->entries[i]); + free(d->entries); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + strlcpy(name, "", namesize); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + /* XXX */ + c->fd = 0; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + if(c->fd >= d->num_entries) + return KRB5_KT_END; + return krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(context, &d->entries[c->fd++], entry); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_keytab_entry *tmp; + tmp = realloc(d->entries, (d->num_entries + 1) * sizeof(*d->entries)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + d->entries = tmp; + return krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(context, entry, + &d->entries[d->num_entries++]); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_keytab_entry *e, *end; + + /* do this backwards to minimize copying */ + for(end = d->entries + d->num_entries, e = end - 1; e >= d->entries; e--) { + if(krb5_kt_compare(context, e, entry->principal, + entry->vno, entry->keyblock.keytype)) { + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, e); + memmove(e, e + 1, (end - e - 1) * sizeof(*e)); + memset(end - 1, 0, sizeof(*end)); + d->num_entries--; + end--; + } + } + e = realloc(d->entries, d->num_entries * sizeof(*d->entries)); + if(e != NULL) + d->entries = e; + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_mkt_ops = { + "MEMORY", + mkt_resolve, + mkt_get_name, + mkt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + mkt_start_seq_get, + mkt_next_entry, + mkt_end_seq_get, + mkt_add_entry, + mkt_remove_entry +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..669e9547c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __krb5_private_h__ +#define __krb5_private_h__ + +#include + +void +_krb5_aes_cts_encrypt ( + const unsigned char */*in*/, + unsigned char */*out*/, + size_t /*len*/, + const void */*aes_key*/, + unsigned char */*ivec*/, + const int /*enc*/); + +void +_krb5_crc_init_table (void); + +u_int32_t +_krb5_crc_update ( + const char */*p*/, + size_t /*len*/, + u_int32_t /*res*/); + +int +_krb5_extract_ticket ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*rep*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*keyseed*/, + krb5_key_usage /*key_usage*/, + krb5_addresses */*addrs*/, + unsigned /*nonce*/, + krb5_boolean /*allow_server_mismatch*/, + krb5_boolean /*ignore_cname*/, + krb5_decrypt_proc /*decrypt_proc*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*decryptarg*/); + +krb5_ssize_t +_krb5_get_int ( + void */*buffer*/, + unsigned long */*value*/, + size_t /*size*/); + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_get_krbtgt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_realm /*realm*/, + krb5_creds **/*cred*/); + +time_t +_krb5_krb_life_to_time ( + int /*start*/, + int /*life_*/); + +int +_krb5_krb_time_to_life ( + time_t /*start*/, + time_t /*end*/); + +void +_krb5_n_fold ( + const void */*str*/, + size_t /*len*/, + void */*key*/, + size_t /*size*/); + +krb5_ssize_t +_krb5_put_int ( + void */*buffer*/, + unsigned long /*value*/, + size_t /*size*/); + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_store_creds_heimdal_0_7 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_store_creds_heimdal_pre_0_7 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_store_creds_internal ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + int /*v0_6*/); + +int +_krb5_xlock ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*fd*/, + krb5_boolean /*exclusive*/, + const char */*filename*/); + +int +_krb5_xunlock (int /*fd*/); + +#endif /* __krb5_private_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-protos.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58788aebab --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,2986 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __krb5_protos_h__ +#define __krb5_protos_h__ + +#include + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb524_convert_creds_kdc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*in_cred*/, + struct credentials */*v4creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb524_convert_creds_kdc_ccache ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*in_cred*/, + struct credentials */*v4creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*name*/, + const char */*instance*/, + const char */*realm*/, + krb5_principal */*princ*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal_ext ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*name*/, + const char */*instance*/, + const char */*realm*/, + krb5_boolean (*/*func*/)(krb5_context, krb5_principal), + krb5_boolean /*resolve*/, + krb5_principal */*princ*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_524_conv_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_principal /*principal*/, + char */*name*/, + char */*instance*/, + char */*realm*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_PKCS5_PBKDF2 ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_cksumtype /*cktype*/, + krb5_data /*password*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/, + u_int32_t /*iter*/, + krb5_keytype /*type*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abort ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abortx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_acl_match_file ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*file*/, + const char */*format*/, + ...); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_acl_match_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*string*/, + const char */*format*/, + ...); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_et_list ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void (*/*func*/)(struct et_list **)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_extra_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_ignore_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_dest ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*f*/, + const char */*orig*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_func ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/, + int /*min*/, + int /*max*/, + krb5_log_log_func_t /*log*/, + krb5_log_close_func_t /*close*/, + void */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addr2sockaddr ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_address */*addr*/, + struct sockaddr */*sa*/, + krb5_socklen_t */*sa_size*/, + int /*port*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_compare ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_address */*addr1*/, + const krb5_address */*addr2*/); + +int +krb5_address_order ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_address */*addr1*/, + const krb5_address */*addr2*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_search ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_address */*addr*/, + const krb5_addresses */*addrlist*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_aname_to_localname ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*aname*/, + size_t /*lnsize*/, + char */*lname*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_anyaddr ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*af*/, + struct sockaddr */*sa*/, + krb5_socklen_t */*sa_size*/, + int /*port*/); + +void +krb5_appdefault_boolean ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*appname*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + const char */*option*/, + krb5_boolean /*def_val*/, + krb5_boolean */*ret_val*/); + +void +krb5_appdefault_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*appname*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + const char */*option*/, + const char */*def_val*/, + char **/*ret_val*/); + +void +krb5_appdefault_time ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*appname*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + const char */*option*/, + time_t /*def_val*/, + time_t */*ret_val*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_append_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*dest*/, + const krb5_addresses */*source*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_free ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_genaddrs ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int /*fd*/, + int /*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_generatelocalsubkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getaddrs ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_address **/*local_addr*/, + krb5_address **/*remote_addr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_authenticator */*authenticator*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_cksumtype */*cksumtype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getflags ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int32_t */*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getkeytype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keytype */*keytype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int32_t */*seqnumber*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getrcache ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_rcache */*rcache*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_init ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_address */*local_addr*/, + krb5_address */*remote_addr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + void */*p_fd*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setcksumtype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_cksumtype /*cksumtype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setflags ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int32_t /*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setkeytype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keytype /*keytype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int32_t /*seqnumber*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setrcache ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_rcache /*rcache*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int32_t /*seqnumber*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setuserkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + int32_t */*seqnumber*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_ap_req ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_creds */*cred*/, + krb5_flags /*ap_options*/, + krb5_data /*authenticator*/, + krb5_data */*retdata*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_authenticator ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_creds */*cred*/, + Checksum */*cksum*/, + Authenticator **/*auth_result*/, + krb5_data */*result*/, + krb5_key_usage /*usage*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/, + int /*rlen*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + ...); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_ext ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/, + int /*rlen*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + ...); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/, + int /*rlen*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + va_list /*ap*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va_ext ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/, + int /*rlen*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + va_list /*ap*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_close ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_copy_cache ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_ccache /*from*/, + krb5_ccache /*to*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache */*id*/); + +const char* +krb5_cc_default_name (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_destroy ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_end_seq_get ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_cc_cursor */*cursor*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_gen_new ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_cc_ops */*ops*/, + krb5_ccache */*id*/); + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/); + +const krb5_cc_ops * +krb5_cc_get_ops ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/); + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_type ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_version ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_ccache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_initialize ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_principal /*primary_principal*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_next_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_cc_cursor */*cursor*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_register ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_cc_ops */*ops*/, + krb5_boolean /*override*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_remove_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_flags /*which*/, + krb5_creds */*cred*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_resolve ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*name*/, + krb5_ccache */*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_retrieve_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_flags /*whichfields*/, + const krb5_creds */*mcreds*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_set_default_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*name*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_set_flags ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_start_seq_get ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_cc_cursor */*cursor*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_store_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_change_password ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + char */*newpw*/, + int */*result_code*/, + krb5_data */*result_code_string*/, + krb5_data */*result_string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_check_transited ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_realm /*client_realm*/, + krb5_const_realm /*server_realm*/, + krb5_realm */*realms*/, + int /*num_realms*/, + int */*bad_realm*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_check_transited_realms ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char *const */*realms*/, + int /*num_realms*/, + int */*bad_realm*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_cksumtype /*type*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_keyed ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_cksumtype /*type*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_checksumsize ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_cksumtype /*type*/, + size_t */*size*/); + +void +krb5_clear_error_string (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_closelog ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_compare_creds ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*whichfields*/, + const krb5_creds */*mcreds*/, + const krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_file_free ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_config_section */*s*/); + +void +krb5_config_free_strings (char **/*strings*/); + +const void * +krb5_config_get ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + int /*type*/, + ...); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + ...); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + krb5_boolean /*def_value*/, + ...); + +int +krb5_config_get_int ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + ...); + +int +krb5_config_get_int_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + int /*def_value*/, + ...); + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_get_list ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + ...); + +const void * +krb5_config_get_next ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + const krb5_config_binding **/*pointer*/, + int /*type*/, + ...); + +const char * +krb5_config_get_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + ...); + +const char * +krb5_config_get_string_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + const char */*def_value*/, + ...); + +char** +krb5_config_get_strings ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + ...); + +int +krb5_config_get_time ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + ...); + +int +krb5_config_get_time_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + int /*def_value*/, + ...); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fname*/, + krb5_config_section **/*res*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file_multi ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fname*/, + krb5_config_section **/*res*/); + +const void * +krb5_config_vget ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + int /*type*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + krb5_boolean /*def_value*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +int +krb5_config_vget_int ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +int +krb5_config_vget_int_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + int /*def_value*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_vget_list ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +const void * +krb5_config_vget_next ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + const krb5_config_binding **/*pointer*/, + int /*type*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +const char * +krb5_config_vget_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +const char * +krb5_config_vget_string_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + const char */*def_value*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +char ** +krb5_config_vget_strings ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +int +krb5_config_vget_time ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +int +krb5_config_vget_time_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_config_section */*c*/, + int /*def_value*/, + va_list /*args*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_address ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_address */*inaddr*/, + krb5_address */*outaddr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_addresses */*inaddr*/, + krb5_addresses */*outaddr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_creds */*incred*/, + krb5_creds **/*outcred*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_creds */*incred*/, + krb5_creds */*c*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_data ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_data */*indata*/, + krb5_data **/*outdata*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_host_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_realm */*from*/, + krb5_realm **/*to*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*inblock*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*to*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*inblock*/, + krb5_keyblock */*to*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*inprinc*/, + krb5_principal */*outprinc*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_ticket ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_ticket */*from*/, + krb5_ticket **/*to*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_create_checksum ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + krb5_key_usage /*usage*/, + int /*type*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + Checksum */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_destroy ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_getblocksize ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + size_t */*blocksize*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_init ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + krb5_crypto */*crypto*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_alloc ( + krb5_data */*p*/, + int /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_copy ( + krb5_data */*p*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +void +krb5_data_free (krb5_data */*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_realloc ( + krb5_data */*p*/, + int /*len*/); + +void +krb5_data_zero (krb5_data */*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_Authenticator ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + Authenticator */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ETYPE_INFO ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + ETYPE_INFO */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncAPRepPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncASRepPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncASRepPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncKrbCredPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncTGSRepPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTicketPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncTicketPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ap_req ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_data */*inbuf*/, + krb5_ap_req */*ap_req*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + krb5_data */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + const EncryptedData */*e*/, + krb5_data */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_ivec ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + krb5_data */*result*/, + void */*ivec*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_ticket ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + Ticket */*ticket*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + EncTicketPart */*out*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_derive_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + const void */*constant*/, + size_t /*constant_len*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*derived_key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_decode ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data /*tr*/, + char ***/*realms*/, + int */*num_realms*/, + const char */*client_realm*/, + const char */*server_realm*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_encode ( + char **/*realms*/, + int /*num_realms*/, + krb5_data */*encoding*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_eai_to_heim_errno ( + int /*eai_errno*/, + int /*system_error*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_Authenticator ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + Authenticator */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_ETYPE_INFO ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + ETYPE_INFO */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncAPRepPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncASRepPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncASRepPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncKrbCredPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTGSRepPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncTGSRepPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTicketPart ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*length*/, + EncTicketPart */*t*/, + size_t */*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + krb5_data */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + int /*kvno*/, + EncryptedData */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt_ivec ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + krb5_data */*result*/, + void */*ivec*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_keysize ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*type*/, + size_t */*keysize*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_keytype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + krb5_keytype */*keytype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + char **/*string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_valid ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype1*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype2*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_err ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*eval*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 5))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_error_from_rd_error ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_error */*error*/, + const krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_errx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*eval*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_expand_hostname ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*orig_hostname*/, + char **/*new_hostname*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_expand_hostname_realms ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*orig_hostname*/, + char **/*new_hostname*/, + char ***/*realms*/); + +PA_DATA * +krb5_find_padata ( + PA_DATA */*val*/, + unsigned /*len*/, + int /*type*/, + int */*index*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_format_time ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + time_t /*t*/, + char */*s*/, + size_t /*len*/, + krb5_boolean /*include_time*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_address ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_address */*address*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +void +krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part */*val*/); + +void +krb5_free_authenticator ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_authenticator */*authenticator*/); + +void +krb5_free_config_files (char **/*filenames*/); + +void +krb5_free_context (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_cred_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*c*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*c*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*c*/); + +void +krb5_free_data ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data */*p*/); + +void +krb5_free_data_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +void +krb5_free_error ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error */*error*/); + +void +krb5_free_error_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error */*error*/); + +void +krb5_free_error_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + char */*str*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_host_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_realm */*realmlist*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_kdc_rep ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*rep*/); + +void +krb5_free_keyblock ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/); + +void +krb5_free_keyblock_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_krbhst ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + char **/*hostlist*/); + +void +krb5_free_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_salt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_ticket ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ticket */*ticket*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_fwd_tgt_creds ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + const char */*hostname*/, + krb5_principal /*client*/, + krb5_principal /*server*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + int /*forwardable*/, + krb5_data */*out_data*/); + +void +krb5_generate_random_block ( + void */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_random_keyblock ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*type*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_seq_number ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + u_int32_t */*seqno*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_subkey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*subkey*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_client_addrs ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*res*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_server_addrs ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*res*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_cred_from_kdc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_creds **/*out_creds*/, + krb5_creds ***/*ret_tgts*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_cred_from_kdc_opt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_creds **/*out_creds*/, + krb5_creds ***/*ret_tgts*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_creds **/*out_creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials_with_flags ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + krb5_kdc_flags /*flags*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_creds **/*out_creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_config_files (char ***/*pfilenames*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype **/*etypes*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal */*princ*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_realm */*realm*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realms ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_realm **/*realms*/); + +const char * +krb5_get_err_text ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/); + +char* +krb5_get_error_string (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_extra_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_fcache_version ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int */*version*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_forwarded_creds ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/, + const char */*hostname*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_data */*out_data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*host*/, + krb5_realm **/*realms*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm_int ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*host*/, + krb5_boolean /*use_dns*/, + krb5_realm **/*realms*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_ignore_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + const krb5_addresses */*addrs*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/, + const krb5_preauthtype */*ptypes*/, + const krb5_preauthdata */*preauth*/, + krb5_key_proc /*key_proc*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*keyseed*/, + krb5_decrypt_proc /*decrypt_proc*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*decryptarg*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*ret_as_reply*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + const krb5_addresses */*addrs*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/, + const krb5_preauthtype */*ptypes*/, + krb5_key_proc /*key_proc*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*keyseed*/, + krb5_decrypt_proc /*decrypt_proc*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*decryptarg*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*ret_as_reply*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + krb5_addresses */*addrs*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/, + const krb5_preauthtype */*pre_auth_types*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*ret_as_reply*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + krb5_addresses */*addrs*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/, + const krb5_preauthtype */*pre_auth_types*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*ret_as_reply*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_skey ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_flags /*options*/, + krb5_addresses */*addrs*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/, + const krb5_preauthtype */*pre_auth_types*/, + const krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_kdc_rep */*ret_as_reply*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_keytab ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_principal /*client*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + krb5_deltat /*start_time*/, + const char */*in_tkt_service*/, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*options*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + int /*anonymous*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*appname*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_enctype */*etype_list*/, + int /*etype_list_length*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + int /*forwardable*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_preauthtype */*preauth_list*/, + int /*preauth_list_length*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + int /*proxiable*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_deltat /*renew_life*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_data */*salt*/); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life ( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_deltat /*tkt_life*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_password ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_principal /*client*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_prompter_fct /*prompter*/, + void */*data*/, + krb5_deltat /*start_time*/, + const char */*in_tkt_service*/, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt */*options*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_kdc_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*id*/, + krb5_kdc_flags /*flags*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/, + Ticket */*second_ticket*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_creds **out_creds ); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb524hst ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_realm */*realm*/, + char ***/*hostlist*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_admin_hst ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_realm */*realm*/, + char ***/*hostlist*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_realm */*realm*/, + char ***/*hostlist*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krbhst ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_realm */*realm*/, + char ***/*hostlist*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_pw_salt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_salt */*salt*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_server_rcache ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_data */*piece*/, + krb5_rcache */*id*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_get_use_admin_kdc (krb5_context /*context*/); + +size_t +krb5_get_wrapped_length ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + size_t /*data_len*/); + +int +krb5_getportbyname ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*service*/, + const char */*proto*/, + int /*default_port*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2addr ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*af*/, + const char */*haddr*/, + krb5_address */*addr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2sockaddr ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*af*/, + const char */*addr*/, + struct sockaddr */*sa*/, + krb5_socklen_t */*sa_size*/, + int /*port*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_errno_to_heim_errno (int /*eai_errno*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_have_error_string (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_hmac ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_cksumtype /*cktype*/, + const void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + unsigned /*usage*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/, + Checksum */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_context (krb5_context */*context*/); + +void +krb5_init_ets (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_etype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + unsigned */*len*/, + krb5_enctype **/*val*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_initlog ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*program*/, + krb5_log_facility **/*fac*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keyblock_key_proc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytype /*type*/, + krb5_data */*salt*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*keyseed*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytab_key_proc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*keyseed*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytype /*keytype*/, + unsigned */*len*/, + krb5_enctype **/*val*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytype /*keytype*/, + unsigned */*len*/, + krb5_enctype **/*val*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytype /*keytype*/, + char **/*string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_format_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_krbhst_info */*host*/, + char */*hostname*/, + size_t /*hostlen*/); + +void +krb5_krbhst_free ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_krbhst_handle /*handle*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_krbhst_info */*host*/, + struct addrinfo **/*ai*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_init ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*realm*/, + unsigned int /*type*/, + krb5_krbhst_handle */*handle*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_next ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_krbhst_handle /*handle*/, + krb5_krbhst_info **/*host*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_next_as_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_krbhst_handle /*handle*/, + char */*hostname*/, + size_t /*hostlen*/); + +void +krb5_krbhst_reset ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_krbhst_handle /*handle*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_add_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*entry*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_close ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kt_compare ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*entry*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_kvno /*vno*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_keytab_entry */*in*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*out*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab */*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default_modify_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + char */*name*/, + size_t /*namesize*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + char */*name*/, + size_t /*namesize*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_end_seq_get ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/, + krb5_kt_cursor */*cursor*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_free_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*entry*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_kvno /*kvno*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*entry*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + char */*name*/, + size_t /*namesize*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_type ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + char */*prefix*/, + size_t /*prefixsize*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_next_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*entry*/, + krb5_kt_cursor */*cursor*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_read_service_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_pointer /*keyprocarg*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_kvno /*vno*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_register ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_kt_ops */*ops*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_remove_entry ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/, + krb5_keytab_entry */*entry*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_resolve ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*name*/, + krb5_keytab */*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_start_seq_get ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_keytab /*id*/, + krb5_kt_cursor */*cursor*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kuserok ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + const char */*luser*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/, + int /*level*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 5))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log_msg ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/, + int /*level*/, + char **/*reply*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 6))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_addrport ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_address **/*res*/, + const krb5_address */*addr*/, + int16_t /*port*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/, + krb5_const_realm /*realm*/, + ...); + +size_t +krb5_max_sockaddr_size (void); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_error ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error_code /*error_code*/, + const char */*e_text*/, + const krb5_data */*e_data*/, + const krb5_principal /*client*/, + const krb5_principal /*server*/, + time_t */*client_time*/, + int */*client_usec*/, + krb5_data */*reply*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_priv ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*userdata*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/, + void */*outdata*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_rep ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + const krb5_flags /*ap_req_options*/, + const char */*service*/, + const char */*hostname*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_exact ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + const krb5_flags /*ap_req_options*/, + const krb5_principal /*server*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_extended ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + const krb5_flags /*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_internal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + const krb5_flags /*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/, + krb5_key_usage /*checksum_usage*/, + krb5_key_usage /*encrypt_usage*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_safe ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*userdata*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/, + void */*outdata*/); + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_net_read ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*p_fd*/, + void */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_net_write ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*p_fd*/, + const void */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_openlog ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*program*/, + krb5_log_facility **/*fac*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_address ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*string*/, + krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*name*/, + krb5_principal */*principal*/); + +const char* +krb5_passwd_result_to_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_password_key_proc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*type*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/, + krb5_const_pointer /*keyseed*/, + krb5_keyblock **/*key*/); + +krb5_realm* +krb5_princ_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/); + +void +krb5_princ_set_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_realm */*realm*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_principal2principalname ( + PrincipalName */*p*/, + const krb5_principal /*from*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ1*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ2*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare_any_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ1*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ2*/); + +const char * +krb5_principal_get_comp_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + unsigned int /*component*/); + +const char * +krb5_principal_get_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/); + +int +krb5_principal_get_type ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_match ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ*/, + krb5_const_principal /*pattern*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_print_address ( + const krb5_address */*addr*/, + char */*str*/, + size_t /*len*/, + size_t */*ret_len*/); + +int +krb5_program_setup ( + krb5_context */*context*/, + int /*argc*/, + char **/*argv*/, + struct getargs */*args*/, + int /*num_args*/, + void (*/*usage*/)(int, struct getargs*, int)); + +int +krb5_prompter_posix ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + void */*data*/, + const char */*name*/, + const char */*banner*/, + int /*num_prompts*/, + krb5_prompt prompts[]); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_close ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_default ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache */*id*/); + +const char * +krb5_rc_default_name (krb5_context /*context*/); + +const char * +krb5_rc_default_type (krb5_context /*context*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_destroy ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_expunge ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_get_lifespan ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/, + krb5_deltat */*auth_lifespan*/); + +const char* +krb5_rc_get_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/); + +const char* +krb5_rc_get_type ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_initialize ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/, + krb5_deltat /*auth_lifespan*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_recover ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/, + const char */*name*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve_full ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache */*id*/, + const char */*string_name*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve_type ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache */*id*/, + const char */*type*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_store ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_rcache /*id*/, + krb5_donot_replay */*rep*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_cred ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/, + krb5_creds ***/*ret_creds*/, + krb5_replay_data */*out_data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_cred2 ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_error ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_data */*msg*/, + KRB_ERROR */*result*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_priv ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*inbuf*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/, + void */*outdata*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_rep ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*inbuf*/, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **/*repl*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*inbuf*/, + krb5_const_principal /*server*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + krb5_flags */*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_ticket **/*ticket*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*inbuf*/, + krb5_const_principal /*server*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/, + krb5_flags */*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_ticket **/*ticket*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_safe ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*auth_context*/, + const krb5_data */*inbuf*/, + krb5_data */*outbuf*/, + void */*outdata*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_message ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_priv_message ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*ac*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_safe_message ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*ac*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_realm_compare ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ1*/, + krb5_const_principal /*princ2*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + const char */*appl_version*/, + krb5_principal /*server*/, + int32_t /*flags*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + krb5_ticket **/*ticket*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth_match_version ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_boolean (*/*match_appl_version*/)(const void *, const char*), + const void */*match_data*/, + krb5_principal /*server*/, + int32_t /*flags*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/, + krb5_ticket **/*ticket*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_address ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_address */*adr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_addrs ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_addresses */*adr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_authdata ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_authdata */*auth*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_creds ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int16 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int16_t */*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int32 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int32_t */*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int8 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int8_t */*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_keyblock ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_keyblock */*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_principal ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_principal */*princ*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_string ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + char **/*string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_stringz ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + char **/*string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_times ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_times */*times*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_salttype_to_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + krb5_salttype /*stype*/, + char **/*string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendauth ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + const char */*appl_version*/, + krb5_principal /*client*/, + krb5_principal /*server*/, + krb5_flags /*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_data */*in_data*/, + krb5_creds */*in_creds*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + krb5_error **/*ret_error*/, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **/*rep_result*/, + krb5_creds **/*out_creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_data */*send_data*/, + krb5_krbhst_handle /*handle*/, + krb5_data */*receive*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto_kdc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_data */*send_data*/, + const krb5_realm */*realm*/, + krb5_data */*receive*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto_kdc2 ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_data */*send_data*/, + const krb5_realm */*realm*/, + krb5_data */*receive*/, + krb5_boolean /*master*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_config_files ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + char **/*filenames*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_in_tkt_etypes ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_enctype */*etypes*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_realm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*realm*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_error_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 2, 3))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_extra_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_fcache_version ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*version*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_ignore_addresses ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const krb5_addresses */*addresses*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_password ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + char */*newpw*/, + krb5_principal /*targprinc*/, + int */*result_code*/, + krb5_data */*result_code_string*/, + krb5_data */*result_string*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_password_using_ccache ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + char */*newpw*/, + krb5_principal /*targprinc*/, + int */*result_code*/, + krb5_data */*result_code_string*/, + krb5_data */*result_string*/); + +void +krb5_set_use_admin_kdc ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_boolean /*flag*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_warn_dest ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sname_to_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*hostname*/, + const char */*sname*/, + int32_t /*type*/, + krb5_principal */*ret_princ*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sock_to_principal ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*sock*/, + const char */*sname*/, + int32_t /*type*/, + krb5_principal */*ret_princ*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2address ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const struct sockaddr */*sa*/, + krb5_address */*addr*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2port ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const struct sockaddr */*sa*/, + int16_t */*port*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting (const struct sockaddr */*sa*/); + +void +krb5_std_usage ( + int /*code*/, + struct getargs */*args*/, + int /*num_args*/); + +void +krb5_storage_clear_flags ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_emem (void); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_free (krb5_storage */*sp*/); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_data (krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_fd (int /*fd*/); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_mem ( + void */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_flags +krb5_storage_get_byteorder ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_flags /*byteorder*/); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_storage_is_flags ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/); + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_storage_read ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + void */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +off_t +krb5_storage_seek ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + off_t /*offset*/, + int /*whence*/); + +void +krb5_storage_set_byteorder ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_flags /*byteorder*/); + +void +krb5_storage_set_eof_code ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int /*code*/); + +void +krb5_storage_set_flags ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_to_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_storage_write ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + const void */*buf*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_address ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_address /*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_addrs ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_addresses /*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_authdata ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_authdata /*auth*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_creds ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_data ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_data /*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int16 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int16_t /*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int32 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int32_t /*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int8 ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + int8_t /*value*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_keyblock ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_keyblock /*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_principal ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_principal /*p*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_string ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + const char */*s*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_stringz ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + const char */*s*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_times ( + krb5_storage */*sp*/, + krb5_times /*times*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_deltat ( + const char */*string*/, + krb5_deltat */*deltat*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_enctype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*string*/, + krb5_enctype */*etype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_data /*password*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data_salt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_data /*password*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data_salt_opaque ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + krb5_data /*password*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/, + krb5_data /*opaque*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_derived ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const void */*str*/, + size_t /*len*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_salt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*enctype*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_salt /*salt*/, + krb5_keyblock */*key*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_keytype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*string*/, + krb5_keytype */*keytype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_salttype ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_enctype /*etype*/, + const char */*string*/, + krb5_salttype */*salttype*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_timeofday ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_timestamp */*timeret*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + char **/*name*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + char */*name*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + char */*name*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_short ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_const_principal /*principal*/, + char **/*name*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_us_timeofday ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int32_t */*sec*/, + int32_t */*usec*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabort ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabortx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_ap_req ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + krb5_ap_req */*ap_req*/, + krb5_const_principal /*server*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/, + krb5_flags */*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_ticket **/*ticket*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_ap_req2 ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context */*auth_context*/, + krb5_ap_req */*ap_req*/, + krb5_const_principal /*server*/, + krb5_keyblock */*keyblock*/, + krb5_flags /*flags*/, + krb5_flags */*ap_req_options*/, + krb5_ticket **/*ticket*/, + krb5_key_usage /*usage*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*ac*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_checksum ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_crypto /*crypto*/, + krb5_key_usage /*usage*/, + void */*data*/, + size_t /*len*/, + Checksum */*cksum*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_init_creds ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_creds */*creds*/, + krb5_principal /*ap_req_server*/, + krb5_keytab /*ap_req_keytab*/, + krb5_ccache */*ccache*/, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt */*options*/); + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init (krb5_verify_init_creds_opt */*options*/); + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail ( + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt */*options*/, + int /*ap_req_nofail*/); + +void +krb5_verify_opt_init (krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/); + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_ccache ( + krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/); + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_flags ( + krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/, + unsigned int /*flags*/); + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab ( + krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_keytab /*keytab*/); + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_secure ( + krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/, + krb5_boolean /*secure*/); + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_service ( + krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/, + const char */*service*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_boolean /*secure*/, + const char */*service*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user_lrealm ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + krb5_ccache /*ccache*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_boolean /*secure*/, + const char */*service*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user_opt ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_principal /*principal*/, + const char */*password*/, + krb5_verify_opt */*opt*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verr ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*eval*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verrx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + int /*eval*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/, + int /*level*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog_msg ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_log_facility */*fac*/, + char **/*reply*/, + int /*level*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vset_error_string ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*args*/) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarn ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarnx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + va_list /*ap*/) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warn ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_error_code /*code*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warnx ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + const char */*fmt*/, + ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_message ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_priv_message ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*ac*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_safe_message ( + krb5_context /*context*/, + krb5_auth_context /*ac*/, + krb5_pointer /*p_fd*/, + krb5_data */*data*/); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_xfree (void */*ptr*/); + +krb5_error_code +principalname2krb5_principal ( + krb5_principal */*principal*/, + const PrincipalName /*from*/, + const Realm /*realm*/); + +#endif /* __krb5_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-v4compat.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-v4compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f89281ed2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5-v4compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: krb5-v4compat.h,v 1.2 2003/03/18 03:08:20 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KRB5_V4COMPAT_H__ +#define __KRB5_V4COMPAT_H__ + +/* + * This file must only be included with v4 compat glue stuff in + * heimdal sources. + * + * It MUST NOT be installed. + */ + +#define MAX_KTXT_LEN 1250 + +#define ANAME_SZ 40 +#define REALM_SZ 40 +#define SNAME_SZ 40 +#define INST_SZ 40 + +struct ktext { + unsigned int length; /* Length of the text */ + unsigned char dat[MAX_KTXT_LEN]; /* The data itself */ + u_int32_t mbz; /* zero to catch runaway strings */ +}; + +struct credentials { + char service[ANAME_SZ]; /* Service name */ + char instance[INST_SZ]; /* Instance */ + char realm[REALM_SZ]; /* Auth domain */ + des_cblock session; /* Session key */ + int lifetime; /* Lifetime */ + int kvno; /* Key version number */ + struct ktext ticket_st; /* The ticket itself */ + int32_t issue_date; /* The issue time */ + char pname[ANAME_SZ]; /* Principal's name */ + char pinst[INST_SZ]; /* Principal's instance */ +}; + + +#define TKTLIFENUMFIXED 64 +#define TKTLIFEMINFIXED 0x80 +#define TKTLIFEMAXFIXED 0xBF +#define TKTLIFENOEXPIRE 0xFF +#define MAXTKTLIFETIME (30*24*3600) /* 30 days */ +#ifndef NEVERDATE +#define NEVERDATE ((time_t)0x7fffffffL) +#endif + +#define KERB_ERR_NULL_KEY 10 + +int +_krb5_krb_time_to_life(time_t start, time_t end); + +time_t +_krb5_krb_life_to_time(int start, int life_); + +#define krb_time_to_life _krb5_krb_time_to_life +#define krb_life_to_time _krb5_krb_life_to_time + +#endif /* __KRB5_V4COMPAT_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e169a0ca6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.3 @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd March 20, 2003 +.Dt KRB5 3 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5 +.Nd kerberos 5 library +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions constitute the Kerberos 5 library, +.Em libkrb5 . +Declarations for these functions may be obtained from the include file +.Pa krb5.h . +.Sh LIST OF FUNCTIONS +.sp 2 +.nf +.ta \w'krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof.3'u+2n +\w'Description goes here'u +\fIName/Page\fP \fIDescription\fP +.ta \w'krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof.3'u+2n +\w'Description goes here'u+6nC +.sp 5p +krb5_425_conv_principal.3 +krb5_425_conv_principal_ext.3 +krb5_524_conv_principal.3 +krb5_addlog_dest.3 +krb5_addlog_func.3 +krb5_addr2sockaddr.3 +krb5_address.3 +krb5_address_compare.3 +krb5_address_order.3 +krb5_address_search.3 +krb5_addresses.3 +krb5_anyaddr.3 +krb5_appdefault_boolean.3 +krb5_appdefault_string.3 +krb5_appdefault_time.3 +krb5_append_addresses.3 +krb5_auth_con_free.3 +krb5_auth_con_genaddrs.3 +krb5_auth_con_getaddrs.3 +krb5_auth_con_getflags.3 +krb5_auth_con_getkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_getrcache.3 +krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_getuserkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_init.3 +krb5_auth_con_initivector.3 +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs.3 +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd.3 +krb5_auth_con_setflags.3 +krb5_auth_con_setivector.3 +krb5_auth_con_setkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_setrcache.3 +krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey.3 +krb5_auth_con_setuserkey.3 +krb5_auth_context.3 +krb5_auth_getauthenticator.3 +krb5_auth_getcksumtype.3 +krb5_auth_getkeytype.3 +krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber.3 +krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber.3 +krb5_auth_setcksumtype.3 +krb5_auth_setkeytype.3 +krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber.3 +krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber.3 +krb5_build_principal.3 +krb5_build_principal_ext.3 +krb5_build_principal_va.3 +krb5_build_principal_va_ext.3 +krb5_cc_close.3 +krb5_cc_copy_cache.3 +krb5_cc_default.3 +krb5_cc_default_name.3 +krb5_cc_destroy.3 +krb5_cc_end_seq_get.3 +krb5_cc_gen_new.3 +krb5_cc_get_name.3 +krb5_cc_get_principal.3 +krb5_cc_get_type.3 +krb5_cc_get_version.3 +krb5_cc_initialize.3 +krb5_cc_next_cred.3 +krb5_cc_register.3 +krb5_cc_remove_cred.3 +krb5_cc_resolve.3 +krb5_cc_retrieve_cred.3 +krb5_cc_set_default_name.3 +krb5_cc_set_flags.3 +krb5_cc_store_cred.3 +krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof.3 +krb5_checksum_is_keyed.3 +krb5_checksumsize.3 +krb5_closelog.3 +krb5_config_get_bool_default.3 +krb5_config_get_int_default.3 +krb5_config_get_string_default.3 +krb5_config_get_time_default.3 +krb5_context.3 +krb5_copy_address.3 +krb5_copy_addresses.3 +krb5_copy_data.3 +krb5_create_checksum.3 +krb5_crypto_destroy.3 +krb5_crypto_init.3 +krb5_data_alloc.3 +krb5_data_copy.3 +krb5_data_free.3 +krb5_data_realloc.3 +krb5_data_zero.3 +krb5_decrypt.3 +krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData.3 +krb5_encrypt.3 +krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData.3 +krb5_err.3 +krb5_errx.3 +krb5_free_address.3 +krb5_free_addresses.3 +krb5_free_context.3 +krb5_free_data.3 +krb5_free_data_contents.3 +krb5_free_host_realm.3 +krb5_free_krbhst.3 +krb5_free_principal.3 +krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3 +krb5_get_all_server_addrs.3 +krb5_get_default_realm.3 +krb5_get_default_realms.3 +krb5_get_host_realm.3 +krb5_get_krb524hst.3 +krb5_get_krb_admin_hst.3 +krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst.3 +krb5_get_krbhst.3 +krb5_h_addr2addr.3 +krb5_h_addr2sockaddr.3 +krb5_init_context.3 +krb5_initlog.3 +krb5_keytab_entry.3 +krb5_krbhst_format_string.3 +krb5_krbhst_free.3 +krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo.3 +krb5_krbhst_init.3 +krb5_krbhst_next.3 +krb5_krbhst_next_as_string.3 +krb5_krbhst_reset.3 +krb5_kt_add_entry.3 +krb5_kt_close.3 +krb5_kt_compare.3 +krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents.3 +krb5_kt_cursor.3 +krb5_kt_cursor.3 +krb5_kt_default.3 +krb5_kt_default_name.3 +krb5_kt_end_seq_get.3 +krb5_kt_free_entry.3 +krb5_kt_get_entry.3 +krb5_kt_get_name.3 +krb5_kt_next_entry.3 +krb5_kt_ops.3 +krb5_kt_read_service_key.3 +krb5_kt_register.3 +krb5_kt_remove_entry.3 +krb5_kt_resolve.3.3 +krb5_kt_start_seq_get +krb5_log.3 +krb5_log_msg.3 +krb5_make_addrport.3 +krb5_make_principal.3 +krb5_max_sockaddr_size.3 +krb5_openlog.3 +krb5_parse_address.3 +krb5_parse_name.3 +krb5_principal.3 +krb5_principal_get_comp_string.3 +krb5_principal_get_realm.3 +krb5_print_address.3 +krb5_set_default_realm.3 +krb5_set_warn_dest.3 +krb5_sname_to_principal.3 +krb5_sock_to_principal.3 +krb5_sockaddr2address.3 +krb5_sockaddr2port.3 +krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting.3 +krb5_timeofday.3 +krb5_unparse_name.3 +krb5_us_timeofday.3 +krb5_verify_checksum.3 +krb5_verify_opt_init.3 +krb5_verify_opt_set_flags.3 +krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab.3 +krb5_verify_opt_set_secure.3 +krb5_verify_opt_set_service.3 +krb5_verify_user.3 +krb5_verify_user_lrealm.3 +krb5_verify_user_opt.3 +krb5_verr.3 +krb5_verrx.3 +krb5_vlog.3 +krb5_vlog_msg.3 +krb5_vwarn.3 +krb5_vwarnx.3 +krb5_warn.3 +krb5_warnx.3 +krn5_kuserok.3 +.ta +.Fi +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83cd5de34a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ + +KRB5(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55 - kerberos 5 library + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions constitute the Kerberos 5 library, _l_i_b_k_r_b_5. Declarations + for these functions may be obtained from the include file _k_r_b_5_._h. + +LLIISSTT OOFF FFUUNNCCTTIIOONNSS + _N_a_m_e_/_P_a_g_e _D_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_o_n + krb5_425_conv_principal.3 + krb5_425_conv_principal_ext.3 + krb5_524_conv_principal.3 + krb5_addlog_dest.3 + krb5_addlog_func.3 + krb5_addr2sockaddr.3 + krb5_address.3 + krb5_address_compare.3 + krb5_address_order.3 + krb5_address_search.3 + krb5_addresses.3 + krb5_anyaddr.3 + krb5_appdefault_boolean.3 + krb5_appdefault_string.3 + krb5_appdefault_time.3 + krb5_append_addresses.3 + krb5_auth_con_free.3 + krb5_auth_con_genaddrs.3 + krb5_auth_con_getaddrs.3 + krb5_auth_con_getflags.3 + krb5_auth_con_getkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_getrcache.3 + krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_getuserkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_init.3 + krb5_auth_con_initivector.3 + krb5_auth_con_setaddrs.3 + krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd.3 + krb5_auth_con_setflags.3 + krb5_auth_con_setivector.3 + krb5_auth_con_setkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_setrcache.3 + krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey.3 + krb5_auth_con_setuserkey.3 + krb5_auth_context.3 + krb5_auth_getauthenticator.3 + krb5_auth_getcksumtype.3 + krb5_auth_getkeytype.3 + krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber.3 + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber.3 + krb5_auth_setcksumtype.3 + krb5_auth_setkeytype.3 + krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber.3 + krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber.3 + krb5_build_principal.3 + krb5_build_principal_ext.3 + krb5_build_principal_va.3 + krb5_build_principal_va_ext.3 + krb5_cc_close.3 + krb5_cc_copy_cache.3 + krb5_cc_default.3 + krb5_cc_default_name.3 + krb5_cc_destroy.3 + krb5_cc_end_seq_get.3 + krb5_cc_gen_new.3 + krb5_cc_get_name.3 + krb5_cc_get_principal.3 + krb5_cc_get_type.3 + krb5_cc_get_version.3 + krb5_cc_initialize.3 + krb5_cc_next_cred.3 + krb5_cc_register.3 + krb5_cc_remove_cred.3 + krb5_cc_resolve.3 + krb5_cc_retrieve_cred.3 + krb5_cc_set_default_name.3 + krb5_cc_set_flags.3 + krb5_cc_store_cred.3 + krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof.3 + krb5_checksum_is_keyed.3 + krb5_checksumsize.3 + krb5_closelog.3 + krb5_config_get_bool_default.3 + krb5_config_get_int_default.3 + krb5_config_get_string_default.3 + krb5_config_get_time_default.3 + krb5_context.3 + krb5_copy_address.3 + krb5_copy_addresses.3 + krb5_copy_data.3 + krb5_create_checksum.3 + krb5_crypto_destroy.3 + krb5_crypto_init.3 + krb5_data_alloc.3 + krb5_data_copy.3 + krb5_data_free.3 + krb5_data_realloc.3 + krb5_data_zero.3 + krb5_decrypt.3 + krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData.3 + krb5_encrypt.3 + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData.3 + krb5_err.3 + krb5_errx.3 + krb5_free_address.3 + krb5_free_addresses.3 + krb5_free_context.3 + krb5_free_data.3 + krb5_free_data_contents.3 + krb5_free_host_realm.3 + krb5_free_krbhst.3 + krb5_free_principal.3 + krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3 + krb5_get_all_server_addrs.3 + krb5_get_default_realm.3 + krb5_get_default_realms.3 + krb5_get_host_realm.3 + krb5_get_krb524hst.3 + krb5_get_krb_admin_hst.3 + krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst.3 + krb5_get_krbhst.3 + krb5_h_addr2addr.3 + krb5_h_addr2sockaddr.3 + krb5_init_context.3 + krb5_initlog.3 + krb5_keytab_entry.3 + krb5_krbhst_format_string.3 + krb5_krbhst_free.3 + krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo.3 + krb5_krbhst_init.3 + krb5_krbhst_next.3 + krb5_krbhst_next_as_string.3 + krb5_krbhst_reset.3 + krb5_kt_add_entry.3 + krb5_kt_close.3 + krb5_kt_compare.3 + krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents.3 + krb5_kt_cursor.3 + krb5_kt_cursor.3 + krb5_kt_default.3 + krb5_kt_default_name.3 + krb5_kt_end_seq_get.3 + krb5_kt_free_entry.3 + krb5_kt_get_entry.3 + krb5_kt_get_name.3 + krb5_kt_next_entry.3 + krb5_kt_ops.3 + krb5_kt_read_service_key.3 + krb5_kt_register.3 + krb5_kt_remove_entry.3 + krb5_kt_resolve.3.3 + krb5_kt_start_seq_get + krb5_log.3 + krb5_log_msg.3 + krb5_make_addrport.3 + krb5_make_principal.3 + krb5_max_sockaddr_size.3 + krb5_openlog.3 + krb5_parse_address.3 + krb5_parse_name.3 + krb5_principal.3 + krb5_principal_get_comp_string.3 + krb5_principal_get_realm.3 + krb5_print_address.3 + krb5_set_default_realm.3 + krb5_set_warn_dest.3 + krb5_sname_to_principal.3 + krb5_sock_to_principal.3 + krb5_sockaddr2address.3 + krb5_sockaddr2port.3 + krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting.3 + krb5_timeofday.3 + krb5_unparse_name.3 + krb5_us_timeofday.3 + krb5_verify_checksum.3 + krb5_verify_opt_init.3 + krb5_verify_opt_set_flags.3 + krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab.3 + krb5_verify_opt_set_secure.3 + krb5_verify_opt_set_service.3 + krb5_verify_user.3 + krb5_verify_user_lrealm.3 + krb5_verify_user_opt.3 + krb5_verr.3 + krb5_verrx.3 + krb5_vlog.3 + krb5_vlog_msg.3 + krb5_vwarn.3 + krb5_vwarnx.3 + krb5_warn.3 + krb5_warnx.3 + krn5_kuserok.3 + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5.conf(5), kerberos(8) + +BSD Experimental March 20, 2003 4 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c9f8771c8a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5 @@ -0,0 +1,477 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5.conf.5,v 1.35.2.2 2004/03/09 19:52:07 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 9, 2004 +.Dt KRB5.CONF 5 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5.conf +.Nd configuration file for Kerberos 5 +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +file specifies several configuration parameters for the Kerberos 5 +library, as well as for some programs. +.Pp +The file consists of one or more sections, containing a number of +bindings. +The value of each binding can be either a string or a list of other +bindings. +The grammar looks like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +file: + /* empty */ + sections + +sections: + section sections + section + +section: + '[' section_name ']' bindings + +section_name: + STRING + +bindings: + binding bindings + binding + +binding: + name '=' STRING + name '=' '{' bindings '}' + +name: + STRING + +.Ed +.Li STRINGs +consists of one or more non-whitespace characters. +.Pp +STRINGs that are specified later in this man-page uses the following +notation. +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It boolean +values can be either yes/true or no/false. +.It time +values can be a list of year, month, day, hour, min, second. +Example: 1 month 2 days 30 min. +.It etypes +valid encryption types are: des-cbc-crc, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-md5, +des3-cbc-sha1, arcfour-hmac-md5, aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96, and +aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 . +.It address +an address can be either a IPv4 or a IPv6 address. +.El +.Pp +Currently recognised sections and bindings are: +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li [appdefaults] +Specifies the default values to be used for Kerberos applications. +You can specify defaults per application, realm, or a combination of +these. +The preference order is: +.Bl -enum -compact +.It +.Va application Va realm Va option +.It +.Va application Va option +.It +.Va realm Va option +.It +.Va option +.El +.Pp +The supported options are: +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li forwardable = Va boolean +When obtaining initial credentials, make the credentials forwardable. +.It Li proxiable = Va boolean +When obtaining initial credentials, make the credentials proxiable. +.It Li no-addresses = Va boolean +When obtaining initial credentials, request them for an empty set of +addresses, making the tickets valid from any address. +.It Li ticket_lifetime = Va time +Default ticket lifetime. +.It Li renew_lifetime = Va time +Default renewable ticket lifetime. +.It Li encrypt = Va boolean +Use encryption, when available. +.It Li forward = Va boolean +Forward credentials to remote host (for +.Xr rsh 1 , +.Xr telnet 1 , +etc). +.El +.It Li [libdefaults] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li default_realm = Va REALM +Default realm to use, this is also known as your +.Dq local realm . +The default is the result of +.Fn krb5_get_host_realm "local hostname" . +.It Li clockskew = Va time +Maximum time differential (in seconds) allowed when comparing +times. +Default is 300 seconds (five minutes). +.It Li kdc_timeout = Va time +Maximum time to wait for a reply from the kdc, default is 3 seconds. +.It v4_name_convert +.It v4_instance_resolve +These are described in the +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 +manual page. +.It Li capath = { +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va destination-realm Li = Va next-hop-realm +.It ... +.It Li } +.El +This is deprecated, see the +.Li capaths +section below. +.It Li default_etypes = Va etypes ... +A list of default encryption types to use. +.It Li default_etypes_des = Va etypes ... +A list of default encryption types to use when requesting a DES credential. +.It Li default_keytab_name = Va keytab +The keytab to use if no other is specified, default is +.Dq FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab . +.It Li dns_lookup_kdc = Va boolean +Use DNS SRV records to lookup KDC services location. +.It Li dns_lookup_realm = Va boolean +Use DNS TXT records to lookup domain to realm mappings. +.It Li kdc_timesync = Va boolean +Try to keep track of the time differential between the local machine +and the KDC, and then compensate for that when issuing requests. +.It Li max_retries = Va number +The max number of times to try to contact each KDC. +.It Li ticket_lifetime = Va time +Default ticket lifetime. +.It Li renew_lifetime = Va time +Default renewable ticket lifetime. +.It Li forwardable = Va boolean +When obtaining initial credentials, make the credentials forwardable. +This option is also valid in the [realms] section. +.It Li proxiable = Va boolean +When obtaining initial credentials, make the credentials proxiable. +This option is also valid in the [realms] section. +.It Li verify_ap_req_nofail = Va boolean +If enabled, failure to verify credentials against a local key is a +fatal error. +The application has to be able to read the corresponding service key +for this to work. +Some applications, like +.Xr su 1 , +enable this option unconditionally. +.It Li warn_pwexpire = Va time +How soon to warn for expiring password. +Default is seven days. +.It Li http_proxy = Va proxy-spec +A HTTP-proxy to use when talking to the KDC via HTTP. +.It Li dns_proxy = Va proxy-spec +Enable using DNS via HTTP. +.It Li extra_addresses = Va address ... +A list of addresses to get tickets for along with all local addresses. +.It Li time_format = Va string +How to print time strings in logs, this string is passed to +.Xr strftime 3 . +.It Li date_format = Va string +How to print date strings in logs, this string is passed to +.Xr strftime 3 . +.It Li log_utc = Va boolean +Write log-entries using UTC instead of your local time zone. +.It Li scan_interfaces = Va boolean +Scan all network interfaces for addresses, as opposed to simply using +the address associated with the system's host name. +.It Li fcache_version = Va int +Use file credential cache format version specified. +.It Li krb4_get_tickets = Va boolean +Also get Kerberos 4 tickets in +.Nm kinit , +.Nm login , +and other programs. +This option is also valid in the [realms] section. +.It Li fcc-mit-ticketflags = Va boolean +Use MIT compatible format for file credential cache. +It's the field ticketflags that is stored in reverse bit order for +older than Heimdal 0.7. +Setting this flag to +.Dv TRUE +make it store the MIT way, this is default for Heimdal 0.7. +.El +.It Li [domain_realm] +This is a list of mappings from DNS domain to Kerberos realm. +Each binding in this section looks like: +.Pp +.Dl domain = realm +.Pp +The domain can be either a full name of a host or a trailing +component, in the latter case the domain-string should start with a +period. +The realm may be the token `dns_locate', in which case the actual +realm will be determined using DNS (independently of the setting +of the `dns_lookup_realm' option). +.It Li [realms] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va REALM Li = { +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li kdc = Va [service/]host[:port] +Specifies a list of kdcs for this realm. +If the optional +.Va port +is absent, the +default value for the +.Dq kerberos/udp +.Dq kerberos/tcp , +and +.Dq http/tcp +port (depending on service) will be used. +The kdcs will be used in the order that they are specified. +.Pp +The optional +.Va service +specifies over what medium the kdc should be +contacted. +Possible services are +.Dq udp , +.Dq tcp , +and +.Dq http . +Http can also be written as +.Dq http:// . +Default service is +.Dq udp +and +.Dq tcp . +.It Li admin_server = Va host[:port] +Specifies the admin server for this realm, where all the modifications +to the database are performed. +.It Li kpasswd_server = Va host[:port] +Points to the server where all the password changes are performed. +If there is no such entry, the kpasswd port on the admin_server host +will be tried. +.It Li krb524_server = Va host[:port] +Points to the server that does 524 conversions. +If it is not mentioned, the krb524 port on the kdcs will be tried. +.It Li v4_instance_convert +.It Li v4_name_convert +.It Li default_domain +See +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 . +.It Li tgs_require_subkey +a boolan variable that defaults to false. +Old DCE secd (pre 1.1) might need this to be true. +.El +.It Li } +.El +.It Li [capaths] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va client-realm Li = { +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va server-realm Li = Va hop-realm ... +This serves two purposes. First the first listed +.Va hop-realm +tells a client which realm it should contact in order to ultimately +obtain credentials for a service in the +.Va server-realm . +Secondly, it tells the KDC (and other servers) which realms are +allowed in a multi-hop traversal from +.Va client-realm +to +.Va server-realm . +Except for the client case, the order of the realms are not important. +.El +.It Va } +.El +.It Li [logging] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va entity Li = Va destination +Specifies that +.Va entity +should use the specified +.Li destination +for logging. +See the +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 +manual page for a list of defined destinations. +.El +.It Li [kdc] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It database Li = { +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It dbname Li = Va DATABASENAME +Use this database for this realm. +.It realm Li = Va REALM +Specifies the realm that will be stored in this database. +.It mkey_file Li = Pa FILENAME +Use this keytab file for the master key of this database. +If not specified +.Va DATABASENAME Ns .mkey +will be used. +.It acl_file Li = PA FILENAME +Use this file for the ACL list of this database. +.It log_file Li = Pa FILENAME +Use this file as the log of changes performed to the database. +This file is used by +.Nm ipropd-master +for propagating changes to slaves. +.El +.It Li } +.It max-request = Va SIZE +Maximum size of a kdc request. +.It require-preauth = Va BOOL +If set pre-authentication is required. +Since krb4 requests are not pre-authenticated they will be rejected. +.It ports = Va "list of ports" +List of ports the kdc should listen to. +.It addresses = Va "list of interfaces" +List of addresses the kdc should bind to. +.It enable-kerberos4 = Va BOOL +Turn on Kerberos 4 support. +.It v4-realm = Va REALM +To what realm v4 requests should be mapped. +.It enable-524 = Va BOOL +Should the Kerberos 524 converting facility be turned on. +Default is same as +.Va enable-kerberos4 . +.It enable-http = Va BOOL +Should the kdc answer kdc-requests over http. +.It enable-kaserver = Va BOOL +If this kdc should emulate the AFS kaserver. +.It check-ticket-addresses = Va BOOL +verify the addresses in the tickets used in tgs requests. +.\" XXX +.It allow-null-ticket-addresses = Va BOOL +Allow addresses-less tickets. +.\" XXX +.It allow-anonymous = Va BOOL +If the kdc is allowed to hand out anonymous tickets. +.It encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep = Va BOOL +Encode as-rep as tgs-rep tobe compatible with mistakes older DCE secd did. +.\" XXX +.It kdc_warn_pwexpire = Va TIME +The time before expiration that the user should be warned that her +password is about to expire. +.It logging = Va Logging +What type of logging the kdc should use, see also [logging]/kdc. +.It use_2b = Va principal list +List of principals to use AFS 2b tokens for. +.El +.It Li [kadmin] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It require-preauth = Va BOOL +If pre-authentication is required to talk to the kadmin server. +.It default_keys = Va keytypes... +for each entry in +.Va default_keys +try to parse it as a sequence of +.Va etype:salttype:salt +syntax of this if something like: +.Pp +[(des|des3|etype):](pw-salt|afs3-salt)[:string] +.Pp +If +.Ar etype +is omitted it means everything, and if string is omitted it means the +default salt string (for that principal and encryption type). +Additional special values of keytypes are: +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It v5 +The Kerberos 5 salt +.Va pw-salt +.It v4 +The Kerberos 4 salt +.Va des:pw-salt: +.El +.It use_v4_salt = Va BOOL +When true, this is the same as +.Pp +.Va default_keys = Va des3:pw-salt Va v4 +.Pp +and is only left for backwards compatibility. +.El +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Ev KRB5_CONFIG +points to the configuration file to read. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width "/etc/krb5.conf" +.It Pa /etc/krb5.conf +configuration file for Kerberos 5. +.El +.Sh EXAMPLES +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[libdefaults] + default_realm = FOO.SE +[domain_realm] + .foo.se = FOO.SE + .bar.se = FOO.SE +[realms] + FOO.SE = { + kdc = kerberos.foo.se + v4_name_convert = { + rcmd = host + } + v4_instance_convert = { + xyz = xyz.bar.se + } + default_domain = foo.se + } +[logging] + kdc = FILE:/var/heimdal/kdc.log + kdc = SYSLOG:INFO + default = SYSLOG:INFO:USER +.Ed +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +Since +.Nm +is read and parsed by the krb5 library, there is not a lot of +opportunities for programs to report parsing errors in any useful +format. +To help overcome this problem, there is a program +.Nm verify_krb5_conf +that reads +.Nm +and tries to emit useful diagnostics from parsing errors. +Note that this program does not have any way of knowing what options +are actually used and thus cannot warn about unknown or misspelled +ones. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 , +.Xr strftime 3 , +.Xr verify_krb5_conf 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.cat5 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.cat5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c7bc6d68d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.cat5 @@ -0,0 +1,476 @@ + +KRB5.CONF(5) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5.CONF(5) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55..ccoonnff - configuration file for Kerberos 5 + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55..ccoonnff file specifies several configuration parameters for the + Kerberos 5 library, as well as for some programs. + + The file consists of one or more sections, containing a number of bind- + ings. The value of each binding can be either a string or a list of oth- + er bindings. The grammar looks like: + + file: + /* empty */ + sections + + sections: + section sections + section + + section: + '[' section_name ']' bindings + + section_name: + STRING + + bindings: + binding bindings + binding + + binding: + name '=' STRING + name '=' '{' bindings '}' + + name: + STRING + + STRINGs consists of one or more non-whitespace characters. + + STRINGs that are specified later in this man-page uses the following no- + tation. + + boolean + values can be either yes/true or no/false. + + time + values can be a list of year, month, day, hour, min, second. + Example: 1 month 2 days 30 min. + + etypes + valid encryption types are: des-cbc-crc, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc- + md5, des3-cbc-sha1, arcfour-hmac-md5, aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96, + and aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 . + + address + an address can be either a IPv4 or a IPv6 address. + + Currently recognised sections and bindings are: + + [appdefaults] + Specifies the default values to be used for Kerberos applica- + tions. You can specify defaults per application, realm, or a + + combination of these. The preference order is: + 1. _a_p_p_l_i_c_a_t_i_o_n _r_e_a_l_m _o_p_t_i_o_n + 2. _a_p_p_l_i_c_a_t_i_o_n _o_p_t_i_o_n + 3. _r_e_a_l_m _o_p_t_i_o_n + 4. _o_p_t_i_o_n + + The supported options are: + + forwardable = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + When obtaining initial credentials, make the cre- + dentials forwardable. + + proxiable = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + When obtaining initial credentials, make the cre- + dentials proxiable. + + no-addresses = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + When obtaining initial credentials, request them + for an empty set of addresses, making the tickets + valid from any address. + + ticket_lifetime = _t_i_m_e + Default ticket lifetime. + + renew_lifetime = _t_i_m_e + Default renewable ticket lifetime. + + encrypt = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Use encryption, when available. + + forward = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Forward credentials to remote host (for rsh(1), + telnet(1), etc). + + [libdefaults] + + default_realm = _R_E_A_L_M + Default realm to use, this is also known as your + ``local realm''. The default is the result of + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm(_l_o_c_a_l _h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e). + + clockskew = _t_i_m_e + Maximum time differential (in seconds) allowed when + comparing times. Default is 300 seconds (five min- + utes). + + kdc_timeout = _t_i_m_e + Maximum time to wait for a reply from the kdc, de- + fault is 3 seconds. + + v4_name_convert + + v4_instance_resolve + These are described in the krb5_425_conv_princi- + pal(3) manual page. + + capath = { + + _d_e_s_t_i_n_a_t_i_o_n_-_r_e_a_l_m = _n_e_x_t_-_h_o_p_-_r_e_a_l_m + + ... + + } + + + This is deprecated, see the capaths section below. + + default_etypes = _e_t_y_p_e_s _._._. + A list of default encryption types to use. + + default_etypes_des = _e_t_y_p_e_s _._._. + A list of default encryption types to use when re- + questing a DES credential. + + default_keytab_name = _k_e_y_t_a_b + The keytab to use if no other is specified, default + is ``FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab''. + + dns_lookup_kdc = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Use DNS SRV records to lookup KDC services loca- + tion. + + dns_lookup_realm = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Use DNS TXT records to lookup domain to realm map- + pings. + + kdc_timesync = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Try to keep track of the time differential between + the local machine and the KDC, and then compensate + for that when issuing requests. + + max_retries = _n_u_m_b_e_r + The max number of times to try to contact each KDC. + + ticket_lifetime = _t_i_m_e + Default ticket lifetime. + + renew_lifetime = _t_i_m_e + Default renewable ticket lifetime. + + forwardable = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + When obtaining initial credentials, make the cre- + dentials forwardable. This option is also valid in + the [realms] section. + + proxiable = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + When obtaining initial credentials, make the cre- + dentials proxiable. This option is also valid in + the [realms] section. + + verify_ap_req_nofail = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + If enabled, failure to verify credentials against a + local key is a fatal error. The application has to + be able to read the corresponding service key for + this to work. Some applications, like su(1), en- + able this option unconditionally. + + warn_pwexpire = _t_i_m_e + How soon to warn for expiring password. Default is + seven days. + + http_proxy = _p_r_o_x_y_-_s_p_e_c + A HTTP-proxy to use when talking to the KDC via + HTTP. + + dns_proxy = _p_r_o_x_y_-_s_p_e_c + Enable using DNS via HTTP. + + extra_addresses = _a_d_d_r_e_s_s _._._. + A list of addresses to get tickets for along with + + all local addresses. + + time_format = _s_t_r_i_n_g + How to print time strings in logs, this string is + passed to strftime(3). + + date_format = _s_t_r_i_n_g + How to print date strings in logs, this string is + passed to strftime(3). + + log_utc = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Write log-entries using UTC instead of your local + time zone. + + scan_interfaces = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Scan all network interfaces for addresses, as op- + posed to simply using the address associated with + the system's host name. + + fcache_version = _i_n_t + Use file credential cache format version specified. + + krb4_get_tickets = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Also get Kerberos 4 tickets in kkiinniitt, llooggiinn, and + other programs. This option is also valid in the + [realms] section. + + fcc-mit-ticketflags = _b_o_o_l_e_a_n + Use MIT compatible format for file credential + cache. It's the field ticketflags that is stored + in reverse bit order for older than Heimdal 0.7. + Setting this flag to TRUE make it store the MIT + way, this is default for Heimdal 0.7. + + [domain_realm] + This is a list of mappings from DNS domain to Kerberos realm. + Each binding in this section looks like: + + domain = realm + + The domain can be either a full name of a host or a trailing + component, in the latter case the domain-string should start + with a period. The realm may be the token `dns_locate', in + which case the actual realm will be determined using DNS (in- + dependently of the setting of the `dns_lookup_realm' option). + + [realms] + + _R_E_A_L_M = { + + kdc = _[_s_e_r_v_i_c_e_/_]_h_o_s_t_[_:_p_o_r_t_] + Specifies a list of kdcs for this realm. + If the optional _p_o_r_t is absent, the de- + fault value for the ``kerberos/udp'' + ``kerberos/tcp'', and ``http/tcp'' port + (depending on service) will be used. + The kdcs will be used in the order that + they are specified. + + The optional _s_e_r_v_i_c_e specifies over what + medium the kdc should be contacted. + Possible services are ``udp'', ``tcp'', + and ``http''. Http can also be written + as ``http://''. Default service is + + + ``udp'' and ``tcp''. + + admin_server = _h_o_s_t_[_:_p_o_r_t_] + Specifies the admin server for this + realm, where all the modifications to + the database are performed. + + kpasswd_server = _h_o_s_t_[_:_p_o_r_t_] + Points to the server where all the pass- + word changes are performed. If there is + no such entry, the kpasswd port on the + admin_server host will be tried. + + krb524_server = _h_o_s_t_[_:_p_o_r_t_] + Points to the server that does 524 con- + versions. If it is not mentioned, the + krb524 port on the kdcs will be tried. + + v4_instance_convert + + v4_name_convert + + default_domain + See krb5_425_conv_principal(3). + + tgs_require_subkey + a boolan variable that defaults to + false. Old DCE secd (pre 1.1) might + need this to be true. + + } + + [capaths] + + _c_l_i_e_n_t_-_r_e_a_l_m = { + + _s_e_r_v_e_r_-_r_e_a_l_m = _h_o_p_-_r_e_a_l_m _._._. + This serves two purposes. First the + first listed _h_o_p_-_r_e_a_l_m tells a client + which realm it should contact in order + to ultimately obtain credentials for a + service in the _s_e_r_v_e_r_-_r_e_a_l_m. Secondly, + it tells the KDC (and other servers) + which realms are allowed in a multi-hop + traversal from _c_l_i_e_n_t_-_r_e_a_l_m to _s_e_r_v_e_r_- + _r_e_a_l_m. Except for the client case, the + order of the realms are not important. + + _} + + [logging] + + _e_n_t_i_t_y = _d_e_s_t_i_n_a_t_i_o_n + Specifies that _e_n_t_i_t_y should use the specified + destination for logging. See the krb5_openlog(3) + manual page for a list of defined destinations. + + [kdc] + + database = { + + dbname = _D_A_T_A_B_A_S_E_N_A_M_E + Use this database for this realm. + + realm = _R_E_A_L_M + Specifies the realm that will be stored + + in this database. + + mkey_file = _F_I_L_E_N_A_M_E + Use this keytab file for the master key + of this database. If not specified + _D_A_T_A_B_A_S_E_N_A_M_E.mkey will be used. + + acl_file = PA FILENAME + Use this file for the ACL list of this + database. + + log_file = _F_I_L_E_N_A_M_E + Use this file as the log of changes per- + formed to the database. This file is + used by iipprrooppdd--mmaasstteerr for propagating + changes to slaves. + + } + + max-request = _S_I_Z_E + Maximum size of a kdc request. + + require-preauth = _B_O_O_L + If set pre-authentication is required. Since krb4 + requests are not pre-authenticated they will be re- + jected. + + ports = _l_i_s_t _o_f _p_o_r_t_s + List of ports the kdc should listen to. + + addresses = _l_i_s_t _o_f _i_n_t_e_r_f_a_c_e_s + List of addresses the kdc should bind to. + + enable-kerberos4 = _B_O_O_L + Turn on Kerberos 4 support. + + v4-realm = _R_E_A_L_M + To what realm v4 requests should be mapped. + + enable-524 = _B_O_O_L + Should the Kerberos 524 converting facility be + turned on. Default is same as _e_n_a_b_l_e_-_k_e_r_b_e_r_o_s_4. + + enable-http = _B_O_O_L + Should the kdc answer kdc-requests over http. + + enable-kaserver = _B_O_O_L + If this kdc should emulate the AFS kaserver. + + check-ticket-addresses = _B_O_O_L + verify the addresses in the tickets used in tgs re- + quests. + + allow-null-ticket-addresses = _B_O_O_L + Allow addresses-less tickets. + + allow-anonymous = _B_O_O_L + If the kdc is allowed to hand out anonymous tick- + ets. + + encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep = _B_O_O_L + Encode as-rep as tgs-rep tobe compatible with mis- + takes older DCE secd did. + + kdc_warn_pwexpire = _T_I_M_E + The time before expiration that the user should be + warned that her password is about to expire. + + logging = _L_o_g_g_i_n_g + What type of logging the kdc should use, see also + [logging]/kdc. + + use_2b = _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _l_i_s_t + List of principals to use AFS 2b tokens for. + + [kadmin] + + require-preauth = _B_O_O_L + If pre-authentication is required to talk to the + kadmin server. + + default_keys = _k_e_y_t_y_p_e_s_._._. + for each entry in _d_e_f_a_u_l_t___k_e_y_s try to parse it as a + sequence of _e_t_y_p_e_:_s_a_l_t_t_y_p_e_:_s_a_l_t syntax of this if + something like: + + [(des|des3|etype):](pw-salt|afs3-salt)[:string] + + If _e_t_y_p_e is omitted it means everything, and if + string is omitted it means the default salt string + (for that principal and encryption type). Addi- + tional special values of keytypes are: + + v5 The Kerberos 5 salt _p_w_-_s_a_l_t + + v4 The Kerberos 4 salt _d_e_s_:_p_w_-_s_a_l_t_: + + use_v4_salt = _B_O_O_L + When true, this is the same as + + _d_e_f_a_u_l_t___k_e_y_s _= _d_e_s_3_:_p_w_-_s_a_l_t _v_4 + + and is only left for backwards compatibility. + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + KRB5_CONFIG points to the configuration file to read. + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/krb5.conf configuration file for Kerberos 5. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + [libdefaults] + default_realm = FOO.SE + [domain_realm] + .foo.se = FOO.SE + .bar.se = FOO.SE + [realms] + FOO.SE = { + kdc = kerberos.foo.se + v4_name_convert = { + rcmd = host + } + v4_instance_convert = { + xyz = xyz.bar.se + } + default_domain = foo.se + } + [logging] + kdc = FILE:/var/heimdal/kdc.log + kdc = SYSLOG:INFO + default = SYSLOG:INFO:USER + +DDIIAAGGNNOOSSTTIICCSS + Since kkrrbb55..ccoonnff is read and parsed by the krb5 library, there is not a + lot of opportunities for programs to report parsing errors in any useful + format. To help overcome this problem, there is a program + vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff that reads kkrrbb55..ccoonnff and tries to emit useful diagnos- + tics from parsing errors. Note that this program does not have any way + of knowing what options are actually used and thus cannot warn about un- + known or misspelled ones. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + kinit(1), krb5_425_conv_principal(3), krb5_openlog(3), strftime(3), + verify_krb5_conf(8) + + HEIMDAL March 9, 2004 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a327f104c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5.h @@ -0,0 +1,683 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: krb5.h,v 1.209.2.2 2004/06/21 08:32:00 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KRB5_H__ +#define __KRB5_H__ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* name confusion with MIT */ +#ifndef KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP +#define KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED +#endif + +/* simple constants */ + +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#define FALSE 0 +#endif + +typedef int krb5_boolean; + +typedef int32_t krb5_error_code; + +typedef int krb5_kvno; + +typedef u_int32_t krb5_flags; + +typedef void *krb5_pointer; +typedef const void *krb5_const_pointer; + +typedef octet_string krb5_data; + +struct krb5_crypto_data; +typedef struct krb5_crypto_data *krb5_crypto; + +typedef CKSUMTYPE krb5_cksumtype; + +typedef Checksum krb5_checksum; + +typedef ENCTYPE krb5_enctype; + +/* alternative names */ +enum { + ENCTYPE_NULL = ETYPE_NULL, + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5 = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5, + ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1 = ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE = ETYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE, + ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV = ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV, + ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB = ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB, + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 = ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56 = ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56, + ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS = ETYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS, + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE = ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE, + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, + ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE = ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE, + ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE = ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE +}; + +typedef PADATA_TYPE krb5_preauthtype; + +typedef enum krb5_key_usage { + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP = 1, + /* AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TICKET = 2, + /* AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART = 3, + /* AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION = 4, + /* TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY = 5, + /* TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM = 6, + /* TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH = 7, + /* TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION = 8, + /* TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY = 9, + /* TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM = 10, + /* AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH = 11, + /* AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART = 12, + /* AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_PRIV = 13, + /* KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_CRED = 14, + /* KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.8.1) */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM = 15, + /* KRB-SAFE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.6.1) */ + KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED = 16, + /* Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be encrypted using an RFC1510 encryption type. */ + KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM = 17, + /* Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be checksummed using an RFC1510 checksum type. */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_ERROR = 18, + /* Krb-error checksum */ + KRB5_KU_AD_KDC_ISSUED = 19, + /* AD-KDCIssued checksum */ + KRB5_KU_MANDATORY_TICKET_EXTENSION = 20, + /* Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions */ + KRB5_KU_AUTH_DATA_TICKET_EXTENSION = 21, + /* Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions */ + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL = 22, + /* seal in GSSAPI krb5 mechanism */ + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN = 23, + /* sign in GSSAPI krb5 mechanism */ + KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEQ = 24 + /* SEQ in GSSAPI krb5 mechanism */ +} krb5_key_usage; + +typedef krb5_key_usage krb5_keyusage; + +typedef enum krb5_salttype { + KRB5_PW_SALT = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT, + KRB5_AFS3_SALT = KRB5_PADATA_AFS3_SALT +}krb5_salttype; + +typedef struct krb5_salt { + krb5_salttype salttype; + krb5_data saltvalue; +} krb5_salt; + +typedef ETYPE_INFO krb5_preauthinfo; + +typedef struct { + krb5_preauthtype type; + krb5_preauthinfo info; /* list of preauthinfo for this type */ +} krb5_preauthdata_entry; + +typedef struct krb5_preauthdata { + unsigned len; + krb5_preauthdata_entry *val; +}krb5_preauthdata; + +typedef enum krb5_address_type { + KRB5_ADDRESS_INET = 2, + KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6 = 24, + KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT = 256, + KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT = 257 +} krb5_address_type; + +enum { + AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY = 1, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED = 2, + AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY = 4 /* library internal */ +}; + +typedef HostAddress krb5_address; + +typedef HostAddresses krb5_addresses; + +typedef enum krb5_keytype { + KEYTYPE_NULL = 0, + KEYTYPE_DES = 1, + KEYTYPE_DES3 = 7, + KEYTYPE_AES128 = 17, + KEYTYPE_AES256 = 18, + KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR = 23, + KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56 = 24 +} krb5_keytype; + +typedef EncryptionKey krb5_keyblock; + +typedef AP_REQ krb5_ap_req; + +struct krb5_cc_ops; + +#define KRB5_DEFAULT_CCFILE_ROOT "/tmp/krb5cc_" + +#define KRB5_DEFAULT_CCROOT "FILE:" KRB5_DEFAULT_CCFILE_ROOT + +#define KRB5_ACCEPT_NULL_ADDRESSES(C) \ + krb5_config_get_bool_default((C), NULL, TRUE, \ + "libdefaults", "accept_null_addresses", \ + NULL) + +typedef void *krb5_cc_cursor; + +typedef struct krb5_ccache_data { + const struct krb5_cc_ops *ops; + krb5_data data; +}krb5_ccache_data; + +typedef struct krb5_ccache_data *krb5_ccache; + +typedef struct krb5_context_data *krb5_context; + +typedef Realm krb5_realm; +typedef const char *krb5_const_realm; /* stupid language */ + +#define krb5_realm_length(r) strlen(r) +#define krb5_realm_data(r) (r) + +typedef Principal krb5_principal_data; +typedef struct Principal *krb5_principal; +typedef const struct Principal *krb5_const_principal; + +typedef time_t krb5_deltat; +typedef time_t krb5_timestamp; + +typedef struct krb5_times { + krb5_timestamp authtime; + krb5_timestamp starttime; + krb5_timestamp endtime; + krb5_timestamp renew_till; +} krb5_times; + +typedef union { + TicketFlags b; + krb5_flags i; +} krb5_ticket_flags; + +/* options for krb5_get_in_tkt() */ +#define KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE (1 << 1) +#define KDC_OPT_FORWARDED (1 << 2) +#define KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE (1 << 3) +#define KDC_OPT_PROXY (1 << 4) +#define KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE (1 << 5) +#define KDC_OPT_POSTDATED (1 << 6) +#define KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE (1 << 8) +#define KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS (1 << 14) +#define KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK (1 << 26) +#define KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK (1 << 27) +#define KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY (1 << 28) +#define KDC_OPT_RENEW (1 << 30) +#define KDC_OPT_VALIDATE (1 << 31) + +typedef union { + KDCOptions b; + krb5_flags i; +} krb5_kdc_flags; + +/* flags for krb5_verify_ap_req */ + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID (1 << 0) + +#define KRB5_GC_CACHED (1U << 0) +#define KRB5_GC_USER_USER (1U << 1) + +/* constants for compare_creds (and cc_retrieve_cred) */ +#define KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM (1U << 31) +#define KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE (1U << 30) + +typedef AuthorizationData krb5_authdata; + +typedef KRB_ERROR krb5_error; + +typedef struct krb5_creds { + krb5_principal client; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_keyblock session; + krb5_times times; + krb5_data ticket; + krb5_data second_ticket; + krb5_authdata authdata; + krb5_addresses addresses; + krb5_ticket_flags flags; +} krb5_creds; + +typedef struct krb5_cc_ops { + const char *prefix; + const char* (*get_name)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); + krb5_error_code (*resolve)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, const char *); + krb5_error_code (*gen_new)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); + krb5_error_code (*init)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal); + krb5_error_code (*destroy)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); + krb5_error_code (*close)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); + krb5_error_code (*store)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_creds*); + krb5_error_code (*retrieve)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, + krb5_flags, krb5_creds*, krb5_creds); + krb5_error_code (*get_princ)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal*); + krb5_error_code (*get_first)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *); + krb5_error_code (*get_next)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, + krb5_cc_cursor*, krb5_creds*); + krb5_error_code (*end_get)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*remove_cred)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, + krb5_flags, krb5_creds*); + krb5_error_code (*set_flags)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_flags); + int (*get_version)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); +} krb5_cc_ops; + +struct krb5_log_facility; + +struct krb5_config_binding { + enum { krb5_config_string, krb5_config_list } type; + char *name; + struct krb5_config_binding *next; + union { + char *string; + struct krb5_config_binding *list; + void *generic; + } u; +}; + +typedef struct krb5_config_binding krb5_config_binding; + +typedef krb5_config_binding krb5_config_section; + +typedef struct krb5_context_data { + krb5_enctype *etypes; + krb5_enctype *etypes_des; + char **default_realms; + time_t max_skew; + time_t kdc_timeout; + unsigned max_retries; + int32_t kdc_sec_offset; + int32_t kdc_usec_offset; + krb5_config_section *cf; + struct et_list *et_list; + struct krb5_log_facility *warn_dest; + krb5_cc_ops *cc_ops; + int num_cc_ops; + const char *http_proxy; + const char *time_fmt; + krb5_boolean log_utc; + const char *default_keytab; + const char *default_keytab_modify; + krb5_boolean use_admin_kdc; + krb5_addresses *extra_addresses; + krb5_boolean scan_interfaces; /* `ifconfig -a' */ + krb5_boolean srv_lookup; /* do SRV lookups */ + krb5_boolean srv_try_txt; /* try TXT records also */ + int32_t fcache_vno; /* create cache files w/ this + version */ + int num_kt_types; /* # of registered keytab types */ + struct krb5_keytab_data *kt_types; /* registered keytab types */ + const char *date_fmt; + char *error_string; + char error_buf[256]; + krb5_addresses *ignore_addresses; + char *default_cc_name; +} krb5_context_data; + +typedef struct krb5_ticket { + EncTicketPart ticket; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_principal server; +} krb5_ticket; + +typedef Authenticator krb5_authenticator_data; + +typedef krb5_authenticator_data *krb5_authenticator; + +struct krb5_rcache_data; +typedef struct krb5_rcache_data *krb5_rcache; +typedef Authenticator krb5_donot_replay; + +#define KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER 0x01 /* old */ +#define KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS 0x02 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE 0x04 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE 0x08 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_MASK 0x60 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_BE 0x00 /* default */ +#define KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE 0x20 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_HOST 0x40 + +struct krb5_storage_data; +typedef struct krb5_storage_data krb5_storage; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_entry { + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_kvno vno; + krb5_keyblock keyblock; + u_int32_t timestamp; +} krb5_keytab_entry; + +typedef struct krb5_kt_cursor { + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + void *data; +} krb5_kt_cursor; + +struct krb5_keytab_data; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_data *krb5_keytab; + +#define KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN 30 + +struct krb5_keytab_data { + const char *prefix; + krb5_error_code (*resolve)(krb5_context, const char*, krb5_keytab); + krb5_error_code (*get_name)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, char*, size_t); + krb5_error_code (*close)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab); + krb5_error_code (*get)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_const_principal, + krb5_kvno, krb5_enctype, krb5_keytab_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*start_seq_get)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_kt_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*next_entry)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, + krb5_keytab_entry*, krb5_kt_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*end_seq_get)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_kt_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*add)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_keytab_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*remove)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_keytab_entry*); + void *data; + int32_t version; +}; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_data krb5_kt_ops; + +struct krb5_keytab_key_proc_args { + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_principal principal; +}; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_key_proc_args krb5_keytab_key_proc_args; + +typedef struct krb5_replay_data { + krb5_timestamp timestamp; + u_int32_t usec; + u_int32_t seq; +} krb5_replay_data; + +/* flags for krb5_auth_con_setflags */ +enum { + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME = 1, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_TIME = 2, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE = 4, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_SEQUENCE = 8, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_PERMIT_ALL = 16 +}; + +/* flags for krb5_auth_con_genaddrs */ +enum { + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_ADDR = 1, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR = 3, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_ADDR = 4, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR = 12 +}; + +typedef struct krb5_auth_context_data { + unsigned int flags; + + krb5_address *local_address; + krb5_address *remote_address; + int16_t local_port; + int16_t remote_port; + krb5_keyblock *keyblock; + krb5_keyblock *local_subkey; + krb5_keyblock *remote_subkey; + + u_int32_t local_seqnumber; + u_int32_t remote_seqnumber; + + krb5_authenticator authenticator; + + krb5_pointer i_vector; + + krb5_rcache rcache; + + krb5_keytype keytype; /* ¿requested key type ? */ + krb5_cksumtype cksumtype; /* ¡requested checksum type! */ + +}krb5_auth_context_data, *krb5_auth_context; + +typedef struct { + KDC_REP kdc_rep; + EncKDCRepPart enc_part; + KRB_ERROR error; +} krb5_kdc_rep; + +extern const char *heimdal_version, *heimdal_long_version; + +typedef void (*krb5_log_log_func_t)(const char*, const char*, void*); +typedef void (*krb5_log_close_func_t)(void*); + +typedef struct krb5_log_facility { + const char *program; + int len; + struct facility *val; +} krb5_log_facility; + +typedef EncAPRepPart krb5_ap_rep_enc_part; + +#define KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION 1 + +#define KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION "KRB5_SENDAUTH_V1.0" + +#define KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE (6) +#define KRB5_TGS_NAME ("krbtgt") + +/* variables */ + +extern const char *krb5_config_file; +extern const char *krb5_defkeyname; + +typedef enum { + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PASSWORD = 0x1, + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD = 0x2, + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD_AGAIN = 0x3, + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH = 0x4 +} krb5_prompt_type; + +typedef struct _krb5_prompt { + const char *prompt; + int hidden; + krb5_data *reply; + krb5_prompt_type type; +} krb5_prompt; + +typedef int (*krb5_prompter_fct)(krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *name, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]); + +typedef krb5_error_code (*krb5_key_proc)(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key); +typedef krb5_error_code (*krb5_decrypt_proc)(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_key_usage usage, + krb5_const_pointer decrypt_arg, + krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep); + + +typedef struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_deltat tkt_life; + krb5_deltat renew_life; + int forwardable; + int proxiable; + int anonymous; + krb5_enctype *etype_list; + int etype_list_length; + krb5_addresses *address_list; +#if 0 /* this is the MIT-way */ + krb5_address **address_list; +#endif + /* XXX the next three should not be used, as they may be + removed later */ + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list; + int preauth_list_length; + krb5_data *salt; +} krb5_get_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE 0x0001 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE 0x0002 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE 0x0004 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE 0x0008 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST 0x0010 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST 0x0020 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST 0x0040 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT 0x0080 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS 0x0100 + +typedef struct _krb5_verify_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + int ap_req_nofail; +} krb5_verify_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL 0x0001 + +typedef struct krb5_verify_opt { + unsigned int flags; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_boolean secure; + const char *service; +} krb5_verify_opt; + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_LREALMS 1 +#define KRB5_VERIFY_NO_ADDRESSES 2 + +extern const krb5_cc_ops krb5_fcc_ops; +extern const krb5_cc_ops krb5_mcc_ops; + +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_fkt_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_mkt_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_akf_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb4_fkt_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_srvtab_fkt_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_any_ops; + +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_VERS_CHANGEPW 1 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_VERS_SETPW 0xff80 + +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS 0 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED 1 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR 2 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR 3 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR 4 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED 5 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION 6 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED 7 + +#define KPASSWD_PORT 464 + +/* types for the new krbhst interface */ +struct krb5_krbhst_data; +typedef struct krb5_krbhst_data *krb5_krbhst_handle; + +#define KRB5_KRBHST_KDC 1 +#define KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN 2 +#define KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW 3 +#define KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524 4 + +typedef struct krb5_krbhst_info { + enum { KRB5_KRBHST_UDP, + KRB5_KRBHST_TCP, + KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP } proto; + unsigned short port; + unsigned short def_port; + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct krb5_krbhst_info *next; + char hostname[1]; /* has to come last */ +} krb5_krbhst_info; + + +struct credentials; /* this is to keep the compiler happy */ +struct getargs; +struct sockaddr; + +#include + +#endif /* __KRB5_H__ */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..78bb62cb40 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_425_conv_principal.3,v 1.10 2003/04/16 13:58:13 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 11, 1999 +.Dt KRB5_425_CONV_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_425_conv_principal , +.Nm krb5_425_conv_principal_ext , +.Nm krb5_524_conv_principal +.Nd converts to and from version 4 principals +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal "krb5_context context" "const char *name" "const char *instance" "const char *realm" "krb5_principal *principal" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext "krb5_context context" "const char *name" "const char *instance" "const char *realm" "krb5_boolean (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal)" "krb5_boolean resolve" "krb5_principal *principal" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_524_conv_principal "krb5_context context" "const krb5_principal principal" "char *name" "char *instance" "char *realm" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +Converting between version 4 and version 5 principals can at best be +described as a mess. +.Pp +A version 4 principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A +version 5 principal consists of one or more components, and a +realm. In some cases also the first component/name will differ between +version 4 and version 5. Furthermore the second component of a host +principal will be the fully qualified domain name of the host in +question, while the instance of a version 4 principal will only +contain the first part (short hostname). Because of these problems +the conversion between principals will have to be site customized. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext +will try to convert a version 4 principal, given by +.Fa name , +.Fa instance , +and +.Fa realm , +to a version 5 principal. This can result in several possible +principals, and if +.Fa func +is non-NULL, it will be called for each candidate principal. +.Fa func +should return true if the principal was +.Dq good . +To accomplish this, +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext +will look up the name in +.Pa krb5.conf . +It first looks in the +.Li v4_name_convert/host +subsection, which should contain a list of version 4 names whose +instance should be treated as a hostname. This list can be specified +for each realm (in the +.Li realms +section), or in the +.Li libdefaults +section. If the name is found the resulting name of the principal +will be the value of this binding. The instance is then first looked +up in +.Li v4_instance_convert +for the specified realm. If found the resulting value will be used as +instance (this can be used for special cases), no further attempts +will be made to find a conversion if this fails (with +.Fa func ) . +If the +.Fa resolve +parameter is true, the instance will be looked up with +.Fn gethostbyname . +This can be a time consuming, error prone, and unsafe operation. Next +a list of hostnames will be created from the instance and the +.Li v4_domains +variable, which should contain a list of possible domains for the +specific realm. +.Pp +On the other hand, if the name is not found in a +.Li host +section, it is looked up in a +.Li v4_name_convert/plain +binding. If found here the name will be converted, but the instance +will be untouched. +.Pp +This list of default host-type conversions is compiled-in: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +v4_name_convert = { + host = { + ftp = ftp + hprop = hprop + imap = imap + pop = pop + rcmd = host + smtp = smtp + } +} +.Ed +.Pp +It will only be used if there isn't an entry for these names in the +config file, so you can override these defaults. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal +will call +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext +with +.Dv NULL +as +.Fa func , +and the value of +.Li v4_instance_resolve +(from the +.Li libdefaults +section) as +.Fa resolve . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_524_conv_principal +basically does the opposite of +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal , +it just doesn't have to look up any names, but will instead truncate +instances found to belong to a host principal. The +.Fa name , +.Fa instance , +and +.Fa realm +should be at least 40 characters long. +.Sh EXAMPLES +Since this is confusing an example is in place. +.Pp +Assume that we have the +.Dq foo.com , +and +.Dq bar.com +domains that have shared a single version 4 realm, FOO.COM. The version 4 +.Pa krb.realms +file looked like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +foo.com FOO.COM +\&.foo.com FOO.COM +\&.bar.com FOO.COM +.Ed +.Pp +A +.Pa krb5.conf +file that covers this case might look like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[libdefaults] + v4_instance_resolve = yes +[realms] + FOO.COM = { + kdc = kerberos.foo.com + v4_instance_convert = { + foo = foo.com + } + v4_domains = foo.com + } +.Ed +.Pp +With this setup and the following host table: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +foo.com +a-host.foo.com +b-host.bar.com +.Ed +the following conversions will be made: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +rcmd.a-host \(-> host/a-host.foo.com +ftp.b-host \(-> ftp/b-host.bar.com +pop.foo \(-> pop/foo.com +ftp.other \(-> ftp/other.foo.com +other.a-host \(-> other/a-host +.Ed +.Pp +The first three are what you expect. If you remove the +.Dq v4_domains , +the fourth entry will result in an error (since the host +.Dq other +can't be found). Even if +.Dq a-host +is a valid host name, the last entry will not be converted, since the +.Dq other +name is not known to represent a host-type principal. +If you turn off +.Dq v4_instance_resolve +the second example will result in +.Dq ftp/b-host.foo.com +(because of the default domain). And all of this is of course only +valid if you have working name resolving. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9927c43e86 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ + +KRB5_425_CONV_PRINCIPAL(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_425_CONV_PRINCIPAL(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall, kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt, + kkrrbb55__552244__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall - converts to and from version 4 principals + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_i_n_s_t_a_n_c_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_i_n_s_t_a_n_c_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _(_*_f_u_n_c_)_(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t_, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l_), + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _r_e_s_o_l_v_e, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__552244__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, _c_h_a_r _*_i_n_s_t_a_n_c_e, + _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + Converting between version 4 and version 5 principals can at best be de- + scribed as a mess. + + A version 4 principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A + version 5 principal consists of one or more components, and a realm. In + some cases also the first component/name will differ between version 4 + and version 5. Furthermore the second component of a host principal will + be the fully qualified domain name of the host in question, while the in- + stance of a version 4 principal will only contain the first part (short + hostname). Because of these problems the conversion between principals + will have to be site customized. + + kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt() will try to convert a version 4 principal, + given by _n_a_m_e, _i_n_s_t_a_n_c_e, and _r_e_a_l_m, to a version 5 principal. This can + result in several possible principals, and if _f_u_n_c is non-NULL, it will + be called for each candidate principal. _f_u_n_c should return true if the + principal was ``good''. To accomplish this, kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt() + will look up the name in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f. It first looks in the + v4_name_convert/host subsection, which should contain a list of version 4 + names whose instance should be treated as a hostname. This list can be + specified for each realm (in the realms section), or in the libdefaults + section. If the name is found the resulting name of the principal will + be the value of this binding. The instance is then first looked up in + v4_instance_convert for the specified realm. If found the resulting value + will be used as instance (this can be used for special cases), no further + attempts will be made to find a conversion if this fails (with _f_u_n_c). If + the _r_e_s_o_l_v_e parameter is true, the instance will be looked up with + ggeetthhoossttbbyynnaammee(). This can be a time consuming, error prone, and unsafe + operation. Next a list of hostnames will be created from the instance + and the v4_domains variable, which should contain a list of possible do- + mains for the specific realm. + + On the other hand, if the name is not found in a host section, it is + looked up in a v4_name_convert/plain binding. If found here the name will + be converted, but the instance will be untouched. + + + This list of default host-type conversions is compiled-in: + + v4_name_convert = { + host = { + ftp = ftp + hprop = hprop + imap = imap + pop = pop + rcmd = host + smtp = smtp + } + } + + It will only be used if there isn't an entry for these names in the con- + fig file, so you can override these defaults. + + kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall() will call kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt() with + NULL as _f_u_n_c, and the value of v4_instance_resolve (from the libdefaults + section) as _r_e_s_o_l_v_e. + + kkrrbb55__552244__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall() basically does the opposite of + kkrrbb55__442255__ccoonnvv__pprriinncciippaall(), it just doesn't have to look up any names, but + will instead truncate instances found to belong to a host principal. The + _n_a_m_e, _i_n_s_t_a_n_c_e, and _r_e_a_l_m should be at least 40 characters long. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS + Since this is confusing an example is in place. + + Assume that we have the ``foo.com'', and ``bar.com'' domains that have + shared a single version 4 realm, FOO.COM. The version 4 _k_r_b_._r_e_a_l_m_s file + looked like: + + foo.com FOO.COM + .foo.com FOO.COM + .bar.com FOO.COM + + A _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f file that covers this case might look like: + + [libdefaults] + v4_instance_resolve = yes + [realms] + FOO.COM = { + kdc = kerberos.foo.com + v4_instance_convert = { + foo = foo.com + } + v4_domains = foo.com + } + + With this setup and the following host table: + + foo.com + a-host.foo.com + b-host.bar.com + the following conversions will be made: + + rcmd.a-host -> host/a-host.foo.com + ftp.b-host -> ftp/b-host.bar.com + pop.foo -> pop/foo.com + ftp.other -> ftp/other.foo.com + other.a-host -> other/a-host + + The first three are what you expect. If you remove the ``v4_domains'', + the fourth entry will result in an error (since the host ``other'' can't + be found). Even if ``a-host'' is a valid host name, the last entry will + not be converted, since the ``other'' name is not known to represent a + host-type principal. If you turn off ``v4_instance_resolve'' the second + example will result in ``ftp/b-host.foo.com'' (because of the default do- + main). And all of this is of course only valid if you have working name + resolving. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_build_principal(3), krb5_free_principal(3), krb5_parse_name(3), + krb5_sname_to_principal(3), krb5_unparse_name(3), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL April 11, 1999 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_address.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_address.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc780add57 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_address.3 @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_address.3,v 1.4 2003/04/16 13:58:12 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 11, 2002 +.Dt KRB5_ADDRESS 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_address , +.Nm krb5_addresses , +.Nm krb5_sockaddr2address , +.Nm krb5_sockaddr2port , +.Nm krb5_addr2sockaddr , +.Nm krb5_max_sockaddr_size , +.Nm krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting , +.Nm krb5_h_addr2sockaddr , +.Nm krb5_h_addr2addr , +.Nm krb5_anyaddr , +.Nm krb5_print_address , +.Nm krb5_parse_address , +.Nm krb5_address_order , +.Nm krb5_address_compare , +.Nm krb5_address_search , +.Nm krb5_free_address , +.Nm krb5_free_addresses , +.Nm krb5_copy_address , +.Nm krb5_copy_addresses , +.Nm krb5_append_addresses , +.Nm krb5_make_addrport +.Nd mange addresses in Kerberos. +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Pp +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_sockaddr2address +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const struct sockaddr *sa" +.Fa "krb5_address *addr" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_sockaddr2port +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const struct sockaddr *sa" +.Fa "int16_t *port" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_addr2sockaddr +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr" +.Fa "struct sockaddr *sa" +.Fa "krb5_socklen_t *sa_size" +.Fa "int port" +.Fc +.Ft size_t +.Fo krb5_max_sockaddr_size +.Fa "void" +.Fc +.Ft "krb5_boolean" +.Fo krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting +.Fa "const struct sockaddr *sa" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_h_addr2sockaddr +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "int af" +.Fa "const char *addr" +.Fa "struct sockaddr *sa" +.Fa "krb5_socklen_t *sa_size" +.Fa "int port" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_h_addr2addr +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "int af" +.Fa "const char *haddr" +.Fa "krb5_address *addr" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_anyaddr +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "int af" +.Fa "struct sockaddr *sa" +.Fa "krb5_socklen_t *sa_size" +.Fa "int port" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_print_address +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr" +.Fa "char *str" +.Fa "size_t len" +.Fa "size_t *ret_len" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_parse_address +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const char *string" +.Fa "krb5_addresses *addresses" +.Fc +.Ft int +.Fo "krb5_address_order" +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr1" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr2" +.Fc +.Ft "krb5_boolean" +.Fo krb5_address_compare +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr1" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr2" +.Fc +.Ft "krb5_boolean" +.Fo krb5_address_search +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr" +.Fa "const krb5_addresses *addrlist" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_free_address +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_address *address" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_free_addresses +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_addresses *addresses" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_copy_address +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_address *inaddr" +.Fa "krb5_address *outaddr" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_copy_addresses +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_addresses *inaddr" +.Fa "krb5_addresses *outaddr" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_append_addresses +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_addresses *dest" +.Fa "const krb5_addresses *source" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_make_addrport +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_address **res" +.Fa "const krb5_address *addr" +.Fa "int16_t port" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Li krb5_address +structure holds a address that can be used in Kerberos API +calls. There are help functions to set and extract address information +of the address. +.Pp +The +.Li krb5_addresses +structure holds a set of krb5_address:es. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_sockaddr2address +stores a address a +.Li "struct sockaddr" +.Fa sa +in the krb5_address +.Fa addr . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_sockaddr2port +extracts a +.Fa port +(if possible) from a +.Li "struct sockaddr" +.Fa sa . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_addr2sockaddr +sets the +struct sockaddr +.Fa sockaddr +from +.Fa addr +and +.Fa port . +.Fa Sa_size +should be initially contain the size of the +.Fa sa , +and after the call, it will contain the actual length of the address. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_max_sockaddr_size +returns the max size of the +.Li struct sockaddr +that the Kerberos library will return. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting +returns +.Dv TRUE +for all +.Fa sa +that for that the kerberos library thinks are uninteresting. +One example are link local addresses. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_h_addr2sockaddr +initializes a +.Li "struct sockaddr" +.Fa sa +from +.Fa af +and the +.Li "struct hostent" +(see +.Xr gethostbyname 3 ) +.Fa h_addr_list +component. +.Fa Sa_size +should be initially contain the size of the +.Fa sa , +and after the call, it will contain the actual length of the address. +.Fa sa +argument. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_h_addr2addr +works like +.Fn krb5_h_addr2sockaddr +with the exception that it operates on a +.Li krb5_address +instead of a +.Li struct sockaddr +.Pp +.Fn krb5_anyaddr +fills in a +.Li "struct sockaddr" +.Fa sa +that can be used to +.Xf bind 3 +to. +.Fa Sa_size +should be initially contain the size of the +.Fa sa , +and after the call, it will contain the actual length of the address. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_print_address +prints the address in +.Fa addr +to the a string +.Fa string +that have the length +.Fa len . +If +.Fa ret_len +if not +.Dv NULL , +it will be filled in length of the string. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_parse_address +Returns the resolving a hostname in +.Fa string +to the +.Li krb5_addresses +.Fa addresses . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_address_order +compares to addresses +.Fa addr1 +and +.Fa addr2 +so that it can be used for sorting addresses. If the addresses are the +same address +.Fa krb5_address_order will be return 0. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_address_compare +compares the addresses +.Fa addr1 +and +.Fa addr2 . +returns +.Dv TRUE +if the two addresses are the same. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_address_search +checks if the address +.Fa addr +is a member of the address set list +.Fa addrlist . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_free_address +frees the data stored in the +.Fa address +that is alloced with any of the krb5_address functions. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_free_addresses +frees the data stored in the +.Fa addresses +that is alloced with any of the krb5_address functions. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_copy_address +copies the content of address +.Fa inaddr +to +.Fa outaddr . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_copy_addresses +copies the content of the address list +.Fa inaddr +to +.Fa outaddr . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_append_addresses +adds the set of addresses in +.Fa source +to +.Fa dest . +While copying the addresses, duplicates are also sorted out. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_make_addrport +allocates and creates an +krb5_address in +.Fa res +of type KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT from +.Fa ( addr , port ) . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_address.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_address.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..423b1d8d56 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_address.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ + +KRB5_ADDRESS(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_ADDRESS(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss, kkrrbb55__aaddddrreesssseess, kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr22aaddddrreessss, kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr22ppoorrtt, + kkrrbb55__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr, kkrrbb55__mmaaxx__ssoocckkaaddddrr__ssiizzee, kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr__uunniinntteerreessttiinngg, + kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr, kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22aaddddrr, kkrrbb55__aannyyaaddddrr, kkrrbb55__pprriinntt__aaddddrreessss, + kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__aaddddrreessss, kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__oorrddeerr, kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__ccoommppaarree, + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__sseeaarrcchh, kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreessss, kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess, + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__aaddddrreessss, kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__aaddddrreesssseess, kkrrbb55__aappppeenndd__aaddddrreesssseess, + kkrrbb55__mmaakkee__aaddddrrppoorrtt - mange addresses in Kerberos. + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr22aaddddrreessss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _s_t_r_u_c_t _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r _*_s_a, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr22ppoorrtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _s_t_r_u_c_t _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r _*_s_a, + _i_n_t_1_6___t _*_p_o_r_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r, + _s_t_r_u_c_t _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r _*_s_a, _k_r_b_5___s_o_c_k_l_e_n___t _*_s_a___s_i_z_e, _i_n_t _p_o_r_t) + + _s_i_z_e___t + kkrrbb55__mmaaxx__ssoocckkaaddddrr__ssiizzee(_v_o_i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr__uunniinntteerreessttiinngg(_c_o_n_s_t _s_t_r_u_c_t _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r _*_s_a) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _a_f, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_a_d_d_r, + _s_t_r_u_c_t _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r _*_s_a, _k_r_b_5___s_o_c_k_l_e_n___t _*_s_a___s_i_z_e, _i_n_t _p_o_r_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22aaddddrr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _a_f, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_h_a_d_d_r, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aannyyaaddddrr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _a_f, _s_t_r_u_c_t _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r _*_s_a, + _k_r_b_5___s_o_c_k_l_e_n___t _*_s_a___s_i_z_e, _i_n_t _p_o_r_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__pprriinntt__aaddddrreessss(_c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r, _c_h_a_r _*_s_t_r, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n, + _s_i_z_e___t _*_r_e_t___l_e_n) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__aaddddrreessss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_s_t_r_i_n_g, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s) + + _i_n_t + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__oorrddeerr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r_1, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r_2) + + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__ccoommppaarree(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r_1, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r_2) + + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__sseeaarrcchh(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_a_d_d_r_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreessss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r_e_s_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__aaddddrreessss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_i_n_a_d_d_r, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_o_u_t_a_d_d_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__aaddddrreesssseess(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_i_n_a_d_d_r, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_o_u_t_a_d_d_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aappppeenndd__aaddddrreesssseess(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_d_e_s_t, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_s_o_u_r_c_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__mmaakkee__aaddddrrppoorrtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_*_r_e_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_a_d_d_r, _i_n_t_1_6___t _p_o_r_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The krb5_address structure holds a address that can be used in Kerberos + API calls. There are help functions to set and extract address informa- + tion of the address. + + The krb5_addresses structure holds a set of krb5_address:es. + + kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr22aaddddrreessss() stores a address a struct sockaddr _s_a in the + krb5_address _a_d_d_r. + + kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr22ppoorrtt() extracts a _p_o_r_t (if possible) from a struct sockaddr + _s_a. + + kkrrbb55__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr() sets the struct sockaddr _s_o_c_k_a_d_d_r from _a_d_d_r and + _p_o_r_t. _S_a___s_i_z_e should be initially contain the size of the _s_a, and after + the call, it will contain the actual length of the address. + + kkrrbb55__mmaaxx__ssoocckkaaddddrr__ssiizzee() returns the max size of the struct sockaddr that + the Kerberos library will return. + + kkrrbb55__ssoocckkaaddddrr__uunniinntteerreessttiinngg() returns TRUE for all _s_a that for that the + kerberos library thinks are uninteresting. One example are link local + addresses. + + kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr() initializes a struct sockaddr _s_a from _a_f and the + struct hostent (see gethostbyname(3)) _h___a_d_d_r___l_i_s_t component. _S_a___s_i_z_e + should be initially contain the size of the _s_a, and after the call, it + will contain the actual length of the address. _s_a argument. + + kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22aaddddrr() works like kkrrbb55__hh__aaddddrr22ssoocckkaaddddrr() with the exception + that it operates on a krb5_address instead of a struct sockaddr + + kkrrbb55__aannyyaaddddrr() fills in a struct sockaddr _s_a that can be used to to. + _S_a___s_i_z_e should be initially contain the size of the _s_a, and after the + call, it will contain the actual length of the address. + + kkrrbb55__pprriinntt__aaddddrreessss() prints the address in _a_d_d_r to the a string _s_t_r_i_n_g + that have the length _l_e_n. If _r_e_t___l_e_n if not NULL, it will be filled in + length of the string. + + kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__aaddddrreessss() Returns the resolving a hostname in _s_t_r_i_n_g to the + krb5_addresses _a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s. + + + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__oorrddeerr() compares to addresses _a_d_d_r_1 and _a_d_d_r_2 so that it can + be used for sorting addresses. If the addresses are the same address + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s___o_r_d_e_r _w_i_l_l _b_e _r_e_t_u_r_n _0_. + + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__ccoommppaarree() compares the addresses _a_d_d_r_1 and _a_d_d_r_2. returns + TRUE if the two addresses are the same. + + kkrrbb55__aaddddrreessss__sseeaarrcchh() checks if the address _a_d_d_r is a member of the ad- + dress set list _a_d_d_r_l_i_s_t. + + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreessss() frees the data stored in the _a_d_d_r_e_s_s that is alloced + with any of the krb5_address functions. + + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess() frees the data stored in the _a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s that is al- + loced with any of the krb5_address functions. + + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__aaddddrreessss() copies the content of address _i_n_a_d_d_r to _o_u_t_a_d_d_r. + + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__aaddddrreesssseess() copies the content of the address list _i_n_a_d_d_r to + _o_u_t_a_d_d_r. + + kkrrbb55__aappppeenndd__aaddddrreesssseess() adds the set of addresses in _s_o_u_r_c_e to _d_e_s_t. + While copying the addresses, duplicates are also sorted out. + + kkrrbb55__mmaakkee__aaddddrrppoorrtt() allocates and creates an krb5_address in _r_e_s of type + KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT from (_a_d_d_r, _p_o_r_t). + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5(3), krb5.conf(5), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL March 11, 2002 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..900e1d9483 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.3 @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_aname_to_localname.3,v 1.2 2003/04/16 13:58:13 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 17, 2003 +.Dt KRB5_ANAME_TO_LOCALNAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_aname_to_localname +.Nd converts a principal to a system local name. +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fo krb5_aname_to_localname +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_const_principal name" +.Fa "size_t lnsize" +.Fa "char *lname" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +This function takes a principal +.Fa name , +verifies its in the local realm (using +.Fn krb5_get_default_realms ) +and then returns the local name of the principal. +.Pp +If +.Fa name +isn't in one of the local realms and error is returned. +.Pp +If size +.Fa ( lnsize ) +of the local name +.Fa ( lname ) +is to small, an error is returned. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_aname_to_localname +should only be use by application that implements protocols that +doesn't transport the login name and thus needs to convert a principal +to a local name. +.Pp +Protocols should be designed so that the it autheticates using +Kerberos, send over the login name and then verifies in the principal +that authenticated is allowed to login and the login name. +A way to check if a user is allowed to login is using the function +.Fn krb5_kuserok . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_get_default_realms 3 , +.Xr krb5_kuserok 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a662c8b37 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_aname_to_localname.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ + +KRB5_ANAME_TO_LOCALNAME(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_ANAME_TO_LOCALNAME(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__aannaammee__ttoo__llooccaallnnaammee - converts a principal to a system local name. + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__aannaammee__ttoo__llooccaallnnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _n_a_m_e, + _s_i_z_e___t _l_n_s_i_z_e, _c_h_a_r _*_l_n_a_m_e) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + This function takes a principal _n_a_m_e, verifies its in the local realm + (using kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmmss()) and then returns the local name of the + principal. + + If _n_a_m_e isn't in one of the local realms and error is returned. + + If size (_l_n_s_i_z_e) of the local name (_l_n_a_m_e) is to small, an error is re- + turned. + + kkrrbb55__aannaammee__ttoo__llooccaallnnaammee() should only be use by application that imple- + ments protocols that doesn't transport the login name and thus needs to + convert a principal to a local name. + + Protocols should be designed so that the it autheticates using Kerberos, + send over the login name and then verifies in the principal that authen- + ticated is allowed to login and the login name. A way to check if a user + is allowed to login is using the function kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk(). + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_get_default_realms(3), krb5_kuserok(3) + + HEIMDAL March 17, 2003 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f913fdc33c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.3 @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_appdefault.3,v 1.10 2003/04/16 13:58:10 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 25, 2000 +.Dt KRB5_APPDEFAULT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_appdefault_boolean , +.Nm krb5_appdefault_string , +.Nm krb5_appdefault_time +.Nd get application configuration value +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_appdefault_boolean "krb5_context context" "const char *appname" "krb5_realm realm" "const char *option" "krb5_boolean def_val" "krb5_boolean *ret_val" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_appdefault_string "krb5_context context" "const char *appname" "krb5_realm realm" "const char *option" "const char *def_val" "char **ret_val" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_appdefault_time "krb5_context context" "const char *appname" "krb5_realm realm" "const char *option" "time_t def_val" "time_t *ret_val" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions get application defaults from the +.Dv appdefaults +section of the +.Xr krb5.conf 5 +configuration file. These defaults can be specified per application, +and/or per realm. +.Pp +These values will be looked for in +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +in order of descending importance. +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[appdefaults] + appname = { + realm = { + option = value + } + } + appname = { + option = value + } + realm = { + option = value + } + option = value +.Ed +.Fa appname +is the name of the application, and +.Fa realm +is the realm name. If the realm is omitted it will not be used for +resolving values. +.Fa def_val +is the value to return if no value is found in +.Xr krb5.conf 5 . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_config 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b5f485d95 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_appdefault.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ + +KRB5_APPDEFAULT(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_APPDEFAULT(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt__bboooolleeaann, kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt__ssttrriinngg, kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt__ttiimmee - + get application configuration value + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt__bboooolleeaann(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_a_p_p_n_a_m_e, + _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_o_p_t_i_o_n, _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _d_e_f___v_a_l, + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _*_r_e_t___v_a_l) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt__ssttrriinngg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_a_p_p_n_a_m_e, + _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_o_p_t_i_o_n, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_d_e_f___v_a_l, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_r_e_t___v_a_l) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__aappppddeeffaauulltt__ttiimmee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_a_p_p_n_a_m_e, + _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_o_p_t_i_o_n, _t_i_m_e___t _d_e_f___v_a_l, + _t_i_m_e___t _*_r_e_t___v_a_l) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions get application defaults from the appdefaults section of + the krb5.conf(5) configuration file. These defaults can be specified per + application, and/or per realm. + + These values will be looked for in krb5.conf(5), in order of descending + importance. + + [appdefaults] + appname = { + realm = { + option = value + } + } + appname = { + option = value + } + realm = { + option = value + } + option = value + _a_p_p_n_a_m_e is the name of the application, and _r_e_a_l_m is the realm name. If + the realm is omitted it will not be used for resolving values. _d_e_f___v_a_l + is the value to return if no value is found in krb5.conf(5). + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_config(3), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL July 25, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..69db32486b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.3 @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_auth_context.3,v 1.8 2003/04/16 13:58:13 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd January 21, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_auth_context , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_init , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_free , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setflags , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getflags , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setaddrs , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getaddrs , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_genaddrs , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getuserkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setuserkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey , +.Nm krb5_auth_setcksumtype , +.Nm krb5_auth_getcksumtype , +.Nm krb5_auth_setkeytype , +.Nm krb5_auth_getkeytype , +.Nm krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber , +.Nm krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber , +.Nm krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber , +.Nm krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber , +.Nm krb5_auth_getauthenticator , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_getrcache , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setrcache , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_initivector , +.Nm krb5_auth_con_setivector +.Nd manage authentication on connection level +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_init +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context *auth_context" +.Fc +.Ft void +.Fo krb5_auth_con_free +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_setflags +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "int32_t flags" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_getflags +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "int32_t *flags" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_setaddrs +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "krb5_address *local_addr" +.Fa "krb5_address *remote_addr" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_getaddrs +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "krb5_address **local_addr" +.Fa "krb5_address **remote_addr" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_genaddrs +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "int fd" +.Fa "int flags" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "void *p_fd" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_getkey +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "krb5_keyblock **keyblock" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "krb5_keyblock **keyblock" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fa "krb5_keyblock **keyblock" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_initivector +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context auth_context" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_auth_con_setivector +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_auth_context *auth_context" +.Fa "krb5_pointer ivector" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm krb5_auth_context +structure holds all context related to an authenticated connection, in +a similar way to +.Nm krb5_context +that holds the context for the thread or process. +.Nm krb5_auth_context +is used by various functions that are directly related to +authentication between the server/client. Example of data that this +structure contains are various flags, addresses of client and server, +port numbers, keyblocks (and subkeys), sequence numbers, replay cache, +and checksum-type. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_init +allocates and initializes the +.Nm krb5_auth_context +structure. Default values can be changed with +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setcksumtype +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setflags . +The +.Nm auth_context +structure must be freed by +.Fn krb5_auth_con_free . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getflags +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setflags +gets and modifies the flags for a +.Nm krb5_auth_context +structure. Possible flags to set are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Dv KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME +check timestamp on incoming packets. +.\".It Dv KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_TIME +.It Dv KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE +Generate and check sequence-number on each packet. +.\".It Dv KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_SEQUENCE +.\".It Dv KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_PERMIT_ALL +.El +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setaddrs , +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getaddrs +gets and sets the addresses that are checked when a packet is received. +It is mandatory to set an address for the remote +host. If the local address is not set, it iss deduced from the underlaying +operating system. +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getaddrs +will call +.Fn krb5_free_address +on any address that is passed in +.Fa local_addr +or +.Fa remote_addr . +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setaddr +allows passing in a +.Dv NULL +pointer as +.Fa local_addr +and +.Fa remote_addr , +in that case it will just not set that address. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd +fetches the addresses from a file descriptor. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_genaddrs +fetches the address information from the given file descriptor +.Fa fd +depending on the bitmap argument +.Fa flags . +.Pp +Possible values on +.Fa flags +are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Va KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_ADDR +fetches the local address from +.Fa fd . +.It Va KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_ADDR +fetches the remote address from +.Fa fd . +.El +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setkey , +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setuserkey +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getkey +gets and sets the key used for this auth context. The keyblock returned by +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getkey +should be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_keyblock . +The keyblock send into +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setkey +is copied into the +.Nm krb5_auth_context , +and thus no special handling is needed. +.Dv NULL +is not a valid keyblock to +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setkey . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setuserkey +is only useful when doing user to user authentication. +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setkey +is equivalent to +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setuserkey . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey , +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey , +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey +gets and sets the keyblock for the local and remote subkey. The keyblock returned by +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey +must be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_keyblock . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_setcksumtype +and +.Fn krb5_auth_getcksumtype +sets and gets the checksum type that should be used for this +connection. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber +.Fn krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber , +.Fn krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber +and +.Fn krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber +gets and sets the sequence-number for the local and remote +sequence-number counter. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_setkeytype +and +.Fn krb5_auth_getkeytype +gets and gets the keytype of the keyblock in +.Nm krb5_auth_context . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_getauthenticator +Retrieves the authenticator that was used during mutual +authentication. The +.Dv authenticator +returned should be freed by calling +.Fn krb5_free_authenticator . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_getrcache +and +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setrcache +gets and sets the replay-cache. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_initivector +allocates memory for and zeros the initial vector in the +.Fa auth_context +keyblock. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_auth_con_setivector +sets the i_vector portion of +.Fa auth_context +to +.Fa ivector . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_context 3 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..025e739f45 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_auth_context.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + +KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__iinniitt, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ffrreeee, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettffllaaggss, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettffllaaggss, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss__ffrroomm__ffdd, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettaaddddrrss, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeennaaddddrrss, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettkkeeyy, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettkkeeyy, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettuusseerrkkeeyy, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettuusseerrkkeeyy, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettllooccaallssuubbkkeeyy, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettllooccaallssuubbkkeeyy, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettrreemmootteessuubbkkeeyy, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettrreemmootteessuubbkkeeyy, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettcckkssuummttyyppee, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettcckkssuummttyyppee, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettkkeeyyttyyppee, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettkkeeyyttyyppee, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettllooccaallsseeqqnnuummbbeerr, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettllooccaallsseeqqnnuummbbeerr, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettrreemmootteesseeqqnnuummbbeerr, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettrreemmootteesseeqqnnuummbbeerr, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettaauutthheennttiiccaattoorr, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettrrccaacchhee, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettrrccaacchhee, + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__iinniittiivveeccttoorr, kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettiivveeccttoorr - manage authentica- + tion on connection level + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__iinniitt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ffrreeee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettffllaaggss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t_3_2___t _f_l_a_g_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettffllaaggss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t_3_2___t _*_f_l_a_g_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_l_o_c_a_l___a_d_d_r, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_r_e_m_o_t_e___a_d_d_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettaaddddrrss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_*_l_o_c_a_l___a_d_d_r, + _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s _*_*_r_e_m_o_t_e___a_d_d_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeennaaddddrrss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _f_d, _i_n_t _f_l_a_g_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss__ffrroomm__ffdd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _v_o_i_d _*_p___f_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettkkeeyy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k _*_*_k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettllooccaallssuubbkkeeyy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k _*_*_k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettrreemmootteessuubbkkeeyy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k _*_*_k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__iinniittiivveeccttoorr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettiivveeccttoorr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_o_i_n_t_e_r _i_v_e_c_t_o_r) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt structure holds all context related to an authenti- + cated connection, in a similar way to kkrrbb55__ccoonntteexxtt that holds the context + for the thread or process. kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt is used by various func- + tions that are directly related to authentication between the serv- + er/client. Example of data that this structure contains are various + flags, addresses of client and server, port numbers, keyblocks (and sub- + keys), sequence numbers, replay cache, and checksum-type. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__iinniitt() allocates and initializes the kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt + structure. Default values can be changed with + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettcckkssuummttyyppee() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettffllaaggss(). The + aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt structure must be freed by kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ffrreeee(). + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettffllaaggss() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettffllaaggss() gets and modifies + the flags for a kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt structure. Possible flags to set are: + + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME + check timestamp on incoming packets. + + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE + Generate and check sequence-number on each packet. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss(), kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss__ffrroomm__ffdd() and + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettaaddddrrss() gets and sets the addresses that are checked + when a packet is received. It is mandatory to set an address for the re- + mote host. If the local address is not set, it iss deduced from the un- + derlaying operating system. kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettaaddddrrss() will call + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreessss() on any address that is passed in _l_o_c_a_l___a_d_d_r or + _r_e_m_o_t_e___a_d_d_r. kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrr() allows passing in a NULL pointer as + _l_o_c_a_l___a_d_d_r and _r_e_m_o_t_e___a_d_d_r, in that case it will just not set that ad- + dress. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettaaddddrrss__ffrroomm__ffdd() fetches the addresses from a file de- + scriptor. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeennaaddddrrss() fetches the address information from the given + file descriptor _f_d depending on the bitmap argument _f_l_a_g_s. + + Possible values on _f_l_a_g_s are: + + _K_R_B_5___A_U_T_H___C_O_N_T_E_X_T___G_E_N_E_R_A_T_E___L_O_C_A_L___A_D_D_R + fetches the local address from _f_d. + + _K_R_B_5___A_U_T_H___C_O_N_T_E_X_T___G_E_N_E_R_A_T_E___R_E_M_O_T_E___A_D_D_R + fetches the remote address from _f_d. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettkkeeyy(), kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettuusseerrkkeeyy() and + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettkkeeyy() gets and sets the key used for this auth context. + The keyblock returned by kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettkkeeyy() should be freed with + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__kkeeyybblloocckk(). The keyblock send into kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettkkeeyy() is + copied into the kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt, and thus no special handling is need- + ed. NULL is not a valid keyblock to kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettkkeeyy(). + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettuusseerrkkeeyy() is only useful when doing user to user authen- + tication. kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettkkeeyy() is equivalent to + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettuusseerrkkeeyy(). + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettllooccaallssuubbkkeeyy(), kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettllooccaallssuubbkkeeyy(), + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettrreemmootteessuubbkkeeyy() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettrreemmootteessuubbkkeeyy() gets + and sets the keyblock for the local and remote subkey. The keyblock re- + turned by kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettllooccaallssuubbkkeeyy() and + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettrreemmootteessuubbkkeeyy() must be freed with kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__kkeeyybblloocckk(). + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettcckkssuummttyyppee() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettcckkssuummttyyppee() sets and gets the + checksum type that should be used for this connection. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettrreemmootteesseeqqnnuummbbeerr() kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettrreemmootteesseeqqnnuummbbeerr(), + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettllooccaallsseeqqnnuummbbeerr() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettllooccaallsseeqqnnuummbbeerr() gets and + sets the sequence-number for the local and remote sequence-number + counter. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__sseettkkeeyyttyyppee() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettkkeeyyttyyppee() gets and gets the key- + type of the keyblock in kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonntteexxtt. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ggeettaauutthheennttiiccaattoorr() Retrieves the authenticator that was used + during mutual authentication. The authenticator returned should be freed + by calling kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aauutthheennttiiccaattoorr(). + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__ggeettrrccaacchhee() and kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettrrccaacchhee() gets and sets the + replay-cache. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__iinniittiivveeccttoorr() allocates memory for and zeros the initial + vector in the _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t keyblock. + + kkrrbb55__aauutthh__ccoonn__sseettiivveeccttoorr() sets the i_vector portion of _a_u_t_h___c_o_n_t_e_x_t to + _i_v_e_c_t_o_r. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_context(3), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL January 21, 2001 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e74c7543bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_build_principal.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:14 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_BUILD_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_build_principal , +.Nm krb5_build_principal_ext , +.Nm krb5_build_principal_va , +.Nm krb5_build_principal_va_ext , +.Nm krb5_make_principal +.Nd principal creation functions +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal_ext "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "va_list ap" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va_ext "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "va_list ap" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_make_principal "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "krb5_const_realm realm" "..." +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions create a Kerberos 5 principal from a realm and a list +of components. +All of these functions return an allocated principal in the +.Fa principal +parameter, this should be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_principal +after use. +.Pp +The +.Dq build +functions take a +.Fa realm +and the length of the realm. The +.Fn krb5_build_principal +and +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va +also takes a list of components (zero-terminated strings), terminated +with +.Dv NULL . +The +.Fn krb5_build_principal_ext +and +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va_ext +takes a list of length-value pairs, the list is terminated with a zero +length. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_make_principal +is a wrapper around +.Fn krb5_build_principal . +If the realm is +.Dv NULL , +the default realm will be used. +.Sh BUGS +You can not have a NUL in a component. Until someone can give a good +example of where it would be a good idea to have NUL's in a component, +this will not be fixed. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..087dd93eaf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ + +KRB5_BUILD_PRINCIPAL(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_BUILD_PRINCIPAL(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall, kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt, kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__vvaa, + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__vvaa__eexxtt, kkrrbb55__mmaakkee__pprriinncciippaall - principal creation + functions + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _i_n_t _r_e_a_l_m___l_e_n, _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _i_n_t _r_e_a_l_m___l_e_n, _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__vvaa(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _i_n_t _r_e_a_l_m___l_e_n, _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__vvaa__eexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _i_n_t _r_e_a_l_m___l_e_n, _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, + _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__mmaakkee__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___r_e_a_l_m _r_e_a_l_m, _._._.) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions create a Kerberos 5 principal from a realm and a list of + components. All of these functions return an allocated principal in the + _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l parameter, this should be freed with kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__pprriinncciippaall() af- + ter use. + + The ``build'' functions take a _r_e_a_l_m and the length of the realm. The + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall() and kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__vvaa() also takes a list of + components (zero-terminated strings), terminated with NULL. The + kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__eexxtt() and kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall__vvaa__eexxtt() takes a list + of length-value pairs, the list is terminated with a zero length. + + The kkrrbb55__mmaakkee__pprriinncciippaall() is a wrapper around kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall(). If + the realm is NULL, the default realm will be used. + +BBUUGGSS + You can not have a NUL in a component. Until someone can give a good ex- + ample of where it would be a good idea to have NUL's in a component, this + will not be fixed. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_425_conv_principal(3), krb5_free_principal(3), krb5_parse_name(3), + krb5_sname_to_principal(3), krb5_unparse_name(3) + + HEIMDAL August 8, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec48c5f37a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.3 @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_ccache.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:12 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 16, 2003 +.Dt KRB5_CCACHE 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_ccache , +.Nm krb5_cc_cursor , +.Nm krb5_cc_ops , +.Nm krb5_fcc_ops , +.Nm krb5_mcc_ops , +.Nm krb5_cc_close , +.Nm krb5_cc_copy_cache , +.Nm krb5_cc_default , +.Nm krb5_cc_default_name , +.Nm krb5_cc_destroy , +.Nm krb5_cc_end_seq_get , +.Nm krb5_cc_gen_new , +.Nm krb5_cc_get_name , +.Nm krb5_cc_get_principal , +.Nm krb5_cc_get_type , +.Nm krb5_cc_get_ops , +.Nm krb5_cc_get_version , +.Nm krb5_cc_initialize , +.Nm krb5_cc_register , +.Nm krb5_cc_resolve , +.Nm krb5_cc_retrieve_cred , +.Nm krb5_cc_remove_cred , +.Nm krb5_cc_set_default_name , +.Nm krb5_cc_store_cred , +.Nm krb5_cc_set_flags , +.Nm krb5_cc_next_cred +.Nd mange credential cache. +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Pp +.Li "struct krb5_ccache;" +.Pp +.Li "struct krb5_cc_cursor;" +.Pp +.Li "struct krb5_cc_ops;" +.Pp +.Li "struct krb5_cc_ops *krb5_fcc_ops;" +.Pp +.Li "struct krb5_cc_ops *krb5_mcc_ops;" +.Pp +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_close +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_copy_cache +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const krb5_ccache from" +.Fa "krb5_ccache to" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_default +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache *id" +.Fc +.Ft "const char *" +.Fo krb5_cc_default_name +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_destroy +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_end_seq_get +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_cc_cursor *cursor" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_gen_new +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const krb5_cc_ops *ops" +.Fa "krb5_ccache *id" +.Fc +.Ft "const char *" +.Fo krb5_cc_get_name +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_get_principal +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_principal *principal" +.Fc +.Ft "const char *" +.Fo krb5_cc_get_type +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fc +.Ft "const krb5_cc_ops *" +.Fo krb5_cc_get_ops +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_get_version +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const krb5_ccache id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_initialize +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_principal primary_principal" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_register +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const krb5_cc_ops *ops" +.Fa "krb5_boolean override" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_resolve +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const char *name" +.Fa "krb5_ccache *id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_retrieve_cred +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_flags whichfields" +.Fa "const krb5_creds *mcreds" +.Fa "krb5_creds *creds" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_remove_cred +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_flags which" +.Fa "krb5_creds *cred" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_set_default_name +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const char *name" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_store_cred +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_creds *creds" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_set_flags +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "krb5_cc_set_flags id" +.Fa "krb5_flags flags" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_cc_next_cred +.Fa "krb5_context *context" +.Fa "const krb5_ccache id" +.Fa "krb5_cc_cursor *cursor" +.Fa "krb5_creds *creds" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Li krb5_ccache +structure holds a Kerberos credential cache. +.Pp +The +.Li krb5_cc_cursor +structure holds current position in a credential cache when +iterating over the cache. +.Pp +The +.Li krb5_cc_ops +structure holds a set of operations that can me preformed on a +credential cache. +.Pp +There is no component inside +.Li krb5_ccache , +.Li krb5_cc_cursor +nor +.Li krb5_fcc_ops +that is directly referable. +.Pp +The +.Li krb5_creds +holds a Kerberos credential, see manpage for +.Xr krb5_creds 3 . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_default_name +and +.Fn krb5_cc_set_default_name +gets and sets the default name for the +.Fa context . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_default +opens the default ccache in +.Fa id . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_gen_new +generates a new ccache of type +.Fa ops +in +.Fa id . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_resolve +finds and allocates a ccache in +.Fa id +from the specification in +.Fa residual . +If the ccache name doesn't contain any colon (:), interpret it as a +file name. +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_initialize +creates a new ccache in +.Fa id +for +.Fa primary_principal . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_close +stops using the ccache +.Fa id +and frees the related resources. +Return 0 or an error code. +.Fn krb5_cc_destroy +removes the ccache +and closes (by calling +.Fn krb5_cc_close ) +.Fa id . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_copy_cache +copys the contents of +.Fa from +to +.Fa to . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_get_name +returns the name of the ccache +.Fa id . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_get_principal +returns the principal of +.Fa id +in +.Fa principal . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_get_type +returns the type of the ccache +.Fa id . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_get_ops +returns the ops of the ccache +.Fa id . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_get_version +returns the version of +.Fa id . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_register +Adds a new ccache type with operations +.Fa ops , +overwriting any existing one if +.Fa override . +Return an error code or 0. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_remove_cred +removes the credential identified by +.Fa ( cred , +.Fa which ) +from +.Fa id . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_store_cred +stores +.Fa creds +in the ccache +.Fa id . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_set_flags +sets the flags of +.Fa id +to +.Fa flags . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_retrieve_cred , +retrieves the credential identified by +.Fa mcreds +(and +.Fa whichfields ) +from +.Fa id +in +.Fa creds . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_next_cred +retrieves the next cred pointed to by +.Fa ( id , +.Fa cursor ) +in +.Fa creds , +and advance +.Fa cursor . +Return 0 or an error code. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_cc_end_seq_get +Destroys the cursor +.Fa cursor . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19624ffb11 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_ccache.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ + +KRB5_CCACHE(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_CCACHE(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ccccaacchhee, kkrrbb55__cccc__ccuurrssoorr, kkrrbb55__cccc__ooppss, kkrrbb55__ffcccc__ooppss, kkrrbb55__mmcccc__ooppss, + kkrrbb55__cccc__cclloossee, kkrrbb55__cccc__ccooppyy__ccaacchhee, kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeeffaauulltt, kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee, + kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeessttrrooyy, kkrrbb55__cccc__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett, kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeenn__nneeww, kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__nnaammee, + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__pprriinncciippaall, kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__ttyyppee, kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__ooppss, + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__vveerrssiioonn, kkrrbb55__cccc__iinniittiiaalliizzee, kkrrbb55__cccc__rreeggiisstteerr, + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreessoollvvee, kkrrbb55__cccc__rreettrriieevvee__ccrreedd, kkrrbb55__cccc__rreemmoovvee__ccrreedd, + kkrrbb55__cccc__sseett__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee, kkrrbb55__cccc__ssttoorree__ccrreedd, kkrrbb55__cccc__sseett__ffllaaggss, + kkrrbb55__cccc__nneexxtt__ccrreedd - mange credential cache. + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + struct krb5_ccache; + + struct krb5_cc_cursor; + + struct krb5_cc_ops; + + struct krb5_cc_ops *krb5_fcc_ops; + + struct krb5_cc_ops *krb5_mcc_ops; + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__cclloossee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ccooppyy__ccaacchhee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _f_r_o_m, + _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _t_o) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeeffaauulltt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _*_i_d) + + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _* + kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeessttrrooyy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___c_c___c_u_r_s_o_r _*_c_u_r_s_o_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeenn__nneeww(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c___o_p_s _*_o_p_s, + _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _*_i_d) + + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _* + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _* + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__ttyyppee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d) + + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c___o_p_s _* + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__ooppss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d) + + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__vveerrssiioonn(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__iinniittiiaalliizzee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_m_a_r_y___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreeggiisstteerr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c___o_p_s _*_o_p_s, + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _o_v_e_r_r_i_d_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreessoollvvee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _*_i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreettrriieevvee__ccrreedd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___f_l_a_g_s _w_h_i_c_h_f_i_e_l_d_s, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_m_c_r_e_d_s, + _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c_r_e_d_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreemmoovvee__ccrreedd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___f_l_a_g_s _w_h_i_c_h, _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c_r_e_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__sseett__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__ssttoorree__ccrreedd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c_r_e_d_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__sseett__ffllaaggss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c___s_e_t___f_l_a_g_s _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___f_l_a_g_s _f_l_a_g_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cccc__nneexxtt__ccrreedd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___c_c___c_u_r_s_o_r _*_c_u_r_s_o_r, _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c_r_e_d_s) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The krb5_ccache structure holds a Kerberos credential cache. + + The krb5_cc_cursor structure holds current position in a credential cache + when iterating over the cache. + + The krb5_cc_ops structure holds a set of operations that can me preformed + on a credential cache. + + There is no component inside krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor nor krb5_fcc_ops + that is directly referable. + + The krb5_creds holds a Kerberos credential, see manpage for + krb5_creds(3). + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee() and kkrrbb55__cccc__sseett__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee() gets and sets the + default name for the _c_o_n_t_e_x_t. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeeffaauulltt() opens the default ccache in _i_d. Return 0 or an error + code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeenn__nneeww() generates a new ccache of type _o_p_s in _i_d. Return 0 or + an error code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreessoollvvee() finds and allocates a ccache in _i_d from the specifica- + tion in _r_e_s_i_d_u_a_l. If the ccache name doesn't contain any colon (:), in- + terpret it as a file name. Return 0 or an error code. + + + kkrrbb55__cccc__iinniittiiaalliizzee() creates a new ccache in _i_d for _p_r_i_m_a_r_y___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l. + Return 0 or an error code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__cclloossee() stops using the ccache _i_d and frees the related re- + sources. Return 0 or an error code. kkrrbb55__cccc__ddeessttrrooyy() removes the + ccache and closes (by calling kkrrbb55__cccc__cclloossee()) _i_d. Return 0 or an error + code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ccooppyy__ccaacchhee() copys the contents of _f_r_o_m to _t_o. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__nnaammee() returns the name of the ccache _i_d. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__pprriinncciippaall() returns the principal of _i_d in _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l. Return + 0 or an error code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__ttyyppee() returns the type of the ccache _i_d. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__ooppss() returns the ops of the ccache _i_d. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeett__vveerrssiioonn() returns the version of _i_d. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreeggiisstteerr() Adds a new ccache type with operations _o_p_s, overwrit- + ing any existing one if _o_v_e_r_r_i_d_e. Return an error code or 0. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreemmoovvee__ccrreedd() removes the credential identified by (_c_r_e_d, _w_h_i_c_h) + from _i_d. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__ssttoorree__ccrreedd() stores _c_r_e_d_s in the ccache _i_d. Return 0 or an error + code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__sseett__ffllaaggss() sets the flags of _i_d to _f_l_a_g_s. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__rreettrriieevvee__ccrreedd(), retrieves the credential identified by _m_c_r_e_d_s + (and _w_h_i_c_h_f_i_e_l_d_s) from _i_d in _c_r_e_d_s. Return 0 or an error code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__nneexxtt__ccrreedd() retrieves the next cred pointed to by (_i_d, _c_u_r_s_o_r) in + _c_r_e_d_s, and advance _c_u_r_s_o_r. Return 0 or an error code. + + kkrrbb55__cccc__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett() Destroys the cursor _c_u_r_s_o_r. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5(3), krb5.conf(5), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL March 16, 2003 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_config.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_config.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..471389e54a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_config.3 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_config.3,v 1.5 2003/04/16 13:58:14 lha Exp $ +.Dd July 25, 2000 +.Dt KRB5_CONFIG 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_config_get_bool_default , +.Nm krb5_config_get_int_default , +.Nm krb5_config_get_string_default , +.Nm krb5_config_get_time_default +.Nd get configuration value +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fn krb5_config_get_bool_default "krb5_context context" "krb5_config_section *c" "krb5_boolean def_value" "..." +.Ft int +.Fn krb5_config_get_int_default "krb5_context context" "krb5_config_section *c" "int def_value" "..." +.Ft const char* +.Fn krb5_config_get_string_default "krb5_context context" "krb5_config_section *c" "const char *def_value" "..." +.Ft int +.Fn krb5_config_get_time_default "krb5_context context" "krb5_config_section *c" "int def_value" "..." +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions get values from the +.Xr krb5.conf 5 +configuration file, or another configuration database specified by the +.Fa c +parameter. +.Pp +The variable arguments should be a list of strings naming each +subsection to look for. For example: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, "libdefaults", "log_utc", NULL) +.Ed +.Pp +gets the boolean value for the +.Dv log_utc +option, defaulting to +.Dv FALSE . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_config_get_bool_default +will convert the option value to a boolean value, where +.Sq yes , +.Sq true , +and any non-zero number means +.Dv TRUE , +and any other value +.Dv FALSE . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_config_get_int_default +will convert the value to an integer. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_config_get_time_default +will convert the value to a period of time (not a time stamp) in +seconds, so the string +.Sq 2 weeks +will be converted to +1209600 (2 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60). +.Sh BUGS +Other than for the string case, there's no way to tell whether there +was a value specified or not. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_appdefault 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_config.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_config.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b8bab2953 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_config.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ + +KRB5_CONFIG(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_CONFIG(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__bbooooll__ddeeffaauulltt, kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__iinntt__ddeeffaauulltt, + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__ssttrriinngg__ddeeffaauulltt, kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__ttiimmee__ddeeffaauulltt - get con- + figuration value + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__bbooooll__ddeeffaauulltt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_f_i_g___s_e_c_t_i_o_n _*_c, _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _d_e_f___v_a_l_u_e, _._._.) + + _i_n_t + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__iinntt__ddeeffaauulltt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_f_i_g___s_e_c_t_i_o_n _*_c, + _i_n_t _d_e_f___v_a_l_u_e, _._._.) + + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r_* + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__ssttrriinngg__ddeeffaauulltt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_f_i_g___s_e_c_t_i_o_n _*_c, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_d_e_f___v_a_l_u_e, _._._.) + + _i_n_t + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__ttiimmee__ddeeffaauulltt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_f_i_g___s_e_c_t_i_o_n _*_c, _i_n_t _d_e_f___v_a_l_u_e, _._._.) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions get values from the krb5.conf(5) configuration file, or + another configuration database specified by the _c parameter. + + The variable arguments should be a list of strings naming each subsection + to look for. For example: + + krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE, "libdefaults", "log_utc", NULL) + + gets the boolean value for the log_utc option, defaulting to FALSE. + + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__bbooooll__ddeeffaauulltt() will convert the option value to a boolean + value, where `yes', `true', and any non-zero number means TRUE, and any + other value FALSE. + + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__iinntt__ddeeffaauulltt() will convert the value to an integer. + + kkrrbb55__ccoonnffiigg__ggeett__ttiimmee__ddeeffaauulltt() will convert the value to a period of time + (not a time stamp) in seconds, so the string `2 weeks' will be converted + to 1209600 (2 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60). + +BBUUGGSS + Other than for the string case, there's no way to tell whether there was + a value specified or not. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_appdefault(3), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL July 25, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_context.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_context.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95d11207d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_context.3 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 200 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_context.3,v 1.5 2003/03/10 02:19:28 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd January 21, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_CONTEXT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_context +.Nd krb5 state structure +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +structure is designed to hold all per thread state. All global +variables that are context specific are stored in this structure, +including default encryption types, credentials-cache (ticket file), and +default realms. +.Pp +The internals of the structure should never be accessed directly, +functions exist for extracting information. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_init_context 3 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_context.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_context.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0f8abc1b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_context.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ + +KRB5_CONTEXT(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_CONTEXT(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ccoonntteexxtt - krb5 state structure + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55__ccoonntteexxtt structure is designed to hold all per thread state. All + global variables that are context specific are stored in this structure, + including default encryption types, credentials-cache (ticket file), and + default realms. + + The internals of the structure should never be accessed directly, func- + tions exist for extracting information. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_init_context(3), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL January 21, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6704113bd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.3 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_create_checksum.3,v 1.6 2003/04/16 13:58:14 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 7, 1999 +.Dt NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof , +.Nm krb5_checksum_is_keyed , +.Nm krb5_checksumsize , +.Nm krb5_create_checksum , +.Nm krb5_verify_checksum +.Nd creates and verifies checksums +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_create_checksum "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage_or_type" "void *data" "size_t len" "Checksum *result" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_verify_checksum "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "krb5_key_usage usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "Checksum *cksum" +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof "krb5_context context" "krb5_cksumtype type" +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_keyed "krb5_context context" "krb5_cksumtype type" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to create and verify checksums. +.Fn krb5_create_checksum +creates a checksum of the specified data, and puts it in +.Fa result . +If +.Fa crypto +is +.Dv NULL , +.Fa usage_or_type +specifies the checksum type to use; it must not be keyed. Otherwise +.Fa crypto +is an encryption context created by +.Fn krb5_crypto_init , +and +.Fa usage_or_type +specifies a key-usage. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_checksum +verifies the +.Fa checksum , +against the provided data. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof +returns true is the specified checksum is collision proof (that it's +very unlikely that two strings has the same hash value, and that it's +hard to find two strings that has the same hash). Examples of +collision proof checksums are MD5, and SHA1, while CRC32 is not. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_keyed +returns true if the specified checksum type is keyed (that the hash +value is a function of both the data, and a separate key). Examples of +keyed hash algorithms are HMAC-SHA1-DES3, and RSA-MD5-DES. The +.Dq plain +hash functions MD5, and SHA1 are not keyed. +.\" .Sh EXAMPLE +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_crypto_init 3 , +.Xr krb5_encrypt 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a0d1d9909 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ + +NAME(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual NAME(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuumm__iiss__ccoolllliissiioonn__pprrooooff, kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuumm__iiss__kkeeyyeedd, + kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuummssiizzee, kkrrbb55__ccrreeaattee__cchheecckkssuumm, kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__cchheecckkssuumm - creates + and verifies checksums + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ccrreeaattee__cchheecckkssuumm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o, + _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _u_s_a_g_e___o_r___t_y_p_e, _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n, _C_h_e_c_k_s_u_m _*_r_e_s_u_l_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__cchheecckkssuumm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o, + _k_r_b_5___k_e_y___u_s_a_g_e _u_s_a_g_e, _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n, _C_h_e_c_k_s_u_m _*_c_k_s_u_m) + + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuumm__iiss__ccoolllliissiioonn__pprrooooff(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___c_k_s_u_m_t_y_p_e _t_y_p_e) + + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuumm__iiss__kkeeyyeedd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_k_s_u_m_t_y_p_e _t_y_p_e) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions are used to create and verify checksums. + kkrrbb55__ccrreeaattee__cchheecckkssuumm() creates a checksum of the specified data, and puts + it in _r_e_s_u_l_t. If _c_r_y_p_t_o is NULL, _u_s_a_g_e___o_r___t_y_p_e specifies the checksum + type to use; it must not be keyed. Otherwise _c_r_y_p_t_o is an encryption con- + text created by kkrrbb55__ccrryyppttoo__iinniitt(), and _u_s_a_g_e___o_r___t_y_p_e specifies a key-us- + age. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__cchheecckkssuumm() verifies the _c_h_e_c_k_s_u_m, against the provided data. + + kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuumm__iiss__ccoolllliissiioonn__pprrooooff() returns true is the specified checksum + is collision proof (that it's very unlikely that two strings has the same + hash value, and that it's hard to find two strings that has the same + hash). Examples of collision proof checksums are MD5, and SHA1, while + CRC32 is not. + + kkrrbb55__cchheecckkssuumm__iiss__kkeeyyeedd() returns true if the specified checksum type is + keyed (that the hash value is a function of both the data, and a separate + key). Examples of keyed hash algorithms are HMAC-SHA1-DES3, and RSA- + MD5-DES. The ``plain'' hash functions MD5, and SHA1 are not keyed. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_crypto_init(3), krb5_encrypt(3) + + HEIMDAL April 7, 1999 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b0284cbfe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.3 @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_crypto_init.3,v 1.6 2003/04/16 13:58:15 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 7, 1999 +.Dt NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_crypto_init , +.Nm krb5_crypto_destroy +.Nd initialize encryption context +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_crypto_init "krb5_context context" "krb5_keyblock *key" "krb5_enctype enctype" "krb5_crypto *crypto" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_crypto_destroy "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to initialize an encryption context that can +be used to encrypt or checksum data. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_crypt_init +initializes the encrytion context +.Fa crypto . +The +.Fa key +parameter is the key to use for encryption, and checksums. The +encryption type to use is taken from the key, but can be overridden +with the +.Fa enctype parameter . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_crypto_destroy +frees a previously allocated encrypion context. +.\" .Sh EXAMPLE +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_create_checksum 3 , +.Xr krb5_encrypt 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f59863aa02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ + +NAME(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual NAME(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ccrryyppttoo__iinniitt, kkrrbb55__ccrryyppttoo__ddeessttrrooyy - initialize encryption context + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ccrryyppttoo__iinniitt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k _*_k_e_y, + _k_r_b_5___e_n_c_t_y_p_e _e_n_c_t_y_p_e, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _*_c_r_y_p_t_o) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ccrryyppttoo__ddeessttrrooyy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions are used to initialize an encryption context that can be + used to encrypt or checksum data. + + The kkrrbb55__ccrryypptt__iinniitt() initializes the encrytion context _c_r_y_p_t_o. The _k_e_y + parameter is the key to use for encryption, and checksums. The encryption + type to use is taken from the key, but can be overridden with the _e_n_c_t_y_p_e + _p_a_r_a_m_e_t_e_r. + + kkrrbb55__ccrryyppttoo__ddeessttrrooyy() frees a previously allocated encrypion context. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_create_checksum(3), krb5_encrypt(3) + + HEIMDAL April 7, 1999 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_data.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_data.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..355d934149 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_data.3 @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_data.3,v 1.4 2003/04/16 13:58:13 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 20, 2003 +.Dt KRB5_DATA 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_data +.Nm krb5_data_zero +.Nm krb5_data_free +.Nm krb5_free_data_contents +.Nm krb5_free_data +.Nm krb5_data_alloc +.Nm krb5_data_realloc +.Nm krb5_data_copy +.Nm krb5_copy_data +.Nd operates on the Kerberos datatype krb5_data. +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Pp +.Li "struct krb5_data;" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_data_zero "krb5_data *p" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_data_free "krb5_data *p" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_free_data_contents "krb5_context context" "krb5_data *p" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_free_data "krb5_context context" "krb5_data *p" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_data_alloc "krb5_data *p" "int len" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_data_realloc "krb5_data *p" "int len" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_data_copy "krb5_data *p" "const void *data" "size_t len" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_copy_data "krb5_context context" "const krb5_data *indata" "krb5_data **outdata" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Li krb5_data +structure holds a data element. +The structure contains two public accessible elements +.Fa length +(the length of data) +and +.Fa data +(the data itself). +The structure must always be initiated and freed by the functions +documented in this manual. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_data_zero +resets the content of +.Fa p . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_data_free +free the data in +.Fa p . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_free_data_contents +works the same way as +.Fa krb5_data_free . +The diffrence is that krb5_free_data_contents is more portable (exists +in MIT api). +.Pp +.Fn krb5_free_data +frees the data in +.Fa p +and +.Fa p +itself . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_data_alloc +allocates +.Fa len +bytes in +.Fa p +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_data_realloc +reallocates the length of +.Fa p +to the length in +.Fa len . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_data_copy +copies the +.Fa data +that have the length +.Fa len +into +.Fa p . +.Fa p +is not freed so the calling function should make sure the +.Fa p +doesn't contain anything needs to be freed. +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_copy_data +copies the +.Li krb5_data +in +.Fa indata +to +.Fa outdata . +.Fa outdata +is not freed so the calling function should make sure the +.Fa outdata +doesn't contain anything needs to be freed. +.Fa outdata +should be freed using +.Fn krb5_free_data . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5 3 , +.Xr krb5_storage 3 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_data.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_data.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..70aa5e247a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_data.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ + +KRB5_DATA(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_DATA(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__zzeerroo kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__ffrreeee kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa__ccoonntteennttss + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__aalllloocc kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__rreeaalllloocc kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__ccooppyy + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__ddaattaa - operates on the Kerberos datatype krb5_data. + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + struct krb5_data; _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__zzeerroo(_k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__ffrreeee(_k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa__ccoonntteennttss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__aalllloocc(_k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p, _i_n_t _l_e_n) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__rreeaalllloocc(_k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p, _i_n_t _l_e_n) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__ccooppyy(_k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_p, _c_o_n_s_t _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__ddaattaa(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_i_n_d_a_t_a, + _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_*_o_u_t_d_a_t_a) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The krb5_data structure holds a data element. The structure contains two + public accessible elements _l_e_n_g_t_h (the length of data) and _d_a_t_a (the data + itself). The structure must always be initiated and freed by the func- + tions documented in this manual. + + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__zzeerroo() resets the content of _p. + + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__ffrreeee() free the data in _p. + + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa__ccoonntteennttss() works the same way as _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a___f_r_e_e. The + diffrence is that krb5_free_data_contents is more portable (exists in MIT + api). + + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa() frees the data in _p and _p itself . + + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__aalllloocc() allocates _l_e_n bytes in _p Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__rreeaalllloocc() reallocates the length of _p to the length in _l_e_n. Re- + turns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__ddaattaa__ccooppyy() copies the _d_a_t_a that have the length _l_e_n into _p. _p is + not freed so the calling function should make sure the _p doesn't contain + anything needs to be freed. Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__ccooppyy__ddaattaa() copies the krb5_data in _i_n_d_a_t_a to _o_u_t_d_a_t_a. _o_u_t_d_a_t_a is + not freed so the calling function should make sure the _o_u_t_d_a_t_a doesn't + contain anything needs to be freed. _o_u_t_d_a_t_a should be freed using + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ddaattaa(). Returns 0 or an error. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5(3), krb5_storage(3), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL March 20, 2003 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84140bffc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.3 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_encrypt.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:15 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 7, 1999 +.Dt KRB5_ENCRYPT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_decrypt , +.Nm krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData , +.Nm krb5_encrypt , +.Nm krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData +.Nd encrypt and decrypt data +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_encrypt "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "krb5_data *result" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "int kvno" "EncryptedData *result" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_decrypt "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "krb5_data *result" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "EncryptedData *e" "krb5_data *result" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to encrypt and decrypt data. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_encrypt +puts the encrypted version of +.Fa data +(of size +.Fa len ) +in +.Fa result . +If the encryption type supports using derived keys, +.Fa usage +should be the appropriate key-usage. +.Fn krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData +does the same as +.Fn krb5_encrypt , +but it puts the encrypted data in a +.Fa EncryptedData +structure instead. If +.Fa kvno +is not zero, it will be put in the +.Fa kvno field in the +.Fa EncryptedData . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_decrypt , +and +.Fn krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData +works similarly. +.\" .Sh EXAMPLE +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_create_checksum 3 , +.Xr krb5_crypto_init 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0188acd39e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ + +KRB5_ENCRYPT(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_ENCRYPT(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ddeeccrryypptt, kkrrbb55__ddeeccrryypptt__EEnnccrryypptteeddDDaattaa, kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt, + kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt__EEnnccrryypptteeddDDaattaa - encrypt and decrypt data + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o, _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _u_s_a_g_e, + _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt__EEnnccrryypptteeddDDaattaa(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o, + _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _u_s_a_g_e, _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n, _i_n_t _k_v_n_o, + _E_n_c_r_y_p_t_e_d_D_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ddeeccrryypptt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o, _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _u_s_a_g_e, + _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a, _s_i_z_e___t _l_e_n, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ddeeccrryypptt__EEnnccrryypptteeddDDaattaa(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_y_p_t_o _c_r_y_p_t_o, + _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _u_s_a_g_e, _E_n_c_r_y_p_t_e_d_D_a_t_a _*_e, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions are used to encrypt and decrypt data. + + kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt() puts the encrypted version of _d_a_t_a (of size _l_e_n) in + _r_e_s_u_l_t. If the encryption type supports using derived keys, _u_s_a_g_e should + be the appropriate key-usage. kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt__EEnnccrryypptteeddDDaattaa() does the same + as kkrrbb55__eennccrryypptt(), but it puts the encrypted data in a _E_n_c_r_y_p_t_e_d_D_a_t_a + structure instead. If _k_v_n_o is not zero, it will be put in the _k_v_n_o _f_i_e_l_d + _i_n _t_h_e _E_n_c_r_y_p_t_e_d_D_a_t_a. + + kkrrbb55__ddeeccrryypptt(), and kkrrbb55__ddeeccrryypptt__EEnnccrryypptteeddDDaattaa() works similarly. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_create_checksum(3), krb5_crypto_init(3) + + HEIMDAL April 7, 1999 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_err.et b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34279239ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +# +# Error messages for the krb5 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: krb5_err.et,v 1.9 2000/04/06 00:41:37 assar Exp $" + +error_table krb5 + +prefix KRB5KDC_ERR +error_code NONE, "No error" +error_code NAME_EXP, "Client's entry in database has expired" +error_code SERVICE_EXP, "Server's entry in database has expired" +error_code BAD_PVNO, "Requested protocol version not supported" +error_code C_OLD_MAST_KVNO, "Client's key is encrypted in an old master key" +error_code S_OLD_MAST_KVNO, "Server's key is encrypted in an old master key" +error_code C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, "Client not found in Kerberos database" +error_code S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, "Server not found in Kerberos database" +error_code PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE,"Principal has multiple entries in Kerberos database" +error_code NULL_KEY, "Client or server has a null key" +error_code CANNOT_POSTDATE, "Ticket is ineligible for postdating" +error_code NEVER_VALID, "Requested effective lifetime is negative or too short" +error_code POLICY, "KDC policy rejects request" +error_code BADOPTION, "KDC can't fulfill requested option" +error_code ETYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for encryption type" +error_code SUMTYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for checksum type" +error_code PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for padata type" +error_code TRTYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for transited type" +error_code CLIENT_REVOKED, "Clients credentials have been revoked" +error_code SERVICE_REVOKED, "Credentials for server have been revoked" +error_code TGT_REVOKED, "TGT has been revoked" +error_code CLIENT_NOTYET, "Client not yet valid - try again later" +error_code SERVICE_NOTYET, "Server not yet valid - try again later" +error_code KEY_EXPIRED, "Password has expired" +error_code PREAUTH_FAILED, "Preauthentication failed" +error_code PREAUTH_REQUIRED, "Additional pre-authentication required" +error_code SERVER_NOMATCH, "Requested server and ticket don't match" + +# 27-30 are reserved +index 31 +prefix KRB5KRB_AP +error_code ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY, "Decrypt integrity check failed" +error_code ERR_TKT_EXPIRED, "Ticket expired" +error_code ERR_TKT_NYV, "Ticket not yet valid" +error_code ERR_REPEAT, "Request is a replay" +error_code ERR_NOT_US, "The ticket isn't for us" +error_code ERR_BADMATCH, "Ticket/authenticator don't match" +error_code ERR_SKEW, "Clock skew too great" +error_code ERR_BADADDR, "Incorrect net address" +error_code ERR_BADVERSION, "Protocol version mismatch" +error_code ERR_MSG_TYPE, "Invalid message type" +error_code ERR_MODIFIED, "Message stream modified" +error_code ERR_BADORDER, "Message out of order" +error_code ERR_ILL_CR_TKT, "Invalid cross-realm ticket" +error_code ERR_BADKEYVER, "Key version is not available" +error_code ERR_NOKEY, "Service key not available" +error_code ERR_MUT_FAIL, "Mutual authentication failed" +error_code ERR_BADDIRECTION, "Incorrect message direction" +error_code ERR_METHOD, "Alternative authentication method required" +error_code ERR_BADSEQ, "Incorrect sequence number in message" +error_code ERR_INAPP_CKSUM, "Inappropriate type of checksum in message" +error_code PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED, "Policy rejects transited path" + +prefix KRB5KRB_ERR +error_code RESPONSE_TOO_BIG, "Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP" +# 53-59 are reserved +index 60 +error_code GENERIC, "Generic error (see e-text)" +error_code FIELD_TOOLONG, "Field is too long for this implementation" + +# pkinit +index 62 +prefix KDC_ERROR +error_code CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED, "Client not trusted" +error_code KDC_NOT_TRUSTED, "KDC not trusted" +error_code INVALID_SIG, "Invalid signature" +error_code KEY_TOO_WEAK, "Key too weak" +error_code CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH, "Certificate mismatch" +prefix KRB5_AP_ERR +error_code USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED, "User to user required" +prefix KDC_ERROR +error_code CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE, "Cannot verify certificate" +error_code INVALID_CERTIFICATE, "Invalid certificate" +error_code REVOKED_CERTIFICATE, "Revoked certificate" +error_code REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN, "Revocation status unknown" +error_code REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,"Revocation status unavailable" +error_code CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH, "Client name mismatch" +error_code KDC_NAME_MISMATCH, "KDC name mismatch" + +# 77-127 are reserved + +index 128 +prefix +error_code KRB5_ERR_RCSID, "$Id: krb5_err.et,v 1.9 2000/04/06 00:41:37 assar Exp $" + +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_BADLOCKFLAG, "Invalid flag for file lock mode" +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD, "Cannot read password" +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_BADPWDMATCH, "Password mismatch" +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR, "Password read interrupted" + +error_code KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR, "Invalid character in component name" +error_code KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED, "Malformed representation of principal" + +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_CANTOPEN, "Can't open/find configuration file" +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT, "Improper format of configuration file" +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE, "Insufficient space to return complete information" + +error_code KRB5_BADMSGTYPE, "Invalid message type specified for encoding" + +error_code KRB5_CC_BADNAME, "Credential cache name malformed" +error_code KRB5_CC_UNKNOWN_TYPE, "Unknown credential cache type" +error_code KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND, "Matching credential not found" +error_code KRB5_CC_END, "End of credential cache reached" + +error_code KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED, "Request did not supply a ticket" + +error_code KRB5KRB_AP_WRONG_PRINC, "Wrong principal in request" +error_code KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID, "Ticket has invalid flag set" + +error_code KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH, "Requested principal and ticket don't match" +error_code KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED, "KDC reply did not match expectations" +error_code KRB5_KDCREP_SKEW, "Clock skew too great in KDC reply" +error_code KRB5_IN_TKT_REALM_MISMATCH, "Client/server realm mismatch in initial ticket request" + +error_code KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for encryption type" +error_code KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for key type" +error_code KRB5_WRONG_ETYPE, "Requested encryption type not used in message" +error_code KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for checksum type" + +error_code KRB5_REALM_UNKNOWN, "Cannot find KDC for requested realm" +error_code KRB5_SERVICE_UNKNOWN, "Kerberos service unknown" +error_code KRB5_KDC_UNREACH, "Cannot contact any KDC for requested realm" +error_code KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME, "No local name found for principal name" + +error_code KRB5_MUTUAL_FAILED, "Mutual authentication failed" + +# some of these should be combined/supplanted by system codes + +error_code KRB5_RC_TYPE_EXISTS, "Replay cache type is already registered" +error_code KRB5_RC_MALLOC, "No more memory to allocate (in replay cache code)" +error_code KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND, "Replay cache type is unknown" +error_code KRB5_RC_UNKNOWN, "Generic unknown RC error" +error_code KRB5_RC_REPLAY, "Message is a replay" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO, "Replay I/O operation failed XXX" +error_code KRB5_RC_NOIO, "Replay cache type does not support non-volatile storage" +error_code KRB5_RC_PARSE, "Replay cache name parse/format error" + +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_EOF, "End-of-file on replay cache I/O" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_MALLOC, "No more memory to allocate (in replay cache I/O code)" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_PERM, "Permission denied in replay cache code" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_IO, "I/O error in replay cache i/o code" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN, "Generic unknown RC/IO error" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_SPACE, "Insufficient system space to store replay information" + +error_code KRB5_TRANS_CANTOPEN, "Can't open/find realm translation file" +error_code KRB5_TRANS_BADFORMAT, "Improper format of realm translation file" + +error_code KRB5_LNAME_CANTOPEN, "Can't open/find lname translation database" +error_code KRB5_LNAME_NOTRANS, "No translation available for requested principal" +error_code KRB5_LNAME_BADFORMAT, "Improper format of translation database entry" + +error_code KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL, "Cryptosystem internal error" + +error_code KRB5_KT_BADNAME, "Key table name malformed" +error_code KRB5_KT_UNKNOWN_TYPE, "Unknown Key table type" +error_code KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND, "Key table entry not found" +error_code KRB5_KT_END, "End of key table reached" +error_code KRB5_KT_NOWRITE, "Cannot write to specified key table" +error_code KRB5_KT_IOERR, "Error writing to key table" + +error_code KRB5_NO_TKT_IN_RLM, "Cannot find ticket for requested realm" +error_code KRB5DES_BAD_KEYPAR, "DES key has bad parity" +error_code KRB5DES_WEAK_KEY, "DES key is a weak key" + +error_code KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE, "Bad encryption type" +error_code KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE, "Key size is incompatible with encryption type" +error_code KRB5_BAD_MSIZE, "Message size is incompatible with encryption type" + +error_code KRB5_CC_TYPE_EXISTS, "Credentials cache type is already registered." +error_code KRB5_KT_TYPE_EXISTS, "Key table type is already registered." + +error_code KRB5_CC_IO, "Credentials cache I/O operation failed XXX" +error_code KRB5_FCC_PERM, "Credentials cache file permissions incorrect" +error_code KRB5_FCC_NOFILE, "No credentials cache file found" +error_code KRB5_FCC_INTERNAL, "Internal file credentials cache error" +error_code KRB5_CC_WRITE, "Error writing to credentials cache file" +error_code KRB5_CC_NOMEM, "No more memory to allocate (in credentials cache code)" +error_code KRB5_CC_FORMAT, "Bad format in credentials cache" + +# errors for dual tgt library calls +error_code KRB5_INVALID_FLAGS, "Invalid KDC option combination (library internal error)" +error_code KRB5_NO_2ND_TKT, "Request missing second ticket" + +error_code KRB5_NOCREDS_SUPPLIED, "No credentials supplied to library routine" + +# errors for sendauth (and recvauth) + +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS, "Bad sendauth version was sent" +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS, "Bad application version was sent (via sendauth)" +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE, "Bad response (during sendauth exchange)" +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED, "Server rejected authentication (during sendauth exchange)" + +# errors for preauthentication + +error_code KRB5_PREAUTH_BAD_TYPE, "Unsupported preauthentication type" +error_code KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY, "Required preauthentication key not supplied" +error_code KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED, "Generic preauthentication failure" + +# version number errors + +error_code KRB5_RCACHE_BADVNO, "Unsupported replay cache format version number" +error_code KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO, "Unsupported credentials cache format version number" +error_code KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO, "Unsupported key table format version number" + +# +# + +error_code KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for address type" +error_code KRB5_RC_REQUIRED, "Message replay detection requires rcache parameter" +error_code KRB5_ERR_BAD_HOSTNAME, "Hostname cannot be canonicalized" +error_code KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN, "Cannot determine realm for host" +error_code KRB5_SNAME_UNSUPP_NAMETYPE, "Conversion to service principal undefined for name type" + +error_code KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY, "Initial Ticket response appears to be Version 4" +error_code KRB5_REALM_CANT_RESOLVE, "Cannot resolve KDC for requested realm" +error_code KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE, "Requesting ticket can't get forwardable tickets" +error_code KRB5_FWD_BAD_PRINCIPAL, "Bad principal name while trying to forward credentials" + +error_code KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP, "Looping detected inside krb5_get_in_tkt" +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM, "Configuration file does not specify default realm" + +error_code KRB5_SAM_UNSUPPORTED, "Bad SAM flags in obtain_sam_padata" +error_code KRB5_KT_NAME_TOOLONG, "Keytab name too long" + +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_addresses.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_addresses.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ac46d44f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_addresses.3 @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_free_addresses.3,v 1.5 2003/04/16 13:58:15 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd November 20, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_FREE_ADDRESSES 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_free_addresses +.Nd free list of addresses +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_free_addresses "krb5_context context" "krb5_addresses *addresses" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Fn krb5_free_addresses +will free a list of addresses that has been created with +.Fn krb5_get_all_client_addrs +or with some other function. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_get_all_client_addrs 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_addresses.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_addresses.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4bf75c35f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_addresses.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ + +KRB5_FREE_ADDRESSES(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_FREE_ADDRESSES(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess - free list of addresses + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess() will free a list of addresses that has been + created with kkrrbb55__ggeett__aallll__cclliieenntt__aaddddrrss() or with some other function. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_get_all_client_addrs(3) + + HEIMDAL November 20, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9900a7981 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_free_principal.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:11 lha Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_FREE_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_free_principal +.Nd principal free function +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_free_principal "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Fn krb5_free_principal +will free a principal that has been created with +.Fn krb5_build_principal , +.Fn krb5_parse_name , +or with some other function. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..91aa5319cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ + +KRB5_FREE_PRINCIPAL(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_FREE_PRINCIPAL(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__pprriinncciippaall - principal free function + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__pprriinncciippaall() will free a principal that has been created + with kkrrbb55__bbuuiilldd__pprriinncciippaall(), kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__nnaammee(), or with some other func- + tion. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_425_conv_principal(3), krb5_build_principal(3), + krb5_parse_name(3), krb5_sname_to_principal(3), krb5_unparse_name(3) + + HEIMDAL August 8, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0aef63e318 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3 @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_get_all_client_addrs.3,v 1.6 2003/04/16 13:58:16 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 1, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_GET_ADDRS 3 +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_get_all_client_addrs , +.Nm krb5_get_all_server_addrs +.Nd return local addresses +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft "krb5_error_code" +.Fn krb5_get_all_client_addrs "krb5_context context" "krb5_addresses *addrs" +.Ft "krb5_error_code" +.Fn krb5_get_all_server_addrs "krb5_context context" "krb5_addresses *addrs" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions return in +.Fa addrs +a list of addresses associated with the local +host. +.Pp +The server variant returns all configured interface addresses (if +possible), including loop-back addresses. This is useful if you want +to create sockets to listen to. +.Pp +The client version will also scan local interfaces (can be turned off +by setting +.Li libdefaults/scan_interfaces +to false in +.Pa krb5.conf ) , +but will not include loop-back addresses, unless there are no other +addresses found. It will remove all addresses included in +.Li libdefaults/ignore_addresses +but will unconditionally include addresses in +.Li libdefaults/extra_addresses . +.Pp +The returned addresses should be freed by calling +.Fn krb5_free_addresses . +.\".Sh EXAMPLE +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_free_addresses 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4093b1a986 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_all_client_addrs.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ + +KRB5_GET_ADDRS(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_GET_ADDRS(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ggeett__aallll__cclliieenntt__aaddddrrss, kkrrbb55__ggeett__aallll__sseerrvveerr__aaddddrrss - return local ad- + dresses + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__aallll__cclliieenntt__aaddddrrss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_a_d_d_r_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__aallll__sseerrvveerr__aaddddrrss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___a_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _*_a_d_d_r_s) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions return in _a_d_d_r_s a list of addresses associated with the + local host. + + The server variant returns all configured interface addresses (if possi- + ble), including loop-back addresses. This is useful if you want to create + sockets to listen to. + + The client version will also scan local interfaces (can be turned off by + setting libdefaults/scan_interfaces to false in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f), but will not + include loop-back addresses, unless there are no other addresses found. + It will remove all addresses included in libdefaults/ignore_addresses but + will unconditionally include addresses in libdefaults/extra_addresses. + + The returned addresses should be freed by calling kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__aaddddrreesssseess(). + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_free_addresses(3) + + July 1, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76ad20bc6e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.3 @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_get_krbhst.3,v 1.6 2003/04/16 13:58:16 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd June 17, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_GET_KRBHST 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_get_krbhst +.Nm krb5_get_krb_admin_hst +.Nm krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst +.Nm krb5_get_krb524hst +.Nm krb5_free_krbhst +.Nd lookup Kerberos KDC hosts +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_get_krbhst "krb5_context context" "const krb5_realm *realm" "char ***hostlist" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_get_krb_admin_hst "krb5_context context" "const krb5_realm *realm" "char ***hostlist" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst "krb5_context context" "const krb5_realm *realm" "char ***hostlist" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_get_krb524hst "krb5_context context" "const krb5_realm *realm" "char ***hostlist" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_free_krbhst "krb5_context context" "char **hostlist" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions implement the old API to get a list of Kerberos hosts, +and are thus similar to the +.Fn krb5_krbhst_init +functions. However, since these functions returns +.Em all +hosts in one go, they potentially have to do more lookups than +necessary. These functions remain for compatibility reasons. +.Pp +After a call to one of these functions, +.Fa hostlist +is a +.Dv NULL +terminated list of strings, pointing to the requested Kerberos hosts. These should be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_krbhst +when done with. +.Sh EXAMPLE +The following code will print the KDCs of the realm +.Dq MY.REALM . +.Bd -literal -offset indent +char **hosts, **p; +krb5_get_krbhst(context, "MY.REALM", &hosts); +for(p = hosts; *p; p++) + printf("%s\\n", *p); +krb5_free_krbhst(context, hosts); +.Ed +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_krbhst_init 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..493b55284f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_get_krbhst.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ + +KRB5_GET_KRBHST(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_GET_KRBHST(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbbhhsstt kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbb__aaddmmiinn__hhsstt kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbb__cchhaannggeeppww__hhsstt + kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbb552244hhsstt kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__kkrrbbhhsstt - lookup Kerberos KDC hosts + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbbhhsstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_*_h_o_s_t_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbb__aaddmmiinn__hhsstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_*_h_o_s_t_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbb__cchhaannggeeppww__hhsstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_*_h_o_s_t_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__kkrrbb552244hhsstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_*_h_o_s_t_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__kkrrbbhhsstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_h_a_r _*_*_h_o_s_t_l_i_s_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions implement the old API to get a list of Kerberos hosts, + and are thus similar to the kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__iinniitt() functions. However, since + these functions returns _a_l_l hosts in one go, they potentially have to do + more lookups than necessary. These functions remain for compatibility + reasons. + + After a call to one of these functions, _h_o_s_t_l_i_s_t is a NULL terminated + list of strings, pointing to the requested Kerberos hosts. These should + be freed with kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__kkrrbbhhsstt() when done with. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + The following code will print the KDCs of the realm ``MY.REALM''. + + char **hosts, **p; + krb5_get_krbhst(context, "MY.REALM", &hosts); + for(p = hosts; *p; p++) + printf("%s\n", *p); + krb5_free_krbhst(context, hosts); + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_krbhst_init(3) + + HEIMDAL June 17, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76213fb13e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.3 @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_init_context.3,v 1.9 2003/04/16 13:58:11 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd January 21, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_CONTEXT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_init_context , +.Nm krb5_free_context +.Nd create and delete krb5_context structures +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_init_context "krb5_context *context" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_free_context "krb5_context context" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Fn krb5_init_context +function initializes the +.Fa context +structure and reads the configuration file +.Pa /etc/krb5.conf . +.Pp +The structure should be freed by calling +.Fn krb5_free_context +when it is no longer being used. +.Sh RETURN VALUES +.Fn krb5_init_context +returns 0 to indicate success. +Otherwise an errno code is returned. +Failure means either that something bad happened during initialization +(typically +.Bq ENOMEM ) +or that Kerberos should not be used +.Bq ENXIO . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr errno 2 , +.Xr krb5_context 3 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d47bafd5f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_init_context.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ + +KRB5_CONTEXT(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_CONTEXT(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__iinniitt__ccoonntteexxtt, kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ccoonntteexxtt - create and delete krb5_context + structures + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__iinniitt__ccoonntteexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _*_c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ccoonntteexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55__iinniitt__ccoonntteexxtt() function initializes the _c_o_n_t_e_x_t structure and + reads the configuration file _/_e_t_c_/_k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f. + + The structure should be freed by calling kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__ccoonntteexxtt() when it is + no longer being used. + +RREETTUURRNN VVAALLUUEESS + kkrrbb55__iinniitt__ccoonntteexxtt() returns 0 to indicate success. Otherwise an errno + code is returned. Failure means either that something bad happened dur- + ing initialization (typically [ENOMEM]) or that Kerberos should not be + used [ENXIO]. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + errno(2), krb5_context(3), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL January 21, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..164eb49992 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.3 @@ -0,0 +1,411 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_keytab.3,v 1.9 2003/04/16 13:58:16 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd February 5, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_KEYTAB 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_kt_ops , +.Nm krb5_keytab_entry , +.Nm krb5_kt_cursor , +.Nm krb5_kt_add_entry , +.Nm krb5_kt_close , +.Nm krb5_kt_compare , +.Nm krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents , +.Nm krb5_kt_default , +.Nm krb5_kt_default_name , +.Nm krb5_kt_end_seq_get , +.Nm krb5_kt_free_entry , +.Nm krb5_kt_get_entry , +.Nm krb5_kt_get_name , +.Nm krb5_kt_get_type , +.Nm krb5_kt_next_entry , +.Nm krb5_kt_read_service_key , +.Nm krb5_kt_register , +.Nm krb5_kt_remove_entry , +.Nm krb5_kt_resolve , +.Nm krb5_kt_start_seq_get +.Nd manage keytab (key storage) files +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Pp +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_add_entry +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *entry" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_close +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fo krb5_kt_compare +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *entry" +.Fa "krb5_const_principal principal" +.Fa "krb5_kvno vno" +.Fa "krb5_enctype enctype" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_keytab_entry *in" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *out" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_default +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab *id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_default_name +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "char *name" +.Fa "size_t namesize" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_end_seq_get +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fa "krb5_kt_cursor *cursor" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_free_entry +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *entry" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_get_entry +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fa "krb5_const_principal principal" +.Fa "krb5_kvno kvno" +.Fa "krb5_enctype enctype" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *entry" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_get_name +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab keytab" +.Fa "char *name" +.Fa "size_t namesize" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_get_type +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab keytab" +.Fa "char *prefix" +.Fa "size_t prefixsize" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_next_entry +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *entry" +.Fa "krb5_kt_cursor *cursor" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_read_service_key +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_pointer keyprocarg" +.Fa "krb5_principal principal" +.Fa "krb5_kvno vno" +.Fa "krb5_enctype enctype" +.Fa "krb5_keyblock **key" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_register +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const krb5_kt_ops *ops" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_remove_entry +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fa "krb5_keytab_entry *entry" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_resolve +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const char *name" +.Fa "krb5_keytab *id" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_kt_start_seq_get +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_keytab id" +.Fa "krb5_kt_cursor *cursor" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +A keytab name is on the form +.Li type:residual . +The +.Li residual +part is specific to each keytab-type. +.Pp +When a keytab-name is resolved, the type is matched with an internal +list of keytab types. If there is no matching keytab type, +the default keytab is used. The current default type is +.Nm file . +The default value can be changed in the configuration file +.Pa /etc/krb5.conf +by setting the variable +.Li [defaults]default_keytab_name . +.Pp +The keytab types that are implemented in Heimdal +are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Nm file +store the keytab in a file, the type's name is +.Li KEYFILE . +The residual part is a filename. +.It Nm keyfile +store the keytab in a +.Li AFS +keyfile (usually +.Pa /usr/afs/etc/KeyFile ) , +the type's name is +.Li AFSKEYFILE . +The residual part is a filename. +.It Nm krb4 +the keytab is a Kerberos 4 +.Pa srvtab +that is on-the-fly converted to a keytab. The type's name is +.Li krb4 . +The residual part is a filename. +.It Nm memory +The keytab is stored in a memory segment. This allows sensitive and/or +temporary data not to be stored on disk. The type's name is +.Li MEMORY . +There are no residual part, the only pointer back to the keytab is the +.Fa id +returned by +.Fn krb5_kt_resolve . +.El +.Pp +.Nm krb5_keytab_entry +holds all data for an entry in a keytab file, like principal name, +key-type, key, key-version number, etc. +.Nm krb5_kt_cursor +holds the current position that is used when iterating through a +keytab entry with +.Fn krb5_kt_start_seq_get , +.Fn krb5_kt_next_entry , +and +.Fn krb5_kt_end_seq_get . +.Pp +.Nm krb5_kt_ops +contains the different operations that can be done to a keytab. This +structure is normally only used when doing a new keytab-type +implementation. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_resolve +is the equivalent of an +.Xr open 2 +on keytab. Resolve the keytab name in +.Fa name +into a keytab in +.Fa id . +Returns 0 or an error. The opposite of +.Fn krb5_kt_resolve +is +.Fn krb5_kt_close . +.Fn krb5_kt_close +frees all resources allocated to the keytab. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_default +sets the argument +.Fa id +to the default keytab. +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_default_name +copy the name of the default keytab into +.Fa name . +Return 0 or KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE if +.Fa namesize +is too short. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_add_entry +Add a new +.Fa entry +to the keytab +.Fa id . +.Li KRB5_KT_NOWRITE +is returned if the keytab is a readonly keytab. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_compare +compares the passed in +.Fa entry +against +.Fa principal , +.Fa vno , +and +.Fa enctype . +Any of +.Fa principal , +.Fa vno +or +.Fa enctype +might be 0 which acts as a wildcard. Return TRUE if they compare the +same, FALSE otherwise. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents +copies the contents of +.Fa in +into +.Fa out . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_get_name +retrieves the name of the keytab +.Fa keytab +into +.Fa name , +.Fa namesize . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_get_type +retrieves the type of the keytab +.Fa keytab +and store the prefix/name for type of the keytab into +.Fa prefix , +.Fa prefixsize . +The prefix will have the maximum length of +.Dv KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN +(including terminating +.Dv NUL ) . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_free_entry +frees the contents of +.Fa entry . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_start_seq_get +sets +.Fa cursor +to point at the beginning of +.Fa id . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_next_entry +gets the next entry from +.Fa id +pointed to by +.Fa cursor +and advance the +.Fa cursor . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_end_seq_get +releases all resources associated with +.Fa cursor . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_get_entry +retrieves the keytab entry for +.Fa principal , +.Fa kvno, +.Fa enctype +into +.Fa entry +from the keytab +.Fa id . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_read_service_key +reads the key identified by +.Ns ( Fa principal , +.Fa vno , +.Fa enctype ) +from the keytab in +.Fa keyprocarg +(the default if == NULL) into +.Fa *key . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_remove_entry +removes the entry +.Fa entry +from the keytab +.Fa id . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_kt_register +registers a new keytab type +.Fa ops . +Returns 0 or an error. +.Sh EXAMPLE +This is a minimalistic version of +.Nm ktutil . +.Pp +.Bd -literal +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *principal; + + if (krb5_init_context (&context) != 0) + errx(1, "krb5_context"); + + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default"); + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0){ + krb5_unparse_name_short(context, entry.principal, &principal); + printf("principal: %s\\n", principal); + free(principal); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_end_seq_get"); + krb5_free_context(context); + return 0; +} +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr kerberos 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..301cb1e27c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_keytab.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ + +KRB5_KEYTAB(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_KEYTAB(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__kktt__ooppss, kkrrbb55__kkeeyyttaabb__eennttrryy, kkrrbb55__kktt__ccuurrssoorr, kkrrbb55__kktt__aadddd__eennttrryy, + kkrrbb55__kktt__cclloossee, kkrrbb55__kktt__ccoommppaarree, kkrrbb55__kktt__ccooppyy__eennttrryy__ccoonntteennttss, + kkrrbb55__kktt__ddeeffaauulltt, kkrrbb55__kktt__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee, kkrrbb55__kktt__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett, + kkrrbb55__kktt__ffrreeee__eennttrryy, kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__eennttrryy, kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__nnaammee, + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__ttyyppee, kkrrbb55__kktt__nneexxtt__eennttrryy, kkrrbb55__kktt__rreeaadd__sseerrvviiccee__kkeeyy, + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreeggiisstteerr, kkrrbb55__kktt__rreemmoovvee__eennttrryy, kkrrbb55__kktt__rreessoollvvee, + kkrrbb55__kktt__ssttaarrtt__sseeqq__ggeett - manage keytab (key storage) files + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__aadddd__eennttrryy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_e_n_t_r_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__cclloossee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__kktt__ccoommppaarree(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_e_n_t_r_y, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _k_r_b_5___k_v_n_o _v_n_o, + _k_r_b_5___e_n_c_t_y_p_e _e_n_c_t_y_p_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ccooppyy__eennttrryy__ccoonntteennttss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_i_n, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_o_u_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ddeeffaauulltt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _*_i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, _s_i_z_e___t _n_a_m_e_s_i_z_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___k_t___c_u_r_s_o_r _*_c_u_r_s_o_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ffrreeee__eennttrryy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_e_n_t_r_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__eennttrryy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___c_o_n_s_t___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _k_r_b_5___k_v_n_o _k_v_n_o, + _k_r_b_5___e_n_c_t_y_p_e _e_n_c_t_y_p_e, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_e_n_t_r_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _k_e_y_t_a_b, _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, + _s_i_z_e___t _n_a_m_e_s_i_z_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__ttyyppee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _k_e_y_t_a_b, _c_h_a_r _*_p_r_e_f_i_x, + _s_i_z_e___t _p_r_e_f_i_x_s_i_z_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__nneexxtt__eennttrryy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_e_n_t_r_y, _k_r_b_5___k_t___c_u_r_s_o_r _*_c_u_r_s_o_r) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreeaadd__sseerrvviiccee__kkeeyy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_o_i_n_t_e_r _k_e_y_p_r_o_c_a_r_g, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _k_r_b_5___k_v_n_o _v_n_o, _k_r_b_5___e_n_c_t_y_p_e _e_n_c_t_y_p_e, + _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_b_l_o_c_k _*_*_k_e_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreeggiisstteerr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___k_t___o_p_s _*_o_p_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreemmoovvee__eennttrryy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b___e_n_t_r_y _*_e_n_t_r_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreessoollvvee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _*_i_d) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kktt__ssttaarrtt__sseeqq__ggeett(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _i_d, + _k_r_b_5___k_t___c_u_r_s_o_r _*_c_u_r_s_o_r) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + A keytab name is on the form type:residual. The residual part is specific + to each keytab-type. + + When a keytab-name is resolved, the type is matched with an internal list + of keytab types. If there is no matching keytab type, the default keytab + is used. The current default type is ffiillee. The default value can be + changed in the configuration file _/_e_t_c_/_k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f by setting the variable + [defaults]default_keytab_name. + + The keytab types that are implemented in Heimdal are: + + ffiillee store the keytab in a file, the type's name is KEYFILE. The + residual part is a filename. + + kkeeyyffiillee + store the keytab in a AFS keyfile (usually _/_u_s_r_/_a_f_s_/_e_t_c_/_K_e_y_F_i_l_e), + the type's name is AFSKEYFILE. The residual part is a filename. + + kkrrbb44 the keytab is a Kerberos 4 _s_r_v_t_a_b that is on-the-fly converted to + a keytab. The type's name is krb4. The residual part is a file- + name. + + mmeemmoorryy The keytab is stored in a memory segment. This allows sensitive + and/or temporary data not to be stored on disk. The type's name + is MEMORY. There are no residual part, the only pointer back to + the keytab is the _i_d returned by kkrrbb55__kktt__rreessoollvvee(). + + kkrrbb55__kkeeyyttaabb__eennttrryy holds all data for an entry in a keytab file, like + principal name, key-type, key, key-version number, etc. kkrrbb55__kktt__ccuurrssoorr + holds the current position that is used when iterating through a keytab + entry with kkrrbb55__kktt__ssttaarrtt__sseeqq__ggeett(), kkrrbb55__kktt__nneexxtt__eennttrryy(), and + kkrrbb55__kktt__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett(). + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ooppss contains the different operations that can be done to a + keytab. This structure is normally only used when doing a new keytab-type + implementation. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreessoollvvee() is the equivalent of an open(2) on keytab. Resolve the + keytab name in _n_a_m_e into a keytab in _i_d. Returns 0 or an error. The oppo- + site of kkrrbb55__kktt__rreessoollvvee() is kkrrbb55__kktt__cclloossee(). kkrrbb55__kktt__cclloossee() frees all + resources allocated to the keytab. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ddeeffaauulltt() sets the argument _i_d to the default keytab. Returns 0 + or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ddeeffaauulltt__nnaammee() copy the name of the default keytab into _n_a_m_e. Re- + turn 0 or KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE if _n_a_m_e_s_i_z_e is too short. + + + kkrrbb55__kktt__aadddd__eennttrryy() Add a new _e_n_t_r_y to the keytab _i_d. KRB5_KT_NOWRITE is + returned if the keytab is a readonly keytab. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ccoommppaarree() compares the passed in _e_n_t_r_y against _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _v_n_o, + and _e_n_c_t_y_p_e. Any of _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _v_n_o or _e_n_c_t_y_p_e might be 0 which acts as a + wildcard. Return TRUE if they compare the same, FALSE otherwise. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ccooppyy__eennttrryy__ccoonntteennttss() copies the contents of _i_n into _o_u_t. Returns + 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__nnaammee() retrieves the name of the keytab _k_e_y_t_a_b into _n_a_m_e, + _n_a_m_e_s_i_z_e. Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__ttyyppee() retrieves the type of the keytab _k_e_y_t_a_b and store the + prefix/name for type of the keytab into _p_r_e_f_i_x, _p_r_e_f_i_x_s_i_z_e. The prefix + will have the maximum length of KRB5_KT_PREFIX_MAX_LEN (including termi- + nating NUL). Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ffrreeee__eennttrryy() frees the contents of _e_n_t_r_y. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ssttaarrtt__sseeqq__ggeett() sets _c_u_r_s_o_r to point at the beginning of _i_d. Re- + turns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__nneexxtt__eennttrryy() gets the next entry from _i_d pointed to by _c_u_r_s_o_r and + advance the _c_u_r_s_o_r. Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__eenndd__sseeqq__ggeett() releases all resources associated with _c_u_r_s_o_r. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__ggeett__eennttrryy() retrieves the keytab entry for _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _k_v_n_o_, + _e_n_c_t_y_p_e into _e_n_t_r_y from the keytab _i_d. Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreeaadd__sseerrvviiccee__kkeeyy() reads the key identified by (_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _v_n_o, + _e_n_c_t_y_p_e) from the keytab in _k_e_y_p_r_o_c_a_r_g (the default if == NULL) into + _*_k_e_y. Returns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreemmoovvee__eennttrryy() removes the entry _e_n_t_r_y from the keytab _i_d. Re- + turns 0 or an error. + + kkrrbb55__kktt__rreeggiisstteerr() registers a new keytab type _o_p_s. Returns 0 or an er- + ror. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + This is a minimalistic version of kkttuuttiill. + + int + main (int argc, char **argv) + { + krb5_context context; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *principal; + + if (krb5_init_context (&context) != 0) + errx(1, "krb5_context"); + + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default"); + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0){ + krb5_unparse_name_short(context, entry.principal, &principal); + printf("principal: %s\n", principal); + free(principal); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_end_seq_get"); + krb5_free_context(context); + return 0; + } + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5.conf(5), kerberos(8) + + HEIMDAL February 5, 2001 4 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87ea3f9b0a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.3 @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_krbhst_init.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:16 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd June 17, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_KRBHST_INIT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_krbhst_init , +.Nm krb5_krbhst_next , +.Nm krb5_krbhst_next_as_string , +.Nm krb5_krbhst_reset , +.Nm krb5_krbhst_free , +.Nm krb5_krbhst_format_string , +.Nm krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo +.Nd lookup Kerberos KDC hosts +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_krbhst_init "krb5_context context" "const char *realm" "unsigned int type" "krb5_krbhst_handle *handle" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn "krb5_krbhst_next" "krb5_context context" "krb5_krbhst_handle handle" "krb5_krbhst_info **host" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_krbhst_next_as_string "krb5_context context" "krb5_krbhst_handle handle" "char *hostname" "size_t hostlen" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_krbhst_reset "krb5_context context" "krb5_krbhst_handle handle" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_krbhst_free "krb5_context context" "krb5_krbhst_handle handle" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_krbhst_format_string "krb5_context context" "const krb5_krbhst_info *host" "char *hostname" "size_t hostlen" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo "krb5_context context" "krb5_krbhst_info *host" "struct addrinfo **ai" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to sequence through all Kerberos hosts of a +particular realm and service. The service type can be the KDCs, the +administrative servers, the password changing servers, or the servers +for Kerberos 4 ticket conversion. +.Pp +First a handle to a particular service is obtained by calling +.Fn krb5_krbhst_init +with the +.Fa realm +of interest and the type of service to lookup. The +.Fa type +can be one of: +.Pp +.Bl -hang -compact -offset indent +.It KRB5_KRBHST_KDC +.It KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN +.It KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW +.It KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524 +.El +.Pp +The +.Fa handle +is returned to the caller, and should be passed to the other +functions. +.Pp +For each call to +.Fn krb5_krbhst_next +information a new host is returned. The former function returns in +.Fa host +a pointer to a structure containing information about the host, such +as protocol, hostname, and port: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +typedef struct krb5_krbhst_info { + enum { KRB5_KRBHST_UDP, + KRB5_KRBHST_TCP, + KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP } proto; + unsigned short port; + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct krb5_krbhst_info *next; + char hostname[1]; +} krb5_krbhst_info; +.Ed +.Pp +The related function, +.Fn krb5_krbhst_next_as_string , +return the same information as a url-like string. +.Pp +When there are no more hosts, these functions return +.Dv KRB5_KDC_UNREACH . +.Pp +To re-iterate over all hosts, call +.Fn krb5_krbhst_reset +and the next call to +.Fn krb5_krbhst_next +will return the first host. +.Pp +When done with the handle, +.Fn krb5_krbhst_free +should be called. +.Pp +To use a +.Va krb5_krbhst_info , +there are two functions: +.Fn krb5_krbhst_format_string +that will return a printable representation of that struct +and +.Fn krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo +that will return a +.Va struct addrinfo +that can then be used for communicating with the server mentioned. +.Sh EXAMPLE +The following code will print the KDCs of the realm +.Dq MY.REALM . +.Bd -literal -offset indent +krb5_krbhst_handle handle; +char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; +krb5_krbhst_init(context, "MY.REALM", KRB5_KRBHST_KDC, &handle); +while(krb5_krbhst_next_as_string(context, handle, + host, sizeof(host)) == 0) + printf("%s\\n", host); +krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); +.Ed +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh HISTORY +These functions first appeared in Heimdal 0.3g. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr getaddrinfo 3 , +.Xr krb5_get_krbhst 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4f925f53b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_krbhst_init.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ + +KRB5_KRBHST_INIT(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_KRBHST_INIT(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__iinniitt, kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt, kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt__aass__ssttrriinngg, + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__rreesseett, kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ffrreeee, kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ffoorrmmaatt__ssttrriinngg, + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ggeett__aaddddrriinnffoo - lookup Kerberos KDC hosts + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__iinniitt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m, + _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _i_n_t _t_y_p_e, _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___h_a_n_d_l_e _*_h_a_n_d_l_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___h_a_n_d_l_e _h_a_n_d_l_e, + _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___i_n_f_o _*_*_h_o_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt__aass__ssttrriinngg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___h_a_n_d_l_e _h_a_n_d_l_e, _c_h_a_r _*_h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e, _s_i_z_e___t _h_o_s_t_l_e_n) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__rreesseett(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___h_a_n_d_l_e _h_a_n_d_l_e) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ffrreeee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___h_a_n_d_l_e _h_a_n_d_l_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ffoorrmmaatt__ssttrriinngg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _c_o_n_s_t _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___i_n_f_o _*_h_o_s_t, _c_h_a_r _*_h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e, _s_i_z_e___t _h_o_s_t_l_e_n) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ggeett__aaddddrriinnffoo(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___i_n_f_o _*_h_o_s_t, + _s_t_r_u_c_t _a_d_d_r_i_n_f_o _*_*_a_i) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions are used to sequence through all Kerberos hosts of a par- + ticular realm and service. The service type can be the KDCs, the adminis- + trative servers, the password changing servers, or the servers for Ker- + beros 4 ticket conversion. + + First a handle to a particular service is obtained by calling + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__iinniitt() with the _r_e_a_l_m of interest and the type of service to + lookup. The _t_y_p_e can be one of: + + KRB5_KRBHST_KDC + KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN + KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW + KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524 + + The _h_a_n_d_l_e is returned to the caller, and should be passed to the other + functions. + + For each call to kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt() information a new host is returned. + The former function returns in _h_o_s_t a pointer to a structure containing + information about the host, such as protocol, hostname, and port: + + typedef struct krb5_krbhst_info { + enum { KRB5_KRBHST_UDP, + KRB5_KRBHST_TCP, + KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP } proto; + unsigned short port; + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct krb5_krbhst_info *next; + char hostname[1]; + } krb5_krbhst_info; + + The related function, kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt__aass__ssttrriinngg(), return the same in- + formation as a url-like string. + + When there are no more hosts, these functions return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH. + + To re-iterate over all hosts, call kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__rreesseett() and the next call + to kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__nneexxtt() will return the first host. + + When done with the handle, kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ffrreeee() should be called. + + To use a _k_r_b_5___k_r_b_h_s_t___i_n_f_o, there are two functions: + kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ffoorrmmaatt__ssttrriinngg() that will return a printable representation + of that struct and kkrrbb55__kkrrbbhhsstt__ggeett__aaddddrriinnffoo() that will return a _s_t_r_u_c_t + _a_d_d_r_i_n_f_o that can then be used for communicating with the server men- + tioned. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + The following code will print the KDCs of the realm ``MY.REALM''. + + krb5_krbhst_handle handle; + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + krb5_krbhst_init(context, "MY.REALM", KRB5_KRBHST_KDC, &handle); + while(krb5_krbhst_next_as_string(context, handle, + host, sizeof(host)) == 0) + printf("%s\n", host); + krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + These functions first appeared in Heimdal 0.3g. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + getaddrinfo(3), krb5_get_krbhst(3) + + HEIMDAL June 17, 2001 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15392023da --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.3 @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_kuserok.3,v 1.5 2003/04/16 13:58:10 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Oct 17, 2002 +.Dt KRB5_KUSEROK 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_kuserok +.Nd verifies if a principal can log in as a user +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fo krb5_kuserok +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_principal principal" +.Fa "const char *name" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +This function takes a local user +.Fa name +and verifies if +.Fa principal +is allowed to log in as that user. +.Pp +First +.Nm +check if there is a local account name +.Fa username. +If there isn't, +.Nm +returns +.Dv FALSE . +.Pp +Then +.Nm +checks if principal is the same as user@realm in any of the default +realms. If that is the case, +.Nm +returns +.Dv TRUE . +.Pp +After that it reads the file +.Pa .k5login +(if it exists) in the users home directory and checks if +.Fa principal +is in the file. +If it does exists, +.Dv TRUE +is returned. +If neither of the above turns out to be true, +.DV FALSE +is returned. +.Pp +The +.Pa .k5login +should contain one principal per line. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_get_default_realms 3 , +.Xr krb5_verify_user 3 , +.Xr krb5_verify_user_lrealm 3 , +.Xr krb5_verify_user_opt 3, +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..379acb8fdf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_kuserok.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ + +KRB5_KUSEROK(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_KUSEROK(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk - verifies if a principal can log in as a + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n + kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + This function takes a local user _n_a_m_e and verifies if _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l is al- + lowed to log in as that user. + + First kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk check if there is a local account name _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e_. If + there isn't, kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk returns FALSE. + + Then kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk checks if principal is the same as user@realm in any of + the default realms. If that is the case, kkrrbb55__kkuusseerrookk returns TRUE. + + After that it reads the file _._k_5_l_o_g_i_n (if it exists) in the users home + directory and checks if _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l is in the file. If it does exists, + TRUE is returned. If neither of the above turns out to be true, is re- + turned. + + The _._k_5_l_o_g_i_n should contain one principal per line. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_get_default_realms(3), krb5_verify_user(3), + krb5_verify_user_lrealm(3), krb5_verify_user_opt(3,) krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL Oct 17, 2002 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3d6a92f8f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: krb5_locl.h,v 1.71 2002/09/10 20:10:45 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KRB5_LOCL_H__ +#define __KRB5_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef _AIX +struct ether_addr; +struct mbuf; +struct sockaddr_dl; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include "crypto-headers.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define ALLOC(X, N) (X) = calloc((N), sizeof(*(X))) +#define ALLOC_SEQ(X, N) do { (X)->len = (N); ALLOC((X)->val, (N)); } while(0) + +/* should this be public? */ +#define KEYTAB_DEFAULT "ANY:FILE:" SYSCONFDIR "/krb5.keytab,krb4:" SYSCONFDIR "/srvtab" +#define KEYTAB_DEFAULT_MODIFY "FILE:" SYSCONFDIR "/krb5.keytab" + +#ifndef O_BINARY +#define O_BINARY 0 +#endif + +#endif /* __KRB5_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb1ccc9ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.3 @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997, 1999, 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_openlog.3,v 1.9 2003/04/16 13:58:12 lha Exp $ +.Dd August 6, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_OPENLOG 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_initlog , +.Nm krb5_openlog , +.Nm krb5_closelog , +.Nm krb5_addlog_dest , +.Nm krb5_addlog_func , +.Nm krb5_log , +.Nm krb5_vlog , +.Nm krb5_log_msg , +.Nm krb5_vlog_msg +.Nd Heimdal logging functions +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft "typedef void" +.Fn "\*(lp*krb5_log_log_func_t\*(rp" "const char *time" "const char *message" "void *data" +.Ft "typedef void" +.Fn "\*(lp*krb5_log_close_func_t\*(rp" "void *data" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_addlog_dest "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "const char *destination" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_addlog_func "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "int min" "int max" "krb5_log_log_func_t log" "krb5_log_close_func_t close" "void *data" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_closelog "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_initlog "krb5_context context" "const char *program" "krb5_log_facility **facility" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_log "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "int level" "const char *format" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_log_msg "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "char **reply" "int level" "const char *format" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_openlog "krb5_context context" "const char *program" "krb5_log_facility **facility" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vlog "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "int level" "const char *format" "va_list arglist" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vlog_msg "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "char **reply" "int level" "const char *format" "va_list arglist" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions logs messages to one or more destinations. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_openlog +function creates a logging +.Fa facility , +that is used to log messages. A facility consists of one or more +destinations (which can be files or syslog or some other device). The +.Fa program +parameter should be the generic name of the program that is doing the +logging. This name is used to lookup which destinations to use. This +information is contained in the +.Li logging +section of the +.Pa krb5.conf +configuration file. If no entry is found for +.Fa program , +the entry for +.Li default +is used, or if that is missing too, +.Li SYSLOG +will be used as destination. +.Pp +To close a logging facility, use the +.Fn krb5_closelog +function. +.Pp +To log a message to a facility use one of the functions +.Fn krb5_log , +.Fn krb5_log_msg , +.Fn krb5_vlog , +or +.Fn krb5_vlog_msg . +The functions ending in +.Li _msg +return in +.Fa reply +a pointer to the message that just got logged. This string is allocated, +and should be freed with +.Fn free . +The +.Fa format +is a standard +.Fn printf +style format string (but see the BUGS section). +.Pp +If you want better control of where things gets logged, you can instead of using +.Fn krb5_openlog +call +.Fn krb5_initlog , +which just initializes a facility, but doesn't define any actual logging +destinations. You can then add destinations with the +.Fn krb5_addlog_dest +and +.Fn krb5_addlog_func +functions. The first of these takes a string specifying a logging +destination, and adds this to the facility. If you want to do some +non-standard logging you can use the +.Fn krb5_addlog_func +function, which takes a function to use when logging. +The +.Fa log +function is called for each message with +.Fa time +being a string specifying the current time, and +.Fa message +the message to log. +.Fa close +is called when the facility is closed. You can pass application specific data in the +.Fa data +parameter. The +.Fa min +and +.Fa max +parameter are the same as in a destination (defined below). To specify a +max of infinity, pass -1. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_openlog +calls +.Fn krb5_initlog +and then calls +.Fn krb5_addlog_dest +for each destination found. +.Ss Destinations +The defined destinations (as specified in +.Pa krb5.conf ) +follows: +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li STDERR +This logs to the program's stderr. +.It Li FILE: Ns Pa /file +.It Li FILE= Ns Pa /file +Log to the specified file. The form using a colon appends to the file, the +form with an equal truncates the file. The truncating form keeps the file +open, while the appending form closes it after each log message (which +makes it possible to rotate logs). The truncating form is mainly for +compatibility with the MIT libkrb5. +.It Li DEVICE= Ns Pa /device +This logs to the specified device, at present this is the same as +.Li FILE:/device . +.It Li CONSOLE +Log to the console, this is the same as +.Li DEVICE=/dev/console . +.It Li SYSLOG Ns Op :priority Ns Op :facility +Send messages to the syslog system, using priority, and facility. To +get the name for one of these, you take the name of the macro passed +to +.Xr syslog 3 , +and remove the leading +.Li LOG_ +.No ( Li LOG_NOTICE +becomes +.Li NOTICE ) . +The default values (as well as the values used for unrecognised +values), are +.Li ERR , +and +.Li AUTH , +respectively. See +.Xr syslog 3 +for a list of priorities and facilities. +.El +.Pp +Each destination may optionally be prepended with a range of logging +levels, specified as +.Li min-max/ . +If the +.Fa level +parameter to +.Fn krb5_log +is within this range (inclusive) the message gets logged to this +destination, otherwise not. Either of the min and max valued may be +omitted, in this case min is assumed to be zero, and max is assumed to be +infinity. If you don't include a dash, both min and max gets set to the +specified value. If no range is specified, all messages gets logged. +.Sh EXAMPLE +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[logging] + kdc = 0/FILE:/var/log/kdc.log + kdc = 1-/SYSLOG:INFO:USER + default = STDERR +.Ed +.Pp +This will log all messages from the +.Nm kdc +program with level 0 to +.Pa /var/log/kdc.log , +other messages will be logged to syslog with priority +.Li LOG_INFO , +and facility +.Li LOG_USER . +All other programs will log all messages to their stderr. +.Sh BUGS +These functions use +.Fn asprintf +to format the message. If your operating system does not have a working +.Fn asprintf , +a replacement will be used. At present this replacement does not handle +some correct conversion specifications (like floating point numbers). Until +this is fixed, the use of these conversions should be avoided. +.Pp +If logging is done to the syslog facility, these functions might not be +thread-safe, depending on the implementation of +.Fn openlog , +and +.Fn syslog . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr syslog 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47177bafb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ + +KRB5_OPENLOG(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_OPENLOG(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__iinniittlloogg, kkrrbb55__ooppeennlloogg, kkrrbb55__cclloosseelloogg, kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ddeesstt, + kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ffuunncc, kkrrbb55__lloogg, kkrrbb55__vvlloogg, kkrrbb55__lloogg__mmssgg, kkrrbb55__vvlloogg__mmssgg - + Heimdal logging functions + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _t_y_p_e_d_e_f _v_o_i_d + (**kkrrbb55__lloogg__lloogg__ffuunncc__tt)(_c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_t_i_m_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_m_e_s_s_a_g_e, _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a) + + _t_y_p_e_d_e_f _v_o_i_d + (**kkrrbb55__lloogg__cclloossee__ffuunncc__tt)(_v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ddeesstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_d_e_s_t_i_n_a_t_i_o_n) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ffuunncc(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, + _i_n_t _m_i_n, _i_n_t _m_a_x, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___l_o_g___f_u_n_c___t _l_o_g, + _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___c_l_o_s_e___f_u_n_c___t _c_l_o_s_e, _v_o_i_d _*_d_a_t_a) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cclloosseelloogg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__iinniittlloogg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_r_o_g_r_a_m, + _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__lloogg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, _i_n_t _l_e_v_e_l, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__lloogg__mmssgg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_r_e_p_l_y, _i_n_t _l_e_v_e_l, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ooppeennlloogg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_r_o_g_r_a_m, + _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vvlloogg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, _i_n_t _l_e_v_e_l, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_r_g_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vvlloogg__mmssgg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_r_e_p_l_y, _i_n_t _l_e_v_e_l, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_r_g_l_i_s_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions logs messages to one or more destinations. + + The kkrrbb55__ooppeennlloogg() function creates a logging _f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y, that is used to + log messages. A facility consists of one or more destinations (which can + be files or syslog or some other device). The _p_r_o_g_r_a_m parameter should be + the generic name of the program that is doing the logging. This name is + used to lookup which destinations to use. This information is contained + in the logging section of the _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f configuration file. If no entry + is found for _p_r_o_g_r_a_m, the entry for default is used, or if that is miss- + ing too, SYSLOG will be used as destination. + + To close a logging facility, use the kkrrbb55__cclloosseelloogg() function. + + To log a message to a facility use one of the functions kkrrbb55__lloogg(), + kkrrbb55__lloogg__mmssgg(), kkrrbb55__vvlloogg(), or kkrrbb55__vvlloogg__mmssgg(). The functions ending in + _msg return in _r_e_p_l_y a pointer to the message that just got logged. This + string is allocated, and should be freed with ffrreeee(). The _f_o_r_m_a_t is a + standard pprriinnttff() style format string (but see the BUGS section). + + If you want better control of where things gets logged, you can instead + of using kkrrbb55__ooppeennlloogg() call kkrrbb55__iinniittlloogg(), which just initializes a fa- + cility, but doesn't define any actual logging destinations. You can then + add destinations with the kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ddeesstt() and kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ffuunncc() func- + tions. The first of these takes a string specifying a logging destina- + tion, and adds this to the facility. If you want to do some non-standard + logging you can use the kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ffuunncc() function, which takes a func- + tion to use when logging. The _l_o_g function is called for each message + with _t_i_m_e being a string specifying the current time, and _m_e_s_s_a_g_e the + message to log. _c_l_o_s_e is called when the facility is closed. You can + pass application specific data in the _d_a_t_a parameter. The _m_i_n and _m_a_x pa- + rameter are the same as in a destination (defined below). To specify a + max of infinity, pass -1. + + kkrrbb55__ooppeennlloogg() calls kkrrbb55__iinniittlloogg() and then calls kkrrbb55__aaddddlloogg__ddeesstt() for + each destination found. + + DDeessttiinnaattiioonnss + The defined destinations (as specified in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f) follows: + + STDERR + This logs to the program's stderr. + + FILE:_/_f_i_l_e + + FILE=_/_f_i_l_e + Log to the specified file. The form using a colon appends to + the file, the form with an equal truncates the file. The trun- + cating form keeps the file open, while the appending form + closes it after each log message (which makes it possible to + rotate logs). The truncating form is mainly for compatibility + with the MIT libkrb5. + + DEVICE=_/_d_e_v_i_c_e + This logs to the specified device, at present this is the same + as FILE:/device. + + CONSOLE + Log to the console, this is the same as DEVICE=/dev/console. + + SYSLOG[:priority[:facility]] + Send messages to the syslog system, using priority, and facil- + ity. To get the name for one of these, you take the name of + the macro passed to syslog(3), and remove the leading LOG_ + (LOG_NOTICE becomes NOTICE). The default values (as well as + the values used for unrecognised values), are ERR, and AUTH, + respectively. See syslog(3) for a list of priorities and fa- + cilities. + + Each destination may optionally be prepended with a range of logging lev- + els, specified as min-max/. If the _l_e_v_e_l parameter to kkrrbb55__lloogg() is with- + in this range (inclusive) the message gets logged to this destination, + otherwise not. Either of the min and max valued may be omitted, in this + case min is assumed to be zero, and max is assumed to be infinity. If + you don't include a dash, both min and max gets set to the specified val- + ue. If no range is specified, all messages gets logged. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + [logging] + kdc = 0/FILE:/var/log/kdc.log + kdc = 1-/SYSLOG:INFO:USER + default = STDERR + + This will log all messages from the kkddcc program with level 0 to + _/_v_a_r_/_l_o_g_/_k_d_c_._l_o_g, other messages will be logged to syslog with priority + LOG_INFO, and facility LOG_USER. All other programs will log all messages + to their stderr. + +BBUUGGSS + These functions use aasspprriinnttff() to format the message. If your operating + system does not have a working aasspprriinnttff(), a replacement will be used. At + present this replacement does not handle some correct conversion specifi- + cations (like floating point numbers). Until this is fixed, the use of + these conversions should be avoided. + + If logging is done to the syslog facility, these functions might not be + thread-safe, depending on the implementation of ooppeennlloogg(), and ssyysslloogg(). + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + syslog(3), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL August 6, 1997 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b936c63d3f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.3 @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_parse_name.3,v 1.8 2003/04/16 13:58:17 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_PARSE_NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_parse_name +.Nd string to principal conversion +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_parse_name "krb5_context context" "const char *name" "krb5_principal *principal" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn krb5_parse_name +converts a string representation of a principal name to +.Nm krb5_principal . +The +.Fa principal +will point to allocated data that should be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_principal . +.Pp +The string should consist of one or more name components separated with slashes +.Pq Dq / , +optionally followed with an +.Dq @ +and a realm name. A slash or @ may be contained in a name component by +quoting it with a back-slash +.Pq Dq \ . +A realm should not contain slashes or colons. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73c72a1d54 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ + +KRB5_PARSE_NAME(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_PARSE_NAME(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__nnaammee - string to principal conversion + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_n_a_m_e, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkrrbb55__ppaarrssee__nnaammee() converts a string representation of a principal name to + kkrrbb55__pprriinncciippaall. The _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l will point to allocated data that should be + freed with kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__pprriinncciippaall(). + + The string should consist of one or more name components separated with + slashes (``/''), optionally followed with an ``@'' and a realm name. A + slash or @ may be contained in a name component by quoting it with a + back-slash (`` .'') A realm should not contain slashes or colons. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_425_conv_principal(3), krb5_build_principal(3), + krb5_free_principal(3), krb5_sname_to_principal(3), krb5_un- + parse_name(3) + + HEIMDAL August 8, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1ece7986ad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.3 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_principal_get_realm.3,v 1.6 2003/04/16 13:58:17 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd June 20, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_REALM 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_principal_get_realm , +.Nm krb5_principal_get_comp_string +.Nd decompose a principal +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft "const char *" +.Fn krb5_principal_get_realm "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" +.Ft "const char *" +.Fn krb5_principal_get_comp_string "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" "unsigned int component" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions return parts of the +.Fa principal , +either the realm or a specific component. The returned string points +to data inside the principal, so they are valid only as long as the +principal exists. +.Pp +The +.Fa component +argument to +.Fn krb5_principal_get_comp_string +is the component number to return, from zero to the total number of +components minus one. If a the requested component number is out of range, +.Dv NULL +is returned. +.Pp +These functions can be seen as a replacement for the +.Fn krb5_princ_realm , +.Fn krb5_princ_component +and related macros, described as intermal in the MIT API +specification. A difference is that these functions return strings, +not +.Dv krb5_data . +A reason to return +.Dv krb5_data +was that it was believed that principal components could contain +binary data, but this belief was unfounded, and it has been decided +that principal components are infact UTF8, so it's safe to use zero +terminated strings. +.Pp +It's generally not necessary to look at the components of a principal. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27cb8b4542 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_principal_get_realm.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ + +KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_REALM(3)UNIX Programmer's ManualKRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_REALM(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__pprriinncciippaall__ggeett__rreeaallmm, kkrrbb55__pprriinncciippaall__ggeett__ccoommpp__ssttrriinngg - decompose a + principal + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _* + kkrrbb55__pprriinncciippaall__ggeett__rreeaallmm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _* + kkrrbb55__pprriinncciippaall__ggeett__ccoommpp__ssttrriinngg(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, + _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _i_n_t _c_o_m_p_o_n_e_n_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions return parts of the _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, either the realm or a spe- + cific component. The returned string points to data inside the principal, + so they are valid only as long as the principal exists. + + The _c_o_m_p_o_n_e_n_t argument to kkrrbb55__pprriinncciippaall__ggeett__ccoommpp__ssttrriinngg() is the compo- + nent number to return, from zero to the total number of components minus + one. If a the requested component number is out of range, NULL is re- + turned. + + These functions can be seen as a replacement for the kkrrbb55__pprriinncc__rreeaallmm(), + kkrrbb55__pprriinncc__ccoommppoonneenntt() and related macros, described as intermal in the + MIT API specification. A difference is that these functions return + strings, not krb5_data. A reason to return krb5_data was that it was be- + lieved that principal components could contain binary data, but this be- + lief was unfounded, and it has been decided that principal components are + infact UTF8, so it's safe to use zero terminated strings. + + It's generally not necessary to look at the components of a principal. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_unparse_name(3) + + HEIMDAL June 20, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e4b9a36c7c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.3 @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_set_default_realm.3,v 1.2 2003/04/16 13:58:11 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Mar 16, 2003 +.Dt KRB5_SET_DEFAULT_REALM 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_free_host_realm +.Nm krb5_get_default_realm +.Nm krb5_get_default_realms +.Nm krb5_get_host_realm +.Nm krb5_set_default_realm +.Nd default and host realm read and manipulation routines +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_free_host_realm +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_realm *realmlist" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_get_default_realm +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_realm *realm" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_get_default_realms +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_realm **realm" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_get_host_realm +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const char *host" +.Fa "krb5_realm **realms" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_set_default_realm +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "const char *realm" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn krb5_free_host_realm +frees all memory allocated by +.Fa realmlist . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_get_default_realm +returns the first default realm for this host. +The realm returned should be free with +.Fn free . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_get_default_realms +returns a +.Dv NULL +terminated list of default realms for this context. +Realms returned by +.Fn krb5_get_default_realms +should be free with +.Fn krb5_free_host_realm . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_get_host_realm +returns a +.Dv NULL +terminated list of realms for +.Fa host +by looking up the information in the +.Li [domain_realm] +in +.Pa krb5.conf +or in +.Li DNS . +If the mapping in +.Li [domain_realm] +results in the string +.Li dns_locate , +DNS is used to lookup the realm. +.Pp +When using +.Li DNS +to a resolve the domain for the host a.b.c, +.Fn krb5_get_host_realm +looks for a +.Dv TXT +resource record named +.Li _kerberos.a.b.c , +and if not found, it strips off the first component and tries a again +(_kerberos.b.c) until it reaches the root. +.Pp +If there is no configuration or DNS information found, +.Fn krb5_get_host_realm +assumes it can use the domain part of the +.Fa host +to form a realm. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_set_default_realm +sets the default realm for the +.Fa context . +If +.Dv NULL +is used as a +.Fa realm , +the +.Li [libdefaults]default_realm +stanza in +.Pa krb5.conf +is used. +If there is no such stanza in the configuration file, the +.Fn krb5_get_host_realm +function is used to form a default realm. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr free 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..539e65c3e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_default_realm.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ + +KRB5_SET_DEFAULT_REALM(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_SET_DEFAULT_REALM(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmm kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmmss + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm kkrrbb55__sseett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmm - default and host realm read + and manipulation routines + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_r_e_a_l_m_l_i_s_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_r_e_a_l_m) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmmss(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_*_r_e_a_l_m) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_h_o_s_t, + _k_r_b_5___r_e_a_l_m _*_*_r_e_a_l_m_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__sseett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_r_e_a_l_m) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm() frees all memory allocated by _r_e_a_l_m_l_i_s_t. + + kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmm() returns the first default realm for this host. + The realm returned should be free with ffrreeee(). + + kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmmss() returns a NULL terminated list of default + realms for this context. Realms returned by kkrrbb55__ggeett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmmss() + should be free with kkrrbb55__ffrreeee__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm(). + + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm() returns a NULL terminated list of realms for _h_o_s_t + by looking up the information in the [domain_realm] in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f or in + DNS. If the mapping in [domain_realm] results in the string dns_locate, + DNS is used to lookup the realm. + + When using DNS to a resolve the domain for the host a.b.c, + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm() looks for a TXT resource record named + _kerberos.a.b.c, and if not found, it strips off the first component and + tries a again (_kerberos.b.c) until it reaches the root. + + If there is no configuration or DNS information found, + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm() assumes it can use the domain part of the _h_o_s_t to + form a realm. + + kkrrbb55__sseett__ddeeffaauulltt__rreeaallmm() sets the default realm for the _c_o_n_t_e_x_t. If NULL + is used as a _r_e_a_l_m, the [libdefaults]default_realm stanza in _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f is + used. If there is no such stanza in the configuration file, the + kkrrbb55__ggeett__hhoosstt__rreeaallmm() function is used to form a default realm. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5.conf(5), free(3) + + HEIMDAL Mar 16, 2003 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2e3086314 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.3 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_set_password.3,v 1.3.2.1 2004/06/21 10:51:20 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd June 2, 2004 +.Dt KRB5_SET_PASSWORD 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_change_password , +.Nm krb5_set_password , +.Nm krb5_set_password_using_ccache +.Nd change password functions +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_change_password +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_creds *creds" +.Fa "char *newpw" +.Fa "int *result_code" +.Fa "krb5_data *result_code_string" +.Fa "krb5_data *result_string" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_set_password +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_creds *creds" +.Fa "char *newpw" +.Fa "krb5_principal targprinc", +.Fa "int *result_code" +.Fa "krb5_data *result_code_string" +.Fa "krb5_data *result_string" +.Fc +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_set_password_using_ccache +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_ccache ccache" +.Fa "char *newpw" +.Fa "krb5_principal targprinc" +.Fa "int *result_code" +.Fa "krb5_data *result_code_string" +.Fa "krb5_data *result_string" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions change the password for a given principal. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_set_password +and +.Fa krb5_set_password_using_ccache +is the newer two of the three functions and uses a newer version of the +protocol (and falls back to the older when the newer doesn't work). +.Pp +.Fn krb5_change_password +set the password +.Fa newpasswd +for the client principal in +.Fa creds . +The server principal of creds must be +.Li kadmin/changepw . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_set_password +changes the password for the principal +.Fa targprinc , +if +.Fa targprinc +is +.Dv NULL +the default principal in +.Fa ccache +is used. +.Pp +Both functions returns and error in +.Fa result_code +and maybe an error strings to print in +.Fa result_string . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_ccache 3 , +.Xr krb5_init_context 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c1189674f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_set_password.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ + +KRB5_SET_PASSWORD(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_SET_PASSWORD(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__cchhaannggee__ppaasssswwoorrdd, kkrrbb55__sseett__ppaasssswwoorrdd, kkrrbb55__sseett__ppaasssswwoorrdd__uussiinngg__ccccaacchhee - + change password functions + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__cchhaannggee__ppaasssswwoorrdd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c_r_e_d_s, + _c_h_a_r _*_n_e_w_p_w, _i_n_t _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e___s_t_r_i_n_g, + _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___s_t_r_i_n_g) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__sseett__ppaasssswwoorrdd(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_r_e_d_s _*_c_r_e_d_s, + _c_h_a_r _*_n_e_w_p_w,_k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _t_a_r_g_p_r_i_n_c, _,, _i_n_t _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e, + _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e___s_t_r_i_n_g, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___s_t_r_i_n_g) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__sseett__ppaasssswwoorrdd__uussiinngg__ccccaacchhee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _c_c_a_c_h_e, + _c_h_a_r _*_n_e_w_p_w, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _t_a_r_g_p_r_i_n_c, _i_n_t _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e, + _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e___s_t_r_i_n_g, _k_r_b_5___d_a_t_a _*_r_e_s_u_l_t___s_t_r_i_n_g) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions change the password for a given principal. + + kkrrbb55__sseett__ppaasssswwoorrdd() and _k_r_b_5___s_e_t___p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d___u_s_i_n_g___c_c_a_c_h_e is the newer two + of the three functions and uses a newer version of the protocol (and + falls back to the older when the newer doesn't work). + + kkrrbb55__cchhaannggee__ppaasssswwoorrdd() set the password _n_e_w_p_a_s_s_w_d for the client princi- + pal in _c_r_e_d_s. The server principal of creds must be kadmin/changepw. + + kkrrbb55__sseett__ppaasssswwoorrdd() changes the password for the principal _t_a_r_g_p_r_i_n_c, if + _t_a_r_g_p_r_i_n_c is NULL the default principal in _c_c_a_c_h_e is used. + + Both functions returns and error in _r_e_s_u_l_t___c_o_d_e and maybe an error + strings to print in _r_e_s_u_l_t___s_t_r_i_n_g. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_ccache(3), krb5_init_context(3) + + HEIMDAL June 2, 2004 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5724ce1876 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_sname_to_principal.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:17 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_sname_to_principal , +.Nm krb5_sock_to_principal +.Nd create a service principal +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_sname_to_principal "krb5_context context" "const char *hostname" "const char *sname" "int32_t type" "krb5_principal *principal" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_sock_to_principal "krb5_context context" "int socket" "const char *sname" "int32_t type" "krb5_principal *principal" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions create a +.Dq service +principal that can, for instance, be used to lookup a key in a keytab. For both these function the +.Fa sname +parameter will be used for the first component of the created principal. If +.Fa sname +is +.Dv NULL , +.Dq host +will be used instead. +.Fn krb5_sname_to_principal +will use the passed +.Fa hostname +for the second component. If type +.Dv KRB5_NT_SRV_HST +this name will be looked up with +.Fn gethostbyname . +If +.Fa hostname is +.Dv NULL , +the local hostname will be used. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_sock_to_principal +will use the +.Dq sockname +of the passed +.Fa socket , +which should be a bound +.Dv AF_INET +socket. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..25e0cde33b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ + +KRB5_PRINCIPAL(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_PRINCIPAL(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ssnnaammee__ttoo__pprriinncciippaall, kkrrbb55__ssoocckk__ttoo__pprriinncciippaall - create a service prin- + cipal + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ssnnaammee__ttoo__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_s_n_a_m_e, _i_n_t_3_2___t _t_y_p_e, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ssoocckk__ttoo__pprriinncciippaall(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _s_o_c_k_e_t, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_s_n_a_m_e, _i_n_t_3_2___t _t_y_p_e, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _*_p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions create a ``service'' principal that can, for instance, be + used to lookup a key in a keytab. For both these function the _s_n_a_m_e pa- + rameter will be used for the first component of the created principal. If + _s_n_a_m_e is NULL, ``host'' will be used instead. kkrrbb55__ssnnaammee__ttoo__pprriinncciippaall() + will use the passed _h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e for the second component. If type + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST this name will be looked up with ggeetthhoossttbbyynnaammee(). If + _h_o_s_t_n_a_m_e _i_s NULL, the local hostname will be used. + + kkrrbb55__ssoocckk__ttoo__pprriinncciippaall() will use the ``sockname'' of the passed _s_o_c_k_e_t, + which should be a bound AF_INET socket. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_425_conv_principal(3), krb5_build_principal(3), + krb5_free_principal(3), krb5_parse_name(3), krb5_unparse_name(3) + + HEIMDAL August 8, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d5dbb3ddf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.3 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_timeofday.3,v 1.5 2003/04/16 13:58:18 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 1, 2001 +.Dt KRB5_TIMEOFDAY 3 +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_timeofday , +.Nm krb5_us_timeofday +.Nd whatever these functions do +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft "krb5_error_code" +.Fn krb5_timeofday "krb5_context context" "krb5_timestamp *timeret" +.Ft "krb5_error_code" +.Fn krb5_us_timeofday "krb5_context context" "int32_t *sec" "int32_t *usec" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn krb5_timeofday +returns the current time, but adjusted with the time difference +between the local host and the KDC. +.Fn krb5_us_timeofday +also returns microseconds. +.Pp +.\".Sh EXAMPLE +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr gettimeofday 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fe0a2afe20 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_timeofday.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ + +KRB5_TIMEOFDAY(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_TIMEOFDAY(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__ttiimmeeooffddaayy, kkrrbb55__uuss__ttiimmeeooffddaayy - whatever these functions do + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__ttiimmeeooffddaayy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___t_i_m_e_s_t_a_m_p _*_t_i_m_e_r_e_t) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__uuss__ttiimmeeooffddaayy(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t_3_2___t _*_s_e_c, _i_n_t_3_2___t _*_u_s_e_c) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkrrbb55__ttiimmeeooffddaayy() returns the current time, but adjusted with the time + difference between the local host and the KDC. kkrrbb55__uuss__ttiimmeeooffddaayy() also + returns microseconds. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + gettimeofday(2) + + July 1, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed96c5d34f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.3 @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_unparse_name.3,v 1.8 2003/04/16 13:58:18 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_UNPARSE_NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_unparse_name +.\" .Nm krb5_unparse_name_ext +.Nd principal to string conversion +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_unparse_name "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" "char **name" +.\" .Ft krb5_error_code +.\" .Fn krb5_unparse_name_ext "krb5_context context" "krb5_const_principal principal" "char **name" "size_t *size" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +This function takes a +.Fa principal , +and will convert in to a printable representation with the same syntax +as described in +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 . +.Fa *name +will point to allocated data and should be freed by the caller. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0eb8d76be5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + +KRB5_UNPARSE_NAME(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_UNPARSE_NAME(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__uunnppaarrssee__nnaammee - principal to string conversion + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__uunnppaarrssee__nnaammee(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _c_h_a_r _*_*_n_a_m_e) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + This function takes a _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, and will convert in to a printable rep- + resentation with the same syntax as described in krb5_parse_name(3). + _*_n_a_m_e will point to allocated data and should be freed by the caller. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_425_conv_principal(3), krb5_build_principal(3), + krb5_free_principal(3), krb5_parse_name(3), krb5_sname_to_principal(3) + + HEIMDAL August 8, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1357ef186e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.3 @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5_verify_user.3,v 1.10 2003/04/16 13:58:11 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd March 25, 2003 +.Dt KRB5_VERIFY_USER 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_verify_user , +.Nm krb5_verify_user_lrealm , +.Nm krb5_verify_user_opt , +.Nm krb5_verify_opt_init +.Nm krb5_verify_opt_set_flags , +.Nm krb5_verify_opt_set_service , +.Nm krb5_verify_opt_set_secure , +.Nm krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab +.Nd Heimdal password verifying functions. +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn "krb5_verify_user" "krb5_context context" " krb5_principal principal" "krb5_ccache ccache" "const char *password" "krb5_boolean secure" "const char *service" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn "krb5_verify_user_lrealm" "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" "krb5_ccache ccache" "const char *password" "krb5_boolean secure" "const char *service" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_init "krb5_verify_opt *opt" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_ccache "krb5_verify_opt *opt" "krb5_ccache ccache" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab "krb5_verify_opt *opt" "krb5_keytab keytab" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_secure "krb5_verify_opt *opt" "krb5_boolean secure" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_service "krb5_verify_opt *opt" "const char *service" +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_flags "krb5_verify_opt *opt" "unsigned int flags" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fo krb5_verify_user_opt +.Fa "krb5_context context" +.Fa "krb5_principal principal" +.Fa "const char *password" +.Fa "krb5_verify_opt *opt" +.Fc +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm krb5_verify_user +function verifies the password supplied by a user. +The principal whose password will be verified is specified in +.Fa principal . +New tickets will be obtained as a side-effect and stored in +.Fa ccache +(if +.Dv NULL , +the default ccache is used). +.Fn krb5_verify_user +will call +.Fn krb5_cc_initialize +on the given +.Fa ccache , +so +.Fa ccache +must only initialized with +.Fn krb5_cc_resolve +or +.Fn krb5_cc_gen_new . +If the password is not supplied in +.Fa password +(and is given as +.Dv NULL ) +the user will be prompted for it. +If +.Fa secure +the ticket will be verified against the locally stored service key +.Fa service +(by default +.Ql host +if given as +.Dv NULL +). +.Pp +The +.Nm krb5_verify_user_lrealm +function does the same, except that it ignores the realm in +.Fa principal +and tries all the local realms (see +.Xr krb5.conf 5 ) . +After a successful return, the principal is set to the authenticated +realm. If the call fails, the principal will not be meaningful, and +should only be freed with +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_init +resets all opt to default values. +.Pp +None of the krb5_verify_opt_set function makes a copy of the data +structure that they are called with. Its up the caller to free them +after the +.Fn krb5_verify_user_opt +is called. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_ccache +sets the +.Fa ccache +that user of +.Fa opt +will use. If not set, the default credential cache will be used. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab +sets the +.Fa keytab +that user of +.Fa opt +will use. If not set, the default keytab will be used. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_secure +if +.Fa secure +if true, the password verification will require that the ticket will +be verified against the locally stored service key. If not set, +default value is true. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_service +sets the +.Fa service +principal that user of +.Fa opt +will use. If not set, the +.Ql host +service will be used. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_opt_set_flags +sets +.Fa flags +that user of +.Fa opt +will use. +If the flag +.Dv KRB5_VERIFY_LREALMS +is used, the +.Fa principal +will be modified like +.Fn krb5_verify_user_lrealm +modifies it. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_user_opt +function verifies the +.Fa password +supplied by a user. +The principal whose password will be verified is specified in +.Fa principal . +Options the to the verification process is pass in in +.Fa opt . +.Sh EXAMPLE +Here is a example program that verifies a password. it uses the +.Ql host/`hostname` +service principal in +.Pa krb5.keytab . +.Bd -literal +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *user; + krb5_error_code error; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_context context; + + if (argc != 2) + errx(1, "usage: verify_passwd "); + + user = argv[1]; + + if (krb5_init_context(&context) < 0) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context"); + + if ((error = krb5_parse_name(context, user, &princ)) != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, error, "krb5_parse_name"); + + error = krb5_verify_user(context, princ, NULL, NULL, TRUE, NULL); + if (error) + krb5_err(context, 1, error, "krb5_verify_user"); + + return 0; +} +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_err 3 , +.Xr krb5_cc_gen_new 3 , +.Xr krb5_cc_resolve 3 , +.Xr krb5_cc_initialize 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_init_context 3 , +.Xr krb5_kt_default 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef1250ed61 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_verify_user.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ + +KRB5_VERIFY_USER(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_VERIFY_USER(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr, kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__llrreeaallmm, kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__oopptt, + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__iinniitt kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__ffllaaggss, + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__sseerrvviiccee, kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__sseeccuurree, + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__kkeeyyttaabb - Heimdal password verifying functions. + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _c_c_a_c_h_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d, _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _s_e_c_u_r_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_s_e_r_v_i_c_e) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__llrreeaallmm(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _c_c_a_c_h_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d, _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _s_e_c_u_r_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_s_e_r_v_i_c_e) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__iinniitt(_k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__ccccaacchhee(_k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t, _k_r_b_5___c_c_a_c_h_e _c_c_a_c_h_e) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__kkeeyyttaabb(_k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t, _k_r_b_5___k_e_y_t_a_b _k_e_y_t_a_b) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__sseeccuurree(_k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t, _k_r_b_5___b_o_o_l_e_a_n _s_e_c_u_r_e) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__sseerrvviiccee(_k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_s_e_r_v_i_c_e) + + _v_o_i_d + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__ffllaaggss(_k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t, _u_n_s_i_g_n_e_d _i_n_t _f_l_a_g_s) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__oopptt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d, _k_r_b_5___v_e_r_i_f_y___o_p_t _*_o_p_t) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + The kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr function verifies the password supplied by a user. + The principal whose password will be verified is specified in _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l. + New tickets will be obtained as a side-effect and stored in _c_c_a_c_h_e (if + NULL, the default ccache is used). kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr() will call + kkrrbb55__cccc__iinniittiiaalliizzee() on the given _c_c_a_c_h_e, so _c_c_a_c_h_e must only initialized + with kkrrbb55__cccc__rreessoollvvee() or kkrrbb55__cccc__ggeenn__nneeww(). If the password is not sup- + plied in _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d (and is given as NULL) the user will be prompted for + it. If _s_e_c_u_r_e the ticket will be verified against the locally stored + service key _s_e_r_v_i_c_e (by default `host' if given as NULL ). + + The kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__llrreeaallmm function does the same, except that it ig- + nores the realm in _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l and tries all the local realms (see + krb5.conf(5)). After a successful return, the principal is set to the + authenticated realm. If the call fails, the principal will not be mean- + ingful, and should only be freed with krb5_free_principal(3). + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__iinniitt() resets all opt to default values. + + + None of the krb5_verify_opt_set function makes a copy of the data struc- + ture that they are called with. Its up the caller to free them after the + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__oopptt() is called. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__ccccaacchhee() sets the _c_c_a_c_h_e that user of _o_p_t will use. + If not set, the default credential cache will be used. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__kkeeyyttaabb() sets the _k_e_y_t_a_b that user of _o_p_t will use. + If not set, the default keytab will be used. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__sseeccuurree() if _s_e_c_u_r_e if true, the password verification + will require that the ticket will be verified against the locally stored + service key. If not set, default value is true. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__sseerrvviiccee() sets the _s_e_r_v_i_c_e principal that user of _o_p_t + will use. If not set, the `host' service will be used. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__oopptt__sseett__ffllaaggss() sets _f_l_a_g_s that user of _o_p_t will use. If the + flag KRB5_VERIFY_LREALMS is used, the _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l will be modified like + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__llrreeaallmm() modifies it. + + kkrrbb55__vveerriiffyy__uusseerr__oopptt() function verifies the _p_a_s_s_w_o_r_d supplied by a user. + The principal whose password will be verified is specified in _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_a_l. + Options the to the verification process is pass in in _o_p_t. + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + Here is a example program that verifies a password. it uses the + `host/`hostname`' service principal in _k_r_b_5_._k_e_y_t_a_b. + + #include + + int + main(int argc, char **argv) + { + char *user; + krb5_error_code error; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_context context; + + if (argc != 2) + errx(1, "usage: verify_passwd "); + + user = argv[1]; + + if (krb5_init_context(&context) < 0) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context"); + + if ((error = krb5_parse_name(context, user, &princ)) != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, error, "krb5_parse_name"); + + error = krb5_verify_user(context, princ, NULL, NULL, TRUE, NULL); + if (error) + krb5_err(context, 1, error, "krb5_verify_user"); + + return 0; + } + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_err(3), krb5_cc_gen_new(3), krb5_cc_resolve(3), + krb5_cc_initialize(3), krb5_free_principal(3), krb5_init_context(3), + krb5_kt_default(3), krb5.conf(5) + + HEIMDAL March 25, 2003 2 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ed4b31fbc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3 @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_warn.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 19:31:49 lha Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_WARN 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_warn , +.Nm krb5_warnx , +.Nm krb5_vwarn , +.Nm krb5_vwarnx , +.Nm krb5_err , +.Nm krb5_errx , +.Nm krb5_verr , +.Nm krb5_verrx , +.Nm krb5_set_warn_dest +.Nd Heimdal warning and error functions +.Sh LIBRARY +Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In krb5.h +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_err "krb5_context context" "int eval" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_errx "krb5_context context" "int eval" "const char *format" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_verr "krb5_context context" "int eval" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "va_list ap" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_verrx "krb5_context context" "int eval" "const char *format" "va_list ap" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vwarn "krb5_context context" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "va_list ap" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vwarnx "krb5_context context" "const char *format" "va_list ap" +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_warn "krb5_context context" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_warnx "krb5_context context" "const char *format" "..." +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_set_warn_dest "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" +.Ft "char *" +.Fn krb5_get_err_text "krb5_context context" "krb5_error_code code" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions prints a warning message to some destination. +.Fa format +is a printf style format specifying the message to print. The forms not ending in an +.Dq x +prints the error string associated with +.Fa code +along with the message. +The +.Dq err +functions exits with exit status +.Fa eval +after printing the message. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_set_warn_func +function sets the destination for warning messages to the specified +.Fa facility . +Messages logged with the +.Dq warn +functions have a log level of 1, while the +.Dq err +functions logs with level 0. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_get_err_text +fetches the human readable strings describing the error-code. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72777bd8f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ + +KRB5_WARN(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual KRB5_WARN(3) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55__wwaarrnn, kkrrbb55__wwaarrnnxx, kkrrbb55__vvwwaarrnn, kkrrbb55__vvwwaarrnnxx, kkrrbb55__eerrrr, kkrrbb55__eerrrrxx, + kkrrbb55__vveerrrr, kkrrbb55__vveerrrrxx, kkrrbb55__sseett__wwaarrnn__ddeesstt - Heimdal warning and error + functions + +LLIIBBRRAARRYY + Kerberos 5 Library (libkrb5, -lkrb5) + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__eerrrr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _e_v_a_l, _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e _c_o_d_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__eerrrrxx(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _e_v_a_l, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vveerrrr(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _e_v_a_l, _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e _c_o_d_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vveerrrrxx(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _i_n_t _e_v_a_l, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, + _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vvwwaarrnn(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e _c_o_d_e, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__vvwwaarrnnxx(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _v_a___l_i_s_t _a_p) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__wwaarrnn(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e _c_o_d_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, + _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__wwaarrnnxx(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_f_o_r_m_a_t, _._._.) + + _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e + kkrrbb55__sseett__wwaarrnn__ddeesstt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___l_o_g___f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y _*_f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y) + + _c_h_a_r _* + kkrrbb55__ggeett__eerrrr__tteexxtt(_k_r_b_5___c_o_n_t_e_x_t _c_o_n_t_e_x_t, _k_r_b_5___e_r_r_o_r___c_o_d_e _c_o_d_e) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + These functions prints a warning message to some destination. _f_o_r_m_a_t is + a printf style format specifying the message to print. The forms not end- + ing in an ``x'' prints the error string associated with _c_o_d_e along with + the message. The ``err'' functions exits with exit status _e_v_a_l after + printing the message. + + The kkrrbb55__sseett__wwaarrnn__ffuunncc() function sets the destination for warning mes- + sages to the specified _f_a_c_i_l_i_t_y. Messages logged with the ``warn'' func- + tions have a log level of 1, while the ``err'' functions logs with level + 0. + + kkrrbb55__ggeett__eerrrr__tteexxtt() fetches the human readable strings describing the er- + ror-code. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5_openlog(3) + + HEIMDAL August 8, 1997 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krbhst-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krbhst-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf98104706 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krbhst-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: krbhst-test.c,v 1.3 2002/08/23 03:43:18 assar Exp $"); + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[realms ...]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j; + krb5_context context; + int types[] = {KRB5_KRBHST_KDC, KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN, KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW, + KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524}; + const char *type_str[] = {"kdc", "admin", "changepw", "krb524"}; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + krb5_init_context (&context); + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + krb5_krbhst_handle handle; + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(types)/sizeof(*types); ++j) { + printf ("%s for %s:\n", type_str[j], argv[i]); + + krb5_krbhst_init(context, argv[i], types[j], &handle); + while(krb5_krbhst_next_as_string(context, handle, + host, sizeof(host)) == 0) + printf("%s\n", host); + krb5_krbhst_reset(context, handle); + printf ("\n"); + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krbhst.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krbhst.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0cc9f47f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/krbhst.c @@ -0,0 +1,823 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: krbhst.c,v 1.43.2.1 2003/04/22 15:00:38 lha Exp $"); + +static int +string_to_proto(const char *string) +{ + if(strcasecmp(string, "udp") == 0) + return KRB5_KRBHST_UDP; + else if(strcasecmp(string, "tcp") == 0) + return KRB5_KRBHST_TCP; + else if(strcasecmp(string, "http") == 0) + return KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP; + return -1; +} + +/* + * set `res' and `count' to the result of looking up SRV RR in DNS for + * `proto', `proto', `realm' using `dns_type'. + * if `port' != 0, force that port number + */ + +static krb5_error_code +srv_find_realm(krb5_context context, krb5_krbhst_info ***res, int *count, + const char *realm, const char *dns_type, + const char *proto, const char *service, int port) +{ + char domain[1024]; + struct dns_reply *r; + struct resource_record *rr; + int num_srv; + int proto_num; + int def_port; + + proto_num = string_to_proto(proto); + if(proto_num < 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "unknown protocol `%s'", proto); + return EINVAL; + } + + if(proto_num == KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP) + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "http", "tcp", 80)); + else if(port == 0) + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, service, proto, 88)); + else + def_port = port; + + snprintf(domain, sizeof(domain), "_%s._%s.%s.", service, proto, realm); + + r = dns_lookup(domain, dns_type); + if(r == NULL) { + *res = NULL; + *count = 0; + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; + } + + for(num_srv = 0, rr = r->head; rr; rr = rr->next) + if(rr->type == T_SRV) + num_srv++; + + *res = malloc(num_srv * sizeof(**res)); + if(*res == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + dns_srv_order(r); + + for(num_srv = 0, rr = r->head; rr; rr = rr->next) + if(rr->type == T_SRV) { + krb5_krbhst_info *hi; + size_t len = strlen(rr->u.srv->target); + + hi = calloc(1, sizeof(*hi) + len); + if(hi == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + while(--num_srv >= 0) + free((*res)[num_srv]); + free(*res); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*res)[num_srv++] = hi; + + hi->proto = proto_num; + + hi->def_port = def_port; + if (port != 0) + hi->port = port; + else + hi->port = rr->u.srv->port; + + strlcpy(hi->hostname, rr->u.srv->target, len + 1); + } + + *count = num_srv; + + dns_free_data(r); + return 0; +} + + +struct krb5_krbhst_data { + char *realm; + unsigned int flags; + int def_port; + int port; /* hardwired port number if != 0 */ +#define KD_CONFIG 1 +#define KD_SRV_UDP 2 +#define KD_SRV_TCP 4 +#define KD_SRV_HTTP 8 +#define KD_FALLBACK 16 +#define KD_CONFIG_EXISTS 32 + + krb5_error_code (*get_next)(krb5_context, struct krb5_krbhst_data *, + krb5_krbhst_info**); + + unsigned int fallback_count; + + struct krb5_krbhst_info *hosts, **index, **end; +}; + +static krb5_boolean +krbhst_empty(const struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd) +{ + return kd->index == &kd->hosts; +} + +/* + * parse `spec' into a krb5_krbhst_info, defaulting the port to `def_port' + * and forcing it to `port' if port != 0 + */ + +static struct krb5_krbhst_info* +parse_hostspec(krb5_context context, const char *spec, int def_port, int port) +{ + const char *p = spec; + struct krb5_krbhst_info *hi; + + hi = calloc(1, sizeof(*hi) + strlen(spec)); + if(hi == NULL) + return NULL; + + hi->proto = KRB5_KRBHST_UDP; + + if(strncmp(p, "http://", 7) == 0){ + hi->proto = KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP; + p += 7; + } else if(strncmp(p, "http/", 5) == 0) { + hi->proto = KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP; + p += 5; + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "http", "tcp", 80)); + }else if(strncmp(p, "tcp/", 4) == 0){ + hi->proto = KRB5_KRBHST_TCP; + p += 4; + } else if(strncmp(p, "udp/", 4) == 0) { + p += 4; + } + + if(strsep_copy(&p, ":", hi->hostname, strlen(spec) + 1) < 0) { + free(hi); + return NULL; + } + /* get rid of trailing /, and convert to lower case */ + hi->hostname[strcspn(hi->hostname, "/")] = '\0'; + strlwr(hi->hostname); + + hi->port = hi->def_port = def_port; + if(p != NULL) { + char *end; + hi->port = strtol(p, &end, 0); + if(end == p) { + free(hi); + return NULL; + } + } + if (port) + hi->port = port; + return hi; +} + +static void +free_krbhst_info(krb5_krbhst_info *hi) +{ + if (hi->ai != NULL) + freeaddrinfo(hi->ai); + free(hi); +} + +static void +append_host_hostinfo(struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, struct krb5_krbhst_info *host) +{ + struct krb5_krbhst_info *h; + + for(h = kd->hosts; h; h = h->next) + if(h->proto == host->proto && + h->port == host->port && + strcmp(h->hostname, host->hostname) == 0) { + free_krbhst_info(host); + return; + } + *kd->end = host; + kd->end = &host->next; +} + +static krb5_error_code +append_host_string(krb5_context context, struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + const char *host, int def_port, int port) +{ + struct krb5_krbhst_info *hi; + + hi = parse_hostspec(context, host, def_port, port); + if(hi == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + append_host_hostinfo(kd, hi); + return 0; +} + +/* + * return a readable representation of `host' in `hostname, hostlen' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_format_string(krb5_context context, const krb5_krbhst_info *host, + char *hostname, size_t hostlen) +{ + const char *proto = ""; + char portstr[7] = ""; + if(host->proto == KRB5_KRBHST_TCP) + proto = "tcp/"; + else if(host->proto == KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP) + proto = "http://"; + if(host->port != host->def_port) + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), ":%d", host->port); + snprintf(hostname, hostlen, "%s%s%s", proto, host->hostname, portstr); + return 0; +} + +/* + * create a getaddrinfo `hints' based on `proto' + */ + +static void +make_hints(struct addrinfo *hints, int proto) +{ + memset(hints, 0, sizeof(*hints)); + hints->ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + switch(proto) { + case KRB5_KRBHST_UDP : + hints->ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP : + case KRB5_KRBHST_TCP : + hints->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + break; + } +} + +/* + * return an `struct addrinfo *' in `ai' corresponding to the information + * in `host'. free:ing is handled by krb5_krbhst_free. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo(krb5_context context, krb5_krbhst_info *host, + struct addrinfo **ai) +{ + struct addrinfo hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + int ret; + + if (host->ai == NULL) { + make_hints(&hints, host->proto); + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", host->port); + ret = getaddrinfo(host->hostname, portstr, &hints, &host->ai); + if (ret) + return krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(ret, errno); + } + *ai = host->ai; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_boolean +get_next(struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, krb5_krbhst_info **host) +{ + struct krb5_krbhst_info *hi = *kd->index; + if(hi != NULL) { + *host = hi; + kd->index = &(*kd->index)->next; + return TRUE; + } + return FALSE; +} + +static void +srv_get_hosts(krb5_context context, struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + const char *proto, const char *service) +{ + krb5_krbhst_info **res; + int count, i; + + srv_find_realm(context, &res, &count, kd->realm, "SRV", proto, service, + kd->port); + for(i = 0; i < count; i++) + append_host_hostinfo(kd, res[i]); + free(res); +} + +/* + * read the configuration for `conf_string', defaulting to kd->def_port and + * forcing it to `kd->port' if kd->port != 0 + */ + +static void +config_get_hosts(krb5_context context, struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + const char *conf_string) +{ + int i; + + char **hostlist; + hostlist = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "realms", kd->realm, conf_string, NULL); + + if(hostlist == NULL) + return; + kd->flags |= KD_CONFIG_EXISTS; + for(i = 0; hostlist && hostlist[i] != NULL; i++) + append_host_string(context, kd, hostlist[i], kd->def_port, kd->port); + + krb5_config_free_strings(hostlist); +} + +/* + * as a fallback, look for `serv_string.kd->realm' (typically + * kerberos.REALM, kerberos-1.REALM, ... + * `port' is the default port for the service, and `proto' the + * protocol + */ + +static krb5_error_code +fallback_get_hosts(krb5_context context, struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + const char *serv_string, int port, int proto) +{ + char *host; + int ret; + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct addrinfo hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + if(kd->fallback_count == 0) + asprintf(&host, "%s.%s.", serv_string, kd->realm); + else + asprintf(&host, "%s-%d.%s.", + serv_string, kd->fallback_count, kd->realm); + + if (host == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + make_hints(&hints, proto); + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); + ret = getaddrinfo(host, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (ret) { + /* no more hosts, so we're done here */ + free(host); + kd->flags |= KD_FALLBACK; + } else { + struct krb5_krbhst_info *hi; + size_t hostlen = strlen(host); + + hi = calloc(1, sizeof(*hi) + hostlen); + if(hi == NULL) { + free(host); + return ENOMEM; + } + + hi->proto = proto; + hi->port = hi->def_port = port; + hi->ai = ai; + memmove(hi->hostname, host, hostlen - 1); + hi->hostname[hostlen - 1] = '\0'; + free(host); + append_host_hostinfo(kd, hi); + kd->fallback_count++; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +kdc_get_next(krb5_context context, + struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + krb5_krbhst_info **host) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if((kd->flags & KD_CONFIG) == 0) { + config_get_hosts(context, kd, "kdc"); + kd->flags |= KD_CONFIG; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + if (kd->flags & KD_CONFIG_EXISTS) + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ + + if(context->srv_lookup) { + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_UDP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "udp", "kerberos"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_UDP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_TCP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "tcp", "kerberos"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_TCP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_HTTP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "http", "kerberos"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_HTTP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + } + + while((kd->flags & KD_FALLBACK) == 0) { + ret = fallback_get_hosts(context, kd, "kerberos", + kd->def_port, KRB5_KRBHST_UDP); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +admin_get_next(krb5_context context, + struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + krb5_krbhst_info **host) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if((kd->flags & KD_CONFIG) == 0) { + config_get_hosts(context, kd, "admin_server"); + kd->flags |= KD_CONFIG; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + if (kd->flags & KD_CONFIG_EXISTS) + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ + + if(context->srv_lookup) { + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_TCP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "tcp", "kerberos-adm"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_TCP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + } + + if (krbhst_empty(kd) + && (kd->flags & KD_FALLBACK) == 0) { + ret = fallback_get_hosts(context, kd, "kerberos", + kd->def_port, KRB5_KRBHST_UDP); + if(ret) + return ret; + kd->flags |= KD_FALLBACK; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +kpasswd_get_next(krb5_context context, + struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + krb5_krbhst_info **host) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if((kd->flags & KD_CONFIG) == 0) { + config_get_hosts(context, kd, "kpasswd_server"); + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + if (kd->flags & KD_CONFIG_EXISTS) + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ + + if(context->srv_lookup) { + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_UDP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "udp", "kpasswd"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_UDP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + } + + /* no matches -> try admin */ + + if (krbhst_empty(kd)) { + kd->flags = 0; + kd->port = kd->def_port; + kd->get_next = admin_get_next; + ret = (*kd->get_next)(context, kd, host); + if (ret == 0) + (*host)->proto = KRB5_KRBHST_UDP; + return ret; + } + + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb524_get_next(krb5_context context, + struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd, + krb5_krbhst_info **host) +{ + if((kd->flags & KD_CONFIG) == 0) { + config_get_hosts(context, kd, "krb524_server"); + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + kd->flags |= KD_CONFIG; + } + + if (kd->flags & KD_CONFIG_EXISTS) + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ + + if(context->srv_lookup) { + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_UDP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "udp", "krb524"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_UDP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + + if((kd->flags & KD_SRV_TCP) == 0) { + srv_get_hosts(context, kd, "tcp", "krb524"); + kd->flags |= KD_SRV_TCP; + if(get_next(kd, host)) + return 0; + } + } + + /* no matches -> try kdc */ + + if (krbhst_empty(kd)) { + kd->flags = 0; + kd->port = kd->def_port; + kd->get_next = kdc_get_next; + return (*kd->get_next)(context, kd, host); + } + + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* XXX */ +} + +static struct krb5_krbhst_data* +common_init(krb5_context context, + const char *realm) +{ + struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd; + + if((kd = calloc(1, sizeof(*kd))) == NULL) + return NULL; + + if((kd->realm = strdup(realm)) == NULL) { + free(kd); + return NULL; + } + + kd->end = kd->index = &kd->hosts; + return kd; +} + +/* + * initialize `handle' to look for hosts of type `type' in realm `realm' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_init(krb5_context context, + const char *realm, + unsigned int type, + krb5_krbhst_handle *handle) +{ + struct krb5_krbhst_data *kd; + krb5_error_code (*get_next)(krb5_context, struct krb5_krbhst_data *, + krb5_krbhst_info **); + int def_port; + + switch(type) { + case KRB5_KRBHST_KDC: + get_next = kdc_get_next; + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos", "udp", 88)); + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN: + get_next = admin_get_next; + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos-adm", + "tcp", 749)); + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW: + get_next = kpasswd_get_next; + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "kpasswd", "udp", + KPASSWD_PORT)); + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524: + get_next = krb524_get_next; + def_port = ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "krb524", "udp", 4444)); + break; + default: + krb5_set_error_string(context, "unknown krbhst type (%u)", type); + return ENOTTY; + } + if((kd = common_init(context, realm)) == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + kd->get_next = get_next; + kd->def_port = def_port; + *handle = kd; + return 0; +} + +/* + * return the next host information from `handle' in `host' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_next(krb5_context context, + krb5_krbhst_handle handle, + krb5_krbhst_info **host) +{ + if(get_next(handle, host)) + return 0; + + return (*handle->get_next)(context, handle, host); +} + +/* + * return the next host information from `handle' as a host name + * in `hostname' (or length `hostlen) + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_krbhst_next_as_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_krbhst_handle handle, + char *hostname, + size_t hostlen) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_krbhst_info *host; + ret = krb5_krbhst_next(context, handle, &host); + if(ret) + return ret; + return krb5_krbhst_format_string(context, host, hostname, hostlen); +} + + +void +krb5_krbhst_reset(krb5_context context, krb5_krbhst_handle handle) +{ + handle->index = &handle->hosts; +} + +void +krb5_krbhst_free(krb5_context context, krb5_krbhst_handle handle) +{ + krb5_krbhst_info *h, *next; + + if (handle == NULL) + return; + + for (h = handle->hosts; h != NULL; h = next) { + next = h->next; + free_krbhst_info(h); + } + + free(handle->realm); + free(handle); +} + +/* backwards compatibility ahead */ + +static krb5_error_code +gethostlist(krb5_context context, const char *realm, + unsigned int type, char ***hostlist) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int nhost = 0; + krb5_krbhst_handle handle; + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + krb5_krbhst_info *hostinfo; + + ret = krb5_krbhst_init(context, realm, type, &handle); + if (ret) + return ret; + + while(krb5_krbhst_next(context, handle, &hostinfo) == 0) + nhost++; + if(nhost == 0) + return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; + *hostlist = calloc(nhost + 1, sizeof(**hostlist)); + if(*hostlist == NULL) { + krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); + return ENOMEM; + } + + krb5_krbhst_reset(context, handle); + nhost = 0; + while(krb5_krbhst_next_as_string(context, handle, + host, sizeof(host)) == 0) { + if(((*hostlist)[nhost++] = strdup(host)) == NULL) { + krb5_free_krbhst(context, *hostlist); + krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + (*hostlist)[nhost++] = NULL; + krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); + return 0; +} + +/* + * return an malloced list of kadmin-hosts for `realm' in `hostlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_admin_hst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return gethostlist(context, *realm, KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN, hostlist); +} + +/* + * return an malloced list of changepw-hosts for `realm' in `hostlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return gethostlist(context, *realm, KRB5_KRBHST_CHANGEPW, hostlist); +} + +/* + * return an malloced list of 524-hosts for `realm' in `hostlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb524hst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return gethostlist(context, *realm, KRB5_KRBHST_KRB524, hostlist); +} + + +/* + * return an malloced list of KDC's for `realm' in `hostlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krbhst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return gethostlist(context, *realm, KRB5_KRBHST_KDC, hostlist); +} + +/* + * free all the memory allocated in `hostlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_krbhst (krb5_context context, + char **hostlist) +{ + char **p; + + for (p = hostlist; *p; ++p) + free (*p); + free (hostlist); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kuserok.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kuserok.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a79532e21b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/kuserok.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kuserok.c,v 1.7 2003/03/13 19:53:43 lha Exp $"); + +/* + * Return TRUE iff `principal' is allowed to login as `luser'. + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kuserok (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *luser) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + struct passwd *pwd; + FILE *f; + krb5_realm *realms, *r; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_boolean b; + + pwd = getpwnam (luser); /* XXX - Should use k_getpwnam? */ + if (pwd == NULL) + return FALSE; + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &realms); + if (ret) + return FALSE; + + for (r = realms; *r != NULL; ++r) { + krb5_principal local_principal; + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &local_principal, + strlen(*r), + *r, + luser, + NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + return FALSE; + } + + b = krb5_principal_compare (context, principal, local_principal); + krb5_free_principal (context, local_principal); + if (b) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + return TRUE; + } + } + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.k5login", pwd->pw_dir); + f = fopen (buf, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return FALSE; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + krb5_principal tmp; + + buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, buf, &tmp); + if (ret) { + fclose (f); + return FALSE; + } + b = krb5_principal_compare (context, principal, tmp); + krb5_free_principal (context, tmp); + if (b) { + fclose (f); + return TRUE; + } + } + fclose (f); + return FALSE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/log.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd7451b4bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,461 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: log.c,v 1.31 2002/09/05 14:59:14 joda Exp $"); + +struct facility { + int min; + int max; + krb5_log_log_func_t log; + krb5_log_close_func_t close; + void *data; +}; + +static struct facility* +log_realloc(krb5_log_facility *f) +{ + struct facility *fp; + f->len++; + fp = realloc(f->val, f->len * sizeof(*f->val)); + if(fp == NULL) + return NULL; + f->val = fp; + fp += f->len - 1; + return fp; +} + +struct s2i { + const char *s; + int val; +}; + +#define L(X) { #X, LOG_ ## X } + +static struct s2i syslogvals[] = { + L(EMERG), + L(ALERT), + L(CRIT), + L(ERR), + L(WARNING), + L(NOTICE), + L(INFO), + L(DEBUG), + + L(AUTH), +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + L(AUTHPRIV), +#endif +#ifdef LOG_CRON + L(CRON), +#endif + L(DAEMON), +#ifdef LOG_FTP + L(FTP), +#endif + L(KERN), + L(LPR), + L(MAIL), +#ifdef LOG_NEWS + L(NEWS), +#endif + L(SYSLOG), + L(USER), +#ifdef LOG_UUCP + L(UUCP), +#endif + L(LOCAL0), + L(LOCAL1), + L(LOCAL2), + L(LOCAL3), + L(LOCAL4), + L(LOCAL5), + L(LOCAL6), + L(LOCAL7), + { NULL, -1 } +}; + +static int +find_value(const char *s, struct s2i *table) +{ + while(table->s && strcasecmp(table->s, s)) + table++; + return table->val; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_initlog(krb5_context context, + const char *program, + krb5_log_facility **fac) +{ + krb5_log_facility *f = calloc(1, sizeof(*f)); + if(f == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + f->program = strdup(program); + if(f->program == NULL){ + free(f); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *fac = f; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_func(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int min, + int max, + krb5_log_log_func_t log, + krb5_log_close_func_t close, + void *data) +{ + struct facility *fp = log_realloc(fac); + if(fp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + fp->min = min; + fp->max = max; + fp->log = log; + fp->close = close; + fp->data = data; + return 0; +} + + +struct _heimdal_syslog_data{ + int priority; +}; + +static void +log_syslog(const char *time, + const char *msg, + void *data) + +{ + struct _heimdal_syslog_data *s = data; + syslog(s->priority, "%s", msg); +} + +static void +close_syslog(void *data) +{ + free(data); + closelog(); +} + +static krb5_error_code +open_syslog(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *facility, int min, int max, + const char *sev, const char *fac) +{ + struct _heimdal_syslog_data *sd = malloc(sizeof(*sd)); + int i; + + if(sd == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + i = find_value(sev, syslogvals); + if(i == -1) + i = LOG_ERR; + sd->priority = i; + i = find_value(fac, syslogvals); + if(i == -1) + i = LOG_AUTH; + sd->priority |= i; + roken_openlog(facility->program, LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY, i); + return krb5_addlog_func(context, facility, min, max, + log_syslog, close_syslog, sd); +} + +struct file_data{ + const char *filename; + const char *mode; + FILE *fd; + int keep_open; +}; + +static void +log_file(const char *time, + const char *msg, + void *data) +{ + struct file_data *f = data; + if(f->keep_open == 0) + f->fd = fopen(f->filename, f->mode); + if(f->fd == NULL) + return; + fprintf(f->fd, "%s %s\n", time, msg); + if(f->keep_open == 0) + fclose(f->fd); +} + +static void +close_file(void *data) +{ + struct file_data *f = data; + if(f->keep_open && f->filename) + fclose(f->fd); + free(data); +} + +static krb5_error_code +open_file(krb5_context context, krb5_log_facility *fac, int min, int max, + const char *filename, const char *mode, FILE *f, int keep_open) +{ + struct file_data *fd = malloc(sizeof(*fd)); + if(fd == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + fd->filename = filename; + fd->mode = mode; + fd->fd = f; + fd->keep_open = keep_open; + + return krb5_addlog_func(context, fac, min, max, log_file, close_file, fd); +} + + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_dest(krb5_context context, krb5_log_facility *f, const char *orig) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int min = 0, max = -1, n; + char c; + const char *p = orig; + + n = sscanf(p, "%d%c%d/", &min, &c, &max); + if(n == 2){ + if(c == '/') { + if(min < 0){ + max = -min; + min = 0; + }else{ + max = min; + } + } + } + if(n){ + p = strchr(p, '/'); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "failed to parse \"%s\"", orig); + return HEIM_ERR_LOG_PARSE; + } + p++; + } + if(strcmp(p, "STDERR") == 0){ + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, NULL, NULL, stderr, 1); + }else if(strcmp(p, "CONSOLE") == 0){ + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, "/dev/console", "w", NULL, 0); + }else if(strncmp(p, "FILE:", 4) == 0 && (p[4] == ':' || p[4] == '=')){ + char *fn; + FILE *file = NULL; + int keep_open = 0; + fn = strdup(p + 5); + if(fn == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if(p[4] == '='){ + int i = open(fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | + O_TRUNC | O_APPEND, 0666); + if(i < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "open(%s): %s", fn, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + file = fdopen(i, "a"); + if(file == NULL){ + ret = errno; + close(i); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "fdopen(%s): %s", fn, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + keep_open = 1; + } + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, fn, "a", file, keep_open); + }else if(strncmp(p, "DEVICE=", 6) == 0){ + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, strdup(p + 7), "w", NULL, 0); + }else if(strncmp(p, "SYSLOG", 6) == 0 && (p[6] == '\0' || p[6] == ':')){ + char severity[128] = ""; + char facility[128] = ""; + p += 6; + if(*p != '\0') + p++; + if(strsep_copy(&p, ":", severity, sizeof(severity)) != -1) + strsep_copy(&p, ":", facility, sizeof(facility)); + if(*severity == '\0') + strlcpy(severity, "ERR", sizeof(severity)); + if(*facility == '\0') + strlcpy(facility, "AUTH", sizeof(facility)); + ret = open_syslog(context, f, min, max, severity, facility); + }else{ + krb5_set_error_string (context, "unknown log type: %s", p); + ret = HEIM_ERR_LOG_PARSE; /* XXX */ + } + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_openlog(krb5_context context, + const char *program, + krb5_log_facility **fac) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char **p, **q; + + ret = krb5_initlog(context, program, fac); + if(ret) + return ret; + + p = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "logging", program, NULL); + if(p == NULL) + p = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "logging", "default", NULL); + if(p){ + for(q = p; *q; q++) + ret = krb5_addlog_dest(context, *fac, *q); + krb5_config_free_strings(p); + }else + ret = krb5_addlog_dest(context, *fac, "SYSLOG"); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_closelog(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < fac->len; i++) + (*fac->val[i].close)(fac->val[i].data); + return 0; +} + +#undef __attribute__ +#define __attribute__(X) + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog_msg(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + char **reply, + int level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 0))) +{ + + char *msg = NULL; + const char *actual = NULL; + char buf[64]; + time_t t = 0; + int i; + + for(i = 0; fac && i < fac->len; i++) + if(fac->val[i].min <= level && + (fac->val[i].max < 0 || fac->val[i].max >= level)) { + if(t == 0) { + t = time(NULL); + krb5_format_time(context, t, buf, sizeof(buf), TRUE); + } + if(actual == NULL) { + vasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap); + if(msg == NULL) + actual = fmt; + else + actual = msg; + } + (*fac->val[i].log)(buf, actual, fac->val[i].data); + } + if(reply == NULL) + free(msg); + else + *reply = msg; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 0))) +{ + return krb5_vlog_msg(context, fac, NULL, level, fmt, ap); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log_msg(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + char **reply, + const char *fmt, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 6))) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_error_code ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = krb5_vlog_msg(context, fac, reply, level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + const char *fmt, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 5))) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_error_code ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = krb5_vlog(context, fac, level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mcache.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mcache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..115760406b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mcache.c @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mcache.c,v 1.15.6.1 2004/03/06 16:57:16 lha Exp $"); + +typedef struct krb5_mcache { + char *name; + unsigned int refcnt; + int dead; + krb5_principal primary_principal; + struct link { + krb5_creds cred; + struct link *next; + } *creds; + struct krb5_mcache *next; +} krb5_mcache; + +static struct krb5_mcache *mcc_head; + +#define MCACHE(X) ((krb5_mcache *)(X)->data.data) + +#define MISDEAD(X) ((X)->dead) + +#define MCC_CURSOR(C) ((struct link*)(C)) + +static const char* +mcc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return MCACHE(id)->name; +} + +static krb5_mcache * +mcc_alloc(const char *name) +{ + krb5_mcache *m; + + ALLOC(m, 1); + if(m == NULL) + return NULL; + if(name == NULL) + asprintf(&m->name, "%p", m); + else + m->name = strdup(name); + if(m->name == NULL) { + free(m); + return NULL; + } + m->dead = 0; + m->refcnt = 1; + m->primary_principal = NULL; + m->creds = NULL; + m->next = mcc_head; + mcc_head = m; + return m; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_resolve(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id, const char *res) +{ + krb5_mcache *m; + + for (m = mcc_head; m != NULL; m = m->next) + if (strcmp(m->name, res) == 0) + break; + + if (m != NULL) { + m->refcnt++; + (*id)->data.data = m; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*m); + return 0; + } + + m = mcc_alloc(res); + if (m == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + + (*id)->data.data = m; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*m); + + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_gen_new(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_mcache *m; + + m = mcc_alloc(NULL); + + if (m == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + + (*id)->data.data = m; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*m); + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + m->dead = 0; + return krb5_copy_principal (context, + primary_principal, + &m->primary_principal); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + + if (--m->refcnt != 0) + return 0; + + if (MISDEAD(m)) { + free (m->name); + krb5_data_free(&id->data); + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_mcache **n, *m = MCACHE(id); + struct link *l; + + if (m->refcnt == 0) + krb5_abortx(context, "mcc_destroy: refcnt already 0"); + + if (!MISDEAD(m)) { + /* if this is an active mcache, remove it from the linked + list, and free all data */ + for(n = &mcc_head; n && *n; n = &(*n)->next) { + if(m == *n) { + *n = m->next; + break; + } + } + if (m->primary_principal != NULL) { + krb5_free_principal (context, m->primary_principal); + m->primary_principal = NULL; + } + m->dead = 1; + + l = m->creds; + while (l != NULL) { + struct link *old; + + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &l->cred); + old = l; + l = l->next; + free (old); + } + m->creds = NULL; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_store_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + krb5_error_code ret; + struct link *l; + + if (MISDEAD(m)) + return ENOENT; + + l = malloc (sizeof(*l)); + if (l == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + l->next = m->creds; + m->creds = l; + memset (&l->cred, 0, sizeof(l->cred)); + ret = krb5_copy_creds_contents (context, creds, &l->cred); + if (ret) { + m->creds = l->next; + free (l); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_get_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + + if (MISDEAD(m) || m->primary_principal == NULL) + return ENOENT; + return krb5_copy_principal (context, + m->primary_principal, + principal); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_get_first (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + + if (MISDEAD(m)) + return ENOENT; + + *cursor = m->creds; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_get_next (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + struct link *l; + + if (MISDEAD(m)) + return ENOENT; + + l = *cursor; + if (l != NULL) { + *cursor = l->next; + return krb5_copy_creds_contents (context, + &l->cred, + creds); + } else + return KRB5_CC_END; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_end_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_remove_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *mcreds) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = MCACHE(id); + struct link **q, *p; + for(q = &m->creds, p = *q; p; p = *q) { + if(krb5_compare_creds(context, which, mcreds, &p->cred)) { + *q = p->next; + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &p->cred); + free(p); + } else + q = &p->next; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_set_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +const krb5_cc_ops krb5_mcc_ops = { + "MEMORY", + mcc_get_name, + mcc_resolve, + mcc_gen_new, + mcc_initialize, + mcc_destroy, + mcc_close, + mcc_store_cred, + NULL, /* mcc_retrieve */ + mcc_get_principal, + mcc_get_first, + mcc_get_next, + mcc_end_get, + mcc_remove_cred, + mcc_set_flags +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/misc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..baf63f6d52 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: misc.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_error.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae9e10a5ef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_error.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mk_error.c,v 1.18 2002/09/04 16:26:04 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_error(krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code error_code, + const char *e_text, + const krb5_data *e_data, + const krb5_principal client, + const krb5_principal server, + time_t *client_time, + int *client_usec, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + KRB_ERROR msg; + int32_t sec, usec; + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + msg.pvno = 5; + msg.msg_type = krb_error; + msg.stime = sec; + msg.susec = usec; + msg.ctime = client_time; + msg.cusec = client_usec; + /* Make sure we only send `protocol' error codes */ + if(error_code < KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE || error_code >= KRB5_ERR_RCSID) { + if(e_text == NULL) + e_text = krb5_get_err_text(context, error_code); + error_code = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + msg.error_code = error_code - KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE; + if (e_text) + msg.e_text = (general_string*)&e_text; + if (e_data) + msg.e_data = (octet_string*)e_data; + if(server){ + msg.realm = server->realm; + msg.sname = server->name; + }else{ + msg.realm = ""; + } + if(client){ + msg.crealm = &client->realm; + msg.cname = &client->name; + } + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB_ERROR, reply->data, reply->length, &msg, &len, ret); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(reply->length != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_priv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_priv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b89f7e9721 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_priv.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_priv.c,v 1.31 2002/09/04 16:26:04 joda Exp $"); + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_priv(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *userdata, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_PRIV s; + EncKrbPrivPart part; + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + u_int32_t tmp_seq; + krb5_keyblock *key; + int32_t sec, usec; + KerberosTime sec2; + int usec2; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + part.user_data = *userdata; + sec2 = sec; + part.timestamp = &sec2; + usec2 = usec; + part.usec = &usec2; + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + tmp_seq = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + part.seq_number = &tmp_seq; + } else { + part.seq_number = NULL; + } + + part.s_address = auth_context->local_address; + part.r_address = auth_context->remote_address; + + krb5_data_zero (&s.enc_part.cipher); + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncKrbPrivPart, buf, buf_size, &part, &len, ret); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + s.pvno = 5; + s.msg_type = krb_priv; + s.enc_part.etype = key->keytype; + s.enc_part.kvno = NULL; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_encrypt (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_PRIV, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &s.enc_part.cipher); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + free(buf); + + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB_PRIV, buf, buf_size, &s, &len, ret); + + if(ret) + goto fail; + krb5_data_free (&s.enc_part.cipher); + + ret = krb5_data_copy(outbuf, buf + buf_size - len, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + free(buf); + return ENOMEM; + } + free (buf); + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) + auth_context->local_seqnumber = + (auth_context->local_seqnumber + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFF; + return 0; + +fail: + free (buf); + krb5_data_free (&s.enc_part.cipher); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_rep.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_rep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1026df0f33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_rep.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_rep.c,v 1.21 2002/12/19 13:30:36 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_rep(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + AP_REP ap; + EncAPRepPart body; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ap.pvno = 5; + ap.msg_type = krb_ap_rep; + + memset (&body, 0, sizeof(body)); + + body.ctime = auth_context->authenticator->ctime; + body.cusec = auth_context->authenticator->cusec; + body.subkey = NULL; + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + krb5_generate_seq_number (context, + auth_context->keyblock, + &auth_context->local_seqnumber); + body.seq_number = malloc (sizeof(*body.seq_number)); + if (body.seq_number == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *(body.seq_number) = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + } else + body.seq_number = NULL; + + ap.enc_part.etype = auth_context->keyblock->keytype; + ap.enc_part.kvno = NULL; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncAPRepPart, buf, buf_size, &body, &len, ret); + free_EncAPRepPart (&body); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, + 0 /* ap.enc_part.etype */, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_encrypt (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &ap.enc_part.cipher); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + free(buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AP_REP, outbuf->data, outbuf->length, &ap, &len, ret); + free_AP_REP (&ap); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_req.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a554123b00 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_req.c,v 1.24 2001/06/18 20:05:52 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_exact(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + const krb5_principal server, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds this_cred, *cred; + + memset(&this_cred, 0, sizeof(this_cred)); + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &this_cred.client); + + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, server, &this_cred.server); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return ret; + } + + this_cred.times.endtime = 0; + if (auth_context && *auth_context && (*auth_context)->keytype) + this_cred.session.keytype = (*auth_context)->keytype; + + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, 0, ccache, &this_cred, &cred); + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &this_cred); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + ap_req_options, + in_data, + cred, + outbuf); + krb5_free_creds(context, cred); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + const char *service, + const char *hostname, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char **realms; + char *real_hostname; + krb5_principal server; + + ret = krb5_expand_hostname_realms (context, hostname, + &real_hostname, &realms); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, &server, + strlen(*realms), + *realms, + service, + real_hostname, + NULL); + free (real_hostname); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_mk_req_exact (context, auth_context, ap_req_options, + server, in_data, ccache, outbuf); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..922be9e0b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_req_ext.c,v 1.26.4.1 2003/09/18 20:34:30 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_internal(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *outbuf, + krb5_key_usage checksum_usage, + krb5_key_usage encrypt_usage) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data authenticator; + Checksum c; + Checksum *c_opt; + krb5_auth_context ac; + + if(auth_context) { + if(*auth_context == NULL) + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context); + else + ret = 0; + ac = *auth_context; + } else + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac); + if(ret) + return ret; + + if(ac->local_subkey == NULL && (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_generatelocalsubkey(context, ac, &in_creds->session); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + +#if 0 + { + /* This is somewhat bogus since we're possibly overwriting a + value specified by the user, but it's the easiest way to make + the code use a compatible enctype */ + Ticket ticket; + krb5_keytype ticket_keytype; + + ret = decode_Ticket(in_creds->ticket.data, + in_creds->ticket.length, + &ticket, + NULL); + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (context, + ticket.enc_part.etype, + &ticket_keytype); + + if (ticket_keytype == in_creds->session.keytype) + krb5_auth_setenctype(context, + ac, + ticket.enc_part.etype); + free_Ticket(&ticket); + } +#endif + + krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock); + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &in_creds->session, &ac->keyblock); + + /* it's unclear what type of checksum we can use. try the best one, except: + * a) if it's configured differently for the current realm, or + * b) if the session key is des-cbc-crc + */ + + if (in_data) { + if(ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) { + /* this is to make DCE secd (and older MIT kdcs?) happy */ + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + NULL, + 0, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4, + in_data->data, + in_data->length, + &c); + } else if(ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5) { + /* this is to make MS kdc happy */ + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + NULL, + 0, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + in_data->data, + in_data->length, + &c); + } else { + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, ac->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + crypto, + checksum_usage, + 0, + in_data->data, + in_data->length, + &c); + + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + } + c_opt = &c; + } else { + c_opt = NULL; + } + + ret = krb5_build_authenticator (context, + ac, + ac->keyblock->keytype, + in_creds, + c_opt, + NULL, + &authenticator, + encrypt_usage); + if (c_opt) + free_Checksum (c_opt); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_build_ap_req (context, ac->keyblock->keytype, + in_creds, ap_req_options, authenticator, outbuf); + if(auth_context == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + return krb5_mk_req_internal (context, + auth_context, + ap_req_options, + in_data, + in_creds, + outbuf, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_safe.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_safe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8bfa066759 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/mk_safe.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_safe.c,v 1.28.4.1 2004/03/07 12:46:43 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_safe(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *userdata, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_SAFE s; + int32_t sec, usec; + KerberosTime sec2; + int usec2; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + u_int32_t tmp_seq; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_keyblock *key; + + if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + s.pvno = 5; + s.msg_type = krb_safe; + + s.safe_body.user_data = *userdata; + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + sec2 = sec; + s.safe_body.timestamp = &sec2; + usec2 = usec; + s.safe_body.usec = &usec2; + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + tmp_seq = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + s.safe_body.seq_number = &tmp_seq; + } else + s.safe_body.seq_number = NULL; + + s.safe_body.s_address = auth_context->local_address; + s.safe_body.r_address = auth_context->remote_address; + + s.cksum.cksumtype = 0; + s.cksum.checksum.data = NULL; + s.cksum.checksum.length = 0; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB_SAFE, buf, buf_size, &s, &len, ret); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM, + 0, + buf, + len, + &s.cksum); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + + free(buf); + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB_SAFE, buf, buf_size, &s, &len, ret); + free_Checksum (&s.cksum); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + outbuf->length = len; + outbuf->data = buf; + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) + auth_context->local_seqnumber = + (auth_context->local_seqnumber + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFF; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7cf4905143 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: n-fold-test.c,v 1.4 2001/03/12 07:42:30 assar Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 24 }; + +static struct testcase { + const char *str; + unsigned n; + unsigned char res[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {"012345", 8, + {0xbe, 0x07, 0x26, 0x31, 0x27, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x55} + }, + {"basch", 24, + {0x1a, 0xab, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x96, 0x4b, 0x98, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x8c, 0xde, + 0x2d, 0x24, 0x48, 0xba, 0x34, 0x55, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x2c, 0x97, 0x31, + 0x64, 0x3f} + }, + {"eichin", 24, + {0x65, 0x69, 0x63, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x2b, 0x4b, + 0x1b, 0x43, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x5b, 0x99, 0x5a, 0x58, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0xd0, + 0xd2, 0xdc, 0xca} + }, + {"sommerfeld", 24, + {0x2f, 0x7a, 0x98, 0x55, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0xe4, 0xab, 0xad, 0xf4, + 0xe7, 0x11, 0x92, 0xdd, 0x44, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xff, 0x53, 0x25, 0xa5, + 0xde, 0xf7, 0x5c} + }, + {"MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY", 24, + {0xdb, 0x3b, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x60, 0x32, 0x82, + 0xb3, 0x08, 0xa5, 0x08, 0x41, 0x22, 0x9a, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xb9, + 0x54, 0x0c, 0x1b} + }, + {"assar@NADA.KTH.SE", 24, + {0x5c, 0x06, 0xc3, 0x4d, 0x2c, 0x89, 0x05, 0xbe, 0x7a, 0x51, + 0x83, 0x6c, 0xd6, 0xf8, 0x1c, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x49, 0x16, 0x5a, + 0xb3, 0xfa, 0xa9} + }, + {"testKRBTEST.MIT.EDUtestkey", 24, + {0x50, 0x2c, 0xf8, 0x29, 0x78, 0xe5, 0xfb, 0x1a, 0x29, 0x06, + 0xbd, 0x22, 0x28, 0x91, 0x56, 0xc0, 0x06, 0xa0, 0xdc, 0xf5, 0xb6, + 0xc2, 0xda, 0x6c} + }, + {"password", 7, + {0x78, 0xa0, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x85, 0xfa} + }, + {"Rough Consensus, and Running Code", 8, + {0xbb, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0x08, 0x70, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xe0}, + }, + {"password", 21, + {0x59, 0xe4, 0xa8, 0xca, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x85, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x7b, 0x3f, + 0x6d, 0x20, 0x00, 0x24, 0x7c, 0xb6, 0xe6, 0xbd, 0x5b, 0x3e}, + }, + {"MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY", 24, + {0xdb, 0x3b, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x60, 0x32, 0x82, 0xb3, + 0x08, 0xa5, 0x08, 0x41, 0x22, 0x9a, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xb9, 0x54, + 0x0c, 0x1b} + }, + {NULL, 0} +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + unsigned char data[MAXSIZE]; + struct testcase *t; + int ret = 0; + + for (t = tests; t->str; ++t) { + int i; + + _krb5_n_fold (t->str, strlen(t->str), data, t->n); + if (memcmp (data, t->res, t->n) != 0) { + printf ("n-fold(\"%s\", %d) failed\n", t->str, t->n); + printf ("should be: "); + for (i = 0; i < t->n; ++i) + printf ("%02x", t->res[i]); + printf ("\nresult was: "); + for (i = 0; i < t->n; ++i) + printf ("%02x", data[i]); + printf ("\n"); + ret = 1; + } + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/n-fold.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/n-fold.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d0db5e81cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/n-fold.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: n-fold.c,v 1.6 1999/08/27 09:03:41 joda Exp $"); + +static void +rr13(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *tmp; + int bytes = (len + 7) / 8; + int i; + if(len == 0) + return; + { + const int bits = 13 % len; + const int lbit = len % 8; + + tmp = malloc(bytes); + memcpy(tmp, buf, bytes); + if(lbit) { + /* pad final byte with inital bits */ + tmp[bytes - 1] &= 0xff << (8 - lbit); + for(i = lbit; i < 8; i += len) + tmp[bytes - 1] |= buf[0] >> i; + } + for(i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { + int bb; + int b1, s1, b2, s2; + /* calculate first bit position of this byte */ + bb = 8 * i - bits; + while(bb < 0) + bb += len; + /* byte offset and shift count */ + b1 = bb / 8; + s1 = bb % 8; + + if(bb + 8 > bytes * 8) + /* watch for wraparound */ + s2 = (len + 8 - s1) % 8; + else + s2 = 8 - s1; + b2 = (b1 + 1) % bytes; + buf[i] = (tmp[b1] << s1) | (tmp[b2] >> s2); + } + free(tmp); + } +} + +/* Add `b' to `a', both beeing one's complement numbers. */ +static void +add1(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, size_t len) +{ + int i; + int carry = 0; + for(i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--){ + int x = a[i] + b[i] + carry; + carry = x > 0xff; + a[i] = x & 0xff; + } + for(i = len - 1; carry && i >= 0; i--){ + int x = a[i] + carry; + carry = x > 0xff; + a[i] = x & 0xff; + } +} + +void +_krb5_n_fold(const void *str, size_t len, void *key, size_t size) +{ + /* if len < size we need at most N * len bytes, ie < 2 * size; + if len > size we need at most 2 * len */ + size_t maxlen = 2 * max(size, len); + size_t l = 0; + unsigned char *tmp = malloc(maxlen); + unsigned char *buf = malloc(len); + + memcpy(buf, str, len); + memset(key, 0, size); + do { + memcpy(tmp + l, buf, len); + l += len; + rr13(buf, len * 8); + while(l >= size) { + add1(key, tmp, size); + l -= size; + if(l == 0) + break; + memmove(tmp, tmp + size, l); + } + } while(l != 0); + memset(buf, 0, len); + free(buf); + memset(tmp, 0, maxlen); + free(tmp); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/name-45-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/name-45-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1455cddd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/name-45-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: name-45-test.c,v 1.3.2.1 2003/05/06 16:49:14 joda Exp $"); + +enum { MAX_COMPONENTS = 3 }; + +static struct testcase { + const char *v4_name; + const char *v4_inst; + const char *v4_realm; + + krb5_realm v5_realm; + unsigned ncomponents; + char *comp_val[MAX_COMPONENTS]; + + const char *config_file; + krb5_error_code ret; /* expected error code from 524 */ + + krb5_error_code ret2; /* expected error code from 425 */ +} tests[] = { + {"", "", "", "", 1, {""}, NULL, 0, 0}, + {"a", "", "", "", 1, {"a"}, NULL, 0, 0}, + {"a", "b", "", "", 2, {"a", "b"}, NULL, 0, 0}, + {"a", "b", "c", "c", 2, {"a", "b"}, NULL, 0, 0}, + + {"krbtgt", "FOO.SE", "FOO.SE", "FOO.SE", 2, + {"krbtgt", "FOO.SE"}, NULL, 0, 0}, + + {"foo", "bar", "BAZ", "BAZ", 2, + {"foo", "bar"}, NULL, 0, 0}, + {"foo", "bar", "BAZ", "BAZ", 2, + {"foo", "bar"}, + "[libdefaults]\n" + " v4_name_convert = {\n" + " host = {\n" + " foo = foo5\n" + " }\n" + "}\n", + HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, 0}, + {"foo", "bar", "BAZ", "BAZ", 2, + {"foo5", "bar.baz"}, + "[realms]\n" + " BAZ = {\n" + " v4_name_convert = {\n" + " host = {\n" + " foo = foo5\n" + " }\n" + " }\n" + " v4_instance_convert = {\n" + " bar = bar.baz\n" + " }\n" + " }\n", + 0, 0}, + + {"rcmd", "foo", "realm", "realm", 2, {"host", "foo"}, NULL, + HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, 0}, + {"rcmd", "foo", "realm", "realm", 2, {"host", "foo.realm"}, + "[realms]\n" + " realm = {\n" + " v4_instance_convert = {\n" + " foo = foo.realm\n" + " }\n" + " }\n", + 0, 0}, + + {"pop", "mail0", "NADA.KTH.SE", "NADA.KTH.SE", 2, + {"pop", "mail0.nada.kth.se"}, "", HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, 0}, + {"pop", "mail0", "NADA.KTH.SE", "NADA.KTH.SE", 2, + {"pop", "mail0.nada.kth.se"}, + "[realms]\n" + " NADA.KTH.SE = {\n" + " default_domain = nada.kth.se\n" + " }\n", + 0, 0}, + {"pop", "mail0", "NADA.KTH.SE", "NADA.KTH.SE", 2, + {"pop", "mail0.nada.kth.se"}, + "[libdefaults]\n" + " v4_instance_resolve = true\n", + HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, 0}, + + {"rcmd", "hokkigai", "NADA.KTH.SE", "NADA.KTH.SE", 2, + {"host", "hokkigai.pdc.kth.se"}, "", HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, 0}, + {"rcmd", "hokkigai", "NADA.KTH.SE", "NADA.KTH.SE", 2, + {"host", "hokkigai.pdc.kth.se"}, + "[libdefaults]\n" + " v4_instance_resolve = true\n" + "[realms]\n" + " NADA.KTH.SE = {\n" + " v4_name_convert = {\n" + " host = {\n" + " rcmd = host\n" + " }\n" + " }\n" + " default_domain = pdc.kth.se\n" + " }\n", + 0, 0}, + + {"0123456789012345678901234567890123456789", + "0123456789012345678901234567890123456789", + "0123456789012345678901234567890123456789", + "0123456789012345678901234567890123456789", + 2, {"0123456789012345678901234567890123456789", + "0123456789012345678901234567890123456789"}, NULL, + 0, KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED}, + + {"012345678901234567890123456789012345678", + "012345678901234567890123456789012345678", + "012345678901234567890123456789012345678", + "012345678901234567890123456789012345678", + 2, {"012345678901234567890123456789012345678", + "012345678901234567890123456789012345678"}, NULL, + 0, 0}, + + {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, {NULL}, NULL, 0} +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct testcase *t; + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + int val = 0; + + for (t = tests; t->v4_name; ++t) { + krb5_principal princ; + int i; + char name[40], inst[40], realm[40]; + char printable_princ[256]; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if (t->config_file != NULL) { + char template[] = "/tmp/krb5-conf-XXXXXX"; + int fd = mkstemp(template); + char *files[2]; + + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "mkstemp %s", template); + + if (write (fd, t->config_file, strlen(t->config_file)) + != strlen(t->config_file)) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "write %s", template); + close (fd); + files[0] = template; + files[1] = NULL; + + ret = krb5_set_config_files (context, files); + unlink (template); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_set_config_files"); + } + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal (context, + t->v4_name, + t->v4_inst, + t->v4_realm, + &princ); + if (ret) { + if (ret != t->ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, + "krb5_425_conv_principal %s.%s@%s", + t->v4_name, t->v4_inst, t->v4_realm); + val = 1; + } + } else { + if (t->ret) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &s); + krb5_warnx (context, + "krb5_425_conv_principal %s.%s@%s " + "passed unexpected: %s", + t->v4_name, t->v4_inst, t->v4_realm, s); + free(s); + val = 1; + continue; + } + } + + if (ret) + continue; + + if (strcmp (t->v5_realm, princ->realm) != 0) { + printf ("wrong realm (\"%s\" should be \"%s\")" + " for \"%s.%s@%s\"\n", + princ->realm, t->v5_realm, + t->v4_name, + t->v4_inst, + t->v4_realm); + val = 1; + } + + if (t->ncomponents != princ->name.name_string.len) { + printf ("wrong number of components (%u should be %u)" + " for \"%s.%s@%s\"\n", + princ->name.name_string.len, t->ncomponents, + t->v4_name, + t->v4_inst, + t->v4_realm); + val = 1; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < t->ncomponents; ++i) { + if (strcmp(t->comp_val[i], + princ->name.name_string.val[i]) != 0) { + printf ("bad component %d (\"%s\" should be \"%s\")" + " for \"%s.%s@%s\"\n", + i, + princ->name.name_string.val[i], + t->comp_val[i], + t->v4_name, + t->v4_inst, + t->v4_realm); + val = 1; + } + } + } + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal (context, princ, + name, inst, realm); + if (krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ, + printable_princ, sizeof(printable_princ))) + strlcpy(printable_princ, "unknown principal", + sizeof(printable_princ)); + if (ret) { + if (ret != t->ret2) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, + "krb5_524_conv_principal %s", printable_princ); + val = 1; + } + } else { + if (t->ret2) { + krb5_warnx (context, + "krb5_524_conv_principal %s " + "passed unexpected", printable_princ); + val = 1; + continue; + } + } + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, princ); + continue; + } + + krb5_free_principal (context, princ); + } + return val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/net_read.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/net_read.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38ff0ea639 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/net_read.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: net_read.c,v 1.6 2002/08/21 09:08:06 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_net_read (krb5_context context, + void *p_fd, + void *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int fd = *((int *)p_fd); + + return net_read (fd, buf, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/net_write.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/net_write.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d87b97547 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/net_write.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: net_write.c,v 1.7 2002/08/21 09:08:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_net_write (krb5_context context, + void *p_fd, + const void *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int fd = *((int *)p_fd); + + return net_write (fd, buf, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/padata.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/padata.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bcf795255a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/padata.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: padata.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +PA_DATA * +krb5_find_padata(PA_DATA *val, unsigned len, int type, int *index) +{ + for(; *index < len; (*index)++) + if(val[*index].padata_type == type) + return val + *index; + return NULL; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/parse-name-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/parse-name-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29bd6bb760 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/parse-name-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: parse-name-test.c,v 1.3.4.1 2004/03/22 19:27:36 joda Exp $"); + +enum { MAX_COMPONENTS = 3 }; + +static struct testcase { + const char *input_string; + const char *output_string; + krb5_realm realm; + unsigned ncomponents; + char *comp_val[MAX_COMPONENTS]; + int realmp; +} tests[] = { + {"", "@", "", 1, {""}, FALSE}, + {"a", "a@", "", 1, {"a"}, FALSE}, + {"\\n", "\\n@", "", 1, {"\n"}, FALSE}, + {"\\ ", "\\ @", "", 1, {" "}, FALSE}, + {"\\t", "\\t@", "", 1, {"\t"}, FALSE}, + {"\\b", "\\b@", "", 1, {"\b"}, FALSE}, + {"\\\\", "\\\\@", "", 1, {"\\"}, FALSE}, + {"\\/", "\\/@", "", 1, {"/"}, FALSE}, + {"\\@", "\\@@", "", 1, {"@"}, FALSE}, + {"@", "@", "", 1, {""}, TRUE}, + {"a/b", "a/b@", "", 2, {"a", "b"}, FALSE}, + {"a/", "a/@", "", 2, {"a", ""}, FALSE}, + {"a\\//\\/", "a\\//\\/@", "", 2, {"a/", "/"}, FALSE}, + {"/a", "/a@", "", 2, {"", "a"}, FALSE}, + {"\\@@\\@", "\\@@\\@", "@", 1, {"@"}, TRUE}, + {"a/b/c", "a/b/c@", "", 3, {"a", "b", "c"}, FALSE}, + {NULL, NULL, "", 0, { NULL }, FALSE}}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct testcase *t; + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + int val = 0; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + /* to enable realm-less principal name above */ + + krb5_set_default_realm(context, ""); + + for (t = tests; t->input_string; ++t) { + krb5_principal princ; + int i, j; + char name_buf[1024]; + char *s; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, t->input_string, &princ); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", + t->input_string); + if (strcmp (t->realm, princ->realm) != 0) { + printf ("wrong realm (\"%s\" should be \"%s\")" + " for \"%s\"\n", + princ->realm, t->realm, + t->input_string); + val = 1; + } + + if (t->ncomponents != princ->name.name_string.len) { + printf ("wrong number of components (%u should be %u)" + " for \"%s\"\n", + princ->name.name_string.len, t->ncomponents, + t->input_string); + val = 1; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < t->ncomponents; ++i) { + if (strcmp(t->comp_val[i], + princ->name.name_string.val[i]) != 0) { + printf ("bad component %d (\"%s\" should be \"%s\")" + " for \"%s\"\n", + i, + princ->name.name_string.val[i], + t->comp_val[i], + t->input_string); + val = 1; + } + } + } + for (j = 0; j < strlen(t->output_string); ++j) { + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ, + name_buf, j); + if (ret != ERANGE) { + printf ("unparse_name %s with length %d should have failed\n", + t->input_string, j); + val = 1; + break; + } + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ, + name_buf, sizeof(name_buf)); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name_fixed"); + + if (strcmp (t->output_string, name_buf) != 0) { + printf ("failed comparing the re-parsed" + " (\"%s\" should be \"%s\")\n", + name_buf, t->output_string); + val = 1; + } + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &s); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + if (strcmp (t->output_string, s) != 0) { + printf ("failed comparing the re-parsed" + " (\"%s\" should be \"%s\"\n", + s, t->output_string); + val = 1; + } + free(s); + + if (!t->realmp) { + for (j = 0; j < strlen(t->input_string); ++j) { + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short(context, princ, + name_buf, j); + if (ret != ERANGE) { + printf ("unparse_name_short %s with length %d" + " should have failed\n", + t->input_string, j); + val = 1; + break; + } + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short(context, princ, + name_buf, sizeof(name_buf)); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name_fixed"); + + if (strcmp (t->input_string, name_buf) != 0) { + printf ("failed comparing the re-parsed" + " (\"%s\" should be \"%s\")\n", + name_buf, t->input_string); + val = 1; + } + + ret = krb5_unparse_name_short(context, princ, &s); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name_short"); + + if (strcmp (t->input_string, s) != 0) { + printf ("failed comparing the re-parsed" + " (\"%s\" should be \"%s\"\n", + s, t->input_string); + val = 1; + } + free(s); + } + krb5_free_principal (context, princ); + } + return val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/principal.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/principal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d46f328017 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/principal.c @@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH +#define USE_RESOLVER +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "resolve.h" + +RCSID("$Id: principal.c,v 1.82.2.1 2003/08/15 14:30:07 lha Exp $"); + +#define princ_num_comp(P) ((P)->name.name_string.len) +#define princ_type(P) ((P)->name.name_type) +#define princ_comp(P) ((P)->name.name_string.val) +#define princ_ncomp(P, N) ((P)->name.name_string.val[(N)]) +#define princ_realm(P) ((P)->realm) + +void +krb5_free_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal p) +{ + if(p){ + free_Principal(p); + free(p); + } +} + +int +krb5_principal_get_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + return princ_type(principal); +} + +const char * +krb5_principal_get_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + return princ_realm(principal); +} + +const char * +krb5_principal_get_comp_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + unsigned int component) +{ + if(component >= princ_num_comp(principal)) + return NULL; + return princ_ncomp(principal, component); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_name(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + general_string *comp; + general_string realm; + int ncomp; + + const char *p; + char *q; + char *s; + char *start; + + int n; + char c; + int got_realm = 0; + + /* count number of component */ + ncomp = 1; + for(p = name; *p; p++){ + if(*p=='\\'){ + if(!p[1]) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "trailing \\ in principal name"); + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + } + p++; + } else if(*p == '/') + ncomp++; + } + comp = calloc(ncomp, sizeof(*comp)); + if (comp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + n = 0; + p = start = q = s = strdup(name); + if (start == NULL) { + free (comp); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + while(*p){ + c = *p++; + if(c == '\\'){ + c = *p++; + if(c == 'n') + c = '\n'; + else if(c == 't') + c = '\t'; + else if(c == 'b') + c = '\b'; + else if(c == '0') + c = '\0'; + else if(c == '\0') { + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "trailing \\ in principal name"); + ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + goto exit; + } + }else if(c == '/' || c == '@'){ + if(got_realm){ + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "part after realm in principal name"); + ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + goto exit; + }else{ + comp[n] = malloc(q - start + 1); + if (comp[n] == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + memcpy(comp[n], start, q - start); + comp[n][q - start] = 0; + n++; + } + if(c == '@') + got_realm = 1; + start = q; + continue; + } + if(got_realm && (c == ':' || c == '/' || c == '\0')) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "part after realm in principal name"); + ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + goto exit; + } + *q++ = c; + } + if(got_realm){ + realm = malloc(q - start + 1); + if (realm == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + memcpy(realm, start, q - start); + realm[q - start] = 0; + }else{ + ret = krb5_get_default_realm (context, &realm); + if (ret) + goto exit; + + comp[n] = malloc(q - start + 1); + if (comp[n] == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + memcpy(comp[n], start, q - start); + comp[n][q - start] = 0; + n++; + } + *principal = malloc(sizeof(**principal)); + if (*principal == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + (*principal)->name.name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL; + (*principal)->name.name_string.val = comp; + princ_num_comp(*principal) = n; + (*principal)->realm = realm; + free(s); + return 0; +exit: + while(n>0){ + free(comp[--n]); + } + free(comp); + free(s); + return ret; +} + +static const char quotable_chars[] = " \n\t\b\\/@"; +static const char replace_chars[] = " ntb\\/@"; + +#define add_char(BASE, INDEX, LEN, C) do { if((INDEX) < (LEN)) (BASE)[(INDEX)++] = (C); }while(0); + +static size_t +quote_string(const char *s, char *out, size_t index, size_t len) +{ + const char *p, *q; + for(p = s; *p && index < len; p++){ + if((q = strchr(quotable_chars, *p))){ + add_char(out, index, len, '\\'); + add_char(out, index, len, replace_chars[q - quotable_chars]); + }else + add_char(out, index, len, *p); + } + if(index < len) + out[index] = '\0'; + return index; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_name_fixed(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean short_form) +{ + size_t index = 0; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(principal); i++){ + if(i) + add_char(name, index, len, '/'); + index = quote_string(princ_ncomp(principal, i), name, index, len); + if(index == len) + return ERANGE; + } + /* add realm if different from default realm */ + if(short_form) { + krb5_realm r; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &r); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(strcmp(princ_realm(principal), r) != 0) + short_form = 0; + free(r); + } + if(!short_form) { + add_char(name, index, len, '@'); + index = quote_string(princ_realm(principal), name, index, len); + if(index == len) + return ERANGE; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len) +{ + return unparse_name_fixed(context, principal, name, len, FALSE); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len) +{ + return unparse_name_fixed(context, principal, name, len, TRUE); +} + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name, + krb5_boolean short_flag) +{ + size_t len = 0, plen; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + /* count length */ + plen = strlen(princ_realm(principal)); + if(strcspn(princ_realm(principal), quotable_chars) == plen) + len += plen; + else + len += 2*plen; + len++; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(principal); i++){ + plen = strlen(princ_ncomp(principal, i)); + if(strcspn(princ_ncomp(principal, i), quotable_chars) == plen) + len += plen; + else + len += 2*plen; + len++; + } + len++; + *name = malloc(len); + if(*name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = unparse_name_fixed(context, principal, *name, len, short_flag); + if(ret) { + free(*name); + *name = NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name) +{ + return unparse_name(context, principal, name, FALSE); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_short(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name) +{ + return unparse_name(context, principal, name, TRUE); +} + +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_ext(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name, + size_t *size) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_unparse_name_ext called"); +} + +#endif + +krb5_realm* +krb5_princ_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + return &princ_realm(principal); +} + + +void +krb5_princ_set_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_realm *realm) +{ + princ_realm(principal) = *realm; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, realm); + ret = krb5_build_principal_va(context, principal, rlen, realm, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +append_component(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, + const char *comp, + size_t comp_len) +{ + general_string *tmp; + size_t len = princ_num_comp(p); + + tmp = realloc(princ_comp(p), (len + 1) * sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + princ_comp(p) = tmp; + princ_ncomp(p, len) = malloc(comp_len + 1); + if (princ_ncomp(p, len) == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (princ_ncomp(p, len), comp, comp_len); + princ_ncomp(p, len)[comp_len] = '\0'; + princ_num_comp(p)++; + return 0; +} + +static void +va_ext_princ(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, va_list ap) +{ + while(1){ + const char *s; + int len; + len = va_arg(ap, int); + if(len == 0) + break; + s = va_arg(ap, const char*); + append_component(context, p, s, len); + } +} + +static void +va_princ(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, va_list ap) +{ + while(1){ + const char *s; + s = va_arg(ap, const char*); + if(s == NULL) + break; + append_component(context, p, s, strlen(s)); + } +} + + +static krb5_error_code +build_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + void (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal, va_list), + va_list ap) +{ + krb5_principal p; + + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + princ_type(p) = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL; + + princ_realm(p) = strdup(realm); + if(p->realm == NULL){ + free(p); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*func)(context, p, ap); + *principal = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm r = NULL; + va_list ap; + if(realm == NULL) { + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &r); + if(ret) + return ret; + realm = r; + } + va_start(ap, realm); + ret = krb5_build_principal_va(context, principal, strlen(realm), realm, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(r) + free(r); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + va_list ap) +{ + return build_principal(context, principal, rlen, realm, va_princ, ap); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va_ext(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + va_list ap) +{ + return build_principal(context, principal, rlen, realm, va_ext_princ, ap); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_ext(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, realm); + ret = krb5_build_principal_va_ext(context, principal, rlen, realm, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal inprinc, + krb5_principal *outprinc) +{ + krb5_principal p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if(copy_Principal(inprinc, p)) { + free(p); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *outprinc = p; + return 0; +} + +/* + * return TRUE iff princ1 == princ2 (without considering the realm) + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2) +{ + int i; + if(princ_num_comp(princ1) != princ_num_comp(princ2)) + return FALSE; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(princ1); i++){ + if(strcmp(princ_ncomp(princ1, i), princ_ncomp(princ2, i)) != 0) + return FALSE; + } + return TRUE; +} + +/* + * return TRUE iff princ1 == princ2 + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2) +{ + if(!krb5_realm_compare(context, princ1, princ2)) + return FALSE; + return krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, princ1, princ2); +} + +/* + * return TRUE iff realm(princ1) == realm(princ2) + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_realm_compare(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2) +{ + return strcmp(princ_realm(princ1), princ_realm(princ2)) == 0; +} + +/* + * return TRUE iff princ matches pattern + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_match(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ, + krb5_const_principal pattern) +{ + int i; + if(princ_num_comp(princ) != princ_num_comp(pattern)) + return FALSE; + if(fnmatch(princ_realm(pattern), princ_realm(princ), 0) != 0) + return FALSE; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(princ); i++){ + if(fnmatch(princ_ncomp(pattern, i), princ_ncomp(princ, i), 0) != 0) + return FALSE; + } + return TRUE; +} + + +struct v4_name_convert { + const char *from; + const char *to; +} default_v4_name_convert[] = { + { "ftp", "ftp" }, + { "hprop", "hprop" }, + { "pop", "pop" }, + { "imap", "imap" }, + { "rcmd", "host" }, + { "smtp", "smtp" }, + { NULL, NULL } +}; + +/* + * return the converted instance name of `name' in `realm'. + * look in the configuration file and then in the default set above. + * return NULL if no conversion is appropriate. + */ + +static const char* +get_name_conversion(krb5_context context, const char *realm, const char *name) +{ + struct v4_name_convert *q; + const char *p; + + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "v4_name_convert", "host", name, NULL); + if(p == NULL) + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", "host", name, NULL); + if(p) + return p; + + /* XXX should be possible to override default list */ + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p) + return NULL; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p) + return NULL; + for(q = default_v4_name_convert; q->from; q++) + if(strcmp(q->from, name) == 0) + return q->to; + return NULL; +} + +/* + * convert the v4 principal `name.instance@realm' to a v5 principal in `princ'. + * if `resolve', use DNS. + * if `func', use that function for validating the conversion + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal_ext(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + krb5_boolean (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal), + krb5_boolean resolve, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + const char *p; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal pr; + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + char local_hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + /* do the following: if the name is found in the + `v4_name_convert:host' part, is is assumed to be a `host' type + principal, and the instance is looked up in the + `v4_instance_convert' part. if not found there the name is + (optionally) looked up as a hostname, and if that doesn't yield + anything, the `default_domain' is appended to the instance + */ + + if(instance == NULL) + goto no_host; + if(instance[0] == 0){ + instance = NULL; + goto no_host; + } + p = get_name_conversion(context, realm, name); + if(p == NULL) + goto no_host; + name = p; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "v4_instance_convert", instance, NULL); + if(p){ + instance = p; + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, instance, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + *princ = NULL; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; + } + if(resolve){ + krb5_boolean passed = FALSE; + char *inst = NULL; +#ifdef USE_RESOLVER + struct dns_reply *r; + + r = dns_lookup(instance, "aaaa"); + if (r && r->head && r->head->type == T_AAAA) { + inst = strdup(r->head->domain); + dns_free_data(r); + passed = TRUE; + } else { + r = dns_lookup(instance, "a"); + if(r && r->head && r->head->type == T_A) { + inst = strdup(r->head->domain); + dns_free_data(r); + passed = TRUE; + } + } +#else + struct addrinfo hints, *ai; + int ret; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + ret = getaddrinfo(instance, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (ret == 0) { + const struct addrinfo *a; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + inst = strdup (a->ai_canonname); + passed = TRUE; + break; + } + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + } +#endif + if (passed) { + if (inst == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + strlwr(inst); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, inst, + NULL); + free (inst); + if(ret == 0) { + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + } + } + } + if(func != NULL) { + snprintf(host, sizeof(host), "%s.%s", instance, realm); + strlwr(host); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, host, NULL); + if((*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + } + + /* + * if the instance is the first component of the local hostname, + * the converted host should be the long hostname. + */ + + if (func == NULL && + gethostname (local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)) == 0 && + strncmp(instance, local_hostname, strlen(instance)) == 0 && + local_hostname[strlen(instance)] == '.') { + strlcpy(host, local_hostname, sizeof(host)); + goto local_host; + } + + { + char **domains, **d; + domains = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "v4_domains", NULL); + for(d = domains; d && *d; d++){ + snprintf(host, sizeof(host), "%s.%s", instance, *d); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, host, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + krb5_config_free_strings(domains); + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + } + krb5_config_free_strings(domains); + } + + + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "default_domain", NULL); + if(p == NULL){ + /* this should be an error, just faking a name is not good */ + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; + } + + if (*p == '.') + ++p; + snprintf(host, sizeof(host), "%s.%s", instance, p); +local_host: + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, host, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; +no_host: + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p == NULL) + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p) + name = p; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, instance, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + krb5_boolean resolve = krb5_config_get_bool(context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_instance_resolve", + NULL); + + return krb5_425_conv_principal_ext(context, name, instance, realm, + NULL, resolve, princ); +} + + +static int +check_list(const krb5_config_binding *l, const char *name, const char **out) +{ + while(l){ + if (l->type != krb5_config_string) + continue; + if(strcmp(name, l->u.string) == 0) { + *out = l->name; + return 1; + } + l = l->next; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +name_convert(krb5_context context, const char *name, const char *realm, + const char **out) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *l; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "host", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_SRV_HST; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "host", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_SRV_HST; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "host", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + + /* didn't find it in config file, try built-in list */ + { + struct v4_name_convert *q; + for(q = default_v4_name_convert; q->from; q++) { + if(strcmp(name, q->to) == 0) { + *out = q->from; + return KRB5_NT_SRV_HST; + } + } + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * convert the v5 principal in `principal' into a v4 corresponding one + * in `name, instance, realm' + * this is limited interface since there's no length given for these + * three parameters. They have to be 40 bytes each (ANAME_SZ). + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_524_conv_principal(krb5_context context, + const krb5_principal principal, + char *name, + char *instance, + char *realm) +{ + const char *n, *i, *r; + char tmpinst[40]; + int type = princ_type(principal); + const int aname_sz = 40; + + r = principal->realm; + + switch(principal->name.name_string.len){ + case 1: + n = principal->name.name_string.val[0]; + i = ""; + break; + case 2: + n = principal->name.name_string.val[0]; + i = principal->name.name_string.val[1]; + break; + default: + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "cannot convert a %d component principal", + principal->name.name_string.len); + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + } + + { + const char *tmp; + int t = name_convert(context, n, r, &tmp); + if(t >= 0) { + type = t; + n = tmp; + } + } + + if(type == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST){ + char *p; + + strlcpy (tmpinst, i, sizeof(tmpinst)); + p = strchr(tmpinst, '.'); + if(p) + *p = 0; + i = tmpinst; + } + + if (strlcpy (name, n, aname_sz) >= aname_sz) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "too long name component to convert"); + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + } + if (strlcpy (instance, i, aname_sz) >= aname_sz) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "too long instance component to convert"); + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + } + if (strlcpy (realm, r, aname_sz) >= aname_sz) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, + "too long realm component to convert"); + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create a principal in `ret_princ' for the service `sname' running + * on host `hostname'. */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sname_to_principal (krb5_context context, + const char *hostname, + const char *sname, + int32_t type, + krb5_principal *ret_princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + char **realms, *host = NULL; + + if(type != KRB5_NT_SRV_HST && type != KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "unsupported name type %d", + type); + return KRB5_SNAME_UNSUPP_NAMETYPE; + } + if(hostname == NULL) { + gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost)); + hostname = localhost; + } + if(sname == NULL) + sname = "host"; + if(type == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST) { + ret = krb5_expand_hostname_realms (context, hostname, + &host, &realms); + if (ret) + return ret; + strlwr(host); + hostname = host; + } else { + ret = krb5_get_host_realm(context, hostname, &realms); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, ret_princ, realms[0], sname, + hostname, NULL); + if(host) + free(host); + krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/prog_setup.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/prog_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f5efb65fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/prog_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: prog_setup.c,v 1.9 2001/02/20 01:44:54 assar Exp $"); + +void +krb5_std_usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +int +krb5_program_setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv, + struct getargs *args, int num_args, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int)) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int optind = 0; + + if(usage == NULL) + usage = krb5_std_usage; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + ret = krb5_init_context(context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + (*usage)(1, args, num_args); + return optind; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4aea3a4229 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: prompter_posix.c,v 1.7 2002/09/16 17:32:11 nectar Exp $"); + +int +krb5_prompter_posix (krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *name, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]) +{ + int i; + + if (name) + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", name); + if (banner) + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", banner); + for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; ++i) { + if (prompts[i].hidden) { + if(des_read_pw_string(prompts[i].reply->data, + prompts[i].reply->length, + prompts[i].prompt, + 0)) + return 1; + } else { + char *s = prompts[i].reply->data; + + fputs (prompts[i].prompt, stdout); + fflush (stdout); + if(fgets(prompts[i].reply->data, + prompts[i].reply->length, + stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + s[strcspn(s, "\n")] = '\0'; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4a7d74cad5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_cred.c,v 1.18 2002/09/04 16:26:05 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds ***ret_creds, + krb5_replay_data *out_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len; + KRB_CRED cred; + EncKrbCredPart enc_krb_cred_part; + krb5_data enc_krb_cred_part_data; + krb5_crypto crypto; + int i; + + *ret_creds = NULL; + + ret = decode_KRB_CRED(in_data->data, in_data->length, + &cred, &len); + if(ret) + return ret; + + if (cred.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + + if (cred.msg_type != krb_cred) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + + if (cred.enc_part.etype == ETYPE_NULL) { + /* DK: MIT GSS-API Compatibility */ + enc_krb_cred_part_data.length = cred.enc_part.cipher.length; + enc_krb_cred_part_data.data = cred.enc_part.cipher.data; + } else { + if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->remote_subkey, + 0, &crypto); + else + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, + 0, &crypto); + /* DK: MIT rsh */ + + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_CRED, + &cred.enc_part, + &enc_krb_cred_part_data); + + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart (context, + enc_krb_cred_part_data.data, + enc_krb_cred_part_data.length, + &enc_krb_cred_part, + &len); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* check sender address */ + + if (enc_krb_cred_part.s_address + && auth_context->remote_address + && auth_context->remote_port) { + krb5_address *a; + int cmp; + + ret = krb5_make_addrport (context, &a, + auth_context->remote_address, + auth_context->remote_port); + if (ret) + goto out; + + + cmp = krb5_address_compare (context, + a, + enc_krb_cred_part.s_address); + + krb5_free_address (context, a); + free (a); + + if (cmp == 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto out; + } + } + + /* check receiver address */ + + if (enc_krb_cred_part.r_address + && auth_context->local_address) { + if(auth_context->local_port && + enc_krb_cred_part.r_address->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT) { + krb5_address *a; + int cmp; + ret = krb5_make_addrport (context, &a, + auth_context->local_address, + auth_context->local_port); + if (ret) + goto out; + + cmp = krb5_address_compare (context, + a, + enc_krb_cred_part.r_address); + krb5_free_address (context, a); + free (a); + + if (cmp == 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto out; + } + } else { + if(!krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->local_address, + enc_krb_cred_part.r_address)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto out; + } + } + } + + /* check timestamp */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + krb5_timestamp sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + if (enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp == NULL || + enc_krb_cred_part.usec == NULL || + abs(*enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp - sec) + > context->max_skew) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + goto out; + } + } + + if(out_data != NULL) { + if(enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp) + out_data->timestamp = *enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp; + else + out_data->timestamp = 0; + if(enc_krb_cred_part.usec) + out_data->usec = *enc_krb_cred_part.usec; + else + out_data->usec = 0; + if(enc_krb_cred_part.nonce) + out_data->seq = *enc_krb_cred_part.nonce; + else + out_data->seq = 0; + } + + /* Convert to NULL terminated list of creds */ + + *ret_creds = calloc(enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.len + 1, + sizeof(**ret_creds)); + + if (*ret_creds == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.len; ++i) { + KrbCredInfo *kci = &enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.val[i]; + krb5_creds *creds; + size_t len; + + creds = calloc(1, sizeof(*creds)); + if(creds == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out; + } + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, creds->ticket.data, creds->ticket.length, + &cred.tickets.val[i], &len, ret); + if (ret) + goto out; + if(creds->ticket.length != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + copy_EncryptionKey (&kci->key, &creds->session); + if (kci->prealm && kci->pname) + principalname2krb5_principal (&creds->client, + *kci->pname, + *kci->prealm); + if (kci->flags) + creds->flags.b = *kci->flags; + if (kci->authtime) + creds->times.authtime = *kci->authtime; + if (kci->starttime) + creds->times.starttime = *kci->starttime; + if (kci->endtime) + creds->times.endtime = *kci->endtime; + if (kci->renew_till) + creds->times.renew_till = *kci->renew_till; + if (kci->srealm && kci->sname) + principalname2krb5_principal (&creds->server, + *kci->sname, + *kci->srealm); + if (kci->caddr) + krb5_copy_addresses (context, + kci->caddr, + &creds->addresses); + + (*ret_creds)[i] = creds; + + } + (*ret_creds)[i] = NULL; + return 0; + +out: + free_KRB_CRED (&cred); + if(*ret_creds) { + for(i = 0; (*ret_creds)[i]; i++) + krb5_free_creds(context, (*ret_creds)[i]); + free(*ret_creds); + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_cred2 (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *in_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds **creds; + int i; + + ret = krb5_rd_cred(context, auth_context, in_data, &creds, NULL); + if(ret) + return ret; + + /* Store the creds in the ccache */ + + for(i = 0; creds && creds[i]; i++) { + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, creds[i]); + krb5_free_creds(context, creds[i]); + } + free(creds); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_error.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca02f3d61a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_error.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rd_error.c,v 1.6 2001/05/15 06:35:10 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_error(krb5_context context, + krb5_data *msg, + KRB_ERROR *result) +{ + + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = decode_KRB_ERROR(msg->data, msg->length, result, &len); + if(ret) + return ret; + result->error_code += KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE; + return 0; +} + +void +krb5_free_error_contents (krb5_context context, + krb5_error *error) +{ + free_KRB_ERROR(error); +} + +void +krb5_free_error (krb5_context context, + krb5_error *error) +{ + krb5_free_error_contents (context, error); + free (error); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_error_from_rd_error(krb5_context context, + const krb5_error *error, + const krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = error->error_code; + if (error->e_text != NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "%s", *error->e_text); + } else { + char clientname[256], servername[256]; + + if (creds != NULL) { + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, creds->client, + clientname, sizeof(clientname)); + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, creds->server, + servername, sizeof(servername)); + } + + switch (ret) { + case KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP : + krb5_set_error_string(context, "Client %s%s%s expired", + creds ? "(" : "", + creds ? clientname : "", + creds ? ")" : ""); + break; + case KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP : + krb5_set_error_string(context, "Server %s%s%s expired", + creds ? "(" : "", + creds ? servername : "", + creds ? ")" : ""); + break; + case KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN : + krb5_set_error_string(context, "Client %s%s%s unknown", + creds ? "(" : "", + creds ? clientname : "", + creds ? ")" : ""); + break; + case KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN : + krb5_set_error_string(context, "Server %s%s%s unknown", + creds ? "(" : "", + creds ? servername : "", + creds ? ")" : ""); + break; + default : + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + break; + } + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_priv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_priv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36ffed5980 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_priv.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_priv.c,v 1.29 2001/06/18 02:46:15 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_priv(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_PRIV priv; + EncKrbPrivPart part; + size_t len; + krb5_data plain; + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + memset(&priv, 0, sizeof(priv)); + ret = decode_KRB_PRIV (inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &priv, &len); + if (ret) + goto failure; + if (priv.pvno != 5) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto failure; + } + if (priv.msg_type != krb_priv) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + goto failure; + } + + if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + goto failure; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_PRIV, + &priv.enc_part, + &plain); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + ret = decode_EncKrbPrivPart (plain.data, plain.length, &part, &len); + krb5_data_free (&plain); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + /* check sender address */ + + if (part.s_address + && auth_context->remote_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->remote_address, + part.s_address)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto failure_part; + } + + /* check receiver address */ + + if (part.r_address + && auth_context->local_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->local_address, + part.r_address)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto failure_part; + } + + /* check timestamp */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + krb5_timestamp sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + if (part.timestamp == NULL || + part.usec == NULL || + abs(*part.timestamp - sec) > context->max_skew) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + goto failure_part; + } + } + + /* XXX - check replay cache */ + + /* check sequence number. since MIT krb5 cannot generate a sequence + number of zero but instead generates no sequence number, we accept that + */ + + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + if ((part.seq_number == NULL + && auth_context->remote_seqnumber != 0) + || (part.seq_number != NULL + && *part.seq_number != auth_context->remote_seqnumber)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER; + goto failure_part; + } + auth_context->remote_seqnumber++; + } + + ret = krb5_data_copy (outbuf, part.user_data.data, part.user_data.length); + if (ret) + goto failure_part; + + free_EncKrbPrivPart (&part); + free_KRB_PRIV (&priv); + return 0; + +failure_part: + free_EncKrbPrivPart (&part); + +failure: + free_KRB_PRIV (&priv); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f947de5e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_rep.c,v 1.22 2001/06/18 02:46:53 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_rep(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + AP_REP ap_rep; + size_t len; + krb5_data data; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = 0; + + ret = decode_AP_REP(inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &ap_rep, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ap_rep.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + if (ap_rep.msg_type != krb_ap_rep) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART, + &ap_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + + *repl = malloc(sizeof(**repl)); + if (*repl == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + *repl, + &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if ((*repl)->ctime != auth_context->authenticator->ctime || + (*repl)->cusec != auth_context->authenticator->cusec) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + if ((*repl)->seq_number) + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context, auth_context, + *((*repl)->seq_number)); + if ((*repl)->subkey) + krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(context, auth_context, (*repl)->subkey); + +out: + krb5_data_free (&data); + free_AP_REP (&ap_rep); + return ret; +} + +void +krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (krb5_context context, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *val) +{ + free_EncAPRepPart (val); + free (val); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_req.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..590952eb3b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,544 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_req.c,v 1.47.8.3 2003/10/21 20:10:33 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_tkt_enc_part (krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + EncryptedData *enc_part, + EncTicketPart *decr_part) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data plain; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + enc_part, + &plain); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_EncTicketPart(context, plain.data, plain.length, + decr_part, &len); + krb5_data_free (&plain); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_authenticator (krb5_context context, + EncryptionKey *key, + EncryptedData *enc_part, + Authenticator *authenticator, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data plain; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + usage /* KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH */, + enc_part, + &plain); + /* for backwards compatibility, also try the old usage */ + if (ret && usage == KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH) + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH, + enc_part, + &plain); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_Authenticator(context, plain.data, plain.length, + authenticator, &len); + krb5_data_free (&plain); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ap_req(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len; + ret = decode_AP_REQ(inbuf->data, inbuf->length, ap_req, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ap_req->pvno != 5){ + free_AP_REQ(ap_req); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + if (ap_req->msg_type != krb_ap_req){ + free_AP_REQ(ap_req); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + } + if (ap_req->ticket.tkt_vno != 5){ + free_AP_REQ(ap_req); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +check_transited(krb5_context context, Ticket *ticket, EncTicketPart *enc) +{ + char **realms; + int num_realms; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(enc->transited.tr_type != DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) + return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; + + if(enc->transited.contents.length == 0) + return 0; + + ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context, enc->transited.contents, + &realms, &num_realms, + enc->crealm, + ticket->realm); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_check_transited(context, enc->crealm, + ticket->realm, + realms, num_realms, NULL); + free(realms); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_ticket(krb5_context context, + Ticket *ticket, + krb5_keyblock *key, + EncTicketPart *out, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + EncTicketPart t; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = decrypt_tkt_enc_part (context, key, &ticket->enc_part, &t); + if (ret) + return ret; + + { + krb5_timestamp now; + time_t start = t.authtime; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &now); + if(t.starttime) + start = *t.starttime; + if(start - now > context->max_skew + || (t.flags.invalid + && !(flags & KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID))) { + free_EncTicketPart(&t); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV; + } + if(now - t.endtime > context->max_skew) { + free_EncTicketPart(&t); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED; + } + + if(!t.flags.transited_policy_checked) { + ret = check_transited(context, ticket, &t); + if(ret) { + free_EncTicketPart(&t); + return ret; + } + } + } + + if(out) + *out = t; + else + free_EncTicketPart(&t); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + void *data, + size_t len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_authenticator authenticator; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator (context, + ac, + &authenticator); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(authenticator->cksum == NULL) + return -17; + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &key); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_verify_checksum (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, + data, + len, + authenticator->cksum); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); +out: + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, key); + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_ap_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags flags, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + return krb5_verify_ap_req2 (context, + auth_context, + ap_req, + server, + keyblock, + flags, + ap_req_options, + ticket, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_ap_req2(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags flags, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + krb5_ticket t; + krb5_auth_context ac; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if (auth_context && *auth_context) { + ac = *auth_context; + } else { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &ac); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key && ac->keyblock){ + ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket, + ac->keyblock, + &t.ticket, + flags); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock); + ac->keyblock = NULL; + }else + ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket, + keyblock, + &t.ticket, + flags); + + if(ret) + goto out; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&t.server, ap_req->ticket.sname, + ap_req->ticket.realm); + principalname2krb5_principal(&t.client, t.ticket.cname, + t.ticket.crealm); + + /* save key */ + + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &t.ticket.key, &ac->keyblock); + + ret = decrypt_authenticator (context, + &t.ticket.key, + &ap_req->authenticator, + ac->authenticator, + usage); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + { + krb5_principal p1, p2; + krb5_boolean res; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&p1, + ac->authenticator->cname, + ac->authenticator->crealm); + principalname2krb5_principal(&p2, + t.ticket.cname, + t.ticket.crealm); + res = krb5_principal_compare (context, p1, p2); + krb5_free_principal (context, p1); + krb5_free_principal (context, p2); + if (!res) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out2; + } + } + + /* check addresses */ + + if (t.ticket.caddr + && ac->remote_address + && !krb5_address_search (context, + ac->remote_address, + t.ticket.caddr)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out2; + } + + if (ac->authenticator->seq_number) + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context, ac, + *ac->authenticator->seq_number); + + /* XXX - Xor sequence numbers */ + + if (ac->authenticator->subkey) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(context, ac, + ac->authenticator->subkey); + if (ret) + goto out2; + } + + if (ap_req_options) { + *ap_req_options = 0; + if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key) + *ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY; + if (ap_req->ap_options.mutual_required) + *ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED; + } + + if(ticket){ + *ticket = malloc(sizeof(**ticket)); + **ticket = t; + } else + krb5_free_ticket (context, &t); + if (auth_context) { + if (*auth_context == NULL) + *auth_context = ac; + } else + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + return 0; + out2: + krb5_free_ticket (context, &t); + out: + if (auth_context == NULL || *auth_context == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ap_req ap_req; + + if (*auth_context == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, inbuf, &ap_req); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_verify_ap_req(context, + auth_context, + &ap_req, + server, + keyblock, + 0, + ap_req_options, + ticket); + + free_AP_REQ(&ap_req); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_key_from_keytab(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_keyblock **out_key) +{ + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_error_code ret; + int kvno; + krb5_keytab real_keytab; + + if(keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_default(context, &real_keytab); + else + real_keytab = keytab; + + if (ap_req->ticket.enc_part.kvno) + kvno = *ap_req->ticket.enc_part.kvno; + else + kvno = 0; + + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, + real_keytab, + server, + kvno, + ap_req->ticket.enc_part.etype, + &entry); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &entry.keyblock, out_key); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); +out: + if(keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_close(context, real_keytab); + + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ap_req ap_req; + krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL; + krb5_principal service = NULL; + + if (*auth_context == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, inbuf, &ap_req); + if(ret) + return ret; + + if(server == NULL){ + principalname2krb5_principal(&service, + ap_req.ticket.sname, + ap_req.ticket.realm); + server = service; + } + if (ap_req.ap_options.use_session_key && + (*auth_context)->keyblock == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "krb5_rd_req: user to user auth " + "without session key given"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY; + goto out; + } + + if((*auth_context)->keyblock == NULL){ + ret = get_key_from_keytab(context, + auth_context, + &ap_req, + server, + keytab, + &keyblock); + if(ret) + goto out; + } else { + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, + (*auth_context)->keyblock, + &keyblock); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_verify_ap_req(context, + auth_context, + &ap_req, + server, + keyblock, + 0, + ap_req_options, + ticket); + + if(keyblock != NULL) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock); + +out: + free_AP_REQ(&ap_req); + if(service) + krb5_free_principal(context, service); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_safe.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_safe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bbba237b27 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/rd_safe.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_safe.c,v 1.27 2002/09/04 16:26:05 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + KRB_SAFE *safe) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + Checksum c; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_keyblock *key; + + c = safe->cksum; + safe->cksum.cksumtype = 0; + safe->cksum.checksum.data = NULL; + safe->cksum.checksum.length = 0; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB_SAFE, buf, buf_size, safe, &len, ret); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_verify_checksum (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &c); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); +out: + safe->cksum = c; + free (buf); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_safe(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_SAFE safe; + size_t len; + + ret = decode_KRB_SAFE (inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &safe, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (safe.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + if (safe.msg_type != krb_safe) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + if (!krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, safe.cksum.cksumtype) + || !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, safe.cksum.cksumtype)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + + /* check sender address */ + + if (safe.safe_body.s_address + && auth_context->remote_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->remote_address, + safe.safe_body.s_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + + /* check receiver address */ + + if (safe.safe_body.r_address + && auth_context->local_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->local_address, + safe.safe_body.r_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + + /* check timestamp */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + krb5_timestamp sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + if (safe.safe_body.timestamp == NULL || + safe.safe_body.usec == NULL || + abs(*safe.safe_body.timestamp - sec) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + } + /* XXX - check replay cache */ + + /* check sequence number. since MIT krb5 cannot generate a sequence + number of zero but instead generates no sequence number, we accept that + */ + + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + if ((safe.safe_body.seq_number == NULL + && auth_context->remote_seqnumber != 0) + || (safe.safe_body.seq_number != NULL + && *safe.safe_body.seq_number != + auth_context->remote_seqnumber)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto failure; + } + auth_context->remote_seqnumber++; + } + + ret = verify_checksum (context, auth_context, &safe); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + outbuf->length = safe.safe_body.user_data.length; + outbuf->data = malloc(outbuf->length); + if (outbuf->data == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto failure; + } + memcpy (outbuf->data, safe.safe_body.user_data.data, outbuf->length); + free_KRB_SAFE (&safe); + return 0; +failure: + free_KRB_SAFE (&safe); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/read_message.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/read_message.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..124499ad4c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/read_message.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: read_message.c,v 1.8 2001/05/14 06:14:51 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_message (krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t len; + u_int8_t buf[4]; + + ret = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, buf, 4); + if(ret == -1) { + ret = errno; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return ret; + } + if(ret < 4) { + data->length = 0; + return HEIM_ERR_EOF; + } + len = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, data->data, len) != len) { + ret = errno; + krb5_data_free (data); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_priv_message(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data packet; + + ret = krb5_read_message(context, p_fd, &packet); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, ac, &packet, data, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&packet); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_safe_message(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data packet; + + ret = krb5_read_message(context, p_fd, &packet); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_rd_safe (context, ac, &packet, data, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&packet); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/recvauth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/recvauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d72b5c644d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/recvauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: recvauth.c,v 1.16 2002/04/18 09:41:33 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * See `sendauth.c' for the format. + */ + +static krb5_boolean +match_exact(const void *data, const char *appl_version) +{ + return strcmp(data, appl_version) == 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + const char *appl_version, + krb5_principal server, + int32_t flags, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + return krb5_recvauth_match_version(context, auth_context, p_fd, + match_exact, appl_version, + server, flags, + keytab, ticket); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth_match_version(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_boolean (*match_appl_version)(const void *, + const char*), + const void *match_data, + krb5_principal server, + int32_t flags, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *version = KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION; + char her_version[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)]; + char *her_appl_version; + u_int32_t len; + u_char repl; + krb5_data data; + krb5_flags ap_options; + ssize_t n; + + /* + * If there are no addresses in auth_context, get them from `fd'. + */ + + if (*auth_context == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + *auth_context, + p_fd); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if(!(flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION)) { + n = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, &len, 4); + if (n < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "read: %s", strerror(errno)); + return ret; + } + if (n == 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS; + } + len = ntohl(len); + if (len != sizeof(her_version) + || krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, her_version, len) != len + || strncmp (version, her_version, len)) { + repl = 1; + krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS; + } + } + + n = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, &len, 4); + if (n < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "read: %s", strerror(errno)); + return ret; + } + if (n == 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS; + } + len = ntohl(len); + her_appl_version = malloc (len); + if (her_appl_version == NULL) { + repl = 2; + krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if (krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, her_appl_version, len) != len + || !(*match_appl_version)(match_data, her_appl_version)) { + repl = 2; + krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "wrong sendauth version (%s)", + her_appl_version); + free (her_appl_version); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS; + } + free (her_appl_version); + + repl = 0; + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1) != 1) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "write: %s", strerror(errno)); + return ret; + } + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = krb5_read_message (context, p_fd, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_req (context, + auth_context, + &data, + server, + keytab, + &ap_options, + ticket); + krb5_data_free (&data); + if (ret) { + krb5_data error_data; + krb5_error_code ret2; + + ret2 = krb5_mk_error (context, + ret, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + server, + NULL, + NULL, + &error_data); + if (ret2 == 0) { + krb5_write_message (context, p_fd, &error_data); + krb5_data_free (&error_data); + } + return ret; + } + + len = 0; + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &len, 4) != 4) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "write: %s", strerror(errno)); + return ret; + } + + if (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) { + ret = krb5_mk_rep (context, *auth_context, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, p_fd, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_data_free (&data); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/replay.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/replay.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4298d12e2f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/replay.c @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: replay.c,v 1.9 2001/07/03 19:33:13 assar Exp $"); + +struct krb5_rcache_data { + char *name; +}; + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + const char *name) +{ + id->name = strdup(name); + if(id->name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_RC_MALLOC; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache *id, + const char *type) +{ + if(strcmp(type, "FILE")) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "replay cache type %s not supported", + type); + return KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND; + } + *id = calloc(1, sizeof(**id)); + if(*id == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return KRB5_RC_MALLOC; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve_full(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache *id, + const char *string_name) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + if(strncmp(string_name, "FILE:", 5)) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "replay cache type %s not supported", + string_name); + return KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND; + } + ret = krb5_rc_resolve_type(context, id, "FILE"); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_rc_resolve(context, *id, string_name + 5); + return ret; +} + +const char * +krb5_rc_default_name(krb5_context context) +{ + return "FILE:/var/run/default_rcache"; +} + +const char * +krb5_rc_default_type(krb5_context context) +{ + return "FILE"; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_default(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache *id) +{ + return krb5_rc_resolve_full(context, id, krb5_rc_default_name(context)); +} + +struct rc_entry{ + time_t stamp; + unsigned char data[16]; +}; + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + krb5_deltat auth_lifespan) +{ + FILE *f = fopen(id->name, "w"); + struct rc_entry tmp; + int ret; + + if(f == NULL) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "open(%s): %s", id->name, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + tmp.stamp = auth_lifespan; + fwrite(&tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), f); + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_recover(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + int ret; + + if(remove(id->name) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "remove(%s): %s", id->name, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + return krb5_rc_close(context, id); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + free(id->name); + free(id); + return 0; +} + +static void +checksum_authenticator(Authenticator *auth, void *data) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + int i; + + MD5_Init (&md5); + MD5_Update (&md5, auth->crealm, strlen(auth->crealm)); + for(i = 0; i < auth->cname.name_string.len; i++) + MD5_Update(&md5, auth->cname.name_string.val[i], + strlen(auth->cname.name_string.val[i])); + MD5_Update (&md5, &auth->ctime, sizeof(auth->ctime)); + MD5_Update (&md5, &auth->cusec, sizeof(auth->cusec)); + MD5_Final (data, &md5); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_store(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + krb5_donot_replay *rep) +{ + struct rc_entry ent, tmp; + time_t t; + FILE *f; + int ret; + + ent.stamp = time(NULL); + checksum_authenticator(rep, ent.data); + f = fopen(id->name, "r"); + if(f == NULL) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "open(%s): %s", id->name, + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + fread(&tmp, sizeof(ent), 1, f); + t = ent.stamp - tmp.stamp; + while(fread(&tmp, sizeof(ent), 1, f)){ + if(tmp.stamp < t) + continue; + if(memcmp(tmp.data, ent.data, sizeof(ent.data)) == 0){ + fclose(f); + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_RC_REPLAY; + } + } + if(ferror(f)){ + ret = errno; + fclose(f); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "%s: %s", id->name, strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + fclose(f); + f = fopen(id->name, "a"); + if(f == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "open(%s): %s", id->name, + strerror(errno)); + return KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN; + } + fwrite(&ent, 1, sizeof(ent), f); + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_expunge(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + krb5_deltat *auth_lifespan) +{ + FILE *f = fopen(id->name, "r"); + int r; + struct rc_entry ent; + r = fread(&ent, sizeof(ent), 1, f); + fclose(f); + if(r){ + *auth_lifespan = ent.stamp; + return 0; + } + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN; +} + +const char* +krb5_rc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return id->name; +} + +const char* +krb5_rc_get_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return "FILE"; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *piece, + krb5_rcache *id) +{ + krb5_rcache rcache; + krb5_error_code ret; + + char *tmp = malloc(4 * piece->length + 1); + char *name; + + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + strvisx(tmp, piece->data, piece->length, VIS_WHITE | VIS_OCTAL); +#ifdef HAVE_GETEUID + asprintf(&name, "FILE:rc_%s_%u", tmp, (unsigned)geteuid()); +#else + asprintf(&name, "FILE:rc_%s", tmp); +#endif + free(tmp); + if(name == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_rc_resolve_full(context, &rcache, name); + free(name); + if(ret) + return ret; + *id = rcache; + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94dae30307 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c @@ -0,0 +1,405 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: send_to_kdc.c,v 1.48 2002/03/27 09:32:50 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * send the data in `req' on the socket `fd' (which is datagram iff udp) + * waiting `tmout' for a reply and returning the reply in `rep'. + * iff limit read up to this many bytes + * returns 0 and data in `rep' if succesful, otherwise -1 + */ + +static int +recv_loop (int fd, + time_t tmout, + int udp, + size_t limit, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + fd_set fdset; + struct timeval timeout; + int ret; + int nbytes; + + if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { + return -1; + } + + krb5_data_zero(rep); + do { + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(fd, &fdset); + timeout.tv_sec = tmout; + timeout.tv_usec = 0; + ret = select (fd + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + return -1; + } else if (ret == 0) { + return 0; + } else { + void *tmp; + + if (ioctl (fd, FIONREAD, &nbytes) < 0) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + if(nbytes == 0) + return 0; + + if (limit) + nbytes = min(nbytes, limit - rep->length); + + tmp = realloc (rep->data, rep->length + nbytes); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + rep->data = tmp; + ret = recv (fd, (char*)tmp + rep->length, nbytes, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + rep->length += ret; + } + } while(!udp && (limit == 0 || rep->length < limit)); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Send kerberos requests and receive a reply on a udp or any other kind + * of a datagram socket. See `recv_loop'. + */ + +static int +send_and_recv_udp(int fd, + time_t tmout, + const krb5_data *req, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + if (send (fd, req->data, req->length, 0) < 0) + return -1; + + return recv_loop(fd, tmout, 1, 0, rep); +} + +/* + * `send_and_recv' for a TCP (or any other stream) socket. + * Since there are no record limits on a stream socket the protocol here + * is to prepend the request with 4 bytes of its length and the reply + * is similarly encoded. + */ + +static int +send_and_recv_tcp(int fd, + time_t tmout, + const krb5_data *req, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + unsigned char len[4]; + unsigned long rep_len; + krb5_data len_data; + + _krb5_put_int(len, req->length, 4); + if(net_write(fd, len, sizeof(len)) < 0) + return -1; + if(net_write(fd, req->data, req->length) < 0) + return -1; + if (recv_loop (fd, tmout, 0, 4, &len_data) < 0) + return -1; + if (len_data.length != 4) { + krb5_data_free (&len_data); + return -1; + } + _krb5_get_int(len_data.data, &rep_len, 4); + krb5_data_free (&len_data); + if (recv_loop (fd, tmout, 0, rep_len, rep) < 0) + return -1; + if(rep->length != rep_len) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * `send_and_recv' tailored for the HTTP protocol. + */ + +static int +send_and_recv_http(int fd, + time_t tmout, + const char *prefix, + const krb5_data *req, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + char *request; + char *str; + int ret; + int len = base64_encode(req->data, req->length, &str); + + if(len < 0) + return -1; + asprintf(&request, "GET %s%s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", prefix, str); + free(str); + if (request == NULL) + return -1; + ret = net_write (fd, request, strlen(request)); + free (request); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = recv_loop(fd, tmout, 0, 0, rep); + if(ret) + return ret; + { + unsigned long rep_len; + char *s, *p; + + s = realloc(rep->data, rep->length + 1); + if (s == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + s[rep->length] = 0; + p = strstr(s, "\r\n\r\n"); + if(p == NULL) { + free(s); + return -1; + } + p += 4; + rep->data = s; + rep->length -= p - s; + if(rep->length < 4) { /* remove length */ + free(s); + return -1; + } + rep->length -= 4; + _krb5_get_int(p, &rep_len, 4); + if (rep_len != rep->length) { + free(s); + return -1; + } + memmove(rep->data, p + 4, rep->length); + } + return 0; +} + +static int +init_port(const char *s, int fallback) +{ + if (s) { + int tmp; + + sscanf (s, "%d", &tmp); + return htons(tmp); + } else + return fallback; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if succesful, otherwise 1 + */ + +static int +send_via_proxy (krb5_context context, + const krb5_krbhst_info *hi, + const krb5_data *send_data, + krb5_data *receive) +{ + char *proxy2 = strdup(context->http_proxy); + char *proxy = proxy2; + char *prefix; + char *colon; + struct addrinfo hints; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + int ret; + int s = -1; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + if (proxy == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + if (strncmp (proxy, "http://", 7) == 0) + proxy += 7; + + colon = strchr(proxy, ':'); + if(colon != NULL) + *colon++ = '\0'; + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", + ntohs(init_port (colon, htons(80)))); + ret = getaddrinfo (proxy, portstr, &hints, &ai); + free (proxy2); + if (ret) + return krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(ret, errno); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + if (a == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + asprintf(&prefix, "http://%s/", hi->hostname); + if(prefix == NULL) { + close(s); + return 1; + } + ret = send_and_recv_http(s, context->kdc_timeout, + prefix, send_data, receive); + close (s); + free(prefix); + if(ret == 0 && receive->length != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Send the data `send' to one host from `handle` and get back the reply + * in `receive'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto (krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *send_data, + krb5_krbhst_handle handle, + krb5_data *receive) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int fd; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < context->max_retries; ++i) { + krb5_krbhst_info *hi; + + while (krb5_krbhst_next(context, handle, &hi) == 0) { + int ret; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + + if(hi->proto == KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP && context->http_proxy) { + if (send_via_proxy (context, hi, send_data, receive)) + continue; + else + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo(context, hi, &ai); + if (ret) + continue; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + fd = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (fd < 0) + continue; + if (connect (fd, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (fd); + continue; + } + switch (hi->proto) { + case KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP : + ret = send_and_recv_http(fd, context->kdc_timeout, + "", send_data, receive); + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_TCP : + ret = send_and_recv_tcp (fd, context->kdc_timeout, + send_data, receive); + break; + case KRB5_KRBHST_UDP : + ret = send_and_recv_udp (fd, context->kdc_timeout, + send_data, receive); + break; + } + close (fd); + if(ret == 0 && receive->length != 0) + goto out; + } + } + krb5_krbhst_reset(context, handle); + } + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + ret = KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; +out: + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto_kdc2(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *send_data, + const krb5_realm *realm, + krb5_data *receive, + krb5_boolean master) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_krbhst_handle handle; + int type; + + if (master || context->use_admin_kdc) + type = KRB5_KRBHST_ADMIN; + else + type = KRB5_KRBHST_KDC; + + ret = krb5_krbhst_init(context, *realm, type, &handle); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_sendto(context, send_data, handle, receive); + krb5_krbhst_free(context, handle); + if (ret == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH) + krb5_set_error_string(context, + "unable to reach any KDC in realm %s", *realm); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto_kdc(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *send_data, + const krb5_realm *realm, + krb5_data *receive) +{ + return krb5_sendto_kdc2(context, send_data, realm, receive, FALSE); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/sendauth.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/sendauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c2889ee777 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/sendauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sendauth.c,v 1.19 2002/09/04 21:34:43 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * The format seems to be: + * client -> server + * + * 4 bytes - length + * KRB5_SENDAUTH_V1.0 (including zero) + * 4 bytes - length + * protocol string (with terminating zero) + * + * server -> client + * 1 byte - (0 = OK, else some kind of error) + * + * client -> server + * 4 bytes - length + * AP-REQ + * + * server -> client + * 4 bytes - length (0 = OK, else length of error) + * (error) + * + * if(mutual) { + * server -> client + * 4 bytes - length + * AP-REP + * } + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendauth(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + const char *appl_version, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_error **ret_error, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + const char *version = KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION; + u_char repl; + krb5_data ap_req, error_data; + krb5_creds this_cred; + krb5_principal this_client = NULL; + krb5_creds *creds; + ssize_t sret; + krb5_boolean my_ccache = FALSE; + + len = strlen(version) + 1; + net_len = htonl(len); + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &net_len, 4) != 4 + || krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, version, len) != len) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "write: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + len = strlen(appl_version) + 1; + net_len = htonl(len); + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &net_len, 4) != 4 + || krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, appl_version, len) != len) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "write: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + sret = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, &repl, sizeof(repl)); + if (sret < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "read: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } else if (sret != sizeof(repl)) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE; + } + + if (repl != 0) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED; + } + + if (in_creds == NULL) { + if (ccache == NULL) { + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) + return ret; + my_ccache = TRUE; + } + + if (client == NULL) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &this_client); + if (ret) { + if(my_ccache) + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache); + return ret; + } + client = this_client; + } + memset(&this_cred, 0, sizeof(this_cred)); + this_cred.client = client; + this_cred.server = server; + this_cred.times.endtime = 0; + this_cred.ticket.length = 0; + in_creds = &this_cred; + } + if (in_creds->ticket.length == 0) { + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, 0, ccache, in_creds, &creds); + if (ret) { + if(my_ccache) + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache); + return ret; + } + } else { + creds = in_creds; + } + if(my_ccache) + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache); + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + ap_req_options, + in_data, + creds, + &ap_req); + + if (out_creds) + *out_creds = creds; + else + krb5_free_creds(context, creds); + if(this_client) + krb5_free_principal(context, this_client); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, + p_fd, + &ap_req); + if (ret) + return ret; + + krb5_data_free (&ap_req); + + ret = krb5_read_message (context, p_fd, &error_data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (error_data.length != 0) { + KRB_ERROR error; + + ret = krb5_rd_error (context, &error_data, &error); + krb5_data_free (&error_data); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_error_from_rd_error(context, &error, NULL); + if (ret_error != NULL) { + *ret_error = malloc (sizeof(krb5_error)); + if (*ret_error == NULL) { + krb5_free_error_contents (context, &error); + } else { + **ret_error = error; + } + } else { + krb5_free_error_contents (context, &error); + } + return ret; + } else { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + return ret; + } + } + + if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) { + krb5_data ap_rep; + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *ignore; + + krb5_data_zero (&ap_rep); + ret = krb5_read_message (context, + p_fd, + &ap_rep); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_rep (context, *auth_context, &ap_rep, + rep_result ? rep_result : &ignore); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (rep_result == NULL) + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (context, ignore); + krb5_data_free (&ap_rep); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b872dfaa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: set_default_realm.c,v 1.13 2001/09/18 09:43:31 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Convert the simple string `s' into a NULL-terminated and freshly allocated + * list in `list'. Return an error code. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +string_to_list (krb5_context context, const char *s, krb5_realm **list) +{ + + *list = malloc (2 * sizeof(**list)); + if (*list == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*list)[0] = strdup (s); + if ((*list)[0] == NULL) { + free (*list); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*list)[1] = NULL; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the knowledge of the default realm(s) in `context'. + * If realm != NULL, that's the new default realm. + * Otherwise, the realm(s) are figured out from configuration or DNS. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *realm) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_realm *realms = NULL; + + if (realm == NULL) { + realms = krb5_config_get_strings (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "default_realm", + NULL); + if (realms == NULL) + ret = krb5_get_host_realm(context, NULL, &realms); + } else { + ret = string_to_list (context, realm, &realms); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_free_host_realm (context, context->default_realms); + context->default_realms = realms; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/sock_principal.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/sock_principal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7bb0bdfb02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/sock_principal.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sock_principal.c,v 1.16 2001/07/26 09:05:30 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sock_to_principal (krb5_context context, + int sock, + const char *sname, + int32_t type, + krb5_principal *ret_princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + socklen_t salen = sizeof(__ss); + char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + + if (getsockname (sock, sa, &salen) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "getsockname: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + ret = getnameinfo (sa, salen, hostname, sizeof(hostname), NULL, 0, 0); + if (ret) { + int save_errno = errno; + + krb5_set_error_string (context, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(ret)); + return krb5_eai_to_heim_errno(ret, save_errno); + } + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + sname, + type, + ret_princ); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store-int.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store-int.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42e695a11b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store-int.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef __store_int_h__ +#define __store_int_h__ + +struct krb5_storage_data { + void *data; + ssize_t (*fetch)(struct krb5_storage_data*, void*, size_t); + ssize_t (*store)(struct krb5_storage_data*, const void*, size_t); + off_t (*seek)(struct krb5_storage_data*, off_t, int); + void (*free)(struct krb5_storage_data*); + krb5_flags flags; + int eof_code; +}; + +#endif /* __store_int_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..512d2a5c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store-test.c,v 1.1 2001/05/11 16:06:25 joda Exp $"); + +static void +print_data(unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if(i > 0 && (i % 16) == 0) + printf("\n "); + printf("%02x ", data[i]); + } + printf("\n"); +} + +static int +compare(const char *name, krb5_storage *sp, void *expected, size_t len) +{ + int ret = 0; + krb5_data data; + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(data.length != len || memcmp(data.data, expected, len) != 0) { + printf("%s mismatch\n", name); + printf(" Expected: "); + print_data(expected, len); + printf(" Actual: "); + print_data(data.data, data.length); + ret++; + } + krb5_data_free(&data); + return ret; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int nerr = 0; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal principal; + + + krb5_init_context(&context); + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, 0x01020304); + nerr += compare("Integer", sp, "\x1\x2\x3\x4", 4); + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_storage_set_byteorder(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE); + krb5_store_int32(sp, 0x01020304); + nerr += compare("Integer (LE)", sp, "\x4\x3\x2\x1", 4); + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_storage_set_byteorder(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_BE); + krb5_store_int32(sp, 0x01020304); + nerr += compare("Integer (BE)", sp, "\x1\x2\x3\x4", 4); + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_storage_set_byteorder(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_HOST); + krb5_store_int32(sp, 0x01020304); + { + int test = 1; + void *data; + if(*(char*)&test) + data = "\x4\x3\x2\x1"; + else + data = "\x1\x2\x3\x4"; + nerr += compare("Integer (host)", sp, data, 4); + } + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_make_principal(context, &principal, "TEST", "foobar", NULL); + krb5_store_principal(sp, principal); + nerr += compare("Principal", sp, "\x0\x0\x0\x1" + "\x0\x0\x0\x1" + "\x0\x0\x0\x4TEST" + "\x0\x0\x0\x6""foobar", 26); + + return nerr ? 1 : 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b0ca731c67 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store.c @@ -0,0 +1,743 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include "store-int.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store.c,v 1.38.4.1 2004/03/09 19:32:14 lha Exp $"); + +#define BYTEORDER_IS(SP, V) (((SP)->flags & KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_MASK) == (V)) +#define BYTEORDER_IS_LE(SP) BYTEORDER_IS((SP), KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE) +#define BYTEORDER_IS_BE(SP) BYTEORDER_IS((SP), KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_BE) +#define BYTEORDER_IS_HOST(SP) (BYTEORDER_IS((SP), KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_HOST) || \ + krb5_storage_is_flags((SP), KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER)) + +void +krb5_storage_set_flags(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags flags) +{ + sp->flags |= flags; +} + +void +krb5_storage_clear_flags(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags flags) +{ + sp->flags &= ~flags; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_storage_is_flags(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags flags) +{ + return (sp->flags & flags) == flags; +} + +void +krb5_storage_set_byteorder(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags byteorder) +{ + sp->flags &= ~KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_MASK; + sp->flags |= byteorder; +} + +krb5_flags +krb5_storage_get_byteorder(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags byteorder) +{ + return sp->flags & KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_MASK; +} + +off_t +krb5_storage_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + return (*sp->seek)(sp, offset, whence); +} + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_storage_read(krb5_storage *sp, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return sp->fetch(sp, buf, len); +} + +krb5_ssize_t +krb5_storage_write(krb5_storage *sp, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return sp->store(sp, buf, len); +} + +void +krb5_storage_set_eof_code(krb5_storage *sp, int code) +{ + sp->eof_code = code; +} + +krb5_ssize_t +_krb5_put_int(void *buffer, unsigned long value, size_t size) +{ + unsigned char *p = buffer; + int i; + for (i = size - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + p[i] = value & 0xff; + value >>= 8; + } + return size; +} + +krb5_ssize_t +_krb5_get_int(void *buffer, unsigned long *value, size_t size) +{ + unsigned char *p = buffer; + unsigned long v = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) + v = (v << 8) + p[i]; + *value = v; + return size; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_free(krb5_storage *sp) +{ + if(sp->free) + (*sp->free)(sp); + free(sp->data); + free(sp); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_to_data(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_data *data) +{ + off_t pos; + size_t size; + krb5_error_code ret; + + pos = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + size = (size_t)sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_END); + ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, size); + if (ret) { + sp->seek(sp, pos, SEEK_SET); + return ret; + } + if (size) { + sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET); + sp->fetch(sp, data->data, data->length); + sp->seek(sp, pos, SEEK_SET); + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t value, + size_t len) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char v[16]; + + if(len > sizeof(v)) + return EINVAL; + _krb5_put_int(v, value, len); + ret = sp->store(sp, v, len); + if (ret != len) + return (ret<0)?errno:sp->eof_code; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int32(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t value) +{ + if(BYTEORDER_IS_HOST(sp)) + value = htonl(value); + else if(BYTEORDER_IS_LE(sp)) + value = bswap32(value); + return krb5_store_int(sp, value, 4); +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t *value, + size_t len) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char v[4]; + unsigned long w; + ret = sp->fetch(sp, v, len); + if(ret != len) + return (ret<0)?errno:sp->eof_code; + _krb5_get_int(v, &w, len); + *value = w; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int32(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t *value) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_ret_int(sp, value, 4); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(BYTEORDER_IS_HOST(sp)) + *value = htonl(*value); + else if(BYTEORDER_IS_LE(sp)) + *value = bswap32(*value); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int16(krb5_storage *sp, + int16_t value) +{ + if(BYTEORDER_IS_HOST(sp)) + value = htons(value); + else if(BYTEORDER_IS_LE(sp)) + value = bswap16(value); + return krb5_store_int(sp, value, 2); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int16(krb5_storage *sp, + int16_t *value) +{ + int32_t v; + int ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int(sp, &v, 2); + if(ret) + return ret; + *value = v; + if(BYTEORDER_IS_HOST(sp)) + *value = htons(*value); + else if(BYTEORDER_IS_LE(sp)) + *value = bswap16(*value); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int8(krb5_storage *sp, + int8_t value) +{ + int ret; + + ret = sp->store(sp, &value, sizeof(value)); + if (ret != sizeof(value)) + return (ret<0)?errno:sp->eof_code; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int8(krb5_storage *sp, + int8_t *value) +{ + int ret; + + ret = sp->fetch(sp, value, sizeof(*value)); + if (ret != sizeof(*value)) + return (ret<0)?errno:sp->eof_code; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, data.length); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = sp->store(sp, data.data, data.length); + if(ret != data.length){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return sp->eof_code; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int ret; + int32_t size; + + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, size); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (size) { + ret = sp->fetch(sp, data->data, size); + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : sp->eof_code; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_string(krb5_storage *sp, const char *s) +{ + krb5_data data; + data.length = strlen(s); + data.data = (void*)s; + return krb5_store_data(sp, data); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_string(krb5_storage *sp, + char **string) +{ + int ret; + krb5_data data; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &data); + if(ret) + return ret; + *string = realloc(data.data, data.length + 1); + if(*string == NULL){ + free(data.data); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*string)[data.length] = 0; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_stringz(krb5_storage *sp, const char *s) +{ + size_t len = strlen(s) + 1; + ssize_t ret; + + ret = sp->store(sp, s, len); + if(ret != len) { + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + else + return sp->eof_code; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_stringz(krb5_storage *sp, + char **string) +{ + char c; + char *s = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + ssize_t ret; + + while((ret = sp->fetch(sp, &c, 1)) == 1){ + char *tmp; + + len++; + tmp = realloc (s, len); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (s); + return ENOMEM; + } + s = tmp; + s[len - 1] = c; + if(c == 0) + break; + } + if(ret != 1){ + free(s); + if(ret == 0) + return sp->eof_code; + return ret; + } + *string = s; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_principal(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal p) +{ + int i; + int ret; + + if(!krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) { + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_type); + if(ret) return ret; + } + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_string.len + 1); + else + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_string.len); + + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_string(sp, p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; i < p->name.name_string.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_store_string(sp, p->name.name_string.val[i]); + if(ret) return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_principal(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + int i; + int ret; + krb5_principal p; + int32_t type; + int32_t ncomp; + + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if(p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) + type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + else if((ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &type))){ + free(p); + return ret; + } + if((ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ncomp))){ + free(p); + return ret; + } + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + ncomp--; + p->name.name_type = type; + p->name.name_string.len = ncomp; + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + p->name.name_string.val = calloc(ncomp, sizeof(*p->name.name_string.val)); + if(p->name.name_string.val == NULL){ + free(p->realm); + return ENOMEM; + } + for(i = 0; i < ncomp; i++){ + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &p->name.name_string.val[i]); + if(ret) return ret; /* XXX */ + } + *princ = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_keyblock(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_keyblock p) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p.keytype); + if(ret) return ret; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE)){ + /* this should really be enctype, but it is the same as + keytype nowadays */ + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p.keytype); + if(ret) return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, p.keyvalue); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_keyblock(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_keyblock *p) +{ + int ret; + int16_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) return ret; + p->keytype = tmp; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE)){ + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &p->keyvalue); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_times(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_times times) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.authtime); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.starttime); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.endtime); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.renew_till); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_times(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_times *times) +{ + int ret; + int32_t tmp; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->authtime = tmp; + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->starttime = tmp; + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->endtime = tmp; + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->renew_till = tmp; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_address(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_address p) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p.addr_type); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, p.address); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_address(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_address *adr) +{ + int16_t t; + int ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &t); + if(ret) return ret; + adr->addr_type = t; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &adr->address); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_addrs(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_addresses p) +{ + int i; + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p.len); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; ilen = tmp; + ALLOC(adr->val, adr->len); + for(i = 0; i < adr->len; i++){ + ret = krb5_ret_address(sp, &adr->val[i]); + if(ret) break; + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_authdata(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_authdata auth) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, auth.len); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; i < auth.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, auth.val[i].ad_type); + if(ret) break; + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, auth.val[i].ad_data); + if(ret) break; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_authdata(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_authdata *auth) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t tmp; + int16_t tmp2; + int i; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) return ret; + ALLOC_SEQ(auth, tmp); + for(i = 0; i < tmp; i++){ + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp2); + if(ret) break; + auth->val[i].ad_type = tmp2; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &auth->val[i].ad_data); + if(ret) break; + } + return ret; +} + +static int32_t +bitswap32(int32_t b) +{ + int32_t r = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + r = r << 1 | (b & 1); + b = b >> 1; + } + return r; +} + + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_store_creds_internal(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds, int v0_6) +{ + int ret; + + ret = krb5_store_principal(sp, creds->client); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_principal(sp, creds->server); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_keyblock(sp, creds->session); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_times(sp, creds->times); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int8(sp, 0); /* this is probably the + enc-tkt-in-skey bit from KDCOptions */ + if(ret) + return ret; + if (v0_6) { + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, creds->flags.i); + if(ret) + return ret; + } else { + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, bitswap32(TicketFlags2int(creds->flags.b))); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_store_addrs(sp, creds->addresses); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_authdata(sp, creds->authdata); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, creds->ticket); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, creds->second_ticket); + return ret; +} + +/* + * store `creds' on `sp' returning error or zero + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_creds(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return _krb5_store_creds_internal(sp, creds, 1); +} + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_store_creds_heimdal_0_7(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return _krb5_store_creds_internal(sp, creds, 0); +} + +krb5_error_code +_krb5_store_creds_heimdal_pre_0_7(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return _krb5_store_creds_internal(sp, creds, 1); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_creds(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int8_t dummy8; + int32_t dummy32; + + memset(creds, 0, sizeof(*creds)); + ret = krb5_ret_principal (sp, &creds->client); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_principal (sp, &creds->server); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_keyblock (sp, &creds->session); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_times (sp, &creds->times); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_int8 (sp, &dummy8); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &dummy32); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + /* + * Runtime detect the what is the higher bits of the bitfield. If + * any of the higher bits are set in the input data, its either a + * new ticket flag (and this code need to be removed), or its a + * MIT cache (or new Heimdal cache), lets change it to our current + * format. + */ + { + u_int32_t mask = 0xffff0000; + creds->flags.i = 0; + creds->flags.b.anonymous = 1; + if (creds->flags.i & mask) + mask = ~mask; + if (dummy32 & mask) + dummy32 = bitswap32(dummy32); + } + creds->flags.i = dummy32; + ret = krb5_ret_addrs (sp, &creds->addresses); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_authdata (sp, &creds->authdata); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_data (sp, &creds->ticket); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_data (sp, &creds->second_ticket); +cleanup: + if(ret) { +#if 0 + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, creds); /* XXX */ +#endif + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_emem.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_emem.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..526cf32f65 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_emem.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include "store-int.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store_emem.c,v 1.13 2002/10/21 15:36:23 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct emem_storage{ + unsigned char *base; + size_t size; + size_t len; + unsigned char *ptr; +}emem_storage; + +static ssize_t +emem_fetch(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + emem_storage *s = (emem_storage*)sp->data; + if(s->base + s->len - s->ptr < size) + size = s->base + s->len - s->ptr; + memmove(data, s->ptr, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static ssize_t +emem_store(krb5_storage *sp, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + emem_storage *s = (emem_storage*)sp->data; + if(size > s->base + s->size - s->ptr){ + void *base; + size_t sz, off; + off = s->ptr - s->base; + sz = off + size; + if (sz < 4096) + sz *= 2; + base = realloc(s->base, sz); + if(base == NULL) + return 0; + s->size = sz; + s->base = base; + s->ptr = (unsigned char*)base + off; + } + memmove(s->ptr, data, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static off_t +emem_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + emem_storage *s = (emem_storage*)sp->data; + switch(whence){ + case SEEK_SET: + if(offset > s->size) + offset = s->size; + if(offset < 0) + offset = 0; + s->ptr = s->base + offset; + if(offset > s->len) + s->len = offset; + break; + case SEEK_CUR: + sp->seek(sp,s->ptr - s->base + offset, SEEK_SET); + break; + case SEEK_END: + sp->seek(sp, s->len + offset, SEEK_SET); + break; + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return s->ptr - s->base; +} + +static void +emem_free(krb5_storage *sp) +{ + emem_storage *s = sp->data; + memset(s->base, 0, s->len); + free(s->base); +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_emem(void) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = malloc(sizeof(krb5_storage)); + emem_storage *s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + sp->data = s; + sp->flags = 0; + sp->eof_code = HEIM_ERR_EOF; + s->size = 1024; + s->base = malloc(s->size); + s->len = 0; + s->ptr = s->base; + sp->fetch = emem_fetch; + sp->store = emem_store; + sp->seek = emem_seek; + sp->free = emem_free; + return sp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_fd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_fd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e31b956143 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_fd.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include "store-int.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store_fd.c,v 1.10 2002/04/18 14:00:39 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct fd_storage{ + int fd; +}fd_storage; + +#define FD(S) (((fd_storage*)(S)->data)->fd) + +static ssize_t +fd_fetch(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + return net_read(FD(sp), data, size); +} + +static ssize_t +fd_store(krb5_storage *sp, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + return net_write(FD(sp), data, size); +} + +static off_t +fd_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + return lseek(FD(sp), offset, whence); +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_fd(int fd) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = malloc(sizeof(krb5_storage)); + + if (sp == NULL) + return NULL; + + sp->data = malloc(sizeof(fd_storage)); + if (sp->data == NULL) { + free(sp); + return NULL; + } + sp->flags = 0; + sp->eof_code = HEIM_ERR_EOF; + FD(sp) = fd; + sp->fetch = fd_fetch; + sp->store = fd_store; + sp->seek = fd_seek; + sp->free = NULL; + return sp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_mem.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_mem.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b0be2002a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/store_mem.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include "store-int.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store_mem.c,v 1.11 2002/04/18 14:00:44 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct mem_storage{ + unsigned char *base; + size_t size; + unsigned char *ptr; +}mem_storage; + +static ssize_t +mem_fetch(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + mem_storage *s = (mem_storage*)sp->data; + if(size > s->base + s->size - s->ptr) + size = s->base + s->size - s->ptr; + memmove(data, s->ptr, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static ssize_t +mem_store(krb5_storage *sp, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + mem_storage *s = (mem_storage*)sp->data; + if(size > s->base + s->size - s->ptr) + size = s->base + s->size - s->ptr; + memmove(s->ptr, data, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static off_t +mem_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + mem_storage *s = (mem_storage*)sp->data; + switch(whence){ + case SEEK_SET: + if(offset > s->size) + offset = s->size; + if(offset < 0) + offset = 0; + s->ptr = s->base + offset; + break; + case SEEK_CUR: + return sp->seek(sp, s->ptr - s->base + offset, SEEK_SET); + case SEEK_END: + return sp->seek(sp, s->size + offset, SEEK_SET); + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return s->ptr - s->base; +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_mem(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = malloc(sizeof(krb5_storage)); + mem_storage *s; + if(sp == NULL) + return NULL; + s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + if(s == NULL) { + free(sp); + return NULL; + } + sp->data = s; + sp->flags = 0; + sp->eof_code = HEIM_ERR_EOF; + s->base = buf; + s->size = len; + s->ptr = buf; + sp->fetch = mem_fetch; + sp->store = mem_store; + sp->seek = mem_seek; + sp->free = NULL; + return sp; +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_data(krb5_data *data) +{ + return krb5_storage_from_mem(data->data, data->length); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ea5cd18d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: string-to-key-test.c,v 1.7 2001/05/11 16:15:27 joda Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 24 }; + +static struct testcase { + const char *principal_name; + const char *password; + krb5_enctype enctype; + unsigned char res[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {"@", "", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0xf1}}, + {"nisse@FOO.SE", "hej", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0xfe, 0x67, 0xbf, 0x9e, 0x57, 0x6b, 0xfe, 0x52}}, + {"assar/liten@FOO.SE", "hemligt", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x5b, 0x9b, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0x97, 0x43, 0xc8, 0x40}}, + {"@", "", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0xce, 0xa2, 0x2f, 0x9b, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x6e, 0x6b, 0x64, + 0x73, 0x62, 0x64, 0x73, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0xce, 0xa2, 0x2f, 0x9b, + 0x52, 0x57}}, + {"nisse@FOO.SE", "hej", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x0e, 0xbc, 0x23, 0x9d, 0x68, 0x46, 0xf2, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x98, 0x5b, + 0x57, 0xc1, 0x57, 0x01, 0x79, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x0e, + 0x13, 0xd0}}, + {"assar/liten@FOO.SE", "hemligt", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x7f, 0x40, 0x67, 0xb9, 0xbc, 0xc4, 0x40, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x73, 0xd9, + 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x7c, 0xc7, 0x67, 0xe6, 0x79, 0x94, 0xd0, 0xa8, 0x34, + 0xdf, 0x62}}, + {"does/not@MATTER", "foo", ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, + {0xac, 0x8e, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x83, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xbe, + 0xea, 0x5d, 0x43, 0xbd, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x00, 0xcc}}, + {"raeburn@ATHENA.MIT.EDU", "password", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0xcb, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0xae, 0x23, 0x52, 0x98, 0xe3}}, + {"danny@WHITEHOUSE.GOV", "potatoe", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0xdf, 0x3d, 0x32, 0xa7, 0x4f, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0x01}}, + {"buckaroo@EXAMPLE.COM", "penny", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x94, 0x43, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x32, 0xfd, 0xc4, 0xf1}}, + {"Juri\xc5\xa1i\xc4\x87@ATHENA.MIT.EDU", "\xc3\x9f", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x62, 0xc8, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x32, 0xb5, 0xe6, 0x9d}}, + {"AAAAAAAA", "11119999", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x98, 0x40, 0x54, 0xd0, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x3e, 0x31}}, + {"FFFFAAAA", "NNNN6666", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0xc4, 0xbf, 0x6b, 0x25, 0xad, 0xf7, 0xa4, 0xf8}}, + {"raeburn@ATHENA.MIT.EDU", "password", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x85, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0x13, 0x58, 0x54, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x5e, 0x86, 0x76, 0x8c, 0x31, 0x3e, 0x3b, 0xfe, 0xf7, 0x51, 0x19, 0x37, 0xdc, 0xf7, 0x2c, 0x3e}}, + {"danny@WHITEHOUSE.GOV", "potatoe", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0xdf, 0xcd, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xd0, 0xa4, 0x32, 0x04, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xc4, 0x37, 0xfb, 0x15, 0xe0, 0x61, 0xb0, 0x29, 0x79, 0xc1, 0xf7, 0x4f, 0x37, 0x7a}}, + {"buckaroo@EXAMPLE.COM", "penny", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x6d, 0x2f, 0xcd, 0xf2, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xdc, 0xad, 0xb5, 0xda, 0x57, 0x10, 0xa2, 0x34, 0x89, 0xb0, 0xd3, 0xb6, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0x9d, 0x4a}}, + {"Juri\xc5\xa1i\xc4\x87@ATHENA.MIT.EDU", "\xc3\x9f", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x16, 0xd5, 0xa4, 0x0e, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0xba, 0xcb, 0x61, 0xb9, 0xdc, 0xe0, 0x04, 0x70, 0x32, 0x4c, 0x83, 0x19, 0x73, 0xa7, 0xb9, 0x52, 0xfe, 0xb0}}, + {NULL} +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct testcase *t; + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + int val = 0; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + /* to enable realm-less principal name above */ + + krb5_set_default_realm(context, ""); + + for (t = tests; t->principal_name; ++t) { + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_principal principal; + int i; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, t->principal_name, &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", + t->principal_name); + ret = krb5_string_to_key (context, t->enctype, t->password, + principal, &key); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_string_to_key"); + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + if (memcmp (key.keyvalue.data, t->res, key.keyvalue.length) != 0) { + const unsigned char *p = key.keyvalue.data; + + printf ("string_to_key(%s, %s) failed\n", + t->principal_name, t->password); + printf ("should be: "); + for (i = 0; i < key.keyvalue.length; ++i) + printf ("%02x", t->res[i]); + printf ("\nresult was: "); + for (i = 0; i < key.keyvalue.length; ++i) + printf ("%02x", p[i]); + printf ("\n"); + val = 1; + } + } + return val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_alname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_alname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a6ec6dc8f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_alname.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: test_alname.c,v 1.4 2003/04/17 05:46:45 lha Exp $"); + +static void +test_alname(krb5_context context, krb5_realm realm, + const char *user, const char *inst, + const char *localuser, int ok) +{ + krb5_principal p; + char localname[1024]; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *princ; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &p, realm, user, inst, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_build_principal"); + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, p, &princ); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + ret = krb5_aname_to_localname(context, p, sizeof(localname), localname); + krb5_free_principal(context, p); + free(princ); + if (ret) { + if (!ok) + return; + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_aname_to_localname: %s -> %s", + princ, localuser); + } + + if (strcmp(localname, localuser) != 0) { + if (ok) + errx(1, "compared failed %s != %s (should have succeded)", + localname, localuser); + } else { + if (!ok) + errx(1, "compared failed %s == %s (should have failed)", + localname, localuser); + } + +} + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm realm; + int optind = 0; + char *user; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) + errx(1, "first argument should be a local user that in root .k5login"); + + user = argv[0]; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_default_realm"); + + test_alname(context, realm, user, NULL, user, 1); + test_alname(context, realm, user, "root", "root", 1); + + test_alname(context, "FOO.BAR.BAZ.KAKA", user, NULL, user, 0); + test_alname(context, "FOO.BAR.BAZ.KAKA", user, "root", "root", 0); + + test_alname(context, realm, user, NULL, + "not-same-as-user", 0); + test_alname(context, realm, user, "root", + "not-same-as-user", 0); + + test_alname(context, "FOO.BAR.BAZ.KAKA", user, NULL, + "not-same-as-user", 0); + test_alname(context, "FOO.BAR.BAZ.KAKA", user, "root", + "not-same-as-user", 0); + + krb5_free_context(context); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_cc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_cc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15181f4d97 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_cc.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: test_cc.c,v 1.1 2003/03/10 00:26:40 lha Exp $"); + +#define TEST_CC_NAME "/tmp/foo" + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *p1, *p2, *p3; + const char *p; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + p = krb5_cc_default_name(context); + if (p == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_default_name 1 failed"); + p1 = estrdup(p); + + ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(context, NULL); + if (p == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_set_default_name failed"); + + p = krb5_cc_default_name(context); + if (p == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_default_name 2 failed"); + p2 = estrdup(p); + + if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_default_name no longer same"); + + ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(context, TEST_CC_NAME); + if (p == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_set_default_name 1 failed"); + + p = krb5_cc_default_name(context); + if (p == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_default_name 2 failed"); + p3 = estrdup(p); + + if (strcmp(p3, TEST_CC_NAME) != 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "krb5_cc_set_default_name 1 failed"); + + krb5_free_context(context); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_get_addrs.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_get_addrs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..97e3b2b1e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/test_get_addrs.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: test_get_addrs.c,v 1.4 2002/08/23 03:42:54 assar Exp $"); + +/* print all addresses that we find */ + +static void +print_addresses (krb5_context context, const krb5_addresses *addrs) +{ + int i; + char buf[256]; + size_t len; + + for (i = 0; i < addrs->len; ++i) { + krb5_print_address (&addrs->val[i], buf, sizeof(buf), &len); + printf ("%s\n", buf); + } +} + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_addresses addrs; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret); + + ret = krb5_get_all_client_addrs (context, &addrs); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_all_client_addrs"); + printf ("client addresses\n"); + print_addresses (context, &addrs); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addrs); + + ret = krb5_get_all_server_addrs (context, &addrs); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_all_server_addrs"); + printf ("server addresses\n"); + print_addresses (context, &addrs); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addrs); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/ticket.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..888218ee00 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ticket.c,v 1.5.8.1 2003/09/18 21:01:57 lha Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context context, + krb5_ticket *ticket) +{ + free_EncTicketPart(&ticket->ticket); + krb5_free_principal(context, ticket->client); + krb5_free_principal(context, ticket->server); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_ticket(krb5_context context, + const krb5_ticket *from, + krb5_ticket **to) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ticket *tmp; + + *to = NULL; + tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + if((ret = copy_EncTicketPart(&from->ticket, &tmp->ticket))){ + free(tmp); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, from->client, &tmp->client); + if(ret){ + free_EncTicketPart(&tmp->ticket); + free(tmp); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, from->server, &tmp->server); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp->client); + free_EncTicketPart(&tmp->ticket); + free(tmp); + return ret; + } + *to = tmp; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/time.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9346546006 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/time.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: time.c,v 1.5 2001/05/02 10:06:11 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * return ``corrected'' time in `timeret'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_timeofday (krb5_context context, + krb5_timestamp *timeret) +{ + *timeret = time(NULL) + context->kdc_sec_offset; + return 0; +} + +/* + * like gettimeofday but with time correction to the KDC + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_us_timeofday (krb5_context context, + int32_t *sec, + int32_t *usec) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); + + *sec = tv.tv_sec + context->kdc_sec_offset; + *usec = tv.tv_usec; /* XXX */ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_format_time(krb5_context context, time_t t, + char *s, size_t len, krb5_boolean include_time) +{ + struct tm *tm; + if(context->log_utc) + tm = gmtime (&t); + else + tm = localtime(&t); + strftime(s, len, include_time ? context->time_fmt : context->date_fmt, tm); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_deltat(const char *string, krb5_deltat *deltat) +{ + if((*deltat = parse_time(string, "s")) == -1) + return EINVAL; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/transited.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/transited.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f48ff1d93 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/transited.c @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001, 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: transited.c,v 1.10.2.3 2003/10/22 06:07:41 lha Exp $"); + +/* this is an attempt at one of the most horrible `compression' + schemes that has ever been invented; it's so amazingly brain-dead + that words can not describe it, and all this just to save a few + silly bytes */ + +struct tr_realm { + char *realm; + unsigned leading_space:1; + unsigned leading_slash:1; + unsigned trailing_dot:1; + struct tr_realm *next; +}; + +static void +free_realms(struct tr_realm *r) +{ + struct tr_realm *p; + while(r){ + p = r; + r = r->next; + free(p->realm); + free(p); + } +} + +static int +make_path(krb5_context context, struct tr_realm *r, + const char *from, const char *to) +{ + const char *p; + struct tr_realm *path = r->next; + struct tr_realm *tmp; + + if(strlen(from) < strlen(to)){ + const char *tmp; + tmp = from; + from = to; + to = tmp; + } + + if(strcmp(from + strlen(from) - strlen(to), to) == 0){ + p = from; + while(1){ + p = strchr(p, '.'); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + p++; + if(strcmp(p, to) == 0) + break; + tmp = calloc(1, sizeof(*tmp)); + tmp->next = path; + path = tmp; + path->realm = strdup(p); + if(path->realm == NULL){ + r->next = path; /* XXX */ + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM;; + } + } + }else if(strncmp(from, to, strlen(to)) == 0){ + p = from + strlen(from); + while(1){ + while(p >= from && *p != '/') p--; + if(p == from) + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + if(strncmp(to, from, p - from) == 0) + break; + tmp = calloc(1, sizeof(*tmp)); + tmp->next = path; + path = tmp; + path->realm = malloc(p - from + 1); + if(path->realm == NULL){ + r->next = path; /* XXX */ + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(path->realm, from, p - from); + path->realm[p - from] = '\0'; + p--; + } + } else { + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + r->next = path; + + return 0; +} + +static int +make_paths(krb5_context context, + struct tr_realm *realms, const char *client_realm, + const char *server_realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r; + int ret; + const char *prev_realm = client_realm; + const char *next_realm = NULL; + for(r = realms; r; r = r->next){ + /* it *might* be that you can have more than one empty + component in a row, at least that's how I interpret the + "," exception in 1510 */ + if(r->realm[0] == '\0'){ + while(r->next && r->next->realm[0] == '\0') + r = r->next; + if(r->next) + next_realm = r->next->realm; + else + next_realm = server_realm; + ret = make_path(context, r, prev_realm, next_realm); + if(ret){ + free_realms(realms); + return ret; + } + } + prev_realm = r->realm; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +expand_realms(krb5_context context, + struct tr_realm *realms, const char *client_realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r; + const char *prev_realm = NULL; + for(r = realms; r; r = r->next){ + if(r->trailing_dot){ + char *tmp; + size_t len = strlen(r->realm) + strlen(prev_realm) + 1; + + if(prev_realm == NULL) + prev_realm = client_realm; + tmp = realloc(r->realm, len); + if(tmp == NULL){ + free_realms(realms); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + r->realm = tmp; + strlcat(r->realm, prev_realm, len); + }else if(r->leading_slash && !r->leading_space && prev_realm){ + /* yet another exception: if you use x500-names, the + leading realm doesn't have to be "quoted" with a space */ + char *tmp; + size_t len = strlen(r->realm) + strlen(prev_realm) + 1; + + tmp = malloc(len); + if(tmp == NULL){ + free_realms(realms); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + strlcpy(tmp, prev_realm, len); + strlcat(tmp, r->realm, len); + free(r->realm); + r->realm = tmp; + } + prev_realm = r->realm; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct tr_realm * +make_realm(char *realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r; + char *p, *q; + int quote = 0; + r = calloc(1, sizeof(*r)); + if(r == NULL){ + free(realm); + return NULL; + } + r->realm = realm; + for(p = q = r->realm; *p; p++){ + if(p == r->realm && *p == ' '){ + r->leading_space = 1; + continue; + } + if(q == r->realm && *p == '/') + r->leading_slash = 1; + if(quote){ + *q++ = *p; + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\\'){ + quote = 1; + continue; + } + if(p[0] == '.' && p[1] == '\0') + r->trailing_dot = 1; + *q++ = *p; + } + *q = '\0'; + return r; +} + +static struct tr_realm* +append_realm(struct tr_realm *head, struct tr_realm *r) +{ + struct tr_realm *p; + if(head == NULL){ + r->next = NULL; + return r; + } + p = head; + while(p->next) p = p->next; + p->next = r; + return head; +} + +static int +decode_realms(krb5_context context, + const char *tr, int length, struct tr_realm **realms) +{ + struct tr_realm *r = NULL; + + char *tmp; + int quote = 0; + const char *start = tr; + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < length; i++){ + if(quote){ + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(tr[i] == '\\'){ + quote = 1; + continue; + } + if(tr[i] == ','){ + tmp = malloc(tr + i - start + 1); + memcpy(tmp, start, tr + i - start); + tmp[tr + i - start] = '\0'; + r = make_realm(tmp); + if(r == NULL){ + free_realms(*realms); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *realms = append_realm(*realms, r); + start = tr + i + 1; + } + } + tmp = malloc(tr + i - start + 1); + memcpy(tmp, start, tr + i - start); + tmp[tr + i - start] = '\0'; + r = make_realm(tmp); + if(r == NULL){ + free_realms(*realms); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + *realms = append_realm(*realms, r); + + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_decode(krb5_context context, + krb5_data tr, char ***realms, int *num_realms, + const char *client_realm, const char *server_realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r = NULL; + struct tr_realm *p, **q; + int ret; + + if(tr.length == 0) { + *realms = NULL; + *num_realms = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* split string in components */ + ret = decode_realms(context, tr.data, tr.length, &r); + if(ret) + return ret; + + /* apply prefix rule */ + ret = expand_realms(context, r, client_realm); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = make_paths(context, r, client_realm, server_realm); + if(ret) + return ret; + + /* remove empty components and count realms */ + q = &r; + *num_realms = 0; + for(p = r; p; ){ + if(p->realm[0] == '\0'){ + free(p->realm); + *q = p->next; + free(p); + p = *q; + }else{ + q = &p->next; + p = p->next; + (*num_realms)++; + } + } + if (*num_realms < 0 || *num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(**realms)) + return ERANGE; + + { + char **R; + R = malloc((*num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*R)); + if (R == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *realms = R; + while(r){ + *R++ = r->realm; + p = r->next; + free(r); + r = p; + } + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_encode(char **realms, int num_realms, krb5_data *encoding) +{ + char *s = NULL; + int len = 0; + int i; + krb5_data_zero(encoding); + if (num_realms == 0) + return 0; + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++){ + len += strlen(realms[i]); + if(realms[i][0] == '/') + len++; + } + len += num_realms - 1; + s = malloc(len + 1); + if (s == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *s = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++){ + if(i && i < num_realms - 1) + strlcat(s, ",", len + 1); + if(realms[i][0] == '/') + strlcat(s, " ", len + 1); + strlcat(s, realms[i], len + 1); + } + encoding->data = s; + encoding->length = strlen(s); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_check_transited(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_realm client_realm, + krb5_const_realm server_realm, + krb5_realm *realms, + int num_realms, + int *bad_realm) +{ + char **tr_realms; + char **p; + int i; + + if(num_realms == 0) + return 0; + + tr_realms = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "capaths", + client_realm, + server_realm, + NULL); + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) { + for(p = tr_realms; p && *p; p++) { + if(strcmp(*p, realms[i]) == 0) + break; + } + if(p == NULL || *p == NULL) { + krb5_config_free_strings(tr_realms); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "no transit through realm %s", + realms[i]); + if(bad_realm) + *bad_realm = i; + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT; + } + } + krb5_config_free_strings(tr_realms); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_check_transited_realms(krb5_context context, + const char *const *realms, + int num_realms, + int *bad_realm) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + char **bad_realms = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "transited_realms_reject", + NULL); + if(bad_realms == NULL) + return 0; + + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) { + char **p; + for(p = bad_realms; *p; p++) + if(strcmp(*p, realms[i]) == 0) { + krb5_set_error_string (context, "no transit through realm %s", + *p); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT; + if(bad_realm) + *bad_realm = i; + break; + } + } + krb5_config_free_strings(bad_realms); + return ret; +} + +#if 0 +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_data x; + char **r; + int num, i; + x.data = argv[1]; + x.length = strlen(x.data); + if(domain_expand(x, &r, &num, argv[2], argv[3])) + exit(1); + for(i = 0; i < num; i++) + printf("%s\n", r[i]); + return 0; +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_init.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..243ac5fa43 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: verify_init.c,v 1.17 2002/08/20 14:47:59 joda Exp $"); + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + memset (options, 0, sizeof(*options)); +} + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options, + int ap_req_nofail) +{ + options->flags |= KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL; + options->ap_req_nofail = ap_req_nofail; +} + +/* + * + */ + +static krb5_boolean +fail_verify_is_ok (krb5_context context, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + if ((options->flags & KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL + && options->ap_req_nofail != 0) + || krb5_config_get_bool (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "verify_ap_req_nofail", + NULL)) + return FALSE; + else + return TRUE; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_init_creds(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal ap_req_server, + krb5_keytab ap_req_keytab, + krb5_ccache *ccache, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data req; + krb5_ccache local_ccache = NULL; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_creds *new_creds = NULL; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_principal server = NULL; + krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; + + krb5_data_zero (&req); + memset (&entry, 0, sizeof(entry)); + + if (ap_req_server == NULL) { + char local_hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + if (gethostname (local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)) < 0) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "gethostname: %s", + strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + local_hostname, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + } else + server = ap_req_server; + + if (ap_req_keytab == NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + } else + keytab = ap_req_keytab; + + if (ccache && *ccache) + local_ccache = *ccache; + else { + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new (context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &local_ccache); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, + local_ccache, + creds->client); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, + local_ccache, + creds); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!krb5_principal_compare (context, server, creds->server)) { + krb5_creds match_cred; + + memset (&match_cred, 0, sizeof(match_cred)); + + match_cred.client = creds->client; + match_cred.server = server; + + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, + 0, + local_ccache, + &match_cred, + &new_creds); + if (ret) { + if (fail_verify_is_ok (context, options)) + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + creds = new_creds; + } + + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + &auth_context, + 0, + NULL, + creds, + &req); + + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + auth_context = NULL; + + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + + ret = krb5_rd_req (context, + &auth_context, + &req, + server, + keytab, + 0, + NULL); + + if (ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND && fail_verify_is_ok (context, options)) + ret = 0; +cleanup: + if (auth_context) + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + krb5_data_free (&req); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + if (new_creds != NULL) + krb5_free_creds (context, new_creds); + if (ap_req_server == NULL && server) + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ap_req_keytab == NULL && keytab) + krb5_kt_close (context, keytab); + if (local_ccache != NULL + && + (ccache == NULL + || (ret != 0 && *ccache == NULL))) + krb5_cc_destroy (context, local_ccache); + + if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL && *ccache == NULL) + *ccache = local_ccache; + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d854bf7b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.8 @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +.\" $Id: verify_krb5_conf.8,v 1.7 2002/08/20 17:07:28 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd August 30, 2001 +.Dt VERIFY_KRB5_CONF 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm verify_krb5_conf +.Nd checks krb5.conf for obvious errors +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Ar [config-file] +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +reads the configuration file +.Pa krb5.conf , +or the file given on the command line, +and parses it, thereby verifying that the syntax is not correctly wrong. +.Pp +If the file is syntactically correct, +.Nm +tries to verify that the contents of the file is of relevant nature. +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +Possible output from +.Nm +include: +.Bl -tag -width "" +.It ": failed to parse as size/time/number/boolean" +Usually means that is misspelled, or that it contains +weird characters. The parsing done by +.Nm +is more strict than the one performed by libkrb5, and so strings that +work in real life, might be reported as bad. +.It ": host not found ()" +Means that is supposed to point to a host, but it can't be +recognised as one. +.It : unknown or wrong type +Means that is either is a string when it should be a list, vice +versa, or just that +.Nm +is confused. +.It : unknown entry +Means that is not known by +.Nm "" . +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Ev KRB5_CONFIG +points to the configuration file to read. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width /etc/krb5.conf -compact +.It Pa /etc/krb5.conf +Kerberos 5 configuration file +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5.conf 5 +.Sh BUGS +Since each application can put almost anything in the config file, +it's hard to come up with a water tight verification process. Most of +the default settings are sanity checked, but this does not mean that +every problem is discovered, or that everything that is reported as a +possible problem actually is one. This tool should thus be used with +some care. +.Pp +It should warn about obsolete data, or bad practice, but currently +doesn't. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6017dfc85f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c @@ -0,0 +1,572 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include +RCSID("$Id: verify_krb5_conf.c,v 1.17.2.2 2004/02/13 16:19:44 lha Exp $"); + +/* verify krb5.conf */ + +static int dumpconfig_flag = 0; +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"dumpconfig", 0, arg_flag, &dumpconfig_flag, + "show the parsed config files", NULL }, + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[config-file]"); + exit (ret); +} + +static int +check_bytes(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + if(parse_bytes(data, NULL) == -1) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: failed to parse \"%s\" as size", path, data); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +check_time(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + if(parse_time(data, NULL) == -1) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: failed to parse \"%s\" as time", path, data); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +check_numeric(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + long int v; + char *end; + v = strtol(data, &end, 0); + if(*end != '\0') { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: failed to parse \"%s\" as a number", + path, data); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +check_boolean(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + long int v; + char *end; + if(strcasecmp(data, "yes") == 0 || + strcasecmp(data, "true") == 0 || + strcasecmp(data, "no") == 0 || + strcasecmp(data, "false") == 0) + return 0; + v = strtol(data, &end, 0); + if(*end != '\0') { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: failed to parse \"%s\" as a boolean", + path, data); + return 1; + } + if(v != 0 && v != 1) + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: numeric value \"%s\" is treated as \"true\"", + path, data); + return 0; +} + +static int +check_524(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + if(strcasecmp(data, "yes") == 0 || + strcasecmp(data, "no") == 0 || + strcasecmp(data, "2b") == 0 || + strcasecmp(data, "local") == 0) + return 0; + + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: didn't contain a valid option `%s'", + path, data); + return 1; +} + +static int +check_host(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + int ret; + char hostname[128]; + const char *p = data; + struct addrinfo *ai; + /* XXX data could be a list of hosts that this code can't handle */ + /* XXX copied from krbhst.c */ + if(strncmp(p, "http://", 7) == 0){ + p += 7; + } else if(strncmp(p, "http/", 5) == 0) { + p += 5; + }else if(strncmp(p, "tcp/", 4) == 0){ + p += 4; + } else if(strncmp(p, "udp/", 4) == 0) { + p += 4; + } + if(strsep_copy(&p, ":", hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) { + return 1; + } + hostname[strcspn(hostname, "/")] = '\0'; + ret = getaddrinfo(hostname, "telnet" /* XXX */, NULL, &ai); + if(ret != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: %s (%s)", path, gai_strerror(ret), hostname); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +static int +mit_entry(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + krb5_warnx(context, "%s is only used by MIT Kerberos", path); + return 0; +} +#endif + +struct s2i { + char *s; + int val; +}; + +#define L(X) { #X, LOG_ ## X } + +static struct s2i syslogvals[] = { + /* severity */ + L(EMERG), + L(ALERT), + L(CRIT), + L(ERR), + L(WARNING), + L(NOTICE), + L(INFO), + L(DEBUG), + /* facility */ + L(AUTH), +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + L(AUTHPRIV), +#endif +#ifdef LOG_CRON + L(CRON), +#endif + L(DAEMON), +#ifdef LOG_FTP + L(FTP), +#endif + L(KERN), + L(LPR), + L(MAIL), +#ifdef LOG_NEWS + L(NEWS), +#endif + L(SYSLOG), + L(USER), +#ifdef LOG_UUCP + L(UUCP), +#endif + L(LOCAL0), + L(LOCAL1), + L(LOCAL2), + L(LOCAL3), + L(LOCAL4), + L(LOCAL5), + L(LOCAL6), + L(LOCAL7), + { NULL, -1 } +}; + +static int +find_value(const char *s, struct s2i *table) +{ + while(table->s && strcasecmp(table->s, s)) + table++; + return table->val; +} + +static int +check_log(krb5_context context, const char *path, char *data) +{ + /* XXX sync with log.c */ + int min = 0, max = -1, n; + char c; + const char *p = data; + + n = sscanf(p, "%d%c%d/", &min, &c, &max); + if(n == 2){ + if(c == '/') { + if(min < 0){ + max = -min; + min = 0; + }else{ + max = min; + } + } + } + if(n){ + p = strchr(p, '/'); + if(p == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: failed to parse \"%s\"", path, data); + return 1; + } + p++; + } + if(strcmp(p, "STDERR") == 0 || + strcmp(p, "CONSOLE") == 0 || + (strncmp(p, "FILE", 4) == 0 && (p[4] == ':' || p[4] == '=')) || + (strncmp(p, "DEVICE", 6) == 0 && p[6] == '=')) + return 0; + if(strncmp(p, "SYSLOG", 6) == 0){ + int ret = 0; + char severity[128] = ""; + char facility[128] = ""; + p += 6; + if(*p != '\0') + p++; + if(strsep_copy(&p, ":", severity, sizeof(severity)) != -1) + strsep_copy(&p, ":", facility, sizeof(facility)); + if(*severity == '\0') + strlcpy(severity, "ERR", sizeof(severity)); + if(*facility == '\0') + strlcpy(facility, "AUTH", sizeof(facility)); + if(find_value(severity, syslogvals) == -1) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: unknown syslog facility \"%s\"", + path, facility); + ret++; + } + if(find_value(severity, syslogvals) == -1) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: unknown syslog severity \"%s\"", + path, severity); + ret++; + } + return ret; + }else{ + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: unknown log type: \"%s\"", path, data); + return 1; + } +} + +typedef int (*check_func_t)(krb5_context, const char*, char*); +struct entry { + const char *name; + int type; + void *check_data; +}; + +struct entry all_strings[] = { + { "", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry v4_name_convert_entries[] = { + { "host", krb5_config_list, all_strings }, + { "plain", krb5_config_list, all_strings }, + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry libdefaults_entries[] = { + { "accept_null_addresses", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "capath", krb5_config_list, all_strings }, + { "clockskew", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "date_format", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "default_etypes", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "default_etypes_des", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "default_keytab_modify_name", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "default_keytab_name", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "default_realm", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "dns_proxy", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "dns_lookup_kdc", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "dns_lookup_realm", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "dns_lookup_realm_labels", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "egd_socket", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "encrypt", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "extra_addresses", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "fcache_version", krb5_config_string, check_numeric }, + { "forward", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "forwardable", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "http_proxy", krb5_config_string, check_host /* XXX */ }, + { "ignore_addresses", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "kdc_timeout", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "kdc_timesync", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "log_utc", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "maxretries", krb5_config_string, check_numeric }, + { "scan_interfaces", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "srv_lookup", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "srv_try_txt", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "ticket_lifetime", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "time_format", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "transited_realms_reject", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "v4_instance_resolve", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "v4_name_convert", krb5_config_list, v4_name_convert_entries }, + { "verify_ap_req_nofail", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry appdefaults_entries[] = { + { "afslog", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "afs-use-524", krb5_config_string, check_524 }, + { "forwardable", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "proxiable", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "ticket_lifetime", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "renew_lifetime", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "no-addresses", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "krb4_get_tickets", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, +#if 0 + { "anonymous", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, +#endif + { "", krb5_config_list, appdefaults_entries }, + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry realms_entries[] = { + { "forwardable", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "proxiable", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "ticket_lifetime", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "renew_lifetime", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "warn_pwexpire", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "kdc", krb5_config_string, check_host }, + { "admin_server", krb5_config_string, check_host }, + { "kpasswd_server", krb5_config_string, check_host }, + { "krb524_server", krb5_config_string, check_host }, + { "v4_name_convert", krb5_config_list, v4_name_convert_entries }, + { "v4_instance_convert", krb5_config_list, all_strings }, + { "v4_domains", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "default_domain", krb5_config_string, NULL }, +#if 0 + /* MIT stuff */ + { "admin_keytab", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "acl_file", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "dict_file", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "kadmind_port", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "kpasswd_port", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "master_key_name", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "master_key_type", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "key_stash_file", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "max_life", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "max_renewable_life", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "default_principal_expiration", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "default_principal_flags", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "supported_enctypes", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "database_name", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, +#endif + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry realms_foobar[] = { + { "", krb5_config_list, realms_entries }, + { NULL } +}; + + +struct entry kdc_database_entries[] = { + { "realm", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "dbname", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "mkey_file", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry kdc_entries[] = { + { "database", krb5_config_list, kdc_database_entries }, + { "key-file", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "logging", krb5_config_string, check_log }, + { "max-request", krb5_config_string, check_bytes }, + { "require-preauth", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "ports", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "addresses", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "enable-kerberos4", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "enable-524", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "enable-http", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "check_ticket-addresses", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "allow-null-addresses", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "allow-anonymous", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "v4_realm", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "enable-kaserver", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep", krb5_config_string, check_boolean }, + { "kdc_warn_pwexpire", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { NULL } +}; + +struct entry kadmin_entries[] = { + { "password_lifetime", krb5_config_string, check_time }, + { "default_keys", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { "use_v4_salt", krb5_config_string, NULL }, + { NULL } +}; +struct entry log_strings[] = { + { "", krb5_config_string, check_log }, + { NULL } +}; + + +#if 0 +struct entry kdcdefaults_entries[] = { + { "kdc_ports", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { "v4_mode", krb5_config_string, mit_entry }, + { NULL } +}; +#endif + +struct entry toplevel_sections[] = { + { "libdefaults" , krb5_config_list, libdefaults_entries }, + { "realms", krb5_config_list, realms_foobar }, + { "domain_realm", krb5_config_list, all_strings }, + { "logging", krb5_config_list, log_strings }, + { "kdc", krb5_config_list, kdc_entries }, + { "kadmin", krb5_config_list, kadmin_entries }, + { "appdefaults", krb5_config_list, appdefaults_entries }, +#if 0 + /* MIT stuff */ + { "kdcdefaults", krb5_config_list, kdcdefaults_entries }, +#endif + { NULL } +}; + + +static int +check_section(krb5_context context, const char *path, krb5_config_section *cf, + struct entry *entries) +{ + int error = 0; + krb5_config_section *p; + struct entry *e; + + char *local; + + for(p = cf; p != NULL; p = p->next) { + asprintf(&local, "%s/%s", path, p->name); + for(e = entries; e->name != NULL; e++) { + if(*e->name == '\0' || strcmp(e->name, p->name) == 0) { + if(e->type != p->type) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: unknown or wrong type", local); + error |= 1; + } else if(p->type == krb5_config_string && e->check_data != NULL) { + error |= (*(check_func_t)e->check_data)(context, local, p->u.string); + } else if(p->type == krb5_config_list && e->check_data != NULL) { + error |= check_section(context, local, p->u.list, e->check_data); + } + break; + } + } + if(e->name == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s: unknown entry", local); + error |= 1; + } + free(local); + } + return error; +} + + +static void +dumpconfig(int level, krb5_config_section *top) +{ + krb5_config_section *x; + for(x = top; x; x = x->next) { + switch(x->type) { + case krb5_config_list: + if(level == 0) { + printf("[%s]\n", x->name); + } else { + printf("%*s%s = {\n", 4 * level, " ", x->name); + } + dumpconfig(level + 1, x->u.list); + if(level > 0) + printf("%*s}\n", 4 * level, " "); + break; + case krb5_config_string: + printf("%*s%s = %s\n", 4 * level, " ", x->name, x->u.string); + break; + } + } +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_section *tmp_cf; + int optind = 0; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed"); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + tmp_cf = NULL; + if(argc == 0) + krb5_get_default_config_files(&argv); + + while(*argv) { + ret = krb5_config_parse_file_multi(context, *argv, &tmp_cf); + if (ret != 0) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_config_parse_file"); + argv++; + } + + if(dumpconfig_flag) + dumpconfig(0, tmp_cf); + + return check_section(context, "", tmp_cf, toplevel_sections); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.cat8 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.cat8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b9cbd32c99 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.cat8 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ + +VERIFY_KRB5_CONF(8) UNIX System Manager's Manual VERIFY_KRB5_CONF(8) + +NNAAMMEE + vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff - checks krb5.conf for obvious errors + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff _[_c_o_n_f_i_g_-_f_i_l_e_] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff reads the configuration file _k_r_b_5_._c_o_n_f, or the file giv- + en on the command line, and parses it, thereby verifying that the syntax + is not correctly wrong. + + If the file is syntactically correct, vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff tries to verify + that the contents of the file is of relevant nature. + +DDIIAAGGNNOOSSTTIICCSS + Possible output from vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff include: + + : failed to parse as size/time/number/boolean + Usually means that is misspelled, or that it contains + weird characters. The parsing done by vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff is more + strict than the one performed by libkrb5, and so strings that + work in real life, might be reported as bad. + + : host not found () + Means that is supposed to point to a host, but it can't be + recognised as one. + + : unknown or wrong type + Means that is either is a string when it should be a list, + vice versa, or just that vveerriiffyy__kkrrbb55__ccoonnff is confused. + + : unknown entry + Means that is not known by . + +EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT + KRB5_CONFIG points to the configuration file to read. + +FFIILLEESS + /etc/krb5.conf Kerberos 5 configuration file + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + krb5.conf(5) + +BBUUGGSS + Since each application can put almost anything in the config file, it's + hard to come up with a water tight verification process. Most of the de- + fault settings are sanity checked, but this does not mean that every + problem is discovered, or that everything that is reported as a possible + problem actually is one. This tool should thus be used with some care. + + It should warn about obsolete data, or bad practice, but currently + doesn't. + + HEIMDAL August 30, 2001 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_user.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_user.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1cd571b23d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/verify_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: verify_user.c,v 1.17 2002/08/20 14:48:31 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +verify_common (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service, + krb5_creds cred) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt vopt; + krb5_ccache id; + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, NULL, service, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if(ret) + return ret; + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(&vopt); + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(&vopt, secure); + + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds(context, + &cred, + server, + keytab, + NULL, + &vopt); + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(ccache == NULL) + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &id); + else + id = ccache; + if(ret == 0){ + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, id, principal); + if(ret == 0){ + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, id, &cred); + } + if(ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + } + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify user `principal' with `password'. + * + * If `secure', also verify against local service key for `service'. + * + * As a side effect, fresh tickets are obtained and stored in `ccache'. + */ + +void +krb5_verify_opt_init(krb5_verify_opt *opt) +{ + memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); + opt->secure = TRUE; + opt->service = "host"; +} + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_ccache(krb5_verify_opt *opt, krb5_ccache ccache) +{ + opt->ccache = ccache; +} + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_keytab(krb5_verify_opt *opt, krb5_keytab keytab) +{ + opt->keytab = keytab; +} + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_secure(krb5_verify_opt *opt, krb5_boolean secure) +{ + opt->secure = secure; +} + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_service(krb5_verify_opt *opt, const char *service) +{ + opt->service = service; +} + +void +krb5_verify_opt_set_flags(krb5_verify_opt *opt, unsigned int flags) +{ + opt->flags |= flags; +} + +static krb5_error_code +verify_user_opt_int(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *password, + krb5_verify_opt *vopt) + +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_creds cred; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(context, NULL, + *krb5_princ_realm(context, principal), + &opt); + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, + &opt); + if(ret) + return ret; +#define OPT(V, D) ((vopt && (vopt->V)) ? (vopt->V) : (D)) + return verify_common (context, principal, OPT(ccache, NULL), + OPT(keytab, NULL), vopt ? vopt->secure : TRUE, + OPT(service, "host"), cred); +#undef OPT +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user_opt(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *password, + krb5_verify_opt *opt) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(opt && (opt->flags & KRB5_VERIFY_LREALMS)) { + krb5_realm *realms, *r; + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &realms); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM; + + for (r = realms; *r != NULL && ret != 0; ++r) { + char *tmp = strdup (*r); + + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + free (*krb5_princ_realm (context, principal)); + krb5_princ_set_realm (context, principal, &tmp); + + ret = verify_user_opt_int(context, principal, password, opt); + } + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + if(ret) + return ret; + } else + ret = verify_user_opt_int(context, principal, password, opt); + return ret; +} + +/* compat function that calls above */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *password, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service) +{ + krb5_verify_opt opt; + + krb5_verify_opt_init(&opt); + + krb5_verify_opt_set_ccache(&opt, ccache); + krb5_verify_opt_set_secure(&opt, secure); + krb5_verify_opt_set_service(&opt, service); + + return krb5_verify_user_opt(context, principal, password, &opt); +} + +/* + * A variant of `krb5_verify_user'. The realm of `principal' is + * ignored and all the local realms are tried. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user_lrealm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *password, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service) +{ + krb5_verify_opt opt; + + krb5_verify_opt_init(&opt); + + krb5_verify_opt_set_ccache(&opt, ccache); + krb5_verify_opt_set_secure(&opt, secure); + krb5_verify_opt_set_service(&opt, service); + krb5_verify_opt_set_flags(&opt, KRB5_VERIFY_LREALMS); + + return krb5_verify_user_opt(context, principal, password, &opt); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/version.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f0fd6680b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/version.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: version.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +/* this is just to get a version stamp in the library file */ + +#define heimdal_version __heimdal_version +#define heimdal_long_version __heimdal_long_version +#include "version.h" + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/warn.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/warn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72398bf460 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/warn.c @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: warn.c,v 1.14 2003/04/16 16:13:08 lha Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code _warnerr(krb5_context context, int do_errtext, + krb5_error_code code, int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__((__format__(__printf__, 5, 0))); + +static krb5_error_code +_warnerr(krb5_context context, int do_errtext, + krb5_error_code code, int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char xfmt[7] = ""; + const char *args[2], **arg; + char *msg = NULL; + char *err_str = NULL; + + args[0] = args[1] = NULL; + arg = args; + if(fmt){ + strlcat(xfmt, "%s", sizeof(xfmt)); + if(do_errtext) + strlcat(xfmt, ": ", sizeof(xfmt)); + vasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap); + if(msg == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *arg++ = msg; + } + if(context && do_errtext){ + const char *err_msg; + + strlcat(xfmt, "%s", sizeof(xfmt)); + + err_str = krb5_get_error_string(context); + if (err_str != NULL) { + *arg++ = err_str; + } else { + err_msg = krb5_get_err_text(context, code); + if (err_msg) + *arg++ = err_msg; + else + *arg++ = ""; + } + } + + if(context && context->warn_dest) + krb5_log(context, context->warn_dest, level, xfmt, args[0], args[1]); + else + warnx(xfmt, args[0], args[1]); + free(msg); + free(err_str); + return 0; +} + +#define FUNC(ETEXT, CODE, LEVEL) \ + krb5_error_code ret; \ + va_list ap; \ + va_start(ap, fmt); \ + ret = _warnerr(context, ETEXT, CODE, LEVEL, fmt, ap); \ + va_end(ap); + +#undef __attribute__ +#define __attribute__(X) + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarn(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))) +{ + return _warnerr(context, 1, code, 1, fmt, ap); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warn(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))) +{ + FUNC(1, code, 1); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarnx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))) +{ + return _warnerr(context, 0, 0, 1, fmt, ap); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warnx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))) +{ + FUNC(0, 0, 1); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verr(krb5_context context, int eval, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 1, code, 0, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_err(krb5_context context, int eval, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 5))) +{ + FUNC(1, code, 0); + exit(eval); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verrx(krb5_context context, int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 0, 0, 0, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_errx(krb5_context context, int eval, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))) +{ + FUNC(0, 0, 0); + exit(eval); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabort(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 1, code, 0, fmt, ap); + abort(); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abort(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))) +{ + FUNC(1, code, 0); + abort(); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabortx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 0, 0, 0, fmt, ap); + abort(); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abortx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))) +{ + FUNC(0, 0, 0); + abort(); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_warn_dest(krb5_context context, krb5_log_facility *fac) +{ + context->warn_dest = fac; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/write_message.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/write_message.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3e23a3aaa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/krb5/write_message.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: write_message.c,v 1.8 2001/07/02 18:43:06 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_message (krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + u_int32_t len; + u_int8_t buf[4]; + int ret; + + len = data->length; + _krb5_put_int(buf, len, 4); + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, buf, 4) != 4 + || krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, data->data, len) != len) { + ret = errno; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "write: %s", strerror(ret)); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_priv_message(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data packet; + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, ac, data, &packet, NULL); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_write_message(context, p_fd, &packet); + krb5_data_free(&packet); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_safe_message(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data packet; + ret = krb5_mk_safe (context, ac, data, &packet, NULL); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_write_message(context, p_fd, &packet); + krb5_data_free(&packet); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3006db2277 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +2003-04-16 Love Hörnquist Åstrand + + * roken_rename.h: rename strlcat, strlcpy + * Makefile.am: (ES): add strlcpy.c and strlcat.c + * otp_db.c: use strlcpy, from openbsd + * otp_md.c: use strlcat/strlcpy, from openbsd + * otp_challenge.c: do strdup again, we desupport ultrix + +2002-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * otp_md.c: if we only have old hash names, we need to include + functions here that do the work + +2002-05-20 Johan Danielsson + + * otp_db.c: fix ndbm test + +2002-05-17 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add hooks for ndbm_wrap + + * otp_db.c: use ndbm_wrap + +2001-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add required library dependencies + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libotp_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 1:2:1 + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * otp_md.c: update to new md4/md5/sha API + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (INCLUDES): add krb4 includes here, which are + somewhat bogusly used when linking against libdes supplied by krb4 + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 1:1:1 + +2000-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * const-ify + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: update version to 1:0:1 + +2000-01-26 Assar Westerlund + + * otp_md.c: update to pseudo-standard APIs for md4,md5,sha. + * otp_md.c: start using the pseudo-standard APIs for the hash + functions + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:1:0 + +Fri Mar 19 14:52:48 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 11:24:19 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Sat Mar 13 22:27:10 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * otp_parse.c: unsigned-ify + +Sun Nov 22 10:44:16 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Mon May 25 05:27:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + +Sat May 23 20:54:28 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: link with DBLIB + +Sun Apr 19 09:59:46 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sat Feb 7 07:27:18 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * otp_db.c (otp_put): make sure we don't overrun `buf' + +Sun Nov 9 07:14:59 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * otp_locl.h: use xdbm.h + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41a109a0fb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.23.2.1 2003/05/12 15:20:47 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_des) $(ROKEN_RENAME) + +noinst_PROGRAMS = otptest + +check_PROGRAMS = otptest + +otptest_LDADD = libotp.la + +include_HEADERS = otp.h + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libotp.la +libotp_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:4:1 +libotp_la_LIBADD = $(LIB_des) $(LIB_roken) $(LIB_NDBM) + +if HAVE_DB3 +ndbm_wrap = ndbm_wrap.c ndbm_wrap.h +else +ndbm_wrap = +endif + +libotp_la_SOURCES = \ + otp.c \ + otp_challenge.c \ + otp_db.c \ + otp_md.c \ + otp_parse.c \ + otp_print.c \ + otp_verify.c \ + otp_locl.h \ + otp_md.h \ + roken_rename.h \ + $(ndbm_wrap) \ + $(ROKEN_SRCS) + +if do_roken_rename +ROKEN_SRCS = snprintf.c strcasecmp.c strncasecmp.c strlwr.c strlcpy.c strlcat.c +endif + +$(libotp_la_OBJECTS): $(ndbm_wrap) + +ndbm_wrap.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/ndbm_wrap.c . +ndbm_wrap.h: + (echo '#define dbm_rename(X) __otp_ ## X'; cat $(srcdir)/../roken/ndbm_wrap.h) > ndbm_wrap.h + + +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . +strcasecmp.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strcasecmp.c . +strncasecmp.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strncasecmp.c . +strlwr.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlwr.c . +strlcpy.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlcpy.c . +strlcat.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlcat.c . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7cac44e181 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,851 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.23.2.1 2003/05/12 15:20:47 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + + +SOURCES = $(libotp_la_SOURCES) otptest.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(include_HEADERS) $(srcdir)/Makefile.am \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog +noinst_PROGRAMS = otptest$(EXEEXT) +check_PROGRAMS = otptest$(EXEEXT) +subdir = lib/otp +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + 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+ +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +$(libotp_la_OBJECTS): $(ndbm_wrap) + +ndbm_wrap.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/ndbm_wrap.c . +ndbm_wrap.h: + (echo '#define dbm_rename(X) __otp_ ## X'; cat $(srcdir)/../roken/ndbm_wrap.h) > ndbm_wrap.h + +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . +strcasecmp.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strcasecmp.c . +strncasecmp.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strncasecmp.c . +strlwr.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlwr.c . +strlcpy.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlcpy.c . +strlcat.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strlcat.c . +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..746f3cb53a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp.c,v 1.8 2000/07/12 00:26:43 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "otp_locl.h" +#include "otp_md.h" + +static OtpAlgorithm algorithms[] = { + {OTP_ALG_MD4, "md4", 16, otp_md4_hash, otp_md4_init, otp_md4_next}, + {OTP_ALG_MD5, "md5", 16, otp_md5_hash, otp_md5_init, otp_md5_next}, + {OTP_ALG_SHA, "sha", 20, otp_sha_hash, otp_sha_init, otp_sha_next} +}; + +OtpAlgorithm * +otp_find_alg (char *name) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(algorithms)/sizeof(*algorithms); ++i) + if (strcmp (name, algorithms[i].name) == 0) + return &algorithms[i]; + return NULL; +} + +char * +otp_error (OtpContext *o) +{ + return o->err; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e813458f62 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp.h @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: otp.h,v 1.19 2000/07/12 00:26:43 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _OTP_H +#define _OTP_H + +#include +#include + +enum {OTPKEYSIZE = 8}; + +typedef unsigned char OtpKey[OTPKEYSIZE]; + +#define OTP_MIN_PASSPHRASE 10 +#define OTP_MAX_PASSPHRASE 63 + +#define OTP_USER_TIMEOUT 120 +#define OTP_DB_TIMEOUT 60 + +#define OTP_HEXPREFIX "hex:" +#define OTP_WORDPREFIX "word:" + +typedef enum { OTP_ALG_MD4, OTP_ALG_MD5, OTP_ALG_SHA } OtpAlgID; + +#define OTP_ALG_DEFAULT "md5" + +typedef struct { + OtpAlgID id; + char *name; + int hashsize; + int (*hash)(const char *s, size_t len, unsigned char *res); + int (*init)(OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed); + int (*next)(OtpKey key); +} OtpAlgorithm; + +typedef struct { + char *user; + OtpAlgorithm *alg; + unsigned n; + char seed[17]; + OtpKey key; + int challengep; + time_t lock_time; + char *err; +} OtpContext; + +OtpAlgorithm *otp_find_alg (char *name); +void otp_print_stddict (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz); +void otp_print_hex (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz); +void otp_print_stddict_extended (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz); +void otp_print_hex_extended (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz); +unsigned otp_checksum (OtpKey key); +int otp_parse_hex (OtpKey key, const char *); +int otp_parse_stddict (OtpKey key, const char *); +int otp_parse_altdict (OtpKey key, const char *, OtpAlgorithm *); +int otp_parse (OtpKey key, const char *, OtpAlgorithm *); +int otp_challenge (OtpContext *ctx, char *user, char *str, size_t len); +int otp_verify_user (OtpContext *ctx, const char *passwd); +int otp_verify_user_1 (OtpContext *ctx, const char *passwd); +char *otp_error (OtpContext *ctx); + +void *otp_db_open (void); +void otp_db_close (void *); +int otp_put (void *, OtpContext *ctx); +int otp_get (void *, OtpContext *ctx); +int otp_simple_get (void *, OtpContext *ctx); +int otp_delete (void *, OtpContext *ctx); + +#endif /* _OTP_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_challenge.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_challenge.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fbfaec956e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_challenge.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp_challenge.c,v 1.11 2003/04/16 16:17:49 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "otp_locl.h" + +int +otp_challenge (OtpContext *ctx, char *user, char *str, size_t len) +{ + void *dbm; + int ret; + + ctx->challengep = 0; + ctx->err = NULL; + ctx->user = strdup(user); + if (ctx->user == NULL) { + ctx->err = "Out of memory"; + return -1; + } + dbm = otp_db_open (); + if (dbm == NULL) { + ctx->err = "Cannot open database"; + return -1; + } + ret = otp_get (dbm, ctx); + otp_db_close (dbm); + if (ret) + return ret; + snprintf (str, len, + "[ otp-%s %u %s ]", + ctx->alg->name, ctx->n-1, ctx->seed); + ctx->challengep = 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_db.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_db.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..036fb77bf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_db.c @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp_db.c,v 1.20 2003/04/16 16:20:58 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "otp_locl.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_NDBM) && !defined(HAVE_DB_NDBM) +#include "ndbm_wrap.h" +#endif + +#define RETRIES 5 + +void * +otp_db_open (void) +{ + int lock; + int i; + void *ret; + + for(i = 0; i < RETRIES; ++i) { + struct stat statbuf; + + lock = open (OTP_DB_LOCK, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0666); + if (lock >= 0) { + close(lock); + break; + } + if (stat (OTP_DB_LOCK, &statbuf) == 0) { + if (time(NULL) - statbuf.st_mtime > OTP_DB_TIMEOUT) + unlink (OTP_DB_LOCK); + else + sleep (1); + } + } + if (i == RETRIES) + return NULL; + ret = dbm_open (OTP_DB, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (ret == NULL) + unlink (OTP_DB_LOCK); + return ret; +} + +void +otp_db_close (void *dbm) +{ + dbm_close ((DBM *)dbm); + unlink (OTP_DB_LOCK); +} + +/* + * Remove this entry from the database. + * return 0 if ok. + */ + +int +otp_delete (void *v, OtpContext *ctx) +{ + DBM *dbm = (DBM *)v; + datum key; + + key.dsize = strlen(ctx->user); + key.dptr = ctx->user; + + return dbm_delete(dbm, key); +} + +/* + * Read this entry from the database and lock it if lockp. + */ + +static int +otp_get_internal (void *v, OtpContext *ctx, int lockp) +{ + DBM *dbm = (DBM *)v; + datum dat, key; + char *p; + time_t now, then; + + key.dsize = strlen(ctx->user); + key.dptr = ctx->user; + + dat = dbm_fetch (dbm, key); + if (dat.dptr == NULL) { + ctx->err = "Entry not found"; + return -1; + } + p = dat.dptr; + + memcpy (&then, p, sizeof(then)); + ctx->lock_time = then; + if (lockp) { + time(&now); + if (then && now - then < OTP_USER_TIMEOUT) { + ctx->err = "Entry locked"; + return -1; + } + memcpy (p, &now, sizeof(now)); + } + p += sizeof(now); + ctx->alg = otp_find_alg (p); + if (ctx->alg == NULL) { + ctx->err = "Bad algorithm"; + return -1; + } + p += strlen(p) + 1; + { + unsigned char *up = (unsigned char *)p; + ctx->n = (up[0] << 24) | (up[1] << 16) | (up[2] << 8) | up[3]; + } + p += 4; + memcpy (ctx->key, p, OTPKEYSIZE); + p += OTPKEYSIZE; + strlcpy (ctx->seed, p, sizeof(ctx->seed)); + if (lockp) + return dbm_store (dbm, key, dat, DBM_REPLACE); + else + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get and lock. + */ + +int +otp_get (void *v, OtpContext *ctx) +{ + return otp_get_internal (v, ctx, 1); +} + +/* + * Get and don't lock. + */ + +int +otp_simple_get (void *v, OtpContext *ctx) +{ + return otp_get_internal (v, ctx, 0); +} + +/* + * Write this entry to the database. + */ + +int +otp_put (void *v, OtpContext *ctx) +{ + DBM *dbm = (DBM *)v; + datum dat, key; + char buf[1024], *p; + time_t zero = 0; + size_t len, rem; + + key.dsize = strlen(ctx->user); + key.dptr = ctx->user; + + p = buf; + rem = sizeof(buf); + + if (rem < sizeof(zero)) + return -1; + memcpy (p, &zero, sizeof(zero)); + p += sizeof(zero); + rem -= sizeof(zero); + len = strlen(ctx->alg->name) + 1; + + if (rem < len) + return -1; + strlcpy (p, ctx->alg->name, rem); + p += len; + rem -= len; + + if (rem < 4) + return -1; + { + unsigned char *up = (unsigned char *)p; + *up++ = (ctx->n >> 24) & 0xFF; + *up++ = (ctx->n >> 16) & 0xFF; + *up++ = (ctx->n >> 8) & 0xFF; + *up++ = (ctx->n >> 0) & 0xFF; + } + p += 4; + rem -= 4; + + if (rem < OTPKEYSIZE) + return -1; + memcpy (p, ctx->key, OTPKEYSIZE); + p += OTPKEYSIZE; + rem -= OTPKEYSIZE; + + len = strlen(ctx->seed) + 1; + if (rem < len) + return -1; + strlcpy (p, ctx->seed, rem); + p += len; + rem -= len; + dat.dptr = buf; + dat.dsize = p - buf; + return dbm_store (dbm, key, dat, DBM_REPLACE); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18c9284566 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: otp_locl.h,v 1.12 2002/08/12 15:09:20 joda Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#include + +#include + +#define OTPKEYS "/.otpkeys" + +#define OTP_DB SYSCONFDIR "/otp" +#define OTP_DB_LOCK SYSCONFDIR "/otp-lock" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_md.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_md.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36f638a279 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_md.c @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp_md.c,v 1.18 2003/04/16 16:19:33 lha Exp $"); +#endif +#include "otp_locl.h" + +#include "otp_md.h" +#include "crypto-headers.h" + +/* + * Compress len bytes from md into key + */ + +static void +compressmd (OtpKey key, unsigned char *md, size_t len) +{ + u_char *p = key; + + memset (p, 0, OTPKEYSIZE); + while(len) { + *p++ ^= *md++; + *p++ ^= *md++; + *p++ ^= *md++; + *p++ ^= *md++; + len -= 4; + if (p == key + OTPKEYSIZE) + p = key; + } +} + +#ifdef HAVE_OLD_HASH_NAMES +static void +otp_md4_final (void *res, struct md4 *m) +{ + MD4_Final(res, m); +} +#undef MD4_Final +#define MD4_Final otp_md4_final + +static void +otp_md5_final (void *res, struct md5 *m) +{ + MD5_Final(res, m); +} +#undef MD5_Final +#define MD5_Final otp_md5_final +#endif + +static int +otp_md_init (OtpKey key, + const char *pwd, + const char *seed, + void (*init)(void *), + void (*update)(void *, const void *, size_t), + void (*final)(void *, void *), + void *arg, + unsigned char *res, + size_t ressz) +{ + char *p; + int len; + + len = strlen(pwd) + strlen(seed); + p = malloc (len + 1); + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + strlcpy (p, seed, len + 1); + strlwr (p); + strlcat (p, pwd, len + 1); + (*init)(arg); + (*update)(arg, p, len); + (*final)(res, arg); + free (p); + compressmd (key, res, ressz); + return 0; +} + +static int +otp_md_next (OtpKey key, + void (*init)(void *), + void (*update)(void *, const void *, size_t), + void (*final)(void *, void *), + void *arg, + unsigned char *res, + size_t ressz) +{ + (*init)(arg); + (*update)(arg, key, OTPKEYSIZE); + (*final)(res, arg); + compressmd (key, res, ressz); + return 0; +} + +static int +otp_md_hash (const char *data, + size_t len, + void (*init)(void *), + void (*update)(void *, const void *, size_t), + void (*final)(void *, void *), + void *arg, + unsigned char *res, + size_t ressz) +{ + (*init)(arg); + (*update)(arg, data, len); + (*final)(res, arg); + return 0; +} + +int +otp_md4_init (OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed) +{ + unsigned char res[16]; + MD4_CTX md4; + + return otp_md_init (key, pwd, seed, + (void (*)(void *))MD4_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))MD4_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))MD4_Final, + &md4, res, sizeof(res)); +} + +int +otp_md4_hash (const char *data, + size_t len, + unsigned char *res) +{ + MD4_CTX md4; + + return otp_md_hash (data, len, + (void (*)(void *))MD4_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))MD4_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))MD4_Final, + &md4, res, 16); +} + +int +otp_md4_next (OtpKey key) +{ + unsigned char res[16]; + MD4_CTX md4; + + return otp_md_next (key, + (void (*)(void *))MD4_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))MD4_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))MD4_Final, + &md4, res, sizeof(res)); +} + + +int +otp_md5_init (OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed) +{ + unsigned char res[16]; + MD5_CTX md5; + + return otp_md_init (key, pwd, seed, + (void (*)(void *))MD5_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))MD5_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))MD5_Final, + &md5, res, sizeof(res)); +} + +int +otp_md5_hash (const char *data, + size_t len, + unsigned char *res) +{ + MD5_CTX md5; + + return otp_md_hash (data, len, + (void (*)(void *))MD5_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))MD5_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))MD5_Final, + &md5, res, 16); +} + +int +otp_md5_next (OtpKey key) +{ + unsigned char res[16]; + MD5_CTX md5; + + return otp_md_next (key, + (void (*)(void *))MD5_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))MD5_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))MD5_Final, + &md5, res, sizeof(res)); +} + +/* + * For histerical reasons, in the OTP definition it's said that the + * result from SHA must be stored in little-endian order. See + * draft-ietf-otp-01.txt. + */ + +static void +SHA1_Final_little_endian (void *res, SHA_CTX *m) +{ + unsigned char tmp[20]; + unsigned char *p = res; + int j; + + SHA1_Final (tmp, m); + for (j = 0; j < 20; j += 4) { + p[j] = tmp[j+3]; + p[j+1] = tmp[j+2]; + p[j+2] = tmp[j+1]; + p[j+3] = tmp[j]; + } +} + +int +otp_sha_init (OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed) +{ + unsigned char res[20]; + SHA_CTX sha1; + + return otp_md_init (key, pwd, seed, + (void (*)(void *))SHA1_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))SHA1_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA1_Final_little_endian, + &sha1, res, sizeof(res)); +} + +int +otp_sha_hash (const char *data, + size_t len, + unsigned char *res) +{ + SHA_CTX sha1; + + return otp_md_hash (data, len, + (void (*)(void *))SHA1_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))SHA1_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA1_Final_little_endian, + &sha1, res, 20); +} + +int +otp_sha_next (OtpKey key) +{ + unsigned char res[20]; + SHA_CTX sha1; + + return otp_md_next (key, + (void (*)(void *))SHA1_Init, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, size_t))SHA1_Update, + (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA1_Final_little_endian, + &sha1, res, sizeof(res)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_md.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_md.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5732606439 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_md.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: otp_md.h,v 1.7 2000/07/12 00:26:44 assar Exp $ */ + +int otp_md4_init (OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed); +int otp_md4_hash (const char *, size_t, unsigned char *res); +int otp_md4_next (OtpKey key); + +int otp_md5_init (OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed); +int otp_md5_hash (const char *, size_t, unsigned char *res); +int otp_md5_next (OtpKey key); + +int otp_sha_init (OtpKey key, const char *pwd, const char *seed); +int otp_sha_hash (const char *, size_t, unsigned char *res); +int otp_sha_next (OtpKey key); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_parse.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_parse.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc69de5005 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_parse.c @@ -0,0 +1,2515 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp_parse.c,v 1.20 2000/07/01 13:58:38 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "otp_locl.h" + +struct e { + char *s; + unsigned n; +}; + +extern const struct e inv_std_dict[2048]; + +static int +cmp(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + struct e *e1, *e2; + + e1 = (struct e *)a; + e2 = (struct e *)b; + return strcasecmp (e1->s, e2->s); +} + +static int +get_stdword (const char *s, void *v) +{ + struct e e, *r; + + e.s = (char *)s; + e.n = -1; + r = (struct e *) bsearch (&e, inv_std_dict, + sizeof(inv_std_dict)/sizeof(*inv_std_dict), + sizeof(*inv_std_dict), cmp); + if (r) + return r->n; + else + return -1; +} + +static void +compress (OtpKey key, unsigned wn[]) +{ + key[0] = wn[0] >> 3; + key[1] = ((wn[0] & 0x07) << 5) | (wn[1] >> 6); + key[2] = ((wn[1] & 0x3F) << 2) | (wn[2] >> 9); + key[3] = ((wn[2] >> 1) & 0xFF); + key[4] = ((wn[2] & 0x01) << 7) | (wn[3] >> 4); + key[5] = ((wn[3] & 0x0F) << 4) | (wn[4] >> 7); + key[6] = ((wn[4] & 0x7F) << 1) | (wn[5] >> 10); + key[7] = ((wn[5] >> 2) & 0xFF); +} + +static int +get_altword (const char *s, void *a) +{ + OtpAlgorithm *alg = (OtpAlgorithm *)a; + int ret; + unsigned char *res = malloc(alg->hashsize); + + if (res == NULL) + return -1; + alg->hash (s, strlen(s), res); + ret = (unsigned)(res[alg->hashsize - 1]) | + ((res[alg->hashsize - 2] & 0x03) << 8); + free (res); + return ret; +} + +static int +parse_words(unsigned wn[], + const char *str, + int (*convert)(const char *, void *), + void *arg) +{ + unsigned char *w, *wend, c; + int i; + int tmp; + + w = (unsigned char *)str; + for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) { + while (isspace(*w)) + ++w; + wend = w; + while (isalpha (*wend)) + ++wend; + c = *wend; + *wend = '\0'; + tmp = (*convert)((char *)w, arg); + *wend = c; + w = wend; + if (tmp < 0) + return -1; + wn[i] = tmp; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +otp_parse_internal (OtpKey key, const char *str, + OtpAlgorithm *alg, + int (*convert)(const char *, void *)) +{ + unsigned wn[6]; + + if (parse_words (wn, str, convert, alg)) + return -1; + compress (key, wn); + if (otp_checksum (key) != (wn[5] & 0x03)) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +otp_parse_stddict (OtpKey key, const char *str) +{ + return otp_parse_internal (key, str, NULL, get_stdword); +} + +int +otp_parse_altdict (OtpKey key, const char *str, OtpAlgorithm *alg) +{ + return otp_parse_internal (key, str, alg, get_altword); +} + +int +otp_parse_hex (OtpKey key, const char *s) +{ + char buf[17], *b; + int is[8]; + int i; + + b = buf; + while (*s) { + if (strchr ("0123456789ABCDEFabcdef", *s)) { + if (b - buf >= 16) + return -1; + else + *b++ = tolower(*s); + } + s++; + } + *b = '\0'; + if (sscanf (buf, "%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x%2x", + &is[0], &is[1], &is[2], &is[3], &is[4], + &is[5], &is[6], &is[7]) != 8) + return -1; + for (i = 0; i < OTPKEYSIZE; ++i) + key[i] = is[i]; + return 0; +} + +int +otp_parse (OtpKey key, const char *s, OtpAlgorithm *alg) +{ + int ret; + int dohex = 1; + + if (strncmp (s, OTP_HEXPREFIX, strlen(OTP_HEXPREFIX)) == 0) + return otp_parse_hex (key, s + strlen(OTP_HEXPREFIX)); + if (strncmp (s, OTP_WORDPREFIX, strlen(OTP_WORDPREFIX)) == 0) { + s += strlen(OTP_WORDPREFIX); + dohex = 0; + } + + ret = otp_parse_stddict (key, s); + if (ret) + ret = otp_parse_altdict (key, s, alg); + if (ret && dohex) + ret = otp_parse_hex (key, s); + return ret; +} + +const char *const std_dict[2048] = +{ "A", "ABE", "ACE", "ACT", "AD", "ADA", "ADD", +"AGO", "AID", "AIM", "AIR", "ALL", "ALP", "AM", "AMY", +"AN", "ANA", "AND", "ANN", "ANT", "ANY", "APE", "APS", +"APT", "ARC", "ARE", "ARK", "ARM", "ART", "AS", "ASH", +"ASK", "AT", "ATE", "AUG", "AUK", "AVE", "AWE", "AWK", +"AWL", "AWN", "AX", "AYE", "BAD", "BAG", "BAH", "BAM", +"BAN", "BAR", "BAT", "BAY", "BE", "BED", "BEE", "BEG", +"BEN", "BET", "BEY", "BIB", "BID", "BIG", "BIN", "BIT", +"BOB", "BOG", "BON", "BOO", "BOP", "BOW", "BOY", "BUB", +"BUD", "BUG", "BUM", "BUN", "BUS", "BUT", "BUY", "BY", +"BYE", "CAB", "CAL", "CAM", "CAN", "CAP", "CAR", "CAT", +"CAW", "COD", "COG", "COL", "CON", "COO", "COP", "COT", +"COW", "COY", "CRY", "CUB", "CUE", "CUP", "CUR", "CUT", +"DAB", "DAD", "DAM", "DAN", "DAR", "DAY", "DEE", "DEL", +"DEN", "DES", "DEW", "DID", "DIE", "DIG", "DIN", "DIP", +"DO", "DOE", "DOG", "DON", "DOT", "DOW", "DRY", "DUB", +"DUD", "DUE", "DUG", "DUN", "EAR", "EAT", "ED", "EEL", +"EGG", "EGO", "ELI", "ELK", "ELM", "ELY", "EM", "END", +"EST", "ETC", "EVA", "EVE", "EWE", "EYE", "FAD", "FAN", +"FAR", "FAT", "FAY", "FED", "FEE", "FEW", "FIB", "FIG", +"FIN", "FIR", "FIT", "FLO", "FLY", "FOE", "FOG", "FOR", +"FRY", "FUM", "FUN", "FUR", "GAB", "GAD", "GAG", "GAL", +"GAM", "GAP", "GAS", "GAY", "GEE", "GEL", "GEM", "GET", +"GIG", "GIL", "GIN", "GO", "GOT", "GUM", "GUN", "GUS", +"GUT", "GUY", "GYM", "GYP", "HA", "HAD", "HAL", "HAM", +"HAN", "HAP", "HAS", "HAT", "HAW", "HAY", "HE", "HEM", +"HEN", "HER", "HEW", "HEY", "HI", "HID", "HIM", "HIP", +"HIS", "HIT", "HO", "HOB", "HOC", "HOE", "HOG", "HOP", +"HOT", "HOW", "HUB", "HUE", "HUG", "HUH", "HUM", "HUT", +"I", "ICY", "IDA", "IF", "IKE", "ILL", "INK", "INN", +"IO", "ION", "IQ", "IRA", "IRE", "IRK", "IS", "IT", +"ITS", "IVY", "JAB", "JAG", "JAM", "JAN", "JAR", "JAW", +"JAY", "JET", "JIG", "JIM", "JO", "JOB", "JOE", "JOG", +"JOT", "JOY", "JUG", "JUT", "KAY", "KEG", "KEN", "KEY", +"KID", "KIM", "KIN", "KIT", "LA", "LAB", "LAC", "LAD", +"LAG", "LAM", "LAP", "LAW", "LAY", "LEA", "LED", "LEE", +"LEG", "LEN", "LEO", "LET", "LEW", "LID", "LIE", "LIN", +"LIP", "LIT", "LO", "LOB", "LOG", "LOP", "LOS", "LOT", +"LOU", "LOW", "LOY", "LUG", "LYE", "MA", "MAC", "MAD", +"MAE", "MAN", "MAO", "MAP", "MAT", "MAW", "MAY", "ME", +"MEG", "MEL", "MEN", "MET", "MEW", "MID", "MIN", "MIT", +"MOB", "MOD", "MOE", "MOO", "MOP", "MOS", "MOT", "MOW", +"MUD", "MUG", "MUM", "MY", "NAB", "NAG", "NAN", "NAP", +"NAT", "NAY", "NE", "NED", "NEE", "NET", "NEW", "NIB", +"NIIL", "NIP", "NIT", "NO", "NOB", "NOD", "NON", "NOR", +"NOT", "NOV", "NOW", "NU", "NUN", "NUT", "O", "OAF", +"OAK", "OAR", "OAT", "ODD", "ODE", "OF", "OFF", "OFT", +"OH", "OIL", "OK", "OLD", "ON", "ONE", "OR", "ORB", +"ORE", "ORR", "OS", "OTT", "OUR", "OUT", "OVA", "OW", +"OWE", "OWL", "OWN", "OX", "PA", "PAD", "PAL", "PAM", +"PAN", "PAP", "PAR", "PAT", "PAW", "PAY", "PEA", "PEG", +"PEN", "PEP", "PER", "PET", "PEW", "PHI", "PI", "PIE", +"PIN", "PIT", "PLY", "PO", "POD", "POE", "POP", "POT", +"POW", "PRO", "PRY", "PUB", "PUG", "PUN", "PUP", "PUT", +"QUO", "RAG", "RAM", "RAN", "RAP", "RAT", "RAW", "RAY", +"REB", "RED", "REP", "RET", "RIB", "RID", "RIG", "RIM", +"RIO", "RIP", "ROB", "ROD", "ROE", "RON", "ROT", "ROW", +"ROY", "RUB", "RUE", "RUG", "RUM", "RUN", "RYE", "SAC", +"SAD", "SAG", "SAL", "SAM", "SAN", "SAP", "SAT", "SAW", +"SAY", "SEA", "SEC", "SEE", "SEN", "SET", "SEW", "SHE", +"SHY", "SIN", "SIP", "SIR", "SIS", "SIT", "SKI", "SKY", +"SLY", "SO", "SOB", "SOD", "SON", "SOP", "SOW", "SOY", +"SPA", "SPY", "SUB", "SUD", "SUE", "SUM", "SUN", "SUP", +"TAB", "TAD", "TAG", "TAN", "TAP", "TAR", "TEA", "TED", +"TEE", "TEN", "THE", "THY", "TIC", "TIE", "TIM", "TIN", +"TIP", "TO", "TOE", "TOG", "TOM", "TON", "TOO", "TOP", +"TOW", "TOY", "TRY", "TUB", "TUG", "TUM", "TUN", "TWO", +"UN", "UP", "US", "USE", "VAN", "VAT", "VET", "VIE", +"WAD", "WAG", "WAR", "WAS", "WAY", "WE", "WEB", "WED", +"WEE", "WET", "WHO", "WHY", "WIN", "WIT", "WOK", "WON", +"WOO", "WOW", "WRY", "WU", "YAM", "YAP", "YAW", "YE", +"YEA", "YES", "YET", "YOU", "ABED", "ABEL", "ABET", "ABLE", +"ABUT", "ACHE", "ACID", "ACME", "ACRE", "ACTA", "ACTS", "ADAM", +"ADDS", "ADEN", "AFAR", "AFRO", "AGEE", "AHEM", "AHOY", "AIDA", +"AIDE", "AIDS", "AIRY", "AJAR", "AKIN", "ALAN", "ALEC", "ALGA", +"ALIA", "ALLY", "ALMA", "ALOE", "ALSO", "ALTO", "ALUM", "ALVA", +"AMEN", "AMES", "AMID", "AMMO", "AMOK", "AMOS", "AMRA", "ANDY", +"ANEW", "ANNA", "ANNE", "ANTE", "ANTI", "AQUA", "ARAB", "ARCH", +"AREA", "ARGO", "ARID", "ARMY", "ARTS", "ARTY", "ASIA", "ASKS", +"ATOM", "AUNT", "AURA", "AUTO", "AVER", "AVID", "AVIS", "AVON", +"AVOW", "AWAY", "AWRY", "BABE", "BABY", "BACH", "BACK", "BADE", +"BAIL", "BAIT", "BAKE", "BALD", "BALE", "BALI", "BALK", "BALL", +"BALM", "BAND", "BANE", "BANG", "BANK", "BARB", "BARD", "BARE", +"BARK", "BARN", "BARR", "BASE", "BASH", "BASK", "BASS", "BATE", +"BATH", "BAWD", "BAWL", "BEAD", "BEAK", "BEAM", "BEAN", "BEAR", +"BEAT", "BEAU", "BECK", "BEEF", "BEEN", "BEER", "BEET", "BELA", +"BELL", "BELT", "BEND", "BENT", "BERG", "BERN", "BERT", "BESS", +"BEST", "BETA", "BETH", "BHOY", "BIAS", "BIDE", "BIEN", "BILE", +"BILK", "BILL", "BIND", "BING", "BIRD", "BITE", "BITS", "BLAB", +"BLAT", "BLED", "BLEW", "BLOB", "BLOC", "BLOT", "BLOW", "BLUE", +"BLUM", "BLUR", "BOAR", "BOAT", "BOCA", "BOCK", "BODE", "BODY", +"BOGY", "BOHR", "BOIL", "BOLD", "BOLO", "BOLT", "BOMB", "BONA", +"BOND", "BONE", "BONG", "BONN", "BONY", "BOOK", "BOOM", "BOON", +"BOOT", "BORE", "BORG", "BORN", "BOSE", "BOSS", "BOTH", "BOUT", +"BOWL", "BOYD", "BRAD", "BRAE", "BRAG", "BRAN", "BRAY", "BRED", +"BREW", "BRIG", "BRIM", "BROW", "BUCK", "BUDD", "BUFF", "BULB", +"BULK", "BULL", "BUNK", "BUNT", "BUOY", "BURG", "BURL", "BURN", +"BURR", "BURT", "BURY", "BUSH", "BUSS", "BUST", "BUSY", "BYTE", +"CADY", "CAFE", "CAGE", "CAIN", "CAKE", "CALF", "CALL", "CALM", +"CAME", "CANE", "CANT", "CARD", "CARE", "CARL", "CARR", "CART", +"CASE", "CASH", "CASK", "CAST", "CAVE", "CEIL", "CELL", "CENT", +"CERN", "CHAD", "CHAR", "CHAT", "CHAW", "CHEF", "CHEN", "CHEW", +"CHIC", "CHIN", "CHOU", "CHOW", "CHUB", "CHUG", "CHUM", "CITE", +"CITY", "CLAD", "CLAM", "CLAN", "CLAW", "CLAY", "CLOD", "CLOG", +"CLOT", "CLUB", "CLUE", "COAL", "COAT", "COCA", "COCK", "COCO", +"CODA", "CODE", "CODY", "COED", "COIL", "COIN", "COKE", "COLA", +"COLD", "COLT", "COMA", "COMB", "COME", "COOK", "COOL", "COON", +"COOT", "CORD", "CORE", "CORK", "CORN", "COST", "COVE", "COWL", +"CRAB", "CRAG", "CRAM", "CRAY", "CREW", "CRIB", "CROW", "CRUD", +"CUBA", "CUBE", "CUFF", "CULL", "CULT", "CUNY", "CURB", "CURD", +"CURE", "CURL", "CURT", "CUTS", "DADE", "DALE", "DAME", "DANA", +"DANE", "DANG", "DANK", "DARE", "DARK", "DARN", "DART", "DASH", +"DATA", "DATE", "DAVE", "DAVY", "DAWN", "DAYS", "DEAD", "DEAF", +"DEAL", "DEAN", "DEAR", "DEBT", "DECK", "DEED", "DEEM", "DEER", +"DEFT", "DEFY", "DELL", "DENT", "DENY", "DESK", "DIAL", "DICE", +"DIED", "DIET", "DIME", "DINE", "DING", "DINT", "DIRE", "DIRT", +"DISC", "DISH", "DISK", "DIVE", "DOCK", "DOES", "DOLE", "DOLL", +"DOLT", "DOME", "DONE", "DOOM", "DOOR", "DORA", "DOSE", "DOTE", +"DOUG", "DOUR", "DOVE", "DOWN", "DRAB", "DRAG", "DRAM", "DRAW", +"DREW", "DRUB", "DRUG", "DRUM", "DUAL", "DUCK", "DUCT", "DUEL", +"DUET", "DUKE", "DULL", "DUMB", "DUNE", "DUNK", "DUSK", "DUST", +"DUTY", "EACH", "EARL", "EARN", "EASE", "EAST", "EASY", "EBEN", +"ECHO", "EDDY", "EDEN", "EDGE", "EDGY", "EDIT", "EDNA", "EGAN", +"ELAN", "ELBA", "ELLA", "ELSE", "EMIL", "EMIT", "EMMA", "ENDS", +"ERIC", "EROS", "EVEN", "EVER", "EVIL", "EYED", "FACE", "FACT", +"FADE", "FAIL", "FAIN", "FAIR", "FAKE", "FALL", "FAME", "FANG", +"FARM", "FAST", "FATE", "FAWN", "FEAR", "FEAT", "FEED", "FEEL", +"FEET", "FELL", "FELT", "FEND", "FERN", "FEST", "FEUD", "FIEF", +"FIGS", "FILE", "FILL", "FILM", "FIND", "FINE", "FINK", "FIRE", +"FIRM", "FISH", "FISK", "FIST", "FITS", "FIVE", "FLAG", "FLAK", +"FLAM", "FLAT", "FLAW", "FLEA", "FLED", "FLEW", "FLIT", "FLOC", +"FLOG", "FLOW", "FLUB", "FLUE", "FOAL", "FOAM", "FOGY", "FOIL", +"FOLD", "FOLK", "FOND", "FONT", "FOOD", "FOOL", "FOOT", "FORD", +"FORE", "FORK", "FORM", "FORT", "FOSS", "FOUL", "FOUR", "FOWL", +"FRAU", "FRAY", "FRED", "FREE", "FRET", "FREY", "FROG", "FROM", +"FUEL", "FULL", "FUME", "FUND", "FUNK", "FURY", "FUSE", "FUSS", +"GAFF", "GAGE", "GAIL", "GAIN", "GAIT", "GALA", "GALE", "GALL", +"GALT", "GAME", "GANG", "GARB", "GARY", "GASH", "GATE", "GAUL", +"GAUR", "GAVE", "GAWK", "GEAR", "GELD", "GENE", "GENT", "GERM", +"GETS", "GIBE", "GIFT", "GILD", "GILL", "GILT", "GINA", "GIRD", +"GIRL", "GIST", "GIVE", "GLAD", "GLEE", "GLEN", "GLIB", "GLOB", +"GLOM", "GLOW", "GLUE", "GLUM", "GLUT", "GOAD", "GOAL", "GOAT", +"GOER", "GOES", "GOLD", "GOLF", "GONE", "GONG", "GOOD", "GOOF", +"GORE", "GORY", "GOSH", "GOUT", "GOWN", "GRAB", "GRAD", "GRAY", +"GREG", "GREW", "GREY", "GRID", "GRIM", "GRIN", "GRIT", "GROW", +"GRUB", "GULF", "GULL", "GUNK", "GURU", "GUSH", "GUST", "GWEN", +"GWYN", "HAAG", "HAAS", "HACK", "HAIL", "HAIR", "HALE", "HALF", +"HALL", "HALO", "HALT", "HAND", "HANG", "HANK", "HANS", "HARD", +"HARK", "HARM", "HART", "HASH", "HAST", "HATE", "HATH", "HAUL", +"HAVE", "HAWK", "HAYS", "HEAD", "HEAL", "HEAR", "HEAT", "HEBE", +"HECK", "HEED", "HEEL", "HEFT", "HELD", "HELL", "HELM", "HERB", +"HERD", "HERE", "HERO", "HERS", "HESS", "HEWN", "HICK", "HIDE", +"HIGH", "HIKE", "HILL", "HILT", "HIND", "HINT", "HIRE", "HISS", +"HIVE", "HOBO", "HOCK", "HOFF", "HOLD", "HOLE", "HOLM", "HOLT", +"HOME", "HONE", "HONK", "HOOD", "HOOF", "HOOK", "HOOT", "HORN", +"HOSE", "HOST", "HOUR", "HOVE", "HOWE", "HOWL", "HOYT", "HUCK", +"HUED", "HUFF", "HUGE", "HUGH", "HUGO", "HULK", "HULL", "HUNK", +"HUNT", "HURD", "HURL", "HURT", "HUSH", "HYDE", "HYMN", "IBIS", +"ICON", "IDEA", "IDLE", "IFFY", "INCA", "INCH", "INTO", "IONS", +"IOTA", "IOWA", "IRIS", "IRMA", "IRON", "ISLE", "ITCH", "ITEM", +"IVAN", "JACK", "JADE", "JAIL", "JAKE", "JANE", "JAVA", "JEAN", +"JEFF", "JERK", "JESS", "JEST", "JIBE", "JILL", "JILT", "JIVE", +"JOAN", "JOBS", "JOCK", "JOEL", "JOEY", "JOHN", "JOIN", "JOKE", +"JOLT", "JOVE", "JUDD", "JUDE", "JUDO", "JUDY", "JUJU", "JUKE", +"JULY", "JUNE", "JUNK", "JUNO", "JURY", "JUST", "JUTE", "KAHN", +"KALE", "KANE", "KANT", "KARL", "KATE", "KEEL", "KEEN", "KENO", +"KENT", "KERN", "KERR", "KEYS", "KICK", "KILL", "KIND", "KING", +"KIRK", "KISS", "KITE", "KLAN", "KNEE", "KNEW", "KNIT", "KNOB", +"KNOT", "KNOW", "KOCH", "KONG", "KUDO", "KURD", "KURT", "KYLE", +"LACE", "LACK", "LACY", "LADY", "LAID", "LAIN", "LAIR", "LAKE", +"LAMB", "LAME", "LAND", "LANE", "LANG", "LARD", "LARK", "LASS", +"LAST", "LATE", "LAUD", "LAVA", "LAWN", "LAWS", "LAYS", "LEAD", +"LEAF", "LEAK", "LEAN", "LEAR", "LEEK", "LEER", "LEFT", "LEND", +"LENS", "LENT", "LEON", "LESK", "LESS", "LEST", "LETS", "LIAR", +"LICE", "LICK", "LIED", "LIEN", "LIES", "LIEU", "LIFE", "LIFT", +"LIKE", "LILA", "LILT", "LILY", "LIMA", "LIMB", "LIME", "LIND", +"LINE", "LINK", "LINT", "LION", "LISA", "LIST", "LIVE", "LOAD", +"LOAF", "LOAM", "LOAN", "LOCK", "LOFT", "LOGE", "LOIS", "LOLA", +"LONE", "LONG", "LOOK", "LOON", "LOOT", "LORD", "LORE", "LOSE", +"LOSS", "LOST", "LOUD", "LOVE", "LOWE", "LUCK", "LUCY", "LUGE", +"LUKE", "LULU", "LUND", "LUNG", "LURA", "LURE", "LURK", "LUSH", +"LUST", "LYLE", "LYNN", "LYON", "LYRA", "MACE", "MADE", "MAGI", +"MAID", "MAIL", "MAIN", "MAKE", "MALE", "MALI", "MALL", "MALT", +"MANA", "MANN", "MANY", "MARC", "MARE", "MARK", "MARS", "MART", +"MARY", "MASH", "MASK", "MASS", "MAST", "MATE", "MATH", "MAUL", +"MAYO", "MEAD", "MEAL", "MEAN", "MEAT", "MEEK", "MEET", "MELD", +"MELT", "MEMO", "MEND", "MENU", "MERT", "MESH", "MESS", "MICE", +"MIKE", "MILD", "MILE", "MILK", "MILL", "MILT", "MIMI", "MIND", +"MINE", "MINI", "MINK", "MINT", "MIRE", "MISS", "MIST", "MITE", +"MITT", "MOAN", "MOAT", "MOCK", "MODE", "MOLD", "MOLE", "MOLL", +"MOLT", "MONA", "MONK", "MONT", "MOOD", "MOON", "MOOR", "MOOT", +"MORE", "MORN", "MORT", "MOSS", "MOST", "MOTH", "MOVE", "MUCH", +"MUCK", "MUDD", "MUFF", "MULE", "MULL", "MURK", "MUSH", "MUST", +"MUTE", "MUTT", "MYRA", "MYTH", "NAGY", "NAIL", "NAIR", "NAME", +"NARY", "NASH", "NAVE", "NAVY", "NEAL", "NEAR", "NEAT", "NECK", +"NEED", "NEIL", "NELL", "NEON", "NERO", "NESS", "NEST", "NEWS", +"NEWT", "NIBS", "NICE", "NICK", "NILE", "NINA", "NINE", "NOAH", +"NODE", "NOEL", "NOLL", "NONE", "NOOK", "NOON", "NORM", "NOSE", +"NOTE", "NOUN", "NOVA", "NUDE", "NULL", "NUMB", "OATH", "OBEY", +"OBOE", "ODIN", "OHIO", "OILY", "OINT", "OKAY", "OLAF", "OLDY", +"OLGA", "OLIN", "OMAN", "OMEN", "OMIT", "ONCE", "ONES", "ONLY", +"ONTO", "ONUS", "ORAL", "ORGY", "OSLO", "OTIS", "OTTO", "OUCH", +"OUST", "OUTS", "OVAL", "OVEN", "OVER", "OWLY", "OWNS", "QUAD", +"QUIT", "QUOD", "RACE", "RACK", "RACY", "RAFT", "RAGE", "RAID", +"RAIL", "RAIN", "RAKE", "RANK", "RANT", "RARE", "RASH", "RATE", +"RAVE", "RAYS", "READ", "REAL", "REAM", "REAR", "RECK", "REED", +"REEF", "REEK", "REEL", "REID", "REIN", "RENA", "REND", "RENT", +"REST", "RICE", "RICH", "RICK", "RIDE", "RIFT", "RILL", "RIME", +"RING", "RINK", "RISE", "RISK", "RITE", "ROAD", "ROAM", "ROAR", +"ROBE", "ROCK", "RODE", "ROIL", "ROLL", "ROME", "ROOD", "ROOF", +"ROOK", "ROOM", "ROOT", "ROSA", "ROSE", "ROSS", "ROSY", "ROTH", +"ROUT", "ROVE", "ROWE", "ROWS", "RUBE", "RUBY", "RUDE", "RUDY", +"RUIN", "RULE", "RUNG", "RUNS", "RUNT", "RUSE", "RUSH", "RUSK", +"RUSS", "RUST", "RUTH", "SACK", "SAFE", "SAGE", "SAID", "SAIL", +"SALE", "SALK", "SALT", "SAME", "SAND", "SANE", "SANG", "SANK", +"SARA", "SAUL", "SAVE", "SAYS", "SCAN", "SCAR", "SCAT", "SCOT", +"SEAL", "SEAM", "SEAR", "SEAT", "SEED", "SEEK", "SEEM", "SEEN", +"SEES", "SELF", "SELL", "SEND", "SENT", "SETS", "SEWN", "SHAG", +"SHAM", "SHAW", "SHAY", "SHED", "SHIM", "SHIN", "SHOD", "SHOE", +"SHOT", "SHOW", "SHUN", "SHUT", "SICK", "SIDE", "SIFT", "SIGH", +"SIGN", "SILK", "SILL", "SILO", "SILT", "SINE", "SING", "SINK", +"SIRE", "SITE", "SITS", "SITU", "SKAT", "SKEW", "SKID", "SKIM", +"SKIN", "SKIT", "SLAB", "SLAM", "SLAT", "SLAY", "SLED", "SLEW", +"SLID", "SLIM", "SLIT", "SLOB", "SLOG", "SLOT", "SLOW", "SLUG", +"SLUM", "SLUR", "SMOG", "SMUG", "SNAG", "SNOB", "SNOW", "SNUB", +"SNUG", "SOAK", "SOAR", "SOCK", "SODA", "SOFA", "SOFT", "SOIL", +"SOLD", "SOME", "SONG", "SOON", "SOOT", "SORE", "SORT", "SOUL", +"SOUR", "SOWN", "STAB", "STAG", "STAN", "STAR", "STAY", "STEM", +"STEW", "STIR", "STOW", "STUB", "STUN", "SUCH", "SUDS", "SUIT", +"SULK", "SUMS", "SUNG", "SUNK", "SURE", "SURF", "SWAB", "SWAG", +"SWAM", "SWAN", "SWAT", "SWAY", "SWIM", "SWUM", "TACK", "TACT", +"TAIL", "TAKE", "TALE", "TALK", "TALL", "TANK", "TASK", "TATE", +"TAUT", "TEAL", "TEAM", "TEAR", "TECH", "TEEM", "TEEN", "TEET", +"TELL", "TEND", "TENT", "TERM", "TERN", "TESS", "TEST", "THAN", +"THAT", "THEE", "THEM", "THEN", "THEY", "THIN", "THIS", "THUD", +"THUG", "TICK", "TIDE", "TIDY", "TIED", "TIER", "TILE", "TILL", +"TILT", "TIME", "TINA", "TINE", "TINT", "TINY", "TIRE", "TOAD", +"TOGO", "TOIL", "TOLD", "TOLL", "TONE", "TONG", "TONY", "TOOK", +"TOOL", "TOOT", "TORE", "TORN", "TOTE", "TOUR", "TOUT", "TOWN", +"TRAG", "TRAM", "TRAY", "TREE", "TREK", "TRIG", "TRIM", "TRIO", +"TROD", "TROT", "TROY", "TRUE", "TUBA", "TUBE", "TUCK", "TUFT", +"TUNA", "TUNE", "TUNG", "TURF", "TURN", "TUSK", "TWIG", "TWIN", +"TWIT", "ULAN", "UNIT", "URGE", "USED", "USER", "USES", "UTAH", +"VAIL", "VAIN", "VALE", "VARY", "VASE", "VAST", "VEAL", "VEDA", +"VEIL", "VEIN", "VEND", "VENT", "VERB", "VERY", "VETO", "VICE", +"VIEW", "VINE", "VISE", "VOID", "VOLT", "VOTE", "WACK", "WADE", +"WAGE", "WAIL", "WAIT", "WAKE", "WALE", "WALK", "WALL", "WALT", +"WAND", "WANE", "WANG", "WANT", "WARD", "WARM", "WARN", "WART", +"WASH", "WAST", "WATS", "WATT", "WAVE", "WAVY", "WAYS", "WEAK", +"WEAL", "WEAN", "WEAR", "WEED", "WEEK", "WEIR", "WELD", "WELL", +"WELT", "WENT", "WERE", "WERT", "WEST", "WHAM", "WHAT", "WHEE", +"WHEN", "WHET", "WHOA", "WHOM", "WICK", "WIFE", "WILD", "WILL", +"WIND", "WINE", "WING", "WINK", "WINO", "WIRE", "WISE", "WISH", +"WITH", "WOLF", "WONT", "WOOD", "WOOL", "WORD", "WORE", "WORK", +"WORM", "WORN", "WOVE", "WRIT", "WYNN", "YALE", "YANG", "YANK", +"YARD", "YARN", "YAWL", "YAWN", "YEAH", "YEAR", "YELL", "YOGA", +"YOKE" }; + +const struct e inv_std_dict[2048] = { +{"A", 0}, +{"ABE", 1}, +{"ABED", 571}, +{"ABEL", 572}, +{"ABET", 573}, +{"ABLE", 574}, +{"ABUT", 575}, +{"ACE", 2}, +{"ACHE", 576}, +{"ACID", 577}, +{"ACME", 578}, +{"ACRE", 579}, +{"ACT", 3}, +{"ACTA", 580}, +{"ACTS", 581}, +{"AD", 4}, +{"ADA", 5}, +{"ADAM", 582}, +{"ADD", 6}, +{"ADDS", 583}, +{"ADEN", 584}, +{"AFAR", 585}, +{"AFRO", 586}, +{"AGEE", 587}, +{"AGO", 7}, +{"AHEM", 588}, +{"AHOY", 589}, +{"AID", 8}, +{"AIDA", 590}, +{"AIDE", 591}, +{"AIDS", 592}, +{"AIM", 9}, +{"AIR", 10}, +{"AIRY", 593}, +{"AJAR", 594}, +{"AKIN", 595}, +{"ALAN", 596}, +{"ALEC", 597}, +{"ALGA", 598}, +{"ALIA", 599}, +{"ALL", 11}, +{"ALLY", 600}, +{"ALMA", 601}, +{"ALOE", 602}, +{"ALP", 12}, +{"ALSO", 603}, +{"ALTO", 604}, +{"ALUM", 605}, +{"ALVA", 606}, +{"AM", 13}, +{"AMEN", 607}, +{"AMES", 608}, +{"AMID", 609}, +{"AMMO", 610}, +{"AMOK", 611}, +{"AMOS", 612}, +{"AMRA", 613}, +{"AMY", 14}, +{"AN", 15}, +{"ANA", 16}, +{"AND", 17}, +{"ANDY", 614}, +{"ANEW", 615}, +{"ANN", 18}, +{"ANNA", 616}, +{"ANNE", 617}, +{"ANT", 19}, +{"ANTE", 618}, +{"ANTI", 619}, +{"ANY", 20}, +{"APE", 21}, +{"APS", 22}, +{"APT", 23}, +{"AQUA", 620}, +{"ARAB", 621}, +{"ARC", 24}, +{"ARCH", 622}, +{"ARE", 25}, +{"AREA", 623}, +{"ARGO", 624}, +{"ARID", 625}, +{"ARK", 26}, +{"ARM", 27}, +{"ARMY", 626}, +{"ART", 28}, +{"ARTS", 627}, +{"ARTY", 628}, +{"AS", 29}, +{"ASH", 30}, +{"ASIA", 629}, +{"ASK", 31}, +{"ASKS", 630}, +{"AT", 32}, +{"ATE", 33}, +{"ATOM", 631}, +{"AUG", 34}, +{"AUK", 35}, +{"AUNT", 632}, +{"AURA", 633}, +{"AUTO", 634}, +{"AVE", 36}, +{"AVER", 635}, +{"AVID", 636}, +{"AVIS", 637}, +{"AVON", 638}, +{"AVOW", 639}, +{"AWAY", 640}, +{"AWE", 37}, +{"AWK", 38}, +{"AWL", 39}, +{"AWN", 40}, +{"AWRY", 641}, +{"AX", 41}, +{"AYE", 42}, +{"BABE", 642}, +{"BABY", 643}, +{"BACH", 644}, +{"BACK", 645}, +{"BAD", 43}, +{"BADE", 646}, +{"BAG", 44}, +{"BAH", 45}, +{"BAIL", 647}, +{"BAIT", 648}, +{"BAKE", 649}, +{"BALD", 650}, +{"BALE", 651}, +{"BALI", 652}, +{"BALK", 653}, +{"BALL", 654}, +{"BALM", 655}, +{"BAM", 46}, +{"BAN", 47}, +{"BAND", 656}, +{"BANE", 657}, +{"BANG", 658}, +{"BANK", 659}, +{"BAR", 48}, +{"BARB", 660}, +{"BARD", 661}, +{"BARE", 662}, +{"BARK", 663}, +{"BARN", 664}, +{"BARR", 665}, +{"BASE", 666}, +{"BASH", 667}, +{"BASK", 668}, +{"BASS", 669}, +{"BAT", 49}, +{"BATE", 670}, +{"BATH", 671}, +{"BAWD", 672}, +{"BAWL", 673}, +{"BAY", 50}, +{"BE", 51}, +{"BEAD", 674}, +{"BEAK", 675}, +{"BEAM", 676}, +{"BEAN", 677}, +{"BEAR", 678}, +{"BEAT", 679}, +{"BEAU", 680}, +{"BECK", 681}, +{"BED", 52}, +{"BEE", 53}, +{"BEEF", 682}, +{"BEEN", 683}, +{"BEER", 684}, +{"BEET", 685}, +{"BEG", 54}, +{"BELA", 686}, +{"BELL", 687}, +{"BELT", 688}, +{"BEN", 55}, +{"BEND", 689}, +{"BENT", 690}, +{"BERG", 691}, +{"BERN", 692}, +{"BERT", 693}, +{"BESS", 694}, +{"BEST", 695}, +{"BET", 56}, +{"BETA", 696}, +{"BETH", 697}, +{"BEY", 57}, +{"BHOY", 698}, +{"BIAS", 699}, +{"BIB", 58}, +{"BID", 59}, +{"BIDE", 700}, +{"BIEN", 701}, +{"BIG", 60}, +{"BILE", 702}, +{"BILK", 703}, 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+{"WEE", 551}, +{"WEED", 1994}, +{"WEEK", 1995}, +{"WEIR", 1996}, +{"WELD", 1997}, +{"WELL", 1998}, +{"WELT", 1999}, +{"WENT", 2000}, +{"WERE", 2001}, +{"WERT", 2002}, +{"WEST", 2003}, +{"WET", 552}, +{"WHAM", 2004}, +{"WHAT", 2005}, +{"WHEE", 2006}, +{"WHEN", 2007}, +{"WHET", 2008}, +{"WHO", 553}, +{"WHOA", 2009}, +{"WHOM", 2010}, +{"WHY", 554}, +{"WICK", 2011}, +{"WIFE", 2012}, +{"WILD", 2013}, +{"WILL", 2014}, +{"WIN", 555}, +{"WIND", 2015}, +{"WINE", 2016}, +{"WING", 2017}, +{"WINK", 2018}, +{"WINO", 2019}, +{"WIRE", 2020}, +{"WISE", 2021}, +{"WISH", 2022}, +{"WIT", 556}, +{"WITH", 2023}, +{"WOK", 557}, +{"WOLF", 2024}, +{"WON", 558}, +{"WONT", 2025}, +{"WOO", 559}, +{"WOOD", 2026}, +{"WOOL", 2027}, +{"WORD", 2028}, +{"WORE", 2029}, +{"WORK", 2030}, +{"WORM", 2031}, +{"WORN", 2032}, +{"WOVE", 2033}, +{"WOW", 560}, +{"WRIT", 2034}, +{"WRY", 561}, +{"WU", 562}, +{"WYNN", 2035}, +{"YALE", 2036}, +{"YAM", 563}, +{"YANG", 2037}, +{"YANK", 2038}, +{"YAP", 564}, +{"YARD", 2039}, +{"YARN", 2040}, +{"YAW", 565}, +{"YAWL", 2041}, +{"YAWN", 2042}, +{"YE", 566}, +{"YEA", 567}, +{"YEAH", 2043}, +{"YEAR", 2044}, +{"YELL", 2045}, +{"YES", 568}, +{"YET", 569}, +{"YOGA", 2046}, +{"YOKE", 2047}, +{"YOU", 570} +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_print.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_print.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..701a74cff5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_print.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp_print.c,v 1.14 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "otp_locl.h" + +extern const char *const std_dict[]; + +unsigned +otp_checksum (OtpKey key) +{ + int i; + unsigned sum = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < OTPKEYSIZE; ++i) + sum += ((key[i] >> 0) & 0x03) + + ((key[i] >> 2) & 0x03) + + ((key[i] >> 4) & 0x03) + + ((key[i] >> 6) & 0x03); + sum &= 0x03; + return sum; +} + +void +otp_print_stddict (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz) +{ + unsigned sum; + + sum = otp_checksum (key); + snprintf (str, sz, + "%s %s %s %s %s %s", + std_dict[(key[0] << 3) | (key[1] >> 5)], + std_dict[((key[1] & 0x1F) << 6) | (key[2] >> 2)], + std_dict[((key[2] & 0x03) << 9) | (key[3] << 1) | (key[4] >> 7)], + std_dict[((key[4] & 0x7F) << 4) | (key[5] >> 4)], + std_dict[((key[5] & 0x0F) << 7) | (key[6] >> 1)], + std_dict[((key[6] & 0x01) << 10) | (key[7] << 2) | sum]); +} + +void +otp_print_hex (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz) +{ + snprintf (str, sz, + "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", + key[0], key[1], key[2], key[3], + key[4], key[5], key[6], key[7]); +} + +void +otp_print_hex_extended (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz) +{ + strlcpy (str, OTP_HEXPREFIX, sz); + otp_print_hex (key, + str + strlen(OTP_HEXPREFIX), + sz - strlen(OTP_HEXPREFIX)); +} + +void +otp_print_stddict_extended (OtpKey key, char *str, size_t sz) +{ + strlcpy (str, OTP_WORDPREFIX, sz); + otp_print_stddict (key, + str + strlen(OTP_WORDPREFIX), + sz - strlen(OTP_WORDPREFIX)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_verify.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5fec82e2b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otp_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otp_verify.c,v 1.7 2000/07/01 13:58:38 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "otp_locl.h" + +int +otp_verify_user_1 (OtpContext *ctx, const char *passwd) +{ + OtpKey key1, key2; + + if (otp_parse (key1, passwd, ctx->alg)) { + ctx->err = "Syntax error in reply"; + return -1; + } + memcpy (key2, key1, sizeof(key1)); + ctx->alg->next (key2); + if (memcmp (ctx->key, key2, sizeof(key2)) == 0) { + --ctx->n; + memcpy (ctx->key, key1, sizeof(key1)); + return 0; + } else + return -1; +} + +int +otp_verify_user (OtpContext *ctx, const char *passwd) +{ + void *dbm; + int ret; + + if (!ctx->challengep) + return -1; + ret = otp_verify_user_1 (ctx, passwd); + dbm = otp_db_open (); + if (dbm == NULL) { + free(ctx->user); + return -1; + } + otp_put (dbm, ctx); + free(ctx->user); + otp_db_close (dbm); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otptest.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otptest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4eb342c797 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/otptest.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +RCSID("$Id: otptest.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +static int +test_one(OtpKey key1, char *name, char *val, + void (*print)(OtpKey,char*, size_t), + OtpAlgorithm *alg) +{ + char buf[256]; + OtpKey key2; + + (*print)(key1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf ("%s: %s, ", name, buf); + if (strcmp (buf, val) != 0) { + printf ("failed(*%s* != *%s*)\n", buf, val); + return 1; + } + if (otp_parse (key2, buf, alg)) { + printf ("parse of %s failed\n", name); + return 1; + } + if (memcmp (key1, key2, OTPKEYSIZE) != 0) { + printf ("key1 != key2, "); + } + printf ("success\n"); + return 0; +} + +static int +test (void) +{ + struct test { + char *alg; + char *passphrase; + char *seed; + int count; + char *hex; + char *word; + } tests[] = { + + /* md4 */ + {"md4", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 0, "d1854218ebbb0b51", "ROME MUG FRED SCAN LIVE LACE"}, + {"md4", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 1, "63473ef01cd0b444", "CARD SAD MINI RYE COL KIN"}, + {"md4", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 99, "c5e612776e6c237a", "NOTE OUT IBIS SINK NAVE MODE"}, + {"md4", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 0, "50076f47eb1ade4e", "AWAY SEN ROOK SALT LICE MAP"}, + {"md4", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 1, "65d20d1949b5f7ab", "CHEW GRIM WU HANG BUCK SAID"}, + {"md4", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 99, "d150c82cce6f62d1", "ROIL FREE COG HUNK WAIT COCA"}, + {"md4", "OTP's are good", "correct", 0, "849c79d4f6f55388", "FOOL STEM DONE TOOL BECK NILE"}, + {"md4", "OTP's are good", "correct", 1, "8c0992fb250847b1", "GIST AMOS MOOT AIDS FOOD SEEM"}, + {"md4", "OTP's are good", "correct",99, "3f3bf4b4145fd74b", "TAG SLOW NOV MIN WOOL KENO"}, + + + /* md5 */ + {"md5", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 0, "9e876134d90499dd", "INCH SEA ANNE LONG AHEM TOUR"}, + {"md5", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 1, "7965e05436f5029f", "EASE OIL FUM CURE AWRY AVIS"}, + {"md5", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 99, "50fe1962c4965880", "BAIL TUFT BITS GANG CHEF THY"}, + {"md5", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 0, "87066dd9644bf206", "FULL PEW DOWN ONCE MORT ARC"}, + {"md5", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 1, "7cd34c1040add14b", "FACT HOOF AT FIST SITE KENT"}, + {"md5", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 99, "5aa37a81f212146c", "BODE HOP JAKE STOW JUT RAP"}, + {"md5", "OTP's are good", "correct", 0, "f205753943de4cf9", "ULAN NEW ARMY FUSE SUIT EYED"}, + {"md5", "OTP's are good", "correct", 1, "ddcdac956f234937", "SKIM CULT LOB SLAM POE HOWL"}, + {"md5", "OTP's are good", "correct",99, "b203e28fa525be47", "LONG IVY JULY AJAR BOND LEE"}, + + /* sha */ + {"sha", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 0, "bb9e6ae1979d8ff4", "MILT VARY MAST OK SEES WENT"}, + {"sha", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 1, "63d936639734385b", "CART OTTO HIVE ODE VAT NUT"}, + {"sha", "This is a test.", "TeSt", 99, "87fec7768b73ccf9", "GAFF WAIT SKID GIG SKY EYED"}, + {"sha", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 0, "ad85f658ebe383c9", "LEST OR HEEL SCOT ROB SUIT"}, + {"sha", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 1, "d07ce229b5cf119b", "RITE TAKE GELD COST TUNE RECK"}, + {"sha", "AbCdEfGhIjK", "alpha1", 99, "27bc71035aaf3dc6", "MAY STAR TIN LYON VEDA STAN"}, + {"sha", "OTP's are good", "correct", 0, "d51f3e99bf8e6f0b", "RUST WELT KICK FELL TAIL FRAU"}, + {"sha", "OTP's are good", "correct", 1, "82aeb52d943774e4", "FLIT DOSE ALSO MEW DRUM DEFY"}, + {"sha", "OTP's are good", "correct", 99, "4f296a74fe1567ec", "AURA ALOE HURL WING BERG WAIT"}, + {NULL} + }; + + struct test *t; + int sum = 0; + + for(t = tests; t->alg; ++t) { + int i; + OtpAlgorithm *alg = otp_find_alg (t->alg); + OtpKey key; + + if (alg == NULL) { + printf ("Could not find alg %s\n", t->alg); + return 1; + } + if(alg->init (key, t->passphrase, t->seed)) + return 1; + for (i = 0; i < t->count; ++i) { + if (alg->next (key)) + return 1; + } + sum += test_one (key, "hexadecimal", t->hex, otp_print_hex, + alg) + + test_one (key, "standard_word", t->word, otp_print_stddict, alg); + } + return sum; +} + +int +main (void) +{ + return test (); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/roken_rename.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/roken_rename.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..de1545e430 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/otp/roken_rename.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken_rename.h,v 1.3 2003/04/16 16:33:57 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __roken_rename_h__ +#define __roken_rename_h__ + +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +#define snprintf _otp_snprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +#define asprintf _otp_asprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASNPRINTF +#define asnprintf _otp_asnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF +#define vasprintf _otp_vasprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASNPRINTF +#define vasnprintf _otp_vasnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +#define vsnprintf _otp_vsnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASECMP +#define strcasecmp _otp_strcasecmp +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRNCASECMP +#define strncasecmp _otp_strncasecmp +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRLWR +#define strlwr _otp_strlwr +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT +#define strlcat _otp_strlcat +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY +#define strlcpy _otp_strlcpy +#endif + +#endif /* __roken_rename_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3132d23ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,1488 @@ +2004-01-15 Love + + * roken-common.h: 1.52: use EAI_NONAME instead of EAI_ADDRFAMILY + to check for if we need EAI_ macros + + * gai_strerror.c: 1.4: correct ifdef for EAI_ADDRFAMILY + 1.3: EAI_ADDRFAMILY and EAI_NODATA is deprecated + +2003-08-29 Love + + * ndbm_wrap.c: 1.1->1.2: patch for working with DB4 on + heimdal-discuss From: Luke Howard + +2003-04-22 Love + + * resolve.c: 1.38->1.39: copy NUL too, from janj@wenf.org via + openbsd + +2003-04-16 Love + + * parse_units.h: remove typedef for units to avoid problems with + shadowing + + * resolve.c: use strlcpy, from openbsd + + * getcap.c: use strlcpy, from openbsd + + * getarg.3: Change .Fd #include to .In header.h + from Thomas Klausner + +2003-04-15 Love + + * socket.c (socket_set_tos): if setsockopt failed with EINVAL + failed, just ignore it, sock was probably a just a non AF_INET + socket + +2003-04-14 Love + + * strncasecmp.c: cast argument to toupper to unsigned char, from + Christian Biere via NetBSD + + * strlwr.c: cast argument to tolower to unsigned char, from + Christian Biere via NetBSD + + * strcasecmp.c: cast argument to toupper to unsigned char, from + Christian Biere via NetBSD + +2003-03-19 Love + + * getarg.3: spelling, from + +2003-03-07 Love + + * parse_bytes.c: use struct units instead of units + + * parse_time.c: use struct units instead of units + +2003-03-04 Love + + * roken.awk: use full prototype for main + +2002-10-15 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: check length of txt records + +2002-09-10 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.awk: include config.h before stdio.h (breaks with + _FILE_OFFSET_BITS on solaris otherwise) + +2002-09-09 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: fix res_nsearch call, but don't use it for now, AIX5 + has a broken version that trashes memory + + * roken-common.h: fix typo in previous + + * roken-common.h: change IRIX == 4 to IRIX4 + +2002-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * getifaddrs.c: remove some warnings from the linux-portion + + * getnameinfo_verified.c (getnameinfo_verified): handle the case + of forward but no backward DNS information, and also describe the + desired behaviour. from Love + +2002-09-04 Johan Danielsson + + * rtbl.c (rtbl_destroy): free whole table + + * resolve.c: use res_nsearch if we have it (from Larry Greenfield) + +2002-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * getifaddrs.c: add Linux AF_NETLINK getifaddrs from Hideaki + YOSHIFUJI of the Usagi project + + * parse_reply-test.c: make this build and return 77 if there is no + mmap + + * Makefile.am (parse_reply-test): add + * parse_reply-test.c: add a test case for parse_reply reading past + the given buffer + * resolve.c (parse_reply): update the arguments to more reasonable + types. allow parse_reply-test to call it + +2002-08-28 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c (dns_srv_order): do alignment tricks with the random() + state (from NetBSD) + +2002-08-27 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (parse_reply): verify the lengths (both external and + internal) are consistent and not too long + (dns_lookup_int): be conservative in the length sent in to to + parse_reply + +2002-08-26 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: add prototypes for str, unvis functions + * resolve.h: add fallback definition for T_AAAA + +2002-08-22 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: we may need a prototype for strndup + +2002-08-20 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: typedef ssize_t here + + * getarg.c: don't put Ns before comma + + * resolve.c: _res might not be available + + * localtime_r.c: include stdio.h and roken.h + + * strftime.c: only use altzone if we have it + + * roken-common.h: AI_NUMERICHOST needs special handling + + * strlcat.c: add some consistency checks + + * strlcpy.c: make the logic simpler, and handle dst_sz == 0 + +2002-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.h: prefix these functions to avoid conflicts with other + packages + +2002-08-14 Johan Danielsson + + * strsep_copy.c: don't write to buf if len == 0 + +2002-05-31 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: *_LDADD: add LDADD, so that libroken is used + +2002-05-17 Johan Danielsson + + * xdbm.h: remove old dbm part + +2002-04-30 Johan Danielsson + + * ndbm_wrap.{c,h}: ndbm wrapper for newer db libraries + +2002-04-18 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: move mini_inetd protos to after addrinfo definition + + * snprintf.c (append_number): make rep const + + * getarg.h: rename optind and optarg to avoid some gcc warnings + + * getarg.c: rename optind and optarg to avoid some gcc warnings + +2002-02-18 Johan Danielsson + + * mini_inetd.c: mini_inetd_addrinfo that takes an addrinfo instead + of a port number + +2001-11-30 Assar Westerlund + + * getifaddrs.c: support SIOCGLIFCONF and SIOCGLIFFLAGS which are + used on Solaris 8 to retrieve addresses larger than `struct + sockaddr'. From Magnus Ahltorp (with some + modifications by me) + +2001-10-27 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 15:0:6 + +2001-10-22 Assar Westerlund + + * localtime_r.c: add + +2001-10-02 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c (dns_srv_order): don't try to return a value + +2001-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * snprintf.c: va_{start,end} fixes; from Thomas Klausner + +2001-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (dns_srv_order): make sure of not reading after the + array + +2001-09-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump to 14:4:5 + * snprintf.c: rename 'struct state' -> 'struct snprintf_test' to + avoid collision with resolv.h on aix + +2001-09-04 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_bytes-test.c, parse_bytes.c, parse_bytes.h, parse_units.c, + parse_units.h: use int instead of size_t as return values to be + compatible with snprintf + + * strftime.c (strftime): check for return values from snprintf() < + 0 + +2001-09-03 Johan Danielsson + + * socket.c: restrict is a keyword + +2001-09-03 Assar Westerlund + + * write_pid.c: handle atexit or on_exit + + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add vis.hin to help + solaris make + +2001-08-30 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: use LDADD directly + +2001-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): set to 14:3:5 + + * issuid.c (issuid): call issetugid if it exists + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: make it play better with recent automake + +2001-08-21 Assar Westerlund + + * glob.c: provide a fallback for ARG_MAX. from + + * roken.h.in: remove all winsock.h + for now, it does more harm than good under cygwin and if it should be + used, the correct conditional needs to be found + from + +2001-08-17 Johan Danielsson + + * getaddrinfo.c: include a definition of in6addr_loopback if it + doesn't exist + +2001-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): update to 14:2:5 + +2001-08-08 Assar Westerlund + + * hstrerror.c: move h_errno to its own file (h_errno.c) + +2001-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add getarg.3 + +2001-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): explicitly use PF_UNSPEC. be more + resilient to bind/listen failing. + +2001-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * getifaddrs.c (getifaddrs2): remove unused variables + +2001-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): update version to 14:1:5 + +2001-07-23 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.c (arg_match_long): fix parsing of arg_counter optional + argument + +2001-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 14:0:5 + +2001-07-17 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf-test.h: add a file with renaming of the snprintf + functions, to be used for running the tests + +2001-07-11 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf-test.c: add more %X tests, and long and conditional + long long tests + * snprintf.c: add support for printing long long (if available) + +2001-07-10 Assar Westerlund + + * getaddrinfo.c (add_hostent): adapt to const hostent_find_fqdn + * hostent_find_fqdn.c (hostent_find_fqdn): const-ize + +2001-07-09 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h (hostent_find_fqdn): add + * hostent_find_fqdn.c: separate out hostent_find_fqdn + + * warnerr.c: move out getprogname, setprogname + +2001-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * warnerr.c (setprogname): add const cast + * vis.c (SVIS): add some (unsigned char) before calling isfoo* + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS:) set version to 13:0:4 + + * Makefile.am: add snprintf_test + * snprintf.c: rewrite so that it does not stop as soon as there + are no more characters to print, we need to figure out how long + the string would have to be. this also fixes snprintf(NULL, 0 + +2001-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * simple_exec.c (pipe_execv): remove unused variable + +2001-06-20 Johan Danielsson + + * getdtablesize.c: fix typo in obviously never used sysctl case + + * simple_exec.c: rename check_status to wait_for_process, and + export it; function pipe_execv similar to popen, but with more + control over input and output + + * roken-common.h: prototypes for wait_for_process and pipe_execv + +2001-06-17 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: move emalloc et al to roken.h.in + * Makefile.am: make emalloc,ecalloc,erealloc,estrdup conditional + * emalloc.c, erealloc.c, estrup.c: use errx, since errno might not + be set reliably + * ecalloc.c: add for symmetry + +2001-06-09 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: dns_srv_order to order srv records + +2001-06-08 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c: Grog tries to figure out if to use mdoc.old instead of + mdoc by looking at some macros that were only present in the old + version, and by looking at the number of .Oo's present. In + mdoc.old .Oo was a toggle, but in mdoc it's closed by .Oc, so if + the number of .Oo's is bigger than the number of .Oc's, it figures + it must be mdoc.old. This doesn't however account for called Oc's, + and thus grog thinks that valid pages are mdoc.old when they + infact are mdoc. So let's make sure that Oc's are not called by + other macros. + +2001-05-29 Assar Westerlund + + * base64-test.c (main): initialize numerr + +2001-05-28 Johan Danielsson + + * base64.c: clean up the decode mess somewhat + + * base64-test.c: base64 tests + +2001-05-18 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: just use standard C types with bswap* + + * bswap.c: just use standard C types + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: include all the headers that AC_GROK_TYPES tries for + finding u_int17_t et al + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 12:0:3 + * roken.h.in: re-add set_progname and get_progname for backwards + compatability + * warnerr.c: re-add set_progname and get_progname for backwards + compatability + +2001-05-12 Assar Westerlund + + * glob.c: add limits.h, from + +2001-05-11 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bswap.c + + * bswap.c: bswap{16,32} + +2001-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * freeaddrinfo.c (freeaddrinfo): also free every `struct + addrinfo'. from + +2001-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.h (free_getarg_strings): add prototype + * getarg.c (free_getarg_strings): add function + +2001-04-21 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c: pack short flag options togther, to shorten the usage + string + +2001-04-17 Johan Danielsson + + * getifaddrs.c (getifaddrs2): close socket when done + +2001-03-26 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.awk: END has to be last with Sun's awk + +2001-03-26 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): do not check the return value + from strtod, it might return != 0.0 when the string has no digits. + just testing if it consumed any characters is enough and more + resilient + * glob.c: add GLOB_LIMIT (from NetBSD) + +2001-02-20 Assar Westerlund + + * warnerr.c (warnerr): do not use __progname + * roken.h.in (setprogname, getprogname): add prototypes + * warnerr.c (setprogname, getprogname): rename to. change all + callers + +2001-02-12 Assar Westerlund + + * getnameinfo_verified.c (getnameinfo_verified): do the first + getnameinfo with NI_NUMERICSERV to avoid the error that bind 8.2.3 + reports on not finding the service + (ENI_NOSERVNAME). reported by Ake Sandgren + +2001-02-09 Assar Westerlund + + * getnameinfo.c (doit): call inet_ntop with correct af, noted by + Ake Sandgren + +2001-02-08 Assar Westerlund + + * getnameinfo_verified.c (getnameinfo_verified): always capture + the service from getnameinfo so it can be sent back to getaddrinfo + and set socktype to avoid getaddrinfo not returning any addresses + +2001-01-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 11:1:2 + * print_version.c (print_version): add 2001 + +2001-01-29 Assar Westerlund + + * getifaddrs.c (getifaddrs2): copy the entire sockaddr + + * roken-common.h (_PATH_BSHELL): add + +2001-01-27 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: move __attribute__ to roken-common.h + + * esetenv.c (esetenv): cast to handle a setenv that takes a `char + * which is the case on Unicos + +2000-12-29 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): ifaddrs.h -> + ifaddrs.hin + +2000-12-25 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.c (print_arg): add a case for arg_strings + +2000-12-15 Johan Danielsson + + * snprintf.c (append_string): handle NULL strings by printing + `(null)' + +2000-12-12 Johan Danielsson + + * roken-common.h: add c++ externs + + * roken.h.in: fix last commit differently + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * err.hin (warnerr): remove, it's not part of the err.h interface + * roken-common.h (warnerr): moved here from err.hin + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 11:0:2 + * vis.c: s/u_int32_t/unsigned/ for systems that do not define + u_int32_t + +2000-12-10 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: rename some headers to avoid conflict with possible + system headers + +2000-12-06 Johan Danielsson + + * vis.c: make sure _DIAGASSERT is defined + + * unvis.c: make sure _DIAGASSERT is defined + + * Makefile.am: unvis.c, and vis.h + + * vis.h: vis.h from NetBSD + + * unvis.c: unvis from NetBSD + + * roken.h.in: cleanup previous + + * roken-common.h: make `extern "C"' into a macro, this make emacs + much happier + + * vis.c: strvis implementation from NetBSD + + * roken.h.in: add prototypes for strvis* + +2000-12-05 Johan Danielsson + + * ifaddrs.h: fix freeifaddrs prototype, and add ifa_broadaddr + macro + + * getifaddrs.c: free some memory + +2000-12-04 Johan Danielsson + + * ifaddrs.h: getifaddrs implementation using SIOCGIFCONFIG etc + + * getifaddrs.c: getifaddrs implementation using SIOCGIFCONFIG etc + +2000-10-08 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): check that fds are not too large to + select on + +2000-09-24 Assar Westerlund + + * esetenv.c: new file/function + +2000-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 10:0:1 + +2000-08-10 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (accept_it): type-correctness on parameters to + accept + +2000-08-07 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: add proto compat for getsockname + +2000-08-04 Johan Danielsson + + * write_pid.c: conditionalise pidfile + + * write_pid.c: add pidfile function + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 9:0:0 + + * warnerr.c: add get_progname + +2000-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * getaddrinfo.c (add_hostent): if there's no fqdn in `he' try + reverse resolving to see if there's a fuller name there. don't + use just-freed memory + +2000-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: do not define ndbm functions in terms of dbm functions + if we're using db + +2000-07-20 Assar Westerlund + + * rtbl.c (rtbl_format): avoid printing an empty row at the end + +2000-07-19 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: make this compatible with `make dist' + + * Makefile.am: revert version number for now + +2000-07-18 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: AM_PROG_LIBTOOL -> AC_PROG_LIBTOOL + +2000-07-17 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: set ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS + +2000-07-15 Johan Danielsson + + * getaddrinfo_hostspec.c: add new function that takes socktype + hint as parameter + +2000-07-09 Assar Westerlund + + * rtbl.c (rtbl_add_column): initialize `col' completely + + * configure.in: bring headers and functions more in-line with + what's actually being used + +2000-07-08 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: declare ether_addr and sockaddr_dl for AIX + + * rtbl.{c,h}: simple table functions + +2000-07-08 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump version to 10 + * configure.in (AC_BROKEN): add strsep_copy + * Makefile.am (ACLOCAL): fetch files from cf + +2000-07-01 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h (pid_file_*): fix protos + +2000-06-28 Assar Westerlund + + * getnameinfo_verified.c (getnameinfo_verified): free memory + returned from getaddrinfo + +2000-06-27 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c: export string_to_type and type_to_string + * resolve.c: add key,sig,cert update test-program + * resolve.h: add key,sig,cert + +2000-06-21 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.h: add T_SIG, T_KEY + * resolve.c: add SIG and KEY + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add environment.c and + write_pid.c + + * write_pid.c: new file for writing a pid file. + + * environment.c: new file with functionality for reading + /etc/environment. From Ake Sandgren + +2000-06-12 Johan Danielsson + + * strsep_copy.c: strsep, but with const stringp so returns string + in separate buffer + +2000-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * vsyslog.c (vsyslog): calculate length of new format string + correctly + +2000-05-22 Johan Danielsson + + * getusershell.c: implment the AIX version use + /etc/security/login.cfg + +2000-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * vsyslog.c (vsyslog): actually handle `%m' + +2000-05-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): set version to 8:1:3 + + * roken-common.h: moved __attribute__ to roken.h.in + +2000-04-14 Assar Westerlund + + * getaddrinfo_hostspec.c (roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec): copy the + correct length from `hostspec'. based on a patch from Love + + +2000-04-09 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: only include one of db.h and the dbm-series + +2000-04-05 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (_resolve_debug): explicitly set to zero. this moves + the variable from bss to data and the dynamic linker on MacOS + X/Darwin seems unhappy with stuff in the bss segment. + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 8:0:3 + +2000-03-11 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (_SS_PAD1SIZE): try to write an inpenetrable + expression that also works on Crays + +2000-03-09 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.c (arg_match_short): backup optind when there's a missing + argument so that the error can point at the flag and not the + non-existant argument + +2000-03-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add timeval.c + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add timeval.c + * timeval.c: new file + +2000-02-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 7:1:2 + +2000-02-16 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf.c (PARSE_INT_FORMAT): note that shorts are actually + transmitted as ints + (according to the integer protomotion rules) in variable arguments + lists. Therefore, we should not call va_arg with short but rather + with int. See for + original bug report + +2000-02-13 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 7:0:2 + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): also fix no- prefix in .Sh OPTIONS + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): better man-stuff for negative + options + +2000-02-07 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 6:0:1 + +2000-02-06 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: hopefully catch a few more declarations by including + even if was found + +2000-01-26 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): separate number of allocated sockets + and number of actual ones + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): count sockets properly. and fail if + we cannot bind any + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): make failing to create a socket + non-fatal + +2000-01-09 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am(libroken_la_SOURCES): add strcollect.c + * Makefile.in: add strcollect.[co] + * simple_exec.c: use vstrcollect + * roken-common.h (_PATH_DEV): add + (strcollect, vstrcollect): add prototypes + * strcollect.c: new file. functions for collapsing an `va_list' + into an `char **' + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 + +1999-12-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (strpftime_test_SOURCES): correct source file name + + * roken.h.in (sockaddr_storage): change padding so that we have + one char[] of pad and then an unsigned long[] (for alignment and + padding). this works much better in practice. + +1999-12-22 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (sockaddr_storage): drop leading underscore on + `public' fields. this was the consensus on the ipng mailing list + +1999-12-21 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (strpftime-test): define sources to avoid having + '.o' + * Makefile.am (print_version.h): use $(EXEEXT) + * Makefile.am (roken.h): add $(EXEEXT) to make this work on cygwin + et al + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:3:0 + + * getaddrinfo.c (get_nodes): use getipnodebyname instead of + gethostbyname(2) + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:2:0 + + * roken.h.in (struct sockaddr_storage): redefine with the example + code from rfc2553 + + * getaddrinfo.c (get_null): set loopback with correct endianess + for v4. dunno about v6. + +1999-12-13 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: add prototypes for str[pf]time + + * signal.c: macosx = rhapsody ~= nextstep also can't handle + various definitions of the same symbol. + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 4:1:0 + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:0 + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: replace inaddr2str with getnameinfo_verified + + * roken-common.h (INADDR_LOOPBACK): add fallback definition + + * roken-common.h: move getnameinfo_verified to roken.h.in + * roken.h.in (inaddr2str): remove + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES); removed inaddr2str + * roken-common.h (getnameinfo_verified): add prototype + * getnameinfo_verified.c: new file + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: add constants for getaddrinfo, getnameinfo + * roken.h.in (socklen_t): make independent of sockaddr_storage + (AI_*, NI_*, EAI_*): move to roken-common.h + +1999-12-03 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inted): rewrite to use `getaddrinfo' + * getaddrinfo.c (const_v*): no sizeof(sizeof()) + * getaddrinfo.c (add_hostent): search for the canonical name among + all aliases + (getaddrinfo): handle AI_NUMERICHOST correctly + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add freeaddinfo, + getaddrinfo, getnameinfo, gai_strerror + (getaddrinfo_test): add + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add freeaddinfo, getaddrinfo, + getnameinfo, gai_strerror + (getaddrinfo_test): add + * roken.h.in: arpa/inet.h: include + (socklen_t): add + (struct addrinfo): add + (EAI_*): add + (NI_*): add + (AI_*): add + (getaddrinfo, getnameinfo, freeaddrinfo, gai_strerror): add + * getnameinfo.c: new file + * getaddrinfo-test.c: new file + * gai_strerror.c: new file + * getaddrinfo.c: new file + * freeaddrinfo.c: new file + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * getopt.c (getopt): return -1 instead of EOF. From + + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * strftime.c (strftime): handle `%z' and `%Z' in a tm_gmtoff-less + world + + * getcap.c: make sure to use db only if we have both the library + and the header file + +1999-11-12 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.h: add arg_counter + * getarg.c: add a new type of argument: `arg_counter' re-organize + the code somewhat + + * Makefile.am: add strptime and strpftime-test + + * snprintf.c (xyzprintf): try to do the right thing with an % at + the end of the format string + + * strptime.c (strptime): implement '%U', '%V', '%W' + * strftime.c (strftime): implement '%U', '%V', '%W', '%z' + + * strftime.c (strftime): correct %E and %O handling. do something + reasonable with "...%" + + * strftime.c: replace the BSD implementation by one of our own + coding + + * strptime.c : new file + * strpftime-test.c: new file + +1999-11-07 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_bytes-test.c: new file + + * Makefile.am: add parse_bytes-test + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): try to handle the case of no + value specified a little bit better + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 3:2:0 + +1999-10-30 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf.c (PARSE_INT_FORMAT): add redundant casts to work + around a gcc-bug that manifests itself on Linux-PPC. From Tom + Rini + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 3:1:0 + + * roken.h.in: use `unsigned char' instead of `u_int8_t' to avoid + having to have that definition. this is the easy way out instead + of getting the definition here where it's needed. flame me. + +Fri Oct 22 15:39:31 1999 Bjoern Groenvall + + * k_getpwuid.c (k_getpwuid): getspuid() does not exist (even + though it should), use getspnam(). + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 3:0:0 + +1999-10-18 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.3: document arg_collect + + * getarg.c: change the way arg_collect works; it's still quite + horrible though + + * getarg.h: change type of the collect function + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: undo last commit + + * xdbm.h: reorder db includes + +1999-10-10 Assar Westerlund + + * socket.c: const-ize and comment + + * net_write.c: const-ize + + * base64.c: const-ize + +1999-10-06 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.c (getarg): also set optind when returning error + +1999-09-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add parse_bytes.[ch] + +1999-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.3: getarg manpage + + * getarg.{c,h}: add a callback type to do more complicated processing + + * getarg.{c,h}: add floating point support + +1999-09-16 Assar Westerlund + + * strlcat.c (strlcat): call strlcpy + + * strlcpy.c: update name and prototype + + * strlcat.c: update name and prototype + + * roken.h.in: rename strc{py,at}_truncate to strlc{py,at} + + * Makefile.am: rename strc{py,at}_truncate -> strlc{py,at} + + * Makefile.in: rename strc{py,at}_truncate -> strlc{py,at} + + * strcpy_truncate.c (strcpy_truncate): change return value to be + the length of `src' + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * getcap.c: try to make this work on systems with DB + +1999-08-16 Johan Danielsson + + * getcap.c: protect from db-less systems + +1999-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * simple_exec.c: add simple_exec{ve,le} + + * getcap.c: getcap from NetBSD + +1999-08-06 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (sockaddr_storage): cater for those that have + v6-support also + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * inet_ntop.c (inet_ntop_v4): remember to call ntohl + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: add shutdown constants + + * mini_inetd.c (listen_v4, listen_v6): handle the case of the + protocol not being supported + +1999-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (socket_set_reuseaddr): remove duplicate + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): fix my stupid bugs + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: add socket* functions + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add socket.c + + * socket.c: new file, originally from appl/ftp/common + + * Makefile.am: set version to 2:0:2 + + * roken.h.in (inet_pton): add prototype + + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add inet_pton + + * inet_pton.c: new file + + * getipnodebyname.c (getipnodebyname): try gethostbyname2 if we + have it + +1999-07-27 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c: support IPv6 + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + + * roken.h.in (inet_ntop): add prototype + + * roken-common.h: (INET{,6}_ADDRSTRLEN): add + + * inet_ntop.c: new file + + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add inet_ntop.c + + * Makefile.am: move some files from libroken_la_SOURCES to + EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES + + * snprintf.c: some signed vs unsigned casts + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (struct sockaddr_storage): define it needed + +1999-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add copyhostent.c, + freehostent.c, getipnodebyname.c, getipnodebyaddr.c + + * roken.h.in: : include + (copyhostent, freehostent, getipnodebyname, getipnodebyaddr): add + prototypes + + * roken-common.h: new constants for getipnodeby* + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add freehostent, copyhostent, + getipnodebyname, getipnodebyaddr + + * freehostent.c: new file + + * copyhostent.c: new file + + * getipnodebyaddr.c: new file + + * getipnodebyname.c: new file + +1999-07-13 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (k_getpwnam): update prototype + + * k_getpwnam.c (k_getpwnam): const-ize + + * get_default_username.c (get_default_username): a better way of + guessing when the user has su:ed + +1999-07-08 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.awk: use puts, as suggested by Jeffrey Hutzelman + + +1999-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * readv.c (readv): typo + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * writev.c (writev): error check malloc properly + + * sendmsg.c (sendmsg): error check malloc properly + + * resolve.c (parse_reply): error check malloc properly + + * recvmsg.c (recvmsg): error check malloc properly + + * readv.c (readv): error check malloc properly + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (acc_units): move the special case of 0 -> 1 to + parse_something to avoid having it happen at the end of the string + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add get_default_username + + * get_default_username.c: new file + + * roken.h.in (get_default_username): add prototype + + * Makefile.am: add get_default_username + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: also try with DB_DBM_HSEARCH == 1 + + * strnlen.c (strnlen): update prototype + + * Makefile.am: strndup.c: add + + * Makefile.in: strndup.c: add + + * roken.h.in (strndup): add + (strnlen): update prototype + + * strndup.c: new file + +Fri Apr 16 17:59:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: include strsep prototype if needed + +Thu Apr 15 14:04:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: make make-print-version.o depend on version.h + +Wed Apr 7 14:11:00 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: make it compile w/o krb4 + +Sat Mar 27 17:33:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * snprintf.c (vasnprintf): correct check if realloc returns NULL + +Sat Mar 27 12:37:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: link print_version with -ldes to avoid unresolved + references if -lkrb is shared + +Sat Mar 20 03:42:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h (eread, ewrite): add + + * simple_exec.c: add + +Fri Mar 19 21:29:58 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add eread, ewrite + + * eread.c, ewrite.c: new files + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add eread and ewrite + +Fri Mar 19 14:52:57 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 12:53:32 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * Makefile.am: parse_units.h + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Sat Mar 13 23:31:35 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add glob.c + +Thu Mar 11 15:02:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * iruserok.c: move innetgr() to separate file + + * innetgr.c: move innetgr() to separate file + + * hstrerror.c (hstrerror): add const to return type + + * erealloc.c: fix types in format string + + * emalloc.c: fix types in format string + +Wed Mar 10 16:36:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: ugly fix for crays + +Mon Mar 8 11:52:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: protos for {un,}setenv + +1999-02-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add fnmatch + + * roken-common.h (abs): add + +Sat Feb 13 17:12:53 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * emalloc.c, erealloc.c, estrup.c: new files + + * roken.h.in (mkstemp, gethostname): also includes prototypes if + they are needed. + +1998-12-23 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: mkstemp: add prototype + +1998-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf.c, iruserok.c, parse-units.c: unsigned char-correctness + + * roken.h.in (inet_aton): also chedk NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO + + * roken-common.h: __attribute__: check for autoconf'd + HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ instead of GNUC + +Sun Dec 6 19:53:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): func is called with val == 0 if + no unit was given + (acc_flags, acc_units): update to new standard + +Fri Nov 27 03:09:42 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (stot): constify + (type_to_string): always declare + (dns_lookup_int): correct debug output + +Thu Nov 26 23:43:55 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (dns_lookup_int): send rr_class to res_search + +Thu Nov 26 17:09:47 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: some cleanup + + * resolve.h: add T_NAPTR + +Sun Nov 22 10:23:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + + * k_getpwnam.c (k_getpwnam): check for `struct spwd' + + * k_getpwuid.c (k_getpwuid): check for `struct spwd' + +Tue Sep 8 05:18:31 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * recvmsg.c (recvmsg): patch from bpreece@unity.ncsu.edu + +Fri Sep 4 16:29:27 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * vsyslog.c: asprintf -> vasprintf + +Tue Aug 18 22:25:52 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.h (arg_printusage): new signature + + * getarg.c (arg_printusage): new parameter `progname'. NULL means + __progname. + +Sun Aug 9 14:53:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: net_{read,write}.c + +Fri Jul 24 21:56:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * simple_exec.c (simple_execvp): loop around waitpid when errno == + EINTR + +Thu Jul 23 20:24:35 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: net_{read,write}.c + +Wed Jul 22 21:38:35 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * simple_exec.c (simple_execlp): initialize `argv' + +Mon Jul 13 23:01:22 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * inaddr2str.c (inaddr2str): don't advance hostent->h_addr_list, + use a copy instead + +Fri Jul 10 01:20:08 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (net_write, net_read): add prototypes + + * Makefile.in: net_{read,write}.c: add + + * net_{read,write}.c: new files + +Tue Jun 30 17:29:09 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (issuid): add + + * get_window_size.c: fix misspelling of TIOCGWINSZ and bad use of + fields + +Sun May 31 03:24:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): Put short and long options in + SYNOPSIS within the same [ ] pair. + +Sat May 30 00:13:01 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (arg_printusage): try to keep options shorter than + column width + + * get_window_size.c (get_window_size): check COLUMNS and LINES + +Fri May 29 00:05:04 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): Put short and long options in + DESCRIPTION on the same line. + + * getarg.c (arg_match_long): make sure you only get an exact match + if the strings are the same length + +Thu May 14 02:23:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.awk: stupid cray awk wants \# + +Fri May 1 01:29:36 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * print_version.c (print_version): according to ISO/ANSI C the + elements of `arg' are not constant and therefore not settable at + compile-time. Set the at run-time instead. + +Sun Apr 19 10:00:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: include paths.h + +Sun Apr 5 12:30:49 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add roken_gethostby.c to make solaris + make happy + +Thu Mar 19 20:41:25 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * simple_exec.c: Simple fork+exec system() replacement. + +Fri Mar 6 00:21:53 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * roken_gethostby.c: Make `roken_gethostby_setup' take url-like + specification instead of split up versions. Makes it easier for + calling applications. + + * roken_gethostby.c: Another miracle of the 20th century: + gethostby* over HTTP. + +Sat Feb 21 15:18:36 1998 assar westerlund + + * parse_time.c (unparse_time_approx): new function that calls + `unparse_units_approx' + + * parse_units.c (unparse_units_approx): new function that will + only print the first unit. + + * Makefile.in: include parse_{time,units} + +Thu Feb 12 03:30:08 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_time.c (print_time_table): don't return a void value. + +Tue Feb 3 11:06:24 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): Change date format to full month + name, and day of month without leading zero. + +Thu Jan 22 21:23:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c: Fix long form of negative flags. + +Mon Dec 29 23:31:10 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: Include , to get linux __progname. + +Sun Dec 21 09:45:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_time.c (print_time_table): new function + + * parse_units.c (print_flags_table, print_units_table): new + functions. + +Thu Dec 4 02:51:46 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * iruserok.c: moved here. + + * snprintf.c (sn_append_char): don't write any terminating zero. + (as_reserve): don't loop. better heuristic for how much space to + realloc. + (vasnprintf): simplify initializing to one. + +Sun Nov 30 14:56:59 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c: Add mandoc help back-end to getarg. + +Wed Nov 12 01:09:17 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * verr.c, verrx.c: Fix warnings by moving exit from. + +Tue Nov 11 21:12:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * parse_units.c: Change the list of separating characters (between + units) to comma, space, and tab, removing digits. Having digits in + this list makes a flag like `T42 generate a parse error. This + change makes `17m3s' an invalid time-spec (you need a space). + +Tue Nov 11 02:38:44 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: add + +Sun Nov 9 04:48:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * fnmatch.c: Add fnmatch from NetBSD + +Sun Nov 9 02:00:08 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): ignore white-space and ',' + +Mon Nov 3 22:38:32 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: fclose prototype + + * roken.h: add prototype for vsyslog + + * Makefile.in: add some more source files to make soriasis make + happy + +Sat Nov 1 00:19:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: include and . + prototypes for readv and writev + + * readv.c, writev.c: new files + +Wed Oct 29 02:21:38 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: Add ugly macros for openlog, gethostbyname, + gethostbyaddr, and getservbyname for the benefit of Crays. Add + default definition of MAXPATHLEN diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34235ab198 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.122.6.3 2003/10/14 16:13:15 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I ../../cf + +CLEANFILES = roken.h make-roken.c $(XHEADERS) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libroken.la +libroken_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 16:3:0 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = make-roken snprintf-test + +nodist_make_roken_SOURCES = make-roken.c + +check_PROGRAMS = \ + base64-test \ + getaddrinfo-test \ + parse_bytes-test \ + parse_reply-test \ + snprintf-test \ + strpftime-test + +TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS) + +LDADD = libroken.la $(LIB_crypt) +make_roken_LDADD = + +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libtest.la +libtest_la_SOURCES = strftime.c strptime.c snprintf.c +libtest_la_CFLAGS = -DTEST_SNPRINTF + +parse_reply_test_SOURCES = parse_reply-test.c resolve.c +parse_reply_test_CFLAGS = -DTEST_RESOLVE + +strpftime_test_SOURCES = strpftime-test.c +strpftime_test_LDADD = libtest.la $(LDADD) +snprintf_test_SOURCES = snprintf-test.c +snprintf_test_LDADD = libtest.la $(LDADD) +snprintf_test_CFLAGS = -DTEST_SNPRINTF + +libroken_la_SOURCES = \ + base64.c \ + bswap.c \ + concat.c \ + environment.c \ + eread.c \ + esetenv.c \ + ewrite.c \ + getaddrinfo_hostspec.c \ + get_default_username.c \ + get_window_size.c \ + getarg.c \ + getnameinfo_verified.c \ + getprogname.c \ + h_errno.c \ + hostent_find_fqdn.c \ + issuid.c \ + k_getpwnam.c \ + k_getpwuid.c \ + mini_inetd.c \ + net_read.c \ + net_write.c \ + parse_bytes.c \ + parse_time.c \ + parse_units.c \ + resolve.c \ + roken_gethostby.c \ + rtbl.c \ + rtbl.h \ + setprogname.c \ + signal.c \ + simple_exec.c \ + snprintf.c \ + socket.c \ + strcollect.c \ + timeval.c \ + tm2time.c \ + unvis.c \ + verify.c \ + vis.c \ + vis.h \ + warnerr.c \ + write_pid.c \ + xdbm.h + +EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES = \ + err.hin \ + glob.hin \ + ifaddrs.hin \ + vis.hin + +EXTRA_DIST = roken.awk roken.h.in + +libroken_la_LIBADD = @LTLIBOBJS@ $(DBLIB) + +$(LTLIBOBJS) $(libroken_la_OBJECTS): roken.h $(XHEADERS) + +BUILT_SOURCES = make-roken.c roken.h + +if have_err_h +err_h = +else +err_h = err.h +endif + +if have_fnmatch_h +fnmatch_h = +else +fnmatch_h = fnmatch.h +endif + +if have_glob_h +glob_h = +else +glob_h = glob.h +endif + +if have_ifaddrs_h +ifaddrs_h = +else +ifaddrs_h = ifaddrs.h +endif + +if have_vis_h +vis_h = +else +vis_h = vis.h +endif + +## these are controlled by configure +XHEADERS = $(err_h) $(fnmatch_h) $(glob_h) $(ifaddrs_h) $(vis_h) + +include_HEADERS = \ + base64.h \ + getarg.h \ + parse_bytes.h \ + parse_time.h \ + parse_units.h \ + resolve.h \ + roken-common.h \ + rtbl.h \ + xdbm.h \ + $(XHEADERS) + +nodist_include_HEADERS = roken.h + +man_MANS = getarg.3 + +SUFFIXES += .hin +.hin.h: + cp $< $@ + +roken.h: make-roken$(EXEEXT) + @./make-roken$(EXEEXT) > tmp.h ;\ + if [ -f roken.h ] && cmp -s tmp.h roken.h ; then rm -f tmp.h ; \ + else rm -f roken.h; mv tmp.h roken.h; fi + +make-roken.c: roken.h.in roken.awk + $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/roken.awk $(srcdir)/roken.h.in > make-roken.c diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9ddcdddcc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,1206 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.122.6.3 2003/10/14 16:13:15 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + + +SOURCES = $(libroken_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES) $(libtest_la_SOURCES) base64-test.c getaddrinfo-test.c $(nodist_make_roken_SOURCES) parse_bytes-test.c $(parse_reply_test_SOURCES) $(snprintf_test_SOURCES) $(strpftime_test_SOURCES) + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(am__include_HEADERS_DIST) $(srcdir)/Makefile.am \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common ChangeLog chown.c \ + copyhostent.c daemon.c ecalloc.c emalloc.c erealloc.c err.c \ + errx.c estrdup.c fchown.c flock.c fnmatch.c freeaddrinfo.c \ + freehostent.c gai_strerror.c getaddrinfo.c getcap.c getcwd.c \ + getdtablesize.c getegid.c geteuid.c getgid.c gethostname.c \ + getifaddrs.c getipnodebyaddr.c getipnodebyname.c getnameinfo.c \ + getopt.c gettimeofday.c getuid.c getusershell.c glob.c \ + hstrerror.c inet_aton.c inet_ntop.c inet_pton.c initgroups.c \ + innetgr.c install-sh iruserok.c localtime_r.c lstat.c \ + memmove.c missing mkinstalldirs mkstemp.c putenv.c rcmd.c \ + readv.c recvmsg.c sendmsg.c setegid.c setenv.c seteuid.c \ + strcasecmp.c strdup.c strerror.c strftime.c strlcat.c \ + strlcpy.c strlwr.c strncasecmp.c strndup.c strnlen.c \ + strptime.c strsep.c strsep_copy.c strtok_r.c strupr.c swab.c \ + unsetenv.c verr.c verrx.c vsyslog.c vwarn.c vwarnx.c warn.c \ + warnx.c writev.c +noinst_PROGRAMS = make-roken$(EXEEXT) snprintf-test$(EXEEXT) +check_PROGRAMS = base64-test$(EXEEXT) getaddrinfo-test$(EXEEXT) \ + parse_bytes-test$(EXEEXT) parse_reply-test$(EXEEXT) \ + snprintf-test$(EXEEXT) strpftime-test$(EXEEXT) +subdir = lib/roken +ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4 +am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/cf/aix.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/auth-modules.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getaddrinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-getnameinfo.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-glob.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-realloc.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/broken2.m4 $(top_srcdir)/cf/c-attribute.m4 \ + $(top_srcdir)/cf/capabilities.m4 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maintainer-clean-generic mostlyclean mostlyclean-compile \ + mostlyclean-generic mostlyclean-libtool pdf pdf-am ps ps-am \ + tags uninstall uninstall-am uninstall-includeHEADERS \ + uninstall-info-am uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES uninstall-man \ + uninstall-man3 uninstall-nodist_includeHEADERS + + +install-suid-programs: + @foo='$(bin_SUIDS)'; \ + for file in $$foo; do \ + x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + echo "*"; \ + echo "* Failed to install $$x setuid root"; \ + echo "*"; \ + fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(nodist_include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + $(CP) $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +check-local:: + @if test '$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; then \ + foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; else \ + foo='$(PROGRAMS)'; fi; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +$(LTLIBOBJS) $(libroken_la_OBJECTS): roken.h $(XHEADERS) +.hin.h: + cp $< $@ + +roken.h: make-roken$(EXEEXT) + @./make-roken$(EXEEXT) > tmp.h ;\ + if [ -f roken.h ] && cmp -s tmp.h roken.h ; then rm -f tmp.h ; \ + else rm -f roken.h; mv tmp.h roken.h; fi + +make-roken.c: roken.h.in roken.awk + $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/roken.awk $(srcdir)/roken.h.in > make-roken.c +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/acconfig.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/acconfig.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5fbe685ce3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/acconfig.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +@BOTTOM@ + +#ifdef BROKEN_REALLOC +#define realloc(X, Y) isoc_realloc((X), (Y)) +#define isoc_realloc(X, Y) ((X) ? realloc((X), (Y)) : malloc(Y)) +#endif + +#ifdef VOID_RETSIGTYPE +#define SIGRETURN(x) return +#else +#define SIGRETURN(x) return (RETSIGTYPE)(x) +#endif + +#define RCSID(msg) \ +static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg } + +#undef PROTOTYPES + +/* Maximum values on all known systems */ +#define MaxHostNameLen (64+4) +#define MaxPathLen (1024+4) + +/* + * Define NDBM if you are using the 4.3 ndbm library (which is part of + * libc). If not defined, 4.2 dbm will be assumed. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_DBM_FIRSTKEY) +#define NDBM +#endif + +/* + * Defining this enables lots of useful (and used) extensions on + * glibc-based systems such as Linux + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/acinclude.m4 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/acinclude.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d0197c5ce --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/acinclude.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl $Id$ +dnl +dnl Only put things that for some reason can't live in the `cf' +dnl directory in this file. +dnl + +dnl $xId: misc.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:04 joda Exp $ +dnl +define(upcase,`echo $1 | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`)dnl diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eace04b01a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: base64-test.c,v 1.2 2001/05/29 13:12:21 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int numerr = 0; + int numtest = 1; + struct test { + void *data; + size_t len; + const char *result; + } *t, tests[] = { + { "", 0 , "" }, + { "1", 1, "MQ==" }, + { "22", 2, "MjI=" }, + { "333", 3, "MzMz" }, + { "4444", 4, "NDQ0NA==" }, + { "55555", 5, "NTU1NTU=" }, + { "abc:def", 7, "YWJjOmRlZg==" }, + { NULL } + }; + for(t = tests; t->data; t++) { + char *str; + int len; + len = base64_encode(t->data, t->len, &str); + if(strcmp(str, t->result) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed test %d: %s != %s\n", numtest, + str, t->result); + numerr++; + } + free(str); + str = strdup(t->result); + len = base64_decode(t->result, str); + if(len != t->len) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed test %d: len %d != %d\n", numtest, + len, t->len); + numerr++; + } else if(memcmp(str, t->data, t->len) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed test %d: data\n", numtest); + numerr++; + } + free(str); + numtest++; + } + + { + char str[32]; + if(base64_decode("M=M=", str) != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed test %d: successful decode of `M=M='\n", + numtest++); + numerr++; + } + if(base64_decode("MQ===", str) != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed test %d: successful decode of `MQ==='\n", + numtest++); + numerr++; + } + } + return numerr; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21e79c1190 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: base64.c,v 1.5 2001/05/28 17:33:41 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include "base64.h" + +static char base64_chars[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + +static int +pos(char c) +{ + char *p; + for (p = base64_chars; *p; p++) + if (*p == c) + return p - base64_chars; + return -1; +} + +int +base64_encode(const void *data, int size, char **str) +{ + char *s, *p; + int i; + int c; + const unsigned char *q; + + p = s = (char *) malloc(size * 4 / 3 + 4); + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + q = (const unsigned char *) data; + i = 0; + for (i = 0; i < size;) { + c = q[i++]; + c *= 256; + if (i < size) + c += q[i]; + i++; + c *= 256; + if (i < size) + c += q[i]; + i++; + p[0] = base64_chars[(c & 0x00fc0000) >> 18]; + p[1] = base64_chars[(c & 0x0003f000) >> 12]; + p[2] = base64_chars[(c & 0x00000fc0) >> 6]; + p[3] = base64_chars[(c & 0x0000003f) >> 0]; + if (i > size) + p[3] = '='; + if (i > size + 1) + p[2] = '='; + p += 4; + } + *p = 0; + *str = s; + return strlen(s); +} + +#define DECODE_ERROR 0xffffffff + +static unsigned int +token_decode(const char *token) +{ + int i; + unsigned int val = 0; + int marker = 0; + if (strlen(token) < 4) + return DECODE_ERROR; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + val *= 64; + if (token[i] == '=') + marker++; + else if (marker > 0) + return DECODE_ERROR; + else + val += pos(token[i]); + } + if (marker > 2) + return DECODE_ERROR; + return (marker << 24) | val; +} + +int +base64_decode(const char *str, void *data) +{ + const char *p; + unsigned char *q; + + q = data; + for (p = str; *p && (*p == '=' || strchr(base64_chars, *p)); p += 4) { + unsigned int val = token_decode(p); + unsigned int marker = (val >> 24) & 0xff; + if (val == DECODE_ERROR) + return -1; + *q++ = (val >> 16) & 0xff; + if (marker < 2) + *q++ = (val >> 8) & 0xff; + if (marker < 1) + *q++ = val & 0xff; + } + return q - (unsigned char *) data; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ad1e3b18e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: base64.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _BASE64_H_ +#define _BASE64_H_ + +int base64_encode(const void *data, int size, char **str); +int base64_decode(const char *str, void *data); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/bswap.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/bswap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c57dc6f38f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/bswap.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: bswap.c,v 1.3 2001/05/18 15:32:11 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_BSWAP32 + +unsigned int +bswap32 (unsigned int val) +{ + return (val & 0xff) << 24 | + (val & 0xff00) << 8 | + (val & 0xff0000) >> 8 | + (val & 0xff000000) >> 24; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BSWAP16 + +unsigned short +bswap16 (unsigned short val) +{ + return (val & 0xff) << 8 | + (val & 0xff00) >> 8; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/chown.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/chown.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3d34e3030 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/chown.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: chown.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/concat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/concat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca295c030a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/concat.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: concat.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +int +roken_concat (char *s, size_t len, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, len); + ret = roken_vconcat (s, len, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +int +roken_vconcat (char *s, size_t len, va_list args) +{ + const char *a; + + while ((a = va_arg(args, const char*))) { + size_t n = strlen (a); + + if (n >= len) + return -1; + memcpy (s, a, n); + s += n; + len -= n; + } + *s = '\0'; + return 0; +} + +size_t +roken_vmconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, va_list args) +{ + const char *a; + char *p, *q; + size_t len = 0; + *s = NULL; + p = malloc(1); + if(p == NULL) + return 0; + len = 1; + while ((a = va_arg(args, const char*))) { + size_t n = strlen (a); + + if(max_len && len + n > max_len){ + free(p); + return 0; + } + q = realloc(p, len + n); + if(q == NULL){ + free(p); + return 0; + } + p = q; + memcpy (p + len - 1, a, n); + len += n; + } + p[len - 1] = '\0'; + *s = p; + return len; +} + +size_t +roken_mconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, max_len); + ret = roken_vmconcat (s, max_len, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/copyhostent.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/copyhostent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a3be6db913 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/copyhostent.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: copyhostent.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * return a malloced copy of `h' + */ + +struct hostent * +copyhostent (const struct hostent *h) +{ + struct hostent *res; + char **p; + int i, n; + + res = malloc (sizeof (*res)); + if (res == NULL) + return NULL; + res->h_name = NULL; + res->h_aliases = NULL; + res->h_addrtype = h->h_addrtype; + res->h_length = h->h_length; + res->h_addr_list = NULL; + res->h_name = strdup (h->h_name); + if (res->h_name == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + for (n = 0, p = h->h_aliases; *p != NULL; ++p) + ++n; + res->h_aliases = malloc ((n + 1) * sizeof(*res->h_aliases)); + if (res->h_aliases == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n + 1; ++i) + res->h_aliases[i] = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + res->h_aliases[i] = strdup (h->h_aliases[i]); + if (res->h_aliases[i] == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + } + + for (n = 0, p = h->h_addr_list; *p != NULL; ++p) + ++n; + res->h_addr_list = malloc ((n + 1) * sizeof(*res->h_addr_list)); + if (res->h_addr_list == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n + 1; ++i) { + res->h_addr_list[i] = NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + res->h_addr_list[i] = malloc (h->h_length); + if (res->h_addr_list[i] == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + memcpy (res->h_addr_list[i], h->h_addr_list[i], h->h_length); + } + return res; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/daemon.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/daemon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..758856c8ad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/daemon.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)daemon.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: daemon.c,v 1.3 1997/10/04 21:55:48 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +daemon(int nochdir, int noclose) +{ + int fd; + + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + return (-1); + case 0: + break; + default: + _exit(0); + } + + if (setsid() == -1) + return (-1); + + if (!nochdir) + chdir("/"); + + if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); + if (fd > 2) + close (fd); + } + return (0); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_DAEMON */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ecalloc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ecalloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..142704f5af --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ecalloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: ecalloc.c,v 1.1 2001/06/17 12:09:37 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like calloc but never fails. + */ + +void * +ecalloc (size_t number, size_t size) +{ + void *tmp = calloc (number, size); + + if (tmp == NULL && number * size != 0) + errx (1, "calloc %lu failed", (unsigned long)number * size); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/emalloc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/emalloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2734f3615 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/emalloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: emalloc.c,v 1.5 2001/06/17 12:07:48 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like malloc but never fails. + */ + +void * +emalloc (size_t sz) +{ + void *tmp = malloc (sz); + + if (tmp == NULL && sz != 0) + errx (1, "malloc %lu failed", (unsigned long)sz); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/environment.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/environment.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62c732c5b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/environment.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: environment.c,v 1.1 2000/06/21 02:05:03 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * return count of environment assignments from `file' and + * list of malloced strings in `env' + */ + +int +read_environment(const char *file, char ***env) +{ + int i, k; + FILE *F; + char **l; + char buf[BUFSIZ], *p, *r; + + if ((F = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + i = 0; + if (*env) { + l = *env; + while (*l != NULL) { + i++; + l++; + } + } + l = *env; + /* This is somewhat more relaxed on what it accepts then + * Wietses sysv_environ from K4 was... + */ + while (fgets(buf, BUFSIZ, F) != NULL) { + if (buf[0] == '#') + continue; + + p = strchr(buf, '#'); + if (p != NULL) + *p = '\0'; + + p = buf; + while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n') p++; + if (*p == '\0') + continue; + + k = strlen(p); + if (p[k-1] == '\n') + p[k-1] = '\0'; + + /* Here one should check that is is a 'valid' env string... */ + r = strchr(p, '='); + if (r == NULL) + continue; + + l = realloc(l, (i+1) * sizeof (char *)); + l[i++] = strdup(p); + } + fclose(F); + l = realloc(l, (i+1) * sizeof (char *)); + l[i] = NULL; + *env = l; + return i; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/eread.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/eread.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a1b24bd55 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/eread.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: eread.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like read but never fails (and never returns partial data). + */ + +ssize_t +eread (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = net_read (fd, buf, nbytes); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/erealloc.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/erealloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8eddd2bb89 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/erealloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: erealloc.c,v 1.5 2001/06/17 12:08:05 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like realloc but never fails. + */ + +void * +erealloc (void *ptr, size_t sz) +{ + void *tmp = realloc (ptr, sz); + + if (tmp == NULL && sz != 0) + errx (1, "realloc %lu failed", (unsigned long)sz); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/err.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29b1f7b567 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/err.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: err.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +err(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + verr(eval, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/err.hin b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/err.hin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1fa7774bd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/err.hin @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: err.hin,v 1.16 2000/12/11 04:40:59 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ERR_H__ +#define __ERR_H__ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern const char *__progname; + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +void verr(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))); +void err(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))); +void verrx(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))); +void errx(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))); +void vwarn(const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 0))); +void warn(const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); +void vwarnx(const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 0))); +void warnx(const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); + +#endif /* __ERR_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/errx.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/errx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f8ec18dd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/errx.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: errx.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +errx(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + verrx(eval, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/esetenv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/esetenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb357527c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/esetenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: esetenv.c,v 1.3 2001/01/27 05:28:38 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#include + +void +esetenv(const char *var, const char *val, int rewrite) +{ + if (setenv ((char *)var, (char *)val, rewrite)) + errx (1, "failed setting environment variable %s", var); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/estrdup.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/estrdup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..75d2721bbe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/estrdup.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: estrdup.c,v 1.3 2001/06/17 12:07:56 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like strdup but never fails. + */ + +char * +estrdup (const char *str) +{ + char *tmp = strdup (str); + + if (tmp == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup failed"); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ewrite.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ewrite.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b2c43de8db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ewrite.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: ewrite.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like write but never fails (and never returns partial data). + */ + +ssize_t +ewrite (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = net_write (fd, buf, nbytes); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "write"); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fchown.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fchown.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..61e854691e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fchown.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: fchown.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +fchown(int fd, uid_t owner, gid_t group) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/flock.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/flock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13da4f474b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/flock.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK +RCSID("$Id: flock.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +#include "roken.h" + + +#define OP_MASK (LOCK_SH | LOCK_EX | LOCK_UN) + +int +flock(int fd, int operation) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_FCNTL) && defined(F_SETLK) + struct flock arg; + int code, cmd; + + arg.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + arg.l_start = 0; + arg.l_len = 0; /* means to EOF */ + + if (operation & LOCK_NB) + cmd = F_SETLK; + else + cmd = F_SETLKW; /* Blocking */ + + switch (operation & OP_MASK) { + case LOCK_UN: + arg.l_type = F_UNLCK; + code = fcntl(fd, F_SETLK, &arg); + break; + case LOCK_SH: + arg.l_type = F_RDLCK; + code = fcntl(fd, cmd, &arg); + break; + case LOCK_EX: + arg.l_type = F_WRLCK; + code = fcntl(fd, cmd, &arg); + break; + default: + errno = EINVAL; + code = -1; + break; + } + return code; +#else + return -1; +#endif +} + +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fnmatch.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fnmatch.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc01d6ea61 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fnmatch.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* $NetBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.11 1995/02/27 03:43:06 cgd Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)fnmatch.c 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/16/94"; +#else +static char rcsid[] = "$NetBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.11 1995/02/27 03:43:06 cgd Exp $"; +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * Function fnmatch() as specified in POSIX 1003.2-1992, section B.6. + * Compares a filename or pathname to a pattern. + */ + +#include +#include + +#define EOS '\0' + +static const char *rangematch (const char *, int, int); + +int +fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags) +{ + const char *stringstart; + char c, test; + + for (stringstart = string;;) + switch (c = *pattern++) { + case EOS: + return (*string == EOS ? 0 : FNM_NOMATCH); + case '?': + if (*string == EOS) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if (*string == '/' && (flags & FNM_PATHNAME)) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if (*string == '.' && (flags & FNM_PERIOD) && + (string == stringstart || + ((flags & FNM_PATHNAME) && *(string - 1) == '/'))) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + ++string; + break; + case '*': + c = *pattern; + /* Collapse multiple stars. */ + while (c == '*') + c = *++pattern; + + if (*string == '.' && (flags & FNM_PERIOD) && + (string == stringstart || + ((flags & FNM_PATHNAME) && *(string - 1) == '/'))) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + + /* Optimize for pattern with * at end or before /. */ + if (c == EOS) + if (flags & FNM_PATHNAME) + return (strchr(string, '/') == NULL ? + 0 : FNM_NOMATCH); + else + return (0); + else if (c == '/' && flags & FNM_PATHNAME) { + if ((string = strchr(string, '/')) == NULL) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + break; + } + + /* General case, use recursion. */ + while ((test = *string) != EOS) { + if (!fnmatch(pattern, string, flags & ~FNM_PERIOD)) + return (0); + if (test == '/' && flags & FNM_PATHNAME) + break; + ++string; + } + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + case '[': + if (*string == EOS) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if (*string == '/' && flags & FNM_PATHNAME) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if ((pattern = + rangematch(pattern, *string, flags)) == NULL) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + ++string; + break; + case '\\': + if (!(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE)) { + if ((c = *pattern++) == EOS) { + c = '\\'; + --pattern; + } + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + if (c != *string++) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + break; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static const char * +rangematch(const char *pattern, int test, int flags) +{ + int negate, ok; + char c, c2; + + /* + * A bracket expression starting with an unquoted circumflex + * character produces unspecified results (IEEE 1003.2-1992, + * 3.13.2). This implementation treats it like '!', for + * consistency with the regular expression syntax. + * J.T. Conklin (conklin@ngai.kaleida.com) + */ + if (negate = (*pattern == '!' || *pattern == '^')) + ++pattern; + + for (ok = 0; (c = *pattern++) != ']';) { + if (c == '\\' && !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE)) + c = *pattern++; + if (c == EOS) + return (NULL); + if (*pattern == '-' + && (c2 = *(pattern+1)) != EOS && c2 != ']') { + pattern += 2; + if (c2 == '\\' && !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE)) + c2 = *pattern++; + if (c2 == EOS) + return (NULL); + if (c <= test && test <= c2) + ok = 1; + } else if (c == test) + ok = 1; + } + return (ok == negate ? NULL : pattern); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fnmatch.hin b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fnmatch.hin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95c91d600b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/fnmatch.hin @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* $NetBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:53 cgd Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)fnmatch.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#ifndef _FNMATCH_H_ +#define _FNMATCH_H_ + +#define FNM_NOMATCH 1 /* Match failed. */ + +#define FNM_NOESCAPE 0x01 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ +#define FNM_PATHNAME 0x02 /* Slash must be matched by slash. */ +#define FNM_PERIOD 0x04 /* Period must be matched by period. */ + +int fnmatch (const char *, const char *, int); + +#endif /* !_FNMATCH_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/freeaddrinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/freeaddrinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56124e5b94 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/freeaddrinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: freeaddrinfo.c,v 1.4 2001/05/11 09:10:32 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * free the list of `struct addrinfo' starting at `ai' + */ + +void +freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + struct addrinfo *tofree; + + while(ai != NULL) { + free (ai->ai_canonname); + free (ai->ai_addr); + tofree = ai; + ai = ai->ai_next; + free (tofree); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/freehostent.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/freehostent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cd92cd732 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/freehostent.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: freehostent.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * free a malloced hostent + */ + +void +freehostent (struct hostent *h) +{ + char **p; + + free (h->h_name); + if (h->h_aliases != NULL) { + for (p = h->h_aliases; *p != NULL; ++p) + free (*p); + free (h->h_aliases); + } + if (h->h_addr_list != NULL) { + for (p = h->h_addr_list; *p != NULL; ++p) + free (*p); + free (h->h_addr_list); + } + free (h); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gai_strerror.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gai_strerror.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e1530fb9e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gai_strerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: gai_strerror.c,v 1.2.20.1 2004/01/15 18:14:17 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +static struct gai_error { + int code; + char *str; +} errors[] = { +{EAI_NOERROR, "no error"}, +#ifdef EAI_ADDRFAMILY +{EAI_ADDRFAMILY, "address family for nodename not supported"}, +#endif +{EAI_AGAIN, "temporary failure in name resolution"}, +{EAI_BADFLAGS, "invalid value for ai_flags"}, +{EAI_FAIL, "non-recoverable failure in name resolution"}, +{EAI_FAMILY, "ai_family not supported"}, +{EAI_MEMORY, "memory allocation failure"}, +#ifdef EAI_NODATA +{EAI_NODATA, "no address associated with nodename"}, +#endif +{EAI_NONAME, "nodename nor servname provided, or not known"}, +{EAI_SERVICE, "servname not supported for ai_socktype"}, +{EAI_SOCKTYPE, "ai_socktype not supported"}, +{EAI_SYSTEM, "system error returned in errno"}, +{0, NULL}, +}; + +/* + * + */ + +char * +gai_strerror(int ecode) +{ + struct gai_error *g; + + for (g = errors; g->str != NULL; ++g) + if (g->code == ecode) + return g->str; + return "unknown error code in gai_strerror"; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/get_default_username.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/get_default_username.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..10b0863888 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/get_default_username.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: get_default_username.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * Try to return what should be considered the default username or + * NULL if we can't guess at all. + */ + +const char * +get_default_username (void) +{ + const char *user; + + user = getenv ("USER"); + if (user == NULL) + user = getenv ("LOGNAME"); + if (user == NULL) + user = getenv ("USERNAME"); + +#if defined(HAVE_GETLOGIN) && !defined(POSIX_GETLOGIN) + if (user == NULL) { + user = (const char *)getlogin (); + if (user != NULL) + return user; + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H + { + uid_t uid = getuid (); + struct passwd *pwd; + + if (user != NULL) { + pwd = k_getpwnam (user); + if (pwd != NULL && pwd->pw_uid == uid) + return user; + } + pwd = k_getpwuid (uid); + if (pwd != NULL) + return pwd->pw_name; + } +#endif + return user; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/get_window_size.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/get_window_size.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4eff8d2d2c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/get_window_size.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: get_window_size.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#if 0 /* Where were those needed? /confused */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PROC_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TTY_H +#include +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +int +get_window_size(int fd, struct winsize *wp) +{ + int ret = -1; + + memset(wp, 0, sizeof(*wp)); + +#if defined(TIOCGWINSZ) + ret = ioctl(fd, TIOCGWINSZ, wp); +#elif defined(TIOCGSIZE) + { + struct ttysize ts; + + ret = ioctl(fd, TIOCGSIZE, &ts); + if(ret == 0) { + wp->ws_row = ts.ts_lines; + wp->ws_col = ts.ts_cols; + } + } +#elif defined(HAVE__SCRSIZE) + { + int dst[2]; + + _scrsize(dst); + wp->ws_row = dst[1]; + wp->ws_col = dst[0]; + ret = 0; + } +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + char *s; + if((s = getenv("COLUMNS"))) + wp->ws_col = atoi(s); + if((s = getenv("LINES"))) + wp->ws_row = atoi(s); + if(wp->ws_col > 0 && wp->ws_row > 0) + ret = 0; + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..427408118d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getaddrinfo-test.c,v 1.4 2001/02/20 01:44:54 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include "getarg.h" + +static int flags; +static int family; +static int socktype; + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"flags", 0, arg_integer, &flags, "flags", NULL}, + {"family", 0, arg_integer, &family, "family", NULL}, + {"socktype",0, arg_integer, &socktype, "socktype", NULL}, + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, "print version",NULL}, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, NULL} +}; + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "[nodename servname...]"); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +doit (const char *nodename, const char *servname) +{ + struct addrinfo hints; + struct addrinfo *res, *r; + int ret; + + printf ("(%s,%s)... ", nodename ? nodename : "null", servname); + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = flags; + hints.ai_family = family; + hints.ai_socktype = socktype; + + ret = getaddrinfo (nodename, servname, &hints, &res); + if (ret) { + printf ("error: %s\n", gai_strerror(ret)); + return; + } + printf ("\n"); + + for (r = res; r != NULL; r = r->ai_next) { + char addrstr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (r->ai_family, + socket_get_address (r->ai_addr), + addrstr, sizeof(addrstr)) == NULL) { + printf ("\tbad address?\n"); + continue; + } + printf ("\t(family = %d, socktype = %d, protocol = %d, " + "address = \"%s\", port = %d", + r->ai_family, r->ai_socktype, r->ai_protocol, + addrstr, + ntohs(socket_get_port (r->ai_addr))); + if (r->ai_canonname) + printf (", canonname = \"%s\"", r->ai_canonname); + printf ("\n"); + } + freeaddrinfo (res); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int i; + + setprogname (argv[0]); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + fprintf (stderr, "%s from %s-%s)\n", getprogname(), PACKAGE, VERSION); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc % 2 != 0) + usage (1); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i += 2) { + const char *nodename = argv[i]; + + if (strcmp (nodename, "null") == 0) + nodename = NULL; + + doit (nodename, argv[i+1]); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83957bb794 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,417 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getaddrinfo.c,v 1.12 2001/08/17 13:06:57 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * uses hints->ai_socktype and hints->ai_protocol + */ + +static int +get_port_protocol_socktype (const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + int *port, + int *protocol, + int *socktype) +{ + struct servent *se; + const char *proto_str = NULL; + + *socktype = 0; + + if (hints != NULL && hints->ai_protocol != 0) { + struct protoent *protoent = getprotobynumber (hints->ai_protocol); + + if (protoent == NULL) + return EAI_SOCKTYPE; /* XXX */ + + proto_str = protoent->p_name; + *protocol = protoent->p_proto; + } + + if (hints != NULL) + *socktype = hints->ai_socktype; + + if (*socktype == SOCK_STREAM) { + se = getservbyname (servname, proto_str ? proto_str : "tcp"); + if (proto_str == NULL) + *protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + } else if (*socktype == SOCK_DGRAM) { + se = getservbyname (servname, proto_str ? proto_str : "udp"); + if (proto_str == NULL) + *protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; + } else if (*socktype == 0) { + if (proto_str != NULL) { + se = getservbyname (servname, proto_str); + } else { + se = getservbyname (servname, "tcp"); + *protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + *socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (se == NULL) { + se = getservbyname (servname, "udp"); + *protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; + *socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + } + } + } else + return EAI_SOCKTYPE; + + if (se == NULL) { + char *endstr; + + *port = htons(strtol (servname, &endstr, 10)); + if (servname == endstr) + return EAI_NONAME; + } else { + *port = se->s_port; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +add_one (int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo ***ptr, + int (*func)(struct addrinfo *, void *data, int port), + void *data, + char *canonname) +{ + struct addrinfo *a; + int ret; + + a = malloc (sizeof (*a)); + if (a == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + memset (a, 0, sizeof(*a)); + a->ai_flags = 0; + a->ai_next = NULL; + a->ai_protocol = protocol; + a->ai_socktype = socktype; + a->ai_canonname = canonname; + ret = (*func)(a, data, port); + if (ret) { + free (a); + return ret; + } + **ptr = a; + *ptr = &a->ai_next; + return 0; +} + +static int +const_v4 (struct addrinfo *a, void *data, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + struct in_addr *addr = (struct in_addr *)data; + + a->ai_family = PF_INET; + a->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sin); + a->ai_addr = malloc (sizeof(*sin)); + if (a->ai_addr == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)a->ai_addr; + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = port; + sin->sin_addr = *addr; + return 0; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 +static int +const_v6 (struct addrinfo *a, void *data, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + struct in6_addr *addr = (struct in6_addr *)data; + + a->ai_family = PF_INET6; + a->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sin6); + a->ai_addr = malloc (sizeof(*sin6)); + if (a->ai_addr == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)a->ai_addr; + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + sin6->sin6_addr = *addr; + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* this is mostly a hack for some versions of AIX that has a prototype + for in6addr_loopback but no actual symbol in libc */ +#if defined(HAVE_IPV6) && !defined(HAVE_IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK) && defined(IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT) +#define in6addr_loopback _roken_in6addr_loopback +struct in6_addr in6addr_loopback = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT; +#endif + +static int +get_null (const struct addrinfo *hints, + int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct in_addr v4_addr; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr v6_addr; +#endif + struct addrinfo *first = NULL; + struct addrinfo **current = &first; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + int ret; + + if (hints != NULL) + family = hints->ai_family; + + if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) { + v4_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + v6_addr = in6addr_any; +#endif + } else { + v4_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + v6_addr = in6addr_loopback; +#endif + } + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v6, &v6_addr, NULL); + } +#endif + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v4, &v4_addr, NULL); + } + *res = first; + return 0; +} + +static int +add_hostent (int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo ***current, + int (*func)(struct addrinfo *, void *data, int port), + struct hostent *he, int *flags) +{ + int ret; + char *canonname = NULL; + char **h; + + if (*flags & AI_CANONNAME) { + struct hostent *he2 = NULL; + const char *tmp_canon; + + tmp_canon = hostent_find_fqdn (he); + if (strchr (tmp_canon, '.') == NULL) { + int error; + + he2 = getipnodebyaddr (he->h_addr_list[0], he->h_length, + he->h_addrtype, &error); + if (he2 != NULL) { + const char *tmp = hostent_find_fqdn (he2); + + if (strchr (tmp, '.') != NULL) + tmp_canon = tmp; + } + } + + canonname = strdup (tmp_canon); + if (he2 != NULL) + freehostent (he2); + if (canonname == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + for (h = he->h_addr_list; *h != NULL; ++h) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + current, func, *h, canonname); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (*flags & AI_CANONNAME) { + *flags &= ~AI_CANONNAME; + canonname = NULL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +get_number (const char *nodename, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct addrinfo *first = NULL; + struct addrinfo **current = &first; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + int ret; + + if (hints != NULL) { + family = hints->ai_family; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct in6_addr v6_addr; + + if (inet_pton (PF_INET6, nodename, &v6_addr) == 1) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v6, &v6_addr, NULL); + *res = first; + return ret; + } + } +#endif + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct in_addr v4_addr; + + if (inet_pton (PF_INET, nodename, &v4_addr) == 1) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v4, &v4_addr, NULL); + *res = first; + return ret; + } + } + return EAI_NONAME; +} + +static int +get_nodes (const char *nodename, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct addrinfo *first = NULL; + struct addrinfo **current = &first; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + int flags = 0; + int ret = EAI_NONAME; + int error; + + if (hints != NULL) { + family = hints->ai_family; + flags = hints->ai_flags; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct hostent *he; + + he = getipnodebyname (nodename, PF_INET6, 0, &error); + + if (he != NULL) { + ret = add_hostent (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v6, he, &flags); + freehostent (he); + } + } +#endif + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct hostent *he; + + he = getipnodebyname (nodename, PF_INET, 0, &error); + + if (he != NULL) { + ret = add_hostent (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v4, he, &flags); + freehostent (he); + } + } + *res = first; + return ret; +} + +/* + * hints: + * + * struct addrinfo { + * int ai_flags; + * int ai_family; + * int ai_socktype; + * int ai_protocol; + * ... + * }; + */ + +int +getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, + const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + int ret; + int port = 0; + int protocol = 0; + int socktype = 0; + + *res = NULL; + + if (servname == NULL && nodename == NULL) + return EAI_NONAME; + + if (hints != NULL + && hints->ai_family != PF_UNSPEC + && hints->ai_family != PF_INET +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + && hints->ai_family != PF_INET6 +#endif + ) + return EAI_FAMILY; + + if (servname != NULL) { + ret = get_port_protocol_socktype (servname, hints, + &port, &protocol, &socktype); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + if (nodename != NULL) { + ret = get_number (nodename, hints, port, protocol, socktype, res); + if (ret) { + if(hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) + ret = EAI_NONAME; + else + ret = get_nodes (nodename, hints, port, protocol, socktype, + res); + } + } else { + ret = get_null (hints, port, protocol, socktype, res); + } + if (ret) + freeaddrinfo (*res); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo_hostspec.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo_hostspec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f6b0d1da9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getaddrinfo_hostspec.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getaddrinfo_hostspec.c,v 1.3 2000/07/15 12:50:32 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* getaddrinfo via string specifying host and port */ + +int +roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec2(const char *hostspec, + int socktype, + int port, + struct addrinfo **ai) +{ + const char *p; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + struct addrinfo hints; + int hostspec_len; + + struct hst { + const char *prefix; + int socktype; + int protocol; + int port; + } *hstp, hst[] = { + { "http://", SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, 80 }, + { "http/", SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, 80 }, + { "tcp/", SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP }, + { "udp/", SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP }, + { NULL } + }; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + + hints.ai_socktype = socktype; + + for(hstp = hst; hstp->prefix; hstp++) { + if(strncmp(hostspec, hstp->prefix, strlen(hstp->prefix)) == 0) { + hints.ai_socktype = hstp->socktype; + hints.ai_protocol = hstp->protocol; + if(port == 0) + port = hstp->port; + hostspec += strlen(hstp->prefix); + break; + } + } + + p = strchr (hostspec, ':'); + if (p != NULL) { + char *end; + + port = strtol (p + 1, &end, 0); + hostspec_len = p - hostspec; + } else { + hostspec_len = strlen(hostspec); + } + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", port); + + snprintf (host, sizeof(host), "%.*s", hostspec_len, hostspec); + return getaddrinfo (host, portstr, &hints, ai); +} + +int +roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec(const char *hostspec, + int port, + struct addrinfo **ai) +{ + return roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec2(hostspec, 0, port, ai); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2f0412835 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.3 @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: getarg.3,v 1.7 2003/04/16 13:58:24 lha Exp $ +.Dd September 24, 1999 +.Dt GETARG 3 +.Os ROKEN +.Sh NAME +.Nm getarg , +.Nm arg_printusage +.Nd collect command line options +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.In getarg.h +.Ft int +.Fn getarg "struct getargs *args" "size_t num_args" "int argc" "char **argv" "int *optind" +.Ft void +.Fn arg_printusage "struct getargs *args" "size_t num_args" "const char *progname" "const char *extra_string" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn getarg +collects any command line options given to a program in an easily used way. +.Fn arg_printusage +pretty-prints the available options, with a short help text. +.Pp +.Fa args +is the option specification to use, and it's an array of +.Fa struct getargs +elements. +.Fa num_args +is the size of +.Fa args +(in elements). +.Fa argc +and +.Fa argv +are the argument count and argument vector to extract option from. +.Fa optind +is a pointer to an integer where the index to the last processed +argument is stored, it must be initialised to the first index (minus +one) to process (normally 0) before the first call. +.Pp +.Fa arg_printusage +take the same +.Fa args +and +.Fa num_args +as getarg; +.Fa progname +is the name of the program (to be used in the help text), and +.Fa extra_string +is a string to print after the actual options to indicate more +arguments. The usefulness of this function is realised only be people +who has used programs that has help strings that doesn't match what +the code does. +.Pp +The +.Fa getargs +struct has the following elements. +.Bd -literal +struct getargs{ + const char *long_name; + char short_name; + enum { arg_integer, + arg_string, + arg_flag, + arg_negative_flag, + arg_strings, + arg_double, + arg_collect + } type; + void *value; + const char *help; + const char *arg_help; +}; +.Ed +.Pp +.Fa long_name +is the long name of the option, it can be +.Dv NULL , +if you don't want a long name. +.Fa short_name +is the characted to use as short option, it can be zero. If the option +has a value the +.Fa value +field gets filled in with that value interpreted as specified by the +.Fa type +field. +.Fa help +is a longer help string for the option as a whole, if it's +.Dv NULL +the help text for the option is omitted (but it's still displayed in +the synopsis). +.Fa arg_help +is a description of the argument, if +.Dv NULL +a default value will be used, depending on the type of the option: +.Pp +.Bl -hang -width arg_negative_flag +.It arg_integer +the argument is a signed integer, and +.Fa value +should point to an +.Fa int . +.It Fa arg_string +the argument is a string, and +.Fa value +should point to a +.Fa char* . +.It Fa arg_flag +the argument is a flag, and +.Fa value +should point to a +.Fa int . +It gets filled in with either zero or one, depending on how the option +is given, the normal case being one. Note that if the option isn't +given, the value isn't altered, so it should be initialised to some +useful default. +.It Fa arg_negative_flag +this is the same as +.Fa arg_flag +but it reverses the meaning of the flag (a given short option clears +the flag), and the synopsis of a long option is negated. +.It Fa arg_strings +the argument can be given multiple times, and the values are collected +in an array; +.Fa value +should be a pointer to a +.Fa struct getarg_strings +structure, which holds a length and a string pointer. +.It Fa arg_double +argument is a double precision floating point value, and +.Fa value +should point to a +.Fa double . +.It Fa arg_collect +allows more fine-grained control of the option parsing process. +.Fa value +should be a pointer to a +.Fa getarg_collect_info +structure: +.Bd -literal +typedef int (*getarg_collect_func)(int short_opt, + int argc, + char **argv, + int *optind, + int *optarg, + void *data); + +typedef struct getarg_collect_info { + getarg_collect_func func; + void *data; +} getarg_collect_info; +.Ed +.Pp +With the +.Fa func +member set to a function to call, and +.Fa data +to some application specific data. The parameters to the collect function are: +.Bl -inset +.It Fa short_flag +non-zero if this call is via a short option flag, zero otherwise +.It Fa argc , argv +the whole argument list +.It Fa optind +pointer to the index in argv where the flag is +.It Fa optarg +pointer to the index in argv[*optind] where the flag name starts +.It Fa data +application specific data +.El +.Pp +You can modify +.Fa *optind , +and +.Fa *optarg , +but to do this correct you (more or less) have to know about the inner +workings of getarg. +.Pp +You can skip parts of arguments by increasing +.Fa *optarg +(you could +implement the +.Fl z Ns Ar 3 +set of flags from +.Nm gzip +with this), or whole argument strings by increasing +.Fa *optind +(let's say you want a flag +.Fl c Ar x y z +to specify a coordinate); if you also have to set +.Fa *optarg +to a sane value. +.Pp +The collect function should return one of +.Dv ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH , ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG , ARG_ERR_NO_ARG +on error, zero otherwise. +.Pp +For your convenience there is a function, +.Fn getarg_optarg , +that returns the traditional argument string, and you pass it all +arguments, sans data, that where given to the collection function. +.Pp +Don't use this more this unless you absolutely have to. +.El +.Pp +Option parsing is similar to what +.Xr getopt +uses. Short options without arguments can be compressed +.Pf ( Fl xyz +is the same as +.Fl x y z ) , +and short +options with arguments take these as either the rest of the +argv-string or as the next option +.Pf ( Fl o Ns Ar foo , +or +.Fl o Ar foo ) . +.Pp +Long option names are prefixed with -- (double dash), and the value +with a = (equal), +.Fl -foo= Ns Ar bar . +Long option flags can either be specified as they are +.Pf ( Fl -help ) , +or with an (boolean parsable) option +.Pf ( Fl -help= Ns Ar yes , +.Fl -help= Ns Ar true , +or similar), or they can also be negated +.Pf ( Fl -no-help +is the same as +.Fl -help= Ns no ) , +and if you're really confused you can do it multiple times +.Pf ( Fl -no-no-help= Ns Ar false , +or even +.Fl -no-no-help= Ns Ar maybe ) . +.Sh EXAMPLE +.Bd -literal +#include +#include +#include + +char *source = "Ouagadougou"; +char *destination; +int weight; +int include_catalog = 1; +int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "source", 's', arg_string, &source, + "source of shippment", "city" }, + { "destination", 'd', arg_string, &destination, + "destination of shippment", "city" }, + { "weight", 'w', arg_integer, &weight, + "weight of shippment", "tons" }, + { "catalog", 'c', arg_negative_flag, &include_catalog, + "include product catalog" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); /* number of elements in args */ + +const char *progname = "ship++"; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + if (getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, progname, "stuff..."); + exit (1); + } + if (help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, progname, "stuff..."); + exit (0); + } + if (destination == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: must specify destination\en", progname); + exit(1); + } + if (strcmp(source, destination) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: destination must be different from source\en"); + exit(1); + } + /* include more stuff here ... */ + exit(2); +} +.Ed +.Pp +The output help output from this program looks like this: +.Bd -literal +$ ship++ --help +Usage: ship++ [--source=city] [-s city] [--destination=city] [-d city] + [--weight=tons] [-w tons] [--no-catalog] [-c] [--help] [-h] stuff... +-s city, --source=city source of shippment +-d city, --destination=city destination of shippment +-w tons, --weight=tons weight of shippment +-c, --no-catalog include product catalog +.Ed +.Sh BUGS +It should be more flexible, so it would be possible to use other more +complicated option syntaxes, such as what +.Xr ps 1 , +and +.Xr tar 1 , +uses, or the AFS model where you can skip the flag names as long as +the options come in the correct order. +.Pp +Options with multiple arguments should be handled better. +.Pp +Should be integreated with SL. +.Pp +It's very confusing that the struct you pass in is called getargS. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr getopt 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eff81f22d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.c @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getarg.c,v 1.46 2002/08/20 16:23:07 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "getarg.h" + +#define ISFLAG(X) ((X).type == arg_flag || (X).type == arg_negative_flag) + +static size_t +print_arg (char *string, size_t len, int mdoc, int longp, struct getargs *arg) +{ + const char *s; + + *string = '\0'; + + if (ISFLAG(*arg) || (!longp && arg->type == arg_counter)) + return 0; + + if(mdoc){ + if(longp) + strlcat(string, "= Ns", len); + strlcat(string, " Ar ", len); + } else { + if (longp) + strlcat (string, "=", len); + else + strlcat (string, " ", len); + } + + if (arg->arg_help) + s = arg->arg_help; + else if (arg->type == arg_integer || arg->type == arg_counter) + s = "integer"; + else if (arg->type == arg_string) + s = "string"; + else if (arg->type == arg_strings) + s = "strings"; + else if (arg->type == arg_double) + s = "float"; + else + s = ""; + + strlcat(string, s, len); + return 1 + strlen(s); +} + +static void +mandoc_template(struct getargs *args, + size_t num_args, + const char *progname, + const char *extra_string) +{ + int i; + char timestr[64], cmd[64]; + char buf[128]; + const char *p; + time_t t; + + printf(".\\\" Things to fix:\n"); + printf(".\\\" * correct section, and operating system\n"); + printf(".\\\" * remove Op from mandatory flags\n"); + printf(".\\\" * use better macros for arguments (like .Pa for files)\n"); + printf(".\\\"\n"); + t = time(NULL); + strftime(timestr, sizeof(timestr), "%B %e, %Y", localtime(&t)); + printf(".Dd %s\n", timestr); + p = strrchr(progname, '/'); + if(p) p++; else p = progname; + strlcpy(cmd, p, sizeof(cmd)); + strupr(cmd); + + printf(".Dt %s SECTION\n", cmd); + printf(".Os OPERATING_SYSTEM\n"); + printf(".Sh NAME\n"); + printf(".Nm %s\n", p); + printf(".Nd\n"); + printf("in search of a description\n"); + printf(".Sh SYNOPSIS\n"); + printf(".Nm\n"); + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++){ + /* we seem to hit a limit on number of arguments if doing + short and long flags with arguments -- split on two lines */ + if(ISFLAG(args[i]) || + args[i].short_name == 0 || args[i].long_name == NULL) { + printf(".Op "); + + if(args[i].short_name) { + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 0, args + i); + printf("Fl %c%s", args[i].short_name, buf); + if(args[i].long_name) + printf(" | "); + } + if(args[i].long_name) { + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 1, args + i); + printf("Fl -%s%s%s", + args[i].type == arg_negative_flag ? "no-" : "", + args[i].long_name, buf); + } + printf("\n"); + } else { + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 0, args + i); + printf(".Oo Fl %c%s \\*(Ba Xo\n", args[i].short_name, buf); + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 1, args + i); + printf(".Fl -%s%s\n.Xc\n.Oc\n", args[i].long_name, buf); + } + /* + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + fprintf (stderr, "..."); + */ + } + if (extra_string && *extra_string) + printf (".Ar %s\n", extra_string); + printf(".Sh DESCRIPTION\n"); + printf("Supported options:\n"); + printf(".Bl -tag -width Ds\n"); + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++){ + printf(".It Xo\n"); + if(args[i].short_name){ + printf(".Fl %c", args[i].short_name); + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 0, args + i); + printf("%s", buf); + if(args[i].long_name) + printf(" ,"); + printf("\n"); + } + if(args[i].long_name){ + printf(".Fl -%s%s", + args[i].type == arg_negative_flag ? "no-" : "", + args[i].long_name); + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 1, args + i); + printf("%s\n", buf); + } + printf(".Xc\n"); + if(args[i].help) + printf("%s\n", args[i].help); + /* + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + fprintf (stderr, "..."); + */ + } + printf(".El\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh ENVIRONMENT\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh FILES\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh EXAMPLES\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh SEE ALSO\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh STANDARDS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh HISTORY\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh AUTHORS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh BUGS\n"); +} + +static int +check_column(FILE *f, int col, int len, int columns) +{ + if(col + len > columns) { + fprintf(f, "\n"); + col = fprintf(f, " "); + } + return col; +} + +void +arg_printusage (struct getargs *args, + size_t num_args, + const char *progname, + const char *extra_string) +{ + int i; + size_t max_len = 0; + char buf[128]; + int col = 0, columns; + struct winsize ws; + + if (progname == NULL) + progname = getprogname(); + + if(getenv("GETARGMANDOC")){ + mandoc_template(args, num_args, progname, extra_string); + return; + } + if(get_window_size(2, &ws) == 0) + columns = ws.ws_col; + else + columns = 80; + col = 0; + col += fprintf (stderr, "Usage: %s", progname); + buf[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + if(args[i].short_name && ISFLAG(args[i])) { + char s[2]; + if(buf[0] == '\0') + strlcpy(buf, "[-", sizeof(buf)); + s[0] = args[i].short_name; + s[1] = '\0'; + strlcat(buf, s, sizeof(buf)); + } + } + if(buf[0] != '\0') { + strlcat(buf, "]", sizeof(buf)); + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(buf) + 1, columns); + col += fprintf(stderr, " %s", buf); + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + size_t len = 0; + + if (args[i].long_name) { + buf[0] = '\0'; + strlcat(buf, "[--", sizeof(buf)); + len += 2; + if(args[i].type == arg_negative_flag) { + strlcat(buf, "no-", sizeof(buf)); + len += 3; + } + strlcat(buf, args[i].long_name, sizeof(buf)); + len += strlen(args[i].long_name); + len += print_arg(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + 0, 1, &args[i]); + strlcat(buf, "]", sizeof(buf)); + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + strlcat(buf, "...", sizeof(buf)); + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(buf) + 1, columns); + col += fprintf(stderr, " %s", buf); + } + if (args[i].short_name && !ISFLAG(args[i])) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "[-%c", args[i].short_name); + len += 2; + len += print_arg(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + 0, 0, &args[i]); + strlcat(buf, "]", sizeof(buf)); + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + strlcat(buf, "...", sizeof(buf)); + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(buf) + 1, columns); + col += fprintf(stderr, " %s", buf); + } + if (args[i].long_name && args[i].short_name) + len += 2; /* ", " */ + max_len = max(max_len, len); + } + if (extra_string) { + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(extra_string) + 1, columns); + fprintf (stderr, " %s\n", extra_string); + } else + fprintf (stderr, "\n"); + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + if (args[i].help) { + size_t count = 0; + + if (args[i].short_name) { + count += fprintf (stderr, "-%c", args[i].short_name); + print_arg (buf, sizeof(buf), 0, 0, &args[i]); + count += fprintf(stderr, "%s", buf); + } + if (args[i].short_name && args[i].long_name) + count += fprintf (stderr, ", "); + if (args[i].long_name) { + count += fprintf (stderr, "--"); + if (args[i].type == arg_negative_flag) + count += fprintf (stderr, "no-"); + count += fprintf (stderr, "%s", args[i].long_name); + print_arg (buf, sizeof(buf), 0, 1, &args[i]); + count += fprintf(stderr, "%s", buf); + } + while(count++ <= max_len) + putc (' ', stderr); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", args[i].help); + } + } +} + +static void +add_string(getarg_strings *s, char *value) +{ + s->strings = realloc(s->strings, (s->num_strings + 1) * sizeof(*s->strings)); + s->strings[s->num_strings] = value; + s->num_strings++; +} + +static int +arg_match_long(struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + char *argv, int argc, char **rargv, int *goptind) +{ + int i; + char *goptarg = NULL; + int negate = 0; + int partial_match = 0; + struct getargs *partial = NULL; + struct getargs *current = NULL; + int argv_len; + char *p; + int p_len; + + argv_len = strlen(argv); + p = strchr (argv, '='); + if (p != NULL) + argv_len = p - argv; + + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + if(args[i].long_name) { + int len = strlen(args[i].long_name); + p = argv; + p_len = argv_len; + negate = 0; + + for (;;) { + if (strncmp (args[i].long_name, p, p_len) == 0) { + if(p_len == len) + current = &args[i]; + else { + ++partial_match; + partial = &args[i]; + } + goptarg = p + p_len; + } else if (ISFLAG(args[i]) && strncmp (p, "no-", 3) == 0) { + negate = !negate; + p += 3; + p_len -= 3; + continue; + } + break; + } + if (current) + break; + } + } + if (current == NULL) { + if (partial_match == 1) + current = partial; + else + return ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH; + } + + if(*goptarg == '\0' + && !ISFLAG(*current) + && current->type != arg_collect + && current->type != arg_counter) + return ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH; + switch(current->type){ + case arg_integer: + { + int tmp; + if(sscanf(goptarg + 1, "%d", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(int*)current->value = tmp; + return 0; + } + case arg_string: + { + *(char**)current->value = goptarg + 1; + return 0; + } + case arg_strings: + { + add_string((getarg_strings*)current->value, goptarg + 1); + return 0; + } + case arg_flag: + case arg_negative_flag: + { + int *flag = current->value; + if(*goptarg == '\0' || + strcmp(goptarg + 1, "yes") == 0 || + strcmp(goptarg + 1, "true") == 0){ + *flag = !negate; + return 0; + } else if (*goptarg && strcmp(goptarg + 1, "maybe") == 0) { +#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM + *flag = random() & 1; +#else + *flag = rand() & 1; +#endif + } else { + *flag = negate; + return 0; + } + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + } + case arg_counter : + { + int val; + + if (*goptarg == '\0') + val = 1; + else if(sscanf(goptarg + 1, "%d", &val) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(int *)current->value += val; + return 0; + } + case arg_double: + { + double tmp; + if(sscanf(goptarg + 1, "%lf", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(double*)current->value = tmp; + return 0; + } + case arg_collect:{ + struct getarg_collect_info *c = current->value; + int o = argv - rargv[*goptind]; + return (*c->func)(FALSE, argc, rargv, goptind, &o, c->data); + } + + default: + abort (); + } +} + +static int +arg_match_short (struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + char *argv, int argc, char **rargv, int *goptind) +{ + int j, k; + + for(j = 1; j > 0 && j < strlen(rargv[*goptind]); j++) { + for(k = 0; k < num_args; k++) { + char *goptarg; + + if(args[k].short_name == 0) + continue; + if(argv[j] == args[k].short_name) { + if(args[k].type == arg_flag) { + *(int*)args[k].value = 1; + break; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_negative_flag) { + *(int*)args[k].value = 0; + break; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_counter) { + ++*(int *)args[k].value; + break; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_collect) { + struct getarg_collect_info *c = args[k].value; + + if((*c->func)(TRUE, argc, rargv, goptind, &j, c->data)) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + break; + } + + if(argv[j + 1]) + goptarg = &argv[j + 1]; + else { + ++*goptind; + goptarg = rargv[*goptind]; + } + if(goptarg == NULL) { + --*goptind; + return ARG_ERR_NO_ARG; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_integer) { + int tmp; + if(sscanf(goptarg, "%d", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(int*)args[k].value = tmp; + return 0; + } else if(args[k].type == arg_string) { + *(char**)args[k].value = goptarg; + return 0; + } else if(args[k].type == arg_strings) { + add_string((getarg_strings*)args[k].value, goptarg); + return 0; + } else if(args[k].type == arg_double) { + double tmp; + if(sscanf(goptarg, "%lf", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(double*)args[k].value = tmp; + return 0; + } + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + } + } + if (k == num_args) + return ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH; + } + return 0; +} + +int +getarg(struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + int argc, char **argv, int *goptind) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + +#if defined(HAVE_SRANDOMDEV) + srandomdev(); +#elif defined(HAVE_RANDOM) + srandom(time(NULL)); +#else + srand (time(NULL)); +#endif + (*goptind)++; + for(i = *goptind; i < argc; i++) { + if(argv[i][0] != '-') + break; + if(argv[i][1] == '-'){ + if(argv[i][2] == 0){ + i++; + break; + } + ret = arg_match_long (args, num_args, argv[i] + 2, + argc, argv, &i); + } else { + ret = arg_match_short (args, num_args, argv[i], + argc, argv, &i); + } + if(ret) + break; + } + *goptind = i; + return ret; +} + +void +free_getarg_strings (getarg_strings *s) +{ + free (s->strings); +} + +#if TEST +int foo_flag = 2; +int flag1 = 0; +int flag2 = 0; +int bar_int; +char *baz_string; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, '1', arg_flag, &flag1, "one", NULL }, + { NULL, '2', arg_flag, &flag2, "two", NULL }, + { "foo", 'f', arg_negative_flag, &foo_flag, "foo", NULL }, + { "bar", 'b', arg_integer, &bar_int, "bar", "seconds"}, + { "baz", 'x', arg_string, &baz_string, "baz", "name" }, +}; + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int goptind = 0; + while(getarg(args, 5, argc, argv, &goptind)) + printf("Bad arg: %s\n", argv[goptind]); + printf("flag1 = %d\n", flag1); + printf("flag2 = %d\n", flag2); + printf("foo_flag = %d\n", foo_flag); + printf("bar_int = %d\n", bar_int); + printf("baz_flag = %s\n", baz_string); + arg_printusage (args, 5, argv[0], "nothing here"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.cat3 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.cat3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84611f0440 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.cat3 @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ + +GETARG(3) UNIX Programmer's Manual GETARG(3) + +NNAAMMEE + ggeettaarrgg, aarrgg__pprriinnttuussaaggee - collect command line options + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + _i_n_t + ggeettaarrgg(_s_t_r_u_c_t _g_e_t_a_r_g_s _*_a_r_g_s, _s_i_z_e___t _n_u_m___a_r_g_s, _i_n_t _a_r_g_c, _c_h_a_r _*_*_a_r_g_v, + _i_n_t _*_o_p_t_i_n_d) + + _v_o_i_d + aarrgg__pprriinnttuussaaggee(_s_t_r_u_c_t _g_e_t_a_r_g_s _*_a_r_g_s, _s_i_z_e___t _n_u_m___a_r_g_s, + _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_p_r_o_g_n_a_m_e, _c_o_n_s_t _c_h_a_r _*_e_x_t_r_a___s_t_r_i_n_g) + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + ggeettaarrgg() collects any command line options given to a program in an easi- + ly used way. aarrgg__pprriinnttuussaaggee() pretty-prints the available options, with + a short help text. + + _a_r_g_s is the option specification to use, and it's an array of _s_t_r_u_c_t + _g_e_t_a_r_g_s elements. _n_u_m___a_r_g_s is the size of _a_r_g_s (in elements). _a_r_g_c and + _a_r_g_v are the argument count and argument vector to extract option from. + _o_p_t_i_n_d is a pointer to an integer where the index to the last processed + argument is stored, it must be initialised to the first index (minus one) + to process (normally 0) before the first call. + + _a_r_g___p_r_i_n_t_u_s_a_g_e take the same _a_r_g_s and _n_u_m___a_r_g_s as getarg; _p_r_o_g_n_a_m_e is the + name of the program (to be used in the help text), and _e_x_t_r_a___s_t_r_i_n_g is a + string to print after the actual options to indicate more arguments. The + usefulness of this function is realised only be people who has used pro- + grams that has help strings that doesn't match what the code does. + + The _g_e_t_a_r_g_s struct has the following elements. + + struct getargs{ + const char *long_name; + char short_name; + enum { arg_integer, + arg_string, + arg_flag, + arg_negative_flag, + arg_strings, + arg_double, + arg_collect + } type; + void *value; + const char *help; + const char *arg_help; + }; + + _l_o_n_g___n_a_m_e is the long name of the option, it can be NULL, if you don't + want a long name. _s_h_o_r_t___n_a_m_e is the characted to use as short option, it + can be zero. If the option has a value the _v_a_l_u_e field gets filled in + with that value interpreted as specified by the _t_y_p_e field. _h_e_l_p is a + longer help string for the option as a whole, if it's NULL the help text + for the option is omitted (but it's still displayed in the synopsis). + _a_r_g___h_e_l_p is a description of the argument, if NULL a default value will + be used, depending on the type of the option: + + arg_integer the argument is a signed integer, and _v_a_l_u_e should + point to an _i_n_t. + + _a_r_g___s_t_r_i_n_g the argument is a string, and _v_a_l_u_e should point to a + + _c_h_a_r_*. + + _a_r_g___f_l_a_g the argument is a flag, and _v_a_l_u_e should point to a + _i_n_t. It gets filled in with either zero or one, de- + pending on how the option is given, the normal case + being one. Note that if the option isn't given, the + value isn't altered, so it should be initialised to + some useful default. + + _a_r_g___n_e_g_a_t_i_v_e___f_l_a_g this is the same as _a_r_g___f_l_a_g but it reverses the mean- + ing of the flag (a given short option clears the + flag), and the synopsis of a long option is negated. + + _a_r_g___s_t_r_i_n_g_s the argument can be given multiple times, and the val- + ues are collected in an array; _v_a_l_u_e should be a + pointer to a _s_t_r_u_c_t _g_e_t_a_r_g___s_t_r_i_n_g_s structure, which + holds a length and a string pointer. + + _a_r_g___d_o_u_b_l_e argument is a double precision floating point value, + and _v_a_l_u_e should point to a _d_o_u_b_l_e. + + _a_r_g___c_o_l_l_e_c_t allows more fine-grained control of the option parsing + process. _v_a_l_u_e should be a pointer to a + _g_e_t_a_r_g___c_o_l_l_e_c_t___i_n_f_o structure: + + typedef int (*getarg_collect_func)(int short_opt, + int argc, + char **argv, + int *optind, + int *optarg, + void *data); + + typedef struct getarg_collect_info { + getarg_collect_func func; + void *data; + } getarg_collect_info; + + With the _f_u_n_c member set to a function to call, and + _d_a_t_a to some application specific data. The parameters + to the collect function are: + + _s_h_o_r_t___f_l_a_g non-zero if this call is via a short option + flag, zero otherwise + + _a_r_g_c, _a_r_g_v the whole argument list + + _o_p_t_i_n_d pointer to the index in argv where the flag is + + _o_p_t_a_r_g pointer to the index in argv[*optind] where the + flag name starts + + _d_a_t_a application specific data + + You can modify _*_o_p_t_i_n_d, and _*_o_p_t_a_r_g, but to do this + correct you (more or less) have to know about the in- + ner workings of getarg. + + You can skip parts of arguments by increasing _*_o_p_t_a_r_g + (you could implement the --zz_3 set of flags from ggzziipp + with this), or whole argument strings by increasing + _*_o_p_t_i_n_d (let's say you want a flag --cc _x _y _z to specify + a coordinate); if you also have to set _*_o_p_t_a_r_g to a + sane value. + + The collect function should return one of + ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH, ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG, ARG_ERR_NO_ARG on + error, zero otherwise. + + For your convenience there is a function, + ggeettaarrgg__ooppttaarrgg(), that returns the traditional argument + string, and you pass it all arguments, sans data, that + where given to the collection function. + + Don't use this more this unless you absolutely have + to. + + Option parsing is similar to what getopt uses. Short options without ar- + guments can be compressed (--xxyyzz is the same as --xx --yy --zz), and short op- + tions with arguments take these as either the rest of the argv-string or + as the next option (--oo_f_o_o, or --oo _f_o_o). + + Long option names are prefixed with -- (double dash), and the value with + a = (equal), ----ffoooo==_b_a_r. Long option flags can either be specified as they + are (----hheellpp), or with an (boolean parsable) option (----hheellpp==_y_e_s, + ----hheellpp==_t_r_u_e, or similar), or they can also be negated (----nnoo--hheellpp is the + same as ----hheellpp==no), and if you're really confused you can do it multiple + times (----nnoo--nnoo--hheellpp==_f_a_l_s_e, or even ----nnoo--nnoo--hheellpp==_m_a_y_b_e). + +EEXXAAMMPPLLEE + #include + #include + #include + + char *source = "Ouagadougou"; + char *destination; + int weight; + int include_catalog = 1; + int help_flag; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "source", 's', arg_string, &source, + "source of shippment", "city" }, + { "destination", 'd', arg_string, &destination, + "destination of shippment", "city" }, + { "weight", 'w', arg_integer, &weight, + "weight of shippment", "tons" }, + { "catalog", 'c', arg_negative_flag, &include_catalog, + "include product catalog" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } + }; + + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); /* number of elements in args */ + + const char *progname = "ship++"; + + int + main(int argc, char **argv) + { + int optind = 0; + if (getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, progname, "stuff..."); + exit (1); + } + if (help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, progname, "stuff..."); + exit (0); + } + if (destination == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: must specify destination\n", progname); + exit(1); + } + if (strcmp(source, destination) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: destination must be different from source\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* include more stuff here ... */ + exit(2); + } + + The output help output from this program looks like this: + + $ ship++ --help + Usage: ship++ [--source=city] [-s city] [--destination=city] [-d city] + [--weight=tons] [-w tons] [--no-catalog] [-c] [--help] [-h] stuff... + -s city, --source=city source of shippment + -d city, --destination=city destination of shippment + -w tons, --weight=tons weight of shippment + -c, --no-catalog include product catalog + +BBUUGGSS + It should be more flexible, so it would be possible to use other more + complicated option syntaxes, such as what ps(1), and tar(1), uses, or + the AFS model where you can skip the flag names as long as the options + come in the correct order. + + Options with multiple arguments should be handled better. + + Should be integreated with SL. + + It's very confusing that the struct you pass in is called getargS. + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + getopt(3) + + ROKEN September 24, 1999 4 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c68b66a1d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getarg.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: getarg.h,v 1.12 2002/04/18 08:50:08 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __GETARG_H__ +#define __GETARG_H__ + +#include + +struct getargs{ + const char *long_name; + char short_name; + enum { arg_integer, + arg_string, + arg_flag, + arg_negative_flag, + arg_strings, + arg_double, + arg_collect, + arg_counter + } type; + void *value; + const char *help; + const char *arg_help; +}; + +enum { + ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH = 1, + ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG, + ARG_ERR_NO_ARG +}; + +typedef struct getarg_strings { + int num_strings; + char **strings; +} getarg_strings; + +typedef int (*getarg_collect_func)(int short_opt, + int argc, + char **argv, + int *goptind, + int *goptarg, + void *data); + +typedef struct getarg_collect_info { + getarg_collect_func func; + void *data; +} getarg_collect_info; + +int getarg(struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + int argc, char **argv, int *goptind); + +void arg_printusage (struct getargs *args, + size_t num_args, + const char *progname, + const char *extra_string); + +void free_getarg_strings (getarg_strings *); + +#endif /* __GETARG_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getcap.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getcap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a29e1f68b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getcap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1119 @@ +/* $NetBSD: getcap.c,v 1.29 1999/03/29 09:27:29 abs Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Casey Leedom of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +RCSID("$Id: getcap.c,v 1.8 2003/04/16 16:23:36 lha Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_DB_185_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define BFRAG 1024 +#if 0 +#define BSIZE 1024 +#endif +#define ESC ('[' & 037) /* ASCII ESC */ +#define MAX_RECURSION 32 /* maximum getent recursion */ +#define SFRAG 100 /* cgetstr mallocs in SFRAG chunks */ + +#define RECOK (char)0 +#define TCERR (char)1 +#define SHADOW (char)2 + +static size_t topreclen; /* toprec length */ +static char *toprec; /* Additional record specified by cgetset() */ +static int gottoprec; /* Flag indicating retrieval of toprecord */ + +#if defined(HAVE_DBOPEN) && defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#define USE_DB +#endif + +#ifdef USE_DB +static int cdbget (DB *, char **, const char *); +#endif +static int getent (char **, size_t *, char **, int, const char *, int, char *); +static int nfcmp (char *, char *); + + +int cgetset(const char *ent); +char *cgetcap(char *buf, const char *cap, int type); +int cgetent(char **buf, char **db_array, const char *name); +int cgetmatch(const char *buf, const char *name); +int cgetclose(void); +#if 0 +int cgetfirst(char **buf, char **db_array); +int cgetnext(char **bp, char **db_array); +#endif +int cgetstr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str); +int cgetustr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str); +int cgetnum(char *buf, const char *cap, long *num); +/* + * Cgetset() allows the addition of a user specified buffer to be added + * to the database array, in effect "pushing" the buffer on top of the + * virtual database. 0 is returned on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +cgetset(const char *ent) +{ + const char *source, *check; + char *dest; + + if (ent == NULL) { + if (toprec) + free(toprec); + toprec = NULL; + topreclen = 0; + return (0); + } + topreclen = strlen(ent); + if ((toprec = malloc (topreclen + 1)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-1); + } + gottoprec = 0; + + source=ent; + dest=toprec; + while (*source) { /* Strip whitespace */ + *dest++ = *source++; /* Do not check first field */ + while (*source == ':') { + check=source+1; + while (*check && (isspace((unsigned char)*check) || + (*check=='\\' && isspace((unsigned char)check[1])))) + ++check; + if( *check == ':' ) + source=check; + else + break; + + } + } + *dest=0; + + return (0); +} + +/* + * Cgetcap searches the capability record buf for the capability cap with + * type `type'. A pointer to the value of cap is returned on success, NULL + * if the requested capability couldn't be found. + * + * Specifying a type of ':' means that nothing should follow cap (:cap:). + * In this case a pointer to the terminating ':' or NUL will be returned if + * cap is found. + * + * If (cap, '@') or (cap, terminator, '@') is found before (cap, terminator) + * return NULL. + */ +char * +cgetcap(char *buf, const char *cap, int type) +{ + char *bp; + const char *cp; + + bp = buf; + for (;;) { + /* + * Skip past the current capability field - it's either the + * name field if this is the first time through the loop, or + * the remainder of a field whose name failed to match cap. + */ + for (;;) + if (*bp == '\0') + return (NULL); + else + if (*bp++ == ':') + break; + + /* + * Try to match (cap, type) in buf. + */ + for (cp = cap; *cp == *bp && *bp != '\0'; cp++, bp++) + continue; + if (*cp != '\0') + continue; + if (*bp == '@') + return (NULL); + if (type == ':') { + if (*bp != '\0' && *bp != ':') + continue; + return(bp); + } + if (*bp != type) + continue; + bp++; + return (*bp == '@' ? NULL : bp); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Cgetent extracts the capability record name from the NULL terminated file + * array db_array and returns a pointer to a malloc'd copy of it in buf. + * Buf must be retained through all subsequent calls to cgetcap, cgetnum, + * cgetflag, and cgetstr, but may then be free'd. 0 is returned on success, + * -1 if the requested record couldn't be found, -2 if a system error was + * encountered (couldn't open/read a file, etc.), and -3 if a potential + * reference loop is detected. + */ +int +cgetent(char **buf, char **db_array, const char *name) +{ + size_t dummy; + + return (getent(buf, &dummy, db_array, -1, name, 0, NULL)); +} + +/* + * Getent implements the functions of cgetent. If fd is non-negative, + * *db_array has already been opened and fd is the open file descriptor. We + * do this to save time and avoid using up file descriptors for tc= + * recursions. + * + * Getent returns the same success/failure codes as cgetent. On success, a + * pointer to a malloc'ed capability record with all tc= capabilities fully + * expanded and its length (not including trailing ASCII NUL) are left in + * *cap and *len. + * + * Basic algorithm: + * + Allocate memory incrementally as needed in chunks of size BFRAG + * for capability buffer. + * + Recurse for each tc=name and interpolate result. Stop when all + * names interpolated, a name can't be found, or depth exceeds + * MAX_RECURSION. + */ +static int +getent(char **cap, size_t *len, char **db_array, int fd, + const char *name, int depth, char *nfield) +{ + char *r_end, *rp = NULL, **db_p; /* pacify gcc */ + int myfd = 0, eof, foundit; + char *record; + int tc_not_resolved; + + /* + * Return with ``loop detected'' error if we've recursed more than + * MAX_RECURSION times. + */ + if (depth > MAX_RECURSION) + return (-3); + + /* + * Check if we have a top record from cgetset(). + */ + if (depth == 0 && toprec != NULL && cgetmatch(toprec, name) == 0) { + size_t len = topreclen + BFRAG; + if ((record = malloc (len)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); + } + (void)strlcpy(record, toprec, len); + db_p = db_array; + rp = record + topreclen + 1; + r_end = rp + BFRAG; + goto tc_exp; + } + /* + * Allocate first chunk of memory. + */ + if ((record = malloc(BFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); + } + r_end = record + BFRAG; + foundit = 0; + /* + * Loop through database array until finding the record. + */ + + for (db_p = db_array; *db_p != NULL; db_p++) { + eof = 0; + + /* + * Open database if not already open. + */ + + if (fd >= 0) { + (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET); + } else { +#ifdef USE_DB + char pbuf[_POSIX_PATH_MAX]; + char *cbuf; + size_t clen; + int retval; + DB *capdbp; + + (void)snprintf(pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), "%s.db", *db_p); + if ((capdbp = dbopen(pbuf, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, 0)) + != NULL) { + free(record); + retval = cdbget(capdbp, &record, name); + if (retval < 0) { + /* no record available */ + (void)capdbp->close(capdbp); + return (retval); + } + /* save the data; close frees it */ + clen = strlen(record); + cbuf = malloc(clen + 1); + memmove(cbuf, record, clen + 1); + if (capdbp->close(capdbp) < 0) { + free(cbuf); + return (-2); + } + *len = clen; + *cap = cbuf; + return (retval); + } else +#endif + { + fd = open(*db_p, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + /* No error on unfound file. */ + continue; + } + myfd = 1; + } + } + /* + * Find the requested capability record ... + */ + { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + char *b_end, *bp, *cp; + int c, slash; + + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is always room for one more character in record. + * R_end always points just past end of record. + * Rp always points just past last character in record. + * B_end always points just past last character in buf. + * Bp always points at next character in buf. + * Cp remembers where the last colon was. + */ + b_end = buf; + bp = buf; + cp = 0; + slash = 0; + for (;;) { + + /* + * Read in a line implementing (\, newline) + * line continuation. + */ + rp = record; + for (;;) { + if (bp >= b_end) { + int n; + + n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (n <= 0) { + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + if (n < 0) { + free(record); + return (-2); + } else { + fd = -1; + eof = 1; + break; + } + } + b_end = buf+n; + bp = buf; + } + + c = *bp++; + if (c == '\n') { + if (slash) { + slash = 0; + rp--; + continue; + } else + break; + } + if (slash) { + slash = 0; + cp = 0; + } + if (c == ':') { + /* + * If the field was `empty' (i.e. + * contained only white space), back up + * to the colon (eliminating the + * field). + */ + if (cp) + rp = cp; + else + cp = rp; + } else if (c == '\\') { + slash = 1; + } else if (c != ' ' && c != '\t') { + /* + * Forget where the colon was, as this + * is not an empty field. + */ + cp = 0; + } + *rp++ = c; + + /* + * Enforce loop invariant: if no room + * left in record buffer, try to get + * some more. + */ + if (rp >= r_end) { + u_int pos; + size_t newsize; + + pos = rp - record; + newsize = r_end - record + BFRAG; + record = realloc(record, newsize); + if (record == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + return (-2); + } + r_end = record + newsize; + rp = record + pos; + } + } + /* Eliminate any white space after the last colon. */ + if (cp) + rp = cp + 1; + /* Loop invariant lets us do this. */ + *rp++ = '\0'; + + /* + * If encountered eof check next file. + */ + if (eof) + break; + + /* + * Toss blank lines and comments. + */ + if (*record == '\0' || *record == '#') + continue; + + /* + * See if this is the record we want ... + */ + if (cgetmatch(record, name) == 0) { + if (nfield == NULL || !nfcmp(nfield, record)) { + foundit = 1; + break; /* found it! */ + } + } + } + } + if (foundit) + break; + } + + if (!foundit) + return (-1); + + /* + * Got the capability record, but now we have to expand all tc=name + * references in it ... + */ + tc_exp: { + char *newicap, *s; + size_t ilen, newilen; + int diff, iret, tclen; + char *icap, *scan, *tc, *tcstart, *tcend; + + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is room for one more character in record. + * R_end points just past end of record. + * Rp points just past last character in record. + * Scan points at remainder of record that needs to be + * scanned for tc=name constructs. + */ + scan = record; + tc_not_resolved = 0; + for (;;) { + if ((tc = cgetcap(scan, "tc", '=')) == NULL) + break; + + /* + * Find end of tc=name and stomp on the trailing `:' + * (if present) so we can use it to call ourselves. + */ + s = tc; + for (;;) + if (*s == '\0') + break; + else + if (*s++ == ':') { + *(s - 1) = '\0'; + break; + } + tcstart = tc - 3; + tclen = s - tcstart; + tcend = s; + + iret = getent(&icap, &ilen, db_p, fd, tc, depth+1, + NULL); + newicap = icap; /* Put into a register. */ + newilen = ilen; + if (iret != 0) { + /* an error */ + if (iret < -1) { + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + free(record); + return (iret); + } + if (iret == 1) + tc_not_resolved = 1; + /* couldn't resolve tc */ + if (iret == -1) { + *(s - 1) = ':'; + scan = s - 1; + tc_not_resolved = 1; + continue; + + } + } + /* not interested in name field of tc'ed record */ + s = newicap; + for (;;) + if (*s == '\0') + break; + else + if (*s++ == ':') + break; + newilen -= s - newicap; + newicap = s; + + /* make sure interpolated record is `:'-terminated */ + s += newilen; + if (*(s-1) != ':') { + *s = ':'; /* overwrite NUL with : */ + newilen++; + } + + /* + * Make sure there's enough room to insert the + * new record. + */ + diff = newilen - tclen; + if (diff >= r_end - rp) { + u_int pos, tcpos, tcposend; + size_t newsize; + + pos = rp - record; + newsize = r_end - record + diff + BFRAG; + tcpos = tcstart - record; + tcposend = tcend - record; + record = realloc(record, newsize); + if (record == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + free(icap); + return (-2); + } + r_end = record + newsize; + rp = record + pos; + tcstart = record + tcpos; + tcend = record + tcposend; + } + + /* + * Insert tc'ed record into our record. + */ + s = tcstart + newilen; + memmove(s, tcend, (size_t)(rp - tcend)); + memmove(tcstart, newicap, newilen); + rp += diff; + free(icap); + + /* + * Start scan on `:' so next cgetcap works properly + * (cgetcap always skips first field). + */ + scan = s-1; + } + + } + /* + * Close file (if we opened it), give back any extra memory, and + * return capability, length and success. + */ + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + *len = rp - record - 1; /* don't count NUL */ + if (r_end > rp) + if ((record = + realloc(record, (size_t)(rp - record))) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); + } + + *cap = record; + if (tc_not_resolved) + return (1); + return (0); +} + +#ifdef USE_DB +static int +cdbget(DB *capdbp, char **bp, const char *name) +{ + DBT key; + DBT data; + + /* LINTED key is not modified */ + key.data = (char *)name; + key.size = strlen(name); + + for (;;) { + /* Get the reference. */ + switch(capdbp->get(capdbp, &key, &data, 0)) { + case -1: + return (-2); + case 1: + return (-1); + } + + /* If not an index to another record, leave. */ + if (((char *)data.data)[0] != SHADOW) + break; + + key.data = (char *)data.data + 1; + key.size = data.size - 1; + } + + *bp = (char *)data.data + 1; + return (((char *)(data.data))[0] == TCERR ? 1 : 0); +} +#endif /* USE_DB */ + +/* + * Cgetmatch will return 0 if name is one of the names of the capability + * record buf, -1 if not. + */ +int +cgetmatch(const char *buf, const char *name) +{ + const char *np, *bp; + + /* + * Start search at beginning of record. + */ + bp = buf; + for (;;) { + /* + * Try to match a record name. + */ + np = name; + for (;;) + if (*np == '\0') { + if (*bp == '|' || *bp == ':' || *bp == '\0') + return (0); + else + break; + } else + if (*bp++ != *np++) + break; + + /* + * Match failed, skip to next name in record. + */ + bp--; /* a '|' or ':' may have stopped the match */ + for (;;) + if (*bp == '\0' || *bp == ':') + return (-1); /* match failed totally */ + else + if (*bp++ == '|') + break; /* found next name */ + } +} + +#if 0 +int +cgetfirst(char **buf, char **db_array) +{ + (void)cgetclose(); + return (cgetnext(buf, db_array)); +} +#endif + +static FILE *pfp; +static int slash; +static char **dbp; + +int +cgetclose(void) +{ + if (pfp != NULL) { + (void)fclose(pfp); + pfp = NULL; + } + dbp = NULL; + gottoprec = 0; + slash = 0; + return(0); +} + +#if 0 +/* + * Cgetnext() gets either the first or next entry in the logical database + * specified by db_array. It returns 0 upon completion of the database, 1 + * upon returning an entry with more remaining, and -1 if an error occurs. + */ +int +cgetnext(char **bp, char **db_array) +{ + size_t len; + int status, done; + char *cp, *line, *rp, *np, buf[BSIZE], nbuf[BSIZE]; + size_t dummy; + + if (dbp == NULL) + dbp = db_array; + + if (pfp == NULL && (pfp = fopen(*dbp, "r")) == NULL) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } + for(;;) { + if (toprec && !gottoprec) { + gottoprec = 1; + line = toprec; + } else { + line = fgetln(pfp, &len); + if (line == NULL && pfp) { + if (ferror(pfp)) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } else { + (void)fclose(pfp); + pfp = NULL; + if (*++dbp == NULL) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (0); + } else if ((pfp = + fopen(*dbp, "r")) == NULL) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } else + continue; + } + } else + line[len - 1] = '\0'; + if (len == 1) { + slash = 0; + continue; + } + if (isspace((unsigned char)*line) || + *line == ':' || *line == '#' || slash) { + if (line[len - 2] == '\\') + slash = 1; + else + slash = 0; + continue; + } + if (line[len - 2] == '\\') + slash = 1; + else + slash = 0; + } + + + /* + * Line points to a name line. + */ + done = 0; + np = nbuf; + for (;;) { + for (cp = line; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { + if (*cp == ':') { + *np++ = ':'; + done = 1; + break; + } + if (*cp == '\\') + break; + *np++ = *cp; + } + if (done) { + *np = '\0'; + break; + } else { /* name field extends beyond the line */ + line = fgetln(pfp, &len); + if (line == NULL && pfp) { + if (ferror(pfp)) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } + (void)fclose(pfp); + pfp = NULL; + *np = '\0'; + break; + } else + line[len - 1] = '\0'; + } + } + rp = buf; + for(cp = nbuf; *cp != '\0'; cp++) + if (*cp == '|' || *cp == ':') + break; + else + *rp++ = *cp; + + *rp = '\0'; + /* + * XXX + * Last argument of getent here should be nbuf if we want true + * sequential access in the case of duplicates. + * With NULL, getent will return the first entry found + * rather than the duplicate entry record. This is a + * matter of semantics that should be resolved. + */ + status = getent(bp, &dummy, db_array, -1, buf, 0, NULL); + if (status == -2 || status == -3) + (void)cgetclose(); + + return (status + 1); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} +#endif + +/* + * Cgetstr retrieves the value of the string capability cap from the + * capability record pointed to by buf. A pointer to a decoded, NUL + * terminated, malloc'd copy of the string is returned in the char * + * pointed to by str. The length of the string not including the trailing + * NUL is returned on success, -1 if the requested string capability + * couldn't be found, -2 if a system error was encountered (storage + * allocation failure). + */ +int +cgetstr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str) +{ + u_int m_room; + const char *bp; + char *mp; + int len; + char *mem; + + /* + * Find string capability cap + */ + bp = cgetcap(buf, cap, '='); + if (bp == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * Conversion / storage allocation loop ... Allocate memory in + * chunks SFRAG in size. + */ + if ((mem = malloc(SFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); /* couldn't even allocate the first fragment */ + } + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem; + + while (*bp != ':' && *bp != '\0') { + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is always room for one more character in mem. + * Mp always points just past last character in mem. + * Bp always points at next character in buf. + */ + if (*bp == '^') { + bp++; + if (*bp == ':' || *bp == '\0') + break; /* drop unfinished escape */ + *mp++ = *bp++ & 037; + } else if (*bp == '\\') { + bp++; + if (*bp == ':' || *bp == '\0') + break; /* drop unfinished escape */ + if ('0' <= *bp && *bp <= '7') { + int n, i; + + n = 0; + i = 3; /* maximum of three octal digits */ + do { + n = n * 8 + (*bp++ - '0'); + } while (--i && '0' <= *bp && *bp <= '7'); + *mp++ = n; + } + else switch (*bp++) { + case 'b': case 'B': + *mp++ = '\b'; + break; + case 't': case 'T': + *mp++ = '\t'; + break; + case 'n': case 'N': + *mp++ = '\n'; + break; + case 'f': case 'F': + *mp++ = '\f'; + break; + case 'r': case 'R': + *mp++ = '\r'; + break; + case 'e': case 'E': + *mp++ = ESC; + break; + case 'c': case 'C': + *mp++ = ':'; + break; + default: + /* + * Catches '\', '^', and + * everything else. + */ + *mp++ = *(bp-1); + break; + } + } else + *mp++ = *bp++; + m_room--; + + /* + * Enforce loop invariant: if no room left in current + * buffer, try to get some more. + */ + if (m_room == 0) { + size_t size = mp - mem; + + if ((mem = realloc(mem, size + SFRAG)) == NULL) + return (-2); + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem + size; + } + } + *mp++ = '\0'; /* loop invariant let's us do this */ + m_room--; + len = mp - mem - 1; + + /* + * Give back any extra memory and return value and success. + */ + if (m_room != 0) + if ((mem = realloc(mem, (size_t)(mp - mem))) == NULL) + return (-2); + *str = mem; + return (len); +} + +/* + * Cgetustr retrieves the value of the string capability cap from the + * capability record pointed to by buf. The difference between cgetustr() + * and cgetstr() is that cgetustr does not decode escapes but rather treats + * all characters literally. A pointer to a NUL terminated malloc'd + * copy of the string is returned in the char pointed to by str. The + * length of the string not including the trailing NUL is returned on success, + * -1 if the requested string capability couldn't be found, -2 if a system + * error was encountered (storage allocation failure). + */ +int +cgetustr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str) +{ + u_int m_room; + const char *bp; + char *mp; + int len; + char *mem; + + /* + * Find string capability cap + */ + if ((bp = cgetcap(buf, cap, '=')) == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * Conversion / storage allocation loop ... Allocate memory in + * chunks SFRAG in size. + */ + if ((mem = malloc(SFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); /* couldn't even allocate the first fragment */ + } + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem; + + while (*bp != ':' && *bp != '\0') { + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is always room for one more character in mem. + * Mp always points just past last character in mem. + * Bp always points at next character in buf. + */ + *mp++ = *bp++; + m_room--; + + /* + * Enforce loop invariant: if no room left in current + * buffer, try to get some more. + */ + if (m_room == 0) { + size_t size = mp - mem; + + if ((mem = realloc(mem, size + SFRAG)) == NULL) + return (-2); + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem + size; + } + } + *mp++ = '\0'; /* loop invariant let's us do this */ + m_room--; + len = mp - mem - 1; + + /* + * Give back any extra memory and return value and success. + */ + if (m_room != 0) + if ((mem = realloc(mem, (size_t)(mp - mem))) == NULL) + return (-2); + *str = mem; + return (len); +} + +/* + * Cgetnum retrieves the value of the numeric capability cap from the + * capability record pointed to by buf. The numeric value is returned in + * the long pointed to by num. 0 is returned on success, -1 if the requested + * numeric capability couldn't be found. + */ +int +cgetnum(char *buf, const char *cap, long *num) +{ + long n; + int base, digit; + const char *bp; + + /* + * Find numeric capability cap + */ + bp = cgetcap(buf, cap, '#'); + if (bp == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * Look at value and determine numeric base: + * 0x... or 0X... hexadecimal, + * else 0... octal, + * else decimal. + */ + if (*bp == '0') { + bp++; + if (*bp == 'x' || *bp == 'X') { + bp++; + base = 16; + } else + base = 8; + } else + base = 10; + + /* + * Conversion loop ... + */ + n = 0; + for (;;) { + if ('0' <= *bp && *bp <= '9') + digit = *bp - '0'; + else if ('a' <= *bp && *bp <= 'f') + digit = 10 + *bp - 'a'; + else if ('A' <= *bp && *bp <= 'F') + digit = 10 + *bp - 'A'; + else + break; + + if (digit >= base) + break; + + n = n * base + digit; + bp++; + } + + /* + * Return value and success. + */ + *num = n; + return (0); +} + + +/* + * Compare name field of record. + */ +static int +nfcmp(char *nf, char *rec) +{ + char *cp, tmp; + int ret; + + for (cp = rec; *cp != ':'; cp++) + ; + + tmp = *(cp + 1); + *(cp + 1) = '\0'; + ret = strcmp(nf, rec); + *(cp + 1) = tmp; + + return (ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getcwd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getcwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1f2610021 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getcwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getcwd.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +char* +getcwd(char *path, size_t size) +{ + char xxx[MaxPathLen]; + char *ret; + ret = getwd(xxx); + if(ret) + strlcpy(path, xxx, size); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getdtablesize.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getdtablesize.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..183e8ff745 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getdtablesize.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getdtablesize.c,v 1.11 2001/06/20 00:00:38 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H +#include +#endif + +int getdtablesize(void) +{ + int files = -1; +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_OPEN_MAX) + files = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX); +#else /* !defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + struct rlimit res; + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &res) == 0) + files = res.rlim_cur; +#else /* !definded(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) */ +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL) && defined(CTL_KERN) && defined(KERN_MAXFILES) + int mib[2]; + size_t len; + + mib[0] = CTL_KERN; + mib[1] = KERN_MAXFILES; + len = sizeof(files); + sysctl(&mib, 2, &files, sizeof(files), NULL, 0); +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYSCTL) */ +#endif /* !definded(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) */ +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) */ + +#ifdef OPEN_MAX + if (files < 0) + files = OPEN_MAX; +#endif + +#ifdef NOFILE + if (files < 0) + files = NOFILE; +#endif + + return files; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getegid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getegid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6eab857e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getegid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETEGID + +RCSID("$Id: getegid.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int getegid(void) +{ + return getgid(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/geteuid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/geteuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4bdf531bf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/geteuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETEUID + +RCSID("$Id: geteuid.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int geteuid(void) +{ + return getuid(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getgid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getgid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2ca01a699 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getgid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETGID + +RCSID("$Id: getgid.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int getgid(void) +{ + return 17; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gethostname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gethostname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..753ba9f1b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gethostname.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETHOSTNAME + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H +#include +#endif + +/* + * Return the local host's name in "name", up to "namelen" characters. + * "name" will be null-terminated if "namelen" is big enough. + * The return code is 0 on success, -1 on failure. (The calling + * interface is identical to gethostname(2).) + */ + +int +gethostname(char *name, int namelen) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_UNAME) + { + struct utsname utsname; + int ret; + + ret = uname (&utsname); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + strlcpy (name, utsname.nodename, namelen); + return 0; + } +#else + strlcpy (name, "some.random.host", namelen); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#endif /* GETHOSTNAME */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getifaddrs.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getifaddrs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8c53f83f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getifaddrs.c @@ -0,0 +1,1182 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getifaddrs.c,v 1.9 2002/09/05 03:36:23 assar Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifdef __osf__ +/* hate */ +struct rtentry; +struct mbuf; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H */ + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_VAR_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_NETINET_IN6_VAR_H */ + +#include + +#ifdef AF_NETLINK + +/* + * The linux - AF_NETLINK version of getifaddrs - from Usagi. + * Linux does not return v6 addresses from SIOCGIFCONF. + */ + +/* $USAGI: ifaddrs.c,v 1.18 2002/03/06 01:50:46 yoshfuji Exp $ */ + +/************************************************************************** + * ifaddrs.c + * Copyright (C)2000 Hideaki YOSHIFUJI, All Rights Reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the author nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include /* the L2 protocols */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define __set_errno(e) (errno = (e)) +#define __close(fd) (close(fd)) +#undef ifa_broadaddr +#define ifa_broadaddr ifa_dstaddr +#define IFA_NETMASK + +/* ====================================================================== */ +struct nlmsg_list{ + struct nlmsg_list *nlm_next; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + int size; + time_t seq; +}; + +struct rtmaddr_ifamap { + void *address; + void *local; +#ifdef IFA_NETMASK + void *netmask; +#endif + void *broadcast; +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_IFA_ANYCAST + void *anycast; +#endif + int address_len; + int local_len; +#ifdef IFA_NETMASK + int netmask_len; +#endif + int broadcast_len; +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_IFA_ANYCAST + int anycast_len; +#endif +}; + +/* ====================================================================== */ +static size_t +ifa_sa_len(sa_family_t family, int len) +{ + size_t size; + switch(family){ + case AF_INET: + size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + break; + case AF_INET6: + size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + break; + case AF_PACKET: + size = (size_t)(((struct sockaddr_ll *)NULL)->sll_addr) + len; + if (size < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)) + size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll); + break; + default: + size = (size_t)(((struct sockaddr *)NULL)->sa_data) + len; + if (size < sizeof(struct sockaddr)) + size = sizeof(struct sockaddr); + } + return size; +} + +static void +ifa_make_sockaddr(sa_family_t family, + struct sockaddr *sa, + void *p, size_t len, + uint32_t scope, uint32_t scopeid) +{ + if (sa == NULL) return; + switch(family){ + case AF_INET: + memcpy(&((struct sockaddr_in*)sa)->sin_addr, (char *)p, len); + break; + case AF_INET6: + memcpy(&((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_addr, (char *)p, len); + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(p) || + IN6_IS_ADDR_MC_LINKLOCAL(p)){ + ((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_scope_id = scopeid; + } + break; + case AF_PACKET: + memcpy(((struct sockaddr_ll*)sa)->sll_addr, (char *)p, len); + ((struct sockaddr_ll*)sa)->sll_halen = len; + break; + default: + memcpy(sa->sa_data, p, len); /*XXX*/ + break; + } + sa->sa_family = family; +#ifdef HAVE_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + sa->sa_len = ifa_sa_len(family, len); +#endif +} + +#ifndef IFA_NETMASK +static struct sockaddr * +ifa_make_sockaddr_mask(sa_family_t family, + struct sockaddr *sa, + uint32_t prefixlen) +{ + int i; + char *p = NULL, c; + uint32_t max_prefixlen = 0; + + if (sa == NULL) return NULL; + switch(family){ + case AF_INET: + memset(&((struct sockaddr_in*)sa)->sin_addr, 0, sizeof(((struct sockaddr_in*)sa)->sin_addr)); + p = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in*)sa)->sin_addr; + max_prefixlen = 32; + break; + case AF_INET6: + memset(&((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_addr, 0, sizeof(((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_addr)); + p = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_addr; +#if 0 /* XXX: fill scope-id? */ + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(p) || + IN6_IS_ADDR_MC_LINKLOCAL(p)){ + ((struct sockaddr_in6*)sa)->sin6_scope_id = scopeid; + } +#endif + max_prefixlen = 128; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + sa->sa_family = family; +#ifdef HAVE_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + sa->sa_len = ifa_sa_len(family, len); +#endif + if (p){ + if (prefixlen > max_prefixlen) + prefixlen = max_prefixlen; + for (i=0; i<(prefixlen / 8); i++) + *p++ = 0xff; + c = 0xff; + c <<= (8 - (prefixlen % 8)); + *p = c; + } + return sa; +} +#endif + +/* ====================================================================== */ +static int +nl_sendreq(int sd, int request, int flags, int *seq) +{ + char reqbuf[NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)) + + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtgenmsg))]; + struct sockaddr_nl nladdr; + struct nlmsghdr *req_hdr; + struct rtgenmsg *req_msg; + time_t t = time(NULL); + + if (seq) *seq = t; + memset(&reqbuf, 0, sizeof(reqbuf)); + req_hdr = (struct nlmsghdr *)reqbuf; + req_msg = (struct rtgenmsg *)NLMSG_DATA(req_hdr); + req_hdr->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*req_msg)); + req_hdr->nlmsg_type = request; + req_hdr->nlmsg_flags = flags | NLM_F_REQUEST; + req_hdr->nlmsg_pid = 0; + req_hdr->nlmsg_seq = t; + req_msg->rtgen_family = AF_UNSPEC; + memset(&nladdr, 0, sizeof(nladdr)); + nladdr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK; + return (sendto(sd, (void *)req_hdr, req_hdr->nlmsg_len, 0, + (struct sockaddr *)&nladdr, sizeof(nladdr))); +} + +static int +nl_recvmsg(int sd, int request, int seq, + void *buf, size_t buflen, + int *flags) +{ + struct msghdr msg; + struct iovec iov = { buf, buflen }; + struct sockaddr_nl nladdr; + int read_len; + + for (;;){ + msg.msg_name = (void *)&nladdr; + msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(nladdr); + msg.msg_iov = &iov; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + msg.msg_control = NULL; + msg.msg_controllen = 0; + msg.msg_flags = 0; + read_len = recvmsg(sd, &msg, 0); + if ((read_len < 0 && errno == EINTR) || (msg.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)) + continue; + if (flags) *flags = msg.msg_flags; + break; + } + return read_len; +} + +static int +nl_getmsg(int sd, int request, int seq, + struct nlmsghdr **nlhp, + int *done) +{ + struct nlmsghdr *nh; + size_t bufsize = 65536, lastbufsize = 0; + void *buff = NULL; + int result = 0, read_size; + int msg_flags; + pid_t pid = getpid(); + for (;;){ + void *newbuff = realloc(buff, bufsize); + if (newbuff == NULL || bufsize < lastbufsize) { + result = -1; + break; + } + buff = newbuff; + result = read_size = nl_recvmsg(sd, request, seq, buff, bufsize, &msg_flags); + if (read_size < 0 || (msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)){ + lastbufsize = bufsize; + bufsize *= 2; + continue; + } + if (read_size == 0) break; + nh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buff; + for (nh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buff; + NLMSG_OK(nh, read_size); + nh = (struct nlmsghdr *)NLMSG_NEXT(nh, read_size)){ + if (nh->nlmsg_pid != pid || + nh->nlmsg_seq != seq) + continue; + if (nh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE){ + (*done)++; + break; /* ok */ + } + if (nh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR){ + struct nlmsgerr *nlerr = (struct nlmsgerr *)NLMSG_DATA(nh); + result = -1; + if (nh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct nlmsgerr))) + __set_errno(EIO); + else + __set_errno(-nlerr->error); + break; + } + } + break; + } + if (result < 0) + if (buff){ + int saved_errno = errno; + free(buff); + __set_errno(saved_errno); + } + *nlhp = (struct nlmsghdr *)buff; + return result; +} + +static int +nl_getlist(int sd, int seq, + int request, + struct nlmsg_list **nlm_list, + struct nlmsg_list **nlm_end) +{ + struct nlmsghdr *nlh = NULL; + int status; + int done = 0; + + status = nl_sendreq(sd, request, NLM_F_ROOT|NLM_F_MATCH, &seq); + if (status < 0) + return status; + if (seq == 0) + seq = (int)time(NULL); + while(!done){ + status = nl_getmsg(sd, request, seq, &nlh, &done); + if (status < 0) + return status; + if (nlh){ + struct nlmsg_list *nlm_next = (struct nlmsg_list *)malloc(sizeof(struct nlmsg_list)); + if (nlm_next == NULL){ + int saved_errno = errno; + free(nlh); + __set_errno(saved_errno); + status = -1; + } else { + nlm_next->nlm_next = NULL; + nlm_next->nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)nlh; + nlm_next->size = status; + nlm_next->seq = seq; + if (*nlm_list == NULL){ + *nlm_list = nlm_next; + *nlm_end = nlm_next; + } else { + (*nlm_end)->nlm_next = nlm_next; + *nlm_end = nlm_next; + } + } + } + } + return status >= 0 ? seq : status; +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +static void +free_nlmsglist(struct nlmsg_list *nlm0) +{ + struct nlmsg_list *nlm; + int saved_errno; + if (!nlm0) + return; + saved_errno = errno; + for (nlm=nlm0; nlm; nlm=nlm->nlm_next){ + if (nlm->nlh) + free(nlm->nlh); + } + free(nlm0); + __set_errno(saved_errno); +} + +static void +free_data(void *data, void *ifdata) +{ + int saved_errno = errno; + if (data != NULL) free(data); + if (ifdata != NULL) free(ifdata); + __set_errno(saved_errno); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +static void +nl_close(int sd) +{ + int saved_errno = errno; + if (sd >= 0) __close(sd); + __set_errno(saved_errno); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +static int +nl_open(void) +{ + struct sockaddr_nl nladdr; + int sd; + + sd = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_ROUTE); + if (sd < 0) return -1; + memset(&nladdr, 0, sizeof(nladdr)); + nladdr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK; + if (bind(sd, (struct sockaddr*)&nladdr, sizeof(nladdr)) < 0){ + nl_close(sd); + return -1; + } + return sd; +} + +/* ====================================================================== */ +int getifaddrs(struct ifaddrs **ifap) +{ + int sd; + struct nlmsg_list *nlmsg_list, *nlmsg_end, *nlm; + /* - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - */ + int icnt; + size_t dlen, xlen, nlen; + uint32_t max_ifindex = 0; + + pid_t pid = getpid(); + int seq; + int result; + int build ; /* 0 or 1 */ + +/* ---------------------------------- */ + /* initialize */ + icnt = dlen = xlen = nlen = 0; + nlmsg_list = nlmsg_end = NULL; + + if (ifap) + *ifap = NULL; + +/* ---------------------------------- */ + /* open socket and bind */ + sd = nl_open(); + if (sd < 0) + return -1; + +/* ---------------------------------- */ + /* gather info */ + if ((seq = nl_getlist(sd, 0, RTM_GETLINK, + &nlmsg_list, &nlmsg_end)) < 0){ + free_nlmsglist(nlmsg_list); + nl_close(sd); + return -1; + } + if ((seq = nl_getlist(sd, seq+1, RTM_GETADDR, + &nlmsg_list, &nlmsg_end)) < 0){ + free_nlmsglist(nlmsg_list); + nl_close(sd); + return -1; + } + +/* ---------------------------------- */ + /* Estimate size of result buffer and fill it */ + for (build=0; build<=1; build++){ + struct ifaddrs *ifl = NULL, *ifa = NULL; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh, *nlh0; + char *data = NULL, *xdata = NULL; + void *ifdata = NULL; + char *ifname = NULL, **iflist = NULL; + uint16_t *ifflist = NULL; + struct rtmaddr_ifamap ifamap; + + if (build){ + data = calloc(1, + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ifaddrs[icnt])) + + dlen + xlen + nlen); + ifa = (struct ifaddrs *)data; + ifdata = calloc(1, + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(char *[max_ifindex+1])) + + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(uint16_t [max_ifindex+1]))); + if (ifap != NULL) + *ifap = (ifdata != NULL) ? ifa : NULL; + else{ + free_data(data, ifdata); + result = 0; + break; + } + if (data == NULL || ifdata == NULL){ + free_data(data, ifdata); + result = -1; + break; + } + ifl = NULL; + data += NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ifaddrs)) * icnt; + xdata = data + dlen; + ifname = xdata + xlen; + iflist = ifdata; + ifflist = (uint16_t *)(((char *)iflist) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(char *[max_ifindex+1]))); + } + + for (nlm=nlmsg_list; nlm; nlm=nlm->nlm_next){ + int nlmlen = nlm->size; + if (!(nlh0 = nlm->nlh)) + continue; + for (nlh = nlh0; + NLMSG_OK(nlh, nlmlen); + nlh=NLMSG_NEXT(nlh,nlmlen)){ + struct ifinfomsg *ifim = NULL; + struct ifaddrmsg *ifam = NULL; + struct rtattr *rta; + + size_t nlm_struct_size = 0; + sa_family_t nlm_family = 0; + uint32_t nlm_scope = 0, nlm_index = 0; + size_t sockaddr_size = 0; + uint32_t nlm_prefixlen = 0; + size_t rtasize; + + memset(&ifamap, 0, sizeof(ifamap)); + + /* check if the message is what we want */ + if (nlh->nlmsg_pid != pid || + nlh->nlmsg_seq != nlm->seq) + continue; + if (nlh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE){ + break; /* ok */ + } + switch (nlh->nlmsg_type){ + case RTM_NEWLINK: + ifim = (struct ifinfomsg *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + nlm_struct_size = sizeof(*ifim); + nlm_family = ifim->ifi_family; + nlm_scope = 0; + nlm_index = ifim->ifi_index; + nlm_prefixlen = 0; + if (build) + ifflist[nlm_index] = ifa->ifa_flags = ifim->ifi_flags; + break; + case RTM_NEWADDR: + ifam = (struct ifaddrmsg *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + nlm_struct_size = sizeof(*ifam); + nlm_family = ifam->ifa_family; + nlm_scope = ifam->ifa_scope; + nlm_index = ifam->ifa_index; + nlm_prefixlen = ifam->ifa_prefixlen; + if (build) + ifa->ifa_flags = ifflist[nlm_index]; + break; + default: + continue; + } + + if (!build){ + if (max_ifindex < nlm_index) + max_ifindex = nlm_index; + } else { + if (ifl != NULL) + ifl->ifa_next = ifa; + } + + rtasize = NLMSG_PAYLOAD(nlh, nlmlen) - NLMSG_ALIGN(nlm_struct_size); + for (rta = (struct rtattr *)(((char *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh)) + NLMSG_ALIGN(nlm_struct_size)); + RTA_OK(rta, rtasize); + rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, rtasize)){ + struct sockaddr **sap = NULL; + void *rtadata = RTA_DATA(rta); + size_t rtapayload = RTA_PAYLOAD(rta); + socklen_t sa_len; + + switch(nlh->nlmsg_type){ + case RTM_NEWLINK: + switch(rta->rta_type){ + case IFLA_ADDRESS: + case IFLA_BROADCAST: + if (build){ + sap = (rta->rta_type == IFLA_ADDRESS) ? &ifa->ifa_addr : &ifa->ifa_broadaddr; + *sap = (struct sockaddr *)data; + } + sa_len = ifa_sa_len(AF_PACKET, rtapayload); + if (rta->rta_type == IFLA_ADDRESS) + sockaddr_size = NLMSG_ALIGN(sa_len); + if (!build){ + dlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(sa_len); + } else { + memset(*sap, 0, sa_len); + ifa_make_sockaddr(AF_PACKET, *sap, rtadata,rtapayload, 0,0); + ((struct sockaddr_ll *)*sap)->sll_ifindex = nlm_index; + ((struct sockaddr_ll *)*sap)->sll_hatype = ifim->ifi_type; + data += NLMSG_ALIGN(sa_len); + } + break; + case IFLA_IFNAME:/* Name of Interface */ + if (!build) + nlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(rtapayload + 1); + else{ + ifa->ifa_name = ifname; + if (iflist[nlm_index] == NULL) + iflist[nlm_index] = ifa->ifa_name; + strncpy(ifa->ifa_name, rtadata, rtapayload); + ifa->ifa_name[rtapayload] = '\0'; + ifname += NLMSG_ALIGN(rtapayload + 1); + } + break; + case IFLA_STATS:/* Statistics of Interface */ + if (!build) + xlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(rtapayload); + else{ + ifa->ifa_data = xdata; + memcpy(ifa->ifa_data, rtadata, rtapayload); + xdata += NLMSG_ALIGN(rtapayload); + } + break; + case IFLA_UNSPEC: + break; + case IFLA_MTU: + break; + case IFLA_LINK: + break; + case IFLA_QDISC: + break; + default: + } + break; + case RTM_NEWADDR: + if (nlm_family == AF_PACKET) break; + switch(rta->rta_type){ + case IFA_ADDRESS: + ifamap.address = rtadata; + ifamap.address_len = rtapayload; + break; + case IFA_LOCAL: + ifamap.local = rtadata; + ifamap.local_len = rtapayload; + break; + case IFA_BROADCAST: + ifamap.broadcast = rtadata; + ifamap.broadcast_len = rtapayload; + break; +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_IFA_ANYCAST + case IFA_ANYCAST: + ifamap.anycast = rtadata; + ifamap.anycast_len = rtapayload; + break; +#endif + case IFA_LABEL: + if (!build) + nlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(rtapayload + 1); + else{ + ifa->ifa_name = ifname; + if (iflist[nlm_index] == NULL) + iflist[nlm_index] = ifname; + strncpy(ifa->ifa_name, rtadata, rtapayload); + ifa->ifa_name[rtapayload] = '\0'; + ifname += NLMSG_ALIGN(rtapayload + 1); + } + break; + case IFA_UNSPEC: + break; + case IFA_CACHEINFO: + break; + default: + } + } + } + if (nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_NEWADDR && + nlm_family != AF_PACKET) { + if (!ifamap.local) { + ifamap.local = ifamap.address; + ifamap.local_len = ifamap.address_len; + } + if (!ifamap.address) { + ifamap.address = ifamap.local; + ifamap.address_len = ifamap.local_len; + } + if (ifamap.address_len != ifamap.local_len || + (ifamap.address != NULL && + memcmp(ifamap.address, ifamap.local, ifamap.address_len))) { + /* p2p; address is peer and local is ours */ + ifamap.broadcast = ifamap.address; + ifamap.broadcast_len = ifamap.address_len; + ifamap.address = ifamap.local; + ifamap.address_len = ifamap.local_len; + } + if (ifamap.address) { +#ifndef IFA_NETMASK + sockaddr_size = NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family,ifamap.address_len)); +#endif + if (!build) + dlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family,ifamap.address_len)); + else { + ifa->ifa_addr = (struct sockaddr *)data; + ifa_make_sockaddr(nlm_family, ifa->ifa_addr, ifamap.address, ifamap.address_len, + nlm_scope, nlm_index); + data += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family, ifamap.address_len)); + } + } +#ifdef IFA_NETMASK + if (ifamap.netmask) { + if (!build) + dlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family,ifamap.netmask_len)); + else { + ifa->ifa_netmask = (struct sockaddr *)data; + ifa_make_sockaddr(nlm_family, ifa->ifa_netmask, ifamap.netmask, ifamap.netmask_len, + nlm_scope, nlm_index); + data += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family, ifamap.netmask_len)); + } + } +#endif + if (ifamap.broadcast) { + if (!build) + dlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family,ifamap.broadcast_len)); + else { + ifa->ifa_broadaddr = (struct sockaddr *)data; + ifa_make_sockaddr(nlm_family, ifa->ifa_broadaddr, ifamap.broadcast, ifamap.broadcast_len, + nlm_scope, nlm_index); + data += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family, ifamap.broadcast_len)); + } + } +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_IFA_ANYCAST + if (ifamap.anycast) { + if (!build) + dlen += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family,ifamap.anycast_len)); + else { + ifa->ifa_anycast = (struct sockaddr *)data; + ifa_make_sockaddr(nlm_family, ifa->ifa_anyaddr, ifamap.anycast, ifamap.anycast_len, + nlm_scope, nlm_index); + data += NLMSG_ALIGN(ifa_sa_len(nlm_family, ifamap.anycast_len)); + } + } +#endif + } + if (!build){ +#ifndef IFA_NETMASK + dlen += sockaddr_size; +#endif + icnt++; + } else { + if (ifa->ifa_name == NULL) + ifa->ifa_name = iflist[nlm_index]; +#ifndef IFA_NETMASK + if (ifa->ifa_addr && + ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC && + ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_PACKET){ + ifa->ifa_netmask = (struct sockaddr *)data; + ifa_make_sockaddr_mask(ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family, ifa->ifa_netmask, nlm_prefixlen); + } + data += sockaddr_size; +#endif + ifl = ifa++; + } + } + } + if (!build){ + if (icnt == 0 && (dlen + nlen + xlen == 0)){ + if (ifap != NULL) + *ifap = NULL; + break; /* cannot found any addresses */ + } + } + else + free_data(NULL, ifdata); + } + +/* ---------------------------------- */ + /* Finalize */ + free_nlmsglist(nlmsg_list); + nl_close(sd); + return 0; +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +void +freeifaddrs(struct ifaddrs *ifa) +{ + free(ifa); +} + + +#else /* !AF_NETLINK */ + +/* + * The generic SIOCGIFCONF version. + */ + +static int +getifaddrs2(struct ifaddrs **ifap, + int af, int siocgifconf, int siocgifflags, + size_t ifreq_sz) +{ + int ret; + int fd; + size_t buf_size; + char *buf; + struct ifconf ifconf; + char *p; + size_t sz; + struct sockaddr sa_zero; + struct ifreq *ifr; + struct ifaddrs *start = NULL, **end = &start; + + buf = NULL; + + memset (&sa_zero, 0, sizeof(sa_zero)); + fd = socket(af, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + + buf_size = 8192; + for (;;) { + buf = calloc(1, buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto error_out; + } + ifconf.ifc_len = buf_size; + ifconf.ifc_buf = buf; + + /* + * Solaris returns EINVAL when the buffer is too small. + */ + if (ioctl (fd, siocgifconf, &ifconf) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) { + ret = errno; + goto error_out; + } + /* + * Can the difference between a full and a overfull buf + * be determined? + */ + + if (ifconf.ifc_len < buf_size) + break; + free (buf); + buf_size *= 2; + } + + for (p = ifconf.ifc_buf; + p < ifconf.ifc_buf + ifconf.ifc_len; + p += sz) { + struct ifreq ifreq; + struct sockaddr *sa; + size_t salen; + + ifr = (struct ifreq *)p; + sa = &ifr->ifr_addr; + + sz = ifreq_sz; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + salen = sa->sa_len; + sz = max(sz, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name) + sa->sa_len); +#endif +#ifdef SA_LEN + salen = SA_LEN(sa); + sz = max(sz, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name) + SA_LEN(sa)); +#endif + memset (&ifreq, 0, sizeof(ifreq)); + memcpy (ifreq.ifr_name, ifr->ifr_name, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name)); + + if (ioctl(fd, siocgifflags, &ifreq) < 0) { + ret = errno; + goto error_out; + } + + *end = malloc(sizeof(**end)); + if (*end == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto error_out; + } + + (*end)->ifa_next = NULL; + (*end)->ifa_name = strdup(ifr->ifr_name); + (*end)->ifa_flags = ifreq.ifr_flags; + (*end)->ifa_addr = malloc(salen); + memcpy((*end)->ifa_addr, sa, salen); + (*end)->ifa_netmask = NULL; + +#if 0 + /* fix these when we actually need them */ + if(ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_BROADCAST) { + (*end)->ifa_broadaddr = malloc(sizeof(ifr->ifr_broadaddr)); + memcpy((*end)->ifa_broadaddr, &ifr->ifr_broadaddr, + sizeof(ifr->ifr_broadaddr)); + } else if(ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) { + (*end)->ifa_dstaddr = malloc(sizeof(ifr->ifr_dstaddr)); + memcpy((*end)->ifa_dstaddr, &ifr->ifr_dstaddr, + sizeof(ifr->ifr_dstaddr)); + } else + (*end)->ifa_dstaddr = NULL; +#else + (*end)->ifa_dstaddr = NULL; +#endif + + (*end)->ifa_data = NULL; + + end = &(*end)->ifa_next; + + } + *ifap = start; + close(fd); + free(buf); + return 0; + error_out: + freeifaddrs(start); + close(fd); + free(buf); + errno = ret; + return -1; +} + +#if defined(HAVE_IPV6) && defined(SIOCGLIFCONF) && defined(SIOCGLIFFLAGS) +static int +getlifaddrs2(struct ifaddrs **ifap, + int af, int siocgifconf, int siocgifflags, + size_t ifreq_sz) +{ + int ret; + int fd; + size_t buf_size; + char *buf; + struct lifconf ifconf; + char *p; + size_t sz; + struct sockaddr sa_zero; + struct lifreq *ifr; + struct ifaddrs *start = NULL, **end = &start; + + buf = NULL; + + memset (&sa_zero, 0, sizeof(sa_zero)); + fd = socket(af, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + + buf_size = 8192; + for (;;) { + buf = calloc(1, buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto error_out; + } + ifconf.lifc_family = AF_UNSPEC; + ifconf.lifc_flags = 0; + ifconf.lifc_len = buf_size; + ifconf.lifc_buf = buf; + + /* + * Solaris returns EINVAL when the buffer is too small. + */ + if (ioctl (fd, siocgifconf, &ifconf) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) { + ret = errno; + goto error_out; + } + /* + * Can the difference between a full and a overfull buf + * be determined? + */ + + if (ifconf.lifc_len < buf_size) + break; + free (buf); + buf_size *= 2; + } + + for (p = ifconf.lifc_buf; + p < ifconf.lifc_buf + ifconf.lifc_len; + p += sz) { + struct lifreq ifreq; + struct sockaddr_storage *sa; + size_t salen; + + ifr = (struct lifreq *)p; + sa = &ifr->lifr_addr; + + sz = ifreq_sz; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + salen = sa->sa_len; + sz = max(sz, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name) + sa->sa_len); +#endif +#ifdef SA_LEN + salen = SA_LEN(sa); + sz = max(sz, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name) + SA_LEN(sa)); +#endif + memset (&ifreq, 0, sizeof(ifreq)); + memcpy (ifreq.lifr_name, ifr->lifr_name, sizeof(ifr->lifr_name)); + + if (ioctl(fd, siocgifflags, &ifreq) < 0) { + ret = errno; + goto error_out; + } + + *end = malloc(sizeof(**end)); + + (*end)->ifa_next = NULL; + (*end)->ifa_name = strdup(ifr->lifr_name); + (*end)->ifa_flags = ifreq.lifr_flags; + (*end)->ifa_addr = malloc(salen); + memcpy((*end)->ifa_addr, sa, salen); + (*end)->ifa_netmask = NULL; + +#if 0 + /* fix these when we actually need them */ + if(ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_BROADCAST) { + (*end)->ifa_broadaddr = malloc(sizeof(ifr->ifr_broadaddr)); + memcpy((*end)->ifa_broadaddr, &ifr->ifr_broadaddr, + sizeof(ifr->ifr_broadaddr)); + } else if(ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) { + (*end)->ifa_dstaddr = malloc(sizeof(ifr->ifr_dstaddr)); + memcpy((*end)->ifa_dstaddr, &ifr->ifr_dstaddr, + sizeof(ifr->ifr_dstaddr)); + } else + (*end)->ifa_dstaddr = NULL; +#else + (*end)->ifa_dstaddr = NULL; +#endif + + (*end)->ifa_data = NULL; + + end = &(*end)->ifa_next; + + } + *ifap = start; + close(fd); + free(buf); + return 0; + error_out: + freeifaddrs(start); + close(fd); + free(buf); + errno = ret; + return -1; +} +#endif /* defined(HAVE_IPV6) && defined(SIOCGLIFCONF) && defined(SIOCGLIFFLAGS) */ + +int +getifaddrs(struct ifaddrs **ifap) +{ + int ret = -1; + errno = ENXIO; +#if defined(AF_INET6) && defined(SIOCGIF6CONF) && defined(SIOCGIF6FLAGS) + if (ret) + ret = getifaddrs2 (ifap, AF_INET6, SIOCGIF6CONF, SIOCGIF6FLAGS, + sizeof(struct in6_ifreq)); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_IPV6) && defined(SIOCGLIFCONF) && defined(SIOCGLIFFLAGS) + if (ret) + ret = getlifaddrs2 (ifap, AF_INET6, SIOCGLIFCONF, SIOCGLIFFLAGS, + sizeof(struct lifreq)); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_IPV6) && defined(SIOCGIFCONF) + if (ret) + ret = getifaddrs2 (ifap, AF_INET6, SIOCGIFCONF, SIOCGIFFLAGS, + sizeof(struct ifreq)); +#endif +#if defined(AF_INET) && defined(SIOCGIFCONF) && defined(SIOCGIFFLAGS) + if (ret) + ret = getifaddrs2 (ifap, AF_INET, SIOCGIFCONF, SIOCGIFFLAGS, + sizeof(struct ifreq)); +#endif + return ret; +} + +void +freeifaddrs(struct ifaddrs *ifp) +{ + struct ifaddrs *p, *q; + + for(p = ifp; p; ) { + free(p->ifa_name); + if(p->ifa_addr) + free(p->ifa_addr); + if(p->ifa_dstaddr) + free(p->ifa_dstaddr); + if(p->ifa_netmask) + free(p->ifa_netmask); + if(p->ifa_data) + free(p->ifa_data); + q = p; + p = p->ifa_next; + free(q); + } +} + +#endif /* !AF_NETLINK */ + +#ifdef TEST + +void +print_addr(const char *s, struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + int i; + printf(" %s=%d/", s, sa->sa_family); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + for(i = 0; i < sa->sa_len - ((long)sa->sa_data - (long)&sa->sa_family); i++) + printf("%02x", ((unsigned char*)sa->sa_data)[i]); +#else + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(sa->sa_data); i++) + printf("%02x", ((unsigned char*)sa->sa_data)[i]); +#endif + printf("\n"); +} + +void +print_ifaddrs(struct ifaddrs *x) +{ + struct ifaddrs *p; + + for(p = x; p; p = p->ifa_next) { + printf("%s\n", p->ifa_name); + printf(" flags=%x\n", p->ifa_flags); + if(p->ifa_addr) + print_addr("addr", p->ifa_addr); + if(p->ifa_dstaddr) + print_addr("dstaddr", p->ifa_dstaddr); + if(p->ifa_netmask) + print_addr("netmask", p->ifa_netmask); + printf(" %p\n", p->ifa_data); + } +} + +int +main() +{ + struct ifaddrs *a = NULL, *b; + getifaddrs2(&a, AF_INET, SIOCGIFCONF, SIOCGIFFLAGS, sizeof(struct ifreq)); + print_ifaddrs(a); + printf("---\n"); + getifaddrs(&b); + print_ifaddrs(b); + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getipnodebyaddr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getipnodebyaddr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f22aad7f73 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getipnodebyaddr.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getipnodebyaddr.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * lookup `src, len' (address family `af') in DNS and return a pointer + * to a malloced struct hostent or NULL. + */ + +struct hostent * +getipnodebyaddr (const void *src, size_t len, int af, int *error_num) +{ + struct hostent *tmp; + + tmp = gethostbyaddr (src, len, af); + if (tmp == NULL) { + switch (h_errno) { + case HOST_NOT_FOUND : + case TRY_AGAIN : + case NO_RECOVERY : + *error_num = h_errno; + break; + case NO_DATA : + *error_num = NO_ADDRESS; + break; + default : + *error_num = NO_RECOVERY; + break; + } + return NULL; + } + tmp = copyhostent (tmp); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_num = TRY_AGAIN; + return NULL; + } + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getipnodebyname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getipnodebyname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..576feef0ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getipnodebyname.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getipnodebyname.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRNO +static int h_errno = NO_RECOVERY; +#endif + +/* + * lookup `name' (address family `af') in DNS and return a pointer + * to a malloced struct hostent or NULL. + */ + +struct hostent * +getipnodebyname (const char *name, int af, int flags, int *error_num) +{ + struct hostent *tmp; + +#ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME2 + tmp = gethostbyname2 (name, af); +#else + if (af != AF_INET) { + *error_num = NO_ADDRESS; + return NULL; + } + tmp = gethostbyname (name); +#endif + if (tmp == NULL) { + switch (h_errno) { + case HOST_NOT_FOUND : + case TRY_AGAIN : + case NO_RECOVERY : + *error_num = h_errno; + break; + case NO_DATA : + *error_num = NO_ADDRESS; + break; + default : + *error_num = NO_RECOVERY; + break; + } + return NULL; + } + tmp = copyhostent (tmp); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_num = TRY_AGAIN; + return NULL; + } + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getnameinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getnameinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..44fcb04633 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getnameinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getnameinfo.c,v 1.4 2001/07/09 15:14:19 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +static int +doit (int af, + const void *addr, + size_t addrlen, + int port, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags) +{ + if (host != NULL) { + if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) { + if (inet_ntop (af, addr, host, hostlen) == NULL) + return EAI_SYSTEM; + } else { + struct hostent *he = gethostbyaddr (addr, + addrlen, + af); + if (he != NULL) { + strlcpy (host, hostent_find_fqdn(he), hostlen); + if (flags & NI_NOFQDN) { + char *dot = strchr (host, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) + *dot = '\0'; + } + } else if (flags & NI_NAMEREQD) { + return EAI_NONAME; + } else if (inet_ntop (af, addr, host, hostlen) == NULL) + return EAI_SYSTEM; + } + } + + if (serv != NULL) { + if (flags & NI_NUMERICSERV) { + snprintf (serv, servlen, "%u", ntohs(port)); + } else { + const char *proto = "tcp"; + struct servent *se; + + if (flags & NI_DGRAM) + proto = "udp"; + + se = getservbyport (port, proto); + if (se == NULL) { + snprintf (serv, servlen, "%u", ntohs(port)); + } else { + strlcpy (serv, se->s_name, servlen); + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + return doit (AF_INET6, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr), + sin6->sin6_port, + host, hostlen, + serv, servlen, + flags); + } +#endif + case AF_INET : { + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + return doit (AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(sin->sin_addr), + sin->sin_port, + host, hostlen, + serv, servlen, + flags); + } + default : + return EAI_FAMILY; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getnameinfo_verified.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getnameinfo_verified.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0145262986 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getnameinfo_verified.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getnameinfo_verified.c,v 1.6 2002/09/05 01:36:27 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * Try to obtain a verified name for the address in `sa, salen' (much + * similar to getnameinfo). + * Verified in this context means that forwards and backwards lookups + * in DNS are consistent. If that fails, return an error if the + * NI_NAMEREQD flag is set or return the numeric address as a string. + */ + +int +getnameinfo_verified(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags) +{ + int ret; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + char servbuf[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo hints; + + if (host == NULL) + return EAI_NONAME; + + if (serv == NULL) { + serv = servbuf; + servlen = sizeof(servbuf); + } + + ret = getnameinfo (sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, + flags | NI_NUMERICSERV); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + ret = getaddrinfo (host, serv, &hints, &ai); + if (ret) + goto fail; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if (a->ai_addrlen == salen + && memcmp (a->ai_addr, sa, salen) == 0) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 0; + } + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + fail: + if (flags & NI_NAMEREQD) + return EAI_NONAME; + ret = getnameinfo (sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, + flags | NI_NUMERICSERV | NI_NUMERICHOST); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getopt.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getopt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45fc350234 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)getopt.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#ifndef __STDC__ +#define const +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * get option letter from argument vector + */ +int opterr = 1, /* if error message should be printed */ + optind = 1, /* index into parent argv vector */ + optopt, /* character checked for validity */ + optreset; /* reset getopt */ +char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */ + +#define BADCH (int)'?' +#define BADARG (int)':' +#define EMSG "" + +int +getopt(nargc, nargv, ostr) + int nargc; + char * const *nargv; + const char *ostr; +{ + static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */ + char *oli; /* option letter list index */ + char *p; + + if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */ + optreset = 0; + if (optind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[optind]) != '-') { + place = EMSG; + return(-1); + } + if (place[1] && *++place == '-') { /* found "--" */ + ++optind; + place = EMSG; + return(-1); + } + } /* option letter okay? */ + if ((optopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' || + !(oli = strchr(ostr, optopt))) { + /* + * if the user didn't specify '-' as an option, + * assume it means -1 (EOF). + */ + if (optopt == (int)'-') + return(-1); + if (!*place) + ++optind; + if (opterr && *ostr != ':') { + if (!(p = strrchr(*nargv, '/'))) + p = *nargv; + else + ++p; + fprintf(stderr, "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", + p, optopt); + } + return(BADCH); + } + if (*++oli != ':') { /* don't need argument */ + optarg = NULL; + if (!*place) + ++optind; + } + else { /* need an argument */ + if (*place) /* no white space */ + optarg = place; + else if (nargc <= ++optind) { /* no arg */ + place = EMSG; + if (!(p = strrchr(*nargv, '/'))) + p = *nargv; + else + ++p; + if (*ostr == ':') + return(BADARG); + if (opterr) + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: option requires an argument -- %c\n", + p, optopt); + return(BADCH); + } + else /* white space */ + optarg = nargv[optind]; + place = EMSG; + ++optind; + } + return(optopt); /* dump back option letter */ +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getprogname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getprogname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fcd4a40b5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getprogname.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getprogname.c,v 1.1 2001/07/09 14:56:51 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME +const char *__progname; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPROGNAME +const char * +getprogname(void) +{ + return __progname; +} +#endif /* HAVE_GETPROGNAME */ + +const char * +get_progname (void) +{ + return getprogname (); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gettimeofday.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gettimeofday.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec8b62f64e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/gettimeofday.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#ifndef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +RCSID("$Id: gettimeofday.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Simple gettimeofday that only returns seconds. + */ +int +gettimeofday (struct timeval *tp, void *ignore) +{ + time_t t; + + t = time(NULL); + tp->tv_sec = t; + tp->tv_usec = 0; + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getuid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ebce0a810 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETUID + +RCSID("$Id: getuid.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int getuid(void) +{ + return 17; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getusershell.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getusershell.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb990f3be2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/getusershell.c @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: getusershell.c,v 1.10 2000/05/22 09:11:59 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H +struct aud_rec; +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_USERCONF_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_SHELLS +#define _PATH_SHELLS "/etc/shells" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_CSHELL +#define _PATH_CSHELL "/bin/csh" +#endif + +/* + * Local shells should NOT be added here. They should be added in + * /etc/shells. + */ + +static char *okshells[] = { _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_CSHELL, NULL }; +static char **curshell, **shells, *strings; +static char **initshells (void); + +/* + * Get a list of shells from _PATH_SHELLS, if it exists. + */ +char * +getusershell() +{ + char *ret; + + if (curshell == NULL) + curshell = initshells(); + ret = *curshell; + if (ret != NULL) + curshell++; + return (ret); +} + +void +endusershell() +{ + if (shells != NULL) + free(shells); + shells = NULL; + if (strings != NULL) + free(strings); + strings = NULL; + curshell = NULL; +} + +void +setusershell() +{ + curshell = initshells(); +} + +static char ** +initshells() +{ + char **sp, *cp; +#ifdef HAVE_GETCONFATTR + char *tmp; + int nsh; +#else + FILE *fp; +#endif + struct stat statb; + + free(shells); + shells = NULL; + free(strings); + strings = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_GETCONFATTR + if(getconfattr(SC_SYS_LOGIN, SC_SHELLS, &tmp, SEC_LIST) != 0) + return okshells; + + for(cp = tmp, nsh = 0; *cp; cp += strlen(cp) + 1, nsh++); + + shells = calloc(nsh + 1, sizeof(*shells)); + if(shells == NULL) + return okshells; + + strings = malloc(cp - tmp); + if(strings == NULL) { + free(shells); + shells = NULL; + return okshells; + } + memcpy(strings, tmp, cp - tmp); + for(sp = shells, cp = strings; *cp; cp += strlen(cp) + 1, sp++) + *sp = cp; +#else + if ((fp = fopen(_PATH_SHELLS, "r")) == NULL) + return (okshells); + if (fstat(fileno(fp), &statb) == -1) { + fclose(fp); + return (okshells); + } + if ((strings = malloc((u_int)statb.st_size)) == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + return (okshells); + } + shells = calloc((unsigned)statb.st_size / 3, sizeof (char *)); + if (shells == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + free(strings); + strings = NULL; + return (okshells); + } + sp = shells; + cp = strings; + while (fgets(cp, MaxPathLen + 1, fp) != NULL) { + while (*cp != '#' && *cp != '/' && *cp != '\0') + cp++; + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + *sp++ = cp; + while (!isspace(*cp) && *cp != '#' && *cp != '\0') + cp++; + *cp++ = '\0'; + } + fclose(fp); +#endif + *sp = NULL; + return (shells); +} +#endif /* HAVE_GETUSERSHELL */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/glob.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/glob.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..295aa2de8e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/glob.c @@ -0,0 +1,854 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2. + * + * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh). + * + * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX: + * + * GLOB_QUOTE: + * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following + * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained). + * GLOB_MAGCHAR: + * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character. + * GLOB_NOMAGIC: + * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did + * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing] + * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC: + * Use alternately specified directory access functions. + * GLOB_TILDE: + * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo + * GLOB_BRACE: + * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b + * gl_matchc: + * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif + +#include "glob.h" +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef ARG_MAX +#define ARG_MAX _POSIX_ARG_MAX +#endif + +#define CHAR_DOLLAR '$' +#define CHAR_DOT '.' +#define CHAR_EOS '\0' +#define CHAR_LBRACKET '[' +#define CHAR_NOT '!' +#define CHAR_QUESTION '?' +#define CHAR_QUOTE '\\' +#define CHAR_RANGE '-' +#define CHAR_RBRACKET ']' +#define CHAR_SEP '/' +#define CHAR_STAR '*' +#define CHAR_TILDE '~' +#define CHAR_UNDERSCORE '_' +#define CHAR_LBRACE '{' +#define CHAR_RBRACE '}' +#define CHAR_SLASH '/' +#define CHAR_COMMA ',' + +#ifndef DEBUG + +#define M_QUOTE 0x8000 +#define M_PROTECT 0x4000 +#define M_MASK 0xffff +#define M_ASCII 0x00ff + +typedef u_short Char; + +#else + +#define M_QUOTE 0x80 +#define M_PROTECT 0x40 +#define M_MASK 0xff +#define M_ASCII 0x7f + +typedef char Char; + +#endif + + +#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII)) +#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE)) +#define M_ALL META('*') +#define M_END META(']') +#define M_NOT META('!') +#define M_ONE META('?') +#define M_RNG META('-') +#define M_SET META('[') +#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) + + +static int compare (const void *, const void *); +static void g_Ctoc (const Char *, char *); +static int g_lstat (Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static DIR *g_opendir (Char *, glob_t *); +static Char *g_strchr (const Char *, int); +#ifdef notdef +static Char *g_strcat (Char *, const Char *); +#endif +static int g_stat (Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static int glob0 (const Char *, glob_t *); +static int glob1 (Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +static int glob2 (Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +static int glob3 (Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +static int globextend (const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +static const Char * globtilde (const Char *, Char *, glob_t *); +static int globexp1 (const Char *, glob_t *); +static int globexp2 (const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *); +static int match (Char *, Char *, Char *); +#ifdef DEBUG +static void qprintf (const char *, Char *); +#endif + +int +glob(const char *pattern, + int flags, + int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), + glob_t *pglob) +{ + const u_char *patnext; + int c; + Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MaxPathLen+1]; + + patnext = (const u_char *) pattern; + if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) { + pglob->gl_pathc = 0; + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS)) + pglob->gl_offs = 0; + } + pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; + pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; + pglob->gl_matchc = 0; + + bufnext = patbuf; + bufend = bufnext + MaxPathLen; + if (flags & GLOB_QUOTE) { + /* Protect the quoted characters. */ + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != CHAR_EOS) + if (c == CHAR_QUOTE) { + if ((c = *patnext++) == CHAR_EOS) { + c = CHAR_QUOTE; + --patnext; + } + *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT; + } + else + *bufnext++ = c; + } + else + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != CHAR_EOS) + *bufnext++ = c; + *bufnext = CHAR_EOS; + + if (flags & GLOB_BRACE) + return globexp1(patbuf, pglob); + else + return glob0(patbuf, pglob); +} + +/* + * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion + * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic + * characters + */ +static int globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob) +{ + const Char* ptr = pattern; + int rv; + + /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ + if (pattern[0] == CHAR_LBRACE && pattern[1] == CHAR_RBRACE && pattern[2] == CHAR_EOS) + return glob0(pattern, pglob); + + while ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, CHAR_LBRACE)) != NULL) + if (!globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, &rv)) + return rv; + + return glob0(pattern, pglob); +} + + +/* + * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace. + * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern. + * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. + */ +static int globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, + glob_t *pglob, int *rv) +{ + int i; + Char *lm, *ls; + const Char *pe, *pm, *pl; + Char patbuf[MaxPathLen + 1]; + + /* copy part up to the brace */ + for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++) + continue; + ls = lm; + + /* Find the balanced brace */ + for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++) + if (*pe == CHAR_LBRACKET) { + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pm = pe++; *pe != CHAR_RBRACKET && *pe != CHAR_EOS; pe++) + continue; + if (*pe == CHAR_EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching CHAR_RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for CHAR_RBRACE + */ + pe = pm; + } + } + else if (*pe == CHAR_LBRACE) + i++; + else if (*pe == CHAR_RBRACE) { + if (i == 0) + break; + i--; + } + + /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */ + if (i != 0 || *pe == CHAR_EOS) { + *rv = glob0(patbuf, pglob); + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) + switch (*pm) { + case CHAR_LBRACKET: + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pl = pm++; *pm != CHAR_RBRACKET && *pm != CHAR_EOS; pm++) + continue; + if (*pm == CHAR_EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching CHAR_RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for CHAR_RBRACE + */ + pm = pl; + } + break; + + case CHAR_LBRACE: + i++; + break; + + case CHAR_RBRACE: + if (i) { + i--; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CHAR_COMMA: + if (i && *pm == CHAR_COMMA) + break; + else { + /* Append the current string */ + for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++) + continue; + /* + * Append the rest of the pattern after the + * closing brace + */ + for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != CHAR_EOS;) + continue; + + /* Expand the current pattern */ +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf); +#endif + *rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob); + + /* move after the comma, to the next string */ + pl = pm + 1; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + *rv = 0; + return 0; +} + + + +/* + * expand tilde from the passwd file. + */ +static const Char * +globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, glob_t *pglob) +{ + struct passwd *pwd; + char *h; + const Char *p; + Char *b; + + if (*pattern != CHAR_TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE)) + return pattern; + + /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */ + for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf; *p && *p != CHAR_SLASH; + *h++ = *p++) + continue; + + *h = CHAR_EOS; + + if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == CHAR_EOS) { + /* + * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME + * first and then trying the password file + */ + if ((h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { + if ((pwd = k_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + } + else { + /* + * Expand a ~user + */ + if ((pwd = k_getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + + /* Copy the home directory */ + for (b = patbuf; *h; *b++ = *h++) + continue; + + /* Append the rest of the pattern */ + while ((*b++ = *p++) != CHAR_EOS) + continue; + + return patbuf; +} + + +/* + * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing + * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally + * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0 + * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error + * to find no matches. + */ +static int +glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob) +{ + const Char *qpatnext; + int c, err, oldpathc; + Char *bufnext, patbuf[MaxPathLen+1]; + size_t limit = 0; + + qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, pglob); + oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc; + bufnext = patbuf; + + /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */ + while ((c = *qpatnext++) != CHAR_EOS) { + switch (c) { + case CHAR_LBRACKET: + c = *qpatnext; + if (c == CHAR_NOT) + ++qpatnext; + if (*qpatnext == CHAR_EOS || + g_strchr(qpatnext+1, CHAR_RBRACKET) == NULL) { + *bufnext++ = CHAR_LBRACKET; + if (c == CHAR_NOT) + --qpatnext; + break; + } + *bufnext++ = M_SET; + if (c == CHAR_NOT) + *bufnext++ = M_NOT; + c = *qpatnext++; + do { + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + if (*qpatnext == CHAR_RANGE && + (c = qpatnext[1]) != CHAR_RBRACKET) { + *bufnext++ = M_RNG; + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + qpatnext += 2; + } + } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != CHAR_RBRACKET); + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_END; + break; + case CHAR_QUESTION: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_ONE; + break; + case CHAR_STAR: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + /* collapse adjacent stars to one, + * to avoid exponential behavior + */ + if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL) + *bufnext++ = M_ALL; + break; + default: + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + break; + } + } + *bufnext = CHAR_EOS; +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("glob0:", patbuf); +#endif + + if ((err = glob1(patbuf, pglob, &limit)) != 0) + return(err); + + /* + * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern + * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified + * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters + * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh. + */ + if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc && + ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) || + ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) && + !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))) + return(globextend(pattern, pglob, &limit)); + else if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) + qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc, + pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare); + return(0); +} + +static int +compare(const void *p, const void *q) +{ + return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q)); +} + +static int +glob1(Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) +{ + Char pathbuf[MaxPathLen+1]; + + /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */ + if (*pattern == CHAR_EOS) + return(0); + return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf, pattern, pglob, limit)); +} + +/* + * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level + * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more + * meta characters. + */ + +#ifndef S_ISLNK +#if defined(S_IFLNK) && defined(S_IFMT) +#define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) +#else +#define S_ISLNK(mode) 0 +#endif +#endif + +static int +glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, + size_t *limit) +{ + struct stat sb; + Char *p, *q; + int anymeta; + + /* + * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until + * segment with meta character found. + */ + for (anymeta = 0;;) { + if (*pattern == CHAR_EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) + return(0); + + if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && + pathend[-1] != CHAR_SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) + || (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && + (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) && + S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) { + *pathend++ = CHAR_SEP; + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + } + ++pglob->gl_matchc; + return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limit)); + } + + /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */ + q = pathend; + p = pattern; + while (*p != CHAR_EOS && *p != CHAR_SEP) { + if (ismeta(*p)) + anymeta = 1; + *q++ = *p++; + } + + if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */ + pathend = q; + pattern = p; + while (*pattern == CHAR_SEP) + *pathend++ = *pattern++; + } else /* Need expansion, recurse. */ + return(glob3(pathbuf, pathend, pattern, p, pglob, + limit)); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static int +glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, + glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) +{ + struct dirent *dp; + DIR *dirp; + int err; + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + /* + * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is + * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h + * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque + * structures. + */ + struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *); + + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + errno = 0; + + if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { + /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */ + if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { + g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf); + if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) || + pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR) + return (GLOB_ABEND); + } + return(0); + } + + err = 0; + + /* Search directory for matching names. */ + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; + else + readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir; + while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) { + u_char *sc; + Char *dc; + + /* Initial CHAR_DOT must be matched literally. */ + if (dp->d_name[0] == CHAR_DOT && *pattern != CHAR_DOT) + continue; + for (sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name, dc = pathend; + (*dc++ = *sc++) != CHAR_EOS;) + continue; + if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) { + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + continue; + } + err = glob2(pathbuf, --dc, restpattern, pglob, limit); + if (err) + break; + } + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp); + else + closedir(dirp); + return(err); +} + + +/* + * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accomodate a new item, + * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. + * + * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size + * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic + * behavior. + * + * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated. + * + * Invariant of the glob_t structure: + * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and + * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. + */ +static int +globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) +{ + char **pathv; + int i; + size_t newsize, len; + char *copy; + const Char *p; + + newsize = sizeof(*pathv) * (2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs); + pathv = pglob->gl_pathv ? + realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newsize) : + malloc(newsize); + if (pathv == NULL) + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + + if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { + /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ + pathv += pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) + *--pathv = NULL; + } + pglob->gl_pathv = pathv; + + for (p = path; *p++;) + continue; + len = (size_t)(p - path); + *limit += len; + if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) { + g_Ctoc(path, copy); + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy; + } + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; + + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && (newsize + *limit) >= ARG_MAX) { + errno = 0; + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + + return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0); +} + + +/* + * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the * + * pattern causes a recursion level. + */ +static int +match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend) +{ + int ok, negate_range; + Char c, k; + + while (pat < patend) { + c = *pat++; + switch (c & M_MASK) { + case M_ALL: + if (pat == patend) + return(1); + do + if (match(name, pat, patend)) + return(1); + while (*name++ != CHAR_EOS); + return(0); + case M_ONE: + if (*name++ == CHAR_EOS) + return(0); + break; + case M_SET: + ok = 0; + if ((k = *name++) == CHAR_EOS) + return(0); + if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != CHAR_EOS) + ++pat; + while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) + if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) { + if (c <= k && k <= pat[1]) + ok = 1; + pat += 2; + } else if (c == k) + ok = 1; + if (ok == negate_range) + return(0); + break; + default: + if (*name++ != c) + return(0); + break; + } + } + return(*name == CHAR_EOS); +} + +/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */ +void +globfree(glob_t *pglob) +{ + int i; + char **pp; + + if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) { + pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp) + if (*pp) + free(*pp); + free(pglob->gl_pathv); + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + } +} + +static DIR * +g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (!*str) + strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof(buf)); + else + g_Ctoc(str, buf); + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf)); + + return(opendir(buf)); +} + +static int +g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + g_Ctoc(fn, buf); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb)); + return(lstat(buf, sb)); +} + +static int +g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + g_Ctoc(fn, buf); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb)); + return(stat(buf, sb)); +} + +static Char * +g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch) +{ + do { + if (*str == ch) + return (Char *)str; + } while (*str++); + return (NULL); +} + +#ifdef notdef +static Char * +g_strcat(Char *dst, const Char *src) +{ + Char *sdst = dst; + + while (*dst++) + continue; + --dst; + while((*dst++ = *src++) != CHAR_EOS) + continue; + + return (sdst); +} +#endif + +static void +g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf) +{ + char *dc; + + for (dc = buf; (*dc++ = *str++) != CHAR_EOS;) + continue; +} + +#ifdef DEBUG +static void +qprintf(const Char *str, Char *s) +{ + Char *p; + + printf("%s:\n", str); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + printf("%c", CHAR(*p)); + printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' '); + printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' '); + printf("\n"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/glob.hin b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/glob.hin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98d8796a0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/glob.hin @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#ifndef _GLOB_H_ +#define _GLOB_H_ + +struct stat; +typedef struct { + int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */ + int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */ + int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */ + int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ + char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ + /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ + int (*gl_errfunc) (const char *, int); + + /* + * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement + * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) + * and lstat(2). + */ + void (*gl_closedir) (void *); + struct dirent *(*gl_readdir) (void *); + void *(*gl_opendir) (const char *); + int (*gl_lstat) (const char *, struct stat *); + int (*gl_stat) (const char *, struct stat *); +} glob_t; + +#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */ +#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */ +#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */ +#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */ +#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */ +#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */ + +#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */ +#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */ +#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */ +#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */ +#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */ +#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */ +#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x1000 /* Limit memory used by matches to ARG_MAX */ + +#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */ +#define GLOB_ABEND (-2) /* Unignored error. */ + +int glob (const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); +void globfree (glob_t *); + +#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/h_errno.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/h_errno.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c2d4452c32 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/h_errno.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: h_errno.c,v 1.1 2001/08/08 03:47:23 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRNO +int h_errno = -17; /* Some magic number */ +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/hostent_find_fqdn.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/hostent_find_fqdn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e955a4c36 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/hostent_find_fqdn.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: hostent_find_fqdn.c,v 1.2 2001/07/10 11:58:23 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * Try to find a fqdn (with `.') in he if possible, else return h_name + */ + +const char * +hostent_find_fqdn (const struct hostent *he) +{ + const char *ret = he->h_name; + const char **h; + + if (strchr (ret, '.') == NULL) + for (h = (const char **)he->h_aliases; *h != NULL; ++h) { + if (strchr (*h, '.') != NULL) { + ret = *h; + break; + } + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/hstrerror.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/hstrerror.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..61897cc84e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/hstrerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: hstrerror.c,v 1.24 2001/08/08 03:47:23 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_HSTRERROR + +#if (defined(SunOS) && (SunOS >= 50)) +#define hstrerror broken_proto +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#if (defined(SunOS) && (SunOS >= 50)) +#undef hstrerror +#endif + +#if !(defined(HAVE_H_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_H_NERR)) +static const char *const h_errlist[] = { + "Resolver Error 0 (no error)", + "Unknown host", /* 1 HOST_NOT_FOUND */ + "Host name lookup failure", /* 2 TRY_AGAIN */ + "Unknown server error", /* 3 NO_RECOVERY */ + "No address associated with name", /* 4 NO_ADDRESS */ +}; + +static +const +int h_nerr = { sizeof h_errlist / sizeof h_errlist[0] }; +#else + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRLIST_DECLARATION +extern const char *h_errlist[]; +extern int h_nerr; +#endif + +#endif + +const char * +hstrerror(int herr) +{ + if (0 <= herr && herr < h_nerr) + return h_errlist[herr]; + else if(herr == -17) + return "unknown error"; + else + return "Error number out of range (hstrerror)"; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ifaddrs.hin b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ifaddrs.hin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2b9be8ccc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ifaddrs.hin @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: ifaddrs.hin,v 1.3 2000/12/11 00:01:13 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ifaddrs_h__ +#define __ifaddrs_h__ + +/* + * the interface is defined in terms of the fields below, and this is + * sometimes #define'd, so there seems to be no simple way of solving + * this and this seemed the best. */ + +#undef ifa_dstaddr + +struct ifaddrs { + struct ifaddrs *ifa_next; + char *ifa_name; + unsigned int ifa_flags; + struct sockaddr *ifa_addr; + struct sockaddr *ifa_netmask; + struct sockaddr *ifa_dstaddr; + void *ifa_data; +}; + +#ifndef ifa_broadaddr +#define ifa_broadaddr ifa_dstaddr +#endif + +int getifaddrs(struct ifaddrs**); + +void freeifaddrs(struct ifaddrs*); + +#endif /* __ifaddrs_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_aton.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_aton.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cdc6bdd4ed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_aton.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: inet_aton.c,v 1.13 1999/12/05 13:26:20 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* Minimal implementation of inet_aton. + * Cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. */ + +int +inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) +{ + addr->s_addr = inet_addr(cp); + return (addr->s_addr == INADDR_NONE) ? 0 : 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_ntop.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_ntop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63c99a5969 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_ntop.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: inet_ntop.c,v 1.5 2001/04/04 23:58:01 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +/* + * + */ + +static const char * +inet_ntop_v4 (const void *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + const char digits[] = "0123456789"; + int i; + struct in_addr *addr = (struct in_addr *)src; + u_long a = ntohl(addr->s_addr); + const char *orig_dst = dst; + + if (size < INET_ADDRSTRLEN) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + int n = (a >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0xFF; + int non_zerop = 0; + + if (non_zerop || n / 100 > 0) { + *dst++ = digits[n / 100]; + n %= 100; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || n / 10 > 0) { + *dst++ = digits[n / 10]; + n %= 10; + non_zerop = 1; + } + *dst++ = digits[n]; + if (i != 3) + *dst++ = '.'; + } + *dst++ = '\0'; + return orig_dst; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 +static const char * +inet_ntop_v6 (const void *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + const char xdigits[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + int i; + const struct in6_addr *addr = (struct in6_addr *)src; + const u_char *ptr = addr->s6_addr; + const char *orig_dst = dst; + + if (size < INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + int non_zerop = 0; + + if (non_zerop || (ptr[0] >> 4)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[0] >> 4]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || (ptr[0] & 0x0F)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[0] & 0x0F]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || (ptr[1] >> 4)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[1] >> 4]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[1] & 0x0F]; + if (i != 7) + *dst++ = ':'; + ptr += 2; + } + *dst++ = '\0'; + return orig_dst; +} +#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */ + +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET : + return inet_ntop_v4 (src, dst, size); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + return inet_ntop_v6 (src, dst, size); +#endif + default : + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + return NULL; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_pton.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_pton.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9c976c8c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/inet_pton.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: inet_pton.c,v 1.3 2000/07/27 04:56:13 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +int +inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst) +{ + if (af != AF_INET) { + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + return -1; + } + return inet_aton (src, dst); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/initgroups.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/initgroups.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dcf1d08e96 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/initgroups.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: initgroups.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +initgroups(const char *name, gid_t basegid) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/innetgr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/innetgr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4bc57f93e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/innetgr.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR + +RCSID("$Id: innetgr.c,v 1.1 1999/03/11 14:04:01 joda Exp $"); + +int +innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *machine, + const char *user, const char *domain) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/install-sh b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/install-sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9de23842d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/install-sh @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# install - install a program, script, or datafile +# This comes from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh). +# +# Copyright 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its +# documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that +# the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting +# documentation, and that the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or +# publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific, +# written prior permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the +# suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" +# without express or implied warranty. +# +# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent +# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it +# when there is no Makefile. +# +# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written +# from scratch. It can only install one file at a time, a restriction +# shared with many OS's install programs. + + +# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script + +# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. +doit="${DOITPROG-}" + + +# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars. + +mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}" +cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}" +chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}" +chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}" +chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}" +stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}" +rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}" +mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}" + +transformbasename="" +transform_arg="" +instcmd="$mvprog" +chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755" +chowncmd="" +chgrpcmd="" +stripcmd="" +rmcmd="$rmprog -f" +mvcmd="$mvprog" +src="" +dst="" +dir_arg="" + +while [ x"$1" != x ]; do + case $1 in + -c) instcmd="$cpprog" + shift + continue;; + + -d) dir_arg=true + shift + continue;; + + -m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -s) stripcmd="$stripprog" + shift + continue;; + + -t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'` + shift + continue;; + + -b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'` + shift + continue;; + + *) if [ x"$src" = x ] + then + src=$1 + else + # this colon is to work around a 386BSD /bin/sh bug + : + dst=$1 + fi + shift + continue;; + esac +done + +if [ x"$src" = x ] +then + echo "install: no input file specified" + exit 1 +else + true +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]; then + dst=$src + src="" + + if [ -d $dst ]; then + instcmd=: + chmodcmd="" + else + instcmd=mkdir + fi +else + +# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command +# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad +# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'. + + if [ -f $src -o -d $src ] + then + true + else + echo "install: $src does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + + if [ x"$dst" = x ] + then + echo "install: no destination specified" + exit 1 + else + true + fi + +# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; if your system +# does not like double slashes in filenames, you may need to add some logic + + if [ -d $dst ] + then + dst="$dst"/`basename $src` + else + true + fi +fi + +## this sed command emulates the dirname command +dstdir=`echo $dst | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'` + +# Make sure that the destination directory exists. +# this part is taken from Noah Friedman's mkinstalldirs script + +# Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case. +if [ ! -d "$dstdir" ]; then +defaultIFS=' +' +IFS="${IFS-${defaultIFS}}" + +oIFS="${IFS}" +# Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason. +IFS='%' +set - `echo ${dstdir} | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'` +IFS="${oIFS}" + +pathcomp='' + +while [ $# -ne 0 ] ; do + pathcomp="${pathcomp}${1}" + shift + + if [ ! -d "${pathcomp}" ] ; + then + $mkdirprog "${pathcomp}" + else + true + fi + + pathcomp="${pathcomp}/" +done +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ] +then + $doit $instcmd $dst && + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dst; else true ; fi +else + +# If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now. + + if [ x"$transformarg" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + dstfile=`basename $dst $transformbasename | + sed $transformarg`$transformbasename + fi + +# don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename + + if [ x"$dstfile" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + true + fi + +# Make a temp file name in the proper directory. + + dsttmp=$dstdir/#inst.$$# + +# Move or copy the file name to the temp name + + $doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp && + + trap "rm -f ${dsttmp}" 0 && + +# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits + +# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to +# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore +# errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command. + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + +# Now rename the file to the real destination. + + $doit $rmcmd -f $dstdir/$dstfile && + $doit $mvcmd $dsttmp $dstdir/$dstfile + +fi && + + +exit 0 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/iruserok.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/iruserok.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b3880bf39 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/iruserok.c @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: iruserok.c,v 1.23 1999/12/05 13:27:05 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int __check_rhosts_file = 1; +char *__rcmd_errstr = 0; + +/* + * Returns "true" if match, 0 if no match. + */ +static +int +__icheckhost(unsigned raddr, const char *lhost) +{ + struct hostent *hp; + u_long laddr; + char **pp; + + /* Try for raw ip address first. */ + if (isdigit((unsigned char)*lhost) + && (long)(laddr = inet_addr(lhost)) != -1) + return (raddr == laddr); + + /* Better be a hostname. */ + if ((hp = gethostbyname(lhost)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* Spin through ip addresses. */ + for (pp = hp->h_addr_list; *pp; ++pp) + if (memcmp(&raddr, *pp, sizeof(u_long)) == 0) + return (1); + + /* No match. */ + return (0); +} + +/* + * Returns 0 if ok, -1 if not ok. + */ +static +int +__ivaliduser(FILE *hostf, unsigned raddr, const char *luser, + const char *ruser) +{ + char *user, *p; + int ch; + char buf[MaxHostNameLen + 128]; /* host + login */ + char hname[MaxHostNameLen]; + struct hostent *hp; + /* Presumed guilty until proven innocent. */ + int userok = 0, hostok = 0; +#ifdef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN + char *ypdomain; + + if (yp_get_default_domain(&ypdomain)) + ypdomain = NULL; +#else +#define ypdomain NULL +#endif + /* We need to get the damn hostname back for netgroup matching. */ + if ((hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&raddr, + sizeof(u_long), + AF_INET)) == NULL) + return (-1); + strlcpy(hname, hp->h_name, sizeof(hname)); + + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), hostf)) { + p = buf; + /* Skip lines that are too long. */ + if (strchr(p, '\n') == NULL) { + while ((ch = getc(hostf)) != '\n' && ch != EOF); + continue; + } + if (*p == '\n' || *p == '#') { + /* comment... */ + continue; + } + while (*p != '\n' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t' && *p != '\0') { + if (isupper((unsigned char)*p)) + *p = tolower((unsigned char)*p); + p++; + } + if (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') { + *p++ = '\0'; + while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') + p++; + user = p; + while (*p != '\n' && *p != ' ' && + *p != '\t' && *p != '\0') + p++; + } else + user = p; + *p = '\0'; + /* + * Do +/- and +@/-@ checking. This looks really nasty, + * but it matches SunOS's behavior so far as I can tell. + */ + switch(buf[0]) { + case '+': + if (!buf[1]) { /* '+' matches all hosts */ + hostok = 1; + break; + } + if (buf[1] == '@') /* match a host by netgroup */ + hostok = innetgr((char *)&buf[2], + (char *)&hname, NULL, ypdomain); + else /* match a host by addr */ + hostok = __icheckhost(raddr,(char *)&buf[1]); + break; + case '-': /* reject '-' hosts and all their users */ + if (buf[1] == '@') { + if (innetgr((char *)&buf[2], + (char *)&hname, NULL, ypdomain)) + return(-1); + } else { + if (__icheckhost(raddr,(char *)&buf[1])) + return(-1); + } + break; + default: /* if no '+' or '-', do a simple match */ + hostok = __icheckhost(raddr, buf); + break; + } + switch(*user) { + case '+': + if (!*(user+1)) { /* '+' matches all users */ + userok = 1; + break; + } + if (*(user+1) == '@') /* match a user by netgroup */ + userok = innetgr(user+2, NULL, (char *)ruser, + ypdomain); + else /* match a user by direct specification */ + userok = !(strcmp(ruser, user+1)); + break; + case '-': /* if we matched a hostname, */ + if (hostok) { /* check for user field rejections */ + if (!*(user+1)) + return(-1); + if (*(user+1) == '@') { + if (innetgr(user+2, NULL, + (char *)ruser, ypdomain)) + return(-1); + } else { + if (!strcmp(ruser, user+1)) + return(-1); + } + } + break; + default: /* no rejections: try to match the user */ + if (hostok) + userok = !(strcmp(ruser,*user ? user : luser)); + break; + } + if (hostok && userok) + return(0); + } + return (-1); +} + +/* + * New .rhosts strategy: We are passed an ip address. We spin through + * hosts.equiv and .rhosts looking for a match. When the .rhosts only + * has ip addresses, we don't have to trust a nameserver. When it + * contains hostnames, we spin through the list of addresses the nameserver + * gives us and look for a match. + * + * Returns 0 if ok, -1 if not ok. + */ +int +iruserok(unsigned raddr, int superuser, const char *ruser, const char *luser) +{ + char *cp; + struct stat sbuf; + struct passwd *pwd; + FILE *hostf; + uid_t uid; + int first; + char pbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + first = 1; + hostf = superuser ? NULL : fopen(_PATH_HEQUIV, "r"); +again: + if (hostf) { + if (__ivaliduser(hostf, raddr, luser, ruser) == 0) { + fclose(hostf); + return (0); + } + fclose(hostf); + } + if (first == 1 && (__check_rhosts_file || superuser)) { + first = 0; + if ((pwd = k_getpwnam((char*)luser)) == NULL) + return (-1); + snprintf (pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), "%s/.rhosts", pwd->pw_dir); + + /* + * Change effective uid while opening .rhosts. If root and + * reading an NFS mounted file system, can't read files that + * are protected read/write owner only. + */ + uid = geteuid(); + seteuid(pwd->pw_uid); + hostf = fopen(pbuf, "r"); + seteuid(uid); + + if (hostf == NULL) + return (-1); + /* + * If not a regular file, or is owned by someone other than + * user or root or if writeable by anyone but the owner, quit. + */ + cp = NULL; + if (lstat(pbuf, &sbuf) < 0) + cp = ".rhosts lstat failed"; + else if (!S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode)) + cp = ".rhosts not regular file"; + else if (fstat(fileno(hostf), &sbuf) < 0) + cp = ".rhosts fstat failed"; + else if (sbuf.st_uid && sbuf.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid) + cp = "bad .rhosts owner"; + else if (sbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) + cp = ".rhosts writeable by other than owner"; + /* If there were any problems, quit. */ + if (cp) { + __rcmd_errstr = cp; + fclose(hostf); + return (-1); + } + goto again; + } + return (-1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/issuid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/issuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..910d85009b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/issuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: issuid.c,v 1.4 2001/08/27 23:08:34 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +issuid(void) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_ISSETUGID) + return issetugid(); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID) + if(getuid() != geteuid()) + return 1; +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GETGID) && defined(HAVE_GETEGID) + if(getgid() != getegid()) + return 2; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/k_getpwnam.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/k_getpwnam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..40681cd2d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/k_getpwnam.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: k_getpwnam.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include "roken.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif + +struct passwd * +k_getpwnam (const char *user) +{ + struct passwd *p; + + p = getpwnam (user); +#if defined(HAVE_GETSPNAM) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD) + if(p) + { + struct spwd *spwd; + + spwd = getspnam (user); + if (spwd) + p->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp; + endspent (); + } +#else + endpwent (); +#endif + return p; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/k_getpwuid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/k_getpwuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e2ca5476f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/k_getpwuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: k_getpwuid.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include "roken.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif + +struct passwd * +k_getpwuid (uid_t uid) +{ + struct passwd *p; + + p = getpwuid (uid); +#if defined(HAVE_GETSPNAM) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD) + if (p) + { + struct spwd *spwd; + + spwd = getspnam (p->pw_name); + if (spwd) + p->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp; + endspent (); + } +#else + endpwent (); +#endif + return p; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/localtime_r.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/localtime_r.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..43402342f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/localtime_r.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: localtime_r.c,v 1.2 2002/08/20 13:00:35 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R + +struct tm * +localtime_r(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result) +{ + struct tm *tm; + + tm = localtime((time_t *)timer); + if (tm == NULL) + return NULL; + *result = *tm; + return result; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/lstat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/lstat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f03e19d18 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/lstat.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: lstat.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +lstat(const char *path, struct stat *buf) +{ + return stat(path, buf); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/memmove.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/memmove.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b77d56af96 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/memmove.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: memmove.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +/* + * memmove for systems that doesn't have it + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +void* memmove(void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n) +{ + char *s=(char*)s2, *d=(char*)s1; + + if(d > s){ + s+=n-1; + d+=n-1; + while(n){ + *d--=*s--; + n--; + } + }else if(d < s) + while(n){ + *d++=*s++; + n--; + } + return s1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mini_inetd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mini_inetd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c8f72d9de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mini_inetd.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: mini_inetd.c,v 1.30 2002/02/18 19:08:55 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * accept a connection on `s' and pretend it's served by inetd. + */ + +static void +accept_it (int s) +{ + int s2; + + s2 = accept(s, NULL, NULL); + if(s2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + close(s); + dup2(s2, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(s2, STDOUT_FILENO); + /* dup2(s2, STDERR_FILENO); */ + close(s2); +} + +/* + * Listen on a specified port, emulating inetd. + */ + +void +mini_inetd_addrinfo (struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + int ret; + struct addrinfo *a; + int n, nalloc, i; + int *fds; + fd_set orig_read_set, read_set; + int max_fd = -1; + + for (nalloc = 0, a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + ++nalloc; + + fds = malloc (nalloc * sizeof(*fds)); + if (fds == NULL) + errx (1, "mini_inetd: out of memory"); + + FD_ZERO(&orig_read_set); + + for (i = 0, a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + fds[i] = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (fds[i] < 0) { + warn ("socket af = %d", a->ai_family); + continue; + } + socket_set_reuseaddr (fds[i], 1); + if (bind (fds[i], a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("bind af = %d", a->ai_family); + close(fds[i]); + continue; + } + if (listen (fds[i], SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + warn ("listen af = %d", a->ai_family); + close(fds[i]); + continue; + } + if (fds[i] >= FD_SETSIZE) + errx (1, "fd too large"); + FD_SET(fds[i], &orig_read_set); + max_fd = max(max_fd, fds[i]); + ++i; + } + if (i == 0) + errx (1, "no sockets"); + n = i; + + do { + read_set = orig_read_set; + + ret = select (max_fd + 1, &read_set, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) + err (1, "select"); + } while (ret <= 0); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if (FD_ISSET (fds[i], &read_set)) { + accept_it (fds[i]); + return; + } + abort (); +} + +void +mini_inetd (int port) +{ + int error; + struct addrinfo *ai, hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (NULL, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + + mini_inetd_addrinfo(ai); + + freeaddrinfo(ai); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/missing b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/missing new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7789652e87 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/missing @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Common stub for a few missing GNU programs while installing. +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Franc,ois Pinard , 1996. + +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. + +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA +# 02111-1307, USA. + +if test $# -eq 0; then + echo 1>&2 "Try \`$0 --help' for more information" + exit 1 +fi + +case "$1" in + + -h|--h|--he|--hel|--help) + echo "\ +$0 [OPTION]... PROGRAM [ARGUMENT]... + +Handle \`PROGRAM [ARGUMENT]...' for when PROGRAM is missing, or return an +error status if there is no known handling for PROGRAM. + +Options: + -h, --help display this help and exit + -v, --version output version information and exit + +Supported PROGRAM values: + aclocal touch file \`aclocal.m4' + autoconf touch file \`configure' + autoheader touch file \`config.h.in' + automake touch all \`Makefile.in' files + bison create \`y.tab.[ch]', if possible, from existing .[ch] + flex create \`lex.yy.c', if possible, from existing .c + lex create \`lex.yy.c', if possible, from existing .c + makeinfo touch the output file + yacc create \`y.tab.[ch]', if possible, from existing .[ch]" + ;; + + -v|--v|--ve|--ver|--vers|--versi|--versio|--version) + echo "missing - GNU libit 0.0" + ;; + + -*) + echo 1>&2 "$0: Unknown \`$1' option" + echo 1>&2 "Try \`$0 --help' for more information" + exit 1 + ;; + + aclocal) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified \`acinclude.m4' or \`configure.in'. You might want + to install the \`Automake' and \`Perl' packages. Grab them from + any GNU archive site." + touch aclocal.m4 + ;; + + autoconf) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified \`configure.in'. You might want to install the + \`Autoconf' and \`GNU m4' packages. Grab them from any GNU + archive site." + touch configure + ;; + + autoheader) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified \`acconfig.h' or \`configure.in'. You might want + to install the \`Autoconf' and \`GNU m4' packages. Grab them + from any GNU archive site." + files=`sed -n 's/^[ ]*A[CM]_CONFIG_HEADER(\([^)]*\)).*/\1/p' configure.in` + test -z "$files" && files="config.h" + touch_files= + for f in $files; do + case "$f" in + *:*) touch_files="$touch_files "`echo "$f" | + sed -e 's/^[^:]*://' -e 's/:.*//'`;; + *) touch_files="$touch_files $f.in";; + esac + done + touch $touch_files + ;; + + automake) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified \`Makefile.am', \`acinclude.m4' or \`configure.in'. + You might want to install the \`Automake' and \`Perl' packages. + Grab them from any GNU archive site." + find . -type f -name Makefile.am -print | + sed 's/\.am$/.in/' | + while read f; do touch "$f"; done + ;; + + bison|yacc) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified a \`.y' file. You may need the \`Bison' package + in order for those modifications to take effect. You can get + \`Bison' from any GNU archive site." + rm -f y.tab.c y.tab.h + if [ $# -ne 1 ]; then + eval LASTARG="\${$#}" + case "$LASTARG" in + *.y) + SRCFILE=`echo "$LASTARG" | sed 's/y$/c/'` + if [ -f "$SRCFILE" ]; then + cp "$SRCFILE" y.tab.c + fi + SRCFILE=`echo "$LASTARG" | sed 's/y$/h/'` + if [ -f "$SRCFILE" ]; then + cp "$SRCFILE" y.tab.h + fi + ;; + esac + fi + if [ ! -f y.tab.h ]; then + echo >y.tab.h + fi + if [ ! -f y.tab.c ]; then + echo 'main() { return 0; }' >y.tab.c + fi + ;; + + lex|flex) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified a \`.l' file. You may need the \`Flex' package + in order for those modifications to take effect. You can get + \`Flex' from any GNU archive site." + rm -f lex.yy.c + if [ $# -ne 1 ]; then + eval LASTARG="\${$#}" + case "$LASTARG" in + *.l) + SRCFILE=`echo "$LASTARG" | sed 's/l$/c/'` + if [ -f "$SRCFILE" ]; then + cp "$SRCFILE" lex.yy.c + fi + ;; + esac + fi + if [ ! -f lex.yy.c ]; then + echo 'main() { return 0; }' >lex.yy.c + fi + ;; + + makeinfo) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is missing on your system. You should only need it if + you modified a \`.texi' or \`.texinfo' file, or any other file + indirectly affecting the aspect of the manual. The spurious + call might also be the consequence of using a buggy \`make' (AIX, + DU, IRIX). You might want to install the \`Texinfo' package or + the \`GNU make' package. Grab either from any GNU archive site." + file=`echo "$*" | sed -n 's/.*-o \([^ ]*\).*/\1/p'` + if test -z "$file"; then + file=`echo "$*" | sed 's/.* \([^ ]*\) *$/\1/'` + file=`sed -n '/^@setfilename/ { s/.* \([^ ]*\) *$/\1/; p; q; }' $file` + fi + touch $file + ;; + + *) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is needed, and you do not seem to have it handy on your + system. You might have modified some files without having the + proper tools for further handling them. Check the \`README' file, + it often tells you about the needed prerequirements for installing + this package. You may also peek at any GNU archive site, in case + some other package would contain this missing \`$1' program." + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +exit 0 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mkinstalldirs b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mkinstalldirs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b3b5fc5d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mkinstalldirs @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy +# Author: Noah Friedman +# Created: 1993-05-16 +# Public domain + +# $Id$ + +errstatus=0 + +for file +do + set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` + shift + + pathcomp= + for d + do + pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" + case "$pathcomp" in + -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; + esac + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + echo "mkdir $pathcomp" + + mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + fi + fi + + pathcomp="$pathcomp/" + done +done + +exit $errstatus + +# mkinstalldirs ends here diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mkstemp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mkstemp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..350f4cb7ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/mkstemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mkstemp.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_MKSTEMP + +int +mkstemp(char *template) +{ + int start, i; + pid_t val; + val = getpid(); + start = strlen(template) - 1; + while(template[start] == 'X') { + template[start] = '0' + val % 10; + val /= 10; + start--; + } + + do{ + int fd; + fd = open(template, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600); + if(fd >= 0 || errno != EEXIST) + return fd; + i = start + 1; + do{ + if(template[i] == 0) + return -1; + template[i]++; + if(template[i] == '9' + 1) + template[i] = 'a'; + if(template[i] <= 'z') + break; + template[i] = 'a'; + i++; + }while(1); + }while(1); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ndbm_wrap.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ndbm_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a1ab927de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ndbm_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: ndbm_wrap.c,v 1.1.8.1 2003/08/29 17:00:34 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "ndbm_wrap.h" +#if defined(HAVE_DB4_DB_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB3_DB_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#define DBT2DATUM(DBT, DATUM) do { (DATUM)->dptr = (DBT)->data; (DATUM)->dsize = (DBT)->size; } while(0) +#define DATUM2DBT(DATUM, DBT) do { (DBT)->data = (DATUM)->dptr; (DBT)->size = (DATUM)->dsize; } while(0) +#define RETURN(X) return ((X) == 0) ? 0 : -1 + +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 +static DBC *cursor; +#endif + +#define D(X) ((DB*)(X)) + +void +dbm_close (DBM *db) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 + D(db)->close(D(db), 0); + cursor = NULL; +#else + D(db)->close(D(db)); +#endif +} + +int +dbm_delete (DBM *db, datum dkey) +{ + DBT key; + DATUM2DBT(&dkey, &key); +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 + RETURN(D(db)->del(D(db), NULL, &key, 0)); +#else + RETURN(D(db)->del(D(db), &key, 0)); +#endif +} + +datum +dbm_fetch (DBM *db, datum dkey) +{ + datum dvalue; + DBT key, value; + DATUM2DBT(&dkey, &key); + if(D(db)->get(D(db), +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 + NULL, +#endif + &key, &value, 0) != 0) + dvalue.dptr = NULL; + else + DBT2DATUM(&value, &dvalue); + + return dvalue; +} + +static datum +dbm_get (DB *db, int flags) +{ + DBT key, value; + datum datum; +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 + if(cursor == NULL) + db->cursor(db, NULL, &cursor, 0); + if(cursor->c_get(cursor, &key, &value, flags) != 0) + datum.dptr = NULL; + else + DBT2DATUM(&value, &datum); +#else + db->seq(db, &key, &value, flags); +#endif + return datum; +} + +#ifndef DB_FIRST +#define DB_FIRST R_FIRST +#define DB_NEXT R_NEXT +#define DB_NOOVERWRITE R_NOOVERWRITE +#define DB_KEYEXIST 1 +#endif + +datum +dbm_firstkey (DBM *db) +{ + return dbm_get(D(db), DB_FIRST); +} + +datum +dbm_nextkey (DBM *db) +{ + return dbm_get(D(db), DB_NEXT); +} + +DBM* +dbm_open (const char *file, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + DB *db; + int myflags = 0; + char *fn = malloc(strlen(file) + 4); + if(fn == NULL) + return NULL; + strcpy(fn, file); + strcat(fn, ".db"); +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 + if (flags & O_CREAT) + myflags |= DB_CREATE; + + if (flags & O_EXCL) + myflags |= DB_EXCL; + + if (flags & O_RDONLY) + myflags |= DB_RDONLY; + + if (flags & O_TRUNC) + myflags |= DB_TRUNCATE; + if(db_create(&db, NULL, 0) != 0) { + free(fn); + return NULL; + } + +#if (DB_VERSION_MAJOR > 3) && (DB_VERSION_MINOR > 0) + if(db->open(db, NULL, fn, NULL, DB_BTREE, myflags, mode) != 0) { +#else + if(db->open(db, fn, NULL, DB_BTREE, myflags, mode) != 0) { +#endif + free(fn); + db->close(db, 0); + return NULL; + } +#else + db = dbopen(fn, flags, mode, DB_BTREE, NULL); +#endif + free(fn); + return (DBM*)db; +} + +int +dbm_store (DBM *db, datum dkey, datum dvalue, int flags) +{ + int ret; + DBT key, value; + int myflags = 0; + if((flags & DBM_REPLACE) == 0) + myflags |= DB_NOOVERWRITE; + DATUM2DBT(&dkey, &key); + DATUM2DBT(&dvalue, &value); + ret = D(db)->put(D(db), +#ifdef HAVE_DB3 + NULL, +#endif +&key, &value, myflags); + if(ret == DB_KEYEXIST) + return 1; + RETURN(ret); +} + +int +dbm_error (DBM *db) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +dbm_clearerr (DBM *db) +{ + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ndbm_wrap.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ndbm_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..77c88b4877 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/ndbm_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: ndbm_wrap.h,v 1.1 2002/04/30 16:37:20 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ndbm_wrap_h__ +#define __ndbm_wrap_h__ + +#include +#include + +#ifndef dbm_rename +#define dbm_rename(X) __roken_ ## X +#endif + +#define dbm_open dbm_rename(dbm_open) +#define dbm_close dbm_rename(dbm_close) +#define dbm_delete dbm_rename(dbm_delete) +#define dbm_fetch dbm_rename(dbm_fetch) +#define dbm_get dbm_rename(dbm_get) +#define dbm_firstkey dbm_rename(dbm_firstkey) +#define dbm_nextkey dbm_rename(dbm_nextkey) +#define dbm_store dbm_rename(dbm_store) +#define dbm_error dbm_rename(dbm_error) +#define dbm_clearerr dbm_rename(dbm_clearerr) + +#define datum dbm_rename(datum) + +typedef struct { + void *dptr; + size_t dsize; +} datum; + +#define DBM_REPLACE 1 +typedef struct DBM DBM; + +#if 0 +typedef struct { + int dummy; +} DBM; +#endif + +int dbm_clearerr (DBM*); +void dbm_close (DBM*); +int dbm_delete (DBM*, datum); +int dbm_error (DBM*); +datum dbm_fetch (DBM*, datum); +datum dbm_firstkey (DBM*); +datum dbm_nextkey (DBM*); +DBM* dbm_open (const char*, int, mode_t); +int dbm_store (DBM*, datum, datum, int); + +#endif /* __ndbm_wrap_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/net_read.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/net_read.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d45bfa547 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/net_read.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: net_read.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like read but never return partial data. + */ + +ssize_t +net_read (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + char *cbuf = (char *)buf; + ssize_t count; + size_t rem = nbytes; + + while (rem > 0) { +#ifdef WIN32 + count = recv (fd, cbuf, rem, 0); +#else + count = read (fd, cbuf, rem); +#endif + if (count < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + return count; + } else if (count == 0) { + return count; + } + cbuf += count; + rem -= count; + } + return nbytes; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/net_write.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/net_write.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f63dbeed1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/net_write.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: net_write.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like write but never return partial data. + */ + +ssize_t +net_write (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + const char *cbuf = (const char *)buf; + ssize_t count; + size_t rem = nbytes; + + while (rem > 0) { +#ifdef WIN32 + count = send (fd, cbuf, rem, 0); +#else + count = write (fd, cbuf, rem); +#endif + if (count < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + return count; + } + cbuf += count; + rem -= count; + } + return nbytes; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6583f227f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_bytes-test.c,v 1.3 2001/09/04 09:56:00 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include "parse_bytes.h" + +static struct testcase { + int canonicalp; + int val; + const char *def_unit; + const char *str; +} tests[] = { + {0, 0, NULL, "0 bytes"}, + {1, 0, NULL, "0"}, + {0, 1, NULL, "1"}, + {1, 1, NULL, "1 byte"}, + {0, 0, "kilobyte", "0"}, + {0, 1024, "kilobyte", "1"}, + {1, 1024, "kilobyte", "1 kilobyte"}, + {1, 1024 * 1024, NULL, "1 megabyte"}, + {0, 1025, NULL, "1 kilobyte 1"}, + {1, 1025, NULL, "1 kilobyte 1 byte"}, +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests)/sizeof(tests[0]); ++i) { + char buf[256]; + int val = parse_bytes (tests[i].str, tests[i].def_unit); + int len; + + if (val != tests[i].val) { + printf ("parse_bytes (%s, %s) = %d != %d\n", + tests[i].str, + tests[i].def_unit ? tests[i].def_unit : "none", + val, tests[i].val); + ++ret; + } + if (tests[i].canonicalp) { + len = unparse_bytes (tests[i].val, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (strcmp (tests[i].str, buf) != 0) { + printf ("unparse_bytes (%d) = \"%s\" != \"%s\"\n", + tests[i].val, buf, tests[i].str); + ++ret; + } + } + } + if (ret) { + printf ("%d errors\n", ret); + return 1; + } else + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b556ddc197 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_bytes.c,v 1.4 2003/03/07 15:51:53 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include "parse_bytes.h" + +static struct units bytes_units[] = { + { "gigabyte", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "gbyte", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "GB", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "megabyte", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "mbyte", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "MB", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "kilobyte", 1024 }, + { "KB", 1024 }, + { "byte", 1 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +static struct units bytes_short_units[] = { + { "GB", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "MB", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "KB", 1024 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +int +parse_bytes (const char *s, const char *def_unit) +{ + return parse_units (s, bytes_units, def_unit); +} + +int +unparse_bytes (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units (t, bytes_units, s, len); +} + +int +unparse_bytes_short (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units_approx (t, bytes_short_units, s, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d7e759da5e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_bytes.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse_bytes.h,v 1.3 2001/09/04 09:56:00 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __PARSE_BYTES_H__ +#define __PARSE_BYTES_H__ + +int +parse_bytes (const char *s, const char *def_unit); + +int +unparse_bytes (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +int +unparse_bytes_short (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +#endif /* __PARSE_BYTES_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_reply-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_reply-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47e12d182e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_reply-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_reply-test.c,v 1.2 2002/09/04 03:25:06 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include "roken.h" +#include "resolve.h" + +struct dns_reply* +parse_reply(const unsigned char *, size_t); + +enum { MAX_BUF = 36}; + +static struct testcase { + unsigned char buf[MAX_BUF]; + size_t buf_len; +} tests[] = { + {{0x12, 0x67, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x03, 'f', 'o', 'o', 0x00, + 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x03, 'f', 'o', 'o', 0x00, + 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x67, 0xff, 0xff}, 36} +}; + +#ifndef MAP_FAILED +#define MAP_FAILED (-1) +#endif + +static sig_atomic_t val = 0; + +static RETSIGTYPE +segv_handler(int sig) +{ + val = 1; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ +#ifndef HAVE_MMAP + return 77; /* signal to automake that this test + cannot be run */ +#else /* HAVE_MMAP */ + int ret; + int i; + struct sigaction sa; + + sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = segv_handler; + sigaction (SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL); + + for (i = 0; val == 0 && i < sizeof(tests)/sizeof(tests[0]); ++i) { + const struct testcase *t = &tests[i]; + unsigned char *p1, *p2; + int flags; + int fd; + size_t pagesize = getpagesize(); + unsigned char *buf; + +#ifdef MAP_ANON + flags = MAP_ANON; + fd = -1; +#else + flags = 0; + fd = open ("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY); + if(fd < 0) + err (1, "open /dev/zero"); +#endif + flags |= MAP_PRIVATE; + + p1 = (char *)mmap(0, 2 * pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + flags, fd, 0); + if (p1 == (unsigned char *)MAP_FAILED) + err (1, "mmap"); + p2 = p1 + pagesize; + ret = mprotect (p2, pagesize, 0); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "mprotect"); + buf = p2 - t->buf_len; + memcpy (buf, t->buf, t->buf_len); + parse_reply (buf, t->buf_len); + ret = munmap (p1, 2 * pagesize); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "munmap"); + } + return val; +#endif /* HAVE_MMAP */ +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_time.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..deab102fdf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_time.c,v 1.6 2003/03/07 15:51:06 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include "parse_time.h" + +static struct units time_units[] = { + {"year", 365 * 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"month", 30 * 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"week", 7 * 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"day", 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"hour", 60 * 60}, + {"h", 60 * 60}, + {"minute", 60}, + {"m", 60}, + {"second", 1}, + {"s", 1}, + {NULL, 0}, +}; + +int +parse_time (const char *s, const char *def_unit) +{ + return parse_units (s, time_units, def_unit); +} + +size_t +unparse_time (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units (t, time_units, s, len); +} + +size_t +unparse_time_approx (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units_approx (t, time_units, s, len); +} + +void +print_time_table (FILE *f) +{ + print_units_table (time_units, f); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_time.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_time.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55de505dbb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse_time.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __PARSE_TIME_H__ +#define __PARSE_TIME_H__ + +int +parse_time (const char *s, const char *def_unit); + +size_t +unparse_time (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +size_t +unparse_time_approx (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +void +print_time_table (FILE *f); + +#endif /* __PARSE_TIME_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_units.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_units.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..217d55ede8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_units.c @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_units.c,v 1.14 2001/09/04 09:56:00 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "parse_units.h" + +/* + * Parse string in `s' according to `units' and return value. + * def_unit defines the default unit. + */ + +static int +parse_something (const char *s, const struct units *units, + const char *def_unit, + int (*func)(int res, int val, unsigned mult), + int init, + int accept_no_val_p) +{ + const char *p; + int res = init; + unsigned def_mult = 1; + + if (def_unit != NULL) { + const struct units *u; + + for (u = units; u->name; ++u) { + if (strcasecmp (u->name, def_unit) == 0) { + def_mult = u->mult; + break; + } + } + if (u->name == NULL) + return -1; + } + + p = s; + while (*p) { + double val; + char *next; + const struct units *u, *partial_unit; + size_t u_len; + unsigned partial; + int no_val_p = 0; + + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p) || *p == ',') + ++p; + + val = strtod (p, &next); /* strtol(p, &next, 0); */ + if (p == next) { + val = 0; + if(!accept_no_val_p) + return -1; + no_val_p = 1; + } + p = next; + while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '\0') { + res = (*func)(res, val, def_mult); + if (res < 0) + return res; + break; + } else if (*p == '+') { + ++p; + val = 1; + } else if (*p == '-') { + ++p; + val = -1; + } + if (no_val_p && val == 0) + val = 1; + u_len = strcspn (p, ", \t"); + partial = 0; + partial_unit = NULL; + if (u_len > 1 && p[u_len - 1] == 's') + --u_len; + for (u = units; u->name; ++u) { + if (strncasecmp (p, u->name, u_len) == 0) { + if (u_len == strlen (u->name)) { + p += u_len; + res = (*func)(res, val, u->mult); + if (res < 0) + return res; + break; + } else { + ++partial; + partial_unit = u; + } + } + } + if (u->name == NULL) { + if (partial == 1) { + p += u_len; + res = (*func)(res, val, partial_unit->mult); + if (res < 0) + return res; + } else { + return -1; + } + } + if (*p == 's') + ++p; + } + return res; +} + +/* + * The string consists of a sequence of `n unit' + */ + +static int +acc_units(int res, int val, unsigned mult) +{ + return res + val * mult; +} + +int +parse_units (const char *s, const struct units *units, + const char *def_unit) +{ + return parse_something (s, units, def_unit, acc_units, 0, 0); +} + +/* + * The string consists of a sequence of `[+-]flag'. `orig' consists + * the original set of flags, those are then modified and returned as + * the function value. + */ + +static int +acc_flags(int res, int val, unsigned mult) +{ + if(val == 1) + return res | mult; + else if(val == -1) + return res & ~mult; + else if (val == 0) + return mult; + else + return -1; +} + +int +parse_flags (const char *s, const struct units *units, + int orig) +{ + return parse_something (s, units, NULL, acc_flags, orig, 1); +} + +/* + * Return a string representation according to `units' of `num' in `s' + * with maximum length `len'. The actual length is the function value. + */ + +static int +unparse_something (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len, + int (*print) (char *s, size_t len, int div, + const char *name, int rem), + int (*update) (int in, unsigned mult), + const char *zero_string) +{ + const struct units *u; + int ret = 0, tmp; + + if (num == 0) + return snprintf (s, len, "%s", zero_string); + + for (u = units; num > 0 && u->name; ++u) { + int div; + + div = num / u->mult; + if (div) { + num = (*update) (num, u->mult); + tmp = (*print) (s, len, div, u->name, num); + if (tmp < 0) + return tmp; + + len -= tmp; + s += tmp; + ret += tmp; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static int +print_unit (char *s, size_t len, int div, const char *name, int rem) +{ + return snprintf (s, len, "%u %s%s%s", + div, name, + div == 1 ? "" : "s", + rem > 0 ? " " : ""); +} + +static int +update_unit (int in, unsigned mult) +{ + return in % mult; +} + +static int +update_unit_approx (int in, unsigned mult) +{ + if (in / mult > 0) + return 0; + else + return update_unit (in, mult); +} + +int +unparse_units (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_something (num, units, s, len, + print_unit, + update_unit, + "0"); +} + +int +unparse_units_approx (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_something (num, units, s, len, + print_unit, + update_unit_approx, + "0"); +} + +void +print_units_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f) +{ + const struct units *u, *u2; + unsigned max_sz = 0; + + for (u = units; u->name; ++u) { + max_sz = max(max_sz, strlen(u->name)); + } + + for (u = units; u->name;) { + char buf[1024]; + const struct units *next; + + for (next = u + 1; next->name && next->mult == u->mult; ++next) + ; + + if (next->name) { + for (u2 = next; + u2->name && u->mult % u2->mult != 0; + ++u2) + ; + if (u2->name == NULL) + --u2; + unparse_units (u->mult, u2, buf, sizeof(buf)); + fprintf (f, "1 %*s = %s\n", max_sz, u->name, buf); + } else { + fprintf (f, "1 %s\n", u->name); + } + u = next; + } +} + +static int +print_flag (char *s, size_t len, int div, const char *name, int rem) +{ + return snprintf (s, len, "%s%s", name, rem > 0 ? ", " : ""); +} + +static int +update_flag (int in, unsigned mult) +{ + return in - mult; +} + +int +unparse_flags (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_something (num, units, s, len, + print_flag, + update_flag, + ""); +} + +void +print_flags_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f) +{ + const struct units *u; + + for(u = units; u->name; ++u) + fprintf(f, "%s%s", u->name, (u+1)->name ? ", " : "\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_units.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_units.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2002625267 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/parse_units.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse_units.h,v 1.8 2003/04/16 17:30:54 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __PARSE_UNITS_H__ +#define __PARSE_UNITS_H__ + +#include +#include + +struct units { + const char *name; + unsigned mult; +}; + +int +parse_units (const char *s, const struct units *units, + const char *def_unit); + +void +print_units_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f); + +int +parse_flags (const char *s, const struct units *units, + int orig); + +int +unparse_units (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len); + +int +unparse_units_approx (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, + size_t len); + +int +unparse_flags (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len); + +void +print_flags_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f); + +#endif /* __PARSE_UNITS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/print_version.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/print_version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b5ce816eb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/print_version.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: print_version.c,v 1.8 2001/02/20 01:44:55 assar Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#include "print_version.h" + +void +print_version(const char *progname) +{ + const char *arg[] = VERSIONLIST; + const int num_args = sizeof(arg) / sizeof(arg[0]); + char *msg; + size_t len = 0; + int i; + + if(progname == NULL) + progname = getprogname(); + + if(num_args == 0) + msg = "no version information"; + else { + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++) { + if(i > 0) + len += 2; + len += strlen(arg[i]); + } + msg = malloc(len + 1); + if(msg == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", progname); + return; + } + msg[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++) { + if(i > 0) + strcat(msg, ", "); + strcat(msg, arg[i]); + } + } + fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s)\n", progname, msg); + fprintf(stderr, "Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan\n"); + if(num_args != 0) + free(msg); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/putenv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/putenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6bdf6001d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/putenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: putenv.c,v 1.7 2000/03/26 23:08:24 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +extern char **environ; + +/* + * putenv -- + * String points to a string of the form name=value. + * + * Makes the value of the environment variable name equal to + * value by altering an existing variable or creating a new one. + */ + +int +putenv(const char *string) +{ + int i; + const char *eq = (const char *)strchr(string, '='); + int len; + + if (eq == NULL) + return 1; + len = eq - string; + + if(environ == NULL) { + environ = malloc(sizeof(char*)); + if(environ == NULL) + return 1; + environ[0] = NULL; + } + + for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) + if(strncmp(string, environ[i], len) == 0) { + environ[i] = string; + return 0; + } + environ = realloc(environ, sizeof(char*) * (i + 2)); + if(environ == NULL) + return 1; + environ[i] = string; + environ[i+1] = NULL; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rcmd.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rcmd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41179484bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rcmd.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: rcmd.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include + +int +rcmd(char **ahost, + unsigned short inport, + const char *locuser, + const char *remuser, + const char *cmd, + int *fd2p) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Only kerberized services are implemented\n"); + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/readv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/readv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..de2f9ea8af --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/readv.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: readv.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +readv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) +{ + ssize_t ret, nb; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + + for(i = 0; i < iovcnt; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + nb = ret = read (d, buf, tot); + p = buf; + while (nb > 0) { + ssize_t cnt = min(nb, iov->iov_len); + + memcpy (iov->iov_base, p, cnt); + p += cnt; + nb -= cnt; + } + free(buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/recvmsg.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/recvmsg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e94ad68c80 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/recvmsg.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: recvmsg.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +recvmsg(int s, struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +{ + ssize_t ret, nb; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + struct iovec *iov = msg->msg_iov; + + for(i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + nb = ret = recvfrom (s, buf, tot, flags, msg->msg_name, &msg->msg_namelen); + p = buf; + while (nb > 0) { + ssize_t cnt = min(nb, iov->iov_len); + + memcpy (iov->iov_base, p, cnt); + p += cnt; + nb -= cnt; + ++iov; + } + free(buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resolve.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resolve.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cdbc069e36 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resolve.c @@ -0,0 +1,664 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +#include "resolve.h" + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: resolve.c,v 1.38.2.1 2003/04/22 15:02:47 lha Exp $"); + +#undef HAVE_RES_NSEARCH +#if (defined(HAVE_RES_SEARCH) || defined(HAVE_RES_NSEARCH)) && defined(HAVE_DN_EXPAND) + +#define DECL(X) {#X, T_##X} + +static struct stot{ + const char *name; + int type; +}stot[] = { + DECL(A), + DECL(NS), + DECL(CNAME), + DECL(SOA), + DECL(PTR), + DECL(MX), + DECL(TXT), + DECL(AFSDB), + DECL(SIG), + DECL(KEY), + DECL(SRV), + DECL(NAPTR), + {NULL, 0} +}; + +int _resolve_debug = 0; + +int +dns_string_to_type(const char *name) +{ + struct stot *p = stot; + for(p = stot; p->name; p++) + if(strcasecmp(name, p->name) == 0) + return p->type; + return -1; +} + +const char * +dns_type_to_string(int type) +{ + struct stot *p = stot; + for(p = stot; p->name; p++) + if(type == p->type) + return p->name; + return NULL; +} + +void +dns_free_data(struct dns_reply *r) +{ + struct resource_record *rr; + if(r->q.domain) + free(r->q.domain); + for(rr = r->head; rr;){ + struct resource_record *tmp = rr; + if(rr->domain) + free(rr->domain); + if(rr->u.data) + free(rr->u.data); + rr = rr->next; + free(tmp); + } + free (r); +} + +static int +parse_record(const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char **pp, struct resource_record **rr) +{ + int type, class, ttl, size; + int status; + char host[MAXDNAME]; + const unsigned char *p = *pp; + status = dn_expand(data, end_data, p, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0) + return -1; + if (p + status + 10 > end_data) + return -1; + p += status; + type = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + p += 2; + class = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + p += 2; + ttl = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + p += 4; + size = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + if (p + size > end_data) + return -1; + + *rr = calloc(1, sizeof(**rr)); + if(*rr == NULL) + return -1; + (*rr)->domain = strdup(host); + if((*rr)->domain == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + (*rr)->type = type; + (*rr)->class = class; + (*rr)->ttl = ttl; + (*rr)->size = size; + switch(type){ + case T_NS: + case T_CNAME: + case T_PTR: + status = dn_expand(data, end_data, p, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + (*rr)->u.txt = strdup(host); + if((*rr)->u.txt == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + break; + case T_MX: + case T_AFSDB:{ + size_t hostlen; + + status = dn_expand(data, end_data, p + 2, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + if (status + 2 > size) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + hostlen = strlen(host); + (*rr)->u.mx = (struct mx_record*)malloc(sizeof(struct mx_record) + + hostlen); + if((*rr)->u.mx == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + (*rr)->u.mx->preference = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + strlcpy((*rr)->u.mx->domain, host, hostlen + 1); + break; + } + case T_SRV:{ + size_t hostlen; + status = dn_expand(data, end_data, p + 6, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + if (status + 6 > size) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + hostlen = strlen(host); + (*rr)->u.srv = + (struct srv_record*)malloc(sizeof(struct srv_record) + + hostlen); + if((*rr)->u.srv == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + (*rr)->u.srv->priority = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + (*rr)->u.srv->weight = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + (*rr)->u.srv->port = (p[4] << 8) | p[5]; + strlcpy((*rr)->u.srv->target, host, hostlen + 1); + break; + } + case T_TXT:{ + if(size == 0 || size < *p + 1) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + (*rr)->u.txt = (char*)malloc(*p + 1); + if((*rr)->u.txt == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + strncpy((*rr)->u.txt, (char*)p + 1, *p); + (*rr)->u.txt[*p] = '\0'; + break; + } + case T_KEY : { + size_t key_len; + + if (size < 4) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + key_len = size - 4; + (*rr)->u.key = malloc (sizeof(*(*rr)->u.key) + key_len - 1); + if ((*rr)->u.key == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + (*rr)->u.key->flags = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + (*rr)->u.key->protocol = p[2]; + (*rr)->u.key->algorithm = p[3]; + (*rr)->u.key->key_len = key_len; + memcpy ((*rr)->u.key->key_data, p + 4, key_len); + break; + } + case T_SIG : { + size_t sig_len, hostlen; + + if(size <= 18) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + status = dn_expand (data, end_data, p + 18, host, sizeof(host)); + if (status < 0) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + if (status + 18 > size) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + /* the signer name is placed after the sig_data, to make it + easy to free this struture; the size calculation below + includes the zero-termination if the structure itself. + don't you just love C? + */ + sig_len = size - 18 - status; + hostlen = strlen(host); + (*rr)->u.sig = malloc(sizeof(*(*rr)->u.sig) + + hostlen + sig_len); + if ((*rr)->u.sig == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + (*rr)->u.sig->type = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + (*rr)->u.sig->algorithm = p[2]; + (*rr)->u.sig->labels = p[3]; + (*rr)->u.sig->orig_ttl = (p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) + | (p[6] << 8) | p[7]; + (*rr)->u.sig->sig_expiration = (p[8] << 24) | (p[9] << 16) + | (p[10] << 8) | p[11]; + (*rr)->u.sig->sig_inception = (p[12] << 24) | (p[13] << 16) + | (p[14] << 8) | p[15]; + (*rr)->u.sig->key_tag = (p[16] << 8) | p[17]; + (*rr)->u.sig->sig_len = sig_len; + memcpy ((*rr)->u.sig->sig_data, p + 18 + status, sig_len); + (*rr)->u.sig->signer = &(*rr)->u.sig->sig_data[sig_len]; + strlcpy((*rr)->u.sig->signer, host, hostlen + 1); + break; + } + + case T_CERT : { + size_t cert_len; + + if (size < 5) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + cert_len = size - 5; + (*rr)->u.cert = malloc (sizeof(*(*rr)->u.cert) + cert_len - 1); + if ((*rr)->u.cert == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + + (*rr)->u.cert->type = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + (*rr)->u.cert->tag = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + (*rr)->u.cert->algorithm = p[4]; + (*rr)->u.cert->cert_len = cert_len; + memcpy ((*rr)->u.cert->cert_data, p + 5, cert_len); + break; + } + default: + (*rr)->u.data = (unsigned char*)malloc(size); + if(size != 0 && (*rr)->u.data == NULL) { + free(*rr); + return -1; + } + memcpy((*rr)->u.data, p, size); + } + *pp = p + size; + return 0; +} + +#ifndef TEST_RESOLVE +static +#endif +struct dns_reply* +parse_reply(const unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + int status; + int i; + char host[MAXDNAME]; + const unsigned char *end_data = data + len; + struct dns_reply *r; + struct resource_record **rr; + + r = calloc(1, sizeof(*r)); + if (r == NULL) + return NULL; + + p = data; +#if 0 + /* doesn't work on Crays */ + memcpy(&r->h, p, sizeof(HEADER)); + p += sizeof(HEADER); +#else + memcpy(&r->h, p, 12); /* XXX this will probably be mostly garbage */ + p += 12; +#endif + if(ntohs(r->h.qdcount) != 1) { + free(r); + return NULL; + } + status = dn_expand(data, end_data, p, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + r->q.domain = strdup(host); + if(r->q.domain == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + if (p + status + 4 > end_data) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + p += status; + r->q.type = (p[0] << 8 | p[1]); + p += 2; + r->q.class = (p[0] << 8 | p[1]); + p += 2; + + rr = &r->head; + for(i = 0; i < ntohs(r->h.ancount); i++) { + if(parse_record(data, end_data, &p, rr) != 0) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + rr = &(*rr)->next; + } + for(i = 0; i < ntohs(r->h.nscount); i++) { + if(parse_record(data, end_data, &p, rr) != 0) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + rr = &(*rr)->next; + } + for(i = 0; i < ntohs(r->h.arcount); i++) { + if(parse_record(data, end_data, &p, rr) != 0) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + rr = &(*rr)->next; + } + *rr = NULL; + return r; +} + +static struct dns_reply * +dns_lookup_int(const char *domain, int rr_class, int rr_type) +{ + unsigned char reply[1024]; + int len; +#ifdef HAVE_RES_NSEARCH + struct __res_state stat; + memset(&stat, 0, sizeof(stat)); + if(res_ninit(&stat)) + return NULL; /* is this the best we can do? */ +#elif defined(HAVE__RES) + u_long old_options = 0; +#endif + + if (_resolve_debug) { +#ifdef HAVE_RES_NSEARCH + stat.options |= RES_DEBUG; +#elif defined(HAVE__RES) + old_options = _res.options; + _res.options |= RES_DEBUG; +#endif + fprintf(stderr, "dns_lookup(%s, %d, %s)\n", domain, + rr_class, dns_type_to_string(rr_type)); + } +#ifdef HAVE_RES_NSEARCH + len = res_nsearch(&stat, domain, rr_class, rr_type, reply, sizeof(reply)); +#else + len = res_search(domain, rr_class, rr_type, reply, sizeof(reply)); +#endif + if (_resolve_debug) { +#if defined(HAVE__RES) && !defined(HAVE_RES_NSEARCH) + _res.options = old_options; +#endif + fprintf(stderr, "dns_lookup(%s, %d, %s) --> %d\n", + domain, rr_class, dns_type_to_string(rr_type), len); + } +#ifdef HAVE_RES_NSEARCH + res_nclose(&stat); +#endif + if(len < 0) { + return NULL; + } else { + len = min(len, sizeof(reply)); + return parse_reply(reply, len); + } +} + +struct dns_reply * +dns_lookup(const char *domain, const char *type_name) +{ + int type; + + type = dns_string_to_type(type_name); + if(type == -1) { + if(_resolve_debug) + fprintf(stderr, "dns_lookup: unknown resource type: `%s'\n", + type_name); + return NULL; + } + return dns_lookup_int(domain, C_IN, type); +} + +static int +compare_srv(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + const struct resource_record *const* aa = a, *const* bb = b; + + if((*aa)->u.srv->priority == (*bb)->u.srv->priority) + return ((*aa)->u.srv->weight - (*bb)->u.srv->weight); + return ((*aa)->u.srv->priority - (*bb)->u.srv->priority); +} + +#ifndef HAVE_RANDOM +#define random() rand() +#endif + +/* try to rearrange the srv-records by the algorithm in RFC2782 */ +void +dns_srv_order(struct dns_reply *r) +{ + struct resource_record **srvs, **ss, **headp; + struct resource_record *rr; + int num_srv = 0; + +#if defined(HAVE_INITSTATE) && defined(HAVE_SETSTATE) + int state[256 / sizeof(int)]; + char *oldstate; +#endif + + for(rr = r->head; rr; rr = rr->next) + if(rr->type == T_SRV) + num_srv++; + + if(num_srv == 0) + return; + + srvs = malloc(num_srv * sizeof(*srvs)); + if(srvs == NULL) + return; /* XXX not much to do here */ + + /* unlink all srv-records from the linked list and put them in + a vector */ + for(ss = srvs, headp = &r->head; *headp; ) + if((*headp)->type == T_SRV) { + *ss = *headp; + *headp = (*headp)->next; + (*ss)->next = NULL; + ss++; + } else + headp = &(*headp)->next; + + /* sort them by priority and weight */ + qsort(srvs, num_srv, sizeof(*srvs), compare_srv); + +#if defined(HAVE_INITSTATE) && defined(HAVE_SETSTATE) + oldstate = initstate(time(NULL), (char*)state, sizeof(state)); +#endif + + headp = &r->head; + + for(ss = srvs; ss < srvs + num_srv; ) { + int sum, rnd, count; + struct resource_record **ee, **tt; + /* find the last record with the same priority and count the + sum of all weights */ + for(sum = 0, tt = ss; tt < srvs + num_srv; tt++) { + if(*tt == NULL) + continue; + if((*tt)->u.srv->priority != (*ss)->u.srv->priority) + break; + sum += (*tt)->u.srv->weight; + } + ee = tt; + /* ss is now the first record of this priority and ee is the + first of the next */ + while(ss < ee) { + rnd = random() % (sum + 1); + for(count = 0, tt = ss; ; tt++) { + if(*tt == NULL) + continue; + count += (*tt)->u.srv->weight; + if(count >= rnd) + break; + } + + assert(tt < ee); + + /* insert the selected record at the tail (of the head) of + the list */ + (*tt)->next = *headp; + *headp = *tt; + headp = &(*tt)->next; + sum -= (*tt)->u.srv->weight; + *tt = NULL; + while(ss < ee && *ss == NULL) + ss++; + } + } + +#if defined(HAVE_INITSTATE) && defined(HAVE_SETSTATE) + setstate(oldstate); +#endif + free(srvs); + return; +} + +#else /* NOT defined(HAVE_RES_SEARCH) && defined(HAVE_DN_EXPAND) */ + +struct dns_reply * +dns_lookup(const char *domain, const char *type_name) +{ + return NULL; +} + +void +dns_free_data(struct dns_reply *r) +{ +} + +void +dns_srv_order(struct dns_reply *r) +{ +} + +#endif + +#ifdef TEST +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct dns_reply *r; + struct resource_record *rr; + r = dns_lookup(argv[1], argv[2]); + if(r == NULL){ + printf("No reply.\n"); + return 1; + } + if(r->q.type == T_SRV) + dns_srv_order(r); + + for(rr = r->head; rr;rr=rr->next){ + printf("%-30s %-5s %-6d ", rr->domain, dns_type_to_string(rr->type), rr->ttl); + switch(rr->type){ + case T_NS: + case T_CNAME: + case T_PTR: + printf("%s\n", (char*)rr->u.data); + break; + case T_A: + printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(*rr->u.a)); + break; + case T_MX: + case T_AFSDB:{ + printf("%d %s\n", rr->u.mx->preference, rr->u.mx->domain); + break; + } + case T_SRV:{ + struct srv_record *srv = rr->u.srv; + printf("%d %d %d %s\n", srv->priority, srv->weight, + srv->port, srv->target); + break; + } + case T_TXT: { + printf("%s\n", rr->u.txt); + break; + } + case T_SIG : { + struct sig_record *sig = rr->u.sig; + const char *type_string = dns_type_to_string (sig->type); + + printf ("type %u (%s), algorithm %u, labels %u, orig_ttl %u, sig_expiration %u, sig_inception %u, key_tag %u, signer %s\n", + sig->type, type_string ? type_string : "", + sig->algorithm, sig->labels, sig->orig_ttl, + sig->sig_expiration, sig->sig_inception, sig->key_tag, + sig->signer); + break; + } + case T_KEY : { + struct key_record *key = rr->u.key; + + printf ("flags %u, protocol %u, algorithm %u\n", + key->flags, key->protocol, key->algorithm); + break; + } + default: + printf("\n"); + break; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resolve.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resolve.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb25b7ab44 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resolve.h @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: resolve.h,v 1.15 2002/08/26 13:30:16 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __RESOLVE_H__ +#define __RESOLVE_H__ + +/* We use these, but they are not always present in */ + +#ifndef T_TXT +#define T_TXT 16 +#endif +#ifndef T_AFSDB +#define T_AFSDB 18 +#endif +#ifndef T_SIG +#define T_SIG 24 +#endif +#ifndef T_KEY +#define T_KEY 25 +#endif +#ifndef T_AAAA +#define T_AAAA 28 +#endif +#ifndef T_SRV +#define T_SRV 33 +#endif +#ifndef T_NAPTR +#define T_NAPTR 35 +#endif +#ifndef T_CERT +#define T_CERT 37 +#endif + +#define dns_query rk_dns_query +#define mx_record rk_mx_record +#define srv_record rk_srv_record +#define key_record rk_key_record +#define sig_record rk_sig_record +#define cert_record rk_cert_record +#define resource_record rk_resource_record +#define dns_reply rk_dns_reply + +#define dns_lookup rk_dns_lookup +#define dns_free_data rk_dns_free_data +#define dns_string_to_type rk_dns_string_to_type +#define dns_type_to_string rk_dns_type_to_string +#define dns_srv_order rk_dns_srv_order + +struct dns_query{ + char *domain; + unsigned type; + unsigned class; +}; + +struct mx_record{ + unsigned preference; + char domain[1]; +}; + +struct srv_record{ + unsigned priority; + unsigned weight; + unsigned port; + char target[1]; +}; + +struct key_record { + unsigned flags; + unsigned protocol; + unsigned algorithm; + size_t key_len; + u_char key_data[1]; +}; + +struct sig_record { + unsigned type; + unsigned algorithm; + unsigned labels; + unsigned orig_ttl; + unsigned sig_expiration; + unsigned sig_inception; + unsigned key_tag; + char *signer; + unsigned sig_len; + char sig_data[1]; /* also includes signer */ +}; + +struct cert_record { + unsigned type; + unsigned tag; + unsigned algorithm; + size_t cert_len; + u_char cert_data[1]; +}; + +struct resource_record{ + char *domain; + unsigned type; + unsigned class; + unsigned ttl; + unsigned size; + union { + void *data; + struct mx_record *mx; + struct mx_record *afsdb; /* mx and afsdb are identical */ + struct srv_record *srv; + struct in_addr *a; + char *txt; + struct key_record *key; + struct cert_record *cert; + struct sig_record *sig; + }u; + struct resource_record *next; +}; + +#ifndef T_A /* XXX if isn't included */ +typedef int HEADER; /* will never be used */ +#endif + +struct dns_reply{ + HEADER h; + struct dns_query q; + struct resource_record *head; +}; + + +struct dns_reply* dns_lookup(const char *, const char *); +void dns_free_data(struct dns_reply *); +int dns_string_to_type(const char *name); +const char *dns_type_to_string(int type); +void dns_srv_order(struct dns_reply*); + +#endif /* __RESOLVE_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resource.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resource.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01cd01d76c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/resource.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +//{{NO_DEPENDENCIES}} +// Microsoft Developer Studio generated include file. +// Used by roken.rc +// + +// Next default values for new objects +// +#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +#ifndef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS +#define _APS_NEXT_RESOURCE_VALUE 101 +#define _APS_NEXT_COMMAND_VALUE 40001 +#define _APS_NEXT_CONTROL_VALUE 1000 +#define _APS_NEXT_SYMED_VALUE 101 +#endif +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken-common.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken-common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f6d6ccea1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken-common.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken-common.h,v 1.51.6.1 2004/01/15 18:15:05 lha Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ROKEN_COMMON_H__ +#define __ROKEN_COMMON_H__ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +#define ROKEN_CPP_START extern "C" { +#define ROKEN_CPP_END } +#else +#define ROKEN_CPP_START +#define ROKEN_CPP_END +#endif + +#ifndef INADDR_NONE +#define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff +#endif + +#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK +#define INADDR_LOOPBACK 0x7f000001 +#endif + +#ifndef SOMAXCONN +#define SOMAXCONN 5 +#endif + +#ifndef STDIN_FILENO +#define STDIN_FILENO 0 +#endif + +#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO +#define STDOUT_FILENO 1 +#endif + +#ifndef STDERR_FILENO +#define STDERR_FILENO 2 +#endif + +#ifndef max +#define max(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef min +#define min(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#endif + +#ifndef FALSE +#define FALSE 0 +#endif + +#ifndef LOG_DAEMON +#define openlog(id,option,facility) openlog((id),(option)) +#define LOG_DAEMON 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_ODELAY +#define LOG_ODELAY 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_NDELAY +#define LOG_NDELAY 0x08 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_CONS +#define LOG_CONS 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_AUTH +#define LOG_AUTH 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_AUTHPRIV +#define LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_AUTH +#endif + +#ifndef F_OK +#define F_OK 0 +#endif + +#ifndef O_ACCMODE +#define O_ACCMODE 003 +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEV +#define _PATH_DEV "/dev/" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL +#define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_HEQUIV +#define _PATH_HEQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_VARRUN +#define _PATH_VARRUN "/var/run/" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifndef MAXPATHLEN +#define MAXPATHLEN (1024+4) +#endif + +#ifndef SIG_ERR +#define SIG_ERR ((RETSIGTYPE (*)(int))-1) +#endif + +/* + * error code for getipnodeby{name,addr} + */ + +#ifndef HOST_NOT_FOUND +#define HOST_NOT_FOUND 1 +#endif + +#ifndef TRY_AGAIN +#define TRY_AGAIN 2 +#endif + +#ifndef NO_RECOVERY +#define NO_RECOVERY 3 +#endif + +#ifndef NO_DATA +#define NO_DATA 4 +#endif + +#ifndef NO_ADDRESS +#define NO_ADDRESS NO_DATA +#endif + +/* + * error code for getaddrinfo + */ + +#ifndef EAI_NOERROR +#define EAI_NOERROR 0 /* no error */ +#endif + +#ifndef EAI_NONAME + +#define EAI_ADDRFAMILY 1 /* address family for nodename not supported */ +#define EAI_AGAIN 2 /* temporary failure in name resolution */ +#define EAI_BADFLAGS 3 /* invalid value for ai_flags */ +#define EAI_FAIL 4 /* non-recoverable failure in name resolution */ +#define EAI_FAMILY 5 /* ai_family not supported */ +#define EAI_MEMORY 6 /* memory allocation failure */ +#define EAI_NODATA 7 /* no address associated with nodename */ +#define EAI_NONAME 8 /* nodename nor servname provided, or not known */ +#define EAI_SERVICE 9 /* servname not supported for ai_socktype */ +#define EAI_SOCKTYPE 10 /* ai_socktype not supported */ +#define EAI_SYSTEM 11 /* system error returned in errno */ + +#endif /* EAI_NONAME */ + +/* flags for getaddrinfo() */ + +#ifndef AI_PASSIVE +#define AI_PASSIVE 0x01 +#define AI_CANONNAME 0x02 +#endif /* AI_PASSIVE */ + +#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST +#define AI_NUMERICHOST 0x04 +#endif + +/* flags for getnameinfo() */ + +#ifndef NI_DGRAM +#define NI_DGRAM 0x01 +#define NI_NAMEREQD 0x02 +#define NI_NOFQDN 0x04 +#define NI_NUMERICHOST 0x08 +#define NI_NUMERICSERV 0x10 +#endif + +/* + * constants for getnameinfo + */ + +#ifndef NI_MAXHOST +#define NI_MAXHOST 1025 +#define NI_MAXSERV 32 +#endif + +/* + * constants for inet_ntop + */ + +#ifndef INET_ADDRSTRLEN +#define INET_ADDRSTRLEN 16 +#endif + +#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN +#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 +#endif + +/* + * for shutdown(2) + */ + +#ifndef SHUT_RD +#define SHUT_RD 0 +#endif + +#ifndef SHUT_WR +#define SHUT_WR 1 +#endif + +#ifndef SHUT_RDWR +#define SHUT_RDWR 2 +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +ROKEN_CPP_START + +#ifndef IRIX4 /* fix for compiler bug */ +#ifdef RETSIGTYPE +typedef RETSIGTYPE (*SigAction)(int); +SigAction signal(int iSig, SigAction pAction); /* BSD compatible */ +#endif +#endif + +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execve(const char*, char*const[], char*const[]); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execvp(const char*, char *const[]); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execlp(const char*, ...); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execle(const char*, ...); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execl(const char *file, ...); + +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION wait_for_process(pid_t); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION pipe_execv(FILE**, FILE**, FILE**, const char*, ...); + +void ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION print_version(const char *); + +ssize_t ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION eread (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes); +ssize_t ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION ewrite (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +struct hostent; + +const char * +hostent_find_fqdn (const struct hostent *he); + +void +esetenv(const char *var, const char *val, int rewrite); + +void +socket_set_address_and_port (struct sockaddr *sa, const void *ptr, int port); + +size_t +socket_addr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa); + +void +socket_set_any (struct sockaddr *sa, int af); + +size_t +socket_sockaddr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa); + +void * +socket_get_address (struct sockaddr *sa); + +int +socket_get_port (const struct sockaddr *sa); + +void +socket_set_port (struct sockaddr *sa, int port); + +void +socket_set_portrange (int sock, int restr, int af); + +void +socket_set_debug (int sock); + +void +socket_set_tos (int sock, int tos); + +void +socket_set_reuseaddr (int sock, int val); + +char ** +vstrcollect(va_list *ap); + +char ** +strcollect(char *first, ...); + +void timevalfix(struct timeval *t1); +void timevaladd(struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2); +void timevalsub(struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2); + +char *pid_file_write (const char *progname); +void pid_file_delete (char **); + +int +read_environment(const char *file, char ***env); + +void warnerr(int doerrno, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))); + +ROKEN_CPP_END + +#endif /* __ROKEN_COMMON_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken.awk b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken.awk new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c1e0c071e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken.awk @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +# $Id: roken.awk,v 1.9 2003/03/04 10:37:26 lha Exp $ + +BEGIN { + print "#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H" + print "#include " + print "#endif" + print "#include " + print "" + print "int main(int argc, char **argv)" + print "{" + print "puts(\"/* This is an OS dependent, generated file */\");" + print "puts(\"\\n\");" + print "puts(\"#ifndef __ROKEN_H__\");" + print "puts(\"#define __ROKEN_H__\");" + print "puts(\"\");" +} + +$1 == "\#ifdef" || $1 == "\#ifndef" || $1 == "\#if" || $1 == "\#else" || $1 == "\#elif" || $1 == "\#endif" || $1 == "#ifdef" || $1 == "#ifndef" || $1 == "#if" || $1 == "#else" || $1 == "#elif" || $1 == "#endif" { + print $0; + next +} + +{ + s = "" + for(i = 1; i <= length; i++){ + x = substr($0, i, 1) + if(x == "\"" || x == "\\") + s = s "\\"; + s = s x; + } + print "puts(\"" s "\");" +} + +END { + print "puts(\"#define ROKEN_VERSION \" VERSION );" + print "puts(\"\");" + print "puts(\"#endif /* __ROKEN_H__ */\");" + print "return 0;" + print "}" +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken.h.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken.h.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16fc6d844f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken.h.in @@ -0,0 +1,682 @@ +/* -*- C -*- */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken.h.in,v 1.169 2002/08/26 21:43:38 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef _AIX +struct ether_addr; +struct sockaddr_dl; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + + +#ifndef ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION +#if defined(__BORLANDC__) +#define ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION /* not-ready-definition-yet */ +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#define ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION /* not-ready-definition-yet2 */ +#else +#define ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T +typedef int ssize_t; +#endif + +#include + +ROKEN_CPP_START + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETSID) && defined(HAVE__SETSID) +#define setsid _setsid +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_PUTENV +int putenv(const char *string); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || defined(NEED_SETENV_PROTO) +int setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int rewrite); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) || defined(NEED_UNSETENV_PROTO) +void unsetenv(const char *name); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETUSERSHELL) || defined(NEED_GETUSERSHELL_PROTO) +char *getusershell(void); +void endusershell(void); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_SNPRINTF_PROTO) +int snprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_VSNPRINTF_PROTO) +int vsnprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 3, 0))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ASPRINTF) || defined(NEED_ASPRINTF_PROTO) +int asprintf (char **ret, const char *format, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || defined(NEED_VASPRINTF_PROTO) +int vasprintf (char **ret, const char *format, va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 2, 0))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ASNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_ASNPRINTF_PROTO) +int asnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_VASNPRINTF_PROTO) +int vasnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 3, 0))); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +char * strdup(const char *old); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRNDUP) || defined(NEED_STRNDUP_PROTO) +char * strndup(const char *old, size_t sz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLWR +char * strlwr(char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN +size_t strnlen(const char*, size_t); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) || defined(NEED_STRSEP_PROTO) +char *strsep(char**, const char*); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP_COPY) || defined(NEED_STRSEP_COPY_PROTO) +ssize_t strsep_copy(const char**, const char*, char*, size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASECMP +int strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2); +#endif + +#ifdef NEED_FCLOSE_PROTO +int fclose(FILE *); +#endif + +#ifdef NEED_STRTOK_R_PROTO +char *strtok_r(char *s1, const char *s2, char **lasts); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUPR +char * strupr(char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY +size_t strlcpy (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT +size_t strlcat (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETDTABLESIZE +int getdtablesize(void); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && !defined(strerror) +char *strerror(int eno); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_HSTRERROR) || defined(NEED_HSTRERROR_PROTO) +/* This causes a fatal error under Psoriasis */ +#if !(defined(SunOS) && (SunOS >= 50)) +const char *hstrerror(int herr); +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRNO_DECLARATION +extern int h_errno; +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) || defined(NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO) +int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *adr); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_PTON +int +inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) +char* getcwd(char *path, size_t size); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +struct passwd *k_getpwnam (const char *user); +struct passwd *k_getpwuid (uid_t uid); +#endif + +const char *get_default_username (void); + +#ifndef HAVE_SETEUID +int seteuid(uid_t euid); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETEGID +int setegid(gid_t egid); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_LSTAT +int lstat(const char *path, struct stat *buf); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_MKSTEMP) || defined(NEED_MKSTEMP_PROTO) +int mkstemp(char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_CGETENT +int cgetent(char **buf, char **db_array, const char *name); +int cgetstr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INITGROUPS +int initgroups(const char *name, gid_t basegid); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWN +int fchown(int fd, uid_t owner, gid_t group); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON +int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR +int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *machine, + const char *user, const char *domain); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_CHOWN +int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_RCMD +int rcmd(char **ahost, unsigned short inport, const char *locuser, + const char *remuser, const char *cmd, int *fd2p); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_INNETGR) || defined(NEED_INNETGR_PROTO) +int innetgr(const char*, const char*, const char*, const char*); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_IRUSEROK +int iruserok(unsigned raddr, int superuser, const char *ruser, + const char *luser); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETHOSTNAME) || defined(NEED_GETHOSTNAME_PROTO) +int gethostname(char *name, int namelen); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_WRITEV +ssize_t +writev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_READV +ssize_t +readv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_MKSTEMP +int +mkstemp(char *template); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_PIDFILE +void pidfile (const char*); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BSWAP32 +unsigned int bswap32(unsigned int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BSWAP16 +unsigned short bswap16(unsigned short); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK +#ifndef LOCK_SH +#define LOCK_SH 1 /* Shared lock */ +#endif +#ifndef LOCK_EX +#define LOCK_EX 2 /* Exclusive lock */ +#endif +#ifndef LOCK_NB +#define LOCK_NB 4 /* Don't block when locking */ +#endif +#ifndef LOCK_UN +#define LOCK_UN 8 /* Unlock */ +#endif + +int flock(int fd, int operation); +#endif /* HAVE_FLOCK */ + +time_t tm2time (struct tm tm, int local); + +int unix_verify_user(char *user, char *password); + +int roken_concat (char *s, size_t len, ...); + +size_t roken_mconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, ...); + +int roken_vconcat (char *s, size_t len, va_list args); + +size_t roken_vmconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, va_list args); + +ssize_t net_write (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +ssize_t net_read (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +int issuid(void); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE +struct winsize { + unsigned short ws_row, ws_col; + unsigned short ws_xpixel, ws_ypixel; +}; +#endif + +int get_window_size(int fd, struct winsize *); + +#ifndef HAVE_VSYSLOG +void vsyslog(int pri, const char *fmt, va_list ap); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_OPTARG_DECLARATION +extern char *optarg; +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_OPTIND_DECLARATION +extern int optind; +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_OPTERR_DECLARATION +extern int opterr; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME_DECLARATION +extern const char *__progname; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ENVIRON_DECLARATION +extern char **environ; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYNAME +struct hostent * +getipnodebyname (const char *name, int af, int flags, int *error_num); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYADDR +struct hostent * +getipnodebyaddr (const void *src, size_t len, int af, int *error_num); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEHOSTENT +void +freehostent (struct hostent *h); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_COPYHOSTENT +struct hostent * +copyhostent (const struct hostent *h); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SOCKLEN_T +typedef int socklen_t; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE + +#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +typedef unsigned short sa_family_t; +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 +#define _SS_MAXSIZE sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) +#else +#define _SS_MAXSIZE sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) +#endif + +#define _SS_ALIGNSIZE sizeof(unsigned long) + +#if HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + +typedef unsigned char roken_sa_family_t; + +#define _SS_PAD1SIZE ((2 * _SS_ALIGNSIZE - sizeof (roken_sa_family_t) - sizeof(unsigned char)) % _SS_ALIGNSIZE) +#define _SS_PAD2SIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - (sizeof (roken_sa_family_t) + sizeof(unsigned char) + _SS_PAD1SIZE + _SS_ALIGNSIZE)) + +struct sockaddr_storage { + unsigned char ss_len; + roken_sa_family_t ss_family; + char __ss_pad1[_SS_PAD1SIZE]; + unsigned long __ss_align[_SS_PAD2SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long) + 1]; +}; + +#else /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN */ + +typedef unsigned short roken_sa_family_t; + +#define _SS_PAD1SIZE ((2 * _SS_ALIGNSIZE - sizeof (roken_sa_family_t)) % _SS_ALIGNSIZE) +#define _SS_PAD2SIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - (sizeof (roken_sa_family_t) + _SS_PAD1SIZE + _SS_ALIGNSIZE)) + +struct sockaddr_storage { + roken_sa_family_t ss_family; + char __ss_pad1[_SS_PAD1SIZE]; + unsigned long __ss_align[_SS_PAD2SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long) + 1]; +}; + +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN */ + +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO +struct addrinfo { + int ai_flags; + int ai_family; + int ai_socktype; + int ai_protocol; + size_t ai_addrlen; + char *ai_canonname; + struct sockaddr *ai_addr; + struct addrinfo *ai_next; +}; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +int +getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, + const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO +int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +void +freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +char * +gai_strerror(int ecode); +#endif + +int +getnameinfo_verified(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags); + +int roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec(const char *, int, struct addrinfo **); +int roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec2(const char *, int, int, struct addrinfo **); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRFTIME +size_t +strftime (char *buf, size_t maxsize, const char *format, + const struct tm *tm); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME +char * +strptime (const char *buf, const char *format, struct tm *timeptr); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_EMALLOC +void *emalloc (size_t); +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ECALLOC +void *ecalloc(size_t num, size_t sz); +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_EREALLOC +void *erealloc (void *, size_t); +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ESTRDUP +char *estrdup (const char *); +#endif + +/* + * kludges and such + */ + +#if 1 +int roken_gethostby_setup(const char*, const char*); +struct hostent* roken_gethostbyname(const char*); +struct hostent* roken_gethostbyaddr(const void*, size_t, int); +#else +#ifdef GETHOSTBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_gethostbyname(x) gethostbyname(x) +#else +#define roken_gethostbyname(x) gethostbyname((char *)x) +#endif + +#ifdef GETHOSTBYADDR_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_gethostbyaddr(a, l, t) gethostbyaddr(a, l, t) +#else +#define roken_gethostbyaddr(a, l, t) gethostbyaddr((char *)a, l, t) +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef GETSERVBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_getservbyname(x,y) getservbyname(x,y) +#else +#define roken_getservbyname(x,y) getservbyname((char *)x, (char *)y) +#endif + +#ifdef OPENLOG_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_openlog(a,b,c) openlog(a,b,c) +#else +#define roken_openlog(a,b,c) openlog((char *)a,b,c) +#endif + +#ifdef GETSOCKNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_getsockname(a,b,c) getsockname(a,b,c) +#else +#define roken_getsockname(a,b,c) getsockname(a, b, (void*)c) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROGNAME +void setprogname(const char *argv0); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPROGNAME +const char *getprogname(void); +#endif + +void mini_inetd_addrinfo (struct addrinfo*); +void mini_inetd (int port); + +void set_progname(char *argv0); +const char *get_progname(void); + +#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R +struct tm * +localtime_r(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSVIS) || defined(NEED_STRSVIS_PROTO) +int +strsvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag, const char *extra); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRUNVIS) || defined(NEED_STRUNVIS_PROTO) +int +strunvis(char *dst, const char *src); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRVIS) || defined(NEED_STRVIS_PROTO) +int +strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRVISX) || defined(NEED_STRVISX_PROTO) +int +strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SVIS) || defined(NEED_SVIS_PROTO) +char * +svis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc, const char *extra); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_UNVIS) || defined(NEED_UNVIS_PROTO) +int +unvis(char *cp, int c, int *astate, int flag); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VIS) || defined(NEED_VIS_PROTO) +char * +vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc); +#endif + +ROKEN_CPP_END diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken_gethostby.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken_gethostby.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6df6c57dd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/roken_gethostby.c @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: roken_gethostby.c,v 1.5 1999/12/05 13:16:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#undef roken_gethostbyname +#undef roken_gethostbyaddr + +static struct sockaddr_in dns_addr; +static char *dns_req; + +static int +make_address(const char *address, struct in_addr *ip) +{ + if(inet_aton(address, ip) == 0){ + /* try to resolve as hostname, it might work if the address we + are trying to lookup is local, for instance a web proxy */ + struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(address); + if(he) { + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)he->h_addr; + ip->s_addr = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + } else { + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +setup_int(const char *proxy_host, short proxy_port, + const char *dns_host, short dns_port, + const char *dns_path) +{ + memset(&dns_addr, 0, sizeof(dns_addr)); + if(dns_req) + free(dns_req); + if(proxy_host) { + if(make_address(proxy_host, &dns_addr.sin_addr) != 0) + return -1; + dns_addr.sin_port = htons(proxy_port); + asprintf(&dns_req, "http://%s:%d%s", dns_host, dns_port, dns_path); + } else { + if(make_address(dns_host, &dns_addr.sin_addr) != 0) + return -1; + dns_addr.sin_port = htons(dns_port); + asprintf(&dns_req, "%s", dns_path); + } + dns_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + return 0; +} + +static void +split_spec(const char *spec, char **host, int *port, char **path, int def_port) +{ + char *p; + *host = strdup(spec); + p = strchr(*host, ':'); + if(p) { + *p++ = '\0'; + if(sscanf(p, "%d", port) != 1) + *port = def_port; + } else + *port = def_port; + p = strchr(p ? p : *host, '/'); + if(p) { + if(path) + *path = strdup(p); + *p = '\0'; + }else + if(path) + *path = NULL; +} + + +int +roken_gethostby_setup(const char *proxy_spec, const char *dns_spec) +{ + char *proxy_host = NULL; + int proxy_port; + char *dns_host, *dns_path; + int dns_port; + + int ret = -1; + + split_spec(dns_spec, &dns_host, &dns_port, &dns_path, 80); + if(dns_path == NULL) + goto out; + if(proxy_spec) + split_spec(proxy_spec, &proxy_host, &proxy_port, NULL, 80); + ret = setup_int(proxy_host, proxy_port, dns_host, dns_port, dns_path); +out: + free(proxy_host); + free(dns_host); + free(dns_path); + return ret; +} + + +/* Try to lookup a name or an ip-address using http as transport + mechanism. See the end of this file for an example program. */ +static struct hostent* +roken_gethostby(const char *hostname) +{ + int s; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + char *request; + char buf[1024]; + int offset = 0; + int n; + char *p, *foo; + + if(dns_addr.sin_family == 0) + return NULL; /* no configured host */ + sin = dns_addr; + asprintf(&request, "GET %s?%s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", dns_req, hostname); + if(request == NULL) + return NULL; + s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if(s < 0) { + free(request); + return NULL; + } + if(connect(s, (struct sockaddr*)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) { + close(s); + free(request); + return NULL; + } + if(write(s, request, strlen(request)) != strlen(request)) { + close(s); + free(request); + return NULL; + } + free(request); + while(1) { + n = read(s, buf + offset, sizeof(buf) - offset); + if(n <= 0) + break; + offset += n; + } + buf[offset] = '\0'; + close(s); + p = strstr(buf, "\r\n\r\n"); /* find end of header */ + if(p) p += 4; + else return NULL; + foo = NULL; + p = strtok_r(p, " \t\r\n", &foo); + if(p == NULL) + return NULL; + { + /* make a hostent to return */ +#define MAX_ADDRS 16 + static struct hostent he; + static char addrs[4 * MAX_ADDRS]; + static char *addr_list[MAX_ADDRS]; + int num_addrs = 0; + + he.h_name = p; + he.h_aliases = NULL; + he.h_addrtype = AF_INET; + he.h_length = 4; + + while((p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\r\n", &foo)) && num_addrs < MAX_ADDRS) { + struct in_addr ip; + inet_aton(p, &ip); + ip.s_addr = ntohl(ip.s_addr); + addr_list[num_addrs] = &addrs[num_addrs * 4]; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 0] = (ip.s_addr >> 24) & 0xff; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 1] = (ip.s_addr >> 16) & 0xff; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 2] = (ip.s_addr >> 8) & 0xff; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 3] = (ip.s_addr >> 0) & 0xff; + addr_list[++num_addrs] = NULL; + } + he.h_addr_list = addr_list; + return &he; + } +} + +struct hostent* +roken_gethostbyname(const char *hostname) +{ + struct hostent *he; + he = gethostbyname(hostname); + if(he) + return he; + return roken_gethostby(hostname); +} + +struct hostent* +roken_gethostbyaddr(const void *addr, size_t len, int type) +{ + struct in_addr a; + const char *p; + struct hostent *he; + he = gethostbyaddr(addr, len, type); + if(he) + return he; + if(type != AF_INET || len != 4) + return NULL; + p = addr; + a.s_addr = htonl((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]); + return roken_gethostby(inet_ntoa(a)); +} + +#if 0 + +/* this program can be used as a cgi `script' to lookup names and + ip-addresses */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *query = getenv("QUERY_STRING"); + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + int i; + struct hostent *he; + + printf("Content-type: text/plain\n\n"); + if(query == NULL) + exit(0); + he = gethostbyname(query); + strncpy(host, he->h_name, sizeof(host)); + host[sizeof(host) - 1] = '\0'; + he = gethostbyaddr(he->h_addr, he->h_length, AF_INET); + printf("%s\n", he->h_name); + for(i = 0; he->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { + struct in_addr ip; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)he->h_addr_list[i]; + ip.s_addr = htonl((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]); + printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(ip)); + } + exit(0); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rtbl.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rtbl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a3bc00e13 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rtbl.c @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID ("$Id: rtbl.c,v 1.4 2002/09/04 21:25:09 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#include "rtbl.h" + +struct column_entry { + char *data; +}; + +struct column_data { + char *header; + char *prefix; + int width; + unsigned flags; + size_t num_rows; + struct column_entry *rows; +}; + +struct rtbl_data { + char *column_prefix; + size_t num_columns; + struct column_data **columns; +}; + +rtbl_t +rtbl_create (void) +{ + return calloc (1, sizeof (struct rtbl_data)); +} + +static struct column_data * +rtbl_get_column (rtbl_t table, const char *column) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < table->num_columns; i++) + if(strcmp(table->columns[i]->header, column) == 0) + return table->columns[i]; + return NULL; +} + +void +rtbl_destroy (rtbl_t table) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < table->num_columns; i++) { + struct column_data *c = table->columns[i]; + + for (j = 0; j < c->num_rows; j++) + free (c->rows[j].data); + free (c->rows); + free (c->header); + free (c->prefix); + free (c); + } + free (table->column_prefix); + free (table->columns); + free (table); +} + +int +rtbl_add_column (rtbl_t table, const char *header, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct column_data *col, **tmp; + + tmp = realloc (table->columns, (table->num_columns + 1) * sizeof (*tmp)); + if (tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + table->columns = tmp; + col = malloc (sizeof (*col)); + if (col == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + col->header = strdup (header); + if (col->header == NULL) { + free (col); + return ENOMEM; + } + col->prefix = NULL; + col->width = 0; + col->flags = flags; + col->num_rows = 0; + col->rows = NULL; + table->columns[table->num_columns++] = col; + return 0; +} + +static void +column_compute_width (struct column_data *column) +{ + int i; + + column->width = strlen (column->header); + for (i = 0; i < column->num_rows; i++) + column->width = max (column->width, strlen (column->rows[i].data)); +} + +int +rtbl_set_prefix (rtbl_t table, const char *prefix) +{ + if (table->column_prefix) + free (table->column_prefix); + table->column_prefix = strdup (prefix); + if (table->column_prefix == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +int +rtbl_set_column_prefix (rtbl_t table, const char *column, + const char *prefix) +{ + struct column_data *c = rtbl_get_column (table, column); + + if (c == NULL) + return -1; + if (c->prefix) + free (c->prefix); + c->prefix = strdup (prefix); + if (c->prefix == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + + +static const char * +get_column_prefix (rtbl_t table, struct column_data *c) +{ + if (c == NULL) + return ""; + if (c->prefix) + return c->prefix; + if (table->column_prefix) + return table->column_prefix; + return ""; +} + +int +rtbl_add_column_entry (rtbl_t table, const char *column, const char *data) +{ + struct column_entry row, *tmp; + + struct column_data *c = rtbl_get_column (table, column); + + if (c == NULL) + return -1; + + row.data = strdup (data); + if (row.data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + tmp = realloc (c->rows, (c->num_rows + 1) * sizeof (*tmp)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (row.data); + return ENOMEM; + } + c->rows = tmp; + c->rows[c->num_rows++] = row; + return 0; +} + +int +rtbl_format (rtbl_t table, FILE * f) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < table->num_columns; i++) + column_compute_width (table->columns[i]); + for (i = 0; i < table->num_columns; i++) { + struct column_data *c = table->columns[i]; + + fprintf (f, "%s", get_column_prefix (table, c)); + fprintf (f, "%-*s", (int)c->width, c->header); + } + fprintf (f, "\n"); + + for (j = 0;; j++) { + int flag = 0; + + for (i = 0; flag == 0 && i < table->num_columns; ++i) { + struct column_data *c = table->columns[i]; + + if (c->num_rows > j) { + ++flag; + break; + } + } + if (flag == 0) + break; + + for (i = 0; i < table->num_columns; i++) { + int w; + struct column_data *c = table->columns[i]; + + w = c->width; + + if ((c->flags & RTBL_ALIGN_RIGHT) == 0) + w = -w; + fprintf (f, "%s", get_column_prefix (table, c)); + if (c->num_rows <= j) + fprintf (f, "%*s", w, ""); + else + fprintf (f, "%*s", w, c->rows[j].data); + } + fprintf (f, "\n"); + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef TEST +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + rtbl_t table; + unsigned int a, b, c, d; + + table = rtbl_create (); + rtbl_add_column (table, "Issued", 0, &a); + rtbl_add_column (table, "Expires", 0, &b); + rtbl_add_column (table, "Foo", RTBL_ALIGN_RIGHT, &d); + rtbl_add_column (table, "Principal", 0, &c); + + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, a, "Jul 7 21:19:29"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, b, "Jul 8 07:19:29"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, d, "73"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, d, "0"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, d, "-2000"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, c, "krbtgt/NADA.KTH.SE@NADA.KTH.SE"); + + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, a, "Jul 7 21:19:29"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, b, "Jul 8 07:19:29"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, c, "afs/pdc.kth.se@NADA.KTH.SE"); + + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, a, "Jul 7 21:19:29"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, b, "Jul 8 07:19:29"); + rtbl_add_column_entry (table, c, "afs@NADA.KTH.SE"); + + rtbl_set_prefix (table, " "); + rtbl_set_column_prefix (table, a, ""); + + rtbl_format (table, stdout); + + rtbl_destroy (table); + +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rtbl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rtbl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16496a7fd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/rtbl.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef __rtbl_h__ +#define __rtbl_h__ + +struct rtbl_data; +typedef struct rtbl_data *rtbl_t; + +#define RTBL_ALIGN_LEFT 0 +#define RTBL_ALIGN_RIGHT 1 + +rtbl_t rtbl_create (void); + +void rtbl_destroy (rtbl_t); + +int rtbl_set_prefix (rtbl_t, const char*); + +int rtbl_set_column_prefix (rtbl_t, const char*, const char*); + +int rtbl_add_column (rtbl_t, const char*, unsigned int); + +int rtbl_add_column_entry (rtbl_t, const char*, const char*); + +int rtbl_format (rtbl_t, FILE*); + +#endif /* __rtbl_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/sendmsg.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/sendmsg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7075bf2142 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/sendmsg.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: sendmsg.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +sendmsg(int s, const struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +{ + ssize_t ret; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + struct iovec *iov = msg->msg_iov; + + for(i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + p = buf; + for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; ++i) { + memcpy (p, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len); + p += iov[i].iov_len; + } + ret = sendto (s, buf, tot, flags, msg->msg_name, msg->msg_namelen); + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setegid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setegid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f46fe4bf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setegid.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: setegid.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +setegid(gid_t egid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SETREGID + return setregid(-1, egid); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRESGID + return setresgid(-1, egid, -1); +#endif + + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setenv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15b58113ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: setenv.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#include +#include + +/* + * This is the easy way out, use putenv to implement setenv. We might + * leak some memory but that is ok since we are usally about to exec + * anyway. + */ + +int +setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int rewrite) +{ + char *t; + + if (!rewrite && getenv(var) != 0) + return 0; + + asprintf (&t, "%s=%s", var, val); + if (t == NULL) + return -1; + + if (putenv(t) == 0) + return 0; + else + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/seteuid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/seteuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ee68ba785e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/seteuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: seteuid.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +seteuid(uid_t euid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SETREUID + return setreuid(-1, euid); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRESUID + return setresuid(-1, euid, -1); +#endif + + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setprogname.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setprogname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e66deab8b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/setprogname.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: setprogname.c,v 1.1 2001/07/09 14:56:51 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern const char *__progname; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROGNAME +void +setprogname(const char *argv0) +{ +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME + char *p; + if(argv0 == NULL) + return; + p = strrchr(argv0, '/'); + if(p == NULL) + p = (char *)argv0; + else + p++; + __progname = p; +#endif +} +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROGNAME */ + +void +set_progname(char *argv0) +{ + setprogname ((const char *)argv0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/signal.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/signal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d482a0e3d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/signal.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: signal.c,v 1.12 2000/07/08 12:39:06 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * We would like to always use this signal but there is a link error + * on NEXTSTEP + */ +#if !defined(NeXT) && !defined(__APPLE__) +/* + * Bugs: + * + * Do we need any extra hacks for SIGCLD and/or SIGCHLD? + */ + +SigAction +signal(int iSig, SigAction pAction) +{ + struct sigaction saNew, saOld; + + saNew.sa_handler = pAction; + sigemptyset(&saNew.sa_mask); + saNew.sa_flags = 0; + + if (iSig == SIGALRM) + { +#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT + saNew.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT; +#endif + } + else + { +#ifdef SA_RESTART + saNew.sa_flags |= SA_RESTART; +#endif + } + + if (sigaction(iSig, &saNew, &saOld) < 0) + return(SIG_ERR); + + return(saOld.sa_handler); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/simple_exec.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/simple_exec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1f27c00e73 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/simple_exec.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: simple_exec.c,v 1.10 2001/06/21 03:38:03 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include + +#define EX_NOEXEC 126 +#define EX_NOTFOUND 127 + +/* return values: + -1 on `unspecified' system errors + -2 on fork failures + -3 on waitpid errors + 0- is return value from subprocess + 126 if the program couldn't be executed + 127 if the program couldn't be found + 128- is 128 + signal that killed subprocess + */ + +int +wait_for_process(pid_t pid) +{ + while(1) { + int status; + + while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + if (errno != EINTR) + return -3; + if(WIFSTOPPED(status)) + continue; + if(WIFEXITED(status)) + return WEXITSTATUS(status); + if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) + return WTERMSIG(status) + 128; + } +} + +int +pipe_execv(FILE **stdin_fd, FILE **stdout_fd, FILE **stderr_fd, + const char *file, ...) +{ + int in_fd[2], out_fd[2], err_fd[2]; + pid_t pid; + va_list ap; + char **argv; + + if(stdin_fd != NULL) + pipe(in_fd); + if(stdout_fd != NULL) + pipe(out_fd); + if(stderr_fd != NULL) + pipe(err_fd); + pid = fork(); + switch(pid) { + case 0: + va_start(ap, file); + argv = vstrcollect(&ap); + va_end(ap); + if(argv == NULL) + exit(-1); + + /* close pipes we're not interested in */ + if(stdin_fd != NULL) + close(in_fd[1]); + if(stdout_fd != NULL) + close(out_fd[0]); + if(stderr_fd != NULL) + close(err_fd[0]); + + /* pipe everything caller doesn't care about to /dev/null */ + if(stdin_fd == NULL) + in_fd[0] = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); + if(stdout_fd == NULL) + out_fd[1] = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY); + if(stderr_fd == NULL) + err_fd[1] = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY); + + /* move to proper descriptors */ + if(in_fd[0] != STDIN_FILENO) { + dup2(in_fd[0], STDIN_FILENO); + close(in_fd[0]); + } + if(out_fd[1] != STDOUT_FILENO) { + dup2(out_fd[1], STDOUT_FILENO); + close(out_fd[1]); + } + if(err_fd[1] != STDERR_FILENO) { + dup2(err_fd[1], STDERR_FILENO); + close(err_fd[1]); + } + + execv(file, argv); + exit((errno == ENOENT) ? EX_NOTFOUND : EX_NOEXEC); + case -1: + if(stdin_fd != NULL) { + close(in_fd[0]); + close(in_fd[1]); + } + if(stdout_fd != NULL) { + close(out_fd[0]); + close(out_fd[1]); + } + if(stderr_fd != NULL) { + close(err_fd[0]); + close(err_fd[1]); + } + return -2; + default: + if(stdin_fd != NULL) { + close(in_fd[0]); + *stdin_fd = fdopen(in_fd[1], "w"); + } + if(stdout_fd != NULL) { + close(out_fd[1]); + *stdout_fd = fdopen(out_fd[0], "r"); + } + if(stderr_fd != NULL) { + close(err_fd[1]); + *stderr_fd = fdopen(err_fd[0], "r"); + } + } + return pid; +} + +int +simple_execvp(const char *file, char *const args[]) +{ + pid_t pid = fork(); + switch(pid){ + case -1: + return -2; + case 0: + execvp(file, args); + exit((errno == ENOENT) ? EX_NOTFOUND : EX_NOEXEC); + default: + return wait_for_process(pid); + } +} + +/* gee, I'd like a execvpe */ +int +simple_execve(const char *file, char *const args[], char *const envp[]) +{ + pid_t pid = fork(); + switch(pid){ + case -1: + return -2; + case 0: + execve(file, args, envp); + exit((errno == ENOENT) ? EX_NOTFOUND : EX_NOEXEC); + default: + return wait_for_process(pid); + } +} + +int +simple_execlp(const char *file, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char **argv; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, file); + argv = vstrcollect(&ap); + va_end(ap); + if(argv == NULL) + return -1; + ret = simple_execvp(file, argv); + free(argv); + return ret; +} + +int +simple_execle(const char *file, ... /* ,char *const envp[] */) +{ + va_list ap; + char **argv; + char *const* envp; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, file); + argv = vstrcollect(&ap); + envp = va_arg(ap, char **); + va_end(ap); + if(argv == NULL) + return -1; + ret = simple_execve(file, argv, envp); + free(argv); + return ret; +} + +int +simple_execl(const char *file, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char **argv; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, file); + argv = vstrcollect(&ap); + va_end(ap); + if(argv == NULL) + return -1; + ret = simple_execve(file, argv, environ); + free(argv); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6904ba612f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#include + +#include "snprintf-test.h" + +RCSID("$Id: snprintf-test.c,v 1.5 2001/09/13 01:01:16 assar Exp $"); + +static int +try (const char *format, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list ap; + char buf1[256], buf2[256]; + + va_start (ap, format); + ret = vsnprintf (buf1, sizeof(buf1), format, ap); + if (ret >= sizeof(buf1)) + errx (1, "increase buf and try again"); + vsprintf (buf2, format, ap); + ret = strcmp (buf1, buf2); + if (ret) + printf ("failed: format = \"%s\", \"%s\" != \"%s\"\n", + format, buf1, buf2); + va_end (ap); + return ret; +} + +static int +cmp_with_sprintf_int (void) +{ + int tot = 0; + int int_values[] = {INT_MIN, -17, -1, 0, 1, 17, 4711, 65535, INT_MAX}; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(int_values) / sizeof(int_values[0]); ++i) { + tot += try ("%d", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%x", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%X", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%o", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#x", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#X", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#o", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10d", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10x", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10X", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10o", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10x", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10X", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10o", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10d", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10x", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10X", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10o", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10x", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10X", int_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10o", int_values[i]); + } + return tot; +} + +static int +cmp_with_sprintf_long (void) +{ + int tot = 0; + long long_values[] = {LONG_MIN, -17, -1, 0, 1, 17, 4711, 65535, LONG_MAX}; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(long_values) / sizeof(long_values[0]); ++i) { + tot += try ("%ld", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%lx", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%lX", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%lo", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#lx", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#lX", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#lo", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10ld", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10lx", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10lX", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10lo", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10lx", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10lX", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10lo", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10ld", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10lx", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10lX", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10lo", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10lx", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10lX", long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10lo", long_values[i]); + } + return tot; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + +static int +cmp_with_sprintf_long_long (void) +{ + int tot = 0; + long long long_long_values[] = { + ((long long)LONG_MIN) -1, LONG_MIN, -17, -1, + 0, + 1, 17, 4711, 65535, LONG_MAX, ((long long)LONG_MAX) + 1}; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(long_long_values) / sizeof(long_long_values[0]); ++i) { + tot += try ("%lld", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%llx", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%llX", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%llo", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#llx", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#llX", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#llo", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10lld", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10llx", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10llX", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10llo", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10llx", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10llX", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#10llo", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10lld", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10llx", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10llX", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-10llo", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10llx", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10llX", long_long_values[i]); + tot += try ("%-#10llo", long_long_values[i]); + } + return tot; +} + +#endif + +#if 0 +static int +cmp_with_sprintf_float (void) +{ + int tot = 0; + double double_values[] = {-99999, -999, -17.4, -4.3, -3.0, -1.5, -1, + 0, 0.1, 0.2342374852, 0.2340007, + 3.1415926, 14.7845, 34.24758, 9999, 9999999}; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(double_values) / sizeof(double_values[0]); ++i) { + tot += try ("%f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%.2f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%7.0f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%5.2f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%0f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#f", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%.2e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%7.0e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%5.2e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%0e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#e", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%.2E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%7.0E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%5.2E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%0E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#E", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%.2g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%7.0g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%5.2g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%0g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#g", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%G", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%10G", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%.2G", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%7.0G", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%5.2G", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%0G", double_values[i]); + tot += try ("%#G", double_values[i]); + } + return tot; +} +#endif + +static int +test_null (void) +{ + return snprintf (NULL, 0, "foo") != 3; +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret += cmp_with_sprintf_int (); + ret += cmp_with_sprintf_long (); +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + ret += cmp_with_sprintf_long_long (); +#endif + ret += test_null (); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf-test.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf-test.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5eb591b2fe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf-test.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: snprintf-test.h,v 1.2 2001/07/19 18:39:14 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __SNPRINTF_TEST_H__ +#define __SNPRINTF_TEST_H__ + +/* + * we cannot use the real names of the functions when testing, since + * they might have different prototypes as the system functions, hence + * these evil hacks + */ + +#define snprintf test_snprintf +#define asprintf test_asprintf +#define asnprintf test_asnprintf +#define vasprintf test_vasprintf +#define vasnprintf test_vasnprintf +#define vsnprintf test_vsnprintf + +#endif /* __SNPRINTF_TEST_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e4b85e9c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/snprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,655 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: snprintf.c,v 1.35 2003/03/26 10:05:48 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +enum format_flags { + minus_flag = 1, + plus_flag = 2, + space_flag = 4, + alternate_flag = 8, + zero_flag = 16 +}; + +/* + * Common state + */ + +struct snprintf_state { + unsigned char *str; + unsigned char *s; + unsigned char *theend; + size_t sz; + size_t max_sz; + void (*append_char)(struct snprintf_state *, unsigned char); + /* XXX - methods */ +}; + +#if TEST_SNPRINTF +#include "snprintf-test.h" +#endif /* TEST_SNPRINTF */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +static int +sn_reserve (struct snprintf_state *state, size_t n) +{ + return state->s + n > state->theend; +} + +static void +sn_append_char (struct snprintf_state *state, unsigned char c) +{ + if (!sn_reserve (state, 1)) + *state->s++ = c; +} +#endif + +static int +as_reserve (struct snprintf_state *state, size_t n) +{ + if (state->s + n > state->theend) { + int off = state->s - state->str; + unsigned char *tmp; + + if (state->max_sz && state->sz >= state->max_sz) + return 1; + + state->sz = max(state->sz * 2, state->sz + n); + if (state->max_sz) + state->sz = min(state->sz, state->max_sz); + tmp = realloc (state->str, state->sz); + if (tmp == NULL) + return 1; + state->str = tmp; + state->s = state->str + off; + state->theend = state->str + state->sz - 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +as_append_char (struct snprintf_state *state, unsigned char c) +{ + if(!as_reserve (state, 1)) + *state->s++ = c; +} + +/* longest integer types */ + +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG +typedef unsigned long long u_longest; +typedef long long longest; +#else +typedef unsigned long u_longest; +typedef long longest; +#endif + +/* + * is # supposed to do anything? + */ + +static int +use_alternative (int flags, u_longest num, unsigned base) +{ + return flags & alternate_flag && (base == 16 || base == 8) && num != 0; +} + +static int +append_number(struct snprintf_state *state, + u_longest num, unsigned base, const char *rep, + int width, int prec, int flags, int minusp) +{ + int len = 0; + int i; + u_longest n = num; + + /* given precision, ignore zero flag */ + if(prec != -1) + flags &= ~zero_flag; + else + prec = 1; + /* zero value with zero precision -> "" */ + if(prec == 0 && n == 0) + return 0; + do{ + (*state->append_char)(state, rep[n % base]); + ++len; + n /= base; + } while(n); + prec -= len; + /* pad with prec zeros */ + while(prec-- > 0){ + (*state->append_char)(state, '0'); + ++len; + } + /* add length of alternate prefix (added later) to len */ + if(use_alternative(flags, num, base)) + len += base / 8; + /* pad with zeros */ + if(flags & zero_flag){ + width -= len; + if(minusp || (flags & space_flag) || (flags & plus_flag)) + width--; + while(width-- > 0){ + (*state->append_char)(state, '0'); + len++; + } + } + /* add alternate prefix */ + if(use_alternative(flags, num, base)){ + if(base == 16) + (*state->append_char)(state, rep[10] + 23); /* XXX */ + (*state->append_char)(state, '0'); + } + /* add sign */ + if(minusp){ + (*state->append_char)(state, '-'); + ++len; + } else if(flags & plus_flag) { + (*state->append_char)(state, '+'); + ++len; + } else if(flags & space_flag) { + (*state->append_char)(state, ' '); + ++len; + } + if(flags & minus_flag) + /* swap before padding with spaces */ + for(i = 0; i < len / 2; i++){ + char c = state->s[-i-1]; + state->s[-i-1] = state->s[-len+i]; + state->s[-len+i] = c; + } + width -= len; + while(width-- > 0){ + (*state->append_char)(state, ' '); + ++len; + } + if(!(flags & minus_flag)) + /* swap after padding with spaces */ + for(i = 0; i < len / 2; i++){ + char c = state->s[-i-1]; + state->s[-i-1] = state->s[-len+i]; + state->s[-len+i] = c; + } + return len; +} + +/* + * return length + */ + +static int +append_string (struct snprintf_state *state, + const unsigned char *arg, + int width, + int prec, + int flags) +{ + int len = 0; + + if(arg == NULL) + arg = (const unsigned char*)"(null)"; + + if(prec != -1) + width -= prec; + else + width -= strlen((const char *)arg); + if(!(flags & minus_flag)) + while(width-- > 0) { + (*state->append_char) (state, ' '); + ++len; + } + if (prec != -1) { + while (*arg && prec--) { + (*state->append_char) (state, *arg++); + ++len; + } + } else { + while (*arg) { + (*state->append_char) (state, *arg++); + ++len; + } + } + if(flags & minus_flag) + while(width-- > 0) { + (*state->append_char) (state, ' '); + ++len; + } + return len; +} + +static int +append_char(struct snprintf_state *state, + unsigned char arg, + int width, + int flags) +{ + int len = 0; + + while(!(flags & minus_flag) && --width > 0) { + (*state->append_char) (state, ' ') ; + ++len; + } + (*state->append_char) (state, arg); + ++len; + while((flags & minus_flag) && --width > 0) { + (*state->append_char) (state, ' '); + ++len; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * This can't be made into a function... + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + +#define PARSE_INT_FORMAT(res, arg, unsig) \ +if (long_long_flag) \ + res = (unsig long long)va_arg(arg, unsig long long); \ +else if (long_flag) \ + res = (unsig long)va_arg(arg, unsig long); \ +else if (short_flag) \ + res = (unsig short)va_arg(arg, unsig int); \ +else \ + res = (unsig int)va_arg(arg, unsig int) + +#else + +#define PARSE_INT_FORMAT(res, arg, unsig) \ +if (long_flag) \ + res = (unsig long)va_arg(arg, unsig long); \ +else if (short_flag) \ + res = (unsig short)va_arg(arg, unsig int); \ +else \ + res = (unsig int)va_arg(arg, unsig int) + +#endif + +/* + * zyxprintf - return length, as snprintf + */ + +static int +xyzprintf (struct snprintf_state *state, const char *char_format, va_list ap) +{ + const unsigned char *format = (const unsigned char *)char_format; + unsigned char c; + int len = 0; + + while((c = *format++)) { + if (c == '%') { + int flags = 0; + int width = 0; + int prec = -1; + int long_long_flag = 0; + int long_flag = 0; + int short_flag = 0; + + /* flags */ + while((c = *format++)){ + if(c == '-') + flags |= minus_flag; + else if(c == '+') + flags |= plus_flag; + else if(c == ' ') + flags |= space_flag; + else if(c == '#') + flags |= alternate_flag; + else if(c == '0') + flags |= zero_flag; + else if(c == '\'') + ; /* just ignore */ + else + break; + } + + if((flags & space_flag) && (flags & plus_flag)) + flags ^= space_flag; + + if((flags & minus_flag) && (flags & zero_flag)) + flags ^= zero_flag; + + /* width */ + if (isdigit(c)) + do { + width = width * 10 + c - '0'; + c = *format++; + } while(isdigit(c)); + else if(c == '*') { + width = va_arg(ap, int); + c = *format++; + } + + /* precision */ + if (c == '.') { + prec = 0; + c = *format++; + if (isdigit(c)) + do { + prec = prec * 10 + c - '0'; + c = *format++; + } while(isdigit(c)); + else if (c == '*') { + prec = va_arg(ap, int); + c = *format++; + } + } + + /* size */ + + if (c == 'h') { + short_flag = 1; + c = *format++; + } else if (c == 'l') { + long_flag = 1; + c = *format++; + if (c == 'l') { + long_long_flag = 1; + c = *format++; + } + } + + switch (c) { + case 'c' : + append_char(state, va_arg(ap, int), width, flags); + ++len; + break; + case 's' : + len += append_string(state, + va_arg(ap, unsigned char*), + width, + prec, + flags); + break; + case 'd' : + case 'i' : { + longest arg; + u_longest num; + int minusp = 0; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, signed); + + if (arg < 0) { + minusp = 1; + num = -arg; + } else + num = arg; + + len += append_number (state, num, 10, "0123456789", + width, prec, flags, minusp); + break; + } + case 'u' : { + u_longest arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + len += append_number (state, arg, 10, "0123456789", + width, prec, flags, 0); + break; + } + case 'o' : { + u_longest arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + len += append_number (state, arg, 010, "01234567", + width, prec, flags, 0); + break; + } + case 'x' : { + u_longest arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + len += append_number (state, arg, 0x10, "0123456789abcdef", + width, prec, flags, 0); + break; + } + case 'X' :{ + u_longest arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + len += append_number (state, arg, 0x10, "0123456789ABCDEF", + width, prec, flags, 0); + break; + } + case 'p' : { + unsigned long arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(ap, void*); + + len += append_number (state, arg, 0x10, "0123456789ABCDEF", + width, prec, flags, 0); + break; + } + case 'n' : { + int *arg = va_arg(ap, int*); + *arg = state->s - state->str; + break; + } + case '\0' : + --format; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '%' : + (*state->append_char)(state, c); + ++len; + break; + default : + (*state->append_char)(state, '%'); + (*state->append_char)(state, c); + len += 2; + break; + } + } else { + (*state->append_char) (state, c); + ++len; + } + } + return len; +} + +#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +int +snprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int ret; + + va_start(args, format); + ret = vsnprintf (str, sz, format, args); + va_end(args); + +#ifdef PARANOIA + { + int ret2; + char *tmp; + + tmp = malloc (sz); + if (tmp == NULL) + abort (); + + va_start(args, format); + ret2 = vsprintf (tmp, format, args); + va_end(args); + if (ret != ret2 || strcmp(str, tmp)) + abort (); + free (tmp); + } +#endif + + return ret; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ASPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +int +asprintf (char **ret, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int val; + + va_start(args, format); + val = vasprintf (ret, format, args); + va_end(args); + +#ifdef PARANOIA + { + int ret2; + char *tmp; + tmp = malloc (val + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) + abort (); + + va_start(args, format); + ret2 = vsprintf (tmp, format, args); + va_end(args); + if (val != ret2 || strcmp(*ret, tmp)) + abort (); + free (tmp); + } +#endif + + return val; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ASNPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +int +asnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int val; + + va_start(args, format); + val = vasnprintf (ret, max_sz, format, args); + +#ifdef PARANOIA + { + int ret2; + char *tmp; + tmp = malloc (val + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) + abort (); + + ret2 = vsprintf (tmp, format, args); + if (val != ret2 || strcmp(*ret, tmp)) + abort (); + free (tmp); + } +#endif + + va_end(args); + return val; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +int +vasprintf (char **ret, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + return vasnprintf (ret, 0, format, args); +} +#endif + + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASNPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +int +vasnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + int st; + struct snprintf_state state; + + state.max_sz = max_sz; + state.sz = 1; + state.str = malloc(state.sz); + if (state.str == NULL) { + *ret = NULL; + return -1; + } + state.s = state.str; + state.theend = state.s + state.sz - 1; + state.append_char = as_append_char; + + st = xyzprintf (&state, format, args); + if (st > state.sz) { + free (state.str); + *ret = NULL; + return -1; + } else { + char *tmp; + + *state.s = '\0'; + tmp = realloc (state.str, st+1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (state.str); + *ret = NULL; + return -1; + } + *ret = tmp; + return st; + } +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) || defined(TEST_SNPRINTF) +int +vsnprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + struct snprintf_state state; + int ret; + unsigned char *ustr = (unsigned char *)str; + + state.max_sz = 0; + state.sz = sz; + state.str = ustr; + state.s = ustr; + state.theend = ustr + sz - (sz > 0); + state.append_char = sn_append_char; + + ret = xyzprintf (&state, format, args); + if (state.s != NULL) + *state.s = '\0'; + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/socket.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/socket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd67013309 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/socket.c @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: socket.c,v 1.8 2003/04/15 03:26:51 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* + * Set `sa' to the unitialized address of address family `af' + */ + +void +socket_set_any (struct sockaddr *sa, int af) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = 0; + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = 0; + sin6->sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + break; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * set `sa' to (`ptr', `port') + */ + +void +socket_set_address_and_port (struct sockaddr *sa, const void *ptr, int port) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = port; + memcpy (&sin->sin_addr, ptr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + memcpy (&sin6->sin6_addr, ptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + break; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the size of an address of the type in `sa' + */ + +size_t +socket_addr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : + return sizeof(struct in_addr); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + return sizeof(struct in6_addr); +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the size of a `struct sockaddr' in `sa'. + */ + +size_t +socket_sockaddr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : + return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the binary address of `sa'. + */ + +void * +socket_get_address (struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + return &sin->sin_addr; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + return &sin6->sin6_addr; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the port number from `sa'. + */ + +int +socket_get_port (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + return sin->sin_port; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + return sin6->sin6_port; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Set the port in `sa' to `port'. + */ + +void +socket_set_port (struct sockaddr *sa, int port) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + sin->sin_port = port; + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + break; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Set the range of ports to use when binding with port = 0. + */ +void +socket_set_portrange (int sock, int restr, int af) +{ +#if defined(IP_PORTRANGE) + if (af == AF_INET) { + int on = restr ? IP_PORTRANGE_HIGH : IP_PORTRANGE_DEFAULT; + if (setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_PORTRANGE, &on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt IP_PORTRANGE (ignored)"); + } +#endif +#if defined(IPV6_PORTRANGE) + if (af == AF_INET6) { + int on = restr ? IPV6_PORTRANGE_HIGH : + IPV6_PORTRANGE_DEFAULT; + if (setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PORTRANGE, &on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt IPV6_PORTRANGE (ignored)"); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Enable debug on `sock'. + */ + +void +socket_set_debug (int sock) +{ +#if defined(SO_DEBUG) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + int on = 1; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, (void *) &on, sizeof (on)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_DEBUG (ignored)"); +#endif +} + +/* + * Set the type-of-service of `sock' to `tos'. + */ + +void +socket_set_tos (int sock, int tos) +{ +#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, (void *) &tos, sizeof (int)) < 0) + if (errno != EINVAL) + warn ("setsockopt TOS (ignored)"); +#endif +} + +/* + * set the reuse of addresses on `sock' to `val'. + */ + +void +socket_set_reuseaddr (int sock, int val) +{ +#if defined(SO_REUSEADDR) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if(setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&val, + sizeof(val)) < 0) + err (1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strcasecmp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strcasecmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cde5b3bf92 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strcasecmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strcasecmp.c,v 1.10 2003/04/14 11:26:27 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASECMP + +int +strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2) +{ + while(toupper((unsigned char)*s1) == toupper((unsigned char)*s2)) { + if(*s1 == '\0') + return 0; + s1++; + s2++; + } + return toupper((unsigned char)*s1) - toupper((unsigned char)*s2); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strcollect.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strcollect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e82ad01b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strcollect.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strcollect.c,v 1.1 2000/01/09 10:57:43 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +enum { initial = 10, increment = 5 }; + +static char ** +sub (char **argv, int i, int argc, va_list *ap) +{ + do { + if(i == argc) { + /* realloc argv */ + char **tmp = realloc(argv, (argc + increment) * sizeof(*argv)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + free(argv); + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + argv = tmp; + argc += increment; + } + argv[i++] = va_arg(*ap, char*); + } while(argv[i - 1] != NULL); + return argv; +} + +/* + * return a malloced vector of pointers to the strings in `ap' + * terminated by NULL. + */ + +char ** +vstrcollect(va_list *ap) +{ + return sub (NULL, 0, 0, ap); +} + +/* + * + */ + +char ** +strcollect(char *first, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char **ret = malloc (initial * sizeof(char *)); + + if (ret == NULL) + return ret; + + ret[0] = first; + va_start(ap, first); + ret = sub (ret, 1, initial, &ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strdup.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strdup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87fb43eb7d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strdup.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strdup.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +char * +strdup(const char *old) +{ + char *t = malloc(strlen(old)+1); + if (t != 0) + strcpy(t, old); + return t; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strerror.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strerror.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21936d7163 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strerror.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +extern int sys_nerr; +extern char *sys_errlist[]; + +char* +strerror(int eno) +{ + static char emsg[1024]; + + if(eno < 0 || eno >= sys_nerr) + snprintf(emsg, sizeof(emsg), "Error %d occurred.", eno); + else + snprintf(emsg, sizeof(emsg), "%s", sys_errlist[eno]); + + return emsg; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strftime.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strftime.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..985b38aa7d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strftime.c @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strftime.c,v 1.13 2002/08/20 12:42:37 joda Exp $"); + +static const char *abb_weekdays[] = { + "Sun", + "Mon", + "Tue", + "Wed", + "Thu", + "Fri", + "Sat", +}; + +static const char *full_weekdays[] = { + "Sunday", + "Monday", + "Tuesday", + "Wednesday", + "Thursday", + "Friday", + "Saturday", +}; + +static const char *abb_month[] = { + "Jan", + "Feb", + "Mar", + "Apr", + "May", + "Jun", + "Jul", + "Aug", + "Sep", + "Oct", + "Nov", + "Dec" +}; + +static const char *full_month[] = { + "January", + "February", + "Mars", + "April", + "May", + "June", + "July", + "August", + "September", + "October", + "November", + "December" +}; + +static const char *ampm[] = { + "AM", + "PM" +}; + +/* + * Convert hour in [0, 24] to [12 1 - 11 12 1 - 11 12] + */ + +static int +hour_24to12 (int hour) +{ + int ret = hour % 12; + + if (ret == 0) + ret = 12; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return AM or PM for `hour' + */ + +static const char * +hour_to_ampm (int hour) +{ + return ampm[hour / 12]; +} + +/* + * Return the week number of `tm' (Sunday being the first day of the week) + * as [0, 53] + */ + +static int +week_number_sun (const struct tm *tm) +{ + return (tm->tm_yday + 7 - (tm->tm_yday % 7 - tm->tm_wday + 7) % 7) / 7; +} + +/* + * Return the week number of `tm' (Monday being the first day of the week) + * as [0, 53] + */ + +static int +week_number_mon (const struct tm *tm) +{ + int wday = (tm->tm_wday + 6) % 7; + + return (tm->tm_yday + 7 - (tm->tm_yday % 7 - wday + 7) % 7) / 7; +} + +/* + * Return the week number of `tm' (Monday being the first day of the + * week) as [01, 53]. Week number one is the one that has four or more + * days in that year. + */ + +static int +week_number_mon4 (const struct tm *tm) +{ + int wday = (tm->tm_wday + 6) % 7; + int w1day = (wday - tm->tm_yday % 7 + 7) % 7; + int ret; + + ret = (tm->tm_yday + w1day) / 7; + if (w1day >= 4) + --ret; + if (ret == -1) + ret = 53; + else + ++ret; + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +size_t +strftime (char *buf, size_t maxsize, const char *format, + const struct tm *tm) +{ + size_t n = 0; + int ret; + + while (*format != '\0' && n < maxsize) { + if (*format == '%') { + ++format; + if(*format == 'E' || *format == 'O') + ++format; + switch (*format) { + case 'a' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", abb_weekdays[tm->tm_wday]); + break; + case 'A' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", full_weekdays[tm->tm_wday]); + break; + case 'h' : + case 'b' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", abb_month[tm->tm_mon]); + break; + case 'B' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", full_month[tm->tm_mon]); + break; + case 'c' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d:%02d:%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_year, + tm->tm_mon + 1, + tm->tm_mday, + tm->tm_hour, + tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec); + break; + case 'C' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", (tm->tm_year + 1900) / 100); + break; + case 'd' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'D' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d/%02d/%02d", + tm->tm_mon + 1, + tm->tm_mday, + (tm->tm_year + 1900) % 100); + break; + case 'e' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%2d", tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'F': + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%04d-%02d-%02d", tm->tm_year + 1900, + tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'g': + /* last two digits of week-based year */ + abort(); + case 'G': + /* week-based year */ + abort(); + case 'H' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_hour); + break; + case 'I' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", + hour_24to12 (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'j' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%03d", tm->tm_yday + 1); + break; + case 'k' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%2d", tm->tm_hour); + break; + case 'l' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%2d", + hour_24to12 (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'm' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_mon + 1); + break; + case 'M' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_min); + break; + case 'n' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, "\n"); + break; + case 'p' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, "%s", + hour_to_ampm (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'r' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d:%02d:%02d %s", + hour_24to12 (tm->tm_hour), + tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec, + hour_to_ampm (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'R' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_hour, + tm->tm_min); + + case 's' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", (int)mktime((struct tm *)tm)); + break; + case 'S' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_sec); + break; + case 't' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, "\t"); + break; + case 'T' : + case 'X' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d:%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_hour, + tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec); + break; + case 'u' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", (tm->tm_wday == 0) ? 7 : tm->tm_wday); + break; + case 'U' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", week_number_sun (tm)); + break; + case 'V' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", week_number_mon4 (tm)); + break; + case 'w' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", tm->tm_wday); + break; + case 'W' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", week_number_mon (tm)); + break; + case 'x' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d:%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_year, + tm->tm_mon + 1, + tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'y' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", (tm->tm_year + 1900) % 100); + break; + case 'Y' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", tm->tm_year + 1900); + break; + case 'z': + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%ld", +#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_GMTOFF) + (long)tm->tm_gmtoff +#elif defined(HAVE_TIMEZONE) +#ifdef HAVE_ALTZONE + tm->tm_isdst ? + (long)altzone : +#endif + (long)timezone +#else +#error Where in timezone chaos are you? +#endif + ); + break; + case 'Z' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", + +#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_ZONE) + tm->tm_zone +#elif defined(HAVE_TIMEZONE) + tzname[tm->tm_isdst] +#else +#error what? +#endif + ); + break; + case '\0' : + --format; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '%' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%%"); + break; + default : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%%%c", *format); + break; + } + if (ret < 0 || ret >= maxsize - n) + return 0; + n += ret; + buf += ret; + ++format; + } else { + *buf++ = *format++; + ++n; + } + } + *buf++ = '\0'; + return n; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlcat.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlcat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1366e88f08 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlcat.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strlcat.c,v 1.6 2002/08/20 09:46:20 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT + +size_t +strlcat (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz) +{ + size_t len = strlen(dst); + + if (dst_sz < len) + /* the total size of dst is less than the string it contains; + this could be considered bad input, but we might as well + handle it */ + return len + strlen(src); + + return len + strlcpy (dst + len, src, dst_sz - len); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlcpy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b43dbdeaaf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strlcpy.c,v 1.6 2002/08/20 09:42:08 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY + +size_t +strlcpy (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz) +{ + size_t n; + + for (n = 0; n < dst_sz; n++) { + if ((*dst++ = *src++) == '\0') + break; + } + + if (n < dst_sz) + return n; + if (n > 0) + *(dst - 1) = '\0'; + return n + strlen (src); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlwr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlwr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2c6a9f5c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strlwr.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strlwr.c,v 1.5 2003/04/14 11:44:34 lha Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLWR +char * +strlwr(char *str) +{ + char *s; + + for(s = str; *s; s++) + *s = tolower((unsigned char)*s); + return str; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strncasecmp.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strncasecmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a08d9e84bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strncasecmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strncasecmp.c,v 1.3 2003/04/14 11:46:04 lha Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNCASECMP + +int +strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) +{ + while(n > 0 + && toupper((unsigned char)*s1) == toupper((unsigned char)*s2)) + { + if(*s1 == '\0') + return 0; + s1++; + s2++; + n--; + } + if(n == 0) + return 0; + return toupper((unsigned char)*s1) - toupper((unsigned char)*s2); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strndup.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strndup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..31e7e9f6a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strndup.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strndup.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP +char * +strndup(const char *old, size_t sz) +{ + size_t len = strnlen (old, sz); + char *t = malloc(len + 1); + + if (t != NULL) { + memcpy (t, old, len); + t[len] = '\0'; + } + return t; +} +#endif /* HAVE_STRNDUP */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strnlen.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strnlen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fffb3b74f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strnlen.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strnlen.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +size_t +strnlen(const char *s, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + for(i = 0; i < len && s[i]; i++) + ; + return i; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strpftime-test.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strpftime-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7eb8fb85eb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strpftime-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strpftime-test.c,v 1.2 1999/11/12 15:29:55 assar Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 26 }; + +static struct testcase { + time_t t; + struct { + const char *format; + const char *result; + } vals[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {0, + { + {"%A", "Thursday"}, + {"%a", "Thu"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "01"}, + {"%e", " 1"}, + {"%H", "00"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "001"}, + {"%k", " 0"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "4"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL}} + }, + {90000, + { + {"%A", "Friday"}, + {"%a", "Fri"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "02"}, + {"%e", " 2"}, + {"%H", "01"}, + {"%I", "01"}, + {"%j", "002"}, + {"%k", " 1"}, + {"%l", " 1"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "5"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + }, + {216306, + { + {"%A", "Saturday"}, + {"%a", "Sat"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "03"}, + {"%e", " 3"}, + {"%H", "12"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "003"}, + {"%k", "12"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "05"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "PM"}, + {"%S", "06"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "6"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + }, + {259200, + { + {"%A", "Sunday"}, + {"%a", "Sun"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "04"}, + {"%e", " 4"}, + {"%H", "00"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "004"}, + {"%k", " 0"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "0"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "01"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + }, + {915148800, + { + {"%A", "Friday"}, + {"%a", "Fri"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "01"}, + {"%e", " 1"}, + {"%H", "00"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "001"}, + {"%k", " 0"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "5"}, + {"%Y", "1999"}, + {"%y", "99"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "53"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL}} + }, + {942161105, + { + + {"%A", "Tuesday"}, + {"%a", "Tue"}, + {"%B", "November"}, + {"%b", "Nov"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "09"}, + {"%e", " 9"}, + {"%H", "15"}, + {"%I", "03"}, + {"%j", "313"}, + {"%k", "15"}, + {"%l", " 3"}, + {"%M", "25"}, + {"%m", "11"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "PM"}, + {"%S", "05"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "2"}, + {"%Y", "1999"}, + {"%y", "99"}, + {"%U", "45"}, + {"%W", "45"}, + {"%V", "45"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + } +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j; + int ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests)/sizeof(tests[0]); ++i) { + struct tm *tm; + + tm = gmtime (&tests[i].t); + + for (j = 0; tests[i].vals[j].format != NULL; ++j) { + char buf[128]; + size_t len; + struct tm tm2; + char *ptr; + + len = strftime (buf, sizeof(buf), tests[i].vals[j].format, tm); + if (len != strlen (buf)) { + printf ("length of strftime(\"%s\") = %d (\"%s\")\n", + tests[i].vals[j].format, len, + buf); + ++ret; + continue; + } + if (strcmp (buf, tests[i].vals[j].result) != 0) { + printf ("result of strftime(\"%s\") = \"%s\" != \"%s\"\n", + tests[i].vals[j].format, buf, + tests[i].vals[j].result); + ++ret; + continue; + } + memset (&tm2, 0, sizeof(tm2)); + ptr = strptime (tests[i].vals[j].result, + tests[i].vals[j].format, + &tm2); + if (ptr == NULL || *ptr != '\0') { + printf ("bad return value from strptime(" + "\"%s\", \"%s\")\n", + tests[i].vals[j].result, + tests[i].vals[j].format); + ++ret; + } + strftime (buf, sizeof(buf), tests[i].vals[j].format, &tm2); + if (strcmp (buf, tests[i].vals[j].result) != 0) { + printf ("reverse of \"%s\" failed: \"%s\" vs \"%s\"\n", + tests[i].vals[j].format, + buf, tests[i].vals[j].result); + ++ret; + } + } + } + if (ret) { + printf ("%d errors\n", ret); + return 1; + } else + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strptime.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strptime.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36f0822431 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strptime.c @@ -0,0 +1,444 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strptime.c,v 1.2 1999/11/12 15:29:55 assar Exp $"); + +static const char *abb_weekdays[] = { + "Sun", + "Mon", + "Tue", + "Wed", + "Thu", + "Fri", + "Sat", + NULL +}; + +static const char *full_weekdays[] = { + "Sunday", + "Monday", + "Tuesday", + "Wednesday", + "Thursday", + "Friday", + "Saturday", + NULL +}; + +static const char *abb_month[] = { + "Jan", + "Feb", + "Mar", + "Apr", + "May", + "Jun", + "Jul", + "Aug", + "Sep", + "Oct", + "Nov", + "Dec", + NULL +}; + +static const char *full_month[] = { + "January", + "February", + "Mars", + "April", + "May", + "June", + "July", + "August", + "September", + "October", + "November", + "December", + NULL, +}; + +static const char *ampm[] = { + "am", + "pm", + NULL +}; + +/* + * Try to match `*buf' to one of the strings in `strs'. Return the + * index of the matching string (or -1 if none). Also advance buf. + */ + +static int +match_string (const char **buf, const char **strs) +{ + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; strs[i] != NULL; ++i) { + int len = strlen (strs[i]); + + if (strncasecmp (*buf, strs[i], len) == 0) { + *buf += len; + return i; + } + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * tm_year is relative this year */ + +const int tm_year_base = 1900; + +/* + * Return TRUE iff `year' was a leap year. + */ + +static int +is_leap_year (int year) +{ + return (year % 4) == 0 && ((year % 100) != 0 || (year % 400) == 0); +} + +/* + * Return the weekday [0,6] (0 = Sunday) of the first day of `year' + */ + +static int +first_day (int year) +{ + int ret = 4; + + for (; year > 1970; --year) + ret = (ret + 365 + is_leap_year (year) ? 1 : 0) % 7; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set `timeptr' given `wnum' (week number [0, 53]) + */ + +static void +set_week_number_sun (struct tm *timeptr, int wnum) +{ + int fday = first_day (timeptr->tm_year + tm_year_base); + + timeptr->tm_yday = wnum * 7 + timeptr->tm_wday - fday; + if (timeptr->tm_yday < 0) { + timeptr->tm_wday = fday; + timeptr->tm_yday = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Set `timeptr' given `wnum' (week number [0, 53]) + */ + +static void +set_week_number_mon (struct tm *timeptr, int wnum) +{ + int fday = (first_day (timeptr->tm_year + tm_year_base) + 6) % 7; + + timeptr->tm_yday = wnum * 7 + (timeptr->tm_wday + 6) % 7 - fday; + if (timeptr->tm_yday < 0) { + timeptr->tm_wday = (fday + 1) % 7; + timeptr->tm_yday = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Set `timeptr' given `wnum' (week number [0, 53]) + */ + +static void +set_week_number_mon4 (struct tm *timeptr, int wnum) +{ + int fday = (first_day (timeptr->tm_year + tm_year_base) + 6) % 7; + int offset = 0; + + if (fday < 4) + offset += 7; + + timeptr->tm_yday = offset + (wnum - 1) * 7 + timeptr->tm_wday - fday; + if (timeptr->tm_yday < 0) { + timeptr->tm_wday = fday; + timeptr->tm_yday = 0; + } +} + +/* + * + */ + +char * +strptime (const char *buf, const char *format, struct tm *timeptr) +{ + char c; + + for (; (c = *format) != '\0'; ++format) { + char *s; + int ret; + + if (isspace (c)) { + while (isspace (*buf)) + ++buf; + } else if (c == '%' && format[1] != '\0') { + c = *++format; + if (c == 'E' || c == 'O') + c = *++format; + switch (c) { + case 'A' : + ret = match_string (&buf, full_weekdays); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret; + break; + case 'a' : + ret = match_string (&buf, abb_weekdays); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret; + break; + case 'B' : + ret = match_string (&buf, full_month); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mon = ret; + break; + case 'b' : + case 'h' : + ret = match_string (&buf, abb_month); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mon = ret; + break; + case 'C' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_year = (ret * 100) - tm_year_base; + buf = s; + break; + case 'c' : + abort (); + case 'D' : /* %m/%d/%y */ + s = strptime (buf, "%m/%d/%y", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'd' : + case 'e' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mday = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'H' : + case 'k' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_hour = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'I' : + case 'l' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + if (ret == 12) + timeptr->tm_hour = 0; + else + timeptr->tm_hour = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'j' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_yday = ret - 1; + buf = s; + break; + case 'm' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mon = ret - 1; + buf = s; + break; + case 'M' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_min = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'n' : + if (*buf == '\n') + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + case 'p' : + ret = match_string (&buf, ampm); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + if (timeptr->tm_hour == 0) { + if (ret == 1) + timeptr->tm_hour = 12; + } else + timeptr->tm_hour += 12; + break; + case 'r' : /* %I:%M:%S %p */ + s = strptime (buf, "%I:%M:%S %p", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'R' : /* %H:%M */ + s = strptime (buf, "%H:%M", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'S' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_sec = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 't' : + if (*buf == '\t') + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + case 'T' : /* %H:%M:%S */ + case 'X' : + s = strptime (buf, "%H:%M:%S", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'u' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret - 1; + buf = s; + break; + case 'w' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'U' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + set_week_number_sun (timeptr, ret); + buf = s; + break; + case 'V' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + set_week_number_mon4 (timeptr, ret); + buf = s; + break; + case 'W' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + set_week_number_mon (timeptr, ret); + buf = s; + break; + case 'x' : + s = strptime (buf, "%Y:%m:%d", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'y' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + if (ret < 70) + timeptr->tm_year = 100 + ret; + else + timeptr->tm_year = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'Y' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_year = ret - tm_year_base; + buf = s; + break; + case 'Z' : + abort (); + case '\0' : + --format; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '%' : + if (*buf == '%') + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + default : + if (*buf == '%' || *++buf == c) + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + } + } else { + if (*buf == c) + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + } + } + return (char *)buf; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strsep.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strsep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..efc714a664 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strsep.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strsep.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP + +char * +strsep(char **str, const char *delim) +{ + char *save = *str; + if(*str == NULL) + return NULL; + *str = *str + strcspn(*str, delim); + if(**str == 0) + *str = NULL; + else{ + **str = 0; + (*str)++; + } + return save; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strsep_copy.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strsep_copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..abe973188c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strsep_copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strsep_copy.c,v 1.4 2002/08/14 17:20:40 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP_COPY + +/* strsep, but with const stringp, so return string in buf */ + +ssize_t +strsep_copy(const char **stringp, const char *delim, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + const char *save = *stringp; + size_t l; + if(save == NULL) + return -1; + *stringp = *stringp + strcspn(*stringp, delim); + l = min(len, *stringp - save); + if(len > 0) { + memcpy(buf, save, l); + buf[l] = '\0'; + } + + l = *stringp - save; + if(**stringp == '\0') + *stringp = NULL; + else + (*stringp)++; + return l; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strtok_r.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strtok_r.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45b036aa9f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strtok_r.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strtok_r.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOK_R + +char * +strtok_r(char *s1, const char *s2, char **lasts) +{ + char *ret; + + if (s1 == NULL) + s1 = *lasts; + while(*s1 && strchr(s2, *s1)) + ++s1; + if(*s1 == '\0') + return NULL; + ret = s1; + while(*s1 && !strchr(s2, *s1)) + ++s1; + if(*s1) + *s1++ = '\0'; + *lasts = s1; + return ret; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_STRTOK_R */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strupr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strupr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d136e001c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/strupr.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strupr.c,v 1.5 2003/04/14 11:46:41 lha Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUPR +char * +strupr(char *str) +{ + char *s; + + for(s = str; *s; s++) + *s = toupper((unsigned char)*s); + return str; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/swab.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/swab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c623bd0708 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/swab.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_SWAB + +RCSID("$Id: swab.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); + +void +swab (char *from, char *to, int nbytes) +{ + while(nbytes >= 2) { + *(to + 1) = *from; + *to = *(from + 1); + to += 2; + from += 2; + nbytes -= 2; + } +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/timeval.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/timeval.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea4dee8618 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/timeval.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Timeval stuff + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: timeval.c,v 1.1 2000/03/03 09:02:42 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * Make `t1' consistent. + */ + +void +timevalfix(struct timeval *t1) +{ + if (t1->tv_usec < 0) { + t1->tv_sec--; + t1->tv_usec += 1000000; + } + if (t1->tv_usec >= 1000000) { + t1->tv_sec++; + t1->tv_usec -= 1000000; + } +} + +/* + * t1 += t2 + */ + +void +timevaladd(struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + t1->tv_sec += t2->tv_sec; + t1->tv_usec += t2->tv_usec; + timevalfix(t1); +} + +/* + * t1 -= t2 + */ + +void +timevalsub(struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + t1->tv_sec -= t2->tv_sec; + t1->tv_usec -= t2->tv_usec; + timevalfix(t1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/tm2time.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/tm2time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b912e32dae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/tm2time.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: tm2time.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +time_t +tm2time (struct tm tm, int local) +{ + time_t t; + + tm.tm_isdst = -1; + + t = mktime (&tm); + + if (!local) + t += t - mktime (gmtime (&t)); + return t; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/unsetenv.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/unsetenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d95a513dc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/unsetenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: unsetenv.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +extern char **environ; + +/* + * unsetenv -- + */ +void +unsetenv(const char *name) +{ + int len; + const char *np; + char **p; + + if (name == 0 || environ == 0) + return; + + for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; np++) + /* nop */; + len = np - name; + + for (p = environ; *p != 0; p++) + if (strncmp(*p, name, len) == 0 && (*p)[len] == '=') + break; + + for (; *p != 0; p++) + *p = *(p + 1); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/unvis.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/unvis.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..363564c049 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/unvis.c @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/* $NetBSD: unvis.c,v 1.19 2000/01/22 22:19:13 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if 1 +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: unvis.c,v 1.2 2000/12/06 21:41:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#ifndef _DIAGASSERT +#define _DIAGASSERT(X) +#endif +#else +#include +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)unvis.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93"; +#else +__RCSID("$NetBSD: unvis.c,v 1.19 2000/01/22 22:19:13 mycroft Exp $"); +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#define __LIBC12_SOURCE__ + +#include "namespace.h" +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +#ifdef __weak_alias +__weak_alias(strunvis,_strunvis) +__weak_alias(unvis,_unvis) +#endif + +__warn_references(unvis, + "warning: reference to compatibility unvis(); include for correct reference") +#endif + +/* + * decode driven by state machine + */ +#define S_GROUND 0 /* haven't seen escape char */ +#define S_START 1 /* start decoding special sequence */ +#define S_META 2 /* metachar started (M) */ +#define S_META1 3 /* metachar more, regular char (-) */ +#define S_CTRL 4 /* control char started (^) */ +#define S_OCTAL2 5 /* octal digit 2 */ +#define S_OCTAL3 6 /* octal digit 3 */ + +#define isoctal(c) (((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7') + +/* + * unvis - decode characters previously encoded by vis + */ +#ifndef HAVE_UNVIS +int +unvis(char *cp, int c, int *astate, int flag) +{ + + _DIAGASSERT(cp != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(astate != NULL); + + if (flag & UNVIS_END) { + if (*astate == S_OCTAL2 || *astate == S_OCTAL3) { + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + } + return (*astate == S_GROUND ? UNVIS_NOCHAR : UNVIS_SYNBAD); + } + + switch (*astate) { + + case S_GROUND: + *cp = 0; + if (c == '\\') { + *astate = S_START; + return (0); + } + *cp = c; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + + case S_START: + switch(c) { + case '\\': + *cp = c; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': + case '4': case '5': case '6': case '7': + *cp = (c - '0'); + *astate = S_OCTAL2; + return (0); + case 'M': + *cp = (char)0200; + *astate = S_META; + return (0); + case '^': + *astate = S_CTRL; + return (0); + case 'n': + *cp = '\n'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 'r': + *cp = '\r'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 'b': + *cp = '\b'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 'a': + *cp = '\007'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 'v': + *cp = '\v'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 't': + *cp = '\t'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 'f': + *cp = '\f'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 's': + *cp = ' '; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case 'E': + *cp = '\033'; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + case '\n': + /* + * hidden newline + */ + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_NOCHAR); + case '$': + /* + * hidden marker + */ + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_NOCHAR); + } + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_SYNBAD); + + case S_META: + if (c == '-') + *astate = S_META1; + else if (c == '^') + *astate = S_CTRL; + else { + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_SYNBAD); + } + return (0); + + case S_META1: + *astate = S_GROUND; + *cp |= c; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + + case S_CTRL: + if (c == '?') + *cp |= 0177; + else + *cp |= c & 037; + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALID); + + case S_OCTAL2: /* second possible octal digit */ + if (isoctal(c)) { + /* + * yes - and maybe a third + */ + *cp = (*cp << 3) + (c - '0'); + *astate = S_OCTAL3; + return (0); + } + /* + * no - done with current sequence, push back passed char + */ + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_VALIDPUSH); + + case S_OCTAL3: /* third possible octal digit */ + *astate = S_GROUND; + if (isoctal(c)) { + *cp = (*cp << 3) + (c - '0'); + return (UNVIS_VALID); + } + /* + * we were done, push back passed char + */ + return (UNVIS_VALIDPUSH); + + default: + /* + * decoder in unknown state - (probably uninitialized) + */ + *astate = S_GROUND; + return (UNVIS_SYNBAD); + } +} +#endif + +/* + * strunvis - decode src into dst + * + * Number of chars decoded into dst is returned, -1 on error. + * Dst is null terminated. + */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUNVIS +int +strunvis(char *dst, const char *src) +{ + char c; + char *start = dst; + int state = 0; + + _DIAGASSERT(src != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(dst != NULL); + + while ((c = *src++) != '\0') { + again: + switch (unvis(dst, c, &state, 0)) { + case UNVIS_VALID: + dst++; + break; + case UNVIS_VALIDPUSH: + dst++; + goto again; + case 0: + case UNVIS_NOCHAR: + break; + default: + return (-1); + } + } + if (unvis(dst, c, &state, UNVIS_END) == UNVIS_VALID) + dst++; + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst - start); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verify.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..842fa9a3ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verify.c,v 1.13 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +int +unix_verify_user(char *user, char *password) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + + pw = k_getpwnam(user); + if(pw == NULL) + return -1; + if(strlen(pw->pw_passwd) == 0 && strlen(password) == 0) + return 0; + if(strcmp(crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd), pw->pw_passwd) == 0) + return 0; + return -1; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67b4512c9d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verr.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verr.c,v 1.10 2001/01/25 12:41:39 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include + +void +verr(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(1, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verrx.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verrx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5df5c8ddf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/verrx.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verrx.c,v 1.10 2001/01/25 12:41:39 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include + +void +verrx(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(0, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vis.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vis.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8dd583215d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vis.c @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ +/* $NetBSD: vis.c,v 1.19 2000/01/22 22:42:45 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + + +#if 1 +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vis.c,v 1.5 2001/09/03 05:37:23 assar Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#ifndef _DIAGASSERT +#define _DIAGASSERT(X) +#endif +#else +#include +#if !defined(lint) +__RCSID("$NetBSD: vis.c,v 1.19 2000/01/22 22:42:45 mycroft Exp $"); +#endif /* not lint */ +#endif + +#if 0 +#include "namespace.h" +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +#ifdef __weak_alias +__weak_alias(strsvis,_strsvis) +__weak_alias(strsvisx,_strsvisx) +__weak_alias(strvis,_strvis) +__weak_alias(strvisx,_strvisx) +__weak_alias(svis,_svis) +__weak_alias(vis,_vis) +#endif +#endif + +#undef BELL +#if defined(__STDC__) +#define BELL '\a' +#else +#define BELL '\007' +#endif + +#define isoctal(c) (((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7') +#define iswhite(c) (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\n') +#define issafe(c) (c == '\b' || c == BELL || c == '\r') + +#define MAXEXTRAS 5 + + +#define MAKEEXTRALIST(flag, extra) \ +do { \ + char *pextra = extra; \ + if (flag & VIS_SP) *pextra++ = ' '; \ + if (flag & VIS_TAB) *pextra++ = '\t'; \ + if (flag & VIS_NL) *pextra++ = '\n'; \ + if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) *pextra++ = '\\'; \ + *pextra = '\0'; \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/0) + +/* + * This is SVIS, the central macro of vis. + * dst: Pointer to the destination buffer + * c: Character to encode + * flag: Flag word + * nextc: The character following 'c' + * extra: Pointer to the list of extra characters to be + * backslash-protected. + */ +#define SVIS(dst, c, flag, nextc, extra) \ +do { \ + int isextra, isc; \ + isextra = strchr(extra, c) != NULL; \ + if (!isextra && \ + isascii((unsigned char)c) && \ + (isgraph((unsigned char)c) || iswhite(c) || \ + ((flag & VIS_SAFE) && issafe(c)))) { \ + *dst++ = c; \ + break; \ + } \ + isc = 0; \ + if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) { \ + switch (c) { \ + case '\n': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'n'; \ + break; \ + case '\r': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'r'; \ + break; \ + case '\b': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'b'; \ + break; \ + case BELL: \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'a'; \ + break; \ + case '\v': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'v'; \ + break; \ + case '\t': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 't'; \ + break; \ + case '\f': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'f'; \ + break; \ + case ' ': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 's'; \ + break; \ + case '\0': \ + isc = 1; *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = '0'; \ + if (isoctal(nextc)) { \ + *dst++ = '0'; \ + *dst++ = '0'; \ + } \ + } \ + } \ + if (isc) break; \ + if (isextra || ((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL)) { \ + *dst++ = '\\'; \ + *dst++ = (u_char)(((unsigned)(u_char)c >> 6) & 03) + '0'; \ + *dst++ = (u_char)(((unsigned)(u_char)c >> 3) & 07) + '0'; \ + *dst++ = (c & 07) + '0'; \ + } else { \ + if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) *dst++ = '\\'; \ + if (c & 0200) { \ + c &= 0177; *dst++ = 'M'; \ + } \ + if (iscntrl((unsigned char)c)) { \ + *dst++ = '^'; \ + if (c == 0177) \ + *dst++ = '?'; \ + else \ + *dst++ = c + '@'; \ + } else { \ + *dst++ = '-'; *dst++ = c; \ + } \ + } \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/0) + + +/* + * svis - visually encode characters, also encoding the characters + * pointed to by `extra' + */ +#ifndef HAVE_SVIS +char * +svis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc, const char *extra) +{ + _DIAGASSERT(dst != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(extra != NULL); + + SVIS(dst, c, flag, nextc, extra); + *dst = '\0'; + return(dst); +} +#endif + + +/* + * strsvis, strsvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst + * + * Extra is a pointer to a \0-terminated list of characters to + * be encoded, too. These functions are useful e. g. to + * encode strings in such a way so that they are not interpreted + * by a shell. + * + * Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible + * expansion. The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL, + * is returned. + * + * Strsvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst. + * This is useful for encoding a block of data. + */ +#ifndef HAVE_STRSVIS +int +strsvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag, const char *extra) +{ + char c; + char *start; + + _DIAGASSERT(dst != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(src != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(extra != NULL); + + for (start = dst; (c = *src++) != '\0'; /* empty */) + SVIS(dst, c, flag, *src, extra); + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst - start); +} +#endif + + +#ifndef HAVE_STRVISX +int +strsvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag, const char *extra) +{ + char c; + char *start; + + _DIAGASSERT(dst != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(src != NULL); + _DIAGASSERT(extra != NULL); + + for (start = dst; len > 0; len--) { + c = *src++; + SVIS(dst, c, flag, len ? *src : '\0', extra); + } + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst - start); +} +#endif + + +/* + * vis - visually encode characters + */ +#ifndef HAVE_VIS +char * +vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc) +{ + char extra[MAXEXTRAS]; + + _DIAGASSERT(dst != NULL); + + MAKEEXTRALIST(flag, extra); + SVIS(dst, c, flag, nextc, extra); + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst); +} +#endif + + +/* + * strvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst + * + * Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible + * expansion. The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL, + * is returned. + * + * Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst. + * This is useful for encoding a block of data. + */ +#ifndef HAVE_STRVIS +int +strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag) +{ + char extra[MAXEXTRAS]; + + MAKEEXTRALIST(flag, extra); + return (strsvis(dst, src, flag, extra)); +} +#endif + + +#ifndef HAVE_STRVISX +int +strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag) +{ + char extra[MAXEXTRAS]; + + MAKEEXTRALIST(flag, extra); + return (strsvisx(dst, src, len, flag, extra)); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vis.hin b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vis.hin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a9d09da958 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vis.hin @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* $NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.11 1999/11/25 16:55:50 wennmach Exp $ */ +/* $Id: vis.hin,v 1.1 2000/12/06 21:35:47 joda Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)vis.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#ifndef _VIS_H_ +#define _VIS_H_ + +/* + * to select alternate encoding format + */ +#define VIS_OCTAL 0x01 /* use octal \ddd format */ +#define VIS_CSTYLE 0x02 /* use \[nrft0..] where appropiate */ + +/* + * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all + * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline). + */ +#define VIS_SP 0x04 /* also encode space */ +#define VIS_TAB 0x08 /* also encode tab */ +#define VIS_NL 0x10 /* also encode newline */ +#define VIS_WHITE (VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL) +#define VIS_SAFE 0x20 /* only encode "unsafe" characters */ + +/* + * other + */ +#define VIS_NOSLASH 0x40 /* inhibit printing '\' */ + +/* + * unvis return codes + */ +#define UNVIS_VALID 1 /* character valid */ +#define UNVIS_VALIDPUSH 2 /* character valid, push back passed char */ +#define UNVIS_NOCHAR 3 /* valid sequence, no character produced */ +#define UNVIS_SYNBAD -1 /* unrecognized escape sequence */ +#define UNVIS_ERROR -2 /* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */ + +/* + * unvis flags + */ +#define UNVIS_END 1 /* no more characters */ + +char *vis (char *, int, int, int); +char *svis (char *, int, int, int, const char *); +int strvis (char *, const char *, int); +int strsvis (char *, const char *, int, const char *); +int strvisx (char *, const char *, size_t, int); +int strsvisx (char *, const char *, size_t, int, const char *); +int strunvis (char *, const char *); +int unvis (char *, int, int *, int); + +#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vsyslog.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vsyslog.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c72cf3373e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vsyslog.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vsyslog.c,v 1.6 2000/05/22 22:09:25 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VSYSLOG + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * the theory behind this is that we might be trying to call vsyslog + * when there's no memory left, and we should try to be as useful as + * possible. And the format string should say something about what's + * failing. + */ + +static void +simple_vsyslog(int pri, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + syslog (pri, "%s", fmt); +} + +/* + * do like syslog but with a `va_list' + */ + +void +vsyslog(int pri, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *fmt2; + const char *p; + char *p2; + int saved_errno = errno; + int fmt_len = strlen (fmt); + int fmt2_len = fmt_len; + char *buf; + + fmt2 = malloc (fmt_len + 1); + if (fmt2 == NULL) { + simple_vsyslog (pri, fmt, ap); + return; + } + + for (p = fmt, p2 = fmt2; *p != '\0'; ++p) { + if (p[0] == '%' && p[1] == 'm') { + const char *e = strerror (saved_errno); + int e_len = strlen (e); + char *tmp; + int pos; + + pos = p2 - fmt2; + fmt2_len += e_len - 2; + tmp = realloc (fmt2, fmt2_len + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (fmt2); + simple_vsyslog (pri, fmt, ap); + return; + } + fmt2 = tmp; + p2 = fmt2 + pos; + memmove (p2, e, e_len); + p2 += e_len; + ++p; + } else + *p2++ = *p; + } + *p2 = '\0'; + + vasprintf (&buf, fmt2, ap); + free (fmt2); + if (buf == NULL) { + simple_vsyslog (pri, fmt, ap); + return; + } + syslog (pri, "%s", buf); + free (buf); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vwarn.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vwarn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4034b1b8b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vwarn.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vwarn.c,v 1.10 2001/01/25 12:41:39 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include + +void +vwarn(const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(1, fmt, ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vwarnx.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vwarnx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7449a75b3c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/vwarnx.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vwarnx.c,v 1.10 2001/01/25 12:41:39 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include + +void +vwarnx(const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(0, fmt, ap); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warn.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d8ee335106 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warn.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: warn.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +warn(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vwarn(fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warnerr.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warnerr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0509d1909e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warnerr.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: warnerr.c,v 1.15 2001/07/09 14:56:51 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include "err.h" + +void +warnerr(int doerrno, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + int sverrno = errno; + const char *progname = getprogname(); + + if(progname != NULL){ + fprintf(stderr, "%s", progname); + if(fmt != NULL || doerrno) + fprintf(stderr, ": "); + } + if (fmt != NULL){ + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); + if(doerrno) + fprintf(stderr, ": "); + } + if(doerrno) + fprintf(stderr, "%s", strerror(sverrno)); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warnx.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warnx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c991176a9d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/warnx.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: warnx.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +warnx(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vwarnx(fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/write_pid.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/write_pid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..763b513ef3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/write_pid.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: write_pid.c,v 1.6 2001/09/02 23:58:15 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +char * +pid_file_write (const char *progname) +{ + FILE *fp; + char *ret; + + asprintf (&ret, "%s%s.pid", _PATH_VARRUN, progname); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + fp = fopen (ret, "w"); + if (fp == NULL) { + free (ret); + return NULL; + } + fprintf (fp, "%u", (unsigned)getpid()); + fclose (fp); + return ret; +} + +void +pid_file_delete (char **filename) +{ + if (*filename != NULL) { + unlink (*filename); + free (*filename); + *filename = NULL; + } +} + +#ifndef HAVE_PIDFILE +static char *pidfile_path; + +static void +pidfile_cleanup(void) +{ + if(pidfile_path != NULL) + pid_file_delete(&pidfile_path); +} + +void +pidfile(const char *basename) +{ + if(pidfile_path != NULL) + return; + if(basename == NULL) + basename = getprogname(); + pidfile_path = pid_file_write(basename); +#if defined(HAVE_ATEXIT) + atexit(pidfile_cleanup); +#elif defined(HAVE_ON_EXIT) + on_exit(pidfile_cleanup); +#endif +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/writev.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/writev.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3859bfe33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/writev.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: writev.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +writev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) +{ + ssize_t ret; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + + for(i = 0; i < iovcnt; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + p = buf; + for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; ++i) { + memcpy (p, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len); + p += iov[i].iov_len; + } + ret = write (d, buf, tot); + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/xdbm.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/xdbm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e65217625 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/roken/xdbm.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2002 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: xdbm.h,v 1.15 2002/05/17 16:02:22 joda Exp $ */ + +/* Generic *dbm include file */ + +#ifndef __XDBM_H__ +#define __XDBM_H__ + +#if HAVE_DB_NDBM +#define DB_DBM_HSEARCH 1 +#include +#elif HAVE_NDBM +#if defined(HAVE_GDBM_NDBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_NDBM_H) +#include +#endif +#endif /* HAVE_NDBM */ + +#endif /* __XDBM_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e25ae812d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +2002-05-19 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: just link mk_cmds against libsl; avoids libtool + problem + +2001-07-09 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add getprogname.c libss.la:add libcom_err.la noted + by Leif Johansson + +2001-05-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump versions to 1:2:1 and 1:4:1 + +2001-05-06 Assar Westerlund + + * roken_rename.h (strdup): add + +2001-03-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: re do the roken-renaming properly + +2001-02-13 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add more functions to rename + +2001-01-26 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.h: proto + + * sl.c (sl_command_loop): try to handle user pressing C-c + +2000-12-11 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libss_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 1:2:1 + +2000-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add dependencies for libss/libsl shared libraries + +2000-07-25 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bump ss version to 1:1:1 + +2000-06-27 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y (yyerror): static-ize + * make_cmds.h (error_message, yylex): add prototypes + * lex.l: fix prototypes and kill warnings + +2000-05-24 Assar Westerlund + + * ss.h (SS_ET_COMMAND_NOT_FOUND): add + * ss.c: check allocation and return some other error codes too + +2000-04-29 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add LIB_tgetent. From Derrick J Brashear + + +2000-04-03 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + +2000-03-07 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.h (SL_BADCOMMAND): define + (sl_apropos): add prototype + + * sl.c: mandoc-generation + (sl_apropos): stolen from arla + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump both versions to 0:1:0 + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y (name2number): not used here. remove. + +Thu Apr 1 17:03:59 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * make_cmds.c: use getarg + +Tue Mar 23 14:36:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: don't rename + +Sun Mar 21 14:13:29 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: don't roken-rename + +Sat Mar 20 03:43:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: replace return with YYACCEPT + +Fri Mar 19 14:53:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add libss; add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 15:07:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: clean lex.c parse.c parse.h + + * Makefile.am: install ss.h + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Thu Mar 11 15:01:01 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * parse.y: prototype for error_message + +Tue Feb 9 23:45:37 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: add snprintf.o to make_cmds + +Sun Nov 22 10:46:23 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.c (sl_command_loop): remove unused variable + + * ss.c (ss_error): remove unused variable + + * make_cmds.c: include err.h + (main): remove unused variable + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sun Sep 27 01:28:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * make_cmds.c: clean-up and simplification + +Mon May 25 02:54:13 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + + * Makefile.in: make symlink magic work + +Sun Apr 19 10:00:26 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sun Apr 5 09:21:43 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: define alloca to malloc in case we're using bison but + don't have alloca + +Sat Mar 28 11:39:00 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.c (sl_loop): s/2/1 + +Sat Mar 21 00:46:51 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.c (sl_loop): check that there is at least one argument before + calling sl_command + +Sun Mar 1 05:14:37 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.c (sl_loop): Fix general broken-ness. + + * sl.c: Cleanup printing of help strings. + +Thu Feb 26 02:22:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: @LEXLIB@ + +Sat Feb 21 15:18:21 1998 assar westerlund + + * Makefile.in: set YACC and LEX + +Mon Feb 16 16:08:25 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: Some fixes for ss/mk_cmds. + +Sun Feb 15 05:12:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: Install libsl under the `libss' name too. Install + mk_cmds, and ss.h. + + * make_cmds.c: A mk_cmds clone that creates SL structures. + + * ss.c: SS compatibility functions. + + * sl.c: Move command line split to function `sl_make_argv'. + +Tue Feb 3 16:45:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.c: Add sl_command_loop, that is the loop body of sl_loop. + +Mon Oct 20 01:13:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.c (sl_help): actually use the `help' field of `SL_cmd' + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2589e58708 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.29 2002/08/13 13:48:17 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +if do_roken_rename +ES = strtok_r.c snprintf.c strdup.c strupr.c getprogname.c +endif + +INCLUDES += $(ROKEN_RENAME) + +YFLAGS = -d + +include_HEADERS = sl.h + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsl.la libss.la +libsl_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:2:1 +libss_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:4:1 + +libsl_la_LIBADD = @LIB_readline@ +libss_la_LIBADD = @LIB_readline@ @LIB_com_err@ + +libsl_la_SOURCES = sl_locl.h sl.c $(ES) +libss_la_SOURCES = $(libsl_la_SOURCES) ss.c ss.h + +# install these? + +bin_PROGRAMS = mk_cmds + +mk_cmds_SOURCES = make_cmds.c make_cmds.h parse.y lex.l +mk_cmds_LDADD = libsl.la $(LDADD) + +ssincludedir = $(includedir)/ss +ssinclude_HEADERS = ss.h + +CLEANFILES = lex.c parse.c parse.h snprintf.c strtok_r.c strdup.c strupr.c getprogname.c + +$(mk_cmds_OBJECTS): parse.h parse.c + +LDADD = \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LEXLIB) + +strtok_r.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strtok_r.c . +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . +strdup.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strdup.c . +strupr.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strupr.c . +getprogname.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/getprogname.c . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a970795b3f --- 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\ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat-mans: + $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/cf/install-catman.sh "$(INSTALL_DATA)" "$(mkinstalldirs)" "$(srcdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(mandir)" '$(CATMANEXT)' $(man_MANS) $(man1_MANS) $(man3_MANS) $(man5_MANS) $(man8_MANS) + +install-data-hook: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +$(mk_cmds_OBJECTS): parse.h parse.c + +strtok_r.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strtok_r.c . +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . +strdup.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strdup.c . +strupr.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strupr.c . +getprogname.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/getprogname.c . +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/lex.l b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/lex.l new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3e394793d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/lex.l @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#undef ECHO + +#include "make_cmds.h" +#include "parse.h" + +RCSID("$Id: lex.l,v 1.6 2001/09/16 23:10:10 assar Exp $"); + +static unsigned lineno = 1; +static int getstring(void); + +#define YY_NO_UNPUT + +#undef ECHO + +%} + + +%% +command_table { return TABLE; } +request { return REQUEST; } +unknown { return UNKNOWN; } +unimplemented { return UNIMPLEMENTED; } +end { return END; } +#[^\n]* ; +[ \t] ; +\n { lineno++; } +\" { return getstring(); } +[a-zA-Z0-9_]+ { yylval.string = strdup(yytext); return STRING; } +. { return *yytext; } +%% + +#ifndef yywrap /* XXX */ +int +yywrap () +{ + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int +getstring(void) +{ + char x[128]; + int i = 0; + int c; + int backslash = 0; + while((c = input()) != EOF){ + if(backslash) { + if(c == 'n') + c = '\n'; + else if(c == 't') + c = '\t'; + x[i++] = c; + backslash = 0; + continue; + } + if(c == '\n'){ + error_message("unterminated string"); + lineno++; + break; + } + if(c == '\\'){ + backslash++; + continue; + } + if(c == '\"') + break; + x[i++] = c; + } + x[i] = '\0'; + yylval.string = strdup(x); + return STRING; +} + +void +error_message (const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start (args, format); + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d: ", filename, lineno); + vfprintf (stderr, format, args); + va_end (args); + numerror++; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/make_cmds.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/make_cmds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..723dfdcee7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/make_cmds.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "make_cmds.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: make_cmds.c,v 1.7 2001/02/20 01:44:55 assar Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include "parse.h" + +int numerror; +extern FILE *yyin; +FILE *c_file; + +extern void yyparse(void); + +#ifdef YYDEBUG +extern int yydebug = 1; +#endif + +char *filename; +char *table_name; + +static struct command_list *commands; + +void +add_command(char *function, + char *help, + struct string_list *aliases, + unsigned flags) +{ + struct command_list *cl = malloc(sizeof(*cl)); + + if (cl == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + cl->function = function; + cl->help = help; + cl->aliases = aliases; + cl->flags = flags; + cl->next = NULL; + if(commands) { + *commands->tail = cl; + commands->tail = &cl->next; + return; + } + cl->tail = &cl->next; + commands = cl; +} + +static char * +quote(const char *str) +{ + char buf[1024]; /* XXX */ + const char *p; + char *q; + q = buf; + + *q++ = '\"'; + for(p = str; *p != '\0'; p++) { + if(*p == '\n') { + *q++ = '\\'; + *q++ = 'n'; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\t') { + *q++ = '\\'; + *q++ = 't'; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\"' || *p == '\\') + *q++ = '\\'; + *q++ = *p; + } + *q++ = '\"'; + *q++ = '\0'; + return strdup(buf); +} + +static void +generate_commands(void) +{ + char *base; + char *cfn; + char *p; + + p = strrchr(table_name, '/'); + if(p == NULL) + p = table_name; + else + p++; + + base = strdup (p); + if (base == NULL) + err (1, "strdup"); + + p = strrchr(base, '.'); + if(p) + *p = '\0'; + + asprintf(&cfn, "%s.c", base); + if (cfn == NULL) + err (1, "asprintf"); + + c_file = fopen(cfn, "w"); + if (c_file == NULL) + err (1, "cannot fopen %s", cfn); + + fprintf(c_file, "/* Generated from %s */\n", filename); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \n"); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + + { + struct command_list *cl, *xl; + char *p, *q; + + for(cl = commands; cl; cl = cl->next) { + for(xl = commands; xl != cl; xl = xl->next) + if(strcmp(cl->function, xl->function) == 0) + break; + if(xl != cl) + continue; + /* XXX hack for ss_quit */ + if(strcmp(cl->function, "ss_quit") == 0) { + fprintf(c_file, "int %s (int, char**);\n", cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, "#define _ss_quit_wrap ss_quit\n\n"); + continue; + } + fprintf(c_file, "void %s (int, char**);\n", cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, "static int _%s_wrap (int argc, char **argv)\n", + cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, "{\n"); + fprintf(c_file, " %s (argc, argv);\n", cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, " return 0;\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "}\n\n"); + } + + fprintf(c_file, "SL_cmd %s[] = {\n", table_name); + for(cl = commands; cl; cl = cl->next) { + struct string_list *sl; + sl = cl->aliases; + p = quote(sl->string); + q = quote(cl->help); + fprintf(c_file, " { %s, _%s_wrap, %s },\n", p, cl->function, q); + free(p); + free(q); + + for(sl = sl->next; sl; sl = sl->next) { + p = quote(sl->string); + fprintf(c_file, " { %s },\n", p); + free(p); + } + } + fprintf(c_file, " { NULL },\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "};\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + } + fclose(c_file); + free(base); + free(cfn); +} + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "command-table"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + + setprogname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(argc == optind) + usage(1); + filename = argv[optind]; + yyin = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(yyin == NULL) + err(1, "%s", filename); + + yyparse(); + + generate_commands(); + + if(numerror) + return 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/make_cmds.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/make_cmds.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d64d979f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/make_cmds.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: make_cmds.h,v 1.3 2000/06/27 02:36:56 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __MAKE_CMDS_H__ +#define __MAKE_CMDS_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +extern char *filename; +extern char *table_name; +extern int numerror; + +struct command_list { + char *function; + char *help; + struct string_list *aliases; + unsigned flags; + struct command_list *next; + struct command_list **tail; +}; + +struct string_list { + char *string; + struct string_list *next; + struct string_list **tail; +}; + +void add_command(char*, char*, struct string_list*, unsigned); + +void error_message(const char *, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1,2))); + +int yylex (void); + +#endif /* __MAKE_CMDS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/parse.y b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/parse.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..deff933637 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/parse.y @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "make_cmds.h" +RCSID("$Id: parse.y,v 1.7 2000/06/27 02:37:18 assar Exp $"); + +static void yyerror (char *s); + +struct string_list* append_string(struct string_list*, char*); +void free_string_list(struct string_list *list); +unsigned string_to_flag(const char *); + +/* This is for bison */ + +#if !defined(alloca) && !defined(HAVE_ALLOCA) +#define alloca(x) malloc(x) +#endif + +%} + +%union { + char *string; + unsigned number; + struct string_list *list; +} + +%token TABLE REQUEST UNKNOWN UNIMPLEMENTED END +%token STRING +%type flag flags +%type aliases + +%% + +file : /* */ + | statements + ; + +statements : statement + | statements statement + ; + +statement : TABLE STRING ';' + { + table_name = $2; + } + | REQUEST STRING ',' STRING ',' aliases ',' '(' flags ')' ';' + { + add_command($2, $4, $6, $9); + } + | REQUEST STRING ',' STRING ',' aliases ';' + { + add_command($2, $4, $6, 0); + } + | UNIMPLEMENTED STRING ',' STRING ',' aliases ';' + { + free($2); + free($4); + free_string_list($6); + } + | UNKNOWN aliases ';' + { + free_string_list($2); + } + | END ';' + { + YYACCEPT; + } + ; + +aliases : STRING + { + $$ = append_string(NULL, $1); + } + | aliases ',' STRING + { + $$ = append_string($1, $3); + } + ; + +flags : flag + { + $$ = $1; + } + | flags ',' flag + { + $$ = $1 | $3; + } + ; +flag : STRING + { + $$ = string_to_flag($1); + free($1); + } + ; + + + +%% + +static void +yyerror (char *s) +{ + error_message ("%s\n", s); +} + +struct string_list* +append_string(struct string_list *list, char *str) +{ + struct string_list *sl = malloc(sizeof(*sl)); + sl->string = str; + sl->next = NULL; + if(list) { + *list->tail = sl; + list->tail = &sl->next; + return list; + } + sl->tail = &sl->next; + return sl; +} + +void +free_string_list(struct string_list *list) +{ + while(list) { + struct string_list *sl = list->next; + free(list->string); + free(list); + list = sl; + } +} + +unsigned +string_to_flag(const char *string) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/roken_rename.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/roken_rename.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..17837fbaa2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/roken_rename.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken_rename.h,v 1.5 2001/05/06 21:47:54 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __roken_rename_h__ +#define __roken_rename_h__ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOK_R +#define strtok_r _sl_strtok_r +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +#define snprintf _sl_snprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +#define asprintf _sl_asprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASNPRINTF +#define asnprintf _sl_asnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF +#define vasprintf _sl_vasprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASNPRINTF +#define vasnprintf _sl_vasnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +#define vsnprintf _sl_vsnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRUPR +#define strupr _sl_strupr +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +#define strdup _sl_strdup +#endif + +#endif /* __roken_rename_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98b101c5b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl.c @@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: sl.c,v 1.29 2001/02/20 01:44:55 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "sl_locl.h" +#include + +static size_t +print_sl (FILE *stream, int mdoc, int longp, SL_cmd *c) + __attribute__ ((unused)); + +static size_t +print_sl (FILE *stream, int mdoc, int longp, SL_cmd *c) +{ + if(mdoc){ + if(longp) + fprintf(stream, "= Ns"); + fprintf(stream, " Ar "); + }else + if (longp) + putc ('=', stream); + else + putc (' ', stream); + + return 1; +} + +static void +mandoc_template(SL_cmd *cmds, + const char *extra_string) +{ + SL_cmd *c, *prev; + char timestr[64], cmd[64]; + const char *p; + time_t t; + + printf(".\\\" Things to fix:\n"); + printf(".\\\" * correct section, and operating system\n"); + printf(".\\\" * remove Op from mandatory flags\n"); + printf(".\\\" * use better macros for arguments (like .Pa for files)\n"); + printf(".\\\"\n"); + t = time(NULL); + strftime(timestr, sizeof(timestr), "%b %d, %Y", localtime(&t)); + printf(".Dd %s\n", timestr); + p = strrchr(getprogname(), '/'); + if(p) p++; else p = getprogname(); + strncpy(cmd, p, sizeof(cmd)); + cmd[sizeof(cmd)-1] = '\0'; + strupr(cmd); + + printf(".Dt %s SECTION\n", cmd); + printf(".Os OPERATING_SYSTEM\n"); + printf(".Sh NAME\n"); + printf(".Nm %s\n", p); + printf(".Nd\n"); + printf("in search of a description\n"); + printf(".Sh SYNOPSIS\n"); + printf(".Nm\n"); + for(c = cmds; c->name; ++c) { +/* if (c->func == NULL) + continue; */ + printf(".Op Fl %s", c->name); +/* print_sl(stdout, 1, 0, c);*/ + printf("\n"); + + } + if (extra_string && *extra_string) + printf (".Ar %s\n", extra_string); + printf(".Sh DESCRIPTION\n"); + printf("Supported options:\n"); + printf(".Bl -tag -width Ds\n"); + prev = NULL; + for(c = cmds; c->name; ++c) { + if (c->func) { + if (prev) + printf ("\n%s\n", prev->usage); + + printf (".It Fl %s", c->name); + prev = c; + } else + printf (", %s\n", c->name); + } + if (prev) + printf ("\n%s\n", prev->usage); + + printf(".El\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh ENVIRONMENT\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh FILES\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh EXAMPLES\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh SEE ALSO\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh STANDARDS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh HISTORY\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh AUTHORS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh BUGS\n"); +} + +static SL_cmd * +sl_match (SL_cmd *cmds, char *cmd, int exactp) +{ + SL_cmd *c, *current = NULL, *partial_cmd = NULL; + int partial_match = 0; + + for (c = cmds; c->name; ++c) { + if (c->func) + current = c; + if (strcmp (cmd, c->name) == 0) + return current; + else if (strncmp (cmd, c->name, strlen(cmd)) == 0 && + partial_cmd != current) { + ++partial_match; + partial_cmd = current; + } + } + if (partial_match == 1 && !exactp) + return partial_cmd; + else + return NULL; +} + +void +sl_help (SL_cmd *cmds, int argc, char **argv) +{ + SL_cmd *c, *prev_c; + + if (getenv("SLMANDOC")) { + mandoc_template(cmds, NULL); + return; + } + + if (argc == 1) { + prev_c = NULL; + for (c = cmds; c->name; ++c) { + if (c->func) { + if(prev_c) + printf ("\n\t%s%s", prev_c->usage ? prev_c->usage : "", + prev_c->usage ? "\n" : ""); + prev_c = c; + printf ("%s", c->name); + } else + printf (", %s", c->name); + } + if(prev_c) + printf ("\n\t%s%s", prev_c->usage ? prev_c->usage : "", + prev_c->usage ? "\n" : ""); + } else { + c = sl_match (cmds, argv[1], 0); + if (c == NULL) + printf ("No such command: %s. " + "Try \"help\" for a list of all commands\n", + argv[1]); + else { + printf ("%s\t%s\n", c->name, c->usage); + if(c->help && *c->help) + printf ("%s\n", c->help); + if((++c)->name && c->func == NULL) { + printf ("Synonyms:"); + while (c->name && c->func == NULL) + printf ("\t%s", (c++)->name); + printf ("\n"); + } + } + } +} + +#ifdef HAVE_READLINE + +char *readline(char *prompt); +void add_history(char *p); + +#else + +static char * +readline(char *prompt) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + printf ("%s", prompt); + fflush (stdout); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + return strdup(buf); +} + +static void +add_history(char *p) +{ +} + +#endif + +int +sl_command(SL_cmd *cmds, int argc, char **argv) +{ + SL_cmd *c; + c = sl_match (cmds, argv[0], 0); + if (c == NULL) + return -1; + return (*c->func)(argc, argv); +} + +struct sl_data { + int max_count; + char **ptr; +}; + +int +sl_make_argv(char *line, int *ret_argc, char ***ret_argv) +{ + char *foo = NULL; + char *p; + int argc, nargv; + char **argv; + + nargv = 10; + argv = malloc(nargv * sizeof(*argv)); + if(argv == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + argc = 0; + + for(p = strtok_r (line, " \t", &foo); + p; + p = strtok_r (NULL, " \t", &foo)) { + if(argc == nargv - 1) { + char **tmp; + nargv *= 2; + tmp = realloc (argv, nargv * sizeof(*argv)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free(argv); + return ENOMEM; + } + argv = tmp; + } + argv[argc++] = p; + } + argv[argc] = NULL; + *ret_argc = argc; + *ret_argv = argv; + return 0; +} + +static jmp_buf sl_jmp; + +static void sl_sigint(int sig) +{ + longjmp(sl_jmp, 1); +} + +static char *sl_readline(const char *prompt) +{ + char *s; + void (*old)(int); + old = signal(SIGINT, sl_sigint); + if(setjmp(sl_jmp)) + printf("\n"); + s = readline((char*)prompt); + signal(SIGINT, old); + return s; +} + +/* return values: 0 on success, -1 on fatal error, or return value of command */ +int +sl_command_loop(SL_cmd *cmds, const char *prompt, void **data) +{ + int ret = 0; + char *buf; + int argc; + char **argv; + + ret = 0; + buf = sl_readline(prompt); + if(buf == NULL) + return 1; + + if(*buf) + add_history(buf); + ret = sl_make_argv(buf, &argc, &argv); + if(ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "sl_loop: out of memory\n"); + free(buf); + return -1; + } + if (argc >= 1) { + ret = sl_command(cmds, argc, argv); + if(ret == -1) { + printf ("Unrecognized command: %s\n", argv[0]); + ret = 0; + } + } + free(buf); + free(argv); + return ret; +} + +int +sl_loop(SL_cmd *cmds, const char *prompt) +{ + void *data = NULL; + int ret; + while((ret = sl_command_loop(cmds, prompt, &data)) == 0) + ; + return ret; +} + +void +sl_apropos (SL_cmd *cmd, const char *topic) +{ + for (; cmd->name != NULL; ++cmd) + if (cmd->usage != NULL && strstr(cmd->usage, topic) != NULL) + printf ("%-20s%s\n", cmd->name, cmd->usage); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5b3e4b7d64 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: sl.h,v 1.9 2001/01/26 14:58:41 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _SL_H +#define _SL_H + +#define SL_BADCOMMAND -1 + +typedef int (*cmd_func)(int, char **); + +struct sl_cmd { + char *name; + cmd_func func; + char *usage; + char *help; +}; + +typedef struct sl_cmd SL_cmd; + +void sl_help (SL_cmd *, int argc, char **argv); +int sl_loop (SL_cmd *, const char *prompt); +int sl_command_loop (SL_cmd *cmds, const char *prompt, void **data); +int sl_command (SL_cmd *cmds, int argc, char **argv); +int sl_make_argv(char*, int*, char***); +void sl_apropos (SL_cmd *cmd, const char *topic); + + +#endif /* _SL_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4bd966003b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/sl_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: sl_locl.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ss.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7655a9ec36 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ss.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "sl_locl.h" +#include +#include "ss.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ss.c,v 1.6 2000/05/25 00:14:58 assar Exp $"); + +struct ss_subst { + char *name; + char *version; + char *info; + ss_request_table *table; +}; + +static struct ss_subst subsystems[2]; +static int num_subsystems; + +int +ss_create_invocation(const char *subsystem, + const char *version, + const char *info, + ss_request_table *table, + int *code) +{ + struct ss_subst *ss; + + if(num_subsystems >= sizeof(subsystems) / sizeof(subsystems[0])) { + *code = 17; + return 0; + } + ss = &subsystems[num_subsystems]; + ss->name = ss->version = ss->info = NULL; + if (subsystem != NULL) { + ss->name = strdup (subsystem); + if (ss->name == NULL) { + *code = ENOMEM; + return 0; + } + } + if (version != NULL) { + ss->version = strdup (version); + if (ss->version == NULL) { + *code = ENOMEM; + return 0; + } + } + if (info != NULL) { + ss->info = strdup (info); + if (ss->info == NULL) { + *code = ENOMEM; + return 0; + } + } + ss->table = table; + *code = 0; + return num_subsystems++; +} + +void +ss_error (int index, long code, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + com_err_va (subsystems[index].name, code, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +ss_perror (int index, long code, const char *msg) +{ + ss_error(index, code, "%s", msg); +} + +int +ss_execute_command(int index, char **argv) +{ + int argc = 0; + int ret; + + while(argv[argc++]); + ret = sl_command(subsystems[index].table, argc, argv); + if (ret == SL_BADCOMMAND) + return SS_ET_COMMAND_NOT_FOUND; + return 0; +} + +int +ss_execute_line (int index, const char *line) +{ + char *buf = strdup(line); + int argc; + char **argv; + int ret; + + if (buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + sl_make_argv(buf, &argc, &argv); + ret = sl_command(subsystems[index].table, argc, argv); + free(buf); + if (ret == SL_BADCOMMAND) + return SS_ET_COMMAND_NOT_FOUND; + return 0; +} + +int +ss_listen (int index) +{ + char *prompt = malloc(strlen(subsystems[index].name) + 3); + if (prompt == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + strcpy(prompt, subsystems[index].name); + strcat(prompt, ": "); + sl_loop(subsystems[index].table, prompt); + free(prompt); + return 0; +} + +int +ss_list_requests(int argc, char **argv /* , int index, void *info */) +{ + sl_help(subsystems[0 /* index */].table, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +int +ss_quit(int argc, char **argv) +{ + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ss.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ss.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0149fa18aa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/sl/ss.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* $Id: ss.h,v 1.3 2000/05/25 00:15:21 assar Exp $ */ + +/* SS compatibility for SL */ + +#ifndef __ss_h__ +#define __ss_h__ + +#include + +typedef SL_cmd ss_request_table; + +int ss_create_invocation (const char *, const char *, const char*, + ss_request_table*, int*); + +void ss_error (int, long, const char*, ...); +int ss_execute_command (int, char**); +int ss_execute_line (int, const char*); +int ss_list_requests (int argc, char**); +int ss_listen (int); +void ss_perror (int, long, const char*); +int ss_quit (int argc, char**); + +#define SS_ET_COMMAND_NOT_FOUND (-1) + +#endif /* __ss_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5a869d585 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +2003-01-02 Johan Danielsson + + * print_version.c: considerable clean up + + * make-print-version.c: make VERSIONLIST a string instead of an + array of strings + +2002-08-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (make_print_version_LDADD): do not hardcode -ldes, + use $(LIB_des) + +2002-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * print_version.c: add bug-report message + +2002-05-20 Johan Danielsson + + * print_version.c: update year + +2001-08-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (make_print_version_LDADD): use = instead of += (be + nice to current automake) + +2001-04-21 Johan Danielsson + + * print_version.c: 2001 + +2001-01-31 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: remove -static turning this into a convenience + library + +2000-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: make the library static and don't install it + +2000-07-08 Assar Westerlund + + * make-print-version.c (heimdal_version, krb4_version): const-ize, + based on thorpej@netbsd.org's change to NetBSD diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d8816123df --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 2002/08/28 22:57:42 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +CLEANFILES = print_version.h + +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libvers.la + +build_HEADERZ = vers.h + +noinst_PROGRAMS = make-print-version + +if KRB4 +if KRB5 +## need to link with des here; otherwise, if krb4 is shared the link +## will fail with unresolved references +make_print_version_LDADD = $(LIB_krb4) $(LIB_des) +endif +endif + +libvers_la_SOURCES = print_version.c + +print_version.lo: print_version.h + +print_version.h: make-print-version$(EXEEXT) + ./make-print-version$(EXEEXT) print_version.h + +make-print-version.o: $(top_builddir)/include/version.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6af87119fc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,757 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.8.3 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 2002/08/28 22:57:42 assar Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.5 2002/05/19 18:35:37 joda Exp $ + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.37.2.2 2003/10/13 13:15:39 joda Exp $ + + +SOURCES = $(libvers_la_SOURCES) make-print-version.c + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +top_builddir = ../.. +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_triplet = @host@ +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am 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print_version.h + +make-print-version.o: $(top_builddir)/include/version.h +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/make-print-version.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/make-print-version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eab167d05d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/make-print-version.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2003 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: make-print-version.c,v 1.3 2003/01/02 15:31:38 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +extern const char *heimdal_version; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +extern const char *krb4_version; +#endif +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *f; + if(argc != 2) + return 1; + f = fopen(argv[1], "w"); + if(f == NULL) + return 1; + fprintf(f, "#define VERSIONLIST \""); +#ifdef KRB5 + fprintf(f, "%s", heimdal_version); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#ifdef KRB5 + fprintf(f, ", "); +#endif + fprintf(f, "%s", krb4_version); +#endif + fprintf(f, "\"\n"); + fclose(f); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/print_version.c b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/print_version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..43f9baa9ab --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/print_version.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: print_version.c,v 1.6.2.1 2004/02/12 18:31:33 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#include "print_version.h" + +void +print_version(const char *progname) +{ + const char *package_list = VERSIONLIST; + + if(progname == NULL) + progname = getprogname(); + + if(*package_list == '\0') + package_list = "no version information"; + fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s)\n", progname, package_list); + fprintf(stderr, "Copyright 1999-2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Send bug-reports to %s\n", PACKAGE_BUGREPORT); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/vers.h b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/vers.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc70355f42 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/lib/vers/vers.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: vers.h,v 1.1 2000/07/01 19:47:36 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __VERS_H__ +#define __VERS_H__ + +void print_version(const char *); + +#endif /* __VERS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ltconfig b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ltconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..91907462a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ltconfig @@ -0,0 +1,2797 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +# ltconfig - Create a system-specific libtool. +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Originally by Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# A lot of this script is taken from autoconf-2.10. + +# Check that we are running under the correct shell. +SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} +echo=echo +if test "X$1" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift +elif test "X$1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # Avoid inline document here, it may be left over + : +elif test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t'; then + # Yippee, $echo works! + : +else + # Restart under the correct shell. + exec "$SHELL" "$0" --no-reexec ${1+"$@"} +fi + +if test "X$1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # used as fallback echo + shift + cat </dev/null`} + case X$UNAME in + *-DOS) PATH_SEPARATOR=';' ;; + *) PATH_SEPARATOR=':' ;; + esac +fi + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test "X${CDPATH+set}" = Xset; then CDPATH=:; export CDPATH; fi + +if test "X${echo_test_string+set}" != Xset; then + # find a string as large as possible, as long as the shell can cope with it + for cmd in 'sed 50q "$0"' 'sed 20q "$0"' 'sed 10q "$0"' 'sed 2q "$0"' 'echo test'; do + # expected sizes: less than 2Kb, 1Kb, 512 bytes, 16 bytes, ... + if (echo_test_string="`eval $cmd`") 2>/dev/null && + echo_test_string="`eval $cmd`" && + (test "X$echo_test_string" = "X$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null; then + break + fi + done +fi + +if test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + : +else + # The Solaris, AIX, and Digital Unix default echo programs unquote + # backslashes. This makes it impossible to quote backslashes using + # echo "$something" | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g' + # + # So, first we look for a working echo in the user's PATH. + + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}${PATH_SEPARATOR}" + for dir in $PATH /usr/ucb; do + if (test -f $dir/echo || test -f $dir/echo$ac_exeext) && + test "X`($dir/echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($dir/echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + echo="$dir/echo" + break + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + if test "X$echo" = Xecho; then + # We didn't find a better echo, so look for alternatives. + if test "X`(print -r '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`(print -r "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + # This shell has a builtin print -r that does the trick. + echo='print -r' + elif (test -f /bin/ksh || test -f /bin/ksh$ac_exeext) && + test "X$CONFIG_SHELL" != X/bin/ksh; then + # If we have ksh, try running ltconfig again with it. + ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL="${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}" + export ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL + CONFIG_SHELL=/bin/ksh + export CONFIG_SHELL + exec "$CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --no-reexec ${1+"$@"} + else + # Try using printf. + echo='printf %s\n' + if test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`($echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + # Cool, printf works + : + elif echo_testing_string=`("$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo '\t') 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`("$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + CONFIG_SHELL="$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL" + export CONFIG_SHELL + SHELL="$CONFIG_SHELL" + export SHELL + echo="$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo" + elif echo_testing_string=`("$CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo '\t') 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = 'X\t' && + echo_testing_string=`("$CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null` && + test "X$echo_testing_string" = "X$echo_test_string"; then + echo="$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo" + else + # maybe with a smaller string... + prev=: + + for cmd in 'echo test' 'sed 2q "$0"' 'sed 10q "$0"' 'sed 20q "$0"' 'sed 50q "$0"'; do + if (test "X$echo_test_string" = "X`eval $cmd`") 2>/dev/null; then + break + fi + prev="$cmd" + done + + if test "$prev" != 'sed 50q "$0"'; then + echo_test_string=`eval $prev` + + export echo_test_string + exec "${ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL-${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}}" "$0" ${1+"$@"} + else + # Oops. We lost completely, so just stick with echo. + echo=echo + fi + fi + fi + fi +fi + +# Sed substitution that helps us do robust quoting. It backslashifies +# metacharacters that are still active within double-quoted strings. +Xsed='sed -e s/^X//' +sed_quote_subst='s/\([\\"\\`$\\\\]\)/\\\1/g' + +# Same as above, but do not quote variable references. +double_quote_subst='s/\([\\"\\`\\\\]\)/\\\1/g' + +# Sed substitution to delay expansion of an escaped shell variable in a +# double_quote_subst'ed string. +delay_variable_subst='s/\\\\\\\\\\\$/\\\\\\$/g' + +# The name of this program. +progname=`$echo "X$0" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + +# Constants: +PROGRAM=ltconfig +PACKAGE=libtool +VERSION=1.4a +TIMESTAMP=" (1.641.2.255 2001/05/22 10:39:30)" +ac_compile='${CC-cc} -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext 1>&5' +ac_link='${CC-cc} -o conftest $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS 1>&5' +rm="rm -f" + +help="Try \`$progname --help' for more information." + +# Global variables: +default_ofile=libtool +can_build_shared=yes +enable_shared=yes +# All known linkers require a `.a' archive for static linking (except M$VC, +# which needs '.lib'). +enable_static=yes +enable_fast_install=yes +enable_dlopen=unknown +enable_win32_dll=no +pic_mode=default +ltmain= +silent= +srcdir= +ac_config_guess= +ac_config_sub= +host= +build=NONE +nonopt=NONE +ofile="$default_ofile" +verify_host=yes +tagname= +with_gcc=no +with_gnu_ld=no +need_locks=yes +ac_ext=c +libext=a +cache_file= +max_cmd_len= + +## Dependencies to place before and after the object being linked: +predep_objects= +postdep_objects= +predeps= +postdeps= +compiler_lib_search_path= + +## Link characteristics: +allow_undefined_flag= +no_undefined_flag= +need_lib_prefix=unknown +need_version=unknown +# when you set need_version to no, make sure it does not cause -set_version +# flags to be left without arguments +archive_cmds= +archive_expsym_cmds= +old_archive_from_new_cmds= +old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds= +striplib= +old_striplib= +export_dynamic_flag_spec= +whole_archive_flag_spec= +thread_safe_flag_spec= +hardcode_into_libs=no +hardcode_libdir_flag_spec= +hardcode_libdir_separator= +hardcode_direct=no +hardcode_minus_L=no +hardcode_shlibpath_var=unsupported +runpath_var= +link_all_deplibs=unknown +always_export_symbols=no +export_symbols_cmds='$NM $libobjs $convenience | $global_symbol_pipe | sed '\''s/.* //'\'' | sort | uniq > $export_symbols' +# include_expsyms should be a list of space-separated symbols to be *always* +# included in the symbol list +include_expsyms= +# exclude_expsyms can be an egrep regular expression of symbols to exclude +# it will be wrapped by ` (' and `)$', so one must not match beginning or +# end of line. Example: `a|bc|.*d.*' will exclude the symbols `a' and `bc', +# as well as any symbol that contains `d'. +exclude_expsyms="_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_" +# Although _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is a valid symbol C name, most a.out +# platforms (ab)use it in PIC code, but their linkers get confused if +# the symbol is explicitly referenced. Since portable code cannot +# rely on this symbol name, it's probably fine to never include it in +# preloaded symbol tables. +extract_expsyms_cmds= + +## Tools: +old_AR="$AR" +old_AR_FLAGS="$AR_FLAGS" +old_CC="$CC" +old_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +old_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" +old_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +old_LIBS="$LIBS" +old_MAGIC_CMD="$MAGIC_CMD" +old_LD="$LD" +old_LN_S="$LN_S" +old_LTCC="$LTCC" +old_NM="$NM" +old_RANLIB="$RANLIB" +old_STRIP="$STRIP" +old_AS="$AS" +old_DLLTOOL="$DLLTOOL" +old_OBJDUMP="$OBJDUMP" +old_OBJEXT="$OBJEXT" +old_EXEEXT="$EXEEXT" +old_reload_flag="$reload_flag" +old_deplibs_check_method="$deplibs_check_method" +old_file_magic_cmd="$file_magic_cmd" + +# Parse the command line options. +args= +prev= +for option +do + case $option in + -*=*) optarg=`echo "$option" | sed 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;; + *) optarg= ;; + esac + + # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + eval "$prev=\$option" + prev= + continue + fi + + case $option in + --help) cat <&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + + *) + if test -z "$ltmain"; then + ltmain="$option" + elif test -z "$host"; then +# This generates an unnecessary warning for sparc-sun-solaris4.1.3_U1 +# if test -n "`echo $option| sed 's/[-a-z0-9.]//g'`"; then +# echo "$progname: warning \`$option' is not a valid host type" 1>&2 +# fi + host="$option" + else + echo "$progname: too many arguments" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi ;; + esac +done + +if test -z "$ltmain"; then + echo "$progname: you must specify a LTMAIN file" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if test ! -f "$ltmain"; then + echo "$progname: \`$ltmain' does not exist" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if test -n "$tagname"; then + # Check whether tagname contains only valid characters + case `$echo "X$tagname" | $Xsed -e 's/[-_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890,/]//g'` in + "") ;; + *) + echo "$progname: invalid tag name: $tagname" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + if grep "^### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname$" < "$ofile" > /dev/null; then + echo "$progname: tag name $tagname already exists" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test ! -f "$ofile"; then + echo "$progname: warning: output file \`$ofile' does not exist" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -z "$LTCC"; then + eval "`$SHELL $ofile --config | grep '^LTCC='`" + if test -z "$LTCC"; then + echo "$progname: warning: output file \`$ofile' does not look like a libtool script" 1>&2 + else + echo "$progname: warning: using \`LTCC=$LTCC', extracted from \`$ofile'" 1>&2 + fi + fi +fi + +# Quote any args containing shell metacharacters. +ltconfig_args= +for arg +do + case $arg in + *" "*|*" "*|*[\[\]\~\#\$\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\\\|\;\<\>\?]*) + ltconfig_args="$ltconfig_args '$arg'" ;; + *) ltconfig_args="$ltconfig_args $arg" ;; + esac +done + +# A relevant subset of AC_INIT. + +# File descriptor usage: +# 0 standard input +# 1 file creation +# 2 errors and warnings +# 3 some systems may open it to /dev/tty +# 4 used on the Kubota Titan +# 5 compiler messages saved in config.log +# 6 checking for... messages and results +if test "$silent" = yes; then + exec 6>/dev/null +else + exec 6>&1 +fi +exec 5>>./config.log + +# NLS nuisances. +# Only set LANG and LC_ALL to C if already set. +# These must not be set unconditionally because not all systems understand +# e.g. LANG=C (notably SCO). +if test "X${LC_ALL+set}" = Xset; then LC_ALL=C; export LC_ALL; fi +if test "X${LANG+set}" = Xset; then LANG=C; export LANG; fi + +if test -n "$cache_file" && test -r "$cache_file" && test -f "$cache_file"; then + echo "loading cache $cache_file within ltconfig" + . $cache_file +fi + +if (echo "testing\c"; echo 1,2,3) | grep c >/dev/null; then + # Stardent Vistra SVR4 grep lacks -e, says ghazi@caip.rutgers.edu. + if (echo -n testing; echo 1,2,3) | sed s/-n/xn/ | grep xn >/dev/null; then + ac_n= ac_c=' +' ac_t=' ' + else + ac_n=-n ac_c= ac_t= + fi +else + ac_n= ac_c='\c' ac_t= +fi + +if test -z "$srcdir"; then + # Assume the source directory is the same one as the path to LTMAIN. + srcdir=`$echo "X$ltmain" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "$srcdir" = "$ltmain" && srcdir=. +fi + +trap "$rm conftest*; exit 1" 1 2 15 +if test "$verify_host" = yes; then + # Check for config.guess and config.sub. + ac_aux_dir= + for ac_dir in $srcdir $srcdir/.. $srcdir/../..; do + if test -f $ac_dir/config.guess; then + ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir + break + fi + done + if test -z "$ac_aux_dir"; then + echo "$progname: cannot find config.guess in $srcdir $srcdir/.. $srcdir/../.." 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + ac_config_guess=$ac_aux_dir/config.guess + ac_config_sub=$ac_aux_dir/config.sub + + # Make sure we can run config.sub. + if $SHELL $ac_config_sub sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + echo "$progname: cannot run $ac_config_sub" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + echo $ac_n "checking host system type""... $ac_c" 1>&6 + + host_alias=$host + case $host_alias in + "") + # Force config.guess to use the C compiler. + # CC_FOR_BUILD overrides the CC variable in config.guess but I had + # problems with it so do it this way for now. + CC="$LTCC" + + if host_alias=`$SHELL $ac_config_guess`; then : + else + echo "$progname: cannot guess host type; you must specify one" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Restore the C compiler. + CC="$old_CC" + ;; + esac + host=`$SHELL $ac_config_sub $host_alias` + echo "$ac_t$host" 1>&6 + + # Make sure the host verified. + test -z "$host" && exit 1 + + # Check for the build system type + echo $ac_n "checking build system type... $ac_c" 1>&6 + + build_alias=$build + case $build_alias in + NONE) + case $nonopt in + NONE) build_alias=$host_alias ;; + *) build_alias=$nonopt ;; + esac ;; + esac + + build=`$SHELL $ac_config_sub $build_alias` + build_cpu=`echo $build | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\1/'` + build_vendor=`echo $build | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\2/'` + build_os=`echo $build | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\3/'` + echo "$ac_t""$build" 1>&6 + +elif test -z "$host"; then + echo "$progname: you must specify a host type if you use \`--no-verify'" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +else + host_alias=$host + build_alias=$host_alias + build=$host +fi + +if test x"$host" != x"$build"; then + ac_tool_prefix=${host_alias}- +else + ac_tool_prefix= +fi + +host_cpu=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\1/'` +host_vendor=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\2/'` +host_os=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\3/'` + +# Transform linux* to *-*-linux-gnu*, to support old configure scripts. +case $host_os in +linux-gnu*) ;; +linux*) host=`echo $host | sed 's/^\(.*-.*-linux\)\(.*\)$/\1-gnu\2/'` +esac + +case $host_os in +aix3*) + # AIX sometimes has problems with the GCC collect2 program. For some + # reason, if we set the COLLECT_NAMES environment variable, the problems + # vanish in a puff of smoke. + if test "X${COLLECT_NAMES+set}" != Xset; then + COLLECT_NAMES= + export COLLECT_NAMES + fi + ;; +esac + +# Determine commands to create old-style static archives. +old_archive_cmds='$AR $AR_FLAGS $oldlib$oldobjs$old_deplibs' +old_postinstall_cmds='chmod 644 $oldlib' +old_postuninstall_cmds= + +if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + old_archive_cmds="$old_archive_cmds~\$RANLIB \$oldlib" + old_postinstall_cmds="\$RANLIB \$oldlib~$old_postinstall_cmds" +fi + +# Source the script associated with the $tagname tag configuration. +if test -n "$tagname"; then + . $ltmain +else + # FIXME: We should use a variable here + # Configure for a C compiler + . $srcdir/ltcf-c.sh +fi + +# Set sane defaults for various variables +test -z "$AR" && AR=ar +test -z "$AR_FLAGS" && AR_FLAGS=cru +test -z "$AS" && AS=as +test -z "$CC" && CC=cc +test -z "$DLLTOOL" && DLLTOOL=dlltool +test -z "$MAGIC_CMD" && MAGIC_CMD=file +test -z "$LD" && LD=ld +test -z "$LN_S" && LN_S="ln -s" +test -z "$NM" && NM=nm +test -z "$OBJDUMP" && OBJDUMP=objdump +test -z "$RANLIB" && RANLIB=: +test -z "$STRIP" && STRIP=: +test -z "$objext" && objext=o + +echo $ac_n "checking for objdir... $ac_c" 1>&6 +rm -f .libs 2>/dev/null +mkdir .libs 2>/dev/null +if test -d .libs; then + objdir=.libs +else + # MS-DOS does not allow filenames that begin with a dot. + objdir=_libs +fi +rmdir .libs 2>/dev/null +echo "$ac_t$objdir" 1>&6 + +# If no C compiler was specified, use CC. +LTCC=${LTCC-"$CC"} + +# Allow CC to be a program name with arguments. +set dummy $CC +compiler="$2" + +# We assume here that the value for ac_cv_prog_cc_pic will not be cached +# in isolation, and that seeing it set (from the cache) indicates that +# the associated values are set (in the cache) correctly too. +echo $ac_n "checking for $compiler option to produce PIC... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:678:checking for $compiler option to produce PIC" 1>&5 + +if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_cc_pic"; then + echo "$ac_t"none 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_cc_pic" 1>&6 + + # Check to make sure the pic_flag actually works. + echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler PIC flag $ac_cv_prog_cc_pic works... $ac_c" 1>&6 + echo "$progname:687:checking that $compiler PIC flag $ac_cv_prog_cc_pic works." 1>&5 + if test "X${ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works+set}" = Xset && \ + test "X${ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works}" != X; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 + else + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works=yes + $rm conftest* + echo $lt_simple_compile_test_code > conftest.$ac_ext + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $ac_cv_prog_cc_pic -DPIC" + if { (eval echo $progname:697: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; } && test -s conftest.$objext; then + # Append any warnings to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + + case $host_os in + hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + # On HP-UX, both CC and GCC only warn that PIC is supported... then + # they create non-PIC objects. So, if there were any warnings, we + # assume that PIC is not supported. + if test -s conftest.err; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works=no + ac_cv_prog_cc_can_build_shared=no + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic= + else + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works=yes + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic=" $ac_cv_prog_cc_pic" + fi + ;; + *) + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works=yes + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic=" $ac_cv_prog_cc_pic" + ;; + esac + else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works=no + ac_cv_prog_cc_can_build_shared=no + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic= + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + $rm conftest* + fi + # Belt *and* braces to stop my trousers falling down: + if test "X$ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works" = Xno; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_pic= + ac_cv_prog_cc_can_build_shared=no + fi + echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_cc_pic_works" 1>&6 +fi + +# Check for any special shared library compilation flags. +if test -n "$ac_cv_prog_cc_shlib"; then + echo "$progname: warning: \`$CC' requires \`$ac_cv_prog_cc_shlib' to build shared libraries" 1>&2 + if echo "$old_CC $old_CFLAGS " | egrep -e "[ ]$ac_cv_prog_cc_shlib[ ]" >/dev/null; then : + else + echo "$progname: add \`$ac_cv_prog_cc_shlib' to the CC or CFLAGS env variable and reconfigure" 1>&2 + ac_cv_prog_cc_can_build_shared=no + fi +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler static flag $ac_cv_prog_cc_static works... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:749: checking if $compiler static flag $ac_cv_prog_cc_static works" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_prog_cc_static_works+set}" = Xset && \ + test "X${ac_cv_prog_cc_static_works}" != X; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + $rm conftest* + echo $lt_simple_link_test_code > conftest.$ac_ext + save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $ac_cv_prog_cc_static" + if { (eval echo $progname:758: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_static_works=yes + else + ac_cv_prog_cc_static_works=no + ac_cv_prog_cc_static= + fi + LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS" + $rm conftest* +fi +# Belt *and* braces to stop my trousers falling down: +if test "X$ac_cv_prog_cc_static_works" = Xno; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_static= +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_cc_static_works" 1>&6 +pic_flag="$ac_cv_prog_cc_pic" +special_shlib_compile_flags="$ac_cv_prog_cc_shlib" +wl="$ac_cv_prog_cc_wl" +link_static_flag="$ac_cv_prog_cc_static" +no_builtin_flag="$ac_cv_prog_cc_no_builtin" +can_build_shared="$ac_cv_prog_cc_can_build_shared" + +# find the maximum length of command line arguments +echo "$progname:780: finding the maximum length of command line arguments" 1>&5 +echo $ac_n "finding the maximum length of command line arguments... $ac_c" 1>&6 +if test "${lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len+set}" = set; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + i=0 + testring="ABCD" + # If test is not a shell built-in, we'll probably end up computing a + # maximum length that is only half of the actual maximum length, but + # we can't tell. + while test "X"`$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo "X$testring" 2>/dev/null` \ + = "XX$testring" && + new_result=`expr "X$testring" : ".*" 2>&1` && + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=$new_result && + test $i != 18 # 1 MB should be enough + do + i=`expr $i + 1` + testring=$testring$testring + done + testring= + # add a significant safety factor because C++ compilers can tack on massive amounts + # of additional arguments before passing them to the linker. 1/4 should be good. + len=`expr $lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len \/ 4` + lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len=`expr $lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len - $len` +fi +echo "$progname:@lineno@: result: $lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len" 1>&5 +echo "${ac_t}$lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len" 1>&6 + +if test -n $lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len ; then + max_cmd_len=$lt_cv_sys_max_cmd_len +else + max_cmd_len=none +fi + +# Check to see if options -o and -c are simultaneously supported by compiler +echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler supports -c -o file.$objext... $ac_c" 1>&6 +if test "${lt_cv_compiler_c_o+set}" = set; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + $rm -r conftest 2>/dev/null + mkdir conftest + cd conftest + $rm conftest* + echo $lt_simple_compile_test_code > conftest.$ac_ext + mkdir out + # According to Tom Tromey, Ian Lance Taylor reported there are C compilers + # that will create temporary files in the current directory regardless of + # the output directory. Thus, making CWD read-only will cause this test + # to fail, enabling locking or at least warning the user not to do parallel + # builds. + chmod -w . + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -o out/conftest2.$objext" + echo "$progname:833: checking if $compiler supports -c -o file.$objext" >&5 + if { (eval echo $progname:834: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>out/conftest.err; } && test -s out/conftest2.$objext; then + + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test -s out/conftest.err; then + lt_cv_compiler_c_o=no + else + lt_cv_compiler_c_o=yes + fi + else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat out/conftest.err 1>&5 + lt_cv_compiler_c_o=no + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + chmod u+w . + $rm conftest* out/* + rmdir out + cd .. + rmdir conftest + $rm -r conftest 2>/dev/null +fi +compiler_c_o=$lt_cv_compiler_c_o +echo "${ac_t}$compiler_c_o" 1>&6 + +# Check to see if we can do hard links to lock some files if needed +hard_links="nottested" +if test "$compiler_c_o" = no && test "$need_locks" != no; then + # do not overwrite the value of need_locks provided by the user + echo $ac_n "checking if we can lock with hard links... $ac_c" 1>&6 + hard_links=yes + $rm conftest* + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>/dev/null && hard_links=no + touch conftest.a + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>&5 || hard_links=no + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>/dev/null && hard_links=no + echo "$ac_t$hard_links" 1>&6 + $rm conftest* + if test "$hard_links" = no; then + echo "*** WARNING: \`$CC' does not support \`-c -o', so \`make -j' may be unsafe" >&2 + need_locks=warn + fi +else + need_locks=no +fi + +if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + # Check to see if options -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions are supported by compiler + echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler supports -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions ... $ac_c" 1>&6 + $rm conftest* + echo $lt_simple_compile_test_code > conftest.$ac_ext + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions -c conftest.$ac_ext" + echo "$progname:887: checking if $compiler supports -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions" >&5 + if { (eval echo $progname:888: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; } && test -s conftest.$objext; then + + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test -s conftest.err; then + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + compiler_rtti_exceptions=no + else + echo "$ac_t"yes 1>&6 + compiler_rtti_exceptions=yes + fi + else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + compiler_rtti_exceptions=no + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + $rm conftest* + + if test "$compiler_rtti_exceptions" = "yes"; then + no_builtin_flag=' -fno-builtin -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions' + else + no_builtin_flag=' -fno-builtin' + fi + +fi + +# See if the linker supports building shared libraries. +echo $ac_n "checking whether the linker ($LD) supports shared libraries... $ac_c" 1>&6 + +echo "$ac_t$ld_shlibs" 1>&6 +test "$ld_shlibs" = no && can_build_shared=no + +# Check hardcoding attributes. +echo $ac_n "checking how to hardcode library paths into programs... $ac_c" 1>&6 +hardcode_action= +if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec" || \ + test -n "$runpath_var"; then + + # We can hardcode non-existant directories. + if test "$hardcode_direct" != no && + # If the only mechanism to avoid hardcoding is shlibpath_var, we + # have to relink, otherwise we might link with an installed library + # when we should be linking with a yet-to-be-installed one + ## test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" != no && + test "$hardcode_minus_L" != no; then + # Linking always hardcodes the temporary library directory. + hardcode_action=relink + else + # We can link without hardcoding, and we can hardcode nonexisting dirs. + hardcode_action=immediate + fi +else + # We cannot hardcode anything, or else we can only hardcode existing + # directories. + hardcode_action=unsupported +fi +echo "$ac_t$hardcode_action" 1>&6 + +echo $ac_n "checking whether stripping libraries is possible... $ac_c" 1>&6 +if test -n "$STRIP" && $STRIP -V 2>&1 | grep "GNU strip" >/dev/null; then + test -z "$old_striplib" && old_striplib="$STRIP --strip-debug" + test -z "$striplib" && striplib="$STRIP --strip-unneeded" + echo "${ac_t}yes" 1>&6 +else + echo "${ac_t}no" 1>&6 +fi + +case $reload_flag in +"" | " "*) ;; +*) reload_flag=" $reload_flag" ;; +esac +reload_cmds='$LD$reload_flag -o $output$reload_objs' +test -z "$deplibs_check_method" && deplibs_check_method=unknown + +# PORTME Fill in your ld.so characteristics +library_names_spec= +libname_spec='lib$name' +soname_spec= +postinstall_cmds= +postuninstall_cmds= +finish_cmds= +finish_eval= +shlibpath_var= +shlibpath_overrides_runpath=unknown +version_type=none +dynamic_linker="$host_os ld.so" +sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib" +sys_lib_search_path_spec="/lib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib" + +echo $ac_n "checking dynamic linker characteristics... $ac_c" 1>&6 +case $host_os in +aix3*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix $libname.a' + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + + # AIX 3 has no versioning support, so we append a major version to the name. + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + ;; + +aix4* | aix5*) + if test "$host_cpu" = ia64; then + # AIX 5 supports IA64 + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + else + # AIX (on Power*) has no versioning support, so currently we can not hardcode correct + # soname into executable. Probably we can add versioning support to + # collect2, so additional links can be useful in future. + # We preserve .a as extension for shared libraries though AIX4.2 + # and later linker supports .so + if test "$aix_use_runtimelinking" = yes; then + # If using run time linking (on AIX 4.2 or later) use lib.so instead of + # lib.a to let people know that these are not typical AIX shared libraries. + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + else + # We preserve .a as extension for shared libraries though AIX4.2 + # and later when we are not doing run time linking. + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.a $libname.a' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major.o' + fi + # If we're using GNU nm, then we don't want the "-C" option. + # -C means demangle to AIX nm, but means don't demangle with GNU nm + if $NM -V 2>&1 | egrep '(GNU)' > /dev/null; then + export_symbols_cmds='$NM -Bpg $libobjs $convenience | awk '\''{ if (((\$2 == "T") || (\$2 == "D") || (\$2 == "B")) && (substr(\$3,1,1) != ".")) { print \$3 } }'\'' | sort -u > $export_symbols' + else + export_symbols_cmds='$NM -BCpg $libobjs $convenience | awk '\''{ if (((\$2 == "T") || (\$2 == "D") || (\$2 == "B")) && (substr(\$3,1,1) != ".")) { print \$3 } }'\'' | sort -u > $export_symbols' + fi + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + deplibs_check_method=pass_all + case $host_os in + aix4 | aix4.[01] | aix4.[01].*) + if { echo '#if __GNUC__ > 2 || (__GNUC__ == 2 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 97)' + echo ' yes ' + echo '#endif'; } | ${CC} -E - | grep yes > /dev/null; then + : + else + # With GCC up to 2.95.x, collect2 would create an import file + # for dependence libraries. The import file would start with + # the line `#! .'. This would cause the generated library to + # depend on `.', always an invalid library. This was fixed in + # development snapshots of GCC prior to 3.0. + can_build_shared=no + fi + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + +amigaos*) + library_names_spec='$libname.ixlibrary $libname.a' + # Create ${libname}_ixlibrary.a entries in /sys/libs. + finish_eval='for lib in `ls $libdir/*.ixlibrary 2>/dev/null`; do libname=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e '\''s%^.*/\([^/]*\)\.ixlibrary$%\1%'\''`; test $rm /sys/libs/${libname}_ixlibrary.a; $show "(cd /sys/libs && $LN_S $lib ${libname}_ixlibrary.a)"; (cd /sys/libs && $LN_S $lib ${libname}_ixlibrary.a) || exit 1; done' + ;; + +beos*) + library_names_spec='${libname}.so' + dynamic_linker="$host_os ld.so" + shlibpath_var=LIBRARY_PATH + lt_cv_dlopen="load_add_on" + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + lt_cv_dlopen_self=yes + ;; + +bsdi4*) + version_type=linux + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/shlib /usr/lib /usr/X11/lib /usr/contrib/lib /lib /usr/local/lib" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/shlib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib" + export_dynamic_flag_spec=-rdynamic + # the default ld.so.conf also contains /usr/contrib/lib and + # /usr/X11R6/lib (/usr/X11 is a link to /usr/X11R6), but let us allow + # libtool to hard-code these into programs + ;; + +cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + version_type=windows + need_version=no + need_lib_prefix=no + case $with_gcc,$host_os in + yes,cygwin*) + library_names_spec='$libname.dll.a' + soname_spec='`echo ${libname} | sed -e 's/^lib/cyg/'``echo ${release} | [sed -e 's/[.]/-/g']`${versuffix}.dll' + postinstall_cmds='dlpath=`bash 2>&1 -c '\''. $dir/${file}i; echo \$dlname'\''`~ + dldir=$destdir/`dirname \$dlpath`~ + test -d \$dldir || mkdir -p \$dldir~ + $install_prog .libs/$dlname \$dldir/$dlname' + postuninstall_cmds='dldll=`bash 2>&1 -c '\''. $file; echo \$dlname'\''`~ + dlpath=$dir/\$dldll; $rm \$dlpath' + ;; + yes,mingw*) + library_names_spec='${libname}`echo ${release} | sed -e 's/[.]/-/g'`${versuffix}.dll' + sys_lib_search_path_spec=`$CC -print-search-dirs | grep "^libraries:" | sed -e "s/^libraries://" -e "s/;/ /g"` + ;; + yes,pw32*) + library_names_spec='`echo ${libname} | sed -e 's/^lib/pw/'``echo ${release} | sed -e 's/[.]/-/g'`${versuffix}.dll' +;; + *) + library_names_spec='${libname}`echo ${release} | sed -e 's/[.]/-/g'`${versuffix}.dll $libname.lib' + ;; + esac + dynamic_linker='Win32 ld.exe' + # FIXME: first we should search . and the directory the executable is in + shlibpath_var=PATH + lt_cv_dlopen="LoadLibrary" + lt_cv_dlopen_libs= + ;; + +darwin* | rhapsody*) + dynamic_linker="$host_os dyld" + version_type=darwin + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}${versuffix}.`test .$module = .yes && echo so || echo dylib` ${libname}${release}${major}.`test .$module = .yes && echo so || echo dylib` ${libname}.`test .$module = .yes && echo so || echo dylib`' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}${major}.`test .$module = .yes && echo so || echo dylib`' + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + shlibpath_var=DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +freebsd1*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; + +freebsd*) + objformat=`test -x /usr/bin/objformat && /usr/bin/objformat || echo aout` + version_type=sunos + case $objformat in + elf*) + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + need_version=no + need_lc=no + need_lib_prefix=no + ;; + *) + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + need_version=yes + ;; + esac + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + case $host_os in + freebsd2*) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + ;; + *) + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + esac + ;; + +gnu*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so${major} ${libname}.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + hardcode_into_libs=yes + ;; + +hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + # Give a soname corresponding to the major version so that dld.sl refuses to + # link against other versions. + dynamic_linker="$host_os dld.sl" + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + shlibpath_var=SHLIB_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no # +s is required to enable SHLIB_PATH + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.sl$versuffix ${libname}${release}.sl$major $libname.sl' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.sl$major' + # HP-UX runs *really* slowly unless shared libraries are mode 555. + postinstall_cmds='chmod 555 $lib' + ;; + +irix5* | irix6*) + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major ${libname}${release}.so $libname.so' + case $host_os in + irix5*) + libsuff= shlibsuff= + ;; + *) + case $LD in # libtool.m4 will add one of these switches to LD + *-32|*"-32 ") libsuff= shlibsuff= libmagic=32-bit;; + *-n32|*"-n32 ") libsuff=32 shlibsuff=N32 libmagic=N32;; + *-64|*"-64 ") libsuff=64 shlibsuff=64 libmagic=64-bit;; + *) libsuff= shlibsuff= libmagic=never-match;; + esac + ;; + esac + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY${shlibsuff}_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib${libsuff} /lib${libsuff} /usr/local/lib${libsuff}" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/usr/lib${libsuff} /lib${libsuff}" + ;; + +# No shared lib support for Linux oldld, aout, or coff. +linux-gnuoldld* | linux-gnuaout* | linux-gnucoff*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; + +# This must be Linux ELF. +linux-gnu*) + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -n $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + # This implies no fast_install, which is unacceptable. + # Some rework will be needed to allow for fast_install + # before this can be enabled. + hardcode_into_libs=yes + + # We used to test for /lib/ld.so.1 and disable shared libraries on + # powerpc, because MkLinux only supported shared libraries with the + # GNU dynamic linker. Since this was broken with cross compilers, + # most powerpc-linux boxes support dynamic linking these days and + # people can always --disable-shared, the test was removed, and we + # assume the GNU/Linux dynamic linker is in use. + dynamic_linker='GNU/Linux ld.so' + ;; + +netbsd*) + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + version_type=sunos + if echo __ELF__ | $CC -E - | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null; then + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}.so$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -m $libdir' + dynamic_linker='NetBSD (a.out) ld.so' + else + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major ${libname}${release}.so ${libname}.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + dynamic_linker='NetBSD ld.elf_so' + fi + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + hardcode_into_libs=yes + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="/usr/lib" + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/lib" + ;; + +newsos6) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + ;; + +openbsd*) + version_type=sunos + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + fi + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}.so$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -m $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +os2*) + libname_spec='$name' + need_lib_prefix=no + library_names_spec='$libname.dll $libname.a' + dynamic_linker='OS/2 ld.exe' + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + ;; + +osf3* | osf4* | osf5*) + version_type=osf + need_version=no + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + sys_lib_search_path_spec="/usr/shlib /usr/ccs/lib /usr/lib/cmplrs/cc /usr/lib /usr/local/lib /var/shlib" + sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec="$sys_lib_search_path_spec" + ;; + +sco3.2v5*) + version_type=osf + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +solaris*) + version_type=sunos + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + hardcode_into_libs=yes + # ldd complains unless libraries are executable + postinstall_cmds='chmod +x $lib' + ;; + +sunos4*) + version_type=sunos + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}.so$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/usr/etc" ldconfig $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=yes + if test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + need_lib_prefix=no + fi + need_version=yes + ;; + +sysv4 | sysv4.2uw2* | sysv4.3* | sysv5*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + case $host_vendor in + motorola) + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + shlibpath_overrides_runpath=no + sys_lib_search_path_spec='/lib /usr/lib /usr/ccs/lib' + ;; + esac + ;; + +uts4*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +dgux*) + version_type=linux + need_lib_prefix=no + need_version=no + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +sysv4*MP*) + if test -d /usr/nec ;then + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='$libname.so.$versuffix $libname.so.$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='$libname.so.$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + fi + ;; + +*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; +esac +echo "$ac_t$dynamic_linker" 1>&6 +test "$dynamic_linker" = no && can_build_shared=no + +# Check for command to grab the raw symbol name followed by C symbol from nm. +echo $ac_n "checking command to parse $NM output... $ac_c" 1>&6 + +# These are sane defaults that work on at least a few old systems. +# [They come from Ultrix. What could be older than Ultrix?!! ;)] + +# Character class describing NM global symbol codes. +symcode='[BCDEGRST]' + +# Regexp to match symbols that can be accessed directly from C. +sympat='\([_A-Za-z][_A-Za-z0-9]*\)' + +# Transform the above into a raw symbol and a C symbol. +symxfrm='\1 \2\3 \3' + +# Transform an extracted symbol line into a proper C declaration +global_symbol_to_cdecl="sed -n -e 's/^. .* \(.*\)$/extern char \1;/p'" + +# Define system-specific variables. +case $host_os in +aix*) + symcode='[BCDT]' + ;; +cygwin* | mingw* | pw32*) + symcode='[ABCDGISTW]' + ;; +hpux*) # Its linker distinguishes data from code symbols + global_symbol_to_cdecl="sed -n -e 's/^T .* \(.*\)$/extern char \1();/p' -e 's/^$symcode* .* \(.*\)$/extern char \1;/p'" + ;; +irix*) + symcode='[BCDEGRST]' + ;; +solaris* | sysv5*) + symcode='[BDT]' + ;; +sysv4) + symcode='[DFNSTU]' + ;; +esac + +# Handle CRLF in mingw tool chain +opt_cr= +case $host_os in +mingw*) + opt_cr=`echo 'x\{0,1\}' | tr x '\015'` # option cr in regexp + ;; +esac + +# If we're using GNU nm, then use its standard symbol codes. +if $NM -V 2>&1 | egrep '(GNU|with BFD)' > /dev/null; then + symcode='[ABCDGISTW]' +fi + +# Try without a prefix undercore, then with it. +for ac_symprfx in "" "_"; do + + # Write the raw and C identifiers. + global_symbol_pipe="sed -n -e 's/^.*[ ]\($symcode$symcode*\)[ ][ ]*\($ac_symprfx\)$sympat$opt_cr$/$symxfrm/p'" + + # Check to see that the pipe works correctly. + pipe_works=no + $rm conftest* + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5 + if { (eval echo $progname:1434: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest.$objext; then + # Now try to grab the symbols. + nlist=conftest.nm + if { echo "$progname:1437: eval \"$NM conftest.$objext | $global_symbol_pipe > $nlist\"" >&5; eval "$NM conftest.$objext | $global_symbol_pipe > $nlist 2>&5"; } && test -s "$nlist"; then + + # Try sorting and uniquifying the output. + if sort "$nlist" | uniq > "$nlist"T; then + mv -f "$nlist"T "$nlist" + else + rm -f "$nlist"T + fi + + # Make sure that we snagged all the symbols we need. + if egrep ' nm_test_var$' "$nlist" >/dev/null; then + if egrep ' nm_test_func$' "$nlist" >/dev/null; then + cat < conftest.$ac_ext +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +EOF + # Now generate the symbol file. + eval "$global_symbol_to_cdecl"' < "$nlist" >> conftest.$ac_ext' + + cat <> conftest.$ac_ext +#if defined (__STDC__) && __STDC__ +# define lt_ptr_t void * +#else +# define lt_ptr_t char * +# define const +#endif + +/* The mapping between symbol names and symbols. */ +const struct { + const char *name; + lt_ptr_t address; +} +lt_preloaded_symbols[] = +{ +EOF + sed "s/^$symcode$symcode* \(.*\) \(.*\)$/ {\"\2\", (lt_ptr_t) \&\2},/" < "$nlist" >> conftest.$ac_ext + cat <<\EOF >> conftest.$ac_ext + {0, (lt_ptr_t) 0} +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif +EOF + # Now try linking the two files. + mv conftest.$objext conftstm.$objext + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + LIBS="conftstm.$objext" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS$no_builtin_flag" + if { (eval echo $progname:1489: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest; then + pipe_works=yes + else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + fi + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + else + echo "cannot find nm_test_func in $nlist" >&5 + fi + else + echo "cannot find nm_test_var in $nlist" >&5 + fi + else + echo "cannot run $global_symbol_pipe" >&5 + fi + else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + fi + $rm conftest* conftst* + + # Do not use the global_symbol_pipe unless it works. + if test "$pipe_works" = yes; then + break + else + global_symbol_pipe= + fi +done +if test "$pipe_works" = yes; then + echo "${ac_t}ok" 1>&6 +else + echo "${ac_t}failed" 1>&6 +fi + +if test -z "$global_symbol_pipe"; then + global_symbol_to_cdecl= +fi + +# Report the final consequences. +echo "checking if libtool supports shared libraries... $can_build_shared" 1>&6 + +# Only try to build win32 dlls if AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL was used in +# configure.in, otherwise build static only libraries. +case $host_os in +cygwin* | mingw* | pw32* | os2*) + if test x$can_build_shared = xyes; then + test x$enable_win32_dll = xno && can_build_shared=no + echo "checking if package supports dlls... $can_build_shared" 1>&6 + fi +;; +esac + +echo $ac_n "checking whether to build shared libraries... $ac_c" 1>&6 +test "$can_build_shared" = "no" && enable_shared=no + +# On AIX, shared libraries and static libraries use the same namespace, and +# are all built from PIC. +case $host_os in +aix3*) + test "$enable_shared" = yes && enable_static=no + if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + archive_cmds="$archive_cmds~\$RANLIB \$lib" + postinstall_cmds='$RANLIB $lib' + fi + ;; + +aix4*) + test "$enable_shared" = yes && enable_static=no + ;; +esac + +echo "$ac_t$enable_shared" 1>&6 + +# Make sure either enable_shared or enable_static is yes. +test "$enable_shared" = yes || enable_static=yes + +echo "checking whether to build static libraries... $enable_static" 1>&6 + +if test "$hardcode_action" = relink; then + # Fast installation is not supported + enable_fast_install=no +elif test "$shlibpath_overrides_runpath" = yes || + test "$enable_shared" = no; then + # Fast installation is not necessary + enable_fast_install=needless +fi + +variables_saved_for_relink="PATH $shlibpath_var $runpath_var" +if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + variables_saved_for_relink="$variables_saved_for_relink GCC_EXEC_PREFIX COMPILER_PATH LIBRARY_PATH" +fi + +# Check whether we must set pic_mode to default +test -z "$pic_flag" && pic_mode=default + +if test "x$enable_dlopen" != xyes; then + enable_dlopen=unknown + enable_dlopen_self=unknown + enable_dlopen_self_static=unknown +else +if test "X${lt_cv_dlopen+set}" != Xset; then + lt_cv_dlopen=no lt_cv_dlopen_libs= +echo $ac_n "checking for dlopen in -ldl""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1593: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-ldl $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if test "X$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" = Xyes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-ldl" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +echo $ac_n "checking for dlopen""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1632: checking for dlopen" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_func_dlopen+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dlopen(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_dlopen) || defined (__stub___dlopen) +choke me +#else +dlopen(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo $progname:1662: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_dlopen=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_dlopen=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +if test "X$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = Xyes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +echo $ac_n "checking for dlopen in -lsvld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1679: checking for dlopen in -lsvld" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_lib_svld_dlopen+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-lsvld $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_svld_dlopen=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_svld_dlopen=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if test "X$ac_cv_lib_svld_dlopen" = Xyes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + lt_cv_dlopen="dlopen" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-lsvld" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +echo $ac_n "checking for dld_link in -ldld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1718: checking for dld_link in -ldld" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_lib_dld_dld_link+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-ldld $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_dld_dld_link=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_dld_dld_link=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if test "X$ac_cv_lib_dld_dld_link" = Xyes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + lt_cv_dlopen="dld_link" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-ldld" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +echo $ac_n "checking for shl_load""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1757: checking for shl_load" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_func_shl_load+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char shl_load(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_shl_load) || defined (__stub___shl_load) +choke me +#else +shl_load(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo $progname:1787: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_shl_load=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_shl_load=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if test "X$ac_cv_func_shl_load" = Xyes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + lt_cv_dlopen="shl_load" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +echo $ac_n "checking for shl_load in -ldld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1805: checking for shl_load in -ldld" >&5 +if test "X${ac_cv_lib_dld_shl_load+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-ldld $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_dld_shl_load=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_dld_shl_load=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if test "X$ac_cv_lib_dld_shl_load" = Xyes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + lt_cv_dlopen="shl_load" lt_cv_dlopen_libs="-ldld" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + +fi + + +fi + + +fi + + +fi + +fi + +fi + + if test "x$lt_cv_dlopen" != xno; then + enable_dlopen=yes + else + enable_dlopen=no + fi + + case $lt_cv_dlopen in + dlopen) +for ac_hdr in dlfcn.h; do +ac_safe=`echo "$ac_hdr" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_hdr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1873: checking for $ac_hdr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo 'X$''{'ac_cv_header_$ac_safe'+set}'`\" = Xset"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int fnord = 0; +int main () { return(0); } +EOF +ac_try="$ac_compile >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo $progname:1884: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=yes" +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_header_'$ac_safe`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi +done + + if test "x$ac_cv_header_dlfcn_h" = xyes; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DHAVE_DLFCN_H" + fi + eval LDFLAGS=\"\$LDFLAGS $export_dynamic_flag_spec\" + LIBS="$lt_cv_dlopen_libs $LIBS" + + echo $ac_n "checking whether a program can dlopen itself""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1912: checking whether a program can dlopen itself" >&5 +if test "X${lt_cv_dlopen_self+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + lt_cv_dlopen_self=cross + else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef RTLD_GLOBAL +# define LTDL_GLOBAL RTLD_GLOBAL +#else +# ifdef DL_GLOBAL +# define LTDL_GLOBAL DL_GLOBAL +# else +# define LTDL_GLOBAL 0 +# endif +#endif + +/* We may have to define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW in the command line if we + find out it does not work in some platform. */ +#ifndef LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW +# ifdef RTLD_LAZY +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW RTLD_LAZY +# else +# ifdef DL_LAZY +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW DL_LAZY +# else +# ifdef RTLD_NOW +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW RTLD_NOW +# else +# ifdef DL_NOW +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW DL_NOW +# else +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW 0 +# endif +# endif +# endif +# endif +#endif + +void fnord() { int i=42; } +int main() { + void *self, *ptr1, *ptr2; self=dlopen(0,LTDL_GLOBAL|LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW); + if(self) { ptr1=dlsym(self,"fnord"); ptr2=dlsym(self,"_fnord"); + if(ptr1 || ptr2) { dlclose(self); exit(0); } } exit(1); } + +EOF +if { (eval echo $progname:1967: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + lt_cv_dlopen_self=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + lt_cv_dlopen_self=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$lt_cv_dlopen_self" 1>&6 + + if test "$lt_cv_dlopen_self" = yes; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $link_static_flag" + echo $ac_n "checking whether a statically linked program can dlopen itself""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "$progname:1986: checking whether a statically linked program can dlopen itself" >&5 +if test "X${lt_cv_dlopen_self_static+set}" = Xset; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=cross + else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef RTLD_GLOBAL +# define LTDL_GLOBAL RTLD_GLOBAL +#else +# ifdef DL_GLOBAL +# define LTDL_GLOBAL DL_GLOBAL +# else +# define LTDL_GLOBAL 0 +# endif +#endif + +/* We may have to define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW in the command line if we + find out it does not work in some platform. */ +#ifndef LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW +# ifdef RTLD_LAZY +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW RTLD_LAZY +# else +# ifdef DL_LAZY +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW DL_LAZY +# else +# ifdef RTLD_NOW +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW RTLD_NOW +# else +# ifdef DL_NOW +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW DL_NOW +# else +# define LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW 0 +# endif +# endif +# endif +# endif +#endif + +void fnord() { int i=42; } +int main() { + void *self, *ptr1, *ptr2; self=dlopen(0,LTDL_GLOBAL|LTDL_LAZY_OR_NOW); + if(self) { ptr1=dlsym(self,"fnord"); ptr2=dlsym(self,"_fnord"); + if(ptr1 || ptr2) { dlclose(self); exit(0); } } exit(1); } + +EOF +if { (eval echo $progname:2041: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=yes +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + lt_cv_dlopen_self_static=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$lt_cv_dlopen_self_static" 1>&6 +fi + ;; + esac + + case $lt_cv_dlopen_self in + yes|no) enable_dlopen_self=$lt_cv_dlopen_self ;; + *) enable_dlopen_self=unknown ;; + esac + + case $lt_cv_dlopen_self_static in + yes|no) enable_dlopen_self_static=$lt_cv_dlopen_self_static ;; + *) enable_dlopen_self_static=unknown ;; + esac +fi + +# Copy echo and quote the copy, instead of the original, because it is +# used later. +ltecho="$echo" +if test "X$ltecho" = "X$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo"; then + ltecho="$CONFIG_SHELL \$0 --fallback-echo" +fi +LTSHELL="$SHELL" + +LTCONFIG_VERSION="$VERSION" + +# Only quote variables if we're using ltmain.sh. +case $ltmain in +*.sh) + # Now quote all the things that may contain metacharacters. + for var in ltecho old_AR old_AR_FLAGS old_CC old_LTCC old_CFLAGS old_CPPFLAGS \ + old_MAGIC_CMD old_LD old_LDFLAGS old_LIBS \ + old_LN_S old_NM old_RANLIB old_STRIP \ + old_AS old_DLLTOOL old_OBJDUMP \ + old_OBJEXT old_EXEEXT old_reload_flag \ + old_deplibs_check_method old_file_magic_cmd \ + AR AR_FLAGS CC LTCC LD LN_S NM LTSHELL LTCONFIG_VERSION \ + reload_flag reload_cmds wl \ + pic_flag link_static_flag no_builtin_flag export_dynamic_flag_spec \ + thread_safe_flag_spec whole_archive_flag_spec libname_spec \ + library_names_spec soname_spec \ + RANLIB old_archive_cmds old_archive_from_new_cmds old_postinstall_cmds \ + old_postuninstall_cmds archive_cmds archive_expsym_cmds postinstall_cmds \ + postuninstall_cmds extract_expsyms_cmds old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds \ + predep_objects postdep_objects predeps postdeps compiler_lib_search_path \ + old_striplib striplib file_magic_cmd export_symbols_cmds \ + deplibs_check_method allow_undefined_flag no_undefined_flag \ + finish_cmds finish_eval global_symbol_pipe global_symbol_to_cdecl \ + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec hardcode_libdir_separator \ + sys_lib_search_path_spec sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec \ + compiler_c_o need_locks exclude_expsyms include_expsyms; do + + case $var in + reload_cmds | old_archive_cmds | old_archive_from_new_cmds | \ + old_postinstall_cmds | old_postuninstall_cmds | \ + export_symbols_cmds | archive_cmds | archive_expsym_cmds | \ + extract_expsyms_cmds | old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds | \ + postinstall_cmds | postuninstall_cmds | \ + finish_cmds | sys_lib_search_path_spec | sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec) + # Double-quote double-evaled strings. + eval "$var=\\\"\`\$echo \"X\$$var\" | \$Xsed -e \"\$double_quote_subst\" -e \"\$sed_quote_subst\" -e \"\$delay_variable_subst\"\`\\\"" ### testsuite: skip nested quoting test + ;; + *) + eval "$var=\\\"\`\$echo \"X\$$var\" | \$Xsed -e \"\$sed_quote_subst\"\`\\\"" ### testsuite: skip nested quoting test + ;; + esac + done + + case $ltecho in + *'\$0 --fallback-echo"') + ltecho=`$echo "X$ltecho" | $Xsed -e 's/\\\\\\\$0 --fallback-echo"$/$0 --fallback-echo"/'` + ;; + esac + + if test -z "$tagname"; then + trap "$rm \"$ofile\"; exit 1" 1 2 15 + echo "creating $ofile" + $rm "$ofile" + cat < "$ofile" +#! $SHELL + +# `$echo "$ofile" | sed 's%^.*/%%'` - Provide generalized library-building support services. +# Generated automatically by $PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION$TIMESTAMP) +# NOTE: Changes made to this file will be lost: look at ltconfig or ltmain.sh. +# +# Copyright (C) 1996-2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Originally by Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Sed that helps us avoid accidentally triggering echo(1) options like -n. +Xsed="sed -e s/^X//" + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test "X\${CDPATH+set}" = Xset; then CDPATH=:; export CDPATH; fi + +# The names of the tagged configurations supported by this script. +available_tags= + +### BEGIN LIBTOOL CONFIG +EOF + else + echo "appending configuration tag \"$tagname\" to $ofile" + echo "### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname" >> "$ofile" + fi + cfgfile="$ofile" + ;; + +*) + # Double-quote the variables that need it (for aesthetics). + for var in old_AR old_AR_FLAGS old_CC old_LTCC old_CFLAGS old_CPPFLAGS \ + old_MAGIC_CMD old_LD old_LDFLAGS old_LIBS \ + old_LN_S old_NM old_RANLIB old_STRIP \ + old_AS old_DLLTOOL old_OBJDUMP \ + old_OBJEXT old_EXEEXT old_reload_flag \ + old_deplibs_check_method old_file_magic_cmd; do + eval "$var=\\\"\$var\\\"" + done + + # Just create a config file. + cfgfile="$ofile.cfg" + if test -z "$tagname"; then + trap "$rm \"$cfgfile\"; exit 1" 1 2 15 + echo "creating $cfgfile" + $rm "$cfgfile" + cat < "$cfgfile" +# `$echo "$cfgfile" | sed 's%^.*/%%'` - Libtool configuration file. +# Generated automatically by $PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION$TIMESTAMP) + +### BEGIN LIBTOOL CONFIG +EOF + else + echo "appending to $cfgfile" + echo "### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname" >> "$ofile" + fi + ;; +esac + +cat <> "$cfgfile" +# Libtool was configured as follows, on host `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`: +# +# AR=$old_AR AR_FLAGS=$old_AR_FLAGS LTCC=$old_LTCC CC=$old_CC \\ +# CFLAGS=$old_CFLAGS CPPFLAGS=$old_CPPFLAGS \\ +# MAGIC_CMD=$old_MAGIC_CMD LD=$old_LD LDFLAGS=$old_LDFLAGS LIBS=$old_LIBS \\ +# LN_S=$old_LN_S NM=$old_NM RANLIB=$old_RANLIB STRIP=$old_STRIP \\ +# AS=$old_AS DLLTOOL=$old_DLLTOOL OBJDUMP=$old_OBJDUMP \\ +# objext=$old_OBJEXT exeext=$old_EXEEXT reload_flag=$old_reload_flag \\ +# deplibs_check_method=$old_deplibs_check_method \\ +# file_magic_cmd=$old_file_magic_cmd \\ +# $0$ltconfig_args +# +# Compiler and other test output produced by $progname, useful for +# debugging $progname, is in ./config.log if it exists. + +# The version of $progname that generated this script. +LTCONFIG_VERSION=$LTCONFIG_VERSION + +# Shell to use when invoking shell scripts. +SHELL=$LTSHELL + +# Whether or not to build shared libraries. +build_libtool_libs=$enable_shared + +# Whether or not to add -lc for building shared libraries. +build_libtool_need_lc=$need_lc + +# Whether or not to build static libraries. +build_old_libs=$enable_static + +# Whether or not to optimize for fast installation. +fast_install=$enable_fast_install + +# The host system. +host_alias=$host_alias +host=$host + +# An echo program that does not interpret backslashes. +echo=$ltecho + +# The archiver. +AR=$AR +AR_FLAGS=$AR_FLAGS + +# A C compiler. +LTCC=$LTCC + +# A language-specific compiler. +CC=$CC + +# Is the compiler the GNU C compiler? +with_gcc=$with_gcc + +# The linker used to build libraries. +LD=$LD + +# Whether we need hard or soft links. +LN_S=$LN_S + +# A BSD-compatible nm program. +NM=$NM + +# A symbol stripping program +STRIP=$STRIP + +# Used to examine libraries when file_magic_cmd begins "file" +MAGIC_CMD=$MAGIC_CMD + +# Used on cygwin: DLL creation program. +DLLTOOL="$DLLTOOL" + +# Used on cygwin: object dumper. +OBJDUMP="$OBJDUMP" + +# Used on cygwin: assembler. +AS="$AS" + +# The name of the directory that contains temporary libtool files. +objdir=$objdir + +# How to create reloadable object files. +reload_flag=$reload_flag +reload_cmds=$reload_cmds + +# How to pass a linker flag through the compiler. +wl=$wl + +# Object file suffix (normally "o"). +objext="$objext" + +# Old archive suffix (normally "a"). +libext="$libext" + +# Executable file suffix (normally ""). +exeext="$exeext" + +# Additional compiler flags for building library objects. +pic_flag=$pic_flag +pic_mode=$pic_mode + +# What is the maximum length of a command? +max_cmd_len=$max_cmd_len + +# Does compiler simultaneously support -c and -o options? +compiler_c_o=$compiler_c_o + +# Must we lock files when doing compilation ? +need_locks=$need_locks + +# Do we need the lib prefix for modules? +need_lib_prefix=$need_lib_prefix + +# Do we need a version for libraries? +need_version=$need_version + +# Whether dlopen is supported. +dlopen_support=$enable_dlopen + +# Whether dlopen of programs is supported. +dlopen_self=$enable_dlopen_self + +# Whether dlopen of statically linked programs is supported. +dlopen_self_static=$enable_dlopen_self_static + +# Compiler flag to prevent dynamic linking. +link_static_flag=$link_static_flag + +# Compiler flag to turn off builtin functions. +no_builtin_flag=$no_builtin_flag + +# Compiler flag to allow reflexive dlopens. +export_dynamic_flag_spec=$export_dynamic_flag_spec + +# Compiler flag to generate shared objects directly from archives. +whole_archive_flag_spec=$whole_archive_flag_spec + +# Compiler flag to generate thread-safe objects. +thread_safe_flag_spec=$thread_safe_flag_spec + +# Library versioning type. +version_type=$version_type + +# Format of library name prefix. +libname_spec=$libname_spec + +# List of archive names. First name is the real one, the rest are links. +# The last name is the one that the linker finds with -lNAME. +library_names_spec=$library_names_spec + +# The coded name of the library, if different from the real name. +soname_spec=$soname_spec + +# Commands used to build and install an old-style archive. +RANLIB=$RANLIB +old_archive_cmds=$old_archive_cmds +old_postinstall_cmds=$old_postinstall_cmds +old_postuninstall_cmds=$old_postuninstall_cmds + +# Create an old-style archive from a shared archive. +old_archive_from_new_cmds=$old_archive_from_new_cmds + +# Create a temporary old-style archive to link instead of a shared archive. +old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds=$old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds + +# Commands used to build and install a shared archive. +archive_cmds=$archive_cmds +archive_expsym_cmds=$archive_expsym_cmds +postinstall_cmds=$postinstall_cmds +postuninstall_cmds=$postuninstall_cmds + +# Commands to strip libraries. +old_striplib=$old_striplib +striplib=$striplib + +# Dependencies to place before the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +predep_objects=$predep_objects + +# Dependencies to place after the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +postdep_objects=$postdep_objects + +# Dependencies to place before the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +predeps=$predeps + +# Dependencies to place after the objects being linked to create a +# shared library. +postdeps=$postdeps + +# The library search path used internally by the compiler when linking +# a shared library. +compiler_lib_search_path=$compiler_lib_search_path + +# Method to check whether dependent libraries are shared objects. +deplibs_check_method=$deplibs_check_method + +# Command to use when deplibs_check_method == file_magic. +file_magic_cmd=$file_magic_cmd + +# Flag that allows shared libraries with undefined symbols to be built. +allow_undefined_flag=$allow_undefined_flag + +# Flag that forces no undefined symbols. +no_undefined_flag=$no_undefined_flag + +# Commands used to finish a libtool library installation in a directory. +finish_cmds=$finish_cmds + +# Same as above, but a single script fragment to be evaled but not shown. +finish_eval=$finish_eval + +# Take the output of nm and produce a listing of raw symbols and C names. +global_symbol_pipe=$global_symbol_pipe + +# Transform the output of nm in a proper C declaration +global_symbol_to_cdecl=$global_symbol_to_cdecl + +# This is the shared library runtime path variable. +runpath_var=$runpath_var + +# This is the shared library path variable. +shlibpath_var=$shlibpath_var + +# Is shlibpath searched before the hard-coded library search path? +shlibpath_overrides_runpath=$shlibpath_overrides_runpath + +# How to hardcode a shared library path into an executable. +hardcode_action=$hardcode_action + +# Whether we should hardcode library paths into libraries. +hardcode_into_libs=$hardcode_into_libs + +# Flag to hardcode \$libdir into a binary during linking. +# This must work even if \$libdir does not exist. +hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec + +# Whether we need a single -rpath flag with a separated argument. +hardcode_libdir_separator=$hardcode_libdir_separator + +# Set to yes if using DIR/libNAME.so during linking hardcodes DIR into the +# resulting binary. +hardcode_direct=$hardcode_direct + +# Set to yes if using the -LDIR flag during linking hardcodes DIR into the +# resulting binary. +hardcode_minus_L=$hardcode_minus_L + +# Set to yes if using SHLIBPATH_VAR=DIR during linking hardcodes DIR into +# the resulting binary. +hardcode_shlibpath_var=$hardcode_shlibpath_var + +# Variables whose values should be saved in libtool wrapper scripts and +# restored at relink time. +variables_saved_for_relink="$variables_saved_for_relink" + +# Whether libtool must link a program against all its dependency libraries. +link_all_deplibs=$link_all_deplibs + +# Compile-time system search path for libraries +sys_lib_search_path_spec=$sys_lib_search_path_spec + +# Run-time system search path for libraries +sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec=$sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec + +# Fix the shell variable \$srcfile for the compiler. +fix_srcfile_path="$fix_srcfile_path" + +# Set to yes if exported symbols are required. +always_export_symbols=$always_export_symbols + +# The commands to list exported symbols. +export_symbols_cmds=$export_symbols_cmds + +# The commands to extract the exported symbol list from a shared archive. +extract_expsyms_cmds=$extract_expsyms_cmds + +# Symbols that should not be listed in the preloaded symbols. +exclude_expsyms=$exclude_expsyms + +# Symbols that must always be exported. +include_expsyms=$include_expsyms + +EOF + +if test -z "$tagname"; then + echo '### END LIBTOOL CONFIG' >> "$ofile" +else + echo "### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname" >> "$ofile" +fi + +case $ltmain in +*.sh) + echo >> "$ofile" + if test -z "$tagname"; then + case $host_os in + aix3*) + cat <<\EOF >> "$ofile" + +# AIX sometimes has problems with the GCC collect2 program. For some +# reason, if we set the COLLECT_NAMES environment variable, the problems +# vanish in a puff of smoke. +if test "X${COLLECT_NAMES+set}" != Xset; then + COLLECT_NAMES= + export COLLECT_NAMES +fi +EOF + ;; + esac + case $host in + *-*-cygwin* | *-*-mingw* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-os2*) + cat <<'EOF' >> "$ofile" + # This is a source program that is used to create dlls on Windows + # Don't remove nor modify the starting and closing comments +# /* ltdll.c starts here */ +# #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +# #include +# #undef WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +# #include +# +# #ifndef __CYGWIN__ +# # ifdef __CYGWIN32__ +# # define __CYGWIN__ __CYGWIN32__ +# # endif +# #endif +# +# #ifdef __cplusplus +# extern "C" { +# #endif +# BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved); +# #ifdef __cplusplus +# } +# #endif +# +# #ifdef __CYGWIN__ +# #include +# DECLARE_CYGWIN_DLL( DllMain ); +# #endif +# HINSTANCE __hDllInstance_base; +# +# BOOL APIENTRY +# DllMain (HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved) +# { +# __hDllInstance_base = hInst; +# return TRUE; +# } +# /* ltdll.c ends here */ + # This is a source program that is used to create import libraries + # on Windows for dlls which lack them. Don't remove nor modify the + # starting and closing comments +# /* impgen.c starts here */ +# /* Copyright (C) 1999-2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# This file is part of GNU libtool. +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# */ +# +# #include /* for printf() */ +# #include /* for open(), lseek(), read() */ +# #include /* for O_RDONLY, O_BINARY */ +# #include /* for strdup() */ +# +# /* O_BINARY isn't required (or even defined sometimes) under Unix */ +# #ifndef O_BINARY +# #define O_BINARY 0 +# #endif +# +# static unsigned int +# pe_get16 (fd, offset) +# int fd; +# int offset; +# { +# unsigned char b[2]; +# lseek (fd, offset, SEEK_SET); +# read (fd, b, 2); +# return b[0] + (b[1]<<8); +# } +# +# static unsigned int +# pe_get32 (fd, offset) +# int fd; +# int offset; +# { +# unsigned char b[4]; +# lseek (fd, offset, SEEK_SET); +# read (fd, b, 4); +# return b[0] + (b[1]<<8) + (b[2]<<16) + (b[3]<<24); +# } +# +# static unsigned int +# pe_as32 (ptr) +# void *ptr; +# { +# unsigned char *b = ptr; +# return b[0] + (b[1]<<8) + (b[2]<<16) + (b[3]<<24); +# } +# +# int +# main (argc, argv) +# int argc; +# char *argv[]; +# { +# int dll; +# unsigned long pe_header_offset, opthdr_ofs, num_entries, i; +# unsigned long export_rva, export_size, nsections, secptr, expptr; +# unsigned long name_rvas, nexp; +# unsigned char *expdata, *erva; +# char *filename, *dll_name; +# +# filename = argv[1]; +# +# dll = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY); +# if (dll < 1) +# return 1; +# +# dll_name = filename; +# +# for (i=0; filename[i]; i++) +# if (filename[i] == '/' || filename[i] == '\\' || filename[i] == ':') +# dll_name = filename + i +1; +# +# pe_header_offset = pe_get32 (dll, 0x3c); +# opthdr_ofs = pe_header_offset + 4 + 20; +# num_entries = pe_get32 (dll, opthdr_ofs + 92); +# +# if (num_entries < 1) /* no exports */ +# return 1; +# +# export_rva = pe_get32 (dll, opthdr_ofs + 96); +# export_size = pe_get32 (dll, opthdr_ofs + 100); +# nsections = pe_get16 (dll, pe_header_offset + 4 +2); +# secptr = (pe_header_offset + 4 + 20 + +# pe_get16 (dll, pe_header_offset + 4 + 16)); +# +# expptr = 0; +# for (i = 0; i < nsections; i++) +# { +# char sname[8]; +# unsigned long secptr1 = secptr + 40 * i; +# unsigned long vaddr = pe_get32 (dll, secptr1 + 12); +# unsigned long vsize = pe_get32 (dll, secptr1 + 16); +# unsigned long fptr = pe_get32 (dll, secptr1 + 20); +# lseek(dll, secptr1, SEEK_SET); +# read(dll, sname, 8); +# if (vaddr <= export_rva && vaddr+vsize > export_rva) +# { +# expptr = fptr + (export_rva - vaddr); +# if (export_rva + export_size > vaddr + vsize) +# export_size = vsize - (export_rva - vaddr); +# break; +# } +# } +# +# expdata = (unsigned char*)malloc(export_size); +# lseek (dll, expptr, SEEK_SET); +# read (dll, expdata, export_size); +# erva = expdata - export_rva; +# +# nexp = pe_as32 (expdata+24); +# name_rvas = pe_as32 (expdata+32); +# +# printf ("EXPORTS\n"); +# for (i = 0; i> "$ofile" || (rm -f "$ofile"; exit 1) + # We use sed instead of cat because bash on DJGPP gets confused if + # if finds mixed CR/LF and LF-only lines. Since sed operates in + # text mode, it properly converts lines to CR/LF. This bash problem + # is reportedly fixed, but why not run on old versions too? + + chmod +x "$ofile" + fi + ;; + +*) + # Compile the libtool program. + echo "FIXME: would compile $ltmain" + ;; +esac + +# Update the list of available tags. +if test -n "$tagname"; then + + # Extract list of available tagged configurations in $ofile. + # Note that this assumes the entire list is on one line. + available_tags=`grep "^available_tags=" $ofile | sed -e 's/available_tags=\(.*$\)/\1/' -e 's/\"//g'` + + # Append the new tag name to the list of available tags. + available_tags="$available_tags $tagname" + + # Now substitute the updated of available tags. + if eval "sed -e 's/^available_tags=.*\$/available_tags=\"$available_tags\"/' ${ofile} > ${ofile}.new"; then + mv ${ofile}.new ${ofile} + chmod +x "$ofile" + else + rm -f ${ofile}.new + echo "$progname: unable to update list of available tagged configurations." + exit 1 + fi +fi + +# Don't cache tagged configuration! +test -n "$cache_file" && test -z "$tagname" || exit 0 + +# AC_CACHE_SAVE +trap '' 1 2 15 +cat > confcache <<\EOF +# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure +# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure +# scripts and configure runs. It is not useful on other systems. +# If it contains results you don't want to keep, you may remove or edit it. +# +# By default, configure uses ./config.cache as the cache file, +# creating it if it does not exist already. You can give configure +# the --cache-file=FILE option to use a different cache file; that is +# what configure does when it calls configure scripts in +# subdirectories, so they share the cache. +# Giving --cache-file=/dev/null disables caching, for debugging configure. +# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it the +# --recheck option to rerun configure. +# +EOF +# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values, +# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient. +# So, don't put newlines in cache variables' values. +# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly, +# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars. +(set) 2>&1 | + case `(ac_space=' '; set | grep ac_space) 2>&1` in + *ac_space=\ *) + # `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes (double-quote substitution + # turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \). + sed -n \ + -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g" \ + -e "s/^\\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*_cv_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1=\${\\1='\\2'}/p" + ;; + *) + # `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes. + sed -n -e 's/^\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*_cv_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=\(.*\)/\1=${\1=\2}/p' + ;; + esac >> confcache +if cmp -s $cache_file confcache; then + : +else + if test -w $cache_file; then + echo "updating cache $cache_file" + cat confcache > $cache_file + else + echo "not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" + fi +fi +rm -f confcache + +exit 0 + +# Local Variables: +# mode:shell-script +# sh-indentation:2 +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ltmain.sh b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ltmain.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47fa4f179f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/ltmain.sh @@ -0,0 +1,6399 @@ +# ltmain.sh - Provide generalized library-building support services. +# NOTE: Changing this file will not affect anything until you rerun configure. +# +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Originally by Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Check that we have a working $echo. +if test "X$1" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift +elif test "X$1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # Avoid inline document here, it may be left over + : +elif test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t'; then + # Yippee, $echo works! + : +else + # Restart under the correct shell, and then maybe $echo will work. + exec $SHELL "$0" --no-reexec ${1+"$@"} +fi + +if test "X$1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # used as fallback echo + shift + cat <&2 + $echo "Fatal configuration error. See the $PACKAGE docs for more information." 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Global variables. +mode=$default_mode +nonopt= +prev= +prevopt= +run= +show="$echo" +show_help= +execute_dlfiles= +lo2o="s/\\.lo\$/.${objext}/" +o2lo="s/\\.${objext}\$/.lo/" + +##################################### +# Shell function definitions: +# This seems to be the best place for them + +# Need a lot of goo to handle *both* DLLs and import libs +# Has to be a shell function in order to 'eat' the argument +# that is supplied when $file_magic_command is called. +win32_libid () { + win32_libid_type="unknown" + win32_fileres=`file -L $1 2>/dev/null` + case $win32_fileres in + *ar\ archive\ import\ library*) # definitely import + win32_libid_type="x86 archive import" + ;; + *ar\ archive*) # could be an import, or static + if eval $OBJDUMP -f $1 | $SED -e '10q' 2>/dev/null | \ + grep -E 'file format pe-i386(.*architecture: i386)?' >/dev/null ; then + win32_nmres=`eval $NM -f posix -A $1 | \ + sed -n -e '1,100{/ I /{x;/import/!{s/^/import/;h;p;};x;};}'` + if test "X$win32_nmres" = "Ximport" ; then + win32_libid_type="x86 archive import" + else + win32_libid_type="x86 archive static" + fi + fi + ;; + *DLL*) + win32_libid_type="x86 DLL" + ;; + *executable*) # but shell scripts are "executable" too... + case $win32_fileres in + *MS\ Windows\ PE\ Intel*) + win32_libid_type="x86 DLL" + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + $echo $win32_libid_type +} + +# End of Shell function definitions +##################################### + +# Parse our command line options once, thoroughly. +while test "$#" -gt 0 +do + arg="$1" + shift + + case $arg in + -*=*) optarg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;; + *) optarg= ;; + esac + + # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + case $prev in + execute_dlfiles) + execute_dlfiles="$execute_dlfiles $arg" + ;; + tag) + tagname="$arg" + preserve_args="${preserve_args}=$arg" + + # Check whether tagname contains only valid characters + case $tagname in + *[!-_A-Za-z0-9,/]*) + $echo "$progname: invalid tag name: $tagname" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + case $tagname in + CC) + # Don't test for the "default" C tag, as we know, it's there, but + # not specially marked. + ;; + *) + if grep "^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname$" < "$0" > /dev/null; then + taglist="$taglist $tagname" + # Evaluate the configuration. + eval "`${SED} -n -e '/^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: '$tagname'$/,/^# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: '$tagname'$/p' < $0`" + else + $echo "$progname: ignoring unknown tag $tagname" 1>&2 + fi + ;; + esac + ;; + *) + eval "$prev=\$arg" + ;; + esac + + prev= + prevopt= + continue + fi + + # Have we seen a non-optional argument yet? + case $arg in + --help) + show_help=yes + ;; + + --version) + $echo "$PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE) $VERSION$TIMESTAMP" + $echo + $echo "Copyright (C) 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc." + $echo "This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO" + $echo "warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + exit 0 + ;; + + --config) + ${SED} -e '1,/^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL CONFIG/d' -e '/^# ### END LIBTOOL CONFIG/,$d' $0 + # Now print the configurations for the tags. + for tagname in $taglist; do + ${SED} -n -e "/^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname$/,/^# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $tagname$/p" < "$0" + done + exit 0 + ;; + + --debug) + $echo "$progname: enabling shell trace mode" + set -x + preserve_args="$preserve_args $arg" + ;; + + --dry-run | -n) + run=: + ;; + + --features) + $echo "host: $host" + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + $echo "enable shared libraries" + else + $echo "disable shared libraries" + fi + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + $echo "enable static libraries" + else + $echo "disable static libraries" + fi + exit 0 + ;; + + --finish) mode="finish" ;; + + --mode) prevopt="--mode" prev=mode ;; + --mode=*) mode="$optarg" ;; + + --preserve-dup-deps) duplicate_deps="yes" ;; + + --quiet | --silent) + show=: + preserve_args="$preserve_args $arg" + ;; + + --tag) prevopt="--tag" prev=tag ;; + --tag=*) + set tag "$optarg" ${1+"$@"} + shift + prev=tag + preserve_args="$preserve_args --tag" + ;; + + -dlopen) + prevopt="-dlopen" + prev=execute_dlfiles + ;; + + -*) + $echo "$modename: unrecognized option \`$arg'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + + *) + nonopt="$arg" + break + ;; + esac +done + +if test -n "$prevopt"; then + $echo "$modename: option \`$prevopt' requires an argument" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# If this variable is set in any of the actions, the command in it +# will be execed at the end. This prevents here-documents from being +# left over by shells. +exec_cmd= + +if test -z "$show_help"; then + + # Infer the operation mode. + if test -z "$mode"; then + $echo "*** Warning: inferring the mode of operation is deprecated." 1>&2 + $echo "*** Future versions of Libtool will require -mode=MODE be specified." 1>&2 + case $nonopt in + *cc | cc* | *++ | gcc* | *-gcc* | g++* | xlc*) + mode=link + for arg + do + case $arg in + -c) + mode=compile + break + ;; + esac + done + ;; + *db | *dbx | *strace | *truss) + mode=execute + ;; + *install*|cp|mv) + mode=install + ;; + *rm) + mode=uninstall + ;; + *) + # If we have no mode, but dlfiles were specified, then do execute mode. + test -n "$execute_dlfiles" && mode=execute + + # Just use the default operation mode. + if test -z "$mode"; then + if test -n "$nonopt"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot infer operation mode from \`$nonopt'" 1>&2 + else + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot infer operation mode without MODE-ARGS" 1>&2 + fi + fi + ;; + esac + fi + + # Only execute mode is allowed to have -dlopen flags. + if test -n "$execute_dlfiles" && test "$mode" != execute; then + $echo "$modename: unrecognized option \`-dlopen'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Change the help message to a mode-specific one. + generic_help="$help" + help="Try \`$modename --help --mode=$mode' for more information." + + # These modes are in order of execution frequency so that they run quickly. + case $mode in + # libtool compile mode + compile) + modename="$modename: compile" + # Get the compilation command and the source file. + base_compile= + srcfile="$nonopt" # always keep a non-empty value in "srcfile" + suppress_opt=yes + suppress_output= + arg_mode=normal + libobj= + later= + + for arg + do + case "$arg_mode" in + arg ) + # do not "continue". Instead, add this to base_compile + lastarg="$arg" + arg_mode=normal + ;; + + target ) + libobj="$arg" + arg_mode=normal + continue + ;; + + normal ) + # Accept any command-line options. + case $arg in + -o) + if test -n "$libobj" ; then + $echo "$modename: you cannot specify \`-o' more than once" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + arg_mode=target + continue + ;; + + -static | -prefer-pic | -prefer-non-pic) + later="$later $arg" + continue + ;; + + -no-suppress) + suppress_opt=no + continue + ;; + + -Xcompiler) + arg_mode=arg # the next one goes into the "base_compile" arg list + continue # The current "srcfile" will either be retained or + ;; # replaced later. I would guess that would be a bug. + + -Wc,*) + args=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "s/^-Wc,//"` + lastarg= + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=',' + for arg in $args; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + + # Double-quote args containing other shell metacharacters. + # Many Bourne shells cannot handle close brackets correctly + # in scan sets, so we specify it separately. + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + lastarg="$lastarg $arg" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + lastarg=`$echo "X$lastarg" | $Xsed -e "s/^ //"` + + # Add the arguments to base_compile. + base_compile="$base_compile $lastarg" + continue + ;; + + * ) + # Accept the current argument as the source file. + # The previous "srcfile" becomes the current argument. + # + lastarg="$srcfile" + srcfile="$arg" + ;; + esac # case $arg + ;; + esac # case $arg_mode + + # Aesthetically quote the previous argument. + lastarg=`$echo "X$lastarg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + + case $lastarg in + # Double-quote args containing other shell metacharacters. + # Many Bourne shells cannot handle close brackets correctly + # in scan sets, so we specify it separately. + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + lastarg="\"$lastarg\"" + ;; + esac + + base_compile="$base_compile $lastarg" + done # for arg + + case $arg_mode in + arg) + $echo "$modename: you must specify an argument for -Xcompile" + exit 1 + ;; + target) + $echo "$modename: you must specify a target with \`-o'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + *) + # Get the name of the library object. + [ -z "$libobj" ] && libobj=`$echo "X$srcfile" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + ;; + esac + + # Recognize several different file suffixes. + # If the user specifies -o file.o, it is replaced with file.lo + xform='[cCFSifmso]' + case $libobj in + *.ada) xform=ada ;; + *.adb) xform=adb ;; + *.ads) xform=ads ;; + *.asm) xform=asm ;; + *.c++) xform=c++ ;; + *.cc) xform=cc ;; + *.ii) xform=ii ;; + *.class) xform=class ;; + *.cpp) xform=cpp ;; + *.cxx) xform=cxx ;; + *.f90) xform=f90 ;; + *.for) xform=for ;; + *.java) xform=java ;; + esac + + libobj=`$echo "X$libobj" | $Xsed -e "s/\.$xform$/.lo/"` + + case $libobj in + *.lo) obj=`$echo "X$libobj" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: cannot determine name of library object from \`$libobj'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + # Infer tagged configuration to use if any are available and + # if one wasn't chosen via the "--tag" command line option. + # Only attempt this if the compiler in the base compile + # command doesn't match the default compiler. + if test -n "$available_tags" && test -z "$tagname"; then + case $base_compile in + # Blanks in the command may have been stripped by the calling shell, + # but not from the CC environment variable when configure was run. + " $CC "* | "$CC "* | " `$echo $CC` "* | "`$echo $CC` "*) ;; + # Blanks at the start of $base_compile will cause this to fail + # if we don't check for them as well. + *) + for z in $available_tags; do + if grep "^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: $z$" < "$0" > /dev/null; then + # Evaluate the configuration. + eval "`${SED} -n -e '/^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: '$z'$/,/^# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: '$z'$/p' < $0`" + case "$base_compile " in + "$CC "* | " $CC "* | "`$echo $CC` "* | " `$echo $CC` "*) + # The compiler in the base compile command matches + # the one in the tagged configuration. + # Assume this is the tagged configuration we want. + tagname=$z + break + ;; + esac + fi + done + # If $tagname still isn't set, then no tagged configuration + # was found and let the user know that the "--tag" command + # line option must be used. + if test -z "$tagname"; then + $echo "$modename: unable to infer tagged configuration" + $echo "$modename: specify a tag with \`--tag'" 1>&2 + exit 1 +# else +# $echo "$modename: using $tagname tagged configuration" + fi + ;; + esac + fi + + for arg in $later; do + case $arg in + -static) + build_old_libs=yes + continue + ;; + + -prefer-pic) + pic_mode=yes + continue + ;; + + -prefer-non-pic) + pic_mode=no + continue + ;; + esac + done + + objname=`$echo "X$obj" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + xdir=`$echo "X$obj" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$xdir" = "X$obj"; then + xdir= + else + xdir=$xdir/ + fi + lobj=${xdir}$objdir/$objname + + if test -z "$base_compile"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify a compilation command" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Delete any leftover library objects. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + removelist="$obj $lobj $libobj ${libobj}T" + else + removelist="$lobj $libobj ${libobj}T" + fi + + $run $rm $removelist + trap "$run $rm $removelist; exit 1" 1 2 15 + + # On Cygwin there's no "real" PIC flag so we must build both object types + case $host_os in + cygwin* | mingw* | pw32* | os2*) + pic_mode=default + ;; + esac + if test "$pic_mode" = no && test "$deplibs_check_method" != pass_all; then + # non-PIC code in shared libraries is not supported + pic_mode=default + fi + + # Calculate the filename of the output object if compiler does + # not support -o with -c + if test "$compiler_c_o" = no; then + output_obj=`$echo "X$srcfile" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%' -e 's%\.[^.]*$%%'`.${objext} + lockfile="$output_obj.lock" + removelist="$removelist $output_obj $lockfile" + trap "$run $rm $removelist; exit 1" 1 2 15 + else + output_obj= + need_locks=no + lockfile= + fi + + # Lock this critical section if it is needed + # We use this script file to make the link, it avoids creating a new file + if test "$need_locks" = yes; then + until $run ln "$0" "$lockfile" 2>/dev/null; do + $show "Waiting for $lockfile to be removed" + sleep 2 + done + elif test "$need_locks" = warn; then + if test -f "$lockfile"; then + $echo "\ +*** ERROR, $lockfile exists and contains: +`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null` + +This indicates that another process is trying to use the same +temporary object file, and libtool could not work around it because +your compiler does not support \`-c' and \`-o' together. If you +repeat this compilation, it may succeed, by chance, but you had better +avoid parallel builds (make -j) in this platform, or get a better +compiler." + + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + $echo $srcfile > "$lockfile" + fi + + if test -n "$fix_srcfile_path"; then + eval srcfile=\"$fix_srcfile_path\" + fi + + $run $rm "$libobj" "${libobj}T" + + # Create a libtool object file (analogous to a ".la" file), + # but don't create it if we're doing a dry run. + test -z "$run" && cat > ${libobj}T </dev/null`" != "X$srcfile"; then + $echo "\ +*** ERROR, $lockfile contains: +`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null` + +but it should contain: +$srcfile + +This indicates that another process is trying to use the same +temporary object file, and libtool could not work around it because +your compiler does not support \`-c' and \`-o' together. If you +repeat this compilation, it may succeed, by chance, but you had better +avoid parallel builds (make -j) in this platform, or get a better +compiler." + + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + + # Just move the object if needed, then go on to compile the next one + if test -n "$output_obj" && test "X$output_obj" != "X$lobj"; then + $show "$mv $output_obj $lobj" + if $run $mv $output_obj $lobj; then : + else + error=$? + $run $rm $removelist + exit $error + fi + fi + + # Append the name of the PIC object to the libtool object file. + test -z "$run" && cat >> ${libobj}T <> ${libobj}T </dev/null`" != "X$srcfile"; then + $echo "\ +*** ERROR, $lockfile contains: +`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null` + +but it should contain: +$srcfile + +This indicates that another process is trying to use the same +temporary object file, and libtool could not work around it because +your compiler does not support \`-c' and \`-o' together. If you +repeat this compilation, it may succeed, by chance, but you had better +avoid parallel builds (make -j) in this platform, or get a better +compiler." + + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + + # Just move the object if needed + if test -n "$output_obj" && test "X$output_obj" != "X$obj"; then + $show "$mv $output_obj $obj" + if $run $mv $output_obj $obj; then : + else + error=$? + $run $rm $removelist + exit $error + fi + fi + + # Append the name of the non-PIC object the libtool object file. + # Only append if the libtool object file exists. + test -z "$run" && cat >> ${libobj}T <> ${libobj}T < /dev/null; then + # Evaluate the configuration. + eval "`${SED} -n -e '/^# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: '$z'$/,/^# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: '$z'$/p' < $0`" + case $base_compile in + "$CC "* | " $CC "* | "`$echo $CC` "* | " `$echo $CC` "*) + # The compiler in $compile_command matches + # the one in the tagged configuration. + # Assume this is the tagged configuration we want. + tagname=$z + break + ;; + esac + fi + done + # If $tagname still isn't set, then no tagged configuration + # was found and let the user know that the "--tag" command + # line option must be used. + if test -z "$tagname"; then + $echo "$modename: unable to infer tagged configuration" + $echo "$modename: specify a tag with \`--tag'" 1>&2 + exit 1 +# else +# $echo "$modename: using $tagname tagged configuration" + fi + ;; + esac + fi + + # We need to know -static, to get the right output filenames. + for arg + do + case $arg in + -all-static | -static) + if test "X$arg" = "X-all-static"; then + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes && test -z "$link_static_flag"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: complete static linking is impossible in this configuration" 1>&2 + fi + if test -n "$link_static_flag"; then + dlopen_self=$dlopen_self_static + fi + else + if test -z "$pic_flag" && test -n "$link_static_flag"; then + dlopen_self=$dlopen_self_static + fi + fi + build_libtool_libs=no + build_old_libs=yes + prefer_static_libs=yes + break + ;; + esac + done + + # See if our shared archives depend on static archives. + test -n "$old_archive_from_new_cmds" && build_old_libs=yes + + # Go through the arguments, transforming them on the way. + while test "$#" -gt 0; do + arg="$1" + shift + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + qarg=\"`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"`\" ### testsuite: skip nested quoting test + ;; + *) qarg=$arg ;; + esac + libtool_args="$libtool_args $qarg" + + # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + case $prev in + output) + compile_command="$compile_command @OUTPUT@" + finalize_command="$finalize_command @OUTPUT@" + ;; + esac + + case $prev in + dlfiles|dlprefiles) + if test "$preload" = no; then + # Add the symbol object into the linking commands. + compile_command="$compile_command @SYMFILE@" + finalize_command="$finalize_command @SYMFILE@" + preload=yes + fi + case $arg in + *.la | *.lo) ;; # We handle these cases below. + force) + if test "$dlself" = no; then + dlself=needless + export_dynamic=yes + fi + prev= + continue + ;; + self) + if test "$prev" = dlprefiles; then + dlself=yes + elif test "$prev" = dlfiles && test "$dlopen_self" != yes; then + dlself=yes + else + dlself=needless + export_dynamic=yes + fi + prev= + continue + ;; + *) + if test "$prev" = dlfiles; then + dlfiles="$dlfiles $arg" + else + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $arg" + fi + prev= + continue + ;; + esac + ;; + expsyms) + export_symbols="$arg" + if test ! -f "$arg"; then + $echo "$modename: symbol file \`$arg' does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + prev= + continue + ;; + expsyms_regex) + export_symbols_regex="$arg" + prev= + continue + ;; + inst_prefix) + inst_prefix_dir="$arg" + prev= + continue + ;; + precious_regex) + precious_files_regex="$arg" + prev= + continue + ;; + release) + release="-$arg" + prev= + continue + ;; + objectlist) + if test -f "$arg"; then + save_arg=$arg + moreargs= + for fil in `cat $save_arg` + do +# moreargs="$moreargs $fil" + arg=$fil + # A libtool-controlled object. + + # Check to see that this really is a libtool object. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $arg | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pic_object= + non_pic_object= + + # Read the .lo file + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $arg in + */* | *\\*) . $arg ;; + *) . ./$arg ;; + esac + + if test -z "$pic_object" || \ + test -z "$non_pic_object" || + test "$pic_object" = none && \ + test "$non_pic_object" = none; then + $echo "$modename: cannot find name of object for \`$arg'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Extract subdirectory from the argument. + xdir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$xdir" = "X$arg"; then + xdir= + else + xdir="$xdir/" + fi + + if test "$pic_object" != none; then + # Prepend the subdirectory the object is found in. + pic_object="$xdir$pic_object" + + if test "$prev" = dlfiles; then + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes && test "$dlopen_support" = yes; then + dlfiles="$dlfiles $pic_object" + prev= + continue + else + # If libtool objects are unsupported, then we need to preload. + prev=dlprefiles + fi + fi + + # CHECK ME: I think I busted this. -Ossama + if test "$prev" = dlprefiles; then + # Preload the old-style object. + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $pic_object" + prev= + fi + + # A PIC object. + libobjs="$libobjs $pic_object" + arg="$pic_object" + fi + + # Non-PIC object. + if test "$non_pic_object" != none; then + # Prepend the subdirectory the object is found in. + non_pic_object="$xdir$non_pic_object" + + # A standard non-PIC object + non_pic_objects="$non_pic_objects $non_pic_object" + if test -z "$pic_object" || test "$pic_object" = none ; then + arg="$non_pic_object" + fi + fi + else + # Only an error if not doing a dry-run. + if test -z "$run"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$arg' is not a valid libtool object" 1>&2 + exit 1 + else + # Dry-run case. + + # Extract subdirectory from the argument. + xdir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$xdir" = "X$arg"; then + xdir= + else + xdir="$xdir/" + fi + + pic_object=`$echo "X${xdir}${objdir}/${arg}" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + non_pic_object=`$echo "X${xdir}${arg}" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + libobjs="$libobjs $pic_object" + non_pic_objects="$non_pic_objects $non_pic_object" + fi + fi + done + else + $echo "$modename: link input file \`$save_arg' does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + arg=$save_arg + prev= + continue + ;; + rpath | xrpath) + # We need an absolute path. + case $arg in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: only absolute run-paths are allowed" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + if test "$prev" = rpath; then + case "$rpath " in + *" $arg "*) ;; + *) rpath="$rpath $arg" ;; + esac + else + case "$xrpath " in + *" $arg "*) ;; + *) xrpath="$xrpath $arg" ;; + esac + fi + prev= + continue + ;; + xcompiler) + compiler_flags="$compiler_flags $qarg" + prev= + compile_command="$compile_command $qarg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $qarg" + continue + ;; + xlinker) + linker_flags="$linker_flags $qarg" + compiler_flags="$compiler_flags $wl$qarg" + prev= + compile_command="$compile_command $wl$qarg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $wl$qarg" + continue + ;; + xcclinker) + linker_flags="$linker_flags $qarg" + compiler_flags="$compiler_flags $qarg" + prev= + compile_command="$compile_command $qarg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $qarg" + continue + ;; + *) + eval "$prev=\"\$arg\"" + prev= + continue + ;; + esac + fi # test -n "$prev" + + prevarg="$arg" + + case $arg in + -all-static) + if test -n "$link_static_flag"; then + compile_command="$compile_command $link_static_flag" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $link_static_flag" + fi + continue + ;; + + -allow-undefined) + # FIXME: remove this flag sometime in the future. + $echo "$modename: \`-allow-undefined' is deprecated because it is the default" 1>&2 + continue + ;; + + -avoid-version) + avoid_version=yes + continue + ;; + + -dlopen) + prev=dlfiles + continue + ;; + + -dlpreopen) + prev=dlprefiles + continue + ;; + + -export-dynamic) + export_dynamic=yes + continue + ;; + + -export-symbols | -export-symbols-regex) + if test -n "$export_symbols" || test -n "$export_symbols_regex"; then + $echo "$modename: more than one -exported-symbols argument is not allowed" + exit 1 + fi + if test "X$arg" = "X-export-symbols"; then + prev=expsyms + else + prev=expsyms_regex + fi + continue + ;; + + -inst-prefix-dir) + prev=inst_prefix + continue + ;; + + # The native IRIX linker understands -LANG:*, -LIST:* and -LNO:* + # so, if we see these flags be careful not to treat them like -L + -L[A-Z][A-Z]*:*) + case $with_gcc/$host in + no/*-*-irix* | /*-*-irix*) + compile_command="$compile_command $arg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $arg" + ;; + esac + continue + ;; + + -L*) + dir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's/^-L//'` + # We need an absolute path. + case $dir in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) ;; + *) + absdir=`cd "$dir" && pwd` + if test -z "$absdir"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot determine absolute directory name of \`$dir'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + dir="$absdir" + ;; + esac + case "$deplibs " in + *" -L$dir "*) ;; + *) + deplibs="$deplibs -L$dir" + lib_search_path="$lib_search_path $dir" + ;; + esac + case $host in + *-*-cygwin* | *-*-mingw* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-os2*) + case :$dllsearchpath: in + *":$dir:"*) ;; + *) dllsearchpath="$dllsearchpath:$dir";; + esac + ;; + esac + continue + ;; + + -l*) + if test "X$arg" = "X-lc" || test "X$arg" = "X-lm"; then + case $host in + *-*-cygwin* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-beos*) + # These systems don't actually have a C or math library (as such) + continue + ;; + *-*-mingw* | *-*-os2*) + # These systems don't actually have a C library (as such) + test "X$arg" = "X-lc" && continue + ;; + *-*-openbsd* | *-*-freebsd*) + # Do not include libc due to us having libc/libc_r. + test "X$arg" = "X-lc" && continue + ;; + *-*-rhapsody* | *-*-darwin1.[012]) + # Rhapsody C and math libraries are in the System framework + deplibs="$deplibs -framework System" + continue + esac + elif test "X$arg" = "X-lc_r"; then + case $host in + *-*-openbsd* | *-*-freebsd*) + # Do not include libc_r directly, use -pthread flag. + continue + ;; + esac + fi + deplibs="$deplibs $arg" + continue + ;; + + -mt|-mthreads|-kthread|-Kthread|-pthread|-pthreads|--thread-safe) + deplibs="$deplibs $arg" + continue + ;; + + -module) + module=yes + continue + ;; + + # gcc -m* arguments should be passed to the linker via $compiler_flags + # in order to pass architecture information to the linker + # (e.g. 32 vs 64-bit). This may also be accomplished via -Wl,-mfoo + # but this is not reliable with gcc because gcc may use -mfoo to + # select a different linker, different libraries, etc, while + # -Wl,-mfoo simply passes -mfoo to the linker. + -m*) + # Unknown arguments in both finalize_command and compile_command need + # to be aesthetically quoted because they are evaled later. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + compile_command="$compile_command $arg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $arg" + if test "$with_gcc" = "yes" ; then + compiler_flags="$compiler_flags $arg" + fi + continue + ;; + + -shrext) + prev=shrext + continue + ;; + + -no-fast-install) + fast_install=no + continue + ;; + + -no-install) + case $host in + *-*-cygwin* | *-*-mingw* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-os2*) + # The PATH hackery in wrapper scripts is required on Windows + # in order for the loader to find any dlls it needs. + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-no-install' is ignored for $host" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: warning: assuming \`-no-fast-install' instead" 1>&2 + fast_install=no + ;; + *) no_install=yes ;; + esac + continue + ;; + + -no-undefined) + allow_undefined=no + continue + ;; + + -objectlist) + prev=objectlist + continue + ;; + + -o) prev=output ;; + + -precious-files-regex) + prev=precious_regex + continue + ;; + + -release) + prev=release + continue + ;; + + -rpath) + prev=rpath + continue + ;; + + -R) + prev=xrpath + continue + ;; + + -R*) + dir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's/^-R//'` + # We need an absolute path. + case $dir in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: only absolute run-paths are allowed" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + case "$xrpath " in + *" $dir "*) ;; + *) xrpath="$xrpath $dir" ;; + esac + continue + ;; + + -static) + # The effects of -static are defined in a previous loop. + # We used to do the same as -all-static on platforms that + # didn't have a PIC flag, but the assumption that the effects + # would be equivalent was wrong. It would break on at least + # Digital Unix and AIX. + continue + ;; + + -thread-safe) + thread_safe=yes + continue + ;; + + -version-info) + prev=vinfo + continue + ;; + -version-number) + prev=vinfo + vinfo_number=yes + continue + ;; + + -Wc,*) + args=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst" -e 's/^-Wc,//'` + arg= + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=',' + for flag in $args; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + case $flag in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + flag="\"$flag\"" + ;; + esac + arg="$arg $wl$flag" + compiler_flags="$compiler_flags $flag" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "s/^ //"` + ;; + + -Wl,*) + args=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst" -e 's/^-Wl,//'` + arg= + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=',' + for flag in $args; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + case $flag in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + flag="\"$flag\"" + ;; + esac + arg="$arg $wl$flag" + compiler_flags="$compiler_flags $wl$flag" + linker_flags="$linker_flags $flag" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "s/^ //"` + ;; + + -Xcompiler) + prev=xcompiler + continue + ;; + + -Xlinker) + prev=xlinker + continue + ;; + + -XCClinker) + prev=xcclinker + continue + ;; + + # Some other compiler flag. + -* | +*) + # Unknown arguments in both finalize_command and compile_command need + # to be aesthetically quoted because they are evaled later. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + ;; + + *.$objext) + # A standard object. + objs="$objs $arg" + ;; + + *.lo) + # A libtool-controlled object. + + # Check to see that this really is a libtool object. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $arg | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pic_object= + non_pic_object= + + # Read the .lo file + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $arg in + */* | *\\*) . $arg ;; + *) . ./$arg ;; + esac + + if test -z "$pic_object" || \ + test -z "$non_pic_object" || + test "$pic_object" = none && \ + test "$non_pic_object" = none; then + $echo "$modename: cannot find name of object for \`$arg'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Extract subdirectory from the argument. + xdir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$xdir" = "X$arg"; then + xdir= + else + xdir="$xdir/" + fi + + if test "$pic_object" != none; then + # Prepend the subdirectory the object is found in. + pic_object="$xdir$pic_object" + + if test "$prev" = dlfiles; then + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes && test "$dlopen_support" = yes; then + dlfiles="$dlfiles $pic_object" + prev= + continue + else + # If libtool objects are unsupported, then we need to preload. + prev=dlprefiles + fi + fi + + # CHECK ME: I think I busted this. -Ossama + if test "$prev" = dlprefiles; then + # Preload the old-style object. + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $pic_object" + prev= + fi + + # A PIC object. + libobjs="$libobjs $pic_object" + arg="$pic_object" + fi + + # Non-PIC object. + if test "$non_pic_object" != none; then + # Prepend the subdirectory the object is found in. + non_pic_object="$xdir$non_pic_object" + + # A standard non-PIC object + non_pic_objects="$non_pic_objects $non_pic_object" + if test -z "$pic_object" || test "$pic_object" = none ; then + arg="$non_pic_object" + fi + fi + else + # Only an error if not doing a dry-run. + if test -z "$run"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$arg' is not a valid libtool object" 1>&2 + exit 1 + else + # Dry-run case. + + # Extract subdirectory from the argument. + xdir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$xdir" = "X$arg"; then + xdir= + else + xdir="$xdir/" + fi + + pic_object=`$echo "X${xdir}${objdir}/${arg}" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + non_pic_object=`$echo "X${xdir}${arg}" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + libobjs="$libobjs $pic_object" + non_pic_objects="$non_pic_objects $non_pic_object" + fi + fi + ;; + + *.$libext) + # An archive. + deplibs="$deplibs $arg" + old_deplibs="$old_deplibs $arg" + continue + ;; + + *.la) + # A libtool-controlled library. + + if test "$prev" = dlfiles; then + # This library was specified with -dlopen. + dlfiles="$dlfiles $arg" + prev= + elif test "$prev" = dlprefiles; then + # The library was specified with -dlpreopen. + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $arg" + prev= + else + deplibs="$deplibs $arg" + fi + continue + ;; + + # Some other compiler argument. + *) + # Unknown arguments in both finalize_command and compile_command need + # to be aesthetically quoted because they are evaled later. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*|"") + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + ;; + esac # arg + + # Now actually substitute the argument into the commands. + if test -n "$arg"; then + compile_command="$compile_command $arg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $arg" + fi + done # argument parsing loop + + if test -n "$prev"; then + $echo "$modename: the \`$prevarg' option requires an argument" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test "$export_dynamic" = yes && test -n "$export_dynamic_flag_spec"; then + eval arg=\"$export_dynamic_flag_spec\" + compile_command="$compile_command $arg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $arg" + fi + + oldlibs= + # calculate the name of the file, without its directory + outputname=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + libobjs_save="$libobjs" + + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + # get the directories listed in $shlibpath_var + eval shlib_search_path=\`\$echo \"X\${$shlibpath_var}\" \| \$Xsed -e \'s/:/ /g\'\` + else + shlib_search_path= + fi + eval sys_lib_search_path=\"$sys_lib_search_path_spec\" + eval sys_lib_dlsearch_path=\"$sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec\" + + output_objdir=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$output_objdir" = "X$output"; then + output_objdir="$objdir" + else + output_objdir="$output_objdir/$objdir" + fi + # Create the object directory. + if test ! -d "$output_objdir"; then + $show "$mkdir $output_objdir" + $run $mkdir $output_objdir + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$output_objdir"; then + exit $status + fi + fi + + # Determine the type of output + case $output in + "") + $echo "$modename: you must specify an output file" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + *.$libext) linkmode=oldlib ;; + *.lo | *.$objext) linkmode=obj ;; + *.la) linkmode=lib ;; + *) linkmode=prog ;; # Anything else should be a program. + esac + + case $host in + *cygwin* | *mingw* | *pw32*) + # don't eliminate duplcations in $postdeps and $predeps + duplicate_compiler_generated_deps=yes + ;; + *) + duplicate_compiler_generated_deps=$duplicate_deps + ;; + esac + specialdeplibs= + + libs= + # Find all interdependent deplibs by searching for libraries + # that are linked more than once (e.g. -la -lb -la) + for deplib in $deplibs; do + if test "X$duplicate_deps" = "Xyes" ; then + case "$libs " in + *" $deplib "*) specialdeplibs="$specialdeplibs $deplib" ;; + esac + fi + libs="$libs $deplib" + done + + if test "$linkmode" = lib; then + libs="$predeps $libs $compiler_lib_search_path $postdeps" + + # Compute libraries that are listed more than once in $predeps + # $postdeps and mark them as special (i.e., whose duplicates are + # not to be eliminated). + pre_post_deps= + if test "X$duplicate_compiler_generated_deps" = "Xyes" ; then + for pre_post_dep in $predeps $postdeps; do + case "$pre_post_deps " in + *" $pre_post_dep "*) specialdeplibs="$specialdeplibs $pre_post_deps" ;; + esac + pre_post_deps="$pre_post_deps $pre_post_dep" + done + fi + pre_post_deps= + fi + + deplibs= + newdependency_libs= + newlib_search_path= + need_relink=no # whether we're linking any uninstalled libtool libraries + notinst_deplibs= # not-installed libtool libraries + notinst_path= # paths that contain not-installed libtool libraries + case $linkmode in + lib) + passes="conv link" + for file in $dlfiles $dlprefiles; do + case $file in + *.la) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: libraries can \`-dlopen' only libtool libraries: $file" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + done + ;; + prog) + compile_deplibs= + finalize_deplibs= + alldeplibs=no + newdlfiles= + newdlprefiles= + passes="conv scan dlopen dlpreopen link" + ;; + *) passes="conv" + ;; + esac + for pass in $passes; do + if test "$linkmode,$pass" = "lib,link" || + test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,scan"; then + libs="$deplibs" + deplibs= + fi + if test "$linkmode" = prog; then + case $pass in + dlopen) libs="$dlfiles" ;; + dlpreopen) libs="$dlprefiles" ;; + link) libs="$deplibs %DEPLIBS% $dependency_libs" ;; + esac + fi + if test "$pass" = dlopen; then + # Collect dlpreopened libraries + save_deplibs="$deplibs" + deplibs= + fi + for deplib in $libs; do + lib= + found=no + case $deplib in + -mt|-mthreads|-kthread|-Kthread|-pthread|-pthreads|--thread-safe) + if test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,link"; then + compile_deplibs="$deplib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$deplib $finalize_deplibs" + else + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + fi + continue + ;; + -l*) + if test "$linkmode" != lib && test "$linkmode" != prog; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-l' is ignored for archives/objects" 1>&2 + continue + fi + if test "$pass" = conv; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + continue + fi + name=`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's/^-l//'` + for searchdir in $newlib_search_path $lib_search_path $sys_lib_search_path $shlib_search_path; do + for search_ext in .la $shrext .so .a; do + # Search the libtool library + lib="$searchdir/lib${name}${search_ext}" + if test -f "$lib"; then + if test "$search_ext" = ".la"; then + found=yes + else + found=no + fi + break 2 + fi + done + done + if test "$found" != yes; then + # deplib doesn't seem to be a libtool library + if test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,link"; then + compile_deplibs="$deplib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$deplib $finalize_deplibs" + else + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + test "$linkmode" = lib && newdependency_libs="$deplib $newdependency_libs" + fi + continue + else # deplib is a libtool library + # If $allow_libtool_libs_with_static_runtimes && $deplib is a stdlib, + # We need to do some special things here, and not later. + if test "X$allow_libtool_libs_with_static_runtimes" = "Xyes" ; then + case " $predeps $postdeps " in + *" $deplib "*) + if (${SED} -e '2q' $lib | + grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + library_names= + old_library= + case $lib in + */* | *\\*) . $lib ;; + *) . ./$lib ;; + esac + for l in $old_library $library_names; do + ll="$l" + done + if test "X$ll" = "X$old_library" ; then # only static version available + found=no + ladir=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$ladir" = "X$lib" && ladir="." + lib=$ladir/$old_library + if test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,link"; then + compile_deplibs="$deplib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$deplib $finalize_deplibs" + else + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + test "$linkmode" = lib && newdependency_libs="$deplib $newdependency_libs" + fi + continue + fi + fi + ;; + *) ;; + esac + fi + fi + ;; # -l + -L*) + case $linkmode in + lib) + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + test "$pass" = conv && continue + newdependency_libs="$deplib $newdependency_libs" + newlib_search_path="$newlib_search_path "`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's/^-L//'` + ;; + prog) + if test "$pass" = conv; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + continue + fi + if test "$pass" = scan; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + newlib_search_path="$newlib_search_path "`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's/^-L//'` + else + compile_deplibs="$deplib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$deplib $finalize_deplibs" + fi + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-L' is ignored for archives/objects" 1>&2 + ;; + esac # linkmode + continue + ;; # -L + -R*) + if test "$pass" = link; then + dir=`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's/^-R//'` + # Make sure the xrpath contains only unique directories. + case "$xrpath " in + *" $dir "*) ;; + *) xrpath="$xrpath $dir" ;; + esac + fi + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + continue + ;; + *.la) lib="$deplib" ;; + *.$libext) + if test "$pass" = conv; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + continue + fi + case $linkmode in + lib) + if test "$deplibs_check_method" != pass_all; then + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: Trying to link with static lib archive $deplib." + $echo "*** I have the capability to make that library automatically link in when" + $echo "*** you link to this library. But I can only do this if you have a" + $echo "*** shared version of the library, which you do not appear to have" + $echo "*** because the file extensions .$libext of this argument makes me believe" + $echo "*** that it is just a static archive that I should not used here." + else + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: Linking the shared library $output against the" + $echo "*** static library $deplib is not portable!" + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + fi + continue + ;; + prog) + if test "$pass" != link; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + else + compile_deplibs="$deplib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$deplib $finalize_deplibs" + fi + continue + ;; + esac # linkmode + ;; # *.$libext + *.lo | *.$objext) + if test "$pass" = conv; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + elif test "$linkmode" = prog; then + if test "$pass" = dlpreopen || test "$dlopen_support" != yes || test "$build_libtool_libs" = no; then + # If there is no dlopen support or we're linking statically, + # we need to preload. + newdlprefiles="$newdlprefiles $deplib" + compile_deplibs="$deplib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$deplib $finalize_deplibs" + else + newdlfiles="$newdlfiles $deplib" + fi + fi + continue + ;; + %DEPLIBS%) + alldeplibs=yes + continue + ;; + esac # case $deplib + if test "$found" = yes || test -f "$lib"; then : + else + $echo "$modename: cannot find the library \`$lib'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Check to see that this really is a libtool archive. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $lib | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + $echo "$modename: \`$lib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + ladir=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$ladir" = "X$lib" && ladir="." + + dlname= + dlopen= + dlpreopen= + libdir= + library_names= + old_library= + # If the library was installed with an old release of libtool, + # it will not redefine variables installed, or shouldnotlink + installed=yes + shouldnotlink=no + + # Read the .la file + case $lib in + */* | *\\*) . $lib ;; + *) . ./$lib ;; + esac + + if test "$linkmode,$pass" = "lib,link" || + test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,scan" || + { test "$linkmode" != prog && test "$linkmode" != lib; }; then + test -n "$dlopen" && dlfiles="$dlfiles $dlopen" + test -n "$dlpreopen" && dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $dlpreopen" + fi + + if test "$pass" = conv; then + # Only check for convenience libraries + deplibs="$lib $deplibs" + if test -z "$libdir"; then + if test -z "$old_library"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot find name of link library for \`$lib'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + # It is a libtool convenience library, so add in its objects. + convenience="$convenience $ladir/$objdir/$old_library" + old_convenience="$old_convenience $ladir/$objdir/$old_library" + tmp_libs= + for deplib in $dependency_libs; do + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + if test "X$duplicate_deps" = "Xyes" ; then + case "$tmp_libs " in + *" $deplib "*) specialdeplibs="$specialdeplibs $deplib" ;; + esac + fi + tmp_libs="$tmp_libs $deplib" + done + elif test "$linkmode" != prog && test "$linkmode" != lib; then + $echo "$modename: \`$lib' is not a convenience library" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + continue + fi # $pass = conv + + + # Get the name of the library we link against. + linklib= + for l in $old_library $library_names; do + linklib="$l" + done + if test -z "$linklib"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot find name of link library for \`$lib'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # This library was specified with -dlopen. + if test "$pass" = dlopen; then + if test -z "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot -dlopen a convenience library: \`$lib'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + if test -z "$dlname" || test "$dlopen_support" != yes || test "$build_libtool_libs" = no; then + # If there is no dlname, no dlopen support or we're linking + # statically, we need to preload. We also need to preload any + # dependent libraries so libltdl's deplib preloader doesn't + # bomb out in the load deplibs phase. + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $lib $dependency_libs" + else + newdlfiles="$newdlfiles $lib" + fi + continue + fi # $pass = dlopen + + # We need an absolute path. + case $ladir in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) abs_ladir="$ladir" ;; + *) + abs_ladir=`cd "$ladir" && pwd` + if test -z "$abs_ladir"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot determine absolute directory name of \`$ladir'" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: passing it literally to the linker, although it might fail" 1>&2 + abs_ladir="$ladir" + fi + ;; + esac + laname=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + # Find the relevant object directory and library name. + if test "X$installed" = Xyes; then + if test ! -f "$libdir/$linklib" && test -f "$abs_ladir/$linklib"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: library \`$lib' was moved." 1>&2 + dir="$ladir" + absdir="$abs_ladir" + libdir="$abs_ladir" + else + dir="$libdir" + absdir="$libdir" + fi + else + dir="$ladir/$objdir" + absdir="$abs_ladir/$objdir" + # Remove this search path later + notinst_path="$notinst_path $abs_ladir" + fi # $installed = yes + name=`$echo "X$laname" | $Xsed -e 's/\.la$//' -e 's/^lib//'` + + # This library was specified with -dlpreopen. + if test "$pass" = dlpreopen; then + if test -z "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot -dlpreopen a convenience library: \`$lib'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + # Prefer using a static library (so that no silly _DYNAMIC symbols + # are required to link). + if test -n "$old_library"; then + newdlprefiles="$newdlprefiles $dir/$old_library" + # Otherwise, use the dlname, so that lt_dlopen finds it. + elif test -n "$dlname"; then + newdlprefiles="$newdlprefiles $dir/$dlname" + else + newdlprefiles="$newdlprefiles $dir/$linklib" + fi + fi # $pass = dlpreopen + + if test -z "$libdir"; then + # Link the convenience library + if test "$linkmode" = lib; then + deplibs="$dir/$old_library $deplibs" + elif test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,link"; then + compile_deplibs="$dir/$old_library $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$dir/$old_library $finalize_deplibs" + else + deplibs="$lib $deplibs" # used for prog,scan pass + fi + continue + fi + + + if test "$linkmode" = prog && test "$pass" != link; then + newlib_search_path="$newlib_search_path $ladir" + deplibs="$lib $deplibs" + + linkalldeplibs=no + if test "$link_all_deplibs" != no || test -z "$library_names" || + test "$build_libtool_libs" = no; then + linkalldeplibs=yes + fi + + tmp_libs= + for deplib in $dependency_libs; do + case $deplib in + -L*) newlib_search_path="$newlib_search_path "`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's/^-L//'`;; ### testsuite: skip nested quoting test + esac + # Need to link against all dependency_libs? + if test "$linkalldeplibs" = yes; then + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + else + # Need to hardcode shared library paths + # or/and link against static libraries + newdependency_libs="$deplib $newdependency_libs" + fi + if test "X$duplicate_deps" = "Xyes" ; then + case "$tmp_libs " in + *" $deplib "*) specialdeplibs="$specialdeplibs $deplib" ;; + esac + fi + tmp_libs="$tmp_libs $deplib" + done # for deplib + continue + fi # $linkmode = prog... + + if test "$linkmode,$pass" = "prog,link"; then + if test -n "$library_names" && + { test "$prefer_static_libs" = no || test -z "$old_library"; }; then + # We need to hardcode the library path + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + # Make sure the rpath contains only unique directories. + case "$temp_rpath " in + *" $dir "*) ;; + *" $absdir "*) ;; + *) temp_rpath="$temp_rpath $dir" ;; + esac + fi + + # Hardcode the library path. + # Skip directories that are in the system default run-time + # search path. + case " $sys_lib_dlsearch_path " in + *" $absdir "*) ;; + *) + case "$compile_rpath " in + *" $absdir "*) ;; + *) compile_rpath="$compile_rpath $absdir" + esac + ;; + esac + case " $sys_lib_dlsearch_path " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) + case "$finalize_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) finalize_rpath="$finalize_rpath $libdir" + esac + ;; + esac + fi # $linkmode,$pass = prog,link... + + if test "$alldeplibs" = yes && + { test "$deplibs_check_method" = pass_all || + { test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes && + test -n "$library_names"; }; }; then + # We only need to search for static libraries + continue + fi + fi + + link_static=no # Whether the deplib will be linked statically + if test -n "$library_names" && + { test "$prefer_static_libs" = no || test -z "$old_library"; }; then + if test "$installed" = no; then + notinst_deplibs="$notinst_deplibs $lib" + need_relink=yes + fi + # This is a shared library + + # Warn about portability, can't link against -module's on some systems (darwin) + if test "$shouldnotlink" = yes && test "$pass" = link ; then + $echo + if test "$linkmode" = prog; then + $echo "*** Warning: Linking the executable $output against the loadable module" + else + $echo "*** Warning: Linking the shared library $output against the loadable module" + fi + $echo "*** $linklib is not portable!" + fi + if test "$linkmode" = lib && + test "$hardcode_into_libs" = yes; then + # Hardcode the library path. + # Skip directories that are in the system default run-time + # search path. + case " $sys_lib_dlsearch_path " in + *" $absdir "*) ;; + *) + case "$compile_rpath " in + *" $absdir "*) ;; + *) compile_rpath="$compile_rpath $absdir" + esac + ;; + esac + case " $sys_lib_dlsearch_path " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) + case "$finalize_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) finalize_rpath="$finalize_rpath $libdir" + esac + ;; + esac + fi + + if test -n "$old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds"; then + # figure out the soname + set dummy $library_names + realname="$2" + shift; shift + libname=`eval \\$echo \"$libname_spec\"` + # use dlname if we got it. it's perfectly good, no? + if test -n "$dlname"; then + soname="$dlname" + elif test -n "$soname_spec"; then + # bleh windows + case $host in + *cygwin* | mingw*) + major=`expr $current - $age` + versuffix="-$major" + ;; + esac + eval soname=\"$soname_spec\" + else + soname="$realname" + fi + + # Make a new name for the extract_expsyms_cmds to use + soroot="$soname" + soname=`$echo $soroot | ${SED} -e 's/^.*\///'` + newlib="libimp-`$echo $soname | ${SED} 's/^lib//;s/\.dll$//'`.a" + + # If the library has no export list, then create one now + if test -f "$output_objdir/$soname-def"; then : + else + $show "extracting exported symbol list from \`$soname'" + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + cmds=$extract_expsyms_cmds + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + # Create $newlib + if test -f "$output_objdir/$newlib"; then :; else + $show "generating import library for \`$soname'" + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + cmds=$old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + # make sure the library variables are pointing to the new library + dir=$output_objdir + linklib=$newlib + fi # test -n "$old_archive_from_expsyms_cmds" + + if test "$linkmode" = prog || test "$mode" != relink; then + add_shlibpath= + add_dir= + add= + lib_linked=yes + case $hardcode_action in + immediate | unsupported) + if test "$hardcode_direct" = no; then + add="$dir/$linklib" + case $host in + *-*-sco3.2v5* ) add_dir="-L$dir" ;; + *-*-darwin* ) + # if the lib is a module then we can not link against it, someone + # is ignoring the new warnings I added + if /usr/bin/file -L $add 2> /dev/null | grep "bundle" >/dev/null ; then + $echo "** Warning, lib $linklib is a module, not a shared library" + if test -z "$old_library" ; then + $echo + $echo "** And there doesn't seem to be a static archive available" + $echo "** The link will probably fail, sorry" + else + add="$dir/$old_library" + fi + fi + esac + elif test "$hardcode_minus_L" = no; then + case $host in + *-*-sunos*) add_shlibpath="$dir" ;; + esac + add_dir="-L$dir" + add="-l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = no; then + add_shlibpath="$dir" + add="-l$name" + else + lib_linked=no + fi + ;; + relink) + if test "$hardcode_direct" = yes; then + add="$dir/$linklib" + elif test "$hardcode_minus_L" = yes; then + add_dir="-L$dir" + # Try looking first in the location we're being installed to. + if test -n "$inst_prefix_dir"; then + case "$libdir" in + [\\/]*) + add_dir="$add_dir -L$inst_prefix_dir$libdir" + ;; + esac + fi + add="-l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = yes; then + add_shlibpath="$dir" + add="-l$name" + else + lib_linked=no + fi + ;; + *) lib_linked=no ;; + esac + + if test "$lib_linked" != yes; then + $echo "$modename: configuration error: unsupported hardcode properties" + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$add_shlibpath"; then + case :$compile_shlibpath: in + *":$add_shlibpath:"*) ;; + *) compile_shlibpath="$compile_shlibpath$add_shlibpath:" ;; + esac + fi + if test "$linkmode" = prog; then + test -n "$add_dir" && compile_deplibs="$add_dir $compile_deplibs" + test -n "$add" && compile_deplibs="$add $compile_deplibs" + else + test -n "$add_dir" && deplibs="$add_dir $deplibs" + test -n "$add" && deplibs="$add $deplibs" + if test "$hardcode_direct" != yes && \ + test "$hardcode_minus_L" != yes && \ + test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = yes; then + case :$finalize_shlibpath: in + *":$libdir:"*) ;; + *) finalize_shlibpath="$finalize_shlibpath$libdir:" ;; + esac + fi + fi + fi + + if test "$linkmode" = prog || test "$mode" = relink; then + add_shlibpath= + add_dir= + add= + # Finalize command for both is simple: just hardcode it. + if test "$hardcode_direct" = yes; then + add="$libdir/$linklib" + elif test "$hardcode_minus_L" = yes; then + add_dir="-L$libdir" + add="-l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = yes; then + case :$finalize_shlibpath: in + *":$libdir:"*) ;; + *) finalize_shlibpath="$finalize_shlibpath$libdir:" ;; + esac + add="-l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_automatic" = yes; then + if test -n "$inst_prefix_dir" && test -f "$inst_prefix_dir$libdir/$linklib" ; then + add="$inst_prefix_dir$libdir/$linklib" + else + add="$libdir/$linklib" + fi + else + # We cannot seem to hardcode it, guess we'll fake it. + add_dir="-L$libdir" + # Try looking first in the location we're being installed to. + if test -n "$inst_prefix_dir"; then + case "$libdir" in + [\\/]*) + add_dir="$add_dir -L$inst_prefix_dir$libdir" + ;; + esac + fi + add="-l$name" + fi + + if test "$linkmode" = prog; then + test -n "$add_dir" && finalize_deplibs="$add_dir $finalize_deplibs" + test -n "$add" && finalize_deplibs="$add $finalize_deplibs" + else + test -n "$add_dir" && deplibs="$add_dir $deplibs" + test -n "$add" && deplibs="$add $deplibs" + fi + fi + elif test "$linkmode" = prog; then + # Here we assume that one of hardcode_direct or hardcode_minus_L + # is not unsupported. This is valid on all known static and + # shared platforms. + if test "$hardcode_direct" != unsupported; then + test -n "$old_library" && linklib="$old_library" + compile_deplibs="$dir/$linklib $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="$dir/$linklib $finalize_deplibs" + else + compile_deplibs="-l$name -L$dir $compile_deplibs" + finalize_deplibs="-l$name -L$dir $finalize_deplibs" + fi + elif test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + # Not a shared library + if test "$deplibs_check_method" != pass_all; then + # We're trying link a shared library against a static one + # but the system doesn't support it. + + # Just print a warning and add the library to dependency_libs so + # that the program can be linked against the static library. + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: This system can not link to static lib archive $lib." + $echo "*** I have the capability to make that library automatically link in when" + $echo "*** you link to this library. But I can only do this if you have a" + $echo "*** shared version of the library, which you do not appear to have." + if test "$module" = yes; then + $echo "*** But as you try to build a module library, libtool will still create " + $echo "*** a static module, that should work as long as the dlopening application" + $echo "*** is linked with the -dlopen flag to resolve symbols at runtime." + if test -z "$global_symbol_pipe"; then + $echo + $echo "*** However, this would only work if libtool was able to extract symbol" + $echo "*** lists from a program, using \`nm' or equivalent, but libtool could" + $echo "*** not find such a program. So, this module is probably useless." + $echo "*** \`nm' from GNU binutils and a full rebuild may help." + fi + if test "$build_old_libs" = no; then + build_libtool_libs=module + build_old_libs=yes + else + build_libtool_libs=no + fi + fi + else + convenience="$convenience $dir/$old_library" + old_convenience="$old_convenience $dir/$old_library" + deplibs="$dir/$old_library $deplibs" + link_static=yes + fi + fi # link shared/static library? + + if test "$linkmode" = lib; then + if test -n "$dependency_libs" && + { test "$hardcode_into_libs" != yes || test "$build_old_libs" = yes || + test "$link_static" = yes; }; then + # Extract -R from dependency_libs + temp_deplibs= + for libdir in $dependency_libs; do + case $libdir in + -R*) temp_xrpath=`$echo "X$libdir" | $Xsed -e 's/^-R//'` + case " $xrpath " in + *" $temp_xrpath "*) ;; + *) xrpath="$xrpath $temp_xrpath";; + esac;; + *) temp_deplibs="$temp_deplibs $libdir";; + esac + done + dependency_libs="$temp_deplibs" + fi + + newlib_search_path="$newlib_search_path $absdir" + # Link against this library + test "$link_static" = no && newdependency_libs="$abs_ladir/$laname $newdependency_libs" + # ... and its dependency_libs + tmp_libs= + for deplib in $dependency_libs; do + newdependency_libs="$deplib $newdependency_libs" + if test "X$duplicate_deps" = "Xyes" ; then + case "$tmp_libs " in + *" $deplib "*) specialdeplibs="$specialdeplibs $deplib" ;; + esac + fi + tmp_libs="$tmp_libs $deplib" + done + + if test "$link_all_deplibs" != no; then + # Add the search paths of all dependency libraries + for deplib in $dependency_libs; do + case $deplib in + -L*) path="$deplib" ;; + *.la) + dir=`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$dir" = "X$deplib" && dir="." + # We need an absolute path. + case $dir in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) absdir="$dir" ;; + *) + absdir=`cd "$dir" && pwd` + if test -z "$absdir"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot determine absolute directory name of \`$dir'" 1>&2 + absdir="$dir" + fi + ;; + esac + if grep "^installed=no" $deplib > /dev/null; then + path="$absdir/$objdir" + else + eval libdir=`${SED} -n -e 's/^libdir=\(.*\)$/\1/p' $deplib` + if test -z "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$deplib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + if test "$absdir" != "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`$deplib' seems to be moved" 1>&2 + fi + path="$absdir" + fi + depdepl= + case $host in + *-*-darwin*) + # we do not want to link against static libs, but need to link against shared + eval deplibrary_names=`${SED} -n -e 's/^library_names=\(.*\)$/\1/p' $deplib` + if test -n "$deplibrary_names" ; then + for tmp in $deplibrary_names ; do + depdepl=$tmp + done + if test -f "$path/$depdepl" ; then + depdepl="$path/$depdepl" + fi + # do not add paths which are already there + case " $newlib_search_path " in + *" $path "*) ;; + *) newlib_search_path="$newlib_search_path $path";; + esac + fi + path="" + ;; + *) + path="-L$path" + ;; + esac + + ;; + -l*) + case $host in + *-*-darwin*) + # Again, we only want to link against shared libraries + eval tmp_libs=`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e "s,^\-l,,"` + for tmp in $newlib_search_path ; do + if test -f "$tmp/lib$tmp_libs.dylib" ; then + eval depdepl="$tmp/lib$tmp_libs.dylib" + break + fi + done + path="" + ;; + *) continue ;; + esac + ;; + *) continue ;; + esac + case " $deplibs " in + *" $depdepl "*) ;; + *) deplibs="$deplibs $depdepl" ;; + esac + case " $deplibs " in + *" $path "*) ;; + *) deplibs="$deplibs $path" ;; + esac + done + fi # link_all_deplibs != no + fi # linkmode = lib + done # for deplib in $libs + dependency_libs="$newdependency_libs" + if test "$pass" = dlpreopen; then + # Link the dlpreopened libraries before other libraries + for deplib in $save_deplibs; do + deplibs="$deplib $deplibs" + done + fi + if test "$pass" != dlopen; then + if test "$pass" != conv; then + # Make sure lib_search_path contains only unique directories. + lib_search_path= + for dir in $newlib_search_path; do + case "$lib_search_path " in + *" $dir "*) ;; + *) lib_search_path="$lib_search_path $dir" ;; + esac + done + newlib_search_path= + fi + + if test "$linkmode,$pass" != "prog,link"; then + vars="deplibs" + else + vars="compile_deplibs finalize_deplibs" + fi + for var in $vars dependency_libs; do + # Add libraries to $var in reverse order + eval tmp_libs=\"\$$var\" + new_libs= + for deplib in $tmp_libs; do + # FIXME: Pedantically, this is the right thing to do, so + # that some nasty dependency loop isn't accidentally + # broken: + #new_libs="$deplib $new_libs" + # Pragmatically, this seems to cause very few problems in + # practice: + case $deplib in + -L*) new_libs="$deplib $new_libs" ;; + -R*) ;; + *) + # And here is the reason: when a library appears more + # than once as an explicit dependence of a library, or + # is implicitly linked in more than once by the + # compiler, it is considered special, and multiple + # occurrences thereof are not removed. Compare this + # with having the same library being listed as a + # dependency of multiple other libraries: in this case, + # we know (pedantically, we assume) the library does not + # need to be listed more than once, so we keep only the + # last copy. This is not always right, but it is rare + # enough that we require users that really mean to play + # such unportable linking tricks to link the library + # using -Wl,-lname, so that libtool does not consider it + # for duplicate removal. + case " $specialdeplibs " in + *" $deplib "*) new_libs="$deplib $new_libs" ;; + *) + case " $new_libs " in + *" $deplib "*) ;; + *) new_libs="$deplib $new_libs" ;; + esac + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + done + tmp_libs= + for deplib in $new_libs; do + case $deplib in + -L*) + case " $tmp_libs " in + *" $deplib "*) ;; + *) tmp_libs="$tmp_libs $deplib" ;; + esac + ;; + *) tmp_libs="$tmp_libs $deplib" ;; + esac + done + eval $var=\"$tmp_libs\" + done # for var + fi + # Last step: remove runtime libs from dependency_libs (they stay in deplibs) + tmp_libs= + for i in $dependency_libs ; do + case " $predeps $postdeps $compiler_lib_search_path " in + *" $i "*) + i="" + ;; + esac + if test -n "$i" ; then + tmp_libs="$tmp_libs $i" + fi + done + dependency_libs=$tmp_libs + done # for pass + if test "$linkmode" = prog; then + dlfiles="$newdlfiles" + dlprefiles="$newdlprefiles" + fi + + case $linkmode in + oldlib) + if test -n "$deplibs"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-l' and \`-L' are ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles" || test "$dlself" != no; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$rpath"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-rpath' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$xrpath"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-R' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info/-version-number' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$export_symbols" || test -n "$export_symbols_regex"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-export-symbols' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + # Now set the variables for building old libraries. + build_libtool_libs=no + oldlibs="$output" + objs="$objs$old_deplibs" + ;; + + lib) + # Make sure we only generate libraries of the form `libNAME.la'. + case $outputname in + lib*) + name=`$echo "X$outputname" | $Xsed -e 's/\.la$//' -e 's/^lib//'` + eval shared_ext=\"$shrext\" + eval libname=\"$libname_spec\" + ;; + *) + if test "$module" = no; then + $echo "$modename: libtool library \`$output' must begin with \`lib'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + if test "$need_lib_prefix" != no; then + # Add the "lib" prefix for modules if required + name=`$echo "X$outputname" | $Xsed -e 's/\.la$//'` + eval shared_ext=\"$shrext\" + eval libname=\"$libname_spec\" + else + libname=`$echo "X$outputname" | $Xsed -e 's/\.la$//'` + fi + ;; + esac + + if test -n "$objs"; then + if test "$deplibs_check_method" != pass_all; then + $echo "$modename: cannot build libtool library \`$output' from non-libtool objects on this host:$objs" 2>&1 + exit 1 + else + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: Linking the shared library $output against the non-libtool" + $echo "*** objects $objs is not portable!" + libobjs="$libobjs $objs" + fi + fi + + if test "$dlself" != no; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen self' is ignored for libtool libraries" 1>&2 + fi + + set dummy $rpath + if test "$#" -gt 2; then + $echo "$modename: warning: ignoring multiple \`-rpath's for a libtool library" 1>&2 + fi + install_libdir="$2" + + oldlibs= + if test -z "$rpath"; then + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + # Building a libtool convenience library. + # Some compilers have problems with a `.al' extension so + # convenience libraries should have the same extension an + # archive normally would. + oldlibs="$output_objdir/$libname.$libext $oldlibs" + build_libtool_libs=convenience + build_old_libs=yes + fi + + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info/-version-number' is ignored for convenience libraries" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for convenience libraries" 1>&2 + fi + else + + # Parse the version information argument. + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=':' + set dummy $vinfo 0 0 0 + IFS="$save_ifs" + + if test -n "$8"; then + $echo "$modename: too many parameters to \`-version-info'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # convert absolute version numbers to libtool ages + # this retains compatibility with .la files and attempts + # to make the code below a bit more comprehensible + + case $vinfo_number in + yes) + number_major="$2" + number_minor="$3" + number_revision="$4" + # + # There are really only two kinds -- those that + # use the current revision as the major version + # and those that subtract age and use age as + # a minor version. But, then there is irix + # which has an extra 1 added just for fun + # + case $version_type in + darwin|linux|osf|windows) + current=`expr $number_major + $number_minor` + age="$number_minor" + revision="$number_revision" + ;; + freebsd-aout|freebsd-elf|sunos) + current="$number_major" + revision="$number_minor" + age="0" + ;; + irix|nonstopux) + current=`expr $number_major + $number_minor - 1` + age="$number_minor" + revision="$number_minor" + ;; + esac + ;; + no) + current="$2" + revision="$3" + age="$4" + ;; + esac + + # Check that each of the things are valid numbers. + case $current in + 0 | [1-9] | [1-9][0-9] | [1-9][0-9][0-9]) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: CURRENT \`$current' is not a nonnegative integer" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + case $revision in + 0 | [1-9] | [1-9][0-9] | [1-9][0-9][0-9]) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: REVISION \`$revision' is not a nonnegative integer" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + case $age in + 0 | [1-9] | [1-9][0-9] | [1-9][0-9][0-9]) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: AGE \`$age' is not a nonnegative integer" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + if test "$age" -gt "$current"; then + $echo "$modename: AGE \`$age' is greater than the current interface number \`$current'" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Calculate the version variables. + major= + versuffix= + verstring= + case $version_type in + none) ;; + + darwin) + # Like Linux, but with the current version available in + # verstring for coding it into the library header + major=.`expr $current - $age` + versuffix="$major.$age.$revision" + # Darwin ld doesn't like 0 for these options... + minor_current=`expr $current + 1` + verstring="-compatibility_version $minor_current -current_version $minor_current.$revision" + ;; + + freebsd-aout) + major=".$current" + versuffix=".$current.$revision"; + ;; + + freebsd-elf) + major=".$current" + versuffix=".$current"; + ;; + + irix | nonstopux) + major=`expr $current - $age + 1` + + case $version_type in + nonstopux) verstring_prefix=nonstopux ;; + *) verstring_prefix=sgi ;; + esac + verstring="$verstring_prefix$major.$revision" + + # Add in all the interfaces that we are compatible with. + loop=$revision + while test "$loop" -ne 0; do + iface=`expr $revision - $loop` + loop=`expr $loop - 1` + verstring="$verstring_prefix$major.$iface:$verstring" + done + + # Before this point, $major must not contain `.'. + major=.$major + versuffix="$major.$revision" + ;; + + linux) + major=.`expr $current - $age` + versuffix="$major.$age.$revision" + ;; + + osf) + major=.`expr $current - $age` + versuffix=".$current.$age.$revision" + verstring="$current.$age.$revision" + + # Add in all the interfaces that we are compatible with. + loop=$age + while test "$loop" -ne 0; do + iface=`expr $current - $loop` + loop=`expr $loop - 1` + verstring="$verstring:${iface}.0" + done + + # Make executables depend on our current version. + verstring="$verstring:${current}.0" + ;; + + sunos) + major=".$current" + versuffix=".$current.$revision" + ;; + + windows) + # Use '-' rather than '.', since we only want one + # extension on DOS 8.3 filesystems. + major=`expr $current - $age` + versuffix="-$major" + ;; + + *) + $echo "$modename: unknown library version type \`$version_type'" 1>&2 + $echo "Fatal configuration error. See the $PACKAGE docs for more information." 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + # Clear the version info if we defaulted, and they specified a release. + if test -z "$vinfo" && test -n "$release"; then + major= + case $version_type in + darwin) + # we can't check for "0.0" in archive_cmds due to quoting + # problems, so we reset it completely + verstring= + ;; + *) + verstring="0.0" + ;; + esac + if test "$need_version" = no; then + versuffix= + else + versuffix=".0.0" + fi + fi + + # Remove version info from name if versioning should be avoided + if test "$avoid_version" = yes && test "$need_version" = no; then + major= + versuffix= + verstring="" + fi + + # Check to see if the archive will have undefined symbols. + if test "$allow_undefined" = yes; then + if test "$allow_undefined_flag" = unsupported; then + $echo "$modename: warning: undefined symbols not allowed in $host shared libraries" 1>&2 + build_libtool_libs=no + build_old_libs=yes + fi + else + # Don't allow undefined symbols. + allow_undefined_flag="$no_undefined_flag" + fi + fi + + if test "$mode" != relink; then + # Remove our outputs, but don't remove object files since they + # may have been created when compiling PIC objects. + removelist= + tempremovelist=`$echo "$output_objdir/*"` + for p in $tempremovelist; do + case $p in + *.$objext) + ;; + $output_objdir/$outputname | $output_objdir/$libname.* | $output_objdir/${libname}${release}.*) + if echo $p | $EGREP -e "$precious_files_regex" >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + continue + fi + removelist="$removelist $p" + ;; + *) ;; + esac + done + if test -n "$removelist"; then + $show "${rm}r $removelist" + $run ${rm}r $removelist + fi + fi + + # Now set the variables for building old libraries. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes && test "$build_libtool_libs" != convenience ; then + oldlibs="$oldlibs $output_objdir/$libname.$libext" + + # Transform .lo files to .o files. + oldobjs="$objs "`$echo "X$libobjs" | $SP2NL | $Xsed -e '/\.'${libext}'$/d' -e "$lo2o" | $NL2SP` + fi + + # Eliminate all temporary directories. + for path in $notinst_path; do + lib_search_path=`$echo "$lib_search_path " | ${SED} -e 's% $path % %g'` + deplibs=`$echo "$deplibs " | ${SED} -e 's% -L$path % %g'` + dependency_libs=`$echo "$dependency_libs " | ${SED} -e 's% -L$path % %g'` + done + + if test -n "$xrpath"; then + # If the user specified any rpath flags, then add them. + temp_xrpath= + for libdir in $xrpath; do + temp_xrpath="$temp_xrpath -R$libdir" + case "$finalize_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) finalize_rpath="$finalize_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + done + if test "$hardcode_into_libs" != yes || test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + dependency_libs="$temp_xrpath $dependency_libs" + fi + fi + + # Make sure dlfiles contains only unique files that won't be dlpreopened + old_dlfiles="$dlfiles" + dlfiles= + for lib in $old_dlfiles; do + case " $dlprefiles $dlfiles " in + *" $lib "*) ;; + *) dlfiles="$dlfiles $lib" ;; + esac + done + + # Make sure dlprefiles contains only unique files + old_dlprefiles="$dlprefiles" + dlprefiles= + for lib in $old_dlprefiles; do + case "$dlprefiles " in + *" $lib "*) ;; + *) dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $lib" ;; + esac + done + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + if test -n "$rpath"; then + case $host in + *-*-cygwin* | *-*-mingw* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-os2* | *-*-beos*) + # these systems don't actually have a c library (as such)! + ;; + *-*-rhapsody* | *-*-darwin1.[012]) + # Rhapsody C library is in the System framework + deplibs="$deplibs -framework System" + ;; + *-*-netbsd*) + # Don't link with libc until the a.out ld.so is fixed. + ;; + *-*-openbsd* | *-*-freebsd*) + # Do not include libc due to us having libc/libc_r. + test "X$arg" = "X-lc" && continue + ;; + *) + # Add libc to deplibs on all other systems if necessary. + if test "$build_libtool_need_lc" = "yes"; then + deplibs="$deplibs -lc" + fi + ;; + esac + fi + + # Transform deplibs into only deplibs that can be linked in shared. + name_save=$name + libname_save=$libname + release_save=$release + versuffix_save=$versuffix + major_save=$major + # I'm not sure if I'm treating the release correctly. I think + # release should show up in the -l (ie -lgmp5) so we don't want to + # add it in twice. Is that correct? + release="" + versuffix="" + major="" + newdeplibs= + droppeddeps=no + case $deplibs_check_method in + pass_all) + # Don't check for shared/static. Everything works. + # This might be a little naive. We might want to check + # whether the library exists or not. But this is on + # osf3 & osf4 and I'm not really sure... Just + # implementing what was already the behavior. + newdeplibs=$deplibs + ;; + test_compile) + # This code stresses the "libraries are programs" paradigm to its + # limits. Maybe even breaks it. We compile a program, linking it + # against the deplibs as a proxy for the library. Then we can check + # whether they linked in statically or dynamically with ldd. + $rm conftest.c + cat > conftest.c </dev/null` + for potent_lib in $potential_libs; do + # Follow soft links. + if ls -lLd "$potent_lib" 2>/dev/null \ + | grep " -> " >/dev/null; then + continue + fi + # The statement above tries to avoid entering an + # endless loop below, in case of cyclic links. + # We might still enter an endless loop, since a link + # loop can be closed while we follow links, + # but so what? + potlib="$potent_lib" + while test -h "$potlib" 2>/dev/null; do + potliblink=`ls -ld $potlib | ${SED} 's/.* -> //'` + case $potliblink in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) potlib="$potliblink";; + *) potlib=`$echo "X$potlib" | $Xsed -e 's,[^/]*$,,'`"$potliblink";; + esac + done + if eval $file_magic_cmd \"\$potlib\" 2>/dev/null \ + | ${SED} 10q \ + | $EGREP "$file_magic_regex" > /dev/null; then + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + a_deplib="" + break 2 + fi + done + done + fi + if test -n "$a_deplib" ; then + droppeddeps=yes + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: linker path does not have real file for library $a_deplib." + $echo "*** I have the capability to make that library automatically link in when" + $echo "*** you link to this library. But I can only do this if you have a" + $echo "*** shared version of the library, which you do not appear to have" + $echo "*** because I did check the linker path looking for a file starting" + if test -z "$potlib" ; then + $echo "*** with $libname but no candidates were found. (...for file magic test)" + else + $echo "*** with $libname and none of the candidates passed a file format test" + $echo "*** using a file magic. Last file checked: $potlib" + fi + fi + else + # Add a -L argument. + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + fi + done # Gone through all deplibs. + ;; + match_pattern*) + set dummy $deplibs_check_method + match_pattern_regex=`expr "$deplibs_check_method" : "$2 \(.*\)"` + for a_deplib in $deplibs; do + name="`expr $a_deplib : '-l\(.*\)'`" + # If $name is empty we are operating on a -L argument. + if test -n "$name" && test "$name" != "0"; then + if test "X$allow_libtool_libs_with_static_runtimes" = "Xyes" ; then + case " $predeps $postdeps " in + *" $a_deplib "*) + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + a_deplib="" + ;; + esac + fi + if test -n "$a_deplib" ; then + libname=`eval \\$echo \"$libname_spec\"` + for i in $lib_search_path $sys_lib_search_path $shlib_search_path; do + potential_libs=`ls $i/$libname[.-]* 2>/dev/null` + for potent_lib in $potential_libs; do + potlib="$potent_lib" # see symlink-check above in file_magic test + if eval $echo \"$potent_lib\" 2>/dev/null \ + | ${SED} 10q \ + | $EGREP "$match_pattern_regex" > /dev/null; then + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + a_deplib="" + break 2 + fi + done + done + fi + if test -n "$a_deplib" ; then + droppeddeps=yes + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: linker path does not have real file for library $a_deplib." + $echo "*** I have the capability to make that library automatically link in when" + $echo "*** you link to this library. But I can only do this if you have a" + $echo "*** shared version of the library, which you do not appear to have" + $echo "*** because I did check the linker path looking for a file starting" + if test -z "$potlib" ; then + $echo "*** with $libname but no candidates were found. (...for regex pattern test)" + else + $echo "*** with $libname and none of the candidates passed a file format test" + $echo "*** using a regex pattern. Last file checked: $potlib" + fi + fi + else + # Add a -L argument. + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + fi + done # Gone through all deplibs. + ;; + none | unknown | *) + newdeplibs="" + tmp_deplibs=`$echo "X $deplibs" | $Xsed -e 's/ -lc$//' \ + -e 's/ -[LR][^ ]*//g'` + if test "X$allow_libtool_libs_with_static_runtimes" = "Xyes" ; then + for i in $predeps $postdeps ; do + # can't use Xsed below, because $i might contain '/' + tmp_deplibs=`$echo "X $tmp_deplibs" | ${SED} -e "1s,^X,," -e "s,$i,,"` + done + fi + if $echo "X $tmp_deplibs" | $Xsed -e 's/[ ]//g' \ + | grep . >/dev/null; then + $echo + if test "X$deplibs_check_method" = "Xnone"; then + $echo "*** Warning: inter-library dependencies are not supported in this platform." + else + $echo "*** Warning: inter-library dependencies are not known to be supported." + fi + $echo "*** All declared inter-library dependencies are being dropped." + droppeddeps=yes + fi + ;; + esac + versuffix=$versuffix_save + major=$major_save + release=$release_save + libname=$libname_save + name=$name_save + + case $host in + *-*-rhapsody* | *-*-darwin1.[012]) + # On Rhapsody replace the C library is the System framework + newdeplibs=`$echo "X $newdeplibs" | $Xsed -e 's/ -lc / -framework System /'` + ;; + esac + + if test "$droppeddeps" = yes; then + if test "$module" = yes; then + $echo + $echo "*** Warning: libtool could not satisfy all declared inter-library" + $echo "*** dependencies of module $libname. Therefore, libtool will create" + $echo "*** a static module, that should work as long as the dlopening" + $echo "*** application is linked with the -dlopen flag." + if test -z "$global_symbol_pipe"; then + $echo + $echo "*** However, this would only work if libtool was able to extract symbol" + $echo "*** lists from a program, using \`nm' or equivalent, but libtool could" + $echo "*** not find such a program. So, this module is probably useless." + $echo "*** \`nm' from GNU binutils and a full rebuild may help." + fi + if test "$build_old_libs" = no; then + oldlibs="$output_objdir/$libname.$libext" + build_libtool_libs=module + build_old_libs=yes + else + build_libtool_libs=no + fi + else + $echo "*** The inter-library dependencies that have been dropped here will be" + $echo "*** automatically added whenever a program is linked with this library" + $echo "*** or is declared to -dlopen it." + + if test "$allow_undefined" = no; then + $echo + $echo "*** Since this library must not contain undefined symbols," + $echo "*** because either the platform does not support them or" + $echo "*** it was explicitly requested with -no-undefined," + $echo "*** libtool will only create a static version of it." + if test "$build_old_libs" = no; then + oldlibs="$output_objdir/$libname.$libext" + build_libtool_libs=module + build_old_libs=yes + else + build_libtool_libs=no + fi + fi + fi + fi + # Done checking deplibs! + deplibs=$newdeplibs + fi + + # All the library-specific variables (install_libdir is set above). + library_names= + old_library= + dlname= + + # Test again, we may have decided not to build it any more + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + if test "$hardcode_into_libs" = yes; then + # Hardcode the library paths + hardcode_libdirs= + dep_rpath= + rpath="$finalize_rpath" + test "$mode" != relink && rpath="$compile_rpath$rpath" + for libdir in $rpath; do + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator"; then + if test -z "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + hardcode_libdirs="$libdir" + else + # Just accumulate the unique libdirs. + case $hardcode_libdir_separator$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator in + *"$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir$hardcode_libdir_separator"*) + ;; + *) + hardcode_libdirs="$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir" + ;; + esac + fi + else + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + dep_rpath="$dep_rpath $flag" + fi + elif test -n "$runpath_var"; then + case "$perm_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) perm_rpath="$perm_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + done + # Substitute the hardcoded libdirs into the rpath. + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator" && + test -n "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + libdir="$hardcode_libdirs" + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld"; then + eval dep_rpath=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec_ld\" + else + eval dep_rpath=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + fi + fi + if test -n "$runpath_var" && test -n "$perm_rpath"; then + # We should set the runpath_var. + rpath= + for dir in $perm_rpath; do + rpath="$rpath$dir:" + done + eval "$runpath_var='$rpath\$$runpath_var'; export $runpath_var" + fi + test -n "$dep_rpath" && deplibs="$dep_rpath $deplibs" + fi + + shlibpath="$finalize_shlibpath" + test "$mode" != relink && shlibpath="$compile_shlibpath$shlibpath" + if test -n "$shlibpath"; then + eval "$shlibpath_var='$shlibpath\$$shlibpath_var'; export $shlibpath_var" + fi + + # Get the real and link names of the library. + eval shared_ext=\"$shrext\" + eval library_names=\"$library_names_spec\" + set dummy $library_names + realname="$2" + shift; shift + + if test -n "$soname_spec"; then + eval soname=\"$soname_spec\" + else + soname="$realname" + fi + if test -z "$dlname"; then + dlname=$soname + fi + + lib="$output_objdir/$realname" + for link + do + linknames="$linknames $link" + done + + # Use standard objects if they are pic + test -z "$pic_flag" && libobjs=`$echo "X$libobjs" | $SP2NL | $Xsed -e "$lo2o" | $NL2SP` + + # Prepare the list of exported symbols + if test -z "$export_symbols"; then + if test "$always_export_symbols" = yes || test -n "$export_symbols_regex"; then + $show "generating symbol list for \`$libname.la'" + export_symbols="$output_objdir/$libname.exp" + $run $rm $export_symbols + cmds=$export_symbols_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + if len=`expr "X$cmd" : ".*"` && + test "$len" -le "$max_cmd_len" || test "$max_cmd_len" -le -1; then + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + skipped_export=false + else + # The command line is too long to execute in one step. + $show "using reloadable object file for export list..." + skipped_export=: + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + if test -n "$export_symbols_regex"; then + $show "$EGREP -e \"$export_symbols_regex\" \"$export_symbols\" > \"${export_symbols}T\"" + $run eval '$EGREP -e "$export_symbols_regex" "$export_symbols" > "${export_symbols}T"' + $show "$mv \"${export_symbols}T\" \"$export_symbols\"" + $run eval '$mv "${export_symbols}T" "$export_symbols"' + fi + fi + fi + + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test -n "$include_expsyms"; then + $run eval '$echo "X$include_expsyms" | $SP2NL >> "$export_symbols"' + fi + + tmp_deplibs= + for test_deplib in $deplibs; do + case " $convenience " in + *" $test_deplib "*) ;; + *) + tmp_deplibs="$tmp_deplibs $test_deplib" + ;; + esac + done + deplibs="$tmp_deplibs" + + if test -n "$convenience"; then + if test -n "$whole_archive_flag_spec"; then + save_libobjs=$libobjs + eval libobjs=\"\$libobjs $whole_archive_flag_spec\" + else + gentop="$output_objdir/${outputname}x" + $show "${rm}r $gentop" + $run ${rm}r "$gentop" + $show "$mkdir $gentop" + $run $mkdir "$gentop" + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$gentop"; then + exit $status + fi + generated="$generated $gentop" + + for xlib in $convenience; do + # Extract the objects. + case $xlib in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) xabs="$xlib" ;; + *) xabs=`pwd`"/$xlib" ;; + esac + xlib=`$echo "X$xlib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + xdir="$gentop/$xlib" + + $show "${rm}r $xdir" + $run ${rm}r "$xdir" + $show "$mkdir $xdir" + $run $mkdir "$xdir" + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$xdir"; then + exit $status + fi + # We will extract separately just the conflicting names and we will no + # longer touch any unique names. It is faster to leave these extract + # automatically by $AR in one run. + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR x $xabs)" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR x \$xabs)" || exit $? + if ($AR t "$xabs" | sort | sort -uc >/dev/null 2>&1); then + : + else + $echo "$modename: warning: object name conflicts; renaming object files" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: warning: to ensure that they will not overwrite" 1>&2 + $AR t "$xabs" | sort | uniq -cd | while read -r count name + do + i=1 + while test "$i" -le "$count" + do + # Put our $i before any first dot (extension) + # Never overwrite any file + name_to="$name" + while test "X$name_to" = "X$name" || test -f "$xdir/$name_to" + do + name_to=`$echo "X$name_to" | $Xsed -e "s/\([^.]*\)/\1-$i/"` + done + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR xN $i $xabs '$name' && $mv '$name' '$name_to')" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR xN $i \$xabs '$name' && $mv '$name' '$name_to')" || exit $? + i=`expr $i + 1` + done + done + fi + + libobjs="$libobjs "`find $xdir -name \*.$objext -print -o -name \*.lo -print | $NL2SP` + done + fi + fi + + if test "$thread_safe" = yes && test -n "$thread_safe_flag_spec"; then + eval flag=\"$thread_safe_flag_spec\" + linker_flags="$linker_flags $flag" + fi + + # Make a backup of the uninstalled library when relinking + if test "$mode" = relink; then + $run eval '(cd $output_objdir && $rm ${realname}U && $mv $realname ${realname}U)' || exit $? + fi + + # Do each of the archive commands. + if test "$module" = yes && test -n "$module_cmds" ; then + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test -n "$module_expsym_cmds"; then + eval test_cmds=\"$module_expsym_cmds\" + cmds=$module_expsym_cmds + else + eval test_cmds=\"$module_cmds\" + cmds=$module_cmds + fi + else + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test -n "$archive_expsym_cmds"; then + eval test_cmds=\"$archive_expsym_cmds\" + cmds=$archive_expsym_cmds + else + eval test_cmds=\"$archive_cmds\" + cmds=$archive_cmds + fi + fi + + if test "X$skipped_export" != "X:" && len=`expr "X$test_cmds" : ".*"` && + test "$len" -le "$max_cmd_len" || test "$max_cmd_len" -le -1; then + : + else + # The command line is too long to link in one step, link piecewise. + $echo "creating reloadable object files..." + + # Save the value of $output and $libobjs because we want to + # use them later. If we have whole_archive_flag_spec, we + # want to use save_libobjs as it was before + # whole_archive_flag_spec was expanded, because we can't + # assume the linker understands whole_archive_flag_spec. + # This may have to be revisited, in case too many + # convenience libraries get linked in and end up exceeding + # the spec. + if test -z "$convenience" || test -z "$whole_archive_flag_spec"; then + save_libobjs=$libobjs + fi + save_output=$output + + # Clear the reloadable object creation command queue and + # initialize k to one. + test_cmds= + concat_cmds= + objlist= + delfiles= + last_robj= + k=1 + output=$output_objdir/$save_output-${k}.$objext + # Loop over the list of objects to be linked. + for obj in $save_libobjs + do + eval test_cmds=\"$reload_cmds $objlist $last_robj\" + if test "X$objlist" = X || + { len=`expr "X$test_cmds" : ".*"` && + test "$len" -le "$max_cmd_len"; }; then + objlist="$objlist $obj" + else + # The command $test_cmds is almost too long, add a + # command to the queue. + if test "$k" -eq 1 ; then + # The first file doesn't have a previous command to add. + eval concat_cmds=\"$reload_cmds $objlist $last_robj\" + else + # All subsequent reloadable object files will link in + # the last one created. + eval concat_cmds=\"\$concat_cmds~$reload_cmds $objlist $last_robj\" + fi + last_robj=$output_objdir/$save_output-${k}.$objext + k=`expr $k + 1` + output=$output_objdir/$save_output-${k}.$objext + objlist=$obj + len=1 + fi + done + # Handle the remaining objects by creating one last + # reloadable object file. All subsequent reloadable object + # files will link in the last one created. + test -z "$concat_cmds" || concat_cmds=$concat_cmds~ + eval concat_cmds=\"\${concat_cmds}$reload_cmds $objlist $last_robj\" + + if ${skipped_export-false}; then + $show "generating symbol list for \`$libname.la'" + export_symbols="$output_objdir/$libname.exp" + $run $rm $export_symbols + libobjs=$output + # Append the command to create the export file. + eval concat_cmds=\"\$concat_cmds~$export_symbols_cmds\" + fi + + # Set up a command to remove the reloadale object files + # after they are used. + i=0 + while test "$i" -lt "$k" + do + i=`expr $i + 1` + delfiles="$delfiles $output_objdir/$save_output-${i}.$objext" + done + + $echo "creating a temporary reloadable object file: $output" + + # Loop through the commands generated above and execute them. + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $concat_cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + libobjs=$output + # Restore the value of output. + output=$save_output + + if test -n "$convenience" && test -n "$whole_archive_flag_spec"; then + eval libobjs=\"\$libobjs $whole_archive_flag_spec\" + fi + # Expand the library linking commands again to reset the + # value of $libobjs for piecewise linking. + + # Do each of the archive commands. + if test "$module" = yes && test -n "$module_cmds" ; then + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test -n "$module_expsym_cmds"; then + cmds=$module_expsym_cmds + else + cmds=$module_cmds + fi + else + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test -n "$archive_expsym_cmds"; then + cmds=$archive_expsym_cmds + else + cmds=$archive_cmds + fi + fi + + # Append the command to remove the reloadable object files + # to the just-reset $cmds. + eval cmds=\"\$cmds~\$rm $delfiles\" + fi + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + # Restore the uninstalled library and exit + if test "$mode" = relink; then + $run eval '(cd $output_objdir && $rm ${realname}T && $mv $realname ${realname}T && $mv "$realname"U $realname)' || exit $? + exit 0 + fi + + # Create links to the real library. + for linkname in $linknames; do + if test "$realname" != "$linkname"; then + $show "(cd $output_objdir && $rm $linkname && $LN_S $realname $linkname)" + $run eval '(cd $output_objdir && $rm $linkname && $LN_S $realname $linkname)' || exit $? + fi + done + + # If -module or -export-dynamic was specified, set the dlname. + if test "$module" = yes || test "$export_dynamic" = yes; then + # On all known operating systems, these are identical. + dlname="$soname" + fi + fi + ;; + + obj) + if test -n "$deplibs"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-l' and \`-L' are ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles" || test "$dlself" != no; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$rpath"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-rpath' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$xrpath"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-R' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + case $output in + *.lo) + if test -n "$objs$old_deplibs"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot build library object \`$output' from non-libtool objects" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + libobj="$output" + obj=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + ;; + *) + libobj= + obj="$output" + ;; + esac + + # Delete the old objects. + $run $rm $obj $libobj + + # Objects from convenience libraries. This assumes + # single-version convenience libraries. Whenever we create + # different ones for PIC/non-PIC, this we'll have to duplicate + # the extraction. + reload_conv_objs= + gentop= + # reload_cmds runs $LD directly, so let us get rid of + # -Wl from whole_archive_flag_spec + wl= + + if test -n "$convenience"; then + if test -n "$whole_archive_flag_spec"; then + eval reload_conv_objs=\"\$reload_objs $whole_archive_flag_spec\" + else + gentop="$output_objdir/${obj}x" + $show "${rm}r $gentop" + $run ${rm}r "$gentop" + $show "$mkdir $gentop" + $run $mkdir "$gentop" + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$gentop"; then + exit $status + fi + generated="$generated $gentop" + + for xlib in $convenience; do + # Extract the objects. + case $xlib in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) xabs="$xlib" ;; + *) xabs=`pwd`"/$xlib" ;; + esac + xlib=`$echo "X$xlib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + xdir="$gentop/$xlib" + + $show "${rm}r $xdir" + $run ${rm}r "$xdir" + $show "$mkdir $xdir" + $run $mkdir "$xdir" + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$xdir"; then + exit $status + fi + # We will extract separately just the conflicting names and we will no + # longer touch any unique names. It is faster to leave these extract + # automatically by $AR in one run. + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR x $xabs)" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR x \$xabs)" || exit $? + if ($AR t "$xabs" | sort | sort -uc >/dev/null 2>&1); then + : + else + $echo "$modename: warning: object name conflicts; renaming object files" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: warning: to ensure that they will not overwrite" 1>&2 + $AR t "$xabs" | sort | uniq -cd | while read -r count name + do + i=1 + while test "$i" -le "$count" + do + # Put our $i before any first dot (extension) + # Never overwrite any file + name_to="$name" + while test "X$name_to" = "X$name" || test -f "$xdir/$name_to" + do + name_to=`$echo "X$name_to" | $Xsed -e "s/\([^.]*\)/\1-$i/"` + done + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR xN $i $xabs '$name' && $mv '$name' '$name_to')" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR xN $i \$xabs '$name' && $mv '$name' '$name_to')" || exit $? + i=`expr $i + 1` + done + done + fi + + reload_conv_objs="$reload_objs "`find $xdir -name \*.$objext -print -o -name \*.lo -print | $NL2SP` + done + fi + fi + + # Create the old-style object. + reload_objs="$objs$old_deplibs "`$echo "X$libobjs" | $SP2NL | $Xsed -e '/\.'${libext}$'/d' -e '/\.lib$/d' -e "$lo2o" | $NL2SP`" $reload_conv_objs" ### testsuite: skip nested quoting test + + output="$obj" + cmds=$reload_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + # Exit if we aren't doing a library object file. + if test -z "$libobj"; then + if test -n "$gentop"; then + $show "${rm}r $gentop" + $run ${rm}r $gentop + fi + + exit 0 + fi + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" != yes; then + if test -n "$gentop"; then + $show "${rm}r $gentop" + $run ${rm}r $gentop + fi + + # Create an invalid libtool object if no PIC, so that we don't + # accidentally link it into a program. + # $show "echo timestamp > $libobj" + # $run eval "echo timestamp > $libobj" || exit $? + exit 0 + fi + + if test -n "$pic_flag" || test "$pic_mode" != default; then + # Only do commands if we really have different PIC objects. + reload_objs="$libobjs $reload_conv_objs" + output="$libobj" + cmds=$reload_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + if test -n "$gentop"; then + $show "${rm}r $gentop" + $run ${rm}r $gentop + fi + + exit 0 + ;; + + prog) + case $host in + *cygwin*) output=`$echo $output | ${SED} -e 's,.exe$,,;s,$,.exe,'` ;; + esac + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info' is ignored for programs" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for programs" 1>&2 + fi + + if test "$preload" = yes; then + if test "$dlopen_support" = unknown && test "$dlopen_self" = unknown && + test "$dlopen_self_static" = unknown; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`AC_LIBTOOL_DLOPEN' not used. Assuming no dlopen support." + fi + fi + + case $host in + *-*-rhapsody* | *-*-darwin1.[012]) + # On Rhapsody replace the C library is the System framework + compile_deplibs=`$echo "X $compile_deplibs" | $Xsed -e 's/ -lc / -framework System /'` + finalize_deplibs=`$echo "X $finalize_deplibs" | $Xsed -e 's/ -lc / -framework System /'` + ;; + esac + + case $host in + *darwin*) + # Don't allow lazy linking, it breaks C++ global constructors + if test "$tagname" = CXX ; then + compile_command="$compile_command ${wl}-bind_at_load" + finalize_command="$finalize_command ${wl}-bind_at_load" + fi + ;; + esac + + compile_command="$compile_command $compile_deplibs" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $finalize_deplibs" + + if test -n "$rpath$xrpath"; then + # If the user specified any rpath flags, then add them. + for libdir in $rpath $xrpath; do + # This is the magic to use -rpath. + case "$finalize_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) finalize_rpath="$finalize_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + done + fi + + # Now hardcode the library paths + rpath= + hardcode_libdirs= + for libdir in $compile_rpath $finalize_rpath; do + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator"; then + if test -z "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + hardcode_libdirs="$libdir" + else + # Just accumulate the unique libdirs. + case $hardcode_libdir_separator$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator in + *"$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir$hardcode_libdir_separator"*) + ;; + *) + hardcode_libdirs="$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir" + ;; + esac + fi + else + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + rpath="$rpath $flag" + fi + elif test -n "$runpath_var"; then + case "$perm_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) perm_rpath="$perm_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + case $host in + *-*-cygwin* | *-*-mingw* | *-*-pw32* | *-*-os2*) + case :$dllsearchpath: in + *":$libdir:"*) ;; + *) dllsearchpath="$dllsearchpath:$libdir";; + esac + ;; + esac + done + # Substitute the hardcoded libdirs into the rpath. + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator" && + test -n "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + libdir="$hardcode_libdirs" + eval rpath=\" $hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + fi + compile_rpath="$rpath" + + rpath= + hardcode_libdirs= + for libdir in $finalize_rpath; do + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator"; then + if test -z "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + hardcode_libdirs="$libdir" + else + # Just accumulate the unique libdirs. + case $hardcode_libdir_separator$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator in + *"$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir$hardcode_libdir_separator"*) + ;; + *) + hardcode_libdirs="$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir" + ;; + esac + fi + else + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + rpath="$rpath $flag" + fi + elif test -n "$runpath_var"; then + case "$finalize_perm_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) finalize_perm_rpath="$finalize_perm_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + done + # Substitute the hardcoded libdirs into the rpath. + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator" && + test -n "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + libdir="$hardcode_libdirs" + eval rpath=\" $hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + fi + finalize_rpath="$rpath" + + if test -n "$libobjs" && test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + # Transform all the library objects into standard objects. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $SP2NL | $Xsed -e "$lo2o" | $NL2SP` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $SP2NL | $Xsed -e "$lo2o" | $NL2SP` + fi + + dlsyms= + if test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles" || test "$dlself" != no; then + if test -n "$NM" && test -n "$global_symbol_pipe"; then + dlsyms="${outputname}S.c" + else + $echo "$modename: not configured to extract global symbols from dlpreopened files" 1>&2 + fi + fi + + if test -n "$dlsyms"; then + case $dlsyms in + "") ;; + *.c) + # Discover the nlist of each of the dlfiles. + nlist="$output_objdir/${outputname}.nm" + + $show "$rm $nlist ${nlist}S ${nlist}T" + $run $rm "$nlist" "${nlist}S" "${nlist}T" + + # Parse the name list into a source file. + $show "creating $output_objdir/$dlsyms" + + test -z "$run" && $echo > "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" "\ +/* $dlsyms - symbol resolution table for \`$outputname' dlsym emulation. */ +/* Generated by $PROGRAM - GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION$TIMESTAMP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern \"C\" { +#endif + +/* Prevent the only kind of declaration conflicts we can make. */ +#define lt_preloaded_symbols some_other_symbol + +/* External symbol declarations for the compiler. */\ +" + + if test "$dlself" = yes; then + $show "generating symbol list for \`$output'" + + test -z "$run" && $echo ': @PROGRAM@ ' > "$nlist" + + # Add our own program objects to the symbol list. + progfiles=`$echo "X$objs$old_deplibs" | $SP2NL | $Xsed -e "$lo2o" | $NL2SP` + for arg in $progfiles; do + $show "extracting global C symbols from \`$arg'" + $run eval "$NM $arg | $global_symbol_pipe >> '$nlist'" + done + + if test -n "$exclude_expsyms"; then + $run eval '$EGREP -v " ($exclude_expsyms)$" "$nlist" > "$nlist"T' + $run eval '$mv "$nlist"T "$nlist"' + fi + + if test -n "$export_symbols_regex"; then + $run eval '$EGREP -e "$export_symbols_regex" "$nlist" > "$nlist"T' + $run eval '$mv "$nlist"T "$nlist"' + fi + + # Prepare the list of exported symbols + if test -z "$export_symbols"; then + export_symbols="$output_objdir/$output.exp" + $run $rm $export_symbols + $run eval "${SED} -n -e '/^: @PROGRAM@$/d' -e 's/^.* \(.*\)$/\1/p' "'< "$nlist" > "$export_symbols"' + else + $run eval "${SED} -e 's/\([][.*^$]\)/\\\1/g' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/$/$/'"' < "$export_symbols" > "$output_objdir/$output.exp"' + $run eval 'grep -f "$output_objdir/$output.exp" < "$nlist" > "$nlist"T' + $run eval 'mv "$nlist"T "$nlist"' + fi + fi + + for arg in $dlprefiles; do + $show "extracting global C symbols from \`$arg'" + name=`$echo "$arg" | ${SED} -e 's%^.*/%%'` + $run eval '$echo ": $name " >> "$nlist"' + $run eval "$NM $arg | $global_symbol_pipe >> '$nlist'" + done + + if test -z "$run"; then + # Make sure we have at least an empty file. + test -f "$nlist" || : > "$nlist" + + if test -n "$exclude_expsyms"; then + $EGREP -v " ($exclude_expsyms)$" "$nlist" > "$nlist"T + $mv "$nlist"T "$nlist" + fi + + # Try sorting and uniquifying the output. + if grep -v "^: " < "$nlist" | + if sort -k 3 /dev/null 2>&1; then + sort -k 3 + else + sort +2 + fi | + uniq > "$nlist"S; then + : + else + grep -v "^: " < "$nlist" > "$nlist"S + fi + + if test -f "$nlist"S; then + eval "$global_symbol_to_cdecl"' < "$nlist"S >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms"' + else + $echo '/* NONE */' >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" + fi + + $echo >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" "\ + +#undef lt_preloaded_symbols + +#if defined (__STDC__) && __STDC__ +# define lt_ptr void * +#else +# define lt_ptr char * +# define const +#endif + +/* The mapping between symbol names and symbols. */ +const struct { + const char *name; + lt_ptr address; +} +lt_preloaded_symbols[] = +{\ +" + + eval "$global_symbol_to_c_name_address" < "$nlist" >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" + + $echo >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" "\ + {0, (lt_ptr) 0} +}; + +/* This works around a problem in FreeBSD linker */ +#ifdef FREEBSD_WORKAROUND +static const void *lt_preloaded_setup() { + return lt_preloaded_symbols; +} +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif\ +" + fi + + pic_flag_for_symtable= + case $host in + # compiling the symbol table file with pic_flag works around + # a FreeBSD bug that causes programs to crash when -lm is + # linked before any other PIC object. But we must not use + # pic_flag when linking with -static. The problem exists in + # FreeBSD 2.2.6 and is fixed in FreeBSD 3.1. + *-*-freebsd2*|*-*-freebsd3.0*|*-*-freebsdelf3.0*) + case "$compile_command " in + *" -static "*) ;; + *) pic_flag_for_symtable=" $pic_flag -DFREEBSD_WORKAROUND";; + esac;; + *-*-hpux*) + case "$compile_command " in + *" -static "*) ;; + *) pic_flag_for_symtable=" $pic_flag";; + esac + esac + + # Now compile the dynamic symbol file. + $show "(cd $output_objdir && $LTCC -c$no_builtin_flag$pic_flag_for_symtable \"$dlsyms\")" + $run eval '(cd $output_objdir && $LTCC -c$no_builtin_flag$pic_flag_for_symtable "$dlsyms")' || exit $? + + # Clean up the generated files. + $show "$rm $output_objdir/$dlsyms $nlist ${nlist}S ${nlist}T" + $run $rm "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" "$nlist" "${nlist}S" "${nlist}T" + + # Transform the symbol file into the correct name. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e "s%@SYMFILE@%$output_objdir/${outputname}S.${objext}%"` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e "s%@SYMFILE@%$output_objdir/${outputname}S.${objext}%"` + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: unknown suffix for \`$dlsyms'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + else + # We keep going just in case the user didn't refer to + # lt_preloaded_symbols. The linker will fail if global_symbol_pipe + # really was required. + + # Nullify the symbol file. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e "s% @SYMFILE@%%"` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e "s% @SYMFILE@%%"` + fi + + if test "$need_relink" = no || test "$build_libtool_libs" != yes; then + # Replace the output file specification. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output"'%g'` + link_command="$compile_command$compile_rpath" + + # We have no uninstalled library dependencies, so finalize right now. + $show "$link_command" + $run eval "$link_command" + status=$? + + # Delete the generated files. + if test -n "$dlsyms"; then + $show "$rm $output_objdir/${outputname}S.${objext}" + $run $rm "$output_objdir/${outputname}S.${objext}" + fi + + exit $status + fi + + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + # We should set the shlibpath_var + rpath= + for dir in $temp_rpath; do + case $dir in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) + # Absolute path. + rpath="$rpath$dir:" + ;; + *) + # Relative path: add a thisdir entry. + rpath="$rpath\$thisdir/$dir:" + ;; + esac + done + temp_rpath="$rpath" + fi + + if test -n "$compile_shlibpath$finalize_shlibpath"; then + compile_command="$shlibpath_var=\"$compile_shlibpath$finalize_shlibpath\$$shlibpath_var\" $compile_command" + fi + if test -n "$finalize_shlibpath"; then + finalize_command="$shlibpath_var=\"$finalize_shlibpath\$$shlibpath_var\" $finalize_command" + fi + + compile_var= + finalize_var= + if test -n "$runpath_var"; then + if test -n "$perm_rpath"; then + # We should set the runpath_var. + rpath= + for dir in $perm_rpath; do + rpath="$rpath$dir:" + done + compile_var="$runpath_var=\"$rpath\$$runpath_var\" " + fi + if test -n "$finalize_perm_rpath"; then + # We should set the runpath_var. + rpath= + for dir in $finalize_perm_rpath; do + rpath="$rpath$dir:" + done + finalize_var="$runpath_var=\"$rpath\$$runpath_var\" " + fi + fi + + if test "$no_install" = yes; then + # We don't need to create a wrapper script. + link_command="$compile_var$compile_command$compile_rpath" + # Replace the output file specification. + link_command=`$echo "X$link_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output"'%g'` + # Delete the old output file. + $run $rm $output + # Link the executable and exit + $show "$link_command" + $run eval "$link_command" || exit $? + exit 0 + fi + + if test "$hardcode_action" = relink; then + # Fast installation is not supported + link_command="$compile_var$compile_command$compile_rpath" + relink_command="$finalize_var$finalize_command$finalize_rpath" + + $echo "$modename: warning: this platform does not like uninstalled shared libraries" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$output' will be relinked during installation" 1>&2 + else + if test "$fast_install" != no; then + link_command="$finalize_var$compile_command$finalize_rpath" + if test "$fast_install" = yes; then + relink_command=`$echo "X$compile_var$compile_command$compile_rpath" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%\$progdir/\$file%g'` + else + # fast_install is set to needless + relink_command= + fi + else + link_command="$compile_var$compile_command$compile_rpath" + relink_command="$finalize_var$finalize_command$finalize_rpath" + fi + fi + + # Replace the output file specification. + link_command=`$echo "X$link_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output_objdir/$outputname"'%g'` + + # Delete the old output files. + $run $rm $output $output_objdir/$outputname $output_objdir/lt-$outputname + + $show "$link_command" + $run eval "$link_command" || exit $? + + # Now create the wrapper script. + $show "creating $output" + + # Quote the relink command for shipping. + if test -n "$relink_command"; then + # Preserve any variables that may affect compiler behavior + for var in $variables_saved_for_relink; do + if eval test -z \"\${$var+set}\"; then + relink_command="{ test -z \"\${$var+set}\" || unset $var || { $var=; export $var; }; }; $relink_command" + elif eval var_value=\$$var; test -z "$var_value"; then + relink_command="$var=; export $var; $relink_command" + else + var_value=`$echo "X$var_value" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + relink_command="$var=\"$var_value\"; export $var; $relink_command" + fi + done + relink_command="(cd `pwd`; $relink_command)" + relink_command=`$echo "X$relink_command" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + fi + + # Quote $echo for shipping. + if test "X$echo" = "X$SHELL $0 --fallback-echo"; then + case $0 in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) qecho="$SHELL $0 --fallback-echo";; + *) qecho="$SHELL `pwd`/$0 --fallback-echo";; + esac + qecho=`$echo "X$qecho" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + else + qecho=`$echo "X$echo" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + fi + + # Only actually do things if our run command is non-null. + if test -z "$run"; then + # win32 will think the script is a binary if it has + # a .exe suffix, so we strip it off here. + case $output in + *.exe) output=`$echo $output|${SED} 's,.exe$,,'` ;; + esac + # test for cygwin because mv fails w/o .exe extensions + case $host in + *cygwin*) + exeext=.exe + outputname=`$echo $outputname|${SED} 's,.exe$,,'` ;; + *) exeext= ;; + esac + case $host in + *cygwin* | *mingw* ) + cwrappersource=`$echo ${objdir}/lt-${output}.c` + cwrapper=`$echo ${output}.exe` + $rm $cwrappersource $cwrapper + trap "$rm $cwrappersource $cwrapper; exit 1" 1 2 15 + + cat > $cwrappersource <> $cwrappersource<<"EOF" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(PATH_MAX) +# define LT_PATHMAX PATH_MAX +#elif defined(MAXPATHLEN) +# define LT_PATHMAX MAXPATHLEN +#else +# define LT_PATHMAX 1024 +#endif + +#ifndef DIR_SEPARATOR +#define DIR_SEPARATOR '/' +#endif + +#if defined (_WIN32) || defined (__MSDOS__) || defined (__DJGPP__) || \ + defined (__OS2__) +#define HAVE_DOS_BASED_FILE_SYSTEM +#ifndef DIR_SEPARATOR_2 +#define DIR_SEPARATOR_2 '\\' +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef DIR_SEPARATOR_2 +# define IS_DIR_SEPARATOR(ch) ((ch) == DIR_SEPARATOR) +#else /* DIR_SEPARATOR_2 */ +# define IS_DIR_SEPARATOR(ch) \ + (((ch) == DIR_SEPARATOR) || ((ch) == DIR_SEPARATOR_2)) +#endif /* DIR_SEPARATOR_2 */ + +#define XMALLOC(type, num) ((type *) xmalloc ((num) * sizeof(type))) +#define XFREE(stale) do { \ + if (stale) { free ((void *) stale); stale = 0; } \ +} while (0) + +const char *program_name = NULL; + +void * xmalloc (size_t num); +char * xstrdup (const char *string); +char * basename (const char *name); +char * fnqualify(const char *path); +char * strendzap(char *str, const char *pat); +void lt_fatal (const char *message, ...); + +int +main (int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + char **newargz; + int i; + + program_name = (char *) xstrdup ((char *) basename (argv[0])); + newargz = XMALLOC(char *, argc+2); +EOF + + cat >> $cwrappersource <> $cwrappersource <<"EOF" + newargz[1] = fnqualify(argv[0]); + /* we know the script has the same name, without the .exe */ + /* so make sure newargz[1] doesn't end in .exe */ + strendzap(newargz[1],".exe"); + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) + newargz[i+1] = xstrdup(argv[i]); + newargz[argc+1] = NULL; +EOF + + cat >> $cwrappersource <> $cwrappersource <<"EOF" +} + +void * +xmalloc (size_t num) +{ + void * p = (void *) malloc (num); + if (!p) + lt_fatal ("Memory exhausted"); + + return p; +} + +char * +xstrdup (const char *string) +{ + return string ? strcpy ((char *) xmalloc (strlen (string) + 1), string) : NULL +; +} + +char * +basename (const char *name) +{ + const char *base; + +#if defined (HAVE_DOS_BASED_FILE_SYSTEM) + /* Skip over the disk name in MSDOS pathnames. */ + if (isalpha (name[0]) && name[1] == ':') + name += 2; +#endif + + for (base = name; *name; name++) + if (IS_DIR_SEPARATOR (*name)) + base = name + 1; + return (char *) base; +} + +char * +fnqualify(const char *path) +{ + size_t size; + char *p; + char tmp[LT_PATHMAX + 1]; + + assert(path != NULL); + + /* Is it qualified already? */ +#if defined (HAVE_DOS_BASED_FILE_SYSTEM) + if (isalpha (path[0]) && path[1] == ':') + return xstrdup (path); +#endif + if (IS_DIR_SEPARATOR (path[0])) + return xstrdup (path); + + /* prepend the current directory */ + /* doesn't handle '~' */ + if (getcwd (tmp, LT_PATHMAX) == NULL) + lt_fatal ("getcwd failed"); + size = strlen(tmp) + 1 + strlen(path) + 1; /* +2 for '/' and '\0' */ + p = XMALLOC(char, size); + sprintf(p, "%s%c%s", tmp, DIR_SEPARATOR, path); + return p; +} + +char * +strendzap(char *str, const char *pat) +{ + size_t len, patlen; + + assert(str != NULL); + assert(pat != NULL); + + len = strlen(str); + patlen = strlen(pat); + + if (patlen <= len) + { + str += len - patlen; + if (strcmp(str, pat) == 0) + *str = '\0'; + } + return str; +} + +static void +lt_error_core (int exit_status, const char * mode, + const char * message, va_list ap) +{ + fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s: ", program_name, mode); + vfprintf (stderr, message, ap); + fprintf (stderr, ".\n"); + + if (exit_status >= 0) + exit (exit_status); +} + +void +lt_fatal (const char *message, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start (ap, message); + lt_error_core (EXIT_FAILURE, "FATAL", message, ap); + va_end (ap); +} +EOF + # we should really use a build-platform specific compiler + # here, but OTOH, the wrappers (shell script and this C one) + # are only useful if you want to execute the "real" binary. + # Since the "real" binary is built for $host, then this + # wrapper might as well be built for $host, too. + $run $LTCC -s -o $cwrapper $cwrappersource + ;; + esac + $rm $output + trap "$rm $output; exit 1" 1 2 15 + + $echo > $output "\ +#! $SHELL + +# $output - temporary wrapper script for $objdir/$outputname +# Generated by $PROGRAM - GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION$TIMESTAMP +# +# The $output program cannot be directly executed until all the libtool +# libraries that it depends on are installed. +# +# This wrapper script should never be moved out of the build directory. +# If it is, it will not operate correctly. + +# Sed substitution that helps us do robust quoting. It backslashifies +# metacharacters that are still active within double-quoted strings. +Xsed='${SED} -e 1s/^X//' +sed_quote_subst='$sed_quote_subst' + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test \"\${CDPATH+set}\" = set; then CDPATH=:; export CDPATH; fi + +relink_command=\"$relink_command\" + +# This environment variable determines our operation mode. +if test \"\$libtool_install_magic\" = \"$magic\"; then + # install mode needs the following variable: + notinst_deplibs='$notinst_deplibs' +else + # When we are sourced in execute mode, \$file and \$echo are already set. + if test \"\$libtool_execute_magic\" != \"$magic\"; then + echo=\"$qecho\" + file=\"\$0\" + # Make sure echo works. + if test \"X\$1\" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift + elif test \"X\`(\$echo '\t') 2>/dev/null\`\" = 'X\t'; then + # Yippee, \$echo works! + : + else + # Restart under the correct shell, and then maybe \$echo will work. + exec $SHELL \"\$0\" --no-reexec \${1+\"\$@\"} + fi + fi\ +" + $echo >> $output "\ + + # Find the directory that this script lives in. + thisdir=\`\$echo \"X\$file\" | \$Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'\` + test \"x\$thisdir\" = \"x\$file\" && thisdir=. + + # Follow symbolic links until we get to the real thisdir. + file=\`ls -ld \"\$file\" | ${SED} -n 's/.*-> //p'\` + while test -n \"\$file\"; do + destdir=\`\$echo \"X\$file\" | \$Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*\$%%'\` + + # If there was a directory component, then change thisdir. + if test \"x\$destdir\" != \"x\$file\"; then + case \"\$destdir\" in + [\\\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\\\/]*) thisdir=\"\$destdir\" ;; + *) thisdir=\"\$thisdir/\$destdir\" ;; + esac + fi + + file=\`\$echo \"X\$file\" | \$Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'\` + file=\`ls -ld \"\$thisdir/\$file\" | ${SED} -n 's/.*-> //p'\` + done + + # Try to get the absolute directory name. + absdir=\`cd \"\$thisdir\" && pwd\` + test -n \"\$absdir\" && thisdir=\"\$absdir\" +" + + if test "$fast_install" = yes; then + $echo >> $output "\ + program=lt-'$outputname'$exeext + progdir=\"\$thisdir/$objdir\" + + if test ! -f \"\$progdir/\$program\" || \\ + { file=\`ls -1dt \"\$progdir/\$program\" \"\$progdir/../\$program\" 2>/dev/null | ${SED} 1q\`; \\ + test \"X\$file\" != \"X\$progdir/\$program\"; }; then + + file=\"\$\$-\$program\" + + if test ! -d \"\$progdir\"; then + $mkdir \"\$progdir\" + else + $rm \"\$progdir/\$file\" + fi" + + $echo >> $output "\ + + # relink executable if necessary + if test -n \"\$relink_command\"; then + if relink_command_output=\`eval \$relink_command 2>&1\`; then : + else + $echo \"\$relink_command_output\" >&2 + $rm \"\$progdir/\$file\" + exit 1 + fi + fi + + $mv \"\$progdir/\$file\" \"\$progdir/\$program\" 2>/dev/null || + { $rm \"\$progdir/\$program\"; + $mv \"\$progdir/\$file\" \"\$progdir/\$program\"; } + $rm \"\$progdir/\$file\" + fi" + else + $echo >> $output "\ + program='$outputname' + progdir=\"\$thisdir/$objdir\" +" + fi + + $echo >> $output "\ + + if test -f \"\$progdir/\$program\"; then" + + # Export our shlibpath_var if we have one. + if test "$shlibpath_overrides_runpath" = yes && test -n "$shlibpath_var" && test -n "$temp_rpath"; then + $echo >> $output "\ + # Add our own library path to $shlibpath_var + $shlibpath_var=\"$temp_rpath\$$shlibpath_var\" + + # Some systems cannot cope with colon-terminated $shlibpath_var + # The second colon is a workaround for a bug in BeOS R4 sed + $shlibpath_var=\`\$echo \"X\$$shlibpath_var\" | \$Xsed -e 's/::*\$//'\` + + export $shlibpath_var +" + fi + + # fixup the dll searchpath if we need to. + if test -n "$dllsearchpath"; then + $echo >> $output "\ + # Add the dll search path components to the executable PATH + PATH=$dllsearchpath:\$PATH +" + fi + + $echo >> $output "\ + if test \"\$libtool_execute_magic\" != \"$magic\"; then + # Run the actual program with our arguments. +" + case $host in + # Backslashes separate directories on plain windows + *-*-mingw | *-*-os2*) + $echo >> $output "\ + exec \$progdir\\\\\$program \${1+\"\$@\"} +" + ;; + + *) + $echo >> $output "\ + exec \$progdir/\$program \${1+\"\$@\"} +" + ;; + esac + $echo >> $output "\ + \$echo \"\$0: cannot exec \$program \${1+\"\$@\"}\" + exit 1 + fi + else + # The program doesn't exist. + \$echo \"\$0: error: \$progdir/\$program does not exist\" 1>&2 + \$echo \"This script is just a wrapper for \$program.\" 1>&2 + $echo \"See the $PACKAGE documentation for more information.\" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi +fi\ +" + chmod +x $output + fi + exit 0 + ;; + esac + + # See if we need to build an old-fashioned archive. + for oldlib in $oldlibs; do + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = convenience; then + oldobjs="$libobjs_save" + addlibs="$convenience" + build_libtool_libs=no + else + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = module; then + oldobjs="$libobjs_save" + build_libtool_libs=no + else + oldobjs="$old_deplibs $non_pic_objects" + fi + addlibs="$old_convenience" + fi + + if test -n "$addlibs"; then + gentop="$output_objdir/${outputname}x" + $show "${rm}r $gentop" + $run ${rm}r "$gentop" + $show "$mkdir $gentop" + $run $mkdir "$gentop" + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$gentop"; then + exit $status + fi + generated="$generated $gentop" + + # Add in members from convenience archives. + for xlib in $addlibs; do + # Extract the objects. + case $xlib in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) xabs="$xlib" ;; + *) xabs=`pwd`"/$xlib" ;; + esac + xlib=`$echo "X$xlib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + xdir="$gentop/$xlib" + + $show "${rm}r $xdir" + $run ${rm}r "$xdir" + $show "$mkdir $xdir" + $run $mkdir "$xdir" + status=$? + if test "$status" -ne 0 && test ! -d "$xdir"; then + exit $status + fi + # We will extract separately just the conflicting names and we will no + # longer touch any unique names. It is faster to leave these extract + # automatically by $AR in one run. + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR x $xabs)" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR x \$xabs)" || exit $? + if ($AR t "$xabs" | sort | sort -uc >/dev/null 2>&1); then + : + else + $echo "$modename: warning: object name conflicts; renaming object files" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: warning: to ensure that they will not overwrite" 1>&2 + $AR t "$xabs" | sort | uniq -cd | while read -r count name + do + i=1 + while test "$i" -le "$count" + do + # Put our $i before any first dot (extension) + # Never overwrite any file + name_to="$name" + while test "X$name_to" = "X$name" || test -f "$xdir/$name_to" + do + name_to=`$echo "X$name_to" | $Xsed -e "s/\([^.]*\)/\1-$i/"` + done + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR xN $i $xabs '$name' && $mv '$name' '$name_to')" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR xN $i \$xabs '$name' && $mv '$name' '$name_to')" || exit $? + i=`expr $i + 1` + done + done + fi + + oldobjs="$oldobjs "`find $xdir -name \*.${objext} -print -o -name \*.lo -print | $NL2SP` + done + fi + + # Do each command in the archive commands. + if test -n "$old_archive_from_new_cmds" && test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + cmds=$old_archive_from_new_cmds + else + eval cmds=\"$old_archive_cmds\" + + if len=`expr "X$cmds" : ".*"` && + test "$len" -le "$max_cmd_len" || test "$max_cmd_len" -le -1; then + cmds=$old_archive_cmds + else + # the command line is too long to link in one step, link in parts + $echo "using piecewise archive linking..." + save_RANLIB=$RANLIB + RANLIB=: + objlist= + concat_cmds= + save_oldobjs=$oldobjs + # GNU ar 2.10+ was changed to match POSIX; thus no paths are + # encoded into archives. This makes 'ar r' malfunction in + # this piecewise linking case whenever conflicting object + # names appear in distinct ar calls; check, warn and compensate. + if (for obj in $save_oldobjs + do + $echo "X$obj" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%' + done | sort | sort -uc >/dev/null 2>&1); then + : + else + $echo "$modename: warning: object name conflicts; overriding AR_FLAGS to 'cq'" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: warning: to ensure that POSIX-compatible ar will work" 1>&2 + AR_FLAGS=cq + fi + # Is there a better way of finding the last object in the list? + for obj in $save_oldobjs + do + last_oldobj=$obj + done + for obj in $save_oldobjs + do + oldobjs="$objlist $obj" + objlist="$objlist $obj" + eval test_cmds=\"$old_archive_cmds\" + if len=`expr "X$test_cmds" : ".*"` && + test "$len" -le "$max_cmd_len"; then + : + else + # the above command should be used before it gets too long + oldobjs=$objlist + if test "$obj" = "$last_oldobj" ; then + RANLIB=$save_RANLIB + fi + test -z "$concat_cmds" || concat_cmds=$concat_cmds~ + eval concat_cmds=\"\${concat_cmds}$old_archive_cmds\" + objlist= + fi + done + RANLIB=$save_RANLIB + oldobjs=$objlist + if test "X$oldobjs" = "X" ; then + eval cmds=\"\$concat_cmds\" + else + eval cmds=\"\$concat_cmds~\$old_archive_cmds\" + fi + fi + fi + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + done + + if test -n "$generated"; then + $show "${rm}r$generated" + $run ${rm}r$generated + fi + + # Now create the libtool archive. + case $output in + *.la) + old_library= + test "$build_old_libs" = yes && old_library="$libname.$libext" + $show "creating $output" + + # Preserve any variables that may affect compiler behavior + for var in $variables_saved_for_relink; do + if eval test -z \"\${$var+set}\"; then + relink_command="{ test -z \"\${$var+set}\" || unset $var || { $var=; export $var; }; }; $relink_command" + elif eval var_value=\$$var; test -z "$var_value"; then + relink_command="$var=; export $var; $relink_command" + else + var_value=`$echo "X$var_value" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + relink_command="$var=\"$var_value\"; export $var; $relink_command" + fi + done + # Quote the link command for shipping. + relink_command="(cd `pwd`; $SHELL $0 $preserve_args --mode=relink $libtool_args @inst_prefix_dir@)" + relink_command=`$echo "X$relink_command" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + if test "$hardcode_automatic" = yes ; then + relink_command= + fi + # Only create the output if not a dry run. + if test -z "$run"; then + for installed in no yes; do + if test "$installed" = yes; then + if test -z "$install_libdir"; then + break + fi + output="$output_objdir/$outputname"i + # Replace all uninstalled libtool libraries with the installed ones + newdependency_libs= + for deplib in $dependency_libs; do + case $deplib in + *.la) + name=`$echo "X$deplib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + eval libdir=`${SED} -n -e 's/^libdir=\(.*\)$/\1/p' $deplib` + if test -z "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$deplib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + newdependency_libs="$newdependency_libs $libdir/$name" + ;; + *) newdependency_libs="$newdependency_libs $deplib" ;; + esac + done + dependency_libs="$newdependency_libs" + newdlfiles= + for lib in $dlfiles; do + name=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + eval libdir=`${SED} -n -e 's/^libdir=\(.*\)$/\1/p' $lib` + if test -z "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$lib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + newdlfiles="$newdlfiles $libdir/$name" + done + dlfiles="$newdlfiles" + newdlprefiles= + for lib in $dlprefiles; do + name=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + eval libdir=`${SED} -n -e 's/^libdir=\(.*\)$/\1/p' $lib` + if test -z "$libdir"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$lib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + newdlprefiles="$newdlprefiles $libdir/$name" + done + dlprefiles="$newdlprefiles" + else + newdlfiles= + for lib in $dlfiles; do + case $lib in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) abs="$lib" ;; + *) abs=`pwd`"/$lib" ;; + esac + newdlfiles="$newdlfiles $abs" + done + dlfiles="$newdlfiles" + newdlprefiles= + for lib in $dlprefiles; do + case $lib in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) abs="$lib" ;; + *) abs=`pwd`"/$lib" ;; + esac + newdlprefiles="$newdlprefiles $abs" + done + dlprefiles="$newdlprefiles" + fi + $rm $output + # place dlname in correct position for cygwin + tdlname=$dlname + case $host,$output,$installed,$module,$dlname in + *cygwin*,*lai,yes,no,*.dll | *mingw*,*lai,yes,no,*.dll) tdlname=../bin/$dlname ;; + esac + $echo > $output "\ +# $outputname - a libtool library file +# Generated by $PROGRAM - GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION$TIMESTAMP +# +# Please DO NOT delete this file! +# It is necessary for linking the library. + +# The name that we can dlopen(3). +dlname='$tdlname' + +# Names of this library. +library_names='$library_names' + +# The name of the static archive. +old_library='$old_library' + +# Libraries that this one depends upon. +dependency_libs='$dependency_libs' + +# Version information for $libname. +current=$current +age=$age +revision=$revision + +# Is this an already installed library? +installed=$installed + +# Should we warn about portability when linking against -modules? +shouldnotlink=$module + +# Files to dlopen/dlpreopen +dlopen='$dlfiles' +dlpreopen='$dlprefiles' + +# Directory that this library needs to be installed in: +libdir='$install_libdir'" + if test "$installed" = no && test "$need_relink" = yes; then + $echo >> $output "\ +relink_command=\"$relink_command\"" + fi + done + fi + + # Do a symbolic link so that the libtool archive can be found in + # LD_LIBRARY_PATH before the program is installed. + $show "(cd $output_objdir && $rm $outputname && $LN_S ../$outputname $outputname)" + $run eval '(cd $output_objdir && $rm $outputname && $LN_S ../$outputname $outputname)' || exit $? + ;; + esac + exit 0 + ;; + + # libtool install mode + install) + modename="$modename: install" + + # There may be an optional sh(1) argument at the beginning of + # install_prog (especially on Windows NT). + if test "$nonopt" = "$SHELL" || test "$nonopt" = /bin/sh || + # Allow the use of GNU shtool's install command. + $echo "X$nonopt" | $Xsed | grep shtool > /dev/null; then + # Aesthetically quote it. + arg=`$echo "X$nonopt" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + install_prog="$arg " + arg="$1" + shift + else + install_prog= + arg="$nonopt" + fi + + # The real first argument should be the name of the installation program. + # Aesthetically quote it. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + install_prog="$install_prog$arg" + + # We need to accept at least all the BSD install flags. + dest= + files= + opts= + prev= + install_type= + isdir=no + stripme= + for arg + do + if test -n "$dest"; then + files="$files $dest" + dest="$arg" + continue + fi + + case $arg in + -d) isdir=yes ;; + -f) prev="-f" ;; + -g) prev="-g" ;; + -m) prev="-m" ;; + -o) prev="-o" ;; + -s) + stripme=" -s" + continue + ;; + -*) ;; + + *) + # If the previous option needed an argument, then skip it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + prev= + else + dest="$arg" + continue + fi + ;; + esac + + # Aesthetically quote the argument. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case $arg in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + install_prog="$install_prog $arg" + done + + if test -z "$install_prog"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify an install program" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$prev"; then + $echo "$modename: the \`$prev' option requires an argument" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -z "$files"; then + if test -z "$dest"; then + $echo "$modename: no file or destination specified" 1>&2 + else + $echo "$modename: you must specify a destination" 1>&2 + fi + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Strip any trailing slash from the destination. + dest=`$echo "X$dest" | $Xsed -e 's%/$%%'` + + # Check to see that the destination is a directory. + test -d "$dest" && isdir=yes + if test "$isdir" = yes; then + destdir="$dest" + destname= + else + destdir=`$echo "X$dest" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$destdir" = "X$dest" && destdir=. + destname=`$echo "X$dest" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + # Not a directory, so check to see that there is only one file specified. + set dummy $files + if test "$#" -gt 2; then + $echo "$modename: \`$dest' is not a directory" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + fi + case $destdir in + [\\/]* | [A-Za-z]:[\\/]*) ;; + *) + for file in $files; do + case $file in + *.lo) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: \`$destdir' must be an absolute directory name" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + done + ;; + esac + + # This variable tells wrapper scripts just to set variables rather + # than running their programs. + libtool_install_magic="$magic" + + staticlibs= + future_libdirs= + current_libdirs= + for file in $files; do + + # Do each installation. + case $file in + *.$libext) + # Do the static libraries later. + staticlibs="$staticlibs $file" + ;; + + *.la) + # Check to see that this really is a libtool archive. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $file | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + $echo "$modename: \`$file' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + library_names= + old_library= + relink_command= + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $file in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Add the libdir to current_libdirs if it is the destination. + if test "X$destdir" = "X$libdir"; then + case "$current_libdirs " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) current_libdirs="$current_libdirs $libdir" ;; + esac + else + # Note the libdir as a future libdir. + case "$future_libdirs " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) future_libdirs="$future_libdirs $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'`/ + test "X$dir" = "X$file/" && dir= + dir="$dir$objdir" + + if test -n "$relink_command"; then + # Determine the prefix the user has applied to our future dir. + inst_prefix_dir=`$echo "$destdir" | $SED "s%$libdir\$%%"` + + # Don't allow the user to place us outside of our expected + # location b/c this prevents finding dependent libraries that + # are installed to the same prefix. + # At present, this check doesn't affect windows .dll's that + # are installed into $libdir/../bin (currently, that works fine) + # but it's something to keep an eye on. + if test "$inst_prefix_dir" = "$destdir"; then + $echo "$modename: error: cannot install \`$file' to a directory not ending in $libdir" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$inst_prefix_dir"; then + # Stick the inst_prefix_dir data into the link command. + relink_command=`$echo "$relink_command" | $SED "s%@inst_prefix_dir@%-inst-prefix-dir $inst_prefix_dir%"` + else + relink_command=`$echo "$relink_command" | $SED "s%@inst_prefix_dir@%%"` + fi + + $echo "$modename: warning: relinking \`$file'" 1>&2 + $show "$relink_command" + if $run eval "$relink_command"; then : + else + $echo "$modename: error: relink \`$file' with the above command before installing it" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + fi + + # See the names of the shared library. + set dummy $library_names + if test -n "$2"; then + realname="$2" + shift + shift + + srcname="$realname" + test -n "$relink_command" && srcname="$realname"T + + # Install the shared library and build the symlinks. + $show "$install_prog $dir/$srcname $destdir/$realname" + $run eval "$install_prog $dir/$srcname $destdir/$realname" || exit $? + if test -n "$stripme" && test -n "$striplib"; then + $show "$striplib $destdir/$realname" + $run eval "$striplib $destdir/$realname" || exit $? + fi + + if test "$#" -gt 0; then + # Delete the old symlinks, and create new ones. + for linkname + do + if test "$linkname" != "$realname"; then + $show "(cd $destdir && $rm $linkname && $LN_S $realname $linkname)" + $run eval "(cd $destdir && $rm $linkname && $LN_S $realname $linkname)" + fi + done + fi + + # Do each command in the postinstall commands. + lib="$destdir/$realname" + cmds=$postinstall_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + # Install the pseudo-library for information purposes. + name=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + instname="$dir/$name"i + $show "$install_prog $instname $destdir/$name" + $run eval "$install_prog $instname $destdir/$name" || exit $? + + # Maybe install the static library, too. + test -n "$old_library" && staticlibs="$staticlibs $dir/$old_library" + ;; + + *.lo) + # Install (i.e. copy) a libtool object. + + # Figure out destination file name, if it wasn't already specified. + if test -n "$destname"; then + destfile="$destdir/$destname" + else + destfile=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + destfile="$destdir/$destfile" + fi + + # Deduce the name of the destination old-style object file. + case $destfile in + *.lo) + staticdest=`$echo "X$destfile" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + ;; + *.$objext) + staticdest="$destfile" + destfile= + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: cannot copy a libtool object to \`$destfile'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + # Install the libtool object if requested. + if test -n "$destfile"; then + $show "$install_prog $file $destfile" + $run eval "$install_prog $file $destfile" || exit $? + fi + + # Install the old object if enabled. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + # Deduce the name of the old-style object file. + staticobj=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + + $show "$install_prog $staticobj $staticdest" + $run eval "$install_prog \$staticobj \$staticdest" || exit $? + fi + exit 0 + ;; + + *) + # Figure out destination file name, if it wasn't already specified. + if test -n "$destname"; then + destfile="$destdir/$destname" + else + destfile=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + destfile="$destdir/$destfile" + fi + + # If the file is missing, and there is a .exe on the end, strip it + # because it is most likely a libtool script we actually want to + # install + stripped_ext="" + case $file in + *.exe) + if test ! -f "$file"; then + file=`$echo $file|${SED} 's,.exe$,,'` + stripped_ext=".exe" + fi + ;; + esac + + # Do a test to see if this is really a libtool program. + case $host in + *cygwin*|*mingw*) + wrapper=`$echo $file | ${SED} -e 's,.exe$,,'` + ;; + *) + wrapper=$file + ;; + esac + if (${SED} -e '4q' $wrapper | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE")>/dev/null 2>&1; then + notinst_deplibs= + relink_command= + + # To insure that "foo" is sourced, and not "foo.exe", + # finese the cygwin/MSYS system by explicitly sourcing "foo." + # which disallows the automatic-append-.exe behavior. + case $build in + *cygwin* | *mingw*) wrapperdot=${wrapper}. ;; + *) wrapperdot=${wrapper} ;; + esac + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $file in + */* | *\\*) . ${wrapperdot} ;; + *) . ./${wrapperdot} ;; + esac + + # Check the variables that should have been set. + if test -z "$notinst_deplibs"; then + $echo "$modename: invalid libtool wrapper script \`$wrapper'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + finalize=yes + for lib in $notinst_deplibs; do + # Check to see that each library is installed. + libdir= + if test -f "$lib"; then + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $lib in + */* | *\\*) . $lib ;; + *) . ./$lib ;; + esac + fi + libfile="$libdir/"`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%g'` ### testsuite: skip nested quoting test + if test -n "$libdir" && test ! -f "$libfile"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`$lib' has not been installed in \`$libdir'" 1>&2 + finalize=no + fi + done + + relink_command= + # To insure that "foo" is sourced, and not "foo.exe", + # finese the cygwin/MSYS system by explicitly sourcing "foo." + # which disallows the automatic-append-.exe behavior. + case $build in + *cygwin* | *mingw*) wrapperdot=${wrapper}. ;; + *) wrapperdot=${wrapper} ;; + esac + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $file in + */* | *\\*) . ${wrapperdot} ;; + *) . ./${wrapperdot} ;; + esac + + outputname= + if test "$fast_install" = no && test -n "$relink_command"; then + if test "$finalize" = yes && test -z "$run"; then + tmpdir="/tmp" + test -n "$TMPDIR" && tmpdir="$TMPDIR" + tmpdir="$tmpdir/libtool-$$" + if $mkdir "$tmpdir" && chmod 700 "$tmpdir"; then : + else + $echo "$modename: error: cannot create temporary directory \`$tmpdir'" 1>&2 + continue + fi + file=`$echo "X$file$stripped_ext" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + outputname="$tmpdir/$file" + # Replace the output file specification. + relink_command=`$echo "X$relink_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$outputname"'%g'` + + $show "$relink_command" + if $run eval "$relink_command"; then : + else + $echo "$modename: error: relink \`$file' with the above command before installing it" 1>&2 + ${rm}r "$tmpdir" + continue + fi + file="$outputname" + else + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot relink \`$file'" 1>&2 + fi + else + # Install the binary that we compiled earlier. + file=`$echo "X$file$stripped_ext" | $Xsed -e "s%\([^/]*\)$%$objdir/\1%"` + fi + fi + + # remove .exe since cygwin /usr/bin/install will append another + # one anyways + case $install_prog,$host in + */usr/bin/install*,*cygwin*) + case $file:$destfile in + *.exe:*.exe) + # this is ok + ;; + *.exe:*) + destfile=$destfile.exe + ;; + *:*.exe) + destfile=`$echo $destfile | ${SED} -e 's,.exe$,,'` + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + $show "$install_prog$stripme $file $destfile" + $run eval "$install_prog\$stripme \$file \$destfile" || exit $? + test -n "$outputname" && ${rm}r "$tmpdir" + ;; + esac + done + + for file in $staticlibs; do + name=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + # Set up the ranlib parameters. + oldlib="$destdir/$name" + + $show "$install_prog $file $oldlib" + $run eval "$install_prog \$file \$oldlib" || exit $? + + if test -n "$stripme" && test -n "$old_striplib"; then + $show "$old_striplib $oldlib" + $run eval "$old_striplib $oldlib" || exit $? + fi + + # Do each command in the postinstall commands. + cmds=$old_postinstall_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + done + + if test -n "$future_libdirs"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: remember to run \`$progname --finish$future_libdirs'" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$current_libdirs"; then + # Maybe just do a dry run. + test -n "$run" && current_libdirs=" -n$current_libdirs" + exec_cmd='$SHELL $0 $preserve_args --finish$current_libdirs' + else + exit 0 + fi + ;; + + # libtool finish mode + finish) + modename="$modename: finish" + libdirs="$nonopt" + admincmds= + + if test -n "$finish_cmds$finish_eval" && test -n "$libdirs"; then + for dir + do + libdirs="$libdirs $dir" + done + + for libdir in $libdirs; do + if test -n "$finish_cmds"; then + # Do each command in the finish commands. + cmds=$finish_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || admincmds="$admincmds + $cmd" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + if test -n "$finish_eval"; then + # Do the single finish_eval. + eval cmds=\"$finish_eval\" + $run eval "$cmds" || admincmds="$admincmds + $cmds" + fi + done + fi + + # Exit here if they wanted silent mode. + test "$show" = : && exit 0 + + $echo "----------------------------------------------------------------------" + $echo "Libraries have been installed in:" + for libdir in $libdirs; do + $echo " $libdir" + done + $echo + $echo "If you ever happen to want to link against installed libraries" + $echo "in a given directory, LIBDIR, you must either use libtool, and" + $echo "specify the full pathname of the library, or use the \`-LLIBDIR'" + $echo "flag during linking and do at least one of the following:" + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + $echo " - add LIBDIR to the \`$shlibpath_var' environment variable" + $echo " during execution" + fi + if test -n "$runpath_var"; then + $echo " - add LIBDIR to the \`$runpath_var' environment variable" + $echo " during linking" + fi + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + libdir=LIBDIR + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + + $echo " - use the \`$flag' linker flag" + fi + if test -n "$admincmds"; then + $echo " - have your system administrator run these commands:$admincmds" + fi + if test -f /etc/ld.so.conf; then + $echo " - have your system administrator add LIBDIR to \`/etc/ld.so.conf'" + fi + $echo + $echo "See any operating system documentation about shared libraries for" + $echo "more information, such as the ld(1) and ld.so(8) manual pages." + $echo "----------------------------------------------------------------------" + exit 0 + ;; + + # libtool execute mode + execute) + modename="$modename: execute" + + # The first argument is the command name. + cmd="$nonopt" + if test -z "$cmd"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify a COMMAND" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" + exit 1 + fi + + # Handle -dlopen flags immediately. + for file in $execute_dlfiles; do + if test ! -f "$file"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$file' is not a file" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + dir= + case $file in + *.la) + # Check to see that this really is a libtool archive. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $file | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + $echo "$modename: \`$lib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Read the libtool library. + dlname= + library_names= + + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $file in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Skip this library if it cannot be dlopened. + if test -z "$dlname"; then + # Warn if it was a shared library. + test -n "$library_names" && $echo "$modename: warning: \`$file' was not linked with \`-export-dynamic'" + continue + fi + + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$dir" = "X$file" && dir=. + + if test -f "$dir/$objdir/$dlname"; then + dir="$dir/$objdir" + else + $echo "$modename: cannot find \`$dlname' in \`$dir' or \`$dir/$objdir'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + ;; + + *.lo) + # Just add the directory containing the .lo file. + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$dir" = "X$file" && dir=. + ;; + + *) + $echo "$modename: warning \`-dlopen' is ignored for non-libtool libraries and objects" 1>&2 + continue + ;; + esac + + # Get the absolute pathname. + absdir=`cd "$dir" && pwd` + test -n "$absdir" && dir="$absdir" + + # Now add the directory to shlibpath_var. + if eval "test -z \"\$$shlibpath_var\""; then + eval "$shlibpath_var=\"\$dir\"" + else + eval "$shlibpath_var=\"\$dir:\$$shlibpath_var\"" + fi + done + + # This variable tells wrapper scripts just to set shlibpath_var + # rather than running their programs. + libtool_execute_magic="$magic" + + # Check if any of the arguments is a wrapper script. + args= + for file + do + case $file in + -*) ;; + *) + # Do a test to see if this is really a libtool program. + if (${SED} -e '4q' $file | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case $file in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Transform arg to wrapped name. + file="$progdir/$program" + fi + ;; + esac + # Quote arguments (to preserve shell metacharacters). + file=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + args="$args \"$file\"" + done + + if test -z "$run"; then + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + # Export the shlibpath_var. + eval "export $shlibpath_var" + fi + + # Restore saved environment variables + if test "${save_LC_ALL+set}" = set; then + LC_ALL="$save_LC_ALL"; export LC_ALL + fi + if test "${save_LANG+set}" = set; then + LANG="$save_LANG"; export LANG + fi + + # Now prepare to actually exec the command. + exec_cmd="\$cmd$args" + else + # Display what would be done. + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + eval "\$echo \"\$shlibpath_var=\$$shlibpath_var\"" + $echo "export $shlibpath_var" + fi + $echo "$cmd$args" + exit 0 + fi + ;; + + # libtool clean and uninstall mode + clean | uninstall) + modename="$modename: $mode" + rm="$nonopt" + files= + rmforce= + exit_status=0 + + # This variable tells wrapper scripts just to set variables rather + # than running their programs. + libtool_install_magic="$magic" + + for arg + do + case $arg in + -f) rm="$rm $arg"; rmforce=yes ;; + -*) rm="$rm $arg" ;; + *) files="$files $arg" ;; + esac + done + + if test -z "$rm"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify an RM program" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + rmdirs= + + origobjdir="$objdir" + for file in $files; do + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$dir" = "X$file"; then + dir=. + objdir="$origobjdir" + else + objdir="$dir/$origobjdir" + fi + name=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + test "$mode" = uninstall && objdir="$dir" + + # Remember objdir for removal later, being careful to avoid duplicates + if test "$mode" = clean; then + case " $rmdirs " in + *" $objdir "*) ;; + *) rmdirs="$rmdirs $objdir" ;; + esac + fi + + # Don't error if the file doesn't exist and rm -f was used. + if (test -L "$file") >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || (test -h "$file") >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || test -f "$file"; then + : + elif test -d "$file"; then + exit_status=1 + continue + elif test "$rmforce" = yes; then + continue + fi + + rmfiles="$file" + + case $name in + *.la) + # Possibly a libtool archive, so verify it. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $file | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + . $dir/$name + + # Delete the libtool libraries and symlinks. + for n in $library_names; do + rmfiles="$rmfiles $objdir/$n" + done + test -n "$old_library" && rmfiles="$rmfiles $objdir/$old_library" + test "$mode" = clean && rmfiles="$rmfiles $objdir/$name $objdir/${name}i" + + if test "$mode" = uninstall; then + if test -n "$library_names"; then + # Do each command in the postuninstall commands. + cmds=$postuninstall_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" + if test "$?" -ne 0 && test "$rmforce" != yes; then + exit_status=1 + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + if test -n "$old_library"; then + # Do each command in the old_postuninstall commands. + cmds=$old_postuninstall_cmds + save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + eval cmd=\"$cmd\" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" + if test "$?" -ne 0 && test "$rmforce" != yes; then + exit_status=1 + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + # FIXME: should reinstall the best remaining shared library. + fi + fi + ;; + + *.lo) + # Possibly a libtool object, so verify it. + if (${SED} -e '2q' $file | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + + # Read the .lo file + . $dir/$name + + # Add PIC object to the list of files to remove. + if test -n "$pic_object" \ + && test "$pic_object" != none; then + rmfiles="$rmfiles $dir/$pic_object" + fi + + # Add non-PIC object to the list of files to remove. + if test -n "$non_pic_object" \ + && test "$non_pic_object" != none; then + rmfiles="$rmfiles $dir/$non_pic_object" + fi + fi + ;; + + *) + if test "$mode" = clean ; then + noexename=$name + case $file in + *.exe) + file=`$echo $file|${SED} 's,.exe$,,'` + noexename=`$echo $name|${SED} 's,.exe$,,'` + # $file with .exe has already been added to rmfiles, + # add $file without .exe + rmfiles="$rmfiles $file" + ;; + esac + # Do a test to see if this is a libtool program. + if (${SED} -e '4q' $file | grep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + relink_command= + . $dir/$noexename + + # note $name still contains .exe if it was in $file originally + # as does the version of $file that was added into $rmfiles + rmfiles="$rmfiles $objdir/$name $objdir/${name}S.${objext}" + if test "$fast_install" = yes && test -n "$relink_command"; then + rmfiles="$rmfiles $objdir/lt-$name" + fi + if test "X$noexename" != "X$name" ; then + rmfiles="$rmfiles $objdir/lt-${noexename}.c" + fi + fi + fi + ;; + esac + $show "$rm $rmfiles" + $run $rm $rmfiles || exit_status=1 + done + objdir="$origobjdir" + + # Try to remove the ${objdir}s in the directories where we deleted files + for dir in $rmdirs; do + if test -d "$dir"; then + $show "rmdir $dir" + $run rmdir $dir >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + + exit $exit_status + ;; + + "") + $echo "$modename: you must specify a MODE" 1>&2 + $echo "$generic_help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + if test -z "$exec_cmd"; then + $echo "$modename: invalid operation mode \`$mode'" 1>&2 + $echo "$generic_help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi +fi # test -z "$show_help" + +if test -n "$exec_cmd"; then + eval exec $exec_cmd + exit 1 +fi + +# We need to display help for each of the modes. +case $mode in +"") $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... [MODE-ARG]... + +Provide generalized library-building support services. + + --config show all configuration variables + --debug enable verbose shell tracing +-n, --dry-run display commands without modifying any files + --features display basic configuration information and exit + --finish same as \`--mode=finish' + --help display this help message and exit + --mode=MODE use operation mode MODE [default=inferred from MODE-ARGS] + --quiet same as \`--silent' + --silent don't print informational messages + --tag=TAG use configuration variables from tag TAG + --version print version information + +MODE must be one of the following: + + clean remove files from the build directory + compile compile a source file into a libtool object + execute automatically set library path, then run a program + finish complete the installation of libtool libraries + install install libraries or executables + link create a library or an executable + uninstall remove libraries from an installed directory + +MODE-ARGS vary depending on the MODE. Try \`$modename --help --mode=MODE' for +a more detailed description of MODE. + +Report bugs to ." + exit 0 + ;; + +clean) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=clean RM [RM-OPTION]... FILE... + +Remove files from the build directory. + +RM is the name of the program to use to delete files associated with each FILE +(typically \`/bin/rm'). RM-OPTIONS are options (such as \`-f') to be passed +to RM. + +If FILE is a libtool library, object or program, all the files associated +with it are deleted. Otherwise, only FILE itself is deleted using RM." + ;; + +compile) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=compile COMPILE-COMMAND... SOURCEFILE + +Compile a source file into a libtool library object. + +This mode accepts the following additional options: + + -o OUTPUT-FILE set the output file name to OUTPUT-FILE + -prefer-pic try to building PIC objects only + -prefer-non-pic try to building non-PIC objects only + -static always build a \`.o' file suitable for static linking + +COMPILE-COMMAND is a command to be used in creating a \`standard' object file +from the given SOURCEFILE. + +The output file name is determined by removing the directory component from +SOURCEFILE, then substituting the C source code suffix \`.c' with the +library object suffix, \`.lo'." + ;; + +execute) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=execute COMMAND [ARGS]... + +Automatically set library path, then run a program. + +This mode accepts the following additional options: + + -dlopen FILE add the directory containing FILE to the library path + +This mode sets the library path environment variable according to \`-dlopen' +flags. + +If any of the ARGS are libtool executable wrappers, then they are translated +into their corresponding uninstalled binary, and any of their required library +directories are added to the library path. + +Then, COMMAND is executed, with ARGS as arguments." + ;; + +finish) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=finish [LIBDIR]... + +Complete the installation of libtool libraries. + +Each LIBDIR is a directory that contains libtool libraries. + +The commands that this mode executes may require superuser privileges. Use +the \`--dry-run' option if you just want to see what would be executed." + ;; + +install) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=install INSTALL-COMMAND... + +Install executables or libraries. + +INSTALL-COMMAND is the installation command. The first component should be +either the \`install' or \`cp' program. + +The rest of the components are interpreted as arguments to that command (only +BSD-compatible install options are recognized)." + ;; + +link) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=link LINK-COMMAND... + +Link object files or libraries together to form another library, or to +create an executable program. + +LINK-COMMAND is a command using the C compiler that you would use to create +a program from several object files. + +The following components of LINK-COMMAND are treated specially: + + -all-static do not do any dynamic linking at all + -avoid-version do not add a version suffix if possible + -dlopen FILE \`-dlpreopen' FILE if it cannot be dlopened at runtime + -dlpreopen FILE link in FILE and add its symbols to lt_preloaded_symbols + -export-dynamic allow symbols from OUTPUT-FILE to be resolved with dlsym(3) + -export-symbols SYMFILE + try to export only the symbols listed in SYMFILE + -export-symbols-regex REGEX + try to export only the symbols matching REGEX + -LLIBDIR search LIBDIR for required installed libraries + -lNAME OUTPUT-FILE requires the installed library libNAME + -module build a library that can dlopened + -no-fast-install disable the fast-install mode + -no-install link a not-installable executable + -no-undefined declare that a library does not refer to external symbols + -o OUTPUT-FILE create OUTPUT-FILE from the specified objects + -objectlist FILE Use a list of object files found in FILE to specify objects + -precious-files-regex REGEX + don't remove output files matching REGEX + -release RELEASE specify package release information + -rpath LIBDIR the created library will eventually be installed in LIBDIR + -R[ ]LIBDIR add LIBDIR to the runtime path of programs and libraries + -static do not do any dynamic linking of libtool libraries + -version-info CURRENT[:REVISION[:AGE]] + specify library version info [each variable defaults to 0] + +All other options (arguments beginning with \`-') are ignored. + +Every other argument is treated as a filename. Files ending in \`.la' are +treated as uninstalled libtool libraries, other files are standard or library +object files. + +If the OUTPUT-FILE ends in \`.la', then a libtool library is created, +only library objects (\`.lo' files) may be specified, and \`-rpath' is +required, except when creating a convenience library. + +If OUTPUT-FILE ends in \`.a' or \`.lib', then a standard library is created +using \`ar' and \`ranlib', or on Windows using \`lib'. + +If OUTPUT-FILE ends in \`.lo' or \`.${objext}', then a reloadable object file +is created, otherwise an executable program is created." + ;; + +uninstall) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=uninstall RM [RM-OPTION]... FILE... + +Remove libraries from an installation directory. + +RM is the name of the program to use to delete files associated with each FILE +(typically \`/bin/rm'). RM-OPTIONS are options (such as \`-f') to be passed +to RM. + +If FILE is a libtool library, all the files associated with it are deleted. +Otherwise, only FILE itself is deleted using RM." + ;; + +*) + $echo "$modename: invalid operation mode \`$mode'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +$echo +$echo "Try \`$modename --help' for more information about other modes." + +exit 0 + +# The TAGs below are defined such that we never get into a situation +# in which we disable both kinds of libraries. Given conflicting +# choices, we go for a static library, that is the most portable, +# since we can't tell whether shared libraries were disabled because +# the user asked for that or because the platform doesn't support +# them. This is particularly important on AIX, because we don't +# support having both static and shared libraries enabled at the same +# time on that platform, so we default to a shared-only configuration. +# If a disable-shared tag is given, we'll fallback to a static-only +# configuration. But we'll never go from static-only to shared-only. + +# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: disable-shared +build_libtool_libs=no +build_old_libs=yes +# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: disable-shared + +# ### BEGIN LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: disable-static +build_old_libs=`case $build_libtool_libs in yes) $echo no;; *) $echo yes;; esac` +# ### END LIBTOOL TAG CONFIG: disable-static + +# Local Variables: +# mode:shell-script +# sh-indentation:2 +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/missing b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/missing new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7ef83a1c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/missing @@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Common stub for a few missing GNU programs while installing. + +scriptversion=2003-09-02.23 + +# Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Originally by Fran,cois Pinard , 1996. + +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. + +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA +# 02111-1307, USA. + +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +if test $# -eq 0; then + echo 1>&2 "Try \`$0 --help' for more information" + exit 1 +fi + +run=: + +# In the cases where this matters, `missing' is being run in the +# srcdir already. +if test -f configure.ac; then + configure_ac=configure.ac +else + configure_ac=configure.in +fi + +msg="missing on your system" + +case "$1" in +--run) + # Try to run requested program, and just exit if it succeeds. + run= + shift + "$@" && exit 0 + # Exit code 63 means version mismatch. This often happens + # when the user try to use an ancient version of a tool on + # a file that requires a minimum version. In this case we + # we should proceed has if the program had been absent, or + # if --run hadn't been passed. + if test $? = 63; then + run=: + msg="probably too old" + fi + ;; +esac + +# If it does not exist, or fails to run (possibly an outdated version), +# try to emulate it. +case "$1" in + + -h|--h|--he|--hel|--help) + echo "\ +$0 [OPTION]... PROGRAM [ARGUMENT]... + +Handle \`PROGRAM [ARGUMENT]...' for when PROGRAM is missing, or return an +error status if there is no known handling for PROGRAM. + +Options: + -h, --help display this help and exit + -v, --version output version information and exit + --run try to run the given command, and emulate it if it fails + +Supported PROGRAM values: + aclocal touch file \`aclocal.m4' + autoconf touch file \`configure' + autoheader touch file \`config.h.in' + automake touch all \`Makefile.in' files + bison create \`y.tab.[ch]', if possible, from existing .[ch] + flex create \`lex.yy.c', if possible, from existing .c + help2man touch the output file + lex create \`lex.yy.c', if possible, from existing .c + makeinfo touch the output file + tar try tar, gnutar, gtar, then tar without non-portable flags + yacc create \`y.tab.[ch]', if possible, from existing .[ch] + +Send bug reports to ." + ;; + + -v|--v|--ve|--ver|--vers|--versi|--versio|--version) + echo "missing $scriptversion (GNU Automake)" + ;; + + -*) + echo 1>&2 "$0: Unknown \`$1' option" + echo 1>&2 "Try \`$0 --help' for more information" + exit 1 + ;; + + aclocal*) + if test -z "$run" && ($1 --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have it, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified \`acinclude.m4' or \`${configure_ac}'. You might want + to install the \`Automake' and \`Perl' packages. Grab them from + any GNU archive site." + touch aclocal.m4 + ;; + + autoconf) + if test -z "$run" && ($1 --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have it, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified \`${configure_ac}'. You might want to install the + \`Autoconf' and \`GNU m4' packages. Grab them from any GNU + archive site." + touch configure + ;; + + autoheader) + if test -z "$run" && ($1 --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have it, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified \`acconfig.h' or \`${configure_ac}'. You might want + to install the \`Autoconf' and \`GNU m4' packages. Grab them + from any GNU archive site." + files=`sed -n 's/^[ ]*A[CM]_CONFIG_HEADER(\([^)]*\)).*/\1/p' ${configure_ac}` + test -z "$files" && files="config.h" + touch_files= + for f in $files; do + case "$f" in + *:*) touch_files="$touch_files "`echo "$f" | + sed -e 's/^[^:]*://' -e 's/:.*//'`;; + *) touch_files="$touch_files $f.in";; + esac + done + touch $touch_files + ;; + + automake*) + if test -z "$run" && ($1 --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have it, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified \`Makefile.am', \`acinclude.m4' or \`${configure_ac}'. + You might want to install the \`Automake' and \`Perl' packages. + Grab them from any GNU archive site." + find . -type f -name Makefile.am -print | + sed 's/\.am$/.in/' | + while read f; do touch "$f"; done + ;; + + autom4te) + if test -z "$run" && ($1 --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have it, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is needed, but is $msg. + You might have modified some files without having the + proper tools for further handling them. + You can get \`$1' as part of \`Autoconf' from any GNU + archive site." + + file=`echo "$*" | sed -n 's/.*--output[ =]*\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p'` + test -z "$file" && file=`echo "$*" | sed -n 's/.*-o[ ]*\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p'` + if test -f "$file"; then + touch $file + else + test -z "$file" || exec >$file + echo "#! /bin/sh" + echo "# Created by GNU Automake missing as a replacement of" + echo "# $ $@" + echo "exit 0" + chmod +x $file + exit 1 + fi + ;; + + bison|yacc) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' $msg. You should only need it if + you modified a \`.y' file. You may need the \`Bison' package + in order for those modifications to take effect. You can get + \`Bison' from any GNU archive site." + rm -f y.tab.c y.tab.h + if [ $# -ne 1 ]; then + eval LASTARG="\${$#}" + case "$LASTARG" in + *.y) + SRCFILE=`echo "$LASTARG" | sed 's/y$/c/'` + if [ -f "$SRCFILE" ]; then + cp "$SRCFILE" y.tab.c + fi + SRCFILE=`echo "$LASTARG" | sed 's/y$/h/'` + if [ -f "$SRCFILE" ]; then + cp "$SRCFILE" y.tab.h + fi + ;; + esac + fi + if [ ! -f y.tab.h ]; then + echo >y.tab.h + fi + if [ ! -f y.tab.c ]; then + echo 'main() { return 0; }' >y.tab.c + fi + ;; + + lex|flex) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified a \`.l' file. You may need the \`Flex' package + in order for those modifications to take effect. You can get + \`Flex' from any GNU archive site." + rm -f lex.yy.c + if [ $# -ne 1 ]; then + eval LASTARG="\${$#}" + case "$LASTARG" in + *.l) + SRCFILE=`echo "$LASTARG" | sed 's/l$/c/'` + if [ -f "$SRCFILE" ]; then + cp "$SRCFILE" lex.yy.c + fi + ;; + esac + fi + if [ ! -f lex.yy.c ]; then + echo 'main() { return 0; }' >lex.yy.c + fi + ;; + + help2man) + if test -z "$run" && ($1 --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have it, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified a dependency of a manual page. You may need the + \`Help2man' package in order for those modifications to take + effect. You can get \`Help2man' from any GNU archive site." + + file=`echo "$*" | sed -n 's/.*-o \([^ ]*\).*/\1/p'` + if test -z "$file"; then + file=`echo "$*" | sed -n 's/.*--output=\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p'` + fi + if [ -f "$file" ]; then + touch $file + else + test -z "$file" || exec >$file + echo ".ab help2man is required to generate this page" + exit 1 + fi + ;; + + makeinfo) + if test -z "$run" && (makeinfo --version) > /dev/null 2>&1; then + # We have makeinfo, but it failed. + exit 1 + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is $msg. You should only need it if + you modified a \`.texi' or \`.texinfo' file, or any other file + indirectly affecting the aspect of the manual. The spurious + call might also be the consequence of using a buggy \`make' (AIX, + DU, IRIX). You might want to install the \`Texinfo' package or + the \`GNU make' package. Grab either from any GNU archive site." + file=`echo "$*" | sed -n 's/.*-o \([^ ]*\).*/\1/p'` + if test -z "$file"; then + file=`echo "$*" | sed 's/.* \([^ ]*\) *$/\1/'` + file=`sed -n '/^@setfilename/ { s/.* \([^ ]*\) *$/\1/; p; q; }' $file` + fi + touch $file + ;; + + tar) + shift + if test -n "$run"; then + echo 1>&2 "ERROR: \`tar' requires --run" + exit 1 + fi + + # We have already tried tar in the generic part. + # Look for gnutar/gtar before invocation to avoid ugly error + # messages. + if (gnutar --version > /dev/null 2>&1); then + gnutar "$@" && exit 0 + fi + if (gtar --version > /dev/null 2>&1); then + gtar "$@" && exit 0 + fi + firstarg="$1" + if shift; then + case "$firstarg" in + *o*) + firstarg=`echo "$firstarg" | sed s/o//` + tar "$firstarg" "$@" && exit 0 + ;; + esac + case "$firstarg" in + *h*) + firstarg=`echo "$firstarg" | sed s/h//` + tar "$firstarg" "$@" && exit 0 + ;; + esac + fi + + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: I can't seem to be able to run \`tar' with the given arguments. + You may want to install GNU tar or Free paxutils, or check the + command line arguments." + exit 1 + ;; + + *) + echo 1>&2 "\ +WARNING: \`$1' is needed, and is $msg. + You might have modified some files without having the + proper tools for further handling them. Check the \`README' file, + it often tells you about the needed prerequisites for installing + this package. You may also peek at any GNU archive site, in case + some other package would contain this missing \`$1' program." + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +exit 0 + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion=" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H" +# time-stamp-end: "$" +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/mkinstalldirs b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/mkinstalldirs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6fbe5e1176 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/mkinstalldirs @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy + +scriptversion=2004-02-15.20 + +# Original author: Noah Friedman +# Created: 1993-05-16 +# Public domain. +# +# This file is maintained in Automake, please report +# bugs to or send patches to +# . + +errstatus=0 +dirmode="" + +usage="\ +Usage: mkinstalldirs [-h] [--help] [--version] [-m MODE] DIR ... + +Create each directory DIR (with mode MODE, if specified), including all +leading file name components. + +Report bugs to ." + +# process command line arguments +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + -h | --help | --h*) # -h for help + echo "$usage" + exit 0 + ;; + -m) # -m PERM arg + shift + test $# -eq 0 && { echo "$usage" 1>&2; exit 1; } + dirmode=$1 + shift + ;; + --version) + echo "$0 $scriptversion" + exit 0 + ;; + --) # stop option processing + shift + break + ;; + -*) # unknown option + echo "$usage" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + *) # first non-opt arg + break + ;; + esac +done + +for file +do + if test -d "$file"; then + shift + else + break + fi +done + +case $# in + 0) exit 0 ;; +esac + +# Solaris 8's mkdir -p isn't thread-safe. If you mkdir -p a/b and +# mkdir -p a/c at the same time, both will detect that a is missing, +# one will create a, then the other will try to create a and die with +# a "File exists" error. This is a problem when calling mkinstalldirs +# from a parallel make. We use --version in the probe to restrict +# ourselves to GNU mkdir, which is thread-safe. +case $dirmode in + '') + if mkdir -p --version . >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -d ./--version; then + echo "mkdir -p -- $*" + exec mkdir -p -- "$@" + else + # On NextStep and OpenStep, the `mkdir' command does not + # recognize any option. It will interpret all options as + # directories to create, and then abort because `.' already + # exists. + test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p + test -d ./--version && rmdir ./--version + fi + ;; + *) + if mkdir -m "$dirmode" -p --version . >/dev/null 2>&1 && + test ! -d ./--version; then + echo "mkdir -m $dirmode -p -- $*" + exec mkdir -m "$dirmode" -p -- "$@" + else + # Clean up after NextStep and OpenStep mkdir. + for d in ./-m ./-p ./--version "./$dirmode"; + do + test -d $d && rmdir $d + done + fi + ;; +esac + +for file +do + set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` + shift + + pathcomp= + for d + do + pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" + case $pathcomp in + -*) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; + esac + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + echo "mkdir $pathcomp" + + mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + else + if test ! -z "$dirmode"; then + echo "chmod $dirmode $pathcomp" + lasterr="" + chmod "$dirmode" "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -z "$lasterr"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + fi + fi + fi + fi + + pathcomp="$pathcomp/" + done +done + +exit $errstatus + +# Local Variables: +# mode: shell-script +# sh-indentation: 2 +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion=" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H" +# time-stamp-end: "$" +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7a9d24d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 2002/09/09 22:29:26 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +EXTRA_DIST = krb5-config.1 + +CLEANFILES = krb5-config + +bin_SCRIPTS = krb5-config + +man_MANS = krb5-config.1 + +krb5-config: krb5-config.in + sed -e "s,@PACKAGE\@,$(PACKAGE),g" \ + -e "s,@VERSION\@,$(VERSION),g" \ + -e "s,@prefix\@,$(prefix),g" \ + -e "s,@exec_prefix\@,$(exec_prefix),g" \ + -e 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"s,@LIB_des_appl\@,$(LIB_des_appl),g" \ + -e "s,@LIBS\@,$(LIBS),g" \ + $(srcdir)/krb5-config.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/build.sh b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/build.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fad860836d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/build.sh @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Build many combinations of kth-krb/heimdal/openssl +# +# $Id: build.sh,v 1.8 2003/04/17 12:55:02 lha Exp $ + +opt_n= #: +make_f= #-j + +heimdal_versions="0.5.2 0.6pre4" +krb4_versions="1.2.2" +openssl_versions="0.9.6i 0.9.7a 0.9.7b" + +make_check_version=".*heimdal-0.6.*" + +# 0.5 dont eat 0.9.7 +dont_build="openssl-0.9.7.*heimdal-0.5.*" +# 1.2 dont eat 0.9.7 +dont_build="openssl-0.9.7.*krb4-1.2.* ${dont_build}" +#yacc problems +dont_build="openssl-0.9.6.*heimdal-0.5.*osf4.* ${dont_build}" +#local openssl 09.7 and broken kuser/Makefile.am +dont_build="openssl-0.9.6.*heimdal-0.5.*freebsd4.8.* ${dont_build}" +failed= + +# Allow override +for a in $HOME . /etc ; do + [ -f $a/.heimdal-build ] && . $a/.heimdal-build +done + +targetdir=${targetdir:-/scratch/heimdal-test} +logfile="${targetdir}/buildlog" + +distdirs="${distdirs} /afs/su.se/home/l/h/lha/Public/openssl" +distdirs="${distdirs} /afs/pdc.kth.se/public/ftp/pub/heimdal/src" +distdirs="${distdirs} /afs/pdc.kth.se/public/ftp/pub/heimdal/src/snapshots" +distdirs="${distdirs} /afs/pdc.kth.se/public/ftp/pub/krb/src" + + +logprint () { + d=`date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S'` + echo "${d}: $*" + echo "${d}: --- $*" >> ${logfile} +} + +logerror () { + echo "$*" + exit 1 +} + +find_unzip_prog () { + unzip_prog= + oldIFS="$IFS" + IFS=: + set -- $PATH + IFS="$oldIFS" + for a in $* ; do + if [ -x $a/gzip ] ; then + unzip_prog="$a/gzip -dc" + break + elif [ -x $a/gunzip ] ; then + unzip_prog="$a/gunzip -c" + break + fi + done + [ "$unzip_prog" = "" ] && logerror failed to find unzip program +} + +find_canon_name () { + canon_name= + for a in ${distdirs} ; do + if [ -f $a/config.guess ] ; then + canon_name=`$a/config.guess` + fi + if [ "${canon_name}" != "" ] ; then + break + fi + done + [ "${canon_name}" = "" ] && logerror "cant find config.guess" +} + +do_check_p () { + eval check_var=\$"$1" + for a in ${check_var} ; do + expr "$2${canon_name}" : "${a}" > /dev/null 2>&1 && return 1 + done + return 0 +} + +unpack_tar () { + for a in ${distdirs} ; do + if [ -f $a/$1 ] ; then + ${opt_n} ${unzip_prog} ${a}/$1 | ${opt_n} tar xf - + return 0 + fi + done + logerror "did not find $1" +} + +build () { + real_ver=$1 + prog=$2 + ver=$3 + confprog=$4 + checks=$5 + pv=${prog}-${ver} + mkdir tmp || logerror "failed to build tmpdir" + cd tmp || logerror "failed to change dir to tmpdir" + do_check_p dont_build ${real_ver} || \ + { cd .. ; rmdir tmp ; logprint "not building $1" && return 0 ; } + cd .. || logerror "failed to change back from tmpdir" + rmdir tmp || logerror "failed to remove tmpdir" + logprint "preparing for ${pv}" + ${opt_n} rm -rf ${targetdir}/${prog}-${ver} + ${opt_n} rm -rf ${prog}-${ver} + unpack_tar ${pv}.tar.gz + ${opt_n} cd ${pv} || logerror directory ${pv} not there + logprint "configure ${prog} ${ver} (${confprog})" + ${opt_n} ./${confprog} \ + --prefix=${targetdir}/${pv} >> ${logfile} 2>&1 || \ + { logprint failed to configure ${pv} ; return 1 ; } + logprint "make ${prog} ${ver}" + ${opt_n} make ${make_f} >> ${logfile} 2>&1 || \ + { logprint failed to make ${pv} ; return 1 ; } + ${opt_n} make install >> ${logfile} 2>&1 || \ + { logprint failed to install ${pv} ; return 1 ; } + do_check_p make_check_version ${real_ver} || \ + { ${opt_n} make check >> ${logfile} 2>&1 || return 1 ; } + ${opt_n} cd .. + [ "${checks}" != "" ] && ${opt_n} ${checks} >> ${logfile} 2>&1 + return 0 +} + +find_canon_name + +logprint using host `hostname` +logprint `uname -a` +logprint canonical name ${canon_name} + +logprint clearing logfile +> ${logfile} + +find_unzip_prog + +logprint using target dir ${targetdir} +mkdir -p ${targetdir}/src +cd ${targetdir}/src || exit 1 +rm -rf heimdal* openssl* krb4* + +logprint === building openssl versions +for vo in ${openssl_versions} ; do + build openssl-${vo} openssl $vo config +done + +wssl="--with-openssl=${targetdir}/openssl" +wssli="--with-openssl-include=${targetdir}/openssl" #this is a hack for broken heimdal 0.5.x autoconf test +wossl="--without-openssl" +wk4c="--with-krb4-config=${targetdir}/krb4" +bk4c="/bin/krb4-config" +wok4="--without-krb4" + +logprint === building heimdal w/o krb4 versions +for vo in ${openssl_versions} ; do + for vh in ${heimdal_versions} ; do + v="openssl-${vo}-heimdal-${vh}" + build "${v}" \ + heimdal ${vh} \ + "configure ${wok4} ${wssl}-${vo} ${wssli}-${vo}/include" \ + "${targetdir}/heimdal-${vh}/bin/krb5-config --libs | grep lcrypto" \ || \ + { failed="${failed} ${v}" ; logprint ${v} failed ; } + done +done + +logprint === building krb4 +for vo in ${openssl_versions} ; do + for vk in ${krb4_versions} ; do + v="openssl-${vo}-krb4-${vk}" + build "${v}" \ + krb4 ${vk} \ + "configure ${wssl}-${vo}" \ + "${targetdir}/krb4-${vk}/bin/krb4-config --libs | grep lcrypto"|| \ + { failed="${failed} ${v}" ; logprint ${v} failed ; } + done +done + +logprint === building heimdal with krb4 versions +for vo in ${openssl_versions} ; do + for vk in ${krb4_versions} ; do + for vh in ${heimdal_versions} ; do + v="openssl-${vo}-krb4-${vk}-heimdal-${vh}" + build "${v}" \ + heimdal ${vh} \ + "configure ${wk4c}-${vk}${bk4c} ${wssl}-${vo} ${wssli}-${vo}/include" \ + "${targetdir}/heimdal-${vh}/bin/krb5-config --libs | grep lcrypto && ${targetdir}/heimdal-${vh}/bin/krb5-config --libs | grep krb4" \ + || \ + { failed="${failed} ${v}" ; logprint ${v} failed ; } + done + done +done + +logprint === building heimdal without krb4 and openssl versions +for vh in ${heimdal_versions} ; do + v="des-heimdal-${vh}" + build "${v}" \ + heimdal ${vh} \ + "configure ${wok4} ${wossl}" || \ + { failed="${failed} ${v}" ; logprint ${v} failed ; } +done + +logprint all done +[ "${failed}" != "" ] && logprint "failed: ${failed}" +exit 0 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..222b760f84 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.1 @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +.\" All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $Id: krb5-config.1,v 1.5 2003/02/16 21:10:32 lha Exp $ +.\" +.Dd November 30, 2000 +.Dt KRB5-CONFIG 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5-config +.Nd "give information on how to link code against Heimdal libraries" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl -prefix Ns Op = Ns Ar dir +.Op Fl -exec-prefix Ns Op = Ns Ar dir +.Op Fl -libs +.Op Fl -cflags +.Op Ar libraries +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +tells the application programmer what special flags to use to compile +and link programs against the libraries installed by Heimdal. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl -prefix Ns Op = Ns Ar dir +Print the prefix if no +.Ar dir +is specified, otherwise set prefix to +.Ar dir . +.It Fl -exec-prefix Ns Op = Ns Ar dir +Print the exec-prefix if no +.Ar dir +is specified, otherwise set exec-prefix to +.Ar dir . +.It Fl -libs +Output the set of libraries that should be linked against. +.It Fl -cflags +Output the set of flags to give to the C compiler when using the +Heimdal libraries. +.El +.Pp +By default +.Nm +will output the set of flags and libraries to be used by a normal +program using the krb5 API. The user can also supply a library to be +used, the supported ones are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It krb5 +(the default) +.It gssapi +use the krb5 gssapi mechanism +.It kadm-client +use the client-side kadmin libraries +.It kadm-server +use the server-side kadmin libraries +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr cc 1 +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +appeared in Heimdal 0.3d. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.cat1 b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.cat1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..298f57b6cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.cat1 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ + +KRB5-CONFIG(1) UNIX Reference Manual KRB5-CONFIG(1) + +NNAAMMEE + kkrrbb55--ccoonnffiigg - give information on how to link code against Heimdal li- + braries + +SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS + kkrrbb55--ccoonnffiigg [----pprreeffiixx[=_d_i_r]] [----eexxeecc--pprreeffiixx[=_d_i_r]] [----lliibbss] [----ccffllaaggss] + [_l_i_b_r_a_r_i_e_s] + +DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN + kkrrbb55--ccoonnffiigg tells the application programmer what special flags to use to + compile and link programs against the libraries installed by Heimdal. + + Options supported: + + ----pprreeffiixx[=_d_i_r] + Print the prefix if no _d_i_r is specified, otherwise set prefix to + _d_i_r. + + ----eexxeecc--pprreeffiixx[=_d_i_r] + Print the exec-prefix if no _d_i_r is specified, otherwise set exec- + prefix to _d_i_r. + + ----lliibbss Output the set of libraries that should be linked against. + + ----ccffllaaggss + Output the set of flags to give to the C compiler when using the + Heimdal libraries. + + By default kkrrbb55--ccoonnffiigg will output the set of flags and libraries to be + used by a normal program using the krb5 API. The user can also supply a + library to be used, the supported ones are: + + krb5 (the default) + + gssapi use the krb5 gssapi mechanism + + kadm-client + use the client-side kadmin libraries + + kadm-server + use the server-side kadmin libraries + +SSEEEE AALLSSOO + cc(1) + +HHIISSTTOORRYY + kkrrbb55--ccoonnffiigg appeared in Heimdal 0.3d. + + HEIMDAL November 30, 2000 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.in b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bdaa39754b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal-0.6.3/tools/krb5-config.in @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: krb5-config.in,v 1.9 2002/09/09 22:29:06 joda Exp $ + +do_libs=no +do_cflags=no +do_usage=no +print_prefix=no +print_exec_prefix=no +library=krb5 + +if test $# -eq 0; then + do_usage=yes + usage_exit=1 +fi + +for i in $*; do + case $i in + --help) + do_usage=yes + usage_exit=0 + ;; + --version) + echo "@PACKAGE@ @VERSION@" + echo '$Id: krb5-config.in,v 1.9 2002/09/09 22:29:06 joda Exp $' + exit 0 + ;; + --prefix=*) + prefix=`echo $i | sed 's/^--prefix=//'` + ;; + --prefix) + print_prefix=yes + ;; + --exec-prefix=*) + exec_prefix=`echo $i | sed 's/^--exec-prefix=//'` + ;; + --exec-prefix) + print_exec_prefix=yes + ;; + --libs) + do_libs=yes + ;; + --cflags) + do_cflags=yes + ;; + krb5) + library=krb5 + ;; + gssapi) + library=gssapi + ;; + kadm-client) + library=kadm-client + ;; + kadm-server) + library=kadm-server + ;; + *) + echo "unknown option: $i" + exit 1 + ;; + esac +done + +if test "$do_usage" = "yes"; then + echo "usage: $0 [options] [libraries]" + echo "options: [--prefix[=dir]] [--exec-prefix[=dir]] [--libs] [--cflags]" + echo "libraries: krb5 gssapi kadm-client kadm-server" + exit $usage_exit +fi + +if test "$prefix" = ""; then + prefix=@prefix@ +fi +if test "$exec_prefix" = ""; then + exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ +fi + +libdir=@libdir@ +includedir=@includedir@ + +if test "$print_prefix" = "yes"; then + echo $prefix +fi + +if test "$print_exec_prefix" = "yes"; then + echo $exec_prefix +fi + +if test "$do_libs" = "yes"; then + lib_flags="-L${libdir}" + case $library in + gssapi) + lib_flags="$lib_flags -lgssapi" + ;; + kadm-client) + lib_flags="$lib_flags -lkadm5clnt" + ;; + kadm-server) + lib_flags="$lib_flags -lkadm5srv" + ;; + esac + lib_flags="$lib_flags -lkrb5 -lasn1 @LIB_des_appl@ -lroken" + lib_flags="$lib_flags @LIB_crypt@ @LIB_dbopen@ @LIBS@" + echo $lib_flags +fi +if test "$do_cflags" = "yes"; then + echo "-I${includedir} @INCLUDE_des@" +fi + +exit 0